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13
EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION
SUMMARY
President Eisenhower took office in the context of negotiations
for. a settlement in Korea and the portending defeat in France in Indo-
china. His Administration early faced the crisis surrounding the Geneva
Conference of 195^, in which direct U.S. intervention in Vietnam was a
distinct prospect. Having pressed diplomatically for a constructive
outcome at Geneva, the United States threw its support behind Ngo Dinh
Diem and the Government of Vietnam. With U.S. support, that government,
despite a series of severe tests, succeeded in consolidating itself and
making significant progress. U.S. justification for its policy toward
Vietnam in this period included the following:
a. The "domino principle": the loss of Vietnam, the most vulner-
able state of Southeast Asia, would imperil the other nations of the
region, and ultimately lead to a seriously weakened U.S. strategic
position. Vietnam was a key to continued free world access to the
human and material resources of Southeast Asia.
b. Communist China was pursuing an expansionist foreign policy
relying upon subversive aggression, as well as armaments. China thus
continued to reflect the unchanging Soviet objective of conquest of the
world, and both had manifest designs on Southeast Asia.
c. The United States proposed, through its aid programs, to help
the small and weak nations contiguous with communist powers to maintain
their freedom and independence lest aggression and expansion be en-
couraged, and the world moved thereby toward a third world war.
d. In the words of President Eisenhower, "We gave military and
economic assistance to the Republic of Vietnam. We entered into a
treaty -- the Southeast Asia Security Treaty -- which plainly warned
that an armed attack against this area would endanger our own peace and
safety and that we would act accordingly."
e. U.S. aid for Vietnam — economic and military — has made
possible not only its survival, but also genuine progress toward a
stable society, a modern economy, and internal and external security.
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V. B. JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR — PUBLIC STATEMENTS
EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION
CONTENTS
Page
1. Eisenhower cites the interrelationship of Southeast Asian
nations, their natural resources and strategic locations
as justifying U.S. concerns (k August 1953 ) B-4
2. Joint Franco -American communique citing agreement whereby
U.S. increases its aid to France in prosecution of its efforts
against Viet Minh (30 September 1953) B-5
3. Eisenhower emphasizes support of French is to avoid the tragedy
of U.S. getting involved on large scale in Southeast Asia
(10 February 195*0 B-5
k. Secretary of State presents a most revealing assessment of
administration's thinking on Indochina and the threat of Red
China. He cites expansion of communist domination, the in-
creased dangers to other nearby countries, the loss of food
supply to Japan and India, the strategic location of Indochina
and the military bases as paramount concerns (29 March 195*0 B-6
5. Alfred le Sesne Jenkins (Officer in Charge, Chinese Political
Affairs) discusses Chinese Communist regime and its relation-
ship to Soviet Union (2 April 195*0 B-9
6. President states "falling domino" principle loses people and
strategic resources to communism and threatens Australia in
comments on importance of Indochina to free world. He responds
to Sen. John Kennedy's expressed position on a guarantee of
independence needed to justify U.S. effort (7 April 195*0 B-10
7. Under Secretary Smith indicates vital basic reason for
Indochina's importance is communist expansion, and reiterates
"domino" theory and strategic resources (19 April 195*!-) B-12
8. Secretary of State Dulles reports on London-Paris conversations
on free world interests; advocates collective defense for
Indochina as U.S. solution to communist threat (19 April 195*0- ••• B-13
9. State Department comments on a speech by Vice President Nixon
by referring to stated U.S. policy of "united action"
(17 April 1954) " • • , B-14
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■ Pa-g 6
10. Dulles summarizes U.S. position on Indochina in light of
Geneva: comnunization of the civil war; U.S. intervention;
French armistice; collective security; possibility of U.S.
intervention (7 May 195*0 • B " 15
11. Eisenhower assesses progress at the Geneva Conference; cites
•plans for collective security arrangement in Southeast Asia
(5 May 195*0 B " 16
12. Eisenhower reaffirms his "domino" concerns in response to
press questioning (12 May 195*0 B-1 °
13. Secretary of State Dulles analyzes developments to date in
Indochina; he discusses the conditions under vihich U.S. would
intervene directly (11 June 195*0 B_l8
Ik. Eisenhower states U.S. position on Geneva Accords
(21July 195*0 B-2 °
15. Text of the declaration (21 July 195*0 B " 23
16. U.S. -French communique announcing desire to aid directly
the newly independent states of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam
(29 September 195*0 B " 25
17. Eisenhower informs President of Vietnam's Council that aid
will be conditioned on his government's giving the U.S.
"assurance as to standard of performance" (23 October 195*+) B " 26
18. Eisenhower notes but questions the moderation in Soviet policy;
refers to Diem's successes in South Vietnam (21 April 1956) B-27
19. Assistant Secretary of State Robertson restates American
policy in Vietnam at a time of relative stability (l June 1956).. B-28
20. Eisenhower emphasizes role of aid program in achieving Asian
goals; cites susceptibility of underdeveloped nations to
communist probings (21 May 1957) B " 32
21. Eisenhower justifies foreign aid to American people as
necessary for U.S. security; cites its "returns" in Vietnam
(21 May 1957) B " 33
22. Eisenhower reports to the nation on the Red Chinese shelling
of Quemoy; relates U.S. security interests to Formosa; cites
lesson of Munich and the militant statements of Chinese Com-
munists as requiring a firm U.S. stand (11 September 1958) B-35
B-2
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23. Eisenhower attempts at news conference to put communist
aggression in perspective (l October 1958) • • • B-k2
2k. Eisenhower in special message to Congress discusses communist
threat to developing nations and need for U.S. aid to maintain
collective defense (13 March 1959) B-U3
25. Eisenhower discusses importance of Vietnam to free world; he
shows specifically how its economy compliments Japan's
(k April 1959) B-U6
26. Eisenhower stresses threat posed by economic and military
power of China and Russia in defense of foreign aid
(16 February i960) B-51
27. Eisenhower reminds Diem of the responsibility that the
Vietnamese people have in safeguarding their independence
(22 October i960) B-52
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B. Eisenhower Administration
1 . Pre s ident Eisenhower's Remarks at Governors' Conference, August h,
1953, Public Papers of the Presidents, 1953 * V- 5^0 •
* * *
"I could go on enumerating every kind of problem that comes before
us daily. Let us take, though, for example, one simple problem in the
foreign field. You have seen the war in Indochina described variously
as an outgrowth of French colonialism and its French refusal to treat
indigenous populations decently. You find it again described as a war
between the communists and the other elements in southeast Asia. But
you have a confused idea of where it is located — Laos, or Cambodia,
or Siam, or any of the other countries that are involved. You don't
know really, why we are so concerned with the far-off southeast corner
of Asia.
"Why is it? Now, first of all, the last great population remaining
in Asia that has not become dominated by the Kremlin, of course, is the
sub-continent of India, including the Pakistan government. Here are
350 million people still free. Now let us assume that we lose Indochina.
If Indochina* goes, several things happen right away. The Malayan penin-
sula, the last little bit of the end hanging on down there, would be
scarcely defensible — and tin and tungsten that we sc greatly value from
that area would cease coming. But all India would be outflanked. Burma
would certainly, in its weakened condition, be no defense. Now, India is
surrounded on that side by the Communist empire. Iran on its left is in
8 weakened condition. I believe I read in the paper this morning that
Mossadegh's move toward getting rid of his parliament has been supported
and of course he was in that move supported by the Tudeh, which is the
Communist Party of Iran. All of that weakening position around there is
very ominous for the United States, because finally if we lost all that,
how would the free world hold the rich empire of Indonesia? So you see,
somewhere along the line, this must be blocked. It must be blocked now.
That is what the French are doing.
"So, when the United States votes $U00 million to help that war,
we are not voting for a giveaway program. We are voting for the cheapest
way that we can to prevent the occurrence of something that would be of
the most terrible significance for the United States of America — our
security, our power and ability to get certain things we need from the
riches of the Indonesian territory, and from southeast Asia.
2 .Tm' nt, Franco-American Communique, Additional United States Aid for
France and Indochina, September 30- 1953, Dep artment of State
■ Bulletin, October 12, 1953, p. ^86;
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"The forces of France and the Associated States in Indochina have
for 8 years been engaged in a bitter struggle to prevent the engulfment
of Southeast Asia by the forces of international communism. The heroic
efforts and sacrifices of these French Union allies in assuring the
liberty of the new and independent states of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam
has earned the admiration and support of the free world. In recognition
of the French Union effort the United States Government has in the past
furnished aid of various kinds to the Governments of France and the
Associated States to assist in bringing the long struggle to an early
and victorious conclusion.
"The French Government is firmly resolved to carry out in full its
declaration of July 3, 1953, by which is announced its intention of
perfecting the independence of the three Associated States in Indochina,
through negotiations with the Associated States.
"The Governments of France and the United States have now agreed
that, in support of plans of the French Government for the intensified
prosecution of the war against the Viet Minn, the United States will make
available to the French Government prior to December 31, 195U additional
financial resources not to exceed $385 million. This aid is in addition
to funds already earmarked by the United States for aid to France and
the Associated States.
"The French Government is determined to make every effort to break
up and destroy the regular enemy forces in Indochina. Toward this end
the government intends to carry through, in close cooperation with the
Cambodian, Laotian, and Vietnamese Governments, the plans for increasing
the Associated States forces while increasing temporarily French forces
to levels considered necessary to assure the success of existing military
plans. The additional United States aid is designed to help make it
possible to achieve these objectives with maximum speed and effectiveness.
"The increased French effort in Indochina will not entail any basic
or permanent alteration of the French Government's plans and programs
for its NATO forces."
3. President Eisenhower's News Conference, February 10, 195^ Public
Papers of the Presidents, 195^ P- 2 53 =
* * *
"Q. Daniel .Shorr, CBS Radio: Mr. President, should your remarks on
Indochina be construed as meaning that you are determined not to become
involved or, perhaps, more deeply involved in the war in Indochina, regard-
less of how that war may go?
"THE PRES3DE1IT. Well, I am not going to try to predict the drift of
wo^ld events now and the course of world events over the next months. I
say that I cannot conceive of a greater tragedy for America than to get
heavily involved now in an all-out war in any of those regions, particularly
with large units.
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"So what we are doing is supporting the Vietnamese and the French
in their conduct of that war; because, as we see it, it is a case of
independent and free nations operating against tne encroachment of
communism.
k Address b v Secretary Dulles before the Oversea s Press Club of America
*' ^if^rcitv on March 29. 1Q^. The Threat of a Red Asia. Depart-
i^Tof State Bulletin. Apri l 12, 195**, p. 539.:
"This provides a timely occasion for outlining the administrations
thinking about two related matters -- Indochina and the Chinese Communist
regime .
"Indochina is important for many reasons. First, and always first,
are the human values. About 30 million people are seeking for themselves
?he dignity of self-government. Until a few years ago, they formed merely
a French dependency. Now, their three political units -Viet-Nam Laos,
and Cambodia - are exercising a considerable measure of independent
political authority within the French Union. Each of the three is no*
recognized by the United States and by more than 30 other nations. They
signed the Japanese peace treaty with us. Their independence is not yet
coPDlete. But the French Government last July declared its intention to
complete that independence, and negotiations to consummate that pledge
are actively under way.
"The United States is watching this development with close attention
and great sympathy. We do not forget that we were a colony that won its
Jreelom. wHave sponsored in the Fnilippines a conspicuously successful
development of political independence. We feel a sense of kinship with
those everywhere who yearn for freedom.
"The Communists are attempting to prevent the orderly development of
independence and to confuse the issue before the world The Communists
have, in these matters, a regular line which Stalin laid down in 192U.
"The scheme is to whip up the spirit of nationalism so that it
becomes violent. That is done by professional agitators. Then the
violence is enlarged by Communist military and technical leadership and
Se provision of military supplies. In these ways, international com-
munism gets a stranglehold on the people and it uses that power to
'amalgamate' the peoples into the Soviet orbit.
»• Amalgamation' is Lenin's and Stalin's word to describe their process.
"'Amalgamation' is now being attempted in Indochina under the ostensible
leadership of Ho Chi Minn. He was indoctrinated in Moscow. He became an
leadership Russian , Borodin, when the latter was organizing the Chinese
CommunX ?Lt^£r"s to bring China into the Soviet orbit. Then Ho
transferred his activities to Indochina.
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"Those fighting under the banner of Ho Chi Minh have largely-
been trained and equipped in Communist China. They are supplied with
artillery and ammunition through the Soviet -Chinese Communist bloc.
Captured materiel shows that much of it was fabricated by the Skoda
Munition Works in Czechoslovakia and transported across Russia and
Siberia and then sent through China into Viet •-Nam. Military supplies
for the Communist armies have been pouring into Viet-Nam at a steadily
increasing rate.
"Military and technical guidance is supplied by an estimated
2,000 Communist Chinese. They function with, the forces of Ho Chi Minh
in key positions — in staff sections of the High Command, at the
division level, and in specialized units such as signal, engineer,
artillery, and transportation.
"In the present stage, the Communists in Indochina use national-
istic anti- French slogans to win local support. But if they achieved
military or political success, it is certain that they would subject
the people to a cruel Communist dictatorship taking its orders from
Peiping and Moscow.
"The tragedy would not stop there. If the Communist forces won
uncontested control over Indochina or any substantial part thereof,
they would surely resume the same pattern of aggression against other
free peoples in the area.
"The propagandists of Red China and Rtissia make it apparent that
the purpose is to dominate all of Southeast Asia.
"Southeast Asia is the so-called 'rice bowl' which helps to feed
the densely populated region that extends from India to Japan. It is
rich in many raw materials, such as tin, oil, rubber, and iron ore.
It offers industrial Japan potentially important markets and sources of
raw materials.
"The area has great strategic value. Southeast Asia is astride
the most direct and best-developed sea and air routes between the Pacific
and South Asia. It has major naval and air bases. Communist control of
Southeast Asia would carry a grave threat to the Philippines, Australia,
and New Zealand, with whom we have treaties of mutual assistance. The
entire Western Pacific area, including the so-called 'offshore island
chain, ' would be strategically endangered.
"President Eisenhower appraised the situation last Wednesday
(March 2*0 when he said that the area is of 'transcendent importance.'
"The United States has shown in many ways its sympathy for the
gallant struggle being waged in Indochina by French forces and those of
the Associated States. Congress has enabled us to provide material aid
to the established governments and their peoples. Also, our diplomacy
has sought to deter Communist China from open aggression in that area.
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"President Eisenhower, in his address of April l6, 1953, explained
tfcat a Korean armistice would he a fraud if it merely released aggressive
armies for attack elsewhere. I said last September that if Red China
sent its own army into Indochina, that would result in grave conse- .
quences which might not he confined to Indochina.
"Recent statements have "been designed to impress upon potential
aggressors that aggression might lead to action at places and hy means
of free-world choosing, so that aggression would cost more than it
could gain.
"The Chinese Communists have, in fact, avoided the direct use of
their own Red armies in open aggression against Indochina. They have,
however, largely stepped up their support of the aggression in that area.
Indeed, they promote that aggression hy all means short of open invasion.
"Under all the circumstances it seems desirable to clarify further
the United States position.
"Under the conditions of today, the imposition on Southeast Asia
of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist
ally by whatever means, would he a grave threat to the whole free com-
munity. The United States feels that that possibility should not he
passively accented hut should he met hy united action. This might involve
serious risks/ But these risks are far less than those that will face us
a few years from now if we dare not he resolute today.
"The free nations want peace. However, peace is not had merely hy
wanting it. Peace has to he worked for and planned for. Sometimes it
is necessary to take risks to win peace just as it is necessary in war
to take risks to win victory. The chances for peace are usually "bettered
hy letting a potential aggressor know in advance where his aggression
could lead him.
"I hope that these statements which I make here tonight will serve
the cause of peace.
"Let me now discuss our political relations with Red China, taking
first the matter of recognition.
"The United States does not recognize the Chinese Communist regime.
That is well known. But the reasons seem not so well known. Some think
that there are no reasons and that we are actuated purely hy emotion.
Your Government "believes that its position is soberly rational.
"Let me first recall that diplomatic recognition is a voluntary
act One country has no right to demand recognition hy another.
Gen-rally it is useful that 'there should he diplomatic intercourse
between those who exercise de facto governmental authority, and it is
veil established that recognition does not imply moral approval.
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"President Monroe, in his famous message to Congress, denounced
the expansionist and despotic system of Czarist Russia and its allies.
But he said that it would nevertheless be our policy 'to consider the
government de facto as the legitimate government for us.' That has
indeed been the general United States policy, and I believe that it is
a sound general policy. However, where it does not serve our interests,
we are free to vary from it.
"In relation to Communist China, we are forced to take account of
the fact that the Chinese Communist regime has been consistently and
viciously hostile to the United States.
"A typical Chinese Communist pamphlet reads: 'We Must Hate America,
because She is the Chinese People's Implacable Enemy.' 'We Must Despise
America because it is a Corrupt Imperialist Nation, the World Center of
Reaction and Decadency. ' 'We Must Look down upon America because She is
a Paper Tiger and Entirely Vulnerable to Defeat. '
"By print, by radio, by drama, by pictures, with all the propaganda
skills which communism has devised, such themes are propagated by the
Red rulers. They vent their hatred by barbarous acts, such as seizures
and imprisonments of Americans.
"Those responsible for United States policy must ask and answer
'Will it help our country if, by recognition, we give increased prestige
and influence to a regime that actively attacks our vital interests? '
I can find only the answer: 'No. '"
* * *
5. Address by Alfred le Sesne Jenkins, Officer in Charge, Chinese
Political Affairs, before the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, Philadelphia, Pa., Present United States Policy
Toward China, April 2, 195^, Department of State Bulletin,
April 26, 195U, p. 62U :
"In recent years we have often heard it said that more heat than
light has been cast on the China question. I am not surprised at the
heat, nor do I object to it, provided there is also sufficient light.
The fate of one-fourth of the world's population is not a matter which
•can be taken lightly, and the addition of China's vast material and
manpower resources to the Soviet bloc is a matter involving not only the
security interests of the United States but those of the entire free
world. I do not "see how one can help feeling strongly about these
matters. We need not apologize that our thinking about China is charged
with feeling. National policies are an expression of national interests
concerning which there is naturally much feeling, and our policies are
an expression both of what we are and of what we want. We are a nation
of free peoples. We want to remain free to pursue in peace our proper
national destiny, and we want the same freedom and rights for others.
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"We do not believe that the Chinese Communist regime represents the
will of the people it controls. First capitalizing on the natural desire
of the Chinese people to enjoy full recognition and respect for their
importance in the world community, the regime then proceeded by its
'lean-to-one- side' policy to betray the powerful Chinese longings to
stand up straight. It has followed slavishly the leadership of the
Soviet Union and attempted to emulate it in all its ways. With the aid
of thousands of Soviet advisers it has set about methodically to change
the entire fabric of traditional Chinese culture, substituting com-
munism's materialistic, atheistic doctrines wherein the state is the
be-all and end-all and the individual its pawn.
"The regime at first attracted considerable support, principally
through its sponsorship of a land redistribution program, but is now,
after establishment of the prerequisite police-state controls, taking
the land away from the owners in the same collectivization process which
is familiar in other Communist countries and which invariably has
brought suffering in its wake. China's much advertised 'New Democracy'
is of course in reality 'old communism.'
"From its inception the regime has proclaimed a 'lean-to-one-
side' policy in foreign affairs, and has left no doubt about its dedica-
tion to the proposition of world Communist revolution under the leader-
ship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. While its 'leaning-to-
one-side' has not brought it to the position of complete 'prostration-
to-one-side' characteristic of the Eastern European Soviet satellites,
there is not the slightest evidence that this indicates any separatist
tendencies. The difference in status of Peiping in its relationship
with Moscow (as distinguished from that of the Eastern European satel-
lites) is rather due chiefly to its having come to power without benefit,
except in Manchuria, of Soviet Army occupation; to the prestige of Mao
Tse-tung, arising from his long history of leadership of Chinese com-
munism and his literary contributions to theoretical communism; to
China's assumption of the role of leadership...."
6. President Eisenhower's Mews Conference, Aoril 7, 1Q5U. Public
Papers of the Presidents, I95U, p. 382 :
* -x- *
"Q.. Robert Richards, Copley Press: Mr. President, would you mind
commenting on the strategic importance of Indochina to the free world?
I think there has been, across the country, some lack of understanding
on just what it means to us.
"THE PRESIDENT. You have, of course, both the specific and the
general when you talk about such things.
"First of all, you have the specific value of a locality in its
production of materials that the world needs .
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"Then you have the possibility that many human beings pass under
a dictatorship that is inimical to the free world.
"Finally, you have broader considerations that might follow what
you would call the 'falling domino' principle. You have a row of
dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to
the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you
could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most
profound influences.
"Now, with respect to the first one, two. of the items from this
particular area that the world uses are tin and tungsten. They are
very important. There are others, of course, the rubber plantations
and so on.
"Then with respect to more people passing under this domination,
Asia, after all, has already lost some U50 million of its peoples to
the Communist dictatorship, and we simply can't afford greater losses.
"But when we come to the possible sequence of events, the loss of
Indochina, of Burma, of Thailand, of the Peninsula, and Indonesia
following, now you begin to talk about areas that not only multiply the
disadvantages that you would suffer through loss of materials, sources
of materials, but now you are talking really about millions and millions
and millions of people.
"Finally, the geographical position achieved thereby does many
things. It turns the so-called island defensive chain of Japan, Formosa,
of the Philippines and to the southward; it moves in to threaten
Australia and New Zealand.
"It takes away, in its economic aspects, that region that Japan
must have as a trading area or Japan, in turn, will have only one place
in the world to go — that is, toward the Communist areas in order to
live.
"So, the possible consequences of the loss are just incalculable
to the free world."
"Q. Robert G. Spivack, New York Post: Mr. President, do you
agree with Senator Kennedy that independence must be guaranteed the
people of Indochina in order to justify an all-out effort there?
"THE PRESIDENT. Well, I don't know, of course, exactly in what
way a Senator was talking about this thing.
"I will say this: for many years, in talking to different
countries, different governments, I have tried to insist on this
■orinci-ole: no outside country can come in and be really helpful
unless* it is doing something that the local people want.
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"Now, let me call your attention to this independence theory.
Senator Lodge, on my instructions, stood up in the United Nations and
offered one country independence if they would just simply pass a
resolution saying they wanted it, or at least said, 'I would work_for
it.' They didn't accept it. So I can't say that the associated states
want independence in the sense that the United States is independent.
I do not know what they want.
•
"I do say this: the aspirations of those people must be met,
otherwise there is in the long run no final answer to the problem.
"Q. Joseph Dear, Capital Times: Do you favor bringing this
Indochina situation before the United Nations?
"THE PRESIDENT. I really can't say. I wouldn't want to comment
at too great a length at this moment, but I do believe this: this is
the kind of thing that must not be handled by one .nation trying to act
alone . "
7. Remarks Made by Under Secretary Smith in Answer to Questions
Prepared for Use on "The American Week" over the CBS Television
Network, April 11, 195*4-, on the Importance of Indochina, Department
of State Bulletin, April 19, 195^ > P- 589 :
"Q. Why is Indochina important to Americans?
"MR. SMITH: For one vital basic and two special additional
reasons. In the first place, the vital basic question is: Shall we
or can the free world allow its position anywhere and particularly in
Asia to be eroded piece by piece? Can we allow, dare we permit, expansion
of Communist Chinese control further into Asia? Propagandists of the
Soviet Union and of Communist China have made it clear that their purpose
is to dominate all of Southeast Asia. Remember that this region helps
to feed an immense population. It stretches all the way from India to
Japan. It's a region that is rich in raw materials, full of tin, oil,
rubber, iron ore.
"Nov;, from the strategic point of view, it lies across the most
direct sea and air route between the Pacific and South Asia. There are
major naval and air bases located in the area. Communist control of
Southeast Asia would threaten the Philippines, Australia, and New Zea-
land directly, would threaten Malaya; it would have a very profound
effect upon the economy of other countries in + he area, even as far as
Japan.
■
"Q. The President, at his news conference on April 7, described
the process of Communist conquest as the 'falling domino' principle. Is
that" a good description of the threat in Southeast Asia?
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it
"MR. SMITH:' Yes, it is. If Indochina is lost to the Communists,
Burma is threatened, Thailand is threatened, the Malay Peninsula is
exposed, Indonesia is subject to the gravest danger, and, in addition to
these countries and their possible loss, there is the possible loss of
food source. I have already mentioned the strategic raw materials, the
bases in the area- and, while they are of enormous importance, the most
important thing of all is the possible loss of millions and millions
of peo-Dle who would disappear behind the Iron Curtain. There are enough
millions behind the Iron Curtain now. So what's at stake in Indochina?
It is the human freedom of the masses of people for all that enormous
area of the world."
*
8. Statement by Secretary Dulles Made at Augusts, Georgia, April 19,
19 5U, on Conversations in London and Paris Concerning Indochina"7
Department of State Bulletin, May 3, 195^ P- 668 :
"I have reported to President Eisenhower on my recent trip to
London and Paris, where I discussed the position in Indochina.
"I found in both Capitals recognition that the armed Communist
threat endangered vital free world interest and made it appropriate that
the free nations most immediately concerned should explore the possibility
of establishing a collective defense. This same recognition had already
been expressed by other nations of the Southeast Asian area.
"The Communists in Viet -Nam, spurred on by Red China, have acted
on the assumption that a quick, easy victory at Dien-Bien-Phu would open
the door to a rapid Communist advance to domination of the entire South-
east Asian area. They concluded they were justified in recklessly
squandering the lives of their subjects to conquer this strongpoint so
as to confront the Geneva Conference with what could be portrayed as
both a military and political victory for communism.
"The gallant defenders of Dien-Bien-Phu have done their part to
assure a frustration of the Communist strategy. They have taken a toll
such that, from a military standpoint, the attackers already lost more
than they could win. From a political standpoint, the defenders of
Dien-Bien-Phu have dramatized the struggle for freedom so that the free
world sees more clearly than ever before the issues that are at stake
and once again is drawing closer together in unity of purpose.
"The Communist rulers are learning again that the will of the free
is not broken by violence or intimidation.
"The brutal Soviet conquest of Czechoslovakia did not disintegrate
the will of the West. It led to the formation of the North Atlantic
Treaty alliance.
"The violent conquest of the China mainland followed by the Korean
aggression did not paralyze the will of the free nations. It led to a
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series of Pacific mutual security pacts and to the creation under the
North Atlantic Treaty of a powerful defensive force-in-being.
"The violent battles now being waged in Viet-Nam and the armed
aggressions against Laos and Cambodia are not creating any spirit of
defeatism. On the contrary, they are rousing the free nations to measures
which we hope will be sufficiently timely and vigorous to preserve these
vital areas from Communist domination.
' "In this course lies the best hope of achieving at Geneva the
restoration of peace with freedom and justice."
*
Q Stateme nt by Jameson Parker, Department Press Offic er, Made to
Co rrespondents April 17, 195*+, on U.S . Policy Toward Indochina^
Department of State Bulletin, April 26, 195^ P- & 2 3 :
"Certain remarks with regard to United States policy toward Indo-
china have been attributed to a high Government official /Vice President
Nixon7 The contents of the speech referred to and questions and
answers which followed were off the record, but a complete report of the
speech has been made available to the State Department.
"The speech enunciated no new United States policy with regard to
Indochina, "it expressed full agreement with and support for the policy
with respect to Indochina previously enunciated by the President and
the Secretary of State.
"That policy was authoritatively set forth by the Secretary of
State in his speech of March 29, 195^, in which he said:
'Under the conditions of today, the imposition on Southeast
Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Com-
munist ally/ by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the whole
free community. The United States feels that that possibility should
not be pessively accepted but should be met by united action. This
miFht involve serious risks. But these risks are far less than those
that will face us a few years from now if we dare not be resolute today.
"In regard to a hypothetical question as to whether United States
forces should be sent to Indochina in the event of French withdrawal,
the high Government official categorically rejected the premise of
possible French withdrawal. Insofar as the use of United States forces
?n Indochina was concerned, he was stating a course of possible action
wnicS he was personally prepared to support under a highly unlikely
hypothesis .
"The answer to the question correctly emphasized the fact that the
interests of the United States arid other free nations are vitally
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involved with the interests of France and the Associated States in
resisting Communist domination of Indochina."
10 . Address "by Secretary Dulles Delivered to the Ration over Radio and
Television, May 7, 195^, The Issues at Geneva, Department of State"
Bulletin, May 17, 195^, P- 7^0 end p. Jhk :
* -x- *
"Let me turn now to the problem of Southeast Asia. In that great
peninsula and the islands to the south live nearly 200 million people
in 7 states -- Burma; the three states of Indochina -- Laos, Cambodia,
and Viet-Han; Thailand; Malaya; and Indonesia. Communist conquest of
this area would seriously imperil the free world position in the Western
Pacific. It would, among other things, endanger the Philippines,
Australia, and New Zealand, with all of which the. United States has
mutual- security treaties. It would deprive Japan of important foreign
markets and sources of food and raw materials.
"In Viet-Nam, one of the three Indochinese states, war has been
going on since I9U6. When it began, Indochina was a French colony just
liberated from Japanese occupation. The war started primarily as a war
for independence. What started as a civil war has now been taken over
by international communism for its own purposes. Ho Chi Minh, the
Communist leader in Viet-Nam, was trained in Moscow and got his first
revolutionary experience in China."
*
"In Indochina, the situation is far more complex. The present
conditions there do not provide a suitable basis for the United States
to participate With its armed forces.
"The situation may perhaps be clarified as a result of the Geneva
Conference. The French have stated their desire for an armistice on
honorable terms and under proper safeguards. If they can conclude a
settlement on terms which do not endanger the freedom of the peoples of
Viet-Nam, this would be a real -contribution to the cause of peace in
Southeast Asia. But we would be gravely concerned if an armistice or
cease-fire were reached at Geneva which would provide a road to a Com-
munist takeover and further aggression. If this occurs, or if hos-
tilities continue, then the need will be even more urgent to create the
conditions for united action in defense of the area.
"In making commitments which might involve the use of armed force,
the Congress is a full partner. Only the Congress can declare war.
President Eisenhower has repeatedly emphasized that he would not take
military action in Indochina without the support of Congress. Further-
more he has made clear that he would not seek that .unless, in his
opinion, there would be an adequate collective effort based on genuine
mutuality of purpose in defending vital interests.
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"A great effort is being made by Communist propaganda to portray
it as something evil if Asia joins with the nations of the Americas and
Europe to get assistance which will help the peoples of Asia to secure
their liberty. These Communist nations have, in this connection,
adopted the slogan 'Asia for the Asians.'
"The Japanese war lords adopted a similar slogan when they sought
to subject Asia to their despotic rule. The similar theme of 'Europe
for the Europeans' was adopted by Mr. Kolotov at the Berlin Conference
when he proposed that the Europeans should seek security by arrangements
which would" send the United States back home .
"Great despotic powers have always known that they could impose
their will and gain their conquests if the free nations stand apart and
none helps the other.
"It should be observed that the Soviet Communist aggression in
Europe took place only against countries which had no collective security
arrangements. Since the organization of the Horth Atlantic Treaty,
there has been no successful aggression in Europe.
"Of course, it is of the utmost importance that the United States
participation in creating collective security in Asia should be on a
basis which recognizes fully the aspirations and cultures of the Asian
•peoples. We have a material and industrial strength which they lack and
vhich is an essential ingredient of security. Also they have cultural
and spiritual values of their own which make them our equals by every
moral standard.
"The United States, as the first colony of modern history to win
independence for itself, instinctively shares the aspirations for
liberty of all dependent and colonial peoples. We want to help, not
hinder the spread of liberty.
"We do not seek to perpetuate Western colonialism and we find even
more intolerable the new imperialist colonialism of communism.
"That is the spirit that animates us. If we remain true to that
spirit, we can face the future with confidence that we shall be in
harmony with those moral forces which ultimately prevail.
1X Pr esident Eisenhower's Mews Conference, May 5, 193^, Public
Vr^P-rs of the Presidents, 195^, P- **51:
"United States foreign policy has consistently supported the
r^noi^les on which was founded the United Nations. The basic expression
ofThis Policy was the Vandenberg resolution in 1<*8. The United States
believes in assuring the peace and integrity of nations through collective
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action and, in pursuance of the United Nations principle, has entered
into regional security agreements with other nations. Examples are the
Inter-American Agreement, the NATO Agreement, and numerous pacts in the
Pacific. These arrangements are invariably to assure the peaceful
security of the contracting nations and to prevent likelihood of attack;
they are not arrangements designed primarily for waging war.
"The Geneva conference, now 9 days old, has produced no surprises.
The expressed fears of some have proved unfounded.
"It has not been a 'Five-Power' conference as the Soviet Union
tried to make it.
"It has not involved establishing express or implied diplomatic
recognition by the United States of the Chinese Communist aggressors.
"The Korean phase of the conference has been organized. Here the
Communists came up with a scheme for Korean unification which was a
Chinese copy of the Soviet scheme for the unification of Germany. Under
their proposal no election measures could be taken without Communist
consent, and there could be no impartial supervision of the election
conditions or of the voting.
"This scheme was rejected for Germany. Secretary Dulles tells me
that is equally unacceptable to the Republic of Korea and to the
United Nations members which took part in the Korean war under zhe
United Nations Command now represented at Geneva.
"The Indochina phase of the conference is in process of being
organized and the issues have not yet been clarified. In this matter
a large measure of initiative rests with the governments of France,
Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia, which are the countries most directly-
concerned.
"Meanwhile, plans are proceeding for the realization of a Southeast
Asia security arrangement. This was publicly suggested by Secretary
Dulles in his address of March 29- Of course, our principal allies
were advised in advance. This proposal of the Secretary of State was
not a new one; it was merely reaffirmation of the principles that have
consistently guided our post-war foreign policy and a reminder to
interested Asian friends that the United States was prepared to join
with others in the application of these principles to the threatened
area Most of the free nations of the area and others directly con-
cerned have shown affirmative interest, and the conversations are
actively proceeding.
"Obviously, it was never expected that this collective security
arrangement would spring into existence overnight. There are too many
Soortant problems to be resolved. But there is a general sense of
Sency. The fact that such an organization is in the process of forma-
tion could have an important bearing upon what happens at Geneva during
the Indochina phase of the conference.
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"The countries of the area are now thinking in constructive
terms, which include the indispensable concept of collective security.
Progress in this matter has "been considerable, and I am convinced that
further progress will continue to be made."
*
12. President Eisenhower's Hews Conference, May 12, 1954, Public
Papers of the Presidents, 1954, p. 473 :~
* * *
"Q. George Herman, CBS Radio: Mr. President, since we seem to be
going into the past, a few weeks ago you told us of your theory of
dominoes about Indochina, the neck of the bottle —
"THE PRESIDENT. Yes.
'tfc. Mr. Herman: Since the fall of Dien Bien Phu, there has been a
certain amount of talk of doing without Indochina. Would you tell us
your administration's position; is it still indispensable to the defense
of southeast Asia?
"THE PRESIDENT. Again I forget whether it was before this body I
talked about the cork and the bottle. Well, it is very important, and
the great idea of setting up an organism is so as to defeat the domino
result. When, each standing alone, one falls, it has the effect on the
next, and finally the whole row is down. You are trying, through a
unifying influence, to build that row of dominoes so they can stand the
fall of one, if necessary.
"Now,, so far as I am concerned, I don't think the free world ought
to write off Indochina. I think we ought to all look at this thing with
some optimism and some determination. I repeat that long faces and
defeatism don't win battles."
13. Address by the Secretary of State, June 11, 1954, (Excerpt) The
Threat of Direct Chinese Communist I ntervention in Indochina,
Department of State Bulletin, June 23, 1954, p. 971 :
"At the moment, Indochina is the area where international communism
most vigorously seeks expansion under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh.
Last year President Eisenhower, in his great 'Chance for Peace' address,
said that 'aggression in Korea and Southeast Asia are threats to the
whole free community to be met ~Dy united action.' But the French were
then opposed to what they called 'internationalizing' the. war. They
preferred to treat it as a civil war of rebellion. However, on July 3,
1953 the French Government made a public declaration of independence
for the three Associated States, and in September it adopted the so-called
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Navarre plan, which contemplated a rapid buildup of national native
forces. The United States then agreed to underwrite the costs of this
plan.
"But last winter the fighting was intensified and the long strain
began to tell in terms of the attitude of the French people toward a
war then in its eighth year. Last March, after the siege of Dien-Bien-
Phu had begun, I renewed President Eisenhower's proposal that we seek
conditions which would permit a united defense for the area. I went to
Europe on this mission, and it seemed that there was agreement on our
proposal. But when we moved to translate that proposal into reality,
some of the parties held back because they had concluded that any steps
to create a united defense should await the results of the Geneva Con-
ference .
"Meanwhile, the burdens of a collective defense in Indochina have
mounted. The Communists have practiced dilatory negotiating at Geneva,
while intensifying their fighting in Indochina. The French and national
forces feel the strain of mounting enemy power on their front and of
political uncertainty at their rear. I told the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee last week that the situation is grave but by no means
hopeless. The future depends largely on decisions awaited at Paris,
London, and Geneva.
"The situation in Indochina is not that of open military aggression
by the Chinese Communist regime. Thus, in Indochina, the problem is
one of restoring tranquillity in an area where disturbances are fomented
from Communist China, but where there is no open invasion by Communist
China. This task of pacification, in our opinion, cannot be successfully
met merely by unilateral armed intervention. Some other conditions need
to be established. Throughout these Indochina developments, the United
States has held to a stable and consistent course and has made clear the
conditions which, in its opinion, might justify intervention. These
conditions were and are (l) an invitation from the present lawful
authorities; (2) clear assurance of complete independence to Laos, Cam-
bodia, and Viet-Nam; (3) evidence of concern by the United Natioris;
(1+) a joining in the collective effort of some of the other nations of
the area; and (5) assurance that France will not itself withdraw from
the battle until it is von.
"Only if these conditions were realized could the President and the
Congress be justified in asking the American people to make the sacri-
fices incident to committing our Nation, with others, to using force to
help to restore peace in the area.
"Another problem might, however, arise. If the Chinese Communist
regime were to show in Indochina or elsewhere that it is determined to
pursue the path of overt military aggression, then the' situation would
be different and another issue would emerge. That contingency has
already been referred to publicly by the President and myself. The
.
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President, in his April l6, 1953, address, and I myself, in an address
of September 2, 1953; made clear that the United States would take a
grave view of any future overt military Chinese Communist aggression in
relation to the Pacific or Southeast Asia area. Such an aggression
would threaten island and peninsular positions which secure the United
States and its allies.
"If such overt military aggression occurred, that would be a
deliberate threat to the United States itself. The United States would
of course invoke the processes of the United Nations and consult with
its allies. But we could not escape ultimate responsibility for deci-
sions closely touching our own security and self-defense.
"There are some, particularly abroad, who seem to assume that the
attitude of the United States flows from a desire for a general war
with Communist China. That is clearly false. If we had wanted such a
war, it could easily have been based on the presence of Chinese aggres-
sors in Korea. But last July, in spite of difficulties which at times
seemed insuperable, we concluded a Korean armistice with Communist
China. How could it be more surely demonstrated that we have both the
will to make peace and the competence to make peace?
"Your Government wants peace, and the American people want peace.
But should there ever be openly launched an attack that the American
people vrould clearly recognize as a threat to our own security, then
the right of self-preservation would demand that we — regardless of any
other country — meet the issue squarely.
"It is the task of statesmanship to seek peace and deter war, while
at the same time preserving vital national interests * Under present
conditions that dual result is not easy to achieve, and it cannot be
achieved at all unless your Government is backed by a people who are
willing, if need be, to sacrifice to preserve their vital interests.
"At the Geneva Conference I said: 'Peace is always easy to achieve
-- by surrender. ' Your Government does not propose to buy peace at that
price. We do not believe that the American people want peace at that
price. So long as that is our national will, and so long as that will
be backed by a capacity for effective action, our Nation can face the
future with that calm confidence which is the due of those who, in a
troubled world, hold fast that which is good."
±k. President Eisenhower's News Conference, July 21, 195^? Public
Papers of tre Presidents, 1954 , p. 6k2 :
* * *
"/Reading/ I am glad, of course, that agreement has been reached
at Geneva to stop the bloodshed in Indochina. The United States has not
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been a belligerent in the war in which thousands of brave men, while
defending freedom, have died during the past 7 years.
"The primary responsibility for the settlement in Indochina rested
with those nations which participated in the fighting.
"Our role at Geneva has been at all times to try to be helpful
where desired, and to -aid France and Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, to
obtain a just and honorable settlement which will take into account the
needs of the interested people.
"Accordingly, the United States has not itself been a party to or
bound by the decisions taken by the conference, but it is our hope that
it will lead to the establishment of peace consistent with the rights
and needs of the countries concerned. The agreement contains features
which we do not like, but a great deal depends on how they work in
practice.
"The United States is issuing at Geneva a statement to the effect
that it is not prepared to join in the conference declaration but, as
loyal members of the United Rations, we also say that in compliance
with the obligations and principles contained in article II of the
United Nations Charter, the United States will not use force to disturb
the settlement. We also say that any renewal of Communist aggression
would be viewed by us as a matter of grave concern.
"As evidence of our resolve to assist Cambodia and Laos to play •
their parts in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful com-
munity of free nations, we are requesting the agreement of the governments
of Cambodia and Laos to our appointment of an ambassador or minister to
be resident at their respective capitals. We already have a. Chief of
Mission at Saigon, the capital of Viet-Nam, and this embassy will, of
course, be maintained.
"The United States is actively pursuing discussions with other free
nations with a view to the rapid organization of a collective defense
in southeast Asia in order to prevent further direct or indirect Com-
munist aggression in that general area. /Ends reading/"
"Q. Mrs. May Craig, Maine Papers: Mr. President, President Rhee
of Korea will be here soon. Do you regard the partition of Korea as
permanent, short of war, and are you including, planning to include,
Korea and Eree China in any kind of a southeast Asia pact?
"THE PRESIDENT. Well, of course, Korea is not in southeast Asia.
"Already we have, you know, a treaty of mutual defense with Korea.
It has been enacted, it has been approved, by the Senate.
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"Now, as I understand it, when the Korean war started, the purpose
of the United Rations was to prevent any advance by force into South
Korea; they did do that.
"I know of no one that has ever proposed that we go to war to free
North Korea.
"As it is, it is an unsatisfactory situation, exactly as exists in
Germany, and now apparently is going to exist in part of Indochina.
"These are very unsatisfactory situations and, to my mind, will
always give reason for aggravating situations that are difficult, at
best. But there is no thought on the part of any of us to start an
aggressive move for the freeing of that country."
"I have never felt that, except through these satellite excursions,
that the Communist world wants any war at this time; in other words, I
don't believe they would deliberately challenge us, challenge the free
world, to a war of exhaustion.
"So the problem, no matter whether you happen to be fighting in
one of these areas, remains the same. The loss of great areas through
propaganda and deceit and subversion and coup d'etat, and every means
available to a secret, well-financed conspiracy, they are all there. _
I personally think that if there is one good that can come out of this
whole southeast Asian experience, it is this: to get the free worla to
looking facts in the face, and to seeing what we must do, what we should
do, what sacrifices we are ready to make, in order to preserve the
essentials of our system.
"I think that when the freedom of a man in Viet-Nam or in China
is taken away from him, I think our freedom has lost a little. I just
don't believe that we can continue to exist in the world, geographically
isolated as we are, if we just don't find a concerted, positive plan of
keeping these free nations so tightly bound together that none of them
will give up; and if they are not weakened internally by these other
methods, I just don't believe they will give up. I believe we can hold
them.
"Q Robert E. Clark, International News Service': Mr. President,
alonR that line, a number of Congressmen today are branding the Geneva
settlement as appeasement. Do you think there are any elements oi
appeasement in the cease-fire agreement?
"THE PRESIDENT. Well, I hesitate, Mr. Clark, to use such words as
T have told you so often. I find that so many words mean so many different
things to different people. I would say this, as I said in my statement:
this agreement, in certain of its features, is not satisfactory oo us.
It is not what we would have liked to have had.
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"But I don't knew, when I am put up against it at this moment, to
find an alternative, to say what we would or could do. Then if I have
no better plan, I am not going to criticize what they have done."
15. Final Declaration of Geneva Conference, July 21, I95U, IC/U3 Rev. 2,
July 21, 19^ , Original: French - -
"Final declaration, dated July 21, 195U, of the Geneva Conference
on the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China, in which the repre-
sentatives of Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, France,
Laos, the People's Republic of China, the State of Viet-Nam, the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United
States of America took part.
"1. The Conference takes note of the agreements ending hostilities
in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam and organizing international control and
the supervision of the execution of the provisions of these agreements.
"2. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the ending of hos-
tilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam; the Conference expresses its
conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present
declaration and in the agreements on the cessation of hostilities will
permit Cambodia," Laos and Viet-Nam henceforth to play their part, in
full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations.
"3. The Conference takes note of the declarations made by the
Governments of Cambodia and of Laos of their intention to adopt measures
permitting all citizens to take their place in the national community,
in particular by participating in the next general elections, which, in
conformity with the constitution of each of these countries, shall take
place in the course of the year 1955, by secret ballot and in conditions
of respect for fundamental freedoms.
"k. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on
the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam prohibiting the introduction
into Viet-Nam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as of
all kinds of arms and munitions. The Conference also takes note of the
declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos of their
resolution not to request foreign aid, whether in war material, in
personnel or in instructors except for the purpose of the effective
defence of their territory and, in the case of Laos, to the extent
defined by the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Laos.
"5. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on
the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam to the effect that no military
base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the
regrouuing zones of the two parties, the latter having the obligation
to see" that the zones allotted to them shall not constitute part of
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any military alliance and shall not be utilized for the resumption of
hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy. The Conference
also takes note of the declarations of the Governments of Cambodia and
Laos to the effect that they will not join in any agreement with other
States if this agreement includes the obligation to participate in a
military alliance not in conformity with the p-inciples of the Charter
of the United Nations or, in the case of Laos, with the principles of
the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Laos or, so long as
their security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on
Cambodian or Laotian territory for the military forces of foreign
Powers .
"6. ' The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the
agreement relating to Viet-Nam is to settle military questions with a
view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line is
provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a
political or territorial boundary. The Conference expresses its con-
viction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present
declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities creates
the necessary basis for the achievement in the near future of a political
settlement in Viet-Nam.
"7. The Conference declares that, so far as Viet-Nam is concerned,
the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect
for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity, shall
permit the Viet-Namese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guar-
anteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general
elections by secret ballot. In order to ensure that sufficient progress
in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary
conditions obtain for free expression of the national will, general
elections shall be held in July 1956, under the supervision of an inter-
national commission composed of representatives of the Member States of
the International Supervisory Commission, referred to in the agreement
on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this
subject between the competent representative authorities of the two
zones from 20 July 1955 onwards.
"8. The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities
intended to ensure the protection of individuals and of property must be
most strictly applied and must, in particular, allow everyone in Viet-
Nam to decide freely in which zone he wishes to live.
"9. The competent representative authorities of the Northern and
Southern zones of Viet-Nam", as well as the authorities of Laos and
Cambodia, must not permit any individual or collective reprisals
against persons who have collaborated in any way with one of the parties
during the war, or against members of such persons' families.
"10. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the Government
of the French Republic to the effect that it is ready to withdraw its
troops from the territory of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, at the request
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of the governments concerned and vithin periods which shall be fixed
by agreement between the parties except in the cases where, by agree-
ment between the two parties, a certain number of French troops shall
remain at specified points and for a specified time.
"11 The Conference takes note of the declaration of the French
Government to the effect that for the settlement of all the problems
connected with the re-establishment and consolidation of peace m Cam-
bodia Laos and Viet-Nam, the French Government will proceed from the
principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty, unity and
territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam.
"12 In their relations with Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, each
' member of the Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty,
the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of the above-
mentioned states, and to refrain from any interference in their intern^
affairs.
"13 The members of the Conference agree to consult one another on
anv question which may be referred to them by the International Super-
visory Commission in order to study such measures as may prove necessary
to ensure that the agreements on the cessation of hostilities m Cam-
bodia, Laos and Viet-Nam are respected."
16 Direct Aid to the Associated States: Communique Regarding Franco-
American Conversations, September 29, 195 1 *, Department of Stat e
Bulletin, October 11, 195^, P- 53^ :
"Representatives of the two Governments have had very frank and
useful talks which have shown the community of their views, and are
in full agreement on the objectives to be attained.
"The conclusion of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty
in Manila on September 8, 195 1 *, has provided a firmer basis than hereto-
fore to assist the free nations of Asia in developing and maintaining
their independence and security. The representatives of France and the
United States wish to reaffirm the support of their Governments for the
principles of self-government, independence, justice and liberty pro-
claimed by the Pacific Charter in Manila on September 8, 195*+ •
"The representatives of France and the United States reaffirm the
intention of their governments to support the complete independence
of Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam. Both France and the United States
vill continue tc assist Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam in their eiforts
to safeguard their freedom and independence and to advance the welfare
of their peoples. In this spirit France and the United States are
assisting the Government of Viet-Nam in the resettlement of the Viet-
namese who have of their ova free will moved to free Viet-Nam a*d who
already number some 300,000.
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"In order to contribute to the security of the area pending the
further development of national forces for this purpose, the representa-
tives of France indicated that France is prepared to retain forces of
its Expeditionary Corps, in agreement with the government concerned,
within* the limits permitted under the Geneva agreements and to an extent
to be determined. The United States will consider the question of
financial assistance for the Expeditionary Corps in these circumstances
in addition to support for the forces of each of the three Associated
States. These questions vitally affect each of the three Associated
States and are being fully discussed with them.
"The channel for French and United States economic aid, budgetary
support, and other assistance to each of the Associated States will be
direct to that state. The United States representatives will begin
discussions soon with the respective governments of the Associated
States regarding direct aid. The methods for efficient coordination
of French and United States aid programs to each of the three Associated
States are under consideration and will be developed in discussions with
each of these states.
"After the bilateral talks, the chiefs of diplomatic missions in
Washington of Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam were invited to a final
meeting to have an exchange of views and information on these matters.
The representatives of all five countries are in complete agreement on
the objectives of peace and freedom to be achieved in Indochina."
Y(, Aid to the State of Viet-Nam: Message from the President of the
United States to the President of the Council of Ministers of
Viet-Nam, October 23, 1$5^, Department of State Bulletin~
November 1$, 195^, PP- 735-736 :
"Dear Mr. President: I have been following with great interest
the course of developments in Viet-Nam, particularly since the conclu-
sion of the conference at Geneva. The implications of the agreement
concerning Viet-Nam have caused grave concern regarding the future of a
country temporarily divided by an artificial military grouping, weakened
by a long and exhausting war and faced with enemies without and by their
subversive collaborators within.
"Your recent requests for aid to assist in the formidable project
of the movement of several hundred thousand loyal Vietnamese citizens
away from areas which are passing under a de facto rule and political
ideology which they abhor, are being fulfilled. I am glad that the
United States is able to assist in this humanitarian effort.
"We have been exploring ways and means to permit our aid to Viet-
nam to be more effective and to make a greater contribution to the
welfare and stability of the Government of Viet-Nam. I am, accordingly,
instructing the American Ambassador to Viet-Nam to examine with you in
your capacity as Chief of Government, how an intelligent program of
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American aid given directly to your Government can serve to assist
Viet-Nam in its present hour of trial, provided that your Government
is prepared to give assurances as to the standards of performance it
would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied.
"The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Viet-Nam
in developing* and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resist-
ing attempted subversion or aggression through military means."
* * *
18 Arirlr ess bv President Eisenhower before the American Society of
Newspaper Editors, April 21, 1936, Public Papers of th e Presidents,
19 56, p. ^17 and p. 423 :
* * *
"The ideas of freedom are at work, even where they are officially
rejected. As we know, Lenin and his successors, true to Communist
doctrine, based the Soviet State on the denial of these ideas. Yet the
new Soviet rulers who took over three years ago have had to reckon with
the force of these ideas, both at home and abroad.
"The situation the new regime inherited from the dead Stalin
apparently caused it to reappraise many of his mistakes.
"Having lived under his one-man rule, they have espoused the con-
cept of 'collective' dictatorship. But dictatorship it still remains.
They have denounced Stalin for some of the more flagrant excesses of
his brutal rule. But the individual citizen still lacks the most
elementary safeguards of a free society. The desire for a better life
is still being sacrificed to the insatiable demands of the state.
"In foreign affairs, the new regime has seemingly moderated the
policy of violence and hostility which has caused the free nations to
band together to defend their independence and liberties. For the
present, at least, it relies more on political and economic means to
spread its influence abroad. In the last year, it has embarked upon a
campaign of lending and trade agreements directed especially toward
the newly-developing countries.
"It is still too early to assess in any final way whether the
Soviet regime wishes to provide a real basis for stable and enduring
relations . "
"For example, why was there such a sudden change in the Soviet
policy' Their basic aim is to conquer the world, through' world revolu-
tion if possible, but in any way. Anyone that has read any of their
books knows that their doctrine is lies, deceit, subversion, war if
necessary but in any way: conquer the world. And that has not changed.
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"But tW changed their policies very markedly. They were depend-
ing on forcTand ^1 threat of force only. And suddenly they have gone
info en entirely different attitude. They are going into the economic
ana pSitical -fields and are really wearing smiles around tne world
SSstSd of some of the hitter faces to which we have become accustomed.
"How any time a policy is winning and the people are completely
satisfied with it, you don't change. You change policies that markedly,
ycu destroy old idols as they have been busy doing only when you thai*
Hreat change is necessary. So I think we can take some comfort; at
leSt we can give careful consideration to the very fact tney had to
change their policies.
"And I think the whole free world is trying to test and determine
the sincerity of that plan, in order that the free nations themselves,
in pursuing their own policies, will make certain that they are not
-surprised in any place.
«w e look at some of the advances we think they have made, but let
»s remember: they did not conquer Korea, which they announced they were
godnTS Z. They were stopped finally in the northern part of Vietnam;
and Diem, the leader of the Southern Vietnamese, is doing splendidly
aM a much better figure in that field than anyone even dared to hope.
"The Iranian situation which only a few short years ago looked
so desperate that each morning we thought we would wake up and read m
our newspapers that Mossadegh had let them under the Iron Curtain has
not become satisfactory, but that crisis has passed and it is much
better."
* * *
TQ United States Policy with Respect to Viet-Nam: Address by the
19 • TTTn^ FReciretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (this^ddress
by-Assistant Secretary of State Robertson restated American policy
and was delivered at a time of relative stability in South Viet-Nam) ,
wpshineton, June 1, 1956, Department of Stat e Bulletin, June 11,
2_Q56. pp. 972-97^ :
"This oast March, I had the pleasure of accompanying the Secretary
nf o + ote (*f his visit to Saigon where we conversed with President Diem
on Se Present and future problems of Viet-Nam. I was struck, as so many
rther recent observers have been, at the progress Free Viet-Nam has made
tn a few short months toward stability, security, and strength. President
mJL seemed to reflect this progress in his own person. On the occasion
of^ur earlier visit some 15 months ago, he seemed tense and gravely con-
cernS about the problems facing Viet-Nam. This time he was reposed,
poised, and appeared confident of the future of his country.
"Among the factors that explain the remarkable .rise of Free Viet-
Nam froTShe shambles created by 8 years of murderous civil and inter-
nal 1", the division of the country at Geneva and the continuing
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menace of predatory communism, there is in the first place the dedica-
tion courage, and resourcefulness of President Diem himself. In him,
his country has found a truly worthy leader whose integrity and devotion
to his country's welfare have become generally recognized among his
people. Asia has given us in President Diem another great figure, and
the entire free world has "become the richer for his example of determina-
tion and moral fortitude. There is no more dramatic example of this
fortitude than President Diem's decisions during the tense and vital days
of the battle against "the parasitic politico-religious sects in the city
of Saigon in the spring of 1955- These decisions were to resist the
multiple pressures to compromise that were building up around him, and
to struggle to the victorious end for the sake of a just cause. The
free world owes him a debt of gratitude for his determined stand at that
fateful hour.
"Consider Viet-Nam at three stages in its recent history:
"First, in mid-195 1 *, partitioned by fiat of the great powers against
the will of the Vietnamese people, devoid of governmental machinery or
military strength, drifting without leadership and without hope in the
backwash of the defeat administered by the combined weight of Communist-
impressed infantry and of Chinese and Russian arms.
"Secondly, in early 1955 , faced with the military and subversive
threat of the Communists north of the 17th parallel, confronted with
internal strife, its government challenged by the armed, self-seeking
politico-religious sects, its army barely reformed and of uncertain
loyalty, assailed from within by the most difficult problems, including
that of having to absorb the sudden influx of three-quarters of a mil-
lion refugees who would rather leave their ancestral lands and homes
than suffer life under Communist tyranny:
"And finally Viet-Nam today, in mid-1956, progressing rapidly to
the establishment of democratic institutions by elective processes, its
people resuming peaceful pursuits, its army growing in effectiveness,
sense of mission, and morale, the puppet Vietnamese politicians dis-
credited, the refugees well on the way to permanent resettlement, the
countryside generally orderly and calm, the predatory sects eliminated
and their venal leaders exiled or destroyed.
"Perhaps no more eloquent testimony to the new state of affairs in
Viet-Nam could be cited than the voice of the people themselves as
expressed in their free election of last March. At that time the last
possible question as to the feeling of the people was erased by an over-
whelming majority for President Diem's leadership. The fact that the
Viet Minn was unable to carry out its open threats to sabotage these
elections is impressive evidence of the stability and prestige of the
government .
"The United States is proud to be on the side of the effort of the
Vietnamese people under President Diem to establish freedom, peace, and
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the good life. The United States wishes to continue to assist and to
be a loyal and trusted friend of Viet-Nam.
"Our policies in Viet-Nam may he simply stated as follows: .
"To support a friendly non-Communist government in Viet-Nam and to
help it diminish and eventually eradicate Communist subversion and
influence .
"To help the Government of Viet-Nam establish the forces neces-
sary for internal security.
"To encourage support for Free Viet-Nam by the non-Communist world.
"To aid in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of a country and
people ravaged by 8 ruinous years of civil and international war.
"Our efforts are directed first of all toward helping to sustain
the internal security forces consisting of a regular army of about
150 000 men, a mobile civil guard of some U5,000, and local defense
units which are being formed to give protection against subversion on
the village level. We are providing budgetary support and equipment for
these forces and have a mission assisting the training of the army. We
axe also helping to organize, train, and equip the Vietnamese police
force The refugees who have fled to South Viet-Nam to escape the Viet
Minn are being resettled on productive lands with the assistance of funds
made available by our aid program. In various ways our aid program also
provides assistance to the Vietnamese Government designed to strengthen
the economy and provide a better future for the common people of tne
country. The Vietnamese are increasingly giving attention to the basic
development of the Vietnamese economy and to projects that may contri-
bute directly to that goal. We give our aid and counsel to this program
only as freely invited.
"I do not wish to minimize the magnitude of the task that still
remains and of the problems that still confront this staunch and valiant
member of the free world fighting for its independence on the threshold
of the Communist heartland of Asia.
"The Communist conspiracy continues to threaten Free Viet-Nam.
With monstrous effrontery, the Communist conspirators at Hanoi accuse
Free Viet-Nam and its friends of violating the armistice provisions which
the Vietnamese and their friends, including ourselves, have scrupulously
respected despite the fact that neither the Vietnamese nor ourselves
signed the Geneva Accords while they, the Comm-mists who have solemnly
undertaken to be bound by these provisions, have violated them in the
most blatant fashion.
"The facts are that while on the one hand the military potential
of Free Viet-Nam has been drastically reduced by the withdrawal of
nearly 200,000 members of the French Expeditionary Corps and by the
reaction of the Vietnamese Army by more than 5 0,000 from the time of
the armistice, to the present as well as by the outshipment from Viet-Nam
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since the cessation of hostilities of over $200 million worth of war
equipment, we have on the other hand reports of steady constant growth
of the warmaking potential of the Communists north of the 17th parallel.
■ "Our reports reveal that in complete disregard of its obligations,
the Viet Minn have imported voluminous quantities of arms across the
Sino-Viet Minh border and have imported a constant stream of Chinese
Communist military personnel to work on railroads, to rebuild roads, to
establish airports, and to work on other projects contributing to the
growth of the military potential of the zone under Communist occupation.
"As so eloquently stated by the British Government in a diplomatic
note released to the press and sent to Moscow in April of this year,
and I quote:
'The Viet Minh army has been so greatly strengthened by the
embodiment and re-equipment of irregular forces that instead of the 7
Viet Minh divisions in existence in July 195^ there are now no less than
20. This striking contrast between massive military expansion in the
North and the withdrawal and reduction of military forces in the South
speaks for itself. '
"By lies, propaganda, force, and deceit, the Communists in Hanoi
would undermine Free Viet-Nam, whose fall they have been unable to secure
by their maneuverings on the diplomatic front. These people, whose crimes
against suffering humanity are so vividly described in the book by Lt.
Dooley who addressed you this morning, have sold their country to Peiping.
They have shamelessly followed all the devious zigzags of the Communist-
bloc line so that their alliance with Communist China and the Soviet Union
is firmly consolidated. These are the people who are now inviting Presi-
dent Diem to join them in a coalition government to be set up through
so-called 'free elections. '
"President Diem and the Government of Free Viet-Nam reaffirmed on
April 6 of this year and on other occasions their desire to seek the re-
unification of Viet- Nam by peaceful means. In this goal, we support them
fully. We hope and pray that the partition of Viet-Nam, imposed against
the will of the Vietnamese people, will speedily come to an end. For our
part we believe in free elections, and we support President Diem fully in
his position that if elections are to be held, there first must be condi-
tions which preclude intimidation or coercion of the electorate. Unless
such conditions exist there can be no free choice.
"May those leaders of the north in whom the spirit of true patriotism
still survives realize the futility of the Communist efforts to subvert
Free Viet-Nam by force or guile. May they force the abandonment of these
efforts and bring about the peaceful demobilization of the large standing
armies of the Viet Minh. May they, above all, return to 'the just cause of
all those who want to reunify their country in peace and independence and
for the good of all the people of Viet-Nam."
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20. Spec ial Message to the Congress on the Mutual Security Programs ,
Ma y 21, 1957, Public Papers of the Presidents — Eisenhower, 1951 }
p." 373.
"First is defense assistance— our and other free nations' common
effort to counter the, Soviet-Chinese military power and their drive to
dominate the world. That power continues to grow— in armaments, in
nuclear capability, in its economic base. The Communist goal of con-
quering the world has never changed.
"For our nation alone to undertake to withstand and turn back Com-
munist imperialism would impose colossal defense spending on our people.
It would ultimately cost us our freedom.
"For other free nations to attempt individually to counter this
menace would be impossible.
"We in our own interest, and other free nations in their own
interest, have therefore joined in the building and maintenance of a
system of collective security in which the effort of each nation
strengthens all. Today that system has become the keystone of our
own and their security in a tense and uncertain world."
* -x- *
"The second major element of our mutual security programs is eco-
nomic development assistance and technical cooperation.
"This part of the programs helps less developed countries make the
social and political progress needed to preserve their independence.
Unless these peoples can hope for reasonable economic advance, the dan-
ger will be acute that their governments will be subverted by Communism.
"To millions of people close to the Soviet and Chinese Communist
borders political freedom is still new. To many it must still prove its
worth. To survive it must show the way to another and equally essential
freedom — freedom from the poverty and hopelessness in which these peoples
have lived for centuries. With their new freedom their desire and their
determination to develop their economies are intense. They are fixed upon
raising their standards of living. Yet they lack sufficient resources.
Their need for help is desperate — both for technical know-how and capital.
"Lacking outside help these new nations cannot advance economically
as they must to maintain their independence. Their moderate leaders must
be able to obtain sufficient help from the free world to offer convincing
hope of progress. Otherwise their peoples will surely turn elsewhere.
Extremist elements would then seize power, whip up national hatreds and
incite civil dissension and strife. The danger would be grave that these
free governments would disappear. Instability and threats to peace would
result. In our closely-knit world, such events would deeply concern and
potentially endanger our own people.
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"The help toward economic development that we provide these countries
is a means to'forestall such crises. Our assistance is thus insurance
against rising tensions and increased dangers of war, and against defense
costs that would skyrocket here at home should tragedy "befall these strug-
gling peoples.
"These revolutionary developments in distant parts of the world are
borne on the crest of the wave sent out a century and a half ago by the
example of our own successful struggle for freedom. The determination of
the people of these nations to better their lot and to preserve their
newly gained liberty awakens memories of our own noblest traditions. Our
helping hand in their struggle is dictated by more than our own self-
interest. It is also a mirror of the character and highest ideals of the
people who have built and preserved this nation."
* * *
"In the many unstable regions of the world, Communist power is today
probing constantly. Every weakness of free nations is being exploited in
every possible way. It is inevitable that we shall have to deal with such
critical situations in the future. In America's own interest, we must
stand ready to furnish special assistance when threatened disaster abroad
foretells danger to our own vital concerns."
* * *
21. R3d io and Television Address to the American People on the Need for
Mutual Security in Waging the Peace, May 21, 1957, Public Papers
of the President— Eisenhower, 1957, p- 3&6 .
* * #-
"The common label of 'foreign aid' is gravely misleading— for it
inspires a picture of bounty for foreign countries at the expense of our
own. No misconception could be further from reality. These programs
serve our own basic national and personal interests.
"They do this both immediately and lastingly.
"In the long term, the ending or the weakening of these programs
would vastly increase the risk of future war.
"And— in the immediate sense— it would impose upon us additional
defense expenditures many times greater than the cost of mutual security
today.
"This evening it is my purpose to give you incontestable proof of
these assertions.
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"We have, during this century, twice spent our "blood and our
treasure fighting in Europe—and twice in Asia. We fought because we
saw—too late to prevent war— that our own peace and security were
imperilled, by the urgent danger— or the ruthless conquest— of other ..
lands .
"We have gained wisdom from that suffering. We know, and the
world knows, that the •American people will fight hostile and aggres-
sive despotisms when their force is thrown against the barriers of
freedom, when they seek to gain the high ground of power from which to
destroy us. But we also know that to fight is the most costly way to
keep America secure and free. Even an America victorious in atomic war
could scarcely escape disastrous destruction of her cities and a fear-
ful loss of life. Victory itself could be agony.
"Plainly, we must seek less tragic, less costly ways to defend
ourselves. We must recognize that whenever any country falls under
the domination of Communism, the strength of the Free World— and of
America— is by that amount weakened and Communism strengthened. If
this process, through our neglect or indifference, should proceed un-
checked, our continent would be gradually encircled. Our safety depends
upon recognition of the fact that the Communist design for such encir-
clement must be stopped before it gains momentum— before it is again too
late to save the peace.
"This recognition dictates two tasks. We must maintain a common
worldwide defense against the menace of International Communism. And
we must demonstrate and spread the blessings of liberty— to be cher-
ished by those who enjoy these blessings, to be sought by those now
denied them.
"This is not a new policy nor a partisan policy.
"This is a policy for America that began ten years ago when a
Democratic President and a Republican Congress united in an historic
declaration. They then declared that the independence and survival of
two countries menaced by Communist aggression— Greece and Turkey— were
so important to the security of America that we would give them mili-
tary and economic aid.
"That policy saved those nations. And it did so without the cost
of American lives.
"That policy has since been extended to all critical areas of the
world. It recognizes that America cannot exist as an island of freedom
in a surrounding sea of Communism. It is expressed concretely by mutual
security treaties embracing ^2 other nations. And these treaties reflect
a solemn finding by the President and by the Senate that .our own peace
would be endangered if any of these countries were conquered by Inter-
national Communism.
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"The lesson of the defense of Greece and Turkey ten years ago
has since been repeated in the saving of other lands and peoples.
A recent example is the Southeast Asian country of Viet-Nam, whose
President has just visited us as our honored guest.
"Two years ago it appeared that all Southeast Asia might be over-
run by the forces of international Communism. The freedom and security
of nations for which we had fought throughout World War II and the
Korean War again stood in danger. The people of Viet-Nam responded
bravely— under steadfast leadership.
"But bravery alone could not have prevailed.
• "We gave military and economic assistance to the Republic of Viet-
Nam We entered into a treaty—the Southeast Asia Security Treaty—
which plainly warned that an armed attack against this area would endanger
our own peace and safety, and that we would act accordingly. Thus Viet-
Nam has been saved for freedom.
"This is one of the nations where we have been spending the largest
amounts of so-called 'foreign aid.' What could be plainer than the fact
that this aid has served not only the safety of another nation— but also
the security of our own.
"The issue, then, is solemn and serious and clear.
"When our young men were dying in the Argonne in 1918 and on the
beaches of Normandy and in the Western Pacific in I9W and at Pusan
in 1950— and when the battlefields of Europe and Africa and Asia were
strewn with billions of dollars worth of American military equipment,
representing the toil and the skills of millions of workers-no one for
an instant doubted the need and the rightness of this sacrifice of blood
and labor and treasure.
"Precisely the same needs and purposes are served by our Mutual
Security programs today— whether these operate on a military or an
economic front. For on both fronts they are truly defense programs.
* *■
22 Radio and Television Report to the American People Regarding the
Si tuation in the Formosa Straits, September 11, 195 tf, Public Papers
of the Presidents— Eisenhower, 195b" , P« 69^. ~
"Tonight I want to talk to you about the situation, dangerous to
peace which has developed in the Formosa Straits, in the Far East. My
purpose is to give you its basic facts and then my conclusions as to
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our nation's proper course of action.
"To begin, let us remember that traditionally this country and
its government have always been passionately devoted to peace with
honor, as they aie now. We shall never resort to force in settlement
of differences except when compelled to do so to defense against aggres-
sion and to protect our vital interests.
"This means that, in our view, negotiations and conciliation should
never be abandoned in favor of force and strife. While we shall never
timidly retreat before the threat of armed aggression, we would welcome
in the present circumstances negotiations that could have a fruitful
result in preserving the peace of the Formosa area and reaching a solu-
tion that could be acceptable to all parties concerned including, of
course, our ally, the Republic of China.
"On the morning of August 23rd the Chinese Communists opened a
severe bombardment of Quemoy, an island in the Formosa Straits off the
China Coast. Another island in the same area, Matsu, was also attacked.
These two islands have always been a part of Free China— never under
Communist control.
"This bombardment of Quemoy has been going on almost continuously
ever since. Also Chinese Communists have been using their naval craft
to try to break up the supplying of Quemoy, with its 125,000 people.
Their normal source of supply is by sea from Formosa, where the govern-
ment of Free China is now located.
"Chinese Communists say that they will capture Quemoy. Bo far
they have not actually attempted a landing, but their bombardment has
caused great damage. Over 1,000 people have been killed or wounded.
In large part these are civilians.
"This is a tragic affair. It is shocking that in this day and age
naked force should be used for such aggressive purposes.
"But this is not the first time that the Chinese Communists have
acted in this way.
"In 1950 they attacked and tried to conquer the Republic of Korea.
At that time President Truman announced the intention of protecting
Formosa, the principal area still held by Free China, because of the
belief that Formosa's safety was vital to the security of the United
States and the free world. Our government has adhered firmly ever since
1950 to that policy.
"In 1953 and 195^ the Chinese Communists took an active part in
the war in Indo-China against Viet Nam.
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"Tr, the fall of 195U they attacked Quemoy and Matsu, the same two
islandstbey are attacking now. They broke off that attack when, in
January 1955, the Congress and I agreed that we should firmly support
Free China.
"Since then, for .about four years, Chinese Communists have not _
used force for aggressive purposes. We have achieved an armistice in
Korea which stopped the fighting there in 1 9 53- There is a 195^ armis-
Sce in Viet Nam; and since 1955 there has been quiet in the Formosa
Straits area. We had hoped that the Chinese Communists were becoming
peaceful—but it seems not.
"So the world is again faced with the problem of armed aggression.
Powerful dictatorships are attacking an exposed, but free, area.
"What should we do?
"Shall we take the position that, submitting to threat, it is
better to surrender pieces of free territory in the hope that this
will satisfy the appetite of the aggressor and we shall have peace?
"Do we not still remember that the name of 'Munich' symbolizes a
vain hope of appeasing dictators?
"At that time, the policy of appeasement was tried and it failed.
Prior to the second World War, Mussolini seized Ethiopia. In the Far
East Japanese warlords were grabbing Manchuria by force. Hitler sent
£s araed forces into the Rhineland in violation of the Versailles
Treaty. Then he annexed little Austria. When he got away with that,
he next turned to Czechoslovakia and began taking it, bit by bit.
"Tn the face of all these attacks on freedom by the dictators, the
powerful democracies stood aside. It seemed that Ethiopia and Manchuria
were too Jar away and too unimportant to fight about. In ^>°f fl-
uent was looked upon as the way to peace. The democracies felt that if
thev tried to stop what was going on, that would mean war. But because
of these repeated retreats, war came just the same.
"Tf the democracies had stood firm at the beginning, almost surely
there would have been no World War. Instead they gave such an appearance
o^weaSess and timidity that aggressive rulers were encouraged to over-
run onf country after another. In the end the democracies saw that their
Try surv^l was at stake. They had no alternative but to turn and fight
In^haHroved to be the most terrible war that the world has ever known.
"I know something about that war, and I never want to see that his -
torv repeated. But, my fellow Americans, it certainly can be repeated
i?The p'ace-ioving democratic nations again fearfully practice a policy
£ sending idly by while big aggressors use armed force to conquer the
small and weak.
B-37
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1
A/
"Let us suppose that the Chinese Communists conquer Quemoy. Would
that be the end of the story? We know that it would not he the end of
the story. History teaches that when powerful despots can gain some-
thing through aggression, they try, by the same methods, to gain more
and more and more.
"Also, we have more to guide us than the teachings of history.
We have the statements, the boastings, of the Chinese Communists them-
selves. They frankly say that their present military effort is part of
a program to conquer Formosa .
"It is as certain as can be that the shooting which the Chinese
Communists started on August 23rd had as its purpose not just the taking
of the island of Quemoy. It is pert of what is indeed an ambitious plan
of armed conquest.
"This plan would liquidate all of the free world positions in the
Western Pacific area and "bring them under captive governments which would
be hostile to the United States and the free world. Thus the Chinese
and Russian Communists would come to dominate at least the Western half
of the now friendly Pacific Ocean.
"So, aggression by ruthless despots again imposes a clear danger
to the United States and to the free world.
"In this effort the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union appear
to be working hand in hand. Last Monday I received a long letter on
this subject from Prime Minister Khrushchev. He warned the United States
against helping its allies in the Western Pacific. He said that we should
not support the Republic of China and the Republic of Korea. He con-
tended that we should desert them, return all of our naval forces to our
home bases, and leave our friends in the Far East to face, alone, the
combined military power of the Soviet Union and Communist China.
"Does Mr. Khrushchev think that we have so soon forgotten Korea?
"I must say to you very frankly and soberly, my friends, the 1 United
States cannot accept the result that the Communists seek. Neither can
we show, now, a weakness of purpose— a timidity— which would surely lead
them to move more aggressively against us and our friends in the Western
Pacific area.
"If the Chinese Communists have decided to risk a war, it is not
because Quemoy itself is so valuable to them. They have been getting
along without Quemoy ever since they seized the China mainland nine years
ago.
"If they have now decided to risk a war, it can only be because
they, and their Soviet allies, have decided to find -out whether threat-
ening -war is a policy from. which they can make big gains.
B-38
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1
3X
"If that is their decision, then a Western Pacific Munich would
not buy us peace or security. It would encourage the aggressors. It
would dismay our friends and allies there. If history teaches any-
thing, appeasement would make it more likely that we would have to
fight a major war.
"Congress has made clear its recognition that the security of
the Western Pacific is vital to the security of the United States
and that we should be firm. The Senate has ratified, by overwhelming
yot» security treaties with the Republic of China covering Formosa
and"the Pescadores, and also the Republic of Korea. We have a mutual
security treaty with the Republic of the Philippines, which could be
next in line for conquest if Formosa fell into hostile hands. These
treaties commit the United States to the defense of the treaty areas.
In "addition, there is a Joint Resolution which the Congress passed in
January 1955 dealing specifically vith Formosa and the offshore islands
of Free China in the Formosa Straits.
"At that time the situation was similar to what it is today.
"Congress then voted the President authority to employ the armed
forces of the United States for the defense not only of Formosa but
of related positions such as Quemoy and Matsu, if I believed their
defense to be appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa.
"I might add that the mandate from the Congress was given by an
almost unanimous bipartisan vote.
"Today, the Chinese Communists announce, repeatedly and officially,
that their military operations against Quemoy are preliminary to attack
on Formosa. So it is clear that the Formosa Straits Resolution of 1955
applies to the present situation.
"If the present bombardment and harassment of Quemoy should be
converted into a major assault, with which the local defenders could
not cope, then we would be compelled to face precisely the situation
that Congress visualized in 1955-
"I have repeatedly sought to make clear our position in this matter
so that there would not be danger of Communist miscalculation. The
Secretary of State on September fourth made a statement to the same
end This statement could not, of course, cover every contingency.
Indeed I interpret the Joint Resolution as requiring me not to make
absolute advance commitments, but to use my judgment according to the
circumstances of the time. But the statement did carry a clear mean-
ing to the Chinese Communists and to the Soviet Union. There will be
no retrofit in the face of armed aggression, which is part and parcel
of a continuing program of using armed force to conquer new regions.
B-39
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1
■
"I co not believe that the United States can be either lured or
friphtened into aup: at. I believe that in talcing the position of
opposing aggression by force, I am taking the only position which is
consistent with the vital interests of the United States, and, indeed
with the peace of the world.
"Some misguided persons have said that Quemoy is nothing to be-
come excited about. They said the same about South Korea— about Viet
Nam, about Lebanon.
"Now I assure you that no American boy will be asked by me to
fight just for Quemoy. But those who make up our armed forces— and
I believe~the American people as a whole— do stand ready to defend the
principle that armed force shall not be used for aggressive purposes.
"Upon observance of that principle depends a- lasting and just
peace. It is that same principle that protects the Western Pacific
free world positions as well as the security of our homeland. If we
are not ready to defend this principle, then indeed tragedy after
tragedy would befall us.
"But there is a far better way than resort to force to settle
these differences, and there is some hope that such a better way may
be followed.
"That is the way of negotiation.
"That way is open and prepared because in 1955 arrangements were
made between the United States and the Chinese Communists that an
Ambassador on each side would be authorized to discuss at Geneva cer-
tain problems of common concern. These included the matter of release
of American civilians imprisoned in Communist China, and such questions
as the renunciation of force in the Formosa area. . There have been 73
meetings since August 1955-
"When our Ambassador, who was- conducting these negotiations, was
recently transferred to another post, we named as successor Mr. Beam, our
Ambassador to Poland. The Chinese Communists were notified accordingly
the latter part of July, but there was no response.
"The Secretary of State, in his September fourth "statement, referred
to these^ Geneva negotiations. Two days later, Mr. Chou En-lai, the Pre-
mier of the Peoples' Republic of China, proposed that these talks should
be resumed 'in the interests of peace.' This was followed up on September
eighth by Mr. Mao Tse-tung, the Chairman of the Peoples* Republic of
China. We promptly welcomed 'this prospect and instructed our Ambassador
at Warsaw to be ready immediately to resume these talks. We expect that
the talks will begin upon the return to Warsaw of the Chinese Communis o
Ambassador who has been in Peipi: lg.
B-UO
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1
SH
"Perhaps our suggestion may be bearing fruit. We devoutly hope
so.
"Naturally, the United States will adhere to the position it
first toot in 1955, that we will not in these talks be a party to any
arrangements which would prejudice rights of our ally, the Republic
of China.
"We know by hard experiences that the Chinese Communist leaders
are indeed militant and aggressive. But we cannot believe that they
would" now persist in a course of military aggression which would
threaten world peace, with all that would be involved. We believe
that diplomacy can and should find a way out. There are measures that
can be taken to assure that these offshore islands will not be a thorn
in the side of peace. We believe that arrangements are urgently re-
quired to stop gun fire and to pave the way to a peaceful solution.
"If the bilateral talks between Ambassadors do not fully succeed,
there is still the hope that the United Nations could exert a peaceful
influence on the situation.
"In 1955 the hostilities of the Chinese Communists in the Formosa
area were brought before tha United Nations Security Council. But the
Chinese Communists rejected its jurisdiction. They said that they were
entitled to Formosa and the offshore islands and that if they used
armed forces to get them, that was purely a 'civil war,' and that the
United Nations had no right to concern itself.
"They claimed also that the attack by the Communist North Koreans
on South Korea was '< civil war,' and that the United Nations, and the
United States; were 'aggressors' because they helped South Korea. They
said the same about their- attack on Viet Nam.
"I feel sure that these pretexts will never deceive or control
world opinion. The fact is that Communist Chinese hostilities in the
Formosa Straits area do endanger world peace. I do not believe that
anv rulers, however aggressive they may be, will flout efforts to f ina
a peaceful and honorable solution* whether It be by direct negotiations
or through the United Nations.
"My friends, we are confronted with a serious situation. But it
is tvui-al or- the security problems of the world today. Powerful and
affcressive forces are constantly probing, now here, now there, to see
whether the free "world is weakening. In the face of this, there are
no easy choices available. It is misleading for anyone to imply that
there are.
"However, the present situation, though serious, is -by no means
desperate or hopeless.
"There is not going to be any appeasement.
B-Hl
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
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55
"I believe that there is not going to be any war.
"But there must be sober realization by the American people that
our legitimate purposes are again being tested by those who threaten
peace and freedom everywhere.
"This has not been the first test for us and for the free world.
Probably it will not be the last. But as we meet each test with courage
and unity, we contribute to the safety and the honor of our beloved
land— and to the cause of a just and lasting peace.
2 3 . T he President's Hews Conference of October 1, 1958, Public Papers
nf the Presidents— Eisenhower, 1958.. P- 715 •
of _
* *
"TEE PRESIDEKT-. Well, sir, all I can tell you about that is that
I conceive of no possible solution that we haven't studied, pondered,
discussed with others in the very great hope that a peaceful solution
can come about.
"As you well know, the basic issue, as we see it, is to avoid
retreat in the face of force, not to resort to force to resolve these
questions in the. international world. And we believe if we are not
faithful to that principle in the long run we are going to suffer.
"Now, Mr. Dulles, who had a very long conference yesterday morn-
ing and almost solely on this subject, did one thing that I would
commend to all of you: he quoted paragraphs, two paragraphs I think,
from Mr. Spaak's speech recently in the United Nations, where Mr. Spaak
said- 'The whole free -world must realize that it is not Quemoy and the
Matsus that we are talking about, we are talking about the Communists'
constant, unrelenting pressure against the free world, against all of
it.'
"As a matter of fact, a magazine just/ I guess, out last evening,
U S. News and World Report, gives quite a detailed and documented story
of Communist aggression and activities in 72 countries.
"I commend that to your reading, because we are very apt, by
focusinc our eyes on some geographical point, to neglect the great
principles for which a country such as ours has stood, for all these
years, and for :.hich Western civilization has largely stood.
"So, I should say, we want to get these things in perspective.
B-U2
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1
S£>
"Nov, you mentioned the question of it would be foolish for
them keeping large forces there for a long time.
"I believe, as a soldier, that was not a good thing to do, to
have all these troops there. But, remember, we have differences
with our allies all over the world. They are family differences, and
sometimes they are acute; but, by and large, the reason we call it
'free world' is because each nation in it wants to remain independent
under its own government and not under some dictatorial form of govern-
ment. So, to the basic ideals, all of us must subscribe.
"Q. Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News: In the light of Mr.
Spaak's statement, can you tell us what your view is of why so many
of our allies fail to see this point you have just made?
"TEE PRESIDENT. Well, it's a very difficult- thing, and of
course an answer is speculative. But when we go back to the Man-
churian incident of 1931, when we go back to Hitler's marching into
the Rhineland, when we take his taking over the Sudetenland and the
Anschluss with Austria by force, when finally he took over all of
Czechoslovakia, where was the point to stop this thing before it got
into a great major war?
"VJhy did not public opinion see this thing happening?
"Now, in hindsight, most of us have condemned these failures very
bitterly, going right back to 1931 in Manchuria. I don't know why the
human is so constructed that he believes that possibly there is an
easier solution—that you can by feeding aggression a little bit, a
teaspoonful of something, that he won't see that they are going to
demand the whole quart.
"I dont know any real answer to that thing; it is puzzling.
And, of course, for those who have to carry responsibility, it is a
very heavy weight on their spirits and minds; there is no question about
that. But there it is."
# -x- -x-
2k . Spe cial Message to the Congress on the Mutual Security Program ,
March 13, 1959, Public Papers of the Presidents— Eisenhower, 1939 ,
* -x- -x-
"I believe that these events of the past year and the stern, in-
deed harsh, realities of the 'world of today and the years ahead demon-
strate the importance of the Mutual Security Program to the security
B-43
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
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^'
of the United States. I think four such realities stand out.
"First, the United States and the entire free world are con-
fronted by the military might of the Soviet Union, Communist China,
and their satellites. These nations of the Communist Bloc now main-
tain well-equipped standing armies totaling more than 6,500,000 men
formed in some H00 divisions. They are deployed along the borders of
our allies and friends from the northern shores of Europe to the
Mediterranean Sea, around through the Middle East and Far East to
Korea. These forces are hacked by an air fleet of 25,000 planes in
operational units, and many more not in such units. They, in turn,
are supported by nuclear weapons and missiles. On the seas around
this land mass is a large navy with several hundred submarines.
"Second, the world is in a great epoch of seething change.
Within little more than a decade a world-wide political revolution
has swept whole nations— 21 of them— with three-quarters of a billion
people, a fourth of the world's population, from colonial status to
independence— and others are pressing just behind. The industrial
revolution, with its sharp rise in living standards, was accompanied
by much turmoil in the Western world. A similar movement is now
beginning to sweep Africa, Asia, and South America. A newer and
even more striking revolution in medicine, nutrition, and sanitation
is increasing the energies and lengthening the lives of people in the
most remote areas. As a result of lowered infant mortality, longer
lives, and the accelerating conquest of famine, there is underway a
population explosion so incredibly great that in little more than
another generation the population of the world is expected to double.
Asia alone is expected to have one billion more people than the entire
world has today. Throughout vast areas there is a surging social up-
heaval in which, overnight, the responsibilities of self-government
are being undertaken by hundreds of millions, women are assuming new
places in public life, old family patterns are being destroyed and
new ones uneasily established. In the early years of independence,
the people of the new nations are fired with a zealous nationalism
which, unless channelled toward productive purposes, could lead to
harmful developments. Transcending all this there is the accompanying
universal determination to achieve a better life.
"Third, there is loose in the world a fanatic conspiracy, Inter-
national Communism, whose leaders have in two score years seized
control of all or parts of IT countries, with nearly one billion
people, over a third of the total population of the earth. The center
of this conspiracy, Soviet Russia, has by the grimmest determination
and harshest of means raised itself to be the second military and
economic power in the world today. Its leaders never lose the oppor-
tunity to declare their determination to become the first with all
possible speed.
B-Uk
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5S
"The other great Communist power., Red China, is now in the
early stages of its social and economic revolution. Its leaders are
showing the same ruthless drive for power and to this end are striving
for ever increasing economic output. They seem not to care that the
results—which thus far have been considerable in materialistic terms —
are built upon the crushed spirits and the broken bodies of their
people .
"The fact that the Soviet Union has just come through a great
revolutionary process to a position of enormous power and that the
world's most populous nation, China, is in the course of tremendous
change at the very time when so large a part of the free world is in
the flux of revolutionary movements, provides Communism with what it
sees as its golden opportunity. By the same token freedom is faced
with difficulties of unprecedented scope and severity— and opportunity
as well.
"Communism exploits the opportunity to intensify world unrest
by every possible means. At the same time Communism masquerades as
the pattern of progress, as the path to economic equality, as the
way to freedom from what it calls 'Western imperialism', as the wave
of the future.
"For the free world there is the challenge to convince a billion
people in the less developed areas that there is a way of life by
which they can have bread and the ballot, a better livelihood and the
right to choose the means of their livelihood, social change and
social justice— in short, progress and liberty. The dignity of man
is at stake.
"Communism is determined to win this contest— freedom must be
just as dedicated or the struggle could finally go against us. Though
no shot would have been fired, freedom and democracy would have lost.
"This battle is now joined. The next decade will forecast its
outcome.
"The fourth reality is that the military position and economic
prosperity of the United States are interdependent with those of the
rest of the free world.
"As I shall outline- more fully below, our military strategy is
part of a common defense effort involving many nations. The defense
of the free world is strengthened and progress toward a more stable
peace is advanced by the fact that powerful free world forces are
established on territory adjoining the areas of Communist power. The
deterrent power of our air and naval forces and our intermediate range
missile is materially increased by the availability of bases in friendly
countries abroad.
B-k c ,
o/
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1
"Moreover the military strength of our country and the needs
of our industry cannot be supplied from our own resources. Such
basic necessities as iron ore, bauxite for aluminum, manganese,
natural rubber, tin, and many other materials acutely important to
our military and industrial strength are either not produced in our
own country or are not produced in sufficient quantities to meet
our needs. This is an additional reason why we must help to remain
free the nations which supply these resources."
* *
"Two fundamental purposes of our collective defense effort are
to prevent general war and to deter Communist local aggression.
"We know the enormous and growing Communist potential to launch
a war of nuclear destruction and their willingness to use this power
as a threat to the free world. We know also that even local aggressions,
unless checked, could absorb nation after nation into the Communist
orbit— or could flame into world war.
"The protection of the free world against the threat or the
reality of Soviet nuclear aggression or local attack rests on the
common defense effort established under our collective security agree-
ments. The protective power of our Strategic Air Command and our
naval air units is assured even greater strength not only by the
availability of bases abroad but also by the early warning facilities,
the defensive installations, and the logistic support installations
maintained on the soil of these and other allies and friends for our
common protection.
"The strategy of general defense is made stronger and of local
defense is made possible by the powerful defensive forces which our
allies in Europe, in the Middle East, and the Far East have raised
and maintain on the soil of their homelands, on the borders of the
Communist world.
•x- * *
25 Addre ss at the Gettysburg College Convocation: The Importance of
Understanding, April h, 1959, Public Papers of the Presidents- -
Eisenhower, 1959; P- 310-
* * *
"I shall not attempt to talk to you about education, but I shall
speak of one vital pur-pose of education— the development of under-
standing—understanding, so that we may use with some measure of wisdom
the knowledge we may have acquired, whether in school or out.
B-U6
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"For no matter how much intellectual luggage ve carry around
in our heads, it becomes valuable only if ve know how to use the
information— only if ve are able to relate one fact of a problem to
the others do ve truly understand them.
"This is my subject today— the need for greater individual
and collective understanding of some of the international facts of
today's life. We need to understand our country's purpose and role
in strengthening the vorld's free nations which, with us, see our
concepts of freedom and human dignity threatened by atheistic dicta-
torship.
"If through education— no matter how acquired— people develop
understanding of basic issues, and so can distinguish between the
common, long-term good of all, on the one hand, and convenient but
shortsighted expediency on the other, they will support policies
under vhich the" nation will prosper. And if people should ever lack
the discernment to understand, or the character to rise above their
own selfish short-term interests, free government would become well
nigh impossible to sustain. Such a government would be reduced to
nothing more than a device which seeks merely to accommodate itself
and the country's good to the bitter tugs-of-war of conflicting pres-
sure groups. Disaster could eventually result.
"Though the subject I have assigned myself is neither abstruse
nor particularly difficult to comprehend, its importance to our
national and individual lives is such that failure to marshal, to
organize, and to analyze the facts pertaining to it could have for
all of us consequences of the most serious character. We must study,
think, and decide on the governmental program that we term 'Mutual
Security. '
"The true need and value of this program will be recognized by
our people only if they can answer this question: 'Why should America,
at heavy and immediate sacrifice to herself, assist many other nations,
particularly the less developed ones, in achieving greater moral, eco-
nomic, and military strength?' ' _
"What are the facts?
"The first and most important fact is the implacable end fre-
quently expressed purpose of imperialistic communism to promote world
revolution, destroy freedom, and communize the world.
"Its methods are all-inclusive, ranging through the use of propa-
ganda, political subversion, economic penetration, and the use or the
threat of force.
B-l+7
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u
"The second fact is that our country is today spending an aggre-
gate of about !iT billion dollars annually for the single purpose of
Preserving the nation's position and security in the world. This
includes the costs of the Defense Department, the production of nuclear
w»a*ons, and mutual security. All three are mutually supporting and
are blended into one program for our safety. The size of this cost
conveys something of the entire program's importance-to the world and,
indeed, to each of us.
"And when I think of this importance to us, think of it in this
one material figure, this cost annually for every single man, woman,
and child of the entire nation is about 275 dollars a year.
"The next fact we note is that since the Communist target is the
world every nation is comprehended in their campaign for domination.
The weak and the most exposed stand in the most immediate danger.
"Another fact, that we ignore to our peril, is that if aggression
or subversion against the weaker of the free nations should achieve
successive victories, communism would step-by- step overcome once free
areas. The danger, even to the strongest, would become increasingly
menacing.
"Clearly, the self-interest of each free nation impels it to
resist the loss to imperialistic communism of the freedom and inde-
pendence of any other nation.
"Freedom- is truly indivisible.
"To apply some of these truths to a particular case, let us con- /
sider, briefly, the country of Viet-Nam, and the importance to us of
the security and progress of that country.
"It is located, as you know, in the southeastern corner of Asia,
exactly half, ray round the world from Gettysburg College.
"Viet-Nam is a country divided into two .parts— like Korea and •
Germany. The southern half, with its twelve million people, is free,
but poor. It is an under- developed country— its economy is weak—
averare individual income being less than $200 a year. The northern
half has been turned over to communism. A line of demarcation running
alonp th- 17th parallel separates the two. To the north of this line
stand several Communist divisions. These facts pose to South Viet-Nam
two great tasks: self-defense and economic growth.
"Understandably, the people of Viet-Nam want to make their country
a thriving, self-sufficient member of the family of nations. This means
economic expansion.
B-l*8
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
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a
"For Viet-Nam 's economic growth, the acquisition of capital is
vitally necessary. How, the nation could create the capital needed
for growth by stealing from the already meager rice howls of its people
and regimenting them into work battalions. This enslavement is the
commune system- adopted by the new overlords of Red China. It would
mean, of course, the loss of freedom within the country without any
hostile outside action" whatsoever.
"Another way for Viet-Nam to get the necessary capital is through
private investments from the outside, and through governmental loans
and where necessary, grants from other and more fortunately situated
nations .
"In either of these ways the economic problem of Viet-Nam could be
solved. But only the second way can preserve freedom.
"And there is still the other of Viet-Nam' s great problems—how
to support the military forces it needs without crushing its economy.
"Eecause of the proximity- of large Communist military formations
in the Forth, Free Viet-Nam must maintain substantial numbers of men
under arms. Moreover, while the government has shown real progress in
cleaning out Communist guerrillas, those remaining continue to be a
disruptive influence in the nation's life.
"Unassisted, Viet-Nam cannot at this time produce and support the
military formations essential to it, or, equally important, the morale—
the hope, the confidence, the pride— necessary to meet the dual threat
of aggression from without and subversion within its borders.
"Still another fact.' Strategically, South Viet-Nam' s capture by
the Communists would bring their power several hundred miles into a
hitherto free region. The remaining countries in Southeast Asia would
be menaced by a great flanking movement. The freedom of twelve million
people would be lost immediately, and that of 150 million others in ad-
jacent lands would be seriously endangered. The loss of South Viet-Nam
would set in motion a crumbling process that could, as it progressed,
have grave consequences for us and for freedom.
"Viet-Nam must have a reasonable degree of safety now— both for her
people and for her property. Because of these facts, military as well
as economic help is currently needed in Viet-Nam.
"We r^ach the inescapable conclusion that our own national interests
demand some help from us in sustaining in Viet-Nam the morale, the eco-
nomic progress, and the military strength necessary to its continued
existence in freedom.
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C3
"Viet-Kam is just one example. One-third of the world's people
face a similar challenge. All through Africa and Southern Asia people
struggle to preserve liberty and improve their standards of living, to
maintain their dignity as humans. It is imperative that they succeed.
"But some uninformed Americans believe that we should turn our
backs on these people, our friends. Our costs and taxes are very real,
while the difficulties of other peoples often seem remote from us.
"But the costs of continuous neglect of these problems would be far
more than we must now bear— indeed more than we could afford. The added
costs would be paid not only in vastly increased outlays of money, but
in larger drafts of our youth into the Military Establishment, and in
terms of increased danger to our own security and prosperity.
"No matter what areas of Federal spending must be curtailed— and
some should— our safety comes first. Since that safety is necessarily
based upon a sound and thriving economy, its protection must equally
engage our earnest attention.
"As a different kind of example of free nation interdependence, there
is Japan, where very different problems exist— but problems equally vital
to the security of the free world. Japan is an essential counterweight
to Communist strength in Asia . Her industrial power is the heart of any
collective effort- to defend the Far East against aggression.
"Her more than 90 million people occupy a country where the arable
land is no more than that of California. More than perhaps any other indus-
trial nation, Japan must export to live. last year she had a trade, deficit
At one time she had a thriving trade with Asia, particularly with her near-
est neighbors. Much of it is gone. Her problems grow more grave.
"For Japan there must be more free world outlets for her products.
She does not want to be compelled to become dependent as a last resort
unon the Communist empire. Should she ever be forced to that extremity,
the blow to free world security would be incalculable; at the least it
would mean for all other free nations greater- sacrifice, greater danger,
and lessened economic stre'ngth.
"What happens depends largely on what the free world nations can,
and will, do.
"Upon us u^on you here — in this audience- -rests a heavy responsi-
bility. We must" weigh the facts, fit them into place, and decide on our
course of action. '
"For a country as large, as industrious, and as progressive as
Japan to exist with the help of grant aid by others, presents no satis-
factory solution. Furthermore, for us, the cost would be, over the long
B-50
£¥
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1
term, increasingly heavy. Trade is the key to a durable Japanese eco-
nomy.
"One of Japan's greatest opportunities for increased trade lies
in a free and developing Southeast Asia. So we see that the two prob-
lems I have beer, discussing are two parts of & single one-the great
need in Japan is for raw materials; in Southern Asia it is for manu-
factured goods. The two regions complement . each other markedly. So,
by strengthening Viet-Eam and helping insure the safety of the South
Pacific and Southeast Asia, we gradually develop the great trade poten-
tial between this region, rich in natural resources, and highly indus-
trialized Japan to the benefit of both. In this way freeaom m the
Western Pacific will be greatly strengthened and the interests of the
whole free world advanced. But such a basic improvement can come about
onlv gradually. Japan must have additional trade outlets now. These
can be provided if each of the industrialized nations in the West does
its part in liberalizing trade relations with Japan.
* *
26 Special Message to the Congress on the Mu tual 'Security Program,
F e bruary 167 1960, Public Fapers of the Presidents-Eisenhower ,
I960, p. 17o^
* * *
"The Mut ual Security Program is a program essential to pea ce. The
accomplishr-nts of the Mutual Security Program in helping to meet the
many challenges in the mid-20th Century place it among the foremost of
the jrreat programs of American history. Without them the map of the
world would be vastly different today. The Mutual Security Program- and
its predecessors have been an indispensable contributor to the present
fact that Greece, Turkey, Iran, Laos, Vietnam, Korea and Taiwan, and
many nations of Western Europe, to mention only part, remain the home
of free men.
"While over the past year the Soviet Union has expressed an inter-
est in measures to reduce the common peril of war, and while its recent
denortment and pronouncement suggest the possible opening of a somewhat
IPs- strained period in our relationships, the menace of Communist
imperialism nevertheless still remains. The military power of the Sovie.
Union continues to grow. Increasingly important to free world interests
is the rate of growth of both military and economic power in Communist
Phina Evidence that this enormous power bloc remains dedicated to the
extension of Co,imunist control over all peoples everywhere' is found in
Tibet, the Taiwan Straits, in Laos and along the Indian border.
"In the face of this ever-present Communist threat, we must, in our
own interest as well as that of the other members of the free world com-
munity, continue our program of military assistance through the various
B-51
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i mT rl+v arrangements we have established. Under these arrange-
mutual security ar rang ^°^ ±lti commenS urate with its capabili-
me nts f ch "^°" f/^Se development and maintenance of defensive
i^a^. S-is aSo Screasin P S ability of other free world nations
to share the burden of this common defense.
"Ohvious^v no one nation alone could bear the cost of defending all
Obviously, n ° °J ^possible for many free nations
f 6 To^vive if^ced'to act separatefy and alone. The crumbling of
theCealc" OS wLL obviously and increasingly multiply the threats to
those remaining free, even the very strongest.
"Collective security is not only sensible- it is essential."
* * *
27-
n q Wis Greetings to Viet- Nam on Anniversary of Independen c e ,
M^^j^MEHJEK^^ *> *«>, Departmj^f
State Bulletin
"The White House on Oc tober 25 mad e uublic the following message
of Viet-Kam .
"OCTOBER 22, i960
"r^AR MR PRESIDENT: My countrymen and I are proud to convey our
g0 od w?" " to the citi-ns of Viet-Nam on the fifth anni-
versary of the birth of the Republic of Viet-Nam.
"We have watched the courage and daring with which you and the
Vietnamese people attained independence in a situation bo perilous that
££ Tough? it hopeless. We have -^£ ** £?£ l * ^ **
chaos yielded to order and progress replaced despair.
»«.«*«» the vears of your independence it has been refreshing for
to observe ^clearly the Government and the citizens of Viet-Nam
us to observe novcxey fcest danger .to their independence was
have faced the feet that th gre^ ^ ^^ ^ .„
Communism You and your^ rr ^ ^^ and res isting
accepting the aouoxe en j cg ^ foundi of the
Communist Jff ^"^^^^ ^ve developed their country in almost
Republic, the Wf2rSrt5S«3T pressed by one example. I am informed
every sector ^^^^gtSese children were able to go to
that last year over ^^ Viet n enrol i ed five years earlier.
elementary *^ **%££ development for Viet-Kam's future. At the
This is certainly ^^'^/deferd itself from the Communists has
STSiSSS s-fiS £££l ™* - *e=o,e an „ to t
Republic .
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a
"Viet-ITam's very success as well as its potential wealth and its
strategic location have led the Communists of Hanoi, goaded by the
bitterness of their failure to enslave all Viet -Nam, to use increasing
violence in their attempts to destroy your country's freedom.
"This grave threat, added to the strains 'and fatigues of the long
struggle to achieve arid strengthen independence, must be a burden that
would cause moments of tension and concern in almost any human heart.
Yet from long observation I sense how deeply the Vietnamese value their
country's independence and strength and I know how well you used your
boldness when you led your countrymen in winning it. I also know that
your determination has been a vital factor in guarding that independence
while steadily advancing the economic development of your country. I am
confident that these same qualities of determination and boldness will
meet the renewed threat as well as the needs and desires of your country-
men for further progress on all fronts.
"Although the main responsibility for guarding that independence
will always, as it has in the past, belong to the Vietnamese people and
their government, I want to assure you that for so long as our strength
can be useful, the United States will continue to assist Viet-Nam in the
difficult yet hopeful struggle ahead.
"Sincerely,
"DWTGHT D. EISENHOWER."
B-53
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