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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

V.B Justification of the War (11 Vols.) 

Internal Documents (9 Vols.) 

2. The Truman Administration: (2 Vols.) 

a. Volume 1: 1945-1949 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 










Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



■ - , ... ■ 


The Trnrnan Actoilnlst i, 19^5- 195? 

BOOK I ~ 1 -I9I19 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 




The Trranai kdministratj , I9H5 - 1952 


This portion of the study consists of a collection of U, S. 
Government doei liich set forth t rationale of U. S # 
policy toward Vietnam, The coll ion represents the .' 
nal C' ent of the TJ.S. as expre. " classified docu- 
ments • ted at th st levels in the 

e eU organized chronologically within each 

Presa tial dstration. lids volume covers the Truman 
years , 19*45-1952. 


: ' ' re 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 





Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 


TOP SECRET - Sens re 


The Truman Lnistratipn, 19^5 - 1952 

Contents and 

Chronological List o D< ments 





Extract oj 'unites of State-War* Coordinating Com- 

Lttee (SWHCC) held 13 / : Mr. Lovett st s that 
T! l lack of a policy ^on Indochina/ is a source of 
serious embarrassment to the military ." The Committee 
agreed i the State D< nt should I the 
question of clarificat of policy on Indoehi] 
Memorandum, R. E. Cox, S 'C, to Mr, Boribright - : ' ■ ' \. 
23 (13 April) 19145 

Sc .tary of State Stettinius infi foassaclor ( 
(Frar the status of U.S. a " nee to p 
sist* ce groups in Indochina, Stettinius 1576 to Caff cry 
(Paris) 3 19 April 19^5 - 

The U. S, rejeci a French proposal to conclude an agree - 
with the French Provisional Go at analog s to 
the F :0-Allied a • ' of 2\j A. t 1S |V '' . The 11. 
refuses to consider diversion of resources to spec:* 

y operate in J . St inius letter to 
French Ambaj lor Bonnet , 20 April 19-5 



The i ierta&es an inter ! bo clarify 

UcS, policy ti • I T following President Lt*s 

death, 12 April 19^5, and tl *ng, 13 A LI I5&5. 

A . ■ . ■ e St- clocui 1 tliis task 

ine; \ as ^i.a. t : ,e,...,. 

a. Divisio of airs (EUR) i pro- 

po r, l - on Xndoc) ' Policy 51 to the " :l 

. for for. to i Pr« ' t. T) aorandum 

and. t t. ; not o e restoration of I 

chi: b to '. K. 3 j I . - to 

, Dunn, A i ■ , 20 April l' : ;\ r; 

• • 


TOP SECT- • ' ma 


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TOr SECRET - Sen sit 


b. Division of Far Eastern Affairs (FE) forwards 
comments and suggested c ges to EUR version of the 
Memorandum on Indochina policy. FE rec nds additions 
to the EUR proposals as well as not O] g restoration 
of Indochina to France, prov3 France gav dequate 
assurances on five major points c] fly concer g Indo- 
Chinese independence. Memorandum by Mr. Stanton, FE, 
to Mr. Dunn, 21 April 191*5 ' 9 

c. Mr, Dunn feels that it is better to let the Indo- 
china policy matter drift rather than base it en the FE 
version of the Memorandum. Dunn message to Mr. Grew* 

Under Secretary of State, 23 April 191*5. . . , 18 

d. The final ct premise Memorandum to the Resident 
includes extracts from both the FE and EUR v ions^ 

but does include mention that the U.S. would seek the 
French views on the five points raised by FE. Memoran- 
dum to the Er dent, subject: American Policy with 
Respect to Indochina, undated, not sent 19 

e. The draft cable, which was approved by all 
Divisions concerned, requests French indication of in- 
tentions on five points : i 

(1) Indochinese self-government within a French 
Union , 

(2) Economic and commercial non-discrimination. 

(3) Haiphong as a free port. 

(h) Recognition of an Indoch -Thai border. 

(5) International security arrangements for South- 
east Asia* Unnumbered cable, 9 May 19-'"). 

5. Assistant Seer ry of War proposes "so far as practic- 
able" the U.S. should avoiu "unnecessary or long term" 
commit fcs of assistance to French resistance forces 
in Indochina. I dum, R # E, Cox, t \C 9 to Mr. Bon- 
bright, WE, 2 May 191*5. , . . 26 

6. French Foreign Minister is informed by Stettinius at 
San Francisco that "the record is entirely innoce ... 
of this gov snt questioning. * .Fr h sovereignty over 

Xndo< . ,T G- > 191*9 to C 9 j ; . S 27 

ii TOP £ I - Ser i i 

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7. Matt! reporl bo R sident Truman of French iesir^ e 
to -participate in Far East war e JCS view that 
little military value would accrue 1 the F ch 

forces. aorandum by ; thews for Triv i 9 16 May 19^5 • -7 

8. Grew rev:' r Hurley the present position of U.S. 
policy on "trustee lure" and th necessity of 
"voluntary" action by colonial powers and that 1 t 
of Pre rtici ion in 1 war in the Facii %s 

to be del tine y Sc ~Ar •-. Grew &73 to Hurley (china) 

7 June 19^5 • - * » 30 

9* 'I U.S. military ly to the French offer of parti ci- 
pa1 [l two F eh di Ln th acific war out- 
lines: t] provi bo acceptance in principle. Er 
tially, the U.S. desires complete command and control of 
the ch l \ ? ecpj and ma 5 .".ivisions 
with e t fron France based on the units having 
attained U.S. cor st Memorandum by U.S. 
Ch.; of Staff to Comb 6 Chiefs of Staff at Potsdam, 
16 July 19^5 • • 33 

10. 3?he U.S. Chiefs of Staff views that logistics coi lera- 
ti< prevented I ch and Dutch parti c\ tion in the 
Pacific war are pres to the C s of 
Staff for consideration. Memorandum by th U.S. Chiefs 

of Staff at R , , . 36 

11. The British Chiefs of Staff suggest tl French 
divisions be "employed in due course in Fr o- 
Cbina." Men: 1 nduia by British Chiefs of Staff at 

Potsdam, 18 July 191*5 , , , . , , 37 

12. The U.S. Chi of Sts tonsider the British view 
and compromise earlier U.S. positions to allow for 
possible use of Freud divJ r British command 
in areas to "be dett lined lat er . JT Memorandum 

U.S. Chiefs of Staff at I , 19 July 19^5 37 

13. Report to the President and Prime Minis :reed 
s y of conclusions on the str : c concept and 

pol I ".es for proses n of th war 3 read the 
Combined CI f at the terminal confer 

cf the ] bdam Lng* B ' ; > the Chiefs 1 j 
tegy focu Japan with t3 U.S, cont? 
tJons. The door was left open for French and Dutch 
participation based on "military cc " and 

"shipping" requir nts. JCS files, C /3> 


TOI' ■ r - Sensil I 

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NND Project Number; NND 633 16. By; NWD Date; 201 1 

>F SEICHES? - Sencitr. 


lk. President Erurnan Hurley (China) 1 it was agreed 
at to divide IndocV ' tude 16° a bh for 
operatic 1 purposes: the s< b going to Soul t Asia 
Command (SEAC) and the north g g to the China i ter- 
Hurley is urged to Kai-sl r . zurre 

Truman tele tin to Hurley om Berlin, 3 August 19^5* ..*.....« hk 

15. William J, Dor- n, Dired of the 01 of Star gic 
Services (08S), reports on the 1 attitude toward 
the Indochj 3, Provisional Government to the Secrt y 
of Sta< . A French commitl e was to negotiate with 
Annamite leaders on f /orable to Indochina; the 
Ft h were to act as Lsore to the Indochina Rro- 
visional G nt with the po* treaties 
for France. Annaiaite leaders > however, expressed the de- 
sire to have sti \ as an A ;an tectorate ? exclud- 
ing both French and Chinese occupation. Threats of 
violence over a French reoccupal " ,de. Memoran- 
dum by I for Secretary of State, 22 / 19^5* • ■ ^5 

l6- Dean Ac! >n, Acting Se< bary of Plate, reasserts U.S. 
policy :ard 3 control of Indochina to the ChargS 
in C3 rtson). 'i U*B\ neither opj nor 
as sis I re-establish of I s eh control in Indo- 
chlna 3 ]• : ton m told, lue U.S. "willingness" to 
see French control is based on the e outcome of 
French claims of popular su rt. son 1622 to 
Re rtson, 5 October 19^5 • . . , ^9 

17. Caffery (Paris) inf Secretary of f the 
Franco-British agreement on Indcchin ch recog- 
nizes the French Civil Administration as e author- 
ity in Indochina south of the l6th p llel. Caf 

6006 to Secretary of State, 12 Octt - 19*15 k$) 

18. Caffery repo: bfaat de Gaulle reje jouncing a 
far-rear " poli designed to give 
Indochinese thority, repre tation, and 
res Llity in goverr it under the pretext of 
the state of ich pre". ' ] 
De Gaulle felt that "no such policy cc be imple- 
mented pend " 1 of Fre Lty." 
Caf 6857 to Secret State, 28 I ber 5 50 


at ion fr heson on tra* 
of j : ' fr i 1 to t Fi 
in 1 sident an 
■ - U.S. s ild . e tr- A 
Mat , 18 r 5 . . . 52 

iv TOP i ET - g i re 


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20. Secretary of te Byri Lnfooc ■ ' ' >n 
conditions in Indochina and c ei a l l y on the 
status of French -X ' Minh negotl Lons. Byrnes 

53 to i , 28 January 1946. 53 

21. Gen Gallagher, OSB^ r als 1 . in his view of 
Indochina j "one or moc ch ' dona could 
defeat the Annr ;e n and i af de Gaulle's 
October pronouncement of colonial policy > the 
Annamese (Ho Chi Minh) refu. to negotiate with 

tfc rench and became 1 Lie. fl Ho himself will 

not deal with th d l. . .and will be 1 y 

continuing Annamese movement*" The Viet i 

administration is young and inexperienced but 

"the demand for indepe: ce is widespread and 

c in the villages the pe* its refer to the 

exBQftple of the Philip ' es, . ,h«- r, the Viet Minh 

shov i ot be labeled full -fledge 1 doctrinaire ccni- 

Mz b," Mem ndum of Converse ' by R.L. Sharpy 

SEA airs> 30 January 191*6 . , 53 

22 • la n reports that dV lieu-Ho Chi Minh nego- 
tiations have 1 proceed d may be compl I 
in two or three week 8, and that only temporary and 
local Rranco-Chinese agrei its hav tzed. 
Landojj (Ss n) O927 t- /rues, 5 February j 58 

23. Caf b ids Byr] tl X V present French 

government "will try t< m a co cory and 
mod-: j b policy in Indochina and will be mo; pro- 
gressive in its outlook than de Gaulle." Caffery 
595 1 yrneBy 6 ) ixy l$k6 

£U. ] ion states that: "it se cert that Annamese 
plan perate resistance to F; . Ho Chi M 
staged that he considering petitioning all U: d 
Nations to mediate Annam I leper ce and pre t 
extensive bloodshed," Lai; . l (Han b B; ? 
16 J 19^6 , 59 

1 25. L& refers to two letters to R 'dent T from 

Ho C!hi : h r- *st the USA as UH mi r to 

sup: se indep according to .mple 

of the Ehili i I* rises 

1 Ho Ch 1 ■'■ the I : -eel I s whic 

incJ a re " of French conq ts, H r s govern- 
mental aecosa lis] and f intervenl 

by bl Fc . tandon (l: i) i -.-?y of £ , 

1 a 27 Fc jtary 6l 

V TOi T-Scn&itive 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
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CREC - sit 


26. She Chinese Foreign Affairs Minis , Dr. Wang, 
indi< s that Chinese troops would be wit] awn 
from Indochina by 15 April and tl he had urged 
a "blc ' Franco-Viet Minh agree 1th 
them* Wang su sts joint Chin- -American 
mediation of French- ] ^Chinese problem and 
fers to the late Pi nt ~>sevelt's interest 
in depei t peoples. Smyth (Chu ing) 39'* 

to Byrnes ? 28 February 19k6 62 

27. Keed reports signing of the 6 March a,gr t 
whereby "Vietnam Ix s a ft state within 

Inclochi federation and will have own army, 
direct own inte? ! affai and finance... are frankly pleased. . .French milj -y 
occupation proeee g smoothly." Reed (Saigon) 
20 to Secretary of State , 7 March 19^6 . . . . . . . 63 

28. Saigon informs State that Chinese are ting 
obstacles in 1 French path and Viet Minh in- 
cidents around Saigon are tnereasi) . Eeed 33 

State, ih M 19''6 63 

29- Viet Minh extremists assassinate a member of the 
Cochin China Council 7 French seize 01 
Treasury 3 and Tc incident? jeopardize 
peaceful outcome of events. Reed 70 to SI 
1 April 19^5 6*t 

30. The U.S. informs France thai e Combined 
ChJ Staff do not object tc lef of 
Chinese troops by French forces in Indochina, 
and that on 1 repat: of Ja] tse ? 
the French milit id c di- 
nate with G (since the Chinese and 

tish were totally relieved of oc 

patriation dut in Indochina). Byrnes' 
e to Bonnet, 12 April 19*16 . . 6k 

31. r S a (Hanoi) indicates that most important 
immediate q; tion in the r "ens or 

at 1 at appear be st* § of C m ChJ 

s Sullivan 2 to Byr P 18 1 1J 65 

32. 13 • S. ir i • s that Ho Chi Minh has 

3 U, . ; U.K. and c recogni is 
as a f Lthin French Uh 
to c«. Officers , 18 April 1$ i 

yi TOP - Sens 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
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33. Ho Chi I : calls for C/ -China to Join Vietnam, 
Fj to cease entering Cc In-China, and for Fi h 
to live up to a£, . Frc e pess:i Le over 
Dalat conferences, ,: ..,c\. 11 picture is not a 
happy one . . . Ir Reed 122 to Byi , 2? il 19'i6. . . . 66 

3k* U.S. reviews the situation at Dale.t conference from the 

t of French and Vietnam*:- as pes: ' tic 
(in light of r conflic outb. of fighting <, 
and conflicting views on C< Ln-China status) and 
feels that T v - v. ill possibly attempt a coup when 
Chinese \ hdraw. Ache son to Consular C Leers 9 
1 May 19*16 - 67 

35. Acheson reports tha Frer are confj nt of 
success in negot i >ns wit] m 5 but they 

feel the Vietnam delegation is controlled by I tter- 

organized commun" ; . even tl only half the 

delegation is communist, Acheson to Consular 

Officers , 13 May 19*16 6? 

36. Ho Chi Mihh is reported as belie tisfactory 
agreement can be r ad with the French. Acheson 

to Consular Officers, 1^ May 19^6 63 

37. U.S. expresses concern over continued 1 

Chinese tro« in Tonkin and that possi- 
ble should be done to speed evacuation. Ach^ 
to Gen G rge C. Marshall (Nanking) a 15 Hay l$k6 68 

38. French propose federal org Lzation for Viet 
(under High C ssioner o ex* Lses French 
Uni f 1 ) ft legislative assembly of 
ten mesbers each from Tt in 9 Aiinam. Cbehin- 
Chi Laos 5 Can and ten French w 

Byrnes to Nar ,, 20 19^6 69 

39. U.S. raises Consulate Saij to Cor G > 
effective 20 K J : 6. Byi^nes 2^27 to Cafftery. 

20 May .191*6 - . . 69 

), U.Si rotes three important j _| i -deal par m 

Vietnam: V iink (whose t a re r rs 

are J t Indocl lis". )> 

Dor L (] 1 i V 

( )j which £ to si, rt of i 

Cathc 1 apj rt no t e p: y a I 

1 : .' ■ bsen 

." O'Sulli to Byr for G 1 

,20 69 

T0J= ! - ; - : /ve 

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TOP i L 1 - ! " i 


hi. Ho Chi Minh has consi y given 3 ton the 

,f he would pay great attention to ;gest ions' 1 

made by the U.S. f £ llivan ( ; 3 

5 June 19^6 . . \. . , . . , , 71 

42. U.S. Consul to r ' ■ 3 Vie1 - ed strength in 
Cochin-China as "diminishing.," that Ho wenl to 
Par' P - is reason^ and at the same time, to 
seek support from French Left ;. 0' Sullivan 
to Byrnes, 5 June 3 71 

^3* Caffjery ts Franco- Viet 1 conference at 
Font?, bleau is off to a bad start, as Viet- 
1 ion proti d assumption of the 
chairmanship by head of the French d " m, 
protested creation of Coehin-Chi 
pendent si 1 ac 3 French of violati] g 
6 March greement. Ho Chi Minh held conversa- 
tions \ Brians on similarity of their 
problems . C ry 3323 to , 7 July 191*6. - . 73 

hk. Vietnam breaks off m iations at Font.: bleau 
on the g violated March 6 
accord by convoking e w Dala onference. 
Caffrey 38OI nes, 2 August 19^ - lh 

45, U.S. views recent moves by the French as de- 
signed to regain a large measure of c trol 
over Indochina in "violation of the sj b 
of the 6 March convention 11 and that widespread 
hostilities may r^ Lt from Vietnam sistance 
to th eneroacl ts . Memorandum by Moffat 
(SE/l) for Vincent (FEA.) , 9 A- t 19^6 . . 75 

, U.S. v: s results of Dalat coni nee as a 
reasc sis for the future ^ but far short 
of larger degree of indepi 1 by 
Vie- and it i: fie "to for* i any 
great 6 suec* o long as Cochin- Shina 
stays apart im Vietnam... 11 Reed 3^2 i 
17 At . . . . . . , ♦ 78 

hf. U.S. expre ricera over n F Lai 

U.S. as aggressive end 1 th- 
istle" and in fitting 
Fr to Cc B&; line. 

Clayton (Ac te) 2^0 to SaJ n 9 78 

h S 

, 13 

TOP £:•' r - £ 

Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 
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kS. U.S. looks at inte 1 orts linking USSR 

to Ho Chi I - and requests inform- ton c relative 

strength outside contacts of Vietnam coaaminists. 

Clayton 2^1 to Saigon. 9 September 19^6 c * *. 79 

J49, C y reports on v At of Ho Chi " :3i just prior 
to signing, modus Vivendi ; Ko deel s he is not a 
communist. Caff ery 6131 to Byrnes. 11 Septe: 
19 l i6 ..*....•• ~.> . 79 

50. U.S. is info 1 by French of incr< ed coirmrimist 
activities in French Indocl ,, c " , CMnese 
Communist entrench at in Saigon and Haipho 
Agencies outside oi doc 3 ' supply!: propa- 
ganda. Bee i to Byrnes 3 17 Septemb 19*: 6 e . . * . , e 80 

] . Caff ery report- ' of modus vivendi it 
Ho Chi ah c lined satisfaction on many points, 
but French would have liked to e definition 
of Vietnam relations to Indochi) i oration and 
K -h Union. Cafi U67I to Byrnes, 17 September 

19^6- * • i • • f • 80 

52, Saigon view "amicable 11 meeting of Ho CM Minh and 

' ^r in I- t of ief that "French 
C< Lsts desire soft-pedal communist ti Is in 
Vietnam for politic:! tea " : to elections. 
Reed )-lll to Byrnes , 19 Oetc IS ...... . 82 

53. Ho Chi Minh infc the U.S. that effectiveness of 
modus vivendi depends on . fighting i:ould not 
stop unless French applied the 1 nt, t. 
Cochin-China "; t be unii to Vic , " 

O f Sul"' Ivan 96 to Byrnes, 25 October 19**6 . ....... 82 

5k a C< tct betvi. Vietnam and Chinese Communists is 
app .',, but the presence of Chicoms as 
in the prdvi is dj to verify. Reports 
Of Chicc in Haij "th suspicion* 
' Sulli va3 1 >1 to By* .11: . member 191*6 ,.»,.< . . 83 

55 , ! y reports Wr .*h c : ov, 1; Ltive proof" 
of bet 
Caf ■ B; ■ I9U6 ............. 83 

. '.. U.S. Con firth's Lth Prance 

as designee facilitate < ' 

V- ' * when j 1 if , it 

is : blish 3 1 

OP ; e - i i ve 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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p sec; ■ " : 

1 .-.r/. 

*s cc mist cont ai Ls t:i is peculiar 
hey are forcing < or preparing 
a puppet government-: t is a pc. Lisle ersion 
fl rench poll a Ixi O'S n 131 to 
Bj' : 3 December 19^6 , 

57- Acheson instruct Moffat on Ho Ch' ranrunist 
record a&d offers guideline?: S, policy in dis- 
cus Lth Ho, Essentially, the U.S. is conce] d 
over Tonkin events, t] American people have led 
Indochinese at ents but \ : rice imperils this 
syi r> ft U.S. ii i iforming Ft 3 Larly. 
The U.S. is not ma] formal ir Lon at this 
time. Acheson 3^5 to Saigon, 5 December 19^6 85 

. U.S. feels France would engage in full scale military 
■ rati J .' 1 only if forced, since they 

e it is no longe 3 to maintain a closed 
door. Howev -, Cocfain-C a political question must 
be settled ErencI irmot resolve it withoul 

tit, C chin-Chine s prefer Tonkin to I ice. 
Reed kj2 to I s, 6 pi her 19**6 87 

59- Secrel , Byrnes reviews basic ] -Vietnamese 
difficulties Missions at Londoi Moscow, and 
Nanlri . ially, the difficul 3 r Ive 
around deep nationalist s nd opp Ltion 
to tbe I ch, guided by a few cc d 
leaders in the government with e rent contacts 
with Moscow and Yenan. r, "French i ice 
is iiapor t not only as an an ote to Soviet 
influence, but to pre Viet and SEA from 
future Chine: " " Three 1 roubles 
are fcual ust, Fre solution of the 
term "free . , !1 ■ Vi intr igence. 
Byrnes message to certain Mis 17 De 
19k6. . . . 

60. Byrnes r nt Ft li p al crii Ls and 
infli f Indoch policy as an impc ,nt 
factor. Outbreak of hostili 3 in Hanoi r 
serious and no to be r bj bet 
and d'Argenli ■ es mesi tc w, Hani 
and S on, 20 Dec r I9J 90 

.61. Vincent inf; in rces 

ar ded pu~ 2 ox : i re 1 

to ac t a str un:* 

Bri tain f < I unwii I i . ■ in s] 

n gu u ! v." The 

x TO - B 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
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-r^ »W^ 


■ — ■ ■ ■ . ' 

French should be informed of U. S, concern, 
especially si the conflict ma; ne before 
the OK or other p< y intervene* Memoran- 
dum t for Aabeson, 23 December 19-t6.... , ,. . . 91 

62. U.S. adv y the Fietna: s.e attacked 
the i ch on 19 Dece ■: (a) orders from Moscov; 
to igpaet Southeast Asia, or to incr e CoiOflranlst 
Part; Lb Prance as a result of a quick 
settlement if the CP should take po .nmj 
and (t.) hope ft- similar J avail «. -Dutch e IrtXenienl 
resulting from fighting Le negotiating, 
' Sull:- 13k to Byrnes, 23 December 1J&6. • , . , 

* « 

63- U.S. impresses concern over Tonkin e fcs on the 

French, but expresses no offer to me .te. U.S, is 

concerned that the . b become involved* 

1 nes i ) to Caffery., 2h December 1$ .6 . . . < 93 

0\. U.S. takes the position to oppose E ese proposals 
for intervention in Indochina, Acheson 8 to 
Gallman (tut) , 27 Dc ber l$k6. . . . . . S 

65* Reed, in discussing with vi -al, 
offers creation of new government under Eao Dai 
-and/or Ts Reed 1|99 to ! nes s 30 December I9I46. 95 

66. U#S« approves the Consul in Hanoi to act on 
human i to save lives, but e : utic 
not to become involved in any situat which could 
be interpreted ■ mediating basic political 
without express authorisation. 
Byrnes 25 to 'Sullivan, 31 December 19^6. ».«»•• o * .».. < . 


67. U.S. reasserts the non- involve] licy of 
approv ' sales of milii and g ; 
to oept in : wh Indochina 

h: I ilities. Byr: s 75 to Paxis, 8 Jas uary 19^7»»»»»- S 

68. U.S. £ es support • full recognition of 

Fr ce's po "-. '• r ; "- U.S. cannot overlook 
d' i' 1 - - ■ t C0I03 ' , On t] 

other hr . the U.S. do ^ ' - t b Prance be 

Ln eommu 1 " y Ho 

"nh . Tb ! « ot favor U 

1 ": ' ;i of 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 

!RET - Sens-; 


pro! i to sv st." C ge C. Marshall P Se- ry 
of State, 'j31 to } ,3 - r y 19- *7 

69. The U.S. is cone lie Wes1 democratic 
syj is on the defensive l : e: " and 
; Asia is in a critic: phase* The key to 

U.S. position i ct 

to i tion ol stern democratic -ars in 

Sou' ia, the United i in the 
boat as the 3 ch, British and the Dutch. "We 
cannot conceive setbacks to the If range inter- 

of Lch Id not also be s of 
our own." The U.S. is ready to he hel 1 in any 
way j hov: r 3 non-inter\ n is still the U.S. 
policy . K i 37 to Paris, 13 May 19U7 100 

70. The Dej is concerned that a ri ed> 
dry s 011 1 re ons 
in a Congress which . be called or extc 
financial : -d to \ bern Europe in 3J Fr&r r s 

••j f inane i. td food position. M 
3*63 Paris 5 11 Sep: , 19S7. . . , t . 103 

71. M. Bollaert^ High Co 

delivers publicly * t deel&n 

of K l 1 policy since before hosti Lities V out. 

33 i a^ Vi se "repre. Lve 

go to except 3 and exclude 

dealing w 1 t r 

and th ly is surrender. Ihe U.S. sees 

1 Ls policy resiill d I 

(aj a propoi nal 1 in s to make con- 

cessii ) as a "retreat" from the -xh 6 accords. 

O'SuU : lett to U , 12 S< r 19% 10*J 

72. The French deny any v'\- ed dry season milit 

offensive. ( 37 1J -> ^ Septt r 
19 ] i7. -• 


73, P: eoj rs Bollaert *s policy s : 

step -rd po s: formal abandonment 

doc n i 

t3 of union of th 

,■ i . Caffery 3753 to Ka L. ] ' ! •• 

tembe * - . 112 

7!;. a ■ . ■ as : the : »si- 

1 1 . . S - do n- : . 

I UCC< " • 

TOP ■ J - r : itive 

■ — — — — "*" "^ —" — 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

)P SEC] - 1 dtj 


personality I abilit;. re impressiv Ho Chi Mihb 

regar a communist, and Ms regime oj 

south 1 does not appee.r of critical impor 

St t ( 096 to "Marshall, 18 Octc ■■ 19^7 1 


75. 3 La hesitates to submit Indochina question to the UK 
bee: e France_could veto and the GOI is not c 

that Vn / Chi hj e rcises de facto sx rity 
or repre: "ity viewpoint in Indochina. Mar U 
telegram to Consular Officers, 29 J ary 19' i 116 

76. A Ho CI lieutenant is reported £" : with 
a petition ; rent ion. J' shall 21 to Saigon, 

3 F>: ry 19^8 . . , 117 

77. Hanoi Consul summarizes recent events centering on 

Bao Dad : ' Bai d' Along co: pence accords, Bao b 

withdraws co mm itmc and will stay in France until called 

fi r ( r. n R: 1 (Hanoi) 31 to ' 1 7 

19 February 19^8 « . * 118 

78. French Government authorizes Bolla rt to approve formation 
of a provisional Vletnt rnment hi 1 by General 

Xuan. fery 2567 to 1, 12 May 191*8. 120 

79* Xuan governs 1 s very li Le enthu , Bao Dai is 
war g for favorable si return. Stv 971 to 
Marshall., 29 May 19*18. - 121 

80. French inc te dubious of su 3 for Xuan 

Gov: , r 3063 to 11, 9 .j 19^8. . 123 

Chi e desire U.S. v on r s coin ■ 1st 

conne ons a an indi< U.S. s ulti- 

xLicy vis-a-vis th 7iet Minh. St fc (] Lng) 

1116 to Marshall, 22 Jr L< 8 r 

82. U.S. 3 sition on Bo Chi I 1:: that he is a c 

; cl in j but no e vi- 
ce of a dii . Marshall 97'+ to 
! 7 IS • • 127 

, U.S. b-: or] Litical ai 

e ' iiti 


3 ■ * 13 

XI 3.1 

TC ; 

■ * 

J. V/i I 

Declassified per Executive Order J 3526, Section 3.3 
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TOP SEi r - £ Ltive 


&h. C jry that U.S. the French vb 

i re fa ; b ciltc j s of approving 

inde;nendenc "on of three KYS or los Indoc) d , 

Caff Br 621 to r shall, 9 July 19 [ iS • • 13?! 

85- U.S. approves Caf y's suggested action (tel 3621) 

and would publicly app re of French acti on C i- 

China status as a forward looking step to rd settle- 

ment in Indochina, Marshall 2637 to Paris, 14 July 

19^8 135 

86. U.S. feels that France is evading the issue of altering 
the French Colony status of Cochin- Chi r-- hich > 5 effect^ 
nullifies the Bajed 1 Along agreement. 'shall 28 91 to 

Paris, 29 July 19I+8 . . 136 

87. The French Assembly must face the issue of changing 
Cochin-China status and approve Baie d 1 Along agreements, 
if the little pr in Indoch? is not t nulli- 
fied, is the view of the French Ministry of Overseas 

Ter pies. Caffery ^03*1 to Marshall, 5 August 19^8 137 

88. U.S. seeks to determine, in the absence of firm 
commit) : : ; hem France can <3i Letm ;e distrust 
of } .neh, split off adherents of Ho, or reduce hostili- 
ties . Mar: 11 136 to Saigon, 27 August 19WL 138 

89. U.S. believes "not" ; should he left undone which will 
strength truly : alist gr< s" in beadily 
deter iora g Incl situation. Marshall 3368 to 

Saigon, 30 August 19k8 lUo 

90. She U.S. licly recognizes major strategem of com- 
munists in Southeast Asia is to c ton the ca of 
local -nationalism. Love it 1^9 to f ;on, 22 Se er 

19k8. - Xkl 

91. U.S. policy st t bn Indoch? cites four long-term 
object ; ochina: (l) elindr communist influ- 
ence, (2) foster ociation of the people with Western 
powers, ticula: oe, (3) rs the stand? 
]l.rin£. ' ) to prevent undue Cfaii g p ion. 
The ir: is to s 'torily resolve 
the Fr . leti ;e i . Dei 1 . Lt : 

Policy Stat on Indoc i , 2? Septi r 19^8 1^3 

92. 3336 U, '. vie* is that for Moscow ,f ] ts are ex- 
cellent that wil the 

1 of the Fr and set u r 

B ' I : * ( ) 

de? 95 to SecSt ,5 r 1< 150 

v - S 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

TOP SI EC - B Lti". 


93. T1k D.S ±n as sing Bao Dai ; annot "iri ly 

coir. U.S. to support of i ve £: eh... 

night be.i vl: pu I govt../ 1 I ^ing 

Sec 5 to January 19^9 . . 152 

9- J : . The U.S. ce ously i ny prer. r figment 
of Bao Dai in order to retain tre Dtion i 
of Frencl pessimism. Acher ( ate) 70 to St 
2 May I9 j t9 * • 15 

95* Abl. Lg Consul > revl- 3 Lna situa- 
tion (for the ; Delhi Foreign Se 20 Con: 
Febi- ;,• 19*19) > for tl ( Depar t. "The alterna- 
te-- to .0 Dai solution are coi oied costly 
co ' - withdrawal le; ig a cc. t- 
eontrolled government in a st . Lc of Sou ast 
/ la." Abbott despatch 93 to . 5 May 19U9 15^ 

96. The U.S. desires the success of Bao Dai expe and 
will exte recognition, as there appears no other 
alt en e to the est* 1 co .1st pattern in 
Vi< ' t success in China* 

Ac] on 77 to Saigon, J 1 , 190 

97. U.S. fear I ce is of ' >o ] too 3 ■■" 
and the U.S. should a" ipicuous " i tT 

of t kind. Ache, 83 to S > 20 May 191*9 193 

98. 33 Feels that the qu Ion Ho Chi Minh's 
nationalise versus c "irrele it." 

"All Stalinists in colonial a sua are nationalists." 

Achr Ih 10 Hi i j y I9I49 1; 

99. The U.S. submits cominei a the 8 1 Franco- 
Bao at to • • , i ily, t ff.S. , 
while ] 8 M sucee 

is p i c that the requd "te concc oris will 

1 le by I s FEA. 1> er 289 to 

Br- ( J- .3 is) > 6 June 19^9- - - • 200 

100, Seer se 1 is son req the 

Se> iil to .sian situation to 

c ' eu .:.'-. ' ' ' is 

large arc 

of in C af 
1 217 

xv J5T ~ I - 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

TOP S Ltiv 


101* The . r< stablishment of . s only the "first 

step 11 in evo: of the Vietnam pr^ 

Ft anee will hav to cor to accommo: national . 
Webb ( Lg) 1^5 to R& on, 20 J 219 

102, The Singapore Confere, - rnmends that t U.S. join the 
D . upport of Bao Dai, that the French cla: i y Vietr l s 
i i , that- de facto recognition be gr :3d on 1 , ;,- 
ary IS • &o.J hopes that the U*S, would fulfill its ON dirties 
in event of an at on Indochii . Bliss (London) 563 to 
SecState, 9 November IS ■ 223 

103* The National Security Council suV ■ . L. "The Position 
of the United States \ Respect to Asia," which, from a 
j I : iry view, indicates the "current basic cor of stra- 
tegy - in the 'West 1 and a strategy in the 
'East.' The 3 nee of So prlnc lly as 
an exj ber of strat Lais — tin, fib . • . - 
rubber . " IISC U8/l, 23 December I9H9 225 

10^4 . The President app the c ions of BSC to/1 as 

amended. The basic obj- rbives cit -- development of 
stable nations and sufficient n Lli1 ay power to prevent 
coaanunii ins ion in A; :tio 3 infl ce in 
Asia, and pr ' on of power latioi rhich -could 
threat U.S. Specifically, in I> , the U.S- "11 
use its i ."! :li ce to resolve colo? list-a lonalist 
conflict. NSC l i8/2, 30 De ber 19^9 265 


105. The JCS reviews the curr- 1] j .rise Ass:" ce Ero- 
gr certain objectives evoli as the basis for future 
military assi; e pre . A [fie long n tge objec- 
tive is "develop! 1 suf " eient mil:*, power in 
selected tations of the Far East 1 ' to pr ■ encroachment 
by coMitii:'. 1 !. JCD Memor- m for th: ; ary of Defense, 
26 Joniv 1950 • 273 

106* 2?h* St« Depart] amends i id President Trus roves 

reco tion of the three legally constituted gavei nts of 
Vi nam, Cambodia, end for ' nt, 
2 Feb- y] . . . * . . . \ • 276 

5?Ja V. S , ££ o " " ' on to the 

Associated r -eply to stion 

c of tic re Ives. Aefa 59 to 

Saigon, k j0 278 

xv j iti\ 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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TC -Si 


108. At-' ighbors consider Ba DaJ Fj , Hie U.S. 
should realize tJ EC/ " litar; Id from the U. S. 

do not constitute decisive in Indochina* 

lems. Theref> Griff iri Mission should not c< 

EGA o ry ai ;-h Ind unless France 

"gives requisite pub!" undertaking her s" 

leading to status simile Indoj sia." Stanton 

(Bang ) 160 to Ac] on, 17 Feb i , I 50. ,*.*.< . 280 

109. The State Department submi" to the NSC report on "The 
Position of the United States with Respect to In d< &/' 
which an s the proll n to determine mea to protect 
U.S. security in Indochina and prevent canoironist c Lou 

in i a. HSC No. 6U 9 2? F 3 1950 ..,....,.•.., 282 

110. I ident Truman a] the c Mr, Ro't -t A. 
Griffin as Chief of the Economic S on to Sou; 1st 
Asia j witfi rank of Minister. Five basic objectives of 

I on are outlined: (l) determine nc jecta of 
po Leal significance; (2) pr Point k programs; 
(3) local officials of in et hods and extent of partici- 
patioi 3 Point h; (h) brief U.S. represents Ives; 
(5) :i 1 stif al aspe of technical assJJ 
Departu of State letter to Griffin, 1 h 1950. 

111. The State Departs nt maintains to the pepartm of Defense 
that Indochina is subject to inn liate d r and is the 
"most strategically important area of Southeast Asia*" 
Dean Rusk believes that the resources of the U. S t should 
be deployed to "reserve Indochina from further C« .mist 
encroachment." j I a Ku;-'k ? Deputy U: stary of State 
to Genera] James Jl. Burns,, Defense Be e to South- 
el La Aid Com 3 7 March 1950 ..,.., ■ ,. 288 

112. A< "i 13 Saigon, in light of ahti Franco- 
Viet fr." m c idldj U.S. aid, thai i ^ f Griffin 
Mis 1' is "clearly u 'stood t findJ " Ac3 on 

136 to u ^ 9 ©••••••■•••••• * * e . 289 

113* Griffin i Lies 1 "l understand 1 ours J an e 

ission" and thai I budding co could jeopar- 
dize the d pre The Tn ow no enthusi- 
asm f - B If, Gullion {: ) 176 to , 13 1 


it: t< ■«•«*(■>. >«.l«b»C' •e* , *C''*c. •<:••••*■*■• t'ta.eaecotr'. * * 0*0 ^* 


ll4. Grif sul r £ preliminary 

I *na with a of spe ' 1c urj • : 3 s total- 

i $23 -=5 million exclusive Llita 

S TOP SECRET - Sens it i\ 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


*•*««*« « t, 


U.S. aid (e, rough Fr ). Obstacle let not per- 

mit it ' i< to alloc Ld money or materials: the 
"crux of the situation lies in prompt decisive action if 
desired political effect ' to 1 aired, 11 G in file 
copy of telegram sent to Ac! 9 3.6 March 1950- *♦•......... 292 

115. The U.S. assumes that France is c to protect 

Indochina from cc mist encroachment 3 that success de- 
pends on indigenous support, and that France supports Eao 
Dai , "but that the. French position and ultimate intentions 
are not cl to rest of the world. The U.S. requests 
Fr- to make a public statement of the concessions to 
Indo alism. Ache con 1363 to Paris , 29 March 



116. Acheson advises Gri on of t implications for U.S. 
policy in Vietnam: (l) The prospect of U.S. aid indirectly 
would Ci it is (induce hyper -confidence in Viets); 

(2) Viets bitter at Huu appointment (end the U.S.) may 

1 i U.S. role; (3) it is better for the U.S. if a 

j 1 union government is set : and (k) the aid program 

can more easily "be worked out with Huu Govern . Acheson 

2kk to Gv CFIn, 9 April 1950 . . 305 

117. Department of State requests an asi sment of the str 'c 
@ of Indochina from a military point of viev because 
of t threat of c list domination. The Joint Chiefs of 
gi 'f ii that the r :1 states of South ia 
also are at present of critical strategic impoj ce to the 
United States.," because of the to stockpile 
str at- materials acquired ; re 3 as veil as the threat 
to othe on th rf li of cc nt. M JCS Memoran- 
dum for the Secretary of , 10 April 1950. ...........* 303 

118. The Join' Chic Staff cc hi S D partment 
on thu 2: ortance of South ;ia to the U.S. Hovever, 
t urge a more fore*, itive U.S. pot" on 
than 3 by State — "« or to retrieve the 
losses resulting from previ mi as on the part of the 
British and French, a. c -11 as to preclude su 

the future, the Joint Chi it necessary 

that positive oper 1 hip amc V tn 

po the United State,? in Sou Asia 

it b1 1 >" JCS for I f 3 2 y 1950 ....... 3 

119. The JCS rect Uin£ tat I U.S. is pre- 
pa. to -.'■ ' and 
t f< ; . JCS 

',2 318 

■ TOP i - 3 ' • 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 

^ S : ■ Sitj 


President T: ;i ml 13 ion for mj ! " 11 

to Indochj ' Acheson 20*f9 i^ London^ 3 May 1950- 



121. Griff: ;tructs the Indo on for Seer ry 
Ac i on. C i indicate, bhat t ! . is quo 
cei i ' ' • "Time is of the essence^ .," 
Dai starts to slip, "it will V impossj ic to resl hisa." 
Given t h are aware that a milit ,. Oution 
is u ' ! . ■ U.S. Ind out vhat French 
expect of Vietnam.* 1 Griffin Mem> i to S of 
Ste , } -i 5 1950, .......... . .- , 322 

122. The special , R, Al in 
recommends a iest$6o million economic and technical 
a&si-sl >e pr<- am for Southeast Asia. State j ss re- 
lease H85, 11 May 1950 . . . . 327 

123. The Ministers of the U.S., U.K., and France agree that 
while Southe- st Asia Is of si tegie importance to the 
U.S., the ct Llities of U.K. a? France make 
it of cor. en to them. Extract of Trip&rtj 
I I Tall 13 May I95O.... . 328 

12U. The French sponsibility for Indochina, acknowledge 
"sup meni .■" U.S. assisl , and assure that 8 March 
a vrij] he "liberally impli ited." L03 a - 
8ECT0 256, 1^ May 1950 330 

125. U.S. j all; ; t to e£ lish an economic aid 
mission to the three Associated Sti bes of Indochina. State 
I ele , 25 lay 1950 332 

126. On the basis of the Griffin r atic ;, S publicly 
announces the 1 shing of a program Ld ecc Lg aid 
to Southeast Asia. Secretary Dean letter 
to R . A13 en Gr :• f f in, 3 Jtu ] \ l iO * * . . . 335 

127. North Kor( attacks Sot' ja and President Tri a 
an] Um"\ as sis not to South 

o an 1 i ration in the furnishing of 
tp.fl 11 / assistance to the forces of Frai c and the 
Ac so. ' as in Indo the dispatch of a 

Lon... ." Pr t, 27 June 

1 ,.,« , . . . c. , . . 

t>«.Ct«CC« t . i. * ft . 


128. The U*S. p ciples governing U.S. xai 

: Indo;-- . Ez- ■ ' ce: 

U« S. aid * to Assi 1 ; - 

xix M - S 

Declassified per Executive Order L3526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

TOP SEC sitj 


to achieve in Ltyj ass5 bhe French 
Union against eonmiunj could 
cause c"J . on of aid from Assocl-j States, on 
It to Si n, 1 JBly 1950 ■ * . . 338 

129. A suited 3 of Ley cu ] oehtn revei U JCS 

f 73 th the U.S. Ly Lon to provid- 

ing • : • and n . 1 as ' 1 hould ■ Chi? -de 

overt support to the VJ Minh. Consultants' 1 ' . . 

£,_P U U-J-Jr JL^/^}{-- « • o • • » o a. p.*. •••••«•«•. .9.4.1 p ft ■• • • • b e o*occ«>»« ■ ■ -J 

130. The U.S. feels that Frc ste for overall assistance 
(milit< ee< d politi al) inadegt a to 
"consum U.S, broad ol ives in Indoehina" and assis- 
tant ill have to be increased to resist encroachment of 
coirimunism* Heath (Saigon) 170 to Aebeson. 7 August 1950* ■•*• 3^3 

131. The U.S. v" s gj- inr 1 and military 6 

iii Indo una with concern; especia . evident aa "■ Llure 

of the governmc to gi. -port, disinclination of 

Dai to assume leadership role, aj lications of CB '- 

Viet Minh military colli ration. The !. see3<:s to have 

Viet- tablish a my and de na1 

emergency. Aci -on 238 to Saig 1 Sep' 1950. ....... . 3I4J1 

132. The U.S, iforms France 1 b the U.S. was pre; i to in- 
c-r ase ass nee to Fr could 1 
furnish money for local v stica] air suj rt. 
Extract of Sip tea of Trip&rtH , Ft ' : 

Meeting, France., U.K., and U.S., 1*4 September 1950 3**7 

133. The Son Asia Aid Policj Committee (£ ) propc 
statement of U.S, policj on I] ;C for con- 
si . "The U.S. L not cc ' any of i I 
for to the defense of Indochina against c -t, foreign 
1 Ion. . ••" hut should ' i ! %an of 

ti al i ; 1 : 1 of 1 ,; ; . oci a 51 . tf The 

U.S. should o "press the French 11 to ear. te 

a ients 8 Marc ' 1 3< 19';* SEAC 

D-21, 11 October 1950. . . . ....•.•*».,-... 3 } 

13k* "The d t s1 nt of I in Ir ina is weals: 
from the p Lde.. ' mt 
art > for a - 5, I i ittj . > : ■'.-.-. i Lticj ] i 
ec* • State E r 
i ly :■ i. ana ir nner. 
Co y, the I 
y, Mi , letter to 
C ' ■ :> 13 ... . 

s& ^ r - g 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



135, The Stal anno, results of h 3 
conversat -h Minister; s jd that 1 I , . 

Cor ppropriat one -half billion doj in mili- 
tary istance for the Far East, D rtme of S 
p : 6,17 c *r 1950.... - *. *. c ... 371 


136, State and Defense recapitulate te with the French Mi 
iers s ^igon's views on 1 review bhe 
proposed NSC po] ' on I> hina; Th nch 

not pre nmeci equipment for 13 bail Ions in the 1951 
"budget and further had reqv bed < t the U.S. 3 , - and 
maintain the E tonal ar.." rmed* It appears that 
the Fren 113 from Tonkin and nsay throw the 
problem to the U.H< The dj is con- 
sidered quite adequate. Meau for ' K.T. 
young) , 17 October 1950 . . . 373 

137. The current situation in ] reveals serious weakness 
in French mai : . leadership^ and intel 3 - The Viet 
Minh forces are build in trp -scale off* Ives to 
seize complete control of j dna. The I ch Dnio 1 

fo ;s of 35: are oppose 92 5 500 Vj reguli 
and 130^000 irregulars. U.S. Hav^l Intel 1 adum^ 

17 Octob 1950* * 38 

138. The U.S. infc Emp« J i s Lth empb / ■-. " 

ia native I t he giye the Vi ; se people ience 03^ 

determination to Lly lead hi, y into 1> 
iate and ' 1c opposition" to the corwnuni, I 
The U.S. has .erpreted his ''prolonged holiday" on the 
1 as lack of patriotism. It i; tactfully si 
that further dj of pri ' on jnj it le' bo log 
of U c n # support for his govern nt. Acheson 38*4 to Sal 

18 October 1950. 388 

|0 >9. A Def £ viev; is that it is IT :< b important t 

do nc ole political \ them. 11 

The U.S. should give increased roilit* 1 not intervene 

an tress pol ' by t feu Memor urn 

St Finlet , 1$ OctoT 1950. * . . . . ..... . 391 

lUO. U.S. desires > " political and ' vantages 

it in t' "onal found i ra« 

of 2d nativ ont:" bs (00 Dai 5 o > Cathc 

etc.) s an ar- j cgkq Dai. A to 

; 25 i! . »-* ; 

itL U.n. approves ± to ; 05 21311 ho' :i •' 

ar '' - 155 Jnm hold bo Indochina, 

^50 to 7 October 1 >.»«.».,.*... 39^ 

, • • ■ 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i 

TOP SB C - S ive 


lk£. General Brink , Ch Mtadt , 3 at the 
French coni ch: ^oops from "pacification" 
dispositions to 3 ;er unit re{ oupment. 3 ich mili- 
tary pi" yed to delays in politic 1 decisions. 
Saigon 763 to Ache s on , k Hover 1950 (see l&ielr A 
to E anent No, lH6, belo. ) : „ h 

1H3. T U.S. does not favor use of the Peace Observation Co: - 
mission in Indochina mid if the Indoc: a subject is to 
come into ti United Kations, it is i that the 
French do it. Acheson 516 to IM, 22 November 1950. -. * . 395 

lkk* The U.S. publicly "welcomes the French statement which sures 
independence of the Associated ! of Indochina within the 
French Union and that their resources LI be d eted "to 
the defense of Indoch" 1st communist cole ' _■]." 
Depart t of State press relea Il87> 27 IJoveinV 0.... y 

iV?. "If the Communists are successful in Korea, thin may so 
weaki r 11 1I1 in Indochina at they will pull out. 
He /Secret ar; son/ doubted if any one of the Presi- 
dent's aclv" .ould urge Man to intervene in that 
at ion. 11 Ex from Ti ai-Attlee Conversations , k De- 
cember 1950 * * * . . » . . . * . . * . . 39§ 

11*6. The Joint C of St position paper on possible f re 
action in Indochina, 28 November 1950; is circulated for 
MSC coixside 'i'n, This paper includes the Brink report 
(k November 1950) as a :- ence. The JCS she term ob- 
jectives emphasize i at action to deny Indoch:" bo 
co oiism. ure retention of responsibility by France, 
and develop I of an over-all military plan for Indochina . 
The long ten: 1 .,...; tiv ; to 3 ..ut cc 1st exi ion, 
to establish in1 I security conditio] such as the foreign 
armed forces would be removed, to press the h to carry 
out c titmentSj and to ei ablish a regional security arranj 
I L i in Sou 3 . Exeeut" to t" 9 
NSC 6tyl ■ 1 December 1950 . ......... 399 


jl^7 t p at Tr reasserts 1 , aid o t ] French 
Union forces * I of the Assoc:' d St- 
will c inue. ieven C s, 30 Jam 
1951. ..*<.* ....... t 

■ * * 


lH8. The U.S. h wtl to : ^elf to the 

budgetar; : -it of ( 5 bi on flrai .-. ) retru;* • 

a r - ' ' ^19 

6 ..*»>• . 

Li TOT ;ET - E 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i 

' ~ Sensj L 


lii9* Th first pr Ct or s a 1 

on 27 > a;- ses the most re thr< o 

French Incloc the ' ■ Viet 

Minh 3 At in. aid. im±stically 3 the 

re< b corclu that "Aiaeric?.- militj , aid fi -shed 
the State ! s f< my of 1 Unic 

have be the decisive or in the of the 

area ag " st commmrut Lou- 11 State 1 tment 

.80 . 15 March 1951 . • . . c 421 

150. President Truman approves KSC Action h§/_ Lch states 
U.S. policy on Asia, With respect tc j a a U.S. 
policy seeks to cc o incr reneb " ' y 
effc :s > to ' bernal auton 

promote int, ional support f ;• Associ I d 

States. KSC 48/5; 17 May 1951 , k 

151. Dulles discn r;es problems with Parodi of 3: ici] ion 
of the th Associated States as "save Tr with re- 
spect to U hip. V' 1 gov 

and positions of In: Buxina^ and In Dulles - 

Parodx Conversation > 11 Jui 1951 - - W 

152. The U.S. ites Vie . Cambodia, and Laos to partici- 
pate in signing of Ja , . Sai 132 des- 
patch I ....... 44? 

153. The U 6 S. and Vietnam enter into an economic cooperation 

a ement. Agreem red intc e 7 Sepi er 195-1 • • - ^9 

I5H. The U.S. agrees with Fr hat they will conti" to be 
primarily hie for ; that U*S. 
shou 2d 3 t first prior it, - : >ary 
aid should to IndochjjvL. u. s. -j -'ranee Lstexs 
Meeting, 3.1 Septf r 1951 . • . « o * . . * c * k-52 

155* I ident Tr . Acl pledge r r 

General I attre and vould not t Indochina fall 

into enemy banc, ' of Con : on. Acheson, 

Schuman, and DeLati tesiber 1951 »«•••»«•••.»••-«»••••« k^h 

15&. G attre cc to ate Depari that the 

aid j - ' " 1 nt •' rily etc to 

don al 11 of c " "jo^x ie it" 

1 that the U.S. . ext 3 e. E e 

Depari -h Del 17 smber 1953 ^56 

xxiii TOP SECRET - B " 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

i - , ■ I " /e 

157. The I . recounts th doubts and " on the 
subject of col 1 trial Lssj in Indochi aint' that 
real 3 te is fc tl Indochinese 11 
tje & v l 1 ■'. 3 to exerci " y or be sub^ to com- 
munist terror. Dean . • November 1951* * * • « ^59 

158. France requests t] conversation 1 place ima 

. , U.K. and I te concern! rted rfcion 
1 in 1 event of mingly tt Chinese interventic :' 

I Indochina. Bn (Paris) 3765 to Acheson, 22 D* 51. ^60 

159. ] delivers an ai to I U.S. on a proposal 
to appeal to tjie U.K. ij R Chi] ' . Paris 3856 

to Acheson, 29 Dec 3 \ 1 *f62 


160. Ac on revi r rs trij bite military discussions i^ bieh 

; be did not participate. G- il Bradley ^ vhil: iable 

to cojm; ■ " of U. : . lit as;: 

ta in the b of CHIC; . ould rec to 

the P ident 1 b a dec ion be issued to ] China 

that aliation uld follow any aggression. P. i\ son 97^ 

to Saigon, 15 J^n . . I165 

161. 7 Lders the c the United States of 
corm Lst domination of South sia. Loss of ?ast 

t is seen as put J economic and political pressures 
on Japan > ope g sou of str jnete ' Is to the 
Sov:" BloG 3 rend ing the U,S, pc the Pacific 
precarious . ] ing II c 

trade rout uth Asia. If Red C " b., the 
U.S. shoi : e appropriate military action as t of a 
U.IT. action or in cor., ction but t unilater- 
ally. KSC 12^ 13 February 1952 If 68 

162. Th CIA esti ■ joint vai against ■ 1 inter- 
vention in Southeast As I t; . 5 that 
ini-f of action in /. . probably "bring a 

X sir r to t regarding Korea, and CHIC 

ance of a joint war ^ invo] ' t 

of g U£ . CI/ ; . . ■ Fe . kTf 

163. The JCS \ " on KSC 12 fcc MSC l'P ] \ e th t *>. L~ 
tary operations in dsfe 1 of Indochin- ". st Chi se 

C " ' 1 3 by a. ; 

C< * ' - • 3e of f ch 1 ' 

result a 1< and - and that from 

poj of viex-i 

c " ' ' • >' ' 

(fox 1 ' ' )j 3' ch 1952* . 5 

TO? l . 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 2011 


TOP SECRET - Sensitr 


X6k. V NSC r somie i ■ implications of g ' g 

to war in China be studied fu .1 to the 

Council c the President: that i grt sr to 

Southeast Asia is subversion ■ not e> .1 aggression^ 

and that contingencies for a Fr : ined. 

KSC 113th Mc (J 3) • 5 £ch 1952, . , , ..... 502 


165* The U.S. stresses to the British i rumors of Frei In- 
tel >ns t< ithdraw or negotiate with Ho C>> i Minh are 
true* The U.S. believes that France will stay in Indoch 
as long suffice it U.S. aid is forthcanii . Acheson 
Conversation with it ish Ambassador 5 28 March 1952 . 508 

166- French stress their problems at tripari eting concern- 
ing their EDC eammitmerr 1 . (l) the French effort in v o- 
china 3 (2) financial da iies and whether the st egic 
imports] of SEA justify .nued effort I (3) Indo- 
china is part of the European defense problem, France 
cannot continue to 1 "alone such great share Indochinese 
burden." Fi ch great importance to U.S. aid. 
Acheson r ^il5 to State, 28 May 1952 . ■ . ■ 511 

I67* If the Chinese invade Indochina, "he /Kcl ~J said i 

clear that j as futile and a e to defend Indochina 

in Indochina. He said we could not have snot 1 fa.... 

we could not put ground troops in Indochina. .■ .our only hope 

was of chi "mg the Chinese mind." Secrel y of State Hote 

(L.D. Battle) , 1? June 1952. . . . 6 515 

168. U.S. informs France that appropriations would be prepared 
to provide up to 150 million dol] • >; additional Fl 1 I 
aid in support of ov 11 French effort in Indochina. 
Acheson ikOh to Paris. 17 June 1952 

169. Acheson publicly announces opi .*■■ : m over the conduct of the 
National a; s in Indocl 1 that communist "aggression 
has been checked" and that the "tide is now mov in our 
favor •" State Dep . Re U73, 18 June 1952. 518 

170. The President aj ^ves NSC 3 '1/2 (HSC 124/1 as amended) on 
the U.S. object:! s and cor 101 Lth re to 
Sout.' t / . V fe to Indoc 3 the U.S. would 
cont 5 to assur the of the ir 1 inte] t 
of the Indc Lna effort: ui U.S. ix poli- 
bical^ military, econcenic, and ' oli : i - 
crea. ] 3 in 1 axon; 
o Fr. : i ' st 
Red Ch . , 25 June Ig 

x> T0i : 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

TOF ' ~ Sensitii 


171. The !. and Bri : - dis s issxd to Red CI: " 
on j ■ ntic in 1 1. Frr s could 
trig ■' Chinese in- id *t U.S. had "no infant 
available for op Lna, " ~. U.S. think- 
in is ale lines of a iv ■ 1 "blocks of China's coast* 
Londoj ' inis I ; al Xalks , June . 5; 

172. The French regis that 15-0 Am rican Air Fo? 1 ics 
be det i ' \ ' ives an opinion for favorable 
action from Q • 1 Tra LL MAAG Chiefs who also reeom- 
mends expediting ell. y of jraft promised for 1953. 

Saigon 9 to Aeheson^ 5 December 1952. . * , , *, . . • e • . 538 

173. The U.S. approves participation of 25-30 U | rsonu I in 
maintt of Fr h aircraft i) , Acheson 1286 to 

n , 22 3 ber ] .... * *«.•••».«».»,».<» 5^0 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


> * 



:■ ' 23, l! ' I 

" \ extrac 1 

1< | 
F< u 11 I b at ' , sri 


. . 


BR* "^ e. n to i h 


\ y 1 s n< " - oii a small 


; ■ : thi ' ! " rr- 

po d 

dquo of b a ; 

3D n 


ito nas 


i in off ■ ■ n , 

as - " i I of our 

. •' I -" s 1 

s to ". " Ltioni 

ty, I I that 1 r",; T . ) isid 

li^ht 58 CO! 




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Ace i ' i ' " 


So n- 


I ' ' • ' Lng 

■ ■ ■ ■ ] . ■ . 

■ ■ 

i j 





i • 

t^ ~ • 

:1 x 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 

V libe ' : " ' 

Bri i 

v^ - b i B " : sh 

: than fcha TJ. 3* \ o? st* al . 'c 

I ]/ i no ; b for Indo-Ghi] oper 

r, bo felt ' b it is 
1 th* bsrszd r Ls to bs 

cularl; be r ■ no maj< rations 

' ' isential that 

China ] rec or [R# 

til i or. 'JOsit 


t!R. i Lnt b that »e for the Far last 

to * the ' our Indo iicy has b 

xl for s viefi of a divor- 

rien Ln tha ' "• * " " b been 

. it /)y id 

c; be policy* 

" •■ c 

Frenc ! finS -'^ P^ r L±rut* 

After : bher discussionj ■.: 

a« ' 5/7 j ting t 

"b, / t th ! nt of St ild 

"" i i clarifies of 

po] on Inclo- r 

to the light of the thre 

e; 1 b; % lovetW 


. -, ■ 

r > 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

3 . <r 1 | p.W, 4 tflA?> : TV!*.'; i 

TVti i' i ■/'// of '- (lie A I 'ft F< 

151 fi From Mai i !l ■ • ' ' >Pr< Rm he 

J *I tv, Di ■ i frtf n ;■>, 
noftfi for ill ' . . 
ber i .' »on fl i ml ■ I i • -' 

Idinoi ; •;• rtir ■' ■' i \p Tndo 

'Kiiilci-^v \vji i ifm ml st< ^ liare boen take fo diwi mfio , 

mil n .. '-'t Urns [r* n ' i •■ .■ ■ ->*r : . Fii'l ii n 

thai qp i of Further ■ ' i e ro o1 her :•. . 5s snbjscl of aci : 
nej ol i [Jlai .] 


Tl ?"-' I- r or fZf« /) 

The Re tfarv of s • . Imiw sto FTis ■>■■ •' 11 

I ti*>>tii)lie :ii I now! ; eooi 

'. . I i ■ . of Mnivli 12, 10 (•>, ponvevymg (Tie di i 'e 

' ; he Fivi i - 

iiicin o1 < iicd Si: i - iu ;ip- F 

:il . . ii '. in Lou i on ;\ . I 2*>, 1D4-] and i 

Jlis ;. 

< I h cm ro ive proposal.' The 

ITnrU'd States Go m has cowi oiitlv I icved, "tod ac« 

irdin/rlv. thai I ho Fur 

i lefoai of Japan, > 
lire i of i : 

, ; ... - hi 

i • f noli vr 'osto i mili arv i 

in i i - i U > : ;,';, mint 1 l . the • the 

Governni i - ■ i i 

, onld - i the CO mIhs i inie of -sii :»j • i 

tin- lines •■■ In v si ol 

"WArsjiTxc ^ . April 20. [0£>. 

!.( . •: 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 


With the death of President Roosevelt on 12 April 1945, the 
indecisive policy toward Indochina took on a new appro: h under the 
new President, Harry S« Truman© Shortly i being sworn in bo 

office,, U So policy was thoroughly revie A 9 On 13 April, the State- 
War-Wavy Coordinating Committee met and discussed the urgent need 
for clarification of U S policy toward French- Indochina, document 
number 3„ Ey 20 April, a Memorandum to the President on Indochina 
policy had been drafted by the State 'Department Division of European 
Affairs (EUR), documents number 5 and 6 C The Division of Far Eastern 
Affairs (FE) revised the EUR version to the extent that it was 
substantially different from the original submitted, document ni r 7* 
The final compromise between the two versions resulted in a draft action 
cable for Paris and a Memorandum on / ^ican Policy with Respect to 
Indochina for the President, both of which app as documents number 
- 9 and 10 e The record shows that the policy stat nts in the memorandum 
was neither sent to nor approved by the President and that the cable was 
not dispatched to Paris* The documentation concerning this evolvement 
of policy is included here as a revelation of the France- Indochina 
commitment internal to the Depart t of State and the impetus lent to 
policy making by the War Depart : In the latter phase of World War II* 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

EpArrr: ■ . of Stai 

DIVISION OF EU ; /.: : . .;. 

Aorll 20 




*\ ---*' t ■ "f* 

V « ■ ■ V * 

>so: ass ';:< T^ 

- " £ on cur policy on. 3 ! whlc! 

you : oveci in ft raft fora this : »rni 
■ : y\u indicated you would tak up at 

the Staff Co: iitt* seating tcao: 
(Pnti >mingi 

As you k:io-'j the : s prepi 

f v resale of a air active from SWSCCi, I 

n 3 ' cop:. 3 Hill d 

Mr. :■:■'■*: v; order to r ;aln info: 1 

el- i:i38 from the an5 K&vy. It has 








H* Freeman Mattxi 








t— j 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



Subject: Suggested Reexamination of A] riean Policy 

with Respect to Indo -China 

General Observation 

1. The Japanese aggression against the French in Indo-China last 
month has brought about a marked increase in the numb of proposals 
advanced by the French for the use of Fre: forces and resource, in 
the Pacific • 

2. The con uenc of these military developments make it clear 
that our past policy, which held that the disposition of Indo-China v 
a matter for post-war determination and that th United States should 
not become involved in military effort for its liberation, is in urgent 
need of reexamination and clarification* This is particularly so in 
order that American mill y and naval authorities may have guidance to 
enable them to take appropriate action with respect to the F pro- 
posals referred to above. 

3. The United States Government has publicly taken the position 
that it recognizes the soy on of France ove: French 
possessions overseas when those possessions are resisting the enemy 
and has expressed the hope that it will see the reestablish of the 
im Lty of French territory. In spite of this general assurance , the 
negative policy so far pursued by this Government with respect to Indo- 
china has aroused French suspicions concerning our intentions with 
respect to the future of that territory. This hi and continues to 
have a harmful effect on American relations with the French Government 
said people - 

Ik On April 3* 19~ ; 5; the Secretary of State h the approval of 
the p. i&ent issued a statr nt of which the following excerpt is perti- 
nent to the present problem: 

1! As to territorial trusteeship, it appeared desirable that 
the Go ^nts represented at Yalta > in consultation with the 
Chinese Gov lent and the French Provisional Government, should 
endeavor to formulate proposals for subn " on to the San 
Francisco Conference for a trusteeship structure as a part of 
the general O] L: . This trusteeship structure, it 
felt , should be defined to permit i placing under it of* the 
territories taken froii the enemy in this \ 9 as might be 
i upon at a later 6 . also such other territor :' 

as it fc voluntarily be placed under trusteeship," 

^ - *^^— ■ ■ ^ ■ i ■■ ■ ■ ■ ■ — ■ ■ ■ * ■■■■ mii r" ■■ ■ i i — i — i » — ■ — ■ * ■ ■ ■ ■ ^.i i — ■— — — — ^— 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



5. General de C He and Ms Government have made it abundantly 
clear that they c et a proposed Indo-Chinese federation to function 
within the fra ork of the "Fren u n There is consequently not 
the slightest possibility at the presi- ■ time or in the foreseeable 
future that Eraa - ill volunteer to place In&o-China w inter- 

na* ional tr bip, or will cor it to any program of in i 1 
accountability which is not applied to the colonial sions of 
other paw * If an effort were made to exert pressure on the French 
Government , such action would have to be taken by the United States 
alone for France could rely upon the support of other colonial po s 5 
notably , Great Britain and the Netherlands. Such action would likewise 
run counter to the established American policy of aiding France to 
regain her strength in order that she may be better fitted to share 
responsibility in maintaining the peace of Europe and the world. 

Recommendat:' - 3 

In the light of the above considerations, the following recomme 
tions, which have been communicated to the War and Navy Departments, are 
ted for your approval. 

1. The Government of the United States should neither oppose the 
restorai i of Judo-China to France, with or without a program of 
international accountability, nor take any a i toward French over- 
seas possessions which it is not prepared to take or suggest with 
regard to th colonial possessions of our other Allies. 

2. The Government of United States should continue to exert its 
influence with the French in the direction of having them effect a libera- 
lization of their past po] i j of limited opportunities for native partici- 
pate on in gov exit and administration, as well as a lil ligation of 
restrictive French economic policies formerly pursued in Indo-Chi . 

3. The French Provisional Cove snt shotild be infomed confi- 
dentially that j owing to the need of concentrating all our resources in 
the Pacific on operations already planned, large-scale military operations 
aimed directly at the liberation of Indo-China cannot be contemplated at 
this time. 

k* Fr offers of i y arid naval assistance in the Pacific 
should be considered n th rits as b : upon the objective of 
defeating Ja na, as in the case of British and Dutch proposals. The 
fact accepta: of a s; ific propc L might serve to strengthen 
French claims for the restoration of Indo- China to ee should not be 
regarded as grounds for rejection. On the c< ry > accepta of En h 
pro Is for : y assistance in the defeat of J should be reg- 
arded as desirabl ' P ie > s Always to military requirement 
in the theater of c ' . 




Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 


5, V tile avoiding specific commitment s with regard to the amount 
or character of any assistance which the United B y give to the 

French resistance forces in Indo-China, this Government should continue 
to afford all possible assistance provided it does not interfere with 
the requirements of other planned operations. 

6- In addition to aid which we are able to bring from the 
China theater of operations to the French forces resis he Japanese 
in Indo-dhina^ the United States should c, se no obstacle to the 
implementation of proposals looking drd the despatch of assistance 
to those forces from the southeast Asia theater of operations, provided 
such assistance does not constitut a div of resour i which the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff consider are needed elsewhere. 

C P Y 

\\ ■ i 1 


Declassified per Executive Order L3526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

■ - i 

i < - - 


• ■ • .71 ; ■ I- 


to : a-D - Mr, Dunn \ A " ,%i j datei Ar>r.U 21, 1< 

•■.•-*••. ■" -. : -• -.-, „ j . 

.... .»•* •• 

* ^* *#» M, * ■ , ■ « * P 
^v- _ ' * «- • ..-' .»- 

FRO] : j ... V[ ;0<t gt OH 


subject* Memory i for thi 10 Infl 




With reference to the memorai ' ; for '' 3 Preei< m-t t 
»gai d 1 nation of American Policy vrith F t 

. | A. to : china' 1 j F3 n js the folio tg c .ts and 

I a \ stsgj ted g] ges: 
J j 
■ f ';' ; >h 1* F3 concurs* ! 

Para? U FS belie 1 this par- ^ ' ould 

be si to o:k • i only tho neeti ' adi -X ■ 

tion of policy* j '" f " - 

Pair fh 3* FS oonoi K^th tl \ first; r.*cn i ?! 

but b i that, in t '■ , >- : : ■'.. J !> 

bo made to the fact ti Ij loci Lna Su b tu ;1^ 

co!3 " '"- ' ' ' b i \y 9 It bs3 : ti at th 3 

balance o the para© . ! shou! ' ..; onlttecl in view i>f 

,ph 2, "-j 

; /: / ■ " 5« FE full;; concurs, but sui .,: 

tj ft . . £ 5 i •• v ■ ' ■ ton to c 1 ■ uq the r* 

si tld include Presids tt Boos 9 it ; £ viei "■■-■■ould suffice 
It a >ve.fl t&at the last i ■ of parasraph 5 

is ii . ■ ;■'-.- V;- enough to •.:.■:■;.-. nt c to a tat snt i*ri ! 

a c ' rcc ling ; teric ir »ata in J ist 


In addit \ to the general obs ttions inelud^d 
j.n th - > i ? 2 beli :s that to press tt a c 

iotu i the raeffloran&um should include: 


A* A statement of the joint State^vrar-Navy dee3 
Bio "'verioy sacle regarding Indochina* 

B, Refer 3 to the coll tionist h o^y 61* 
\% e !/:■- Lnistj i in Indochina in cli 

to the rsccrd of th^ colonj 3 of oux^ othei ftllic ■ « 

! l 

C, St; as to tne increasingly 

r/:- in f futi of s 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


\ D. A statement as to the independence tt 

In Indochi 

» E« Reference to the frrc b teffienia on Indochina 

indici o concessions to ' ? i o:r r : y for 

the French ac " nation of ; : i, but whiah do not 

ii cate an intention to pailt g tains Indoc] In *e s 
government; a to the app : na for ti 

concc " S© 

F* Referei to tho effect on China of past I 
ecc FTiic po3 ! in Indoch a CJ th 

safety of its t ^ flank* 

Go Re to tho clangor inherent in the Thailand 
Indochina boundary questions 


Rg22£S^ yior 1 , Reco "ion 1 9 as 

cir; , r< IN to ; e 1 Indochina - anc! would In J . i\ 

for inats », - in lived in the Go \ Lnitta 

Government of the* S -; H ' " . s« Fe cor rs in ti _ 1 lo 

policy that tho Uni' should t • bc a trustee- 
ship for Indochina or ij ."' " account "•" ,; \ ■•••"■ \ 
similar ac' ' is to ha i / ' from '' \ B 'J ' and the 
DutcJ It "believes, ho- ■. that f 
of / interests it is or atial th 
policies in Indochin/. follow a patl snore liberal 
t; any : ' " - - enounced* ! I ! also that 
u i , olrcunistai 3s a policy of n - exerting 
infli ie to achieve such a .roi It will not ; ac! 


Several ti ; during the ? 6 f* ? the French 
authorities ft de announce r ths 
of Indochina which, though still ii uate to r sur< peace 
end a' bility in a, indicates an intention to nh 
their pre~v ill tic tow is Indochina, It is t; 

belief* of FK that this cJ in aititu; has boon due, 
first, to i XXzB ion of tho anti-F: , i a 

sentj i »? Infix Lio must t ooea if 
h ' "on is to be si ssful and, second, 
to unco; ! aty : the - e of I ted 

a ; . a feeling 1 i* Unj ! 3 for ;.. on 

G f s . ■ : pel i 

, -;-• • tj ti t tj t ' • 1 61 I 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

-Because the liberation of Indochina isj in fact, 
r lent on African defeat of Jar a; "bo-- - w® are 
sacrificing blood and treasure to assure peace and 
s.t illty in the Far East, *>ost-vrar maintenance of which 
villi bo largely our responsibility; b shout 
recognition of the dynamic trends towards If-government 
among the peoples of Asia there can be no peace and stability 
in the Far East and the peoples of Southeast . a may 
embrace Ideol-Qf o contrary l;o our ovrn or develop a p 
Asiatic niovcraent against all western p ; rsj FS feels r&s 
that it -rould not bo unreasonable for the United Sir s 
to insist that the French give ade assurances as to 
the implements ; of policies in Indochina vjhicb we 
consider r ential to assure peace t stability in the 

Vfe ux^ge, thereto } that t" polio;/ of the Unite 
States slv Id 1 not to or - 3 reator -ion of 
jnc to '.- ace, n; ;.-;. & the 1 adequate 

assure ceo as to the ^bilowingj 

a* Development of a national or federal f nt 
to he run for and Increasingly by the Indochine , t] 
selves with no special privileges for Fro- ht or 
p .) :■;" not ; bltants and citizens of Indochina 
so that within the foreseeable future Indocl bo 
fully self -governing r autonomous alone denoc? 
lines, exc in matters of i r rial cc orn in which 
Indoo ; Lna should bo a p.: - r in the Pre < I aion« 

b. Maintenance of a policy of non-discriminatory 
treat) it and of c lete economic and commercial equality 

c» Establishment of Ha: a free port Kith 
ax-free ti ' faclll " ig ant! Ghli l« 

d» ptanoo of a frontier betr c 2 

Ti ~ ' , '• "■- " •- :. ro - h< 1 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

e« Acceptance of such inter tional security - - 
r<\p '\ inclti ':..: Americ inter; uional h- 9 

an . - y be d t to be necegs y fo: Into: felonal 
security, lnoludi protee m of GhiJ i's sou:',-: >rn fla 

Recon elation 3« FE believes' that the last part 
of the j ho old be 3 • \ified in accor 3 with 
military plans already adopted so that the Fren will 

not vainly hove for* either American military 0; 'lone 

or American supplies for the liberation of IndoehinUa 

Recomsienc .tion 4* FS3 bi ;este that t first 

sente . ■ be c] to specify : ■ it Fro b ofi . 3 of 

assists ; vrill be consic od B solely en their military 
merj n o It believes that with this cl a 1 ice 

of the pa: ,; \ I nnecesoary and s! « omit* 1* 

Recj 5c F£ belies 3 that this v ph 

should be If assist" can be given the : h 

which viil] aifl in the defeat of t ; at in sring 

with A-aeri* m strategic cor ion& § the mil' 

authc Lea c " political ions involved 

at t) tl r :^= ) ' Lie, FS be ■■ ! : tro&ld bo 

desir litioallj the United B Ses not to lend 

military id to or be a \ writh fc] seatabli r t 

of Fr 1 control o 3 


r % a : sre b now less th a a ',.' . I 

FroaoV Y forces in Indochina (the rest h • 

cr , lev to China) and 1 ' \ould 

a: in a stats t of policy 2 tion 

Attached is a suggested draft of the r " to 
t3 president, embody^ g above modifications 1 
C h : , 5 voloh F3 e^; :\ b .svsb are of great 
irnoort* for the establishment 1 1 1 main' 1 aance of 
osace and stability in the Far Sast, 



r , 



Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 

SAI FOR : 325 IT 

,vi ,5 Aneric Policy .. 3Ct to Indochj 

ral (Xbse I xs 

■r 1 **-. 

1c '. 3 Japanese t ggrei ■ ■ • . i ; . \ in 

Xndochj last nsonth has brongj i :' ?ase s- 

;he r iber of propo ; .g ac by t' toh for 1 

use of Prei h Tore resources :ln the Pa c 6 

2o 5?hese proposals and re< :';. mil:Vi . . sesvta 

lnako it e. ' that the United S fces :■■ Si a c 

' in rega ling % ; •'■ '■ -. ' : ' 3 ' ' :c 

a : for j , ' ' cU:tc ' 

5* The Unit States Gc ' £ - 3 ' ' ' GLy 1 

the Dositlon :" ■ it re< s the so-- . ' ;;-.- 

of 'prance over .'. 'h po; : ■ v/hen 

p 0S ■ re ' king th ; . > : 5 has eanpresseci 

jjop-s LH s ie the re it of the ;' 

60 Until the last : ' 5 the I ich 1 inisiration 

£ j ' '■' - co?--' oral " : . v/ith t] Japi in narked 

c y '■■ ' a tO V' ' i-OnS Of C i 8 &Xo 

in V ; .-:> • of 


Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 

He realized that dyn :lc fo ;s lr " : to./' :0'. 

gc t are growing in Asia 5 that the 1 lited Sta 

as a great C oeracy— cans t and must tot try to :•.-. a 

this clove' '; but ra" ■ :' h; -.-■:" it; 1 

that social s o ic or polii inst ity in ; 

may threaten the p -o and stability of t3 Par Sast "i 

indeed the world* 

8» As his solution of this Q.ea s it relates 

to '.■ > china 9 Resident Boc lo f.i ; 

Indochina v a ustc ' ; - ■ s on April 3, 1945 , 

the ' of State with t) ap 2. of the S .vb 

issued a r ' &ient relative to the ; ; :'; at . 

which \ Id :lncU ;e th ', : old • • the 

trusti p : only by " . ao\ ■ ■' the 

grencho It is a" itly c? : ti at f . ; : i no ] 

at the pz "; t" ■ or in the . seal v. ; ' tl t 

■ranee v 1 voluni to •'■ Indochina under '■ ■ ' . ; 

or •■ i '' ■ e :<>- '■ of •' '■•' ■ ■ ' f.ity 

whi< • is not a= i: •"■ to the co3 ssess;i o.1 

power io -££ ■• effo . to e :■ v 

U 1 : ich ( ' r n f; would * e to r *' ^ 

the Uni' es a could : • I3 . the 

support of a- 3? co3 Lai 3 s 9 not 

;: Y the ' 

9* '.Che prewar, Fi • , .■ ' "•'.-■ : :' \ 7i\ 

was the le b colo; lal a Lstri in in &sia$ 

both a • "-" ; the develoj it and :•■ ' " of bo nati 3 

peoples and as ; kc reli is with ot <r c v- 

ftrnor : - ' rites -re is inc: 1 

to : ' : IPhe Chi :e are giving actit tpport to 

the a ice nto France will pro' y enec 

ser3 - •'". ■ ! ' re:Vi?.po tg French control in ' 1 Lna 

10c :-:c y liberal .:'.c:' . toi >china 

KO t ad ' the . ' -policies v;h. jco, : .se the 

pari at : ; • of t : ; ' ■ P- ' "• giv 

wit] the foreseeable future a _ genuine "o;; y for 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

b '; - ?■■•' ' st be; t of March PA Is v 3 and 3 

v," 1 Ined . Ltli care s indicates little int< &ion of 

p ' g ; lf~mle ; ths Irvdo ' ' u 2ho 

c" 1 French attitude t ■ Indochina is bsliev 

to have bsen occasioned by ciV real:'.;/. 'the ■. 

French r ':• : the . id a belief t: tt 

A* -ican a; 1 of Fr< ;h : it ion can he \- 

bv a liberalization of its policies tr trds Indochi ./ 

1;U It is stat ' ' policy - cession of 

territory by InJi. hina to 'jChaiXand in 1941 :l not 1 , Used 
and that th: ritos tst be returned to'X sia» Enis 

territory, ho.; . .. had in earlier yea: bo irrs 3d by 
t,he Fri sh f: Tiiaili 1 and its :' litants are cnli 7 

akin to tl ' Similarly, 3 cs of Ls j v^ai :"■- 

chaw g i - ! ' the 1 bao' - be 9 e 

; border :. ': hina and £haj 111 

be a sov. of ial conflict v * a a fair ■■ 

priate fro: '' ? is det ' ir.ip< : 1 Internat; : 1 

co! :tssioho Th3 : ii (k s&nt t/ill accept any fa? ntier 
so deter; Lnedo v 

14* It will be .' . victory over £apan vrhicii trill 

.Ice poss.' " of j china* Vie • 3 f:< tog 

to and stability in the and v/ill ? 

Xn , ,, V jo: , Lty for its : : 5 

a f ,- t a Encourage* rfe of and sistance to tl 

t^e ' ' that s s but v/ould i bs ths c ; prac- 

tic ' rhich v; a a p and stability in the 

Far" East* If this policy is ot followed , *:' millions who 

X: v.- -;■ I • " i&eo3 co ' ry to 

q^j. lop a pan-./ it aj ' t 

... tiorldt. It is not &, the for 

f: ■..-. ■ •'*" t). . ' give ac 

assn ^ ' ■" : " '-' ' - P°« 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

Re< to 

» ■ . i — ■ i . 

I In the ^ight of the abc considerations s the follovr~ 
ins : iatio 9 Yfhich h been ec ' 1 to the 

War c 7y Depart bs for their c ' ; « " Bitted 

Tor v approvals 

lo The Gove:.. it of the United States should not 
seels v. 1 bees-hip 9 int .tio: 1 or French 9 o - Indocj '■ 
v (©s it ; sks s liar trusl \ :h as 

Di -h ovo.7 Burma and the Netherlands ': Iies« ; 
t: ' ct States see?; international acx ly uhich 

is not sought tor the a ' •■ \ a Its3 la 

not ppos : toration of Xndoe< to Fra P p ovided 

the h give adequate a • that t' y will meet 

the folio ' , tdlti so 

an Develop sent of a dm ratio ' 1 
or fee 1 t '; srn sat to "bo run for and ireas- 
in y by " Indochin 3 *;:"v selves with no 
special privileges : : h or other persons 

who are , >t inhabit i,ts £ ci s of Irri> 

china so .t v;:lt" ' •. t able futiiro 

Xndocl '■ i be fully self«g srnin i 1 a m« 

j e'.v pt in matters of :' ; 1 In 

V:- I ch Indochina should be a pa: fcnec in ths 
French 0: 


be Maintenance of a policy of non- 
diserjb . ; i : ;iory treai ; - nt and of eo] ipl< ' 3 
e ic and cge dal equality© 

Co Establishment or Haiphong as a free 
port with tax-free transit facilities between 
Haiphong and China* 


d* Acceptance of a frontier he -en 
Indoc ia and Ehaili l s to he determined by 
an imp; rtial inter national ■ dssion. 

e D Accept- of such int al 

secu Lty arrange fcs, :""•■'•' American or 

inters onal bas 3 as nay be ds"l d to 

cess* ' :<■ for int : ?urity 9 

Of (a ' ! 


2n For '■•■■ t] he United 

bl it7i .' 31 ." " ""■ 

' :. . £ French ( 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 L6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


* . * 

3o The French Provisional C70 it >uld bs 

in# isclj confidential ■-, tl P c ;j to ■'. ed o? eon- 

*.; : ig all onr res: . : the Pacific on 0; 

a! ly pla ted ? / . : . ' ary operations aimed direct' 
at b se lil ation of Indoc3 eg lot be contemplated v "L 


after the d fc of »■ an ? . nor will it be pos . ; '. ' 11 

any coaajiitments 1 the i ' i g o.C rnilii y eon' & 

ov snppl to resistance groups :1m Xj 3 thina or to l. leh 
military forces in the Asiatic the; es of war* 

4o French offers or . : . ,- and naval as! 3 
in t cifle should ba ace bed or rejected by : 

'■: .10 ties solely on tl Lr : ' y merits as 
beari upon it of Jaj v as in the c of 3 
and fcch proposal 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

f " • 


Department of ssta. 



umoB on : 


April 24. 1945 

Mt*. Punn left the following message to be delivered 

to Mr. & ' on the f of I: a: 

Mr* Dunn Btal -\ thai: ha t] It was ):■ y d< 

able So cl:. ';* c position on Indochina and * " at "" 

\ ■ lcI boon dravm up by EUB and ; 

Mr. D'j 1-8 definitely c; accept *q revi- 

sion-* Re it It would b r ju3t to 

the ma' • n* dr. vat* nan 1 our policy on She FiS 

■ sraion ■ ■ tiria p: i - Hov/o* p ho i >ulcl 

grftPvtly prefer to have us c' ■ up ::*■ Xnc s) - 

Krs sooi •• pos3 e e 


Mr, ' J«fl th . he b^lle* that Just no^ es- 
pecially we : i; C ~ T te ^° ' : ' ^- : 'V and I ■ 5 
the stri " Su: t c (and :.-j hope 
t will ba Bt sr and at >lp her)* 

1- ? ana the and g! Id try to 

all-.> her appr< ' ^l r - ■' aro ( prsp ■-■■ tl 

fcerritorj be : - "• away £ro her* 70 i : " . 

ftic^a is • - > e : ' '^ r;i •' ' ■ . ' ' - 7* •- 
can on* . ' " -; £ 

so. for* exa *pl9, to br 3 F; to iispro' 2 ths Gove: - 

: nd conditio Shore ) i I ■ 1 ' not 


Mr. Dunn emphasized his no?. tl no-; in the time 

for ■ to co : v/hole Cedly with , In this 

connection he re- red to Lb recent co ttion ~;;l';h 

Bid; It; in v: -■ the latter [&ed : :\3 for w rn 

eivlli^atic ) as a result o? the donii of ; 










: ■ ■ , ■ 
- » * 

■ • 1 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


Subject: American Policy with Respect to Indochina 

Ger 1 Observations 

1. The Japanese aggression a< st the French in Indochina has 
"brought about a marked increase in the number of proposals need by 
the French for the use of French forces and resources in the Pacific. 

2. These proposals and recent military developments make it 
essential that the United States reach a definitive determination re- 
garding its policy toward Indochina, 

3. It is established American policy to aid France to regain her 
strer bfa in order that she may be bettei _. «.tted to share responsibility 
in maintaining the peace of Europe and of the world. It seems par- 
ticul iy important that at this time the United States should draw 
close to France and Great Brit he stro st Western Powers, and 
attempt to remove the sourc of friction between the United States and 
France, whici ftch apprel ions that we are going to propose 
that French territc 1 _■-: 1 ray. However, in pur sir this policy, 

he United States must not jeop; e its increasingly important 
interests in Southeast Asia and must take into account the dynamic 
forces leading towards self government in that ■ social, 
economic or political instability may threaten the peace of the Far 
East and the world. 

If, The United St cites Government has publicly taken the position 
that it recogs i ' so i jv iction of France over French 
possessions oversea n i e possessions are resisting the e 
and has expressed the hope that it will see the re~ establishment of tl 
integrity of French territc , The surrender of Indochina to Japan, 
however, not only opt i the way to Japanese conquest of southeastern 
Asia and the Inc tit exposed China's southwestern fl; Ln the midst 
of its war with Japan. Ifert 11 recently there coll tion 

on the part of Indo Lna with the d nese, but Japanese aggression in 
Indochina has now given rise to resistance on the y of local French 
and native elements* 

5 fl Altho " Roosevelt had in the pact expressed his 
preference v should be placed under trustee Lp, he 

neve] apprc sta at is; the Secretary of State 
on April 3, 19^-5 *&X* " to the plans approved at Yalta which can " I 
tiie c on that Indochin ould only come under a prop- 

trustee r re J voli ction by t rich. The 

U n: ; States position that trusteeship should apply only to ated 
and c territory and territories voluntarily ced under the sysl 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

r ■-. ^ 

by states respo Lble for their administration has been re-affir I 
during the current discuss!' at San Franc o. It is abundantly 
clear that there is no possibility at the present t' or in the 
foreseeable future that France will volunteer to place Indochina 
under trusteeship 9 or consent to anj program of international accoun- 
tability which is not applied to the colonial possessions of other 

6. French policies in Indochina before the war were unsatis- 
factory both as regards the Indo T jsc and as regards economic and 
commercial relations with other countries. There is increasing 
independence si Leiii among the Indochinese and this movement appears 
to It re at least the tacit support of China. ! re aj indications , 
however, that the present French Government is emba "ng i a new 
policy which is taking the factors into account. On several 
occasions in recent years 3 French authorities have iss; policy 
statements on the future of Indochina. These fellow a general trend 
toward greater autonomy for the French administration of Indochina 
but the most recent statement, that of March 2k 9 19^5* 3- s still vague 
and Indicates little progress toward the establishment of genuine self 
rule for the Indochinese or of an open door economic policy in Indo- 

7* The economic policies pursued before the war by the French 
admin istr at ion in respect to foreign trade with China thr< Haiphong, 
and over the Yunaan railway affected adversely the economic develop- 

of southwest China and foreign coe rce with that region. Unless 
the situation is changed, this 1 be an increasingly important source 
of po, ar friction. 

8. The frontier between In hina and Thailand is also a potent! 
source of future trouble in southeastern Asia because it does not con- 
form to ethnic and cultural oupings and involves conflicting historic 
clams . 


In the light the abov tons, the following ni- 

dations are submitted for your approval. 

1. The Government of the United States should we J o the 
French Provisional Government its concern for the future peace end 
stability of the Far East and its views as to how French action with 
respect to Indochina can c ribute toward 1 maintenance of peace 
and" stability. To that 2 Co. - of a proposed telegraphic uc- 
tion to the Trie ador at Paris is enclosed ewith. In this 
instruction t Ambi to s the \ of the Trench. 

Government on five specific t propo. Is which agpee r to be of chief im- 
port a for the future pje and sta Lity of this area. 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

-3 "~\. 


2. Pending the outcome of the proposed discussions in Paris the 
followinj rocedl 3 which is in line with 1 m views of the 
Joint Ch : of I will be followed: 

(a) While avoiding so fai- as practicable unnecessary or 
long- & commitm*: th regard to the amount or cha r 
of any assistance which the United States / give to the 
French resistance forces in Indochina, this Government should 
con to afford such assistance as does not interfere with 
the requirements of other p] jed operations. The French Pro- 
vis io Government should be informed cor i J ly that 
owing to the need for concentrating all our resoir s in the 
Pacific on operations i ly planned, large-scale military 
operations aimed directly at the li Deration of Indo na 
cannot "be contemplated at this time. American troops should 
not be use J in Indochina except in American military opera- 
tions against the Japanese • 

(b) Free i offers of military and naval ast ice in the 
Pacific shot t] be considered on their military merits as bear- 
ing on the objective of defeating J; - in the case of 
British and Dutch proposals. There would be no objection to 
furnishing of assistance to any French military or naval forces 
so approved regardless of the theatre of operations from which 
the assistance may be sent provided such assistance does not 
involve a diversion of ources which the O or Joint 
Chiefs of Staff consider are needed elsewhere. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

J 1/1 

, . . 


;-' r: 

** . ■". Vfi '-'; ;':' J ' f ' ft *tl 

h in Inrlc cl " na h ; :■:■;'■ i 1 )u5 : ; 3 • in 

the n ." of ; Is aaY&jn - by the :'v . I . ; nss 

or I> " I o i In the ? Lc, 

£. n co] In g: lor £1 * : :y be 

Li a pes! tlon Btora cl 1 In , ' Lcj • " 


r: i ■ ochlna it \ c .: : bo most ho3 

-% H 

IT .i a 

• i f: i fcha Frc ' ..v & f ! r oxp. 

x \; ; &ifri in ? si; of £n5 ; Lna t' i vag 
s1 :>f Har«h 24 , Alt; gh tl " '! i a 

of is it nererthslese " Ucatd3 lifci s pros to T i 

- , self-rule for V- Xndochine s or tha v; 

3. lire o the 13 ion of Ififloc fta is In f ■:.:.• . 

of n'; u i the A; lean d- t of «3 i; ' 3 

- tfao r * : ; ;, la thcr ". 113 for * * 

n : ' will W : ; i ■ pt w ij 2 ch ; 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 

■f the S3 wS 

e*n6 stol its in th I ' n \ » 

e< ! •■- ■ ; e lc I -: - to our o%*n d: ■ 


3 Sp : i :■ ! ' ic rco o ag 5 6 all ' ••:-, 

•.■ 3 i ■ L It Is n I ■ . £1 (5 ti tit " St ' i 

its In t •/ ' : ■ " « of th'3 f. " ■ i, a 

satS -i of i insu; 

•tdlity in tho ' t. 


a, ' ' ■ '• ' ■. - at of ii i n ;. fea be run f« ■ •-■- 

- .. ■ " ■ : - y ': ;," • 1 [ 

utoaoj i v o " 3 

! anion, (For 

v;iii bt3 suo ssful ■" So not prqvJ e i il 111 

■ ,: " g sad cc i as J to t*n ... fcb 

vill 5 vo this sei£^ i! the early futura), 

? to ' I itt •' ' " tra -j • 

co Lon S * ■- in r.fl i <t to i 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

o. ■ -■ of Ducb inl ! c -\».V : / 

;■•... , s nay bs fiQ ;< : ft: 

1* - " ; ' In th 3 F&r £ , 

p: BCfcion of China 1 -a e ' " :. 

yovi should p:: '- it ' v that this f v.v> 3 >tJ . i by 

Its grs for the raaint of po 

'■ ".-.;. r^3 ■ .- i 3 py Its a with 

■ nt t *-• . **3 e • rnfj c :? t t1 fo tS 

& ! Of BCll LOVlng' 1 SS ' 3a It ! ■'-."" 

t; ; ):- s fle '.on of An Li an inti ; ist in the ful: 

of tho object" set fort): in p, -:-. ' £ 

i of the responsibility of ' . i*c : irily int 

5 .- i" ; - | . , tha founc fcions of a r *1 understanding of tho 

r _ , . •■• ". probli s of th< ! Rations In '.' it region 

I I , jtost-vav ; ' ' '■=.-. ' uMoh %t!1] be aoc 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

In v : . i " to t- • &llit ' ro feeon \ • 

pt In u t 

(fc) ! h o?1 : - . a: s : y end i 

in ? '" Ue con: ! ' 

! -. i ■■ . •/ . jecti . 9 or i ' ■ 

: 1 i . ■ : 

t] ' a fro - ! cth the 

tit % - f ' - * does not . 

Of ;■-. t3 9 C iloinl ef - . ff 

■ ; e : 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 U 


WA. ON, D. C. 

■7 2, 3 



% Bo hri ihtj 


S CX3 35/10 j> Bugger i nation 

of i licy v/ith " to 





s Assistant Secretary o? War proposes to 

ph 5>* t n 5 page I. \ c>; s ;cc 35/ 

as fo] 

"5* ile aro: o far as 

p: ' le« y or lc 

y ■ ■ ■ ■■ ■ * ■ ■ * ■■■ M i I ■ ■ ■ ifcdfc ■ .^ » ■■ ■ *» . ■ -* in' ■ ■ 1 1 i w 

ci LI nts ard to th it or 

of any ■ 1st i th ited 

States r . to the 

fc .j th:' Id 


c<: ■ to afford all pc sis , 






provi t r 

snts o;? of : plan tions," 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


The Acting ■>"■ . ctavy of SUi o tht - I ntbaswador h, Frame [.& y) 

"Washingtox, M; -1100 . 

1943, Follow jrauj dated Mav 3 received from tin: Secretary 

at Sat) E I ft ' j our inform; i. 

m n-i 

The r«It< i n lul tal < k£an3 I San 

Frsuu'iwii i',- .. Xi*rU 2r» lo Jnn> £tt, is ." 

"The subject of In . ( Jhina cai up in n reeen! converse i T In 
with Bi !. The'latter Remarked that although the 

:i Cm ■> I*icl:mlt, French 5J aim 

French interprets Mr: \\ ' sintei >f tS '■ c l* 

cerniug the re of French sovereignty over the French Em* 

-For text ti ,> rt«t*Hl April 13, I from .\ $ei i rrtftr.v of State $ni 

tut Wnls i.iAiJ- «ulm* < I »i3f<f»it n<*in i & nY/« Motions, .10-1 ,, 

p.5Gl f nr npiiHjhiwnl 'i' Stsilo HtfUvtbi, April is. 19-1:2, p. :;::".. 

piiv its including Indo-Ohiua, flic [>i ■ — co ties to imply th 
speci situs will be reserved for ilii colonial area. It wa, nin 
qui clear to Hidault thai the m is entirely : irenl of any 
olliCial statement of this govt&rmi stionhu;, even .by implica- 

tion, French sovereignty over I -('liinu. ( .-in bten 
^ American public opinion, however, condemned French governmen- 
tal policies and practices in 1 China. Ridanlt seemed relive 
and has ao doubi cabled Paris that In *ed assuranc 

:/ .-. iiition of Fi ■ ■. fi rere y ov «i. s: 


_^ . , ... 

■ - ■ * 
Memonm hij lh< At S of Sltdt f<& President Ti 

Wahjiixotox, May 16, 1945 

With res] f to General deGraulle-sm igeofMaj 1.5 s i nun 

'-■ Anncs to thl tu. 

bi me desire to hav< Freud trtieipate in ' ; of 

Am an fo in i Jap*tn, # fl i 

ivhi ticlo Follow i ■ ideral ions i »d for | • ibl ■ 

us© i3i your conversation with the French Foi sign 'Mini I Gen- 

oral Jtitn u ivow scheduled tor ton tow, May I , for Mr, Ridault, 

* Gen. AIj ■ Trc Juta f? Staff, 

and May I s for Oe i tuI J inn, 

Tlir F tl»Sr i 3) military an*.] naval 

,,, , i.i i rhe Far East wai Erencjj Naval 

Mi.-- ' I • : > . on M*i rch 20, AY i Join] I 

tr A,l:,,.. I fl, 

of Sl« ! ! ref ' t for an csp i of 

*vij I g >i State repli Aj>ri 5 that 

p] ... Is in prii •• i • ■. cl ■ '. the poin 

of view of reiaui i . i tit, rjeel 

• . ry vs | in the thealu ions. It 

i . . : . French 

. rliei . iii Un il fuil 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

rhnent of State should I; be up the qui ion of prompt elur - 
Ri-ji of our policy on Indochina* In us much as (lie final di mi- 
iint ton of policy wiili re . to Indochina will probably involve and 
depend upon discus ion« wii h . Veneh Government, ai.ul in as much 
as (he Secretary of State has t*xpiv.sscd Hie wish thai these discussion 
should nol be initiated al least e the present conference in San 

Frond ■• ; - hi session, consideration of the matter has been restricted 
to the immediate implications of ;Gencra1 de Gaulh e to the 

e] Unit Fran* e wished t<. pari icip i tively a1 ihe side of Ameri- 
can foriN ihe dgii against Jap.-ui. This j age was dis- 
cussed with the French Foreign Minister by the Pn tut and by the 
Aciin": Secretary of State and referred io in the President's public 
statemeul = * regarding his talks wit h M. Hidault. in the Inner "the 

a to the ]-iv>s May IS, L) mrlinenl i £ State Bulletin May 20, If] 
p. 027/ 

President emphasized thai we arc faced with ;; still strong and deadly 
enemy in tin* Far F a whose defeat thr total resoun ' coun^ 

try, both in manpower and material, are pledged. IK* indicated thai 
such assistance a- France and our other Allies may bring t< lI Strug- 
gle and which may l)e sj i iromged with ope : '. ■ [y phim 

or underway, will be we] rued/' 

In the conversation which took pi in thcWhfr ay t^, 

1945, Hie lv ti i '''/reel to General de ftaulle*s ii age ai i c- 
pn pel his appreciation of Fj i ' off* istance. The Presi- 

dent then said "that he had a me row (Jen til de 

G*udl< i the ■ ' France would be glad b p the 

was i insi -Japan alongsi Pnited e Pre ident 

express hisappr* iion of Fram istauc T 

sklent said thai ii is his , I y to leave to (hi C i^fuvder-in^hief 
in the tU'lA mat) re dialing to th.e p< ndu f the war and that in 
tlits case also he, w - to the rnmandcr-in-< ;", 

U.S. Army F< > Pacific, ' | the i dilation of whether it would 

pi •;;•■ helpful to have Fronch f -* - v join with ns in th 

Opera ioi pan. He indicated that such assi France 

and oi • i her Allies niighi bring to (he : i< the Pacific, which 

would svn with operutio adv uned or under w, .. 

wi !. The Prei thought that the question wo 

depend in large n are on tin problem of fcrcra ... tul, as H 
3fi i' no doubt was it >•. this was an important problem involv- 
ing [hive tin c the i innate rha'i had been used in I war 

in the Atki ' k cl was i | id".'- 

On the followh day the samp was again n rred to i 

the follov ii in a co i'i ;. . ■, \ cen the Acting i sir; 

of State and the French iign XJ i : ■ I i 

the pom which had been touched nj the V.. s tlui 

pf French milhi y assi v in tl>e Fi i si in the wa'r 
Japan. I remii I SI . - nil rlntt while the President I 
I Mf, i 'j ion will 

ii: Iteater, he i ie prob 

;«-.■• judged on its merits the 
ry aul . i • i it v a i p io 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

G. LOX rt X*i.lll 11 ^ L'uTo h and where I idi 

mHitarv contrilm! ion *-<>:ili1 be h at ilizecl. The Minister 
that there v,v;v-two French divisions n-iuiy for im iate transport 
tion to the Fur L In reply to my turpi Try as lo whether tin are 
Senegalese t among them, he admitted thai this was j< l>]y so, 

although there were nl ant Jul imWrs of white French, lie 

made il clear thai the F ]j divisi could he utilized anywh 
in the Far East, and rlu r< ^ i of Itniiti 

tribution to attacking the imemy in Indochina, 1 reiterated that 
this matter wglild be pi Hilary at t»s imme- 


]n as much i (he Acting Secretary of State agreed that the in; 
\ t>uld be placed I ire military authorises immediately^ it is recom- 
mended thai tike foregoing I brought to the attention of the Joini 
of 5 taft at the earliest i uont. In 1 1 i I Ion, 

the fol wing - tions which are believed to be in bar, ^ y with 

tin I i icy i f ih ;n: ( St:i : are pui forward : 

(//) While avoiding so far able unnt wry or lo 

. iminitinents with repird to the aiiiount or character of ! . : tance 

which the- 1 tcsmnj* give to French resistance fo do- 

china, this ( should continue ta afford such assistance as 

does not interfere with the requirements of < .planned op 
Owing to the need for con >t tn rating all our ■ « in I In Pa ific 

on operations already phi . lares military operat ions ai i 

reclly al the lil a tion of Indochina cannot, h I con 

pin 'ai tins time* American tro | should be used in Ind 

i ;i A inertcan military the Ja] 

(/,) Frei OjI milii ary ai al as i e in the T?m 

should be con klered on their military merit; taring on llt&obji 
five of defeat ing Japan as in tl Iritishand Dutch prop* 

XI. ■ n io furnishing of ■ e to any Fr 

military or naval force approved, re of the the; of < 

ns from • at, provided : - ist- 

ai>C'C doei ti ■ h diversion of re -h th 'ombiue 

jo i Stafl' consider are nee ed t-e. 

n . 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

S S C a S 1 


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r iELEGitf.H SBKT 

D*i ,-" A -V*. 1.'-»"j- A^> C r,". . .", 


^ashingtoiAj June y, 1$[5 

7 p.n. 





The President thanks you for- your cons icier 3d tele- 
gram in re ard to the problems presented by the reestab- 
lish :nt of French control in Indoehli is a:xl the Fritish 
desire to re occupy Hongkong and fully appreciates the 
difficulties in which you and Genera] one-yor may be 

' placed on account of the lack of specific directives in 
respect to both of these problems fcihich have bean m 
careful study both here and in connection v&th the dis- 
cuss ion s at &eii Franc 1 s c o * 

I h:*ve also received your Liessa e Ko« l^l\B of June 6 
end regret thct frl e has been delay in teplyinj to your 
earlier one owln^ to the study which has been required of 
these matters in connection with present developments at 
the Conference. The President h^s s-sUed me to si y that 
there has been no basic change in the policy in respect 
to these two questions anc that the present position is 
as follows-: 

The ^resident assumes thi.t you '\re familiar with the 
ateteoent i-de by the Secret ry of LU-te on April J, I9I4.5 
with the approval of /resident ftoosevelt in which- 
tip, Stettlnius aeclrrod that as a result of the Yalta 
discussions the "trusteeship structure., it v:rs felt, 
should be defined to permit the placing under it of such 
of - territories taken from the enemy in this w&Sj as 
might be agreed upon at a later date, end al^o such other i 
territories &s rai-^ht voluntarily be placed nr r trusts ■ / 
ship". The position thus publicly announced has been con- 
fir ' by the eonversati ts which are now taking place 

in San Franca sco 

i_J t* U 11 ,.i J. 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 


S (; ri 3 T 

in San FyancisGO in regard to trusteeships* Throughout 
these discussions [the American delegation has Insisted 
upon the necessity of providing for a progressive measure 
of self-government for all dependent peoples looking 
toward their eventual inf nee or incorporation in 

sorae" form of federation according to circumstances and 
the ability of the peoples to assume these responsibili- 
ties. Such decisions would preclude the establishment 
of a trusteeship in In ^china except with the conront of 
the French Gove pent. The latter seems- unlikely. Never- 
theless it is the President's intention at sane appropriate 
time to ask that the French Government give some posit :; 
indication of its intentions in regard to the establish- 
ment of civil liberties and increasing measures of self- 
government in Indochina before formula ting further decla- 
rations of policy in this respect// 

In. the meantime the President has explained to the 
French Forei n Minister that v^rer s we welcome French 
> participation in the war against Japan the determination 

of the extent that it would be practical end helpful to 
have French forces join with us in such operations must 
be left to the Commander in Chief x United States Army 
Forces, Pacific* The Joint Chiefs of Staff are at present 

engage^ "*" n a s ^ u ^3 r °- ^ ie possibilities of French help 
alons the lines of the following su^estionsj 

(a) While avoiding so far as practicable 
unnecessary or ions-term commitments with regard 
to the amount or character of any assistance 
which the United States iftay give to French resis- 
tance forces in Indochina j this Government should 
continue to afford such assistance as does not 
interfere with the requirements of other planned 
operations 1 . Owing to the need for concentrating 
all our resources in the Pacific on operatic 
already planned, large- scale military op-er- ions 
aimed directly at the liberation of Indochina 
cannot, hot/ever, be contemplated at this t' . 
American troops should not be used in Indochina 
except in American military operations against 
the Japatieset 

(b) French offers of military and naval 
assistance in the Pacific should be considered 
on tJ Iv military merits as becrin^: on the 
objective of defeating J en as in the case of 

British ■ 

S L C H E T 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 i 

S E G H 


British ©nd Dutch proposals, Tnerc ./ould be 
xi o objection to furnishing of assistance to 
\ any French military or naval forces so approved.,, 
1 regardless of the theatre of operations from 
I wh ;i c 1 } t h e a s s i s fc&ne e may . be se nt 9 p r o v I d ed r uc h 
i assistance does not involve a diversion of 
resources which the Combined or Joint Chiefs of 
Staff consider are needed elsevheret 

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 

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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


an organisation si tilar to thai of cost i srica 

Par E- 

It is therefore requested, In regard ' as v to sup- 

porting array corps -.5 and services, thai the t; pes of units to 1 
organized, be exactly gfined, 

XL is finally suggested, in order to facilitate fui I "ncgotiai i i s t ;. 
Supreme Headquai s, Allied E;q>Gditionary Force, be a : 
deal directly with eneh command iu what concerns details of 

mutters herewith referred to. 

A* XI. Bkossix de Saixt Bdk 


[Enc o B] 
lop ssgsbt 

Mbmoeanbsdi foe the Chief or a Frkxcii Militah's: ^ rssiox 


1. With reference to your men urn of 30 _ Es y 5 3 addr 

io the Chief of Staff, U. S. Array, the XJni - " ! 

;, in ; Lple that portion of your proposal v. . iby the Fn 
Govs ait puts i ha -entire dis] I be A ( oani i 

French army corps of two h *y di s, with co, 

. Ld service units on the U. R. . • E r op 

Japan, This acceptance in £ ; that 

the agrei -it on this E .er with the French Government w2 ' acta 
the following provisions: — 

. TL a< :■;. corps a, bom i 

and in the pa readju t period 

United States, subje 
United £ 2s coj id in tlic - firmer i . "J. S, ars ; . i-ps. 

J, i lent . loo-ti , .". 

Fx i - of United Stat ■ 

com" tiencybs J on United States sta - $. 

c. Assi 1 bo provided 

ie F] '• So 1 emu us n ■ 

rf. Mi -urn use will be le of e . ent pro 1 
North African ai ;n Hear: it Pro is., 

e. The imp] ion of tis a'«pn ■ i tcb as 

accompi yingsup] 3,provisi ; [pmei 

and the ' I iming t e - - n e ! employ: 

corps wi [ be mi scbrdaa ffith plans i aro . gements to be deter- 
mined by the Unitel States rnih ury i u i nities ■ d v.-":. d -..': directly 
with the French military authorities. 

s Enclosure A, supra. 

[No. 12S3] 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

2, P ' rations in dvrin* &e 

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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

cox srrs and sopplemektart papers 




Mr.MOR.v • ran the Cktef of the Frbkch Military Mi 

in Tin: United States 4 

The Combined Chi of S accept in principle your offer of a 
French corps of two infantry divisions to tvi in the Pacific war oi; 
the lie I ^standing that: — ■ 

a. Whether the corp [Unserve under V. S. or British ep ; 

and the area in which if w'M open will be cl trained later. 

6. Final ac re of th ps wilt involve an agreement with tl 

government concerned on basic matters inciudiug command, con:! 
efficiency^ n . \ and In ] support. 

c. Maximum use will bo made of equipment provided under v. ■ 
North African and Metropoli i B racial ■ ■' Pro] 

d. The ti of poveinent will be in accord&J with the priority 
of the opcratioi in which it is to be 1. Prcssinj ipping i 
other requirements for operations in the Pacific make e in that the 
corp.- cai t he moveil from J 1 .- for at least several months, 
Whel • used in the main efforl or in the South Chi] a area, it 
will not be possible to commit i! to o a •• pri »r to the sp 

19 J 6. 

* This text was corumtml i lie f of the French Mill y MI 

a mcmor«v ! y the Co ined Secret I of the C ct Chiefs 

of Staff in Washington on July 19. 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 

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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


d. In cooper: : " q with other Allies cc ttions, if ■ 

to lil 1 ■ eneinj ar ar 



Strategic Direction qf ilr. War 

8. Wo bare discussed the strategic direction of the v* ar again 
Japan and have agr< id as follows:— 

& Tli'3 control of operational strategy in the Pacific Theater 
remain in ike Lauds of the 1 " >! St ■ I iefs of Sti 

&/Thc United States Chi Staff w ill j ridethoBri 

of Stall with full and timely h as to their f plan 

mtei is. 

c. The United os Chiefs of Staff will consult the ) h CI 

of Staff on matters of general strategy on the und nding tl \ , 
the event of disaj . Em : : ' i n the n ' m to be i ! 

win lie with the United State fi\ 

d. In the event the British Chiefs of ! I ;T should d " that tl 
tdt commit British troops in support of n d ion made by 

I States Ci of Staff as indicated in c. above, the Bi 
Chiefs of Staff will give to the Ui 'ofs of Staff su 

advance notice of their decision a ill permit them to make time!;; 

e. In fcho event the V. B. S. R. enters the v.-ar agai an, tl 
strategy to be pv ' i hotild be discussed b i the parties c* 

i rricd. 

Opera lions in fiifl J\u:ifio 

9. We hare taken note of the plans and operations proposed bv 
the United States Chiefs of Stal i App !ix "A." 

10. We have eon suit rod the scope and nature of British partici] 
tion in opera in the Pacific area. Our conclusions are as follows:- 

a. The British Pacific Fleet \r3\ participate as at present |)lan 

b. A British very long range bomber f i of 10 squadrons, inert 
ing to 20 i Ire ii'fields becom ble, will p 
ticlpate. There is li prospect that airfield sj for more tl 
10 squadrons of this force will become available before 1 Decern* 
1945 at the earliest, 

c. We ] I in principle that a Commonwealth land fo 
and, if possible, a small helical air force, should take part, in t" 
final phase of the war t Japan, subject to the s Lorr 
resolution of operational and other probl *ras. In addition, soil 
units of the British 8 East Inril t mi bo t-nh p . 


1L In con n with paragraph 10 c* above, we have jk, 

that the appropri British command and staff should visit 
Admiml Nimitz and ( ! "■•'. cArtl i and d up with lb 

a plan for submission to the Com Chiefs of Stafi". 

a 1 j ; \) " h f1 does not •• . Q ' point in C. C. & £00/2. 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 


• '" ' Southeast Asia ( 


12. We 5 discussed tlie instructions iliould be 1 Dd to 

Supreme Allied Coram- \r f So;: - , and have agr* 

on. the terms of the directive in Appendix '15." 

\;!bcation qf Areas and Command in &e Swift . ■ 1 ' \ft \ and Sou 
east A Areas 

13. We have agreed in principle that that pa Southwi 
oific Area lying south of the boundary described in Append! ' ( 

should pass from Unl States to British command as soon as pos- 
sible. The British Chiefs of Staff have undertaken to obtain the 
agreement of tlie Australian, New Zealand] and Dutch Governments 
jo these proposals and to investigate and report thi tpn -able 

late on which the transfer can be effected. 

14. We con ider it desirable that initially Admiral Mountbatfc 
control 0] ls und taken in southern Indo-China since i 1 

more closely relate 1 to those of Southeast Asia Command thi 
to those of the China The We are agreed that the best arrange- 

ment would be to include that portion of Indo-China lying south 
of latitude 10° north in Southeast. Asia Command. This nt 

xould continue General "\\\ a oyer's control of tlmi pari of Indo- 
China which covers the flunk of projected Chinese operations in 
China, and would enable Admiral Mountbatten to prepare the ground 
m the sou.0 I If of Indo-China where any initial operations by 
him would develop. 

We recommend that an approach to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek 4 
be made by our two governments to secure his agreement to ti 

At a later date it may prove to be desirable to place all o j ti of 
the remainder of Indo-China within the sphere of operations of the 
.Southeast Asia Command, 

nch and Dutch Participation in the War 

15. We have considered the r which can be made for 
Frr I Dutch participation in the war against Japan and o 
conclusions are as follows: — 

a. While it is at p: i m ble due chiefly to 1 

Officii! French or Netb armed forces to take a major 

i in tlie immediate oper lis in the Far East, the provisi uofsu ! 

istance which may be sync' ' 1 with o] >ns will be taken 

Into ace 6, The use of such forces will di id solely on mi 
considerations. French or > lands forces so accepted must 

.rate under the coin] ol of the <:■• aander in chief 


* C. C. S. 000/2 reads: "an aj teb io the Ger ao M * 


if 2 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 





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NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 


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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






n ' 



22 August 194-5 

Hone ole Ja sC. Bur 
Assists Secretary of SI &< 
D tit it of * .te 

Dear Jimmy: 

■ ■ 
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: ! - 



* ! 


*, ^ " — * * — . 


I think the Secretary will be inter- 

ested in the enclosed message fron the OSS r sen- 

V - I 


tative in Kunming. Will you kindly see that : : 
rear s his desk? Thank you. 

Sincerely yours 



Snclor e. 

j*> + 





K^— 7^- 

illij J. Dono 
Direc ■ 







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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



22 August 1945 



he S'rej ' ive in Ku> ' tranr Ltted the foil g 
infc lion concerning the F< toi h the Inc" -Chi- 

nese Provisional Government. The 1 Government was e 
subject, of our two i anda of 21 Augi.v ' 

The French Gove? it has decided to i ?t a passive diplomatic 
attit ; t< reoccv tion of In do-China be so c. their 
inability to make an entry ith a powerful s" ar; k com- 
mittee of three has been appoi eel by the F it in 
Paris, co & of the chief c the Kv 7,' ich intel- 
ligence Service?, the Mini-- ar of Colonies, and nistra- 
tor al of' Coloi ies. Its issio; Is to cc b h 
lead s and n otiate with t- . t- \able to the Indo- 
Chinese, acco to Major £ ho will r sent 1 
commi • Hi i. The French pc ;y will be one of liberal 
a : istr : on in the capac.' of ors to the Indo-Chinese 
Prov. Govern it, to v : by the Kuoi Intang An- 
nami d the Vietminh, which ler form a c a- 
tional liberat . (The Vi< ' 3 a . > Cc ' t party, 
a r bership of lately 2( the active political n 
ele it. The Kuo s six minora ar 
sc 3 of independent ones.) The* French C ls been 
ed with 1 ' ta ng - I Oh? ^e 
ers anc : en 1 oper U. It has J 1 
cowers o treaties in the name ^ce. The committee 
111 in turn report to I" bains the pre e of 
akiw minor ^° the gen ;re ant. Anns -e lead- 
res \ of the C< Lbei Ion Com- 
m j ee j f >i, .have exp: 2d a c" ' s to brj 





from ) re 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



Hell- informed French and Am ?. sources state - the ; ral 
C< ittee has been negol Lth 3 1 Japar ' u- 
thorities for the pra se. of g id ai sinita , wit}- 
tent of using them, should « er the French or Chi se 
to reoccupy their areas. '. Inclc ie fear a Chinese r c- 
cupation because they feel the Chin ill become squa ?s 
living c bl land, : looting. The I aeh 

concu: . thj opinion only in so far as to wish exclusive ad- 

•ative rights for t. el' . The leader of g k ite 
Kuo i itang rty in China and a d representative of the 
Cen il Liberation C ittee in Hanoi, made t following st i - 
ment on 15 August: 

"Should the Frencl to ret i to Indo-China le 
intention of governing the c d to act once more as 
oppr Se Indo-Chinese people are prep? :1 to i 
to" id against any s h reoc pation. On the other 
, if they c 3 as fri Is to establish commerce, in- 
dustry and withoi spirations to j sven , t" y 
will be the $ as any other foreign pc The 
Central ( ashes to nu ! . m to the Ui 1 St 
Government .t 1 i Indo-Chinei le est of all desire 
the independence of Indo hina, and are hopa that the 
Unit-- ' s a champion of scracy, will assist her 
in seen in/? this ind in the foil ' manner: 

ploit the resources of the land; and (.•') developing thoj 

\ tes hat Indo-China is ca; ble i supporti . 

"In c- asi< Indo-Chinese woi 1: to be placed on 
ti sta 3 as the .es for an undet* i per- 
iod. • 


ip Fj eh repr in ' jor ' '» is re ~ 

il aid i . ->A ML. 

) C 
[ for the : ' • K 

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Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 

at air , t ;re cor ' Chinese a erican 

xiic abo the j -•, prohibiting t i fj 

1< ; - the airfield. In convert ion 1 r that Ltb j • 

j : .nt ', he ssed the ht ' French h. 

trayed by 1 ri< s. He further that the Americ 

in C ia have right along been p'J linese ga ie, all igh 

u Ltt <;:hen. qr t eonceri s int from : 

on, lie i iictantly stated there \ not the French to do 

but await instruct: from C The Jft ich DG$ X r a~ 

mir had infiltrat- .earns of men into fiaj r the l€ 

ershin of a ''■ ' ' Blanc He has h Li. ( L. 


Kamiya, f< r li; o c icer : aen the J; 
qi ters in Hanoi and Admi: al Decoux 1 Luis ation. X '. de- 
tained t team in Haiphong, ' to ' 

ssages cone ' x-ende: ad meteoro? ;ieal dat 

to i oli I larters in 

Reports from ' " t Col. Roos, C of the . c In 

Calcutl is now en route to £ ,o 1 part i: the J ■■ 

ese surrender on tt 'f of t" a r sentat:* ith 

Col. JR( is Col. Fay, for. 1; Fi ;h ' ' , 

-de' ined, but lo is ber of ! 



illiam J. Pono*. 

D:' >r 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

S5lO.ftl/10-r»4S5 : Trfrtfram 

Tht At ' tart/ of i, tJu ClutrgP h China {Roberttion) 

TV \xnTi,s. ( »ber 5, 19-45 — (5 p, i 

1622* Folio ; Ttinent extracts from Dcpl R57 August 30, to 

Kcw Delhi M for Bishops are repeated for your iiifonnation, 

l *,Ma\' W. Bi#hc!i>, - rt'tnry of U ' uiprfrftH Oman* Iks Jmi ;h Xcw Delhi* 

"ITS has no thought ol opp » tJie i of French con- 

trol in Indochina and no o fteial sfai . by US Gov! has q fcioned 

even by implication French sovereignity over Indochina. Howcvi 

is not the policy of this Qovj I the French to ree ablh 

i heir control ov< r h by Force and ilie willingness of the US 

to see French control ablished a: rones that French claim t 

have the sup] ■ of the population of Indochina is borne ou< by 
future events. 


8510.1 10 1245. v mm 

T i . Lm&tf r ?' in Fi ' (C • _ ) ft? //■•■ $ 

Pakis. October 12, tl -7p,m 
[Re . i I < ■ l 1 13—1 :30 a* m.] 

600fi. My 5964, Octol I0* ae ] V s l/oneb 

gives Further details re Franco-British agreement on Indochina. Lc 
Mondi •' k nt will . be ] ted at tins time bill til 

principal provi. . ■ known* 

Ju the French Civil Adminisfratil i i ed as 

sale authority in i ha1 pan of ] utli of 16th parallel* On 

exception 1.1 From presenci British troops in this pail i 

Indochi cither e lo no* ret principles of xi rcment. 

L> lilo'i i I is i ' nniho reh I 

French Civil Admhmtratio i\d Bri military authorities an 

i hnt HniLsh Ooi ■ ' will not ii in civil affair* 

except Ihronjrh French tvi tb rentier in Turkey agree to fulfill 

any veq\ ;. arising from pre* we? of British troops, Ag 
provides Ihiiisli tra will only be rhere tei rfly Forpurp of 

enforcing tei i of Jap surrender i A llu 

priso civilian in en 

II is again em] *d thai dial atmosphere of n . 

wa lication • f - ity of Franco Briti latio bi | 

i he v. orld- 

Senl Dep ii as 6i I , . ■ p« I London as 748* 

C ! ■ 'KRY 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

The Atnl>, (for In -France {Caff cry) to the -" *Jary of State 


P*uqs, November 2 . L915. 
[Received November 28— J : 03 p. m.] 

6857, Speaking of [n hina Chaiivel" stud that when trouble? 

** Jean Cfcattvel, Secretary-Gemini to rli \\ Minister for Foreign Affairs'. 

with the Annamites broke out clc Gaulle had In-, n ii'gedby the French 
Mi on in India to snake som< ficy statement annotmcing 

Fran ionfoudopl n far-reaching progr ivepolic 

to give the native population much greater authority, i atsibili 
and representation in govt. Do I He considered the idea but rejected 
il because m the state of cti order prevailing in I china lie believed 
thai no such policy could be implemented pending n torati< 
French authority and would therefore i be eons ' I by everyone 
as "merely more -fine \rords". Furthermore d< Gaulli and the F\ . 
Minister believe thai the present situation h still so c used and they 
have so little in format inn really reliable on tl i revall Indochina pic* 
ture thai - uch plans and thoi ghts as they held heretofore may have to 
be wry thoroughly revised in the light of ; dcvclopm mts. 

Despite the that the French do not feel that they can as 

make any general statements outlining specific future plans for I ml 

inn, Chauvcl says thai they hope "very \iv- to pu1 into op ton 
in certain areas proghum including local elections which will be de- 
signed to granl much greater authi y and great w void m aft 
to the natives, This he said would bo n much better indication of the 
sincerity pf FY< h intentions than any policy statement, 

In this connection In aid thai Admiral ciMrseiifieu M is in touch 

: ■ .\m.i. Thierry ti*A risen Ik* tverum* General «f French [ml Inn. 
with tho King of Cambodia and the latter has iwlii rl thai lie has 

[ilitytoth! \ch (I on the contrary apparently tears bo 

Aunamvl Aiyh pirations). The Flinch hop ■ i to neg 

tinte an agreement with him which will result in the pouring of mu 

ter i-espi ibility and authority to the Cambodians, lie men- 
tioned specifically that rheri would be many more natives hue ted 
into the local aclmiuii i ive servi nd il was also hoped that local 
I ctionj could i ho held. The iMvneh lie said intend to follow the 
procedure in Laos when the situate permits and ituall; 
in Ai Tonkin, When ■ i* is n red throughout Indo- 

china and agt have been I with the individual sfctii 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Pro]©:! Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

Oliaiiwl said I lie Kivm-h inj tin body the result* of these sepa- 

rate? tijrix^cmctits info a jreneral \> mm for all of (ndorhina. 

Insofar its (lie Chinese ixyb concerned Chauvel said thai lie does not 
believe lb 03 arc eiicourn#tn*rthe Annamites who have a hearty dislike 
of the Chinese nor docs he believe flicy Iinve any Jerrilorlal n&piirafi 
in Indochina, On the other Im-ud be ihinks the Chinese are definitely 
trying (o {ret (lie maximum w ; »e* from Hie French in the form of 

upational fosts for their uriiiy, el cetera (my (5815, Xoveiubei - ') 

An! prlllfC 

He also mentioned I he ero 11c nej with (lie Chines 1 

lathijrto Indochina and said that th Pr I etty agreeable to 

tablishinj poils for the Chinese wtHicci ' 1 transit riglil 

and use of railways, ei cetera in Tonkhi \v] they would be of real 
use but ibe Chinese are demanding free port and transit rights for (be 
whole Indochina, Furthermore, the Chinese are di i of ob- 
taining title to the northern section of 1 lie lucl ¥11 an Kail 
way. Chauvel was not inclined tophi any great import; of [of£\ 
these di H'erena • I'opii andthoujd &nt w-Hl be reached. 


'COr >EN', 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 20! 1 




January 18 % l$k6 

w. Acheson 

As you know we have teen following a policy by which 
we will not permit the French to buy armai nt and. military 
maintenance supplies for use in Indochina* The British 
military authorities in Indochina have now asked pep sic 
to turn over to the French some 800 jeeps and trucks which 
had been given to the British under Lend-Lease, and which 
are now in Indochina * The British state that the French 
must have this equipment so that they can maintain order 
in Indochina when they have taken over from the British* 
Our own military authorities have recomme ed approval of 
the British request. The French, and no doubt the British 
also s will be very much upset if we refuse to permit this 
transfer© However s in the light of our recently adopted 
policy wd may be subjecting ourselves to criticism if v/e 
permit this transfer for the purposes stated s i#e M 
maintenance of order. ' 

I would appreciate having your direction as "to the 
response which we should make to the military. 

II . Freeman Matthews 


^/Handwritten note by Acheson7 

EUR Mr. Matthews « 

I dincus ' ; this with the President who thought that 
we should agreo to the transfer. He pointed out that this 
does not bring any new equipment into the area and that 
to remove the trucks and jeeps would be impracticable* 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NMD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



1 For previmis (TorntuetttatlaM on thv fur arc of XttctnciiliMj s?i e Fwcltfu RefutiOH$ a 
1045, vol. vi, i\>. — ff. 

SSlC.Ofl i -Mi; :TM 


Th' Se&vtiUty of Stitf.- tu tin A**i*htnt Chief of the Dirfaion of South* 
east Asian Affiun (Lttnrl i, Then at Saigon 

sechkt TTasuixctox, rTamiarj 2S, 194B- -noon. 

Please proc I Hanoi, renin iningsueli tune as you consider necei sary, 
and report to Dept as fully as possible on conditions northern Ind* 
china and especially on any French-Tie* Minh negotiations* 
D'Argenlicu - understood to have stared privately that Fivik-U negotia- 

* Acini. Thierry d'Argealieu, Hlgli Comniia^ioiier of Fn:. li [ndodiiiia. 

tions with Ho Chi Miiih 3 hare been proceeding since late Xov and 

Xi Tre$ident of flie Fruvistoual Govefmneiit t>£ Vietnam DeuwomtiL- Republic*', 
satisfactory agreemenf anticipated by end of Jan. Other reports deny 
existence negotiations. D'Argentieu also reported to have cxp d 
personal willingness accepi Philippine mode] for Aiitnatn with in/ 
pendente at end 30 years. Crtel from Saigon i tved Jtin 2± 4 ap- 

*Xot prints.], bul see tttragntiih 2 of telegmiu 1S2, January 30, G i», nu, to 

Chungking, V- — . 

predated. Please try to secure maximum information 1 tail French 
or Annaniese ceo; lie agreements with Chinese and status of such 

SSI exploring possibility for SSU representative pro 1 Hanoi. 
Reed B expected Saigon end of Feb. 

s Charles 8 Reed* 2d, Causal assigned l«» Stiigoa. 

B 111 X lis 

831G.1 #M0 

Jfenioi'fntdttm of Conn rtfon* by Mi, Richard L. Sharp, of the 

Dhmhn of Smith A*hm Ajffrin 

restricted [Wash ix«. rt»N.] January SO, 1940. 

Participants: Brigadier General Philip E, Galluj r a War Depart- 
Colonel VUtrup,TTsir I mem Liaison; 

Sir. Woodruff Wallner, AVE; 

HnAUbot Low: Fat," SEA; 

Mr. Jl. L. Sharp, SKA. 

"Cliiff. I '■'• i rt«H "f Smith*?!*! Asian Affairs, 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

Asked whetij in his opinion, the Chin e -.would get out of Indochina 3 
General Gallagher said that General Lu Y^n i/had told hirn the 

7/ Commanding General of Chines: forces in Indochina. 

Chinese would move out when the job given th the Allies was completed, 
General Gallagher said he thought they really intend to do this although 
the whole matter depend;; i 1 the removal of the panes . To date, 
shipping for this purpose has not been available but r it is understood 
that United States bottoms will be used, The question is, therefore, wl 
will such ships be allocated. General Gallagher said he had recommended 
to Gem demeyer 2/that high priority should be gi such allocation. 

8/ It. Gen, Albert C. Wcdemeyer, Commanding General, U.S. F; s, 
China Theater, and concur] tly Chief of Staff, China Theater. 

There are some 20 to 30 thousand Japanese in Haiphong and the Do Son Pe aula. 

>lit 1 sett ;nt can be reached in Indochina L! the C e m 
out and they cannot do that until the Japanese are repatriated. General 
Gall; added that he thought US army teams would have to be put into 
:oehina to concentrate and prepare the Japanese for evacuation. 

General Gallagher was asked whether he knew of any arrange t whereby 
French forces moving into the north would overlap departing Chin: ees. 
He replied fcta in December Saint eny 2/ said tl Fre ould enter until 


Jean Sainteny, French Commissioner of Tonkin and North Amiam, 

the Chinese left. General Gallagher thought the French were probably not get- 
ti far in negotiating with the Chi: on probler connected with 
their removal. Unless in the meantime something has been arranged between 
the French and the C aese, the French would probably infiltrate overland from 
the &ox rather than land in force in nor oris. 

General Galla sr pointed 6u1 that little love v lost betw e 
Chinese and the French; that the presence of the American group in Hanoi re- 
strained anti-French Chinese action; and that he himself had influenced 
General Lu Han to bring aintenj 1 Ho Chi Mirib together 3 confront both 
with a strong directive that order mast be maintained. The existence of a 
vacuum in the north with neither French nor Chinese troops present would be 
extremely igerous, as tl e would react strongly a t all French 
in the a , w3 ffould be helpless in protect ; themselves. To take over 
successfully, the French would need a sufficient force to co\ r whole. 
north. One or two modern Fre] divisions could, in Gen 1 Gallagher's 
opinion, de innai 

In response to the 13 ion wl her the French could do more than ke 
key cities, he ad: 3 that the Annamese would to the hills and con- 
tinue guerrilla e. Even in Saigon, he point* at, tin an m 
peaceful cJ ttish and French claims to the c rary. Establishment of 
Fi :h control could I eded up if they were able to 
drops thr< e north. The Ar , er, £ w§ll organized s 
so far as 1 ar go, ar ait- I armed, although they ha\^e no r , , 
shore bat le artill* 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

The <|tu 4'um was raised whether the French n ion in Hanoi w; 
it t fad negotiating vrith Ho Chi Minh. ( ; ral Galls v repli 
that the Vict Mitib Provisional Government was at firsl willing tu 
negotiate-; then in October, alter de GaulleV pronoun- ■ - on 

10 Gen. ChnHW rtt« GawltiN PnvhU»»t of the Pnrt'Mtmal rtutieui of n 
Republic of Krauze tint II *T;imwu*y -'». 

colonial policy, the Amuiinese refused to negotiate with the French 
and reacted vigorously against all French nationals in Hanoi, Tl 
Chinese mav succeed in putting in a less ai French Annanicse gov- 
ernment *<> that n m might go for- \ AH French efforts 

to stimulate a palace revolution agaius* Tin were of no avail. Tin 
himself will not deal with *lie French. The Viet Minh »s strong and, 
regardless of 1 1 ssil le 'facial chaises in the Provisional Govern- 
menf, l;lo \rill be hehhul any continuing Annamese movement. 
Genral Gal burlier said ►hat Pain*env had told him he expected peaceful 
agreement between the French and the Annamese would, be reached 
l>v > i eflfo f h*tion. 

General Gall* 1 was a*ked how effective f he Viet Minh admin- 

istraHor would be wtth neither French nor Chun forces present 
He replied that on the whole he was impressed by the remarkably 
effective Annainepe administration. There was an personnel; 

they were all enthr?iastic an 1 vonn«\bn* there were too few nf them. 
Whatever thi *r [eel-mica 1 skill, thev perhaps lack executive abili and 
experience sfnee *he technical services in Hanoi" were at first very well 
run bnl fraduajlv deteriorated T rainecl people for the government 
and at the municipal level are hn*k"m 7n ( I pal Gallagher's opin- 
ion (lie Annamese are nol yet readv for self-government and in full- 
fledged con* petition with other nati thev would "1" $c their shir' ". 
Hoy v. the demand far independence is widespread and even in 
(lie villages Hie peasants refer to the example of the Philippine 

Hi I willing *o cooperate with G'v-m Britain. FSSR. or frheTni*ed 
States and would perhaps even a ttle for French tutelage if that wen 
subordinated to control bv the o*ber nations. French control alone, 
however, will be strongly resisted* The deep~seatcd hatred for the 
French has been Fanned by e>rc< lutly clever Viel Minh piwia«*»n la- 
General Gallagher was asked whether the Aiinamese were realistic 
regarding their ability to stand tu> against French military force. 
Wliile thev are too en*hnsi«stie and too naive. \v> said, thev probably 
know th:H thev w'll he 1 etl They are strong on pan and re- 
iterate their willing! "io figlri tn the las' man", bu Kev would be 


slaughtered and they have been told thai and probably know it. The 
Annami would be no match for forci with modern ai ren if 
they tin nselves have some, which they may ha Chinese 

found no Japanese roll ins artillerv and numerous Jaminese anti- 
aircraft gnus in to have completely disappeared, Vnited States 
Armv 'vi nl i i ? ne**er did learn the extent of arms controlled bv 
the Yief Minh. Certainly the Chinese are not turning Japai 
over in them. Before V« J Day the Janai ■ tmdonhi-edly had armed 
: ml framed manv An A Japanese & n 1 claimed thev had 


taken over on Uarcl ' imply been us thfrFn ronldno-h _ n n- 
troltheAnnai Jnittltissta 1 : f f; rnl Gallagher c! mm 
as a lie. He h: rd thai mi d r the pretexi of arming Amwmese 

gendanne« for police duty iii F-Tanouthe.l '. icselmda I i 1 

three dfettuH coutii . fisini.^ group when i med and 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

1 ringing in a new one to be armed and trained. Furthermore, tlic 
Annan had acquired Japanese anus frmn arcrrods which !. 
been opened. G fterol GaMairher-did not know whether or not r ! 

Li n \, ' sarins to the Viet Jlinh. 

* : JVpntj DSrrrtnr. 1 i-i Invalidation awl > tfclics Chitted National 

Omr Military .\u\iirs. 

General Gallagher was asked whether the presence of French hos- 

lai'i - in the north would restrain Fi h forces when thev enter the 
region. Tie pointed out tha* onlv a fc^ French civilians had been 
removed by air. All the res*, 1 five thousand disarm 

French troops, were still to be renu L The Chinese cannot take 
i hern out nor would Lit Han even permit their evacuation to the T)o 
Son Peninsula* Their presence had been a constant restraining in- 
fluence on Saintenv. A?ked whether the Anna would lei the 


French be evacuated, General Gallagher replied that they would have 
i if the Chinese were still there, but that these French natioi aid 

be a real problem if f he Chinese were moved out. The American Army 
group had to I considerate pressure on the Chinesi to gi I them 
to,give any freed* in a? all to French civilians in Hatpin Hue and 
other centers besid Hanoi, However, the Chinese and French alone 
had arranged for shipments of food from the south. Tl American 
group, incid lly, had to intervene to prevent the moi tj by the 
French of & :h food or of food distributed bv the U.S. Army. The 
French nationals could be evacuated from Hongai and Tourane by 
(he United State when the Japanese were removed if the CI. 
would concentrate them at those ports Howi i*er, General Gallaghi 
noted, that would plac us in a position of working against t lie 

Originally, General Gallagher explained, tlie F ch exp -d the 
United States to ythi role in the north thai the British were 

playing in tl In "JVhen fliey found us neutral they became moi 

and more nntag I ic and did everything \ sible to persuade Unit 
States personnel to favor the French position. They hud no appre- 
ciation of the actual help which the American group gave to the 
prisoneriTof war and s< civilian French in the form of food s 

medical aid, ai : \ on. Tlie Annamese, too s ex] Anieri in help 

o: lly, having been thoroughly indoctrin I with the Atlantic 

Charter and other ideological pronouncements. In our neutral role 
we were thus a diss t] uitmenl to 

In response to a question, Get 1 Gallagher gave his opinion 
that Lu Han would bi faithful to Cluuigki although as govern* 
of Yunnan he would also be influenced to maintain as fully as possible 
relations lei ween Yunnan and north Indochina which would 1 
profitable to hitu, * 

General Galhu at the half dozen or so top Freimh mil 

tary officers held by the Ja| ?ehad »rtly 

after Saiuteuy reu 1 Hanoi, lie did not know what had happeni 
to 1 )ecoux 

**Ylci? Aflro. -Twin . ''"ViTLur t)i Frcueti fricfe bet-aiue ;i j>n*> 

0| ■: ;.: itf J tpnll ill "Slit? 'h V'z">. 

Asked how^o r" the Viet Xflnh wnerei General Oullagh 

il rbsit the; were snunl tind sihve^fully gave the im] 
hot bet] communist. Rather, they cnipha* ; I their ii est in i 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

dependence and their Annamcse na*Ti^ti?m. Tl^ir excellent onrani- 
f /;vi ii pucI nmpa^anda rechninnpfs. Gener?*! Gnllairher pointed our, 
vomII ceeni to have flip r nf some 1- influence, fieneral 

GsiIU»*y]ipr <*rntpc1 flin! the minority Oao Da-j /rronn \n w rl itely 
Communist. In life rminfno. however. Hie YiiM'Minh should not 1 
labeWI t'ull-fif.lovj rlftrh'tnairp A Binnisi. 

Af fba nre<*pnJ rime rite Hanoi radio is controlled by the Chine 5 
j=o/lvo Him ■ roninniniojtiinnl>p*>vwnTTf»noi ttncl Ruiwn, A British 
noli hi rv smd civilian Hafcon team wn- a^nl In H^noi and a Chh 
connfprnjn'i toSaiowi, ThoBrU^ *» i Ha^oi at fir a > made liule prog- 
ress vt*]\ Hie Chimin i>nt General'Gal her tin land? they hai 
sine* m«u1* fn< iv headwa 

The Phtnpse fift*li Armv in rt»p Fonfh of fhr f^mese scone and the 
WJrd ^mv si^otmd H«"f»i, both toi-n^ino- pomp SH tlioiwjuul nv*Bi have 
been tphl to concpn*rctfp for pcinovfll *o M*«rhiiria, hit! whether they 
have pc*im"nv ynovpfl ont pi < GptumiT Ga^hi/dw dcv»s jyoJ know. By 
Doi'i«i"l>or, however the fltnip«o 53rd Armv h;\d bpjjnn 'o come in 
front ^ii^an and would probably provide replacements for the other 
two A nnii . 

Gp»er*l Gtiilp/rhfr nofed thai n c'Jc mine? bavp not been ci 
iii,iv ^earpd ;«t Vp&I from Hie northern ports mid r h:» T iln threat 
prorhWI bv Mip^p moii''> In*? In^ned and wouhl ron.tinnr* to hpln keep 
the Fn'Hi Hpi »nder^ki n F hir«e-Frt$b» binding oneraHons in that 
area.- Ti> Feb tba* fwdnr mil communications betwe< Saigon and 
Hanoi mi n # another year. 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 2011 

1 he Awistant Chief of ta< OifMop of Xottffu A rh s (Lfih- 

don) to ih* Secretary of State 

SECnETAEY S.VKM >W February 5. 19 I 

[Received February 5—3:05 p. m.} 

TTar Series Saig 27, Refereu' e Wash ; T. We - ■■ all y in 
position !« ;i le li-lif on question* asked. 

1, D*Argenlieu-Ho Chi Jlinh nego have in fact been going 

on ssince November. There negol tat tons looking toward Fi 'h reeng- 
nit ion of independence for Aiuuimite to be worked out what along 

Philippine lines. 1 have no knowledge of | eriod time content plated. 
Negotiations would j mbahly have been ronipleted by now but for 
Lec^erc raising nn objection. TFe told the A.dmiraFs Counril '1ml if 
these negotiations succeeded the French might as well leave Indochina 
altogether. He recoil 1 military reeonquesi and statefd] 

HQ*S A rni v was all r tdvforit. Xeveil untiafions were later 

resum A and are con* inning between Tin Chi Minh und Saint em who 
is French Commissioner for Tonkin. 1 rope they will be cam; d in 

2 or 3 weeks. 13 

a This imra^ratrih was reported by Hi I in its telegram 630, Feb- 

ruary T. Lft-lfl l p. i«m i" Paris*, n -t m-hitad. 

2. There tire no Chin economic agret with the Aiimunites. 

3. Reference Franco-Chine; agreeme nothing formal yi 
Temporary and local agreements are -■. follows : 

$l In north French pay in pin for maintenance of Chines 

troops. These payments eon iidered as advanci on amounts French 
are s losed to receive as war damage from Japanese. 

h. Small part of lhe. 3 e pias're advan» eupp d to be used for 

withdrawal of some Chinese gold units ai official rate, 

c, Chinese Government advances gold units which are freely con- 
vertible into CIiph' r- national dollars for exnenses of French repre 
sentntives in Chungking, Kunming und Shanghai. Such advances 
are only frai i or ainouul reach are paying for Chinese troops. 

•A There is an agreemenl for exchange of Hanoi coal for Cochin 
China rice* Due to tack of shippi and troubles of various sorl 
the volume of exchange under tin *nt has been disappoint- 

ingly low, 

4 Chirac now in Chungking laying groundwork for important 
agreements. Among other thing- following are contenipl < 1: 

a. Yunnan-Haiphong Railway will be operated jointly by Chin u 
&. Haiphong will becoiw free port. 

c. French will exchange all live (#*V) hundred | rre notes held by 
Chinese military. This will be wry profitable to Chinese who h 
been buying fhcni up all oyer country al depreciated prices. 

d, Chungking with as h ance of*Chinese Consul Saigon is now 
preparing lis! o tg French lawn and practici whir!, teud I 
discrimini Ch'u Inline u in Indo-Chma. Principal 
complaints are poll tux, other discrimn rx u . rti ton 
in amounts of money allowed to be exported* tin rl 3k*ul 
allegedly u tli fril of rationed : Is. French indicate 
willing*.] ■ ■> ilj ring tl 

[TiA&l IN 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

2*A« Jiwia**ad&r hi /*/ Wtf£ (Cuffa)/) to flu Secretary of Stale 

socket Paris, February fi. 194G — p. m. 

[Tieceived Filii 7 — \J.: M a, m.] 

595. Depths r>fi-|, February I. While T have nol ai= yel detailed in- 
formation on the differences of op : « : ons I tween DWrgenlien and 
Lederc oh French policy ; ird Indo-Chinn nil indications in Paris 
point to rite Fad thai the French Govt at this tune favors n eoneilL- 
atorv and moderate policy, The Foreign Office ha? been stressing 
to Hip Govt the fact *"hal in the light of the evolution of event? in the 
Far Ens* an • ••' heast Asia. French interest can best be ?afe*marded 
by a liberal aiid progressive. colonial policy in Iiulo-Chimi. The So* 
cialist Partv, which al present h in a position to exercise much in- 
fluence on French govenunen f al policy, i- : also in favor of «uch a 
policy as is •! • present Socialist lfii : r Colonies. Marins Montei 

This? does not mean, however, that they are thinking in 1 of in- 

dependence for Tiulo-Ohina for no Frenchmen appear to be thinking 
in puch terms. 

TTIiile it i& of course* impossible al this limp to #azG too far into 
the future, presen' evidence would seem to indicate that Hie or. 
Govt will try ro follow a coneiliatorvand moderate policy in Tndo- 
Chino and will be more progressive in it- outlook than the de Ganllo 
Govt. 11 * As the Pept is aware, in the latter Govt the influence of 

1 1 ■ 

Am u as*i*rlwr Cn^fw rP|vrrh*ii in iH'-Tim fc*fl. * t *eHrnflr.v 21. 1!M0 3 i>. m, a 

that tii" T, i""K'li Ci**tOTmu*»iit 1 * si rl fTfK'f'Ipct r*t jfj^f A^til^al tVAt^^tlU'Hl. thioi n 

a vNit f'» Par** *"^ nutln-rftv r« emlpn v or h» iwicli a ' 'Ha« wttti the 

native element* meetiiij iimcli more ivny" fsrjffKnn-21 ir,) 

certain old-luie mil 'taw leaders sometimes had an unfortunate in- 
fluence on French col- >licy. 


B31 G.Oa 2 H". I G : IVlncrn til 

7*/i e *4 * # w ft -' * ' t ( S ft?/ « / / /' i /?//■ / > /,' , of i C; t ■' > ■' t h • ■ •■ n f d 1 & h n A . f * t h *$ (L» i 

don) to th Se l nry of Ktate 

_ * 

secret Hanoi. February 16, lruo. 

pkioj : 1 1 [ J tecei red Febrnc vy 2t f — 10 : 34 a . m . | 

2. From Laudon for ^ToHar and Culbertson : " Chin< ' infdnnally 

,T P;uil T, CttlHpvtsfja, Ciitef. DivMou uf Western Enroittftn Affairs. 

state that Fi*e»irfi are negotiating two instriuuentfs?] at Chungking: 

1. An aivri-c;i»ont in regard to Chinese troops in Indochina. 

2. A treatv of commerce: Thai the agt*eemeni ton ' ion: 

a. The an il to he [iaid the Chinese by the French to cover troop 
ex;pen?p.s in Indochina. 

7>. 11 tp to ] iven French troops by Chinr e to reestat lish : I j- 
selve? in Tonkin* 

r. Time and method of v .'■■ wnl of Chinese tin ops. Ti i^ be- 
lieved that French Chinese to withdraw h> tofn at once and I 

coordinate their withdrawal \'i |T French entry wltile C «e want 
to withdraw i-ii ■ ■•' over an expended neriod. In iliJ : - ponrvection 
05rd Army he«3in wM, iran-ino 1 no i:. Febn ' i IP'h Division 

started maivhin« to 1 fai Idnc: thai about i ry 10 il r n other 

tmion will I gin i mi rch until allot 03rd Ai iy exits. Ho'Chilfinh 


5 9 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

^ ....... » , \t\r lion »*;«•> \ i t I 1 1 V ."** (UC 

bc^tr.itiiiir oxif and abou* 5.000 Fr*»nrh trains from China now w 
Lnirji ii near Laolcay rn ilrorul to Hanoi, He siuu-d thai although 
French troops suppose*! 1 ^ for L^o* no^hin^r t* •""*••*» ■•' rtw* on _ 
traininir any dav f^r- Hanoi For rw//* < 'A Tin ("hi Minh did not 
spom fn fpfr French froons nl Lsnchau Oilier Anname • pxnre-ss 'be- 
lief Annates? papaWe of disarming Chines tro in Tonkin. Ii 
peemp certain Hi«* Annai plan depneptte tf to French. 

Hoclumr"h atod rl'nt he foundering petWonin£ all rni*ed Xarinns 

to pwliate Annam* p independence nnd prevent *Xten$ive blood-lied, 
In tlii- ponnj ■' ; ( ,n C*Jvti sh'te »h-M h^ayv lc^ of lives peem* inevita- 
ble and that rti^v would Hire h> refer Indochina pi+natinn 'oTTO hut 
caunol i 1 i po Ihi'.Mi-f- of Chinese nopftiw in r^ard '<> ^Fanrlturia, 
The alWed Sino-Freiieh treaty of commerce paid bv Chi; to be 
stalled over mt^t'on of Wup " r ( Ipn- hi T ndor-Vn -> Oh hies 
rerun re p»*«i f-i\-niMl wr*ion tteatuienl for Ohv v es o n*Hoi on 

ChinePe h*m& of eitixen.*liin namely ms-tomnyfoh. This h'< of 
commerce supposed to include ei ions bj 1'Y h to Chinese of: 

[ 1,1 .Free access to nori of Hanoi ' 

5, Join* control of Ralpho^-Yunnan railroad. 

3, Join! •"hare of profits -on China end oil in*. 

!. Dutyl transit of good? consigned to China. 

These con- bnfed on Chines i phihn of heavy lodges due to 

Fivnrli r 'i • ion to Annai ■-** to upp Tonkin as ba^e attack China. 
French ?r*Hor Sjiiptenv op^imis^ or#»r oipck n pnien^ with Oliiiu 
although pi.-M'i'V return de'aved mde^ni^pH*, Snintpnv inthnated 
thai although no( formally seated [fiftttw??] tlio treaty of com men 
v.ill be contingent on Chinese tro ; tauce and e< dimition. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 


The A$mtt(ni ffltlef of fhe D/rw&i) of South* <i«t A*fat\ A]f<ur« 

[Landcm) to the Si en fttry of Stofe 

■ * 

secret TTaxw, undated. 

[Received February 2T — 1 1 : 45 a. in- J 

FromLandon forMottat and Culhertson, 

1. Saintenv Stated thai in conversation! with Ho Chi Minh lie? of- 
fered Annnmese complete independence within French community: 
That this meant thai Annantese would have benefit of French advi 

in every department of Govern™ : it : That for instance Annnmese 
Foreign Office would express its policies through French channels: 
Thai Annamesc Armv and T»Var Ministry would he coordinated with 

■ ■ 

French Army j?nd War Ministrr: And thai Annnmese if "{"/«?] Finance 
and Commerce Ministries would heed French advisers as Ann$mes 
were inexnei i in i\ matters and might jeopardize [i\ - garble] 

French investment. Sauitenv saul that Annnmese in Cochin China 
would p 'My prefer to remain French Colony rather come under 
northern MtP i unp?r Government* In this connection TTo ('hi Sfinh 
said thai French official? had conferred with him hut that they wei'e 
vapue in their comments and had avoided the real issu >f Annames 
independence so that he had askcxl them to pet specific terms from 
Paris which would make clear whether the French really offered 
Ajitt&iries* independence or wen relv using new language to de- 
scribe usual Fr It control Annnmese affairs. 

2. ITo Chi Minh liandod me iwo letters addressed to President of 
USA, China, Russia, arid Britain, identical copies of which we, 
stated *o have Ixen for -led *o other prorernments named- In two 
letters TTo Chi .M~iph requests USA as one of United Nation-: tosimport 
idea of Annamese independi according to Philippines example, I 
e> incthecasenf the Annainese»and tptakesfeps \ a-ryto main- 
tenance of world peace whir], is being endangered by French efforts 
to reconquer Tndochhia. Tie asserts that Am amese will fight until 
United Nations interfere in support of Annnmese independence. The 
petit ion addressed to major United Nations contains: 

a, Beriew of Frem-h relations with Japanese where French Indo- 
china allegedly aided .Taps: 

J, Statement of establishment on 2 Rentend^v lft+o of [Provisional 
Government of?] Democratic liePublic of T J e1 Mhih: 

r. Summary of French conquest of Cochin China begun 23 Sept 
1945 and still incomplete : 

d\ Outline of accomplishments op Annamese Government in Tonkin 
includinf!: popular elections, abolition of undesirable taxes* expanstoi 
of education and resumption as far as possible of normal economic 

e. Red I i<> four powers: M) To intervene and Mop ihe war in 
Indoch*na in order to i fair settlement and f2) to bring the 

Ihdnchii is-ue he United Nation Organisation. The pe- 

tition oiifls w : i!i tit that Annamese ask for full independence in 

fact and rhaf in interim while awaiting 1 UNO de. >n ih- An name; 
will co timie to fight the ^establishment of French imperialism. 
Letter;-: and p tfition will be tra : ted toDepamnei 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

The Counselor of Emtmsy In China ( \/fh ) to the Rca i tar.y of 8ta U 

gnscRKT * CnuxcstNO, February 28, IMfl — 5 p. m. 

rs ckgext * [Received 11 : 1*2 p. m.] 

SB4. Embassy's 280, February VI:- 1 Tins afternoon Br. "Wang 

21 Xr4 priirtecl, buJ run "i Felu'Uiu? 10 tn Saigon, p. — . 

Shih-ohieh, MiuirVi for Foreign Affairs, called me to Foreign Ofiice 
and said thai Sino-Frcnch treaty on Indochina would be signed at 
4 p. m. today. lie paid main points in treaty were as given to me by 
Vice Minister Liu Chieh on February 1*2. 

Dr. Wang said that Chinese forces would hand over control of their 
area in Indochina at end of March* Chinese troops would withdraw 
from Indochina at end of March, Chinese troops would withdraw 
from Indochina during? March, by sea and land, 1ml due io diificnltie. 
of pipping and of withdrawal by land, Chinese forces would probably 
not be able t,o complete withdrawal until a short time after end < 
March,rio f later, he felt sure, than April 15. 

Tie said thai Chinese Government had informally bn( emphatically 
urged French nuthorities to roach a "bloodle agr< nt with the 
Indoehinese: he expressed opinion that present French Governntent 
fis less intransigent than that of de Gaulle, He said that Chi in 
Indochina had also urged the Indoclunesc to reach a bloodless" agree- 
ment wi!h French- 

Dr. Wang -said that the Chinese Government would be willing to 
mediate between French and Tndoehinese, if requested by both 
He then ashed me to ascertain the views of the Secretary of State 
regarding '' ie possibility of joint Cliinese-A an mediation* if re- 

quested b\ Both French and fmloel}ine3&. He referred (o the great 
interest which fli- j hue President Roosevelt had shown in dependent 
peoples, remar g that due to opposition from certain countries, the 
President had been unable to establish trusteeship principle for 
colonies of European ]" He indicated that, if US G ent 

should agree to Joint mediation, the matter of r 2 such media- 

tion could be u mg§ 1"' to the French and Indo'chmese. Dr. Wang 
commented that, as result of Chinese actions during rt lis, he 

felt (lint French were convinced of Chinese good faith. 

Dr. Wanp expressed opinion that, if joint Chin -A >;m media- 
tion is agreed upon, it shoul undertaken during the coming month. 
He said that he would appreciate very much receiving the vu f the 
Secretary of State 9 oon as possible. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

The Consul at Saigon (Heed) toflv Sec'rettrrjf of 'State 

stricter Saigox. iTaivh 7, 1040 — 7 p, m. 

[Ree< 1 March 7 — 1 : 33 p. m.] 

20. Spokesman for the Oovei anient in Tndocbina announced signing 
.of agreement vcftferdav af Hanoi whereby Vietnam I =•■•-. -m es a free 
state within rhc Indochina federation mid will have own army, direct 
own internal affair? and finance. Further negotiations on other points 
such as foreign affa»r?« French economic interests, fci ee*era. to be 
held shortly. Referendum to be held in Tonkin, Annani and Cochin 
China to determine Form of government desired and they may be 
separate or may unite. Full texi of agreement will be forwarded.* 5 

^Telewraiii 21, "Starch &. W4d. noi tiriufeft. ne«nnfrli -«U4. Mmvii S. from 
Paris. enelnsecl rnpy f<f text :j- translated from the Paris Flwro. of the prelim* 
inary eonifrutinti si-sud at llauoi, March ft. ;it H ]». ni. : neither |»riate.tL 

Spokesman concluded thai many concessions on both sides, AnnamUes 
aw frankly pleased and French military occupation now proceeding 

T { i:ed 

bechet Saioox. March 14, 1010 — 5 p, m. 

[Keceived March 16—9: 24 a. nu] 
33, In formal ion from north indicates Chinese putting many ob- 
stacles in way of French, and Saigon press queries Chh intentions. 
Chirac reviewed wor^ning situation in detail, mentioning imex] 
lasf minute n al Chine?? General Staff to sign ngreemenl for reli 
Chinese by French (to begin before March 15, to end before March SI) 
because needed approval Combined Chiefs of Staff. This has been 
[apparent garble] but Chirac not dear if they have ae*ed, also adding 
MacArtluir-' had said it was not his business which Chirac found 

*■ General of tin* Army Dougla&c MacArtliur, Stqweme Commander for the 
Allied Forces. ,1;\\r,u\. 

astonishing in view of Moimtbattens 2 * approval of relief British by 

M Adai. L'»rt1 Route Mou»tt*at tea, Siipreu e Altfed Cainii ler, Southeasl Asia. 
French f-on*h of Tfith I para 1 Id], ITe i e worried as Chinese digging 
trenches Haiphong and encircling citadel, Hanoi fear.- serious chi 
but hopes* jLn Hair?! arrival yesterday may ease tension* also Lu may 
have authority to implement n i (: agreement. 8 * Clarac^s information 

**Tele£»*«iai 8**« MVijvh t."T, 11' in. in y K m M from Saigon, reported that the Sin* 
French milti ,■ ft'weai was jdaniert :*f Chii I tag on Mardi 14, thereby bu[ile- 
ii^ntini! the earlier ugreeineul tor relief of Chinese by French B>r< (731,- 

from China shows growing Chinese sentiment again*! Vietiniuh- 
French s*<rrpempni probably I ■ ■ • ! on Chine?* 1 ffear of?1 Commn 
state south of China and al*o Ft7 :| i<> fa Pure Chinese snona 
partv to have Id #ef ro^e in Yie'nimb. Increasim? number i. its 

Saio-ou and el cwhere bul on whoV Annai li^es willing to work our 
agreement as nhii • cl and £e ten ; I etief if Chines ' : not eh id 
attifude things onldhavegi .veil. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

S31G 00, t-1 «>« ; TMmtkmi 

Thc( ij/vn (Rfied) fo t?te $erret**r\ 

cuxiinr:xn.\L " Siicox. April K I04fi I a. in. 

[Received April 2—10:80 p. m.]' 

70. A s at filiation Dr. Phut, ineinl 'V Cochin China Council, on 
March 2*> by known Viettntnh extremists? and threats to kill members 
opi ''.1 in Cochin China joining Vietnam has not helped Vietnam 
cause, Ifucr ing extremist activities Saigon and Cochin China also 
bad effect and modi rate Cochin Chi not particularly pro-French 
comment Vielminh trying to force joining Vietnam whether Cochin 
Chinese desires or not. On other hand French seizure of Treasury 
Hanoi precipitating general strike and inckl in Tonkin have not 
helped French cause and inspires little confidence that they will ke 
faith. One might hope that both sides take no ; during period oi 
negotiation which might jeopardize Run] peaceable outcoi ie bu1 every 
liL'clihi' d >torniy period ahead, particularly so far as concerns mature 
status Cochin China. 


£5iC.0fi<-l 54(1 

The $ ■ twff of Sinti to the Ereneh Amimmdw [Bonnet)** 

*TliiK note wa« rermlert by tbe Dcpnrttnenl in telegram 1'ftW, AinH 12. VMQ. 
5 j>. iil, t* Paris nnil repeated tn Chungking fiwl Saigon. 

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency 
the French Ambassador and lias the honor to refer to the Ambassa- 
dor^ note no. 167 of March 7, KMiV' 1 enclosing a copy of the Franco- 

30 x>t i%rihttfL 
Chinese Agreement with regard to the relief *of Chinese force- in 
northern Lido-China hy French forces and requesting the approval of 
tin Combined Chiefs of Staff thereto. 

The Secretary of S f aN? is pleaded to inform the Ambassador that 
the Combined Chief? of Staff bare no objection to the relief of Clun< 
troons in northern French Lido-China bv French forces, since tlu-v 
consider that such arrangement? are a matter for determination bv 
the Governments of France and China, 

Smce the Franco-Chinese agreement eomnte*e? the reversion of all 
Indo-China to French control the Comhi ! C! -consider 

that tht* French military commander in Xndo-Chimi should aH as a 
medium for the French Government for coordination with the Su- 
preme Commander for the Allied Powers on inarfers rehi*m** ro tins 
repatrhi »n of Japan from Tndo-China, and thi Chii Sn 

premc Commander ' rl and Admiral Monntbatten should i i " : : >ved of 

m Geui r ilfcsiiun C!rittn£ KnM 

their duties and ibilities for disarmaw and evacuation at 

Japanese i 'hunt. 


Declassified per Executive Order L3526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

Current repatriate envls&ge the completion of the evac- 

uation of the Japant from nothern [ndo-Chimi by April 13. The 
Combined Chiefs of Staff consider that it is most desirabl to Inn 
the French commander in Tndo-China conform to pn -out schedules* 

Accordingly, Admiral MVuuuh n has been directed to make tl 
nere>arv arrangements wnh thi French military commander In Tiulo- 
China reirardrn*: t lie transfer of his share of the above ; ed re- 

sponsib*) it a* at the earliest possible date. 

Tin" Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers ami 'he appro- 
priate Chinese authorities have been informed of the Combined Chiefs* 
of Staff action on this matte 

It. is niuler -' ood t lint a memorandum has been addn d directly 
to the French ifilitary Attache to the Vniled States informing him 
of the above and requesting thai appropi I t+e in ^ructions be issued to 
the French military connnander in Indp China. 

WASirixGTOXj April 10, HUG, 

The Via Conml nt Tlanoi (0*$u?llrtw) to the Secretary of State** 


"This tel m wi^^uimmr m n Departs circular telegram ut April 10, 
VM\\ aoon, to Baugknk, Elatarfa^ Cinmgl iwg. Mauila. ami Parte; 



priority - [Received April IS- 8 a. itl] 

2. Despite many questions which are tPl in Buid state, condition 
in Hanoi are surprising v quiet. French Annamite and CI e 'mop? 
are in city in varying force I ml with iparatively little friction. 

French troops under Ge rcri Va 1] nv, com nosed of elements of 
Second Armoured and Ninth Colonial Infantry Divisions, are making 
streimo ffnvt* to avoid tuit witting Chinese. 

Fifty-*hird Army with sea'. : | rvi & are only Chinese tro 
which n in in vicinity of Hanoi, of their withdrawal i 

unknown here. 

Repatriation of Japanese soldier,- and civiHans not*h of ififh paral- 
lel has been taknigr place during pa=1 '2 weeks. Approximately ?A of 
85,000 have h n shipped. Remainder ai luled to leave in near 


French appear to be « xereisiug no civilian fund ions here. Vietnam 
; P $t fecto government of Hanoi, running po%e and adminis^rati 
service?. There are indications thai no effective een'ral authority 
exists outside of city areas a 1 though natives are said r bitterly anti- 
French. Passage of receu 1 French convoy from Haiphong *o Hanoi, 
for exmnpV, was n ! I by barricades (bur apparently not by rii 
fire) in vilb»ges aloiu* route, 

Xei. ; \fu us now opening between French and Wtiuim ai Dal at 
(Da hit *$ hill Ftation in Cochin China) to implement preliminary 

reem to M-nvli (H* \\qs\ important immediate qi 
to be ft ;i* ii CoHiin China. 

Food s ; tua**ion generally bet f er than hi-f year. Reports indicn 
there should be no famine in northern FIC in near futnri - 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 

851G.01 r 4-l?4*; : Circular lt'fr?mai 

The s - ■ n tary of State to Certain DiploumtU a i < - ■ v///;- Officei 

53 At B;n»g:fe»k, Batarfa, Chungking. London. Maniln, Paris, and The Hague, 
secki r . " W.\sinxtno\-. April 18, liMfi — ] p, m. 

Vlenain Republics President TI<^C1 i Minh requested I~S, UK and 
other recognitions approximating French recoitnifton as free state 
within French Union, UK iiiform*»Py replied unable recognize be- 
cause negotiations re Vietnam nctnal status continuing, 


8510.00/4-274** :T>l©£ttim 

The Consul at Sutgon (Seed) to the Secretary of $fafe 

confidently. Saigox, April '27, 104fi — 1 1 '. m. 

[Received April 23— 2 : U a. m.] 

1*2:2. Mytel 121, April 27, 10 il mf* Returned yesterday front Hanoi 

^Not.pHnntl: for suamuuT, *ep rimilar, teto&ratii »f April 30. 11 a. uu Fw/m. 
where situation tense. Called on all high French. Chinese, Vietnam 
officials. Hi» [J?*?] dwel; largely on Cochin China issue, first, musl 
join Vietnam, second, French must ces ring Cochin China; he 

also mentioned need for complete financial independence, own bank 
and own bank note \< Ife was highly indignant action of French 

in arresting find dispj lling [ettpt llh from Dal at Dr. Thaeh, Cochin 
Chinese delegate to Dalat confereiv He exp 1 hope for future 
if Freheh lived up to their a; mentis which lie rather d i'ed bill 
added \\vxt outside help, chiefly capital and teclmica! aid, must be 


Pessimistic views held by all French regarding success of Dalai 
conference which is now uspended for a few days while Vietnam 
demands re/rardh'g Cochin (cease hostiHil . - p»disical interne 
Armistice Commission and political freedom) and French count 
offer regarding all Indochina (establish special committee to tnvesti- 
*mte Vietnam-French incident | are being studied and thai French 
have now* adopted thesis conference merely preliminary and Pail 
approval mi-.r be obtained which is contrary previous understanding. 
French defend ^t, expelling Dr, Thaeh on grounds that he is no- 
torious anti-French Cochin Chinese and that Cochin China not \ 
pari of Vietnam. 

French insi ice withdrawal Clpnese froip north and all-over pro- 
t mat' on r <» Dalai may have ulterior motives as it \< not imp ible 
French military coup may be brought oil' as soon its Clih goi 
Some French eh ili; have • | ken of this "as putting V in 

their place*\ In any event over-all picture \> noj happy one and 
i ticli compromise, \ ifh and tolerance needed to efl | eac* ful 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

Kil&fth 5-t4i» : Circular tnteifrcnu 

The Acting Secrefrai/ of Sfttfe *o f ' tin Diplomatic and Consul 


39 At Bangkok. Batavia, London. StoukJnj: P*trl*e. $1nsap"re. aiul Tiie Elaine. 
confidential Washington, May 1, 104(3 7 p, m. 

French Vietnam conference Dalat temporarily suspended for study 
conflicting views re Corhinchinu. Vietnam officials hope for future 
li<l by doubts French will abide by their agreements. Freud 
pessimistic re outc< Vietnam demand? cessation hostilities Co- 

ehinchina, release political internees* establishment armistice com- 
mission aftd political freedom Cochinchina. French counter-offer 
special committee studv French- Viotuan incidents throufdioul Indo- 
china. French now bold Dala* conference rneivlv preliminary and 
results must have Paris apnroval. 

Consul Saigon observes 4 " French maneuvers propaganda to fi 

'"Trl.-nr- ISO AuHl -<X 1040. 3 n itt„ not nrlntrf. In It, Poium] Recfl men- 
tionpil M»at Ho Phi Mmli lunl stressed o> hi.m at Hon^l ■unjust necessity of 
toterrettog Aui^Wcan capital ami employing An ui tcelmtdans in Vietnam." 
(8TilG.OO/4 30 

withdrawal Chinese troops Tonkin and delaying tactics T)alat con 
ference compatible with possibility French planning military coup 
when Chinese withdraw. 


g5lG.O0/5-l54fi : Circular tefogrj 

3TAff 'Acting Utry of State to Certain Diplomatic ami C< lav 

Officers '- 

42 Ai Sacking mul Saigon, 
BECrei TTAStTCXOTON. May 18, 1046 — 1 p. m, 

French FouOff official confidenl ultiin; c «no Dtiarions with 


Vietnam which may be prol !, 4r - Vietnam deU^ Fhmrc impressed 

^Tdejrrani 2243. M 1040. 2 p. n*„ from Pari* not prlnMI, 

him favoraWv bnr be regarded recent devc'opinents Indochina China 
disturb:] fnee b«>Ueved CMn&sw* rvmunandRsTndtf china openly 
initundennininF Chiang Tvsii V incere efforts evacuate Indochina, 
Chinese cfficial Pari- stated M tbat Vietnam d from] 1 five Com- 

* Tfctwsrinri 227JK STay 10, v.ur;. t p, m„ froia Parte, not priiif*(L 
*,iuni*t^ four uon-CcnunnPists, one K »ntang, but Communists 

Vietnam better owapwd than non-Corn mu«fe f s and ?itni> r 1 by 
French Cnntinunists»rhat Chinese troops would er^cnpte. that Chn 
wj>i h) • neutral, would not !,«:• intermediary for A 
ekirg l"S sppport. Consul Hanoi observes 43 Chinese appear try- 

*T«* \l(K Mn*jr a IMG, s a, m.. not printed 
iiiU undermine Vie*" Minli party and leadej ive Chine 

dominated 1 iJ inh Hoy party in power. 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
KND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

•-.-,t':,"- T> ]-\ I -• :Cln nhir tt^mm 

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diploma • C&mii!m l 




**At Bangkok, l.omlon. Moscow, Xriiikiirr. Moscow, Park, and Raigon, 
C(vxnni;xTiAL YT.-isni.wrox. May 14. 194(5 — 11 a. m. 

Vietnam Republic's President believe factory agreement can 

be readied with French, expressed confidence their ^1 faith in 
Hanoi Paris bid disturbed by French actions Ss '.. 


851G 00 k 5 -1*415-: Tetaffrttig 

Thi Acting Seen • of S l ot, to (renew? of the Army ft* C. 

Mar$hftll 3 nt Sanhr, 

secret Washixgtox. May 15, 1016 — G p. m, 

133. For General M-u •■ ! lali Dopt concerned by re] 
from both French and CS sources indicating serious effects of con- 
tinued presence 53rd Chinese Army and independent uirts northern 
Indochina despite, agreement to withdraw all troops by Mar %\ or 
Apr 15 at latest. 

Consul Hanoi (Reinfotel May 1-!) rcj danger thai actions local 
Chinese military 1 an will embitter Franco-Chinese reli u i (Si 
Paris Enibtel 6 to Chungking May 9 4T ) as well as obstruct recent 


c TelPjjr«ni 2243 tn Department, Xfny 0, 104ft, 2 p< ia„ from Paris, not printeti, 
hul seerimitnr telejrram rvf >jay 13, 1 p. in., p, — . 

progress Franro-Yiel Xain relations. Also that Viet Sam President 
hinted his tasks easier when Chinese leave. Hanoi believes thai few 
problems facing French and Annamese can be handled until Chines 

French Emb W;i *h May 8 verbally empha» : zed importance Fn h 
Govt attaches to prompt Chinese evacua f ion to avoid further incidents, 
and n I possibility evacuation 53rd Army by ship, 

Dept believes everything possible should be done urgently speed 
evacuation Chinese h --. Request your views as to what a< '• n. if 
any, might be I pn US Govt t h »lation this problem, and 

your recommendati thereon. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

SolG.rtfi/O-SO I- : Ctrvtrtor r- :■ -ram 

Thr Seen tary of State io & " Diplomatic Offi IS 

* At X:m L in* r aiul The Ib>-:m*. This teV i was based ' ' n ' trains 100. 
aiay 14, 1040. 3 p. in., and 163, May 15, from Saipm. is- printed. 

CONFIDENTIAL WaSJIIXGTDX, MftV 20 5 10 t6 — $ a. m. 

D*Aij*eiiliei] to meel President Vietnam soon prior departure 
French, Y>etn:-.m delegs Paris for final negotiations " ■ governmental 
structure Indochina and Vietnam's status therein. French propose 
federa 1 organ : zfltic*h tuuler High Commissioner who exo; 7 neh 
Union's powers and with Assembly initiate federal legislation. As- 
sembly comp 10 French members, 10 member? each from Tonkin, 
Annam, Cochinchina, Laos, Cambodia. Each state form own govtj 
elcci Parliament, vole own constitution recruit defence armv, fix 
budget, orgar*ze adminHra^oUjenaci iutprnal Jaws. Vietnam coun- 
ter-proposal would limit federal powers to cu^oms policy currency 
and supplies coordhia^ion, would place relations beh Vit and 
federation on sta f u$ international re 1 at toils with Higb Commissi r 
as ambassador to federation's member states. 


12$. 7* •" ' '» 2 <> 4 fl : T* 1 1 v srn m 

The Secretory of State to the Amhmwdor m France {Caffery) 

-Tit i en :i> Wa sin x r ;'! ox, Slay 2(1 , 194 ft — 5 p. pi . 

2-127. Consulate ftrgon ra : sed to Consulate General effective im- 

jm y. Inform French (xoveriuneut. 


77*£ F7<?* Comul at llano! (0 n) to tl> v - ■'"■ - v of Su 

Hanoi, May 20, 1946— fip.m. 
[Received "May 23—11 rSOp.m | 

20. Please pass to General Marshall fur information. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 


There ate .three important political parties in Viet Xam. 

They are Viet itinli League, composed of former Indo-Chinese 
Communist Parly (PCI dissolved itself November 30* 1045) anil 
Democratic Party, son (**/>] Vietnam Caeh Menli Dons* Mini) Hoi, 
generally referred to as Dong Minh Iloi or I) J III; and Vietnam Quoc 
Dan Dans:. 

There are in addition several splinter parties which seem to serve 
chief] v as vehicles for oruantxed banditry. 

Both Dong Jiittli Hoi and Ouoe Dan Dang seem have support of 
Chinese. Most a< live part of Viet Minh is factor composed of for 
PCI members. 

Vief Jlinh strength seems to be spread throughout northern Indo- 
China. Dong Minh Hoi and Quoc Dan Dang control territory in 
Moncay, Langson, Vinb Yen area. 40 

« \-i 

Vice Consul O'Salliran. In termini m. July 20. 184fl, 4 p. ill.. 'from TTrinui, 
reported the steady elimination <>f all orsitniftWI bi«iio^slt1«n m tlie Viet Miuij 
Lea ■. Tlie Hon* Minh Hoi niul Qiiw nan Dans toad Inst influent* with | 
departure of the .12ud Cnmese Ann.v from Tonkin. (R11Q.OO/7-24HG) 

As yei no Catholic party has appeared nor do Catholics appear to 
lie committed to support of any one part v. Viet Minh League bus 
I n making tentative moves to capture Cathode support but is said 
to be too radical to obtain full cooperation from church, Tn view of 
fact church claims million members in Tonlving and Annain (large 
percentage believed to be u r?ee Christians**), i( seems probable that 
Catholics as group will fnof ?! remain Ion.<£ absent from politics. 

Sent Department, repeated Nanking: Saigon informed airmail. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

have 1 h vi' -d (o evacuate bv land and to reach Chin territory 

before 10 Ji tie or, weather permitting, liefore the end of May. Re- 
maining division is now at Haiphong awaiting transportation to 
•Japan. At request of Foreign Office SOAP has been informed of 




The Vict Consul at Hanoi (O'SuWcan) to the Secretary of State ' 

CUXFIDKXTIAL Haxoi, June 5, 1946—5 p. m. 

[Received June fi — 7 : 5-2 a. m.] 
86. Hi Chi Minh probably will call at AmEmbs shortly. He 
has constantly given me impression he would pay great attention to 
any suggest i CiS m a '.1 e by 1 )e p t . 


851G.OO/I3 i'J : Tel^nim 

The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O'S-uJlitmn) to the Secretary of State 

Hanoi, Juno B, 11)4-6—8 p. m. 
; [Received June ft — 10 : -ir» a. m.] 

37. There is growing conviction in Viet Xam circles that principal 
point involved in Paris negotiations will be future states of Cochin 
China nndhowit will be determined. 

Viet Xame-e generally agree that without Cochin China any hide- 
pendente will be largely theoretical 

Vicl Xam nasi/ ion regarding referendum anpears to have under- 
gone extensive changes. Ho Chi Miuli when lie <- : 1 convention 
of March I'm was convinced thai in any "fair*' referendum Cochin 
China would not \i?ofe?~\ to attach itse 1 f to Viet Xam, 

However, Dahit Conference delegation appai entlv returned to 
Hanoi with realization that Viet Xam strength in Cnrliin China was 
diminishing. This they attribute to French propaganda and absence 
of freedom for their own agents. 

Realization of diminishing Vie' Xam strength in Cochin China is 

probably principal n w why Ho accompanied delegation to Paris. 

hopes to reach satisfactory solution on this alMinpi nt question 

on basis of tturaerau friend Lips which he has with Left Wi French 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 


French here give impression they would not object to i*ef iduni in 
Cochin Chuia. However, lliev indicate ihcv would not cue to allow* 
complete freedom for Viet Nam agents there. Their objection is thai 
such agents would resort to tei -in (n influence vote, (There sei 
to be certain amount of Justification for French contention. Viet Xnm 
police have been treating pro-French Viet Xamese and Metis with 
French nationality rather s y in Tonkin.) 

Outcome of any referendum would probably l>e lamely determined 
by conditions under which it would be held. French feel Cochin 
China would vote > for autonomy. Viet Nam claim Cochin China 
would vufe 80/f for* incorporation witli Viet Num. Both claim [s] 

ve an unspoken promise [y y l thai claimant could establish 

conditions of referendum, Xeulral observers 1 Feel vote in referen- 
dum free of undue influence from cither side would be close. 

Sent Dept as 37, June 5, 8 p. m. ; rep d Xanking, Saigon in formed* 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

* The Amhmsrtdor in 1 ce {Caffery) to the Seen ■ >j of State 

RESTRICTED Paims, July 7, l! -1 p. HI. 

[Received July 7 — 12 : 39 p. in.] 

8323, Opening of Franeo-Viet Xam conference at Fojitamebleau 
yesterday brought to an apparent end pre-con fere nee honeymoon 
period during which Fi h and Indocbinese officials had rivaled 
with each other in displays of Franco- Viet Xam friendship. 

After long wait for Admiral Thierry d'Argenlieu supposed to pre- 
side over conference, unexpected* anuotineeinent that "Admiral was 
indisposed" created uneasiness and rumors* to effect Vie! Xtiiu.delegat 
had vetoed presidency of Tltierry d'Argenlieu who, in their eye 
"typified French imperial ism 5 *. 

Max Andre, heal of French delegation, assuming Presidency at 
last moment j delivered innocuous speech of welcome and decl&n 
conference open. Mr. Phan Van Dong, head of Viet Xam delegation, 
immediately protested against this unilateral assumption of the chair 
of the direction of the proceedings. In a fighting sell which con- 
trasted sharply with platitudes of Andre's address, he went immedi- 
ately to the core of (he worst difficulties which the conference will have 
to face. In sharp words, he protested against "the mutilation of the 
Viet "Xam Motherland" through the creation of an independent state, 
of Cochin China outside of (he Viet Xam. lie vrmi on to accuse the.- 
French authorities in Indochina of having violated the accords of 
Dalai of March 6, 1946 and of having used these accords to penetrate 
peacefully in the north while military op rations were being carried 
on in the south and in the in fr. 

This unexpected offensive of Hie Viet Xam delegation on the fi 
clay has created a sensation. Independent and impartial Comba£ : 
genuinely interested in colonial problems, headline.-' Met Xam ac- 
cusation across the entire first page and recognizes French mistakes 
made in Indochina. Communist Uvmnrnte frankly sides with Viet 
Xam. Socialists PopuhfJn gives fair and impartial account in a vein 
sympathetic to Viet Xauu MTVP, Attbc regrets "that French good- 
will did not find a corresponding echo". In the conservative and 
Nationalist papers there is literally an expl ion of wrath against Viet 
Kara delegation. Inert ingly Leftist but always itTtra-Xationaltst 
Ordre terms Phan Van Dongas statements "shocking" and already 
blames Viet Xam for any future breakdown in negotiations. All : 
these papers play up violations of Dalai agreement by the Viet Xam 
and underline assa inal! . kidnapping and rape of Enr< :ts as 
Justification of continui 1 mil itary operations by French expeditionary 


On the who] conference had gotten oft" to had start, Viet Xam 
leaders also esq I I thai conference "of such considerable 

importance** si aid he'heltt outsidi Pari 

Interesting. to note thai yesterday afternoon onversa i held be- 
tween TTo Chi iljuh", Vie! Xam Pn ident, and A ian deputies of 
friends of manifest j | hy Fcirhal Abbas (my despatch 

5571 of July 3 -*') on similarity between problems facing Algeria and 

"Not printed; it r<n»orfe<l an interview ivJtli the Alcrei'lrto antottmuM leader, 
FerluiKU'bils, A drfesati &\\ Alsedmj rlfimfW. ei 

[nflei t*iui. *NlPuiofrflti ton In favor < 'Algerian I '\ was In 

ris, (8TilIL00/7-:J4G) 

Viet Xam. 

Sent Depl 323, repeated London as509. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

Th\ Ambam [t ^ffcry) to the Secretary of Stafi 

coxiiuEXTUL Paris, Angus! 2, in G p. in. 

[Received S : 16 p. m/J 

3801. Viet Xiiiii delegation at Fontainebleau conference y relay 
broke off negotiations on ground thai French have violated March 
accord by convoking new conference at Dalat* Head of delegation 
alleged Hial French intend to use new Dal at conference (to which 
Viet Xam was not invited) to engineer their own statute for Indo- 
Chinese federation and to fix future of Cochin China and other areas 
claimed by Viet Xam. He added thai Fontainebleau conference is 
not terminated bu! only siu tided until French clear ii]> this w equiv< 
eaP situation* Delegation will remain at Fontainebleau for time" 
being and is prepared to maintain contact with French delegates on 
unofficial basis. 

This decision has been received by press as a kind of bomb shell 
although reports had been current that eoirlY e was entering a 
critical stage and that lie [Zfo], Chi M~inh, would depart soon for 
Indo China. Press reaction 1ms followed ex] ted linei with left- 
wing onrans justifying decision while right-wing and radical papers 
acci Viei Nam of blackmail and insist thai Freuce has perfect right 
to consult other peoples of Indochina in parallel Dal at conference. 

Radical Aurorc demands thai France shall not "abdicate* 1 in Indo- 
china and adopts E potato line in charging that "other imperialism 
are utifiz'iu? Viet Xam for own purposes* 

Montlr insists thai France is playing role of impartial arbiter and 
must not ret real before ultimatum. Sf&nd* ulso takes off gloves with 
respect to TIo Chi *\Iinh. recalling that lie was friend of Doric J 
thai in 1943 he publicly expressed determination to "break oft all n 
]a lions with French peopled 


Am Fenders of Viet Xam Cwmmimist EfwwmiM is most out- 

spoken. Independent's Combat ttinues to stress "the flagrant dis- 
sonance' 4 between French statemei in Paris and Fi ; n 
Indochina which has b Fitly amounted to a "provocation n . ( // 
expects ions repcrcv in Indochina. 

Caught in the middle, both Socialists and MTIP are eml sed 

and worried* Popvfaw blames Admiral d'Argenlieu for imp 
liable polity which must "be repudiated by French Government 
£'Aube, on other hand, takes ed [stand?] and ij Dal 

conference is entirely proper under Man accord. 

Baudet, one of Foreign Office delegates r( Fontainebleau* admit 
situation is serious but believes conference will resume in a \ el* or 
10 days. He in new Dalat conference is piily exploratory and 
consultative. Baudei once again indicated French officials are not 
particularly anxious to * i p work of Fontainebleau con fere 

and are quite willing (ny relations with Viel Xam to continue under 
present agreement until the pacifica! ion of Indochina and i irularly 
Cochin China is compl tl Tk i tdeel that security situation hi 
Cochin China is more serii : n French public is aware. 

Sent 1 nsSSOl; Dept pi i f re] it to Saij .1 London 

as 578, 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 

8516.00 'S 040 

Memorandum by the Chief of tlie ftirhion of Southeast Asiftn Affairs 
(3/offtft) to the D % .or of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs 
(1'weenf) t 

[Was ox.] August 0, 1946. 

Receni developments indicate that the French are moving to regain 
a large measure of their control of Indochina in violation of the 
spirit of the March convention. The ev'ul », as set forth below, 
suggests thai the French are attempting Im stain tlietr objective by 
manoeuvres designed to confine and weaken Viet Xam. In the event 
that Viel Xam decides to Est tl encroachments, which is l>y no 
means unlikely, widespread hostilil i mnv result. 

The chief opposition to the ree^tab^ishmenl of French rule in Indo- 
china has all along come from the Aimamese, who inhabit the three 
east coastal province of Tonkin, Annum, and Cochinchina, which 
once comprised the Kingdom of A imam. The populations of the 
other two countries of Indochina— Cambodia and Laos — are no! in 
n high stale of political development or in any condition seriously to 
resist French control. A modus rirewdi between the French and the 
Annamese was achieved in the preliminary convention of March G, 
1946, by which theAnnamese "Republic of Viel Xanv 1 was recognized 
as a free state within the Xndochinese Federation and the Viet Xam 
Government declared its readiness to receive the French Army. The 
convention left for future settlement two crucial problems: ih- status 
of Viet Xam in its external relafio and the geographical extent of 
Viel Xam. On the former point, the provisional agn ent stated 
that "each contracting party will take all n v m ures 

• • * 

" 'Omission indicated in tie- origin 

to create the favorable atmosphere ueci for an immediate open- 

in^ o f a mi cable a n d free 1 1 em > t i at i o i , Tl iese 1 i es'< >t in t ions will I tea r 
particularly upon diplomatic relations hi iveen the Viel Xam and 
foreigtl stale-, the future status of Indochina, French economic and 
cultural intei in Viel Xanv 1 On the latter point the agreement 
stated thai "with re U the bringing together of he three (prov- 

inces), the Fraieh Government pledges itself to ratify the decisions 
taken by the populatioi -■ consulted by referendum/* The crus of (he 
present situation lies in the apparent intention of the French to settle 
both matters to their own advantage and without reference to Viet 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

The hostility of the Annan toward the French bej ;m to mount 
to its present intensify wjiw th* ^*'^nch en Juno 1 announced the 
inauguration of the Provisional Government of the Republic of 
Cochinchina. Aniui incste Idlers ha*] 1 >ng emph; d their view thai 
the inclusion of Crichinrhiua in Vie1 Nam was a matter of life an (3 
death to their country, Cochinchina, it may he mentioned, a tains 
the important mercantile • i Saigon and Cholon, includes tl 

months of th? M u, and is the riches! province in Tiulftcliin; 
Called the Southern Province by the Vie! Xaniese, it is racially in- 
distinct from Tonkin and Annum. Statements by the French thai til 
referendum in Cochinchina fas pledged in the March C convention) 
would still be held failed to reassure Viet Xam 1 ?rs, who pointed 
out that such a referendum could nol possibly be fair owing to the sup- 
pression by flie French of pro- Viet Sam political parties and of all 
anti-French opinion, SEA's information tends to substantiate this 
point of view. 

Tension between the French and tlte Annaiuese readied its present 
pitch when the French on August 1 convened a conf at Dalai 

(in southern Annam) to which the Royal Governments of Cambodia 
and Laos, the Government of the autonomous Republic of Cochin- 
china, and the native peoples of southern Annam and high plateau 
of Indochina (but not Vict Xam, recognized by the French as part of 
the. Indochina Federation and French I'liiou) io send delegates t< 
"study the fiameworfc of the French Union''. Sub ently puh- 
lislied agenda of the conference indicated thai the .-nlicnt aspi of 
the Indochina Federation would also be, deliberated. As an immediate 
result of this conference, the Viet Nam delegation which had been 
discussing I lie future relation between France and Viet Nam with the 
representatives of the French al Fouulahieblean since duly an- 
nounced tlini they were suspending negotiations until the French 
should have clesi up tlte "equivocal" situation which had been 
created. The head of the Viet Xam delegation, who had opened the 
conference with a violent bias) against French polieii , charged that 
the French were now frying to engineer their own statute for the 
Ind< tese Federation and their own settlement of the status of 
Cocllinchina and other are; claimed by Viet Nam. The view of 
Consul Saigon is not very different. He gave as his opini thai a 
front againsi Viet Nam was in the maki . that the states partici- 
pating in the Dalat Conference were at least \\ ly recognized a-. 
free states by the French, and that Fran nnd these free states ai 
now determining the status of the Indocliinese federation without 
refer to Viet Xam. In his view it indicated double-dealing on 
the pari of the French, and lie reported thai the French Commissioner 
for Cochinchina had forced the issue by threatening to resign unless 
his p i.n carried ou*". Nothing ha- been said at the conference 

about a referendum. Finally, Consul Saigon added that he had 
learned thai representatives of tin us of the Province 

of Annam f which has always b« ;t claimed by Viet Nam) will peti- 
tion for inclusion of their tentorial in Corluneliina, In view of the 
completi the agenda of the Dalat Con hich covei 

the . nfial framework of 'lie Ind deration, and in view 

of the delil te e i of Vief Xam from f lie co iferenee, t lie 

conclusion is htescapi ■ e thai the French are endeavoring to w3 te 
down Vi i ? and to tie th ire form of organization of Indo- 

china with t! ' expected to be an ble to J k nch 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

Annamese reaction to French moves lias been sharp, unci Follow n 
the suspension of the Fontainpblcau negotiation^ there were pro-Yi 
Nam manifestations In Saigon* The ambush oF a French supply 
column near Hanoi by Annamese soldiers, during which the French 
suffered 52 casimlt ies (one of the worst of many incidents during the* 
past several months), may have been related to the opening of tl 
Dal at Conference* 

"While it is lo be doubted that the French will allow the Fontaine- 
blean Conference to break down ly, Embassy Paris quotes 

Eaudet as having stated that French officials i>re in no hurry to speed 
up negotiations until the pacificatjoi T Indochina, and particularly i 
Cochinehina, has been completed. 3n this connection, Consul Saigon 
reports that more troops are arriving in Indochina and thai the French 
military position has rown much stronger. Meanwhile, tire Saigon 
press has horn parrying vitriolic attacks against Yiel Mini, Since 
fliis pi is completely controlled by the French, there would appear 
to he noofficial objection to thisliue. 

In his latest report, Consul Hanoi states thai there now exists an 
imminent danger of an open brealk between the French ancTYfei Nam. 
He adds thai a rupture of relations would probably be followed by a 
period of anarchy and that, although the French could qtiicfdy over- 
run the country, they could not— as they themselves admit — pacify it 
except through a long and bitter military operation* 

In conclusion, it is SEAs view that the Annamese are faced with 
the cli of a costly submission to the French or of open resistance, 
and that the French may he preparing to resort to force in order to 
secure their position throughout Indochina, Ti may i be advisable 
for this Government to take official notice of till nation during I he- 
Peace Conf' " hut the Department should be prepared, V 

" For document t<l between -July 2D and October 15 

see rot — . pi>; — ff. 

\li n , to express to the French, in view* of our interest in peace and 
orderly develops of depeudcnl peoples, our hope thai they will 
abide by tli i-rit of the March 6 convention, 

A,£bbot] L[ow] M[offat] 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

B51G.0O/& 1740: TV1«*srain 

TJu Cotrnil at Saiffon {Reed) to the Secivtctry. of State 

coxFinKXiLVL Saksox, August 17, W46 — 1(1 a. m. 

[Beceived Angus! 18 — 2:53 a. m.] 

3-£2. At Daltif conference, which closed on 1-lth, delegations wei 
reasonably unanimous as to desired structure and scope of federation 
and relationship of meniher states with federation and each cither. 
Cochin-Chinese delegations vowed {delegation $ko move hide- 

pendente oT thought than other del itions and followed less slav- 
ishly French pattern for Indochina of future. This is part to 
impress Cochin-Chinese and to help lessen belief presets Cochin- 
Chinese Govt only a puppet, hut as previously reported members of 
this govt sincerely want more fret of action and less domination 

by French. "While findings and recommendations of conference i 
binding they appear to be reasonable basis for future, but ir is certain 
Viet Xnm will find nmHi fault therewith, as they frill short of the 
larger degree of independ desired by that state. Growing bi 
High Connnii er and Commissioner for CochhvCliina : mny go as 

ir policy subjected increasing criticism here and re] dly in 
FmiUT, particularly in calling 1 Palar conference knowing Viet Nam 
could object and in creating Cochin-China Oovl withonl referei 
to referendum. However, thev argue no reason whv FreneltVie! Xn 
negotiations should decide future without reference to of her state? and 
thai necessary atmosphere for n euidmu is In 1 tug (hitter probably 
tmeasanv referendum under existing conditions mi r Mt well increase 
partisan activities). 1'nn mably both officials are less 1 d in 
views re na'nv neoples than when first came to French Indochina. 
Nexl more will be submission Dalai nronosals to French Gov! and 
attemnf to reconcile proposals with Fonhiiuphlpiin a/renda. However, 

fardle^s soundness manv these prono^ata difficult fore • • anv great 
degree success in above so lorn* as ( bin China stars apart from Viet 
Nam, whieh is one point of French policy in F !i Indochina. 


8330*Oa/S- 2QTO : TWrkim 

The Acting 5 ry of State to the Comal o (R> ed) 

ijr Wariiixotox, September 1, 1946 — 5 p, m, 

240. Action ur I Aug 2(5 commended,* 8 Lose no opporti. 

m Not printed. 

counteract with i r>ns responsible pn orientation, and in maim 
you deem most effective, 1 i ncli colonial tendency picture FS as s 
gv< - i e and imperialistic. This brings ct in French cotoi ials, un- 
wittingly for rnosl part, very- clos inmtvist Party line. 

Wuh his knowledge FS Clarac (renrtel 357 An i should know 
I tter M encourage anii*American suspi ' this juncture Franco- 
Am n relations, and Pen! believes lie can lie j traded take and 
fosti f attii n rents. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

The Acting Secretory of State to the Coft&ul nt Shigon (Bee$) 

secret * WASitTXCTOX", September 9, IWB — 2 p. m. 

241. Intel 1 hrence renorts of uncertain reliabilihr starve VSSR (ft) 
anxious see Ho Chi Mlnh succeed unite l^hree Kys under Viet Nam 
for possible eventual weapon against National Govt Chhia and fo) 
has instructed French Communi manoeuvre reliable French Officers 
to Indochina for training: cadres future Viet Xam army. ICeep T)epf 
infn 1 indications sul vienrr to Party line hv Ilo and other- 
leaders, relative strength Conunmusl and non-Communist elements 
Viet Nam, and contracts with Communists other countries. Inform 
CTSullivuu. Sent Saigon. Repented Paris for info. 

As telegram -HJS0- 


S5H; n to 

The Awhtxxadar In France (Cttffery) io tTie fiecrettwy of State 


ooxftoextlvl ^ * Paris. September 11, IfMfi. 

No. (5131 [Received September 17.] 

Snt: I have the honor to report thai al Jus request T received a visit 
this morning from SL Ho Chi Miuh, ''President of llie Republic of 
Viet-Xam", who confirmee! the news published in the local press that 
the FontaineWeaii negotiations between the Tle^Nam representatives 
and Hie "French representatives 1. etically broken down and the 

Yiet-Xam delegation will be returning to Indochina within the next 
few days. 

The principal point on which they failed to reach agreement con- 
cerns Cochin China: (lie French representatives insipl that Cochin 
China he an "independent *' entity in an Indochinese federation, while 
the \. j .i Xanj represenfafim: ii thai one centra] srovernineiit ii 
Indochina irin ' itc the whole country. He said that he and 

his o-uiv a-]vred to Yie«-Xam u ind( idence* 1 in an K T*nlon Fran* 
gaise"- He said thai they would like to receive some "help" from 
us, but did not epe what he meant by that ITe took occasion io 
sav thai he was not a communi 

From the srenera* 1 ftizzine f his remarks, I gathered that he would 
like us U) ovf inn* the gai rid he woukl he verv pleaded if h*» could 
use Pit* »n f orne way or i in hi- futmv negotiate tl French 


1 eypi s*cl our in*ere$1 in Indoclumi and Trie people of Indochina 
bu f made »o wrctmitments. 

Respectfully yours, Jefferson Caffeet 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NMD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

• The Consul at Sn*gon {Ret *1) fa the IFecretmy of State 


secket Satook, September 17, 1040 — 11 a. m, 

[Received September IS— 1 : o:i a, m.J 

S74. Both Chirac and Chief of Surety have informed me increasefd] 
Communistic activities in French Indochina are disquieting. Infer- 
eepfed let f era indicate Chinese Communist are entrenched in Chinese 
centers Saigon and Haiphong and tlui t Annamites chiefly in Tonkin 
and Ainnm), bill also to certain extent in Cochin China 1 are receiving 
much Coiniwmist propaganda- They feel Viet Xam leaders not en- 
tirely responsible for this apparent trend but point out those leadei 
have Communist training and leanings. Chirac added that one dif- 
ficulty in handling Communist problem is imp ibility using word 
c *Cowmunist" hi regard to this movement as strength of Communis! 
party in France precludes any unfavorable mention. Both believed 
continuance uncertainty Freneh-Viet Xam relation? despite signing 
proris*onal agreement fA will contribute to such activities hut stress 

m See felegr&ui 4(171, tnfvu* 

Connnuni- ire already in French Indochina (no Russians) and 
close watch over developments must be maintained as agencies outside 
French Indochina are undoubtedly supplying propaganda. 

This telegram $74 to Department, repeated as 2 Nanking. Depart- 
ment pie repeat Paris. 


SSl&Dft/!) 174fl:THr-r.nn 

The Ambaxmdor In Frnnch (C ry) to the && nj of State 

COXTTOEntial Pakis. September 17* 1940— 5 p. m. 

[Received ptentber IT — 8:24 p. nu] 

4G71. A1 final conference with French September II. Tin Chi Miuh 
signed ioini declaration and nwtfm nirefidi and denarfed few horn's 
later for TWon to sail for Saigon. Agreement will he submitted to 
French Cabinet tomorrow 01 and after expected approval, given to 

a *Tiit* French Oimtfl of Ministers approved the agreement on Seji i ~}%: 

the text was transmitted to rteisiirtiiicKt in despatch 6203, Septemb 20* 1 f> ? i : P 

frn.: ['.'iris; neither prhi i rl 

press on September W. Following are essential pointsof agri ent 
summarised From text obtained from Foreign Office, 

Joint declaration emphasizes a.*Erecm of March fi, 194fi, still in 
eftVH hut wodit* rirewdi providing provisional solutions of urgent 
problems was necessary until permanent and definitive agreement 
conhl be re: • !. Date and procedure for referendum in Cochin 
C),ii! i is to he fixed later* Ii is expected Fontalnebleau conference 
will be resumed in January in 17. 

Summaries of numbered j raplis of M&rlw ■■'■■..-. fi Follow: 

1. Reciprocal u demo ic* ! rights for citizens of one country m 
territorv of other* 

2. Recommit inn of reehirocal i». / rights. French pro v 
ini?itionedor*e'xedin*VietXaintoi d, 

i. French Fchoo's to operate freely in Viet Nam; Pasteur instirutt 
to be restored in French. 

4- Viet Xam to : ' France prion tj win king advi , tech- 

nicians or t lu-Ms. 

• "». Pi tied in French t'> to bi single currency for Indochin 
whli I iiu'i'"]- • lerindochii temporary bank of b 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

0. Establishes customs union and free trade within Indochii 

7* Provides for coord inn Hon of transport and communications of 
all tvws within federation and T'nton Fwp£ah . 

& Pemhng agi Jiiont on Viet Xani diplomatic relations, Mixed 
Commission will arrange consular re] rotation with neighboring 

0. Re Cochin China: (if) all fhduhur to case: (h) Mixed Commis- 
sion of general staffs to control this: (c) nil political and military 
prisoners to be released except those accused of common cri : ((f) 
democratic l'hertri reciprocally guaranteed? (e) unfriendly propa- 
ganda mutually lo cease; (0 collaboration in control of ex-enemy 
citizens 'J iff) representative oi Yiet Nam accredited to High Commis- 
sioner will control execution of above provisions. 

Signed by I To Chi Minh and Manns Montet. 

It will be seen that llo Chi M'lili obtained safi tion on majority 
of point d in mytel 1591, September 12, 

Bo : ii of Foreign Office etates French g iilly satisfied with 
agreement biH would Pmvel liked to include paragraphs defining 
more nrerisely relations of Viet Nam to Indochinese federation and 
French Pnioit. They were also unsucc fid in having written in(o 
agreement provisions for disarmamenl of resistance elenyents in 
Cochin China but Bo'ssezon claims it \ orally understood with ITo 
Chi Minh fhaf h elen would hare chance of either retiring I 

Tonkin with arms and baggage or giving up arms if remaining in 
Cochin China- 

Sent Dept as 4671,, repeated I Ion ns 69&, Dept pic relay to 

Saigon as 2, 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

B5lO,00 ln-lflhi.TH.^rum 

The ( n7 ttl Srigon (Reed) to the > en tary of State 

coxfihlxtial Saioox, October 10, 1946—6 p. m.. 

[Received Octolier H2 — 2:03 p. m.| 

411. Meeting High Commissioner and Ho took place yi relay a? 
reported Mytel 109, Ocl IS." 2 Few details known bul understand 

■*Nft1 printed. In desjuih'li H, OefrpTier 22, l!Hfi« fttuji Hntuif, Vice GmMil 
CPfttiUiran renorhtl the return there MirOctahW" 21 of Iln fill Mfnli frwn France 
by way of Oamninh Ray. where Ui* hail euaf erred with Admiral d'Awnil en on 
October is. ami added: "Geuerims gesture* on the pari of l««ih iht* French and 
Vietnamese ereotefl an *m pa ratified rinitre-'itli . i t nubile tiuilty n eortttaUty 
between fh^hrwgnmns." fSSl&oQt, ID 2240) 

meeting most amicable with I In unusually pro-French and even de- 
nouncing Vietnam terrorist activities. So much so one recalls earlier 

rumors Ho has sold out to French. 1 i above true. que$1 ion po.*es itself 
whether I To can keep unqualified support in north, particularly in 
view of further reports of Communist character of that state. I 
still believe French Communists desire sofl pedal Communist trends 
Vietnam for political reasons and will adopt passive attitude until 
after elections. FIC vote against ion mum ion (mylel -104") is be- 

43 Not printed* it reported thai preliminary H. showed ao ove; -whelming , 

majority "voted no*' (.s:w:s tr. iron (Snajftl/lft-l&lG). 

tiered to be vote again?! left and is possible Fascist reaction against 
theory independence For native peoples. 

£510,00/10 35JG : Telegram 

The Vice Consul at Hanoi {O'SulVium) to the S tary of State 

secret Hanoi* October 25, 1046 — 11 a. m, 

[Received : 20 p. m/] 

PH. In private conversation, Ho Clii ilinh told me iha» effectiveness 
of modus vh*endi l would depend upon French actions in Cochin -China, 

"If they allow spread of democratic liberties, release political 
prisoners, and stop attacking my people, things will go well for them 
in Tonkin. Otherwise the commissions (provided IVu' in modus ri- 
vendi) will not accomplish much*-, he said. 

He added fighting in south \ ild nol stop unless French applied 
agreement locally. 

He stated Vietnamese polity remained unchanged: i.e., Xanibo 54 

"Southern district, meaning Coefcln-Cbina, 
mnrf he united to Vietnam. He thought thai French had reached 
conclusion that referendum in Cochm-China would favor unification 
and t hey ' herefore seemed to b ing ro avoid it . 

Mv said he had been promised oi oniie aid hut thought French 

would provide what ihey could if and when definite agreenienl s 

In concluding Ho said that if there was any information T required 
he would see that T obtained it. 


The Vtrt Ct t.J *>f lift no* {0 % $ulJ*r$n to th\ ^ fary of St 

s; r • ILvxor. November I, 194 fl S a* 

[Received November 2 — 12:30 » 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

101. ReBepfel 2+i^ September 0. : 2 »>, m M to S : <>on. There ap- 
parently is confute! between Vietnam and Chinese Comniunfefs. 

Reports difficult to verify indicate presence in Vietnam of Chinese 
Communists who are said to be listed as advi rs in provinces. Xum- 
ber? ore not known bni estimates run to hundreds. Traffic apparently 
is directed by sea from Shanghai to Hong tiring, thence to Haiphong, 

However- any reports concerning pi j ce of Cliinese Communists 
in Haiphong itself shouM he regarded with suspicion. Pirates from 
Son*h Chinp have combined with Chinese Army deserters to black* 
mail Clvnese congregating there. While calling themselves Com- 
miii : , thev are actually outlaw's. 


S51Q.0A/1 1 29 EA: TefoffTOm 

The Ambasm in Fi {^afjfery) to the Secretary of Statt 

•? Repeated l»y the Depart] : \o Hanoi as 2?«v 17% nml to Saigon as No. 200, 

secret Paws, November : [016 3 p. fin. 

[Received Xovember 29 — 12 : 53 p. m/| 

5857. Tlie French are verj concerned over developments in Tmh 
china. A high Foreign Minis* rv official sa'd thev are particularly 
worried because they have "positive proof thai Ho Chi Minh is in 
direct con*acl with Moscow and is receiving advice and instruct! 
from the Soviets." ■** 

••Consul Reert. In \eh pain 4153. !■ I*W>, 3 p. m.. from Saferoi. U\ 

spans? rp'wrtefl ")!!i''nn:v tnv pnutacfa rfiutlriii generally ilevtli »] -niprif of Com- 
!sl >| <i'Uxv in FIC. Himfly [n Tonkin. Nonli Annum". it? prevlmi*}? ttrfegrapft 

(.^niOjMt/l^-iMt;!. ITafml had - a nn . : - nt return p»s juu! Ae^patehes In 

i . ;\r>] in iViuinu: nt Haiphong between Freneh and Vietnam forget* >[. 

Vi-vii::' 1 -!' 23, fttihiwiiig vifiutts incidents earUei French ultimatum to 

Viet an ai to evaluate certain areas. 

Repeated London as 7S0> Moscow as E1.6. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


831G.0U I ■' MUrTrfcgnuii 

The Vice Consul at lLnu/t (O'SuIUemi) to the Secretary of State** 

-T J;<.'i'f".-iirti hy the D tnumf to Parts In telegram] 6332, Dec* 5, ItW 

T p, m. 

secret Hani u, December 3, 1 JM (i —noon, 

[Received December -l — I a. hi,] 

131. ReDeptel 15, November ».■ Possibility ITo Chi Minh in 

& %> 

■■ fniitn<'- . J>, - 

— — — - * 4 

contact Moscow suggested my telegram 00, October .29® bat have no 

"Not printed; 

further information available. 

Am beginning believe Flo following line which v ill keep liim in 
contact with French and will assure pertain amount Freiu-h influenc 
here after three ICys united as sugj led Deplel 241, September to 
Saigon. Then, if :md when, Convmimist Govt establ 1 in Fnmec, 
Vietnam Govt will progressively apply Marx principles. 

However, thnt French should only now become concerned with tl 
velopineni is peculiar. Un Govt '" sow seeds more nationalist than 

** Governmpul tvf the fal-on <>f rntiocbTnese elates, 
year ago* French to mv certain I knowledge?] have known since 18 

that (?) is Ko (hi Minh ( ?) [apparent garble] stands very high in 
Third International. They further have strongly s j ected for at 
It that if fro was not receiving instructions from Moscow it 

was only ! use of technical difficulties in transmission. Tt is fur- 
ther very peculiar that Fi onceni Id be brought to Dep 
attention at very moment when French apparently ,\r? heginnii to 
[apparent omi i n] program in Tonkin and when French i 
preparing to force Vietnam Govt to collaborate on French tei ms or to 
establish puppet govt in its place, 

French t oneem over Communist may well becfevised to divert Depths 
attention from French policy in Indochina. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


851G « 00/12 ~3 y ] 6s Confidential File 





December J? 9 19 ] i6 





Assume you will sec Ho in Hanoi and offer following 
summary our present thanking as guide * 

Keep in mind Ho ! s clear record as agent International 
communism* absence evidence recantation Moscow affilia 


tionsj confused political situation Fra- ce and support 
Ho receiving French Communist Party. Least desirable 
eventuality would be establishment Comrmnist-doininated, 
Moscow-oriented state Indochina in view DEPT, which most 
interested IKFO strength non-communist elements Vietnam. 
Report fully , repeating or requesting DEPT repeat Paris. 

Recent occurrences fonkin cause deep concern* Con- 
sider March 6 accord and modus vivendi as result peaceful 
negotiation provide basis settlement outstanding questions 
between France and Vietnam and impose responsibility both 
sides not prejudice future, particularly forthcoming 
Fontainobleau Conference, by resort force, Unsettled 
situation such as pertains certain to offer provocations 
both sides 5 but for this reason conciliators patient atti- 
tude especially necessary. Intransigence either side and 
disposition exploit incidents can only retard economic re- 
habilitation Indochina and cause indefinite postponement 
conditions cooperation France and Vietnam which both 
agree essential. 

If Ho takes stand non-implementation promise by 
i of Cochinch: i relieves Vietnam respon: 

bility compliance with agreements, you might if you 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



consider advisable raise question \ ther he believes 
referendum after such long disorder could produce worth- 
while result and whether he considers compromise on status 
Cochinchina could possibly be reached through negotiation 

May say American people have welcomed attainments 
Jndochinese in efforts realise praiseworthy aspirations 
greater autonomy in framework democratic institutions 
and it wo be regrettable should this interest and 
sympathy be imperilled by any tendency Vietnam administra- 
tion force issues by intransigence and violence* 

May inform Ho Caff cry discussing situation Pre] h 
similar frankness. For your IKF0, ? Baudet in DEC 3 con- 
versation stated 1) no question reconciles t Indochina as 
such would be counter French public opinion ^nd probably 
beyond French military resources, 2) French will con- 
tinue base policy March 6 accord and modus Vivendi and 
make every e 'fort i ly then through negotiation Viet;: . 
3) French would resort forceful measures only on re- 
stricted scale in case flagrant violation agreements 
Vietnam j k) d'Argenlieu^ usefulness impaired by out- 
spoken dislike Vietnam officials and replacement perhaps 
desirable j 5) French Communists embarrassed in pose as* 
guardian French, inter-national interests by barrage 
telegraphic appeals from Vietnam, Caffery will express 
gratification this statement French policy with observa- 
tion implementation such policy should go far obviate any 

danger that 1) Vietnamese irreconcilables and extremists 

might be in position make capital of situation 2) Viet- 
namese might be turned irrevocably against West and toward 
ideologies and affiliations hostile democracies which 
could result perpetual foment Indochina with consequences 
all Southeast Asia. 

* Avoid impression US Govt making formal intervention 
this juncture* Publicity any kind would be unfortunate. 

Paris be guided foregoing* 



Ac tins 
SEA: COg burn 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

The. CoMttJ at Srttgon (/?< ed) to thi St tary of Sfrrte 

coxfu>i:xtial Sausox. Decemtar (I k l M>— l j> .m. 

[Received Dceenilier 7 — IL: 12 p. uk] 

472, During risirs Mortal to high French ofiic*iu.1s latter almost 
invariaWv si it'll desire arrive at peaceable settlement with 

Vietnam, comment tug difficulty dealing with Vietnam and that Tat- 
ter almost always tried put poljttcal aspect toevensimpl - economic 
negotiations, and hinting France could and would go only so far in 
I lie desired settlement. C > j i interesting remark by Commissioner for 
Finance was to eft eel France nol working for political federation in 
French Tndo-China but rather build up economic federation in which 
all iih ] r~ would be represented ami projected — he pointed out in- 
ability Vietnam unci and purely economic miestions and piv.-^m 
indifference to such nr'mfrrv matters as affec* the national economy. 
He and another high official Fitvssed willingness even desire for for- 
eign capital Inves'ments in FJC if they were for constructive pur- 
pose? and not (mentioning Chinese specifically) speculative. Com- 
missioner for Fii t . however, recommending foreign capital si Id 
be united with French knowledge conditions. In above connection 
question is raided whether Fivueh would insist upon lar<*er share 
capital and ortwjorHv boai*d d tors. Commissioner for Econnuiii 
Affair was optimistic for n year's fir* crop. estunaMn" at least 
250.00H tons exportable sumhis and if noHtical conations iinnrove as 
much ps ftOfllOOO; Prospect for rubber n.ot sob^gh'l (perhaps 30,< 
35.000 tons^ unh-s labor Question solved and i^n+io^cd plan under 
study imi 1 > Chines coolies tmt said V*C native? v n ■ ;iM in 

sibly not reaH kindly to this. Mentioned aho allocations of FTC 
rice evpor*s Khis year have not been taken up conmVMv. Among 
other points Commissioner for Political Affairs stated personnel all 
mixed commissions envisaged by wpdiw rifepd* have b*en nanwtbut 
still disci ioji where thev are to niee* — und^vsNnd Mixed Military 
Commission has fein|Kn*ar^vsuspei work in Hanoi until rft'tu 

tion is clarified. Almost a 1 ! officials remarked in one form or another 
Commnnis' cltaracter of regime in north and one stated specifically 
Soviet mission her (inytel 131, November 21 ;t ) lias already violated 

"Not printed 

its undertaking not to ens e in political activities in FIC. 

In coinmen' above and i ions telegrams feel French wouhl . 
eepF solution protecting intet hut will only go so far (witne 
present stifferat f ihtde) but hesitate believe French wonhl en#*w* uuon 
full ?cale unwary operations ui;l. iHtfcH" forced. French linear 

to realize ho h frer tio ib'emain'ain closed door here and non-French 
interests will have chance to parti ■ In in can . H o Iri li economic 

fusibilities. Pefore this ran happen political situation must he 
, hd and «n doing tins Cochin China question will be turnhur point — 
still believe French "ill find it cftftHilt to Fsvve Cochin Clnna ui 
prepaid to fight, for n iefnam and French ti 

Cochin Chin will join former de pite dislike of Tonkinc? and 
fear of lonomi l political exploitation by them. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

$510,00/12 174G: Circular Mmntm 

The Srjufury of Sfttte fo Certain JIfesiom Abr I :T 
tT .\t London, M< .-nu'. and Xnntcing. 

WASTfixoTox, December 17, 1946—1 :03 p. m, 

SECRET FOB CHfi;!' or M i>;-WX 

Basic Fincxcii-VirrxAMi.sK Difj iculitcs 

-After conversations with French and Vietnamese and 

British, .Chinese and US Consuls Hanoi Mr. Abbot ilotlnU who is at 
present in SEA, has developed views in which Consul Saigon con- 
curs alouj* th 'Mowing lines ; 7 

"Telesraw 47& D< r 1*J. 1040, 5 p. m., from Rateoii f£31G.0ti/l2 i 

tr.'ifr-ti'iri! il Mr. >i iffat's report in whlcll lit 1 si • I ft? llclcl left LlaiMU. mi D« smt- 
i r i> lirfun reeetviitj Mie t>&]KirtuiCMit"« to mi 5M1TJ # December ■">, 3 p. .m., p. — • . 

The Vietnam Government is in control of n *inall Communis* Egroiip 
possibly in indirect touch with Mas i o\v and direct touch with Ycnan. 
A nationalist group is utilizing Communist party techniques and 
discipline with wh"n*h they are familiar* The people are conserve 
fcive Inndowne is and at tempts to -comnutnize tb« condary 

and would await sim fit! operation of a j malis'l e. Appar- 
ently some leaders, like* Ho Chi ifiuh, e< Ii r collaboration with the 
French essential: those like Giap : would avoid collaboration fearing 

French domination Imi iitight not reject French influence and aid. 
Jvationalisl sentiment runs deep among the \lel iwse and does op- 
position to tlu i French, hi liey mi| I >rn against all whites. 

French infl e is impor*itui not only as an Antidote to Soviet i 
flirenre bin (<• project Vietnam and SEA from future Chinese im- 
perialism. Delay in achii ir a settlement v. ill ] sively di- 
minish i he possibility of ultimate French infiuen< 

The in y of both French and Viet™ " iaJs i : questional >le 

in connection with recent incidents, O'SulIivan k 1 -'-- rt>* Vwt 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 

clear that with a drfferenl French commander af T r : 1 1 ^ . T l . •■ 1 1 1^- than 
Colonel Debes, who is notorious for graft and brutality and who has 
admitted thai he cannot control U\< own troops, the trouble might have 
been confined to the original incident! . 

According to the French, lite Viefi iinu enlarge their clai 
each agreement and an 1 so impractical ami doctrinaire th;n all e< 
versa t tons are ineffectual. The Vietnamese Feel that the French 
renege on each agreement and aiv trying to reestablish control. How- 
ever, both say they have approximately the same obj ires, although 
Giap says Vietnam opposes a political Indoehincs ration but 

f avors n federation, dealing with common economic probl . StoiEat 
has mentioned to the French tin nt basic troubles: [ft) co 

plete mutual distrust, (i) failure of tlie French lo resolve their own 
views on "free state within French Tnion", (r) almost childish Viet tra- 
me ' attitude and knowledge i I ik questions and vagne grop- 

ing for "independence* 1 * Agreement cannol 1> reached by trying to 
reach accords on incidental problem Basic Vietnam powers and 
relations with France must first I i iblishe.t. JCot only new f 
are needed but neutral good offices even mediation nun be e iial. 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

83lC.0ft/13-2f>4G : Circular tr[.- t ;im 

The Secrettwy of Shift to Ci vtuhx Diplomatic and Con&ulitr r$* 1 
** At Moscow, Nanking, and Salami. 

( >xfiiu:xi ial Washixgtox, December 20, If) !(> — 10 n. m. 

Ami) Paris states Motttet, Minister Ovci^eas* will leave soon visit 
all part* Tticloclunn confer with Tin ('hi Minh after which he will go 
Xa^ki ,wv (Vsh 1 ^ Chinese n*hi*ions with Indochina. TVAr/reiltieu will 
arrive Indochina same time as Jfontct Caffery says- 5 * question 

French hoticv Indochina wa> important i >r dnrtnjr receni political 
crisis^ omiMbti betw* ^hnrn'v meraaringiy divided on subject* Loft- 
irirfs purees defemh Ml policy inward Vietnam* acenstn* 

cV.\ r<>vidj ( >u, French mililat'v. civilian anthori'ips T ndochina of sabo- 
tu^-Infv >t ;i r i: n-eiiifNU and m, rirentft. Radical Socialists ."MRP 
and o*her center and H«rh*wi?vff nhrties h crnwl JEontel* nf giving 
away Fiwcels mpsf valuable colony, demanded firmer atlihide toward 
Ho :» » » ' I Y 'm. In speech to Assembly, Communis Duc^os spoke 
of peed ,,ir no'icv nrotpctinsr inter* ! 1 i h ui'inn, maintaining in- 
tero-rs France everywhere in world. TTe warned France rauri not 
make Tndocbina same mistakes tha* cofI her pnsiHon Levant. Thb- 
modi i <>te bu' crvptic statement i cts recent Communist caution re 
Indochmo which nmeraPv interpreted as designed avoid onnoaiiig 
pnhlip oi>into« which fa ipct »nsflv nnvio its over i >-il>"dit\ losing 
In do ••Vi>i-'». C- 1 " ItWv remark? TVHun Govt's d^ri-ar.n -pud both Moiltet, 
d'Arjreid'ii-ii Indochina ,-oem> W compromise which avoids any de- 
cision J.^t\Tp rt, *'I nni m ;M<r advocates of finn and cnnciltatorv policy. 
He doubts wjiefj'ors.'idi can hope solve sue* fully seriot crisis 

which arisen Indochina*. 


Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 

831G.flfl 12 2:1441 

Mcmomndmn hy flu Director of the Office of Far E'Ufern Affffirs 
(I'//ifv/i/) ft) th» VndcT S 1 } tmy of Sftrfe [Ai >) 

nYA<ntxr,TON\] D ceml S3, 1946- 

The serious implications of the fighring between the French and 
tin? Vietnamese which tools place in the T »se towns of Haiphoivg 

and Lnn hi during the week of November 20—27 w noted in a 
memorandum to von of Xorember 2G. W It was feared at that time 

** Not priiifWL 

iat a si i down l>y force was in tlie making This now appears to 
have eventuated; V**r the past six days* open war lias been raging in 
Tonkin and a1 several points in Annam. The Vietnamese Govern- 
ment has (led Hanoi and t lie French are savoring to clear the city 
of remaining Vietnamese guerillas with plain . and tanks. Vietname 
casualties dnring the pasf month an probably now well over 2,000, 
Although French casualties have been far lighter, Sainteny (Oommi 
sioner for Tonkin and northern Animm) was himself seriously 
wounded four days ago. 

Yon may w*$h to make the following points when vou see Ambits* 
sador Bonnei this aftt moon : 

1. AVe are deeplv concerned bv the oi eak of war in kin and 
Ainniin and by the apparent severance of mosl of the ntacts between 
the French and the Vietnamese and am fully awar the unhappy 
position in which the French have been placed ; 

% AVe are gratified by tlie news that M. Moutet Ofinister for Over- 
seas France 1 is proceeding hunieditfteiv by air to Indochina to obtai 
first-hand information on the situation; 

& AVe are aware fhftt such unsettled condemns a? now prevail in 
northern Indochina offer provocation to outside interference and are 
disturbed lest: 

a. The co I I e brought up before the Security Council . i\ threat 

to peace; 

h. Oil'^r powers attemrct pnr»e form of intervention, in wh?ch con- 
nection *f mav he noted that the Chinese press ha? reported that the 
dispatch of inese *roops f « the :r\ ; lv»*nfij coi sidererl owing to 
the* heavy los sustained by the local Chinese in the November 

/>./ / information: 


Although r hc French in Indochina hare made fa aching paper- 
ed ions to the A'u'namee desire for antou< tiy, French actions 
on the ■•■. havebei n directed f owatd whittlim »wn the powers and 
the territorial extent of tlie Vie , "free state". This, n the 
Vietnamese have conttrnned io L At the same t»n the French 
themselves adi n( thi they lack the military stremtfh to re juer 
the country. In brief, wKh inadequate forces, with public opinion 
sbamlv at i ' . with n povemm nf tendered largely i tFective 
throt^h internal division, the French have fried to accompli in 
Indn hina wh;*t a ' f united RrHain has found it i rise to 
at; • in Burma. Riven the pi element in tht -' t-i u 

m v \u • tntiinie incl Finite! v. 




Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 

In connexion with the possibility of Chinese intervention in Titdo- 
china, tlit* Chinese Emba? j in London lias approached tin* Foreign 
Ofii'-e to oronosc ioim Chinese British intervention in Indochina and 
the Chinese Embassy in Paris has approached our Emh •-,- in Parts 
to prono?e Chinese British- American intervention, It is believed that 
the Chinese Embassy here may approach us to tin* same purpose. If 
so, i( h considered (hat vre-should reply as the British replied, to i ]*e 
effec' that Mnutet is en route to Iudiv! i to review the situaf ion, that 
the French line in Indochina will probablv ho clarified as. French 
internal pontics emerpe from their pi m confusion, and that an 
offer of mediation at this time would probably be resented and 


rejected by ihe French. 

J[onx] C[-vwer] V[ix»t.\t] 

85lO»flfl 1" 2;M0 : Tt'fojrrnin 

The Vice ('■■■ id at Hanoi (0*SuUicttn) to fh< s< - retary of State 

Secret Haxoi, December 23, 1948 — fl p. m. 

[Keci 1 De tber 24— l : 85 p. m.] 
154. Reasons why Vietnamese attacked French I 19 


However, theories here are: (1) Resnli ordefs from Sfoseoiv ('<) 
possibly ^ieodv to nn 1 1 Rnutlieasi Asia, (h) possibly to *?ive French 
Commnnisi Party, should H fa! ower when t i' Blom Rovern- 
menf <r<>"-- opivwtfimil v to irrak? rniirk favorable . i lenvnii with Vuf- 
tium ' Urns en^Wln^ French Coiin v ninfc*s to pose as "protectors of 
French inter thereby inemi^injrc CP strwpjth hi Fr^nee; (2) Re- 
sult >>' -Javanese obtained «n Holland bv fi<*htin«: while 
Tie 1 ' a('n*c -<\- Vietnamese apparently l I all hope satisfactory settle* 
men! irh^n r**unid*Ai^ lieu announced. 
Kepeat to Paris. 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 





„ Decemb i ■ . P 19 ! i6 
I\IY: :: 7 ASSY 

6586 ■ 

The Under Secretary asked Bonnet to call yesterday 
afternoon to discuss the situation in Indochina. 
Mr, Acheson said that we are deeply concerned by the out- 
break of hostilities in Tonkin and A m and are fully 
aware of the unhappy situation in which the French find 
themselves. We had anticipated such a .situation de- 
veloping in November and events have confirmed our 
fears. While we have no wish to offer to mediate under 
present conditions we do want the French GOVT to kr 
that we are ready and willing to do anything which it 
might consider helpful in the circumstances. We have 
been gratified to learn of Moutet's mission and have 
confidence in his mode bion and broad viewpoint . \!e 
believe however that the situation is highly li-iflaii tory 
and if present unsettled conditions continue 3 there is 
a possibility that other powers might attempt to bring 
the matter up before the Security Council. If this 
happens, as in the case of Indonesia } the question will 
arise whether the matter is one of purely French internal 
concern or a situation likely to disturb the peace. 
Other powers might likewise attempt some form of inter- 
vention as has been sn^ested in the Chinese pres^. We 
would be opposed to such steps , but from every point of 
view it f *s important that the question be settled as 
soon as possible. Mr. Acheson added that he v dered 
whether the French would attempt to reconquer the 
country through mil it a force which was a step that the 
British had found unwise to attempt in Bur . 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 


Bonnet said that he had little direct info with 
regard to the present situation in Indochina but referred 
to Loon Blum 1 8 speech in the- Assembly this morning. He 
summarised important points of the speech which he 
said clearly indicated that Blum's policy is to settle 
the question as far as .-possible by conciliatory means 
and that this was the purpose of Mount's visit. He 
said that Blum had reiterated that French policy is to 
assure the independence (within the French empire) of 
Viet Nam and complete self GOVT* It was unfortunate 
that it had been impossible up to the present to imple- 
ment the far reaching concessions embodied in the 
French agreement with Viet Nam, 

Ho said that personally he would be surprised if 
the Chinese brought the question up before the Security 
Council at this time for he felt that the Nanking GOVT 
was sympathetic to the French position in Indochina, 
He concluded by saying that he would inform his GOVT 
of our friendly interest and of our deep concern over 
the situation and let us know the reaction from Paris. 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By; NWD Date; 201 1 

Tit*- Acting Si cretary of Flute to th Charge //< tfu United Kingd&i 


secret WlvsinxOTOX, I k seemlier 27. 19iti — 7 p. in. 

SS17. Uriels 10216, Dec 21 and 10245, Dec 24.** Xo Chinese pro- 

p See ftiotunte. Pi — . 

sal received hew for intervention Indochina. Event such approach 
Depi reaction v ill be negative with reply bused same considerations 
einpha.-ized bv l>rit FonOff in reiVtv such sas&estton hv Chinese^ 
namely (1) possibility insults from MfoittH trip, (2) likely clarifica- 
tion French Hue Indochina as I h internal politics em< from 
confusion, and (3) ainty offer of mediation would be resentfully 
rejected by French.* 

"Telegram 1027!), Ivnuier 30, in in, i p. nt.. from Lmiclcm« reported that 11 
British Furufgn Office wra«* gratified ;;t the Delia rhttentVf similar position ntid 
stated r'';!f flu iTiIiiese Eiuluissy w:i> b^ing* Informed ot Biirlsb rejection «>f tl»e 
proposed intervention hi 13 hlna fsriin.00/12-: ->. 

Sen 1 to London as S3 17- Related to Paris as BOOS; Saigon as 31! 
and Nanking as 1*214. 



TTus Conml at Saigon {Reed) to the Secretary of St 

coxfidkxtial * Saicon, December 30, 1.946 — 1 p. m. 

[Received 10: 21 p. m.] 

409. I^eclerc arrived Saturday n - p. m, with many his original Staff 

03 December 2& 

faitd] is proceeding Hanoi Tuesday. After conference with Leclei 
Moutel lefl for Cambodia, Laos and Argenlieu for Hanoi Sunday a. m. 
French making progre in north and west and proposal from 
Vicftnam military 1 r fro] withdraw his troops from city is being 
favorably consi id. Big question now with whom Moutet can deal, 
pro-Vietnam elements iiieistmg still can treat with Oobue, most ob- 
seri think lias unlikely. Solution as 1 hare previously reported 
mar be creation new Vietnam ("Ion ay under Rao Dai 

18 BBiperor of Amtain who alidlcfttecl In Aniai^t VM't, 

and/or Tarn (now in Nanking) with which )'. nch can treat wit-haul 
losing face and which will have influence with native population. 
Mnnt natives definitely tired tin* seemhi^lv endless insecurity and 
want chance resrnie peaceful life. XT-illi d'uloinatic handling, solu- 
tion can he obtained bin extremtef element will continue make trouble 
iblv lonq; time in come, Xot impossible Vietnam Government 
thus created will clahn only Tonkin. Anuam as overheard remark 
^IVmtet 'ft Tv (Vi lent Cochin China Government ) indical 

French kirlc'iis independent Cochin China. FnoneMionnbly attack 
and atrocities (Tom hro to five hundred French civilian- killed) have 
routed French feeling— even Mbutei surprisingly mil en — and 
untd all other n its exha French will 1 disinclined accc 


Department please repeal Paris,. L ,X- ag. 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

* Thr S,-. try of State to the Vice Consul at Hanoi {O'SutVerm)** 

Wr n*e riri»;«rtirn'iif also sent Information telegrams. gCiwg Hir gfst of tbis 
telegram t^> Paris. London, Xanfcing. mid Saigon, 

secret Waswixgtoj., December SI, 11)46—7 p. m. 

23. Xo objection your acting humanitarian grounds as described 

crtel i fO Dee 28 n< " or, w irli Fi eiuli agreeing, in any other strictly local, 

w In tWs h'ii •ram Vice Consul (VSuUh-ati reji >rted Mint lu» bad informed tin* 
Chinese Consul General at Hanoi thai he ir»tilcl lit* wilfiiijr m aid in an.\ eai«idJ^ 
fen whirl; Frown auUmritn-s ,f ajHirfivu] and reifiiestwl the Dpjui'fhiienfs i»- 
strs:»-r If nis "ii this point. The n*imw hrttl *hkj: I that the Victual up^ might 
wish unofficial nresewe of nrUish and Am* all 'an nmsmtur officers in any meeting 
wiiu rlie French, i -Hi.oti/u-^M 

military, non-political hit nation in order save lives. Ton should not, 
however, withoul express Depl authorization become involved any 
situation any way which could be interpreted as mediation basic politi- 
cal issues between opposing rmiftcs; For your secret info. Acting 
Secy in Dee 28 conversation with French Amb here expressed our con- 
cern outbreak hostilities an 1 our read! do anything which img] 
be con^ulered helpful bul stated we have no wish offer mediate present 
conditions Further- on receinl info that Chinese liutl aj 1 

Brit FonOff and AinKinb Paris with proposal join) mediation, Depl 
decision vastfdy< i this unieture in new certainty ni fid ejection 
by French- V*y'\t reaction also negative. Chinese desire extend in 
fluf'iK'f* Indochina wins seems clear and French Communist? ready 
make infant capital any appi Lde intervention Indochina 

u foreign imperialism.' 3 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 





Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


85?.2Vl-3^7s Secret File 






January 8, 19'+7 
7 p 


DEPT's present policy on arms and armaments approves 
QUOTE sales to France by the FLO of reasonable quantities 
of military supplies except in cases which app v to re- 
late to Indochina I c French requests for purchase 
surplus military supplies in Buraaa and Philip; ?s for 
use Indochina have been consistently refused on basis thj 
"policy which consequently should be well knowxi to F P 
and ' >G Paris o Since French have apparently stated 
their proposed purchase ammunition subject UK TEL 33 is re- 
lated to Indochina hostilities, DEPT could not approve its 
resale to them by Belgians* You may wish ii Imate as much 
to FONQFF before receipt note you anticipate. 





Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



AME3SBASSY February 3, I9V7. 

8 pm 

' There is reason for increasing concern over situation 
as it is developing in Indochina and for that reason I 
feel you might well take early occasion to have frank talk 
with Ramadier or Bidault or both so: .;hat along lines 
conversations you have already had with Blum, but at this 
time going in fact beyond position you took in those talks. 
We have only very friendliest feelings toward France and 
we are anxious in every way we can to support France in 
her fight to regain her economic, political and military 
strength and to restore herself as in fact one of major 
po rs of world. In spite any wi sunder standing which 
might have arisen in minds French in regard to our posit 3 
concerning Indochina they must appreciate that we have 
fully recognized France 1 s sovereign position in that area 
and we do not wish to have it appear that we are in any 
way endeavoring undermine that position) and French should 
know it is our desire to be helpful and we stand ready 
assist any appropriate way we can to find solution for 
Indochinose problem* At same time we cannot shut ouv 
eyes to fact that there are two sides this problem and that 
our reports indicate both a lack French understanding of 
other side (more in Saigon than in Paris) and contin 3 
existence dangerously outmoded colonial outlook and methods 
in area. Furthermore, there is no escape from fact that 
trend of times is to effect that colonial e: es in XIX 
Century sense t rapidly becoming thing of past. Action 
Brit in India a: Burma and Dutch in Indc sia are out- 
standing examples this trend, and French themselves took 
cognizance of it both in new Constitution and in their 
agreements with Vietnam, On other hand we do not lose 
sight fact that Ho Chi Mirih has direct Cc unist connections 

id it s ild be obvious that we are not interested in 
seeing colonial € ire administrations supplanted by 
philosophy and political o: ni; is r ting iron and 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 


controlled by Kremlin, Fact does remain 5 however, that a 
situation does exist in Indochina which can no longer he 
consider* I 3 if it ever was considered, to be of a local 
character c If that situation continues deteriorate some 
country in direct interest is very likely to bring matter 
I before Security Council under Chapter 11 of Charter c We 
i have no intention talcing such action ourselves at this 

time, but French will surely appreciate that we do have 
a vital interest in political and economic well being this 
area* If some country should bring matter before Securit; 
Council we wojild find it difficult to oppose an Investiga- 
tion Indochinese problem unless negotiations between par- 
ties were going on. It might be added that it would not 
in our est on be in France's Ion: range interest to 
use her veto position to keep matter from coming before 
Council* Fi Iy_v. r e_h ; ' cl solution, qf^pr sug- 
gest # It Is 1: 11 y matter for two v s "to "work out 
. themselves and from your reports and those from Indochina 
we are led to feel that both parties have endeavored to 
ke door open to some sort of set *nt« We appreciate 
fact that Viet i started present fighting in Indochina 
on December 3.9 and that this action has made it more diffi- 
cult for French to adopt a position of generosity and ■ 
conciliation* Nevertheless we hope that French will 
find it possible to be more than generous in trying to 
find a solution* 


- r TCulberts on 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By; NWD Date; 201 1 


&5lG»00/5f-13^7s Secret File 



Hay 13, 19^7. 

8 pin 


We becoming increasingly concerned by slow progress 
tbtfard settlement Indochina dispute. We fully appreciate 
French are making effort roach satisfactory settlement and 
hope visit Co; sioner Boll&ert to Indochina will produce 
concrete results* The following considerations, however , 
are submitted for your use any conversations you may have 
with French authorities at appropriate time this subject* 
We recognize it night not be desirable make such approach . 
to newly constituted government in first days its reorgani- 
zation, but nevertheless feel early appropriate opportunity 
might be found inform Trench Gov of our concern in this 

Key our position is our awareness that in respect 
developments affecting position Western democratic powers 
in southern Asia, we essentially in same boat as French, 

also as British and Dutch, 

cannot conceit setbacks 

close as so- 

to long-range interests France which would not also be 
setbacks our own, ' Conversely we should regard 
elation France and members French Union as not only to 
advantage peoples concerned, but indirectly our own- 

In our view, south' Asia in critical phase its 
history with seven new nations in process achieving or 
struggling independence or autonomy* r iese nations include 
quarter inhabit is world and their future course, ow; : 
sheer weight populations, resources they command, and 
strategic location* will be momentous factor world stabil- 
ity. Follow' \g relaxation European controls, internal 
racial, religious, and national differences could plunge 
new nations bo violent discord, or aire ad; apparent 
anti tern Pan-Asiatic tendencies could become dominant 
political force, or C anists could c controls V 
eonsic as best safeguard against these ev alitie-s a 



Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



8?1G.00/5»13 1 '7 

continued close association between newly-autonomous 
peoples and powers \i) ch have long been responsible their 
welfare . In particular we recognize Viet: : ; will for 
indefinite period require French material and technical 
assistance and enlightened political guidance which can 
bo provided only by nation steeped like Fra j in democratic 
tradition and confirmed in respect human liberties and 
\i or tb ind i v idua 1 » 

We equally convinced, however, such association must 
be voluntary to be lasting and achieve results, and that 
protraction present situation Indochina can only destroy 
basis voluntary cooperation, leave legacy permanent bitter- 
ness 5 and irrevocably alienate Vietnamese from France and 
those values represented by France and other Western democra- 
cies * 

While fully appreciating difficulties French position 
this conflict , we feel there is danger in any arrangement 
which might pro e Vietnamese oppc Ity compare unfavor- 
ably their own position and that of other peoples southern 
Asia who have made tremendous strides toward autonomy 
since war* 

While we are still ready and willing do anything we 
can which might be considered helpful, French will understand 
we not attempting come forward with any solution our own 
or intervene in situation* However, they will also under- 
stand wo inescapably concerned with situation Far East 
generally, upon which developments Indochina likely have 
profound effect* 

Plain fact is that Western democratic syst is on 
defensive in almost all emergent nations sou rh Asia and, 
because identified by peoples these nations with what they 
have considered fori r denial their ri ts, is ticularly 
vulnerable to attacks by de; Ic leaders political 
moveno of either ultrf ationalist or Communist nature 
which promise redress and revenge past so-called wrongs 
and in : all ties, ' Signs development anti-Western Asiatic 
consciousness all ay multiplying, of which Inter-Asian 
CGEF an ple« Unanimity support for Vietnai se among 
othor Asiatic countries very striking, even lead ; to 
moves Burma, I] a, and Malaya send volunteer forces their 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


851G. 00/5- 13-7 

assistance* Vietnam cause proving rallying -cry for all 
anti-Western forces and playing in hands Communists all 
areas. We fear continuation conflict may jeopardize posi- 
tion all Western democratic powers in southern Asia and 
lead to very eventualities of which we most apprehens." * 

We confident French fully aware dangers inherent in 
situation and therefore venture express renewed hope 
they will be most generous attempt find early solution 
which, by recognizing legitimate desires Vietnamese 3 will 
restore peace and deprive anti-democratic forces of 
powerful weapon . 

For your INFO, evidence that French Communists arc 
being directed accelerate their agitation French colonies 
even extent lose much popular support France (URTEL 1719 
Apr 25) raay be indication Kremlin prepared sacrifice tem- 
porary gains with ^0 million French to long range colonial 
strategy with 600 million dependent people, which lends 
great urgency foregoing views * French position Indochina 
dispute since DSC 19 5 which based on Vietnam initiative 
attack j seems DEPT dangerously one-sided in ignorii g Debes 
attack Haiphong NOV 23 and under stand able Vietnam conten- 
tion that stand had be made some point view steady French 
encroachments after B 6 on authority and territory 
Vietnam (e.g., establishment Cochinchinese REP, occupation 
southern Annam and Moi Plateau, and Dalat plan French- 
dominated Federation to which Vietnam would be subservient,) 
DEPT much concerned lest French efforts find QUOTE true 
representatives Vietnam UNQUOTE with whom negotiate result 
creation impotent puppet GOVT along lines Co chinch ina 
regime, or that restoration Baodai may be attempted, 
implying democracies reduced resort monarchy as weapon 
against Communism. You may refer these further views if 
nature your conversations French appears warrant. 

Saigon and Hanoi should be guided by this TEL in 
any conversations Bollaert. 

SEA ;C0k burn 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

851G. 00/9- 11^7: Secret Pile 



US Urgent 


Sep 11 19^7 


PARIS 3>33 
For the Ambassador 

We have read with concern recent telegrams from 
OU7iO£ fleers in Indochina (repeated to you) to the 
effect that local French military are seriously con- 
■fcemplating an offensive against Vietnamese in dry 
season beginning at end this month. It is difficult 
for' us give credence these reports in light French 
econ LCj financial and food position. It is obvious 
that such an offensive,, if it took place under these 
conditions > would have serious effect on public 
opinion here which would be reflected in a Congress 
which will be called upon to consider extensive 
.financial aid for western European nations, Including 

Please make appropriate Informal Inquiries and 
report urgently. For your Info Dept considering 
approach French on apparently rapidly deterioratin 
prospects for Franco-Vietnam settlement end is" 
awaiting your reply this point. 





Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

noi, French Indochina 
September 12, 19^7 

Oct 7 ? 19'+7 

ACTION SUBJECT: Speech of Emile Bollaert on September 10 on French Policy 
PE-ene in Indochina . 







man: Washington d.c. 



I hav J the honor to refer to my telegram number 286 of 
September 11 9 8 a.m. and to report further on the speech delivered by 
EMI IE BOLLAERT y High Commissioner of France for Indo China. There are 
enclosed five copies of the speech as published by ,f L 'Entente" in a 
supplement to its regular daily edition. 

The site selected by Mr. Bollaert was HADGKG, a provincial capital 
which lies 10 miles southeast of Hanoi, and which was, for a time 5 head- 
qi bers of the Viet Ham Government after its flight from Hanoi in 
December, 19^6. Hadong apj ntly was ch n as the place for the speech 
that M. Bolleart might make reference to "tW razed city of Tonkin, in 
ruins still haunted by memories of terror' 1 . Robert Sherrod of "Time" 
had previously described it as "probably the most thoroughly -war-wrecked 
city in the world." 

The speech itself was delivered at about 5 p.m. in a publi re* 
Around M. Bollaert, when he spoke, were gathered the ver&l hundred 
civilians (white and Vietnamese) and the many military officers who had 
been invited. Some 1,500 V * largely peasant women children, 
were kept behind ropes set up to form a square in the center of which was 
the ro am that the Vietnamese guerrillas had tried to burn the ev 
previous . 

This speech n its the most important declaration of French 

policy t has been made in the last year. M. Bollaert, it will be re- 
called, was originally named H Commissioner for Indo China, replacing 
Admiral 33C DVABGEH 1TI in He tvec in Indo China ei r in 
April, and subsequently returned to Paris in Ji . 

He was in Saigon again in late July and s) ly thereafter revealed 
to the p ss that he intended to deliver a major policy declaration in 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

- - * 

Tonkin in the course of the next month. He came to Hanoi on August 7 ? 
I9V7. The Rainadier Gove erit* at that time, faced the dii ult qu- - 
t ions of the Statute of Algeria and the Municipal Election law and was 
under attack from within its own party. Bollaert* instead of delivering 
his speech* when the government. ... .Ho less than four "conseils restrients 
des 1 stres" a one full "Conseil", plus a series of private in> s 
between Bollaert* the Generals &e Pellet and Valluy* and Raanadier were 
needed to settle the final form of the speech* which I em i] 'armed, was 
much changed from the original version. 

The speech* then, was word by ;1 and sentence by sentence labori- 
ously ass* '.ed by the Raniadier Government* and is the lOj 1 conclusion 
of France policy as pursue 6 in S03 bhern Indo China for the past two yc 
For as the Frenc Hi y position in 5 has improved militarily , so 
in : lost exact ratio has declined their willingness to make concessions. 
M. Bollaert f s speech represents a definite retreat from the French 
position taken in the March 6 > 19^6* Accords* and indeed its terms on 
their face are no more liberal than the 188*4 Treaty of tl Protectorate. 

Stripped of its verbiage* the speech constituted an oblique offer to 
the Vietnamese people to bring forth a "representative government rT b 
would accept the terms offered by M.- Bollaert on wl there was to be no 
""bargaining" as this "would be in truth unworthy of such a nob" cause." 

■ lis seems to be designed ■ an escape clause for the French government 
and is directed against Ho Chi Minh with whom the French apparently v I 
deal only in a last extremity. At thepresent time* the French have no 
intention of dealing with Ho and should he accept the terms as offered* 
the French would unquestionably demand the immediate surrender of his 
arms and an" 1 t "the weapons must grow silent." 

Bollaert first defined the goal toward 1 h "the Vietnamese people 
aspire freedom within the French Union and unity of the three Kys". He 
said this freedom is in no way restricted othc han "by the limits forced 
on it by 1 t that these territories belt the French Union". 
But France* he maintained "does not take any position with regard to the 
problem" of unity of the Kys save that "she requires that the Union should 
not be made under pressure and according to totalit an f c iver- 
sally condemned 11 . Then should the Union be derived from the popular wish 
duly e: d ? local particularisms should be preserved* and the cohesion 
of the Annamii - countries should "be founded not on the interest of only 
one but on the confidence and friendi Lp of all",, fa stated. 

As : the si s. separated or unified as they wish* M. Bollaert said 
"we are ready to hand over to the fully qualified governmerr manage- 
me of public affi " whic eans the org: on wit! ench 
i erence of "its repr ". " stitutions* judicial pre dings* it 
own fii ie* education, social legislation, end hospitals". 

jhe states of the p : la* M. Boll- x fc i ,- the facts of 
geo ( *hy e cert ■ 11 rt tire common 

He 1 ed out t "all rj L people" will cc de that among oth 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



j .. 

things., a "common customs sy. m, coramon currency , and common policy of 
immigration" is necessary. (This 1 vras added because of the prob- 
lems posed by the oximity of China,) These states, M. Bollaert con- 
tinued , will also plan toge r the reconstruction of indo China in 
which "of course j we (the French) have our own point of view". 

"This collaboration is, after all. unavoidable and all those con- 
cerned (the French Republic to Lug one of them) will have to decide- 
together how, under the supe: ion of the K Ccmnriissioner, ........ 

also be "commissioners of the republic" to defend eh 

economic and cultural int n . 

"The High Commissioner, or his deli c (whose funciio or position 
is not specified) , will take good care that our countrymen are enabled 
to enjoy all the democratic freedom enjoyed by the ci1 Lzens of the states 
belonging to the Union and will see to it that our concerns do i fare 
worse than local ones; the citizens and concerns of Indochina being, in 
return, certain of finding the same adv; jes in Frar The Hi - 
mission: r or his deleg: will therefore 1st on asc aiming \ the 

personal and material status of French subjects is never one-sidedly 
cl &•" 

And finally, M. Bollaert said, the High Commissioner will have a 
special status drawn up for the "soul and northern minorities of 
Indo China whose right: considered by the French as having a sacred 
character . " 

All the Indochinese states will be, H- Bollaert said, in the French 
Union which "must frame in the autonomy of the Indo Chinese people... it 
does not restrain private immunities. . .the F ± Union is resilient and 
dynamic enough to allow a nation to develop fr :Jy in framewoa is 
an aggregate of forces, ever on the move, each through a never ceasing 
interplay of exchange, giving and taking at one and the same time... it is 

the French Union that men will find their raison d'etre". 


But, he added, the French Union can have only one i and one diplo- 

y, "The police forces of the associated states of Indo China will 
assure in time of peace internal order on their own territory : in case 
of foreign aggression, they will be integrated in the i med forces of ti 
Frei Union for the defense of their countries and of the Union," 

M. Bollaert also promised that the French "would not take re; sals 
and that all political and military prisoners would be liberated recipro- 
cally. He j th> at the "originr -s of the December 1 aggres- 
sion" who h: . lost "■ h of their credit with the French r le". He 
extolled the French Unio:> I its act icnt and possibi? b 
some h and conel i: 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


■%**■ fcj h 

w * — «■ -j ** L 

"This peace depends upon you (the Vietnamese people) to obtain it." 


Individual States 

The speech left th way open for u ication of the three Kys which 
the French feel as a foregone conclusion. The French cleverly do not 
propose any solution "but leave the burden of preparing a plan acceptable 
to all Kys in the hands of the Vietnamese. 

The status of the states, either unified or separate , is one of 
"liberty arid freedom" within the French Union. There is no recof don 
of Vietnam as an "etat Libre" , such as was done in the March 6 agreement. 
There is nowhere any mention of "independence" save in the t-t dent by 
. Bollaert in Vietnamese; "BOC LAP TRONG KHOI LAM KEEP THAT" (indepen- 
dence within the framework of the French Union.) Nor will France hand 
over anything to the States which resembles "sovereignty". Rather she 
will give only "public administration". 

Tiiis omission is commented upon by the AFP in a September 12 despatch 
from Hanoi as follows: 

"On the other hand, French circles expressed ap; elation for the 
liberalism of the French oent, a liberalism which may reduce the 
tension. It is only regretted that the word ' independence • , as being 
capable of producing a (favorable) psyschological shock, was not pro- 

Each state or states will organ' its representative institul as, 
its justice, its finances, its education, its social legislation mid its 

The exact judicial formula has not yet been settled, 1 er. 
Didier MACHEL, Political Counsellor to the High Commissioner, whom I 
saw aft the speech was deliv 1. pointed out it was uncertain her 
the courts of the states would have jurisdiction over French and for- 
eigners wit its territory. He did not specify whet] "i and 
Cambodians would be cc ed fc ,ers with a special status- He 
sug d, as his personal opinion, that perhr there might be a so ion 
in the establish rfc of "mixed tribunals" or possibly mixed or wholly 
French appelate courts over Vietnamese courts of first instance. 

The . :ate governments will have the help, if they so desire of "our 
functiormaires and our te icians", snot: eat from the previous 
position as only French "coir llors, technici b, and experts" were 
m oned in A Lcle *! of the Modus V: : li of Septead>er lU. Finally, 
France solemnly renounced all ace ct and indi t. France 

sol renounced r, c ct" adm5nist> ion in the June 6^ >- 3 y 

^icl -ticle 7: Efae (French) resit, bs (in Tc In) will avoid 

treating det< interic ' on in the provinces. 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 

Grouping of States 

Bollaert did not abolish the "Federation 11 . He diluted ■ watered 
it down and his staff maintain that it is dead. However, at least three 
"common services" (a euphonistic n for federal services )will exist: 
finance, immigration, and customs.. It is probably an economic fact that 
if there were no fed on in Indo C3 " it would probably be necessary 
to invent one. Bollaert indicated in his speech that there might be 
more "common services" than those he specifically mentioned. Didier 

EL maintained vehemently there would not be: that the concept of the 
Fede.v Ion > as proposed by D'Ar genii eu, had been com etely abandoned. 
However , the history of 'French administration in Indo China is not one 
to inspire confid a in such limitations as the French voir rily place 
on the activity of their services. 

Mo wlu is there any mention of the "Surete", that ubiquitous 
French combination of an FBI (for Europeans) and a Gestapo (for Vietnamese). 
MICHEL maintained the ete of the state or st s which « ould 
be in the hands of the local government. He said that in Laos and Cambodia 
there was not a single French member of the Surete which entirely in 
the: hands of the indigenous peoples. He considered that during the early 
stages of development in Vietnam, there would be two Suretes which would 
then be merged as gradually French personnel would be eliminated. "You 
will understand, I believe, that the situation in Tonkin is not such that 
we can eliminate , at the present time, the French Surete completely with- 
out danger to French lives 11 , he said. 

There is no good explanation of why Bollaert did not mention the 
eventual disappearance of the Surete in his speech. Eor ir re any 
good r by it was left to Pr er RAXJADIER rather than Bollaert to 
state in a Paris Press Conference tha-t the goveriMent "undertook to elimi- 
nate th network of the administrative corps which control or direct the 
administrative service 1 ' . 

Special Status 

Special status will be prepared by the J h Commissioner for the 
minorities of the Korth a South whose rights have, r e th: war, 
assured an overwhelming "sacredness" to the French. It might be mentioned 
that th Dutch in Indo: and, for a time 5 the British in Burma developed 
similar sentiments at about, the same tme. 

The Mo Is of the south - the lauig, Xho, Meo, ITari^ Lolo, tluong, Black 
and White Thai, among others in the -rth - \ L become more or less 
special war eh- Didier MICHEL did not care to elabo 

what kind of a status the I :h propoj sd for these people. 1 is the 
logical develop ' French policy vis-a-vis minorities set as early as 
April 9, 19-6, as reveale by doc b&cfa the Vietnam government 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

- - 


. . 

»*■■!• •_* 

obtained from the French Headquarters by ways more or less devious. It 
is also interesting to note that throughout last year 5 French officials 
-stridently denied that they intended to enclose Vietnam in a framework: 
of directly admi ed French territories. 

External Relations 

Vietnam or the individual three Kys are flatly denied foreign 
representation as such. It or they -..ill have the right to ipate 
in the representation of the French Union particularly in the surround- 
ing countries where it or they have economic and cultural interests to 
defend. But Vietnamese diplomats will represent^ re Hess of their 
grade ? only the interests of the French Union. 


The States will have only armed forces which will be integrated into 
the single army of the French Union. The army of the r at libre 11 of 
March 6 has thus d ppeared although in time of peace the police forces 
of the associated states of Indo China will assure "internal order 11 . 


The Commissioners of the Republic will be attached to the local 
government. According to MICHEL* he or they will have only a very small 
staff: a political , economic * and possibly a culture J adviser or coun- 
sellor. His or their task will be to protect Fr h intea :-s # His 
position as d ned is very nebulous but it will develop great strength 
as the defender of French interests. It offers such possibilities that 
i attempt can yet be made to evaluate its workings . 


The position taken in the speech is the logical develo nt of French 
policy Is ido China. As France's military strength improved with willing- 
ness to make concessions diminished. Before French troops were in place 
in To: n ; France wa,s willing to concede recognition of Vietnam as an 
"etat libre". having its c government ? parliament > arisiy and finances. 
By the Modus Vi" idi of September 1^ Frt s demanding much strengthened 
Federation ~. i control of customs of primary importance. It on the 
willingness of the French to enforce tl customs control that the Haiphong 
incident of Hovember 21 developed. It was from the desi of the French 
to reduce the Vietname Government to impotence that the French counter- 
posit, of Ilovember 23 with its famous ultimatum was taken. 

At the present time, tl e are only two reasons for France to e 
any concessions whatsoever; world opinion (to - Lch the Indoch >se Ft h 
j been more or less immune - note the pre-', u i ; monopoly) 

and the fact ; hat they arc 3d wit) wsied resisi :e. 





Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

Bui should this resi be broken in Torn; in during the cooing 
fall campaign, there is no doubt whatsoever that the final settlement 
111 in practice be even less liberal than its present form. 

As it now stands, the French posa n as expressed by M- Boliacrt 
is an elastic instrument which wil] I .■• -ame a vise if the Vietnam Govern- 
ment is crushed but which, if this task proves beyond French military 
strength, can be stretched even to cover negotiations with Ho, 

Respectfully yours, 

James L. 1 Sullivan 
American Vice Consul 

Enclosures: Five Copies of M- Bollaert's speech on S er 10 


JLC 1 Sullivan :jcf 

cc: Consulate General Saigon 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

851G. 00/9-1 2 Vf: Secret File 

Incoming Telegram 



Rec'd September 12,19^7 
2:^0 p.m. 

PROM: Paris 

TO: Secretary of State 


NO; 5715# September: 12 j 4 p.m. 

I talked informally to Bidault along the lines ox" 
Dept ! s 3K33 September 11* He said he understood our 
point of viev; and as far as he knevr there are no plans 
for a military offensive a; nst Vietnamese in dry 
season b Inning at end this month, 


' t 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


! OF 
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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 





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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 




Control 5638 


Ree'd October l8, 19)47 

7:17 a.m. 

FROM: Nanking 

TO: Sec iary of State 

NO: 2096 , October l8, 2 p. in, 

In conversation with Embassy officer on subject of Indochina, 
Vice I IK George Yeh and Director of Europ Dept F0IJ0FF 
{pressed following vi : 

It is difficult to foresee a settlement of Indochina question 
under current French policy, which is iraing position of 
other powers, particularly China and US, extremely dif ult. 
It is unlikely that a govt can successfully be formed 
without participation of Ho Chi Minh, as Ho and his group 
are the only ones having a genuinely popular following. 
Attempts to alienate Ho f s adherents under present circumstar- 
unlikely of success. Persistence of French in present military 
cou carries danger of forcing entire freedom movement into 
hands of Extreme, Communist elements. 

Ho is regarded as Coi anist but many Vietminh leaders are not. 
Vice Minister is impressed with Ho's personality and com- 
mented that Ho was an abler individual for example thai] 
Sjahrir of Indonesian Govt, both men being personally known 
to hinu Tbe question of possible danger to China from a 
Communist -Influenced regime adjac to her southern border 
did not appear to be of critical importance. 

Tlit tional Union F3 does not have a solid popular base. 
It cons: in th n of a group of prominent fig s and 
If these lead s were removed from the picture (the recent 

-sassinations in Saigon and Hanoi e recalled) the move- 
ment would probably h: v ble force left. As rega Is Bao- 

Dai IL : 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


#2096 , October 18, 2 p.m., from Nanking 

Dai "the Chinese people would not regard favorably the 
reestablisbment of a monarchy in Indochina* Bao-Dai 
has not recently been in Hanking (RED] L 1205 5 
September 29) and POKOPF officials made oblique reference 
to a "French story" to that effect* 

Embassy comment: while no direct statement was vouch- 
safed by F0N0FF officials as to Chinese attitude toward 
National Union or Nguyen Hai I ■ , foregoing would 
appear to indicate P0N0PF does not contemplate support 
of Be o -Dai who would seem to be an indispensable element 
in present Frenc plans and that a dubious view, at best, 
is taken of National Union move) b. As Dept is aware 
there are diverse Chinese elements interested in the 
Indochina situation and views given above do not purport 
to represent crystallised Chinese attitude. No allusion w 
made during interview to possible mediation by third power 
or powers. 





Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 





— — ^- — 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


: • • -Washington, 1110 P' n ' 






Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers. 

. , \ 
Afr assy, I'gv." Delhi , has reported following regarding 
the Government of India's attitude toward Indoel a as fur- 
nished by off ic&ial- External .Affairs Depts 

\ / ■ 

"As frequently expressed by Kehru>y India has deep sym- 
pathy for efforts southeast Asian countries fulfill national 
•■ ' aspirations' mid improve their peoples living standards, 
notwithstanding this India will hesitate submit question 
Indochina Uh because (onn) Franco as permanent , member 00 
nJ2*j could veto any action contrary French interests and (tv/o) 
^ GDI not convinced Vietnam exorcises de facte authority 

Indochina or, in contrast- Indonesia s it* represents viet? joint 
majority Indochinese. For. time being India* s sympathy 
"-. Indochinese aspirations viill take negative forms such as 
refusing permit India be used as base French operations in 
; Indochj t and GOI crill not take positive steps toward inter- 
vention. Lastly India v/oiuM not like submit In' Lncbe 
question UH as long as GOI GO? dispute regarding Kashmir 
under cons -ion by DJjN ,< . 

- ! 

a i 

■ ■' ' "Embassy feels that above represents true picture of 
External Affairs Kinigtry's attitude*. This attit ?, ho» r 



ver, subject to reversal in case Kehru becomes imbued 
eel In;: that French oppressing Indechinese in v.Ic ■: lis - 

frcouent emotional approach such problems. . Extremely un- 
. likelv India V/ill take any action regarding Indochina until 

decision re dispute 7/ 1th .Pakistan handed d by in. 1 ' 










1 ■ * 


VAt tefcs Bangkok, Lordon, lhattqtt> Kankingj j^ ^^ ^ J^" 
\/ Pandit Jayaharlal Kehru, Indian Pri, ;.: inis t er . 










.• r: 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 

NM) Project Number: NND 63310. By: NWI.) Dale: 201 I 






Control k r [0 

February 3 5 19I18 7 p.m. 

Mil Attache Bangkok reports Pham Ngoc Thach one of 
Ho Chi Miiih's chief lieutenants in cours recent visit 
(l) said he departing for India 29 Jan with petition 
signed by Ho Chi Mirih requesting US intervention (2) con- 
firmed suspicion previously voiced by AjjER correspondent 
of imminent offensive which certain involve fighting in 
city Saigon, 

Sent Saigon as 21 ; rptd New Delhi as 
Saigon repeat Hanoi. 


KAR^ ij, 

Colonel Reginald F. C, Vance 

"President of the Brovisional Government of Vietnam Democratic 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 


depart: c of sta { 


ntrol 588U 
Rec'd February 19, 19^8 
12:03 p.m. 

FROM: Hanoi 


NO : 

Secretary State 
31 , February 19 > No 

Re APF story February 17 Cannes that Bao Dai had postponed departure 

Kong for indefinite period, \ ;lly reliable Vietnamese source 
gives following summary recent events. 

At 1 ong conference December with Bollaert, Bao Dai signed accord 
of two articles: (l) France recognizes independence and unity Vietnam; 
(2) once independent , Vietnam will freely adhere to French union. When 
General Xuan, Tran Van Ly, and Diem ( according this source continu 



eminence grise" E&tionalist) met Bao Dai Hong Kong after Bai dalong 
conference. Diem persuaded Bao Dai signature of above accord was ti- 
cal error, that Vietnam should only bind itself to France by alliance, 
not French union. (To \: tent this position taken for bargaining 

purposes not clear). Finally decided best method of allowing Bao Dai 

'thdraw gracefully from cc dtment was to take position he s: 1 d only 
as individual, sot for hi 3 then have "assei Ly of notables" 
call for his return Indochina as emperor of state freely allic i<th 
France . 

This strategy now being applied. Bar Dai, who anta d failure 
Ge a conversations, fop p ent to remain ] where he 
can deal directly Bidault, Sclsuman in preference Bollaert, Mean- 
while opening gun in prep bion public opinion for calling "as Ly 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

-2- #31 j February 19 > Noon, from Hanoi 

of notables" by General Xuan was article by Ifzuyen Fhan Long in Saigi 
journal ECHO DU VTETH&M of February 1?% demand ' representation all 
groups including resistants." Hanoi ! s THODISU, which in Mbveinber sabo- 
taged Xuan f s proposals for aasei Ly of "hommes distingues," will beat 
drums here an ran Van Ly f s paper in Hue* 

At vs Bao Dai aware of fact recent French promt; ] 1 population 
re his early return, combined with lack of French success in military 
operations, have strengthened his bargaining position- 

Repeat to Paris: sent Saigon 



■ ■ 


Declassified per Executive Order 13326, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 




b'iO'': Paris 


Control 3885 
Kec'd May 12, 191*8' 
9-1^ p-r.. 


WO : 

Secretary of State 
256?' 3 May 12, 6 p.m. 

Baeyens has .info fed me that French Governs has auti oilaert 
to approve formation provisional Vietnam government headed hy Xuan but to 
insist that seat of g it be located at eit ■ Hanoi or Hue and not 
at Saigon* Boilaert-Xuan negotiations will be conducted on basis Bay 
of Along protocol which Xuan will countersign. Bao Dai will conntersi; 
agreement reached with Xuan. 

Baeyens si d Foreign Office was not optimistic as to extent popular 
support provisional go orient could achieve and expressed hope that 
representatives from Ann and Tonkin would be of sufficient stature to 
offset at least in part government's being chart rized as French pupp* 

He had information other than pi report of early Bao Dai-Boll aert 
meeting and Bao Dai's visit to Euro >gn Office endeavoring to bio 
latter which they consider could only lend support to charges of puppet 

government . 

Department pass Saigon a o. 18 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 




Control 9859 

{ Rec'd May 29 , 19U8 

8:22 a.m. 

FROM: Nanking 

TO: Secretary of State 

0: 971, May 2$ 3 10 a.m. 

Responsible Foreign Office officials states that according 
to Chinese information very little enthusiasm had been 
aroused among Indochina natives by news of formation of 
government by General Nguyen Van Xu . , Pie expressed doubt 
that imich more result would be obtained by d oup 
than was attained by local administr- ve canmdl , 
unless Bao Dai came back. He believed Bao Dai was 
adopting wait-and-see attitude and that his decision 
whether to return would wait upon signs of favorable 
reaction to government by native elements. Upon being 
questioned, officials said latter point would in his 
view be more important with Bao Dai than question of 
independence; that Bao Dai would himself in the end accept 
about what Bollaert has already c red (given appearance 
of popular support) despite couns el of most Ms advisers 
to hold firm for independence, and this even though he 
incurred risk of playing role of Henry Pu Yi for French* 
He said Bao Dai ! s supporters are insisting more strongly 
on foreign policy independence, being less intractable 
on question of military control, probably in realization 
that native levies would be incapable for some time of 
putting d- any continuing int .1 revo.1t. 

While all Chin elements are not one on line of action 
to be followed in Indochina, Foreign Office itself seems 
to distrust Bao Dai, viewing him as possible vehicle for 
restore Lon French prewar s us. At same time many 
officials plainly give evidence Chir wish to keep on 
freiendly terms with Ho Chi llinh. As indicated i; EI 
251, February 12, 19^7* Chinese problem is to el 1 
and in time capt or at least hold veto over power 

elements in 



Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 


•2- #971, May 29, 10 a.m. 

elea in Indochina. Thus nationalism suits them^ 
as does Ho CM Minh with his galvanizing political force. 
Their expectation is that Indo se political groups P 
with their rivalries and easy realignments 5 "will provide 
their own equipoise > if the French do not have the final 
word. Chinese have no illusions as to Communist 1 b of 
many of Ho's followers and possibly Ho himself * They woir 
expect to be in a position to intervene 9 with the Communist 
menace as a pretext ^ if a decisive Red coup took place; 
moreover P they would probably attest to take some steps 
toward intervention immediately (especially in Tonkin) if a 
Communist coup took place in Prance (this threat has> of 
course 3 diminished recently). Finally .> if the Chinese 
Government itself is further weakened or possibly driven 
southward ■> the Chinese may not impossibly feel that the 
US will not in its own interests allow such a strategic 
ea to fall to Communism and mil necessarily come to 
the rescue. 

Department repeat Paris y Saigon and Hanoi ^ pouched 
Hong Kong. 


NOTE: Relayed to Paris ^ Saigon and Hanoi at 11 a.m. 
May 29. F,M.K« 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 




Control 3213 
Rec'd June 9, 19 V? 
2:1*7 p.m. 

FROM: Paris 



Secretary of State 
3063, June 9> 5 p.m. 


Baeyens has Informed Embassy that prevailing opinion in French Government 
circles is that Xuan Govern t has only dubious chance of success and that 
best iication its viability will be extent d se in guerrilla activi- 
ties during next month. States both Foreign Office and Overseas France 
would welcome cl es in Provisional Government giving it a more repre- 
sentative character, as for example-, replacement of Xuan by Diem. He 
added that Bao Dai who dislikes Xuan has repeatedly stated Provisional 
Government would r -in in power only long enough to "secher les raurs." 

Commenting on Bay of Ale ■ eernent, which had r Lous a,} >val of 
reach Government (Saigon 1 s 130, June 7> to Department, 3^ to Paris). 
Baeyens sta referendum in Cochin China was prerequisite to Ass iy 
approval of change in statu which would undoubtedly be vigorously oppo. 
by Gaullists (iiy 3006^ June 7)- (Baeyens spent three hours with D'Ar'g lieu 
yesterday in discussion devoted primarily to means of pre ting French 
intere; Cochin China.) In addition to put 3: I text there is secret 
annex • "h Baeyens describes as "neither more nor less" than Bay of Along 
protocol of last December. Implement aa called for in para- 

graph 3 of -nt (text In immediately following cable) must be "nego- 
tiated from scratch/ 5 a- to yens who envis? s conference i Lar 
Dal at or Fontainebleau. 

Bolla-ert returns to Paris about June 20 in order confe] it] Coste-Flc 

latter 1 s dep are for I r June 23. R s does not believe 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 


-2- #3063, June 9, 5 p.»-j from Paris 

he will return Indeed a- B: yens gives as principal reason other than 
personal for Bao Dai's forth: i g European visit his desire to remove 
himself from Far East dur difficult period of establishment of Provi- 
sional Government and negotiations wit Prance, 



Department pass Saigon as 23* 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

■ ni i vision of 

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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 


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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 





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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 




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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



Charge Departs** 

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a situation in -which Per inv 


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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NNI> Project Number: NNl) 63310. By: NW1.) Dale: 201 I 

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Dept Cvi-o Iderlns ways of implementing .recommendations eon* 

twined In final para 3aIgoft f 8 tel 150 Jun 30 to Dept/i'ptd Paris 


as 40, appenro desirable that with fifobj you consult 

* . - ■ 


informally vlth French officials, particularly Bollr.ert, ee to £f ( 

points 3. and 2 belo;;, Plec.oe comment on these as veil c.s re- £) 

.-..'. ■ ■ ' - ' " • 

lining points. ; ■ -.'■.- . . .. q 

l) I^riilanv4?ar> informally stated to Dent officer that -in 


* ' O) 

his opinion Assembly would rut :x ■ ' not. have, to ratify El-Ic d 1 - j 

• •■'... V • ■ * W 

Along agreement. He pointed out ? however, that definite agree- q 

'• ■ ' ' . ■ &• 

meat covering points mentioned in para 3 that document would CO 

ssuiaaaly have to be" so ratified. Dent inclined believe French 

■ * 

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* * ' V* 

I. ; ■ 

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Boll^ert's signature of agreement. , Pie report current French S^ 

: d 

thinking this question/ * / ■ / 

?,) In event Baridan'a interpretation correct, Dept believes 
that" only measure which "French Govt would have to submit for an- i 

■ . . • 4 : 

proval Assembly would be question of change of status Co chin eft] 
to allow 'iuote union three kya Unquote to be* achieved by Viets 
as stated Jun 5 agreement, Yfould such t - 




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V/oodruff UallneTj recently Associate Chief of the Division of 



H ■••: : rs %r , " . ■ s, was ; Pointed First Secretary of the ■ 

• . '''''■ ? fr e on J--:!y 21 . hi . o- a visit to 

I-iot printer]. 


Goxaiselor of the Fr 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 







Chjrg* Department 

outgoing' Telegram 
i?Lgpnvitn$tti xsf Blniz 


- •':x_ 

.,--"" \ V/asfiington 

Charge to ... ., ..^ , ,,^. . . ***&&** -*~* 




^ofner.s only) 

^7^ s^TOP ' SECPKT - 


• ' ' \/ • ■•• 

such r.ove by Schu: it/Govt precipitate crisis? Is there any 


possibility that Communists might support such a measure or 

' at least abstain from voting against it ? as their line -has 

■ . * .. • 

consistently' favored Quote Union of 3 kys Unquote? 

■ hi 


3) How can approach to French best be made? In respect 
Baeyens 1 views (Einbstel 3^5*3 Jm /30) and v rptd" statements of 
Daridan that he does not believe Schuman covt v;oulc] risk its 


political life to brine question before assembly 3 Dept 
believes that" If desired n Its to be obtained, it must ' 
be done at hig'l t level j i#e» JSghumanj Bidault and Coste-' 

Floret in spite latter * s recent statement to Assembly 

* \ A * c 

(Kmbsiel 3155 Jun l^yparalleled of course by high' level 

■;•••• V / * • 

approach to Bonne tyin Washington. • * * • 

4)..' Should approach, if made* be confined for present 
only to change in status .Cochinchina? In this connection, 
What is best timing? . J . ■ * . 

■ * 

J>) V/hat concessions are judged neeessai. to give, plan 

* ■ * 

fair start? . .•..".'• ! ' " - 


Dept cognizant of fact that fighting in Indochina 1, 

nov/ coni ' 5 fur al st three years; that v;e believe given. 

« 1 

N/Robert Schiosan, ifegggfedB ^ 

uouncii 01 j .mif (pre irj. 

\/ Not printed. 

\/ Henri: I b, French i or . 

Resident of the French 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 




Outgoing Telegi m- • ««n«« 


jW- v 





« , 

•.^■•-TOP- 'SECRET' 

3Tr£d - 




present world political arid economic conditions % , French 

$ Imply do not have and have no prospect of amassing suf- 

ficient strength Indochina reach mil solution; that 


instead of being element strength to "France, Indochina 

since war, at present, and for foreseeable future, unless 

situation' changes radically, will remain grievously costly 

enterprise weakening France. economically and all west 

generally in its relation:' with Oriental peoples ♦ 

In our view, continuation of parade puppets such as 

• ■ ■ 

■ • 

French have produced over past two years will strong then 


land Ho Chi Minh find 'may well insure 'eventual en rgnnce of 

state prolmbly .dominated' by communists and almost certainly 

■ . * * 

oriented toward Moscow • .It "is to avoid such eventuality 

that we consider it of highest importance that present 

. ■ * « 

1 . # 

so-cdlied central government , or in' fact any non~coriii.:unist 


government* be given every chance to succeed by .the -granting 

■ . . * 

to it of such concessions as will attract greatest possible 



number of non- communist elements # 

Mo action 

—1 KULJJPGr-i*?- 




trtf jP|~*3th**«!tt >•»*"* 1 atr\zfi'ui i-rf«i if 



* . 

• ! 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

. • ■ 

• » » 





v CoIUct 

■ ■ I » I ■ I ■ 


"M- ■ - 

-• • ' 


- I ■ 



Charge D*|»aftfn«ftt 


*$ i n i 


.. i* 

,.- ..,.^ **"*"- «—'-'*"' 



No action contemplated pending your return jfashington. 

" ' ;i .« ,<""". /<(? op- 
iated Saigon as / 


Paris fe ^fp 4 i re 


t . 

■ i 

* • 






1 ."■"•? 









-C0D3~RCX)Mr-pl r-pt' above message • in its entirety to 

, ..Safgon as / & & . ... . . . . . 


Jtt : JLO ' 3uiTivan . : cc'p : ratb 












CF \«ANGi£ 



■ - • 

£ V |, t9vtr««;M Minn* ©met.* mi jt:m 


: i 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 

r : l 

8510.01/7-9^8: Top Secret File 


FROM: Paris 'Rec'd July 10, 19^8 

TO: Secretary of State 

NO: 3621, July 9, 7 p»i. 

1 - . 


Dept may wish instruct Embassy inform Schuman Govt from 
top level clown of US conviction that Prance is faced with 
alternatives of unequivocally and promptly approving 
principle Viet independence within French union and union 
three KYS or losing Indochina, While immedia Assembly 
debate seems only solution Embassy should be given dis- 
cretion in applying pressure to avoid charge giving tad 
cal advice on political maneuvers or becc ig identified 

with maneuvers that may ril govt* 


Ambassador concurs. 





Declassified per Executive Order J 3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



85lG.01/7-9}i-8: Top Secret File 


AMEMBASSY, ' July 1^, 19^8 



Dept approves line of action recommended last para 
EIBBL 3^21 and wishes you proceed immediately to ascertain 

Imposition Sehuman Govt toward dealing with Indochina 
situation before Assembly adjournment* On basis your find- 
ings you should apply such persuasion and /or pressure as 
is best calculated produce desired result * In applying 
such persuasion and/or pressure you may in your discretion 
convey to Schv Govt that once Baie d f Along agreement 
together with change in status Cochinchina approved, Dept 
would be disposed consider lending its support to extent 
publicly approving French Govt's action as forward looltia 
step toward settlement of troubled situation Indochina 
and to d realization of aspirations vietnr se people « 
It appears to Dept that above stated US approval -would 
materially assist in strengthening hands of nationalists 
as opposed to communists in Indochina* Keep Dept closely 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

♦'. '/ PltEPAftlHG OFFICE 

1 / * 

C 'J 


Telegram Sent 

A I 





Charge D(jpJr|r:icM:X 

« . 

L- ^rgt |o 

jSepartmeg| g^ ^tate 


coufwfl: 1 """ " 




JUL 29 1945 

* >■ 

;;. :'• AMEJ5BAQSY, ■ 


r T *< 

5 ' ;i • 


ji*ft . 





Please ascertain Eollaert's reaction/to points 
^ wade, by Maria and CosteKFloret- ( 3934). They 

* m m • 

■ I 

"^ appear to be evading central issue of CochiuOhina 

! : 

whose- stetus ao French Colony cermet be altered- 

except by lav/ of .Assembly • Unless this status is , 


definitively altered Bale d* Along agreement is in effect 


nullified, Saigon 1 c 42 July 6 to Par is^pep tains « 

. : 


, ' Sent Paris as '3$?f ; rptd Saigon ae /*? J * 



z"^. Ov. 


July 2£, not printed. 

See telegr; 155, ante « p, . 

«^^diie-l%riir^S2^^ sSmrasdamoc nt-o£ tl ranch 

— -6eunci3nsr fillisters (premier),- 


■ en 









.. i 


■ • 





Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 




Control 1771 

Rec'd August 6, 19U8 
1 12:1*3 a.m. 

FROM: Paris 

TO: Secretary of State 

NO: ^03^, August 5> 8 p.m. 

Bollaert is of opinion (DEFTEL 2891, July 29) that 
President French Union may legally ratify Bale d 'Along 
agreements b that change in si Cochinehina re- 
quires Assembly action. He maintains t he will not 
return to Saigon unless there is an Assembly debate on 
government's policy in Indocl ' bd approval of Bale 
d 'Along agreements and change in status Cochinehina. 

Baeyens> DeLavignette and Moutet sbax-e Eoll t f s views. 
All consider that regardless of legal considerations, 
failure by Assembly to meet issue squarely will e 
practical effect of ar< tsing such mistrust in Indochina 
as to nullify completely such progress as has been made, 

In last sight's ;sion of Assembly 9 Frederic DuPong 
(PRL) introduced motion cal discussion Indochina 
prior to adjournment for su , Despite request by 

anadier that motion be withdrawn tr as it deals with sub- 
ject too delicate for gover: to undertake without 
prudence and without a full review of all aspects of he 
sii tion. 11 Motion was carried by narrow vote 288 to 
286. Date of c ie vri.ll be set by conference of 

Sent Department '-103^ repeated Saigon 36, 


G: -nor-General Re lv" was head of the political 
section of the French Ministry of Overseas T itories. 

" Moutet ifas French I i ber of Overseas Tr Ltories from 
January 26, I9U6 to ITcv. *r Zh 9 19*47, 

Paul R- was President of the French Council c sters in 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 




Control 6MS9 

AMCOHSUl " August 27 > I9U8 


Bollaert' s position as expressed in Paris tel h^Qk 
Aug 2k to Dept (rpt Saigon as hS) unclear. Dept notes 
(pgh 7) Bollaert believes as QUOTE IEKERQUOTE it 
bec< ent that Bao Dai has been 1 to achieve more 

by negotiations than Ho has or will be able to achieve by 
force of arms EHD BIIffiRQUOTE there Kill be increasing tendency 
in ranks of non-Communist elements of Viet Minh to switch 

1% UHQUOTE It not clear how Bao Dai < show he has 
gained more from France by negotiation than Ho has or will 
gain by force arias 1 nch no prepared to maky any 
QUOTE irrevocable commit] its UNQUOTE (j 6) to Bao Dai or 
any provisional govt of he may form part as High Com- 
missioner states (pgh 5) that such govt will remain provi- 
sional until peace restored sufficiently to permit popular 
referendum on permanent form govt. 

Abbot 1 ight see Bollaert (who reportedly left Ifcris 
Aug 26 for Saigon) ; atte; clarify ambiguities his state- 
jnent to Embassy. At t) time ? y^ ; i point out that 
it difficult see how course action he 3 s will in 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

1NDICA1 i. 


'^— J 


^ ^^ 

. -:■•'-• 


■ «** 

Charge Department 


Charge to 

S3 t # tx tJM£ tit" tH i t a i ? 

Y/ai lying ton 


.- ,— w , _ ■ " 



/ _,— 



-*— 'SB6RET* 

'•K****"**"*^'-" »-» to .,-.^^^--**-*- ,: *'«'-■'* V"-' ' 


SiVspel^ Vletnamet 

absence firm conLTitments by Frimce till vietj 


distrust of Prenchj split off adherents o't Ho, or materially 
reduce hostilities. ' : "._"•■ ..." 

Sent Sr.Ir;on/repea ted Pari b a s , Air gra in 




^/ V --TO . % > 

%/**« t 

3 j.i ar>e Reno ■t-'O-oo-u- of i***o-~ ^nc 


f * 

^FSrS^ArOl;^ Sal H vr :i : w ^S 1 

.fi:.i * 

'^E V,'E; ■ j £^ 

u». •• - 

* ■ * 





. > • . 


/ ! ■ 

" c. i,f:ti«'v!" in.* .. :-r;;-tn« I- lit* 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 

Department of Stale 




AUG 20 1948 


Dept concurs views Saigon's 188 Aug 28 similar 
those Deptel 136 Aug 2J to Saigon (rpt Paris as agamj . 
Dept appreciates difficulties facing any French Govt 
taking decisive action vis-a-vis Indochina but can 
only see steadily deteriorating situation unless more 
positive approval Bale d 'Along Agree ntj enactment ' 
legislation or action permitting change Cochlnchlna 
status j and immediate commencement formal negotia- 
tions envisaged that Agreement, Dept believes nothing 
should be left undone which will strengthen truly 
nationalist groups Indochina and induce present 
supporters Viet II;inh come to side that group. Mo 
such inducement possible unless that group can show 
concrete evidence French prepared implement promptly 
creation Vietnam as free state associated French 
Union and with all attributes free state. When you 
deem appropriate please point out to French Govt 
Dept 1 a views regarding Indochina and repeat Dept' 1 a 
readiness publicly approve French Govt action along 
above lines which will assist bringing about solution 
of Indochina problem* In foregoing connection you 
might refer substance second para Deptel 3231 AUG 26. 



Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 

Ct>*TQ* ?pzrir.\cnk 

CKftrgi to 



" §738 



S A 1 6033 , J — /*■ c^! 

OU( >tf ir> 4 l 

C H 

»Eoi--ts -"text statement ISLBept spokesman Sept 16 




—response pertinent questions A QTE Dept has watched clbsel 
rapid increase- of Communist activity whicfr has taken place 
In southeast Asia since e ly this 'year and "has naturally 

taken this development into consideration in determining 

-. ■ 

Its course of action. Results of these activities in 


Burma , Malaya, Indochina and Indonesia have been, reported 
by press as they occurred from time to time and need not 
be reviewed* However, little attention has been directed 

* ■ 

toward ©ne major strategem employed by Comj.vunislss in do- 
pendent areas of southeast Asia. To win support and allies 










:es only). 



east Asia, originally deceived t this device, have now 
y& av/al to fact that, in Commn: t controlled states 

ICMEARAtt^* ' 




■ ,m, I 

. clv b- 

*&_1^,*^^ ■:»"< ! - : - '■:: ii;.- Uj 


in their drive for power, Communist leaders have consistent!, 

pretended to champion cause of local nationalists and have C 


attempted to identify communism with nationalism in minds 


of'^ people of area. This scheme worked well, at lesst until 

* , - 

Cominf orm*s denunciation of Yugoslav Communist leaders as 
being, among other things, guilty of nationalism. There 
Is some evidence that sincere nationalist leaders in south- 





Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 




outgoing Telegram 


Chargo Department 


fcaJ, WashiJgUJ III 



- ■ • . 

outside Soviet Union, nationalism to which they sfspire 
is regarded as a high crime and grounds for ruthless in- 
terference in internal affairs of such s tates by inter- 
national Communist organization a UKQTE Sent SaigoiVrptd 




"-and- Sin ga p or » -a s— — 75***/ 





As l/,9. 

As 45 and 151 


I ■ 


' ' n 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



A '' 

■ ■ . ■ .■ • »mi j_. i a ■» - - — — — . '*— _. / - ' " ' i __ j ._ l t* , ' i .* . ' "•- - d~~ZV^J-25^"JL.'"r "■iTZV ~?'Z'~~-~~~ 






. " ■' *■ ' 


elJ2e_^i v r. 

c— 3j t^r^T^rr 



zJ^a el -ba c ._ li r:_. m \ 


■ **' 


* n 


_ - 1 f i 1 1 

■ *. 

, p ■ i i_ i ■ ■ ■ ■ * t '— 

,* ..■ 

Septembsr 27, 1? 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

Executive Secretariat Files, Lot 57 D-6£9 — tr\*i *r 

Department of State Policy Statement on Indochina, September 27, 194.8 



The immediate objective of US policy in Indochina is to assist in a solution 
of the present impasse which will be mutually satisfactory to the French and 
the Vietnamese peoples, which will result in the termination of the present 
hostilities, and which will be within the framework of US security. 

Our long-term objectives are: (1) to eliminate so far as possible Communist 
influence in Indochina and to see installed a self-governing nationalist state 
which will be friendly to the US and which, commensurate with the capacity 
of the peoples invoLed, will be patterned upon our conception of a democratic 
state as opposed to the totalitarian state which woxild evolve inevitably from 
Communist domination; (2) to foster the association of the peoples of Indo- 
china with the western powers, particularly with France with whose customs, 
language and laws they are familiar, to the end that those peoples will prefer 
freely to cooperate with the western powers culturally, economically and politi- 
cally; (3) to raise the standard of living so that the pi of Indochina will be 
less receptive to totalitarian influences and will have an incentive to work 
productively and thus contribute to a better balanced world economy; and 
(4) to prevent undue Chinese penetration and subsequent influence in Indo- 
china so that the peoples of Indochina will not be hampered in Haeir natural 
developments by the pressure of an alien people and alien interests, 



To attain our immediate objective, we should continue to press the French 
to accommodate the basic aspirations of the Vietnamese: (1) unity of Cochin- 
china, Annam, and To; i, (2) complete internal autonomy, and (3) the right 
to choose freely regarding participation in the French Union. We have recog- 
nized French sovereignty over Indochina but have maintained that such recog- 
nition does not imply any commitment on our part to s t France to exert its 
authority over the Indochinesc pe> Since V-J day, the majority people of 

the area, the Vietnamese, have .stubbornly resisted the reestablish in en t of French 
authority, a struggle, in which we have tried to maintain insofar as possible a 
position of non-support of either party. 

While the nationalist movement in Vietnam (Cochin , Annam, and Ton- 

kin) is strong, and tho great majority of the Vietnamese are not funda- 

mentally Communist, the .most active element in the r nee of the L 

peoples to the French has been a Communist group headed by Ho Chi Minn. 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


This group has successfully extended its influence tolnclude practically all armed 
forces now fighting the French, thus in efiect captu/mg control of the nationalist 

The French on two occasions during 1946 attempted to resolve the problem 
by negotiation with the government established and dominated by Ho Chi Minh. 
The general agreements reached were not, however, successfully implemented 
and widescalc fighting subsequently broke out. Since early in 1947, the French 
have employed about il^OOO troops in Indochina, with little result, nnce the 
countryside except in Laos and Cambodia remains under the firm control of 
the Ho Chi Minh • rnment. A series of French-established puppet govern- 
ments have tended to enhance the prestige of Ho's government and to call into 
question, on the part of the Vietnamese, the sincerity of French intentions to 
accord an independent status to Vietnam. . 

1. Political 

We have regarded these hostilities in a colonial area as detrimental not 
only to our own long-term interests which require as a minimum a stable 
Southeast Asia but also detrimental to the interests of France, since the hatred 
engendered by continuing hostilities may render impossible peaceful collabora- 
tion and cooperation of the French and the Vietnamese peoples. This hatred 
of the Vietnamese people toward the French is keeping alive anti-western feeling 
among oriental peoples, to the advantage of the USSR and the detriment of 

the US. 

We have not urged the French to negotiate with Ho Chi Minh, even though 

he probably is now supported by a considerable majority of the Vietnamese 

people, because of his record as a Communist and the Comi list background 

of many of the influential figures in and about his government. 

postwar French governments have never understood, or have chosen to 
underestimate, the strength of tionalist movement with which they must 

deal in Indochina. It remains possible that the nationalist movement can 
be subverted, from Communist control but this will require granting to a non- 
Communist group of nationalists at least the same concessions demanded by 
Ho Chi Minh. The failure of French governments to deal successfully with the 
Indochinese question has been due, iti large measure, to the overwhelming 
internal issues facing France and the Frezich Union, and to foreign policy 
considerations in Europe. TJ factors have combined with the slim parlia- 
mentary majorities of postwar governments in France to militate against the 
bold moves iv sary to divert al iance of the Vietnamese nationalists to non- f 
Communist leadership. 

In accord with our policy of regarding with favor the efforts of dependent 
peoples to attain theh* legitimate political as rations, we have been anxious to 
see French accord to the Vietnamese the largest possible degree of political 
and economic in endence cons" with legitimate French interests. We 

have therefore declined to permit the export to the French in Indochina of arms 
and munitions for the pros of the war against the Vietnamese. This 


. . | w 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

policy has been limited in its effect as we have allowed the free export of arms 
to France, such-exports thereby being available for re-shipment to Indochina or 
for releasing stocks from reserves to be forwarded to Indochina. 

2. Economic 

Indochina's trade with the United States before the war was relatively small 
as the greater part of its commerce was carried on with France and the French 
* Empire duty free. Indochina now enjoys a limited customs autonomy, and the 
US should be able to compete more successfully with France. 

American investment hi Indochina has also been of minor importance in 
part at least because there has been no treaty basis for the protection of Ameri- 
can interests there as activities in certain business lines are prohibited or can 
be conducted only with the consent of the French authorities. 

Should a political solution satisfactory to the French and the Vietnamese 
be reached leading to the establishment of peaceful conditions within the area, 
the US should endeavor to have the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
made effective in Indochina and to make an arrangement which would afford 
protection for American enterprise there. The increased trade and investment 
in Indochina which might result from these measures would tend to raise the 
level of economic activity and standard of living. 

We do not wish to press for these matters, nor to develop a long-term finan- 
cial or economic policy in the area, until such time as a political solution, such 
as may terminate in large measure the present hostilities, has been achieve: 1 

With respect to the important question of whether EGA assistance 
should be extended to the area, we have informed the French that because re- 
construction and dc opment of Indochina is impossible under the present con- 
ditions of warfare which pertain there,, no direct EGA financing for Indochina 
will be forthcomingsat present although French requirements will be readjusted 
accordingly. We have indicated informally our willingness to reconsider the 
question should conditions change. 

As regards French claims for Japanese reparations on behalf of Indochina, 
we have taken the position in the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) that France 
should receive two percent of the total amount of reparations which may be 
determined to be available. While most 3 countries feel that the proposed 
share is too large, in view of the French wartime performance in Indochina, 
v/e have indicated a willingness to allow the French an additional one half of 
one percent. Fiance presumably would also be eligible for a. prorata share 
(or a portion to be determined by negotiation) of the 18 of our 28 percent of tot 
reparations which we have proposed to make available to h FEC countries 
as accept our schedule for reparations distribution. This question remains 
unsettled. We have not allowed the French a* portion of the advance transfers 
within the interim reparations program. 

We have under consideration a French cl i to gold v; 1 at 37.5 million 
dollars earmarked for Japan in Indochina, 1 gold r bs the settlement 

of certain trade balances 1 een Ind 1 Japan and of Japanese local 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 









currency requirements dining the period Angus V : l 940 to March 9, 1945. Since 

the earmarking oC the gold transferred title to In'dochina and since there are j "|| 

no general considerations of equity or public policy of a sufficiently compelling ! - 

nature to justify withholding recognition of title thus transferred, the tentative r 

position of the Dcp/ritment is that SCAP deliver the gold to Indochina unless 

an early FEC policy decision precludes such action. 


The French, whose policy since the Japanese surrender has been a failure 
with regard to the Vietnamese, have made some progress in normalizing,! 
relations with Cambodia and Laos. Both these Indochinesc protectorates have 
now been formally admitted as "associated" states to the French Union. The 
peoples of both these protectorates have been allowed some degree of autonomy, 
which apparently satisfies them for the present. Unquestionably, however, the 
current modi vivendi will be altered by any French settlement with the Vietna- 
mese which gives the latter more autonomy than now possessed by the Laotians ' 
and Cambodians. 

The most recent French attempt to resolve the question resulted in the 
June 5 Baic d'Along Agreement between the French High Commissioner of 
Indochina and General Nguyen Van Xuan, head of the Provisional Central 
Government of Vietnam, and countersigned by the former Emperor of Annam, \ \ 

Bao Dai In this agreement, France recognizes the independence of Vietnam, i 

whose responsibility it will be to unite the three Vietnamese provinces of Indo- 
china with only such limits as are imposed by its membership in the French 
Union to which it freely declares its adherence. Further negotiations to fix re- 
lationships of France and Vietnam are provided by the agreement which must 
now be ratified by the French Assembly, particularly as it relates to a change 
in the status of Cochinchina, now a French colony, to permit its union with f 

Annam and Tonkin. 

As regards international conferences, the US, as it recognizes French sover- 
eignty over Indochina, has upheld the right of France as a metropolitan power 
to^submit the applications for associate membership in ECAFE of its dependent 

areas in Indochina. 

French relations v Siamese Government have improved since the 

November coup d'etat of Field Marshal Phibun. Phibun apparently has given *&&* 
assurances to the French that he has accepted the solution of the recent Siamese- 
Indochinesc border c He has furthermore taken limited measures de- 

signed to reduce the activity of Indochinesc elements in Siam hostile to the' 


Chinese relations with Indochina, based upon a 1948 treat} tiich confers 

substantial benefits upon the Chinese in the p "^sula, are largely determined 

by the needs and interests of the co ereially and economically powerful 

Chinese overseas community in Indochina, numbering almost one million. 

On the surface, Chinese official relations with the French officials have been 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

correct although signs of tension develop from time to time. The Chinese have 
pressed the French to indemnify Chinese who have suffered property loss in 
Indochina's fighting. The Kuomintau- has striven to maintain a tight control 
over the Chinese community through consular representation, while the French 
have endeavored to reestablish the situation of pre-war years wherein the French 
authorities successfully maintained a degree of control over Chinese within 

The Chinese, however, have also tried to protect the several hundred thous- 
ands of their fellowmen who live in territory not under French control There 
have been contacts between Ho's agents and Chinese government officials which 
apparently resulted in Chinese tolerance of a munitions traffic from China to 
the benefit of the Ko government. French efforts to enlist Chinese support in 
Kwangsi and Kwangtung to suppress Chinese bandit and Communist bands 
which cross the Indochinese border have not been successful despite an agree- 
ment in principle. 

An increasing Soviet interest in Indochina, as demonstrated by a step-up 
in radio broadcasts, was evidenced in the first half of 1948. The line taken by 
these broadcasts has been constantly to discredit the United States by attempt- 
ing to identity it with "imperialistic France." There continues to be no known 
communication between the USSR and Vietnam, although evidence is accumu- 
lating that a radio liaison may have been established through the Tass agency 
in Shanghai. 


The objectives of US policy towards Indochina have not been realized. 
Three years after the termination of war a friendly ally, France, is fighting 
a desperate and apparently losing struggle in Indochina. The economic drain 
of this warfare on French recovery, while difficult to estimate, is unquestionably 
large. The Communist control in the nationalist movement has been increased 
during this period US influence in Indochina and Southeast'; has suffered 
as a result. 

The objectives of US policy can only be attained by such French action as 
will satisfy the nationalist aspirations of the peoples of Indochina. We h 
repeated], ted out to the French the desirability of their giving such sat 5 

faction and thus termi; rig the present open conflict. Our greatest etifficul 
in talking with the French and in stressing what should and what should not 
be done has been our inability to suggest any practicable solution ol the Indo- 
china problem, as we are all too well aware of the unpleasant fact that Com- 
munist Ho Chi Minh is the strongest and perhaps the ablest figure in Indochina 
and thai any suggested solution which excludes him is an expedient of un- 
certain outcome. We are naturally hesitant to press the French too strongly 
or to become deeply in eel so long as we are not in a position to suggc. 
solution or until \ye are prepared to accept the onus of intervention. The 
above cons! lions are further complicated by the fact that we have an inv 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 


— - 





. « 

• .ii 


mediate into rest in maintaining in power a friendly French government, to 
assist in the furtherance of our aims in Europe* 'This irfimediate and vital 
interest has in consequence taken precedence over active step:' Looking toward 
the realisation of our objectives in Indochina, * 

We are prepared, however, to support the French in every way possible in 
the establishment of a truly nationalist government in Indochina which, by 
giving satisfaction to the aspirations of the peoples of Indochina, will serve 
as a rallying point for the nationalists and will weaken the Communist elements. i 

By such support and by active participation in a peaceful and constructive \\ 

solution in Indochina we stand to regain influence and prestige, T 

Some solution must be found which will strike a balance between the aspira- 
tions of the peoples of Indochina and the interests of the French, Solution by j 
French military reconquest of Indochina is not desirable. Neither would the 
complete withdrawal of the French from Indochina effect a solution. The first 
alternative would delay indefn ly the attainment of our objectives, as we 
would share inevitably in the hatred engendered by an attempted military re- 
conquest and the denial of aspirations for self-government. The second solu- 
tion would be equally unfortunate as in all likelihood Indochina would then be 
taken over by the militant Comn 1st group. At best, there might follow a 
transition period, marked by chaos and terrot c activities, creating a political l 
vacuum into which the Chinese inevitably would be drawn or would push. 
The absence of stabilization in China will continue to have an important in- 
fluence upon the objective of a permanent and peaceable solution in Ind ta. 

We have not been particularly successful in our information and education 
program in orienting the Vietnamese toward the western democracies and the 
US. The program has been hampered by the failure of the French to under- ^ 

stand that such inform aal activities as wc conduct in Indochina are not I 

inimical to their own long-term interests and by administrative and fin; lal j 

considerations which have prevented the development to the maximum extent 
of contacts with the Vietnamese. An increased effort should bo made to explain 
democratic institutions, especially American institutions and American policy, 
to the Indochinese by direct personal contact, by the distribution of informa- 
tion about the US, and the encouraging of educational exchange. 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

Air 2:ail 




* - 

I'o* 195 j/q f-Q\/ JQ ;\. ( 3 :0 Saigon, Indochina, November 5, 1948 / ' 


Sub loot: 

r v •; .-. flT-OF SJA - 

Soviet Policy in Southeast Asia* 








DEC 1 10-13 


c > 

.« * 




n> i ■ *' 


I have the honor to refer to the Department *s secret circular 
^instruction of October 13, 19*i-8, Y entitled "Pattern of Soviet Policy 
in Far East and Southeast Asia 11 and to submit certain comments, as 
requested by the Department. 

Soviet policy in Indochina appears to follow in general tho 
lines described in tho final section of the instruction under ac- 
knowledge] • but with certain minor variation* In general 11 
to paid* that Indochina presents an ideal picture fro© the point of 
vie?/ of I'oscov;* A s:;a11 group of Moscow and Chinese trained Com- 
munists has firm control of the strong and deep seated native 
Ratio: lisai. A native government under Con t direction controls 
considerable areas of the country and intains an amy sufficiently 
strong to pin dovm large French forces. The country has been kept 
in turMoil sis o the end of the vrar, : ing it a serious drain on 
the military and economic resources of France instead of a source 
\of wealth* From the point of view of Iioscov/, prospects are excel- 
.lent that Ho Chi^fBfE will c tfcually force the withdrawal of th 
French and set up the first "flew Democratic Republic*' in Southeast 
Asia. At the s time CoEtaunist control has been cc alod and 
" identified with Nationalism so successfully as to confuse and 
delude public opinion in France and the United States and thus gain 
the sunoort of large Socialist and liberal groups in those ecu ie$. 


I • 
I : 

* i 






r - 






f,f In recent inonths particular emphasis has been placed' on eeo- W 
■feomic sabotage. This has included burning of rice mills and rubber 
vrare] ses in Saigon* and attacks on eovr aicati of all types, 
inclu g railroads, road convoys and barge transport* This has 
been so successful t ■ the :i:o of paddy and rica to Saigon*- 
Choi on has pr illy ceased in recent weeks* Curiously eno-\^h 

there have " i no serious ; stacks on " particularly vulnerable 
petroleum £ >pots in Sa" i aftrl ?ng nor have the larger riibbex 
plantation! b .• :ly list bed* 

J. j 


The Co. list led Vict:niiih has not yet adopted the violent 
anti-Araerican lino follov/ed by mo t Sorraunist parties th jh&ut 
the world., although thers are rnany in ions that this is oal; 





~ - 





Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 

on the surface cliici that the standard anti-Anerican line is being 
distributed. in directives to party loaders* IIo evidence has yet 
turned up that Ho Chi Ilnh is receiving current directives either 

: from Koscov/, China, o Soviet 


\B& that Moscow fools that Ko and his lieutenants have had 
sufficient training and experience and are sufficiently loyal to 
j be trusted to determine their day-to-day policy vrithout supervision 


Another factor peculiar to Indochina is the apparent quiescence 
of CoiP-'tiunist elements among the resident Chinese colony. Not only 
are these believed by the Surete to be relatively few in number, 
but anv plans they *aay have had to emulate their comrades in l/alava 
have undoubtedly been hampered by the Surete which has been quietly 
rounding up and deporting their leaders for several months. It may 
also be that Eos cow feels that anti-Chinese feeling is so strong in 
the Vietnam that active cooperation of Chinese Communists with the 
Vietainh would furnish too valuable a propaganda weapon to the 
French i 

Kespect fully yours, 




ancUeg^l^ii L^e?a£tra&nt 
to American Embassy, Bangkok 
t^itmo^ican assy, London* 
to Amerl^aji Smbas sy, Moscow 



to American ^tQassy, 
to American imoassy, 
to USPOL/tD, Seoul 
■ho American Coi 

George it* Abbott 
A!ue?4-GAn^-Con&^l--Sen6-F^ h 

to American,^onsulat9 General, 
&) 9 Tokyo 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By; NWD Date; 201 1 



Department of State 


January 17/ 19^9 
6 p.m. 





Daridan haj expressed to Dept same view con- 
tained penultimate para urtel 10? Jan 10 qualifying 
his remarks however with statement that he unin- 
formed developments past ten days which might ex- 
plain optimism Overseas Prance officials in urtel 
IQo Jan 10 re negotiations with Boo Dai. 


While De de ?oub F; tch coming to term* 
with Dal or an: ~_n a 1st group \ ch 

"chance winning over prepoi ance of 
Viet cannot ""at "" E bly* [sic] com- 

mit to ct of natj jjovt which by foiling 
cievc i^ 81 ^ 1 }? Vietname se might become I 

iy j >vt ; sep arat e from people and 
r iting orila / pre nee rench military forces - 
Accordingly j Emb should make no additinal[slp.K repre- 
sentations to French until and unless further in- 
structed by Dept which does not believe it desir- 
able go beyond position outlined Deptel 26p7 July 1^ 
its reftel >621 July 9 from Paris and Embtel 5129 
Sept 30. 

Dept will inform Emb re possibility any common 
anti-Communist action Indochina (third para Embtel 107) 
after it has reed Brit views as Emb London reports 
Brit Fonoff instructed Brit Emb Wash discuss 
matter with Dept. 




Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 






Charge to 


outgoing Telegram 

C]_ s s sif i o a t i o p^ ,- re d : 





2 1949 


In forthcomi* difficult period Dept desires you 


guard carefully ; alnst any action which might b~ seiz 
upon as prem.: re endorse t or de facto recognition by 

US of Baa Dai or any re iiay establish. FR g; m 


evidence pessim: viability Bap Dai solution and D t 
desires retain as much freedom of action re IC as possible 
thout : : any manner i ins im; * :i v:e oppose or wish 







to hinder ex-Enqperor, Dept has aln discussed lnfor Lly • 

with FR Esib (as well as Brit b here) desirability 



afpicir only) 

i i ropriate _ H R officials issuing to consular coi'ps ii ta~ 
tions to attend all ceremonies involving Bao Dai (fifth 
para artel 9? 29). 

Dept Irishes you and Gibson con tin porting situatlo 

closely a * veil as you have in p it. 




AC f X>lT 





<5s ; 



\:JL0 ! Sullivan :v 



Cleared h WS 

■• . p-J Shp 




4f Corf'-c!::oni natfft o/t this,, !" 4>a r>'udo on 

cop' i dcJivGryM^iV h Bianch. 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

i pp ? n 




:.; -c/z 








J y 

>:t* Indochina, r.v 5, 194 



' • :.; Additional Copy of Powers o:i Indochi::;< fo? 

Action /. . v .' ' \ 


T*-«--r--«' r 

TEE SSC : 0? STA' 


to to t>£ Action 




Action Offi'c ,- - 

' «? OfTiftw 



-• - 1 

! ^ 

It 7&s : d at tha Eot Delhi ?c ign Service Conforoncs •'" 

- that tio 3 irtEKttie v/ould anrc; sci^tc recelTJ 1 ocpioo 

jpors -Mr.;, Right bo available a I accordingly 1 ,j 


th^ honor to tra.v one add. 1 sot on Indoc!*> * 

Ihoao is also ^rd&t&stil i s additional stfopld: : coy-,.;- 

politics^ c:^v;lop: in IndochJ in February and I&troh > ' 

■•-■•:■ r ■ bs "o v&iXo esrouto to tho Con." cd« 

* ' 

sail ou ' p; 

As the DaparttaotfC i^ arare tho T ,1 A bly dis^s: 

in this ?*5>p3 "•"'- *»c duly n o] ©d? and voted cm April 28* 1' p 
a x*i3rtolu-\on fATcring i ty of tho 7i^t; ? E :,' t ;bho m- 

ton by ^: ?youdi ^.rlv b to iT.\pl :it thio roc 
hus bo-n •- i&>eci : 1y C- ':-:y d by t3 &S of tho Rydii 

?;■.."' • -,,v-iv.i2 V-y 17c I n:itc:id of s riviag in Scdg on Ap^iS S 
r A ri j *kU B?vO ;-VC ] pril S3 by p; In Palat va-vj h < VdH 

rc;.uii i:. :v prdvw> cipa-city urLtll tho French Furll&SK&it; haa i: 

aria ir^i:^ pxJxnq 

Whilo th^ t.' will not ba ^atireljr na^tact« it in novortholoos felt 
tb ' tbc delay is oxtronoly i -tut. % :9 Hot only 3 ,s fe3 *^ poy*» 
cholc \l -offcert of to I^^i'o arr" 1 in Saigon bringing unity end 
ibdop$&<2 ■ io b.o^a largely di^ipated, but tto r ' cl progyosa of'tJ 
Chiso^c Obraaxtaista cn-^l-n ;.\ ler^hisnins ^Irviov; oTjr Isido^hin^, r/:^ 
ovory c/.y cC delny inc k c©3 tho difficulty of Eao Dati achi ' ; 
hia c - ■ > 


j3D^c ifully v :> 



Gr^or^o }I 4 A" tt 
i >rioan Consul Sen-oral 

■Ihl Caxifc 

*:, ITo* 

,,. _ 


' ■ 



Mu3 ' ' '.. ■ 

Copy to • v« ?«' 






^ • 


SECRET ; ■■ii:-: 










■ i 







■i ' 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


American Consulate General, ■ ■ 
Saigon, Xndcehi] eta . , -"arch SI, 1949« 




Annex I 1 

Dovelo; :s? In Pol .ry and S&rch 1949 

Feverish negotiations vrent on in Paris during ths th of Fobruary 
and the early days of -:a*ch- Thoy v/oro all broken off v.hon Priisa 

Minister ^1 -. J that for internal political reasons ho could 

not live up to his enrlicr proviso to* present tho proposed agro mt ■ 
to Parli ut for rati* fore rao DAI f s roturno Ho f that 

tho only ch&n-cc to obtain a faTorahlc vote would to aftor.tho I sro? " 

d retu: i d axtd established £ si ble goyerrauant which appeared to 
}^ L v!; a fair chanco of v/inning tho sup b of a majority of his people : 
and restoring ?c-lcoa 3ao Dai finally accepted this but vias ad<: 
th b] joi&ing of Cochinehisa to tho ViotnaD niust bo an accomplished 7 
faeb before ho arrived in Indocl 

Kc.. r difficulties arpse otot hov; this was to bo accomplished*' Tho 
quick and ol#ar-eut way ve&s to act under the paragraph of the French. 
Constitution govs; ting aliem&bioa or acquisition of French territory 

and p^ss i law trains i colony of Cochincl ia to tho of 

fictnana Hc^erer, it v/:l ^ argued, first that this v/ould ronuiro a* 
refcrend of ths people affected* ' , ibis to hold under proscni 
conditions*-** td second^ the proper : 'hod was to act under paragj 
?? permitting a ch ig*> in status of parts of tho Frxich ^nlon*o .Shi 
requires ft vote by tho French Assembly after a request fron tho 
territorial Assembly* r Chc constitutional experts argued that no 
DiroDcr assembly had ever been established in Coehinchina sinco tho 
existing Asso:iVbIy do Sud Vieta ^ boon appointed and not elected? 

Tho Cabinet hurriedly d« r nd submitted to tho French Parli aeiris 

a bill to sot up o Territorial Assembly* This bill wa« j :kV 
through th -*i A ibly of the French Union, tho French Assembly and ■ 
the Council of tho Republic in & v h of all night dot is* Tho 
Socialist ?arty* 5 v ilaiess for Ho Chi I itrioa to 3ac 

Dai b <ko in th* first debits and gpTcmncnt received heavy 

majorities frc: fchffi on, only tho Co^jranists tenaciously oopo ; 

the bill. 


it of 

Tho n stops are the "election 1 ' of tho no?/ assspbly, :, vote 
■, petition lo el Cool china frora a colony to a:\ 

";, Latcd Stato tf and to join tho V'iot ':... : and tb i nev; scr; 

of vot:?-i in tho '. Parlias at to iaple7ft«jnt thiso This must nil 

bo ftcco j sh^d by April 35^ th Lat« ; b for tho : ; " return 

to Indoc* ' -u It i?; dii icult to s h it can h:> dotie and £i 
postpone it of i Uai 1 l^ral in Saig« : 1 tici 

It shou? 


rr t 

st: a- 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

xi shouM 

bo :. Loaod that ♦tha necessity for this eonpli< fcod 
(if it. exist*, j) has b^cn little v * -ood in IndooM - by cither 
French or Yistn&ri^sq &iid. laueb additional j&is trust ^nd suspicion of 

:r.otiv^s h^3 b*ssn c -. Tn-jro : also 1 „ eriti- 

cisn of th$ r^n-up of fc-era Ltorial assenihly*—tho French claiming 

they vrill not fee adequately repress ?d (13 out of 64 : " 0> awl 
trv; Vietnamese protest!: H st any Troncli representation at all* ". 


When (and if) the above described process is eoiaploted, Bao 
Dai e.rrivos in Saigon and tho Auriol-B&o Dai agroenc sij 2 in 
Paris y rch 8, 1949, goo^ into' effects subject to future ratification. 
Tho text has :iot yet boon published but :-. ros, was givoa to the 
press after. th xchan^o of letters ' and. soma additional details were 
revealed by the gov.;r; at during the doc .to in tho Assembly and by 
h Coxarjis r PIG1TOE in a speech is Saisroa o:i Hareh 2y« 


It confirms tho provisions of tho Exi d 1 Along Agrt at of 
Jjupto S, 1946— unity and i icb vd.thi:i tho French tf::io:i, pro** 
toction of French cultural and eeo l: do positic - and 
for French advisors and technicians-*- -Tart apoai v goes a . - • 
considerable tray in settling tho :.'c\y points loft for future 
negotiation by that agi nit* The Vict: .ill hav-3 its o\n arsy 
under its ov#n coj uid except in v i of mr« Franco vrill r: iyo 
nilitary and naval bases with carefully dej sd righlta of c 
nuni cation* Tha Vietnam will have It's o?ra diplomatic and eonsular 
oorvioD, but Viotna n missions will bs restricted to throe— ^ i, 
f ' .-■: and Ch France v 1 sponsor a do; . -1 for adsd&sion to u^Q* 
French citim will r i:i joct to It la~f« There Trill bo 

l: -?■:* custon f s union i*nd a Joint eurro: y tied to 
fr to* 3< ::ic and c r catters affecting all of Indochina, 
including the thorny and important question of control of tho 
Federal sorvices-- cuatoruSj railroads, postal service, aviati ; 
highways, oto— are to bo discussed at a conferoncq or CaiAbodi&j 
Laos and Vietnan in May or Juno of this year© " • * 


• It io usderatood that tho agroun::v^ ©ontaino naay p-roviolc 
distinctly favorable to tho ?ict:m& triiieh tho French gov< aent 
preferred not to reveal prior to the Assenbly dotnn and the c 

tonal cloctio:n* ' ; v 


It is p: .turo to ciscusn the prospects for sue " of 
prosoas p^ caferb tho text of the agrw : 3 boon oarefully ' 

;,:;udiod and until tho arj . ats for cKaagias the statufi of 

Cc china ! 1 nn suceos y conp: :todr« (t aru n rn 

circuici^iiig that the diehard colonialists in Saigon vrill at'' 
to rig tho oleotioiis •schoduled for April 10 -. ':" a hopo to block 
tho veto for ai , or, noro likely ^ the veto f o:\unv ■ 1th the 

rest of the Vietnan in the ! ?pe of achievi: g thoir niiiisivsi objective 
of :. ..' 3 an to^ Ceehiachiiu under Fron ' atroltj d * . 

Oai ■ " ■' also foru a go^ j ent en hia return ^ith n h r rro p: stige 
dl -.n'shoriny. i;;v i tho pro at XUAS r< ' u 

He pj i: r thd full text! ' u of h. h S .; 

suppl -',-• "^3 for it ;./" r : r to C ;ai: 

1 1 r } 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


:i<jo jabia b^ for satisfying the nirair^u:^ dona: of tho, Viet: so 
nationalists^ jsi&d if the other i tioacd c iitiosxs ard ::tj it 

in V^l;: ■ 1 Eao Dai v;il! } ft fair c" .;.;-, to sucooed in his plan to 

sop i tho ^on^Cc 1st; ol i of the resi3taaee frora the V 

Miaiu A loyal and liberal attitude "by both sidos dur : critical 

period of ehasxgo over froa French to V . adtiini stratip^ vriLll to-, 

a vied factor i:i determining tho civ ; of succdcc* 

.This raises tho q cion # of the altitude of the Waited States 

■ goveriiuent tovstrds the p.lsuu It has 1 ir. ated to the French 
that \tho:\ an a| it v,ias reached in Indochina vrhich appeared to 
iaeei ts&g niniviuri demands .of tho Vi i nationalists and to havo ?. 
reaso " go of adj g> we would b? prepared to : 
officially our approval reid support* and to, cc sidor direct alloca- : 
ticn of ISareh&ll Plan funds to I:idoc a aud perhaps other cconor.iio ." 

+ , • ■ ■ ■* 

aid© . . : •■ •" , 

■ * ■ 

It is believed that this policy should bo ir.ipl ftted at .the 
earliest; possible apriont after, the ess lal eo:i^" " ' : ationod . 

in the previous paragraphs ha^ Loo:i ^to Naturally if Eao Dai faile 
after our support has been eamou 3d, the proavige. p£'the United 
Stages suffers j\ serious blo;To . On the other ] l $ the laclc of our - 
support a heavy } dicap -.vhieJi saight troll elisdsiato any .■ 
. chaueo of suceosso Tho alternatives to tho Bao Dai .solution ar 
■ either conta d costly epic il v/arfarc or French v/ithdr 1 lo&vir 
a Coaai&l at -oont rolled govern in asv ^gio area of Southeast ■ *• 

Aaia« Seither of those would appear 'to bo to our i;rb 3t« 


-: '-' 




» ■ 


•- ' - 


To* 54 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


Saigon, Indochina , February 12, 3 •« 


Subject: Transrn. ttilig S«igon f'craorauda for Hew Delhi C . nao 

Tiir; -:■:: c : : le 



.. r~ 

• r* 



•; ■ 

I have the honor to refer to ' pirfement's circular telograia 
of January 12, 192 9, 5; 00 • , f and to transit herewith five c 
of the insmorandum prepared by this office for the How Delhi I ? 
Foreign Service C Perence. Copies have been forv Led to other in- 
terested pests as instru* bed* 

Respectfully yours. 

Geo | T. Abbott 
American Consul Gone 


tfenorandun on Indochina for 
Hew Delhi Foreign Service 
Conference, dtcf Feb. 12, 1049 

Original and ozalid to Department 

Copies to: Auionibassy, Rangoon 

Amenib:;s£y f Cairo 
AiaDiabassy, Hew Delhi 
Asnenibassy, Tehran 
Air: \ y, Karachi 
A / cissy, Hanila 
A to: sy, Bangkok 
American C ulato General, Colombo 
1-c ic:m Consulate General, 3oabay 
American Consulate General, Calcutta (2) 
Aisoric £ ulata Go al, JSvclras 
American Consulate General. Batai " 
American Consulate Go, l 3 Lai 3 
African Consulate General, Sing&j 
American Consulate < -. " ., Canton 
U3i D, Tokyo 

1 - 


G; Abbott :P.AColc* rook : HFCunnir ' ! teors/ 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

SECRET America** Consulate Genera?, 

Saigon, Indochina, February 12, 1949 



&« Internal Political Situation in the Vietnam 


1# General Situation - Postwar developments In the Annaiaito provinces 
of IndochTaa, fcrTov;n as the Viet] tia, are fund&tngnt&lly similar to those in 
other parts of Asia in that tJ • ;,- stern fro:: s powerful upsurge of National- 
ism. Tho Viotnan st is cub from other regions in that ConniunisR has 
gained control of the Nationalist may mt and created a situation which 
is a clt sic cy. ie of the successful application Gf Cossitiu 1st strategy 
in a col ial area- A small Koseot; ai Chine so trained gr has soiled 
leadership and control of tho strong and aliitost universally supported 
indc : ace laovom nt« ^ho country has be?n !copt in a state of strife a: 
-confusion for throe years* One hundred thousand French troops are pinned 
dcrcm in Indochina and not available in 3ui . ■, The area is a serious 
drain on Prance's resources ins id o? a source of v/oaltb end rav; mate- 
rials for Franco and tho world. Finally t hero is a fair chance that 
French may bo driver, out and tho first Co: i.lst outpost in Southeast 
Asia established* 

Tho French hare belatedly co^e to a partial understanding of the 
situation with which they are facer! and arc endeavoring to Croat a non- 
Communist autonomous gevernaent under the leadership of former Esaperor 
Bao DAI. They hope to rct_.ii: tho Vietnam vlthin the nebulous French 
Onion and maintain French military and economic positions* 

2. Background - To understand how tho present situation arose e, 
brief review of the history of the colony is necessary. Indochina oamo 
under 'European domination considerably later than Indonesia, India, or 
the Philippines, the French first occupying part of Cochinchina in 1864* 
The area of this colony was expanded v;hile protectorates r;ere established 
over tho remaining parts of tho peninsula during subsequent years* Tho 
administration tendsd to becoTO more centralized and eventually evolved 
into a tightly knit political and ceo ic fee ition in which the rights 
and Dowers of the 1 sror of As im, King of Ca:;.bocia, and Princes of Laos 
had practically disappeared* Th was little utc y or self govern- 
ment eve;i at the local level and little pi oo for natives in the i tetinis- 
tration exs pt in or cb ntially honorary posts. 

The Fr aro justly proud of bho taste which t/oy ace ?lis3 *& 
in bui 1 is and r^ilroa-5s, dc sloping ports, convert: j tho i ps 
of tho Cochinchinose deltas into rice lands, and dcvcloj fc] mineral 
resources of T kin. They also nade considers! Lo p . uss in intplsnting 
the French la: .go and cult through schools and the church, (?h 
arc tv;o million i in ths Vietnam, nearly 10$ of f 3 

p iletirlj : 1] educated km so speak sc~ie French. 

?ho occur ,-- t of th couni ; was not ac i 

plished vdLth ■ ►Its Lei vrorc.put 1 great sc . y. 

Tho nationalist ?;.■■. ', however s v ~ never tely s* ' 


-■«- V^ 4-^ f ' **» l*r~. 1 *» *" • -"* 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

developed particularly rapidly in the period between the two world wars. 
The Communists early became influential therein although never numerous. 
The Trotzkyist faction was strong and at one time controlled the Indo- 
Chinese Communist party. 

The shattering defeat of France by Germany and the immediately 
f ollov, ■; Japanese occupation of Indochina dealt a severe blow to French 
prestige with the natives, while the early Japanese victories in the 
Pacific extended this loss of face to all whites. Even though the 
Annainese hated the Japs, five years of anti -western propaganda left per- 
manent icts on the minds of the people. 

In the final months of the war when defeat was inevitable, 
Japanese leaders in Indochina deliber ly created a situation ch 
would mal the return of the French difficult by setting up a native 
government and allowing arms to get into native hands. The allies had 
contributed to this situation by parachuting arms and supplies to the 
native underground fighting the Japa , As in most occupied countries 
both in Asia and Europe, the Communists were one of the most active and 
best organized elements in this underground. Some months before the 
Japanese surrender Ho Chi MIMH returned secretly to Indochina. He has 
had a long and promi b history as an Annamite revolutionary and a 
Comintern agent under a variety of aliases. For the Communists there 
was no question of his leadership; to others he was known as a lift long 
fighter for independence who had returned from exile to lead his people. 
He had around him a small group of able Communists trained as he was in 
Moscow, or veterans of the Chinese Communist movement. Following the 
then current popular front tactics-, Ho organized a coalition of political 
parties known as the Viet Mirih J and set up a government in which 
Communist control v at first concealed. 

Thus when after some delay the Chinese arrived in Tonkin and the 
British in Saigon to disarm the Japanese troops, they found a native 
government established and in control # 

A more detailed account of events from this point on will be 
found in the annex to this memorandem. 

3, French Colonial Policy, Past and Present - While not always 
clear or consistent, French colonial policy before the war s generally one 
of assimilation. In its h:l :t and simplest form, this was based on a com- 
plete absence of color or race prejudice and a belief that the mission of 
France was not to prepare her subject peoples for independence, but to 
convert them to French civilization, culture, and religion and prepare 
tl to become French citizens and their homelands to become i gral parts 
of France. (Martinique and Guadaloupe were pies of the complete ap- 
plication of this policy.) 

This policy had I i questioned even before the war and in ] ; 
General de Gaulle held a conference of colonial experts at Brazzaville 
to consider postwar colonial problems. At this erence was born the 
idea of the French Uni which was to be a centralized colonial federa- 
tion with varying degrees of local autonomy but with essential cc ol 
remaS i In Paris. 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

When France was liberated and the drafting of a new constitution 

■was taken up, colonial policy played an important "but confusing parte 

Few of the deputies to the two constituent assemblies knew much about 

colonial matters while the few "experts" were s] ply divided. It must 

be remembered that the average Frenchman believes what he was taught in 

school - that Prance is the only color" :r that really uric! bands 

the natives > that the latter are universally grateful for the benefits 

of French civilization and t any disce nt is the work of a small 

minority of professional agitators. * 

Those who realized that the era of colonialism was past and that 

France must make fundamental changes in her policy if she were not to 

lost her empire could make little j ession on the general apathy and 

ignorance. Even the Communists were hesitant about going too far against 

public opinion by advocating independence for the colonics, and were 

probably also doubtful about the wisdom of b g up an empire which 

they expected shortly to control. 

The result of all these factors was a constitution which was 
extremely vague , confused , and conflicting on colonial matters. It 
provides for three classes of o\ \ territories - (a) the overseas 
departments which arc an integral part of France, (b) the overseas 
territories which have limited local autonomy, and (c) the Associated 
States. The latter category was created to take care of Morocco , Tunis, 
and the states of Indochina, Ho details were given as to their posi- 
tion in the Union except that it should be determined an "Act" or 
agreement with each Associated State. 

The overseas territories (and, of course, the overseas depart- 
ments) are represented in the Assembly and even more heavily in the 
Consei] de la Republique, the upper branch of the French Parliament. 
In addition, there is an Assembly of the French Union composed of 
half colonial and half metropolitan members which, however, ) only 
consultative powers. Finally there is to be a Council- of the French 
Union composed of a representative of each Associated State, the 
Pi 'dent of France, and certain cabinet members. 

It was expected that the Vietnam would be the first Associated 
State and that the agreement with it would establir precedents for 
the entry of Morocco and Tunis. Unfortunately by the time the constit- 
ution was adopted and in operation, the situation had already gotten 
out of hand in Indochina. Ho Chi Jlinh was not willing to accept the 
e: jmeiy limited a ority which the French insistence on control of 
defeme. Lgn affairs, and economic policy would leave him, and 
incited by the inept policy of Admiral d f ARGEHLIEU and his subordi- 
nates, he made a s rise attack on December 19, 19^6, which almost 
succeeded in overrunning the Fre rces in Tonkin and mam and 
resulted in the der of many innocent French civilians. 

This attack strengthened the influence of the conservative and 
reactio; circles i France and Indochina and was followed by a 
desperate ati t to pacify the country by military i is. While the 
control of most of the cities was regained, the countryside re i ned 
in the hands of Ho f s forces and open fight i- ally sir! o 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

bitter and destructive guerrilla war.rar©-» In this the French superi- 
ority in arms and equips nl ites balanced by the size of the country, 
the difficulty of ' terrain, and the h llity of the great bulk of 
the population* 

Tho reali£Stion that paM£i<^tion of the country by force, oven 
if possible, would be a long and'costly process, and fear that world 
public opinion might force U. TO or ^icrican 5 bervention caused the 
Kronen Government fco shift policy in the spring of 1946 and replace 
Admiral d'Argenlieu by a civilian, Lie Enile 3C12, - IT, as High Com- 
missioner* II ■ wail sent to Saigon *'/ith no precise instructions but 
with the hope that he could roach agrcc&pnt with someone and step the 

In judging tho situation on April 1, 1947, wh a ho arrived in 
Indochina, dev&lppnonts in tho French* and interxiati 1 political situ- 
ation since 1945 must be kept in mind* The most iraportant was un- 
doubtedly tho growing split between the Western powers raid lioscdw* 
tiihon tho French first accepted to negotiate with Ho Chi Hinh, his 
Coisnunist background was pf minor importance « France was an. ally of 
Russia/ and the French CoEicunists were an important element jn tho 
coalition government in Paris* In tho y<y:\i- that passed before Bollaert 
arrived on tho scene, tho international crisis had becoiae clear, the 
Gosmniists Were no longer in tho French 3o vernTitent , and tho fact that 
the Vict h was Cccficunist controlled bcoarao o.n important political 
factor* Thus Bollaert soon decided that tho rorurcption of negotiations 
with Ko was iiff>ossible« 

Kis decision t'» droatoa new political force around tho ex- 
Emperor Dei rnd the lengthy an2 confused nogobiatic: -vhich fol- 
ic is arc described in coma detail in the annex to this nemo- 
randuKu As it finally took fom, what is coHsaonly called the Bollaert- 
Bao Dai solution pay bo sufesarized as follows--: ■ 

a. It v necessary to recapture from the Communists 
control cf the Victtfrua n&tioxxalist movements. 

b* To do this it was necessary to group together anti- 
Co!rjTiunir,t forces around some political figure with national 

prestige and influence* Bao* Dai was selected - with consider- 
able reluctance - since it Was felt that traditional nennrchism 
was still a for co among tho people, (and because it was felt 
that his F-rc:i-:h education and the fact that his wife is a d . ut 
Catholic would mako bin o : ro rca sonabls per go:, to deal with}.* 


c% An agreerent would bo negotiated with Bao Bai granting 
the r. Nationalist c^ : -.-,nds. 

do Sac Dsti would return to Fuc and set up a govern 
which Jfculd be a polo of atfcro i to those cl : ;r*ts su oorf- I;o Chi llinh whiah voire not SeirMnists or sympathizers . 

(pr« b] ;: 

*~Th i " r Tlr . - '- '■"■ - act nly on the French side* Bao Dai has : 
or . 1 ' ''■ , Lhe p] of th Hiviera for :, difficu] 

and daa reus position in Hue. 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By; NWD Date; 201 1 

(pre ly 80$ of the total) and which were becoming increas- 
ingly fed up with the totalitarian methods and discipline of 
the Communist leaders of the Viet Kinh and discouraged by 
months of hardship in the jungle. 

e* Gradually Bae Dai's strength would increase and Ho's 
decline until the latter would either have to surrender, flee 
the country , or become a minor guerrilla leader. 

It is obvious that the success o£ such a plan required grant i- 
sufficient authority and concessions to Bao Dai to ible him to es- 
tablish a stable government in at least a restricted area and to con- 
vince native leaders that their essential demands had been met and 
that there was no longer any reason for continuing to fig] ; , In this 
Bollaert failed, .largely because of the political situation in France. 
The various "Third Force r governments were not only weak but sharply 
divided on colonial policy. They were particularly anxious not to 
give ammunition to the growing strength of de Gaulle's forces, always 
ready to exploit the average Frenchman's out-of-date views on colonial 
matters. Thus Bollaert was not eve able to persuade the Government 
to request Assembly ratification of the extremely vague Eaie d 'Along 
Protocol of June 5? 19'+ 8 ♦ This fact was largely response for Bao 
Dai's decision not to return to Indochina which made further stops in 
the 5 ntation of the plan impossible, even though a Provisional 
Central Government had been set up under General XUAN, former President 
of the Coehinchina Provisional Government. 

Bollaert gave up in disgust and was replaced by M. Leon riGl. 
a young career colonial officer with much expe i in Indochina. 

If. Present Situation - M. Pignon, being a civil servant rather 
than a politician brought a fresh viewpoint to the situation, and 
appears to have made considerable progress towards a solution in 
his short period of office. 

He has adopted the policy of his predecessor but has been 
successful in having it aecepl as that of the French Government 
rather than as a personal policy of the High Commissioi . In this 
he was aided by a number of factors, the most important, of course, 
being recent developments in China, Even the most die-hard French 
political leader can realize that with the arrival of Chinese Com- 
munist forces on 1 Tonkin frontie which would assist or perhaps 
even join with Bo Chi 2-linli, the precarious French military position 
would become impossible. Moreov , a growing number of pre 
French- n in and out of the G ent has in recent months advo- 
cated liberal concessions to Vietnam nationalism. Even the Indochina 
resolution of the HPF (Gaullist) Congress last fall was surprisingly 
mod ? (although Gene de Gaulle himself has been ] liberal). 

Pignon reopened negotiations with Bao Dai in November and 
continued them in Jan ry after his return from a brief turn in Indo- 
china. Little lite is known as to the exact status of these 
negotiations , but arently cgti ions have been made on both sides. 
Bao Dai has agreed to return to Indor a if the ] ly 

ratifies the B; d'AJ resraent and c *es the si is o 


Coc ichii 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

Cochinchina from a French colony to a part of the Associated St of 
Vietnam. A debate on these points is expected early in March. Bao 
Dai also wishes the prompt signing and ratification of a treaty cover- 
ing the subjects reserved under the Baie d 'Along Protocol* but it seems 
doubtful if tliis can be accomplished In the time available before his 
return. Disagr* still continues on certain Dints, the most 
important apparently being over separate diplomatic representation for 
the new sta t • The French are believed to have offered consulates in 
neighboring countries and Vietnam officers in certain French missions* 

Opinions differ considerably as to the chances of the French 
Government to obtain the necessary parliamentary action. Undoubtedly 
opposition will be violent from both t: extreme right and left wings 
while the Socialist Party will be seriously split. However, specul- 
ation at this i j is pointless since the matter vail presumably be 
settled by the time the conference opens at New Delhi* 

A more pertinent question is - assuming Bao Dai returns - what 
chances has he to establish a stable government, split away the non- 
Cor. followers of Ho Chi Minh, and eventually pacify the country? 
It is believed that the most important factor will be the nature of 
the French agreement with Bao Dai and the meaning which it gives to 
"independence within the French Union." If this independence is a 
sham with most real authority remaining in French hands, then Communist 
propaganda proclaiming him a puppet and a traitor will be vindicated. 

A second factor is the manner in which the return is staged 
and the agreement is implemented. Because of the delay, inaction, and 
disunity on the part of the French in recent months, the Vietnam leaders 
and people have become cynical and distrustful. The popular enthusi- 
asm which might have been aroused by the return of Bao Dai last June 
can no longer be expected. Furthermore, the French civilian population 
in Indochina will be sullenly hostile o any new regime while few of- 
ficials can be counted on to offer real cooperation in the difficult 
transition perido. The result of the French local elections in March 
mil also be a factor since if they fo: ast a return of cle Gaulle, 
doubt will be cast on the permanence of the agreement with Bao Dai. 

Finally much will depend on Bao Dai's ability to resolve the 
rivalry and intrigue 1 c. en Vietnam leaders and the r Zonal jealousy 
and suspicion between the three provinces which are to form the Vietnam 
state. The Tonkinese are poor but energetic, intelligent and aggressive , 
the Annamese poor but cultured and proud, while the Cochinchinese feel 
that the other provinces are interested mainly in sharing the wealth of 
their region. Opposition to the Fr h and Chinese is about the only 
thing that the leaders of the three provinces see eye to eye on. CocMn~ 
Chinese s: atism has been encouraged and supported by French business 
interests and less openly by many French c ' icials. 

B. Internal Situation in Cambodia and laos . 

The J la of Cambodia and Laos differ in race, reli :i, and 
tt rament from the , and the pr< blem of their relation with 

France is less difficult and acute. Cambodia has good reason to fear 

the aggressif 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


the rcssion cf both £icin and "ho ETctnara, and tho French Pre borate 
has a literal meaning* Folio 1 the BtirrrtaJier i ' ho Japo-iese a Modus 
Vivendi vjas sigi I in 1946 vi\,h the Fr.c:o;i grs 5 local ai ;_:• 
Lost year C? and Laos became tho first Is so elated Spates in tho 
French Union, end recently tho ■ l independence" of Cambodia in the French 
Union v;as proclaimed* Tho nc fciotts for ar* agreement or tre by to 
determine tho waning of those terms has been delayed until tho Vietnam 
problem is settled, with tho French promising t Cambodia v:ould re- 
ceive at least the same concessions* 

Cambodia has a now liberal constitution and has made soma pro- - 
gross in adopting the forms of dcuKJOxa^y* French officials are now 
called advisors to their Cambodian counterparts and exert tftoir au- 
thority largely behind tho scenes. 

There has been increasing evidence of Cambodian impatience 
over the delay in fixing their final status, and a determination to win 
v/idcr auto; 7 and sovereignty- LU Pignon as farmer Governor of 
Cambodia can be expected to bo sympathetic to these demnds* 

Laos ?/ith a population of only cne million, thinly scattered 
along tho upper Jfekong, is oven less a political problem* After the 
war tho French set up the Prince of Luong Prabang as Sing of Laos 
under a t parary agreement siniilar to that nith Cambodia. The French 
adnsinist ration in Laos is, hovrerer, much raoro direct and open* The 
region has been generally peaceful, but there have recently boon, rumors 
of concent rat ion of "Free Laotians" in the Siamese provinces along the 
l\ :n; which nay forecast raids into Indochincso territory. "The ob- 
jective of the Frco Laotians is apparently an independent greater Laos 
including both the French province end territories inhabited by Laotians 
in Siam* 

C. International Relations, 

1. United Stat e? - Pest war relations between the United States 
and Indochina got off to a bad starts! th President Roosevelt 1 s views 
on international trusteeship for strategic areas in the hands of 
powers unable to defend them, followed by the overenthusiastic activi- 
ties of certain CSS agents in the period just before and after tho 
Japanese surrender* The belief that the policy of tho United States 
is to throw the French out of Indochina still persists in any circles 
both in j china • in Fr r \^co* Ue are also bla; i y cT permitting the 
Chinese and English to occupy the northern and southern halves of the 
country to disarm J panose troops. Our pens: bent refusal to supply 
equipment and arms for French military operations in 1: I shina is a 
sore subject v;ith most 1 nch any officers s Another source of irri- 
tation has boon the almost universal / of A:n rican correal idonts 
visiting Indoch' ■ to write articles axtrczaely critical of the French. 

As c litions hav; deteriorated in J lochiiia (and in Europe) 
there has been 1 3 understand] o£ our policy 5 nors desire to 
ol al ■• ' assistance in irp] 1 Lng 1 1 I plans, and 

at higher levels Lons are relatively c lial* 


In recent 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

In recent vrocks the French navo acti^-siy sunvoited proposals 
for four povrer co rat' in Southeast reve I of 

C 'T-v-inisn, and bhere has "boon grjeh talk .about the strategic importance 
of Indochina as a bastion against 1 eouthratrd spread of Chinese 

C c.:r:.y.;; : LstS- 

As fnr as the Ar.nani are concerned., they were encouraged 
to believe that after the defeat of Japan vro v/ould assist th - in ob- 
taining independence- As it became apx>arent that our syxnpath] v/cre 
tempered by strategic considerations in Europe > the p ul&rity of tho 
United States has diminished* Nevertheless, tho prestige of tho 
United States is still high, and even Ho Chi Minh has boon careful to 
prevent any public ant i-Aiuori can propagandas 

2. China - Tho civil?. ton of the Vietnam is essentially Chinese^ 
and Political and cultural ties have boon close throughout t - 
turios- JTcverthelosSj there is little sympathy or natural liking 
bciv.-een the tv/o races largely because of the fear of future Chinese 
expansion aiid jealousy oP tho large Chinese minority which controls 
most of the bush and trade of the country* The Chinese occupying 
forces in Tonkin and northern Annam loft behind a bitter noiacry* 

In the French-Chined Treaty of 194C, Prance granted important 
concessions in China- These included the return of the French con- 
cessit in S} gfeai end bhe leased territory of Xv/an^chov;. the sale of 
the Chinese portions of the Yunnan Railroad, a froo port in Haiphong, 
and the continuation of free Chinese immigration into sc hern Indo- 
china- The latter two provisions angered Viol nan leaders, and there 
have been repeated warnings that since they xroro not consulted in 
drafting the treaty, they did not cc ier the : as eive s bound to honor 
it when thoy regained their independence- Attacks on Chinese 5 d- 
gration are frequent in tho native press* Tho French authorities^ 
have boon far rn>:.i reluctant to heed the voice of public opinion, and 
are endeavor:! to chock iimnigration by strict enforcement of quarantine 
and other regulations. 

The orobleB of Chinese CoirjiiujiictG v/ill be treated in a sub- 
sequent section- ' * 


3, Philippines - Political and economic rclatio: between Indo- 
ch and the ] ilippine Republic are of surprisingly minor iingiorto 
There is not even a Philippine Consulate in S-aigon- V: :i polity sal 
loaders arc much interested in Philippine inc 1 and the nature 
of tl political, military, and economic agreements ivith the United 

4* Siaia - The cession of Cambodian, and Laotian territory to Siara 
under Japan are in 1041 left FronSh-Sianu : relations in a 
^ngoreus St the r ended. After prolonged negotiations :J 
Si I tho J : evinces but has never officially accepted the 

decision of tho co: illation cor^nission* 


With ths ' of povrar of J&rshnl I I : :I the French V .v. 

ft&de :t; us r : ■ i-'-p' "■" ; relations v/ith $iam- s 

r- ; concluded last year for coo; in preventing s 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

moments of partisans across the frontier, ard tho present Siamese 

govern sti'C as much less &~&3pat?v*tic tc tho large group of Vict 

Lnh refugees residing in Sis:?, 

5* EStlaya - ffith tho outbreak of tiisordnrs in fcSalaya last year 
the French 1 oit that they could expect greater sympathy and coop ion 
from the British authorities in Sir- rc> have boon a number of 
visits back and forth of military and civilian officials* Tho general 
impression is that tho French are such zsore eager than the British* 

6. Indonesia - Tho French have naturally sympathized and supported 

the Dutch in their difficui Log in Indonesia* The recent police "action 

has boon enthusiastically approved, I the attitude of the Unit States 

an! Australia bitterly attacked* There is undoubtedly an undercurrent 

of envy and jealously over tho contrast between Dutch Liilitary successes 

and French failures* 

The Vietnam people naturally sympathize wholeheartedly with 
their Indonesian fcllov/ sufferers, and tho recent developments have 
been given as nuch pr .'nenco in tho native press as censorship would 
permit* The do vole sits in tho Security Council have generally been 
greeted with disilluLionniont and a frequent reaction has boon that the 
mi-si ; of tho Indonesians was to place too rt&dh trust in the United 
Nations and in the United States as tho leading : P that organi- 
zation* The Hew Delhi Conference cr little eiccitoriont cr enthusi- 
asm, and the effect of Coxr^unist pro; . - clearly visible in 
certain articles denounci hru as a number of the imperialist clan* 
Di e*-or the fact that Vietnam representatives wore not 

invited tt Indochina wis not discussed was undoubtedly a factor 
in the poor press received by the conference* 

7* India - Tho considerable Indian minority, most of whom are 
shop keepers and money lenders, is the most important factor in relations 
between Indochina and India* Tho presence of a number of minor officials, 
oh ly police, fro:?* Pondiehcry, also tends to harm relations between 
the Vietnamese and Indians. Difficulties over tho future of tho French 
territories" in India naturally gets nuch attention in the French pr 

C S E » 

It is not believed that an independent Vietnam will bo enthusi- 
astic about accepting the leadership cf India in Southeast Asia* An 
effort to play oif^ the Indian .against tho Chinese can be crrpoctedo 

I), Co? tnisft i:i Indochina 

A brief description of the C- mism in Indochina before an 1 durin 
tho war - lined control cf the nationalist nov at is in- 
cluded ir. otion A, Part 2* 



Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 


ho one knovs hov; many Corossunists there . j in Indochina, but the 
mibbor of real party irieiabprs 3 s certainly pjjeuI* TV; highest estimate 
in 20$ of the troop:' fig] ting rcith Ho Chi EBUih and this includes 
sympathisers* 3Io:v ^, the nu? r is undoubi Ly grot Lng, and at tho s 
tine nou-Conniunist ciilitary u s arc being si . ily infiltrated with 
secret agents* Ofelts under C anist co;v: 1 are generally r ariaed- 

Thus the problem for tho lor.dcr cento fcing changing sides is not an 

easy onCt 


Another point on which definite infor: ion is lacking is tho 
channel of coiununie ations with !!os-c and tho canter of regional con- 
trol. [It is probable that all of the available channels are used - 
overland ?r^- China, Buripa, and Siamj and "by spa from China, Hans 
Kongj and Singapore- It is also vory possible that Uoscovr din . : ves 
arrive; via France »J Certainly satis ft. ry ccr-ir.u.nications exist since 
Moscow Duplications of fairly recent date arc frequently seised hy the 
French J^Corununist headquarters in South Asia are variously reported 
to be in Hong Kong, Bangkok* Sinj ora 3 Rangoon, and Calcutta* Hong 
Kong seems to bo the most likely! 


One peculiar thing about Vietnam Co irAsn is that there has boon 
very little anti-American propaganda* It is obvious this is not 
due to ignorance of the current party line* It apparently rep-rose s 
a hope en the part of ho Chi !linh that he nay still obtain American 
support for or at least acceptance of a Vict Minh govern at under his 
lr .dership- Evidence that this hope is dinj tshing is furnished in a 
regional party directive dated in Hbvcinber 1948 v/htch st d that 
active anti-American propaganda should be conducted in party circles 
and by vro rd of nouth &:$ong the people but should not yot appear on 
the riidio, in the press, or in public speeches •T/ThC main there of 
this propaganda was to be that the United States is an imperialist 
power which aims to extend it:: damnation over Indochina "in a n nnor 
even no re cruel and ruthless than the Fron I 1 - An inter sting iton 
v/as thet pro -American Annamites v.*ore to be denounced in anonymous 
letters to French officials vrhich indicates that the Comraunists are 
av/nro of the similarity between their propaganda and the belief of 
e«: tain French circleso ; 

Tho problem of Goznmunism anong the C}_" ;sc minority is one v;hich 
has been given ranch attention by the French authorities, especially 
since tho situation becano critical in China* Up until now there has 
boon surprising little direct cooperation bot~.vocn local Chi :-. Zy .- 
■ mists and the Vict *finh* There are vory fev/ Chinese aniens; the 
insui t troops,*. nd the Chief of Surete stc tes that no Chin had 
over been caught taking ; in ^r- : raring or other terrorist 

activities. Howe- , the Chin play an important part in cos^iuni- 
cations an?3 in smuggliJ I supplies* For seme • F nov: the 
French have been quUF:dy rip iding ^ '- y ' _: snail batches of 

iGiovm Con.:. 1st leaders and the rote Is thej h^ire 3 sit' ion 

j in hand* In a recent convor i "on with the head of the Surote 
ho, nevertheless^ expros ~] co^o disquiet over the tendency of ' te 
local Chi*i33G coi - Lty to climb on the has 3 .. (;on as Communist 
victor ■ ?s in China r« Hod up, 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


Back - InJCbr-satior: 

It is believed thvt a brief discursion of the bac ;rouad.„ 3 
essential to the understs ] :i~ of the present situation in Indo- 
china. The following paragraphs accordingly pre at a soj tfhat 
over-simplified version of events since 1345* 

C:i ixeh 9, 1945, the Japanese took over direct control of the 
a- Lnistration of Indochina, disarmed ?n sh troops and interned ir.ost 
French officials and Civilians* Enporor Bao DAI was retained in 
pov/er and promised independence* When Ji^an surrendered, Japanese 
officials in Indochina permitted control to be seized ly Anaamese 
nationalists. Emperor Bao P&i abdicated on August 25, 1945, and Ho 
Chi I' IK, i\ prominent Ccni rn ]. ier, proclaimed the Viotnarn 
Republic on Septenbor £* The British, v;^o laoved into the s uthern 
region to disarm Japanese trocps, refused to recognize the new 
republic and promptly turned over the administration to the French- 
There was spiae fighting in Saigon and continued guerrilla ivarfaro 
throughout Cochinchina* 


In the north the Chinese occupation forces recognised Eo 1 s 
government and supported pro-Chinese elements in the doMnairt Viet 
Minh party coalition* After prolonged negotiations and considerable 
concessions on the part of the French (Shanghai, Yunnan Railroad, et 
cetera) the Chinese agreed to vrithdravr* On I -arch 6, 1946, just before 
tho Chinese ^rithdrev/al, a representative of the French High Coirgaissioner 
signed a brief protocol with Ko Chi Minh, recognising the Vietnam as a 
free cor y v/ithin the French Union and tho Jndoohincse Federation 
vrith its ovm array, finances, and government* Tho status of Coch 
china v/as to be determined by a plebiscite* Details Were to be- worked 
out at a subsequent conference* 


After unsuccessful negotiations txt Balat, Ko and a largo delega- 
tion cane to France early in June* Tho so-called Fontaineblcau Con- 
ference lasted from July 5 to September 11. It broke down over tho 
issues of tho unity of Coehinchina v.ith the rest cf Annam, military 
relations, and Vietnam depends for a separate dip" 1 : tic service and 
control of customs, finance and economc scatters • Just before leaving 
France, Eo signed a nodus vivondi vfith {Sinister of Overseas Franco 
KOUTBS v;hich provided for stopping errilla fighting in southern 
Indochina, release of prisoners and hostages, and for the re: tion 
of negotiations in January 1947.' 


1* It s-2 ild bo recalled that 4 Fontainebleau Conference took pier 

trier tho n^riocl of tha second Constituent Assembly in v;hich colonial 
policy *.;as a crucial and 1 i r issud Thus the Fro ncgotic s 

v/crc • ferung by ; of fa of v;hat the ne^; constitution v:-:u" 

do a! tho Fj eh Union, ;vhile the V bnara dolcgj :n v?as b h doul 

ful of the p '-'' sri fcy e ! s3 ! 3 - iticn ai ' c: 

int.j ' " •; "• ' speeches in the Ass ly by colonial and Cc::~ 

nunist o$» The C< Foresee ws 1 is foi 1 to failure. 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


When :io returned to Hanoi, in October, hs found -: sts in 
his gover 3-, led by Coanuiiisi Minister of war SIAP, had itu sed 
their influence cmtI::- his nearly five isonths : ab oe. The Erasures 
for stopping the fighting in Cochinehina v;erc never implemented and 
relations vriLth the French deteriorates rapidly, A dispute over cus~ 
toins control in Heiph:. in Uovaxtor resulted in localized fighting, 
and on DeeorJb^r 19, 1^ a carefully pr rod surprise attaci almost 
succeeded i:: overrunning ?r^rr:h forces in, Tonkin and Jtaaasu 

Fighting has boon continuous since then-* - After a for/ v/oeks of 
real warfare in V a and vicinity it deteriorated into bitter end 
costly guerrilla operations* Kith great difficulty Franco concentrated 
about 100,000 troops in Indochii ari^od chiefly v/it British and 
American lend lease equipment* This force, ;*h31e sufficient to gar- 
rison the chief cities and maintain pro communications be I n 
then, v/as not large enough to p^oii*v the country* Civil end military 
officials in both France and Indochina have for sane time admitted 
that this cannot be done without freatlv increased forces which arc 
not available. 

Hhcn it bccar.o apparent \hat a nilitary solution v;as not practi- 
cable the French returned to the idea "of negotiations • Adrdfal 
d : ; : was repl d as High Co^Tdssioner hy *!- BCL1 a 1 , a resis- 
tance leader a::! former career prefect. Partly because of the proju- 

d-? ■-».-» r* ^ "* f 4-,"^T cr^ r % ' t''"h ".''i FStfV" <*1^?*TT V I^ "Mir 1 *i J J ftf»l- nf* L/** ■ ^ ^. -- ] Q <\ *? fs 

...... yi , .„;il j iiv« , .v u v * y ^ *•.»'■_' V'k, r _. w. t j, y.^^, i '^-* rt v.'. ;•.' . > v .<■-. * vA. O/, MvvvmJ - - X*? *.*%j • H 

personal affront to hie., and also because 'of grovdrig anti-Coi:::-enis:n 
in France, the French v:ere reluctant to resume negotiations -rath Ho 
Chi Minh- In the absence cf any other loader with n national following, 
the French turned to the ex-Emperor eao Dai ^rhe was living in exile in 
Hong Kong- During the of 1947 fevered and confused negotiations 
succeeded in collecting a laoticy group of parties, nov bs and in- 
dividuals billing to support Bao Dai. The nucleus was traditional 
monarchists fro::. Annan and Tonkin. To this tras joined certain native 
Catholic elements in Tonkin, the Caodadst and iioa Eao religious sects 
in Cochinehina,. certain anti-Conraunist nationalists, and various other 
minor groups v;ith nixed snotives. 

Jy September 1947, the French felt prepared to epen a combined 
diplomatic and nilitary offensive, Bollaert v;as to : ke an : bant 
policy speech outlining the conditio for a settle ttt, rchile a 
limited military offc ive in To: '!:in would e. n Ho Chi Minh and 
one aire rors tc rally to Bao £ai. Unfortus xly. the text of 
Bollaoi : 3 spec -: v? : 3 a political foot! til in France and as de- 
livered 7;as s: * Lt< r< ? devm that it nade a peer i: . ssion in rative 
circles. Tho only nev: 'concession affero. .s union of the three 
Annandto provinces* 

Bno Dai, after considerable urging, : &dth Sollaert on a French 

t-'i 'JIj. QVa — . . -•- i - -- — ■*■ " ■-» -* **• *-• *-i_ i •'wy»<«ww« U t*i fcV! i t .'■ -- - • , . -, . i .. t J.S** -■ '-^ a 

Si" "' - Tiv f*c ' "" ' •'■ **t1 t>f J- i 7 *i/H *l ^ fiC'T\r* v ^ t***\f*€* r- tsA ,.-^.' t J-,. r\t" > -*-V i-i 

V :: th ion, p " for the pre Ion of Pronc^i 

pcpi ic ini s, ( ! riority ! h in choosing advisers 

*-; l 


n ■ 


Declassified per Executive Order 1 3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

and technicians, but loft to later negotiations tho detailed solution 
of diplomatic, military, economic, financial, and technical : :rs# 
(This agrc' Lt was, except for two u - > exactly t 

same as tho ono signed on June 5, 1948, by Bollaert, Xttan, and Bao Dai.) 
Bollaert is understood to have arr^eed he should not deal with Ho* It v/as 
arranged that o vould beet again in February to rrake final arrange 
inonts for the return of B&o Dai to- Indoehi2ia« 

Bollaert returned to France to explain his plans to his govsrmient 
and obtain its an sal. Bao Dai un etodly follovred Bollaert, going 
to S\vit seriate *:!i3ra ho had a meeting v.dth M« Bollaert in Jo try* Tho 
High Cordis si oner returned to Indochina on January 26 to prepare for 
the meeting with Bap IXii scheduled for February. Tho latter, hovnvor, 
went to Prance and vj&s received by a number cf high government officials 
This infuriated Bollaert, v.ho t reatenod to resign and was only placated 
by an official statement that negotiations vvith 3ao Dai YTould bo ex- 
clusively through hin. 

Events fro:r\ this point on were confused- ObViously Bao Dai had 
roconsiderQd hi^ reluctant ugrq orient to return to Annam and felt : fc 
additional concessions and guarantees ess 1 if he v;cre to 
gain the support of sufficient Nationalist elc s to insure stability 
for his nev; governments In addition, his i y in Franc:: had opened his 
"eyes to the unstable position of the Prench government and the possi- 
bility of a return to power of do GAULLE* 

too Dai did not return to Hong Kong until l?arch 14, 1948. The 
following vxeks v.-e re .marked by much oc Lng and going between Saigon 
and Hon" Kong of French and Vietnam representatives, and continually 
changing rumors of the status of the negotiations* Apparently do** 
spairing of persuading; Bao Dai to return in the near future, Bollaert 
agreed to set up a Provisional Central Vietnam Government Which v:ould 
prepare the v/ay for the Emperor, v/ho agreed to give his moral backin 
to tho nev/ regime* 



The w*i govornnent v;as headed by General Xu&n, then President of 
the Cochinehinese Government. Xuan, while an Ani Ite by birth, is a 
general in the French Array, a French citizen , and married to a French 
woman- Ho v/as, of course, promptly hi ;ed as a French puppet (which 

not believed to be true)* Xuan h:A great difficulty in persu 
persons of ability influ : to join hi! government, even v;ith fchi 
backing of Bao Dai, and the toara ho collected vis very weak, particu- 
larly as regards rcprosentatj . ;- from Tonkin* 

On Juno 5, 1948, Boil vert ; with Xuan and Bao Bai, again on a 
cruiser in tho Baio dv ng, and a r-r. m agrc at v/as signed which v/as 
ul b exactly ths sa as the first one. The text v;as promptly made 
public in cor s h to first protocol. Jhs : • ±ror left for 

dtEcrlaftd the sans il- K« Bolli stun o Prince shortly 
aft* c Preside '&xki * i his : ra gov< i fc in Hanoi* 


The Hij 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


The High Coran&ssioner jarantly believed t ho vrould obtain 
proinpt ratification of his -reement by t! French Cabinet anc sibly, 
following which. Bad Dai would urn to Indochina, raid the negotiations 
for' the supplementary agrc^ its could then begin* Unfortunately, ho 
returned to Paris at p. particularly difficult i b» The Sehuirann 
Government was faco4 ^itb grovring internal dissension and opposition 
within the Assembly- The Socialist Party Confer, o hac revealed a 
sv;ing to tho left and voted a resolution favoring negotiations with 
}Io Chi Itinh. Colonialist and cor 'vative groups in Indochina and 
Franco began an active? campaign against the Bale d 1 Along agreoiastnt as . 
tho first step in throwing mmy the csipire« In the circi fences, tho 
government was naturally reluctant to take up a problesi which might 

jll res It in its overthrow by the Assembly c Lch appeared less 
urgent than other serious internal and iirtea Lonal problems* After 
tho Schuraann Cabinet finally fell, the shortlived Mario Cabinet tras 
even less eager to face a debate on Indo china * 

When the long scheduled interpolation o Indochina finally cro 
up on the a t, the Priias • rter as"; *d tbat the debate bo post- 
poned indefinitely, but Indi tbe gove: saontJs appr 1 of M» 
Bollaert 1 s policy and the Bale d'Alcng protocol and a: need that a 
vote in favor of adjournment v/ould be. consider* 1 as approving this 
policy* A substa] bjtal majority was obtaii 1 after a brief < jo on 
tho adjournment motion Tflhieh indicated sral approval of the Bi 
d 'Along protocol by all parties except tho Co&munists, but consid 
able differences of opinion as to its into rotation and methods of 
application* The Socialists In particular ware embarrassed by the 
par by directive mentioned abov 



ir C» 

■ !!• Bollaert returned to Indochina breathing optimism and pro- 
fessing to be co:pletoly satisfied vith the Assoisbly's action and 
convinced that Bao Dai would return, and the iiaplosientation of tho 
Bade d 1 Along protocol could proceed irmed lately * This optimistic 
facade crumbled quickly* Eao Dai lest no time in shaking it clear 
that he v-as not returning until a formal agreement had been signed 
and ratified by the French Government, not only covering the princi- 
ples of the Bale d ! Along protocols but the reserved subjects left for 
future negotiation* Private and public stat -nts of X i and his 
ministers and articles In the native press shelved that they v:ere In no 
way satis I with the oblique handling of the the French 
Govern: : The local colonialist press proclaimed a defeat for 
Bollaert and too 1 : pains to po:' out that th .hole situation in Indo- 
cK i s illegal and unconstitutional and that, in particular, no 
change c Id take place in the political status of Coehinchina without 
formal Assenbly action., since C< hinchina, in c .st to Tonkin a 
AnnoBi. is a French colony and French soil* 

M« Bollaert noon lot it be krs a t- ho would m * re st a 
fur' r tr ' tff his tern of of , which expired Sey :r SO. 

io reason sivo: .s his need to i to Franca to Feb 
litie ! cos for tho c tic for tl - C seil ia la I -bl- 
kc Ly, it vv.r, cle r iso ns 1 ' \ nd his c ol, 





Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
KM) Pmjeei Number: NND 63310. By: NWD Date: 201 I 

his plans for a prompt solution of the IndoclrLnese problem had failed 
and that much time and effort still remained to be expended. 

The appointment of M e PIGNOK as successor to M. Boliaert came as 
a great sur se since his name had not even been mentioned among the 
numerous candidates for the position- (The two most talked of were 
General MST > former Governor of Tunis y and General CATKOUX^ a former 
Governor of Indochina and recently French Ambassador to Moscow) . 
Pignon is a career colonial official just over kO years of age who 
has spent most of his service in Indochina. In 19U8 he had been 
Coimnissaire de la Republique (provincial governor) for Cambodia when 
he was called to Paris for a responsible job in the Ministry of Over- 
seas France. His appointment is generally considered as indicating 
the intention of the Cabinet to keep closer control over developments 
in Indochina. 

The new High Commissioner spent the first weeks after his ap- 
pointment in Paris, arrived in Saigon on November 21 5 and returned to 
Paris on December 11, 19^8. His brief stay in Indochina was chiefly 
occupied in bolstering up the tettering Xuan Government. A more 
detailed account of his activities since assuming office will be found 
in the main section of this paper, 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

American Consulate General, 
Saigon, Indochina, February 12, 19^9 



A, Need for USIS in Indochina 

No American news service reaches Indochina* UP service to Indo- 
china ceased in December 19^8 because it could not meet expenses, AP 
is negotiating with the Bureau of Press and Information of the French 
high Commissariat for Indochina, but even if AP succeeds in selling 
its service to the Bureau, that organization will translate, select 
and edit whatever AP Serial it sees fit to pass on to the public 
through press and radio. 

Agence France Presse service is distributed in Indochina under 
the Bureau's supervision. The Bureau naturally concentrates on pre- 
senting the French point of view and on excluding all news which 
might disturb the population or be inimical to French policy. News 
of the United States and of the United Nations reaches the public 
here badly truncated or not at all. 

Against this background, USIS Saigon should be disseminating the 
full facts on United States policy. Here is an illustration of this 
mission. The French In Indochina have admired the Butch "police 
action" of last December in Indonesia. The Indochinese press, lacking 
adequate news sources, at first misinterpreted beyond recognition the 
United States' attitude toward that action. If the Department's wire- 
less bulletin were being received here, it would have been possible 
to provide the papers and Radio Saigon promptly with the full texts 
of the Department's January releases on Indonesia and of Mr. JESSUP's 
statements of United States policy. Though delayed, this material 
did reach here by pouch from Bangkok and has been brought to the 
attention of friendly journalists. As will be explained below, ef- 
forts are being made to begin copying the wireless bulletin in Saigon, 
The British Consulate Genera] distributes a small daily wireless 
bulletin mimeographed in English on both sides of a single legal size 

sheet . 

American and other English language books are not on sale in Indo- 
china, There has been very little English taught here. Nevertheless, 
the public, whether Vietnamese, French, or Chinese, is acquiring some 
English and is eager to learn about the United States and its culture 
and achievements. The large, steady attendance at the Reading Room is 
evidence that USIS' stock of books and publications fills a need and 
at the same time contributes to American prestige 

B. Current Activities 

Since USIS Saigon first opened a temporary Reading Room on 
August 26, 19**6, there have been ] iods ox inactivity irpos^d by 

obj 3 of space and per lei. The present Ree g Room opened its 
doors on August 13 > 19^7* It has a popular corner location on the 


1?; E 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 201 1 

ina In business stre&t of Saigon- Tha chairs are cc;t ble, the shelves 
attractive, 1 the Vietnamese attendants are efficient and courl us. 
The stock of books is modest (just over 1,000), but interesting ner 
acquisitions are flowing ln« I-aiiy attendance of readers and visitors 
exceeds 200 (average 5,000 par gonth) and is in the ratio of more than 
3 Asiatics to 1 European • There is also a British Reading Rooe in 
Sairon. but it suffers from a verv inCon >nt location and lacks 
staff* Attendance at the British Reading Soon is only a small fraction 
of that enjoyed by USIS. 

Frcis 'larch 7/ 1 , when i!rs. Jeanne S; :*, a public affairs 
assistant temporarily in charge of USIS, Saigon, was ambushed and 
killed, until the arrival of the present Information Officer en 
Kovo:;bor 12 there was no American y -1 attached to USIS Saigon* 
Hov/cvor, the Consul General instructed a vice consul, Mr* Dallas M* 
G00HS l to give such attention to the conduct of a "holding operation 11 
at USIS as v/ould be consistent with the performance of his other duties* 


The previous American director cf USIS Saigon resigned on January 15, 
1948. The present director arrived one year later, en January 13, 1949* 

Thanks to the effective r;crk of Mr* Coors and cf the sisall and 
devoted Vie tn* ::ie?c staff, the fcsrp American officers hew at USIS have 
taken over a going concern v/hich provides, in addition to the Rending 
Room, v/eekly film sliovrings in a hall leaned by the Bureau of Press 
and Information, a system for lording filths and projectors to schools 
and organizations, the distribution of Arvorican periodicals to a care- 
fully selected list, t; gift distribution of mrtime stocks of paper- 
bound CVfl books and Amy textbooks, and a little cultural exc] tgc 
work. The periodicals and v/a rtioo : ks arc mailed or shipped to 
persons and institutions in rnany parts of Indochina. USIS has reason 
to believe that sorno of this natorial filters into areas under Viet 
Liinh (rebel) control. , ■ 

Plans to monitor and distribute the wireless bulletin have gone 
on for & long tine and are nov: bei&g pushed. The present stunbling 
block is the lack c^ office space po aceoi&sbdato the wireless equip- 
ment and operator and the employees and r.a chines to take care of 
* duplication, distribution, and eventual translation of the bulletin. 

Office space is extremely scarce in Saigon, but USIS is leaving no 
stone unturned in search of it. 

Sinai! bulk subscriptions to Tine,, Kev.-svreek, and Life (25, 27 and 
19 copies respectively) are ro, d here (Pacific editions) r dis- 
tributed by USIS to a selected list including; friendly journalists* 
The Information Officer distributes nevrs itenis and photos received 
by air fron the De^&rtnstnt : .vor: to place then wl" :• they will 
he appreciated and published. As this ziro^c progr - has just been 
revived (lack of personnel has caused its suspension), it is 1 
early to rxasurq its effectiveness* Sot 1 local papers, Vietnamese, 
Frei h and Chinese 1 kge, arc printing uZlG material, chiefly 
photos plastic cuts. 7! pirate so:;o ratorial f: £ and 

C. Particular 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

Particular Problems Encountered in Indochina 

The civil war in Indochina and tho" fast fc Saigon for all its 
harm is a besieged city have a direct bearing or. the day to di\y 
activities of USIS. Asiong Fronchnon in Indochina the belief persists 
that tho United States wishes for economic reasons to supplant French 
power and influence hero. Those factors feavo in tho past lad to of- 
ficial French protests against one or another activity of USIS, and 
still condition its functioning Two plain clothes men habitually 
loiter near tho entrance to the Reading Room*. Aside fron the question 
of whether anyone is actually molested for attending tho American 
Reading Roo::i, tho presence of these dotictives inay cause some interested 
persons to stay away. 

The showing and lending of films is or: cumbered with controls and 
red tape. To be shown at all a £i%m raust have been granted a "visa 11 
by the Bureau of Press and Inf crmtiori. Anyone wishing tc borrow 
films for showings must have the specific approval of the Bureau* 
For instance j an owner of rubber plantations requests U3IS in writing 
to place his plantations on the list for regular film loans* Ko 
states that the audiences will consist of Vietnamese enployoes, 
French supervisors, local guards, and French soldiers s US 13 writes 
to tho Bureau, encloses a copy of tho loiter fron the plantation 
owner, and asks approval* This is granted promptly, and USIS is then 
free to circulate films, each of which must have been "visaed" to tho 
plantations in question. Although the precise effect cannot bo esti- 
mated, these formalities must act as a brake on applications to 
borrow USIS films* 

The Director of the Bureau of Press and Information has stated 
infomally that application for permission to issue the wireless 
bulletin must be Trade to him in writing* He added that he would 
iiriTiiodiatoly grant approval. Nevertheless , this required procedure 
illustrates tho close control exercised over printed ratter. The 
French authorities will certainly protest against and endeavor to 
stop any USIS activities to which they take objection. Expansion 
of the progran here or additions to the American staff of USIS must 
be carried out with circumspection in order to avoid suspicion and 
obsb ruction* 


The shortage of office space is accompanied by a scarcity of 
living ace: aoctations. The unsolved and haru^sing housing problems 
of the two American couples are evidence that sgifks time nust elapse 
before even a third African is assigned to USIS Saigon. On the 
other hand j additional local personnel will be employed as soon as 
additional office space is obtained- This prospective increase in 
local staff will., in addition to producing the wireless bulletin, 
enable V?>15 to o::p the distribution of photo exhibits and to set 
up a lending library of recorded rsusio. 

The present possibilities of exchange of per t-s working here arc 
s rely United. A few students h applied for scholarships* at 
Ar rican universities, and USIS has forwarded th Lr replications. 
Cc: In advsrso factors exist independently af the civil rear and of 

tho inposi ility 



iBm * r- 

Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 


cc : : : "L 

the impossibility of obtaining dollar ' ;: .^ Very few \ 
arc sufficiently wealthy un*Ier any circumstances to send their children 
half v.'L\y around the world to colle£e. The iiaple; tation cf tho Ful- 
bright agreement with Franee is being 'worked out in Paris. It seems 
probable that thl^ iapl bion vail place Tndochinese applicants in 
direct competition vrith those in' Franca, In that case there is not 
likely to bo any political disorifninati on against Vietnamese or other 
Indochinese applicants* They will, hovJdver, constitute but a small 
fraction of those applying in French territory and will rarely possess 
acco:nplisl sits permitting them to r^eet the competition of students 
fro::i Franco itself, It will be recalled that the Fuibright program 
is designed for graduate students, 

Hanoi is under more in' ic siege than Saigon, and has experienced 
raorc destruction. A very modest USIS program, limited primarily to 
Eiagajsines and some fills distribution, is about to be launched by tho 
Consulate there* The possibility of expanding this program will be 
subject to periodic review* Present plans are f'or the Consul and 
Vice Consul to delete sor.e of their time to USIS activities , assisted 
by one or tv;o Vietnamese ployed at USIS cxpen The possibility 
of opening a small reading room at Phnoni Penh, the capital of Cambodia, 
is being considered. 

Despite the accelerated tempo of events in China. Indonesia, 
Kalaya, and Burim, the situation in the French- held areas of Indo- 
china ha 3 boon relatively static for some time past* This report 
has been v/ritten in tho light of this static situation. Current 
French negotiations v. r ith ox-Emperor Bao Dai of Annara nay lead to 
his early return to Vietnam v;ith a trend toward sore peaceful con- 
ditions in Indochina wh-ieh would permit expanded USIS activities, 
Tho single factor of improved transportation facilities vrould bo an 
immense advantage. If, however, conditions become more unsettled, 
USIS v/ill soon be adversely affected. ■ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 

Lt. "fin. Y* nunter 
; raerican E:Y^sy 

.amrican Consulate General, 
Saigon, Indochina , February 1£, 1949 

\«t , v ( '-. ,, *;ri-;;; A3.; 7 A "V.r*" 1 '■ ^ PHP STT#7 TV?' CTT W^7- r "fr" T ^"V^TPv PnT'^F P-T??:f 

Si'CTXC:; :I 





The v:ir in Indoclaina* nor* in Its third ye?/r, has continued its 
indecisive course during the nut $±a month*: « 

3 hs usual full and 

;vintor c^:p-ips, more la in ccepe than I& : st year, resulted in the 
reoccup&tion of abandoned tern:: a v.-d the usual capture of stocks of ar, 
and explosives, "fithptit Dny r«?oii " result* The truism that "there is 
no military solution" r$r Indochina is ::oro pertinent now than ever. 
with 100,000 French troops, over 80;^ Indophincse^ Senegalese, Foreign 
Legion or c i r ntereenariea, hardly snore than adequate to hold the 
present very limited areas of control* In this stale^ate^ large sortie 
Chinese Ccr;:»uni."t intervention or the complete tireakdovm of present 
political negotiations 1c ling to self-government v/ould have a serious, 
if not disastrous, effect on the ^resent French ni3itary position. 



Since early in 1946 a succession of French generals (including 
Lo Clerc and valluy, fcvo of the ablest) have tried their hand at 
pacifying Indochina* A high point in the scries of campaigns v/as 
reached in ?Iov siber 1947, vrith a Successful fall car.paign in Tonkin 
that dealt a severe and unexpected blow to the- Viet Hinh* The French 
v/ero unable to consolidate their advantage, he vor, and by Dec I r 
1947 vrere being counter-attacked all along the line, finally being 
forced to vdthdravj virtually to their original positions-* 

In spite of subsequent raids or epmhined operations into Vie- 
2'lnh held territory, the initiative has regained with the no Govern- 
rsent, together v/ith control of most of the country* 


urre n t S i t u rt . t i on 



The past f "" - tth-s h^ive seen two operations in Tonkin. The 
first, "Operation d-d 1 , was designed to cut off the :'.v:*unr- incus 
''northern" redoubt" from the rich rice producing delta. It involved a 
five battalion, cordbi: ! aratroop, land and river operation to seize 
Sen Tay, Vietri and the line Sen lay - -venoi. no rei " ce was net 
in the-initial stages and no Vict clones ?/erc found* Harassing co 
attacks along the perimeter of this 20 :d g&ke it air y 

ai ar doubtful if it can ba held during the rainy season. 

The . i<3 tonkin operation 1 sran on S Decern or end red the line 
: :: ; h - ?hu Ly -fed tig as its objective, r vrith a "clean 
i ■" of the : r bar of f -iid &r:r*s supnlv in the Del 

Paratroops, infantry and Lkrii u:ed, heavy resist e r.ot, and 

1 « O cons 1? 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

considerable stocks of munition: and i .lies v:orc seised* Sine:; th< 
K am Eir.h - Phtt Ly - Hedoftg line is entirely surrounded by Vict Hinh 
hold arc?, and hr.d to bo supplied by air or river-boat, Fronch trithdrc 
from the area when objectives had been reached, operation ending 
21 January* 

Central and South Annam 

This relatively tranquil sector erupted on 16 January 1949 with a 
largo scale Viet h :h attack on the Tour no - Bhe railroad resulting 
in destruction of the train and capture of tho manager* of the railroad. 
Previously only routine French clean-up operations have been noted 
during the past six months in the narrow, hundre :d-nilo-long coastal 
strip hold by Fre::~h for cos in central Annam* As in South Annam, an 
attenuated chain of srnll forts and blockhouses, manned by second- 
line troops, is subject to intermittent and admittedly nerve -v. racking 
attacks* This attrition, plus miserable living and sanitary conditions 
has reduced morale and initiative in both Central and South Annan sharply < 


■ i i j i n i ii i 

Three fairly able generals, LS CLE3C, KYO. and Boyer DE LA IGOR 
DU MOULIN, have tried their v hand at pacifying Cc hina, but in al- 
most throe years thy situation has renain&d virtually unchanged. The 
French hold all the large tovrns and a small network of roads radiating 
from Saigon to the north, wast and northwest quite firmly, although 
attacks even within this limited frar.vxTork are frequent and sometimes 
severe* Beyond it, in spite of mssive sweeps and encirclements, para- 
troop and amphibious operations, the countryside remains in Viet Minh 
control* The w Plaii3 ies Jones 1 ' area west a: south of Saigon &-*" the 
v/hole rich, rice-gror/ing Ga Ehu peninsula remin particularly strong 
centers of Viet resistance. The latest reported French plan for the 
Ca Lfeu y insula is to permit no rice to be exported from it, in spite 
cf world rice shortages, so solidly is its economy controlled by the 
Viet Minh. 

Cambodia and Laos 

These large, sparsely-inhabited, deficit areas use up large num- 
bers of French and Indochinese garrison troops to protect towns and 
communications from an insignificant Independence mov Snt which draws 
most of it's strength from Slam and the Viet Minh* Important operations 
on the part of either adversary r^rc very rare, although large scale 




Lcvos operations are reported planned for late February* 


Current estimates give a total of ICO, COD Fronch troops for all 
of Indochina* Of these, almost 50% are believed to be Indochinese 
natives, under French officers and non-coms* Total vrhitc French .trooos , 
includj ' ' j cire not believed to e:-:c 1 20;'; of the total or about 
20,000* 12, C00 Foreign Legion rind a mixture of Sen. esc, ?-!orrocans, 
Algeria] ~ , Tunisians, to i v/ith a few 3 iich ; Indiai s, : dee up 
the balance* A re^:: " of French U rines also serve as infa y cc bat 
troop-: v/3 ! the Fronch gr 1 forces. 


Nat ii 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 

Native anti-Viet Mirita movements such as Cao Dai, Koa Hao, Partisans, 
etc. have been virtually written off as an asset, and in the case of the 
latter two groups have become an admitted liability. 

Morale and discipline in all combat units visited during past 
months showed a sharp decline over the past year, particularly among 
para troop units. Widespread atrocities have been reported by American 
and British sources in the North; health and sanitary conditions in 
the field were observed to be very bad; and th is a widespread lack 
of confidence in both the French government at home and French general- 
ship in Indochina among officers and superior non-coms. Feeling the 
general hopelessness of the military sit ion, many of the albest 
young officers are seeking staff rather than combat duty, and only the 
most recently arrived French troops show much combat enthusiasm or 
smartness of discipline. In this connection, Viet propaganda 
makes much of an alleged recent proclamation by Andre MARIE, French 
Minister of Justice, offering French convicts a chance to "redeem" 
themselves by joining the Colonial Army to fight in Indochina. 

The pay of officers and superior non-coms, however, is good to 
excellent, particularly in comparison with metropolitan France; pro- 
fessional advancement and decorations frequent; and these factors have 
inhibited widespread resignations or desertions. 


The present two top generals in Indochina (BLAIZOT and ALLESAi 3 ) 
are thought by French officers to be decidedly second rate, although 
served by a first rate General Staff. Area commands (KOCH in Tonkin, 
LE BRIS in Annam, DE LA TOUR in Cochinchina) are little more than 
autoj io sector commands. All large scale plans and decisions are 
made in Saigon by Allesandri and staff, with some interference by the 
High Commissariat, particularly on the political impH cat ions of 
litary moves. 

The Navy 

With a single carrier, a cruiser, a dozen colonial sloops 3 three 
LST's, l6 mine sweeps, and a variety of small landing craft at its 
dispostion, the Naval Command in Indochina is a minor military factor. 
Its functions are: river and coastal patrol ( ant i -arms and rice s ;- 
gling); transport and support of troops in amphibious operations, and 
protection of river convoys, A regiment of Marines (Fusiliers - 

rins) while officered by the Navy is under Array operational command. 
They are recognized as the best combat infantry in Indochina at present. 

The Air Force 

Some 36 out-dated German Junker transports (JU^S's) used for para- 
troop operations, are the backbone of the French Air Force in Indochina. 
Additional planes arc old Spitfires and C-117's, plus light observation 
and perse 1 pl^ ^ such as Piper Cubs. Bes3 s transport of para- 
. the mission of the Air Force is the bombing and strafing of 
villages not in French control, support of ground troops and personnel 
trail >rt. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 

As in the Navy, promotions and decorations are slow, and i ,le 
and maintenance have both fallen off sharply in the past months. Pilots 
particularly resent lack of ground facilities, and various safety devices 
which those trained in the U.S. (over 50$) there learned to regard as 
indispensables * 

The Viet Minli 

— » 

Opposed to the French forces are about 75,000 Viet ese troops of 
various political complexions, largely under Communist dominated leader- 
ship. There is considerable French- furnished evidence of Communist 
political commissars and indoctrination ext ling do™ to company 
strength levels o It is certain that the disciplined Communist element 
has been the largest factor in maintaining the vigor and cohesiveness 
of the resistance. In this, they have been greatly helped by French 
indecision and bad faith, and the terrorism of French troops. 

In spite of arms captures and occasional defections, there is no 
sign of large scale weakening of Vietnamese resi nee abilities or 
morale. The large areas under Vietnamese control lack luxuries and 
medicines, but are wholly self-sufficient in the basic necessities 
and tolerably well rdministered, according to what few reports are 
available. They continue to form a source of supplies and of fresh 
troops that are only limited in numbers by the arms available. 

Although there are rumors of a Chinese Communist treaty with Ho 
Chi Minh, and of a Chinese Commi; t general and his staff in Northern 
Tonkin, there is little evidence, as yet, that the Chinese are of any 
considerable help in the resistance. French sources feel that there 
is little danger of a Chinese Communist 5th column in Cochinchina, or 
of an invitation on the part of Ho Chi Minh to the troops of the age- 
old national enemy to enter Indochina in force, in spite of the Com- 
munist link. All French military sources consulted, however, feel 
that a large scale Chinese Communist invasion would make most, if not 
all, of Tonkin, militarily untenable • 

For many months past, observers feel that the resistance has not 
put forth its maximum effort, perhaps because the leaders are waiting 
for the outcome of political negotiations going on between the High 
Commissariat, the French Government and the Xuan-Bao Dai el< nts. If 
these should break down, the resistance will be greatly strengthened 
by the adhesion of many now neutral or pro-French elements. If the 
negotiations are successful, the resistance army is sure to be a 
dominant factor in any form of V 3se self-government. 


Having long since explored, and exhausted, the possibilities of a 
final military victory in I) ? there is little incentive for the 
French mill Lgh cc A to plan beyond small scale operations of 
limited scope, while waiting for the politicians in Paris and Mao Tze 
TUNG in China to make the really decisive .moves. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

American Consulate General, 
Saigon* Indochina , February 12, 1949* 


A* General 


Indochina has an ares, of 235,000 miles - half/aa largo ::s 
Prance - and a population of about" 26,000*000* The population is 
largely concentrated in the deltas of the Rod and Mekong Rivers and a 
narrow strip p.long ths coast- Largo parts of the interior are practi- 
cally uninhabited* Tr economy of the country is pr~- irily agri~ 
cultural and largely based on the growing, processing, and export of 
rico. Rubber output -.v,s inci ling rapidly before the war, and some 
progress had been niado in del ■■ loping the country's Hiineral resources. 

Eecoirery since the war has been slow because of the practically 
continuous guerrilla warfare. Even with the return of peace it will 
probably take two years for production in most fields to reach prewar 
levels, f\nd largo capital investments would be necessary* 

Be Resources 

1. Agric ulture 

- — "■ ' -- 

Rico is the rcainstay oT the native diet and by far the most 
important crop* Tonkin is only self support ; in exceptional years; 
Annan aiid Cambodia usually break even; while Cochinchina can produce 
a large surplus for export and seldom suffers a crop failure » Agri- 
cultural methods are primiti ~:-. and yields per acre arc Ib&fi Other 
iiaportant crops are corn, grovai chiefly for export, sugar cane, beans 9 
cot ton, tobacco, and vegetables* Copra and oil reeds are of minor 
iiHportance as arc coffee ;, tea, and kapok* 


Rubber planting began late in Indochina and reached its greatest 
development in the period 1925 - 19£4. Present acreage is about 134,000 
hectares a perhaps 20$ of which his boon more or loss sariously d&imged 
by the guerrillas* Potential production is estimated at 100,000 tons, 
but mny plantations have boon abandoned because of insecurity, and the 
balance lack labor* Productiq n 1948 was only about 45,000 tons* 
Rubber is almost entirely in French hands and th great bulk in largo 
plantats is - the 33 largest contain BO?* of the total acreage* Frenzl^ 
planters ha?e boon pro; bo develop and adopt modern methods, and error 
40JS of the trees zkto fro::: grafted and s cted seedlings. It is under- 

that cost- of pre tot ion is low coiriparod with other grov/ing regions* 

2, Antral Husl . . Pishing, and Timber 

In the Vietnam, cattle and buffalo are raised chiefly for draf 
animals j and their >rs arc still bolew pr - r totals* Cambodia 
raises 6 fair number of beef cattle* H _ - xre the moat Imj • food 

aj ' " : -. t -- t in c- ain /■ "lite j . h cos are an " i i it source of 
in o* Gr its sheep are of ninor importance* Fish for an 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

1- * 

important part of tho native dipt., and lcx§o quantities are caught in 
tho coastal voters, tho rivers and particularly in the Tonic Sap Lake 
In C- m bodia« Largo quantities of dried fash wore formerly exported* 
V/hilo Indochina has groat areas of forest anj inany valuable woods, 
their exploitation 5s difficult and timber li&i never V a an important 
export c Tho cutting of . construction timber and firewood is, r ; 
an iisportant local industry* - 

5, Minerals 

The provinces of Tonkin and Laos are rich in ninerals, tho 
latter largely uncxploitod. High quality anthracite coal deposits 
arc found north of Haiphong and bofoie th@ war production reached 
over 2,000,000 tons a year nostly by open cut mining* Production in 
1940 v/CvS only 540,000 tons dus to lack of machinery and labor and 
guerrilla activities* Coking coal is found only in insignificant 
quantities* . " 

There are valuable tin deposits in North Tonkin and Central 
laos* Production reached 1800 tons in 1938* Considerable crude tin 
v/as also brought dovm from Yunnan, China, for siaelting at Haiphong* 
Production is at present at a standstill due to the guerrilla -warfare* 
A fev; tons v/orc flovm out of Yunnan in 1943, but plans for developing 
'this have been postponed because of the pros* high price, of Chinese 
tin. Tonkinose tin ores contain tungsten, and production in 1338 
reached 555 tons of concentrate • 

There arc valuable zinc ores in Tonkin* Production reached 
25,000 tons in 192G, but dropped to about 5.000 before the war as 
v/orld prices declined* Those mines aro also closed* Gold deposits 
v;cro worked at various points before the war but verc of minor im- 

There are important deposits of phosphate rock in northwest 
Tonkin near the Chinese frontier, the develop it of which v:as begun 
by the Japanese during the mr- Exploitation of these rich mines will 
require not only tho pacification of the area but large investments of 

I'sxziy other minerals, including iron orc^ bauxite, lead, anti- 
nomy, and grap: ibc, arc known to exist, and Laos particularly lias only 
boon partially prospected* 

, — — ^-~— . ■ 


Indust2 % y is of little iiaportance in Indochina and is chiefly 
concorj h the processing of agricultural and forest p: iucts* 

The most i:&H>rt&nt : ifacturing industry is the cc . at v'orks near 
Eaip! g* is produced 260,000 tons V the war an: 

100,0 ;0 in 1 » Other : industries produce alcohol 3 textiles, 

: r . and cif,are> bed- 

• w,- J 


C. Foreign 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

C* Foreign Trades 

1« Experts 


Before the waif rice, rubber, and corn represented 75> of the 
total value of exports. Of other items, only coal, dried fish, tin and 
cement wore over 1% of the total* 

Today rubber is the leading export by value* Shipments totaled 
about £2,000 tons in 1948* This cotaparps favorably with prev/ar but is 
loss than half of present capacity* Pice exports at 220,000 tons im- 
proved ov-jY 1917 but vrere only a fraction of the prc-.var average of over 
1,500,000 tons* In 1933 over 500,000 tons of corn were exported, 
almost nil to France. During the war production practically ceased and 
has siado little recovery since * With the decline in the export of rice 
and corn, certain other products such as hides and skins, soya and 
other beans, pepper, and kapok have assumed relative importance* 

The recovery of Indocninoso exports to prewar levels depends 
primarily on political factors and the return of security. However, 
such recovery v;euld net occur i diatoly on the return of peace 
since much destruction and deterioration has occurred which would 
take tine to repair. Thus rice exports will bo hindered for sol 
tir= by failure to keep up dittos an:! drainage or irrigation canals, 
lack of junlcs to move the pad iy, and destruction and deterioration of 
rice mills* Rubber could recover more quickly but isany trees have 
boon slashed or burned and factories and houses destroyed* Annual now 
or replanting schedules have been largely abandoned since 1945* All 
export industries are affected by the 2*e iK)r ^ deterioration of 7/atcr, 
road, and rail transport* 

Over 60J&, by value, of Indochina's exports go to Franco and 
the Srr,oiro f about the san.o as before the -war* Most of the balance 
goeb to Singapor ;.-, Hong Kong, and China* Exports to the United States 
amountci to only about Z% of the total value in the first ten : bhs 
of 1948* The percentage v;as rorr.ov.hat higher before the war bub has 
never been large and probably never frill be unless the economy of the 
country cl ;es sharply* Vfe do not import rice, corn, coal, or c :it, 
while Indoehincso rubber vrill normally go to France. 

2, Imports 

Imports are : ; up of the u 1 selection of manufactured 
products vrhich are ded by a non- industrial eduntry of low per 
capita purchasing pov.-er. Due to the great need for both cons :; 
and eaoital goods follcvdng six years of bio do, imports since the 

.r }. been relatively high c trod with exports and have recently 
excee 1 ■ • r volume* 

Under tl prevrar syst or empire pr rence, Franco naturally 
supplied the 3 ! sh of inports, 57jS 5 . In spite of a 

cl. e to n co as C-::r as i: port duties are concerned, ?rauco 

ha i h r po'sH 'en an:: supplic 1 ' 1947* Ir trts 

fr 3 States have ) t relatively larger since the war and 

: to r, ! : U This dropped to 14$ in the First ten months 
of 3 LB. Most of the balance ;o from C " t, He Ron*, Slam,, and India* 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 

3» Balance of Tra 

From 1906 until the war Indochina had a favorable balance of 
trade except in 1923, 1931, and 1932. The balance has now sharply- 
changed and from January to October 19^8 imports were valued at 1,76^ 
million piastres and exports only 926 ^ a deficit of 838 million. The 
foreign exchange problem is thus acute, particularly as concerns dol- 
lars* The deficit has been made up by France under the plan for the 
French Union. The failure to include Indochina for direct allotments 
under the Marshall Plan resulted in considerable delay in the I9H8 
Plan, and it is only in recent weeks that certain dollar allotments 
have been approved, st imports from the United States in 19^8 were 
delayed shipments under the 19^7 Plan. 

The ambitious ten yea}' plan for the reconstruction and equip- 
ment of Indochina foresees large investments of capita] * The present 
administrators of the plan expect most of this capital to come from 
government sources, and there is little place for private capital, 
either French or foreign. It is probable that present plEtns will 
have to be considerably modified to fit the new political conditions 
now developing. 

h . Finance and Currency 

Internal finances are in relatively good shape in spite of the 
critical fore :change problem* The central government has derived 
its chief income from customs fees.> excise taxes and monopolies 5 of 
which the opium monopoly is the most lucrative. Subsidies were granted 
to provincial governments from the central budget. 

During the past year a number of changes have taken place in 
preparation for the new political organization. The bank note monopoly 
has been taken from the pa\-rerfulBanque de l f Indochine and is being 
transferred to a new Emission Institute. A separate Indochinese 
Treasury has been authorized, while the revenues from the excise taxes 
and monopolies were technically transferred to the Associated States 
on January 1, 19^9 • AH these measures contejr. te a closely knit 
economic federation for Indochina in which French participation and 
influence will be prominent. The individual states, particularly the 
Vietnam, are strongly opposed to this, and lengthy and bitter disputes 
with the 1 ach on economic and financial matters can be anticipated. 

The Indochinese piastre was worth 10 francs from 193^ until 
19*16 when the rate was changed to 17. The rate of 6.95 piastres per 
dollar became 12«55 as a result of the French devaluation of January 
19^8. In October 19^8 the system of a double exchange rate was ex- 
tended to Indochina, the official rate remaining at 12.55 per dollar 
and the "free" rate fluctuating with the free franc. Current quotations 
are about 19 per dollar. Foreign trade transactions take place at the 
average of the two rates or about 15»70* The black 3 eat rate rose 
during 19^8 from around J+0 to about 55 per dollar. Even better rates 
are occasionally reported from Hong Kong and Bangkok* 

5 . Cost 

* It is difficult to convert these figures to dollar ue to two 

devaluations during the period* Foreign trade is conducted at 
about 15.7 piastres per dollar, the average between the official 
rate of 12.55 and the free rate of about 19« 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 201 1 

5* Cost of Living 

The cost of liiring has mounted rapidly since the ivar, and t 
index for Europeans in December 1948 was 2646 (first half 1939 ~ 100) 
conpared vath 1G58 g year earlier* Ccr.prrativc figures for native 
working classes v.cro 3966 and 2802* For Asnoricans attempting to oper 
ate at the n froo fl exch &: o r&te^ prices are outrageous* 


Salaries tend to lag behind prices with resulting unrest 
among the working population and the large class of civil servants* 

6. Conclusion 

The "basic problems of the economy of Indochina arc similar to 
those- of other iLsi&tic countries, with ^ny increase in the standard of 
living tending to be checked by the rapid rise in th population* 
(Cambodia is an exception in that the population is static.) The 
dOTelo] fc or the mineral resources and the industrialization o2 the 
country will reoui: enormous amounts of capital and much time. 


The immediate problem of restoring peace and order is primarily 
a political on 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i 

American Consulate General, 

Saigon, Indochina, February IE, 19*9. 



section v. consular akd AioniSTRATivH problems 




A problen which confronts all ssei.11 officer,, no doubt, is the 
unusually heavy load of administrative work in proportion to the 
aino unt o f crea t i ve wo r k , tu r nod o v t * Th o r e qu i rosiest s of tho Dop a rt - 
mont for administrative reports, and tho quantity of administrative 
detail involved in tho daily operation of a small office 5s roughly 
the same as for a large office* The administrative instructions and 
the forms prescribed are naturally drafted vdth large offices in nind, 
and their use in a Email office is difficult end results in a dis- 
proporl* to amount of time spent on administrative workt 

It is urged that the Department investigate this matter with a 
vie 1 /; to giving additional authority to the field to decisions 
and also to transferring to tho Department ranch of the "control 11 
records and roper ting that is new demanded of the field* 


Alien Staff ' • ' • 

■ i ■ i 

Saigon has boon experiencing cc Uticr&ble trouble in finding and 
keeping alien personnel, particularly French employees* Business 
houses are in a position to offer better salaries and a shorter work 
week j and the Consulate has been unable to coinpctOi Re consolidations 
have recently boon sent to Washington which, it is he i, v/ill sone- 
what ameliorate this situation. A single wage including basic wage 
end temporary increase has been suggested , which will be semi-annually 
adjusted according to changes in the cost of living index* At the 
same tir.c r position classification system has been established v/Mch 
1 allows in-*gradc prorations for merit and service* 

To encourage tho alien staff to continue its work with the Govern- 
ment; end to isake thorn more valuable to the office, it is hoped that 
some way can bo found vithiu budget* limitations to provide language 
and stenographic lessons for those members of tho staff who appear to 
bo qualified* Stenographers arc almost impossible to find in Saigon, 
and it is, therefore, necessary for officers to consume much valuable 
time in drafting correspondence for typists. Tho cost of such train- 
in* is Doiuinr,!, the tirse allowed during working hours for the study 
would bo negligible, and tho results undoubtedly satisfying 


Supply s j^LifilHP? 

Saigon formerly e:xpericnc< serious losses in shipments of of- 
fici&l supplies and personal e^feeb- through short sh." plants, theft, 
1 br ;* It was found that clearing agents usually took little 
interest in c alar shipments since as r, rule they are smll a 
the r for the ti 3 effort s: fc en clear" ; does not v/arrai 
making the extra off % to supervise c fully our shi; . ;-• -The 
ulatc still sj ading r csh tirso en each shipment in ar ing 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

for tho free entry of tho goods and assisting the clearing agent* 

It has been found that a considerable sum of money can be sa- I 
by training an alien oyco to handle tho entire clearance lie 
has sufficient official s din^ to povndt hisa to ezr lite papers 
and clearance procedures that would otherwise take days, and by 
devoting his full tisse to trio clearing of the ship rib and noving 
the j;aods quickly losses have boon cut to a large extent* 

Kail and Courier Service 


Saicon has boon experiencing considerable delay in the trans-* 
mission of pouch rnail, both courier and unace anied air pouch . 
It is necessary to allow up to throe v/eeks for the transmission of 
mail to the Department. It is possible that other offices in this 
area have been experiencing the same difficulty^ and it is suggested 
that a concerted effort be mdo to encoui'a^e the Dopar' :it to v;ork 
out a more expeditious v/ay to handle mil to and from Southeast 
Asia- Sea pouches take a miniiraam of six v;eeks to reach Saigon « 

It is not safe to send personal correspondence of any iinportanee 
through the open rail in Indochina. In spite of firm denials there 
is adequate procf that a form of censorship exists. This delays 
mail, and encourages the loss of enclosures and sinall p ckages. 

Vis i tors to In dochina 

It is a&ain dosircd to point out to neighboring offices that 
Saigon is not able to guarantee accomodations to visiting business 
men, and only with great difficulty and v:ith anple notice can ac- 
comodations be arranged for official visitors* A critical housing 
situation is not peculiar to Saigon. Kovrevcr, consular residences 
here are small and with the exception of the consul general's 
residence do not possess gu^st rooms. !2ven a confirmed rerr rvation 
usually means a bed in a dormitory with from three to ten people. 

Kany unofficial travelers have been giving the Consulate General 
as a reference when applying for an entry visa. The French officials 
call at the Consulate General anticipating that v*e will give a guaran- 
tee of lodging* This, of course, is not possible, and it is, therefore, 
again urged that business.: :n and tourists be vrarned that there may 
not be any accomodation available in Saigon and that they should mho 
no attenpb to co:vj to Indochina unless they are assured in advance of 



Saigon cencuro v;ith Eatavia that s---'j cfforl should be made to 
provide an operate ' for each consular office. Nov officers 
coning to tfc i ti tld for the first bino, c or a training p riod 
5?. iv ■:.:' ton, find it most difficult to f rise fchi soivi vril 
their vto: Often they arc replac: ; so::.:: . tthc has all ly loft 

188 J ?os 

: ! CTSD 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

the post or who leaves shortly after his arrivals It is impossible 
to assimilate all th details of procedure in a short time, and for 
this reason detailed operating instructions should be made av&il&b] 

Iho precedent file gives rnuch valuable information about con- 
ditions peculiar to 0210 particular post* irov/cvor, for instructions 
regarding shipping, seamen, visas, and passports or notarials,, a 
detailed guide is essential* In a small post an officer nay neve!', 
during his tenure, have occasion to issue certain typos of visas or 
experience unusual shipping and seamen problems* But occasionally 
those situations do arise, and an unexperienced officer has no re- 
course but to refer to soino guide foi^ assistance* 

The Foreign Service Regulations are, of course, the basic 
manual* Experience lias proven, however, that the sections e:i visas, 
passports, shipping and seamen, immigration and not& are notice- 
ably inadequate vfhen detailed instructions are required. In the 
interest of efficient office routine and the proper execution of 
consular duties within the bounds of cur present budget limitations, 
Which makes it essential to operate with a s^sall staff and a maximum 
of productive effort, it is urged that these portions of the regu- 
lations be re-examined with a viev; to iinproving their content so 
that they n&y servo as a helpful guide* 

TcJc^ra n Rate s 

This post also agrees iTith Batavia tliat a concerted effort 
should be n^dc to obtain reductions in telegraph rates between 
posts in' this region. It is desired to point, out to neighboring 
posts that there is considerable delay in transmission of telegrams 
betvreen countries since radio circuits are open only once or at 
most trace a day, usually at night* Thus persons traveling by air 
to Saigon often reach here before the telegram announcing their 




: n r» mm*. •. 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


outgoing Telegram 





Chsrgo Department 


gpnttmgni mi i tuft 







>is utton 



$ 1.4 o 






T 10 1 

for dc A' use ONLY 





Assumption Urtel 141 Dept desires success Baodai 
experiment entirely correct. Since appears be no other 
alternative to estab Commie pattern Vietnam, Dept cdnsiders 
no effort ehld be spared by FR, other We£ rn powers, and 
non- Commie Asl^n nations to assure experiment best c; toe 

At proper time and under proper circumstances Dept will 

be prewar ed do its part by extending recognition Baodai Govt ,\ 

and by exploring possibility of complying yrlth any request 

by such Govt for US arms and econ assistance. Must be under- 


stood however aid program this nature v/ld require Congressional^ 


approval. Since. US eld however scarcely afford- backing govt <^ 

which v;ld have color and be li Ly suffer fate of puppet regime, 

it must first be clear PR will offer all necessary concessions 
■ * 

to make Baodai r solution attractive to nationalists. This is 
stpo of which FH themselves must see urgent necessity view v 
■nosciblv short" time remaining before Connie s uccesses Chi a 

It ti do c hina. Moreover, Baodai ( t must throug h n effi s 
demonef 0:i nize.and conduct affairs wisely so 

■ > j 1 1 ■ ■*— 1 _ i i ij» 


mmmm ** 

-...-.- 'opportunity obtaining requisite ] ular 

support- i? *£d 



* * I 1 

I • . . > 



Corroctions mfi<Jo on ' f$T*!re rnfido - 

copses b bo T .n. 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

Ctarg*3 LVf.-ulment 

CKat^o I 

•■■Igp&tinxvni &$ Qi&fg 




-t'S ONLY) 




Indochina analagous Kuomintang wld be foredoomed failure. 

.11 l i ■ „ » t +mmm 

t^>-. I |»H» I 

Assuming essential FR concessions are forthcoming, best 
chance success Baodai wld appear lie in persuading Vietnamese 
nationalists (l) their patriotic aims may be realized prompt] 
through FR-Baodai agreement (2) Baodai govt will be truly 
representative even to extent including outstanding non-Commie 
leaders now supporting Ho t (3) Baodai solution probably 
only means safeguarding Vietnam from aggressive designs Commie 


While attainment these objectives depends initially upon 

attitude FR and Baodai circle , Dept believes more will ultimately 
be required. Beet hope might lie in active demonstration of 
interest in and support of Baodai solution by other non- Commie 
Asian govts. Appeal such so3.ution to Vietnam nationalists wld 

prer tably be far greater if it api ared sponsored by free 


Aelan nations animated by interest self-determination Asian 



peoples and their own self-preservation in face Inimed Commie 
menade rather ti^an if it had appearance gambit engineered by 
FR, US and UK as part strategy of West-Bast; conflict, 

Dept giving closest consideration to means whereby US 
might assist attainment these ends # 

From above, you will see Dept thinking closely par lels 



CL/ f fllFICA 


Corrections made on tfa I /AUST b& mad a or 

co pie i bcfoio delivery to Telegraph Eranc' 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

Charg* P*p>irtmmt 

Chtrgv to 





your own. Dept agrees when time comes Baodai must certainly 
be fully warned of danger yielding to any temptation include 
Commies his govt and this connection again believes other Asian 
govts eld serve most useful purpose since India, Slam, Philippines, 
and Indonesians (both Repubs and Federalists) are fully alive 
growing Commie threat Asia. 

Re last para Urtel 141 QTE reliability Baodai solution 
UK^TE was error, Deptel 70 shld have read QTE viability UNQTE 
cleaning able live. 

While Dept continues believe it wld be premature and unwise 
for you make special point (such as trip Dalat) see Baodai, there 
no objection your talking informally with polit personalities 

close to hira with whom you have doubtless already made contact 


in normal course carrying out your functions. In such talks 

vou might well as suggested Urtel 14-1 take occasion cite examples 

futility collaboration Cdmraie's and grave danger 





Telegraph Branch: y 

Send: AMC0W3UL, S//lG0N - 7 1 

F3: SSAl COgburn, Jr : ccp 
5/9/49 £? 


Repeat: AM 3ASSY, PARI S /S/& 



FS - 


I - 



■ilii raaco on this t ! 3T bs r.".J» on all 

eopi.S boforo dolivet/ tr> TeiogTaf.ii Brenck 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



C - : 

Charge Department 


$$mttm#ni ®i £Hai? 

Charge to 



rsi* < " 



(offices only) 



App ro v efl g*v 





P.M. f 




iWY 20 19/ 




Urtel 147: 

Dept believes extent to v/hich FR concessions embodied 


Mar 8 agreements will satisfy nationalists can be determined 01 

only by reaction nationalists themselves* Meanwhile via 


^ o 


appreciate your view. 


While not fully informed provisions Mar 8 agreements 
plus associated documents, Dept fears national. opinion will i 


follow line Duoc Viet editorial Apr 9 which, states QJPE althoug. 
Vietnamese reassured on score their country's unification, they* 
remain uneasy -about question foreign relations and,. army, Vietnam 
sovereignty villi not permit Vietnamese army be com i by FR 

general nor villi requirement of ooverelgntvbe satisfied by 

■ ■ 
diplomatic representation only in- China, Slam and Vatican", UHQTE 

: ' ; As practical matter, Dept believes that uhen independence 

movement in colony too strong to be defeated, metropolitan power 


if it wishes preserve influence In area has no real choice but 
attempt establish special relationship with former colony br 
free acceptance terras by latter, and that asooc between metre 


-,-dc baft po% -rtd former colony is more 11) y prove fruitful 

■ . . ■ 

id. dv ble if 3d free consent of latter than if trans: 



♦ i • • • • 


Corrections made on yvCk^Jtr^l MUST be mad© on all 
■ - T03 b&!or4 to T 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

CfiAf$« L>*|'*tftm*r»l 

Mzputiminxt 0! §5>tzit£ 

Chargft to 







of autonomous powers to latter la made conditional upon its 


acceptance of such important qualifications upon its Independence 

as continued metropolitan control its fon relations and command 

armed forces. 


However, Dept/snaosfl FR unlikely make further concession 


this time and that any US efforts press them do so w^d probably 

(Paris to indie; if this not correct.) 
miscarry,/ Hope is, the refore, th at F R w ill carry out thei r 

obligations urn Mar 8 agree its with such generosity and 

' "" ^' ■— ■»■! I ■ ■ ■ I ■ m il M l -» M 1 I I IM * ' 

expedition that impressively constructive I tmo sphere will be 

created and that at same time Viet nationalists wlLl rapidly 

appreciate true character menace approaching from Chi and will 
prefer cooperate Baodal solution rather than accept alternative 
continued resistance and risk loss all real autonomy to Ghl 
Commies. Presumably such outcome not impossible particularly If 
FR eld let it be understood Baodai agreement does not permanently 
define status Vietnam but provides basis for further early evo3j 


tion. ; 

At same time, ehld it appear as Dept fears that FR are 
offering too little too late, Dept will not be inclined make up 
for FR deficiencies by rushing into breach to support Baodai 

■ ■ 

agreements at cost its own re '.nirig prestige Asia. «S 


Dept considers US this st a shld avoid conspicuous position any 


C »— ' ■ • • 

Corrections fnc4e on this I MUST t*> mada en 

copies bofo- ■ T^l&greph Bi 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

Charge Department 

Charge to 

gpuriiit&nl nt • 

segh: : 




kind and try reach common attitude with other interested rjovtt, 
particularly UK, India and Philippines. 

i ' ■ i 

u ' '■ ■ *— 

Telegraph Branch: 

Send to: 


FE : SEA : COgburn , Jr : ccp 




to: AM ,;, 

PARI S |7 p 


^— * ■" , f <a *rf 


FE . 


n v> 

■d'' vJ0 







/ Q 




Corrections math M * original MUST be* rrt6<3o on 
lea boforo del to T^tr-ripJi Branch. 




Declassified per Executive Order J 3526, Section 3.3 

NND Project Nuinbcr: NNU 63310. By: NW1.) Dale: 201 I 













■ * 

. , - 

• r 

H&30I, Ij EOCEI25A 





ft '".1 

- s 




H< . ivs 3.; 


In tali Kuan ; you ma; 

-■ -•; it j : com '• L ■ 'armed .■■■ ;lc 

In U zit He's kne o c tssumption 


oosibls .' ; that he cu. •. Commis sq Ion. 

Lvce c and Co 3»qt 

- ' ■ 

and (S) rei ■ er • l out toy 


> C 3 5SS and 3 i t . p. US 

:t impre ■ :-ed by aa£i< tallat c'- ?er red flag vi iw 




arnncsa only) 

^ st: j. £&u - s a ' ■ i much st e i.s 

irrelevant. All La c * ■ are mat. J 

With achJ '- hat! aims (i.e., !:■ tjis P 

n • trill 1 be cob subo i itJio i it q t Cqoiii] s ir 

- tlm K1I3 o ' feicua , *o i is all 

elem- ; s suspec >atj , 0. 

tern Sur'it must be a d sv.z':: 1 a goal 'o - 

st • p 1 inelu Led 3s ■ , 5q i cr - 

re io ale 

1 ' ro. ':•!; is 

. . : . ; " ' t c i •_■ 


i- _j v 



Corrc a on oo i! 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 




Chnr<J'> to 

• l$partm&ni of 



;ES ON" 



probably even leas favorable nat3 lists than now. It must 
of ecu:, be conceded theoretical possibility exists estab 
National Communist state on patt Jugoslavia in any r 
beyond reach Soviet array. He sr, 03 attit* old t acot 
such possibility only if every oti r possible avenue closed to 
pr -rvation area from Kremlin ol. Moreo , while 
Vietnam out of reach Soviet .army it will do btless b^ by no 
means out of r* h Ghl Commie h n a irmed forces. 

Fol is for urinfo and such reference as you dosm judicious; 

Dept naturally consider only FH c through concessions 
to nationalist movement lay ! is for so: Ion Indochina 
problem. As suggested Deptel Sua to Saigon, if nationalists 
find concessions Mar 8 agreements inads ., much / d 

urxm willingness FH put agreements in most favo ble possj le 

- ■ 

context by t hasiaing e:^ id evolution " i 

beyond a envisaged tfc ante. Provided F.?. d >lay 

realistic and generous attitude, most i rtant part 
r inder in program — viz, port nation fcs 


from 0. ^ 1 hip — mu 3 vol*- i on E i and Xi 


led by other South Ao who st in nost 1 

r from aqu >; Indochina ho by slit * 

.'HP' i 




Cortee-ic^s meda en t'i'c c : L n ' on jiI 

te Teli 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

7-1 --1 



CUsrqtf Dcp&r L -*l 

% Chirgo to 

&n&rim£iit &i * >faie 



D: D 

rricca only) 

CL4ssrn jn 

• * 


propaganda support Baodai solution night nore than anyone else 
bo able deprive Ho of talking -points in event ho continues demand 
armed resistance Baodai regardless circumstances (which appears 
certain in light vitriolic tone, current Vietminh broadcasts on 
Baodai which give no recognition any FR concessions to nationalist 


demands.) Even with conditions for US support Baodai realized, 
it futile expect US be able assist effectively this initial task 
beyond (stressing requirements situation in talks South Asian 


govts and providing materials evidencing realities of Communism 
through USIS for distribution a3 you and Condon Saigon consider 

desirable in conjunction with Baodai efforts arouse compatriots 
to Commie menace. Experience Chi has shown no aat US nil and* 
econ aid can save govt, even if recogn" d by all other power a 
and possessed full opportunity achieve natl ainis, unless it can 
rally si port people against Commies by affording representation 
all important natl groups, anif eating devotion to natl a3 oppose 
person or party interests, and demonstrating real leadership. 
Re Viet opinion reported Saigon 1 s 145 that OS abandonment 
Nationalist China presents unfavorable augury for non-Co: Le regit 


Viet: : , there no objection emphasizing to persona with this v i 
that tier list China c 3 to pre 




Q f icfo 6 o 0.1 fill 

ptoi 1- to T 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


FORM OS <azz 


• Co U eel 

- . Outgoing Te gram 

Charge Dapfirtw*' * 

CUirgtt to 

£$rarfttt£ttt i tni& 






above qualities and lack will to fight, not because US Q!?S 
wrote It off UNQTE. 

Re Xuan query whether US wld propose Vietnam for membership 
UN e hid FR renlg, you ehld avoid discussion this matter , at 
most if pressed state circumstance s at moment will of course 
determine US action. For urinfo only it unlikely US old even 
vote for Vietnam membership UN if as it appears now FR wld 
remain in control Vietnam fon relations «, 

Telegraph Branch; 

Send to: AM00HSUL, 



Repeat to: 



1 IS Hi 


Clearances : 



P. \ i CQgburn , Jr : ccp 
5/19/49 £p 

* l 



tf £ 




Corrtctu "Jo on th«i prlj \UST bs» mado oft 

cop' # before delivery to T 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



*• ■ " '■ " ■** 

The Honorable 

David K. E. Bruce, 

American Am sndor # 

Sir : 

There in transmitted he fith a memorandum sefctl 
forth the Department f s views on the ogre it signed en 

reh 8 bv the President o> nice and the for. a« 

peror of Annam defining the ful o r tun of tlio State 
of Vietnam* You are raqu d to p: ent this memoran* 

dum to the ilstry of Foreign A ra of the ' rach 


It 1 5 bi jested that fcJ " jy f s no to trancnittir 

the memoranda bo composed ig the folio lln 









B The Vrabassy of the United States of America pre~ 
sents its t pll t try of Fore 1 

Affairs and f on in taction its govt mt $ 

has • honor to tran It h< artaix^ c< ents 

of the Department of Stat© on the agreement con** 
eluded on eh 0* 1949* b n the Freai it of 

tho eh Republic and the former Emperor of 

Annam, which the Ministry of Foreign Affaire was 
kind enc i to r available to tho Sever it 

of tho United States* 11 

As vn alternative j the i sent n of tho noto hy 
Hr* Charles B* Bohlen may apt preferable • Tho prob- 

1 3 dealt with in the memor* ium were die cues od in a 
conversation ,v;ith the Secretary of State shortly before 
his departure from 1 hiiigfcon at p« Bdhler 

pros ent • :: 


Vojwr truly you- 


1 i ■ -J.' ■■' f~*" 

i e 

Srigloal ' o copj a, 


For Acting Secrel - of State 5 




■llton ,Butterv:orth 
Director for astern Affairs 

o:. .loranaum 





Declassified per Executive Order 1 3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

She Govern nt of the United States is most appre- 

ciative of the actio/), of the French Govern - it in m 3 

available to it tho text" of the agreement con clue 

March 8 betYJcen the President of France and tho fo: r 

Emperor of nam defining the future status of the State 

of Vietnam* The agreement 3 b'eon studied frith -tho 

greatest interest by the Depart nfc of State* 

A.S the French Gove: is *e, the United. Stat-. 

Government has followed with s 3 concern the cov e of 

events in French Indochina since the end of* tho war "in 


tho Pacific* Ttils concern , it is cc to.. , haa 

been prompted by p. reali tho forces which 

• " ;]•;: con .bated predominantly to tho ol . :.» o:C tho 


Vietnamese »fttl< \liat move it are mi no of 


the 3aaio forces whl ' orked pre Ac a in 

sc end it the e 3 0: 

201 ■ 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

a or cob can bo oi* considerable consoquonce Tor tho world 

in none 1# 


ion at tho end of. the war it frecamo ovic- b that 

in most of fche pendent countries of southern Asia the 
indigenous peoples were doteratinad to control t) dr oraxi 
destinies in the JFuture, tho Unit Statoa Government 
ventured to hope that the trcstv nations would copra- 



ciato tho strength o;C this peso* n and ttlllli gly grant 

the essentia! dea " of the nationalist ram .onto* It 
x?bb ho? red that in so doing* fclio metre litan powors 
would be yielding rchat in any i »se thoy co 1 oocj at to 
bold only by military Torco at at cost* la unci e fc 
It sftoms'd probable t" at tho costs to otropolitan 

Goverr «t r;ould be unrecoverable and tho value of V 




. colony and its p >iblo contribution to world staMli 

would too reduced by the em at hostilities* Ca i other 
] d it was b d * by p: effe: the neces- 

r y i ttleal c ~ to ' itl< I til© 

elo1 • ost 1- ly 

202 • 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

to result in a continued close rind mutually fruitful i 


latloi ip with the former colony, in the preserv ' Lon < 
patterns of trade and economy lcn Intexraesl d, arid in b 
readiness on the part of the colonial people to \*ol<* 

the continued technical and admin Srativo assistance c 

the metropolitan power* It appears iat only on such a 

"basis would there be any real hope that tho V/ootora po^e^ 

could retain their legitimate 1 bs in the countric 

go closely associated wlfch-r m over such lor^ p©riocto # 

and that e ng the 13 notions of southera Asia conditions 

of political stability and of freedom of political and 

econoxalc development could bo achieved c tiling thou to 

realise t lv potentialities and make their full contrl 

but ion to the worlds 

* Convereply* it se od that an intention on tho part 

f tho bropolifcan pt r to r a authority xrhlc 

19 flop oplo was • ad to o^erci itself 

v could * suit on^y in turning tl natle list movi int 

.to deatru chnn- -. In 3 circ ja : 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

could bo expected that wide ond 3 OS till ties :ld result 

nnd that the consequent destruction c the faci bio a < 

production in the de; ident area would cause economic 
setbacks seriously Injurious to to peoples* Furthr ore 

it could bo anticipated " it atlonalist forces uould 

turn iijc ;ly to an un corner omlelng It >rshlp Tshich 

would react Inst cooperation i?;lt!i the West id against 
those free institution: wixicfe Europe civilization I: 
cx T olvod through long experience In celT*-govominc^t# 

Events fm southern Asia 'in tho past jfcur y< : have 


caused no revision of those vie ; and It is In tho 1:1 
of this estimate that the Unit iteSi'G ft Y 

examined tho agreement o£ 3 rch 6 and offers Its x." 

Because of Its conviction that c no by Pa:' ice 

• tq the Nat' aalist movement cossae: ,?.to with fcrength 


of that moir fe can alone provide tho basis for a r "lu- 
tion of the Ind.c Lnei sii ties t ie err of a 

st ' - ' : V: Go 1 , tho Unit 



t ■■" th • I I ?3 


20 1 * # 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

al v'^cre' , the fcerriti -al unit; *£ Vietnam* coisprl 

Tonkin* Annnia, ana Go chinchilla, -y be realised and i 

Vietnamese State enjoy far-s powers of i 

autonomy* It c '. bated a I: once i*. b 31a the opj a 

of the United S1 <;es Government the Viet o people 

would bo guilty of a mist ! e disastrous to t&eir futui 

should fch reject this solution and givo their suppo*;. 

not to the Viotnasiosc Government formed v. tor the :*£■• r> 

agfc nt cut to the so-oall vie Republic ( 

Vietnam* Fop those in cozamaad of I ds fi bile are cj 

trained in the r&othe :-3?5jio of Inl tiona! c: 

roonlsmj Bad regardless of t&eir pr .t e al of t 

noti st cause, it cannot he Ignored 1 they !r 

a ever Misa vended tlieir Kremlin ct toctii & op repudiated 

tlio techniques find oh; tives of cc :a p rhit-h are ti 

cause of so suffering in the v:orld to * It t 

p t' ore, r idr : at j 

% c its ji the r - he act 

one io ■' ■ of a ;' 



Declassified per Exeemive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

total! tarJ nlsm will bo.elmng a u i Vietnam under* *hich 
all lilbertie , national and personal* will be lost* Such 
i outcome would not only be fatal to the welfare and 

hopes cf the" Vietnamese Kit would bo neat defer!] 1 to 

tho Interests pf ell free peoples, particularly those ojf 

southern Asia who stand h oat immediate ( %ev of fur- 

ther GoffiBxaniet a$ os sic 

Hov/ever, tho United Stat Gov ; doea not Tool 

confl don t that tho Viet o p pie in gexw 1 will aco 

tho choice confronting th in these, teams, eaj/o daily 

in viev; of the isolating factors in thoir aituatlon dur- 

ing moot of the pr decade* Th& Vietnamese nationalist 

who for" the most part have boon supporting tho ao*»call3d 

Democratic Bepublic of Vietnam as tho one a; :cy 

appeared to promise independenci ay not* it is feared, 

find i provisions of tho rch 8 agreese entirely 

op; * In this connection, It \ Id be pointed ov 

it I States Gofers is cor I ly 

this c. at oo it ia not f itex 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

or anj associated doc ieh i y bear upon ths matter 

and does not Ira era whether tho 2 >ch Q a; mt Is intended 

to define tho status of Vietnam permanently or to provide 


basis for f further early evolution of the Tietnsinese 


The United States Government is Inclined to believe 

th orio of tho strongest motivating fore ©a behl .io»< 

alist mov&a^nts among dopenc it peoples i?> resentment of 

the iiapnt of Inferior.' -licit to a bordln&t 

status. When s. people has fought for I > goal of ind 

I &m 

pendenae with such tenacity as tfc displayed by the 

Vietnamese resistance forces* It appears tmll&elj that It 


will he content with a position of anything loss fchr.n 

equality with other peoples* It In t ir©4 I t tho cc 

'cession a granted by the French Gave ien ybe obecu cl 

In tho eyes or the Vietnamese by t* o I a of tho t 


cient which a incomp hie with Vi< o national prJ/' 

f " feelings determine t otlon of t 

■y of ' o to e ov< £v 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

March 8 agreement 3 then it must be supposed that the Com- 

munist-dominated "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" -will 

continue to receive the support of these Vietnamese. 

Certainly as long as the Vietnamese are persuaded that the 

two-and -a -half-year -old war with France must be prosecuted 

to a conclusion if the goals for which they have fought 

are to be won, they will continue to regard the dominant 

Communist element of the Vietminh League in the light of 
its effective leadership of the nationalist movement and 


not of its inevitable intention to subvert the nationalist 
cause in the end to the requi onts of international 
Communism, with which they have had little acquaintance 

as yet. 

The United States Government would be lacking in 


frankness if it did not state that in its considered 

estimation the paramount question in Indochina now is 

whether the country is to be saved from Communist control. 

Under the circumstances, all other is cues must be regarded 

as irrelevant. Much time has already been lost. The 

years since the end of the Pacific War have seen the Com- 

munist threat to Indochina intensified rather than other- 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 


The southward progress of Chinese Cor: list era; 

tc rd the northern frontier of In." hina Introduces a 

nev element that transforms an already serious ol tuition 

into an emergency* 

As it has made clear in ,tha part, the United States 

Government is of the opinion that- It most prove cliff i 

cult to save this situation tm< o preserve Indochina frr 

a foreign tyranny unless the French Government offers 

the Vietn&cwae the attain nt of those nationalist goals 

which tho; Mould continue to fight for a "aer than forego 

id unless the Vietnamese r be convinced t t they c 


in fact j, fully realise their patriotic alms throurti co 

operation with the Government envisaged in the 

agreement* In its view, develops ba have reduced tl 

• '. choice in Indochina to simple altoraa ttvea : will Viet 

achieve independence through an agree it with Frsn< 

ant the assistance of Prance ancS raaintai* ■■ thi3 in' 

C denes fortified by colla' v>at moo, c 

113 i cc e inde; ice fro? 


t t ' .liv 





Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

:v rovei *t balleves t' b tho Vic 

oameso 11 vrillinc;ly ace b a partnership 7 r Ith Francs 

cnlv if the e Hty of Vietnam Is re cog :ed and if* r 

a nrior condition to the deterrr nation of the cha cter 

. r 

of this rela tier. ship, the sovereignty of Vietnam is 


aefaaoifrled&fccL Observation of developments in southern 

Asia since tho end of the war -Id seam to leave little 

doubt that a Bnicaa "betv/eon Prance sne! Yiotne.n would be 

far mors likely of attainment and \ Id prove mo: fruit* 

ftil snfi < LdurSag If attained wore tho Union conceived not 

V3 on instrument fop tho control of ono ">or by ti 

other but os t noy of coo, itlon in flold3 of connion 

Sntoroet^ diplomatic, military* economic, and cultural 

voluntarily espoused on both i s« 

An approach to the future on tb le lines would ep. 

* * 



ear to offer; the greatest hope tliafc French Influence in 

ndochlna may be proaervsd, whtcifa Jt be r 3 v 

qi fclcnably to the best sis, of .^ 

milli ; and naval .ha » VI. a r.ay ' 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

tainod by Fru cam c rights "be a 

• ; this course the aietr olitaxi coi try d 


?©ar to havo little bo lose and nuch to gain* Mo] p f 


froa s strictly practical ; rjfc of vi P the United States 

Soirermaetib has "been 1 ?esse<3 to the difficulties likely 

arias if in transferri ; au.fc 10120 pcerers to the 

goven mt of a depend it territory t metropolitan 

or i feSj as a condition to »&eh tram # for , to ettb&ivic 

sovereignty in the a: % h.v retail g c alu tranectnd-. 

xfehts to Itself* For in this case fc! question of t< 

precise dlvinlon of ant .y i^ prone to present it el:C 

in conse na with every field of genre t as* the process 

of transfer is planned* In coj nce^ 9 greatly 

and good will vrhich should accrue to the met olitaa 

* P from its a auce of a r r io likely to bo 

dissipated In fin at npharo of < cord and u* n fcrua 1, &3 

suspicion • aaoag tho nations Hie metropolis 

. taa 01 rr Is in fact sec . fco pers o its existing 

f • 

eo • Itt c \co tho pi defialtli 

211 . 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NMD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


indefinitely protracted, rrlth results uhltih, may C &at 

the enterprise* 


I A cllfjpasslonate appraioal 1 is the United States 

Government to boll eve, in abort, that the preservation o 

Indochina 1 a Integrity depends, in the first placo, upon 

the willingness of the metropol:- n country to give ao 

Durances that Vietnam la feo exorcise control or Ito do» 

tinios; that its participation in the French Union \"ill 
be upon ter^s freely accepted by representatives on^oyir 
the confidence of the Vieti: one p lo v?hon these shall 

h^vo boon assembled j that the p( > of t inlstratic 

:e3*clsed by Franco in Vletr. uill ha transferred to 

the Vietnamese ©o soon go condition pexmlt tho institu* 

tic: :\ and functioning of tho non re .03 and tfc t t 

* . « 

\£&smsnt of French* forces in Vietnam outside thoir I 

is to be accounted for in terms of the c^fcuno of Viet 

i against the pro fe - 'a-national t U- 

t o rrould nrxr:. * V: i to alien controie* 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

In the second \>lnc0 $ tm ffoi Id n. p to depend u] 

the read an of tb icdn or the Vietm so Govcr 

formed un March 8 t to invite the p cl* 

patios this Dover: 3nt of henr ruly nati( Xiofc 

Icad^^y of Vlefeianij including, those ■she have heretofore 

supported the ' foocratlc Republic of Vietn; r # tc tfco 

end that this Govorr it a c 5 leadership 

and obtain the couri of the nationalist cleric 

cov ismc the major rt of the r tance forces* 

Such an ; rc«cb bo prot rouid Tseafc 1 .r 

to lay the basl3 for the e3 reparation of nationalist 

from 0i : ; elements in Vietnauj for those nho per- 

1 ;.sted in resists ic Government t 

all 3 bioi tst is could he : iHsod In favor of cc 

dher^nce to the "Eeiaocratle Bepv >lle of Vietnam** 

a iii effect be * ] it tUoir seals w 


not yiationa." hufc C mist* Ehe 1 ' it cf th 

C tine Mild 1 the sine £ a solu 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

- r 

avlJ strata! its ipac . fco rally 1 

list sajc ity of Vie.tno to its support,, : rn- 



ment formed under- the pch 8 a^r nt would -« * it would to the Ijnited Stauea &over enfc — have grounds £<a? 


appealing for tVic support or all fro© nat". »« The United 

States Government would hope that this ap il v/oultl I 

lly hooded, or oially by the other Governments oi* 

southern &sia if " ch, tta ea having 6 py r man to 

regsrcl tno further iraslon of £ ; controls la fcho 

region with ala: f could fill a yi ly Important polo by 
clarifying £03? the V£etn<u le pooplo the Issues c fronts 

jfcng tl on the t>asis of r c orienco and un-* 

ted fidelity to t ado or solf-dete: Lnatlon 1 

tho A£lsn peoples* 

14 33ie United nt 1b # ; her :?, convinced 

that if the requisite c ions toy the Pre a £ov< 

to tib natl alisfc c 

a, or' * the tasl 


vii igreei it must 

fc diffic It of ■ fl • : • 3 

to Indochina will ' a t fc 

2:U; " 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

tho prospect of the *rmtoo or f >le Cc 1st** 

controlled forces on their frontiers* 

It goes without saying that file earnest hopo of the 

Waited States Government is that tho Government fcracd 

under the March 8 agreement will auec 4 in Its crucial 

task* At the same time It would appear aadL< tie tl 

Insofar ae the probabilities of Its success aro rel fi 

to tho extent or International aupport it obtains, t] 

decision of a third party in "reapcefc of t feasibility 

of its ©attending support or a tsneo \ t ho or; 

by the extent to Ich tho French Cove nt h Itself 

provlc" that Povernment vrlth t! political ac&rant 

upon which ita appeal to tho Vietnamese mua 

Clearly the* success of this Gov- at is the 

f: fc instance r upon thooo means of ace shtng lfco pu: 

pooe -which only the Fr- verr it t provide* 

III talcing "vantage of f elation a of cordial; 

and i anderstan g 11 

ta< ; "by c Is fronli a ?ir ail 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

n] no- direction o£ Ita "/ I lug a 

dculjt ana fcbnt a*3 crc o of vlevs a it "bo adv; 


considering all t* ; la Involved la the oufcee 

of situation 

i Xndochl 



■*w e 


FJ EA : Ogbura , Jr : mp 



Clear-ed witk EUR end \ 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 





to the 



The enclosed memorandum by the Secretary 
of Defense on the subject is circulated herewith for 
the information of the National Security Council and 
referred to the NSC Staff, as requested in the second 
paragraph thereof, for the preparation of a report 
for consideration by the Council, 

Executive Secretary 

The President 
The Secretary of State 
The Secretary of Defense 
The Secretary of the Army 
The Secretary of the Navy 
The Secretary of the Air Force 
The Chairman j National Security 
Resources Board 

P1 7 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 










June 10, 194-9 




Sub j : United states Policy Toward Asia 

1. I am becoming Increasingly concerned at the course of 
events in Asia, The advance of commun :i .&m in large areas of the 
world and particularly the successes of c ommuni sm in China 
seriously affect the .future security of the United States, I 
am aware that this critical situation is being watched closely 
in the several departments of the government, and I appreciate 
that the. current problems are being handled as realistically 

as circumstances permit, it occurs to me, however, that this 
day-to-day, country -by -country approach may not develop a broad 
program in our best long-range Interests, 


2. A major objective of United States policy, as I under* 
stand it, is to contain communism in order to reduce its threat 
to our security, Our actions in Asia should be part of a care- 
fully considered and comprehensive plan to further that objec- 
tive. I therefore request that the staff of the National 
Security Council undertake as soon as practicable a study of 
the current situation in Asia to re-examine and correlate 
current policies and to appraise the commitments and risks 
involved in the various courses of action — political, economic 
and military- -which might be undertaken in support of the broad 
objective and recommend for the consideration of the National 
Security Council an appropriate plan of action outlining 
specific objectives to be achieved. 



USC 48 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 

NND Project Number: NND 63310. By: NW1.) Dale: 201 I 



/ Collect 

Char^o Djpartrnont 

Charge to 


zputtmtni ni i tnt$ 



CLf. 31F1CA1 




*ri • ^ 







JUN 20 1949 




On JOH 14 new Vietnam Stat© El B under Bao Dal 
ae» associated state of PR Union with wide attributes 
internal and external sovereignty but with FR retaining 
measure of control over external relatione and defense, 


FJR troopn regaining In Viet* i t Eofer Fortnightly axm~ 
aries for additional background especially Bao Dai 

statement JUN 14 

DEFT will ma! 
tlally same DEPOIELTEfr. JUN 14 

d3io statement to press ^FUM S] 

1 sv."bstaii' 


FXI DEPT Recently ecu'. ?io.for delivery F0N0FF 
memo commenting MAR-Q agreement (basis new Vietnam State), 
expressing view success Bao Dal solution depends first 


instance upon readiness FR provide him with means satis 

* j 

* fying alms nationalist majority Vietnam?, that If requisite 







FR concessions forthcoming and VI GOVT evidences qapacity 
rally support substantial percentage Vic ouch GOVT v;ld ; 


>ve grounds for appealing for support froe nations, which 

US Hopes wld be generally he L, Id GOVT and V 

m ■ — i ^ 

1MAR 8 at i :ceens thin venture,. 







-ft Y 

^u^s. tpvE*K«ufiT Minims errict t i#*i mom» 

i C/) 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

US with expectation coordination BRIT wld bqqIz obtain backl' 
other South Aslai} GOVTS and itself lend support including 
recognition new regime and extenolon such assistance aa 
possible .in circumstances, ' Other hand, shld PR and Vlot - 
GOVTS fall short what enev ont upon then, US wld regain 
from oupporting Bao Dai eolation and it Kid bo clear, aa 


to why US unable prevent COMMIE control Vietnam, 

Memo will he delivered only orally and in part as 
EMB Paris reports its delivery btthis time wld impede 
rather than encourage PR to move along lines DEPI desires. 

If Bao Dai regime suocoeds and wo are able get 
Indian approval Bao Dai GOV?, possibility may eventually 
develop get GOB approval However understand Burmese 
have friendly attitude Ho Chi I-Iin faction which believed 


propagandising -in BURM against Bao Dai. 

For your consideration end action your discretion wo 

s.v. 3G estio:-.i 

/M? advance/:' "that you explain GOB importance to Asia of 
success Bao Dai regime which mlg thereby create bulwark 
against COMMIE control Vietnam^ If COMMIES gain- control 
IC THAI and rest SEA will be imperiled. You 1 also 
express hope GOB will refrain from publlo statements which 



• * 

v i w-y.- 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 

WLD prejudice chances his success 

In explaining our position GOB you may PT out that 
failure Bao Dal experiment may troll result ehortly in 
COMMIE control IC; that in view Internal POLS'? practica- 
bilities FR, MAR 8. agreeme represents lor r ent maximum 
concessions which PR GOTO could ir?,koj that; Bao Dal is only- 
person visible at present about whom Vietnamese nationalist 
may group.. You may also PT out that Ho Chi Min has long 
record as agent of thlwaiMTERKATL Including i vice SOV 

CONS to Canton 1925 under Boro&ine. was organiser 10 

■ V 


Z Party and that his re it actions have not changed 

DBPT's "belief that he remains COMMIE. 

Youma y stated t hat UB y 8TAS Bao. Dal GOV? as 

only first -step in evolution Vietnam problem and that we 

. - — i 

Relieve in time FH will have to move far beyond oonoecsnior 

thus far made In order accommodate nationalist aspirations 

i. 1 1 

i— i ■ ■ 

Vietnamese people » 

■ ■ 

Even iif iuipraoti cable for you approach GOB along 
these lines now, foregoing explanation our position may be 


-#. O 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

useful replying any questions this matter trow GOB 

PYI PBP1 planning approach THAI and PHIL GOVTS 

with view obtain oome public expression encouragement 

for Bao Dai solution 








C: '.•'•--:',"! 


ir u. t. covcprriMtnT mum no cinct i ttia ?toci> 

Cleared in 

aft vriLth SEA 

Mr* O f btip.ivaii afl 
Mr. Read 


Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

Department of State 


PROM: Amembassyj London 

DATE: NOV 9, 19^9 

RECD: Nov. 15, 19^9 2:12 pm 

Mailed : Unknown 


Secretary of State, 


Following in substance are the recommendations made 
at the Singapore Conference in regard to Indo-China: 

1. A failure of the Bao Dai experiment would 
inavitably result In a complete French withdrawal from 
Indo-China; therefore U.S. and Commonwealth Governments 
should join the UK in assisting the French in support 
of Bao Dai. 

2. In view of the urgency of the situation Western 
nations cannot afford to await prior sponsorship of Bao 
Dai by the Asiatic nations. It is therefore recommended 
that after the transfer of sovereignty to Vietnam on 
January 1 the UK support the new regime. 



3. Following action is recommended: 

a. The French should be asked to clarify 
the legal status of the Vietnam. 

b * P^ j3*£e recognition is not possible 

until March 8th Agreement is ratified. 
It is therefore recommended that d_e facto 
recognition of Vietnam be granted on the 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


Dated: NOV 9, IS 

Proms Am :>assy, London.. 

transfer of sovereignty* It would be 
desirable to inform Boo Dai of the 
British Qovera Tit's intention before 
the British Government recognizes the neu 
Chinese government. 

c. The French should be encouraged to 

expedite the ratification of the March 8th 
Agreement and the transfer of the control 
of Indo-Chinese affairs from the Ministry 
of Overseas France to the Foreign Office, 

h. It is hoped that See bary of State Aches oft 
will issue a public si nt with regard to Indo- 
china similar to that made with regard to Hong Kong on 
May l8th wl n fas stated th in the event of an attack 
on Eong Kong the United States will fulfil its duties 
unc the Charter of the United Nations. 

$. The IV ould c nsult closely with the French 
in Indo-China v;; : regard to a -Communist propaganda. 

6. Neutrality from India is the. most that can be 


. .. 

• 22^ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 

NSC kQ/1 

December 23, 19^9 


to the 


on , 



— • • ■ » 

Reference: NSC 48 and related papers. 

The enclosed report on the subject has been prepared by 
the NSC staff pursuant to NSC 48 and related papers, with the ad- 
vice and assistance of representatives of the Secretaries of State 
and Defense and of the Acting Chairman, National Security Resources 
Board and the Director of Central Intelligence. 

The enclosure is submitted herewith for discussion at the 
special meeting of the National Security Council scheduled for 
December 29, 1949, &nd for whatever action the Council may decid- 
to take with respect thereto. 


Executive Secretary 

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury 



/ . 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number. NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 201 1 

NSC hQ/l 

- December 23, 19^9 






1. To assess and appraise the position of the United States 
with respect to Asia* on the basis of our national security inter 



General Considerations 

•^ ^*» 


2. The peoples and countries of Asia have in common a heavy 
pressure of population on scanty or underdeveloped natural re- 
sources and a consequent meager standard of living: disruption 
experienced in the war: the vigorous nationalistic spirit which 
characterizes newly independent states or restive colonies : and 
active discontent with their prevailing social, economic and 


political institutions. In other words the Asians share poverty , 
nationalism, and revolution. The United States position with 
respect to Asia is therefore that of a rich and powerful country 
dealing with a have-not and sensitively nationalistic area, and o: 
competition together with friendly countries against the USSR for 
influence on the form and direction of the Asiatic revolutions. 


*For' the" purposes of this report "Asia" is defined as that part o 
the continent of Asia south of the USSR and east of Iran together 
with the major off-shore islands— J< n, Formosa, the Philippines, 
Indonesia and Ceylon. 

NSC 48/1 226 TOP SECRET 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 

NNI) Project Number; NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 


v" - - 3. Asia is an area of significant potential power — political, 
economic and military. The development in this region of stable 
and independent countries friendly to the United States and seeking 
to direct their potential power, into constructive channels would 
enhance the security of Asia and strengthen the world position of 
the United States. Conversely, the domination of Asia by a nation 
or coalition of nations capable of exploiting the region for pur- 
poses of self-aggrandizement would threaten the security of Asia 
and of the United States, Recognition of these principles has been 
implicit in our traditional policies toward Asia; We have consis- 
tently favored a system of independent states and opposed aggran- 
dlzement of any powers which threatened eventual domination of the 


k. Our over-all objective with respect to Asia must be to 
assist in the development of truly independent, friendly, stable 
and self-sustaining states in # conf ormity with the purposes and 


principles of the United Nations Charter. In order to achieve this, 
we must concurrently oppose the domination of Asia by any single 
country or coalition. It is conceivable that in the course of time 
a threat of domination may come from such nations as Japan, China , 
or India, or from an Asiatic bloc. But now and for the foreseeable 
future it is the USSR which threatens to dominate Asia through the 
complementary instruments of 'communist conspiracy and diplomatic 
pressure supported by military strength. For the foreseeable 
future, therefore, our immediate objective must be to contain and 
where feasible to reduce the power and influence of the USSR in 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 


Asia to such a degree that the Soviet Union is not capable of 
threatening the security of the United States from that area and 
that the Soviet Union would encounter serious obstacles should it 

attempt to threaten the peace, national independence or stability 

of the Asiatic nations. 

political Considerations * • * 

5. Asia is in the throes of political upheaval. Communist 
attempts to capture leadership of this revolution, nationalism and 
the revolt against colonial rule, the emergence of new nations, the 
decline of western influence, the absence of a stabilizing balance 
of power, the prevalence of terrorism, economic distress ana social 
unrest, and the repercussions of the struggle between the Soviet 
world and the free world are currently disruptive forces. The 
conditions now prevailing in Asia render the realization of United 
States objectives there difficult and facilitate expansion of the 
area of both communist control and Soviet influence, 

6. The USSR is now an Asiatic power of the first magnitude 
with expanding influence and interests extending throughout conti- 
nental Asia and into the Pacific, Since the defeat of Japan, which 
ended a balance of power that had previously restrained Russian 
pressures in China and the pacific, the Soviet Union has been able 
to consolidate its strategic position until the base of Soviet power 


in Asia now comprises not only the Soviet Par East, but also Chin: 
north of the Great Wall, Northern Korea, Sakhalin, and the Kuriles. ! 
The islands of Japan and the subcontinent shared by India and 
Pakistan are the major Asian power centers remaining out fide the 

KSO 40/1 90 fl TO? SaEOSBT 

ijw f»- V 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 


Due to a mechanical failure 7 Numbers 229 through 238 
were not used in consecutive pagination. The text of 
Page 228 is coi- " med without omission on the page 
numbered 239* 

22 - 238 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 


Soviet orbit, If^ Japan, the principal component of a Far Eastern 
war-making complex, were added to the Stalinist bloc, the Soviet 
Asian base could become a source of strength capable of shifting 

the balance of world power to the disadvantage of the United States. 

Should India and Pakistan fall to coffimunism, the United States and" 

its friends might find themselves denied any foothold on the Asian 

mainland . 

7. While the military advantages of this position to the USSR 
are great , the general par Eastern situation also gives the USSR 
significant political advantages, in estimating the degree of 
political pressure that the USSR may exert from its present posi- 


tion in Asia, it should be remembered that its proteges deal with 
Asiatic peoples who are traditionally "submissive to power when 
effectively applied and habituated to authoritarian government and 
the suppression of the individual. Moreover, the USSR In Asia as 
elsewhere with relatively little oyert interference In other states, 
at relatively small cost, and at limited risk, is able to give 
assistance and impetus to native communist movements. The political 
offensive of the Kremlin or its "proteges also tends to gather addi- 
tional momentum as each new success Increases the vulnerability of 
the next target. * 

8. Japan has ceased to bo a world power, but retains the 
capability of becoming once more 3 significant Asiatic power. 

Whether its potential is developed and the way in which it is used 
will strongly influence the future patterns of politics in Asia. 
As a result of the occupation, Japan* o political structure has been 

'. / NSC 48/1 . TOP SECC/ET 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


basically altered? and notable steps have been taken toward the 
development of democratic institutions and practices . Despite 
these advances, however, traditional social patterns, antithetical 
to democracy, remain strong. The" demonstrated susceptibility of 
these patterns to totalitarian exploitation is enhanced by economic 
maladjustment which may grow more serious as a result of popula- 
tion increases and of obstacles to the expansion of trade . 

9. Although, in terms of the Japanese context, an extreme 
right-wing movement might be more effective in exploiting tradi- 
tional patterns and current dislocations than one of the extreme 
left, a number of factors combine to make the threat of Communism 
a serious one. These factors include the close proximity to a 

weak and disarmed Japan of Communist areas with the attendant 

opportunities for infiltration, clandestine support of Japanese 

Communist efforts, and diplomatic pressure backed by a powerful 
threat; the potential of Communist. China as a source of raw mate- 
rials vital to Japan and a market for its goods; and the existence 
in Japan of an ably-led, aggressive, if still relatively weak, 
Communist movement which may be able to utilize Japanese tendencies 
toward passive acceptance of leadership to further its drive for 
power while at the same time exploiting economic hardship to under- 
mine the acceptability to the Japanese of other social patterns that 
are antithetical to Communist doctrines. 

■ • 

10. Even if totalitarian patterns in Japan were to reassert 
themselves in the form of extreme right-wing rather than Communist 
domination, the prospect would remain that Japan would find more 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 

> * 


1 compelling the political and economic factors moving it toward 
accommodation to the Soviet orbit internationally, however anti- 
Communist its internal policies , than those that move it toward 
military alliance with the United States, Extreme right-wing 
domination of Japan, moreover, although loss immediately menacing 
to the United States than Communist control would represent a 
failure, particularly marked In the eyes of other non-Communist 
Asiatic countries, of a major United States political effort. 

11. A middle of the road regime in Japan retaining the spirit 


of the reform program, even if not necessarily the letter, would 

in the long-run prove more reliable as an ally of the United States 

than would an extreme right-wing totalitarian government . Under 

such a regime the channels would be open. for those elements in 

japan that have gained most from the occupation to exercise their 

influence over government policy and to mold public opinion. Such 

a regime would undoubtedly wish to maintain normal political and 


economic relations with the communist bloc and, in the absence of 

open hostilities, would probably resist complete identification 
either with the interests of the United States or the Soviet Union. 
The existence of such a regime, however, will make possible the 
most effective exercise of United States political and economic 
influence in the direction of ensuring Japan's friendship, its 
ability to withstand external and internal Communist pressure, and 
its further development in a democratic direction. 

12. Tlie basic United States non-military objectives in Japan, 
therefore, remain the promotion of democratic forces and economic 
stability before and after the peace settlement, To further this 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


objective the United States must seek to reduce to a minimum occupa- 
tlon op post -occupation interference in the processes of Japanese 
Government V7hile at the same time providing protection for the basic 
achievements of the occupation and the advice and assistance that 
will enable the Japanese themselves to perpetuate these achieve- 
ments; provide further economic assistance to Japan and, in concert 
with its allies, facilitate the development of mutually beneficial 
economic relations between Japan and all other countries of the 
world; make it clear to Japan that the United States will support it 
against external aggression while at the same time avoiding the 
• appearance that its policies in Japan are dictated solely by con- 
r siderations of strategic self-interest and guarding against Japan* s 
*■ ^ exploitation of its strategic value to the United States for ends 


contrary to United States policy interests; and promote the accept- 

ance of Japan as a peaceful, sovereign member of the community of 

nations t • 

13. The United States has taken the lead in assisting the 

efforts of the Korean people to regain that independence promised 
them at Cairo. In 'NSC 8/2 , approved by the President on March 23, 


19*1-9, it was agreed that "if the significant gains made thus far, 
in terms both of the welfare and aspirations of the Korean people 
and of the national interest of the United States are to be 
consolic ed, the United States must continue to give political 
support and economic, technical, military and other assistance to 
the Republic of Korea." The principal objective of this policy is 
to strengthen that Government to the point where it can (1) succes; 

NSC hQ/l 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


fully contain the threat of expanding Communist influence and 
control arising out of the existence in north Korea of an aggressive 
Soviet -dominated regime, and (2) serve as a nucleus for the eventual 

peaceful unification of the entire country on a democratic basis, 


14. It can be assumed that under present circumstances the 

communists have the capability of dominating China* Communist 
domination of China is significant to the USSR primarily because it 
enhances USSR capabilities for obtaining Soviet objectives in Asia, 
Soviet ability to capitalize on the situation in China will depend 
on the degree of control that the Kremlin can exert over Chinese 
communist leaders, and on the control that the Chinese communists 
can exert over all elements of Chinese society. Development of 
these two varieties of control will not necessarily proceed in 
parallel. The formidable problems of overpopulation, limited and 
undeveloped natural resources, technical backwardness, and social 
and political lag which confront . the Chinese communists have 
contributed to the downfall of every Chinese regime in recent 
history. Chinese communist success in surmounting their internal 
difficulties might well be accompanied by a lessening rather than 
an intensification of their subservience to the Kremlin, Similarly 
Chinese communist failure to achieve an effective solution of 
China T s problems might drive the Chinese communists to depend more 
rather than less on the USSR* For the very immediate future it 
may be assumed that both Kremlin influence on the Chinese communists 
and Chinese communist control over China will grow more firm and 
that China will represent a political asset to the USSR in accomp- 

HSC Wl 'top secret 

... 2ti3 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 


lishmcnt of its global objectives. But longer range development of 

Kremlin influence over the Chinese communists will be subject to 

the interplay of such presently unpredictable factors as Chinese 

communist effectiveness, USSR policy toward the Chinese communists, 


and the relations between the Chinese communists and the non- 
communist world . If the Kremlin should attempt to extend to China 
the pattern of political and economic control and exploitation that 
has characterized its relations with its European satellites, it is 
quite possible that serious frictions would develop between the 
Chinese communist regime and Moscow, Moreover, an attempt by the 
USSR to mobilize directly all Chinese resources in pursuance of its 
strategic objectives might well result in China's becoming more of 
a liability than an asset to the Soviet Union. The actions of the 
United States or of other Western powers cannot be expected greatly 
to weaken Chinese communist control of China in the foreseeable 
future, but may have inf iuence on* the relations between the Chinese 
communists and the USSR, In fact, any attempt on the part of the 
United States openly to deny Chinese territory, such as Formosa to 
the communists would probably react to the benefit of the communists 
by rallying all the anti -foreign sentiment in China to their side, 
15, Furthermore, action by the u. S. to occupy Formosa would 
inevitably expose the U. S. to charges of "imperialism" and serious- 
ly affect the moral position of tne U. 5, before the bar of world 
opinion, particularly in the Far East, at a time when the u. S. is 
seeking to expose Soviet imperialist designs on other nations. Such 
action would provide the Chinese communists with an irredentist 


2k k 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 


1 issue for their propaganda against the U. S. and a cause which 

would rally almost unanimous public sentiment behind them in China, 
/ 16. It is not believed that denial of Formosa to the Chinese 

.conanunists can be achieved by any method short of actual u. S.. 

military occupation. As a CIA intelligence estimate of October 19, 

19^9 (ORE 76-^9, concurred in by the intelligence organizations of 

the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force) states: 

"Without major armed intervention, U. S* political, 
economic, and logistic support of the present Nationalist 
island regime cannot insure its indefinite survival as a 
non-communist base. Communist capabilities are such that 
only extended u. S. military occupation and control of 
Taiwan can prevent its eventual capture and subjugation by 
Chinese communist forces. Failing U. S. military occupa- 
tion and control, a non- communist regime on Taiwan probably 
will succumb to the Chinese communists by the end of 1950." 

17. In the light of the foregoing, and in view of the estimate 
of the JCS, reaffirmed in MSC 37/7 of August 22, 19^9, that "the 
strategic importance of Formosa does not justify overt military 
action. • •", it is believed that ,u. S. military occupation of 
Formosa, which would require concurrent responsibility for the 
administration of the Island, would not be in the U. S« national 



18. On December 23, 19^9, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated 


that events which have taken place in China have not changed their 


above views (NSC 37/7/ dated August 22, 19^9). However, within 
these limitations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that a modest, 


ell-directed and closely supervised program of military advice and 

assistance to the an ti -Communist government in Formosa would be in 
the security interest of the United States, and should "be integrated 
with a stepped~up political, economic and psychological program 

NSC 48/1 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
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pursued energetically in extension of present United States 
programs there . 

19. In south Asia we are favored by the fact that communist 
groups and leaders played a minor part in the nationalist move- 
ments of the area, which attained independence through a peaceful 
transfer of power by the British. The present south Asian 
governments are non-communist and, except in Burma, are maintain- 
ing law and order and have good prospects of remaining in power 
for the next few years, Soviet and Chinese communist hostility 
and internal communist opposition, on the one hand, and friendli- 
ness and circumspection on the part of the United States, the" 
United Kingdom and the other Western powers, on the other, have 
during the past two years strengthened the Western orientation 

of the south Asian government f 

20, India and Pakistan, the pivotal nations of the area, 
inherited from the British well trained armies, a corps of 
experienced civil administrators, transport and communications 
facilities well developed by Asian standards, important agricul- 


tural .and extractive industries, and a few large-scale processing 

and manufacturing industries. They, and Ceylon, remain within 

the Commonwealth and have significant military, economic and 

cultural ties with the United Kingdom- -as does Burma which chose 

to leave the Commonwealth. 

21. There are, unfortunately, adverse factors which threaten 
the continued relative stability of south Asia. Active disputes 
between India and Pakistan and between Pakistan and Af, mis tan, 


2«i 6 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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• r> 



and suspicion of* India in varying degree among its smaller neighbors 
at the minimum impede essential regional cooperation, At the un- 
likely maximum, they could embroil the area in war* Internally, 
all the governments of south Asia are faced with the necessity of 
bringing to their peoples within the next few years at least some 
hope of improved economic and social conditions. Failing this, 
they may lose control to extreme groups of the right or the left. 

22. Consideration of the foregoing unfavorable aspects of the 
south Asian situation together with the current reluctance of the 
area to align itself overtly with any "power bloc" leads to the 
conclusion that it would be unwise for us to regard south Asia, 
more particularly India, as the sole bulwark against the extension 
of communist control in Asia. We should, however, recognize that 
the non-communist governments of the area already constitute a 

/ bulwark against communist expansion. We should accordingly exploit 

every opportunity to increase the 'present Western orientation of 

> « 


south Ar'a and to assist, within our capabilities, its non- communist 
governments in their efforts to meet the minimum aspirations of 
their people and to maintain (in the case of Burma to restore) 
• internal security, 

23. The current conflict between colonialism and native 
independence is the most Important political factor in southeast 
Asia. This conflict results not only from the decay of European 
imperial power in the area but also from a widening political 
consciousness and the rise of militant nationalism among the 
subject peoples. With the exception of Thailand and the Philippines, 


' 2'*7 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

the southeast Asia countries do not possess leaders practiced in 


he exercise of responsible power. The question of whether a 

colonial country is fit to govern itself , however, is not always 
relevant in practical politics. * The real issue would seem to be 
whether the colonial country is able and determined to make 
continued foreign rule an overall losing proposition for the metro- 
politan power. If it is, independence for the colonial country is 
the only practical solution,, even though misgovernment eventuates, 
A solution of the consequent problem of instability, if it arises, 
must be sought on a non-imperialist plane • In any event, colonial- 
nationalist conflict provides a fertile field for subversive 
communist activities, and it is now clear that southeast Aisa is the 
-*- target of a coordinated offensive directed by the Kremlin, In 

seeking to gain control of southeast Asia, the Kremlin is motivated 

in part by a desire to acquire southeast Asla ? s resources and 
communication lines, and to deny ,then to us. But the political 
gains which would accrue to the USSR from communist capture of 
southeast Asia are equally significant. The extension of communist 
authority in China" represents a grievous political defeat for us; 
If southeast Asia also is swept by communism we shall have suffered 
a major political rout the repercussions of which will be felt 
throughout the rest of the world, especially in the Middle East and 
in a then critically exposed Australia . The United States should 
continue to use its influence looking toward resolving the colonial 
nationalist conflict in such a way as to satisfy the fundamental 
demands of the nationalist-colonial conflict, lay the basis for 

NSC 48/1 ■ ' ' TOP SECRET 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
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political stability and resistance to communism, and avoid weakening 
the colonial powers who are our western allies. However, it must 
"be remembered that the long colonial tradition in Asia has left 
the peoples of that area suspicious of Western influence* Ve must 

• * 

approach the problem from the Asiatic point of view in so far a 
possible and should refrain from talcing the lead in movements which 
must of necessity be of Asian origin. It will therefore be to our 
interest wherever possible to encourage the peoples of India, 
Pakistan, the Philippines and other Asian states to take the leader- 
ship in meeting the common problems of the area. 

24. Although European influence has certainly declined 


throughout Asia and European powers are no longer able fully to 
* shape the course of events in that part of the world, nevertheless 
the influence of such powers is by no means negligible. This is 
particularly true of the United Kingdom because of the advanced 
policies followed in Asia by that > nation since the end of the war. 
With the successful conclusion of the Round Table talks at the 


Hague (for which this Government can claim preeminent credit) the 
Dutch will undoubtedly regain much of their lost popularity. It 
would be to the interest of the United States to make use of the 
skills, knowledge and long experience of our European friends and, 
to whatever extent may be possible, enlist their cooperation in 
measures designed to check the spread of USSR influence in Asia. 
If members of the British Commonwealth, particularly India, Pakistan, 
Australia and New Zealand, can be persuaded to join with the United 

Kingdom and the United States in carrying out constructive measures 


NSC 48/1 ' * TOP SECRET 

of. g 

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of economic, political and cultural cooperation, the results will 
certainly be in our interest. Not only will the United States be 
able thus to relieve itself of part of the burden, but the coopera- 
tion of the white nations of the Commonwealth will arrest any 
potential dangers of the growth of a white -colored polarization. 

25. With the rise of new nations and the decline of colonia- 
lism, a consciousness of common interests and a demand for regional 


collaboration is beginning to take form among the countries of Asia. 
However, the wide diversity of political organization and develop- 
ment, the lack of a tradition of cooperation and a sound economic 
basis for large-scale mutual trade, and the suspicions with which 


the weaker nations of Asia view the stronger } have all operated to 

delay the formation of any regional organization up to the present. 
But efforts continue and will probably increase in tempo as the 
advance of Soviet influence becomes more and more a direct threat. 
As stated above the peoples of Asia are suspicious of the Vest and 
in any cooperation the United States may extend to a developing 


regionalism it .will be necessary to do nothing which would excite 
further suspicion of our motives, Asian leaders have already 
taken the Initiative in this natter and it should continue to rest 
in their hands. There are many indications for example that India 
aspires to draw Ceylon, Burma and southeast Asia into a regional 
association. These aspirations are aided by the considerable moral 
influence which India enjoys throughout this area, derived from the 
great prestige of its revolutionary leaders and its position as the 
largest of the Asian dependencies to become independent of colonial 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

* i 


rule. India has -'gained additional goodwill by its strong support of 


he Indonesian independence movement. Prime Minister Nehru is, 

however, aware of the difficulties of creating an effective regional 
organization in south and southeast Asia, and is moving slowly and 
cautiously* Ke and other Indian leaders prefer that such an 
association develop from indigenous desires and would not look with 
favor upon attempts by outside powers to impose, or even too 
actively to foster, a regional organization of the area* United 
States interests would appear to demand that our sympathetic support 
be given to Asiatic leaders to the end that any regional associa- 
tion which may develop be one with which we could cooperate on 
equ&l terms and which would be in harmony with the UK Charter. 

26. Asia is only one of several fronts on which tho United 
States directly or indirectly confronts the USSR. Pressures, or 
lack of them* on any front affect all the others. The fortunate 
circumstance of occupying a favorable geographic position both in 
Europe and in Asia allows the USSR great flexibility in the 
pressures it may apply. Operating from the center of the Eurasian 
continent it may advance or retreat in the east or in the west as 
the occasion demands. Because there is no longer a force either in 
Europe or Asia which can withstand without full United States assis- 
tance the power of the USSR if it shouid be unleashed, determination 
of the effective use of United States power, in its total sense, on 
any or all of its fronts with the USSR -European, Kear Eastern, or 
' Asiatic --requires decisions based upon a constant and skillful re- 
evaluation of the costs involved and the probable results to be 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


obtained in each-oase, both in the event of war and its probable 
afterjaath, and in the event of continued peace. The United States 
for its part must be able to apply pressure on fronts at tines of 
= its own choosing rather than spreading itself thin in reacting to 

every threat posed by the Soviets if it is not to lose the advantages 
of the initiative In the struggle between the Soviet world and the 
free world. Mobilization of our cold war potential and implementa- 
tion by effective techniques is essential. 


27. United States ability to exert counter influence against 
the Kremlin in Asia rests on U. S. ability to provide economic 
assistance and cooperation to Asiatic countries; on preservation 

and development of the u. S. traditional reputation as a non- 
imperialistic champion of freedom and Independence for all nations; 

■ • 

on the frictions which will arise between Asiatic nationalisms and 
USSR Imperialism; on U. S. cxiltural and philanthropic contacts in 
Asia; on U. S, ability to exert constructive influence on the 
European Far Eastern colonial powers and to gain assistance from 
these powers in the Far East; on U. S« military power, and on the 
U, S. strategic position in the Pacific, Appropriate development 
and utilization of these U. S. assets in Asia through effective 
diplomacy and propaganda will naturally increass the influence which 
the United States can now bring to bear to check the USSR in that 


28 # It must be remembered, however, that helping Asiatic 
countries to resist USSR pressure is not something we can do by our 
own policy alone. We will depend for success on interaction between 


c* vJ £ 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 





/policy and what already exists in the way of will and ability to 
resist on the part of the Asiatic countries themselves. It must 


also be borne in mind that the sweeping changes which have been 

taking place in Asia since the war ha\se been stimulated in very 

considerable part by the determination of the peoples of Asia to 

control their own destinies and to redress the grievances of the 

past which they associate with foreign rule and foreign influence. 

Intervention in their affairs, particularly by the Western powers, 

however well-intentioned, will of itself be suspect and be likely 

to result in the undoing of the very interests which prompted the 

intervention. In the conflict between the u. S. and the USSR, the 

advantage in the long run in Asia is likely to rest with the side 

V , which succeeds in identifying its own cause with that of the Asian 

peoples and which succeeds in working in harmony with the dominant 
motivating forces in Asia today and in influencing these forces 
rather than attempting by direct 03? impatient methods to control 
them . 

t c w *5 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


Strategic Considerations 

29. The potential pover of Asia is strategically significant 


both to the United States and to the USSR because of its capacity in 


the long run to affect the relative military strength of these tvo 
countries and hence the character of military operations in the event 
of var between them. Translation of the Asian 'pover potential into 
military strength vould require development of each of its elements- - 
organization and training of manpower, exploitation of natural re- 
sources, development of sea transportation, improvement of communica- 
tions and further industrialization- -as veil as their integration to- 
vard coordinated objectives. Even given the most favorable atmos- 
phere for development, including the pover to consolidate as neces- 

- sary, the authority to divert channels of trade, and the military 

force required to protect long sea routes and other lines of communi- 
cation—the full development of Asia's potential pover is a long-term 
affair. In the pover potential of f Asia, Japan plays the most import- 
ant part by reason of its industrious, aggressive population, provid- 
ing a large pool of trained manpower, its integrated internal communi- 
cations system with a demonstrated potential for an efficient mer- 
chant marine, its already developed industrial base and its strategic 


position. Because of Japan 1 s economic importance in Asia, of the ex- 
treme vulnerability of Japan to blockade, of the long period required 
under the best of circumstances for the development of significant 
strategic potential in Asia, and of the hazards involved in attempts 
to harness Chinese potential to Soviet ends, there exists no serious 
dancer that the USSR vlll in the near future be able to undertake mil- 

itary aggression based on Asia's strategic potential. 

* . 

NSC 48/1 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 




30. The location of Asia, contiguous to the USSR and separated 
from the United States, presents different strategic implications, 
both offensive and defensive, to the United States and to the USSR. 
The Asian power potential is more ■ valuable to Russia than to the 
United States, since American industrial power is so much greater 
than Russian, The industrial plant of Japan vould be the richest 
strategic prize in the Far East for the USSR, For Japan and major 
Asian raw-material producing areas, together with the necessary 
transportation lines, to be controlled by the Soviet Union would add 
measurably to the war-making potential of the USSR, Russia could 

not, however, quickly build up a powerful self-sufficient war-making 


complex in Asia without access to and control over Japan and could 

not effectively mobilize Japan in war without a larger merchant 

fleet in the Pacific than the USSR and Japan are likely to have for 

/ years to come. Other Asiatic assets of potential value to Russia 

include soybeans, tin, rubber, and* South China 1 s tungsten. Petro- 

leum coring from Indonesia including Borneo, while not essential to 

meet Russian domestic requirements, is one of the most important 


'strategic materials 4 in the region. 

31. The strategic value of Asia to the United States rests on 
three considerations: In the first place denial of USSR control over 
Asia might prevent the acquisition by the Soviets of elements of 
power which might in time add significantly to the Russian war-making 
potential. Secondly, to the degree that Asian indigenous forces de- 
velop opposition to the expansion of USSR influence, they would assist 
the U. S, in containing Soviet control and influence in the area, 

NSC 48/1 255 T0P SB0HB9P 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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possibly reducing- the drain on the United States economy. The in- 
digenous forces of Asia, including manpower reserves, would also be 
a valuable asset, if. available for the support of the United States 


in the event of war. Thirdly, Asia is a source of numerous raw ma- 
terials, principally tin and natural rubber, which are of strategic 
importance to the United States, although the United States could, 
as in World War II, rely on other sources if necessary. 

32. Since, from the military point of view, the primary stra- 


tegic interests and war objectives of the United States consistent 
with the aim of destruction of the enemy's means to wage war are not 
now in Asia, the current basic concept of strategy in the event of 
war with the USSR is to conduct a strategic offense in the "West" 
and a strategic defense in the "East 11 • In keeping with this basic 
concept and in light of the strategic interests of the United States 
and the USSR as developed above, certain principles may be stated. 
As a primary matter in the event of war, it is essential that a suc- 
cessful strategic defense in the "East" be assured with a minimum 
expenditure of military manpower and material in order that the 
major effort may be expended in the "West". In order to gain free- 
dom of access to the Asian continent within these limitations, the 
United States must now concentrate its efforts on bringing to bear 
such power as can be made available, short of the commitment of 
United States military forces, in' those areas which will show the 
most results in return for the United States effort expended. In 
addition the United States must maintain a strategic position which 

will facilitate control of coastal and overseas lines of communica- 

tion in Asia. 


5G 48/1 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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33. From the military point of view, the United States must 
maintain a minimum position in Asia if a successful defense is to be 
achieved against future Soviet aggression. This minimum position is 

considered to consist of at least- our present military position in 

the Asian. offshore island chain, and in the event of war its denial 

to the Communists. The chain represents our first line of defense 

and in addition, our first line of offense from which we may seek to 

reduce the area of Communist control, using whatever means we can 

develop, without, however, using sizeable United States armed forces. 

The first line of strategic defense should include Japan, the 

Ryukyus, and the Philippines. This minimum position will permit con- 

trol of the main lines of communication necessary to United States 

strategic development of the important sections of the Asian area, 

Economic Considerations 

I l - i-lii ■ ■■!-■■ i" " ' ta * I I ■■—■■■ ■ 1" ^ 


3^ t Except for industrialization in Japan and to a lesser ex- 
tent in India, Asia is basically an agricultural region. Pressure of 
population on the land has depressed living standards to the margin 
of subsistence. Communications and transportation facilities are 
poor and productivity is low. However, Asia is the source of import- 
ant raw -and semi-processed materials, many of them of strategic value. 
Moreover in the past, Asia has been a market for the processed goods 
of industrialized states, and has also been for the western colonial 
powers a rich source of revenue from investments and other invisible , 


35. The United States has an interest in the attainment by the 

free peoples of Asia of that degree of economic recovery and develop- 

NSC 48/1 257 T0P 5ECRET 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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merit needed as a foundation for social and political stability. This 


interest stems from the principle that a viable economy is essential 
to the survival of independent states. In the two major non-Commun- 
ist countries of this area, India 'and Japan, U. S, aid (direct in the 
case of Japan, and via convertible sterling releases in the case of 
India) Is averting a deterioration in economic conditions that vould 
otherwise threaten political stability. While scrupulously avoiding 
assumption of responsibility for raising Asiatic living standards, 
It Is to the U. S, interest to promote the ability of these countries 
to maintain, on a self-supporting basis, the economic conditions pre- 
requisite to political stability. Japan can only maintain its pres- 

ent living standard on a self-supporting basis if it is able to se- 

cure a greater proportion of Its/food and raw material (principally 

cotton) imports from the Asiatic area, in which its natural markets 
lie rather than from the U. S., in which its export market is small. 
In view of the desirability of avoiding preponderant dependence on 
Chinese sources, and the limited availability of supplies from pre- 
war sources in Korea and Formosa, this will require a considerable 
increase in Southern Asiatic food and raw material exports. 

36. The Indian problem is somewhat analogous: The sizeable 
post-war Indian dollar deficit may be traced largely to this coun- 
try's unprecedented dollar food imports. These imports have been 
necessitated by the failure of Indian food production to keep pace 
with population growth and to the reduced post-war availability of 
food exports from India's soft currency suppliers in Southern Asia. 

Even with these significant dollar food imports, Indian food con- 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 


-sumption has fallen belov pre-war levels* - A further decline vould 
almost certainly produce serious political instability in the major 
cities of India. A serious problem vould thus result if the U. K. 
were no longer able to bear the burden of the convertible sterling 


releases that have so far met the Indian dollar deficit. 

37. It is thus difficult to foresee a time at vhich Japan and 
India will be self-supporting in the absence of greatly increased food 
production and some increased cotton production in Southern and South- " 
east Asia. One major prerequisite to such an increase is the restora- 

tion of political stability in the food exporting countries of Burm 
and Indo China. Given such a restoration, perhaps as much as 2,5 
million more tons of rice exports could be secured from these coun- 


'""xtries vith only minimal loans for rehabilitation of damaged facili- 
ties, e.g., transportation. Another major prerequisite is expanded 
agricultural development in the stable Southern Asiatic countries in - 
vhich such development vould be economic: India, Pakistan -- vhich 
exports vheat and cotton, Thailand — vhich exports rice, and Ceylon 
-- vhose sizeable rice imports reduce the availability of Asiatic 
foodstuffs to India and Japan. Japanese and Indian food requirements, 
and Japanese cotton requirements, could be met if certain projected 
irrigation reclamation, and transportation projects vere executed in 
the above countries, 

38. These projects vill probably require: (i) a more effective 
mobilization of local resources by the governments concerned, 
(ii) some external technical aid, (iii) some limited external finan- 
cial aid. Most of the countries in question are nov taking steps to 


NSC 48/1 . . T0P SECRET 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
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L •' o 

.mobilize local resources more effectively in the agricultural field, 
and they should be encouraged along these lines. External technical 
aid should "be made available under the Point IV program. The extern- 
al financial aid required is of such a limited character that it can 


probably be adequately provided by the International Bank and the 

Export-Import Bank, Ve should, therefore, continue to urge these in- 
stitutions to give serious consideration to requests for loans to fi- 
nance sould development projects that vould increase agricultural 
production in India, Thailand, Pakistan and Ceylon, This encourage- 
ment should, of course, be vithout prejudice to other additional loans 
. these institutions may vish to make for non-agricultural purposes to 


these countries. • 
" / -^ 39, Expanded agricultural development in Southern and Southeast 
Asia vould make a contribution to the political stability and the 
welfare of the exporting, as veil as the importing countries. Through 
increased sales of rice, vheat, anjl cotton, Thailand and Pakistan 
could most economically secure the imports of capital and consumer 
goods to develop and diversify their economies. A comparable effect 
vould be felt in India and Ceylon, if increased food production en- 


abled these countries to reduce the disproportionate amount of for- 
eign exchange that they presently devote to the purchase of food 


i|0. Our interest in a viablb economy in the non- Communist coun- 
tries of Asia vould be advanced by increased trade among such coun- 
tries. Japanese and Indian industrial revival and development can 
: ^contribute to enlarged intra- regional trade relations vhlch suffered 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
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• O 

; -a set-back because of the economic vacuum resulting from the defeat 
of Japan, the devastation caused by the war in other areas and the 
interference and restrictions arising from extensive governmental 


i controls. Given a favorable and secure atmosphere--plus adequate 
freedom to individual traders, readily available working capital, 
suitable commercial agreements establishing conditions favorable to 
commerce and navigation and general assistance in the promotion of 
trade— it Is expected that a substantial Increase in intra-Asia trade 
can occur* The patterns of such trade, however, may differ from 
those existing before the war. In any event, a strong trading area 
• among the free countries of Asia would add to general economic devel- 

opmant and strengthen social and political stability. Some kind of 
/^regional association, facilitating interchange of information, among 
the non-Communist countries of Asia might become an important means 
of developing a favorable atmosphere for such trade among themselves 
and with other parts of the world., 

^1 # Asia, particularly South and Southeast Asia, are among the 


1 principal sources of United States imports of several basic commodi- 
ties which could contribute greatly to United States security for 
stockpiling purposes and would be of great assistance in time of war 
if they remained available to us. Exports to Asia from the United 
States are of less importance than are imports, but are not now in- 
significant and could. grow in importance to the stability of our own 
domestic economy. In brief, the economic advantage derived by the 
United States from our trade with non- Communist Asia is considerable 
x and there is little doubt of the wisdom of its development. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 


m * 

I 42, One effective means available to the United States for as- 

sisting in economic development, particularly in Southeast Asia, is 
I " to enlarge, consistent with security considerations, and despite pos- 
sible objections of U. S. competitors, the orderly and sustained pro- 
curement, both by private and public agencies, of strategic and other 
basic commodities, such as tin, hard fibers and particularly natural 
rubber. United States purchases of strategic materials on current 
account would represent an important source of dollars for use by 
Asian countries in and outside the sterling area in meeting their 
current and capital needs, 

43. The USSR is the primary target of those U. S. economic pol- 
icies designed to contain or turn back Soviet-Communist imperialism, 


"'' and not China or any of the Soviet satellites considered as individ- 
ual countries. It would, therefore, be Inappropriate to apply to the 
willing or unwilling partners of the USSR punitive or restrictive 
economic measures which are not being applied to the USSR itself. 
This guiding principle should be the point of departure in applica- 
tion of procedures for conduct of our economic relations with Commun- 
ist China. It should be our objective to take steps to prevent the 

Soviets and their satellites from obtaining, via trans-shipment in 

the Par East, strategic goods now denied them through direct channels. 

It should also be our objective to prevent Chinese Communists from 

obtaining supplies of goods of direct military utility which might be 


used to threaten directly the security interests of the western powers 
in Asia, It is not, however, either necessary or advisable to re- 

strict trade with China in goods which are destined for normal civil- 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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Ian uses within China provided safeguards are established to accomp- 

lish the two objectives mentioned above. Three reasons exist for 
this position: (l) Japan's economy cannot possibly be restored to a 
self-sustaining basis vithout a considerable volume of trade with 
China, the burden of Japan on the United States economy cannot be re~ 
1 moved unless Japan's economy is restored to a self-sustaining basis 
and U. S. interference with natural Japanese trade relations with 


China wou_d produce profound Japanese hostility; (2) permitting trade 
with Communist China in goods destined for normal civilian end uses 
within China, will enable us to obtain quantities of important commod- 
■'ities needed by the U. S. (e.g,, tung oil, bristles, tungsten, anti- 
mony etc.) and might contribute to internal economic and political 

Vvtensions between the urban and rural sectors of the Chinese economy, 
and permit China to choose between a Soviet and a Western orientation 
in their foreign economic relations; and (3) restriction of trade for 
any purpose other than those indicated by the objectives outlined 
above would be ineffective and impractical in view of the existence 
of alternative sources of supply in other countries which will not 
cooperate in export controls affecting normal trade with China, The 
U. S, should seek the cooperation of friendly countries in exercising 
export controls to achieve the objectives indicated, and request SCAP 


to conform to our general policy in this respect, While SCAP should 
be requested to avoid preponderant? dependence on Chinese markets and 
sources of suDply he should not be expected to apply controls upon 
Japan's trade with China more restrictive than those applied by Vest— 
- / rn European countries in their trade with China. At the same time, 

263 ' 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
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* r 


. SCAP should encourage development of alternative Japanese markets 
elsewhere in the world, including Southern and Southeast Asia, on an 
economic basis. Notwithstanding the advantages of the permissive 
trade policy outlined above, there would be no advantage for the 
United States to extend governmental economic assistance to or en- 
courage private investment in Cor^munist China. 


2}4 # Our basic security objectives with respect to Asia are: 

a. Development of the nations and peoples of Asia on a 
stable and self-sustaining basis in conformity with the purposes 
and principles of the United Nations Charter, 

b. Gradual reduction and eventual elimination of the pre- 
ponderant power and influence of the USSR in Asia to such a de~ 
gree that the Soviet Union will not be capable of threatening 
from that area the security of the United States or its friends 
and that the Soviet Union would encounter serious obstacles 
should it attempt to threaten the peace, national independence 
and stability of the Asiatic nations. 

c. Prevention of power relations;. Ivjs in Asia which would 
e.nable any other nation or alliance to threaten the security of 
the United States from that area, or the peace, national inde- 
pendence and stability of the Asiatic nations, 

i-5. In pursuit of these objectives, the United States must en- 
courage n on -Communist forces to take the initiative in Asia, must ex- 
ert an influence to advance its own national interests and must take 

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Reference:' NSC W/l 

I ) 

At its 50th Meeting j vith the President presiding, the Rational 
Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Acting Secretary 
of Commerce , and the Acting Economic Cooperation Administrator, dis- 
cussed a report on "The Position of the United States vith Respect to 
Asia" (NSC 40/l), and adopted the Conclusions contained therein sub- 
ject to amendments at the meeting and to further amendments subse- 
quently agreed upon by the Departments of State and Defense. The 

Conclusions as revised are enclosed herewith. 


The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, 
the Acting Secretary of Commerce, and the Acting Economic Cooperation 
Administrator, recommend that the President approve the Conclusions 
contained herein and direct their implementation by all appropriate 
Executive Departments and Agencies of the U. S. Government under the 
coordination of the Secretary of State, 

Executive Secretary 

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury 
The Secretary of Commerce 
The Economic Cooperation Administrator 




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1. Our "basic security objectives vith respect to Asia* are: 

a. Development of the nations and peoples of Asia on a 
stable and self-sustaining basis in conformity vith the pur- 
poses and principles of the United Nations Charter, 

b. Development of sufficient military pover in selected 
non-Communist nations of Asia to maintain internal security 
and to prevent further encroachment by communism. . 

c. Gradual reduction and eventual elimination of the pre 
ponderant power and influence of the USSR in Asia to such, a 
degree that the Soviet Union vill not be capable of threaten- 
ing from that area the security of the United States or its 
friends and that the Soviet Union would encounter serious ob- 

3 stacles should it attempt to threaten the peace , national in- 
dependence ' and stability of the Asiatic nations, 


d. Prevention of power relationships in Asia which vould 
enable any other nation or alliance to threaten the security 
of the United States from that area, or the peace , national 
independence and stability of the Asiatic nations, 

2. In pursuit of these objectives, the United States should 
ct to: • ■ , ■ 

a. Support non-Communist forces in taking the initiative 
in A"siaj 

b. Exert an influence to advance its own national inter- 
ests; and 

c. Initiate action in .such a manner as vill appeal to 
the Asiatic nations as being compatible vith their national 
interests and worthy of their support. 

For the purposes of this report "Asia" is defined as that part 
of the continent of Asia south of the USSR and east of Iran together 
*fith the major off-shore islands — Japan, Formosa, the Philippines, 
I Indonesia and Ceylon. 


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* As the basis for realization of its objectives, the United 
' ci 4«-. "should pursue a policy toward Asia containing the following 

a. The United States should make known its sympathy with 
the efforts of Asian leaders to form regional associations of 
non-Communist states of the various Asian areas, and if in due 
course associations eventuate, the United States should be pre- 
pared, if invited, to assist such associations to fulfill their 
purposes under conditions which would be to our interest. The 
following principles should guide our actions in this respect: 

(1) Any association formed must be the result of a 
genuine desire on the part of the participating nations 
to cooperate for mutual benefit in solving the political, 
economic, social and cultural problems of the area. 

(2) The United States must not take such an active 
part in the early stages of the formation of such an associa 
tion that it will be subject to the charge of using the 
Asiatic nations to further United States ambitions. 

(3) The association, if it is to be a constructive 
force, must operate on the basis of mutual aid and self- 
help in all fields so that a true partnership may exist 
based on equal rights and equal obligations. 

(4) United States participation in any stage of the 
development of such an association should be with a view 
to accomplishing our basic objectives in Asia and to as- 
; suring that any association formed will be in accord with 

\ Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations dealing 

with regional arrangements. 

[ b. The United States should act to develop' and strengthen 

i the "security of the area from Communist external aggression or 

internal subversion. These steps should take into account any 
] benefits to the. security of Asia which may flow from the de- 

velopment of one or more regional groupings. The United States 
on its own initiative should now: 

(1) Improve the United States position with respect 
to Japan, the Ryukyus and the Philippines. 

(2) Scrutinize closely the development of threats 
from Communist aggression, direct or indirect, and be pre- 
pared to. help within our means to meet such threats by 
providing political, economic, and military assistance 
and advice where clearly needed to supplement the resist- 
ance, of the other governments in and out of the area 
which are more directly concerned. 



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t (3) Develop cooperative measures through multilateral 

or bilateral arrangements to combat Communist internal sub- 

(*0 Appraise the desirability a,nd the means of devel- 
oping in Asia some form of collective security arrangement s, 
be&ring in mind the following considerations: 

(a) The reluctance of India at this time to join 
in any ant i- Communist security pact and the influence 
this vill have among the other nations of Asia, 

(b) The necessity of assuming that any collective 
security- arrangements vhich might be developed be based 
on the principle of mutual aid and on a demonstrated de- 

■ sire and ability to share in the burden by all the par- 
ticipating states, 

(c) The necessity of assuring that any such secur- 
ity arrangements would be consonant with the purposes of 
any regional association vhich may be formed in accord- 
ance with paragraph 3-& above. 

(d) The necessity of assuring that any such secur- 
ity arrangement would be in conformity with the provi- 
) sions of Article 51 of the Charter relating to individ- 

ual and collective self-defense. 

I c. The United States should encourage the creation of an 

• atmosphere favorable to economic recovery and development in 

} non-Communist Asia, and to the revival of trade along multilat- 

'* eral, non-discriminatory lines. The economic policies of the 

United States should be adapted to promote, where possible, 

j economic cpnditions that will contribute to political stability 

L in friendly countries of Asia, but the United States should 

j carefully avoid assuming responsibility for the economic welfare 

I and development of that continent. Such policies might be pro- 

: jected along the following lines: 

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(1) Vigorous prosecution of the Point IV program in 
friendly countries of Asia, in an endeavor to assist them, 
by providing technical assistance, to make a start toward 
the solution of some of their long-range economic problems. 


(2) Maintenance of a liberal United States trade pol- 
icy with Asia and stimulation of imports from Asia. The 
special problems concerning trade with China are treated 
in paragraph 3-f-(^) below. 

(3) Execution of a stockpiling program for strategic 
materials, based upon United States needs for strategic 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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reserves and upon Immediate and long-range economic effects 
in the supplying countries. 

(k) Negotiation of treaties of friendship, commerce and 
navigation vith non-Communist countries of Asia to define 
and establish conditions facilitating capital movements, 
trade and other economic relations between them and the 
United States. { 

(5) Encouragement of private United States investment 
In non- Communist countries and support of the early exten- 
sion of credits by the International Bank and the Export- 
Import Bank for specific key economic projects of a self- 
liquidating nature, especially those directed towards in- 
creasing production of food in this area. 

(6) Efforts t 
tries to the prlnc 
trade as embodied 
Trade, as a means 
the International 
an economic basis, 
efforts to secure 
ment for Japan. 

o obtain the adherence of Asiatic coun- 
iples of multilateral, non-discriminatory 
in the General Agreements on Tariffs and 
of reducing trade barriers and expanding 
and intra- regional trade of the region on 

This would include, for example, further 
the benefits of most- favored -nation treat- 


_ The question of a peace settlement with Japan, nov re- 
ceiving separate consideration, will be presented for the con- 
sideration of the National Security Council at a later date and 
policies vith respect to Japan vill be re-evaluated after the 
decision regarding a peace treaty has been made. 

e. (l) The United States should continue to provide for 
"the extension of political support and economic, technical, 
military and other assistance to the democratically-elected 
Government of the Republic of Korea 


(2) The United States should therefore press forward 
with the implementation of the EGA, MDAP, USIE and related 
programs for Korea, and should continue to accord political 
support to the Republic of Korea, both within and without 
the' framework of the United Nations. 

f ( (l) The United States should continue to recognize the 
National Government of China until the situation is further 
clarified.** The United States should avoid recognizing the 
Chinese Communist regime until it Is clearly in the United 
States interest to do so. The United States should, continue 


* KSC _ B/2, approved March 23, 19^9 • 
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to express to friendly governments its own views concerning 
the dangers of hasty recognition of the Chinese Communist 
regime but should not take a, stand which vould engage the 
prestige of the United States in an attempt to prevent such 
recognition. In general, however, it should he realized 
that it vould he inappropriate for the United State? to 
adopt a posture more hostile or policies more harsh towards 
a Communist China than towards the USSR itself. It should 
also be realised that the according of recognition by other 
friendly countries vould affect the bargaining position of 
the United States in the absence of United States recogni- 
tion and i^ould affect United States private and national 
interests in China. In the event that recognition of the 
Chinese Communists is anticipated, appropriate steps should 
be taken to make it clear that recognition should not be 
construed as approval of the Chinese Communist regime, or 
abatement of our hostility to Soviet efforts to exercise 
control in China. 

(2) The United States should continue the policies of 
avoiding military and political support of any non- Communist 
elements in China unless such elements are willing actively 
to resist Communism with or without United States aid and 

* unless such support vould mean reasonable resistance to the 

Communists and contribute to the over-all national interests 
a of the United States.* In determining whether or in what 

manner any such assistance or encouragement should be given, 
consideration vould have to be given to the protection vhich 
Chinese Communist authorities, as they become generally rec- 
ognized by other governments, vould be able to claim under 

; international lav and the Charter of the United Nations, 

The United States should maintain so far as feasible active 
contact with all elements in China and maintain our cultural 
and informational program at the most active feasible level. 


The United States should exploit, through appropri- 
ate political, psychological and economic means, any rifts 
between the Chinese Communists and the USSR and between the 
Stalinists and other elements in China, while scrupulously 
avoiding the appearance of intervention. Where appropriate, 
covert as veil as overt means should be utilized to achieve 
I - these objectives.* 

(4) The United States should, as a security measure, 
! seek to prevent the USSR, its European satellites, and North 

i Korea from obtaining from abroad through China supplies of 

1 strategic materials and equipment vhich are currently denied 

them by the United States and its European allies through 

* NSC y^/27 



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V I 

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direct channels. The United States should also use every 
effort to prevent the Chinese Communists from obtaining 
from non-Soviet sources supplies of materials and equipment 
of direct military utility U-4 items). The United States 
should, on the other hand, permit exports to China of IB 
items within quantitative limits of normal civilian use and 
\ under controls which can be applied restrietively if it be- 
1 comes necessary to do so in the national interest, and 
'should place no obstacle in the way of trade with China in 
"non- strategic commodities. The United States should seek 
the support and concurrence of its principal European allies 
in these policies. The United States should not extend gov- 
ernmental economic assistance to Communist China or encour- 
age private investment in Communist China. 

g, (l) The United States should continue the policy set 
forth in NSC 37/2 and 37/5 of attempting to deny Formosa 
end the Pescadores to the Chinese Communists through diplo- 
matic and economic means within the limitations imposed by 
the fact that successful achievement of this objective will 
primarily depend on prompt initiation and faithful implemen- 
tation of essential measures of self-help by the non-Commun- 
ist administration of the islands , and by the fact that 

freedom of U, S. diplomatic and economic action vill be 
influenced,, necessarily, by action taken- by other countries 


Since the United States may not be able to achiev 

its objectives through political and economic means, and in 

view of the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (reaffirmed 
in NSC 37/7 of August 22, 19 J 19) that, while Formosa is stra- 
tegically important to the United States, "the strategic 
importance of Formosa does not justify overt military action 

• • • 

so long as the present disparity between our military 

strength and cur global obligations exists", the United 
States should make every effort to strengthen the over-all 
U* S. position with respect to the Philippines, the Ryukyus, 
and Japan. The United States should, for example, proceed 
apace with implementation of the policy set forth in regard 

to the Ryukyus in paragraph 5 of 



h, The United States should continue to use its influence 
in .Asia toward resolving the colonial-nationalist conflict in . 
such a way as to satisfy the fundamental demands of the nation- 
alist movement while at the same time minimizing the strain on 
the colonial powers who are our Western allies. Particular at- 
tention should be given to the problem of French Indo- China and 
action should be taken to bring home to the French the urgency 
of removing the barriers to the obtaining by Bao Dai or other 
non- Communist nationalist leaders of the support of a substan- 
tial proportion of the Vietnamese. With the successful conclu- 
sion of the Round Table Conference at The Hague the United 


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States should give immediate consideration to the probl tns con- 
fronting the ne\i Republic of United Indonesia and how best it 
can be aided in maintaining its freedom in the face of internal 
and external Communist pressures, 

jU Active consideration should "be given to means by which 
all members of the British Coinmonwealth may be induced to play 
a more active role in collaboration with the United States in 
Asia. Similar collaboration should be obtained to the extent 
possible from other non- Communist nations having interests in 

j[* Recognising that the non- Communist governments of South 
Asia already constitute a bulwark against Communist expansion 
in Asia, the United States should exploit every opportunity to 
increase the present Western orientation of the area and to as- 
sist, within our capabilities, its governments in their efforts 
to meet the minimum aspirations of their people and to maintain 
internal security, 

k. The United States should undertake an information pro- 
gram, both foreign and domestic, and publish United States pol- 
icies and programs vis-a-vis Asia designed to gain maximum sup- 
port both at home and abroad, 

1, Nothing in this paper shall be construed as amending 
approved NSC papers unless a specific statement to that effect 
has been made on each point. 


m. The sum of $75,000,000 for assistance to the general 
ecL of China, which was made available under Section 303 of 

the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 19^9, should be programmed 

a matter ox urgency. 



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