(navigation image)
Home American Libraries | Canadian Libraries | Universal Library | Community Texts | Project Gutenberg | Biodiversity Heritage Library | Children's Library | Additional Collections
Search: Advanced Search
Anonymous User (login or join us)
Upload
See other formats

Full text of "Pentagon Papers"

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



IV.C Evolution of the War (26 Vols.) 
Direct Action: The Johnson Commitments, 1964-1968 

(16 Vols.) 
6. U.S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployments: 1965-1967 

(3 Vols.) 
a. Volume I: Phase II, Program 3, Program 4 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 




UNITED STATES • VIETNAM RELATIONS 



1945 



1967 




VIETNAM TASK FORCE 



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 



[top secret - sensitive) SCT 



* 



/S 









Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






iV.C.6.(a) 



U.S. GROUND ■ 



AND F< ■ ; .- 






1965-- -7 



VOLUME I 



Sec Def Cant B-r. &-. 



0295 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 




1 



O 

O 

i— 

o 



r 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 




3 



TOP SECRET ~ Sensitive 



[ 



iv. c. 6 



U.S. GROUND STRATEGY AND FORCE DEPLOYMENTS 



1965 -- 1967 



18 Jun 65 



CHRONOLOGY 

Memo from McGeorge Bundy 
to SecDef 



Bundy passes on President's desires 
that "we find more dramatic and 
effective action in South Vietnam." 



1 Jul 65 



2 Jul 65 



7 Jul 65 



12 Jul 65 



Ik Jul 65 



16-20 Jul 65 



17 Jul 65 



20 Jul 65 



22 Jul 65 



Draft Memo for the Pre si 
dent 



Memo for General 
Goodpaster from ASD(lSA) 



McNaughton 



SecDef message to Sai&on 
072352Z Jul 65 ' 



■o 



Memo for the Record, 
Subj: 63 Battalion Plan 



Intensification of the 
Military Operations in 
Vietnam - Concept and 
Appraisal 



Message from Secy Vance 
to SecDef McNamara 
0720U2Z Jul 65 



Memo for the President, 
Subj : Recommendations 
of Additional Deploy- 
ments to Vietnam 

MACV message 220625Z 
Jul 65 



SecDef recommends kk battalions 
(3*+ U.S.) to Vietnam in next few 
months. Says Westmoreland is not 
sure about requirements for 1966. 

Secy McNaughton suggests questions 
to be addressed by JCS study on 
assurance of winning the war. 

SecDef gives Westmoreland questions 
he will want answered on his trip - 
includes probable requirements for 
additional forces in 1966. 

SecDef memorandum for the record 
calls for building up the armed 
forces by 63 battalions. 

JCS study on concept and appraisal 
of assurance of winning goes to 
SecDef. 



SecDef in Saigon, receives West- 
moreland ' s requirements . 

Vance informs McNamara that Presi- 
dent has approved 3k Battalion Plan 
and will try to push through reserve 
call-up. 

SecDef recommends 3^ U.S. battalions 
to SVN in 1965 (Phase i) with possible 
need for 100,000 additional troops in 
I966 (Phase II). - 

MACV recommends 101,712 personnel and 
27 battalions for Phase II. 






TOP SEC T - 



Sensitive 



d 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - 



Sensitiv 



13 Dec 65 



16 Dec 65 



1 Jan 66 



8 Jan 66 



15 Jan 66 



19 Jan 66 



2k Jan 66 



2k Jan 66 



Jan 66 



7-9 Feb 66 



12 Feb 66 



SecDef Multi-Addressee 
Memo 



CINCPAC Letter 
Ser: 000^73 



Memo for SecDef 



Memo for the President 



CINCPAC 3010 
Ser: OOO55 



If • 
11 



SecDef disseminates tables showing 
Phase IIA deployments, bringing 
U.S. strength to 75 battalions and 
367,800 by December 1966, 393,000 
personnel by June 19 67- 

CINCPAC sends revised requirements 
for Phase IIA, desires 75 battalions 
and W-3,000 by December 1966. 

173^d Airborne Brigade begins 
Operation MARAUDER in Hau Nghia 
Province near Cambodia border. 

173^d Airborne Brigade units and 
1st US Infantry Division launch 
Operation CRIMP in Plau Nghia and 
Binh Tuong Provinces. 

Guidelines for assumptions on avail- 
ability of forces for SE Asia. 
Case 3 assumes availability of CONUS 
forces and activations only. Case 2 
adds drawdowns from overseas areas. 
Case 1 further adds callup of selected 
reserve units and extension of terms 
of service. 



1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, 
begins Operation VAN BUREN, in Phu 
Yen Province. 

3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry, launches 
Operation MASHER/WHITE WING near 
Bong Son in Binh Dinh Province. 

SecDef estimates U.S. strength" at 
end of 1966 at 75 battalions and 
367,800 troops. 

U.S. Marine Corps units launch 
DOUBLE EAGLE in Quang Ngai Province. 

Honolulu Conference with Ky and 
President Johnson. 

CINCPAC forwards revised version 
of requirements for SE Asia, and 
deployment plans under the assump- 
tions of Cases, 1, 2, and 3. 



TOP SE0 ' ~ Sensitive 



c 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



■ 



r 



17 Feb 66 



SecDef Mult i- Addressee 
Memo, Subj: SE Asia 
Planning Assumptions 



21 Feb 66 



1 Mar 66 



JCSM 130-66 



7 Mar 66 



9 Mar 66 



10 Mar 66 



SecDef Memo to CJCS 



10 Mar 66 



19 Mar 66 



h Apr 66 



JCSM 218-66 



SecDef directs Military Departments 
and the JCS to study possible ways 
of meeting Case 1 deployment schedule 
without calling reserves or extending 
tours of duty. 

1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, 
begins Operation HARRISON, in Phu Yen 
Province. 

JCS reply they cannot meet Case I 
deployment schedule without calling 
up reserves . Recommend stretch out 
of deployment into 1967- 

1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, 
and 173d Airborne Division launch 
Operation SILVER CITY, a 17-day 
search and destroy operation in the 
Bien Duong and Long Khanh Provincial 
border area. 

Estimated OTA regiment overwhelms 
Ashau Special Forces camp at Thua 
Thien Province, 

SecDef directs planning on the basis 
of Case I schedule without call-up 
of reserves or extension of terms 
of service. 

GVN National Leadership Copjmittee 
votes to remove Lt Gen Thi from his 
post as I Corps Commander. Demon- 
strations protesting Thi's ouster 
signalled the start of long political 
turbulence. 

USMC units launch Operation TEXAS in 
Quang Ngai Province. 

JCS reply to SecDef giving a program 
reflecting the Services "current 
estimate of their capabilities to 
provide forces required. .. (and meet- 
ing) as closely as. feasible the pro- 
gram for South Vietnam prescribed" 
by the SecDef on 10 March. 



iv 



TOP SECRET ~ S ; re 



7 



11 Apr 66 



12 Apr 66 



2k Apr 66 



10 May 66 



16 May 66 



2 Jun 66 



2 Jun 66 



10 Jun 66 



13. Jun 66 



18 Jun 66 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



SecDef Mult i- Addressee 
Memo, Subj: SE Asia De- 
ployment Plan 

SecDef Memo for CJCS 



TOP SEC1 • - Sensitive 



ASD(SA) Memo for SecDef,, 
Subj: Report on Deploy- 
ments to SKA 

ASD(SA) Memo for SecDef , 
Subj: Deployments to 
SE Asia 

CINCPAC 3010 
Ser: OOO255 



SecDef approves Deployment Plan 
recommended by JCS in JCSM 218-66. 



SecDef requests an explanation of 
differences between JCSM 218-66 and 
the Case I Deployment Plan. 

Elements of 1st Infantry Division 
launch Operation BIRMINGHAM. The 
24-search and destroy operation 
involving the deepest friendly 
penetration in 5 years into War Zone 
C in Tay Ninh Province. 

Elemenfe of 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry 
Division, launch Operation PAUL 
REVERE, an 82-day border screening 
area control operation in Pleiku 
Province. 

Elements of 1st Cavalry Division 
launch 22-day Operation CRAZY HORSE 
in Binh Dinh Province. 

Elements of 1st Infantry Division begin 
Operation EL PASO II. ^-1- search and 
destroy operation in Binh Long Pro- 
vince. 

1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, 
launches Operation HAWTHORNE, a 19- . 
search and destroy operation in 
Kontum Province. 

ASD Enthoven reports that a large 
number of adjustments to deployment 
plan have been proposed by the Army. I 

Enthoven explains major bookkeeping 
changes in deployment schedules. 



CINCPAC T s CY 66 and CY 67 requirements 
based upon a concept which now em- 
phasizes restricting access to the 
land borders of RVN and increased 
efforts in the highlands and along th 
western RVK border. CIMCPAC envisions 
a rise to $0 maneuver battalions and 
5^2, 588 personnel by end of CY 67 . 



e 






V 



J. Ul 1 



S 1 Ltj 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOt SECRET - Sensitive 



28 Jun 66 



30 Jun 66 



2 Jul 66 



7 Jul 66 



8 Jul 66 



15 Jul 66 



16 Jul 66 



1 Auk 66 



3 Aug 66 



5 Aug 66 



5 Aug 66 



President's Memo for 
SecDef 



if 



ASD(SA) Memo for SecDef., 
Subj: SE Asia Deployment 
Plan 



SecDef Multi -Addressee 
Memo, Subj: SE Asia 
Deployment Plan 



JCSM h^O-66 P Subj: 
CINCPAC Calendar Year 
Deployments 

SecDef Memo for the 
President, Subj: 
Schedule of Deployments 
to South Vietnam 



SAIGON 256k 



JCSM 506-66 



SecDef Memo to CJCS 



Requests SecDef and JCS to see 

any more acceleration of deployment 

is possible. 

« 

Revised version of 10 April plan in- 
dicates acceleration of deployment 
of 2 brigades of the 9th Division to 
December 1966, and deployment of 
196th Infantry Brigade in August 1966 



Revised 10 April Plan, now named 
"Program $3.?" i s published. 



USMC units launch Operation HASTINGS, 
a 27-day search and destroy operation 
against the 32^B NVA Division south 
of the DMZ. 

JCS report that further acceleration 
is unlikely. 



SecDef reports to the President on 
the acceleration achieved since the 
beginning of the year. 



Operation DECK HOUSE in eastern Quang 
Tri Province is conducted in support 
of HASTINGS. • 

1st Cavalry Division units launch 
25-day search and destroy operation, 
PAUL REVERE II in Pleiku. 

Lodge quotes Westmoreland as agreeing 
with him on urgent desirability of 
hitting pacification hard while other 
things are going well. 

JCS forwards CINCPAC T s requirements 
for CY 66 and 67. Recommend that 
almost all of them be accepted. 

SecDef directs JCS to evaluate 
CINCPAC 1 s requirements and also Issue 
Papers referred for SecDef by Systems 
Analysis. 



VI 



)V ' 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



1 



r,i 



TO 






- Sensitive 









8 Aug 66 



10 Aug 66 



10 Aug 66 



17 Aug 66 



23 Aug 66 



2k Aug 66 



SAIGON 2934 to 
Secy of State 



MACV 27578 



SAIGON 3129 



SAIGON 3670 



26 Aug 66 



Interagency Roles and 
Missions Study Group 
Final Report 



MACV 29797 



Lodge reports an upsurge of enemy 
infiltration thru the DMZ and passes 
on Westmoreland's KANZUS recommenda- 
tion. 

Westmoreland passes on his evaluation 
of the requirements forwarded by 
CINCPAC. "I cannot justify a reduc- 
tion in requirements submitted." 

Lodge points out the need for making 
a strong effort now to make sure 
"the smell of victory" is in the air. 
He reemphasizes the need for pacifi- 
cation. 

Porter in Saigon informs Komer of j 
ant i- inflationary measures and points 
out possible problem areas ; including 
US military piaster budget. 

CINCPAC sends MACV its draft strategy 
for 1966 and 1967- The proposed 
strategy emphasizes pacification and 
nation building. 

Roles and Missions Study Group report 
points out need for pacification. 
Makes several recommendations to im- 
prove pacification effort . 

Westmoreland in cable to CINCPAC de- 
scribes his concept of operations for 
the rest of the year. He describes 
his strategy during the period 1 May 
to 1 November 1966 that of containing 
the enemy through offensive tactical 
operations; describes his strategy for 
1 November 19 66 to 1 May 1967 as in- 
creasing momentum of operations in a 
general offensive with maximum prac- 
tical support to area and population 
security in further support of revolu- 
tionary development. He visualizes 
that significant numbers of US/FW 
maneuver battalions will be involved 
in pacification. In addition to 
emphasizing pacification., Westmoreland 
emphasizes need to fight against enemy- 
main forces. 



vi; 



T0£ S ~ S utiv 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



10 



TO*' SECR -Sen fcive 



31 Aug 66 









2 Sep 66 



7 Sep 66 



11 Sep 66 
13 Sep 66 



13 Sep 66 



13 Sep 66 



l4 Sep 66 



15 Sep 66 



16 Sep 66 



20 Sep 66 



SAIGON 4923 



SecDef Memo for CJCS 



JCS.1975 to CINCPAC 



Cite Unknown 



MACV 41191 to CINCPAC 



SAIGON 6100 



1ACV 41676 



MACV 8212 



Lodge points out efforts being taken 
in Saigon to emphasize pacification. 
He begins to express reservations on 
need for more troops . 

SecDef asks CJCS to explore caref Lilly 
all desirable tradeoffs between pias- 
ter funding of GVN and US armed 
forces in SVN. 

JCS informs CINCPAC of Jason Plan for 
aerial supported ant i- infiltration 
barrier. 

GVN elections. 

CINCPAC comments on ant i- infiltration 
barrier proposed by Jason study. 
Doubts practicality of scheme. 

Westmoreland discusses build-up in 
Quang Tri Province. Requests au- 
thority to use B-52 strikes. 

1st Cavalry Division launches 40- day- 
search and destroy Operation THAYER I 
in Binh Dinh Province. 

196th Infantry Brigade begins 72-day 
search and destroy Operation ATTLEBORO 
in Tay Ninh Province, which grows into 
largest operation of war to date. 
Other US units involved included all 
three brigades of the 1st Infantry 
Division, the 2nd Brigade of the 25th 
Division, the 3rd Brigade of the 4th 
Infantry Division, and 1 battalion of 
the 173^3. Airborne Brigade. 

Embassy gives their latest data on 
inflation in SVN; forecast a 44.1 
billion piaster inflationary gap in 
CY 67. 

Westmoreland discusses Sla m concept 
designed to impede enemy infiltration 
thru Laos. 

Westmoreland conveys his concern over 
enemy forces in sanctuaries to Admiral 
Sharp . . 



vixi. 



TO.?/ I 1 - 



// 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOJe SECRET 



Sensitive 



22 Sep 66 



23 Sep 66 



24 Sep 66 



24 Sep 66 



29 Sep 66 



1 Oct 66 



2 Oct 66 



cc 



5 Oct 6b 



5 Oct 66 



6 Oct 66 



CM- 1774 -66 



State 535^1 to Saigon 



MACV 8371 to Sharp 
and Wheeler 



JCSM 613-66 



ASD(SA) Memo for SecDef 



SAIGON 7332 



MACV 43926 



MACV 44378 



ASD(SA) Memo for SecDef 



SecDef Memo for CJCS 



Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
tells SecDef that piaster costs per 
matt of US forces are several times 
those of GVN forces. However, he does 
not see any piaster advantages from 
feasible exchanges. 

State calls news of size of infla- 
tionary gap in Saigon's 15 September 
message very disturbing. 

Westmoreland reviews VC/lWA's recent 
campaign and assesses the effective- 
ness of US campaigns. Does not 
mention pacification. 

JCS forward their final evaluation of 
CINCPAC's 18 June submission and the 
results of their evaluation of the 
SecDef 's Issue Papers, from 5 August. 

Enthoven tells SecDef he is review- 
ing JCSM- 6l3- 66 and forwards some 
new deployment Issue Papers to 
Secretary of Defense. 

Lodge, in a message to Rusk, McMamara 
and Komer, sets forth his proposal on 
piaster ceilings. Sets a piaster 
ceiling of 42 billion on military 
spending in South Vietnam. 

MACV recommends to CINCPAC and JCS 
deployment of Caltrop for operational 
tests ASAP. 

Westmor eland submits his reclama to 
Lodge's proposal for a piaster budget 



ceiling. 



Dr. Enthoven analyzes Lodge's message 
of 1 Oct for SecDef. Points out dif- 
ferences in spending associated with 
different deployments small relative 
to ether uncertainties. Terms Lodge's 
estimates on holding inflation down 
optimistic. 



SecDef forwards another set of deploy- 
ment Issue Papers to the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. 



IX 



TOF SEC; BT - Sensltx' 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



/ 



i 



TUJP SECjRET - Sensitive 



■ 



7 Oct 66 



JCSM- 6k6- 66 



10 Oct 66 



Ik Oct 66 



Draft Presidential 
Mamo, Trip Report, 
Actions Recommended 
for Vietnam 



Ik Oct 66 



jcsm- 672- 66 



18 Oct 66 



20 Oct 66 



CINCPAC 3010 
Ser: 000438 



23 Oct 66 



CINCPAC Ser: 

000^55 






23-25 Oct 66 
26 Oct 66 



ASD(lSA) Memo for 

SecDef, Subj: 

"Mc Naught on in Manila" 



X 



Joint Chiefs of Staff forward their 
evaluation of world-wide military 
posture and the effects which 
deployments to SVN will have upon 
same. 

the 3rd US Marine Division assumes 
control of Operation PRAIRIE in 
Quang Tri Province. This is the 
first Division-controlled operation 
in. I CTZ. 

SecDef recommends force levels 
stabilize at V70,000, that US 
stabilize ROLLING THUNDER, deploy 
a barrier and gird itself for a long 
haul. 

Joint Chiefs of Staff submit their 
comments on SecDef T s memorandum for 
the President. Do not agree with 
470,000-man limitation. Are doubtful 
on feasibility of the barrier, re- 
serve judgment until they receive 
detailed programs being prepared by 
CINCPAC 

Elements of 4th Infantry Division, 
25th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry 
Division, launch 7^- day Operation 
PAUL REVERE IV, in Pleiku Province. 

CINCPAC forwards results of the 
Honolulu Planning Conference. Recom- 
mend a build-up to 91 maneuver 
battalions and 4-93 > 9^9 personnel 
by end of CY 6j . Total strength 
after filling out will be 9k batta- 
lions and 555; 7^-1 personnel. 

CINCPAC forwards three alternative 
deployment plans and their associated 
piaster costs. 

Manila Conference 

Mc Naught on gives his report of con- 
versations with Westmoreland on force 
levels and ROLLING THUNDER. Says 
Westmoreland is thinking of an end- 
CY 67 strength of 480,000. 



TOje : T ~ 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



li 



h Nov 66 



7 Nov 66 



9 Nov 66 



11 l^ov 66 



17 Nov 66 



18 Nov 66 



2 Dec 66 



9 Dec 66 



22 Dec 66 



2 Jan 67 



8 Jan 67 



TOP SECRET- Sensitive 






JCSM 702-66, "Deploy- 
ment of Forces to Meet 
CY 67 Requirements" 

AB 1^2, Combined 
Campaign Plan, 1967 



ASD(SA) Memo for SecDef 



SecDef Memo for CJCS, 
"Deployments to SEA" 



Draft Presidential Memo, 
"Recommended FY 67 SEA 
Supplemental Appropria- 
tion" 



Joint Chiefs of Staff forward report 
of Honolulu Planning Conference • 



MACV and RVNAF JGS set forth campaign 
plan for 1967* Plan emphasizes paci- 
fication. 

Enthoven outlines his "Program 4," 
bringing strength to 87 battalions 
and 469,000 troops by June 1968- 

SecDef responds to JCS recommendations 
in JCSM 702-66, and sets forth guide- 
lines for Program h essentially as 
recommended by Enthoven. 

SecDef sets forth in some detail his 
reasoning behind the deployment plan 
now called "Program k. u 



SecDef Memo for Secys Transmits tables of deployments which 
of Military Departments, were authorized on 11 November 1966, 
c/jCS, Asst Secys of Def 



JCSM 739-66, "Deployments 
to SEA and other PACOM 
Areas Tr 

Memo for CJCS from Sec 
Def, Subj : "Deployments 
to SEA and other PACOM 
Areas " 

DCP^ memo for SecDef, 
Subj: "Plan for In- 
creased Anti- 
Infiltration Capability 
for SEA" 

COMUSMACV 00610 



JCS asked direct substitution of 
units to provide "balanced forces" 



Approves direct substitution with' 
in 470,000 man ceiling. 



Established intent and guidance for 
planning barrier concept. 



MACVs year-end assessment of enemy 
situation and strategy. 

Operation CEDAR FALLS. Begins longest 
operation of war to date in terms of 
forces employed- 



XI 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 









21 Feb 67 



22 Feb 67 



22 Feb 67 



18 Mar 67 



20-21 Mar 67 



2k Mar 67 



28 Mar 67 



7 Apr 67 



Ik Apr 67 



20 Apr 67 



25-27 Apr 67 



1 'May 67 



Memo from DepSecDef 
to Under Sec State, 
Subj : "Military Action 
Programs for SEA Tt 



JCSM 97-67, Subj : MACV 
Practice Nine Require- 
ments Plan 



CM-213U-67, "PRACTICE 
NIKE Requirements Plan, 
dated 26 Jan 1967" 

COMUSMACV message 09101 



JCS message 59881 



COMUSMACV 1033.1 



JCSM-208-67, Subj: 
Marine Corps Rein- 
forcement of I Corps 
Tactical Zone 



JCSM-218-67 



OASD(ISA) Memo for 
SecDef 9 Subj : ' 
Increase of SEA 
forces 



Forwarded DOD input to analysis of 
alternative strategies prepared for 
the President. Incorporated various 
separate proposals made* by JCS over 
past two months. 

JCS forwards and coments on MACV 
manpower and logistics requirements 
to implement barrier plan. Recommends 
plan not be approved. 

CJCS forwards his dissent to JCSM 
97-67* Recommends implementation of 
plan. 

MACV analysis of current force require 
merits submitted to CINCPAC. "Optimum 
force" of 4-2/3 divisions; "minimum 
essential force" of 2-l/3 divisions. 

Guam Conference. Bunker, Locke, 
Komer introduced to Vietnamese 
leaders. 

Requested CINCPAC/MACV detailed 
analysis and justification for ad- 
ditional forces. 

Forwarded MACV detailed justification 
and planning calculations to JCS. 

Task Force OREGON formed , posted to 
Quang Hgai Province. 

Proposed 2 brigades from 9th MAB be 
stationed off Vietnamese coast to be 
committed when required by COMUSMACV 3 
remainder of MAB placed on 15-day 
call in Okinawa. 

Formally reported to SecDef the 
MACV force requirements. 

General Westmoreland returns to 
US 5 consults with President. 

Detailed analysis of MACV force re- 
quest. Recommended against adding 
more US combat forces. 



xi 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



£< 



9 May 19&T 



c, 



Cx 



19 May 19&T 



20 May 1967 



23 May I967 



2k May I967 



£. 



29 May 19&7 



£< 



1 June 19&7 



2 June I967 



NSAM 362 



Draft Memorandum for 
President, Subject: 
Future Actions in 
Vietnam 



£ Cx 



20 May 1967 JCSM 286-67, "Opera- 



tions Against North 



Vietnam 



II 



JCSM 288-67, "US -World- 
wide Military Posture" 



Memo for CJCS, Subject: 
Combat Service Support 
Staffing in SVN 

CM 2278-67, "Alternative 
Courses of Action" 



CM 238I-67, Future 
Actions in Vietnam 



JCSM 306-67, Draft 
Memorandum for the 
President on Future 
Actions in Vietnam 



/:■ 



JCSM-312-&7, Air Opera- 
tions Against NVN 



All pacification efforts placed 
under KACV. Komer named -Deputy 
for Pacification to COMUSMACV. 

ASD(lSA) reviews situation in 
Vietnam, analyzes alternative mili- 
tary courses of action, argues against 
force level increases, proposes 
strategy of "slow progress." 

JCS seriously concerned at the 
prospective introduction by the USSR 
into NVN of new weapons. Proposed 
neutralization of Hanoi -Haiphong 
complex by attacking all elements of 
the import system of NVN, "shouldering 
out" foreign shipping, mining port. 

JCS recommend selective callup of 
reserves so US could more effectively 
fulfill worldwide commitments. 

SecDef requested JCS to prepare 
detailed study analyzing in depth 
CSS staffing levels in SVN. 

JCS reply to 26 April memo by DepSecDef . 
Concluded that (a) force levels recom- 
mended in JCSM 218-67 should be deployed; 
(b) a more effective air/naval campaign 
against l^VN should be conducted as recom- 
mended in JCSM 218-67. 

Identifies certain factual corrections 
and annotations in COMUSMACV 18 March 
"minimum essential force" request. 

JCS reply to 19 May DPM, expressed 
strong objections to basic orientation 
as well as specific recommendations 
and objectives. Saw "alarming pattern" 
which suggested a major realignment of 
US obj 3ctives and intentions in SEA, 
recommended that DPM "not be considered 
further." 

JCS response to SecDef memo of 20 May. 
Concluded that original recommendation 

of 20 May represented the most effec- 
tive way to prosecute air/naval 
campaign against NVN. 



X1IL1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



2 June 1967 



8 June I967 



12 June 1967 



r, 



13 June 3967 



£* 



5 July 1967 



7-8 July I967 



13 Jxxlj 1967 



£. 



13 July 1967 



Ik July I967 






Note, Wm. P. Bundy to Mr. 
McN aught on 



Memorandum for Under • 
SecDef (sic) Vance from 
UnderSecState Katzenbach, 
Subject : Preliminary 
Comments on DOD Draft 
of 19 May. 

ASD(ISA) Draft Memoran- 
dum for the President, 
Subject: Alternative 
Military Actions Against 
NVN 



Memo for CJCS from Sec 
Def , Sub j : Increased 
Use of Civilians for 
US Troop Support (c) 

Memo for SecDef from 
ASD(SA), subject: Cur- 
rent Estimate of Addi- 
tional Deployment 
Capability 



Memo for Record, Sub j : 
Fallout from SecDef 
Trip to SVN 

Memo for SecDef from 
Richard C. Steadman, 
DASD, Subject: Addi- 
tional Third Country 
Forces for Vietnam 

Memo for Record, Subj : 
SEA Deployments 



Comments on 19 May DPM. Expressed 
general agreement with basic objec- 
tives as stated in DPM, but agreed 
with JCS that DPM displayed a negative 
turn to our strategy and commitment 
in SVN. 

Comments on 19 May DPM. Recommended 
increase of 30,000 men in small incre- 
ments over 18 months, get GVN more 
fully involved and effective, concen- 
trate bombing LOCs in the north. 



Revised DPM incorporated views of 
JCS, CIA, State. Opposed JCS 
program, recommended concentrating 
bulk of bombing on infiltration 
routes south of 20th parallel, skirted 
question of ground force increase. 

Requested JCS to determine which 
logistical requirements could be met 
by increased use of SVN civilians for 
US troop support. 

Update of original estimate of what 
Army could provide. Approx. 3-2/3 
DE could be provided to MACV by 
31 Dec 68 without calling reserves. 



SecDef in ■SVN receives MACV justifica- 
tion. 

ASD(ISA) memo for the record indi- 
cates decision in Saigon to increase 
forces to 525,000 limit. 

Provided series of letters to Manila 
countries making clear the need for 
additional forces. 



ASD(SA) outlined the decisions made 
in Saigon and directed work priorities 
and assignments for OASD(SA). to flesh 
out the 525,000 troop limit. 



xiv 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



\1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



20 July I967 



26 July 1967 



22 Jul - 5 Aug 
I967 



Ik Aug I967 



9 Sept I967 



JCSM 1*16-67, Subject: 
US Force Deployments 
Vietnam* 



Memo from DepSecDef 
to CJCS, Subj: Opera, 
tions Against M 



16 Sept 1967 



22 Sept 1967 



ASD(SA) Memo for Secys 
of Mil Depts, CJCS, 
ASDs, Subject: SEA 
Deployment Program $5 



DJCSI-i 1118-67, Subj: 
Examination of Speed-Up 
in Program 5 Deployments 



12 Sept I967 CM 26^0-67 



15 Sept I967 JCSM-505-67 



SecArmy Memo for Sec- 
Def, Subject: Deploy- 
ment Schedule for 101st 
Airborne Division (-) 

SecDef Memo for Sec- 
Array; Subj : Deployment 
of 101st Airborne 
Division (-)• 



28 Sept 1967 MACV message 31998 



JCS provide detailed troop list 
within 525,000 ceiling. Reaffirmed 
force requirements as set forth in 
JCSM 288-67. 

Comments on JCSM 286-67. 



General Taylor, Mr. Clifford tour 
troop contributing countries, seek 
additional third-country forces. 

Formally approved forces for deploy- 
ment in Program 5. Established 
civilianization scheduled, approved 
additional 5 destroyers for gunfire 
support. 

Joint Staff examined possible actions 
to speed up Program 5 deployments. 



Joint Staff requested by President 
to indicate actions which would 
increase pressure on NVN. 



JCS forward refined troop list fo: 
Program 5* 

Div(-) could be deployed to close 
in VN prior to Christmas. 



Approves accelerated deployment of 
101st Airborne Div(-). 



MACV plan for reorienting in-country 
forces. 



4 Oct I967 



£> 



5 Oct 19&7 



SecDef Memo for the 
President 



SecDef memo for Secys 
of Mil Depts, CJCS, ASDs, 
Subject: FY 68 U.S. 
Force Deployments, Viet- 
nam. 



SecDef indicated actions taken on 
MACV recommendations contained in 
message 31998. 

SecDef approves force deployments 
listed in JCSM 505-67. 



xv 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



*■> 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



' 






16 Oct 1967 



21 Oct 1967 



o 



31 Oct I967 



6 Nov I967 



7 Nov I967 



fx 



22 Dec 19&7 



SecArmy memo for SecDef , 
Subj : Deployment of 101st 
Airborne Division (-) 



17 Oct 1967 JCSM-555-67 



SecDef memo for Sec- 
Army^ Subject: Deploy- 
ment of the 101st 
Division (-) 



SecArmy indicates that remainder 
of 101st Airborne Division can be 
accelerated to close in Vietnam 
by 20 December I967. 

JCS forward to President through 
SecDef their reply to questions 
raised on 12 September. 

SecDef approves accelerated deploy- 
ment of remainder of 101st Airborne 
Division. 



SecArmy memo for Sec- SecArmy indicates that Brigade could 

Def, Subject: Deployment be deployed on or about 10 December. 
of 11th Infantry Brigade. 

SecDef memo for SecArmy, SecDef approves early deployment of 

Subject: Deployment of the 11th Infantry Brigade, 
the 11th Infantry Brigade. 



CM-27 J l3-67 



10 Nov I967 CM-2752-67 



21 Nov I967 DJSM- 1U09-71 



27 Nov I967 JCSM-663-67 



ASD(ISA) memo to 
C JCS . 



26 Jan 1968 MACV message 617^2 

31 Jan 1968 

12 Feb 1968 JCSM-91-68 



CJGS directs Joint Staff to explore 
what further foreshortening of deploy, 
ment dates could be accomplished. 

CJCS directs Joint Staff to recom- 
mend military operations in SEA for 
next four months. 

Joint Staff reply to CJCS request 
of 7 Nov to explore foreshortening 
of deployment dates. 

JCS provide SecDef their recommenda- 
tions for conduct of military opera- 
tions in SEA over next four months. 

Forwards SecDef and SecState comments 
on JCSM 663-670 

C0MJSMACV year-end assessment. 

TET offensive begins. 

JCS examine plans for emergency aug- 
mentation of MACV, recommended deploy- 
ment of reinforcements be deferred. 






XVI 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 









TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



. ■ 









13 Feb 1968 JCS Message 9926 



13 Feb 1968 JCS Message 9929 



13 Feb 1968 JCSM-96-68 



23-26 Feb 68 
27 Feb I968 



1 Mar 1968 



k Mar 1968 



8 Mar 1968 



11-12 Mar 68 



Ik Mar 1968 



22 Mar 1968 



23 Mar I968 



Report of CJCS on 
Situation in SVN and 
MACV Force Requirements 



Draft Memorandum for 
the President 

CM-3098-68 



DepSecDef memo for 
CJCS, Subject: SEA 
Deployments 



ik Mar 1968 SecArmy memo to SecDef 



16 Mar 1968 ASD(SA) Memo for Record 



OASD(SA) Memo for Sec- 
Def, Subj : Program #6 
Summary Tables (Tenta- 
tive) 



Directs deployment of brigade task 
force of 82nd Airborne Division to SVN. 

Directs deployment of one ferine 
regimental landing team to SVW. 

JCS forward to SecDef recommenda- 
tions for actions to be taken relative 
to callup of reserves, 

CJCS visit to SVW. 

CJCS reports on his trip to SVW and 
furnishes MACV Program 6 force require- 
ment s . 

Clark Clifford sworn in as Secretary 
of Defense. 



-O 



Forwards recommendations of SecDei 
Working Group to the President. 

JCS forward COMUSMACV comments on 
DPM. 

SecState testifies before Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee 

DepSecDef informs CJCS of Presidential 
decision to deploy 30*000 additional 
troops. 

SecArmy indicated requirement for 
13; 500 additional men to support 
emergency reinforcement. 

Summarizes decision to deploy J-I-3,500 
additional troops and plans for reserve 
call-up. 

Gen. Westmoreland to be new Chief of 
Staff of the Army. 

Forwarded to SecDef for approval 
Program 6, based on manpower ceiling 
of 579; 000. 



xvii 



TOP SECRET 1 - Sensitive 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET. - Sensitive 



26-27 Mar 68 



30 Mar 1968 



31 Mar 1968 



3 Apr 1968 



k Apr 1968 



Dept of State msg 139^31 



Remarks of President to 
the Nation 



White House Press 
Release 

DepSecDef memo for 
Secys of Mil Depts, CJCS, 
ASD's, Subj: SEA Deploy- 
ment Program jf6 



General Abrams in Washington, confers 
with President. 

Annoi" , nces Presidential decision to 
US Ambassadors in troop contributing 
countries. 

President announces partial bombing 
halt, deployment of 13,500 additional 
troops . 

Hanoi declares readiness to meet. 
U.S. accepts. 

DepSecDef establishes Program #6, 
placed new ceiling of 5^-9; 500 on 
U.S. forces in SVU. 



xvi 11 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 









oo 
o^ 

§8 



§ 

3 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



VOLUME I 
U.S. GROUND STRATEGY AND FORCE DEPLOYMENTS, I965—I967 



TABLE OF CONTENTS and OUTLINE 



I. PHASE II 

Page 

A. PRELUDE TO PHASE II 1 

B. McNAMARA GOES TO SAIGON — A DECISION ON II 7 

1 . Westmoreland Proposals 7 

2 . McNamara T s Recommendations . 10 

3. The President's Decision 12 

C . DEVELOPMENT OF A CONCEPT 13 

1. Concept for Vietnam 13 

2 . Westmoreland' s Concept l6 

3* The JCS on Future Operations and Force Deployments 16 

D. OVERALL STRATEGY REVIEWED AS CONFLICT. IN SVN STEPS UP 17 

1. McNamara ! s DPM on Increasing the Pressure 17 

2. NVA Infiltration Increases 18 

E . McNAMARA GOES TO SAIGON - A DECISION ON IIA 2k 

1. McNamara Visits Saigon 2h 

2 . Westmoreland * s Recommended Add-Ons 2k 

3 . McNamara ■ s Recommendations to the President 25 

k. Phase I ; II, and IIA Are Published 25 

F. PHASE IIA IS REVISED ' 26 

1. CINOPAC ' s Requirements 26 

2 . Assumptions for Planning 26 

3 • The Honolulu Conference 23 

k . Results of the CINCPAC Planning Conference 3^ 

G. PHASE IIA(R) PRESENTED 38 

1 . The JCS Recommendation 38 

2 . McNamara Directs Another Try 38 

3. The JCS Try Again k . 39 

k . McNamara Acquiesces , . 39 

FOOTNOTES , 4 2 



TOP SECRET ~ Sens it It 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



-*■ 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



• 



II. PROGRAM NO. 3 



Page 



A . INTERLUDE k€~ 

B. PHASE IIA(R) BECOMES PROGRAM NO . 3 kQ 



1. Bookkeeping Changes 

2. The Pen is Quicker than the Eye 



FOOTNOTES 



k8 
k8 

51 









III . P ROGRAM NO. k 
A. PLANNING BEGINS FOR CY 6j 52 



E. 



1. 
2. 

3. 
h. 



CINCPAC ' s 18 June Request 52 

JCS Recommendations 53 

Secretary of Defense Directs Studies 53 

The "Quick Fix" 5^ 



B. EVENTS IN THE SUMMER 55 



1. 
2. 

3. 



Emphasis on Pacification 55 

Westmoreland's Attention Turns to the Sanctuaries 62 

Lodge ' s Attention Turns to Inflation 69 



C. CONFLICTING INEXORABLES 71 

1. Lodge's Piaster Ceiling 71 

2. Westmoreland' s Reclama 76 

3 . The JCS : Issue Papers and World Wide Posture 79 

D. McNAMARA GOES TO SAIGON — DECISION ON FOUR ...... 8l 



1. 
2. 

3. 
k. 

5. 

6. 



A Memorandum for the President 8l 

Tae JCS Reclama 93 

ClNCPAC Planning Conference Results 96 

Manila „ 97 

JCS Recommendations . « » 100 

Decisions on Program j[k 101 



ANTI -CLIMAXES , 101 



1. 
2. 
3. 



Program Four- is Announced 101 

Program Four is Explained 105 

The Combined Campaign Plan is Published 120 



F.. WHAT DID IT MEAN? 



000 



000 



125 



FOOTNOTES .' 128 



11 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 













3 













. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



IV. C. 6. 



U.S. 



GROU ND ST RATEGY AND FORCE DEPLOYMENTS 



I. PHASE II 



A. Prelude to Phase II 



The story of the Phase II build-up begins near the end of the chain 
of events which led to the decision, announced on 28 July 19 65, on a 
Phase I build-up to kh Free World battalions. Sparked by the news that 
the Viet Cong were building up their strength, that ARVN was doing badly 
on the battlefield, and that the President desired "that we find more 
dramatic and effective actions in Sou^h Vietnam, " l/ Secretary of 
Defense McNamara prepared to decide what forces would be necessary to 
achieve the goals of the United States in Vietnam. The history of the 
decision on the size and composition of the forces to be deployed during 
the time remaining in 1965, termed Phase I forces, is the subject of 
another study in this series. 2/ However, there were some events and 
decisions taken in this period~~which were to influence the decisions on 
Phase II forces. While Secretary McNamara was preparing for his 16-20 
July trip to Saigon to discuss the build-up of American forces in 
Vietnam, he asked General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
for an assessment of "the assurance the U.S. can have of winning in South 
Vietnam, if we do everything we can." The results of the study, which 
General Wheeler directed to be prepared by an ad hoc study group with 
representation from the Office of the Chairman, the Chairman's Special 
Studies Group, DIA, J- 3, and the Joint War Games Agency, were given to 
Secretary McNamara on Ik July. 3/ The study group's assessment was a 
conditi onal affirmative, k/ "With in the bounds of reasonabl e assump- 
t ions, . ^jjier e appears to be no reason we canno t win if such is our will 
-- and if that will Is manifested in strategy and tactical operati ons . lT 

At the same time, Secretary McNamara asked Assistant Secretary 
Mc Naught on to work with the study group to suggest some of the questions 
that occurred to him. McNaughton's memorandum to General Goodpaster is 
included in full. 

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL GOODPASTER 

Assistant to the Chairman, JCS 

SUBJECT: Forces Required to Win in South Vietnam 

Secretary McNamara this morning suggested, that General Wheeler 
form a small group to address the question, "if we do everything 
we can, can we have assurance of winning in South Vietnam?" 
General Wheeler suggested that he would have you head up the 
group and that the group would be fairly small. Secretary 



TOF SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



' 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



McHamara indicated that he wanted your group to work with me 
and that I should send down a memorandum suggesting some of the 
questions that occurred to us. Here are our suggestions: 

1. I do not think the question is whether the ^J-4-battalion 
program (including 3d-country forces) is sufficient to do the 
job, although the answer to that question should fall out of the 
study. Rather, I think we should think in terms of the Mi- 
battalion build-up hy the end of 1965, with added forces — as 
required and as our capabilities permit — in 19 66. Furthermore, 
the study surely should look into the need for forces other than 
ground forces, such as air to be used one way or another in- 
country. 1" would hope that the study could produce a clear 
articulation of what our strategy is for winning the war in 
South Vietnam, tough as that articulation will be in view of 
the nature of the problem. 

2. I would assume that the questions of calling up reserves 
and extending tours of duty are outside the scope of this study. 

3* We must make some assumptions with respect to the number 
of VC. Also, we must make some assumptions with respect to what 
the infiltration of men and material will be especially if there 
is a build-up of US forces in South Vietnam. I am quite con- 
cerned about the increasing probability that there are regular 
PAVN forces either in the II Corps area or in Laos directly 
across the border from II Corps. Furthermore, I am fearful that, 
especially with the kind of build-up here envisioned, infiltra- 
tion of even greater numbers of regular forces may occur. As a 
part of this general problem of enemy build-up, we must of course 
ask how much assistance the USSR and China can be expected to give 
to the VC. I suspect that the increased strength levels of the 
VC and the more "conventional" nature of the operations implied 
by larger force levels may imply that the oft en- repeated ratio of 
10 to 1" may no longer apply. I sense that this may be the case 
in the future, but I have no reason to be sure. For example, if 
the VC, even with larger forces engaged in more "conventional" 
type actions, are able to overrun towns and disappear into the 
jungles before we can bring the action troops to bear, we may 
still be faced with the old "ratio" problem. 

h. I think we might avoid some spinning of wheels if we 
simply assumed that the GVN will not be able to increase its 
forces in the relevant time period. Indeed, from what Westy 
has reported about the battalions being chewed up and about their 
showing some signs of reluctance to engage in offensive operations, 
we might even have to ask the question whether we can expect them 
to maintain present levels of men --or more accurately, present 
levels of effectiveness. 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



27 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



5» With respect to 3d-country forces, Westy has equated 
the 9 ROK battalions with 9 US battalions, saying that, if he 
did not get the former, he must have the latter. I do not 
know enough about ROK forces to know whether they are in all 
respects "equal to" US forces (they may be better in some 
respects and not as good in others). For purposes of the 
study, it might save us time if we assumed that we would get 
no meaningful forces from anyone other than the ROKs during 
the relative time frame, (if the Australians decide to send 
another battalion or two, this should not alter the conclusions 
of the study significantly.) . 

6. I would hope that we can minimize the amount of the 
team's creative effort that must go into analyzing the ROLLING 
THUNDER program or such proposals as the mining of the DRV 
harbors. Whether we can or not, of course, depends a good 
deal on the extent to which we believe that the ROLLING THUNDER 
program makes a critical difference in the level of infiltra- 
tion (or perhaps the extent to which it puts a "ceiling" on 
logistical support) and the time lag in the impact of such 
things as a quarantine of DRV harbors. My suggestion is we 
posit that the ROLLING THUNDER program will stay at approxi- 
mately the present level and that there will be no mining of 
the DRV harbors. My own view is that the study group probably 
should not invest time i:a trying to solve the problem by cutting 
off the flow of supplies and people by either of these methods. 
I do not know what your thoughts are about the wisdom of invest- 
ing time in the proposal that ground forces be used to produce 
some sort of an ant i- infiltration barrier. 

7. Is it necessary for us to make some assumption with* 
respect to the nature of the Saigon government? History does 
not 



encourage 



us to believe that Ky's government will endure 



throughout the time period relevant to the study. Ky's beha- 
viour is such that it is hard to predict his impact --he could, 
by his "revolutionary" talk and by his repressive measures gene- 
rate either a genuine nationalist spirit or a violent reaction 
of some sort. I would think that the study must make some obser- 
vation, one way or the other, as to things which might happen to 
the government which would have a significant effect on the con- 
clusions of the study. My own thought is that almost anything 
within the realm of likelihood can happen in the Saigon govern- 
ment, short of the formation of a government which goes neutral 
or asks us out, without appreciably affecting the conduct of the 
war. The key point may be whether the Army rather than the 
government holds together. 

8. One key question, of course, is what we mean by the words 



"assurance" 



and "win." My view is that the degree of 



should be fairly high -~ better than 75% (whatever that 



"assurance" 



mean: 



■). 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



: 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



With respect to the word win, this I think means that we 
succeed in demonstrating to the VC that they cannot win; this, 
of course, is victory for us only if it is, with a high degree 
of probability, a way station toward a favorable settlement in 
South Vietnam. I see such a favorable settlement as one in 
which the VC terrorism is substantially eliminated and, obvi- 
ously, there are no longer large-scale VC attacks; the central 
South Vietnamese government (without having taken in the 
Communists) should be exercising fairly complete sovereignty 
over most of South Vietnam. I presume that we would rule out 
the. ceding to the VC (either tacitly or • explicitly) of large 
areas of the country. More specifically, the Brigadier 
Thompson suggestion that we withdraw to enclaves and sit it 
out for a couple of years is not what we have in mind for pur- 
poses of this study. 



9- At the moment, I do not see how the study can avoid 
addressing the question as to how long our forces will have to 
remain in order to achieve a "win" and the extent to which the 
presence of those forces over a long period of time might, by 
itself, nullify the "win." If it turns out that the study cannot 
go into this matter without first getting heavily into the poli- 
tical side of the question, I think the study at least should 
note the problem in some meaningful way. 

10. I believe that the study should go into specifics — 
e.g., the numbers and effectiveness and uses of the South 
Vietnamese forces, exactly where we would deploy ours' and 
exactly what we would expect their mission to be, how we would 
go about opening up the roads and providing security for the 
towns as well as protecting our own assets there, the time frames 
in which things would be done, command relationships, etc. Also, 
I think we should find a way to indicate how badly the conclu- 
sions might be thrown off if we are wrong with respect to key 
assumptions or judgments. 



As to timing, the Secretary said he would like to have a "quick 
answer" followed by a "longer-term answer." He set no specific 
dates; I gather that he expects your team to work as fast as you 
reasonably can. 

General Vogt and General Seignious of ISA are available to work 
with you on this project, as am I. 



Copies to: 
General Vogt 



o 



General Seignious 



Sgd: JOHN T. McMUGBTOH 

5/ 



The Mc Naught on memorandum is of interest because it demonstrates several 
Important items. First; the fact that the question about assurance of 



ii 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



: 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



winning was asked indicates that at the Secretary of Defense level there 
was real awareness that the decisions to be made in the next few weeks 
would commit the U.S. to the possibility of an expanded conflict. The 
key question then was whether or not we would become involved more deeply 
in a war which could not be brought to a satirfactory conclusion. 



ii. 



Secondly, the definition of win 



I! 



i.e. 



"succeed in demonstrat- 



ing to the VC that they cannot win, indicates the assumption upon which 
the conduct of the war was to rest -- that the VC could be convinced in 
some meaningful sense that they were not going to win and that they would 
then rationally choose less violent methods of seeking their goals. But 
the extent to which this definition would set limits of involvement or 
affect strategy was not clear. 

Thirdly, the assumptions on the key variables (the infiltration 
rates, the strength of GVN forces, the probable usefulness of Third 
Country Forces, the political situation in South Vietnam) were rightfully 
pessimistic and cautious. If they were to be taken seriously, the con- 
clusions of the Study Group were bound to be pessimistic. If the Study 
Group was to take a "positive attitude," they were bound to be ignored. 
The latter inevitably happened. 

The study outlined the strategy as follows: 

h. Concept: 

a. Presently organized and planned GW forces, except 
for present GVN national reserve battalions, possibly augmented 
by a limited number of ranger and infantry battalions, retain 
control over areas now held ; extend pacification operations and 
area control where possible, defend critical installations and 
areas against VC attack and seek out and destroy Viet Cong 
militia units. 

b. US and Allied forces, in conjunction with the GVN 
national reserve, by offensive land and air action locate and 
destroy VC/PAVN forces, bases and major war- supporting organi- 
zations in South Vietnam. 

5* a. Under this concept the RVNAF, now hard-pressed by 
the Viet Cong summer offensive, would continue to regroup 
battle- damaged units and build up total strengths. For the. 
most part they would be relieved, except for the national re- 
serve (6 Airborne Battalions, 5 Marine Battalions), of offen- 
sive actions against main force units and would concentrate 
their efforts on maintaining and extending the present GVN 
area control. They would defend important installations from 
attack and would conduct offensive operations against local VC 
militia units. As the situation might allow ; selected units 



5 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



would participate with the national reserve battalions in 
operations against VC main force units in order to engender 
the buildup of an offensive spirit within the RVNAF. 

b. US and Allied forces would occupy and secure 
bases at which their major items of heavy equipment, such as 
aircraft, would be stationed. Thereafter they would operate 
in coordination with the RVNAF reserve battalions to seek out 
and destroy major Viet Cong units, bases and other facilities. 
Individual units would rotate between security tasks and 
mobile offensive operations. Secure base areas would be 
expanded by deep patrolling. 6/ 

The JCS Study Group estimated that this strategy would have the following 
results: 

Military o perations i n SVN. Presently organized and 
planned GVN forces, except for reserve battalions (possibly 
including a limited number of ranger and infantry battalions), 
would retain control over areas now held, extend pacification 
operations and area control where permitted by the progress of 
major offensive operations, defend critical installations and 
areas against VC attack and seek out and eliminate VC militia 
units. US, SVN, and Third-Country forces, by offensive land 
and air action, would locate and destroy VC/DRV forces, bases 
and major war- supporting organizations in SVK. The cumulative 
effect of sustained, aggressive conduct of offensive operations, 
coupled with the interdiction of DRV efforts to provide the 
higher level of support required in such a combat environment, 
should lead to progressive destruction of the VC/DRV main force 
battalions. 7 / 

As can be seen, the strategy was essentially that which has governed the 
conduct of the war ever since. However, it did not take escalatory re- 
actions into account nor did it address the problems of pacification or 
rural development. 

The strategic concept which the JCS developed was predicated on their 
estimate of what strength was available to the Viet Cong and North Viet- 
namese., and on their judgment about what the enemy was trying to do with 
his forces. The estimate of enemy strength given in the Study Group's 
14 July I965 report was that the Viet Cong organized combat units con- 
sisted of 10 regimental headquarters, 65 battalions, 188 companies, for 
a total strength of approximately 1+8,500. The 101st Regiment, 325th PAVW 
Division, with its subordinate battalions, is included in this total. In 
addition, 17, 600 personnel were considered to be engaged in combat support 
type operations. At that time, the Viet Cong were continuing to expand 
their control in rural areas and had succeeded in isolating several pro- 
vincial and district towns from, the bulk of the rural population. Their 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



• ■ 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



apparent willingness to accept large casualties in offensive engagements 
indicated the manpower shortage did not currently exist. Intelligence 
estimates of PAVN's capability of intervening overtly in South Vietnam 
across the Demilitarized Zone was that PAVN could do so with approximately 
three divisions against moderate opposition. If PAVN were to try to intro- 
duce units into South Vietnam covertly through the Laotian Corridor, it 
is estimated he would be able to introduce 1 to 2 additional divisions by 
the end of I965. The estimate admitted that the purpose and role of PAVN 
units were not certain' and might well have changed since their initial 
deployment. Perhaps Hanoi had wanted a PAVN force on the spot in the 
eventuality that the Saigon government collapsed, and perhaps Hanoi wanted 
to assure itself the VC would not collapse in the face of the US military 
commitment, or, more likely, Hanoi may have wanted to assist the VC in 
increasing the tempo of its campaign and in hastening a victory. At that 
time, it appeared that there was no intention of employing the PAVN units 
as a division; rather, they would assist the recurrent VC strategy of 
widespread harassment and terrorism punctuated with multi-battalion 
spectaculars . 

The manner in which the probable requirements for additional forces 
were derived is of interest. The critical assumption was "that the VC/nVA 
can mount simultaneous attacks in each GVN corps area not to exceed one 
reinforced regimental (h battalions) attack and one single battalion attack 
at any given time." From this, a simple numerical- calculation, based 
upon the assumption that a h to 1 superiority would provide a high proba- 
bility of victory, resulted in the requirement for Free World offensive 
maneuver battalions. When added to the number needed for base defense, 
the result was the total of required Free World battalions. If U.S. forces 
were to be placed in all four Corps Tactical Zones, a total of 35 addi- 
tional battalions would be needed to secure bases and gain the k to 1 
advantage desired. If the U.S. effort were limited to the area north of 
Saigon, only 7 additional battalions would be needed. It would seem that 
this requirement was very sensitive to rates of infiltration and recruit- 
ment by the VC/NVA, but very little analysis was, in fact, given to the 
implications of the capabilities of the VC/NVA in this regard. 

B. McNamara Goes to Saiaon - A Decision on II 



1. Westmoreland Proposals 

On 7 July 1965; Secretary McNamara cabled Westmoreland to lay 
out the purpose of his visit to Saigon and some of the questions which 
he would like to have answered. 

The main purpose of our visit will be to receive from you. ■ 
your recommendations for the number of U.S. combat battalions, 
artillery battalions, engineering battalions, helicopter com- 
panies, tactical aircraft, and total military personnel to be 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



assigned to South Vietnam between now and the end of this 
year; . . ./and/ the probable requirements for additional forces 
next year. 5/ 

This request for "probable requirements for additional forces next year" 
seemed to be an attempt to improve the quality of planning figures for 
1966. In his 1 July Draft Memorandum for the President, McNamara quoted 
Westmoreland as saying that he "cannot now state what additional forces 
may be required in 1966 to gain and maintain the military initiative... 
Instinctively, we believe that there may be substantial U.S. Force Re- 
quirements." The memorandum went on to comment that "He /COMUSMACV/ 
has a study underway, with a fairly solid estimate due in early August. 
The number of battalions ultimately required could be double the H 
mentioned above. 9/ 

According to the MACV Command History of 1965, General Westmoreland 
answered Secretary McNamara f s question about forces required in 1966 
during the Secretary's Saigon visit. 10/ General Westmoreland "antici- 
pated that a need would exist for an increase of 2k maneuver battalions, 
lk artillery battalions; 3 air defense (Hawk) battalions; 8 engineer 
battalions; 12 helicopter companies; 6 helicopter battalions, and addi- 
tional support units." ll/ As reconstructed by the MACV Command History, 
this requirement was predicated upon a concept of operations in South 
Vietnam and upon a three phased plan: 

' CCMUSMACV's objective was to end the war in RVN by con- 
vincing the enemy that military victory was impossible and 
to force the enemy to negotiate a solution favorable to the 
GVH" and the US. To secure these objectives, US/fWMA forces 
would be built up and then employed to wrest the initiative 
from the enemy, secure vital areas and support the GVN in 
expanding its control over the country* 

The overall concept was based on three- assumptions: 

(1) That the VC would fight until convinced that 
military victory was impossible and then would not be willing 
to endure further punishment. 

(2) That the CHICOM's would not intervene except to 
provide aid and advice. 

(3) That friendly forces would maintain control of the 
air over RVN. 

The concept visualized a three-phase operation: 

Phase I - The commitment of US/FWMA forces necessary 
to halt the losing trend by the end of 1965. 



8 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



2<( 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Phase II - The resumption of the offensive by US/fWMA 
forces during the first half of 1966 in high priority areas 
necessary to destroy enemy forces, and reinstitution of rural 
construction activities. 

Phase III - If the enemy persisted, a period of a year 
to a year and a half following Phase II would be required for 
the defeat and destruction of the remaining enemy forces and 
base areas. 

Specific military tasks were associated with the objective 
of each phase. 



Phase I : 

(1) Secure the major military bases, airfields and 
communications centers. 

(2) Defend major political and population centers. 

(3) Conduct offensive operations against major VC 
base areas in order to divert and destroy VC main forces. 

(h) Provide adequate reserve reaction forces to 
prevent the loss of secure and defended areas. 

(5) Preserve and strengthen the RVMF. 



logistic. 



(6) Provide adequate air support, both combat and 



(7) Maintain an ant i- infiltration screen along the 
coast and support forces ashore with naval gunfire and amphibious 
lift . 

(8) Provide air and sea lifts as necessary to trans- 
port the necessary but minimum supplies and services to the civil 
populace. 

(9) Open up necessary critical lines of communication 
for essential military and civil purposes. 

(10) Preserve and defend, to the extent possible, 
areas now \inder effective governmental control. 

Phase II, 

■ — in in. ».*— • 

(l) All Phase I measures. 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



^ » f 









TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



(2) Resume and/or expand pacification operations. 
Priority will be given to the Hop Tac area around Saigon, to 
that part of the Delta along an east-west axis from Go Cong 
to Chau Doc, and in the provinces of Quang Nam, Quang Tri, 
Quang Ngai; Binh Dinh and Phu Yen. 

(3) Participate in clearing, securing, reserve 
reaction and offensive operations as required to support and 
sustain the resumption of pacification. 

Phase III: 

(1) All Phase I and II measures. 

(2) Provide those additional forces necessary to 
extend and expand clearing and securing operations throughout 
the entire populated area of the country and those forces 
necessary to destroy VC forces and their base areas. 12/ 

2. Mcffamara's Recommendations 

Secretary McNamara's 20 July 1965 Memorandum for the President 
spelled out the troop requirements for Vietnam as follows: The forces 
for 1965 should be brought up to about 175,000, and "it should be under- 
stood that the deployment of more men (perhaps 100,000) may be necessary 
in early 1966, and that the deployment of additional forces thereafter 
is possible but will depend on developments." 13/ 

This 100,000-man possible addition was broken down in a cable 
from C0MUSMACV to CINCPAC as providing 27 maneuver battalions with 
associated combat and service support elements, bringing the total num- 
ber of maneuver battalions to 6l sometime in 1966. lh/ The question 
arises as to how -this 100,000-man 27 -battalion figure was reached. In 
the absence of documentary evidence; it seems simplest to assume that 
Westmoreland was given pretty much what he asked for. However, the 6l 
battalion figure comes very close to the number of battalions the Secre- 
tary of Defense was thinking about earlier in July, when a memorandum 
for the record dated 12 July shows a proposal to strengthen U.S. forces 
"by 63 battalions through a combination of calling up reserves, extending 
tours of duty, and increasing the draft. 15/ In fact, the 63 battalion 
figure appears again in the Secretary 1 s 20 July memorandum to the 
President; allowing one to speculate that the size of the build-up had 
already been fixed in early July prior to the trip. 

In either case, the result was that phase II was recommended 
to the President at a level of roughly 100,000 which when added to the 
then current estimates for Phase I of 175,000 gave a total estimate of 
275,000 by the end of 1966. 



10 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Secretary McNamara envisioned that the employment of U.S. forces 
would be as follows: 

. . . Use of force s. The forces will be used however they 
can be brought to bear most effectively. The US/third- country 
ground forces will operate in coordination with South Viet- 
namese forces. They will defend their own bases; they will 
assist in providing security in neighboring areas; they will 
augment Vietnamese forces, assuring retention of key logistic 
areas and population centers. Also, in the initial phase they 
will maintain a small reserve-reaction force, conducting nui- 
sance raids and spoiling attacks, and opening and securing 
selected lines of communication; as in- country ground strength 
increases to a level permitting extended US and third-country 
offensive action, the forces will be available for more active 
combat missions when the Vietnamese Government and General 
Westmoreland agree that such active missions are needed. The 
strategy for winning this stage of the war will be to take the 
offensive -- to take and hold the initiative. The concept of 
tactical operations will be to exploit the offensive, with the 
objects of putting the VC/DRV battalion forces out of operation 
and of destroying their morale. The South Vietnamese, US and 
third-country forces, by aggressive exploitation of superior 
military forces, are to gain and hold the initiative — keeping 
the enemy at a disadvantage, maintaining a tempo such as to 
deny them time to recuperate or regain their balance, and 
pressing the fight against VC/DRV main force units in South 
Vietnam to run them to ground and destroy them. The operations 
should combine to compel the VC/DRV to fight at a higher and 
more sustained intensity with resulting higher logistical con- 
sumption and, at the same time, to limit his capability to 
- resupply forces in combat at that scale by attacking his LOC. 
The concept assumes vigorous prosecution of the air and sea 
ant i- infiltration campaign and includes increased use of air 
in- country, including B~52s, night and day to harass VC in 
their havens. Following destruction of the VC main force units, 
the South Vietnamese must reinstitute the Program of Rural 
Reconstruction as an antidote to the continuing VC campaign of 
terror and subversion. 16/ 

He evaluated the probable results in the following manner: 

" * ' Evaluation . ARVN overall is not capable of successfully 
resisting the VC initiatives without more active assistance 
from more US/third- country ground forces than those thus far 
committed. Without further outside help, the AKVW is faced with 
successive tactical reverses, loss of key communication and 
population centers particularly in the highlands, piecemeal 
destruction of ARVN units, attrition of RVIIAP will to fight, 



11 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






- 



■ 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



and loss of civilian confidence. Early commitment of addi- 
tional US/third- country forces in sufficient quantity, in 
general reserve and offensive roles, should stave off GW 
defeat . 

The success of the program from the military point of 
view turns on whether the Vietnamese hold their own in terms 
of numbers and fighting spirit, and on whether the US forces 
can be effective in a quick-reaction reserve role, a role in 
which they are only now being tested. The number of US troops 
is too small to make a significant difference in the tradi- 
tional 10-1 government -guerrilla formula, but it is not too 
small to make a significant difference in the kind of war 
which seems to be evolving in Vietnam -- a "Third Stage" or 
conventional war in which it is easier to identify, locate 
and attack the enemy. 

The plan is such that the risk of escalation into war with 
China or the Soviet Union can be kept small. US and South 
Vietnamese casualties will increase — just how much cannot 
be predicted with confidence, but the US killed- in-action 
might be in the vicinity of 500 a month by the end of the 
year. The South Vietnamese under one government or another 
will probably see the thing through and the United States public 
will support the course of action because it is a sensible and 
courageous military-political program designed and likely to 
bring about a success in Vietnam. 

It should be recognized, however, that success against 
the larger, more conventional, VC/PAVIT forces could merely 
drive the VC back into the trees and back to their '1960-64 
pattern --a pattern against which US troops and aircraft 
would be of limited value but with which the GVN, with our 
help, could cope. The questions here would be whether the VC 
could maintain morale after such a set-back, and whether the 
South Vietnamese would have the will to hang on through another 
cycle. 17/ 

3- The President's Decision 

The President accepted the recommendation of building up to 
175; 000, but disapproved the call up of reserves, and made no decision 
(since none was really necessary at the time) on the full Phase II 
strength. In a backgrounder, following his announcement of the troop 
increase on 28 July 1965, the President explained that the reserves, if 
called, would have taken several months before they were equipped to be 
effective in Vietnam, so he decided to use the Airmobile Division and 
Battalions on Okinawa which 'were ready to go. 18/ The disapproval of 
the reserve call up appears to have been the President's decision and 



12 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



was probably based more on considerations of political feasibility. As 
late as the 17th of July, Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance had cabled 
McNamara that the President had OK'd the 3^ Battalion Phase I Plan and 
would try to "bull" the reserve call up through Senator Stennis whom he 
saw as his chief obstacle on this issue. 19 / The President's decision 
was evidently a difficult one to make. Prior to McNamara 1 s departure 
for Saigon, both he and the President had hinted at press conferences 
that a reserve call-up and higher draft calls were a distinct possibility 
This, of course, triggered the predictable response from some members of 
Congress in opposition to a reserve call up. Upon McNamara 1 s return from 
Saigon, President Johnson waited over a week before he publicly announced 
his Vietnam decisions. Since Vance's cable to McNamara of the 17th of 
July indicated that the President had approved the 3k battalion deploy- 
ment, it is probably reasonable to assume that the President spent much 
of the week assessing the political variables of the situation. The 
consensus in the press was that the announced measures were not as great 
a leap as had been expected and that perhaps the attitude of influential 
Senate Democrats had restrained Johnson from taking stronger action. 
The issue was not that pressing as far as Phase I was concerned because, 
as the President pointed out, there were active Army units already 
available to cover the short term needs. 

^ • Development of a Concept 

•*-• Concept for Vietnam 

By late August 1965; ~^ ie JCS had developed and coordinated a 
Concept for Vietnam which was set out in JCSM 652-65 dated 27 August. 
The heart of the concept is summarized as follows: 

a. The objective in Vietnam, as stated by NSAM 288, 
dated 17 March 1904, is a stable and independent noncommu- 
nist government. 

b. The major problems to be dealt with in the conduct 
of the war are: 

(1) The continued direction and support of Viet 
Cong operations by the DRV, infiltration from the north, 
and the apparent attendant Viet Cong capability to pro- 
vide materiel support and to replace heavy personnel 
losses. 

(2) The continued existence of a major Viet Cong 
infrastructure, both political and military, in the RVN. 

(3) The greater growth rate of Viet Cong strength 
as compared to that of the South Vietnamese ground 
forces. 



13 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 















Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



(h) The continued loss of LOCs, food-producing areas, 
.and population to Viet Cong control. 

(5) The lack of a viable politico/economic structure 
in -the RVN. 

(6) The' threat of CHICOM intervention or aggression in 
Southeast -Asia and elsewhere in the Western Pacific. 

c. The basic military tasks, of equal priority, are: 

(1) To cause the DRV to cease its direction and support 
of the Viet Cong insurgency. 

(2) To defeat the Viet Cong and to extend GVN control 
over all of the RVN. 

(3) To deter Communist China from direct intervention 
and to defeat such intervention if it occurs. 

d. The US basic strategy for accomplishing the above tasks 
should be: to intensify military pressure on the DRV by air and 
naval power; to destroy significant DRV military targets, includ- 
ing the base of supplies; to interdict supporting LOCs in the DRV; 
to interdict the infiltration and supply routes into the RVN; to 
mprove the combat effectiveness of the RVNAF; to build and pro- 
tect bases; to reduce enemy reinforcements; to defeat the Viet 
Cong, in concert with RVN and third country forces; and to main- 
tain adequate forces in the Western Pacific and elsewhere in 
readiness to deter and to deal with CHICOM aggression. By 
aggressive and sustained exploitation of superior military force, 
the United States /Government of Vietnam would seize and hold the 
initiative in both the DRV and EVN : keeping the DRV, the Viet 
Cong, and the PL/VM at a disadvantage, progressively destroying 
the DRV war- supporting power and defeating the Viet Cong. The 
physical capability of the DRV to move men and supplies through 
the Lao Corridor, down the coastline, across the DMZ, and through 
Cambodia must be reduced to the maximum practical extent by land, 
naval, and air actions in these areas and against infiltration- 
connected targets. Finally, included within the basic US mili- 
tary strategy must be a buildup in Thailand to ensure attainment 
of the proper US-Thai posture to deter CHICOM aggression and to 
facilitate placing US forces in an advantageous logistic position 
if such aggression occurs. 20/ 



It continued: 



...In order to gain the offensive and to seize and hold the 
• initiative in the RVN, a major effort must be made not only 



lh TOP SECRET - Sensitive 









Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



in terms of direct combat action to expand the areas under 
US/GVN control but also to support the GVN in its rural re- 
construction program and to assist that government in the 
creation of new military units and the rehabilitation of its 
depleted units as rapidly as possible. A psychological 
climate must be created that will foster KVN rural recon- 
struction progress. 2l/ 

The strategic concept envisioned that during... 



. . .the build-up phase US-Third Country and GVN forces should 
strengthen military and civilian control in present areas of 
the KVN. . .As the force build-up is achieved, a principal 
offensive effort within the RVN of US- Third Country forces 
should be to participate with the RVNAF in search and destroy 
operations while assisting the RVNAF in clearing and securing 
operations in support of the rural reconstruction effort. 22/ 

The document went on to explain that: 

Friendly control of population and resources is essential 
to success in countering guerrilla warfare. In this regard, 
the RVN areas of major military significance are: the Saigon 
area and the Mekong Delta; the coastal plain; and the central 
highlands. It is imperative that the US/GVN have the support 
of the people and the control of resources in those areas. 
Elimination of the Viet Cong from these areas must be vig- 
orously undertaken in order to provide adequate security for 
the people. Of particular importance is the need for friendly 
control of the main food-producing areas in order that the GVN 
may gain control of rice, feed the people under its control, 
enable exports of rice to bolster the economy, and cause the 
Viet Cong to import or to fight for food. A paramo-ant require- 
ment under this concept is the building and maintaining of a 
series of secure bases and secure supporting LOCs at key 
localities along the sea coast, and elsewhere as necessary, 
from which offensive operations can be launched and sustained, 
with the subsequent enlargement and expansion of the secure 
areas. 23/ 

Assistant Secretary McNaughton, in a memorandum for Secretary 
McNarnara, gave the following evaluation of the JCS plan. "The concept 
includes certain generalized courses of action about which there would 
be little or no dispute and a number of other courses that are clearly 
controversial and raise far-reaching policy issues (e.g., blockade and 
mining of DRV, U.S. build-up in Thailand, intensified RT')." He recom- 
mended that since "an overall approval. ...is not required at this time... 
the concept proposed not be 'specifically approved." 2k/ Acting along 
these lines, Secretary McNarnara agreed "that recommendations for future 
operations in SEA should be formulated," but went no further. 25/ 



15 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



2. W estmoreland f s Concept 

This concept of operations was interpreted by General Westmore- 
land in his MACV Directive 525-4 of 20 September 1965, in which he set 
forth the tactics and techniques for employment of US forces in the 
Republic of Vietnam. General Westmoreland 1 s strategy consisted of three 
successive steps: 

1. Firsts to halt the VC offensive — to stem the tide, 

2. Second, to resume the offensive — to destroy VC and 
pacify selected high priority areas, 

3- Third ; to restore progressively the entire country to 
the control of the GVN. 26/ 

The tasks which he saw necessary included the defense of military bases, 
the conduct of offensive operations against VC forces and bases, the 
conduct of clearing operations as a prelude to pacification, provision 
of permanent security for areas earmarked for pacification, and the pro- 
vision for reserve reaction forces. Most of the document is concerned 
with the conduct of offensive operations against VC base areas and forces. 
The conduct of clearing operations were given little attention since these 
were planned to be primarily accomplished by RVN regional forces and 
popular forces. 

3* The JC S on Future Oper at ions and Force Deployments 

By early -November, the Joint Chiefs had further refined their 
"Concept for Vietnam" and in JCSM 8II-65, dated 10 November, 27/ submitted 
their recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. Although it was 
billed as establishing a basis for determining the Phase II force require- 
ments, it achieved little more than explicating in some detail the tasks 
to be accomplished in Phase IT, and evaluating the degree to which the 
forces already programmed for Phase II would accomplish these goals. 
However, the figures used were close to those discussed in July. The new 
figures were 112, 1+30 personnel and 28 battalions, most of which would be 
in Vietnam by the end of 1966. These figures were still being used as late 
as 20 November 1965. 28/ 

The JCS did manage to capture the essence of the Phase II concept 
by pointing out that "Phase I. . .was designed to stop losing the war. 
Phase II... is then the phase needed to start winning it." Their concept 
still included the three basic military tasks of pressuring North Vietnam, 
defeating the VC and extending GVN control over South Vietnam, and 
deterring Communist China. However, the memorandum went on to spell out 
in which areas of Vietnam the JCS and presumably MACV felt were the 
militarily and economically significant areas in Vietnam." These were 
listed as Saigon, the Mekong Delta, Coastal Plain, and the Central 



16 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 












Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



• 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






Highlands. The role of the US forces was to assist the GVN in expanding 
its control ever these areas. However, primary emphasis was placed upon 
providing "heavy assault strength against VC forces and bases. The 
division of effort between RVNAF and US/Third Country forces clarified 
as follows: 

The overall concept .. .visualizes the employment of US, 
Third . Country and RVMF forces for the basic mission of 
search and destroy, and participation in clearing and secur- 
ing operations and civic actions plus the defense of govern- 
mental centers and critical areas. 

US/Third Country forces will not ordinarily be employed 
throughout securing operations except in areas contiguous to 
their bases. The Vietnamese JCS is in general agreement with 
this concept and with the concept of weighting the effort 
wherein the bulk of operations against the VC forces and bases 
outside the secure areas will be undertaken by US/Third Country 
and RVNAF general reserve forces, while the bulk of RVN forces 
will be committed to the defense of GVN installations and 
securing operations. 29/ 

Interestingly enough, a note of growing disenchantment with the 
Vietnamese capabilities appeared in this memorandum, when it was explained 
that "complex, detailed US conceived programs may not be picked up and 
executed by the Vietnamese /therefore/ COMUSMACV now deals with them in 
terms of simple tasks and short step by step objectives." 

D . Overall Strategy Reviewed as Conflict in SVN Steps Up 

Meanwhile in November two other things were taking place which would 
have a significant effect on Phase II. 



1. McNamara's DPM on Increasing the Pressure 



In early November a Draft Memorandum for the President was in the 
works which addressed the problem of how best to conduct the overall effort 
in Vietnam. 30 / In this memorandum, Mr. McNarnara discussed the relative 
merits of varying combinations of a pause in the air war against North 
Vietnam, gradual intensification of the ROLLING THUNDER program, and 
carrying out Phase II deployments. This memorandum seems to mark one of 
the key decision points in the growing involvement of U.S. in Vietnam. 
The Phase I deployments appeared to have arrested the deterioration of the 
situation in Vietnam, and it now became feasible to consider what kind of 
outcome we might be able to get from the present situation. The analysis 
in the memorandum was that roughly sticking with the present situation 
would lead to a "compromise outcome" which would very likely be unstable, 
difficult to sell domestically, and damaging to "U.S. political effective- 
ness on the world scene." Therefore, the course, of action to follow was 



17 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 









TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



to step up the pressure both in the North, i.e., increase the- tempo of 
ROLLING THHDER, and in the South, i.e., move ahead with Phase II de- 
ployments. However, a pause in bombing would be inserted prior to the 
increased pressure. The arguments for the pause were four: (l) It 
would offer the DRV and VC a chance to move toward a solution if they 
should be so inclined. . .(2) It would demonstrate to domestic and inter- 
national critics that our efforts to settle the war are genuine. (3) 
It would probably tend to reduce the dangers of escalation after we 
resumed the bombing. . .And (4) it would set the stage for another pause 
perhaps in late 1966, which might produce a settlement. The conclusion 
to this draft, which was discussed with the President on 7 November, was 
the warning that "none of these actions assures success. . .the odds are 
even that despite our effort, we will be faced in early 1967 with stag- 
nation at a higher level and with a need to decide whether to deploy 
Phase III forces, probably in Laos as well as in South Vietnam." 

While the pros and cons of a pause or a cease-fire were being 
debated in a series of drafts and memoranda which were prepared and 
circulated between Defense and State, the situation in Vietnam was under- 
going a change. 

2 . jWA Infiltration Increases 

By November 1965, the infiltration of units from North Vietnam 
had begun to increase. By 17 November, six confirmed, two probable, and 
one possible, PAVN regiments had been identified in South Vietnam. The 
Viet Cong regimental-size units had increased from five in July of 1965 
to twelve. The total strength of the PAVN/VC array was estimated at 
27 PAVN infantry battalions and a total of 110 PAVN/VC battalions. The 
accepted strength was 63,500 in combat units, and 17,000 in combat sup- 
port units, with. 53,600 in the militia. The VC/PAVN build-up rate was 
estimated to be 15 battalions per quarter during 1967. 

The implications of the build-up were made abundantly clear by the 
bloody fighting in the la Drang Valley in mid-November. 31/ 

In. mid-October, the Viet Cong attack on Plei Me Special Forces Camp 
in Pleiku Province, had triggered a month- long campaign by both RVN and 
U.S. forces. Operation SILVER BAYONET, conducted by the 1st Cavalry 
Division was designed to provide security and artillery support to RVN 
forces around Plei Me. On 27 October, the 1st Brigade of the 1st Cavalry 
Division, was given a search and destroy mission between Plei Me and the 
Cambodian border. By 1 November; the brigade, having contacted a large 
enemy force-, began to pursue VC/NVA forces west of the Plei Me camp, 
moving along the South Vietnamese/Cambodian border. Then, on 1*4- November, 
after the 3*'d Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division had relieved the 1st 
Brigade in the vicinity of Plei Me and Pleiku, the most significant phase 
of SILVER BAYONET began. Airmobile search and destroy operations were 
initiated which resulted in very heavy and intense contacts within the 



18 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 









TOP SECRET - Sensitiv e 

• 

direction of VC/NVA forces, COMUSMACV requested a series of B-52 strikes 
to support ground operations in the vicinity of Chu Pong Mountain. These 
strikes were delivered on 16 November. Three U.S. infantry battalions 
. were closely engaged, supported by tactical air sorties and artillery. 
The VC/NVA forces, which exceeded division strength, continued active 
resistance to the U.S. forces from well-entrenched position. The battle 
of the 3rd Brigade against numerically superior VC/r!VA forces continued 
until 18 November in the vicinity of Chu Pong Mountain and la Drang Valley 
Fighting was often hand to hand with many small units temporarily cut off 
from their parent organization. 

On 20 November, the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, flew to Pleiku 
to relieve the 3d Brigade. The VC/KVA had lost over 1,200 killed in 
action while the U.S. losses were over 200. 32/ 

According to the MACV Command History, 1966: 

"The overall NVN political strategy was aimed at the demorali- 
zation of the RVN and the collapse of resistance in the south, 
as well as the closely related contingency of US withdrawal from 
Vietnam. In their planning to accomplish this strategy the NVN 
" leaders were influenced by their experience during the Indochina 
War, when the Viet Minh had relied on the unwillingness of the 
French people to continue to support a long and costly "dirty war." 
Although the US was a more f ormidable enemy, NVN leaders appar- 
ently believed that the same political strategy would succeed 
again, and that their own will to fight would outlast that of the 
Americans. The enemy expected that the high financial cost, the 
loss of American lives, international pressures, and domestic 
dissension inevitably would force the US Government -to withdraw 
military forces from RVN. The enemy 1 s long-range plan of military 
strategy had three phases. The first phase called for the creation 
of a political organization and a guerrilla capability, and the 
initiation of guerrilla warfare. The second phase called for the 
establishment of larger bases from which a "strategic mobility" 
effort could be launched. The third phase called for the initi- 
ation of the final large-scale attacks that would annihilate the 
opposing forces. During the first phase of the NVN plan the Iao 
Dong Party established a firm party organization by the creation 
of the NIF. Concurrently, NVN began guerrilla- type operations, 
established secure bases for larger operations, and began to force 
the RVN into a defensive posture. Infiltration routes from NVN 
were established and a system of logistic support for the base 
areas was set up. In order to accelerate the transition to the 
final phase of annihilation, NVN began to move regular NVA troops 
• into the RVN. This activity was first indicated in April 1Q&+, 
when the 325th NVA Div began accelerated training in preparation 
for deployment to the RVN. 






19 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 












Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



An important facet of the second phase was to attain "stra- 
tegic mobility" in order to counter the tactical mobility of RVN 
and FW forces. The object of a "strategic mobility" was to mass 
a large number of maneuver battalions in several widely- scattered 
areas. These maneuver battalions would tie large numbers of 
Allied forces to static defense roles, and permit the NVA/VC to 
attack specific positions at times of their own choosing. The 
buildup in the number of battalions, and particularly the infil- 
tration of larger MA units, would be done covertly with the 
object of initiating the larger-sized attacks by surprise. The 
version of "strategic mobility" implemented by Gen Vo Nguyen Giap 
was a "defensive/offensive" strategy which had the following ob- 
jectives: 



l) to develop strong multi-division forces in dispersed areas 
that were secure and accessible to supplies; 2) to entice FW 
forces into prepared enemy positions so that the entrenched 
communist forces could inflict heavy casualties on them; and 
3) to continue country-wide guerrilla action to tie down Allied 
forces, destroy small units, and extend control. 

The MN and VC emphasized in guidance put out to their people 
that the war would be won in the highlands of MR5, an area that 
the enemy envisioned as a "killing zone." The mountainous and 
jungled terrain favored VC operations in that the highlands were 
closer to the NVA buildup areas near the DMZ and to the secure 
base areas in Laos and Cambodia. These factors made the highlands 
a much more favorable battle area for the MVA/vC than for the W 
forces. The enemy would also be able to place sizeable forces on 
the entrance routes to the heavily populated coastal areas. In 
order to use the highlands as the killing zone in the war for RVN, 
the enemy hoped first to establish an "equilibrium of forces" in 
the highlands, and then to launch an offensive in one or more 
districts. The enemy had thus hoped in 1966 to launch ever-larger 
attacks in the highlands, to concentrate his troops and firepower, 
and ; with improved command and control, to attack and hold im- 
portant objectives. 

During the same enemy time-frame that the highlands were 
being exploited as the killing zone, the enemy had other plans 
for the Delta area and for Saigon. The Delta was to be the 
support area and as such was to continue to provide manpower and 
fill logistic requirements for the other operational regions, 
particularly MR5. Insofar as possible, it was planned that the 
Delta should move also toward the second phase of larger-unit 
"strategic mobility." The Delta, being the seat of the old revol- 
utionary political organization, was to be the originating point 
of new political organizations sent out- to support the offensive 



o 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



in the highlands. In his plans concerning Saigon and the sur- 
rounding areas ; the enemy intended to dominate all routes 
leading into the city, to isolate the city economically, and 
to create an atmosphere of insecurity in and around the city. 
It appeared that the enemy intended to capture and hold im- 
portant areas in an arc above the Capital Military District 
(CMD). For this purpose several special units had been formed 
and were operating in the area of Saigon. 33 / 

On 23 November, General Westmoreland analyzed the impact of the 
increased infiltration upon his Phase II requirements as follows: 



•x- 



-x- 



-x- 



•x- 



■X- 



2. The VC/PAVN buildup rate is predicated to be double that 
of U.S. Phase II forces. Whereas we will add an average of 
seven maneuver battalions per quarter the enemy will add fifteen. 
Tim; development has already reduced the November battalion 
equivalent ratio from an anticipated 3.2 to 1, to 2.8 to 1, and 
it will be further reduced to 2.5 to 1 by the end of the year. 
If the trend continues, the December 1966 battalion equivalent 
ratio, even with the addition of Phase II, will be 2.1 to 1. 



3^ Thus far the PAVN increase has been concentrated in the 
central highlands and the Viet Cong increases have largely been 
in the northern part of III Corps. There is little evidence so 
far that there is any appreciable enemy increase south of the 
Mekong, and in fact it appears that the local forces in the lower 
delta may have lost some capability as a result of the movement 
of guerrillas to Tay Ninh for training and organization into 
battalions . 

4. MACV must, as an absolute minimum, free at least one US 
division for mobile operations against new PAVN units in the 
general area of II Corps. In addition, there is a vital need to 
open Highway 15 from Vung Tau to Saigon to utilize the port 
capacity there and to project US forces into the delta at least 
as far as My Thiem, this will strengthen the GVN hand in this 
critical population and food producing area and interdict the 
main infiltration route from the delta to War Zone C. The addi- 
tion of a ROK division (or US division) to II Corps, for location 
at coastal bases near Due My, Nha Trang, Cam Ranh and Phan Rang, 
will permit the entire 4th Infantry Division (with its bases pro- 
tected by the coastal division) to be used for sustained combat 
against the ne\r PAVN forces. The opening of Highway 15 to Vung 
Tau would be facilitated by adding a brigade to the 1st Infantry 
Division to be located in the Ba Ria area and additional brigade 
for the 25th Division to be located at Tan Hiep would provide 



21 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



V 






TOP SECRET - -Sensitive 



protection necessary for the area north of My Tho. Besides the 
requirement for an additional division and two brigades, opera- 
tions by the 1st Air Cavalry Division have shown that this unit 
needs one more infantry battalion (airmobile) and an additional 
air cavalry squadron so that it can sustain operations over a 
long period of time. Because of the tactical problems involved 
in conducting combat reconnaissance over vast areas to find and 
fix PAVJS/VC it would be highly desirable to have one of the 
brigades of the Vth Infantry Division composed of three Airmo- 
bile Infantry Battalions and provide for the division one Air 
Cavalry Squadron. A ROK RCT to fill out the capital division 
would permit 'deployment of the ROK Marine Brigade to I Corps for 
operations with III MAP. 

5« The additional units described above are essential to 
meet the immediate threat and certain immediate problems. How- 
ever, even these additional forces will not match the enemy 
buildup. To reach the level of force required to make signifi- 
cant progress toward accomplishment of Phase II tasks will 
ultimately require much larger deployments. 

6. Unfortunately certain physical restrictions and the time 
required to establish a suitable logistics base limit the rate 
of buildup in RVN CY 66. If the deployment of logistics forces 
can be further accelerated and if construction programs meet the 
increased requirements we might be able to squeeze two additional 
brigades into SVKf in CY 66 over and above Phase II forces AFD the 
minimum add-ons which we have described in paragraph k above. 
We should program these additional logistics and canbat forces 
against the maximum build-up rate because we need them to match 
the PAVN/VC buildup. With two more brigades we would have three" 
US divisions in the area around Saigon and the 4th Division In 
the II Corps area would have three infantry brigades plus an air- 
mobile brigade and an air cavalry squadron. 

7» Because of current problems regarding port and support 
facilities, no major deployments other than currently requested 
Phase II deployments can be accepted in the 1st Qtr of CY 66. 
Thereafter., the buildup should be Incremental. If ROK units 
were made available (with both the RVTf and the ROK providing a 
portion of the support, reinforced by additional US support) a 
division could be handled in the second quarter, and an additional 
division equivalent in each quarter thereafter, provided appropri- 
ate US logistics forces are available. 

8. Tactical air support would amount to three tactical fighter 
squadrons for the first deployment alternative and four squadrons 
for the second. Eventually, this might require construction of 
another airfield, in addition to Tuy Hoa. 



22 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



9- One of the most pressing needs is to ijnprove the logis- 
tics situation in RVN. Phase I logistic units are stretched out 
through CY 66 and into CY 67. It was determined at the Honolulu 
Conference in September that the preferred schedule for deploy- 
ment of major Phase II combat units could not be met because the 
essential logistics units would not be available in the time 
frame required. Nevertheless, we accepted marginal logistic sup- 
port in order to deploy combat units as rapidly as possible. 
Therefore the logistics system in SVN cannot accept the even 
greater burden represented by the required additional combat 
forces without significant augmentation early in CY 66. We ap- 
preciate the fact that this may require extraordinary measures. 
It has been determined that the ports can accommodate the force 
buildup if the critical through-put capabilaVty can be provided 
in the form of added logistics units and related facilities. 
MACV is prepared to specify the quantity, type and time phasing 
of logistics units required to support the buildup. 



10. Undoubtedly the detailed development of these added, force 
requirements and their integration into existing programs and 
schedules will require another set of conferences. The initial 
development should take place here with assistance from the PACOM 
components as required. Subsequently a final conference in 
Honolulu appears necessary 'to check requirements against F^vail- 
ability, make adjustments and work out the detailed scheduling. 

j — [_•• . « • • 



We estimate that our minimum course of action (a ROK 
division and RCT and two US brigades as major units) will require 
a total add-on strength of approximately 48,000 (23,000 ROK), 
which includes 35; 300 combat and combat support and 12,700 service 
support. Our preferred course of action (a ROK div and RCT and a 
US div and brigade as major units) will add approximately 64, 500 
(23,000 ROK), which includes 47,200 combat and combat support and 
17^300 service support. 



-x- 



* 



■x- 



* 



-x- 



3V 






This assessment of the VC/PAVN buildup appears to be consistent with the 
retrospective evaluation found in the intelligence community's National 
Intelligence Estimate 14-3-66, published on 7 July 1966. According to 
this later estimate, the infiltration for the months of September and 
October 1965 totaled approximately 10,000 which was only 1,000 less than 
the total for tue preceding 8 months, from January through August 1965. • 
The estimated rate of the buildup given in NIE 14.3-66 was one or two 
infantry regiments per month which fits the earlier MACV estimate of 
15 battalions per quarter. 






2^ 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



; 



-■ *,. TOP SECRET - Sensitive 

Westmoreland's recommendation for an additional 4l, 500 U.S. forces 
would have raised the Phase II deployment to approximately 15^-, 000 bring- 
ing total U.So troop strength in the area to nearly 375^000 by mid- 1967. 

E. M cNamara Goes to Saigon - A Decision on IIA 

1 . M cNama ra Visits Saigon 

Faced with this changed enemy situation. Secretary of Defense 
McNamara diverted his return from a NATO meeting in Paris to allow him 
to visit Saigon on 28-30 November. As outlined in the Secretary of 
Defense's 23 November cable to Saigon, the purpose of the trip was 
"further discussion of Phase II requirements." 35/ Specifically, he 
asked: "Will it not be necessary to add one or two divisions to the 28 
battalions proposed in order to provide forces for the Delta; will even 
more forces be required in 1966 if the number of PAVN regiments continues 
to increase?" 

2. Westmoreland's Recommended Add-Ons 

According to the MACV Command History, when Secretary McNamara 
arrived in Saigon, "C0MUSMACV expressed a need for an additional division 
(which could be R0K) for deployment along the coastal plain in II CTZ, 
thereby freeing the kth Infantry Division. . .for operations further 
inland. Another USA division was needed for employment in the Upper 
Delta in the area contiguous to Saigon, for a total of three USA divi- 
sions around the capital city. A separate brigade for FFORCEV was 
necessary to reinforce the 1st Cavalry Division ( AM)... Two air cavalry- 
squadrons were needed to support the 4th Infantry Division and the 
1st Cavalry Division (AM), as was another airmobile infantry battalion 
for the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) to give that division a balanced force 
of three 3~t>attalion brigades." This revised deployment plan was referred 
to as Phase IIA (add-on). 36/ 

Secretary McNamara was told that the Free World battalions requested 
for the end of CY 1966 and ARVN would be used for the major tasks in the 
following proportions: 

FWMAF ARVN 

Defense of Major U.S. Bases 29 1 

Defense of Government Centers and — 68 

Critical. Installations 

Security for Expansion of Government Control 22 22 

Offensive Operations and Major Reactions h6 71 

Total 97 162 37/ 






2k ' TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






3* McNamara' s Recommendations to the President 

Upon his return from Saigon., Secretary McNamara drafted a 
Memorandum for the President , outlining the changed military situation 
in Vietnam, and commenting that in view of the communist build-up, 
"the presently contemplated Phase I forces will not be enough... Nor 
will the originally contemplated Phase II addition of 28 more U.S. 
battalions (112,000 men) be enough. .. Indeed it is estimated that, with 
the contemplated Phase II addition of 28 U.S. battalions we would be 
able only to hold our present geographical positions." 39 / 

In order to "provide what it takes in men and materiel. . .to stick 
with our stated objectives and with the war, " Secretary McNamara recom- 
mended the deployment of one Korean division plus another brigade, an 
additional Australian battalion, and kO U.S. combat battalions, bringing 
the total of U.S. maneuver battalions to jk, and the total of U.S. per- 
sonnel in Vietnam to approximately 400,000 by the end of 1966 with the 
possible need for an additional 200,000 in 1967. 

In the 7 December version of his Memorandum for the President, 
McNamara added the information that "although the 1966 deployments to 
South Vietnam may require some shift of forces from other theaters, it 
is believed that they can be accomplished without calling up reserve 
personnel; however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not believe additional 
forces can be deployed to Southeast Asia or elsewhere unless reserves 
are called. " k0 t 

In evaluating this course of action, the Secretary warned that it 
"will not guarantee success." He estimated the odds to be about even 
that the NVA/vC will match the U.S. buildup and that "even with the 
recommended deployments, we will be faced in early 1967'with a military 
standoff at a much higher level, with pacification still stalled, and 
with any prospect of military success marred by the chance of an active 
Chinese intervention." 

^ • le ases I, II, and IIA Are Pu blished 

On 13 December, the Secretary of Defense sent out a Draft 
Memorandum for the President, which included tables outlining the 
planned deployments to Southeast Asia under Phases I, II and IIA. 
This December Plan projected the total strength for Phases I, II and 
IIA to be 367,800 by the end of 1966 and 393,900 by the end of June 
19^7- The number of U.S. maneuver battalions would reach 75 by the 
end of 1966. 

Meanwhile, the requirements which Secretary McNamara had brought 
back from Saigon with him were being reviewed by CINCPAC in preparation 
for a planning conference scheduled for 17 January to 6 February 1966 . 
at which the refined requirements would be presented and recommended 
deployment schedules prepared. 



25 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



F. Phase IIA is Revised 

1. CINCPAC ! s Requirements 

The results of the review were forwarded to the Secretary of 
Defense on 16 December. CINCPAC's new requirements were summarized by 
ASD Enthoven as follows: 

The CINCPAC request involves a deployment to RVN of 
443,000 personnel by December 1966, vice 368,000 in the 
December plan... In addition he wants to increase Thailand 
strength from the approved December 1966 total of 26,800 
to 57,100 of which 33,000 is available. While CINCPAC 
still wants 75 US maneuver battalions by December, his re- 
quest involves an earlier deployment, approximately 711 
battalion months in CY 1966 vs 65k- in the December plan or 
693 Service capability. 

The increase and acceleration of Combat Support Batta- 
lions is more serious, involving over 82 battalions as com- 
pared with less than 60 in the December plan; 13 battalions 
of this increase are HAWK and Air Defense guns, neither of 
which are readily available. Similarly CINCPAC wants over 
68 battalions of engineers by December, 22 more than in the 
December plan, and similarly unavailable. 

The helicopter problem would be further compounded by 
the CINCPAC request for 2,884 by December versus 2,391 in 
the December plan and 2,2^0 said to be available by the 
Services. . . . \2/ 

With the revised CINCPAC requirements in hand, the services began 
to estimate their capability of meeting them. This exercise surfaced 
the problem of assumptions to be made about sources of manpower avail- 
able to meet the requirements . 

2. Assumptions for Planning 

These assumptions were grouped into three sets or cases: 



CASE 1: 



Meeting these requirements by providing forces 
from C0MJS current force structure including 
activations, plus feasible draw-downs from over- 
seas areas, call-up of selected reserve units 
and individuals, and extending terms of service. 



CASE 2 : Meeting these requirements by providing forces 
from C0NUS current force structure including 
activations, plus feasible draw-downs from 
overseas areas. 



26 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



S< 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



CASE 3 : Meeting these requirements by providing forces 
from CO'LIUS current force structure including 
activations. 

A fourth case was considered by the JCS. It assumed: 

. . . .provision of forces from COMJS current force 
structure including activations, call-up of 
select reserve units and individuals, and ex- 
tension in terms of service, but no draw-down 
from overseas areas. 
• 
Assistant Secretary Enthoven added that: 

The JCvS deleted Case h from the agenda largely because 
they estimate that the President is more reluctant to call 
up reserve units and extend terms of service than he is to 
take forces out of Europe. If they are correct, I think 
that the agenda as they have laid it out makes a great deal 
of sense and will provide us with much useful information. 
If, on the other hand, willingness to activate reserves and 
extend terms of service has been underestimated, I think we 
should recommend to the JCS that they restore Case k to the 
agenda . 

Significantly, the guidance the JCS received was to study only the 
first three cases, indicating that the JCS had not underestimated the 
willingness to activate reserves and extend terms of service." 

Meanwhile, Secretary McNamara, in a Memorandum for the President, 
dated 2k January 19 66, gave, as his best estimate of force levels for 
the next twelve months, the following: 

1. By December 1966, the U.S. would have 75 battalions 
and 367,800 men in Vietnam. 

2. Allied nations would have 23 battalions and kk,6Q0. kg/ 

He noted, however, that the JCS believed that "it would be necessary to 
have a selective call-up of reserves and a selective extension of terms 
of service to achieve the personnel strengths shown at the times indi- 
cated." He noted that the U.S. figures would rise substantially above 
those shown if CBICPAC estimates were accepted. 

He also included General Westmoreland 1 s estimate that such a deploy- 
ment would: 

"a. Result in destruction of one-third of the enemy* s base • 
areas, i.e., in-country resources. 



27 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



• 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



b." Permit friendly control of just under one-half, as 
compared with the present one-third, of the critical roads 
and railroads. 

c. Attrite VC/PAVN forces at an increasing rate, lead- 
ing to the leveling off of enemy forces at the 150+ battalion 
level. . .(provided the Chinese do not supply volunteers). 

d. Ensure that friendly bases and government centers 
are defended under any foreseeable circumstances (though some 
district towns may be overrun and have to be retaken). 

e. Lead to government control of an estimated 50 P er cent 
of the population." 

3* The Honolulu Conference 

However, by 28 January, the CINCPAC/mACV requirements had risen 
to 102 Free World battalions (79 U.S. including h tank battalions...) W/ 
An intermediate evaluation was that "it appears that the MACV-CINCPAC 
requirements (102 battalions...) are valid, and required to meet the 
military objective on which the Secretary of Defense has been previously 
briefed. The information brought back by Secretary of Defense in late 
November as to combat and support force requirements was incomplete." 

During the CBTCPAC Conference, the top American and Vietnamese 
leaders also met at Honolulu, primarily to "permit the leaders of the 
United States and South Vietnam to get to know each other better and to 
discuss non-military programs." 

Upon his return, Secretary McNamara assembled his key subordinates. 
The summary of this conference follows: 



28 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



SUMMARY FOR RECORD 



DRAFT 
9 Feb 66 



A meeting was held in the Conference Room of the Secretary of Defense 
from 1:45 to 3:00 p.m., February 9, 1966 following the return of the 
Secretary of Defense from Honolulu. At the conference table were the 
Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries, 
and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff minus the Chairman. Also 
present were Mr. Anthony, Mr. Ignatius, Mr. McNaughton, Mr. Morris, 
Dr. Enthoven, Mr. Glass, and the undersigned. This memorandum will 
summarize the major points of the meeting. 

1. The Honol ulu Conference. Mr. McNamara opened with a general 
report on the events in Honolulu. The meetings in general were highly 
successful. The primary purpose of the Honolulu conference was as indi- 
cated in the press, namely to permit the leaders of the United States and 
South Vietnam to get to know each other better and to discuss non -military 
programs. The top South Vietnamese handled themselves superbly and 
made a fine impression. They have a non -military program which, if it 
can be put into effect, should greatly strengthen the government and the 
country. Most of the discussions concentrated on the non-military pro- 
grams. The Vice President is going to Saigon to assist on this. McCeorpe 
Bundy is also going there to help the American Embassy organize so as to 
further the non -military efforts. 

Mr. McNamara brought back with him a great deal of material 
prepared by General Westmoreland and Admiral Sharp. He will have this 
material reproduced and copies sent to the Service Secretaries and the 
Chiefs of Staff, No significant military decisions were taken with the 
exception of one which he will now discuss. 

• 

2. The Case 1 Decision. Mr. McNamara reminded the group of 
the three cases which have been under discussion involving various 
assumptions. Briefly, Case 1 assumes that the Reserves will be called 
up, tours will be extended, and units will be re-deployed from other 
overseas areas. Case. 2 is the same as Case 1 but does not involve 
calling up the Reserves. Case 3 involves no Reserve call-up and no 
overseas, re-deployment. One of the big differences between these cases 
is in the number of support units available, with the resulting effect on 
the number of combat units that can be deployed. For example, under 
Case 1, some 102 maneuver battalions would be deployed by the end of 
the year as opposed to 80 such battalions under Case 3. This is in 
comparison to approximately 50 deployed at present. 



29 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



I 






\ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






General Westmoreland, in his deployment planning, is pro- 
ceeding on the important assumption that on balance any proposed 
deployments must increase his overall combat effectiveness; that is, 
before he deploys a combat unit he must be sure that he has adequate 
support for it. This does not mean, however, that he will deploy a 
unit only when, he can get 100 percent combat effectiveness for the unit. 

Both General Westmoreland and Admiral Sharp put to McNarnara 
the critical question: In our future planning, which of the three cases 
shall we assume will be followed? McNarnara told them that it was simply 
! not possible yet to decide, but for the present, they should plan on combat 

unit deployments equal to those in Case 1. (In this regard, it should be 
noted that the combat unit deployments under Case 1 and Case 3 do not 
differ significantly for the first 6 months of 1966, although the logistics 
deployments do differ for that period.) Likewise the Department of 
Defense is to: 

(1) Assume and act to deploy combat units as provided 
under Case 1, but without a reserve call-up. (This does not prejudice 
the still-open question whether or not the Reserves will be called up. ) 

(2) Assume and act on the basis that we are authorized to 
deploy up to 260,000 personnel through March 31, 1966, (This is in lieu 
of the existing authorization of 220, 000 through February 28, 1966.) 
However, it should be understood that if we need to go- above 260, 000, 
we will not hesitate to request further authorizations. 

This contemplates the deployment by the end of the year of 102 
combat maneuver battalions (including third country forces) and related 
forces amounting to 429, 000 U.S. military personnel. 

There was discussion of extensions of tours. With respect to 
the possible reserve call-up, this is to be subjected to intense critical 
analysis over the next several weeks. It must be studied on a world- 
wide basis, Furthermore General Westmoreland and Admiral Sharp 
have done a good deal of work on alternatives under Case 1 to call-up 
of the reserves, Mr. McNarnara has these studies. Dr. Enthoven , 
■will reproduce them and distribute them to the Service Secretaries 
and the Chiefs of Staff. 



30 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



i 



. 



3. Southeast Asia Pro gram Off ice. It is essential that the 
Department of Defense has at all times a readily available and central 
ized bank of information with respect to the Southeast Asia build-up. 
To this end, Dr. Enthoven is to establish a Southeast Asia Program 
Office which is to be able to furnish Mr. McNamara and Mr. Vance 
all information that may be required with respect to Southeast Asia. 
Among other things, this unit is to be able to provide immediate 
information on what overseas units are being depleted in order to 
accommodate Southeast Asia needs. If there is any draw-down any- 
where, Mr. McNamara wants to know it promptly. We must know the 
full price of what we are doing and propose to do. 



Mr. McNamara suggested that each Service Secretary establish 
a similar Southeast Asia Program Unit to bring together and keep current 
data relating to that Service involving Southeast Asia, and that the Joint 
Staff might establish a similar set-up. 

Mr. McNamara said that it was mandatory that the situation be 

brought under better control. For example, the Southeast Asia construc- 
tion program was $1. 2 billion in the FY 66 Supplement; yesterday at 
Honolulu the figure of $2.5 billion was raised. Yet there is only the 
vaguest information as to how these funds will be spent, where, on what, 
and by whom. This is part of the bigger problem that there is no proper 
system for the allocation of available resources in Vietnam. McGeorge 
Bimdy is to help organize the country team to deal with this problem, 
including reconciling military and non-military demands. 

^' Manpower Contr ols. Mr. McNamara designated Mr. Morris as 
the person to be responsible for the various manpower requirements. He 
is either to insure that the requirements are met or to let Mr. McNamara 
know if they are not being met. Mr, McNamara wants a written state- 
ment whenever we have been unable to do something that General West- • 
mo r eland says he needs for full combat effectiveness. (In this regard, 
General Westmoreland recognizes that it is not possible to have 100 
percent combat effectiveness for all the 102 battalions.- For example, 
there are not sufficient helicopter companies. Roughly, he estimates 
he will get 96 battalion combat effectiveness out of the 102 battalions.) 



31 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



sc 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



At this point there was a brief discussion concerning Vr^ use 
of U.S. troops for pacification purposes. Mr. Nitze indicated that in 
his view the Marines were doing this to some degree. The point was 
disputed. At any rate, Mr. McNamara said that the 102 combat 
battalions contemplated under Case 1 were not to be used for pacifica- 
tion but only for defense of base areas and offensive operations. 
Mr. McNamara outlined briefly the South Vietnamese Government's 
plan for pacification. It will affect some 235, 000 people in the whole 
country. The major allocation of resources and personnel will be to 
four very limited areas, one of which is near Damang. There will 
also be a general program extending throughout the country involving 
some 900 hamlets. 



^' Call-Up of Reserves. Mr. McNamara said that it was im- 
portant that everyone understand why a Preserve call-up is receiving 
such careful study. There are at least two important considerations, 
r irst, the problem is a very complicated one and we do not yet have 
all the facts. Mr. Morris and others will amass the necessary data 
as soon as possible. Second, the political aspects of a Reserve call- 
up arc extremely delicate. There arc several strong bodies of opinion 
at work in the country. .Look, for example, at the Fulbright Committee 
hearings. One school of thought, which underlies the Gavin thesis, is 
that this country is over-extended economically and that we cannot 
afford to do what we are doing. Another school of thought feels that 
we plain should not be there at all, whether or not we can afford it. 
A third school of thought is that although we arc rightly there, the war 
is being mismanaged so that we are heading straight toward war with 
China. Furthermore, there is no question but that the economy of 
this country is beginning to run near or at its capacity with the result- 
ing probability of a shortage of certain skills and materiel. If this 

J o 

continues wo may be facing wage and price controls, excess profits • 
taxes, etc. , all of which will add fuel to the fire of those who sa.y we 
cannot afford this. With all these conflicting pressures it is a very 
difficult and delicate task for the Administration to mobilize and main- 
tain the required support in this country to carry on the war properly. 
The point of all this is to emphasize that a call-up of the Reserves 
presents extremely serious problems in many areas and a decision 
cannot be maae today.' 



General Johnson said he wished to add three additional con 
siderations. First, a Reserve call-tip might be an important factor 



32 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



n 



! 



s? 



- 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



in the reading of the North Vietnamese and the Chinese with respect 
to our determination to see this war through. Second, Reserve call- 
ups are traditionally a unifying factor. Third, as a larger problem, 
a hard, long-„erm look should be taken at the degree to which we as 
a government are becoining committed to a containment policy along 
all the enormous southern border of China. Mr. McNamara said he 
would ask for a JCS study of this last point and discussed it briefly. 

During the course of the meeting, General Johnson also 
pointed out that with respect to overseas deployment, the Army is 
already shortchangi?ig certain overseas areas so as to increase the 
training cadres in CONUS. He pointed out that because of the effect 
on the strategic reserve of deployments already made, the quality 
of new units will be lower than at present. He raised certain additional 
points affecting the Army. Mr. McNamara, Mr. Vance, Mr. Pvosor 
and General Johnson will discuss these problems further. 

• 

^' Dg.ployTLient Schedule. Dr. Brown asked whether there is any 
single authoritative document which now sets forth the planned deploy- 
ment schedule. Mr. McNamara said for the time being everyone 
should operate off of the schedule in the December 11 Draft Memoran- 
dum to the President. By Monday evening, February 14, Dr. Enthoven 
will have a revised deployment schedule which will be distributed and 
then become the official one. (Mr. McNaughton mentioned that people 
should keep in mind that Phase II-A in the Draft Memorandum to the 
President is not quite the same as Case 1. ) A procedure will be 
worked out for changing the deployment schedule in an official and 
orderly way, probably through the use of a procedure similar to that 
of Program Change x°roposals. 

It should be kept in mind that the deployment schedule referred 
to covers only deployments to South Vietnam (and not to Thailand or 
elsewhere in Southeast Asia), and that it is a planning deployment 
schedule. Actual deployment authorizations will continue to be re- 
quired from Mr. McNamara or Mr. Vance in writing, as at present. 



Attachment 
a/s 



John M. Ste adman 
The Special Assistant 



w 






3- 



j> 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 

Two important items as far as the build-up was concerned were the 
guidance to "assume and act to deploy combat units as provided under 
Case 1, but without a reserve call-up," and the emphasis on the serious 
problems which a reserve call-up would present (in spite of the insis- 
tence that the reserve call-up was a "still-open question"). 

^ • fc es ults of the CINCPAC Planning Conference 

On 12 February, the results of the CINCPAC Conference were 
published. hSf 

The concept of operations for 1966 had been more completely 
spelled out. The three basic military objectives had by this time grown 
to four. Now there were two separate objectives, 

1. To extend GVN dominion, direction, and control over 
SVN, and 

2. To defeat the VC and PAW forces in ARM and force 
their withdrawal, 

instead of the old task which combined both of these. In achieving the 
objective for extending GVN domination, US forces 1 tasks were very care- 
fully spelled out as "assisting the RVNAF in the conduct of clearing and 
securing the civic action operations .. .assist and reinforce other US 
mission agencies, and assist the RVNAF to defend major political, eco- 
nomic, food producing population centers." The object of defeating the 
VC and PAVN forces required more direct action such as conducting sus- 
tained coordinated offensive operations against the enemy, conducting 
air offensives, raids and special operations against enemy war zones and 
base areas to render them unusable. In general, "US military operations 
are aimed at creating operation environment and opportunity for the GVN 
to gain control and establish security of main food producing areas in 
order to feed the people, deny food to the enemy, bolster the economy, 
to cause the enemy to import or fight for food." In explaining the US 
emphasis on search and destroy, the memorandum stated that such opera- 
tions "against VC/PAVN forces and base areas attrite VC/PAVN main forces 
and destroy VC base areas and in-country supplies. These operations, 
although contributory to, are not a part of the rural construction effort, 
per se, but are constituted concomitantly with it. It is clear that a 
known and expected VC/PAVN build-up, the prime focus of combat capable 
units of US/FWMAF and RVNAF forces must be' directed to the search and 
destroy effort . " 

CINCPAC conceded that: 

This concept of employment of forces is of .long standing; 
however, the lack of sufficient ARVN regular forces for offen- 
sive operations plus the increasing VC strength have resulted 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



sr 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



in local RVN military commanders utilizing the security forces 
(primarily RF, PF) in offensive actions against hard core VC 
units. The introduction of U3/FWMA forces into key areas has 
reestablished the balance of force in these areas in favor of 
the GVN. These deployments allow RVNAF forces to be employed 
in the roles for which they were originally conceived and 
equipped, and permit the RF and PF to function in their proper 
role, kjy 

The CINCPAC/MCV submission included the following estimates of 
MACV's requirements and the deployments to Vietnam possible under the 
assumptions of Cases 1, 2, and 3. 

Strength at End of CY '66 



Maneuver Bns 


Requirement 


Case 1 


Case 2 


Case 3 


U.S 

-Allied 

Total 

Equivalent Strength 


79 
23 

102 
102 


79 

23 

102 

96 


70* 

23 

■ 93 
88 


61 

23 
"BE 

72 


Personnel 











U.S. 



459, ooo 



422, 517 



* Other 9 battalions available in Jan 6j 48/ 



The difference in the programs in Case 1 and Case 2 was the degree 
to which helicopter and combat service support could be provided. The 
support required for the 102 battalion force would not be completely 
provided in either case, which would result according to MACV estimates 
in a reduction in the effectiveness of the 102 battalion force to the 
equivalent of 96 fully supported battalions under Case 1 and to the 
equivalent of 88 under Case 2. 

Case 3 provided a total of only 84 maneuver battalions. 

The CIKCPAC requirements also included 20 battalions for reconsti- 
tution of the PAC0M reserve. Case 1 provided for the full 20 battalions, 
Case 2 for 10, and Case 3 for 13 battalions. 

CINCPAC T s evaluation of the impact of the three cases upon military 
objectives was: 

(1) Case 3: 

(a) Provides for the security of the US/l F command 
at the projected rate of VC/PAVN build up. 



35 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



Co 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



(b) The principal deficiencies of the Case 3 forces 
are: 

1. Inadequate mobility. 

2. Inadequate artillery support. 

3« There are no ground forces provided for 
stationing in the Delta. 

4. Insufficient force and mobility to guarantee 
defense of all provinces and districts now 
under GVN control. 

(2) Case 2; ' 

(a) Provides for the safety of the US/FWiME command. 

(b) Provides the required number of maneuver battalions. 

However, shortfalls in combat and service support restrict the 
capabilities of the force and produce the following deficiencies: 

1. Inadequate mobility. 

2. Limited offensive capability, resulting in an 
inability to produce enemy casualties faster 
than the enemy can produce replacements, thereby 
prolonging the war at a high level of casualties 
on both sides. 

3' A high rate of equipment loss and deadline result- 
ing from maintenance deficiencies. 

h. The acceptance of a high risk in the event of 
escalation because the force is not supported 
adequately for sustained operations of the kind 
which could be expected. 

5- Insufficient forces for desired level of sus- 
tained offensive operations to offset VC/PAVN 
build-up. 



• 6. A shortage of maneuver units, the adverse effect 
of which are cumulative and project into CY 6j . 

7« Insufficient logistic support forces to provide 
desired level of support for US forces in SVN. 
; The adverse effects caused by the shortage of 

logistic units are cumulative and project into 



s 



CY 67 



36 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



i> 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



(3) Case 1: 

(a) Generally adequate when measured against CINCPAC ■ 
objectives and capabilities except that there is 
a continuing deficiency in helicopter mobility. 49 / 

Having received CINCPAC ! s requirement, the Secretary of Defense 
directed a series of studies to identify and evaluate the options which 
appeared to be open. The scope of these studies is indicated by a 
partial listing of projects compiled by Assistant Secretary for Man- 
power, Thomas D. Morris: 

Views on Army and Marine Corps PACOM reserve forces; 

Acceptable draw- down on Europe; 

Recommendations on use of third country forces; 

Posture paper on strategic reserves and reconstitution 
of draw- downs; 

Analyze rotation base requirements; 

Study possibilities for further expansion of Army 
training base; 

Recommend temporary draw- downs on Army COMJS and over- 
seas forces to support deployments, activations and 
training- rotation base; 

Evaluate use of resources of Army temporary forces 
(9th Division and 2 add-on brigades) to meet other 
MACV requirements. . . . 50/ 

One key question asked was the latest date at which a decision on 
use of reserves must be made. 51/ 

Part of the answer — the dates by which reserves would have to be 
called in lieu of forming the 9th Division and the 198th Brigade -- was 
15 June for the brigade and 26 June for the division. 52/ 

■ 

With this time to work in, the Secretary of Defense directed the 



.s 



. . .Military Departments and the JCS to assume that thii 
/the Case 1 deployment schedule/ is the lequirement we will 
try to meet, to study all possible ways of meeting it short 
of calling reserves or extending terms of service, and until 
• further notice, in so far as possible, to plan to deploy 
forces to SVTJ on this schedule (forces to other SEA areas 



37 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



. 



L2 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



will continue to be deployed on the basis of the "December 11, 
1965 Plan") . I would like to urge that you use all the in- 
genuity you can in developing suggested ways of meeting these 
conditions by use of suitable substitutes, civilian contractor 
personnel, etc. In this connection, General Westmoreland and 
Admiral Sharp have made a list of suggestions which is being 
analyzed by the JCS J-4 and my staff. Every effort should be 
made to carry out these and similar suggestions. 

The fourth line in the tables is my understanding of the 
current Service estimates of their capabilities to meet these 
requirements under the assumption that only cadres are taken 
from Europe, and that no Reserves or extensions of terms of 
service are utilized. Would you please study these estimates, 
amprove upon them, and find ways to bring our effective combat 
capability into equality with the Case 1. 

I would like by February 28 the individual Service and JCS 
comments on our capabilities to meet Case 1 requirements. 53/ 

G. Phase IIA(r) Presented 

1. The JCS Recommendation 

On 1 March 1966, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded their 
recommendation for Phase IIA(r) and their plan to reconstitute the 
draw-downs on our strategic reserve. $k/ The JCS recommended that the 
^3-2/3 battalion U,S. force be deployed to Vietnam in CY 1966, which. 
would require a "selective call-up of reserve units and personnel and 
extension of terms of service." They also considered, at the request 
of the Secretary of Defense, a variation of Case 1, in which reserve 
call-up and extension of terms of service were excluded. They recom- 
mended against this plan because of the severe effects upon our combat 
effectiveness in Europe. If the reserves were not to be called or terms 
of service extended, the JCS recommended that the deployments for Phase 
IIA(R) be extended into 1967 rather than attempt to complete them by the 
end of 3.966. Their plan was basically to delay the deployment of 13 of 
the scheduled 37 Army maneuver battalions until the first half of 1967 
(7 the first quarter and 6 the second quarter) . The battalions them- 
selves would be ready for deployment by 1 January 1967; but the necessary 
combat service support units would not be. 

2. McNamara Directs Another Try 

Iloweve:*, the JCS's recommendations were not bought by the Sec- 
retary of Defense and on 10 March he stated, "I have reviewed JCSM 130- 66 
and the related memorandums from the Secretary of the Military Departments. 
All of these require more study and review. However, until such studies 
are completed, you should plan to deploy forces to SVN in accordance 



38 



TOP SECRET ~ Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



cz 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



with. . .Case l...all necessary actions are to be taken to meet these 
deployment dates without call-up of reserves or extension of terms of 
service. Troop movements from Europe will be made only by written 
approval of Mr. Vance or myself." 55/ 

3. The JCS Try Aga in 

Accordingly, the JCS submitted their plan on h April 1966 which 
provided for placing all 37 Army maneuver battalions in SVN by January 
1967. 56/ The end of year strength for i960 was projected to be 376,350; 
while the strength at the end of CY 67 was to be 4 38, 207 • 

Although Secretary McNamara still had questions about the dis- 
crepancy between the JCS plan laid out on h April 1966 and the Case 1 
capabilities, he apparently accepted the reasoning expressed by Assis- 
tant Secretary of Defense Alain Enthoven in his memorandum of 9 April 
1966, "that there is not much to be gained by insisting on a more rapid 
deployment of maneuver battalions . " 57/ 

h. McNamara Acquiesce s 

Accordingly, on 11 April 1966 Secretary McNamara, "with the 
exceptions noted. . ./approved/. . .the deployment plan proposed by the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff in JCSM 218-66." 58/ 

Attached to his approval memorandum was a set of tables entitled 
"April 10 Deployment Plan." These showed planned U.S. strength at the 
end of December 1966 to be 70 maneuver battalions and 383.? 500 personnel. 
The remaining 9 maneuver battalions would arrive in January 1967 and by 
the end of June 19 67 total strength was scheduled to be 425,000. This 
plan, called the "10 April Plan" by Systems Analysis and the Secretary 
of Defense's office represented the approved version of what the Services 
called the Deployment Plan for Phase IIA(r) . 

Apparently however, even this was not close enough to the 
original Case 1 deployment capabilities schedule to suit Secretary 
McNamara, and in a memorandum dated 12 April 1966 he asked why the 
difference between the revised JCS figure for end of l 66 strength and 
the Case 1 figure for end *66 strength of lj-13,557. 59/ 

The Acting Chairman of the JCS answered as follows: 



* 



•x- 



■x- 



-x- 



■X- 



3- (IS) JCSM- 218 -66 reflects a projected and calendar 
year 1966 strength of 376,350 compared to the Case I strength 
of 413,557 -- a shortfall of 37,207. However, due to adjust- 
ments since Case I capabilities were developed, including 
changes in requirements and refinements in strengths, the 



39 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



actual net shortfall reflected in the Appendices hereto amounts 
to 47,731 

h. (s) The basic difference in the two capability plans, 
as viewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is that Case I was based 
upon the call up of Reserve forces, extension of terms of ser- 
vice, and a firm decision by 1 February 1966. The JCSM-218- 66 
plan represented a changed set of assumptions in that it did not 
have access to the skilled resources available from the Reserves 
and from extended terms of service. Furthermore, JCSM-218- 66 
represented a two-month delay in certain basic decisions. De- 
spite extraordinary actions being taken to improve the availa- 
bility of combat support and combat service support units, no 
means have been found to eliminate certain skill shortages and 
to create these skills in the time available. Another funda- 
mental difference is that Case I would have deployed largely 
units in being, whereas the current deployment plan will depend 
primarily on activation of new units. 

5- (S) Despite the shortcomings apparent in the 10 April 
1966 plan, the Services are taking positive actions to bring 
this plan, which is based essentially upon Case IT rules, in 
line with the Case I deployment capabilities insofar as possible. 
Such extraordinary actions have resulted in significant improve- 
ments. 

6. (S) In consideration of the above, the current approved 
deployment program in JCSM~2l8- 66 meets as closely as feasible 
the program for South Vietnam prescribed in your directive to 
plan, for an interim period, to deploy forces in accordance with 
Case I. However, this program as well as the Case I capability 
plan falls short of the total calendar year i960 CINCPAC force 
•. requirements submitted by CIWCPAC to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
Although there will be a delay in meeting the total requirement, 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services will continue their 
efforts to fulfill the total requirements as close to CINCPAC's 
schedule as practicable. 60/ 

The question of where the numbers for Phases 13.", IIA, and IIA(r) 
came from provokes much speculation. It can be hypothesized that from 
the outset of the American build-up, some military men felt that winning 
a meaningful military victory in Vietnam would require something on the 
order of one million men. Knowing that this would be unacceptable 
politically, it 'may have seemed a better bargaining strategy to ask for 
increased deployments incrementally. At the outset, the limiting factor 
on the build-up was the speed with which units could be readied for 
deployment, and the speed with which logistical support facilities could 
be provided in Vietnam, (the later constraint being heavily influenced by 



^0 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



the scarcity of dock facilities and the shipping jam up in Saigon). Once 
these problems had been surmounted, the barrier then became the level at 
which the reserves would have to be called up. This barrier became very- 
real in early f 66 when General Westmoreland's desires for numbers of men 
and rates of deployments began to exceed the capabilities of the services 
to provide them without a reserve call up. In this speculative explana- 
tion of military bargaining strategy, the reserve call-up 'could have been 
viewed as a barrier that should be breached in order to fight the conflict 
in South Vietnam along more rational-professional lines. 

An alternative explanation is that no one really foresaw what the 
troop needs in Vietnam would be and that the ability of the DRV/Vc to 
build up their effort was consistently underrated. During the period 
under review this explanation seems with some exceptions, to be reasonable 
The documents from the period around July 1965 seem to indicate that MACV 
had not given much thought to what he was going to do in the year or years 
after 1965. The words of the MACV History for 19^5 indicate something of 
this. "The President's 28 July announcement that the U.S. would commit 
additional massive military forces in SVN necessitated an overall plan 
clarifying the missions and deployment of the various components. 
COMUSMACV's Concept of Operations was prepared to fulfill this need." 
If this is a true reflection of what happened it would indicate the MACV's 
plan of what to do was derived from what would be available rather than 
the requirements for manpower being derived from any clearly thought out 
military plan. 

A compromise explanation of the origins of the numbers is that 
the military may have had a visceral feeling that a large (somewhere above 
500,000) number of troops would be needed to win the war, but were unable 
to justify their requirements in terms clear or strong enough to persuade 
the President, who had an interest in keeping the domestic effects of war 
as small as possible. 



^ TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



FOOTNOTES 



1. Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to SecDef, dated 18 Jun 65. 

2. Phase I in the Build-up of U.S. Forces: The Debate, March-July 1965. 

3- Intensification of the Military Operations in Vietnam — Concept and 
Appraisal, Report of Ad Hoc Study Group, Ik July 1965. 

k. Ibid., p. ii. 

5- Memo for General Goodpaster, Sub j : "Forces Required to Win in South 
Vietnam," dated 2 July I965. 

6. Intensification of the Military Operations in Vietnam- -Concept and 
Appraisal, op. cit . 

7. Ibid. , p. J~3, 

8. SecDef 072352s Jul 65. 

9- Draft Memorandum for the President dated 7/1/65, Subject: Program 
of expanded military and political moves with respect to Vietnam. 
Secretary McNamara has inserted "Rev'd" before the typed date, 
7/1/65, and written the date 6/26/65 above it. 

10. Command History, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 
1965. p. 42. 

11. Ibid. 

12 - Ibj -cU > pp. llkl-1^8. 

13- Memo for the President from SecDef, dtd 20 Jul 65, Sub j : Recommendations 
of Additional Deployments to Vietnam, pp. 4-5- . 

Ik. MACV 220625S Jul 65. 

15. Memo for the Record, dtd 12 Jul 65, Sub j : "63 Battalion Plan," signed 
by Col Moody, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. The 
same figures, in McNamara T s handwriting, are in his notebook for the 
Saigon trip. 

^' 92' Pit* , 20 Jul 65, Memo for the President from the Secretary of Defense. 

17. Ibid . 

18. Notes on background briefing given by President Johnson on 28 Jul 65, 
taken by ASD(PA) Goulding. 






h?. 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



• 9? 









TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



19- Message from DepSecDef Vance to Secretary McNamara, 1720^32 Jul 65, 
Back Channel. 

20. JCSM 652-65 dated 27 August I965, Subj : Concept for Vietnam^ pp. 1-3. 

21 • lb Id. , pp. 6-7. 

22. Ibid., p. 8. 

23. Ibid. 

2k. Memo for SecDef, dtd 8 Sep 65., Sub 3 : Concept for Vietnam, signed 
McNaughton. 

25. Memo for CJCS, Sub j : Concept for Vietnam, dtd 11 Sep 65, signed 

McNamara . 

26. MACV Directive 525-4, 20 Sep 65, p. 2. 

27. JCSM 8II-65, dtd 10 Nov 65, Sub j : Future Operations and Force 
• Deployments with Respect to the War in Vietnam. 

28. ASD(SA) Memo for Secys of Military Departments, Chmn JCS, Sub j : 
Southeast Asia Deployment Assumptions for Planning, dtd 20 Nov 65, 
signed Enthoven. 

29. JCSM 8II-65, 10 Nov 65. 

* 

30. 1st Rough Draft of Memorandum for the President, dtd 3 Nov 65, Sub j : 
Courses of Action in Vietnam. Secretary McNamara' has written "a copy 
of this was sent to the President by courier thru Mac f s office on 
11/7 and discussed with him by me, Dean, George, & Mac on Il/7. n 

31. MACV 40748, 17 Nov 65, to DIA, Sub j : VC and PAVN Forces Build-up. 

32. MACV Command History, 1965, p. 168. 
33- MACV Command History, I966, pp. 20-21. 

34. C0MUSMA.CV 4l485 to CINCPAC, 23 Nov 6^. Add-On to Phase II Deployments. 



35 



SecDef 4539-65 to Saigon, 23 Nov 65. 



36. MACV Command History, I965, pp. 44-45. 

1 

37* J -3 Briefing given to McNamara while in Saigon. 

33. MACV Command Hi story ,196 5, p. k^. 






43 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



a 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



39- Draft Memorandum for the President, dtd 30 Nov 65. 

kO. Memorandum for the President, dated 7 December, Subject: Military 
and Political Actions Recommended for South Vietnam, p. 3. 

kl. Draft Memo for President, Subject: Recommended FY I966 Southeast 
Asia Supplemental Appropriation (u), dated December 11, I965 
(transmitted by multiaddress memo signed by DepSecDef dated 13 Dec 65) 

k2. ASD Memorandum for Secretary of Defense , Subject: Southeast Asia 
Deployments, dated Ik Jan 66. 

43. Memorandum for the President dated 2k Jan 66, Sub j : The Military 
Outlook in South Vietnam. 

kk. Notes on Honolulu Visit, dated 1/28/66, unsigned but marked "Mr. Vance 
has seen. u 

k$. Summary for Record, dated 9 Feb 66, signed by John T. Steadman. 

k6. CINCPAC 3010, Ser: OOO55, 12 Feb 66, to JCS, Sub j : Calandar Year 
1966 Capabilities Programs (u). 

k7. Ibid. 
48. Ibid . 
k9. Ibid. 

50. ASD(m) Memorandum for Secretary McNamara and Secretary Vance, dated 
16 Feb 66. 

51. ASD(M) Mmeorandum. for Record, Subject: Studies of CINCPAC Require- 
ments as of 2/16/66, dated Ik Feb 66, signed by Thomas D. Morris. 

52. ASD(M) Memorandum for Secretary Vance, Subject: Decision Dates 
Required to Call Reserve Units in Lieu of Forming the 9th Division 
and one of the Temporary Brigades, dated 16 Feb 66, signed by 
Thomas D. Morris. 

53. SecDef Memo for Secys of the Mil Depts, CJCS, Sub j : Southeast Asia 
Deployment Planning Assumptions (u), dtd 1? Feb 66, signed Robert S. 
McNamara . 

5k. JCSM-I3O-66, dated 1 March 1966, Subject: CY 1966 Deployments to 
Southeast Asia and World Wide Military Posture. 

55. JCSM 218-66, k Apr 66, Deployment Program for Southeast Asia and 
Other PACOM Areas . 



kk 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



(9 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



- 



56. JCSM 218-66, h Apr 66, Deployment Program for Southeast Asia and 
Other PACOM Areas . 

57. Memorandum for SecDef, Subject: Deployments to Southeast Asia (u), 
dtd 9 April 1966, from Alain Enthoven. 

58. Secretary of Defense Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military 
Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Assistant 
Secretaries of Defense, Assistants to the Secretary of Defense, 
Subject: SEA Deployment Plan, dated 11 April I966, signed Robert S. 
McNamara . 

59- Memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 12 April 
1966, Subject: JCSM 218-66, dated k April 1966. 

60. JCSM-27I1-66, 28 April, Subject: Deployment Program for South Vietnam, 



^5 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



L 



t=\ 



o 
a 

3D 

> 



o 

GO 









Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



II. PROGRAM No. 3 



A. Interlude 



As far as the actual conduct of ground operations in Vietnam was 
concerned, the period of time from 1 May 1965 to 1 November 1965 was 
spent in building up combat and logistical forces and learning to employ 
them effectively. This was followed by a period from 1 November 1965 to 
1 May 1966 ; in which the deployment of U.S. forces was extended toward 
the frontiers, logistical support was exercised in furnishing support to 
troops in sustained combat , and commanders were indoctrinated on the 
techniques of sustained ground combat. 

The NVA/VC avoided initiating actions which might result in 
large and unacceptable casualties from the firepower of Allied 
forces. During the year the enemy became increasingly cautious 
■ in the face of increased Allied strength. The enemy tended to 
attack only when he had overwhelming superiority of numbers, 
such as during the attack in March on the Special Forces outpost 
at A Shau. VC tactics were designed to conserve main force 
strengths for the most opportune targets. The IWA/VC avoided 
attacking large Allied units of regiment or brigade size, but 
did attack isolated battalions and companies using sufficient 
strength to insure great numerical superiority. It was typical 
of the enemy to attack with one-third of his available force 
and to employ the remaining two-thirds of the units to set up 
an ambush of the Allied relief column. During attacks the 
NVA/VC used a- hugging tactic as a means of protecting them- 
selves from Allied artillery and air strikes. The enemy often 
withdrew by small squad-sized increments, using multiple routes. 
To defend against surveillance and artillery and air strikes, 
the enemy dispersed into the jungle in small units, moved fre- 
quently, and made maximum use of darkness and periods of low 
visibility. . . 1/ 

It is interesting to note, however, the pattern formed by MACV ! s 
operations during 1966. In the I Corps area, the large-scale operations 
conducted by the Marines in the spring of the year were for the most 
part located along the coast of the southern part of the area, in the 
Provinces of Quang Tin and Quang Ngai. 

Beginning with Operation DOUBLE EAGLE I (28. January to IT February), 
they progressed through DOUBLE EAGLE II (19 February to 1 March); 
Operation UTAH (4 March); Operation TEXAS (l8 March); and Operation 
HOT SPRINGS on 21 April. All of these operations were keyed on intelli- 
gence of an enemy build-up in and around Quang Ngai. Contact on these 
operations ranged from sporadic to contact with a NVA regiment on Opera- 
tion UTAH. The major exception to the location of operations in this area 
was Operation OREGON which was conducted in the vicinity of Thua Thien in 
late March. 



¥ 



b 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Another significant activity during the period, although not one 
initiated by the United States forces, was the fall of the Special 
Forces camp at A Shau, on the 10th of March. 

Operations in the II Corps Tactical Zone in 1966 displayed a simi- 
lar pattern. The two key areas of concern in II Corps were the coastal 
plains in Binh Dinh Province and near Tuy Hoa, and the Central Highland 
Plateau area around Pleiku. Although General Westmoreland appeared to 
be. impatient to find the enemy and defeat him in the relatively sparsely 
populated plateau area, most of the operations in the first half of the 
year which resulted in significant contact with the enemy took place 
near the Coastal Plains. The first operation of the year, which ran 
from 28 January to k February, was Operation MASHER, renamed Operation 
WHITE WING because of the concern over public reaction to the image 
portrayed by the name "MASHER." 

Operation WHITE WHIG continued until 6 March. This operation in 
the Bong Son and An Lao Valley region made heavy contact with 1 VC and 

I NVA regiment. It was followed by DAVEY CROCKETT (4-l6 May) and 
CRAZY HORSE (17 May to 5 June), both in the same area. 

Other significant operations in the spring of the year were Opera- 
tions VAN BUREN and HARRISON which, together, ran from 19 January through 
2k March in the area around Tuy Hoa. These operations^ conducted by the 
1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, were designed to protect the 
rice harvest in that area. 

■ 

Operations in the III Corps area began with Operation MARAUDER in 
Hau Nghia and Long An Provinces on 7 January; Operation CRIMP, along the 
Hau Nghia/Binh Duong border; and Operation BUCKSKIN near ChuChi on 

II January. 

In February, Operation MASTIFF Into the Michelin Plantation, and 
Operation MALLET in Phouc Tuy Province, were carried out. Neither 
Operation produced substantial enemy kills, but hopefully they were 
instrumental in breaking up VC supply and command and control facilities. 
By 10 February ; however, Operation ROLLING STONE had been kicked off and 
by 20 September it had encountered a 1,000-man VC force in Binh Duong. 
On 7 March; another search and destroy operation in Binh Duong; Operation 
SILVER CITY; triggered a four-hour attack by the enemy against 173^ Air- 
borne Brigade, one of the participating units. On 2k April, the center 
of operations moved further north when BIRMINGHAM began a thrust into 
Tay Ninh. The most significant part of BIRMINGHAM was the capture of 
vast quantities of enemy supplies and facilities despite the small number 
of enemy killed. By May of 1966, the 1st Cavalry Division was operating 
in the Central Highlands; the 1st Infantry Division was in operation 
north of Saigon; while the 25th Infantry Division had one brigade operat- 
ing with the 1st Cavalry Division on the Central Plateau, with the other 
brigades engaged in the III Corps area. 



k7 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



r o 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 









As far as the pattern which American forces in Vietnam followed, 
there seemed to be an initial preoccupation in the spring of 1966 with 
the Viet Cong and NVA units located in the populated areas, Quang Ngai 
in the I Corps, Binh Dinh and Phu Yen in the II Corps and Kau Nghia 
and Binh Duong in the III Corps. 

B. Phase IIA(r) Becomes Program No. 3 

1. Bookkeeping Changes 

Reflecting the relatively low level of combat and the preoccupa- 
tion with the build-up of U.S. forces, only minor changes and adjust- 
ments to the figures in the plan were made during the two months following 
the publication of Phase IIA(R). By June, however, the number of changes 
had begun to build up. Assistant Secretary Enthoven, in his 10 June 1966 
memorandum to Secretary McNamara, reported that there had been "a large 
number of changes proposed by the Army. . .This package of deployment ad- 
justments is the result of detailed CONARC studies of unit availability 
based upon equipment inventories, personnel training outputs, etc. These 
changes affect virtually every month and type of unit . n 2/ 

Assistant Secretary Enthoven then followed this with a memorandum 
on 13 June 1966 providing copies of the. current statistical summary of 
deployments and an explanation of the major changes. Most of these were 
bookkeeping in nature, having to do with changes in the base from which 
future strengths were computed and certain other adjustments such as 
eliminating transients from the totals. This made no change in battalion 
strengths but brought the December 1966 and June 1967 totals to 378,000 
and 427,000, respectively. 3/ 

On 16 June, Secretary McNamara, in a handwritten note in the margin 
of this latest Enthoven memorandum, directed Dr. Enthoven to make some 
changes in strengths to be included and to issue the revised plan as a 
separate document, not as part of the statistical summary. 

By 30 June, when Enthoven sent the revised plan back to McNamara 
for approval, two changes had occurred which brought the totals for 
December 66 and June 67 to 391,000 and ^31,000. These changes were the 
acceleration of the deployment of two brigades of the 9th Infantry 
Division from January 67 to December G6 } and the availability of the 
196th Infantry Brigade for deployment In August of I966. This brigade 
was originally scheduled for deployment to Dominican Republic, but was 
diverted to Vietnam. These changes brought the total of U.S. maneuver 
battalions scheduled to be in Vietnam by the end of 1966 to 79 and the 
total by June 67 to 82. k/ 

2 • The Pen is Quicker Than The Eye 

The question arises here as to why this revision of the plan ' 
became Program No. 3 rather than "change x n to the 10 April Plan. The 



k8 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



difference in the December 66 strengths of the 10 April Plan (later 
retroactively designated Program No. 2) was 7,500 while the difference 
in the June 1967 strengths was 5,900 — hardly very large changes. 

An explanation may lie in an exchange of memoranda which took place 
between 28 June and 15 July. On 28 June, the President wrote Secretary 
McNamara as follows: 

THE WHITE HOUSE 

* 

Washington 

Tuesday, June 28, 1966 
5:05 p.m. 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

As you know, we have been moving our men to Viet Nam on a 
schedule determined by General Westmoreland's requirements. 

As I have stated orally several times this year, I should 
like this schedule to be- accelerated as much as possible so that 
General Westmoreland can feel assured that he has all the men he 
needs as soon as possible. 

Would you meet with the Joint Chiefs and give me at your 
early convenience an indication of what acceleration is possible 
for the balance of this year. 

Sgd: Iyndon B. Johnson 6/ 

Secretary McNamara passed the question on to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
who replied on 8 July, 7/ that the present revised schedule did meet 
the CINCPAC requirements of 79 maneuver battalions by December 1966, and 
that "it appears that no significant acceleration of supportable combat- 
ready forces beyond those indicated will be attained." McNamara then 
replied to the President on 15 July that the Department of Defense had 
been "making strenuous efforts to accelerate deployments." 8/ He added, 

I am happy to report that this effort has been successful, 
and wc will be able to provide more troops and equipment during 
the remainder of this calendar year than we had though possible 
last sjDring . . . To illustrate the degree of acceleration already 
achieved, we now plan to have 79 Army and Marine Corps maneuver 
battalions in South Vietnam by December I966, as compared to the ■ 
70 battalions we thought could be safely deployed only four months 
ago. We now expect to have 395^000 personnel in South Vietnam 
by the end of this year compared to 31^000 estimated last March. 

The whole exchange may have a purpose other than simply requesting. 
information or directing acceleration. Presumably,- the President and 



■ 



k9 TOP SECRPJT - Sensitive 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






McNamara frequently conferred on the conduct of the Vietnam war and there 
would seem to be little need for such a request or directive to be placed 
in writing unless it was to act as some sort of record which could be 
easily pulled out and displayed in order to demonstrate that the President 
had been sending troops to Vietnam as rapidly as Westmoreland needed them. 

This makes sense if it is recalled that at this particular time the 
President was just in the process of publicly turning up the pressure on . 
North Vietnam by ordering the bombing of the POL supplies. This effort 
to step up the pace in the aftermath of the disruption caused by the 
Buddhist struggle movement probably also included a desire to increase 
the pace of the ground war in an effort to convince the DRV that we could 
and would do whatever was necessary to defeat them in the South. 

At the same time, there began to be some comment in the news, par- 
ticularly by Hanson W. Baldwin of the New York Times that top military 
men were beginning to feel that the policy of a gradual build-up was 
becoming outmoded and that what was needed was a sharp increase in the 
application of force. 

Seen in this context, the exercise of naming the last change to 
Phase IIA(R), "Program 3j " and the exchange of memoranda between the 
Secretary of Defense and the President can be interpreted as follows. 
The President, impatient at being held back by the internal strife in 
South Vietnam in his effort to convince the North of our will to win the 
war, was anxious to get on with the war in an attempt to get it over with 
quickly. The implication, from a writer reputed to have close ties with 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the military felt that the President was 
not doing enough, prompted the President to write a memorandum to the 
Secretary of Defense asking him specifically to see if the JCS could 
think of some way to accelerate the deployments of ground forces. When . 
the JCS wrote back that the present plan did meet Westmoreland's require- 
ments and that additional acceleration was unlikely, the President had 
in effect secured the agreement of his senior military men that he was 
doing all that was needed and possible 

The ploy of naming the latest change "Program #3" can be seen to 
have two effects in this effort. First, it gave the illusion of pro- 
gress. Second, it neatly wrapped up the changes since the beginning of 
the year, making the very real progress since December readily apparent, 
but obscuring the fact that most of the increase in the plan had occurred 
by 10 April. 



50 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



FOOTNOTES 



1. MA.CV Command History 1°66, pp. 20-21. 

2. Asst SecDef. (Systems Analysis) Memo for SecDef, Subj: Report on 
Deployments to SKA. (u), dtd 10 Jun 66. 

3. ASD(SA) memorandum for SecDef, Subj: Deployments to Southeast 
•Asia (U), dtd 13 Jun 66. 

k. ASD(SA) Memorandum for SecDef, Subj: Southeast Deployment Plan (u), 
dtd 30 Jun 66. 

5. SecDef Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Assistant Secretaries of 
Defense, Subj: Southeast Asia Deployment Plan, dtd 2 Jul 06. 

6. President's Memorandum for the SecDef, June 28, 1966. 

7- JCSM I+5O-66, Subj: CINCPAC Calendar Year Deployments dtd 8 Jul 66. 

8. SecDef Memorandum for the President, Subj: Schedule of Deployments 
to South Vietnam (u), dated 15 July 1966. 



51 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






N 









Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



% 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



III, PROGRAM Wo. k 



A. Planning Begins for CY 67 

1. CINCPAC ! s 18 June Request 

However, even before the Secretary of Defense published Program 
Wo. 3j CINCPAC had submitted his Calendar Year 1966 adjusted requirements 
and Calendar Year 1967 requirements, l/ 

CINCPAC 1 s requirements were based on a new concept for Vietnam. 
The four basic objectives remained as they had been set forth in CINCPAC's 
February concept. A new item in the June concept was that US/FWMAF and 
RVNAF general reserves and ARVN corps reserve forces would conduct sus- 
tained and coordinated operations with increased effort in the Highlands 
and along the western ARVN border. This was in line with the generally 
increased emphasis given in the concept to restricting NVA/Vc forces 1 
access to the coastal and land borders of ARVN through effective land, 
sea, and air interdiction operations. 

During this time, two slightly different estimates of enemy 
strength were available. The figures used by CINCPAC in their l8 June 
submission were 12 5 confirmed, 7 probable, and l8 possible battalions in 
South Vietnam. It was estimated that the enemy was capable of infiltrat- 
ing up to 15 battalion equivalents (9,000 personnel) per month into South 
Vietnam unless denied capability to do so. It was also estimated that the 
enemy could train 7 VC battalion equivalents (3,5 00 personnel) per month 
under the current existing situation. However, the best estimate of his 
intentions was that he would attempt to reinforce at the rate of 18.5 
battalion equivalents (11.5 NVA, and 7 VC) per month, which would give 
him a maximum build-up total of l80 battalion equivalents by March I967, 
at which time losses would exceed inputs and total VC strength would 
begin to decline. 

• The estimate of VC strength given in NIE lh.3-66, 2/ was as follows: 
The total Communist force in South Vietnam was estimated to be between 
250,000 and 280,000. The major combat elements included some 38,000 
North Vietnamese troops, approximately 63,000 regular main and local 
forces and from 100 - 200,000 guerrillas. The North was estimated to 
have a capability to infiltrate from 75>000 to 100,000 individual re- 
placements; but present evidence suggested that the probable infiltration" 
would be between 55^000 and 75,000. The estimate of VC recruiting in the 
South was from r {,000 to 10,000 a month. A projection of strength for end 
of 1966 was 125,000 in the Communist regular forces, but this could grow 
by the end of 1967 to over 150,000. The estimated strength for 1 January 
1967 > In terms of battalions, was between 170 and 190. 



5 2 ' TOP SECRET - Sens it i ve 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 

The requirements for 1966 had been adjusted to 474,786 bringing 
the year-end totals for 1966 and 1967 to 395,269 and 436,406, although 
the maneuver battalion strength remained at 79 U.S. battalions (this did 
not include the windfall of the 3 battalions of the 196th Brigade). The 
CINCPAC submission also reiterated the request made in February for 20 
batta3.ions to reconstitute the PACOM reserve. 

The requirements for CY 1967 were basically considered to be 
"rounding out forces." This force package basically consisted of: 
5 tactical strike squadrons; 11 U.S. maneuver battalions of infantry/ 
armored cavalry/tank configuration; a 4th rifle company for each of the 
6l U.S. infantry battalions, and 7 FWMAF battalions, 6 of which were to 
round out the ROK Marine Brigade to a Division, and 1 additional battalion 
for the Australian Task Force to round it out to a full regiment. After 
all of the deployments recommended in the plan were carried out, the 
strength of U.S. forces in Vietnam would be 90 maneuver battalions and 
542 ; 588 personnel. 

2. JCS Recommendations 

These requirements were forwarded to the Secretary of Defense 
by the JCS in JCSM 506-66, on 5 August. 3/ 

The memorandum noted that the JCS felt that with a few excep- 
tions the requirements and proposed force additions were valid, and 
that a capabilities planning conference was scheduled for early October 
to correlate this planning into a comprehensive program." 

3. Secretary of Defense Directs Studies 

On the same day, the Secretary of Defense sent a memorandum to 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as follows: 

5 August 1966 
MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SUBJECT: CINCPAC CY I966 Adjusted Requirements & CY I967 

Requirements (u) 

As you know, it is our policy to provide the troops, weapons, 
and supplies requested by General Westmoreland at the times he 
desires them, to the greatest possible degree. The latest revised 
CINCPAC requirements, submitted on 18 June 1966, subject as above, 
are to be accorded the same consideration: valid requirements for 
SYN and related tactical air forces In Thailand will be deployed 
on a schedule as close as possible to CINCPAC/cOMUSMACV's requests. 



53 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






V 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 

Nevertheless , I desire and expect a detailed, line-by-line 
analysis of these requirements to determine that each is truly 
essential to the carrying out of our war plan. We must send to 
Vietnam what is needed, but only what is needed. Excessive 
deployments weaken our ability to win by undermining the eco- 
nomic structure of the EVN and by raising doubts concerning the 
soundness of our planning. 

In the course of your review of the validity of the require- 
ments, I would like you to consider the attached Deployment 
Issue Papers which were prepared by my staff. While there may 
be sound reasons for deploying the units questioned, the issues 
raised in these papers merit your detailed attention and specific 
reply. They probably do not cover all questionable units, par- 
ticularly for proposed deployments for the PACOM area outside of 
SVN. I expect that you will want to query CINCPAC about these 
and other unite for which you desire clarification. 

I appreciate the time required to verify the requirements 
and determine our capability to meet them, but decisions must 
be made on a timely basis if units are to be readied and equip- 
ment and supplies procured. Therefore I would appreciate having 
your recommended deployment plan, including your comments- on 
each of the Deployment Issue Papers, no later than 15 September 
• 1965 . 

• 
Enclosures . Sgd: ROBERT S. McNAMARA k/ 

The items questioned in the Issue Papers totalled approximately 
70,000 troops with artillery and air defense providing the two largest 
single items. 

*• The "Quick Fix" 

While the JCS were beginning their review of the items questioned 
by the Secretary of Defense, they attempted to secure a "quick fix" in the 
form of a message from General Westmoreland. General Westmoreland evalu- 
ated the 1966 and 1967 force requirements as follows: 

...Continuous study of the situation indicates that past and 
current developments reinforce my appraisal of the war on which 
the CY 66-67 force requirements were based. There are no indi- 
cations that the enemy has reduced his resolve. He has increased 
his rate of infiltration, formed Division size units, introduced 
new weapons into his ranks, maintained lines of communications 
leading into South Vietnam, increased his use of Cambodia as a 
safehaven, and recently moved a combat division through the DMZ. 



5^ TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



These and other facts support earlier predictions and suggest 
that the enemy intends to continue a protracted war of attri- 
tion. We must not underestimate the enemy nor his determination. 

The war can continue to escalate. Infiltration of enemy troops 
and supplies from WN can increase and there is no assurance 
that this will not occur. 

If; contrary to current indications, Hanoi decides not to esca- 
late further, some modification of the forces which I have 
requested probably could be made. Under such circumstances, I 
conceive of a carefully balanced force that is designed to- fight 
an extended war of attrition and sustainable without national 
mobilization.. 

I recognize the possibility that the enemy may not continue to 
follow the pattern of infiltration as projected. Accordingly, 
my staff is currently conducting a number of studies with the 
objective of placing this command and the KVN in a posture that 
will permit us to retain the initiative regardless of the 
course the enemy chooses to pursue. These include: 

A. A study which considers possible courses of action by 
the enemy on our force posture and counteractions to maintain 
our superiority. 

B. An analysis of our requirements to determine a balanced 
US force that can be employed and sustained fully and effec- 
tively in combat on an indefinite basis without national mobi- 
lization. 

C A study to determine the evolutionary steps to be taken 
in designing an ultimate GVN security structure. 

D. A study to determine the optimum KVMF force structure 
which can be attained and supported in consideration of recent 
experience and our estimate of the manpower pool. 

Ref B /The CINCPAC submission/ establishes and justifies minimal 
force requirements, emphasizing, the requirement for a well 
balanced, sustainable force in SVN for an indefinite period. 
Consequently, at this point in time I cannot justify a reduc - 
^° n ^jjJ jqA^^Soents submitted . 4a/ 

B# Events in the Summer 

In the meantime, other things were happening which would have a 
significant effect on U.S. strategy in Vietnam and force requirements for 



55 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 









TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



supporting that strategy. First of these was the growing emphasis on 
pacification. The story of this growing emphasis is the subject of 
another study in this series. However , a few of the highlights and 
their implications for U.S. force requirements may be useful. Although 
the war between U.S. and enemy battalions progressed satisfactorily 
during the spring and early summer of 19 66, it became increasingly 
apparent that the pacification effort was not keeping pace. Urged on 
by Komer's visits to Vietnam, both Ambassador Lodge and General West- 
moreland turned their attention increasingly towards the problem of 
pacification.- On August 3, Ambassador Lodge in his weekly report to 
the President mentioned that he "conferred with General Westmoreland 
about the Vietnamese Regular Army — the ARVN — contributing more to 
pacification. He agrees on the urgent desirability of hitting pacifi- 
cation hard at this time when other things are going quite well." 5/ 

By 10 August _, Lodge was putting even more emphasis upon the pacifi- 
cation effort. This 10 August weekly report to the President gives an 
indication of the atmosphere in Saigon at this time. Lodge's cable 
opened with the following: 

In the struggle of the independence of Vietnam, the follow- 
ing can be said: we are not losing; we cannot lose in the normal 
sense of the word; never have things been going better; indeed, 
never have things been going so well. We are "on the track" 
with regard to almost every aspect of the war and we are winning 
in several. . .but all of this is still not called "victory." 
Indeed, however much they disagree about many things everyone 
-- in Washington and Hanoi and in Saigon — - seems to agree that 
what we have now is not victory. In truth we do not need to 
define "victory" and then go ahead and achieve it 100$. If it 
becomes generally believed that we are sure to win (just as it 
is now generally believed that we cannot lose) all else would be 
a mopping up. If there is "the smell of victory" we will be 
coasting. 6/ 

Lodge followed this up by listing a number of things which would 
psychologically mean "victory." Among these were "smashing results" in 
the criminal war of terrorism, subversion and local guerrilla action, 
movement towards constitutional democracy, spectacular success in the 
Chieu Hoi program and the opening of the roads in Vietnam. Lodge esti- 
mated that none of these things were "just around the corner." Therefore, 
it seemed to him that we had quite a stretch of time ahead of us. His 
questions then were "Could we shorten the time? Should we shorten the 
time? and if so, How? It was Lodge's judgment that a quick victory as 
the result of a relatively big, fast offensive might be easier to obtain 
than a victory achieved through a relatively moderate, slow offensive. 
He observed that, 

. . .Maybe the Vietnamese can last indefinitely — although it 
may be dangerous to assume it. But certainly It would be 



56 ' TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 









TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






helped by a quick end to the war ; assuming always that a satis- 
factory outcome was achieved. At present, U.S. military forces 
must help the Vietnamese actively in order to get the Vietnamese 
pacification effort moving -- let alone the war against the big 
units. We have high hopes that eventually they can undertake 
it all themselves and our soldiers have already expressed ap- 
preciation for the newly created Vietnamese political action 
teams and have recognized that they render the kind of service 
• no American can render. Nonetheless, our help is at present 
indispensable in the field of criminal-terrorist war as it is 
on the purely military side. 7/ 

To back up his feeling that now was the time for a big push, he quoted 
General Eisenhower's saying that if you desire to conquer one well readied 
organized and entrenched battalion with two battalions, you may succeed, 
but it will take a long time and many casualties. However, if you use a 
Division, you will do the job quickly and the losses will be slight. 

Ambassador Lodge then went on to discuss the newest proposals for 
pacification. He said that MACV had explained that: 

In the past ARVN had been so hard pressed by VC main .forces 
and North Vietnamese army units that it had had no choice but 
to concentrate on major offensive and defensive operations against 
these forces, leaving regional and popular forces with primary 
responsibility for providing local security in hamlets and villages. 
The latter had not been adequate to this mission. Now the build-up 
in US and Free World military forces makes it feasible to release 
a major part of ARVN from its former primary task of search and 
destroy operations and direct its main attention to pacification. 
This new concept of ARVN support of pacification operations will 
mean that US tactical forces will be carrying the main burden of 
search and destroy operations against the VC main force in North 
Vietnamese array units, while ARVN will be concentraing on pacifi- 
cation. 8/ 

This new interest was picked up as far away as CIECPAC where a draft 
military strategy to accomplish the U.S. objectives for Vietnam had been 
prepared. This draft was sent to MACV for his comments on 23 August 
19oo. 9/ This draft strategy broke down our concept for Vietnam into 
three inter-dependent undertakings. The first being U.S. actions against 
North Vietnam, the second, by actions against Communist forces in the 
South, and third, "nation building." In the section on nation building, 
draft strategy stated: 

Military operations will provide a steady improvement in 
security throughout the country permitting extension of govern- 
ment control in creating an environment in which RD can proceed. 
The RD program is vital to the attainment of military success 
in South Vietnam. Our forces will vigorously support and 






57 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 












Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



participate in the program in such areas as logistics, sanita- 
tion, medical care, construction, and resources and population 
control. Military personnel having the necessary skills would 
be employed in political, economic and social development pro- 
grams until they can be replaced by qualified civilians. 10 / 

On 2k August, the Roles and Missions Study Group in Saigon had com- 
pleted its study and gave its recommendations to the Ambassador, ll/ ' 
Among their recommendations were several which had Implications for the 
deployment of U.S. forces. One of these was that "as the increase of 
FWMAF strength permits, these forces engage with EVHAF in clearing up 
operations in support of RD with the primary objective of improving the 
associated GW forces." They also recommended that ARVN be the principal 
force in RVJNAF to provide the security essential for RD. To accomplish 
this, they recommended that the bulk of ARVN divisional combat battalions 
be assigned to sector commanders, that the ARVN division be removed from 
RD chain of command, and that the province chief be upgraded. They 
further recommended that Ranger units be disbanded because of their fre- 
quently intolerable conduct toward the population and that the RF and PF 
become provincial and district constabulary under the control of the 
ministry of RD. Also recommended was that the national police (special 
branch) assume primary responsibility with the identification -and de- 
struction of VC infra- structure. 

As far as the U.S. advisory effort was concerned, they recommended 
that USAID/Pield Operations, USAlI)/0ff ice of Public Safety, JUSPAO/Field 
Operations, OSA/Cadre Division and OSA/Liaison Branch have one responsi- 
bility in each province at a minimum. In MACV, they recommended that a 
Deputy for RD be established at the division advisory, corps advisory, 
and COMUSMACV levels. 

General Westmoreland, on 26 August, 2 days after the Roles and 
Missions Study was published, sent a message to CINCPAC, information 
copies going to the White House and State Department, Secretary of 
Defense, the JCS, and CIA. He opened by saying that: 

In order to promote a better understanding of the role 
which military operations play in the overall effort in South 
Vietnam I discern a need at this time to review the military 
situation in South Vietnam as relates to our concepts; past, 
present, and future. This is an appropriate time in light of 
the fact we are on the threshold of a new phase in the conflict 
resulting from our battlefield successes and from the contin- 
uing US/FWMAF build-up. 12/ 

Jle went on to describe the enemy's infiltration and build-up in his effort 
to gain control in South Vietnam; After characterizing his efforts fra 
1 May 1965 to 1 May 1966, as being basically to build up our combat and 
logistical forces and to learn how to employ them effectively, he went on 



rom 



58 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






• TOP SECRET - Sensitive 

to describe his strategy for the period from 1 May to November 1966. 
This SW monsoon season had been spent seeking to: 

...contain the enemy through offensive tactical operations 
(referred to as "spoiling attacks" because they catch the 
enemy in the preparation phases of his own offensive), force 
him to fight under conditions of our choosing, and deny him. 
attainment of his own tactical objectives. At the same time, 
we had utilized all forces that could be made available for 
area. and population security in support of RD...the threat of 
enemy main forces has been of such magnitude that fewer 
friendly forces devoted to general area security and support 
of RD envisualized at the time our plans were prepared for the 
period. 13/ 

General Westmoreland visualized his strategy for the period 1 November 
19oo to 1 May 1967 -- the NE monsoon season — as being one of maintain- 
ing and increasing the momentum of operations. The strategy would be 
one of 

...a general offensive with maximum tactical support to ares 
and population security in further support of RD. The essen- 
tial tasks of RD in nation building cannot be accomplished if 
enemy main forces can gain access to population centers and 
destroy our efforts. US/FW forces, with their mobility and 
coordination with RVMF, must take the fight to the enemy by 
attacking his main forces and invading his base areas. Our 
ability to do this is improving steadily. . .The growing strength 
of US/FW forces will provide the shield that will permit ARVN 
to shift its weight of effort to an extent not heretofore feasi- 
ble, to direct support of RD. Also, I visualize that a signi- 
ficant number of the US/jW maneuver battalions will be committed 
to tactical areas of responsibility (TAOR) missions. These 
missions encompass base security and at the same time support 
RD by spreading security radially from the bases to protect more 
of the population. . .At the same time, ARVN troops will be avail- 
able if required to reinforce offensive operations and to serve 
as reaction forces for outlying security posts and government 
centers under attack. . .The priority effort of ARVN forces will 
be in direct support of the RD program. In many instances, 
province chiefs will exercise operational control over these 
units. This fact notwithstanding, the ARVN division structure 
must be maintained and it is essential that the division com- 
mander enthusiastically support RD- Our highly capable US 
division commanders who are closely associated with correspond- 
ing ARVN commanders are in a position to influence them to do 
what is required. We intend to employ all forces to get the 
best results measured, among other things, in terms of population 



59 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



security; territory cleared of enemy influence; VC/lWA bases 
eliminated; and enemy guerrillas, local forces, and main forces 
destroyed. Barring any unforeseen change in enemy strategy, I 
visualize our strategy for South Vietnam will remain essentially 
the same throughout I967...I11 summation, the MACV mission, which 
is to assist GVN to defeat the VC/HVA forces and extend GVN 
control throughout South Vietnam, prescribes our two principal 
tasks, We must defeat the enemy through offensive operations 
against his main forces and bases. We must assist the GVN to 
gain control of the people by providing direct support of revol- 
utionary development ... Simultaneous accomplishment of these 
tasks is required to allow the people of SVN to get on with the 
job of nation building. lh/ 

Westmoreland closed his message by adding that Ambassador Lodge concurred 
with the following comment: 

I wish to stress my agreement with the attention paid to 
this message to the importance of military support for RD. 
After all, the main purpose of defeating the enemy through 
offensive operations against his main forces and bases must 
be to provide the opportunity through RD to get at the heart 
of the matter, which is the population of South Vietnam. 15/ 

A possible interpretation of this message is that it is a reaction 
both to a growing tendency to focus almost all attention on the pacifi- 
cation effort, and to the on- going battle over who would control the RD 
effort. General Westmoreland seemed to be saying that, while he fully 
recognized the essential importance of pacification effort, we should not 
lose sight of the importance of the mission performed by US/FW forces in 
keeping the enemy main force units away from the areas undergoing paci- 
fication. However, he did not want to restrict MACV only to fighting the 
war against main force units. Pie indicated that some US/FW forces would 
be used in direct support of RD activities, and recommended that the 
ARVN division be left in the RD chain of command, keeping the RD effort 
"militarized," and more susceptible to control through MACV. The 
military T s coolness to many of the recommendations of the Roles and 
Missions Study is indicated by the fact that MACV did not forward the 
study to CINCPAC until 2.6 September, while CINCPAC did not forward the 
study to the JCS until 26 October. 

However, Ambassador Lodge, on August 3-1, felt that he had finally 16/ 
achieved "the biggest recent American effort affecting Vietnam. . .giving 
pacification the highest priority which it has ever had — making it, 
in effect, the main purpose of all our activities." He pointed to 
Westmoreland's "concept of military operations in South Vietnam," a 
MACV proposal to put ARVN in support of pacification, and the report of 
the Inter-Agency Roles and Missions Study Group as evidence. He did, 



60 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 

however, begin to back away from the implication of his earlier cable 
(in which he felt that now was the time for a big push) by quoting 
General DePuy as saying that 

. . .As a general rule, he does not undertake pacification 
operations until RD personnel are ready to put in. Other- 
wise, he says, the effort is wasted and ground is covered 
which simply returns to the enemy if no organized formations 
exist which can be left behind. This statement could influ- 
ence the question of how much to increase the number of US 
troops in Vietnam. If US troops assigned to pacification 
are limited by the availability of RD personnel, and RD per- 
sonnel are presently being trained at the rate of about 
16,000 to 20,000 a year, then this fact (unless offset by 
others such as increased NVN infiltration) must have a limit- 
ing effect on the number of US troops which can profitably 
be used in Vietnam. 17/ 

Ambassador lodge then quoted General Westmoreland as believing that 
we had reached a crossover point where the rate of enemy losses equals 
the rate of infiltration," raising the question whether a certain number 
of US troops should be pared off of one task (the fighting of main force 
units) to go to the other (pacification). 

He next modified his earlier quotation of General Eisenhower's to 
read: 

There were advantages in having overwhelmingly superior 
military forces which would cut the time and cut the casual- 
ties — if conditions at the specific time and place warranted 
it. Clearly, this limit on producing RD personnel is a new 
and big "if." 20/ 

Lodge finally rounded out his appeals to authority by quoting an article 
by Sir Robert Thompson in the 12 August Sp ectator which advised that 
American military strategy 



. • • 



should be rather to commit the minimum forces against the 
enemy 1 s purely military forces, sufficient only to keep the 
Viet Cong dispersed and off balance. Thus the remainder of 
the American troops couJLd then be committed to providing the 
punch and protection without which the pacification program 
still left almost entirely in Vietnamese hands will not gather 
momentum . 19/ 

Lodge closed by claiming that the new stress on pacification was consis- 
tent with Thompson's advice. 



61 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



2 . Westmoreland's Attention Turns to the Sanctuaries 

However, in spite of Ambassador Lodge's belief that the atten- 
tion of General Westmoreland had been turned toward pacification, and 
that pacification was now to receive first priority, events were occur- 
ring which began to divert COMUSMACV's attention: 

The WA/VC had planned to shift into the final annihila- 
tion phase as far back as early 19 65. The buildup of US forces 
in particular in late 1965 and early 1966 inhibited the shift 
by the VC into their final phases. As an alternative the enemy 
attempted to build up larger forces in certain areas in accor- 
dance with Giap's version of "strategic mobility." The areas 
wherein the enemy attempted these buildups were Quang Tri 
Province in the I CTZ, and the border areas opposite the high- 
lands in the II CTZ. In July it appeared that the enemy might 
also attempt to create a holding area between the highlands and 
the Delta by the use of sufficient forces to prevent the US and 
FW forces from reinforcing the main threat in the highlands. 

During late June and early July the NVA attempted to move 
the 32^-B Div across the DMZ without detection and establish a 
base area complete with underground shelters and supply caches. 
At the same time the 3WA/VC attempted to establish a base for a 
two or three division force in the southwestern part of Kontum 
Province. In addition, .it appeared that in War Zone C an attempt 
would be made to train and re- equip the 9th VC Div and reinforce 
it with a regiment of the NTA, and to establish a base area east 
of Tay Ninh. With the advent of the northeast monsoon season in 
October the NVA/vC had planned to launch attacks from the base 
area into Quang Tri and Thua Thien. The NVA 2d Div was to make 
diversionary attacks along the coast between Quang Tri and Quang 
Ngai. From the base area in southern Kontum an attack to the 
east would be made in coordination with the NVA 3d Div in Binh 
Dinh. The objective was to control the Pleiku-Qui Nhon axis, a 
classic element of strategy which long has been of interest to 
the NVA and VC The main effort in the III CTZ was an attack 
• from the base east of Tay Ninh by the 9th VC Div and the 101st 
NVA Regt. The aim of this attack was to control Tay Ninh, Bien 
Quong, and Hau Nghia, the three provinces northwest of Saigon. 
In the Delta the VC continued random attacks on outposts and 
isolated units. Toward the end of the year the enemy disposition 
of one division in Quang Ngai, one in Binh Dinh and one in Phu 
Yen indicated a possible intention to retain control over large 
population centers and LOC's and to increase his access to rice, 
fish, and salt. The enemy dispositions also made it possible for 
him. to threaten to isolate the I CTZ. 20/ 

By July, the focus of operations had shifted. In I Corps during 
early July, Operation HASTINGS, the largest combined operation of the 



62 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 









Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



war to that date, began. This operation took place in the area south 
of the DMZ. As the operation continued, heavy contact was made with the 
NVA 325B Division, which had infiltrated through the DMZ with the sus- 
pected purpose of attacking and seizing Quang Tri province. Operation 
HASTINGS was followed by Operation PRAIRIE, which began on 3 August, 
when one battalion was retained south of the DMZ to keep track of the 
NVA.324B and 341st Divisions which had been driven back into, the DMZ in 
Operation HASTINGS. Contact with the enemy began immediately and con- 
tinued to increase. The Marine Corps forces were redistributed and 
Operation PRAIRIE continued until the end of the year. During this 
period of time, amphibious Operation DECK HOUSE IV was launched against 
enemy units which had been detected trying to infiltrate from the DMZ 
southward along the coast. 2l/ 

In II Corps, General Westmoreland set forth his strategy for the 
highlands in the immediate future. It was apparent that, although the 
enemy had begun his final SW monsoon campaign, the US S¥ monsoon cam- 
paign was proceeding admirably and had only to continue to keep the 
enemy off balance. General Westmoreland envisioned a series of opera- 
tions in which the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, the 3rd Brigade 
of the 25th Infantry Division, and a brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division 
would provide surveillance and a screen to the west of Kontum and 
Pleiku. 22/ 

Late in the spring, on 10 May, the 3rd Brigade of the 25th Infantry- 
Division had initiated Operation PAUL REVERE along the Cambodian border 
near Chupong Mountains. This operation was to be evaluated by MACV 23/ 
as "probably the single most significant Allied action in keeping the 
enemy from mounting his vaunted SW monsoon offensive." By July, when 
the KVA infiltration appeared to have become too much for them to handle, 
the 1st Air Cavalry was called in to assist. When the 1st Cavalry Division 
became involved the operation was renamed PAUL REVERE II. It continued 
for another 25 days when the major threat seemed to abate, at which time 
the operation was again redesignated, this time, PAUL REVERE III. 

In III Corps, BIRMINGHAM was followed by EL PASO II, which ran 
fran 2 June through July. This search and destroy operation marked 
the entrance of the 1st Infantry Division into the War Zone C. The 
results of this operation included killing of over 800 enemy, destruc- 
tion of a substantial quantity of rice, salt, and fish, and the engage- 
ment of three VC regiments, the 271st, 272nd, and 273rd -- the regiments 
of the 9th VC Division. 2k/ 

By August, Operations HASTINGS south of the DMZ in I Corps, PAUL 
REVERE II along the Cambodian border in the Central Highlands of II Corps, 
and EL PASO II along the Cambodian border in III" Corps had indicated to 
COMUSMACV that infiltration, was increasing from sanctuaries outside the 
boundaries of South Vietnam. The most pressing of these infiJ.tr at ion 
routes appeared to be the one through the -EMZ. On 8 August, Ambassador 
Lodge sent a message to the Department of State. 



63 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



. 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



The recent upsurge of enemy infiltration, thru the DMZ is 
causing a complete re-evaluation of Allied military posture 
in Quang Tri Province. If, as is strongly indicated, the 
enemy has made the decision to increase the tempo of his 
operations thru the DMZ, additional steps must be taken to 
block that approach effectively. 25/ 

Ambassador Lodge quoted General Westmoreland as advancing the sug- 
gestion, with which he agreed, that there might be merit in giving these 
measures the greatest possible international flavor by. constituting a 
multi-national organization to help block enemy's infiltration through 
the DMZ. 

The organization would be known as the KANZUS Force from 
its national components: Korean, Australian, New Zealand, and 
US. As presently visualized, the organization would be 
brigade size, with 2 US Marine and 1 ROK battalion as the 
combat elements. Individual battalions would retain their 
national identity. Formation of the command headquarters sup- 
porting structure would provide a place for incorporating token 
remaining national contributions from Australia and New Zealand 
and others such as the Philippines, should this become suitable 
. . .The organization; commanded by a USMC officer, possibly a 
brigadier general, would operate in the US tactical chain of 
command in close coordination with and in support of the ARVN. 26/ 

Ambassador Lodge foresaw that: 

The establishment of such a force might eventually provide 
us with a basis for suggesting the presence of an international 
force of different composition under UN or Asian regional 
sponsorship which could inherit the anti-infiltration role of 
KANZUS. An eventual successor would function obviously as a 
political and psychological cordon sanitaire and not, of course, 
as a military Maginot Line. However, a physical barrier is a 
possible future development. 2j/ 

On 10 August; General Westmoreland, in a message for Admiral Sharp 
and General Wheeler, 28/ pointed out that the enemy "has increased his 
rate of infiltration, formed division-size units, introduced new weapons 
into his ranks; maintained lines of communication into South Vietnam, 
increased his use of Cambodia as a safe haven, and recently moved a 
combat division through the DMZ." 

The KANZUS suggestion was only the first of a series of ideas pro- 
posed by various people and agencies to limit infiltration through the 
£>MZ. On 16 August, Lodge forwarded to the Secretary of State 
General Westmoreland's proposal that: 



6H TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



?/ 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



We consider defoliation of the southern portion of the DMZ 
as a possible means to prevent enemy infiltration through that 
area... In the event defoliation of the DMZ is not acceptable, 
MACV staff has drawn up an alternate plan which would call for 
defoliation of a large area just south of DMZ running east from 
Laos border to fringe of coastal lowlands. Target would be 
sufficiently south to insure against accidental spread into 
DMZ itself. I see no serious political objections. 29 / 

On September 7th, the JCS sent to CINCPAC, with an information copy 
to COMUSMACV, a proposal which had resulted from a Jason summer study on 
an air supported ant i- infiltration barrier. 30/ 

This study suggested that an air supported barrier system specifi- 
cally designed against the North Vietnamese infiltration system through 
Laos, based on further development of components that in the main were 
available, might be obtainable in about a year after the decision to go 
ahead. The barrier would have two somewhat different parts, one designed 
for foot traffic and one against vehicles. The proposed location for 
the foot traffic barrier was the region along the southern edge of the 
DMZ to the Laotian border, then north to Tchepone, and then to the 
vicinity of Muong Sen. The location for the anti- vehicle part of the 
system was further to the west where the road network was more open to 
traffic . 

The anti-troop infiltration system (which would also 
function against supply porters) would operate as follows. 
There would be a constantly renewed minefield of non- 
sterilizing Gravel (and possibly button bomblets) distri- 
buted in patterns covering interconnected valleys and slopes 
over the entire barrier region. . .There would also be a 
pattern of acoustic detectors to locate mine explosions 
indicating an attempted penetration. The minefield is in- 
tended to deny opening of alternate routes for troop infil- 
trators and should be emplaced first. On the trails cur- 
rently being used from which mines may — we tentatively 
assume -- be cleared without great difficulty, a more dense 
pattern of sensors would be designed to locate groups of 
infiltrators. Air strikes using Gravel and SADEYES would 
then be called against these targets. The sensor patterns 
would be monitored 2k hours a day by patrol aircraft. The 
struck area would be reseeded with new mines. 

The anti-vehicle system would consist of acoustic detec- 
tors distributed every mile or so along all truckable roads 
In the interdicted area, monitored 2k hours a day by patrol 
aircraft with vectored strike aircraft using SADEYE to 
respond to signals that trucks or truck convoys are moving. 31/ 



65 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



\ 



The Gravel mines were small mines designed to damage the enemy's 
feet and legs. These mines were to sterilize (become non-effective) 
after a given period of time. The button bomblets were small mines 
(aspirin size) designed to give a loud report but not to injure when 
stepped on by a shod foot. Their purpose was to make a noise, indica- 
ting pedestrian traffic, which could be picked up by the acoustic 
sensors. The SADEYE was a bomblet cluster, dropped from aircraft, which 
was exceedingly effective against personnel. 

This was not the first barrier proposed against infiltration from 
North Vietnam. Earlier in the year, in April, CINCPAC had replied to a 
suggestion to construct a conventional barrier, utilizing mines, and wire 
with troops to monitor and back it up, which would run from the coast 
across the northern portion of South Vietnam through the panhandle of 
Laos, to Thailand. CINCPAC and MA.CV had argued against this barrier 
because of the tremendous strain it placed upon the logistical facilities 
]n "both South Vietnam and Thailand, and because of the large number of 
troops which it required. 32/ The CINCPAC reply to the Jason proposal 
was sent to the JCS on 13 September i960. Although CINCPAC conceded that 
"any measure which will effectively impede, disrupt flow of men and materiel 
from North Vietnam into South Vietnam merits consideration." Their judgment 
was that even "if we were to invest the time, effort and resources in a 
barrier project, it is doubtful that it would improve US position in South 
Vietnam." CINCPAC expressed doubt whether the barrier suggested would 
impede infiltration. He contended that a barrier system must be tended; 
if not, it could be breached with ease, while the flow of men and materiel 
to the VC/NVA continued. An aerial delivered obstacle would not be expected 
to supplant the need for soldiers on the ground, and the time, effort and 
resources of men and materiel required to establish a ground barrier would 
be tremendous. Also, he expressed his misgivings over the reliability 
and practicality of the electronic and other type gadgetry which would be 
in the barrier. 

However, General Westmoreland was interested in another anti-infiltration 
device which was under development by the Army. This was a Caltrop — a 
non-explosive device designed to penetrate enemy footwear to inflict wounds. 
On 2k September I966, General Westmoreland had indicated that a 3O-9O days 
sterilization time for the Caltrop would be acceptable, 33/ and on 
2 October, he recommended to CINCPAC and JCS that the Caltrop be deployed 
for operational tests as soon as possible. 3b/ 

Unfortunately, all of these ideas for halting or slowing the infil- 
tration through the DMZ were to become effective sometime in the future. 
General Westmoreland f s problem was very much in the present. On Septem- 
ber 13, he sent Admiral Sharp a message on the threat to the I Corps 
Tactical Zone. 35/ In this message, Westmoreland laid out what he con- 
sidered to be the nature of the threat posed by the enemy sanctuaries; 
in this case, the Demilitarized Zone and North Vietnam immediately above 
the DMZ. 



66 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



The current enemy build-up. . .constitutes a direct threat 
to US/FW GVN forces in I CTZ and to the security of Quang Tri 
and Thua Thien Provinces. The seriousness of this threat 
underscores the importance and urgency of utilizing all prac- 
ticable means to prevent the enemy from generating a major 
offensive designed to 'liberate 1 the provinces in question 

and to inflict maximum casualties on US/fw/gVN forces The 

enemy is consolidating his position in northern I CTZ and, 
according to my J-2, the 324th B Division is reinforced by the 
3nlst Division and being further reinforced by possibly two 
additional divisions, one now in the vicinity of the DMZ and 
one on the move south. He continues to use the DMZ as a troop 
haven and as a supply head for his forces moving into northern 
I CTZ.... The size of his build-up, disposition of forces, forward 
stockage of supplies, AA weapons systems being deployed southward, 
and depth of patrol penetrations indicate by all accepted stan- 
dards that the enemy is developing an offensive as opposed to 
defensive posture. By October, the weather in Laos will be 
clearing and the enemy may be expected once again to move person- 
nel and supporting materiel in quantity through the area, thus 
permitting him to engage our flank in Quang Tri Province from 
the west. Conversely, worsening weather in the coastal plain 
of I and II CTZ's would work to the enemy's advantage in attacks 
on friendly positions in these areas. Utilizing traditional 
routes through the Laos panhandle he will be able to reinforce 
large-scale diversionary attacks further south in coordination 
with a main assault through the DMZ and against the Western 
flan k . The success of our efforts in coping wi th enemy ini ti- 
atives has been based u pon spoilin g attacks by ground and a ir 
^2£S±BJLJi£L disrupt the plans before he is cap able of comp leting 
prepar ations for attack! He has thus bee n kept off balance from 
mounting a successful offensive It now would appear, however, 
tha t because of ou r a pproach th e enemy is employing a new tactic 
entailing us e of sanctuaries in ~the DMZ and north thereof in an 
-effort to p r-gZgjj^L, s . P Q ^ lj - n g attacks. Since we are unable to 
exercise the initiative in moving ground forces into the DMZ or 
NW we are left with fire power alone as the instrument for attack. 
I consider it imperative in this regard that we utilize aerial 
delivered fire power and naval gun fire in this situation if we 
are to thwart the enemy's pending offensive as discussed above." 

He concluded by requesting employment of B-52's against the North 
Vietnamese forces infiltrating through the DMZ. 

On 16 September General Westmoreland sent a message to Admiral 
Sharp 36/ in which he presented his concept for handling infiltration 
through the Laotian panhandle. As General Westmoreland put it, "With 
the arrival of the WE monsoon season weather in Laotian panhandle will 
be clearing and enemy is expected to infiltrate personnel and supporting 






67 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



materiel in quantity through that area. The requirement to carry this 
threat is evident. If allowed to go unchecked , it will permit enemy to 
engage our flank in Quang Tri Province from the west and will permit 
large-scale diversionary attacks further south. The seriousness of 
this thrust led us to development of a new concept to block., deny, spoil 
and disrupt the infiltration of enemy personnel and supplies through 
Laos during the forthcoming dry season." The concept hinged upon two 
basic principles. "First, we will intensify around-the-clock surveillance 
and interdiction of known infiltration routes. This process will stress 
attack of selected interdiction points as well as strikes against targets 
of opportunity. Second, we will concentrate our resources on successive 
key target areas to be known as ! slams. ™ Once an area was designated as 
a slam it would be hit with B-52 and Tactical Air Strikes to neutralize 
it. This action would be followed by visual and photo air reconnaissance 
and/or ground reconnaissance patrols and, if appropriate, exploitation 
forces. Upon their withdrawal they would leave mines and booby traps, 
and the Air Force would follow with air delivered land mines. In special 
instances, General Westmoreland planned to leave stay-behind reconnaissance 
parties. The term 'slam 1 itself came from "seek, locate, annihilate, and 
monitor . " 

On 20 September 1966, General Westmoreland followed this up with 
yet another message to Admiral Sharp. 37/ 

Subject: Containment of Enemy Forces in Sanctuaries 

1. The threat to South Vietnam of large enemy forces in 
the sanctuaries of Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam has now 
clearly emerged and is of increasing concern to me. Particu- 
larly vulnerable to enemy attacks from these sanctuaries are 
the Special Forces Camps of Hie Sanh, Due Co, Du Dop, Loc Ninh 
and Song Be. We are therefore compelled to seek ways of con- 
taining the enemy forces in their sanctuaries and preventing 

a major ingress of these forces in South Vietnam. 

2. The problem is now under active study by my staff. 
Redeployment of available forces to counter this threat may 
be necessary and could seriously jeopardize other important 
undertakings. Moreover, additional forces already requested 
may not be sufficient to contain the enemy forces in their 
sanctuaries and still accomplish other essential tasks. 
Studies a^-e now underway to determine what additional forces 
will be required. 

3- The above is submitted for your information in connec- 
tion with the force requirements and capabilities actions now 
in progress. You will be advised of the results of our current 
studies. 



68 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



- 

TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






3 . Lodge's Attention Turns to Inflation 

While General Westmoreland's attention was being increasingly- 
drawn towards the problems of infiltration from sanctuaries outside the 
borders of Vietnam, Ambassador Lodge's attention was being increasingly 
drawn towards the problem of inflation inside the borders. As Ambassador 
Porter in Saigon wrote to Komer on 17 August: 

Fiscal year 1966 was a year of inflation. Money supply 
rose by 72$ and Saigon working class cost of living index by 
92$. Near of end of year (June 18) the piaster was devalued 
from 60 piasters per dollar to 118 piasters per dollar and 
six weeks later at time of writing, prices had begun to 

stabilize It appears at this writing (Aug 11, 1966) that 

devaluation of June 18 3ms been successful surgical operation. 
It has increased by nearly 100$ the number of piasters with- 
drawn from circulation for each dollar of imports, and this 
has sopped up enough demand to stabilize prices and actually 
reduce the total monetary circulation. Retail price indices 
have sho\m little change for last five weeks. Black market 
price of green dollars appears to have levelled off at a 
level of about 185-195, and price of gold also declining. 
There remain, however, number of threats to this newly estab- 
lished and so far fragile stability. 38/ 

He then listed five primary threats: The first was wage stability. There 
had been a general round of wage increases since devaluation, but it was 
not yet certain that labor demands had been satisfied. 

Second was mounting U.S. expenditure: 

US military build-up has tendency to generate continu- 
ously greater piaster expenditure, both by US BOB officially, 
and by our troops as individuals. Current total rate of 
expenditure ' around 36 billion piasters a year. In US, DOD 
programming rise to rate of over k-7 billion piasters was orig- 
inally foreseen for fiscal year I967. This order of increase 
would tend very definitely to upset the stabilization effort. 
Budget of 36 billion piasters for total BOB generated expen- 
diture in FY I967 has now been ordered, but this may prove 
• very difficult to implement. 

The third danger was seen to be an increased GVN budget. The 
total GVN civil and military expenditures were about 55 billion piasters 
, in FY 1966, and they might rise to 70 billion or more in FY 67. 

On 15 September the Saigon Ero"oe.ssy 39/ forwarded their latest 
computation of the inflationary gap, based upon programs and budgets 
which had been submitted for CY 67.' 



69 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



to 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



The GVN military budget was estimated at 57 billion piasters , while 
the GVN civil budget was estimated at 40.1 billion piasters. The U.S. 
expenditures were estimated to be as follows: US Military Personal 
Expenditures, 16,9 billion piasters; US Military Official Purchases, 28.7 
billion; Wage Increase for Local Personnel, 2.4 billion; US Mission 
Civilian Housing, 1 billion; US Military Cantonments, 3 billion; Expen- 
ditures of other US Agencies, 8 billion; and Non-Official Purchases, 
1 billion. With credit expansion and exports added in the total, monetary 
creation projected for year 1967 was 175-9 billion piasters. Total 
monetary absorption was estimated to be I3I.8 billion piasters which left 
an inflationary gap of 44.1 billion piasters. The message concluded: 

We consider a gap of this magnitude to be unacceptable 
in light of current U.S. policies. Mission currently studying 
ways to reduce gap. 

In answer to this news, the Department of State sent back a message 
on 23 September. 40/ It stated that the size of the inflationary gap 
was "very disturbing," and tersely indicated that: 

. . .much work needs to be done on policy side to get 
US house in order in preparation for discussions with GVN 
....Official US piaster spending estimated to be 45 billion 
piasters. However /according to your message, U.S. expendi- 
ture_s/, total 59-8 piasters, of which military expenditures 

■ alone total 48.6 excluding US civilian housing project and any 
portion 2.4 billion for wage increase for local military hire. 

• This would appear to represent 50^ increase over present level 
official US spending (including over 1/3 increase in military 
spending) which is certainly way out of line with" stabiliza- 
tion. Military spending figures also gross variance with 
quarterly ceilings imposed for the first half of CY 67 of 
9 billion piasters, 4l/ 

Apparently, at this time Secretary McNamara was also becoming 
interested in the piaster situation in Vietnam. On 22 September, the 
JCS answered 42/ a question given them on 2 September by Secretary 
of Defense with regard to a preliminary examination of the piaster 
cost per man for the U.S. forces in Vietnam compared to those of GVN 
forces. Their reply indicated that "the piaster costs per man for 
U.S. forces /were/ several times the magnitude of the joint support 
piaster costs per man for GVN armed forces. /However^/ since available 
indicators /did/ not support a comparable ratio of combat effectiveness 
■ per man, consideration purely on a piaster cost basis might suggest- 
\ increasing GVN armed forces strength in relation to U.S." On the other 
hand, other considerations had indicated that "we may be near the upper 
manpower limit on GVN armed forces strength." The Joint Chiefs indi- 
cated they would "include appropriate consideration of potential piaster 
cost tradeoffs in future recommendations with respect to the strength of 
both US and GVN armed forces in Vietnam," but did not "foresee significant 
. piaster advantages as becoming available through feasible exchanges." 



70 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



V 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



C. Conflicting Inexorables 



!• Lodge's Piaster Ceilin g 

On 1 October 1966, Ambassador Lodge sent back his reply to 
the State Department's earlier message. L3/ 

Ao SUMMARY 

I. -REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN MISSION COUNCIL CONCURRENCE 

ON PIASTER BUDGETS FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR OF 1967 HAVE NOT 

PROVEN SUCCESSFUL, AFTER CONSIDERABLE STUDY OF THIS 

ENTIRE MATTER, I, NEVERTHELESS, PROPOSE THAT WASHINGTON ACCEPT 

A U.S. PIASTER EXPENDITURE CEILING FOR 1957 OF 42 BILLION FOR THE 

US. MILITARY AND 16 FOR THE U,S. CIVILIAN ELEMENTS, THIS 

TOTAL OF DZ BILLION FOR 1967 COMPARES WITH 42 BILLION IN 1966. 

THESE SPENDING LEVELS, WHEN OFFSET BY ANTI- INFLATIONARY 

MEASURES, GIVE AN ESTIMATED SO-CALLED "INFLATIONARY GAP" OF 10 

BILLION PIASTERS FOR 1S57, IN MY JUDGMENT, HIGHER U, S, 

PIASTER SPENDING LEVELS WOULD CAUSE AN ACCELERATION OF 

INFLATION ''.HIGH WOULD JEOPARDIZE OUR POLITICAL AND MILITARY 

& STAFF STUDIES 

2. DURING THE USAID PRESENTATION TO THE MISSION COUNCIL OF 
ITS 1967 PROGRAM- IT BECAME APPARENT THAT A DECISION ON TIE 
USAID PROGRAM COULD BE MADE ONLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH A REVIEW 
OF ALL U.S. AGENCY PROXGRAMS IN TERMS OF THEIR PIASTER AND 
MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS. I REQUESTED A REVIEW OF PLANNED 
PROGRAMS AND SPENDING LEVELS OF U.S. AGENCIES AND RECEIVED 
REQUESTS TOTALLING 75 RI1XION.PJAST-ERS CREF. A), OF WHICH ABOUT 
kS BILLION PIASTERS WERE - I&iiWi" AFD 26 BILLION FOR 
U.S. CIVILIAN PURPOSES, IRIS COMPARES TO A TOTAL LL S, PIASTER 
SPENDING THIS YEAR OF ABOUT 42 BILLION PIASTERS, OF WHICH THE 
MILITARY CONSTPTUTES 30 AND TIE CJVV JAM 12, TIE INCREASE 
REQUESTED BY THE MILITARY OF 19/BJLLION IS OBVIOUSLY CLOSELY 
RELATED TO THE PROPOSED INCREASE IN TGOOP STRENGTH, WHICH LATEST 
REPORTS AVAILABLE TO ME SHOW LILLIGO FROM ABOUT 386,020 BY 
THE END OF 1956 TO ABOUT 519,000 OR SO BY THE END OF 1967, 
THE INCREASE REQUESTED BY THE CIVILIAN SECTOR OF 14 3ILLI0N 
IS TO FINANCE THE SHARPLY EXPANDING OF "THE OTHER WAR" 
ACTIVITIES, TOGETHER THESE SUGGESTED BUDGET LEVELS LCULD REQUIRE 
AN INC \SE OF ZZ BILLION PIASTERS, WHICH WHEN PLACED ON TOP OF 
AN ALREADY TAUT ECONOMY WCULD CERTAINLY CAU3ESERI0US INFLATION. 
THE QUESTPON IS NOT HOW MUCH WE MUST CUT, BUT WHERE. 



71 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



3. 1 ASKED FOR A STAFF STUDY TO REDUCE THESE PIASTER REQUESTS TO 

A LEVEL WHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH REASONABLE ECONOMIC STABILITY 
DURING 1967 AND YET WHICH DOES NOT JEOPARDIZE OUR MILITARY 
■ PROGRESS AND OUR CIVILIAN PROGRAMS. THE STAFF RECOMMENDED 
A LEVEL OF 33 BILLION PIASTERS FOR THE U,Sc MILITARY FORCES. 
MACV STATED THAT THIS WAS TOO LOW TO ALLOW FOR EXPANSION OF 
FORCES IN 1957 AND I AGREED, A SECOND STAFF STUDY WAS PREPARED 
WHICH SET 39 BILLION AS A MAXIMUM FIGURE FOR THE ILS. 
MILITARY FORCES. THIS TOO WAS TURNED DOWF BY GENERAL 
WESTMORELACD AS BEING INADEQUATE TO MEET THE NEEDS OF 
MACV DURING 1957. AGAIN, I AGREE, 

4. ON THE CIVILIAN SIDE THE FIRST STAFF STUDY RECOMMENDED 
A LEEL OF 13 BILLION PIASTERS C^ WHICH USAID WOULD RECEIVE 
1? BILLION, THIS IS 3 BILLION LESS THAN USAID REQUESTED. 

THE SECOND STAFF STUDY PROPOSED 15 BILLION PIASTERS OF WHICH 
USAID WOULD RECEIVE 10 BILLION HIS REDUCTION WAS NOT 
AGREED TO BY MR, MCDONALD OF USA 10 WHO SAID HE DID NOT 

REGARD THIS REDUCED AMOUNT SUFFICIENT FINANCING FOR 
ESSENTIAL GVN/U3 BUILD-UP ON THE CIVILIAN SIDE. . 

C THE DANGER. OF INFLATION 

5, FAILING AGREEMENT AMONG U.S. AGENCIES, I HAVE REVIEWED 

BOTH THE VARIOUS PIASTER REQUESTS AND THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK AFD 
AM HERE PRESENTING FOR WASHINGTON CONSDERATION MY PROPOSAL 
FOR PIASTER SPENDING CEILINGS IN CALENDAR YEAR 1967, BEFORE 
PGESENTING THIS PROPOXSAL, IT IS IMPORTANT TO GET CLEARLY IN MIND 
WHY AN INCREASE IN SPENDING BY M.S. AGENCIES OF 33 BILLION 
PIASTERS DURING 1957 IS INTOLERABLE AND MUST BE REDUCED 
LET US FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT CONSIDER THIS LHOLE SUBJECT 
IN THE LIGHT OF. THE AMERICAN SOLDIER'S LIFE. CLEARLY, HIS LIFE 
CAN BE IMPERILED SEVERAL WAYS: 

A) THE MOST OBVIOUS IS BY DEFEAT IN BATTLE. 

B) BUT IN THIS COUNTRY, A WILDCAT, SOUL DESTROYING INFLATION 
WHICH MEANS THAT VIETNAMESE MILITARY PERSONNEL CANNOT MAKE 
BOTH ENDS MEET AND THEREBY THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES LOSE 
FIGHTING QUALITY COULD ALSO JEOPARDIZE CUR OWE TROOPS. 

C) ALSO, AN INFLATION WHICH RESULTS IN THOUSANDS OF ADULTS 
DEMONSTRATING IN THE STREETS (WHERE FORMRLY WE HAVE HAD ONLY 
ROCK-THROWING TEENAGERS),/ WITH THEKESLUUTING POLITI CAI 
INSTABILITY LEADING TO THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT, COULD 
BE AN EVEN MORE PRESSING DANGER—MORE SO EVEN THAN DEFEAT IN 
BATTLE. INDEED, RAND REPORTS INDICATE VIET CONG PRISONERS NO 
LONGER BELIEVE THAT THEY CAN BE VICTORIOUS IN BATTLE, BUT ARE 
COUNTING ON OVERTHROWING THE GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON. THIS IS THE 
POLITICAL DANGER WHICH INFLATION CAN CAUSE, 

6. THEREFORE, IF WE LOOK AT THIS PROPOSITION SOLELY FRCM THE 
STANDPOINT OF THE LIFE AND DEATH OF 'THE SOLDIER, WE FIND OUR- 
SELVES CAUGHT BETWEEN VARIOUS INEX0RA3LES: THE INEX0EA3LES 

OF BATTLE, OF INFLATION, AND OF POLITICS 

7. LET US NOW CONSIDER THESE VARIOUS, APPARENTLY CONFLICTING, 
INEX0RA3LES, TAMING THE MILITARY FIRST. 



O 



72 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






8. I -BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD BRING A3 MASSIVE AN AMERICAN 
MILITARY FORCE TO BEAR IN VIET- NAM A3 WE CAN AND' THAT WE SHOULD 
DO SO AS 3UICKLY AS WE CAN— SO LONG AS THIS CAN RE DONE WITHOUT 
A WILDCAT INFLATION AND WITHOUT OTHER LETHAL POLITICAL EFFECTS, 

BELIEVE THAT '/HEN ONE HAS RECOURSE TO FORCE, OVERWHELMING 

STRENGTH BRINGS A QUICKER RESULT, A SHORTER WAR AND THUS FEWER 
CASUALTIES. 

9. THE POLITICAL AND INFLATIONARY DANGERS WHICH THE PRESENCE 
OF TROOPS CREATES MUST BE CONSTANTLY WATCHED. WE HAVE, CLEARLY, 
FOR EXAMPLE, ALREADY GONE TOO FAR IN PUTTING AMERICANS-- MILITARY 
OR CIVILIAN— INTO VIETNAMESE COMMUNITIES, JOSTLING THE VIET- 
NAMESE, SQUATTING ON AFTER LEASES HAVE EXPIRED, AND IN EFFECT 
TELLING THEM TO MOVE OVER. 

10. i UNDERSTAND THAT TODAY SOME W PERCENT OF U.S. TROOPS ARE 
ASSIGNED UNDER THE GENERAL HEADING OF "GUARDING BASES'* AND THAT 
THE REMAINING 60 PERCENT IS ENGAGED IN SO-CALLED "OFFENSIVE 
OPERATIONS" AGAINST MAIN FORCE UNITS. IT NOW APPEARS THAT 
TROOPS ARE GOING TO BE NEEDED FOR AN ENTIRELY NEW KIND OF 
WORK—THAT IS CONTAINMENT OF THE SANCTUARIES" IN COUNTRIES 
ADJACENT TO VIET-NAM WHICH ARE BECOVING VERY BIG. THE 

TROOPS ENGAGED IN SUCH WORK WOULD BE IN RELATIVELY UNPOPULATED 
COUNTRY AND THEY SHOULD NOT HAVE SERIOUS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCE. 

11. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, TROOPS ARE STATIONED IN THE DELTA, 
WHICH IS BOTH THICKLY POPULATED AND A GREAT RICE PRODUCING 
COUNTRY, THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DANGERS COULD BE GREAT. 
THESE THINGS CANNOT BE FORETOLD AHEAD OF TIME AND MUST BE 
WATCHED ON A DAILY BASIS. 

D. RECOMMENDATIONS 

12. TURNING NO'V TO THE CIVIL SIDE, I FEEL IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT 
USA ID EXPENDITURES FOR 1966 ARE 7.5 BILLION AND I VELiEVE WE 
COULD 00 THE ABSOLUTELY VITAL TPINGS IN 1957 WITH SOMEWHERE 
AROUND THAT AMOUNT. THIS IS BECAUSE OF MY BZlltt , AS 
REGARDS CIVIL EXPENDITURES, THAT THE PROBLEM IS hlQT SO MUCH 

DO MORE AS IT IS TO DO WHAT WE DO BETTER AND MORE SKILL- 
FULLY, THEREBY DEVELOPING AND ENCOURAGING VIETNAMESE SELF 
HELP AND SKILL DEVELOPMENT. INSTEAD OF GOING TO THE 1956 LEVEL 
OF 7.6, I PROPOSE AN INCREASE OF UP TO 10 o WITH OTHER CIVILIAN 
EXPENDITURES I THUS PROPOSE AN OVERALL CIVILIAN CEILING OF 16 
BILLION PIASTERS. HAVING IN MIND THE FACT THAT IN THIS PAINFUL 
CONTEMPLATION THE IMMOVEABLE FORCE IS UP AGAINST THE IRRESIST- 
IBLE OBJECT, I BELIEVE THIS WILL BE THE BEST THING TO DO - 
DIFFICULT THOUGH IT IS. 

13. THE U.S. MILITARY IS THUS ASSIGNED A CEILING OF hZ 
BILLION PIASTERS FOR 1967. TPIS PROPOSED MILITARY CEILING OF 

42 BILLION PIASTERS IS 12 BILLION HIGHER THAN THE SPENDING LEVEL 
FOR 1966. IT CONSTITUTES AN INCREASE OF 9 BILLION PIASTERS ABOVE 
THE FIRST STAFF STUDY RECOMMENDATION OF 33 BILLION. IT RE- 
PRESENTS AN INCREASE OF 3 BILLION ABOVE THE SECOND STAFF STUDY. 
TPE LEVlL OF 1*2 BILLION PIASTERS APPEARS TO VE REASONABLE IN 



I 



73 



TO LP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



■ 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



\ 



LIGHT OF OUR SERIOUS INFLATIONARY PROBLEM. THIS REPRESENTS AN 

INCREASE OF 6 BILLION PIASTERS ABOVE THE CURRENT PiASTER 
CEILING FOR THIS FISCAL YEAR OF 36 BILLION PIASTERS. WHILE IT 
IS CLEAR THAT SOME INCREASE OVER THE CURRENT CEILING IS 
NECEUSARY IN VIEW OF THE TROOP BUILDUP, I FEEL THAT AN INCREASE 
ABOVE h2 BILLION WOULD BE DANGEROUS. SUCH AN INCREASE WOULD 
CONFRONT US WITH A CHOICE BETWEEN STILL FURTHER REDUCING CIVILIAN 
VROGRAMS OR FACING DANGEROUS INFLATION DURING 1967. NEITHER 
OF THESE ALTERNATIVES IS ACCEPTABLE . 
14. I, THEREFORE, RECOMMEND THAT WASHINGTON APPROVE MY 
PROPOSAL FOR U.S. PIASTER SPENDING WHICH, WHEN ADDED TO 
VIETNAMESE SPENDING, WOJLD GIVE THE FOLLOWING GRAND TOTAL: 
A MILITARY SENIOR BUDGET OF 923! LL I ON PIASTERS OF WHICH 50 
WOULD BE FOR VNAF AND k2 FOR MACV, AND A CIVILIAN PIASTER 
BUDGET OF 41 BILLION, OF WHICH 25 WOULD BE FOR GVN CIVIL BUDGET, 
10 FOR USA ID- AMD 6 FOR NON-USA ID UoS. MOHER EXPENDITURES 
TOTAL 15 BILLION, OF WHICH CREDIT EXPANSION AMOUNTS TO 12. 
THIS MAKES A TOTAL OF PIASTER EXPENDITURES OF 143 BILLION." 
FACTORS WHICH DECREASE THE MONEY SUPPLY, SUCH AS IMPORTS 
AND TAXES, ARE ESTIMATED TO TOTAL 133 BILLION PIASTERS, LEAVING 
A SO-CALLED "GAP" OF 13 BILLION (SEPARATE TELEGRAM WILL FOLLOW 

GIVING FURTHER DETAILS), 
. WEAKNESSES OF 1 HE GVN 

15. QLEASE NOTE TWO POINTS WHICH REINFORCE THE NECESSITY FOR 
KEEPING OUR PLANNED "INFLATIONARY GAP' 1 TO 10 BILLION PIASTERS 
OR LESS 

16. FIRST, I DOUBT WHETHER ANY STABILIZATION AGREEMENT HERE 
CAN DO SO MUCH OR SO WELL AS DESCRIBED IN REF C. VIETNAMESE 
OFFICIALS WILL PROBABLY TRY TO 03LIGE US BY AGREEING TO A NUMBER 
OF THINGS, SIMPLY IN ORDER TO BE POLITE. BUT '//HEN IT COMES TO 
MEASURES WHICH REALLY HAVE SOVE TEETH, I AM NOT OPTIMISTIC. 
WHAT MADE KY'S MEASURES ON DEVALUATION AND PORT OPERATIONS 
VALUABLE IS THAT THEY WERE THINGS WHICH WERE CLEARCUT AND WHICH 
HE COULD CARRY OUT. I FEAR A MUCH LARGER U.S .-SPONSORED PROGRAM 
IN VIET -NAM BECAUSE I BELIEVE THAT THE GVN IS ADMINISTRATIVELY 
TOO WEAK TO KARRY THEM OUT AND SPECIAL INTERESTS ARE Si ILL 

VERY STRONG. IT IS A BIT LIKE A FLYWHEEL BELT WHICH CAN BE 
TIGHTENED SO MUCH THAT TRACTION IS LOST AND THE MOTOR MERELY 
SPINS WITHOUT GETTING THE FLYWHEEL TO VOVE. AS I HAVE SAID 
IN PREVIOUS TELEGRAMS', I 3ELIEVE THERE IS A RATE AT WHICH 
THESE PEOPLE CAN GO AHEAD AND ANYTHING BEYOND THAT RATE 
TENDS TO BE LIP SERVICE. THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES, | ,\i MY 
MIND, TO RESEMBLE LITTLE EVA, JUMPING FROM ICE FLOE TO ICE 
FLOE. THIS MAKES THE SEPTEMBER 11 ELECTION A PARTICULARLY 
WELCOME MIRACLE, BUT SOMEWHAT OF A VIRACLE NEVERTHELESS. 
THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION IS TENUOUS AND PRECARIOUS. 

17. SECOND, OUR GAP ESTIMATES ARE ON THE OPTIMISTIC SIDE. I 
DOUBT WHETHER THE GVN CAN RAISE DOMESTIC TAX REVENUES FROM 



ABOU' 



13.5 



BILLION PIASTERS THIS YEAR TO 20 BILLION PIASTERS 



NEXT YEAR. FURTHERMORE. GIVEN THE PRESENT LULL IN THE MARKET 



7h 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



/* * 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



AND. CONTINUING PORT CONGESTION, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT IMPORTS WILL 
REACH THE ASSUMED LEVEL OF $725 MILLION DURING 1957. TO THE 
EXTENl THEY DO NOT AMD CUSTOMS COLLECTION ARE LESS THAN 
PLANNED s WE '.'/ILL BE FACED WITH A LARGER GAP AND HENCE MORE 
INFLATION THAN WE NO?/ ANTICIPATE IN OUR PLANNING FIGURES. 
F, KEY ASSUMPTIONS 

18. BASED ON THE ABOVE THINKING, WE MADE AS STRINGENT A 
BUDGET PLAN AS WE COULD. CONSISTENT WITH OUR OTHER MILITARY 
AND CIVILIAN OBJECTIVES. OJR PROPOSED BUDGET PLAN IS BASED 
ON THE FOLLOWING ASSUMPTIONS-. 

A. VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES ARE ASSUMED TO HOLD DURING 1967 
AT A FORCE LEVEL EQUAL TO THAT REACHED AT THE END OF OCTOBER 
1966. I FEEL THAT GIVEN OJR INFLATIONARY SITUATION, IT IS 
IMPERATIVE THAT THE VIETNAMESE MILITARY NOT PLACE FURTHER 
DRAINS ON THE LIMITED MANPOWER RESOURCES IN THIS 
COUNTRY. THESE DRAINS HAVE HAD A WEAKENING EFFECT ON THE 
ABILITY OF THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT TO PERFORM. WITH THE 
IMPROVEMENT IN OUR MILITARY POSITION DURING 1966, IT SEEMS 
DESIRABLE TO CONCENTRATE IN 1967 ON IMPROVING THE QUALITY 
OF THE VN ARMED FORCES RATHER THAN EXPANDING THEM IN SIZE. 
B) WE HAVE ASSUMED A WAGE INCREASE BY THE GVM OF ONLY 
10 PER CENT. CLEARLY THIS IS THE MINIMUM "/AGE INCREASE 
THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE, 

C) WE HAVE HELD BOTH THE CIVIL AND THE MILITARY GVM BUDGETS 
TO BARE-BONES LEVELS. 

D) WE HAVE ASSUMED THAT THE MILITARY WILL MAINTAIN THEIR 
PIASTER EXPENDITURES THROUGHOUT CALENDAR YEAR 1957 AT THE 
k2 BILLION PIASTER LEVEL. THIS IS A CRITICAL ASSUMPTION AND 
IS BASED ON MY UNDERSTANDING THAT SECRETARY MCNAMARA HAS 
ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO HOLD U.S. MILITARY PIASTER SPENDING 

TO WITHIN 36 BILLION PIASTERS DURING THIS FISCAL YEAR. ADMIT- 
TEDLY, THIS WILL MEAN A FURTHER STRETCHOUT OF CONSTRUCTION 
PROGRAMS j ADDITIONAL MEASURES TO REDUCE PERSONAL EXPENDITURES 
BY U.S. TROOPS,. AMD POSSIBLY THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL U.S. 
SUPPORT TROOPS. IF THIS BUDGET LEVEL CANNOT BE HELD, IT WILL 
JEOPARDIZE OUR ENTIRE ANT I -I NFLAT I ONARY PROGRAM HERE IN 
VIET- NAM. I AM MOST APPRECIATIVE OF THE UNDERSTANDING AND 
EXCELLENT COOPERATION WHICH SECRETARY MCNAMARA HAS GIVEN TO US 
ON THIS SUBJECT, 

E) WE HAVE CUT THE USAfD/GVN PROGR^'S BY ONE -THIRD, 
BRINGING THEM DOWN FROM THE 15 WHICH WAS REQUESTED TO 13 
BILLION PIASTERS.- I WAS MOST RELUCTANT TO MAKE A CUT OF SUCH 
PROPORTIONS IN THIS VITAL AREA, BUT FEEL THAT WE CANNOT MEET 
OUR STABILIZATION OBJECTIVES UNLESS BOTH THE CIVILIAN AND 
MILITARY PROGRAMS ARE CUT. CUTTING ONE WITHOUT THE OTHER 
NEITHER SERVES OUR INTERESTS NOR ALLOWS US TO MEET OUR 
OBXCTIVES. FURTHERMORE, IT SEEMS '(0 ME DESIRABLE OH THE 
CIVILIAN SIDE, TO CONCENTRATE ON IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF 
PROGRAMS AS WELL AS EXPANDING THEM. LODGE 



tc: 



75 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






In essence , what Ambassador Lodge seemed to be looking for was a 
solution which would balance the conflicting inexorables, especially 
those of battle and inflation. He ended up by straddling the fence. 
He stated that he believed that we should "bring as massive an American 
military force to bear in Vietnam that we can and that we should do so 
as quickly as we can." But he hedged by adding "so long as this can be 
done without a wildcat inflation and other lethal political effects." 
He seemed to think he had found a solution in Westmoreland's new fasci- 
nation with the sanctuaries across the borders of South Vietnam. He 
hoped that with large numbers of troops employed in the less populated 
areas , it might be possible to have both the massive force quickly 
employed and a relatively small inflationary effect. However, he seems 
to have been misjudging what Westmoreland had in mind. 

Nevertheless, his 42 billion piaster limit on U.S. military expen- 
ditures was to become one of the controlling factors in the decision on 
Program #k strengths . 

2. Wes tmore land' s Reclama 

On 5 October, COMUSMACV sent a message to Washington to set 
forth his reclama to the Ambassador's proposed piaster expenditure limit, kk/ 

1 While MACV does not concur in the Ambassador's 

message 3 we are fully committed to maintaining restrictions 
on US spending in Vietnam. COMUSMACV's position concerning 
the military and economic situation in SVN is as follows: 

A. The primary mission of US forces in RVN is to 
defeat the VC/NVA forces in SVN, and to assist GVN in 
extending governmental control throughout the land. If 
MACV must operate within a piaster ceiling of k2 billion 
for CY 67 and if our actual deployments approach the 
approved deployment level as identified in OSD's South- 
east Asia Deployment Program No. 3 dated 1 Aug 66, it 
would mean that US troop deployments to RVN would have 
to stop about mid-December i960. Such action would 
deprive us of at least one division and the required 
combat support and combat service support necessary to 
balance our forces as identified and approved in the 
CY 66 force requirements. A US military piaster expen- 
diture ceiling of k-7.k billion is ihe minimum requirement 
needed by MACV in order to conduct sustained operations 
of the OSD FY 66 approved force level of 445,000, an 
average of 440,000 during CY 67. 

B. While it is recognized that inflation is a 
serious problem, a reduction of US military piaster 
spending with a corresponding reduction of US forces 
or military efforts could seriously jeopardize our 
military progress. . 

76. TOP SECRET - Sensitive 









Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






C. Today, with the US/FW forces available, large 
scale sustained operations can be mounted within any 
. geographical area of SVN. However, with the enemy 1 s 
increasing buildup capability he has been able to 
.increase his combat strength in SVN to 131,200, approxi- 
mately 7 combat divisions. It is estimated that he will 
have a combat strength of 1^7,300 consisting of l8l Inf 
Bns and 63 Combat Spt Bns, or approximately 10 Combat 
Divisions, in country during the second quarter of CY 67. 
By maximizing his training capability in NVN, the input 
could be substantially increased. If the enemy adopts 
this course of action, further selected increases in 
US/FW strength in SVN may be required over requested 
I967 force levels. 

I). The CY 66 US/lW force increases will allow 
tactical commanders to step up their search and destroy 
and other offensive operations both in size and frequency. 
This increase is necessary to turn the tide of the enemy 
buildup. The estimated enemy attrition made possible by 
this force increase would hold the enemy buildup to 
approximately 1^7,300 combat strength as stated above. 
If the US/FW forces continue attrition of the enemy at 
the same increasing rate during the next 12 month period 
as accomplished during Jan -Jul 66, the enemy combat strength 
should start to decline during the second quarter CY 67. 
However, if the enemy accelerates buildup in SVN to his 
maximum capability, his strength probably will not start 
to decline until some time in CY 68. The enemy continues 
to show every inclination to continue his military efforts. 

E. On the basis of the foregoing, it can be seen that 
a large scale forced deferral of troop increases at this 
time, while the enemy continues to build up, would be a 
most imprudent course of action that could jeopardize 
seriously. ... 

-X- #■ -X- #• #■ 

2. Part C, Ref A discusses the dangers of inflation and 
refers to the RAND reports on Viet Cong prisoners. It is recog- 
nized that the political danger of inflation is a continuing 
threat to the GVN and that we must use all available resources 
to insure the economy is not faced with a, "wildcat" rise in 
prices. However, we must not at this time impose a restriction 
that possibly would hamstring our military effort. 

3- RAND reports are difficult to assess. The time lag in 
publication and the conclusions drawn from the studies will vary. 



77 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



/ 



■ 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



It is true that the majority of "hard core" captives and defectors 
cited in the RAND reports no longer predict an inevitable VC 
victory, many of this selected group now see the war as a stale - 
. mate with each side building up its respective force. Although 
some of this group now see defeat, in the main the confidence of 
the individual enemy soldier in a military victory has dwindled 
due 5 in large measure, to the string of defeats he has suffered 
at the hands of the US/GVN/Eree World Forces. However, limita- 
tion of these US/GVN forces for economic reasons would curtail the 
momentum of the military effort at this critical point and con- 
ceivably jeopardize the overall US effort in Vietnam. 

k. Para 10 & 11, Part C, Ref A discusses troop utilization 
but does not depict clearly the military concept of operations in 
Vietnam for CY 67. Our concept recognizes and is built around 
two equally important, continuing and complementary requirements 
which call for the same type of military resources and flexibility 
in their application. On the one hand, we must maintain the 
security of our bases and key population and food producing centers 
and assist in expanding security of areas under Government control. 
On the other hand we must seek out and destroy the enemy's main 
forces and his bases to create the environment in which meaningful 
Revolutionary Development can proceed. The priority of US/FW 
military efforts will continue to be devoted to our main mission, 
the destruction of enemy main forces and bases. The "entirely 
new kind of work" referred to by the Ambassador is in reality a 
continuation of our surveillance and rapid reaction tactics vis- 
a-vis enemy forces occupying sanctuaries in adjacent territory. We 
are according heightened emphasis to this effort, and may find it 
necessary to ask for additional forces to insure its success. 

Information copies of this message were sent to the Secretary of State, 
Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Also on 5 October, Dr. Alain Enthoven, Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Systems Analysis, in a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, kp/ 
compared Lodge's proposed 42 billion piaster budget with several other 
relevant figures. The first figure was kl billion piasters, which would 
allow Program 3 deployments based upon actual July and August piaster 
spending rates, but which did not allow for any price increases during 
CY 67 • The next figure given was kk billion piasters which allowed 
for completion of Program 3 deployments and for prices to rise during 
the period July I966 to December 1967 by %. The third figure given was 
43.6 billion piasters which would allow a rise in U.S. strength to a total 
of 525,000 by December of 1967, but did hot allow room for inflation. The 
last figure given was I+7A billion piasters, which would allow completion 
of CINCPAC's deployment plan which envisioned an end T 68 strength of 
569,000, but which did not allow for any increase in prices. Assistant 



78 



TOP SECRET - Sensitiv 



f 



- 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Secretary Enthoven pointed out that differences in spending associated 
with different deployments were small in CY 67 relative to the uncer- 
tainty about spending for a, given deployment. However, he also added 
that if Lodge T c expenditure program were achieved, it was likely that 
at best the rate of inflation would be reduced to about 20$ per year. 
At this rate, he estimated that even Program 3 would cost nearly 50 
billion piasters. 

3« The JCS: Issue Papers and World Wide Posture 

Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had completed their review 
of CINCPAC ! s 18 June requirements for CY 66 and 67 and the issue papers 
which the Secretary of Defense had given them on 5 August. On 2k September, 
they forwarded their review of these requirements and their answers to the 
issue papers. k6 / This document was reviewed by Dr. Enthoven f s office 
and on 29 September, he sent a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense. He 
reported that deletions of requirements by CINCPAC and the JCS totaled 
1+9 j 000 personnel of the 215,000 add-on requirements for US forces in 
PAC0M (excluding Hawaii). Of the deletions, 39,000 were included in the 
issue papers. He added that his SEA Programs Division was in the process 
of analyzing the detailed rationale for the remaining requested units and 
that new deployment issue papers would be provided to the Secretary of 
Defense for his approval on 3 October. ^6a/ Apparently, the Secretary of 
Defense approved them for on 6 October he forwarded another set of deploy- 
ment issue papers to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asking 
that they review the issues and have their recommendations for him by 
1 November when he planned to make his decision on the papers. The items 
considered in the issue papers totaled some 5*f, 000 troops out of CINCPAC f s 
total request of 569,000 for deployment to South Vietnam. The leading 
items considered were the 15,000 troops (9,000 Army and 6,000 AF) which 
were involved in IV Corps operations and 12,000 Artillery troops. 

By this time, Secretary McNamara. had already decided to make a trip 
to Saigon to see if he could get a better feel for the situation there. 
However, before he departed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded to him 
a paper analyzing the world-wide military posture of the United States in 
light of the August CINCPAC requirements study for CY 1967- kjj 

Assuming that there would be no call-up of reserves, no change in 
rotation policies, and that resources for the proposed deployments would 
be obtained from the world-wide military structure, the impact of meeting 
the CINCPAC 1967 requirements, as they saw it, would be tremendous. The 
Army would suffer most, meeting the CINCPAC requirements (12 additional 
maneuver battalions) on the average six to eight months late, and in the 
, process emasculating C0MJS STPAF, leaving it but two airborne brigade 
forces for 1967 and the first part of 1968. Other NATO reinforcing 
division forces could not be ready from the Army until late 1968. USAREUR, 
USAPAL and PAC0M reserve would all be at a reduced level because of 
"qualitative personnel withdrawals." In total, the Army would have a 
force deficiency of three and two-thirds active division forces if it 
were to satisfy strategic reserve and -sustaining base requirements. 



79 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



.. • 



i 



Carrier pilots would remain the major Naval shortage. The Air Force , 
upon completion of the required deployments (in September of I967) 
'would not have the capability to deploy rapidly any combat-ready 
tactical fighter forces." With one exception, all tactical and recon- 
naissance units in the United States were assigned and executing training 
tasks. To meet CINCPAC requirements would require drawing down from 21 
TFS (486 aircraft) in Europe to 13 squadrons or 288 aircraft. Given all 
Air Force commitments and responsibilities to respond to NATO and provide 
other reinforcements a short-fall of some 22 TFS (kk^ aircraft), 5 TRS (90 
aircraft) and k TCS (6k aircraft) would result. 

In the "guts" portion of the memorandum detailed consideration was 
given to the extent which mobilization of the reserves could alleviate 
shortages. It noted these: 

Army . Significant withdrawals of equipment have been 
made from the reserve components to support new activations. 
This has resulted in a degradation of the training capability 
and the mobilization potential of the reserve components. 
Therefore, full or partial mobilization of reserve units would 
have only limited effectiveness in accelerating Army deploy- 
ments. However j mobilization of reserve units would permit a 
more rapid restoration, personnel-wise, of the STRAP- In 
addition, reserve unit mobilization and subsequent deployment 
of these units to Europe or Korea would accelerate restoration 
of Army forces in those areas. Selective mobilization of 
reservists possessing critical skills could greatly improve 
the quality. of the training and sustaining base and the quality 
of deploying units which are now having to deploy with shortages 
of skills and experienced leaders. Selective mobilization would 
permit some acceleration of unit deployments. 

Air Force. Mobilization could provide 20 deployable ANG 
tactical fighter squadrons (k09 aircraft minimum) and 12 ANG 
tactical reconnaissance squadrons. While not nuclear capable 
and possessing less modern aircraft, the TFSs would partially 
provide for the 22 TFS shortfall anticipated. By using older 
equipment, shortfalls in TRSs would be reduced to zero, and 
•the CONUS base posture improved. TCS shortfalls would be reduced 
through use of C-119 aircraft. Some personnel shortages would 
be alleviated. 

» 

«* * # •* * 

In conclusion, the Services cannot fully respond to 
CINCPAC *s CY 1966 (adjusted) and CY 1967 force requirements on 
the time schedule he has prescribed and under the conditions 
stated in paragraph k, above. Providing the preponderance of 
his requirements, even on a delayed schedule, would further 
impair the US military posture and capability to maintain for- 
ward deployments to deter aggression world-wide. It would 

80 . TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



7 






\ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



further reduce the capability to reinforce NATO rapidly, to 
provide forces for other contingencies, and to maintain. a 
sufficient rotation and training base. Mobilization of 
reserves, extension of terms of service, and extending over- ' . 
seas tours would assist in alleviating shortfalls associated 
with satisfying CINCPAC's requirements. Certain critical 
problems cannot be fully resolved by mobilization because of 
equipment and skill shortages. Of particular note in the 
case of the Army, equipment withdrawals from the Reserve 
components have substantially weakened the Army's reserve 
structure. k&J 

Interestingly enough, the kind of mobilization the JCS were talking 
about in JCSM-646-66 was a full-blown affair which added 688,500 reservists 
generally in units to the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines by December 
1966. Other than listing units, availability dates and programmed total 
strengths, the memorandum did not delve into specific applications of 
these reserve forces or how they would alleviate the manpower/unit/equip- 
ment crunch which the JCS described. k$J 

D " McNamara Goes to Saigon -- Decision on Four 

With all of this information in hand, Secretary McNamara departed 
for Saigon. While the records available do not indicate what went on 
in Saigon, the results were clearly spelled out in the Secretary of 
Defense's Memorandum for the President, submitted upon his return. _50 

1. A Memorandum for the President 




1. Evaluati on of the situation. In the report of my last trip to 
Vietnam almost a year ago, I stated that the odds were about even that, 
•even with the then-recommended deployments, we would be faced in early I967 
with a military stand-off at a much higher level of conflict and with 
"pacification 1 ' still stalled. I am a little less pessimistic now in one 
respect. We have done somewhat better militarily than I anticipated. We 
have by and large blunted the communist military initiative — any military 
Victory in South Vietnam the Viet Cong may have had in mind 18 months ago 
has been thwarted by our emergency deployments and actions. And our program 
of bombing the North has exacted a price. 



„ TOP SECRET - Sensitive 
81 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



■ 



My concern continues, however ", in other respects* this is because I 
J*gg.Jl c L.jgJfi OKa fr3-g way to bring jhe w ar to an end soon. Enemy morale has not 
broken — he apparently has adjusted to our stopping his drive 'for military 
victory and has adopted a strategy of keeping us busy and waiting us out 
fa strategy of attriting our national will). He knows that we have not been, 
and he believes ve probably will not be, able to translate our military 
successes into the "end products 1 ' — broken enemy morale and political 
achievements by the GVN. 

The one thing d emonst rably goi ng for us in Vietnam over the p&st year 

has been the large number of enemy killed~in~action resulting from the big , 

military operations . Allowing for possible exaggeration in reports, the 

enemy must be taking losses — deaths in and after battle ~ at the rate of 

more than 60,000 a year. The infiltration routes would seem to be one-way 

trails to death for the North Vietnamese, Yet there is no sig n of an im- 

P -Z break in enemy morale and it ar s that he can more tha n r ep lace 

his lps.ses or i nfiltration fr:.- North Vietnam and r ecruit b inJSoubh 
Vie una: , 

• 

Pacification is a bad disappointment . We have good grounds to be pleased 
by the rec: b elections, by Y.y's l6 : shs in povcr, and by the -faint signs 
of development of national political institutions and of a legitimate civil 
government. But none of this has translated itself .into political achieve- 
ments at Province level or belov. Pacificatio n has if anything -gc \ •' ;d , 
As compared with two, or four, years ago, enemy full-time regional farces and 
part-time guerrilla, forces are larger; attacks, terrorism and sabotage have 
increased in scope and intensity; more railroads are closed and highways cu: ; 
the rice crop expected to come to market is smaller; we control little, if any, 
more of the population; the VC political infrastructure thrives in most of the 
country, continuing to give the enemy his enormous intelligence advantage; full 
security exists nowhere (not even behind the US Marines 1 lines and in Saigon); 
in the countryside, the enemy almost completely controls the night. 

Nor has the ROLLI NG THUNDER progr am of bombing the North either significant] 
affected infiltration or cracked the morale of Hanoi. There is agreement in the 
intelligence community on these facts (see the attached Appendix), 

In essence, we find ourselves — from the point of^view of the important 
war (for the complicity of the people) — - no better f and if anything worse off. 
This Important war must be fought and won by the Vietnamese thems elves^ We have 
known this from the beginning. But the discouraging truth is that v as was the 
case in 19 6l and 1963 and I965, we have not found the formula , the catalyst » 
for training and inspiring them into effective action. ~~ "" ""' 



82 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



/ 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



2. Recommended a ctions . In such an unpromising state of affairs, what 
should we do? We must continue to press the enemy militarily; we mu st make 
demonstrable progress in pacification; at the sari- time, ve must add a new 
ingredient forced on us by the facts . Specifically, ve must improve our position 
by getting our elves into a militar y posture that we credibly would mainta in^ 
. inde finitely — a posture t ; tryingjto_"wait us out 11 less att ract ive, 
I recommend a five-pronged course of action to achieve those ends. 

a * Stabilize US force l eve ls in Vietnam. It is my judgment that, 
barring a dramatic change in the war, we should limit the increase in US forces 
in SVN in 1967 to 70,000 men and ve should level off at the total of 1*70,000 
which such an increase would provide. a / ^ i s m Y view that this is enough 
to punish the enemy at the large-unit~operations level and to keep the enemy's 
main forces from interrupting pacification. I believe also that even many more 
than 1*70,000 would not kill the enemy off in such numbers as to break their 
morale so long as they think they can wait us out. It is possible that such 
a hO percent increase over our present level of 325,000 will break the enemy's 
morale in the short term; but if it does not, we must, I believe, be prepared 
for and have underway a long-term program premised on more than breaking the 
morale of main force units. A stabilized US force level would be part of such 
a long-term program. It would put us in a position where negotiations would be 
more likely to be -productive , but if they were not we could pursue the all- 
important pacification task with proper attention and resources and without the 
spectre of apparently endless escalation of US deployments. 

b * Install a barrier . A portion of the 1*70,000 troops — perhaps 
10,000 to 20,000 ~- should be devoted to the construction and maintenance of 
an infiltration barrier. Such a barrier would lie near the 17th parallel -- 
would run from the sea, across the neck of South Vietnam (choking g:? the new 
infiltraticn routes through the DMZ) and across the trails in Laos. This 
interdiction system (at an approximate cost of $1 billion) would comprise to 
the east a ground barrier of fences, wire, sensors, artillery, aircraft and 
mobile troops; and to the west — mainly in Laos — an interdiction zone 
covered by air-laid mines and bombing attacks pin-pointed by air-laid acoustic 
sensors. < 

The barrier may not be fully effective at first, but I believe that it 
can be made effective in time and that even the threat of its becoming -effective 
can substantially change to our advantage the character of the war. It would 
hinder enemy efforts, would permit more efficient use of the limited number of 
friendly troops," and would be persuasive evidence both that our sole aim is to 
protect the Souuh from the North and that we intend to see the job through. 



a/ Admiral Sharp has recommended a 12/31/67 strength of '570,000. However, I 
believe both he and General Westmoreland recognize that the danger of 
inflation will probably force an end I967 deployment limit of about 1*70,000 






83 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



c * gjjftbmze the ROLLING THUNDER program against the North. Attack 
sorties in North Vietnam have risen from about ^,000 per month at the end of 
last year to 6,000 per month in. the first quarter of this year and 12,000 per 
month at present. Most of our 50 percent increase of deployed attack-capable 
aircraft has been absorbed in the attacks on North Vietnam. In North Vietnam, 
almost 8h,000 attack sorties have been flown (about 25 percent against fixed 
targets), 1*5 percent during the past seven months. 

Despite these efforts, it now appears that the North Vietnamese-Laotian 
road network will remain adequate to meet the requirements of the Communist 
forces in South Vietnam — this is so even if its capacity could be reduced 
by one-third and if combat activities were to be doubled. North Vietnam's 
serious need for trucks, spare parts and petroleum probably can, despite air 
attacks, be met by imports. The petroleum requirement for trucks involved in 
the infiltration movement, for example, has not been enough to present sig- 
nificant supply problems, and the effects of the attacks on the petroleum 
distribution system, while they have not yet been fully assessed, are not 
expected to cripple the flow of essential supplies. Furthermore, it is clear 
that, to bomb the North sufficiently to make a radical impact upon Hanoi's 
political, economic and social structure, would require an effort which we 
could make but which would not be stomached either by our own people or by 
world opinion; and it would involve a serious risk of drawing us into open 
war with China, 

The North Vietnamese are paying a price. They have been forced to -assign 
some 300,000 personnel to the lines of communication in order to maintain the 
critical flow of personnel and materiel to the South. Nov that the lines of 
communication have been manned, however, it is doubtful that either a large 
increase or decrease in our interdiction sorties would substantially cringe 
the cost to the enemy of maintaining the roads, railroads, and waterways or 
affect whether they are operational. It follows that the marginal sorties -~ 
probably the marginal 1,000 or even 5,000 sorties -- per month against, the 
lines of communication no longer have a significant impact on the. war. (See 
the attached excerpts from intelligence estimates.) 



When this marginal inutility of added sorties against North Vietnam and 
Laos is compared with the crew and aircraft losses implicit in the activity 
(four men and aircraft and $20 million per 1 3 000 sorties) , I recommend, as. a 
minimum, against increasing the level of bombing of North Vietnam and against 
increasing the intensity of operations by changing the areas or kinds of 
targets struck, a / 



a/ See footnote on page 82 



8k 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Under these conditions, the bombing program would continue the pressure 
and would remain available as a bargaining counter to get talks started (or to 
trade off in talks). But, as in the case of a stabilized level of US ground 
forces, the stabilization of ROLLING THUNDER would remove the prospect of ever- 
escalating bombing as a factor complicating our political posture. and dis- 
tracting from the main job of pacification in South Vietnam. 

• 

At the proper time, as discussed on pages 6-7 below, I believe we should 
consider terminating bombing in all of North Vietnam, or at least in the North- 
cast zones, for an indefinite period in connection with covert moves toward 
peace. 

d. Pursue a vigorous -pacification nrogram. As mentioned above, the 
pacification (Revolutionary Development) program has been and is thoroughly 
stalled. The large-unit operations war, which we know best how to fight and 
where we have had our successes, is largely irrelevant to pacification as long 
as we do not lose it. By and large, the people in rural areas believe that the 
GVN when it comes will not stay but that the VC will; that cooperation with the 
GVN will be punished by the VC; that the GVN is really indifferent to the people 1 
welfare; that the low-level GVN are tools of the local rich; and that the GVN is 
ridden with corruption. 

- • 

Success in pacification depends on the interrelated functions of providing 
physical security a destroying the VC apparatus, motivating the people to cooperate 

and establishing responsive local government , An obviously necessary but not 
sufficient requirement for success of the Revolutionary Development cadre and 
police is vigorously conducted and adequately prolonged clearing operations by 
military troops, who will "stay" in the area, who behave themselves decently 
and who show some respect for the people. 

This elemental requirement of pacification has been missing. ( 



s 



In almost no contested area designated for pacification in recent years 
have ARVN forces actually "cleared and stayed" to a point where cadre teams, if 
available, could have stayed overnight in hamlets and survived, let alone 
accomplish their mission. VC units of company and even battalion size remain 
in operation, and they are more than large enough to overrun anything the local 
security forces can put up. . 

Now that the threat of a Communist main-force military victory has been 
thwarted by our emergency efforts , we must allocate far more attention and a 
portion of the regular military forces (at least half of the ARVN and perhaps 
a portion of the US forces) to the task of providing an active and permanent 
security screen behind which the Revolutionary Development teams and police can 
operate and behind which the political struggle with the VC infrastructure can 
take place. 
« 

The US cannot do- this pacification security job for the Vietnamese. All 
we can do is "massage the heart." For one reason., it is known that we do not 
intend to stay; if our efforts worked at all, it would merely postpone the . 
eventual confrontation of the VC and GVN infrastructures. The GVN must do the 
job; and I am convinced that drastic reform is needed if the GVN is going to 
be able to do it. 



85 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



The first essential reform is in the attitude of GVN officials. They are 
generally apathetic, and there is corruption high and low. Often appointments t 
promotions, and draft deferments must be bought; and kickbacks on salaries are 
common. Cadre at the bottom can be no better than the system above them. 

The second needed reform is in the attitude and conduct of the ARVN. The 
image of the government cannot improve unless and until the ARVN improves 
markedly. They do not understand the importance (or respectability) of pacifi- 
cation nor the importance to pacification of proper, disciplined conduct. 
Promotions, assignments and awards are often not made on merit, but rather on 
the basis of having a diploma, friends or relatives, or because of bribery. 
The ARVN is weak in dedication, direction and discipline. 

Not enough ARVN are devoted to area and population security, and vhen the 
ARVN does attempt to support pacification, their actions do not last long enough; 
their tactics are bad despite US prodding (no aggressive small-unit saturation 
patrolling, hamlet searches, quick-reaction contact,. or offensive night ambushes); 
they do not make good use of intelligence; and their leadership and discipline 
are bad. 

Furthermore, it is my conviction that a part of the problem undoubtedly 
lies in bad management on the American as well as the GVN side. Here split 
responsibility — or "no rcsponsibili ty f1 — has resulted in too little hard 



pressure on the GVN to do its job and no really solid or realistic planning with 



respect to the whole effort. We must deal with this management problem now and 
deal with it effectively. 

One solution would be to consolidate all US activities which are primarily 
part of the civilian pacification program and all persons engaged in such 
activities, providing a clear assignment of responsibility and a unified com- 
mand under a civilian relieved of all other duties. a / Under this approach, 
there would be a carefully delineated division of responsibility between the 
civilian-in-charge and an element of COMUSMACV under a senior officer, who would 
give the subject of planning for and providing hamlet security the highest pri- 
ority in attention and resources . Success will depend on the men selected for 
the- jobs on both sides (they must be among the highest rank and most competed 
administrators in the US Government), on complete cooperation among the US 
elements, and on the extent to which the South Vietnamese can be shocked cut 
of their present pattern of behavior. The first work oT this reorganized US 
pacification organization should be to produce within 6G 
detailed plan for 






cays a 



realistic and 



one coming; year . 



From the political and public-relations viewpoint , this solution is prefer 
able — if it works. But we cannot tolerate continued failure. If it fails 
after a fair trial , the only alternative in my view is to place the entire 
pacification program — civilian and military — under General Westmoreland. 
This alternative would result in the establishment of a Deputy C0MUSMA.CV for 
Pacification who would be in command of all pacification staffs in Saigon and 
of all pacification staffs and activities in the field; one person in each 
corps, province and district would be responsible for the US effort* 



a/ If this task is assigned to Ambassador Porter, another individual must be 
lent immediately to Saigon to serve as Ambassador Lodge's deputy. 



s^ 



86 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



(it should be noted that progress in pacification, more than anything else, 
will persuade the enemy to negotiate or withdraw.) 

e * P ress f° r ne goti ations. I am not optimistic that Hanoi or the VC 
will respond to peace overtures now (explaining my recommendations above that 
we get into a level-off posture for the long pull). The ends sought by 'the two 
sides appear to be irreconcilable and the relative power balance is not in their 
view unfavorable to them. But three things can be done, I believe, to increase 
the prospects: • 

(l) Take steps to increase the credibility of our peace gestures 
in the minds of the enemy. There is considerable evidence both in private state- 
ments by the Communists and in the reports of. competent Western officials who 
have talked with them that charges of US bad faith are not solely propagandistic , 
but reflect deeply held beliefs;- Analvses of Communists' statements and actions 
indicate that they firmly believe that American leadership really does not want 
the fighting to stop, and that we are intent on winning a military victory in 
Vietnam and on maintaining our presence there through a puppet regime supported 
by US military bases. 

As a way of projective US bona fides, I believe that we should consider two 
possibilities with respect to our bombing program against the North, to be 
undertaken, if at all, at a time very carefully selected with a view to maxim- 
izing the chances of influencing the eneirrj and world opinion and to minimizing 
the chances that failure would strengthen the hand of the "hawks" at home: 
First, without fanfare, conditions, or avowal, whether the stand-down was 
permanent or temporary, stop bombing all of North Vietnam. It is generally 
thought that Hanoi will not agree to negotiations until they can claim that the 
bombing has stopped unconditionally. We should see what develops, retaining 
freedom to resume the bombing if nothing useful was forthcoming. 

Alternatively, we could shift the weight-of-ef fort away from "Zones 6A 
and 6B" — zones including Hanoi and Haiphong and areas north of those two 
cities to the Chinese border. This alternative has some attraction in that 
it provides the North Vietnamese a "face saver" if only problems of "face" 



are holding up Hanoi peace gestures; it would narrow the bombing down directly 
to the objectionable infiltration (supporting the logic of a stop-infiltration 




to require her to pay almost the full cost oy maintaining her repair crews 
in place. The sorties diverted frcn. Zones 6A and 63 could be concentrated 

on the infiltration routes in Zones 1 and 2 (the southern end of North Vietnam, 
including the Mu Gia Pass), in Laos and in South Vietnam, a y 



a/ Any limitation on the bombing of North Vietnam will cause serious psycho- 
logical problems among the men who are risking their lives to help achieve our 
political objectives; among their commanders up to and including the JCS; and 
among those of our people who cannot understand why we should withhold punish- 
ment from the enemy. General Vie st mo re land, as do the JCS- strongly believes in 
the military value of the bombing program. Further , Westmoreland reports that 
the morale of his Air Force personnel may already be showing signs of erosion -- 
an erosion resulting from current operational restrictions. 



87 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



\rs — 



To the same end of improving our credibility, ve should seek way 
through words and deeds — to make believable our intention to withdraw our 
forces once the North Vietnamese aggression against the South stops. In* par- 
ticular, we should avoid any implication that we will stay in South Vietnam 
with bases or to guarantee any particular outcome to a solely South Vietnamese 
struggle. 

(2) Try to split the VC off from Hanoi. The intelligence estimate 
is. that evidence is overwhelming that the North Vietnamese dominate and control 
the National Front and the Viet Cong. Nevertheless, I think we should continue 
and enlarge efforts to contact the VC/NLF and to probe ways to split members 

or sections off the VC/NLF organization. 

(3) Press contacts with North Vietnam, the Soviet Union and 
other parties who might contribute toward a settlement. 

(h) Develop a realistic plan providing a role for the VC in 
negotiations, post-war life, and government of the nation. An amnesty offer 
and proposals for national reconciliation would be steps in the right direction 
and should be parts of the plan. It is important that this plan be one which 
will appear reasonable, if not at first to Hanoi and the VC , at least to world 
opinion. 

3. ^9JiI5r>I!.£.?2J.* ^e prognosis is bad that the war can be brought to a 

satisfactory conclusion within the next two years. The large-unit operations 

probably will % not do it; negotiations probably will not do it. While we should 

continue to pursue both of these routes in trying for a solution in the short 

13iIL^Jj r .^.-g.^. - u -~ ^-. reco gn ize t hat succe ss from them is a mere possi bility , not a 
probability. 

The solution lies in girding, openly, for a longer war and in taking actions 
immediately which will in 12 to ]6 months give clear evidence that the continuing 
costs and risks to the A merican people a re accep t ably limited % that t he formula 
for success has been found „ and that the end of the war is merely a matter of 
time. All of my recommendations will contribute to this strategy, but, the one 
most difficult to implement is perhaps the most important one — enlivening the 
pacification program. The odds are less than even for this task, if only -because 
we have failed consistently since 19oI to mike a dent in the problem. But, 
because the 1957 trend 01 pacification will, i believe, be the main talisman of 
ultimate US success or failure in Vietnam, extraordinary imagination and effort 
should go into changing the stripes of that problem. 

President Thieu and Prime Minister Ky are thinking along similar lines. 
They told me that they do not expect the enemy to negotiate or to modify his 
progra:n in less than two years, Rather, they expect the enemy to continue to 
expand and to increase his activity. They expressed agreement with us that 
the key to success is pacification and that so far pacification has failed. 
They agree that we need clarification of GVN and US roles and that the bulk 



80 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



5 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



of the ARVN should "be shifted to pacification. Ky will, between. January and 
July 1967 j shift all ARVN infantry divisions to that role. And he is giving 
Thang, a good Revolutionary Development director, added powers. Thieu and Ky 
see this as part of a two-year (1967-68) schedule, in which offensive opera- 
tions against enemy main force units are continued, carried on primarily by 
the US and other Free World forces. A.t the end of the two-year period, they 
believe the enemy may be willing to negotiate or to retreat from his current 
course of action. 



Note: Neither the Secretary of State nor the JCS have yet had an opportunity 
to express their views on this report. Mr. Katzenbach and I have dis- 
cussed many of its main conclusions and recommendations — in general, 
but not in all particulars, it expresses his views as well as my own. 



89 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



I/& 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



APPENDIX 



Extracts from CIA/DIA Report "An Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam 



<r\\ 



thro ugh 12 Sep tember 19 oG 



1. There is no evidence yet of any shortage of POL in North Vietnam arid 
stocks on hand, with recent imports, have been adequate to sustain necessary 
operations. . • ■ 

, 2. Air strikes against all modes of transportation in North Vietnam increased 
during the past Month, but there is no evidence of serious transport problems 
in the movement of supplies to or within North Vietnam, 

, * 

3. There is no evidence yet th&t the air strikes have significantly weakened 
popular morale. 

k. Air strikes continue to depress economic growth and have been responsible 
for the abandonment of some plans for economic development, but essential 
economic activities continue. ' - - 

■ 

Extracts from a March 16, 1966 CIA Report "An Analysis of the ROLLING THUNDER 
m _ Air pTTcnp>iye_ a gainst North Vietnam" ; 

1, Although the : Dvement of men and supplies in North Vietnam has been 
hampered and made somewhat more costly [by our bombing], the Communists have • 
been able to increase the flow of supplies and manpower to South Vietnam. 

2. Hanoi f s determination [despite our bombing] to continue its policy of 
supporting the insurgency in the South appears as firm as ever. 

3- Air attacks almost certainly cannot bring about a meaningful reduction 

in the current level at which essential supplies and men flow into South Vietnam. 

Bomb Damage Assessment in the North by the Institute for Defense Analysis 1 
„ "Summer Study Group" m ; s 

What surprised us [in our assessment of the effect of bombing North 
Vietnam] was the extent of agreement among various intelligence agencies on 

the effects of past operations and probable effects of continued and expanded 
Rolling Thunder. The conclusions of our group , to which we all subscribe, 
are therefore merely sharpened conclusions of numerous Intelligence summaries. 
They are that Rolling Thunder does not limit the present logistic flow into 
SVN because HVN is neither the source of supplies nor the choke-point on the 
supply routes from China and USSR. Although an expansion of Rolling Thunder 
by closing Haiphong harbor, eliminating electric power plants and totally- 
destroying, railroads 5 will at least indirectly impose further privations on 
the populace of IWN and make the logistic support of VC costlier to maintain, 
such expansion will not really change the basic assessment • This follows 
because HVN has demonstrated excellent ability to improvise transportation, 
and because the primitive nature of their economy is such that Rolling Thunder 
can affect directly only a small fraction of the population. There is very 
little hope that the Ho Chi Minh Government will lose control of population 
because of Rolling Thunder. The 'lessons of the Korean War are very relevant 
in these respects. Moreover, foreign economic aid to NVN is large compared 

90 ' TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



H7 






r 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



. ■ 



to the damage we inflict, and growing. Probably the government of. NVH has 
assurances that the USSR and/or China will assist the rebuilding of itsj 
economy after the war, and hence its concern about the damage being inflicted 
may be moderated by long-range favorable expectations- Specifically: 

1. As of July 1966 the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam had had no measurable 
direct effect on Hanoi's ability to mount and support military operations 
in the South at the current level. 

2. Since the initiation of the. .Rolling Thunder program the damage to 
facilities and equipment in North Vietnam has been more than offset by the 
increased flow of military and economic aid, largely from the USSR end 
Communist China. * 

* 

3. The aspects of the basic situation that have enabled Hanoi to continue 
its support of military operations in the South and to neutralize the impact 
of U.S. bombing by passing the economic costs to other Communist countries* 
are not likely to be altered by reducing the present geographic constraints, 
mining Haiphong and the principal harbor? in North Vietnam, increasing the 
nttsiber of anr.ed reconnaissance sorties and otherwise expanding the U.S. air 
offensive along the lines now contemplated in military recommendations and 
planning studies. 

k\ While conceptually it is reasonable to assume that some limit may be 
imposed on the scale of military activity that Hanoi can maintain in the 
South by continuing the Rolling Thunder program at the present, or some 
higher level of effort, there appears to be no basis- for defining that 
limit in concrete terms , or . for concluding that the present scale of VC/NVN 
activities in the field have approached that limit. 

#■ 
5. The indirect effects of the bombing on the will of the North Vietnamese 
to continue fighting and on their leaders - f appraisal of the prospective gains 
and costs of maintaining the nresent nolicy have not shown themselves in any 
tangible way. Furthermore, we have not discovered any basis for concluding 
that the indirect punitive effects of bombing will prove decisive in these 
respects . 



91 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



ti£ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 









In this memorandum, McNamara reveals with striking clarity that many 
of the premises under which the war to that point had been fought (and 
manned) were shifting. 

He agreed with COMUSMACV that the military situation has gone 
"somewhat better in i960 than anticipated/ 1 but he found little cause 
for optimism in the longer run. In fact, he seemed almost disheartened 
as he noted that there was "no reasonable way to bring the war to an 
end soon. Finding an injured but undismayed opponent committed now to 
waiting us out" while sapping our national will and seeing "pacification 
a basic disappointment. . .no better, and if anything worse off..." hardly 
was the kind of progress he hoped for. 

His solution was to get ourselves into "a military posture that we 
credibly would maintain indefinitely -- a posture that makes trying to 
wait us out 1 less attractive." To do this, he proposed a five part 
program : 

(1) First, he suggested that, barring a major change in the 
war, we should stabilize U.S. force levels in Vietnam at about 470,000. 
The new figure of 470,000 for U.S. force levels (only 25,000 above the 
latest figure of 41+5,000 for Program #3) apparently was arrived at during 
the sessions in Saigon. Before the meetings, Westmoreland had estimated 
that Program 3 would entail a piaster cost of 47.4 billion. The follow-up 
papers to the conference all continued to focus upon the piaster costs of 
various troop deployments with the intent to keep them under the 42 billion 
Lodge ceiling. The most probable explanation of the genesis of the 470,000 
figure is that it represented the best guess at the time of the Saigon 
meeting of what strength could be supported within the 42 billion limit 

by making very strong efforts to reduce piaster costs per man. 

(2) He recommended a barrier near the DMZ and "across the 
trails of Laos." 

(3) He opposed expansion of the ROLLING THUNDER program, recom- 
mending instead a "stabilization" to prevent the unsettling escalations 
from complicating our political situation (and negotiating posture) and 
distracting from the main job of pacification. 

(4) He said we should "pursue a vigorous pacification program" 
noting that "progress in pacification more than anything else, will 
persuade the enemy to negotiate or withdraw" 51/ 

(5) Finally, he prof erred a three -sided attempt to get negoti- 
ations going by (a) shifting the pattern of our bombing (or perhaps even 
stopping it); (b) considering strategies designed to enhance the probability 
of a split between the VC and Hanoi; and (c) "developing a realistic plan 
providing a role for the VC in negotiations, postwar life, and the govern- 
ment of the nation." 



TOP 



92 



SECRET 



Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



.- • 



The summation was a somber conclusion to a resounding new emphasis 
in American strategic thought. He "believed that there was no great 
probability of success lurking on any of the routes he proposed, only 
a "mere possibility." The solution in his eyes, was to gird openly for 



a longer war. 



...and in taking actions immediately which will in 12 
to 18 months give clear evidence that the continuing costs 
and risks to the American people are acceptably limited, 
that the formula for success has been found, and that the 
end of the war is merely a matter of time. 52/ 

The recommendations as a whole showed the influence of the studies 
which had been done over the summer. The Jason studies on the anti- 
infiltration barrier and the effects of U.S. bombing in the north were 
apparently influential in the decisions to move ahead with the barrier 
but to stabilize ROLLING THUNDER. 

The increased emphasis .on the pacification effort is apparently 
a result of the feeling that, since it represented the heart of the prob- 
lem in Vietnam, and the main force war was only contributory to it, 
perhaps all that was needed in the main force war was to keep the enemy 
off the back of the pacification effort in a strategic defensive, rather 
than to destroy the enemy in a strategic offensive. 



T! 



IT 



In a sense, the memorandum was a clear no to MA.CV, CINCPAC and 
JCS proposals for expanded bombing and major ground force increases, but 
it was a negative with a difference. It provided alternatives. From 
this time on, the judgment of the military as to how the war should be 
fought and what was needed would be subject to question. New estimates 
of what was needed in Vietnam would have to be calculated in light of new 
objectives and new criteria for success, as well as new assumptions about 
"winning." The warning had rung and unless dramatic outcomes measured 
in time and political advantage could be promised, additional force 
increases in the upward direction promised to be sticky indeed. 

2. The JCS Reclamas 

The JCS reaction to the DIM was predictably rapid -- and violent. 
The Chiefs expressed their agreement with McNamara's basic- evaluation of 
a long war, but disagreed on his guarded assessment of the military situ- 
ation., which in their eyes had "improved substantially over the past year." 53/ 
They were especially concerned that the DPM did not take into account the 
"adverse impact over time of continued bloody defeats on the morale of VC/ 
FVA forces and the determination of their political and military leaders." 5k/ 

However, they noted that the 470,000 -man figure was "substantially 
less" than earlier recommendations of C0MU3MACV and CINCPAC, and they 
wished to "reserve judgment" until they reviewed the revised programs 
being prepared during the CINCPAC planning conference. 



93 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



The disagreement was less veiled on the bombing: 

c..,.The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not concur in your 
recommendation that there should be no increase in level of 
bombing effort and no modification in areas and targets sub- 
ject to air attack. They believe our air campaign against 
NVN to be an integral and indispensable part of our over-all 
war effort. To be effective, f the air campaign should be con- 
ducted with only those minimum constraints necessary to avoid 
indiscriminate killing of population. ! 

Nor did they find the new organizational arrangements for pacifica- 
tion especially appetizing: 

d The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed you earlier that, 

to achieve early optimum effectiveness, the pacification pro- 
gram should be transferred to COMJSMkCV. They adhere to that 
conclusion. However, if for political reasons a civilian-type 
organization should be considered mandatory by the President, 
they would interpose no objection. Nevertheless, they are not 
sanguine that an effective civilian-type organization can be 
erected, if at all, except at the expense of costly delays. 
As to the use of a substantial fraction of the ARVN for paci- 
fication purposes, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur. However, 
they desire to flag that adoption of this concept will undoubt- 
edly elicit charges of a US takeover of combat operations at 
increased cost in American casualties. 

Finally, they did not share the Secretary's views on how to induce 
negotiations. They believed the bombing was one "trump card" in the 
President's hand and should not be surrendered without an equivalent 
quid pro quo, such as "an end to the NVN aggression in SVN." The essence 
of disagreement here centered around what each party, Secretary of Defense 
and JCS felt was adequate return for a "trump," the JCS believing that as 
the military campaign wore on with "increasing success, the value of the 
trump would become apparent." 55/ 

In this regard, the Chiefs seemed to sense that a significant turn 
in our views about Vietnam had been taken in high policy circles of our 
government. In final comment, they observed that the conflict had reached 
a stage at which decisions taken over the next sixty days could determine 
the outcome of' the war, and therefore they wished to provide the President 
with "their unequivocal views" on two salient aspects of the war situation 
the search for peace and military pressures on NVN. 

The frequent, broadly -based public offers ma.de by the 
President to settle the war by peaceful means on a generous 
basis,' which would take from NVN nothing it now has, have 
been admirable. Certainly, no one -- American or foreigner 



9U TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



121 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



— except those who are determined not to "be convinced , can 
doubt the sincerity, the generosity, the altruism of US 
actions and objectives. In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff the time has come when further overt actions and 
offers on our part are not only nonproductive, they are 
counterproductive. A logical case can be made that the 
American people, our Allies, and our enemies alike are 
increasingly uncertain as to our resolution to pursue the 
war to a successful conclusion. 

They ^ recommended a "sharp knock" on M military assets and war sup- 
porting facilities rather than the campaign of slowly increasing pressures 
which was adopted. 

Whatever the political merits of the latter course, we 
deprived ourselves of the military effects of early weight 
of effort and shock, and gave to the enemy time to adjust to 
our slow quantitative and qualitative increase of pressure. 
This is not to say that it is now too late to derive military 
benefits from more effective and extensive use of our air and 
naval superiority. 

Accordingly, they recommended: 

(1) Approval of their ROLLING THUNDER 52 program, which 
is a step toward meeting the requirement for improved target 
systems. This program would decrease the Hanoi and Haiphong 
sanctuary areas, authorize attacks against the steel plant, 
the Hanoi rail yards, the thermal power plants, selected areas 
within Haiphong port and other ports, selected locks and dam 
controlling water LOCs, SAM support facilities within the 
residual Hanoi and Haiphong sanctuaries, and POL at Haiphong 
Ha Gia (Phuc Yen) and Can Thon (Kep). 



s 



j 



(2) Use of naval surface forces to interdict North 
Vietnamese coastal waterborne traffic and appropriate land 
LOCs and to attack other coastal military targets such as 
radar and AAA sites. 

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that their views 
as set forth above be provided to the President. 

All of these developments persuaded the JCS that they needed a 
reply with powerful arguments for a program force level far above the 
470,000 proposed by the Secretary. 

The JCS hesitation in discussing the new 470,000 force level was 
rooted in an educated estimate of what was coming out of MACV-CTNCPAC 
in the next two weeks. 56 



95 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



m 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



3 . CIHCPAC Planning Conference Results 

On 20 October , the CINCPAC Planning Conference was done and the 
results forwarded to the JCS. 57/ 

There were few surprises. The concept had been changed to include 
a heavier emphasis on RD, set forth in a preamble to the concept contained 
in the 18 June submission. The estimate of Communist forces in South 
Vietnam was 83,000 combat, U6,000 combat support, with 35 5 000 guerrillas. 
Total strength was estimated at ikk infantry battalions, 60 of which 
were North Vietnamese. The enemy addition to his force was estimated 
at the monthly rate of 12,500 -- 9,500 OTA and 3,000 VC. A projection 
of enemy strength for the end of 1966 was lij-3,000 combat and combat sup- 
port, while the projections for the end of 1967 was 190,000. The courses 
of action which seemed to be open to the enemy in October were: 

1. To increase the level of operations to include the conduct 
of simultaneous widely separated operations, utilizing 
forces of up to division size. 

2. To maintain the current level of operations which would 
include the conduct of simultaneous widely separated multi- 
battalion operations. 

3- To threaten large-scale attacks in the DMZ in order to 
divert large numbers of forces into the hinterland, thus 
reducing, forces available in populated areas to accomplish 
Revolutionary Development. 

4. To decrease the level of operations to include reverting 
to guerrilla warfare. 

CINCPAC' s requirements and the services capabilities to provide them 
were listed as follows: 

Requirements Capabilities 
Maneuver Bns, US Man.Bns. Pers. 

End-CY 66 ' 82 79 384,361 

End CY 67 9b 91 493,969 

End CY 68 3k Sh 519,310 

» 

End CY 69 9h 9h 520,020 

Plus Requirements with 

Availability Rates Unknown m 555,7^1 



96 • TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



|2 



TOP SECRET-- Sensitive 



Requirements for PACOM other than Vietnam would total 23 maneuver 
battalions and 271,666 personnel. The PACOM conference results clearly 
amplified what General Westmoreland had echoed over a month earlier as 
the manpower problem in Vietnam worsened. KVA infiltration in the DMZ 
area, the strategy of hitting the enemy in his sanctuaries and the addi- 
tional manpower requirements of the pacification program punctuated the 
critical conclusion of the PACOM conference; they could not justify a 
reduction in requirements submitted. In the meantime, information which 
the Secretary of Defense had requested on alternative force structures 
possible under piaster ceilings of 42, 44, and 1+6 billion, had been for- 
warded to the JCS. 58/ The three packages did not cost out at the 
exact ceilings, because of the requirement for balanced forces, but the 
alternatives were as follows: 



MACV Requirement 



Plan A 



Plan B 



Plan C 



CY 67 
Piaster Cost 
(Bil lions) 

46.21 
45.07 
44.54 
42.03 



Total Strength 
Man.Bns. Pers. 



9h 
88 



8^ 



555,7^1 
^81,705 



73 ^3,487 



End '67 Strength 
Man.Bns. Pers. 



94 

88 
84 

73 



49 



3,969 



467,850 

457,803 
421,574 



4. Manila 

Before the formal JCS ratification of the- CINCPAC-COMUSMACV 
requirements was forwarded, one other important contact between the major 
decision-makers on Program 4 occurred. This was at Manila in late October. 
What views were exchanged between the President and General Westmoreland 
remain a mystery, but the General twice sought out Mr. John McNaughton, 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA, and laid out his thinking on force 
levels, ROLLING THUKDER, the barrier, and Revolutionary Development. 59/ 

The American commander was thinking about an end CY 67 strength of 
about 480,000, fleshed-out to ^00^000 by the end of CY 68. Barring sur- 
prises, he would plan to hold it there. This was a substantial drop from 
his original request through CINCPAC, but apparently he had not yet resigned 
himself to McNamara's figure of 470,000. He believed that those levels 
were what "the U.S. /could/ sustain over time without mobilization and 
without calling up reserves and what the Vietnamese economy /could/ bear." 
Pie said the 480,000-500,000 man level would be enough "even if infiltration 
went on at a high level," but he waffled by adding he was not sure if he 
had enough troops to take on the Delta. 



97 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



jl^ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Westmoreland remained apprehensive about the absence of a sizeable 
reserve located within quick reaction distance in the Pacific, asking 
McNaughton to stress to the Secretary that he badly needed such a "Corps 
Contingency Force." He reiterated his desire for a strategy devoted to 
building Tr a balanced, powerful force that we can sustain indefinitely/' 
a posture that would be of critical importance in communicating our 
resolve to the North. 60/ 

On the bombing, Westmoreland favored reducing restrictions on targets 
("more flexibility"), but he could not make a good case for the effects an 
expanded RT program would have on his operations. McNaughton cited a CIA 
study showing that even with enlarged strikes, the enemy could supply 
several times the amount of material required to support a much increased 
level of combat in the South. Pressed, Westmoreland observed that "I'm 
not responsible for the bombing program. Admiral Sharp is. So I haven't 
spent much time on it. But I asked a couple of my best officers to look 
into it and they came up with the recommendations I gave you." 6l/ 

The barrier idea appeared to be evolving as a substitute for some 
ROLLING THUNDER activity — and Westmoreland "shuddered" at this. Some 
of his earlier resistance, founded on a belief that MACV resources in SVN 
would be drawn down to man the barrier trace, seemed to have softened. In 
a way, he seemed to sense that the NVA was providing the justification for 
more U.S. troops in the area in much more eloquent fashion than he ever 
could --the threats in I CTZ, to Conthien and Khe Sanh, embryonic as 
they were, would provide impulse for additional troops well beyond the 
artificial program dates established. 

• 

Revolutionary Development figured heavily in his plans, but he pre- 
dicted that it would be July 1967 before the new orientation of ARVN to 
pacification would be in full effect. (He cited as a rough figure 75$ 
ARVN and 2% of US devoted to ED.) 

Westmoreland did not outline the same picture of urgency as had the 
JCS memoranda. (The fact he was really not set on some figures may suggest 
that he (and his staff) were looking at "ballpark" figures and had not 
really analyzed the new outputs they would produce.) Explaining why at 
that time he sof^b -pedalled the threat developing in the border region 
sanctuaries and I CTZ is difficult. He certainly had been concerned 
earlier, even telling Lodge that the new enemy actions possibly made a 
re-evaluation of basic strategy necessary. Possibly his. formal warnings 
(such, as his 20 September message to Sharp) were exaggerated, or the 
threat had diminished. Events were to prove neither was so. Probably 
he missed an excellent opportunity to put his arguments for more troops 
before the President, and then felt it best to fight the battle for more 
troops "through channels," — the CINCPAC-JCS funnel. 

Nevertheless, his views surely had an important bearing on Mr. 
McNamara's estimates in early November. The senior field commander was 



98 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






saying he could get along with small force increases. Of course, he 
added that such a force level would degrade his ability to meet time 
deadlines ("it would be a longer war") but, as the Ik October LFM 
clearly shows, the Secretary was thinking al^ng different lines -~ if 
there was to be no quick, "successful" end to the war, why invest greater 
resources and run greater political risks to get there -- still late. 

The President returned from his highly publicized swing to Manila 
and the Far East to find some press rumblings about the services exceeding 
their budgeted FY I967 strengths, and some speculation that the bombing 
would increase; there had always been some change after such a trip. 62/ 
Richard Nixon had fired a final broadside in a belated attempt to heat up 
the war issue for the election berating the President for making a trip 
which "accomplished nothing" and which "resigned America and the free 
Asian nations to a war which could last five years and cost more casualties 
than Korea,." 63/ These events notwithstanding, even though President 
Johnson's administration was facing its first extensive national test 
at the polls early in November, the Vietnam war was not a central public 
issue. Basic uncertainty about how the electorate really felt about the 
war, combined with the traditional wariness of old-line politicians in 
bucking a "patriotic issue" had dampened some of the heat of the Vietnam 
war as an issue. The only major race which focused on the war occurred 
in Oregon, where Robert Duncan, an outspoken advocate of President Johnson's 
VN policies, was defeated by what he described as "voter dissatisfaction with 
the war." 6k/ 

The war itself seemed to cooperate with the Administration's efforts 
to low-key the issue. Our forces were doing well in Operation HASTINGS 
near the Cambodian border where, in the words of one commander, we "had 
blunted the spearhead of the enemy winter offensive." 65/ 

The superficial quiet of an off-year election was in no way reflected 
by the President's private activity upon his return from Manila. It was 
budget time and he was wrestling with a war budget, featuring a whopping 
supplemental of $9.1 billion for Vietnam prior to the beginning of FY 68. 
Working out of the Texas ranch, the President generated a constant stream 
of travelers from official Washington as he sought information, counsel, 
and exposure. Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler made two trips to 
the Pedernales, visiting the President on Friday and Saturday, k and 5 
November, and later on Friday, the 11th. 66/ | 

The visits coincided with the decision branch-points in the Program k 
development, for they occurred in sequence with significant new inputs of 
information and discussions, and in each case resulted in an Important 
decision or public announcement. 



TOP SECRET - Sens itive 

99 : ' : 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



5- JC S Recommendations 

On k November 5 the JCS forwarded to the Secretary of Defense 
the results of the October PACOM Planning Conference with their "refine- 
ments" added. The document, labeled JCSM 702-66, "Deployment of Forces 
to Meet CY Requirements, " held few surprises. The memorandum addressed 
the crux of disagreement: 

....As in past concepts, it goes beyond certain 
restraints that have been placed on US operating forces 
to date, such as those on the air campaign in North Viet- 
nam, on cross border operations, on certain special opera- 
tions, and on ground actions in the southern half of the 
demilitarized zone. Further, this concept should be carried 
out in its entirety, if achievement of US .objectives is to 
be accomplished in the shortest time and at the least cost 
in men and materiel. The concept describes preparation for 
operations that have not as yet been authorized, such as 
mining ports, naval quarantine, spoiling attacks and raids 
against the enemy in Cambodia and Laos, and certain special 
operations. Such action will support intensified and 
accelerated revolutionary development and nation building 
programs. Since the force requirements are based on this 
concept in its entirety, continued restraints and the 
absence of authorization for recommended operations could 
generate significantly different requirements for forces 
and timing. 67/ 

In a sense, it embraced all of the right arguments (for "intensified 
and accelerated revolutionary development and programs" and "shortest 
time at the least cost," an overdetermined test) but unfortunately for 
all the wrong reasons. MeHamara and Johnson were not politically and 
militarily enchanted with a costly major force increase at that time, 
nor with cross border and air operations which ran grave political risks. 
The specter of early mobilization, while briefly raised by the JCS, was 
temporarily erased by an ambiguous statement acknowledging that "capability 
to meet these requirements cannot be developed without significant modifi- 
cation to the criteria mentioned earlier: draw down latitude, rotation 
policy, no call-up of reserves, maintenance of COMJS training base. Never- 
theless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, while the program is less 
than that desired, it will provide for the effective execution of the con- 
cept of operations set forth "68/ 

Finally, the Chiefs expressed their views about the piaster ceiling 
.which Lodge and members of the Mission Council had found so attractive. 

....They consider that the req.uirern.ent to reduce piaster 
expenditures in the interest of combating inflation in South 
Vietnam is important; however, this factor cannot be over- 
riding in determining force levels because enemy actions could 



100 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



r* 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



require US force levels substantially above those recom- 
mended. They note especially that the equation and factors 
used to price out piaster costs permit only rough approxi- 
mations and have not been tested over a length of time. 
They also note that the three force-level packages do not 
cost out precisely at 42.0, kk.O, and k6.0 billion piasters, 
respectively, since the operational requirement for balanced 
forces prevented that degree of precision...." 69 / 

^ ' De cision on Program #k 

With the Chiefs 1 views in hand the Secretary of Defense met 
with the President on k November, and again at the ranch on Saturday, 
the 5th. By late Saturday morning, the ba.sic ground force deployment 
decision had been made. Mr. McNamara announced in an open-air press 
conference that increases in Vietnam would be forthcoming "but at a 
substantially lower rate and that draft calls for the next four months 
/would/ be significantly smaller." 70/ He also quoted a "new study" 
based upon interrogations of NVA/VC captives and defectors which showed 
that extensive allied air-ground operations impaired morale, exposed the 
sanctuaries, reduced food supplies and brought the enemy death figure 
to over 1,000 per week. He did not comment on how he thought the war 
effort was going or what meaning he saw in the new report. 

The elections were held on Tuesday, 8 November, with mixed results 
for the Administration. It was difficult to tie specific results, or 
even the general trend to the war issue. Even when there was some rela- 
tionship, "basic dissatisfaction" was usually the explanation, a neutral 
reply which failed to explain whether the respondents wanted to hasten 
the end by escalation of our military efforts, by withdrawal, or what. 
The fact that off-year elections are traditionally damaging to the party 
in power further blurred the issue. In the end, hj House seats and 
8 Governorships had been gained by the Republicans and, in light of even 
those "minor" gains, the I968 Presidential race, potentially one debating 
our war policies, promised to be a more interesting and heated campaign 
than anyone had anticipated two years before. 



E# Ant i - C limaxe s 

1. Program Four is Announced 

McNamara and General Wheeler returned to the ranch on Friday, 
the 10th, to participate in a joint news conference. In the meantime, 
Dr. Enthoven had given the following memorandum to the Secretary of 
Defense: 



101 TOPSECRET - Sensitive 









Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Enclosed for your signature is a memorandum to the 
JCS replying to their November k memorandum submitting 
recommended deployments to Southeast Asia for FY 67-68. 
Their recommended program and my proposed alternative 
(Program #h) are compared below with the CINCPAC P46 
billion force. The major elements of the OSD and JCS 
forces are compared in greater detail on the attached 
table : 

(Thousands of Personnel in SVN) 
Dec 66 Jun 67 Dec 67 Jun 68 Total 



JCS Rec. 



395 



CINCPAC P. he Bil. 392 



Program #4 



391 



456 

m 



44o 



504 

1*76 
463 



522 
484 



564 
508 



469 ^69 



In general my proposal follows the CINCPAC 46 billion 
piaster alternative force. The JCS recommended force ignores 
piasters and the JCS do not endorse the P46 billion force. 
My alternative adds five maneuver" battalions (3 armored cavalry 
and 2 infantry) compared to 6 maneuver battalions (3 armored 
cavalry and 2 infantry and 2 airborne) in the CINCPAC P46 
billion force. Both add 10 artillery battalions. The CINCPAC 
force adds 5 tactical air squadrons, Program #4 cuts the cur- 
rent program by 1 squadron (the F-100 squadron to deploy in 
March to replace the E~5 squadron to be converted to the VNAF) . 

My proposed force provides about 25,000 fewer Army sup- 
port personnel with only 1 fewer maneuver battalion than in 
the P46 billion force. The JCS will most likely claim that the 
recommended force is not balanced. However, our forces are 
operating effectively at present with an even leaner mix of 
support personnel. Program #4 consists of about 6 1/3 Army 
division equivalents. If the U.S. ARVN advisors and 2 separate 
armored cavalry regiments are excluded, the division slice 
is about 48,000. While U.S. forces are also providing some 
support for 3rd country troops and to an extent to the ARVN, 
this division slice appears adequate. 

The JCS state their recommendation is exclusive of any 
personnel needed by Task Force 728. In the absence of data 
as to the TF 728 requirements, I cannot say that all of its 
needs are met by my recommended force. However, the air 
cavalry, armored cavalry, and related units were included 
in my force primarily because of their usefulness for a 
barrier operation. Furthermore, the inflationary situation 



102 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



in SVN appears so critical in CY 19o7 that I cannot recom- 
mend any additions to Program #4, at least until CY 1968. 

A detailed troop list has been prepared to define 
precisely Program #h. As soon as It can be reproduced, it 
will be provided to you for transmission to the JCS. This 
should be by close of business tomorrow, November 10. 

One can speculate that the two officials carried back detailed plans 
and costs associated with the earlier broad force decision made the 
preceding week-end. 

It appears they were quite ready to talk about Vietnam. General 
Wheeler read a short prepared statement explaining that after his recent 
trip he was able to report to the President that "the war in my judgment 
continues in a very favorable fashion. General Westmoreland retains the 
initiative and in every operation to date has managed to defeat the 
enemy." Beyond this, questions about Vietnam were little more than 
rehash of the previous week T s session. 72/ 

On 11 November, the Secretary of Defense informed the JCS formally 
that he had approved a new deployment program for MA.CV with an end 
strength of 1+70,000 by June of 1968. 

I have reviewed your recommendations in JCSM-702-66, 
November h, I966, and the related military and economic 
effects of your recommended deployments. The attached 
table summarizes your plan and the forces which I am 
approving for planning purposes. 

As you know, a reasonably stable economy in South 
Vietnam is essential to unite the population behind the 
Government of Vietnam — indeed to avoid disintegration 
of the SVN society. Runaway inflation can undo what our 
military operations accomplish. For this reason, we have 
already taken actions to reduce military and contractor 
piaster spending towards the minimum level which can be. 
accomplished without serious impact on military operations. 
Nevertheless, the price stability achieved last summer may 
be giving way to a new round of severe inflation. More 
must be done. 

Ambassador Lodge has asked that U.S. military spending 
be held to p!+2 billion in CY 1967. The Ambassador proposed 
program of tightly constrained U.S. and GVN civilian and 
military spending will not bring complete stability to SVN; 
there would still be, at best, a 10 billion piaster infla- 
tionary gap. It would, however, probably hold price rises in 
CY 1967 to lOfo-2% as opposed to 75$~90$ in FY 1966. The 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



103 



TZ& 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



burden of inflation falls most heavily on just those 
Vietnamese -- the ARVN and GVN civil servants -- 
upon whose' efficient performance our success most 
heavily depends. Unless we rigidly control inflation, 
the Vietnamese Army desertion rate will increase further 
and effectiveness will decline, thus at least partially 
cancelling the effects of increased U.S. deployments. 
Further, government employees will leave their jobs and 
civil strife will occur, seriously hindering both the 
military and the pacification efforts and possibly even 
collapsing the GVN. 

For these reasons we must fit our deployments to the 
capacity of the Vietnamese economy to bear them without 
undue inflation. As your memorandum indicates, the 
program you recommend would cost over Tk6 billion in 
CY 1967 at current prices. I believe implementation of 
a program of this size would be self-defeating. The plan 
I am- approving at this time for budgetary planning appear 
to me to be the maximum consistent with my reasonable 
hope of economic stability. If contingencies arise during 
the year, we can re-examine the plan accordingly. I plan 
to provide sufficient combat-ready forces in the U.S. to 
meet reasonable contingencies. 

A troop list containing each unit in Progra.m #h is 
attached. You may wish to suggest changes in the unit 
mix., if there are units that have been deleted that have 
a higher priority than those I have approved. I would 
like to have these recommendations by December 1, 1966. 
I also would like your proposals as to ways in which 
approved units can be accelerated so as to provide maxi- 
mum combat capability as early as possible in CY I967. 



SOUTHEAST ASIA DEPLOYMENT PROGRAM #k 



1. 



2. 





HAN SUMMA.RY 73/ 




• 


Jun 67 
JCS OSD 
Plan Plan 


Dec 67 
JCS OSD 
Plan Plan 


Jun 68 
JCS OSD 
Plan Plan 


Personnel-SVN (000) 
Army 

USMC 

Air Force 

Navy 


292.6 286.0 
70.6 70.6 

60.6 55-3 
32.1 27.6 

455-9 ^39-5 


334.8 307.9 
70.6 70.6 

63.3 55-4 

35-3 29.4 

504.0 46*3.3 


350.5 313.9 
70.6 70.6 

65.3 55-4 
35.8 29.4 

522.2 469.3 


Maneuver Battalions - 
Army 

USMC 


-SVN 

62 62 
20 20 
82 82 


74 67 

20 20 
94 87 


74 67 
20 20 • 

94 £7 



104 



TO P SECRET - Se ng it ive 



\l\ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Pie had disapproved the force recommendations of JCSM 702-66, but had 
not commented on the "new 11 concept and objectives — an omission which 
left an excellent opening for the next round of force requirements 
discussions. The 11 November memorandum explained the decision to hold 
the force levels at ^70,000 almost solely in terms of piaster costs and 
the dangers of inflation. 

2. Program Four is Explained 

A fuller explanation of the reasoning behind the Program Four 
decisions was given by the Secretary of Defense in his 17 November 
Draft Memorandum for the President, jh/ 

* #• * * * 

I have reviewed the additional funding and forces required to sup- 
port our planned deployments and operations in Southeast Asia. I 
recommend a supplemental appropriation request totaling $12. h billion 
in Total Obligational Authority be submitted to Congress in January for 
the following purposes: 



FY67 TOA 



I. Direct Support of SEA Operations 

a. Land forces 

b. Tactical air and B-52 forces 

c. Naval forces 

d. Logistic support 




$ Billions) 



$5^ 
h.3 

• 3 
1.0 



II. Rotational Ease and Strategic Reserve 
a. Land forces 
Air forces 
Naval forces 
Defense Agencies 



b. 
c. 
d. 



k o 



III. Non-Sea 



*/ 



Total 



.5 
.3 
.03 
.1 

• 6 / 
$127V §/ 



a/ These costs are subject to revision in the budget review. 

Construction costs are still under review and .are excluded. 
b/ Includes pay raise and home owners assistance. 

Forces totaling ^69,000 be approved, for planning and budgeting 
purposes, "or deployment to SVE by" June 30, I968. 

Current U.S. military forces be augmented by 3^6,13^ "to total end 
FY68 strength of 3,V/6,^-00 personnel to support these deployments to 
Southeast Asia. Deployment, force augmentation, and financial summaries 
follow. The December I965 plan on which the FY67 Budget was based is shown 
for comparison. 



105 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



, • « 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



SUMMARY DEPLOYMENTS TO SEA 



Pers onnel - SVTI (OOP) 
Dec Plan - Total 

SecDef Rec - Array 

Marines 
Air Force 
Navy 
TOTAL 
JCS Rec - Array 

Marines 
Air Force 
Navy 
TOTAL 
Perso n nel - WESTPAC (OOP) 
Dec Plan 
SecDef Rec 
JCS Rec 



19^5 

June Jun 



60 

27 
18 

11 

h 

'66 



2U2 

2ll2 



1966 



278 
l6C 

5* 

36 

J-7 

267 



I18H 



Dec 



386 
69 

54 

25 

392 

244 
69 

57 

395 



588 
624 

63h 



1967 



Jun 



394 
286 

71 
55 

28 

44o 
292 

71 
61 

32 

618 
677 
703 



Dec 



308 
71 

55 

29 
F63 

335 
71 
63 

50 4 



701 
756 



1958 



V 



June 






314 
71 
55 
29 

TT6'§ 
350 

71 

65 

_36 

522 



707 

774 



Maneuver Ens 



• Dec Plan 

SecDef Rec 

JCS Rec 
Art ille r y Bns 

Dec Plan 

SecDef Rec 

JCS Rec 
Eng inee r Bns 

Dec Plan 

Sec Def Rec 

JCS Rec 
Fighter-Attack a/c (U.S) 





Dec 


PI on 










SecDef Rec 










JCS 


Rec 








Attacl 


: Sorties 


(coo) 






Dec 


D l an 










SecDef Rec 










JCS 


Rec 








A: 


Ir Cta 


lance 


'(CCO Tons 


) 

4 






Dec Plan 
SecDef Rec 
JCS Re 2 
Other Fixed W ing a/c 

Dec Plan 
SecDef Rec 

JCS Rec 



9 

9 


48 
5lf 


77 
79 
79 


77 
82 

82 

• 


87 
94 


87 
94 


3 

3 


33? 

335 


47 
4?f 

47-f 


47 

57f 
57'f 


63§ 


63| 
69! 


6 f 
6-J 


37 
30|- 


hl\ 

44 

44 


56 

59 


56 
60 


56 
60 


599 
599 


801 
849 


89U 

io46 
10U6 


929 

989 
1061 


993 
1106 


933 
1127 


10 
10 


21 

2k 


2b 
2S 


26 
28 


28 


28 






28 


30 


32 


3^ 


11 
11 


52 

35 


68 

65 

70 


73 

65 
80 


65 
93 


55 

96 


397 
397 


891 
825 


1134 
1131 


975 
1293 
.1335- 


-1375 
1U9-- 


1375 
1521 



106 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



I3S 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



I have not denied any funding request necessary to conduct' the war 
and which can be effectively utilized during the current fiscal year. 
The FYo7 supplemental and FY68 budgets have been designed to meet 
war needs through the FY68 funding leadtime. If the tempo of the conflict 
increases beyond the level now planned, additional funds will be required. 
The recommended Southeast Asia deployments and supporting supplemental . 
budget requests are in accord with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
with the exceptions noted later, 

. -°._ d l l * e i ve haYe met virtually all of COMUSM-ICV 1 s requirements for 
maneuve r battalions at or near the time he requested them 3 without recal l 
of the Reserves or withdrawals of units deployed to Europe or ot her key ' 
overse as area s. Moreover, we still have the capability to deploy addi - 
tiona l active forces as well as a large ready force wherever they may 
be needed. " " ~* 

The decision to retain the organized reserve as a reserve led to a 
requirement to organize certain units that were not available in the 
COKUS active forces. With only a few exceptions, we have deployed them 
as required and on a schedule quite close to what we could have expected 
under a reserve mobilization. Many of the units that could not be pro- 
vided as required (e.g., aviation units) were not available in the reserve 
structure either. The table below compares the current plan with the 
deployment schedule that the JCS last March estimated sculd b< 



rnca i 



the 



a 



reserve 



'orces had been called to active duty. 



Strength in SW (OOP) 
SecLef Rec , 
With Reserves & 

Mane uver Bns in SVN 
SecDef Rec 



With Reserves 






» 


1966 




Mar 


1967 


Mar 


Jun 


Sep 


Dec 


Jun 


231 
227 


267 

28k 


313 

•^359 


' 392 

ku. 


k2k 


kko ' 

k26 


k6 

k6 


52 
52 


6k 

67 


79 

76 


82 
79 


82 

79 ' 



a/ Case I 5 CINCPAC Capabilities Conference, 12 February I966. 

U.So forces in SEA have performed exceedingly well. In the summer 
of I965 NVA forces threatened to destroy the SVN armed forces and achieve 
a military Victory. The introduction of U.S. forces almost completely 
neutralized the VC/WVA large units. He has lost 11^,000 troops in the 
last year, including invaluable cadre. The B-52 and tactical air effort 
has hurt enemy morale, produced casualties, and disrupted his operations 
and logistics operations. It is our success to date that permits the 
analysis in the next section of the incremental value of still more 
deployment, 



'-■s 



107 



TOP SECRET - Sen i -ive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



n ? E 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



The incremental annual cost of the conflict amounted 'to $$)A billion 
in PY66 and is estimated at $19.7 billion for FY6?. If in FY.68 the 
forces and rates of operations stabilized at the levels shown in this 
paper, the cost will be about $2U billion, calculated as follows: 

* 

( $ Billions ) 

Military Personnel . " $ 5-5 

Operations and Maintenance 6.7 

Ammunition Consumption ^»5 

Aircraft & Helicopter Attrition l.H" 

Other Procurement ^-3 

Free World force Support .1.5 

Construction • 2 ■ 

These data exclude economic aid to Vietnam and other SE Asia nations 
that might be attributed to the conflict. Economic aid for SVII currently 
is running at about $.7 billion per year. 

I. MILITARY STRA 3Y IN VIETNAM 



The war in Vietnam has two highly interdependent parts: (l) the 
"regular" war against the main force VC/NVA battalions and regiments 3 and 
the interdiction of their men and supplies flowing down from North Vietnam, 
and (2) the "Pacification" cr revolutionary development war to neutralize 
the local VC guerrillas and gain the permanent support of the SVH population. 

The infiltrated men and supplies serve to bolster the regular units 
whose function is. to support the local VC guerrillas and infrastructure by 
def eating the GVN forces in the area and generally exposing the GVK 1 s ina- 
bility to protect the rural populace. The local guerrillas and infrastruc- 
ture maintain a constant VC presence in their area and support the offensive 
efforts of the regular units by providing intelligence; terrain guidance 9 
supplies , and recruits. In addition, the guerrillas conduct many of the 
thousands of incidents of terror, harassment, and sabotage reported each 
month . The principal task of U.S. military forc es i n SVN must be to_elimi - 
nate the offensive eambility of the regular units in order to allow theT 
GVN to c ounter the g uerr illa forces and extend permanent control over areas 
fro m which regular u n its have been cleared. 

We now face a ch oice of two approaches to the threat of the regular 
VC/NVA forces. The first appro ach would be to con tinue in 19o7"to in~ 
cre ase frie ndly forces as rapidly as poss ible, and without limit, and 
emplo y them primari ly in larg e-scale " seek out and destroy operati on 
to destroy the main force VC/NVA units. 



s 



108 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



This approach appears to have some distinct disadvantages. First , 
we are finding very strongly diminishing marginal returns in the destruc- 
tion of VC/NVA forces. If our estimates of enemy losses (killed, captured 
and defected) are correct, VC/lTVA losses increased by only 115 per week - 
(less than 1%) during a period in which we increased friendly strength 
by 160,000 including 1^0,000 U.S. military personnel and h2 U.S. and Third 
Country maneuver battalions. At this rate, an additional 100,000 friendly 
personnel deployed would increase VC/NVA losses by some 70 per week. Se- 
cond, expanding U.S. deployments have contributed to a very serious in- 
flation in South Vietnam. Prices increased 75~90$ in FYb6. An extra 100,000 
U.S. forces would add at least P9 billion to our piaster expenditures, doubl- 
ing the 1967 inflationary gap in SVN. Third, the high and increasing cost 
of the war to the United States is likely to encourage the Communists to 
doubt our staying power and to try to "wait us out." 

The -second approach is to fol low a similarly aggressive' strategy of 

"seek out and destroy," but to build friendly fore es_ only to that level re - 
Quired to neutralize the large en y units and prevent them from interfering 
with the pa cif ication urogram. It is essential to this approach that such 
a level be consistent with a stable economy in SVN, and consistent with a 
military posture that the United States credibly would maintain indefinitely, 
thus making a Communist attenrot to "wait us out r 



] ace 
— _ ... o •»» 



attractive. 



I believe that this level is about *!-70,C00 U.S. and 52,000 Free World 
personnel and less than half of the ARW.* The remainder of the ARVrl, plus 
a portion of the U.S. force, would give priority to improving the pacifi- 
cation effort. The enemy regular units would cease to perform what I. believe 
to be their primary function of diverting our effort to give security to the 
population. This, plus the effects of a 'successful interdiction campaign 
to cut off their other support, would effectively neutralize them, possibly 
at the cost of far fewer casualties to both sides than the first approach 
would allow. 



1 b elieve it is tim e to adopt the second approach for three reasons : 
(l) if MACV estimates of enemy strength are correct , we have not been able 



to attrite the en-my forces fast eno^^xi to b reak their morale and more U.S. 
forces are unl ikely ;o do so in the foreseeable future; (?) we cannot 
deploy more than about ^70,000 personnel by the end of I967 without a h:~;- 



-■■ -. 



*Admiral Sharp has recommended a 12/33/67 U.S. strength of 570,000 






f p 



c >"i*n \\a "i C-. v •_-. 1 — ^ r *"". "v*^- i 3 n n Y*a r* nrrm ?;; 



zv.e.t 



the danger of inflation will probably force a 6/30/63 deploymen 
limit of about 1*70,000, " ' 



109 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



12 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



probability of generating a self-defeatin g runaw ay inflation in SVN and * 
(3) an endleg scal ation of U n S . deploy \ents .is. nat._likely to he accppfc- 
fibl§ II 1 . the U . S . o r to induce the enemy to believe that the ll.fi. Is P"T 5~ 
pared to stay as long as is required to produce a secure non-communist 
SVN. Obviously a greatly improved pacification campaign must be waged to 
take advantage of the protection offered by the major friendly forces. 
Alternatively , if enemy strength is greatly overstated and our "seek out 
and destroy" operations have been more effective than our strength and 
loss estimates would imply - a possibility discussed below - more than 
470,000 U.S. personnel should not be required to neutralize the VC/NVA 
main force. 

A^tH.ting Enemy Forces . All of our estimates of enemy strength and 
variations in it contain very great uncertainties. Thus, any conclusions 
drawn from them must be considered to be highly tentative and conjectural. 
Nevertheless 3 the data suggest that we have no prospects of attriting the 
enemy force at a rate equal to or greater than his capability to infiltrate 
and recruit, and this will be true at either the 1*70,000 ij.S. personnel 
level or 570,000. The table on the following page shows our' estimates of 
the average enemy loss rate per month since April 1965. By kta quarter 1965, 
estimated military losses (killed, captured, military defectors) reached 
2215 per week. The v/eekly average for C160 has remained about the same, 
although enemy losses increased to 2330 per week in the 3rd Quarter and to 
2930 in October. 

Enemy losses from wounds are included above based on the U.S. Intelli- 
gence Board estimate that there are 1.5 enemy wounded for each one killed, 
with one-third of the wounded put out ,of action, resulting in a loss of .5 
for each vc/iiVA recorded killed, or 520 additional average losses per week. 
(MA.CV estimates .28 .additional- losses for each VC/MVA killed, D r an average 
loss of 300 per week.) Also included are defectors not turning themselves 
into the GVW centers, based on the Board estimate that* there is one unre- 
corded military deserter for each military defector, resulting in another 
235 average losses per week. 

- 
The enemy loss rate was apparently not affected significantly by the 

greatly increased friendly activity during 1966, which included: kh% in- 
crease in battalion days of operation; 25^ increase in battalion sized 



110 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



1 2? 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



vc/kva losses 

(Weekly Average) 



196 



>o5 



1966 



E s t imat ed Losses 
Killed a/ 
Captured 

Mil Defectors b/ 
Total Est Losses 

Average Friendly 
Strengths (000) 

Total Losses/1000 
Eriendly/vJeek 



2nd 
Qtr 

705 

3.00 

1150 



3rd 

Qtr 




TTth 
Qtr 



1555 
135 

2215 



1st 
Qtr 

1505 
130 

580 



2215 



2nd 
1370 

1^5 
Ji30 

W5 




Oct 



1805 
170 

355 

2330 



1915 
U70 



672 759 871 



930 982 IO37 1113 



1.7 2.3 



2.5 



2.k 



2.0 



2.2 



a/ 1.5 times recorded "body count." 

b/ 2 times recorded military defectors. 



Last k 
: Qtrs 
Plus 



_'V^, 



1585 
175 

kio 



2930 2230 



,<:- 



967 



2.6 2.3 



operations contacting the enemy: and 2&f increase in small unit actions 
accompanied by a 12$ increase in contacts. Moreover 3 armed helicopter 
sorties doubled from A, 000 to' 29,000 per month and attack sorties in SVN 
rose from 12,800 to 1^,000 per month. 

The failure of enemy losses to increase during the first half of I.966 
was primarily due to the January Vietnamese New Year lull, the political 
turmoil during the Spring, the apparent decrease in ARVN efficiency, and an 
increasing enemy reluctance to fight 'large battles. 

Despite improvements during the past four months, it. is impossible 
to predict the point at which we can expect to attrite enemy forces at the 
rate he introduces new ones. As the table above indicates, an average enemy 
total loss rate of 2230 per week has prevailed for the past 13 months, com- 
pared to the calculated enemy personnel input rate of 2915 per week for the 
same period. The input rate is that required to provide the average increase 
of 685 per week reflected in the VC/jWA order of battle strength figures 
estimated by MACV, it is not estimated independently. Assuming that the 
weekly infiltration rate from KVN for the past 13 months averaged IO75 as . 
estimated (MACV indicates that the I966 figure may be as high as 1638 per 
week), VC recruitment (input minus infiltration) must have been a.bout 18^0 
per week. This recruitment rate lies well within the current U.S. Intelli- 
gence Board estimate that the VC can recruit and train I635 to 2335 men 
per week, and can replace current losses solely from within South Vietnam 
if necessary. But it lies far above the current MACV recruitment estimate 
of 815 VC personnel per week. 



Ill 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



• 



■ 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



■ • 



As indicated in the VC/NVA losses table, enemy losses increased by 
H5 per week during a period in which friendly strength increased by 
166,000: an increase of about 70 losses per 100,000 of friendly strength. 
There are far too many uncertain variables in the situation to permit a 
simple extrapolation of these results to the effect of introduction of. 
the next 100,000, or a subsequent 1C0, 000 troops. However, we have no' 
evidence that more troops than the U 70, 000 I am recommending would sub- 
stantially change the situation. For example, if it were assumed that 
new forces would produce enemy losses at a rate equal to the average of 
all forces deployed by the end of October 1966, each deployment of 100,000 
additional friendly troops would produce only 230 more total enemy losses 
per week compared to the 2915 current enemy input rate. A U.S. force of 
470,000 would result in enemy losses of 2^50 per week; an extra 100,000 
U.S. personnel would increase average weekly enemy losses to about 2680, 
still less than the 35OO per week that the enemy is supposed to be able 
to infiltrate/recruit. Moreover, it is possible that our attrition es- 
timates substantially overstate actual VC/NVA losses. For example, the 
VC/HVA apparently lose only about one- sixth as many weapons as people, 
suggesting the possibility that many of the killed are unarmed porters or 
bystanders. 



vc/h va personnel input 

(Weekly Average; 



£i 



19&5 



1966 



MACV Estimate of Strength 
(End of Qtr - 000 ) a/ 
Net Change per wk.b/ 

Estimated Losses 

Required Gross Personnel 
Input 

Less J/.ICV Accepted 
NVA Infiltration 

Calculated Residual VC 
Recruitment c/ 



2nd 3rd 
Qtr Qtr 


Qtr 


^ — , ,, ■ .— ■ ■ ■ m 

1st 
Qtr 


2nd 
Qtr 


• 

3rd 
Qtr 


Oct. 


Last h 
Qtrs 
Plus Oct 


231.5 238.3 
520 


250.3 
920 


265.6 
1175 ' 


277 • 1* 

905 


282.0 

355 


277 . 

-II3O.O 


685 


17^5 


2215 


2215 


191*5 


2330 


2930 


2230 


2265 


3135 


3390 


2350 


2685 


1800 


2915 ' < 



315 9^5 



),c: 



>£. 



1760 1525 



^3 






0d/ 1075 



1950 



219O 



I63O 1325 2255 180C 



\ 



181^0 



±1 



Sources: MACV submission of August 15 3 I.966 and 

Table 101 0SD SEA Statistical Summary. 

Net quarterly gain divided by 13. 

No figures reported. Figures shewn equal 

gross input minus NVA infiltration. 

MACV confirmation of infiltration figures normally 

lags several weeks behind actual entry of personnel 



112 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



->'~l 



il'l 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



In summary, despite the wide variations in estimates of infiltration, 
recruitment and losses, the data indicate that current enemy recruitment/ 
infiltration rates and tactics have more than offset the increased friendly 
deployments, enabling the enemy to increase his forces in the past and -in 
the foreseeable future. If we assume that the estimates of enemy strength 
are accurate, the ratio of total friendly to total enemy strength has only 
increased from 3.5 to h.O to 1 since the end of 19^5- Under these, circum- 
stances, it does not appear that we have the f avorable leverage required 
to achieve decisive attrition by introducing more forces. It may be pos- 
sible to reduce enemy strength substantially through improved tactics or 
other means such as an effective amnesty/defection program or effective 
pacification to dry up VC sources of recruitment, but further large in- 
creases in U.S. forces do not appear to be the answer. 

Enemy Offe nsive C apability. These estimates of enemy strength, losses 
and replacement rates "raise" some important questions. They assume that 
the enemy has all of the battalions carried in the MACV Enemy Order of 
Battle (OB), and that most of these battalions have retained their offensive 
capability. Neither assumption can be supported by available data. 

In the last 7 months (February- August) for which data are available, 

friendly forces averaged 25 contacts per month with VC/KVA battalions. 
If each contact represented a different battalion, the contact rate would 
equal 20$ of the average reported total enemy VC/NVA battalions; at best, 
we would contact each battalion one in 5 months. However, analyzing the 
August OB of 175 battalions, only 112 battalions had been positively iden- 
tified as contacted during the 7 month period and 59 battalions were unre- 
corded as to last contact. (The remaining battalions were contacted prior 
to period.) Other battalions in addition to the 112 positively identified 
were undoubtedly active during the period. Nevertheless, it appears that 
the actual existence, or ability to operate, of some of the 59 units with 
no records of contact with friendly forces is open to question. Moreover, 
enemy activity rates reflected in the number of battalion contacts initiated 
by themselves or by us do not show increases that we might expect as the 
result of the U9 battalion increase reflected in the Order of Battle reports 

CONTACTS WITH VC/jWA BATTALIONS - ' 



VC/HVA Initiated Contacts 

Total Contacts 

Estimated Totsl Baotalions in Force 126 IU5 152 157 Ijk 175 175 153 



113 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 









1966 




* 


F23 MAR 


1 P"S 

_■ 

20 


MAY JUN JUL 


AUG AVG. 

Id lo 

3^ 35 


n - ■-• 7- -r 
- - . • ;_- •— L/C) 


18 J 9 

^ k3 


15 1M 14 
22 35 39 



/ 



m 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Furthermore 3 the enemy is undertaking fewer large scale offensive 
■operations in recent months and concentrating his small scale attacks, 
ambushes, and harassments against easier targets (troops in the field 
and isolated military posts). This indicates a possible regression to 
activities characteristic of earlier stages of guerrilla warfare, is 
.inconsistent with large numbers of battalions and even divisions, and 
may reflect an increasing inability to conduct large scale operations 
without incurring unacceptably high casualties. The VC/NVA have not 
won a significant large scale military victory in several months. There 
is every reason to be on guard, as General Westmoreland is, but there is 
no reason to believe that we need to increase our planned deployment of 
large units to prevent such victories in the future. 

The Interdiction Campaign. The VC force has reportedly increased 
by 20 battalions ( from Jk to $k) since last December, NVA by U3 (from 
^3 to 86) during the same period. The NVA represented only 25,600 of 
21*9,700 (IO56) last December, increasing to 1*5,600 of 277,000 (l6$ in 
October. The weekly rate of accepted infiltration has been about 1115 
in I966 compared to 9^-5 in i*th quarter I965 and 510 for all of 1965. 
MA.CV has recently reported that infiltration may have been as high as 
I63O per week in 1966. The NVA units, equipped almost exclusively with 
Chinese and Russian weapons, have a much greater requirement for infil- 
trated ammunition and supplies, thus increasing their dependence on the 
logistics network flowing from NVN to SVN. 

Air I nterdiction . The use of air power to interdict enemy infiltration 
and supply has been very great by any standard. Attack sorties in Laos and 
NVN have risen from ^750 per month at the end of last year to 9100 in 1st 
quarter of this year and to 10,600 and 12,900 in subsequent quarters. The 
interdiction campaign has absorbed most of the increase in deployed attack- 
capable aircraft in the past years. 

A substantial air interdiction campaign is clearly necessary and worth- 
while. In addition to putting a ceiling on the size of the force that can 
be supported, it yields three significant military effects. First, it ef- 
fectively harasses and de3_ays truck movements down through the southern 
panhandles of NVN and Laos, though it has no effect on troops infiltrating 
on foot over trails that are virtually invisible from the air. Our ex- 
perience shows that daytime armed reconnaissance above some minimum sortie 
rate makes it prohibitively expensive to the enemy to attempt daylight 
movement of vehicles, and so forces him to night movement. Second, des- 
truction of bridges and cratering of roads forces the enemy to deploy repair 
crews, equipment 5 and porters to repair or bypass the damage. Third, attacks 
on vehicles, parks, and rest camps destroy some vehicles with their cargoes 
and inflict casualties. Moreover, our bombing campaign may produce a bene- 
ficial effect on U.S. and SVN morale by making NVN pay a price for its 
aggression and by showing that we are doing what we can to interdict the 
enemy. But at the scale we are now operating, I believe our bombing is 
yielding very small marginal returns, not worth the cost in pilot lives 
and aircraft. 



-x- -x- -x- -x- -x- 



llif 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



II. CONSOLIDATION AND EXTENSION OF GVN CONTROL 






Pacification. Based on available reports of questionable validity, 
the table on the following page indicates the various degrees of GVN and 
VC/lWA population and hamlet control. In the ik months between July 31, 
19o5 and September 30, 1966, the GVN reportedly gained control of an addi- 
tional 1 ; 500,000 people, raising Its control of the total SVH population 
from k% to 55$ ~ the highest: level to date. During the saice period VC/NVA 
control of the total population decreased 6$, a loss of 800,000 people. GTd 
control of the rural population rose from 23$ to 35$, while VC/NVA rural 
control fell from 35$ to 28$ during the same period. 

It is highly likely that these figures are grossly optimistic. It should 
be noted' that about 30$ of the reported gains probably came from movement of 
refugees into cities and towns. Another report indicates that GVN increased 
its control of area only from % to 12$ in I966 through September. Since 
the VC/NVA have claimed control' of 80$ of the S'VN territory and 1% of the 
population. At the end of September i960, the GVN controlled about 25$ of 
the vital roads in SVH. It controlled about 20$ of the total roads, down 
from 35$ in 1965 and 1+0$ in I96U. The rest were marginal or closed and could 
be traveled only with adequate security precautions. 



1965 



The pacification progr am has been stalled for years; it is stalled 
today. The situation in this rega^d^jio^b^tt^^ worse - than 
it was in I965, 196 3 and I96I. The large u nit war, at which we as 



.re suc- 



ceeding fairl y wel l", is largely irreleva ntjbc^^ as long_as_j7e 
keep the regular VC/wK units from inte rfering and do not lose the major 
bat tles . 

POPULATION AND HAMIET CONTROL a/ . 



Population Control 



(i n Th ousands) 

Total SVN Population 
GVN Control 
VC/NVA Control 

Rural Population b/ 

GVN Control 
VC/NVA Control 

GVN Hamlet Control 



6865 
3658 



2338 
3658 



>o) 



33^5 



./", 



July 19&5 
Pop <& 



hi 

25 



23 
36 



Net 
Change 
Pop 



+756 
-301 



Pec 
Pop 



-1-859 772U 
-301 3357 



3357 



+558 3903 



£c 



19&5 

et 



52 
23 



309H 30 



33 



Net 
Change 
Pop 



+55^ 
-U70 



Sep 
Pop 



36U8 

2887 



+287 1*190 



i960 



+627 8351 55 
-lf70 2887 19 



35 
28 



Source: MA.CV monthly Population and Area Con- 
trol Report, 
b/ Rural population equals total population lainuu 
~ the cities and. tcvms under G VI T control. 



Tote 



a n 



et 



Change 



Pop 



+11*86 

- 771 



+1310 
- 771 

+8it5 



115 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



IH: 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






The most important problems are reflected in the belief of the rural 
Vietnamese that the GVN will not stay long when it comes into an area but 
the VC will; the VC will punish cooperation with the GVN; the GVN is indif- 
ferent to the people 1 s" welfare; the low-level GVN officials are tools of 
•the local rich; and the GVN is excessively corrupt from top to bottom. 

Success in changing these beliefs, arid in pacification, depends on 
the interrelated functions of providing physical security, destroying the 
VC organization and presence, motivating the villager to cooperate, and 
establishing responsive local government. 

Physical security must come first and is the essential prerequisite 
to a successful revolutionary development effort. The security must be 
permanent or it is meaningless to the villager, and it must be established 
by a well organized "clear and hold" operation continued long enough to 
really clear the area and conducted by competent military forces who have 

been trained to show respect for the villager and his problems. So far 
this prerequisite has been absent. In almost no area designated for paci- 
fication in recent years have ARVN forces actually "cleared and held n to 
a point wnere cadre teams could have stayed overnight in hamlets and sur- 
vived, let alone accomplished their missions. VC units of company and 
even battalion size^ too large for local defenses j have remained in oper- 
ation. 






Now that the threat of a Communist large -unit military victory has 
been eliminated, we must allocate far more attention and a significant 
portion of the regular military forces (at least half of the ARVN) to 
providing permanently secure areas in which Revolutionary Development (RD) 
teams, police, and civilian administrators can root out the VC infrastruc- 
ture and establish the GVN presence. This has been our task all along. It 
is still our task. The war cannot come to a successful end until we have 
found a way to succeed in this task. 

As^ig^Lent_of ARVN to Revolutionary Development Role. The increasingly 
unsatisfactory performance of ARVN in combat operations is reflected in U.S. 
Army advisory reports and in ARVN and U.S. operational statistics. During 
the January-September period for which data are available. U.S. field 
aavisors raced combat effectiveness as unsatisfactory or marginal in up to 
32% of all ARVN combat batt.al.ions. Over 115,700 SVN military personnel 
(19$) deserted in I965. and desertions in .,966 through October" vere at 
the annual rate of 130^000. 21$ of the regular, regional, popular and. C1DG 
forces. The poor ARVN per formal ■■ also shows in the operational statistics. 
ARVN made contact in only k&$, of its large-scale operations against a U.S. 
contact rate of 90;'. Similar actions for small unit actions are not 
readily available. 



116 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



3 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



ARVlff & U.S . OP ERATION! IffR PO RteANCES ~ CYI966 */ 

(Weekly Averages) 



Maneuver Battalions (AYC-) 
U.S. 
ARVTI 



1st 


2nd 


3rd 


Qtr 


Qtr 


Qtr 


hk 


51 


62 


ihi 


157 


158 



1966 

Thru Ser> 



52 
153 



I^^e_Gp^a^ions 
Battalion Days per 
U.S. 

ARVH 

$ or Large Operations 
U.S. 



DX1 





3.0 


3.1 


3.8 


3.3 




2.9 


2.2 


1.8 


2.3 


with Cent act 












79 
1* 


• 9h 
hi 


97 
hi 


90 
k6 



a/ Source: JCS (CM-I9OI-66) 



ARVN effectiveness against the enemy has declined markedly during 
the January-September 1966 period. ARYN kills of VC/TIVA dropped from a 
weekly average of 356 to 238 ; while the U.S. averages rose from h'jG to. 
557 per week. VC/WA killed per ARYN battalion per week averaged 1.8 
compared to 8.6 for U.S. battalions, Conversely .> the friendly killed 
rates were .6 per ARVN battalion and 1.7 per U.S. battalion per week. 
The enemy/friendly killed ratios for ARVN and U.S. were 3-2 and 5.1* 
to 1 respectively. 

ARVN EFFECTIVENESS AGftJKST VC/lWA -' - CYI966 



(Weekly .Averages) 






1st 2nd 


3rd 


v. 

1966 


Qtr . Qtr 


Qtr 


. Thru SeD 
_ — , — , ^_ 



Results 

VC/lWA Killed by: 
U.S. 
ARVW 

• VC/NVA Captured by: 
U.S. 

Add. (JVM Forces 
Weapons Captured by: 
U.S. 

ARM 



356 . 


2** 


557 
238 


67^ 


52 
79 


105 


105^/ 
13^ 


119 
8k 


110 

88 



279 



50 

8U 



111 

102 



a/ Source: Secret K0F0R1I CINCVICH) Message DTG 311950Z Oct C6. 

NMCC/MC Nr. IOI63, Subject: Comparison of Ground Forces (u). 
\f January data unavailable. 



117 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






/¥¥ 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



In view of the ARVN f s low efficiency in major combat operations and 
the increasing difficulties that SVN forces have had in recruiting and 
retaining the planned forces in an overtaxed economy, I believe that we 
should not increase the SVN forces (ARVN, Regional and Popular Forces) 
above the present strength of 158 battalions with 610,000 men. It is 
likely that GVN control can be extended most rapidly by using SVN forces 
mainly for revolutionary development, and using additional recruitable 
personnel for non-military and para-military revolutionary development 
duty. The ARVN must be retrained and assigned to RD duty, and General 
Westmoreland plans to do so. The performance of the ARVN and other SVN 
forces as an instrument for winning popular support for the GVN has been 
decidedly unsatisfactory. Apparently ARVN personnel have not appreciated 
the decisive importance of revolutionary development and popular support; 
the importance of these items will be heavily emphasized in the retraining 
programs . 

jfe^fe-p frJ-erc °f Inflation . To unite the population behind the Govern 
merit ~ Indeed, to avoid disintegration of SVN society - a sound economy- 
is essential. Runaway inflation can undo what our military operations 
accomplish. For this reason, I have directed that a "piaster budget" be 
established for U.S. military funded activities. The intent of this 
program is to hold military and contracter piaster spending to the mini- 
mum level which can be accomplished without serious impact on military^ 
operations. 

• 

Ambassador Lodge has asked that U.S. military spending be held to 
P't2 billion in CY 67. The Ambassador's proposed program of tightly 
constrained U.S. and GVN civilian and military spending will not bring 
complete stability to SVN; there will still be, at best, a P10 billion 
inflationary gap. It should, however, hold price rises in CY 67 to 10$ 
to 2% as opposed to 75yo to 90$ in the current year. Unless we rigidly 
control inflation, the ARVN desertion rate will further increase and 
effectiveness will decline thus partially canceling the effects of 
increased U.S. deployments. Further, government employees will leave 
their jobs and civil strife will occur, possibly collapsing the GVN and, 
in any event, seriously hindering both the military and the pacification 
efforts. 



pUp 



The success of our efforts to hold U.S. military expenditures to 



? L Vd billj 



pends. among other things, on U.S. force levels. The iisi- 



at 



pact of .three differing deploy: at plans on piaster spending au constant 
prices is shown in the table below. The actual level of piaster spending 
associated with each deployment program is, of course, determined oy what 
policies are pursued in saving piasters. The planning factors used in 
the table are based on little actual experience and may be either too high 
or too low to serve as a reliable basis for projection. They do, however 
reflect first quarter FY 67 experience, MA.CV planning factors, and expected 
ant i- inflationary "programs. 



118 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



I its 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



1 U.S. TROOP DEPLOYMENTS AND DOD PIASTER SPEEDING 



U.S. Deployments 



b/ 



Current Program 
SecDef Recommended 
JCS Recommended 



_ C O '-» \_ j. O VJ^ L _ i . 

Current Program 
SecDef Recommend 
JC S R e c omme nd e d 



sJ 



a 



ed 



.End Strength 



Average Strength. 



CY62T 


C" 


i6i 


CY66 


Dec 


Jun 


Dec 


Jun 


392 

291 


kko 

k$6 


1*63 
5CA 


522 



FY67 

368 
370 

37b 



38 
38 
39 



* / 



CY&7 
U2ii 

kSi 



kl 
k6 



:y63 



113k 
H68 
520 



37 
39 
^7 



_/ All FY 67 statistics based on actual figures for the first quarter and 

projections for final three. 

b/ Program 3 through change 21. Assumes forces hold at June 1967 levels. 

c/ Based on annual planning factors of 138,^32 ($23^) per man-year for per- 
sonnel spending, pl+3, 200 ($ 5^+0) per man-year for 0&M and, for construction: 



PT 67 
CY 67 
CY' 68 



SecDef 

♦■■*»■-*-—»■- — " ' 

7,878- 

6,702 

1,386 



JCS 



7 , 967 
8,3^3 
^551 



The table clearly illustrated that with the deployment of 1^3,000 
troops the CY 67 goal of ?k2 "billion is feasible. The planning factors 
used, however, entail a "pushing down 11 of 0&M and personal spending from 
the MACV planning factors ($360 per man year for personal spending, 
$600 for 0&M) in light of past performance and likely future savings; , 
application of the MACV planning factors result in T?k6 billion piaster 
spending. If these later planning factors hold, the.Ph6 spending rate 
would increase the inflationary gap by kC$ and would be a severe blow 
to the stabilization program. If inflation occurs and U.S. expenditures 
are maintained in constant dollar terms, piaster expenditures will in- 
crease and the problem will be worsened. If the CIKCPAC construction 
program were approved, similar problems would result, It appears impera- 
tive to adopt a plan, such as the one exemplified in the table above, 
which will call for a strong effort to reduce spending below the levels 
embodied in the MACV planning factors. 

In addition to U.S. military spending, stabilization of the SVH 
economy requires strict limitation of RVKAF spending. We must plan to 
support the RYIIAF at no higher than the Ambassador's requested level of 

P7O billion during CY 67. ' 



* * * # • * 



119 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



3 • The Combined Camp aign Pl an is Published 

Ten days earlier, on the 7th., COMUSMACV, in a formal ceremony 
had signed with General Vien, the Chairman of the RVNflJ? Joint General 
Staff, the Combined Campaign Plan 19o7, which committed RV1MAF to sup- 
port pacification with the majority of its forces, and identified as 
priority for U.S. effort military operations in areas adjacent to the 
populated regions of Vietnam — the concept advocated by Lodge and 
Komer throughout the summer, 75/ 

The concept for conducting operations was as follows: 

a. Concept. The initiative achieved in the 1966 Cam- 
paign will be retained through a strategic and tactical 
offensive conducted in consonance with political, economic 
and sociological programs of GVN and US/FW agencies. RVNAF, 
U.S. and FWMA forces will be employed to accomplish the 
mission in accordance with the objectives established and 
tasks assigned for this campaign. RVHA.F will have the primary 
mission of supporting Revolutionary Development activities, 
with priority in and around the National Priority Areas and 
other areas of critical significance, defending governmental 
centers, and protecting and controlling national resources, 
particularly rice and salt. U.S. forces will reinforce RVNA.F; 
operate with other FWM&Fj and as necessary, conduct unilateral 
operations. The primary mission of U.S. and FWMAF will be to 
destroy the VC/WA main forces, base areas, and resources and/ 
or drive the enemy into the sparsely populated and food- scarce 
areas; secure their base areas and clear in the vicinity of 
these bases; and as directed assist in the protection and 
control of national resources. 

Throughout this campaign increased emphasis will 
be given to identifying and eliminating the VC infrastructure 
and to small unit operations designed specifically to destroy 
the guerrilla force. These operations will be characterized 
by saturation patrolling, ambushes, and an increase in night 
operations by both ARVN and US/l'WMAF. 

River Assault Group forces will be used to the optimum 
in III and IV CTZ's in small unit operations against enemy 
river crossing points and tax collection points; in armed 
river patfcol operations in the major rivers of the Delta; and 
-in any other operations where their special capabilities may 
be profitably employed. 

Surface LOC's will be used to the maximum, to include 
optimum use of River Assault Groups where appropriate, in 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 

1 r 1 . 1 , 11.. . ._ 

120 



I 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



support of all operations with a corresponding- decrease on 
the dependence on airlift support. Riverine operations , 
amphibious operations along the RVN coast , and rapid spoiling 
attacks will be conducted against enemy units confirmed by- 
hard intelligence. Emphasis will be placed on all types of 
reconnaissance, especially long range patrols, to acquire the 
necessary hard intelligence. 



area 



v-' 



The systematic neutralization of the enemy's base 
will be pursued aggressively during this campaign. 



By directing priority of effect to the neutralization of 
those base areas which directly affect the National Priority 
Areas, key population and economic centers, and vital com- 
munications arteries, the accomplishment of both objectives 
for this campaign will be facilitated. 

Although RVNAF is assigned the primary responsibility 
of supporting Revolutionary Development and US/FWMAF are 
assigned the primary mission of destroying the main VC/NVA 
forces and bases, there will be no clear cut division of 
responsibility. RVNAF General Reserve and ARVN Corps Reserve 
units will conduct unilateral and participate in coordinated 
and combined search and destroy operations. US/FWMAF will 
continue to provide direct support and implicit aid to 
Revolutionary Development activities. 

The people are the greatest asset to the enemy and 
control of the people is the enemy's goal. With them, the 
enemy has most of the ingredients needed for success: food, 
supplies, money, manpower, concealment and intelligence. 
During this campaign every effort will be made to deny these 
assets to the enemy. Map 1 reflects the National Priority 
area for each corps tactical zone, and the area for priority 
of military offensive operations. These priority areas 
together cover a large majority of the population, food pro- 
ducing lands, and critical lines of communications within 
SVN. The National Priority Areas are areas of major signifi- 
cance at the national level where critical civil and military 
resources are figured on a priority basis for revolutionary 
development. The purpose of designating the area for priority 
of military offensive operations in conjunction with the 
national priority areas is to focus the attention and effort 
of RVNAF and US/FWMAF in those areas where operations will 
destroy or drive the enemy into sparsely populated and food- 
scarce areas; insure the protection of the population, 
control of resources and provide unrestricted use of major 
lines of communications, all of which will facilitate follow- 
on Revolutionary Development. Spoiling attacks to frustrate 
the VC strategy will continue to be conducted in other areas 
as directed, 76/ 



121 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Of particular interest in the Combined Campaign Plan is the 
emphasis given to Revolutionary Development. The concept for this 
was as follows : 

a. Strategic Concept* 

(l) The GVN strategic concept for defeating the 
VC/MVA forces and building a viable, free nation includes 
three separate but mutually supporting operations as follows : 

(a) A military offensive conducted by RVNAF 
and US/FWMAF to defeat the VC/MVA military forces. 

(b) Revolutionary development conducted by 
RVMA.F and GVJ\ T civil elements, with the assistance of US/ 
FWMAF and US/FW civil agencies, to establish and maintain 
security in populated areas and extend legal government 
control over these areas. 

(c) Nation building conducted by GVN civil 
elements, with the assistance of US/FW civil agencies, to 
complete the development of nationwide political, economic, 
and social institutions necessary for a viable, free, non- 
communist Republic of Vietnam. 

(2) The three operations will take place concur- 
rently. In areas where there is adequate government control, 
nation building will be in progress. In other areas, RD will 
be underway, while in less secure areas, the military offen- 
sive will be prosecuted. Previously, the military offensive 
dominated national efforts; however, during 1967, RD will 
receive increasingly greater emphasis. With regard to the 
military offensive, priority of effort will be given to 
destroying the enemy forces in those areas where RD is 
expected to be carried out in the future. Offensive opera- 
tions also will be conducted to prevent major VC/lWA main 
forces from interfering in RD and nation building programs 
that are in progress. 77 / 

However, as the year wore on, attention was increasingly focused toward 
the border regions and the problems of halting enemy infiltration from 
sanctuaries outside South Vietnam. This is reflected in the operations 
just south of the DMZ in the I Corps, west of Pleiku, and Konturn in 
the II Corps, and the movement towards War Zone C in III Corps. 

In I CTZ, by the end of October, the NVA 32lffi Division again 
was drawn back across the DMZ. Intelligence indicated that the 32^B 
Division had been relieved by the NVA.3^1st and had withdrawn north 
of the DMZ. The 3^1st was in and just north of the DMZ near the 



122 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



eastern edge of the mountainous area. By the end of the year, the 
attention of the Marines in the I Corps Tactical Zone was fastened 
on the DMZ. 78/ 

In II CTZ, PAUL REVERE IV, which ran from 18 October through the 
end of the year, conducted by elements of the recently arrived ifth 
Infantry Division and the 25th Infantry Division with later reinforce- 
ment by two battalions of the 1st Cavalry Division, resulted in almost 
a thousand enemy killed. 79/ 

In III CTZ, in spite of the casualties which the enemy had sus- 
tained in EL PASO II, the 9th VC Division moved into well-concealed 
base areas where he absorbed replacements, retrained them on their 
equipment. In early November, the 9th VC Division moved into a new 
base area near the Michelin Plantation intending to use this base as 
a jumping off place for objectives in Tay Ninh. Instead, the enemy 
collided with the 196th Infantry Brigade, resulting in Operation 
ATTLEBORO. ATTLEBORO, begun on Ik September as a single battalion 
search and destroy operation, expanded as additional base areas were 
located and by 3 November, the operation had grown to include portions 
of the 1st Infantry Division, the 3rd Brigade of the Uth Infantry 
Division and 173rd Airborne Brigade. By the time ATTLEBORO was termin- 
ated in late November, the enemy had lost over 1,000 killed. The 
pattern in III Corps, with the exception of a couple of operations in 
Phuoc Tuy Province designed basically to clear the lines of communica- 
tion from Saigon to Vung Tau, was a gradual shifting of emphasis north- 
ward from Long An Province to Hoa Ninh Province to Binh Duong and then 
north and west into Tay Ninh Province and War Zone C. 80/ 

By the end of the year, MACV estimated the total forces available 
to the enemy in Vietnam at 152 combat battalions, the total personnel 
strezigth of 280,600, of which 123,600 were combat or support troops, 
112,000 were militia, and 39,000 were political cadre. MACV had accepted 
a figure of 1+8, U00 infiltrators during the year. An additional 25,600 
may have infiltrated on the basis of information evaluated as possibly 
true. This total of 7^,000, accepted and possible, was based on infor- 
mation available to MACV as of 31 Dec 66. The infiltration rate for 
the first 6 months of i960 was approximately 15 battalion equivalents. 
Although most of this infiltration took place through Laos, an increasing 
number had begun to infiltrate through the Demilitarized Zone as the 
year wore on. 8l/ 

Program h was promulgated on 18 November I966. 82 / At the time it 
was published events in Vietnam and decisions In Washington had essen- 
tially rendered the ground strategy concepts of AB 1^2 meaningless. 
Program k denied C0MUSM&CV the additional troops he proclaimed necessary 
for the tasks set forth in AB 1^2, while the troops he did have were 
engaged in War Zone C, in the highland border areas, and along the DMZ 
-- far from the populated regions of Vietnam, which constituted the 
National Priority areas of AB 1^2. 



123 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



L 



/C'J 



• -- — 









TOP SE2EEJ - Sensitive 



SOUTHEAST ASIA DEPLOYMENT PROGRAM ~'-;-SU:-MARY SCHEDULE 
(Tc be used to Manpower and Logistical Planning and Financial Budgeting) 



1965 



196C 



1967 



1968 



Jun 



Oct 



Dec 






eo 



Oct 



Nov 






Ja a 






Mar 



Ar-r 



May 









Z~c 



Mar 



Jun 



KA33J7E3 BATTALIONS IN SYff: 



OS & VHAF FIGHTER AND ATTACK 
SORTIES 



B-52 SORTIES 

AIR Q5DHAXICE: CGnSUMPZEOB ^/ 
(Thousands of Tons) 

USA? i USMC FIGHTER AND 

ATTACK TACTICAL SQUADRONS 



US FTGKTEB AND ATTACK 
T A : TI CAL AI R CRAF T 
(INCL NAVY) 



Actual - army 
USMC 

TOTAL US 
11/11/66 Flan 
12/11/65 Plan 

Actual - SVN 
LAOS 

NVN 

TOTAL 
H/ll/66 Plan-SVN 

LAOS 

NVN 

TOTAL 
12/11/65 Plan Tctal 
Actual 

11/11/66 Plan 
12/11/65 Plan 



22 
13 
35 

9 35. 



2 
7 

9 



22 
13 
35 

35 



29 
17 

ho 



33 

12 

52 

■ 



44 50 

20 20 

oT+ 70 



59 



59 



70 
62 



7,234 12,090 12,763 15,153 12-672 12,797 u,jk 
511 96& 3,003 6,217 2,-2 1,261 2,31 



79 
77 



82 
77 



82 
XL 



82 
77 



82 
XL 



82 
XL 



82 
77 



86 



87 



87 



87 



6 
310 



2,U01 3,^63 2,193 4,4 97 7,7:3 12,24 9 e.656 
10,l46' 16,524 H^ok 25,c^7 22,;-:5 26,307 22,712 

13,810 14,567 lU,6'09 1^,720 14,102 13,701 14,466 14,243 13,938 13,110 12,725 12, 861 

3,013 kj&2 4,999 ^,83^ ^,732 4,307. 3,566 3,186 2,505 *,2 L ,938 2,815 

9,988 9j c 66 9)72]4 9j693 0,793 10,236 10,111 10,746 10,7 9,c77 9,496 11,793 

n a _ _ ,_ ^ ,„„ 2 7,8ll 28,555 29,332 29,253 25,632 28,244 28,143 23,2cO 27,5& 27,335 27,159 27,46"9 

1 0.146 16,52U' 13,75b 21,1^3 ^1,-r- ^2,p77 2- ,^3 25,770 25,77 25,770 25,770 25,770 25,770 25,770 25,770 

297~ 316 ^10 2^3 . kkti Eio " " 

600 650 650 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 

?00 300 500 7C-: 800 600 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 



Actual 
7/1/66 



11 



32 



36- 



41 



T6 - 



-3 



Plan 



Actual - S7N 
THAI 
TOTAL 
11/11/66 Plan 
I2/II/65 Plan 



52 



56 



60 



64 



6k 



6k 



6h 



6k 



6k 



6k 



6k 



6k 



US & VNA7 FIGHTER AND 
ATTACK AIRCRAFT LOSSES 



Actual - S '...' 
THAI 
CARRIER 
TOTAL 
11/11/66 Plan 
12/11/65 Plan 



AF: Actual 



11 

5 
16" 

16 
214 

96 

188 
T^H 

I49S 

~i6~ 



ik 

JL 

21 

20 



19 

7 

20" 

27 



22 

_3 
30 

31 



23 

15 
35 



29 
12 

34 



27^ 
130 
217 
o21 

621 



29 
12 

la 

36 



371 
127 

183 

551 
723 



157 

20U 

733 

801 



«*21 

251 
2:7 



301 



494 

227 

151 
902 

307 



ki 
33 



^3 

i40 



^3 


43 


k2 


k2 


k2 


k2 


40 


ko 


ko 


ko 


ko 


ko 



k2 



k2 



k2 



k2 



lB" 



509 
249 

200 

953 

84o 



15 



17 



40 



1,002 
576 



-:- 



1,046 1,038 i,o4o 1,022 i,oi4 1,011 939 
£;■■ 929 959 929 929 929 929 



967 993 998 983 



21 



11/11/66 Plan „ - TV,, - 
12/11/65 Plan l6 .18 23 gff ligS §3 



J J 1& UU ' 




■A^- €. 



tZdc&h* 




3k 33 35 35 3k 

12/ll'/65.Plan 16 I? ?3 26__._1^5 23. 31 3U ^ Q 2 U 34 

USMC: Actual 5 3 A "^x<T \ 2 ° 

11/11/66 Plan , » „ 1/ Jv— ^ V J « 3 3 

12/11/65 Plan J VJ j?/JL£!I Z 2 _ 2 2 3 



3^ 
3k_ 



3k 
3k 



35 
^4 



33 



30 



29 



32 



t/ L,^6/ // v/ 11/ll/66 




NAVY: Actual 

11/11/66 Plan — - 1. , 
12/11/65 Plan / (t'^ 5 

~*££CZ&^ " 



j *y i/^> r AA. 

7 T L^Tr^i! " ifc 

r^* o i? 12 13 



3 
2 



3 
2 



3 
2 



3 
2 



3 
3 



3 

3 



13 

l 



12 . 

2 



: 3 

2 



11 

12 
2 



10 



13 



.12. 




12 

2 



20 
13 



19 
12 



19 
13 



22 
13 



23 
12 



2k 
13 



23 
12 



23 
13 



18 



16 



20 



21 



Plan 



ATTACK SORTIE LOSS RATES 



12/ll/25_?lan P 1 1-- 

t^Actual 2k 37 35 

11/11/66 Plan 
12/11/65 Plan 



2 

r 



36 



52 



-_1. 
36 



2 

1 



2 
1 



2 
1 



24 



36 









LL 



SVN: Actual 

ll/n/66 Plan 

LAOS 



1.03 . 0.59 






0.73 



:.- 7 



:. - 



k6 

0.' 



59 
50 



57 
5C 



59 

50 



62 
50 



62 



63 
50 



62 
50 



63 

51 



55 



50 



53 



57 







•■ 



1 






11/11/66 Plan „ ^ °-- -50 . 0. 0.50 O.47 0.U7 0.U8 0.43 O.^r 0.1+7 0.46 

12/11/65 Plan i i g3._.o i i:.._Q i 64__..o,:;_._o i ji___ — 9^§1— «.2 A §2 0.92 9.82 . ;^z ...Q 4 £z. „.CqI .0.87 0.67 _ _ 

:Actual 3.91 ■ n - °-33 0.16 0.8? 0. 1.73 " 

11/11/66 ELan 1 ' 1 9 1-17 1.15 1.: 1.15 1. 1.26 1.27 I- 1.15 1.03 1.15 

12/11/65 ?ian_ 2.J1 1^91 ls2..^- ii^ riiL-__zi22__.^;?9 li?2-___h2L-:.?:;22_. _":: .r-.:-!_ ._:: ..;• _r: :. 

NWiActuaV" 5.91 5.7c 2.21 2.6 1.96 " """ '"""* 

11/iiAXvim 2' 2k 3.16 3.13 2. 3.4U 3.43 3.-: 3-35 3.12 3.01 3.24 3.20 



EELICOPTER DSPLOBffiNTS 



HELICOPTER LOSSES 
(AR.Ti AM) USMC) 

TOTAL US MJL FERSCir.EL-ST.; 



U/ll/66 Plan 

12/11/6 5 ?l*.r. 
Actual 

11/11/66 Plan 

1 2/11/65 Plan 



3.90 



507 
507 



4.91 4.61 

C02 1,403 

832 1,456 



.61 



3-24 
4.6l 



3.16 

4.61 



3.18 
4.61 



-.51 



Actual 

11/11/66 ?lan£/ 

12/11/65 Plan 



11 
11 



15" 
36 



17 

33 



1,522 1,6 1,$C9 2,010 

1,856 1,934 2,092 2,112 2,234 

li2ll lilll h211 2>152 2,246 2 , 391 2,552 



2,360 2,419 2,452 2,600 3,008 3,143 3,167 



30 



23 



24 
45 



33 
47 



FIA3TER EXPE2JD 

(Billions: P.) 



Actual - A?M: 

USMC 

NAVY 

USAF 

IOTAI 

11/11/66 PI 

12/11/65 Plan 



27.3 

18.1 

3.8 

10.7 

59.9 

.59.9 



92.0 
36.8 

8.5 
15.2 

153.3 
153.3 



116.0 
35.2 

6.7 
20.6 


137.4 

.7 

12.: 
22.3 


53.7 

1". 


1&.3 

19-. 9 


231.2 

244.2 


-- 

£77.3 



169.2 2C9.9(?) 

56.5 . 53.9(P) 

21.9 22.4(p) 

45.5 46.4(p) 

313.1 337.6(?) 



28 
47 



29 
50 



32 

54 



32 



34 



36 



37 



37 



40 



46 



48 



48 



221. 4 



326.^ 



360.0 

3^6.3 



Actual- 
11/11/66 Plan 



3.1 



391.0 
367.3 



404.0 
379.9 



415. 423.0 432.0 437.0 440.0 -52.O 463.0 468.0 469.0 



3.0 



3.0 



3.0 



3.2 



3.3 



3.5 



3.6 



3.7 



3.7 



R - Denotes preliminary data. 

SJ. excludes y 15C0 tons per - cnth consuned in world-wide training. 

2/ Fifetire is being verified for accuracy. 

Sf ing detailed analysis. 



12^ 



1 

■ ■ 



Prog ran 

OASD/SA/SSA Prograns Division 

November 17, i960 



TOP S : - Sensitive 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



tSi TOP SECRET - S ensitive 



F. What Did It Mean? 

Program 1* had important historical antecedents which provide the 
basic texture of the decision-making on Program 5. The preceding 
sections have outlined the major themes and historical developments 
which projected into the succeeding program with telling effect. These 
can "be briefly summarized as follows: 

(1) A precedent, albeit a seemingly fragile one, of essen- 
tially saying "no" to the COMUSMACV force requirements was established. 
Actually, DoD and the President were beginning to question the concept 

of operation for Vietnam which had led to programs, now becoming increas- 
ingly costly and depres singly barren of tangible results. The illusion 
of quick victory "on the cheap" had fled, and hard reality intervened. 
People in and out of government were beginning to seek alternatives to 
our policies in Vietnam with increased interest, and Program 5 was to 
increasingly reflect this basic mood surfacing in late 1966. 

(2) The JCS had adopted a strategic concept based upon -widely 
expanded operations in the North, widened and intensified operations in 
the South designed to seek out and destroy enemy forces, and committed 
to assisting the GVN in building an "independent, viable, non-communist 
society" -- a vestige of the unfortunate wording of NSAM 288.^83/ The 
military heads had been denied the troops they said they required^to 
successfully accomplish the objectives developed under the concept, but 
the concept itself had survived. This strategic thought was to provide 
the conceptual baseline for Program 5- 

(3) The basic troop requirement numbers, so important to 
Program 5, were introduced during Program k. In fact, the refined 
figure the JCS proposed in JCSM 702-66 for mid-1968, 524,288, became 
the eventual "approved" figure for Program 5- This number remained a 
focal point throughout the planning period despite frequent important 
changes in the strategic situation. 

(k) Certain "oblique alternatives," those which were not 
directly substitutable options appeared during this time -- all of them 
designed to relieve pressure on U.S. resources, especially manpower. 
Among these were the barrier plan (proposed by McNamara), new free 
world military force sharing formulas (KANZUS), efforts to subtly hold 
the RVMAF's "feet to the fire," and operations of various kinds in the 
"sanctuaries." 

(5) The Reserve mobilization line — a political sound barrier 
as it were, remained unbroken. 

. The JCS had made a two-pronged case for breaking it: One, 
that we could not adequately meet CINCPAC's 1967 requirements and simul- 
taneously fulfill our commitments to NATO and other threatened areas 
without mobilization (and even then probably dangerously late); and 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 
125 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



»z 



*-* 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



secondly, only such massive infusions of firepower in the North and man- 
power in the South as they proposed could possibly achieve our' war 
termination objectives "in the shortest time with the least cost" and 
this could not be done unless we mobilized. Other arguments emerged 
in discussions. There were those who feared the move because of the ■ 
inherent uncertainties about public reaction. To this the Chiefs 
replied that mobilization had traditionally unified the country, and 
it would also provide a strong indication of our national resolve — 
an important message to relay to Hanoi, and one in which Westmoreland 
as a field commander was also interested. Regardless, the issue loomed 
as the ceiling figure in the majority of ground-force strategy delibera- 
tions -- it appeared that the level was periodically studied, possibly 
negotiated, but always there -- the "Plimsoll line." 8k/ 

(6) Public disenchantment with the war was growing, and this 
was being manifested in diverse ways. On the "hawk" side powerful 
political figures (and many lesser ones) were increasingly vocal in 
their opposition to bombing restraints and restrictive force levels. 
Senator Stennis was in the vanguard of this group. On the other side, 
public and private figures alike were energetically working to create a 
genuine political war issue and to generate palatable alternative policies 
for the upcoming Presidential elections in 1968. Feeding a less focused 
sense of public dissatisfaction was an increasing awareness of the oppor- 
tunity costs of the war in terms of national resources -- men, money and 
attention -- denied to domestic programs. As the defense slice of the 
budget hovered near the eighty billion dollar mark, the public realized 

it was "paying more and liking it less." There were strong inclinations . 
to "paying less" as long as the voter was resigned to liking it less. 

The press was moving beyond the bounds of its traditional 
adversary relationship vis-a-vis the Administration and assuming a leading 
role in catalyzing the swell of public opposition and questioning about 
the war. Acute even early on in the war, the press opposition intensified 
and expanded as the divergence of official public pronouncements 'on the 
war and what reporters and their sources saw on the ground increased. 

(7) Failure is in the truest sense an orphan and as the sense 
of futility and self-doubt about achieving our objectives in Vietnam 
heightened, the architects of our military ground strategy found them- 
selves increasingly isolated. The official base of support for the 

MACV strategy narrowed as more alternatives to it were seriously examined 
in Washington. This tended not only to aggravate a communications prob- 
lem which had always hindered political -military planning, but it placed 
COhUSMCV-CINCPAC on the defensive, creating an information and planning 
bias (from those sources) toward protection, justification and continua- 
' tion of present programs. 

(8) Finally, we had a field commander facing a strategic 
dilemma with no high prospect of satisfactory resolution. If it had 






126 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



153 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



any hope of success, the Combined Campaign Plan for 19&7 required both 
a military "shield" to keep large enemy units from the populated areas 
where pacification was proceeding, and a "shelter" under which pacified 
areas could be respectably kept that way. The "shield" concept could be 
implemented in a number of ways, statically or dynamically, (mobile vs. 
position defense) geographically oriented or enemy force oriented, or by 
different combinations of these at different times. General Westmoreland's 
strategy based upon exploitation of our inherent superior mobility and 
firepower was designed to simultaneously attrite the enemy and retain the 
initiative by disrupting VC/NVA operations before they completely materi- 
alized. This led to seeking engagement with enemy main force units well 
out into the border regions, where they literally could be held at distance 
before jumping off in operations. Related to this was the notion that the 
important thing was to fight — to engage the enemy and create casualties. 
It mattered little that you accepted combat in regions with certain 
advantages for the enemy — ■ the prime objective was to engage and to kill 
him. 

Fighting the mobile defense kind of war provides an adequate but 
not perfect shield. You can liken it to a vast semi -permeable membrane 
which has significant leakage by small amounts, over time. Backing up this 
kind of a "shield" is the "shelter" also manned by combat troops, geo- 
graphically dispersed (actually occupying) in the areas where pacification 
is going on. The combination of the two, shield and shelter, require 
men and the balance is crucial, especially so if you have limited resources 
If your operating assumptions are those held by COMUSMA.CV in late I966, 
then what you have for the "shelter" is a function of the kind and sizes 
of enemy forces you are fighting in the "shield" mission. If you are 
fighting large units at many points simultaneously, you are forced to 
strip "shelter" forces -- or to use AKVN (or request more U.S. forces). 
As Program if closes we find MA.CV facing just those same large multiple 
threats, stripping the "shelter" forces, and relying upon an inadequate 
ARVN for the majority of pacification security. With sufficient forces, 
U.S. and ARVN, the task was prodigious — and precarious. To attempt to 
"shield" without adequate forces to "shelter" was bound to be precarious. 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 
127 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






A 



FOOTNOTES 

1. CINCPAC 3010, Ser: 000255, 18 Jun 66, Sub j : Calendar Year 1966 
Adjusted Requirements and Calendar Year 1967 Requirements. 

2. National Intelligence Estimate lk.3-66, North Vietnamese Military 
Potential for Fighting in South Vietnam, 7 Jul 66. 

3. JCSM 506-66, dated 5 Aug 66, Sub j : CINCPAC CY I966 Adjusted Force 
Requirements and CY I967 Force Requirements. 

k. SecDef Memo for Chairman of the JCS, dtd 5 Aug 66, Subj : CINCPAC 
CY 66 Adjusted Requirements and CY 67 Requirements. 

ka. MACV 27578 dtd 10 Aug 66, Westmoreland to Admiral Sharp and General 
Wheeler, Subj: CY 66-67 Force Requirements, emphasis added. 

5. Saigon 256*1-, dtd 3 Aug 66, from Lodge for the President. 

6. Saigon 3129, dated 10 Aug 66. 

7. Ibid. 

8. Ibid. 

9. CINCPAC 2323332 Aug 66 to C0MJSMACV, Subj: Draft Military Strategy 
to Accomplish US Objectives for Vietnam. 

10. Ibid. 

11. Report of Inter-Agency "Roles and Missions" Study Group, U S. Mission, 
Vietnam, 2k Aug 66. 

12. MACV 29797 to CINCPAC, Subj: Concept of' Military Operations in SVN (u), 
dated 26 Aug 66. 

13- Ibid. , p. 2. 

lk. Ibid. 

15» Ibid. , p. 6. 

16. .Saigon U923, dated 31 Aug 66. 

17. Ibid., p. 2. 

18. Ibid. , p. 3. 

^' Ifc^* > Section two, page 2. 



128 



j 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



, .- 



20. Command History, I966, Hq USMACV, 19 Apr 67, pp. 21-22. 

21. Ibid., pp. 366-369. 

22. Ibid ., p. 377- 

23. MACV Command History, 1966, p. 376. . 
2k. Ibid., p. 385. 

25. Saigon 293*1 from AmEmb Saigon to Sec/State, dtd 8 Aug 66. 

26. Ibid . 

27. Ibid. 

28. MACV 27578, Subj: CY 66-67 Force Requirements dtd 10 Aug 66. 

29. Saigon 36OI from AmEmb Saigon to SecState, dtd 16 Aug 66. 

30. Air Supported Anti-Infiltration Barrier, Aug 66, Institute for 
Defense Analyses, JACN Division. 

31. Ibid. 

32. CINCPAC to JCS, DTG O719252 Apr 66, Subj: Counter-Infiltration Barrier. 

33. MACV U287, 2k Sep 66. 

3^. macv U326, 2 Oct 66. 

35. COMUSMACV lOJ.91 to CINCPAC, Sub j : Threat to I CTZ, dtd 13 Sep 66, 
emphasis added. 

36. MACV I6O5195 Sep 66 to CINCPAC, Subj : COMUSMACV Slam Concept 

37- MACV 8212 from Westmoreland to Sharp, Subj : Containment of Enemy 
Forces in Sanctuary, DTG 2OU56S Sep 66, emphasis added. 

38. Saigon 367O to SecState, Porter for Komer, dated 17 Aug. 66. 

39. Saigon 6.100, Subj: Inflation Control in CY 1967 Programs, dtd 15 Sep 66. 
ifO. State 535'4l, Subj: CY 67 Inflation Control, dtd 23 Sep 66. 

ill. Ibid . 

k2. CM-177^-66, Subj: Revised Piaster Limits on Military Spending in 
Vietnam, dtd 22 Sep 66. 



129 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






lSC> 



k3. Saigon 7332 to SecState, dtd 1 Oct 66. 

* 

kk. MACV Ul+378, Subj: Piaster Budget, CY 1967, 5 Oct 66. 

^5* ASD(SA) Memo for SecDef, Subj: US Military Piaster Spending in 
South Vietnam FY 67 and CY 67, dtd 5 Oct 66. 

k6. JCSM 613-66, Subj: CINCPAC CY 1966 Adjusted Force Requirements and 
CY I967 Force Requirements. 

*l6a. Memo for SecDef 5 Subj: SKA. Deployment Plan, dtd 29 Sep 66. 

1+7. JCSM-6U6-66, Subj: World-Wide U.S. Military Posture (u), dtd 7 Oct 

66. Its baseline for requirement analysis was JCSM 721-65, dtd 2k Sep 65, 
Subj: "US Military Posture (u)," which provided a broad strategic 
concept embracing the following objectives: 

a. In conjunction with allied forces, maintain forward deploy- 
ments world-wide to deter communist aggression. 

b. A military capability to support NATO/Europe obligations with 
active, readily deployable forces through the first month (m/d+30) in 
the event or imminence of hostilities. 

c. A military capability to conduct other contingency operations 
in which force commitments are of a minor nature but where timely 
commitment of such forces may be crucial to the attainment of US 
objectives. 

- 
■ 

d. Support military operations in Southeast Asia. 

e. Maintain an adequate training and rotation base to support 
the above. 

1*8. Ibid. • 

k9. Ibid. See: Tab F to Appendix A, "Summary of U.S. Army Forces (u)" 
to JCSM 6k6-66, dated 7 October 1966. 

50. SecDef memo for the President, Subj: Actions Recommended for Vietnam, 
dated Ik Oct 66, emphasis added. 

51. For a detailed analysis of this aspect, see Task Force Paper entitleC 
"Re-emphasis on Pacification." 

52. Memorandum for the President, Ik Oct 66 , op. cit. 

53- JCSM-672-66, Subj: "Actions Recommended for Vietnam (u)," dtd 
Ik Oct 66. 



$k. Ibid.. 



130 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



& 



55- Ibid . 

56- In a sense, JCSM-672-66 appears to be a delaying device used to buy 
time for the COMUSMACV reclamas to the DIM. However, it concomitantly 
provided an excellent opening through which to drive home their views 
on the bombing and negotiations. 

57- CINCPAC 3010, Ser 000^38, Sub j : Calendar Year 1966, and I967 Force 
Requirements/Capabilities Programs (u), dtd 20 Oct 66. 

58. CINCPAC Serial 000^5, 23 Oct 66. 

59. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from McNaughton, ASD(lSA), 
Subj: "McNaughton in Manila, October 23-25, " dtd 26 Oct 66. 

6°- lb id . For McNamara's views on the communications aspects of our force 
structure in SVN, see page 5, Memo for the President, Ik Oct 66. 

6l - 3Md» j At another time Westmoreland reported that the President had 
asked him his views in front of Thieu and Ky and he had given them; 
that Rostov/ had asked him to put them into a memo which he was 
drafting. McNaughton observed that he had a sort of paired list of 
favorable targets — ones related to air defense, ones to infiltra- 
tion and ones to "bargaining," but none very explicitly analyzed. 

• 

62. The New York T imes, 1 November 1966. The article said the Army had 
76^51 men more than authorized, the Air Force W-,313> the Navy 
12,029, and the Marines over 2,000. The conclusion was that with 
the increased forces (the Army had been told to go to 1,500,000 
according to the piece) the country could support 500,000 troops in 
SVN in CY I967 and to these increases 600,000 the following year. 
It did indicate that resistance from both civilian and military 
sources was growing in the Pentagon. 

63- The New York Times, h November 1966. 

6k. The New York Times , 9 November 1966. 

65. The New York Times, 6-12 Nov 66. The officer quoted in a front 
page story was m/g William DePUy, then CG, 1st Division. 

66. The New York Times , 3 -11 Nov 66. 

67. Ibid. 

68- Ibid. The ambiguity in the statement is interesting. The JCS ack- 
nowledge that the program as proposed was adequate (even in light of 
their earlier analysis of US worldwide posture deficiencies), but 
could not be developed without some yet unnamed "modifications" to 
the criteria. The door remained open to come back in for the reserves 
if need be. 



131 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



1SB 



~\ 



69- Ibid . 

70. The New York Times , 6 November 1966. 

71- ASD(SA) Memo for the SecDef, Sub j : Deployments to Southeast Asia 
dtd 9 Nov 66. 



72. 



73 



lh 



75 



The New York Times, 11 Nov 66. The subject of Vietnam was obscured 
at this conference by the Soviet ABM issue, for McNamara confirmed 
at this conference that the Soviets had an ABM system, and the US 
was studying the problem. 

Memo for the Chairman of the JCS, Sub j : Deployments to Southeast 
Asia (u), dtd 11 Nov 66. 

Draft Memorandum for the President, Subject: Recommended FY 67 
Southeast Asia Supplemental Appropriation (u), dtd 17 Nov 66. 

See MACV 52klk 9 Sub j : "Military Planning and Progress in SVN," dated 
8 December I966. This message extends MACV O613OOZ November I966, 
same title. This plan, transparently an effort to get the GVN offi- 
cially on the line for emphasis upon revolutionary development, in 
C0MlJSMACV T s eyes incorporated two significant innovations: 



...First, the plan requires RVNAF and MA.CV subordinate 
commands to prepare supporting plains to accomplish the 
objectives, tasks and goals stated in AB 1^2 and to support 
the achievement of goals stated in provincial revolutionary 
development (RD) plans. These plans are to be submitted 
for review by 15 December. Second, to maintain the viable 
nature of this plan, a requirement for quarterly reviews has 
been incorporated. These reviews will cover progress made, 
problems encountered, and recommendations for improvement. 
A combined RVNAF/maCV directive is being developed which 
establishes procedures for these reviews..." (See: MACV 3^1, 
080245Z December 1966) 

The follow-up to this message, also an extension, is MA.CV OO989, 
9 January I967. 

76. AB ll|2 Combined Campaign Elan, I967, pp. B~l, B-2. 

77. Ibid. 

78. MACV Command History, i960, pp. 368-369. 

« 

79- Ibid , , pp. 378-379. 
80. Ibid., pp. 386-387. 



132 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






81. Ibid ., p. 22. 

82. Memo for Secretaries of the Military Departments , Chairman of the 
JCS, Assistant Secretaries of Defense, Sub j : Southeast Asia Deployment 
Program #1|, dtd 18 Nov 66. 



j 83. JCSM 702-66, op. cit. 






8h. An early plumbing of this line was an article in early I965 by 
Hanson W. Baldwin, entitled: "We Must Choose — (l) T Bug Out 1 ; 
(2) Negotiate; (3) Fight." He wrote: 

"How many United States soldiers would be needed is 
uncertain — probably a minimum, of three to six divisions 
(utilized chiefly in battalion or brigade sized units), 
possibly as many as 10 or 12 divisions. Including Air Force, 
Navy and supporting units perhaps 200,000 to 1,000,000 Ameri- 
cans would be fighting in Vietnam. 

"Obviously this would mean a Korea type conflict, a 
major war, no matter what euphemisms would be used. Nor 
could we wage it in the present 'business as usual 1 economy. 
We would require partial mobilization, vastly beefed up 
military production. Many weaknesses in our military struc- 
ture would need strengthening. Even so, we could not antici- 
pate quick success. The war would be long, nasty and wearing." 
(The New York Times, 21 February I965, p. 63). 



133