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Full text of "Pentagon Papers"

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
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V.B Justification of the War (1 1 Vols,) 

Internal Documents (9 Vols.) 

2, The Truman Administration: (2 Vols.) 

b. Volume II: 1950-1952 






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UNITED STATES 





VIETNAM TASK FORCE 



OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFEN 



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V.B.2. 



V. 



JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR 
- INTERNAL COIv&lETMEMTS - 

The Truman Administration, 19^5-1952 



BOOK II - 1950-1952 







Sac Dif Cent Evm Zr* 



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JUSTIFICATION OF IKE WAR ~ INTERNAL COMMITMENTS 



The Truman Administration; 19^5 - 1952 



Foreword 



This portion of the study consists of a collection of U.S. 
Government documents which set forth the rationale of U.S. 
policy toward Vietnam. The collection represents the inter- 
nal commitment of the U.S. as expressed in classified docu- 
ments circulated at the highest levels in the government. 
The documents are organized chronologically within each 
Presidential administration. This volume covers the Truman 
years, 19 J +5 - 1952. 



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2m Secretary of State Stettinius informs Ambassador Caffery 
(France) on the status of U.S. assistance to French re- 
sistance groups in Indochina, Stettinius 1576 to Caffery 
(Paris) , 19 April 19^5* - - • - 



3. The U.S. rejects a French proposal to conclude an agree- 
ment with the French Provisional Government analogous to 
the Franco-Allied agreement of 25 August lQkh* The U.S. 
refuses to consider diversion of resources to specific 
military operations in Indochina. Stettinius letter to 
French Ambassador Bonnet , 20 April 19^5 



V.B.2. 

JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR — INTERNAL COMMITMENTS 

The Truman Administration, 19^5 - 1952 / 

* 

Contents and 
Chronological List of Documents 

19^5 Page 

1. Extract of minutes of State-War -Navy Coordinating Com- 
mittee (SWIICC) held 13 April: Mr. Lovett states that 
"the lack of a policy /on Indochina7 is a source of 
serious embarrassment to the military." The Committee 
agreed that the State Department should take up the 
question of clarification of policy on Indochina. 
Memorandum, R. E. Cox, SWNCC, to Mr. Bonbright - Minutes, 
■ 23 May (13 April) 19^5 1 






k. The State Department undertakes an internal task to clarify 
U.S. policy toward Indochina following President Roosevelt's 
death , 12 April 19^5, and the SWNCC meeting, 13 April 19^5. 
• A summary of how the State Department documented this task 
and the pertinent documents follow as lt.a. through U.e 9 

a. Division of European Affairs (EUR) submits a pro- 
posed "Memoran Turn on Indochina Policy" to th-» Assistant 
Secretary for forwarding to the President. The memorandum 
. recommends that the U.S. .not oppose restoration of Indo- 
china to France. H. Freeman Matthews, EUR, Memorandum ,to 
Mr. Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State, 20 April 19^5 9 



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b. Division of Far Eastern Affairs (FE) forwards 
comments and suggested changes to EUR version of the 
Memorandum on Indochina policy* FE recommends additions 
to the EUR proposals as veil as not opposing restoration 
of Indochina to France, provided France gave adequate 
assurances on five major points chiefly concerning Indo- 
chinese independence. Memorandum by Mr. Stanton, FE, 
to Mr. Dunn, 21 April 19^5* • • • • ......... 9 

Ct Mr. Dunn feels that it is "better to let the Indo- 
china policy matter drift rather than base it on the 1*2 
version of the Memorandum. Dunn message to Mr. Grew, 
Under Secretary of State, 23 April 19^5 18 

d. The final compromise Memorandum to the President 
includes extracts from both the FE and EUR versions, 

but does include mention that the U.S. would seek the 
French views on the five points raised by FE. Memoran- 
dum to the President, subject: American Policy with 
Respect to Indochina, undated , not sent * . . 19 

> * 

e. The draft cable^ which was approved by all 
Divisions concerned* requests French indication of in- 
tentions on five points : ,, MMMI M M , , M#tfl M rM .|. Mi . , 22 



(l) Indochinese self-government within a French 



Union . 



(2) Economic and commercial non-discrimination. 

(3) Haiphong as a free port. 

(h) Recognition of an Indochina-Thai border. 

(5 J International security arrangements for South - 
: east Asia. Unnumbered cable 5 9 May 19^5. 

5. Assistant Secretary of War proposes "so far as practic- 
able" the U.S. should avoid "unnecessary or long term" 
commitments of assistance to French resistance forces 
in Indochina. Memorandum, R.E. Cox, SWNCC, to Mr. Bon- 
bright, WE, 2 May 19^5 _ _ 26 

6. French Foreign Minister is informed by Ste^tinius at 
San Francisco that "the record is entirely innocent... 

# of this government questioning. . .French sovereignty over 
Indochina. " Grew 19^9 to , Caf f ery, 9 May I9I45 - - - * 27 



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7. Matthews reports to President Truman of French desires 
to participate in Far East war and the JCS view that 
little military value would accrue from the French 

forces. Memorandum by Matthews for Truman, 16 May 19^5* *. 2 7 

8. Grew reviews for Hurley the present position of U.S. 
policy on "trusteeship structure" and the necessity of 
"voluntary" action "by colonial powers and that the extent 
of French participation in the war in the Pacific was 

to be determined by Gen MacArthur. Grew 873 to Hurley (China) 

7 June 19l*5 . • 30 

■ 

9- The U.S. military reply to the French offer of partici- 
pation (by two French divisions) in the Pacific war out* 
lines the provisions to acceptance in principle. Essen- 
tially, the U.S. desires complete command and control of 
the French trained, equipped and maintained divisions 
with movement from France based on the units having 
attained U.S. combat standards. Memorandum by U.S. 
Chiefs of Staff to Combined Chiefs of Staff at Potsdam, 
16 July 19^5 * * • • * • 33 

10. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff views that logistics considera- 
tions prevented French and Dutch participation in the 
Pacific war are presented to the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff for consideration. Memorandum by the U*S. Chiefs 

of Staff at Potsdam, 18 July 19^5 . 36 

11. The British Chiefs of Staff suggest that the French 
divisions be "employed in due course in French Indo- 
china." Memorandum by British Chiefs of Staff at 

Potsdam, 18 July 19^5 # 37 

12. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff consider the British view 
and compromise earlier U.S. positions to allow for 
possible use of French divisions under British command 
in areas to be determined later. Memorandum by 

U.S. Chiefs of Staff at Potsdam, 19 July 191+5... 37 

13- Report to the President and Prime Minister of the agreed 
summary of conclusions on the strategic concept and 
policies for prosecution of the war, reached by the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff at the terminal conference 
of the Postdam meeting. Basically, the Chiefs' stra- 
tegy focused on Japan with the U.S. controlling opera- 
tions. The door was left open for French and Dutch 
* participation based on "military considerations" and 
"shipping" requirements. JCS files, CCS 9OO/3, 
2k July 191*5 39 



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lU. President Truman informs Hurley (China) that it was agreed 
at Potsdam to divide Indochina at latitude 16° north for 
operational purposes: the south going to Southeast Asia 
Command (SEAC) and the north going to the China theater* 
Hurley is urged to get Chiang Kai-shek's concurrence. 
Truman telegram to Hurley from Berlin, 1 August 19^5 ^ 

15. William J. Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS), reports on the French attitude toward 
the Indochina Provisional Government to the Secretary 
of State- A French committee was to negotiate with 
Annamite leaders on terms favorable to Indochina; the 
French were to act as advisors to the Indochina Pro- 
visional Government with the power to sign treaties 

for France- Annamite leaders, however, expressed the de- 
sire to have status as an American protectorate, exclud- 
ing both French and Chinese occupation. Threats of 
violence over a French reoccupation were made. Memoran- 
dum by Donovan for Secretary of State, 22 August 19^5 ^5 

16. Dean Aches on, Acting Secretary of State, reasserts U.S. 
policy toward French control of Indochina to the Charg§ 
in China (Robertson). The U.S. neither opposed nor 
assisted re -establishment of French control in Indo- 
china, Robertson was told. The U.S. "willingness" to 
see French control is based on the future outcome of 
French claims of popular support. Acheson 1622 to 

Robertson, 5 October 19^5 - h$ 

17. Caffery (Paris) informs Secretary of State of the 
Franco-British agreement on Indochina which recog- 
nizes the French Civil Administration as sole author- 
ity in Indochina south of the l6th parallel. Caffery 
6006 to Secretary of State, 12 October 19^5 k$ 

18. Caffery reports that de Gaulle rejected announcing a 
far-reaching, progressive policy designed to give 
Indochinese greater authority, representation, and 
responsibility in government under the pretext of 
the state of disorder which prevailed in Indochina. 
De Gaulle felt that "no such policy could be imple- 
mented pending restoration of French authority." ' 
Caff ery 6857 to Secretary of State, 28 November 19^5- . 50 

♦ • 

* * 

19^6 

19- Matthews requests direction from Acheson on transfer 
of Lend-Lease vehicles from the British to the French 
in Indochina. Acheson replies that President Truman 
thought the U.S. should agree to the transfer. Acheson- 
Matthews notes, 18 January 19^+6. 52 • 

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20, Secretary of State Byrnes requests information on 
conditions in Indochina and especially on the 
status of French-Viet Minh negotiations. Byrnes 
53 to Bangkok, 28 January 19^6. 



21. 






22. 



23. 



2k. 



25- 






53 



Gen Gallagher, OSS, reveals that, in his view of 
Indochina, "one or two modern French divisions could 
defeat the Annamese" and that after de Gaulle's 
October pronouncement of colonial policy, the 
Annamese (Ho Chi Minh) refused to negotiate with 
the French and became hostile. n Ho himself will 
not deal with the French.., and will be behind any 
continuing Annamese movement." The Viet Minh 
administration was young and inexperienced but 
"the demand for independence is widespread and 
even in the villages the peasants refer to the 
example of the Philippines. . .however, the Viet Minh 
should not be labeled full-fledged doctrinaire com- 
munist." Memorandum of Conversation by R.L. Sharp, 
SEA. Affairs , 30 January 19^6 .......... 



53 



Landon reports that d ' Argenlieu-Ho Chi Minh nego- 
tiations have been proceeding and may be completed 
in two or three weeks, and that only temporary and 
local Franco- Chinese agreements have been realized. 
Landon (Saigon) O927 to Byrnes, 5 February 19*16.... 



58 



Caffery informs Byrnes that the present French 
government "will try to follow a conciliatory and 
moderate policy in Indochina and will be more pro- 
gressive in its outlook than de Gaulle." Caffery 
595 to Byrnes, 6 February 19^6. • 



...» 



■..■«..#..#.. 



59 



ir 



Landon states that: "It seems certain that Annamese 
plan desperate resistance to French. Ho Chi Minh 
stated that he considering petitioning all United 
Nations to mediate Annamese independence and prevent 
extensive bloodshed." Landon (Hanoi) 2 to Byrnes, 
16 February 19^6 . . 



Landon refers to two letters to President Truman from 
Ho Chi Minh which request the USA. as UN member to 
support Annamese independence according to the example 
of the Philippines. Landon summarizes the points in 
Ho Chi Minh's petition to the United Nations which 
includes a review of French conquests, Ho's govern- 
mental accomplishments, and requests for intervention, 
by the Big Four. Landon (Hanoi) to Secretary of State, 
undated (received 27 February 19^-5 ) * - • 



59 



61 



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27- 



28. 



29. 






30. 



31. 






32. 



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The Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister, Dr. Wang, 
indicates that Chinese troops would be withdrawn 
from Indochina by 15 April and that he had urged 
a "bloodless" Franco-Viet Mirih agreement with 
them. Wang suggests joint Chinese -American 
mediation of French-Indochinese problem and re- 
fers to the late President Roosevelt's interest 
in dependent peoples. Smyth (Chungking) 39*+ 
to Byrnes , 28 February 19**6 , 



62 



Reed reports signing of the 6 March agreement 
whereby "Vietnam becomes a free state within 
the Indochina federation and will have own army, 
direct own internal affairs, and finance... 
Annamites are frankly pleased. . .French military 
occupation proceeding smoothly." Reed (Saigon) 
20 to Secretary of State, 7 March 10k6 « 



63 



Saigon informs State that Chinese are putting 
obstacles in the French path and Viet Minh in- 
cidents around Saigon are increasing. Reed 33 
to State, Ik March I9U6 



63 



Viet Minh extremists assassinate a member of the 
Cochin China Council, French seize Hanoi 
Treasury, and Tonkin incidents jeopardize 
peaceful outcome of events. Reed 70 to State, 
1 April 19I16 



6k 



The U.S. informs France that the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff do not object to relief of 
Chinese troops by French forces in Indochina, 
and that on the repatriation of Japanese, 
the French military commander should coordi- 
nate with Gen fcacArthur (since the Chinese and 
British were totally relieved of occupation 
and repatriation duties in Indochina). Byrnes' 
note to Bonnet, 12 April 19U6 



6k 



1 Sullivan (Hanoi) indicates that most important 
immediate question in the negotiations opening 
at Dalat appears to be status of Cochin China. 
0' Sullivan 2 to Byrnes, 18 April 19^6 



65 



The U.S. indicates that Ho Chi Minh has re- 
quested U.S., U.K. and other recognitions 
as a free state within French Union. Byrnes 
to Consular Officers, 18 April 191*6 



66 



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33. Ho Chi Mink calls for Cochin- China to join Vietnam, 

French to cease entering Cochin-China, and for French 

to live up to agreements, French are pessimistic over 

Dalat conferences. ff ... over -all picture is not a 

happy one..." Reed 122 to Byrnes, 27 April 19^6 66 

« 

%k. U.S. reviews the situation at Dalat conference from the 
viewpoint of Freilch and Vietnamese as pessimistic 
(in light of recent conflicts, outbreaks of fighting, 
and conflicting views on Cochin-China status) and 
feels that French will possibly attempt a coup when 
Chinese withdraw. Acheson to Consular Officers, 
1 May 19^6 • 



6? 



35 • Acheson reports that the French are confident of 
success in negotiations with Vietnam, but they 
feel the Vietnam delegation is controlled by better- 
organized communists, even though only half the 
delegation is communist. Acheson to Consular 

Officers, 13 May 19^6 67 

■ 

36. Ho Chi Minh is reported as believing satisfactory 
agreement can be reached with the French. Acheson 
to Consular Officers, ih May 19if6 . • • • • 68 

37- U.S. expresses concern over continued presence of 
Chinese troops in Tonkin and that everything possi- 
ble should be done to speed evacuation. Acheson 
to Gen George C. Marshall (Nanking), 15 May 19^6. •••* 68 

38. French propose federal organization for Vietnam 
(under High Commissioner who exercises French 
Union powers) with a legislative assembly of 
ten members each from Tonkin, Annam, Cochin- 
China, Laos, Cambodia, and ten French members. 
Byrnes to Nanking, 20 May I9I46 69 

39- U.S. raises Consulate Saigon to Consulate General, 
effective 20 May 19^. Byrnes 21*27 to Caffery, 
20 May 19^6 69 

^0. U.S. notes three important political parties in 
Vietnam: Viet Minh (whose most active members 
are former Indochinese Communist Party members), 
Dong Minh Hoi (DMH) and Vietnam Q,uoc Dan Dang 
(VNQDD), which seem to have support of the Chinese. 
Catholics appear to support no single party, but 
"as a group will not remain long absent from 
politics." r Sullivan 20 to Byrnes for General- 
Marshall, 20 May 19^6 '. £a 



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kl. Ho Chi Minh has constantly given impression that 
"he would pay great attention to any suggestions 11 
made by the U.S. O'Sullivan (Hanoi) to Byrnes, 

5 June 19^6 71 

1*2. U.S. Consul in Hanoi views Vietnam strength in 
Cochin-China as "diminishing," that Ho went to 
Paris for this reason, and at the same time, to 
seek support from French Left Wing. f Sullivan 
to Byrnes, 5 June 19^6 . 71 

1*3- Caffery reports Franco-Vietnam conference at 
Fontainebleau is off to a bad start, as Viet- 
namese delegation protested assumption of the 
chairmanship by head of the French delegation, 
protested creation of Cochin-China as an inde- 
pendent state, and accused French of violating 

6 March agreement. Ho Chi Minh held conversa- 
tions with Algerians on similarity of their 

problems . Caffery 3323 to Byrnes, 7 July 19^6 73 

a. 

kk. Vietnam breaks off negotiations at Fontainebleau 
on the grounds that France violated March 6 
accord by convoking a new Dalat conference, 
Caffrey 3801 to Byrnes, 2 August 191*6 7^ 

U5. U.S. views recent moves by the French as de- 
signed to regain a large measure of control 
over Indochina in "violation of the spirit 
of the 6 March convention" and that widespread 
hostilities may result from Vietnamese resistance 
to these encroachments . Memorandum by Moffat 
(SEA) for Vincent (FEA) , 9 August 191*6 75 

k6 . U.S. views results of Dalat conference as a 

reasonable basis for the future, but far short 

of larger degree of independence desired by 

Vietnam, and it is difficult "to foresee any 

great degree success... so long as Cochin-China 

stays apart from Vietnam..." Reed 3^2 to Brynes, 

17 August 191*6 . 78 

1*7- U.S. expresses concern over "French colonial 

tendency picture U.S. as aggressive and imperial- 
istic" and indicates closeness of this unwitting 
French colonial view to Communist Party line. 

Clayton (Acting SecState) 2^0 to Saigon, "78 

h September 19^6. ........ 



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kQ. U.S. looks at intelligence reports linking USSR 

to Ho Chi Minh and requests information on relative 

strength and outside contacts of Vietnam communists. 

Clayton 2^1 to Saigon, 9 September 19^6 79 



1*9- Caffery reports on visit of Ho Chi Minh just prior 
to signing modus vivendi ; Ho declares he is not a 
communist. Caffery 6131 to Byrnes, 11 September 
19^6 . 



79 



50. U.S. is informed by French of increased communist 
activities in French Indochina, chiefly Chinese 
Communist entrenchment in Saigon and Haiphong. 
Agencies outside of Indochina are supplying propa- 
ganda. Reed 37^ to Byrnes , 17 September 19^6 80 

51. Caffery reports signing of modus vivendi and that 
Ho Chi Minh obtained satisfaction on many points, 
but French would have liked to include definition 
of Vietnam relations to Indochinese federation and 
French Union. Caffery U67I to Byrnes, 17 September 

19^6 80 

52. Saigon views "amicable" meeting of Ho CM Minh and 
High Commissioner in light of belief that "French 
Communists desire soft-pedal communist trends in 
Vietnam for political reasons" prior to elections. 

Reed iOl to Byrnes, 19 October I9U6 82 

53. Ho Chi Minh infoims the U.S. that effectiveness of 
modus vivendi depends on France, fighting would not 
stop unless French applied the agreement, and that 
Cochin-China "must be united to Vietnam." 

f Sullivan 96 to Byrnes , 25 October 19U6 82 

5^. Contact between Vietnam and Chinese Communists is 
apparent, but the presence of Chieoms as advisors 
in the provinces is difficult to verify. Reports 
of Chieoms in Haiphong are regarded with suspicion. 
'Sullivan 101 to Byrnes, 1 November 19I+6 83 

■ 

55- Caffery reports French concern over "positive proof" 
of direct contact between Moscow and Ho Chi Minh. 
Caffery 5857 to Byrnes, 29 November 19U6 83 

56. U.S. Consul views Ho Chi Minh's contacts with France 
as designed to facilitate application of Marxist 
principles when, and if, a Communist government 
is established in France. Further, French concern 



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of Ho's communist contacts at this time is peculiar 

when they are forcing collaboration or preparing 

a puppet government; this ploy is a possible diversion 

from French policy in Indochina. f Sullivan 131 to 

Byrnes , 3 December 19^6 . 8^ 

57. Ache son instructs Moffat on Ho Chi Minh's communist 
record and offers guidelines of U.S. policy in dis- 
cussion with Ho. Essentially, the U.S. is concerned 
over Tonkin events, the American people have welcomed 
Indochinese attainments but violence imperils this 
sympathy, and U.S. is informing France similarly. 
The U.S. is not making formal intervention at this 

time . Acheson 305 to Saigon, 5 December 19^6 85 

58. U.S. feels France would engage in full scale military 
operations in Vietnam only if forced, since they 
realize it is no longer possible to maintain a closed 
door. However, Cochin-China political question must 
be settled and French cannot resolve it without a 
fight. The Cochin-Chinese prefer Tonkin to France. 

Reed kj2 to Byrnes , 6 December I9U6 . • * 87. 

59. Secretary Byrnes reviews basic French-Vietnamese 
difficulties for Missions at London, Moscow, and 
Nanking. Essentially, the difficulties revolve 
around. deep nationalist sentiment and opposition 
to the French, guided by a few communist trained 
leaders in the government with apparent contacts 
with Moscow and Yenan. However, "French influence 
is important not only as an antidote to Soviet 
influence, but to protect Vietnam and SEA from 
future Chinese imperialism." Three basic troubles 
are mutual distrust, French irresolution of the 
term "free state," and Vietnamese intransigence. 
Byrnes message to certain Missions, 17 December 
19)46 . 



88 



60. Byrnes reviews recent French political crisis and 
influence of Indochina policy as an important 
factor. Outbreak of hostilities in Hanoi seen as 
serious and not likely to be resolved by Moutet 
and d'Argenlieu. Byrnes message to Moscow, Nanking 

and Saigon, 20 December 19^6 90 

61. Vincent informs Acheson that with inadequate forces 
and divided public opinion, the French have tried 
to accomplish in Indochina what a strong, united 
Britain found unwise to attempt in Burma. In short, 
"guerrilla warfare may continue indefinitely." The 

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French should "be informed of U.S. concern, 
especially since the conflict may come "before 
the UN or other powers may intervene. Memoran- 
dum by Vincent for Acheson , 23 December 1946 91- 

62. U.S. advances reasons why the Vietnamese attacked 
the French on 19 December; (a) orders from Moscow 

• to upset Southeast Asia, or to increase Communist 
Party strength in France as a result of a quick 
settlement if the CP should take power from Blum; * 
and (b) hope for similar Javanese-Dutch settlement 
resulting from fighting while negotiating. 

f Sullivan 154 to Byrnes, 23 December 1946 • 92 

■ 

63. U.S. impresses concern over Tonkin events on the 
French, but expresses no offer to mediate. U.S. is 
concerned that the UN might become involved. 

Byrnes 6586 to Caffery, 24 December 1946 93 

64. U.S. takes the position to oppose Chinese proposals 
for intervention in Indochina. Acheson 8317 to 

Gallman (UK) , 27 December 19^6 95 

65» Reed, in discussing with whom Moutet can deal, 
offers creation of new government under Bao Dai, 
and/or Tarn. Reed 499 to Byrnes, 30 December 1946....... 95 

66. The U.S. approves the Consul in Hanoi to act on 
humanitarian grounds to save lives, but cautions 
not to become involved in any situation which could 
be interpreted as mediating basic political issues 
without express authorization. 
Byrnes 25 to 'Sullivan, 31 December 19^6 96 



1947 

67. The U.S. reasserts the non- involvement policy of 
approving sales of military arms and armaments 
to France except in cases which relate Indochina . 

hostilities . Byrnes 75 to Paris, 8 January 1947 97 

68. U.S. expresses support and full recognition of 
France's position; however, the U.S. cannon overlook 
dangerous outmoded colonial French methods. On the 
other hand, the U.S. does not desire that France be 
replaced by Kremlin communism as evidenced by Ho 
Chi Minh connections. The U.S. does not favor UN 
intervention, but "frankly we have no solution of the 



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problem to suggest." George C. Marshall, Secretary 

of State, 431 to Paris, 3 February 19**7 98 

69. The U.S. is concerned that the Western democratic 
system is on the defensive in emerging nations and 
Southern Asia is, in a critical phase. The key to 
the U.S. position is an awareness that in respect 
to the position pf Western democratic powers in 
Southern Asia, the United States is in the same 
boat as the French, British and the Dutch. Tr We 
cannot conceive setbacks to the long range inter- 
ests of France which would not also be setbacks of 
our own." The U.S. is ready to be helpful in any 
way, however, non-intervention is still the U.S. 

policy. Marshall I737 to Paris, 13 May I9H7 100 

70. The State Department is concerned that a rumored, 
dry season French offensive would have repercussions 
in a Congress which will be called on for extensive 
financial aid to Western Europe in light of France's 
economic, financial, and food position. Marshall 

3I+33 to Paris , 11 September 19^7 . . . . . 103 

71. M. Bollaert, French High Commissioner in Indochina, 
delivers publicly the most important declaration 

of French policy since before hostilities broke out. 
The French ask for a Vietnamese "representative 
government" to accept French terms, and exclude 
dealing with Ho Chi Minh except as a last resort, 
and then only for his surrender. The U.S. sees 
this policy resulting from a strengthened France 
(and a proportional unwillingness to make con- 
cessions) as a "retreat" from the March 6 accords. 
0' Sullivan letter to Marshall, 12 September I9V7 10*+ 



72. The French deny any planned dry season military 

offensive. Caffery 3715 to Marshall, 12 September 
19^7 



Ill 



73* France considers Bollaert' s policy speech as a 
step forward on two points: formal abandonment 
of Indochina federation idea, and acceptance of 
the principle of union of the three KYs without 
a referenda. Caffery 3753 to Marshall, Ik Sep- 
tember 19^7 . * * • * 112 

7^* The Chinese view French policy as making the posi- 
tion of U.S. and China difficult and do not see 
a successful government without participation of 
Ho Chi Minh. The "Chinese people" would not re- 
gard a Bao Dai monarchy favorably. Though his 



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personality and ability are impressive, Ho Chi Minh 

is regarded as a communist, and his regime on China's 

south border does not appear of critical importance. 

Stuart (Nanking) 20$6 to Marshall, 18 October 19^7 Uh 



19^8 



75* India hesitates to submit Indochina question to the UN 
because France could veto and the GOI is not con vine ea 
that Vietnam ^io Chi Minh7 exercises de_ facto authority 
or represents majority viewpoint in Indochina, Marshall 
telegram to Consular Officers , 29 January 19^+8 . ufi 

76. A Ho Chi Minh lieutenant is reported going to India with 
a petition for UN intervention. Marshall 21 to Saigon, 
3 February 19^8 . . 117 

77* Hanoi Consul summarizes recent events centering on 

Bao Dai signing Bai d T Along conference accords- Bao Dai 

withdraws commitment and will stay in France until called 

for as "emperor/ 1 Rendall (Hanoi) 31 to Marshall, 

19 February 19^8 . U8 

78. French Government authorizes Bollaert to approve formation 
of a provisional Vietnamese government headed by General 
Xuan. Caf fery 2567 to Marshall, 12 May 191*8 120 

79* Xuan government arouses very little enthusiasm. Bao Dai is 
waiting for favorable signs to return. Stuart 971 to 
Marshall, 29 May 19^8 121 

■ 

80. French indicate dubious chances of success for Xuan 
Government. Caffery 3063 to Marshall, 9 June 19^8 123 

81. Chinese desire U.S. views on Ho Chi Minh's communist 
connections as an indicator of U.S. attitudes and ulti- 
mate policy vis-a-vis the Viet Minh. Stuart (Nanking) 

1116 to Marshall, 22 June 19**8 125 

82. U.S. position on Ho Chi Minh is that he is a communist 
with a well-; known record in the Comintern, but no evi- 
dence of a lirect link to Moscow. Marshall 97^ to 

Nanking, 2 July 19^8 12 7 

i 

83. U.S. believes that given present world political ancj 
economic conditions, French cannot possibly amass suffi- 
cient strength for a military solution to Indochina. 

Marshall 21*66 to Paris, 3 July 19 [ *8, 1 30 



♦ 



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Qk* Caffery suggests that the U.S. inform the French that 
they are faced with alternatives of approving Viet 
independence , union of three KYS or losing Indochina. 

Caffery 3621 to Marshall, 9 July 19^8 ^ 

* * 

85. U.S. approves Caffery' s suggested action (tel 3621 ) 

and would publicly approve of French actions on Cochin- 
China status as a forward looking step toward settle- 
ment in Indochina. Marshall 2637 to Paris, 1^ July 
19^8 



135 



♦ 



86. U.S. feels that France is evading the issue of altering 
the French Colony status of Cochin-China which , in effect, 
nullifies the Baled 'Along agreement. Marshall 2891 to 

. Paris, 29 July I9WJ. 136 

87. The French Assembly must face the issue of changing 
Cochin-China status and approve Baie d 'Along agreements, 
if the little progress in Indochina is not to be nulli- 
fied, is the view of the French Ministry of Overseas 
Territories. Caffery 1*031* to Marshall, 5 August 19I48...... 137 

88. U.S. seeks to determine, in the absence of firm 
commitments, how France can dispel Vietnamese distrust 
of French, split off adherents of Ho, or reduce hostili- 
ties . Marshall 136 to Saigon, 27 August 19^8 • 138 

89- U.S. believes "nothing should be left undone which will 
strengthen truly nationalist groups" in the steadily 
deteriorating Indochina situation. Marshall 3368 to 
Saigon, 30 August 19^8 ll+0 



90. The U.S. publicly recognizes major strategem of com- 
munists in Southeast Asia Is to champion the cause of 
local nationalism. Lovett 1^9 to Saigon, 22 September 
19W 



lia 



91* U.S. policy statement on Indochina cites four long-term 
objectives in Indochina: (l) eliminate communist influ- 
ence, (2) foster association of the people with Western 
powers, particularly France, (3) raise the standard of 
living, and (h) to prevent undue Chinese penetration. 1 
The immediate objective is to satisfactorily resolve 
the French-Vietnamese impasse. Department of State 
Policy Statement on Indochina, 27 Septemoer I9U8 1^3 

92. The U.S. view is that for Moscow "prospects are ex- 
cellent that Ho Chi Mihh will eventually force the 
withdrawal of the French and set up the first 'New 
Democratic Republic 1 in Southeast Asia." Abbot (Saigon) 
despatch No . 195 to SecState, 5 November l$kS 150 



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93. The U.S., in assessing Bao Dai, cannot "irretrievably 
commit U.S. to support of native government which... 
might become virtually puppet govt..." Lcvett (Acting 
SecState) lk$ to Paris, 17 January 19^9 152 

$h. . The U.S. cautiously avoids any premature endorsement 

of Bao Dai in order to retain freedom of action in face 

of French pessimism. Acheson ( SecState) 70 to Saigon, 

2 May 19^9 • • 153 

95- Abbot , Saigon Consul, reviews the entire Indochina situa- 
tion (for the New Delhi Foreign Service Conference, 
February 19^9) for the State Department. "The alterna- 
tives to the Bao Dai solution are either continued costly 
colonial warfare or French withdrawal leaving a communist- 
controlled government in a strategic area of Southeast 
Asia." Abbott despatch 93 to SecState, 5 May 19^9 15^ 

96. The U.S. desires the success of Bao Dai experiment and 
will extend recognition, as there appears no other 
alternative to the established communist pattern in 
Vietnam and possible communist success in China. 
/ Acheson 77 to Saigon, 10 May 19U9 . . 190 

97* U.S. fears France is offering "too little too late" 
and the U.S. should avoid "a conspicuous position" 
of any kind. Acheson 83 to Saigon, 20 May 19I+9 193 

. ' 98. The U.S. feels that the question of Ho Chi Minh's 

nationalism versus communism is "irrelevant." 
"All Stalinists in colonial areas are nationalists." 
Acheson ik to Hanoi, 20 May 19^9 196 

■ 

99- The U.S. submits comments on the 8 March Franco- 

Bao Dai agreement to France. Essentially, the U.S., 

while hoping the 8 March agreements would succeed, 

is pessimistic that the requisite concessions will 

be made by France. Butterworth, FEA, letter 289 to 

Bruce (Paris ) , 6 June 19^9- • • • • • 200 

100, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson requests the National 
Security Council to study the Asian situation to re- 
examine current policy. "The advance of communism in 
large areas of the world and particularly the successes 
of communism in China seriously affect the future 
security of the United States." Johnson Memo to 
NSC, 10 June l$k9 217 

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101 • The U.S. regards establishment of Bao Dai as only the "first 
step" in the evolution of the Vietnam problem and that 
France will have to concede more to accommodate nationalists.- 
Webb (Acting) 1U5 to Rangoon, 20 June 19^9 • 219 

102. The Singapore Conference recommends that the U.S. join the 
UK in support of. Bao Dai, that the French clarify Vietnam's 
legal status, that de facto recognition be granted on 1 Janu- 
• ary 1950, and hopes that the U.S. would fulfill its UN duties 
in event of an attack on Indochina. Bliss (London) A2063 to 
SecState, 9 November I9U9. 223 

103* The National Security Council submits a report, "The Position 
of the United States with Respect to Asia," which, from a 
military view, indicates the "current basic concept of stra- 
tegic offense in the 'West 1 and a strategic defense in the 
'East. 1 The importance of Southeast Asia is principally as 
an exporter of strategic materials — tin, fibers, and 
rubber-" NSC kQ/l> 23 December I9U9 225 

10^. The President approves the conclusions of NSC ^8/l as 

amended. The basic objectives cited are -- development of 
stable nations and sufficient military power to prevent 
communist expansion in Asia, reduction of USSR influence in 
Asia, and prevention of power relationships which could 
threaten the U.S. Specifically, in Indochina, the U.S. will 
use its influence to resolve the colonialist -nationalist 
. conflict. NSC 1*8/2, 30 December I9U9. . . 265 



1950 

105. The JCS reviews the current Mutual Defense Assistance Pro- 
gram and certain objectives evolve as the basis for future 
military assistance programs. A specific long range objec- 
tive is "development of sufficient military power in 
selected nations of the Far East" to prevent encroachment 
by communism. JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 

26 January 1950 273 

106. The State Department recommends and President Truman approves 
recognition of the three legally constituted governments of 
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Memorandum for the President, 

2 February 1950 276 

107. The U.S. forwards the letters of recognition to the 
Associated States and requests a reply to the suggestion 
qn exchange of diplomatic representatives. Acheson 59 to 
Saigon, k February 1950. 278 



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108. Asiatic neighbors consider Bao Dai a French puppet 9 The U.S. 
should realize that ECA and military aid from the U. S. 
do not constitute decisive factors in Indochina's prob- 
lems. Therefore the Griffin Mission should not commit 
ECA or military aid to French Indochina unless France 
"gives requisite public undertakings re further steps 
leading to status similar to Indonesia." Stanton 
(Bangkok) 160 to* Acheson, 1? February 1950. 280 

109- The State Department submits to the NSC a report on "The 
Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina/' 
which analyzes the problem to determine measures to protect 
U.S. security in Indochina and prevent communist expansion 
in the area. NSC No. 6k 3 2? February 1950. 282 

HO. President Truman approves the designation of Mr. Robert A. 

Griffin as Chief of the Economic Survey Mission to Southeast 
Asia, with rank of Minister. Five basic objectives of the 
Mission are outlined; (l) determine needed projects of 
political significance; (2) prepare for Point k programs; 
(3) advise local officials of methods and extent of partici- 
pation in Point k; (h) brief U.S. representatives; and 
(5) investigate regional aspects of technical assistance. 
Department of State letter to Griffin , 1 March 1950 286 

111. The State Department maintains to the Department of Defense 
that Indochina is subject to immediate danger and is the 
"most strategically important area of Southeast Asia." 
Dean Rusk believes that the resources of the U. S. should 
be deployed to "reserve Indochina from further Communist 
encroachment." Dean Rusk, Deputy Undersecretary of State 
to General James H. Burns, Defense Representative to South- 
east Asia Aid Committee , 7 March 1950 288 

112. Acheson instructs Saigon, in light of anticipated Franco- 
Viet friction on handling U.S. aid, that function of Griffin 
Mission is "clearly understood to be fact finding." Acheson 

136- to Saigon, 9 March 1950. 289 

113. Griffin replies that "I understand that ours is an economic 
aid mission" and that the budding controversy could jeopar- 
dize the economic aid program. The French show no enthusi- 
asm for Point k m Gullion (Saigon) I76 to Acheson, 13 March 
1950 



114. Griffin submits his mission f s preliminary conclusions on 

Indochina with a listing of specific urgent programs total- 
ing $23*5 million exclusive of military aid and indirect 



290 



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U.S. aid ( e.g . j through France). Obstacles should not per- 
mit indecision to allocate aid money or materials; the 
"crux of the situation lies in prompt decisive action if 
desired political effect is to he attained." Griffin file 
copy of telegram sent to Acheson, 16 March 1950 * 292 

115. The U.S. assumes -that France is determined to protect 
Indochina from communist encroachment , that success de- 
pends on indigenous support * and that France supports Bao 
Dai, hut that the French position and ultimate intentions 
are not clear to the rest of the world. The U.S. requests 
France to make a public statement of the concessions to 
Indochinese nationalism. Acheson 1363 to Paris, 29 March 

1950 301 

116. Acheson advises 'Griffin Mission of the implications for U.S. 
policy in Vietnam: (l) The prospect of U.S. aid indirectly 
would cause crisis (induce hyper-confidence in Viets) ; 

(2) Viets bitter at Huu appointment (and the U.S.) may 

magnify the U.S. role; (3) it is better for the U.S. if a 

national union government is set up; and (k) the aid program 

can more easily be worked out with Huu Government. Acheson 

2kk to Griffin, 9 April 1950 305 

117* Department of State requests an assessment of the strategic 
aspects of Indochina from a military point of viev because 
of the threat of communist domination. The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff indicate that the "mainland states of Southeast Asia 
also are at present of critical strategic importance to the 
United States," because of the requirement to stockpile 
strategic materials acquired there, as well as the threat 
to other states on the "line of containment." JCS Memoran- 
dum for the Secretary of Defense, 10 April 1950. 308 

118. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur with the State Department 
on the importance of Southeast Asia to the U.S. However, 
the JCS urge a more forceful and positive U.S. position 
than expressed by State — "....in order to retrieve the 
losses resulting from previous mistakes on the part of the 
British and French, as well as to preclude such mistakes in 
the. future, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it necessary 
that positive and proper leadership among the Western 
Powers be assumed by the United States in Southeast Asia 
matters." JCS Memorandum for SecDef, 2 May 1950 315 

119- The JCS recommend telling the French that the U.S. is pre- 
pared to assist France and the three Associated States and 
that arrangements for U.S. military aid be made. JCS 
Memorandum for SecDef, 2 May 1950 318 



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121. 






123. 



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120, President Truman approves $10 million for military items 
to Indochina, Acheson 20^9 to London, 3 May 1950 



Page 



321 



Griffin reconstructs the Indochina situation for Secretary 
Acheson. Griffin indicates that the present status quo 
cannot "be maintained. "Time is of the essence...." if Bao 
Dai starts to slip, "it will he impossible to restore him." 
Given that the French are aware that a military solution 
is unattainable,"the U.S. must find out what the French 
expect of Vietnam." Griffin Memorandum to Secretary of 
State, h May 1950 



#..*••..*** 



322 



122. The special survey mission headed hy R. Allen Griffin 
recommends a modest$60 million economic and technical 
assistance program for Southeast Asia. State press re- 
lease U85> 11 May 1950 



327 



The Ministers of the U.S., U.K., and France agree that 
while Southeast Asia is of strategic importance to the 
U.S., the direct responsibilities of U.K. and France make 
it of greater concern to. them. Extract of Tripartite 
Ministerial Talks, 13 May 1950 



328 



124 • The French affirm responsibility for Indochina, acknowledge 
"supplementary" U.S. assistance, and assure that 8 March 
agreements would be "liberally implemented." London - 
SECT0 256, Ik May 1950 330 

125. U.S. formally announces intent to establish an economic aid 
mission to the three Associated States of Indochina. State 
press release 5*+5, 2 5 May 1950 . • . . 332 

126. On the basis of the Griffin recommendations, the U.S publicly 
announces the launching of a program of rapid economic aid 

to Southeast Asia. Secretary of State Dean Acheson letter 

to R. Allen Griffin, 3 June 1950 335 

127. North Korea attacks South Korea and President Truman 
announces U.S. military assistance not only to South 
Korea but also an "acceleration in the furnishing of 
military assistance to the forces of France and the 
Associated States in Indochina and the dispatch of a 
military mission. .. ." Presidential Statement, 27 June 

1950 . . 336 

128. The U.S. clarifies the principles governing U.S. military 
1 aid to Indochina. Essentially, the basic principles are: 

U.S a aid supplements French assistance to Associated States 



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to achieve internal security; assist army of the French 
Union against communist aggression; Korean events could 
cause diversion of aid from Associated States. Acheson 
k to Saigon 3 1 July 1950 ' 338 

129. A summary of existing policy on Indochina reveals the JCS 
view on NSC 73 that the U.S. give consideration to provid- 
ing air and naval assistance should the Chinese provide 
overt support to the Viet Minh. Consultants 1 Meeting, 

25 July 1950. 3*H 

130. The U.S. feels that French requests for overall assistance 
(military , economic, and political) are inadequate to 
"consummate U.S. broad objectives in Indochina" and assis- 
tance will have to be increased to resist encroachment of 
communism. Heath (Saigon) 170 to Acheson, 7 August 1950* ••• 3^3 

131. The U.S. views growing political and military deterioration 
in Indochina with concern; especially evident are failure 
of the government to gain support 3 disinclination of Bao 
Dai to assume leadership role, and indications of CHIC0M- 
Viet Minh military collaboration. The U.S. seeks to have 
Vietnam establish a national army and declare a national 
emergency. Acheson 238 to Saigon, 1 September 1950 -. 3^ 

132. The U.S. informs France that the U.S. was prepared to in- 
crease assistance to French Union forces but could not 
furnish money for local use or direct tactical air support. 
Extract of Summary Minutes of Tripartite, Foreign Ministers 
Meeting, France, U.K., and U.S., ll* September 1950 3^7 

133- The Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee (SEAC) proposes a 
statement of U.S. policy on Indochina to the NSC for con- 
sideration. "The U.S. will not commit any of its armed 
forces to the defense of Indochina against overt, foreign 
aggression.,.." but should assist in the "formation of 
new national armies of the three Associated States." The 
U.S. should also "press the French" to carry out the 
agreements of 8 March I9U9 and 30 December 19^9* SEAC 
D-21, 11 October 1950 3^9 

13^. "The draft statement of U.S. policy in Indochina is weak 
from the political side.... the Defense representatives 
argued for 1 strong, hardhitting policy en political and 
economic concessions. The State Department representatives 
flatly refused. .. .to consider Indochina in that manner. 
Consequently, the paper ended with a compromise." K. T. 
Youngs DoD Office of Foreign Military Affairs, letter to 
General iMalony, SEAC, 13 October 1950 369 



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135. The State Department announces the results of high level 
conversations with French Ministers and that the U. S. 
Congress has appropriated one -half billion dollars in mili- 
tary assistance for the Far East* Department of State 
press release 1066 , 17 October 1950 . . . . . . . 371 

■ 

136, State and Defense recapitulate talks with the French Minis- 
ters, analyze Saigon's views on Indochina, and review the 
proposed NSC policy statement on Indochina: The French 
had not programmed equipment for 18 battalions in the 1951 
budget and further had requested that the U.S. pay for and 
maintain the national armies when formed. It appears that 
the French will withdraw from Tonkin and may throw the 
problem to the U.N. The draft policy statement is con- 
sidered quite adequate. Memorandum for the Record (Mr. K.T. 
Young), 17 October 1950....*-...-.. ...* 373 

137* The current situation in Indochina reveals serious weakness 
in French manpower, leadership, and intelligence. The Viet 
Minh forces are building up for large-scale offensives to 
seize complete control of Indochina. The French Union 
forces of 353*970 are opposed by 92,500 Viet Minh regulars 
and 130,000 irregulars. U.S. Naval Intelligence Memorandum, 

17 October 1950 382 

138. The U.S. informs Emperor Bao Dai, with emphasis, that it is 
imperative that he give the Vietnamese people evidence of 
his determination to personally lead his country into immed- 
iate and "energetic opposition" to the communist menace. 
The U.S. has interpreted his "prolonged holiday" on the 
Riviera as lack of patriotism. It is tactfully suggested 
that further displays of procrastination might lead to loss 
of U.S. support for his government. Acheson 38^ to Saigon, 

18 October 1950 388 

■ 

139* A Defense view is that it is "most important that the French 
do. not quit cold and leave a political vacuum behind them." 
The U.S. should give increased military aid but not intervene 
and stress political steps by the French. Memorandum for 
Secretary Finletter, 19 October 1950 391 

1^0. U.S. desires the immediate political and military advantages 
sought in the National amy plan be found through integra- 
tion of armed native contingents (Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Catholics, 
etc.) into an army commanded by Bao Dai. Acheson U36 to 
Saigon, -25 October 1950. , 393 

> 

ll+l. U.S. approves French request to transfer 2k -105 mm howitzers 
and 6 -155 xnm howitzers of MDAP assistance to Indochina. 
Acheson 2250 to Paris, 27 October 1950... . 39I4. 



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1^2. General Brink, Chief MAAG-Indochina, reports that the 
French contemplate changing troops from "pacification" 
dispositions to larger unit regroupment. French mili- 
tary plans are keyed to delays in political decisions. 
Saigon 7^3 to Ac he son, h November 1950 (see Enclosure A 
to Document No • lU6, below) . . . . U05 

llf3. The U.S. does not favor use of the Peace Observation Com- 
mission in Indochina and if the Indochina subject is to 
come into the United Nations, it is preferred that the 
French do it. Acheson 516 to UN, 22 November 1950 395 

ikh. The U.S. publicly welcomes the French statement which assures 
independence of the Associated States of Indochina within the 
French Union and that their resources will be directed "to 
the defense of Indochina against communist colonialism." 
Department of State press release H87, 27 November 1950.... 397 

1^5* "If the Communists are successful in Korea, this may so 
weaken the French in Indochina that they will pull out. 
He /Secretary Acheson/ doubted if any one of the Presi- 
dent's advisers would urge him to intervene in that situ- 
ation." Extract from Truman- Att lee Conversations, k De- 
cember 1950. o . , 398 

lU6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff position paper on possible future 
action in Indochina, 28 November 1950 > is circulated for 
NSC consideration ■ This paper includes the Brink report 
(k November 1950) as a reference. The JCS short term ob- 
jectives emphasize urgent action to deny Indochina to 
communism, insure retention of responsibility by France, 
and development of an over-all military plan for Indochina. 
The long term objectives seek to prevent communist expansion, 
to establish internal security conditions such as the foreign 
armed forces would be' removed, to press the French to carry 
out commitments, and to establish a regional security arrange- 
ment in Southeast Asia. Executive Secretary to the NSC, 
NSC 6k/l 9 21 December 1950. 399 

1951 

lif7 • President Truman reasserts that U.S. aid to the French 

Union forces and National armies of the Associated States 
will continue. Truman-Pleven Conversations, 30 January 

1951 



U17 



ll}8. The U.S. is very unlikely to engage itself to finance the 
budgetary deficit of France (25 billion francs) required 
for the National armies in Indochina. Acheson 97^ to U19 
Saigon, 30 January 1951 



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IU9. The first progress report on NSC 6U, which was approved 
on 27 March 1950, assesses the most severe threat to 
French Indochina as the increased capability of the Viet 
Minh resulting from Red Chinese aid. Optimistically, the 
report concludes that "American military aid furnished 
the State's forces and the Army of the French Union may 
have been the decisive factor in the preservation of the 
area against communist aggression." State Department 
Memorandum to NSC , 15 March 1951 **21 

150. President Truman approves NSC Action U8/5 which states 
U.S. policy on Asia. With respect to Indochina, U.S. 
policy seeks to continue to increase French military 
effectiveness , to encourage internal autonomy, and to 
promote international support for the three Associated 

States. NSC b&/5, 17 May 1951. U25 

151. Dulles discusses problems with Parodi of participation 
of the three Associated States as "sovereign" with re- 
spect to U.N. membership, Viet Minh rival government, 
and positions of India, Burma, and Indonesia. Dulles- 

Parodi Conversation, 11 June 1951* * W+6 

152. The U.S. invites Vietnam, Cambodia, end Laos to partici- 
pate in signing of Japanese Peace Treaty. Saigon 132 des- 
patch to State, 6 September 1951 M17 

153* The U.S. and Vietnam enter into an economic cooperation 

agreement. Agreement entered into force 7 September 1951*.. hk$ 

15^ The U.S. agrees with France that they will continue to be 
primarily responsible for Indochina, that U.S. troops 
should not be used, and that first priority in military 
aid should go to Indochina. U.S. -France Foreign Ministers 
Meeting, 11 September 1951 U52 

155* President Truman and Secretary Acheson pledge support for 
General DeLattre and that "we would not let Indochina fall 
into enemy hands." Memorandum of Conversation, Acheson, 
Schuman, and DeLattre , ik September 1951 ^5^ 

156. General DeLattre comments to the State Department that the 
aid program had not been working out satisfactorily due to 
the "missionary zeal" of certain "young men" which made it 
appear that the U.S. was extending its influence. State 
Department Discussions with DeLattre, 17 September 1951 k^G 



' 



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157- 



160. 



l6l. 



162 • 



163. 



Page 



e U.S. recounts the doubts and distrust remaining on the 
subject of colonialism in Indochina but maintains that the 
real issue is whether or not the Indochinese people will 
be allowed to exercise sovereignty or be subjected to com- 
munist terror. Dean Husk Address, 6 November 1951- ....... 



^59 



158. France requests that conversation take place immediately 
between U.S., U.K. and France concerning concerted action 
in the event of seemingly imminent Chinese intervention in 
Indochina. Bruce (Paris) 37o5 to Acheson, 22 December 1951. 



1*60 



159* France delivers an a ide -memo ire to the U.S. on a proposal 
to appeal to the U.N. if Red China intervenes. Paris 3856 
to Acheson, 29 December 1951- • - . . - . • 



462 



1952 

Acheson reviews tripartite military discussions in which 
State did not participate. General Bradley, while unable 
to commit or indicate the extent of U.S. military assis- 
tance in the event of CHICOM invasion, would recommend to 
the President that a declaration be issued to Red China 
that retaliation would follow any aggression. Acheson 97^ 
to Saigon, 15 January 1952 



• • 



The NSC considers the consequences to the United States of 
communist domination of Southeast Asia. Loss of Southeast 
Asia is seen as putting economic and political pressures 
on Japan, opening sources of strategic materials to the 
Soviet Bloc, rendering the U.S. position in the Pacific 
precarious and jeopardizing lines of communication and 
trade routes to South Asia. If Red China intervenes, the 
U.S. should take appropriate military action as part of a 
U.N. action or in conjunction with others but not unilater- 
ally. Annex to NSC 124, 13 February 1952 



The CIA estimates that a joint warning against CHICOM inter- 
vention in Southeast Asia would tend to deter them, that 
initiation of action in the U.N. would probably bring a 
response similar to that regarding Korea, and CHICOM defi- 
ance of a joint warning would probably involve prior consent 
of the USSR. CIA Special Estimate, SE-22, 29 February 1952. 

The JCS views on NSC 124 and Annex to NSC 124 are that mili- 
tary operations in defense of Indochina against Chinese 
Communist invasion must be accompanied by action against 
Communist China itself — a course of action which might 
result in a long and expensive war, and that from a military 
point of view, the JCS oppose acceptance of all the military 
commitments of NSC 12!+ . jfjS Memorandum for the SecDef 
(forwarded to the National Security Council), 3 March 1952.. 



465 



468 



^77 



486 



XXIV 



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164. The NSC recommends that the military implications of going ' 
to war in China be studied further and explained to the 
Council and the President; that the greater danger to 
Southeast Asia is subversion and not external aggression; 
and that contingencies for a French withdrawal be examined. 
NSC 113th Meeting (item 3) , 5 March 1952 . 502 

165*- The U.S. stresses to the British that rumors of French in- 
tentions to withdraw or negotiate with Ho Chi Minh are not 
true. The U.S. believes that France will stay in Indochina 
as long as sufficient U.S. aid is forthcoming. Ac he son 
Conversation with British Ambassador , 28 March 1952. ........ 508 

166. French stress their problems at tripartite meeting concern- 
ing their EDC commitments: (l) the French effort in Indo- 
china , (2) financial difficulties and whether the strategic 
importance of SEA justified continued effort , and (3) Indo- 
china is part of the European defense problem. France 
cannot continue to bear "alone such great share Indo Chinese 
burden." French attach great importance to U.S. aid. 

Acheson 7^15 to State, 28 May 1952 5H 

167. If the Chinese invade Indochina , "he /Acheson/ said it was 
clear that it was futile and a mistake to defend Indochina 
in Indochina. He said we could not have another Korea.... 
we could not put ground troops in Indochina. . . .our only hope 
was of changing the Chinese mind." Secretary of State Note 

(L.D. Battle) 9 17 June 1952. 515 

168. U.S. informs France that appropriations would be prepared 
to provide up to 150 million dollars additional FY 1953 
aid in support of overall French effort in Indochina. 

Acheson 7^ to Paris, 17 June 1952. - * 517 

- 

169 . Acheson publicly announces optimism over the conduct of the 
National armies in Indochina and that communist "aggression 
has been checked" and that the "tide is now moving in our 
favor." State Department Release U73, 18 June 1952 518 

170. The President approves NSC 12U/2 (NSC 12U/1 as amended) on 
the U.S. objectives and courses of action with respect to 
Southeast Asia. With respect to Indochina, the U.S. would 
continue to assure, the French of the international interest 
of the Indochina effort; use U.S. influence to promote poli- 
tical, military, economic, and social policies; provide in- 
creased aid in the absence of overt Chinese aggression; 
oppose French withdrawal; and seek collective action against 

Red China intervention. NSC X2h/2, 25 June 1952 520 



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Page 

[ —*- 

171. The U.S. and Britain discuss issuing a "warning to Red China 
on intervention in Indochina. French successes could 
trigger Chinese intervention and the U.S. had "no infantry 
available Tor operations within Indochina." The U.S. think- 
ing is along the lines of a naval "blockade of China's coast, 
London Ministerial Talks, 26 June 1952. . 535 

172. The French request that 150 American Air Force mechanics 
be detailed to Vietnam receives an opinion for favorable 
action from General Irapnell, MAAG Chief s who also recom- 
mends expediting delivery of aircraft promised for 1953- 

Saigon 11^9 to Acheson , 5 December 1952 . , • ♦ 538 

173* The U.S. approves participation of 25-30 USAF personnel in 
maintenance of French aircraft in Vietnam. Acheson 1286 to 
Saigon, 22 December 1952 5^0 



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m 






THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 
Washington, D. C. 

r 

26 January 1950 



MEMORAKDUM FOE THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: 



Subject: Military Objectives in Military Aid Programs 



The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the current Mutual 
Defense Assistance Program and have considered the military implica- 
tions of future programs of this nature. From their study, they 
evolved the following objectives as the military basis for future mili- 
tary assistance programs. 

The long-range overall military objective of United States 
military defense assistance programs should be the development of con- 
ditions which will improve to the maximum extent possible, within 
economic realities both current and foreseen, the ability of the United 
States in event of war to implement in conjunction with its a3JJ.es a 
long-range strategic concept . Briefly, that concept is that the United 
States, in collaboration with its allies, will seek to impose the 
allied war objectives upon the USSR by conducting a strategic offensive 
in western Eurasia and a strategic defensive in the Far East. 

Specific long-range objectives in furtherance of the overall 
military objective for future military defense assistance programs 
should be: 

a. Development of sufficient military power in Western 
Europe to prevent loss or destruction of the Industrial complexes 
in that region and to control those areas from which future 
operations can best be projected; 

b. The security and the use of Greenland, Iceland, the 
Azores, the United Kingdom, and French Northwest Africa; 

£. Denial to our enemy of naval and air bases in Norway, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France; 

d. Development of the Italian armed forces authorised 
by the peace treaty to their maximum strength and combat effec- 
tiveness. If peace treaty limitations are lifted, development 
• of sufficient military power in Italy to delay materially and 

possibly to check Soviet invasion, to prevent loss of Sicily to 
an enemy, and to defend successfully those sea and air approaches 
within and adjacent' to Italy which will be necessary for offen- 
sive ©Derations: 



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£• Development of sufficient military power in selected 
nations of the Eastern Mediterranean-Middle East area to prevent 
Greece > Turkey, and Iran from capitulating to communism during 
the ideological conflict; and in event of war, to retain for the 
United States and its allies base areas in Turkey, to delay 
materially any USSR advance , possibly to deny to the enemy the 
oil resources and oil facilities of the Middle East and, with 
allied support; to assure control by the western powers of the 
Eastern Mediterranean and the security of base areas in Egypt; 

f . Development of sufficient military power in South 
Asia (India and Pakistan) to promote the internal security of the 
area and to assure its Western orientation, 

jg. Development of sufficient military power in selected 
nations of the Far East* and the Western Pacific Ocean area, to 
prevent further encroachment by communism in those areas; to 
insure, with the United States support, that in event of war, 
Japan, and the other Asian offshore islands, including the 
Philippines j are available for military use in order to consti- 
tute a multiple-front threat to the USSR, and by military action 
to delay any Communist invasion in other Far East and southeast 
Asia areas; and 

h. Development of sufficient military power in Latin 
America to insure the security of the area and its external lines 
of communications and to furnish military forces for which United 
States or other allied forces might otherwise be used. 

In connection with the foregoing specific military objectives 
for future military defense assistance programs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
would reaffirm their view that military cooperation between Spain and 
members of the North Atlantic security system would be in the security 
interests of the United States. Western Germany, and Austria, when and 
if granted authority to rearm, should be included in this security system. 
In the security interests of the United States , sufficient military 
assistance should be provided to Yugoslavia to insure continued resistance 
to Moscow control since such an example of successful opposition might 
encourage movements of resistance to Moscow control in other satellite 
states. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are unable to predict the finite 
benefits to be achieved through the implementation of the Mutual Defense 
Assistance Act of 19^9* They expect, however, that, as implementation 
progresses, the internal security situation of the recipient nations 
should improve concurrently. In addition, from the standpoint of United 
States military planning, increases in the armaments of the nations of 



* For the purposes of this paper, Far East is defined as that part of 
Asia east of India, including Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Indonesia, 
Indo -China, China, Japan, and eastern Siberia. 

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** 







Western Europe can be considered as a means of "buying increased time for 
both preparations and movements , if there should be an invasion of that 
area. Further , the provision of new armaments of United States manu- 
facture would serve to strengthen the industrial mobilization base of 
United States forces. The overall benefits tc be derived are cumulative 
but over a period of time must depend largely upon the self-help efforts 
of the recipient nations. 

The major portion of the funds appropriated in the Mutual 
Defense Assistance Act of 19^+9 is earmarked for members of the North 
Atlantic Treaty organization possessing* major capabilities for self-help. 
While the Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot at this time recommend definite 
limitations on future assistance to these nations, they would suggest both 
progressive reductions in the aid to be provided in the future, and a time 
limit determined primarily by: 

a. Planned force requirements; 

b. The world situation generally; 

c* The finite benefits derived from each program toward 
the attainment of United States objectives; and 

d. The concrete demonstrations by recipient nations of 
self-help toward their national and collective security. 

Further , and as a contingency in addition to a limit in time beyond which 
assistance to the North Atlantic Treaty members will not be extended, it 
should be emphasised the continuation of military aid even within that 
limit will be dependent upon the efforts for self-help and mutual aid 
exerted by each recipient nation since United States military aid can 
support but not replace efforts at self-help and will to resist. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue to review the objectives 
of future military assistance programs and will recommend changes in these 
objectives to you as they become appropriate. 

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

(SIGNED-) 

OMAR H, BRADLEY, 
Cha-'rman, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff 



COPY 



I Or dCbaLi 

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751c*, 02/2-350 



J&x'A&MLWr OF STriTE 

Washington 
i€AT'i£CT£D February 2, 1950 



UEUOjsS&«tJi£ r'0*\ SEE iftJS&IPSiHT 



Subjects U.S. recognition of Vietnam, 

Laos and Cambodia 



1. 'fiie French Assembly (Lower House) ratified 
on 29 January by a large majority (396 - 193) the bill 
which, in effect, established Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia as autonomous states within the French Union* 
The opposition consisted of l8l Coramunist votes v;ith 
only 12 joining in from other parties, The Council of 
the republic (Senate J is expected to pass the bills by 
the same approximate majority on or about February 3* 
^resident Aurlol's si nature is expected to follow 
shortly thereafter* 

2* The French legislative and political steps 
thus taken will transform areas which were formerly 
governed as rrotectorates or Colonies into states within 
the French Union, with considerably more freedom than 
they enjoyed under their prior status. The French 
Government fcga indie: ted that it hopes to ^rant greater 
decrees of independence to the three states as the 
security position in Indochina allows, and as the newly 
formed O overnments become more able to administer the 
areas following withdrawal of the French. 

3. r /ithin Laos and Cambodia there are no power- 
ful movements directed against the governments \hich are 
relatively stable. Hov;ever, Vietnam has been the battle- 
ground since the end of r *orld *-7ar II of conflicting poli- 
tical parties and military forces. Ho Chi Uinh, wfeo 
under various aliases, has been a communist agent In. 
various parts of the world since 1925 &nd was able to 
take over the anti-French nationalist movement in 19^5- 
After failing to reach agreement with the French regarding 
the establishment 01 an autonomous state of Vietnam, he 
withdrew his forces to the jungle and hill arers of 

. " , Vietnam 

h:^T;acTLD 



o 



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/£-ST\iICED 



Vietnam and has harassed the French ever since. His 
followers who are estimate a at approximately 7*5*000 
armed men, with probe bly the same number unarmed. His 
headquarters are unknown. 

The Frencii counter efforts have included, on the 
military side, the deployment of approximately 130,000 
troops, of whom the approximately 50*000 are local natives 
serving voluntarily, African colonials, and a hard core 
mede up of French troops and Foreign Legion units. Ho Chi 
Minh 1 s guerrilla tactics have been aimed at denying the 
French control of Vietnsm. On March 8, 19^+9 the French 
President signed sn agreement with Bao Dai as the Head of 
fatatQj granting independence within the French Union to 
the Government of Vietnam. Similar agreements were 
signed with the Ring of Laos tnd the Iiing of Cambodia, 

itecent developments have included Chinese Communist 
victories bringing those troops to the Indochina borderj 
recognition of ho Chi winh as the head of the legal 
Government of Vietnam by Communist China (l8 January) 
and by Soviet nussia (JO January). 

lj.# recognition by the United States of the three 
legally constituted governments of Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia appears desirable and in accordance with United 
States foreign policy for several reasons. Among them 
are: encouragement to national aspirations under non- ■ 
Communist leadership for peoples of colonial areas in 
Southeast Asia; the establi shment of stable non-Communist 
governments in areas adjacent to Communist China j sup- 
port to a friendly country which is also a signatory" to 
the Korth Atlancic Treaty; and as a demonstration of 
displeasure with Communist tactics vhich are obviously 
aimed at eventual domination of Asia, working under the 
guise of indigenous nationalism. 

Subject to your approval, the Department of State 
recommends' that the United States of America extend 
recognition to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, following 
ratification by the French Government. 

(signed) DEAB AGBESOW - 

Approved 

9 (signed^ 
Harry S ' Truman 

February J, 1950 

■ ■ ------- ... 

2 7 7 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
OUTGOING TELEGRAM 



SECRET 



FEB 4 1950 



AMCOWSUL 









SAIGOII, 

■ 

59 

* 

You SJiLD deliver (for timing see DEPTEL 58) the 
FOL Massages from the PEES to Bao Dai Laos and Cambodia 
After consultation PR High Commissioner Actual letters 
Will FOL by pouch. 

QTE Your Imperial Majesty:: . ■. ...-*.. 1 ■' 

I have Your Majesty's letter in which I am 
informed of* the signing of the agreements of March 8, 
19^9 between Your Majesty, on behalf of Vietnam, 
and the President of the French Republic, on behalf 
of France. My Government has also been informed 
of the ratification on February 2, 1950 by the 
French Government of the agreements of March 8, ' 

19^9. 



* mVi "^ W Vi ~** W WJ.QLlJ.4tQ 









QTE Since these acts establish the Republic 
of Vietnam as an independent State v/ithin the 
French Union, I take this opportunity to congratu- 
late Your Majesty and the people of Vietnam on 
this happy occasion- f 

QTE The Government of the United States of 
America Is pleased to welcome the Republic of 
Vietnam into the community, of peace-loving nations 
of the world and to extend diplomatic recognition 
to the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, I 
look forward to an early exchange of diplomatic 
representatives between our two countries. 



SECRET 



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SECRET 



QTE I take this opportunity to extend my 
personal greetings to Your Majesty with my best 
wishes for the prosperity and stability of Vietnam. 



QTE His Imperial Majesty 
Bao Dal, 

Head of State of the 

Republic of Vietnam. 



UNQTE 



While you will present the letters in your eapaei.ty 
as CONGEN, PLS point out to the POW Ministers of the 
three states that the letters of recognition also invite 
reply to the suggestion of exchange of DIPL REPS. DEPT 
understands France will acquiesce to this if requested 
by th2 three states. DEPT plans establish LEG Saigon 
with single Minister accredited three states. Mission 
to be headed by Charge pending selection and appointment 
of Minister. 



ACHESOM 



Portion of telegram here deleted consists of similar 
letters to Kings of Laos and Cambodia. 

SECRET 



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-■* • 






o 



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li\Jj] I £L SECREl 

ITMEHT 0? STATE— D1VJ3" OF 



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TCI CfiO A dm r-rvi*ir 






'Control 8723 

Rec ' cl Feb 3PU3 ry 1 8 3 
7:31 p.m. 



193C 



■ * » 



-:CH: Bangkok 

TO: Secretary of State 



WO: 160, Ffefcruory IT. 10 p,m. 



FOK 5KJHAHT FHOK : VS. 



Tleto inminent depaiptuve - n siission and i;: satii ta 

Ijt Dapavt&snt 95 t sin ■-■:-;•■ 10- neon that fXvm deeisic 

ssay X?e in prose if being take t re r ' other 

3 id to xndocMftSj X iug&t ;v"o^ m re like to have i •■: ■ 
itspress-ions ?2 aonfe so discussions and j . Its h 

Thailand Pri:;-3 Sinister and ?o?dig nlster during 

Stanton* ":s3up and I 'ess 3 hard ?ov> ?eco^:V n 



It is transparently clear .that Asiatic nei bors of 



Indochina sonsigg? Bac Dai £ P; . -:^ creation and a 






puppet; despite gurz " nd a ntJ actions of 

-. fey IB v J i >s bom pq??e] tnay pic d sell hi 
regies 3-fro-rt s if stattis ^'jh Dai x ns undrastieel 

modified.; 3 1 ■"■; l ouc-fe all - n 9 pros " ';ly « h: n 



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escort Dfrecc^/G iead&rsnxi) cenro v.e 



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Ho r s , 



£« should r©«] fcliat BC3 ' : railitarsr aid froiii US, ;-ui 

as recognition V" U3. do not constitute "missing compo- 
nents" * '-a toaengs of -o military &ic3/\yu8t 96 
lack recogMu ■ ■: Katild prove disadvantageous 5 under 

resent: cxr kcinaes :' :• are not of primary inpo* ;e 
and Kill not cc ' jute flacisiv factors. Conference 
?oun<3 Gull ion 1 s analogy »itfc G far froia persuasive 

and j in fsot, ds reus <3 sicn. 










« ,** 



- • - 



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-vfe 















, -* 






• -*. 






SECRET- 






' „ - 









l> 



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- i ■ 



■ 



- 






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SECRET 



• . 



' — ■ -< 



7^ 10 p*ra«, from Birjlco^* 

fi: " -} action b; >ch 

in ■ ti ■ : i tfc states , 



*cc ^: isslon should : • very ; Ise 

:1 V sions pr^o^ to ciopnrhnr^ and 1 r -.r.-j 

:■-- recc lation that no & 02? military aid • co^- 

. Indochina tmloaa France gives r-^uislte 
public " civt^Q 2>e further 1 3 leading to status 

ail • v ;• • ia, Currsnt F^onch in^en^lcn'i soon 

L*S statement to Guillen {: EL 
FqX 7s 1 a*nu,) it sfc ?arlia^nt could not 

lochii :cor:l rati rj Februa: r 2 of only 
L 2 ond it woitld ele 1 rre harm fciian g 3 kindle 
ir; ■ : 3.3 Ltea J VXetn; Ich wotCLd r^cor rll 

? diss? ; -:," Qu-:r';iovi, }v : . ^ e , is uhat Ere ths 
*a3 . ■>, r ti ;gs : ch LI not be dls- 

apnc ■* 



ST 






SECRET 



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i> 



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i 



c 



;;5C 64 



TOP SECRET 



,*- * 



# * •. a 



r 5 bruary 27 , 1950 



NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 

to the 



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 



THE POSITION OF 



T 



on 



UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA 



The enclosed report by the Department of State on the 
subject is submitted herewith for urgent consideration by the Nation- 
al Security Council and the Secretary of the Treasury. 

It is recommended that, if the Council and the Secretary 
of the Treasury adopt the enclosed report } it be submitted to the 
president for his consideration, with the recommendation that he 
approve the Conclusions contained therein and direct their imple- 
mentation by all appropriate executive departments and' agencies of 
the U* S, Government under the coordination of the Secretary of 
State . 



) 



JAMES S. LAY, Jr. 
Executive Secretary 



cc: The Secretary of the Treasury 



r 









II3C 6k 



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r 



TOP SECRET 



DRAFT 



■ 



CO 




REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 

on 

■ 

THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA 

- ■ — - ' - "' — ■■ i .. .. . ^ 



THE PROBLEM 



1. To undertake a determination of all practicable United 
States measures to protect its security in Indochina and to prevent 
the expansion of communist aggression in that area, 

ANALYSIS 

» m m » ■ ■ 

2. It is recognized that the threat of communist aggression f 
against Indochina is only one phase of anticipated communist plans- 
to seize all of Southeast Asia, It is understood that Burma is 
weak internally and could be invaded without strong opposition or 
even that the Government of Burma could be subverted. ~ However 
Indochina is the area most immediately threatened. It is also the 
only area adjacent to communist China which contains a large Euro- 
pean army , which along with native troops is now in armed conflict 
with the forces of communist aggression. A decision to contain 
communist expansion at the border of Indochina must be considered 
as a part of a wider study to prevent communist aggression into 
other parts of Southeast Asia, 

3. A large segment of the Indochinese nationalist movement 
was seized in 19^5 by Ho Chi Minh, a Vietnamese who under various 
aliases has served as a communist agent for thirty years. He has 
attracted non-communist as well as communist elements to his. support. 
In 19^6, he attempted, but failed to secure French agreement to his 
recognition as the head of a government of Vietnam, Since then he 
has directed a guerrilla army in raids against French installations 
and 









lines of communication, French forces which have been attempt- 
to restore law and order found themselves pitted against a 
determined adversary who manufactures effective arms locally , who 
received supplies of arms from outside sources, \fno maintained no 
capital or permanent headquarters and who was, and is able, to dis 
rapt and 'harass almost any area within Vietnam (Tonkin, Annam and 
Oochinchina) at will. 

K. The United States has, since the Japanese surrender, 
I -inted out to the French Government that the legitimate national! 
aspirations of the people of Indochina must be satisfied, and that 
m - return to the prewar colonial rule is not possible. The Depart- 
-s&t of State has pointed out to the French Government that it was 



'*"«, 






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I 






c 



D 

- 



-_ cl 



cud is necessary to establish and support governments in Indochina 
particularly in Vietnam, under leaders who are capable of attracting 
to their causes the non- communist nationalist followers who had 
drifted to, the Ho Chi Minh communist movement in the absence of 
any non-communist nationalist movement around which to plan their 
aspirations, 

5. In an effort to establish stability by political means, 
where military measures had been unsuccessful, i.e., by attracting 
non-communist nationalists, now followers of Ho Chi Minh, to the 
support of ant i -communist nationalist leaders, the French Govern- 
ment entered Into agreements with the governments of the Kingdoms 
of Laos and Cambodia to elevate their status from protectorates to 
that of independent states within the French Union. The State of 
Vietnam was formed, with similar status, out of the former French 
protectorates of Tonkin, Annam and the former French Colony of 
Cochinchina, Each state received an increased degree of autonomy 
and sovereignty. Further steps towards independence were indicated 
by the French. The agreements were ratified by the French Govern- 
ment on 2 February 1950. 

* 

a 

6. The Governments of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were offi- 
cially recognized by the United States and the United Kingdom on 
February 7, 1950. Other Western powers have, or are committed to 
do likewise. The United States has consistently brought to the 
attention of non-communist Asian countries the danger of communist 
aggression which threatens them if communist expansion in Indochina 
is unchecked. As this danger becomes more evident it is expected 
to overcome the reluctance that they have had to recognize and 
support the three new states. We are therefore continuing to press 
those countries to recognize the new states. On January 18, 1950, 
the Chinese Communist Government announced its recognition of the 
Ho Chi Minh movement as the legal Government of Vietnam, while on* 
January 30, 19 5° > the Soviet Government, while maintaining diplo- 
matic relations with France, similarly announced its recognition. 

7. The newly formed States of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia do 
not as yet have sufficient political stability nor military power to 
prevent the infiltration into their areas of Ko Chi Minh's forces. 
The French Armed Forces, while apparently effectively utilized at 
the present time, can do little more than to maintain the status 
quo. Their strength of some 1^0,000 does, however, represent an 
army in being and the only military bulwark In that area against 
the further expansion of communist aggression from either internal 
or external force 






» 



8 # The presence of Chinese Communist troops along the bor-dei 1 
of Indochina makes It possible for arms, material and trooos to neve 
freely from Communist China to the northern Tonkin area now coii-v 
trolled by Ho Chi Minh. There is already evidence of movement cf 
arms . 



* 



use 6k 



2Qk 



TO? 









I 



■ 
i 









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j"» 



TOP SECRET 



9. In the present state of affairs, it is doubtful that the 
combined native Indochinese and French troops can successfully con- 
tain Ho's forces should they he strengthened by either Chinese 
Communist troops crossing the border, or Communist-supplied arms 
and material in quantity from outside Indochina strengthening Ho ! s 
force 



s 



CONCLUSIONS 

10v It is important to United States security interests that 
all practicable measures be taken to prevent further communist ex- 
pansion in Southeast Asia, Indochina is a key area of Southeast 
Asia and is under immediate threat « 

11 . The neighboring countries of Thailand and Burma could be 
expected to fall under Communist domination if Indochina were con- 
trolled by a Communist -dominated government. The balance of South- 
east Asia would then be in grave hazard. 

= 12. Accordingly^ the Departments of State and Defense should 
prepare as a matter of priority a program of all practicable measures 
designed to protect United States security Interests in Indochina, 



< 






t 



* 









. 






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6if 



285 



TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



THE SECRETARY OF STATE 




DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

WASHINGTON 



m reply refer to 
IC 



March 1, 1950 



;gstrictkd 



The Honorable 

Robert Allen Griffin, 

Chief, Economic Survey Mission to the 

Southeast Asian Coin tries* 

Sir; 

I am pleased to inform you that the Eresd .it has approved your 
designation as Chief of the .Economic Survey llission to the Southeast 
Asian Countries, with the personal tbzHz of I Minister a There is enclosed 
the Presidents letter of appointments 

This J.assion has been established with the following basic 
objectives: (1) To determine justifiable projects needed in the 
coim tries- to be visited for financing out of funds appropriated by 
Congress pursuant to Section 303 of the Mutual Defease Assistance Act 
which will have iizaediate political significances (2) To lay the 
groundwork for the anticipated Point k pro:;r^::i in the Southeast Asian 
countries 5 .with special attention given to the problem of avoiding 
disillusionment by keeping proposed projects within "a proper 
perspective; (3) To advise the local authorities en the preparation 
for the Point h program, particularly rath reference to the local 
condition? that vail be required for Point k assistance, the extent 
and kind of participation which would be required of then in any 
joint project, ond to the anticipated operating methods $ (h) To brief 
the United States representatives in the area on current Depsrt&ent 

linking regarding the anticipated Point k program^ and (£) To 
investigate regional aspects of technical assistance programs* More 
detailed instructions for the conduct of this lassion will be furnished 
you in separate communications and nay be supplemented from tine to 
time by cable* 

Since this is an official governiaent Kissxon, it must act as a 
unit and express the views of the Gov: ient rather than the views 
'of individuals© As Chief, you shall be responsible for such coordinated 
action j and in the event of disagrc 3nt within the Mission, your 
decision shall be final and binding * 



Hovrever 



286 






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IT 






RESTRICTED 



However j this is not intended to bar the expression of personal views* 
provided such views do not run counter to the laws of the United States^ 
the policy of the Administration or your instructions* Tihere personal 
Views are'properly c:carec*sed, they should be clearly identified as personal* 

Tou vri.ll appreciate , I am sure, that the members of the TS.3sion are 
not authorised to offer any written or oral statement v/hich might ba 
construed as committing this Government to a definite course of action or 
which might involve an obligation to expend governmental funds not 
previously appropriated and allocated 

i 

You are requested to communicate with the Chief of the United States 
Mission in each country on your itinerary and to seek his advice and 
counsel as circumstances warrant* Mr* McAfee of the Department*, who has 
been designated as one of your Advisers, f be looked to for assistance 
in your relations with the United States Missions and with the Department* 

You are authorized to delegate to anotl member of the Fission all 
authority held by you in the event of your inability to exercise the 
functions of your position* 

Details of the financial and transportation arrangements for your 
journey are contained in a Travel Order which will be sent to you under 
separate cover* 

It is expected that you will transmit by air pouch or cable preliminary 
reports from each country visited, and at the conclusion of the Mission a 
comprehensive report listing justifiable i ' o projects* appraising 
the local governments l attitudes tcr.rard collaboration in anticipated 
progsaiaSj and appraisin the possibilities of a regional -approach to the 
implementation of programs to meet regional jaeeds. Enclosed for your 
convenience is the usual outline for conference reports , which, though 
it will not quite fit your requirements, may nonetheless prove useful 
as a convenient checklist of a number of the items to be covered and the 
format which is desirable in all reports to the Department* Ton may wish 
to sv nt this forxaal report ha confidential reports 

You and your colleagues undertake your responsibilities with the 
assurance of my keen interest and wholehearted support * I have every 
confidence in the individual ability of the lassion members and in the 
capacity of the Mission as a whole* under your able leadership, to 
reflect credit on. the United States in this important undertaking* 



Very truly yours* 



iclosurcs: 

Is letter o 
2. Outlir 




f , &** 



Under Secretary 



loint at* 



r report* 



RESTRICT. I 



287 



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'•COPY 



o •■ o 



TOP SECRET 



- 



March 7, 1950 



Dear' Genera! Burns : * ' 

Embodied below *is a brief statement of Department of State 
policy in Indochina and Southeast Asia. I believe that an examin- 
ation of this statement willJ'facilitate your consideration of 
NSC 64. 
« 

The Department of State continues to hald that Southeast 
Asia is in grave danger of Communist domination as a consequence 
of aggression from Communist China and of internal subversive ' , 
activities. The Department of State, maintains that Indochina, ! 
subject as.it is to the most immediate danger, is the most 
strategically important area of Southeast Asia, 

The Department of State believes that within the limitations 
Imposed by existing commitments and strategic priorities, the 
resources of the United States should be deployed to reserve Indo- 
china and Southeast Asia from further Communist encroachment, 
The Department of State has accordingly already engaged all its 
political rosources to the end that this object be secured. The - 
Department is now engaged in: the process of urgently examining what 
additional economic resources can effectively be engaged in the 
same operation. 

It is now, in the .opinion of the Department, a matter of the 
greatest urgency that the Department of Defense assess the strategic 
aspects of the situation and consider, from the military point of 
view, how the United States can best contribute to the prevention of 
further Communist encroachment in that area. 

The military assessment requested above is necessary to a 
final determination by this Government of the manner in which 
United States policy in this area shall be executed. 

Sincerely yours, 

/s/ Dean Rusk 

Deputy Under Secretary 






Major General James H. Burns, 
Office of the Secretary 
. of Defense, 

Department of Defense. 



TOP SECRET 

288 



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jr 



SECRET 



TELEGRAM RECEIVED 



From: SECSTATE WASHINGTON 



Code: Secret 



Date: March 9, 1S50 



No: 136 



Reed: ^iarch 10, 1S50 



Sent Saigon 136, Paris 1023, London 1070, repeated Tokyo 212 
liarch 9, 5 PM, Secret 

Re Paris tel 62 to Saigon. Dept believes situation clearly points 
to possibility of friction betv/een French and Viets re mechanics of 
handling US military aid. Although vitally interested in satisfactory 
solution, Dept feels nothing to rain by US intervention in what is a 
matter for joint decision three states and French. Therefore Legation 
should exercise caution in maintaining neutral attitude unless lack 
agreement endangers program, in ?/hich case Dept will act. Your con- 
tinuing progress reports required. 

Similarly the related problems concerning the relations of the states 
with France and with each other are obviously capable of friction, vrhich 
US should be careful to avo 



In meantime, the status of the French prepared request for military 
aid has been received in only basic form, and av.aits further clarification 
fro:: 1 . Paris (see Leptel 850 to Paris, repeated Saigon as 109). Request 
for economic aid in more understandable terms has been received. 'Embassy 
here states PIG1I0N has copies both economic and military lists Saigon 
for information GRIFFIN Mission and Legation. Exercise care ensure no 
embarrassment to French or states results from your use such lists. 
BAG DAl's long request to JESS UP nc»v being translated, and not yet available 
for study. French request for military aid from UK not yet available Dept. 

Against, background foregoing, fol lowing comments on Urtel 157, Karch 6. 

Paragraph 2. Agencies represented on TIAC working group have received 
all relevant documents on economic discussions. Summary Eao Dai Memo 
likewise available, but full translation not completed. Military requests 
in present basic form (see above) not made available to all civil agencies 
pending clarification. 

paragraph 3. Dept has no inforniion. 

Paragraph 4. Three statesrrd French must, we feel, reach ovm ajreement 
en unique lists. Above all, v.*e cannot urge acceptance of one or another 
draft unless we are prepared to accept it, and this is not true of any 
presentation hitherto made. 



Paragraph 5. 
finding. 



Griffin Kiss ion function is clearly understood to be fact 

£. -rT ACH2SCU 

28:? 



IT 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011 



CONFIDENTIAL 



Copy for Griffin Mission 



Tl- 



1 P 



*/ 



■ • A ■ 

1 



- 






■ / 






/ 



To: SSCSTATBj iiASHIHGTOH 



Date: March 13, 1950 



No : 



176, 86 to Paris 



Code : Conf 



Charged to; Go© 



Sent lept 176 repeated Paris 86, Dept pass Paris 
FROM GRIFFIK. 



COIfflDSKTIAL 



1* Mission work till novr has been limited to receiving requests 
?r, Yiets, Car.bodians, Laotians * Hone of these coordinated yet by them 
or us, although French have shown at least part of their program, as 
developed here to Viets*. This has been time consuming process of many 
meetings and postponements* Ho difficulty anticipated vrith relatively 
simple Cambodian Laotian program as these peoole cooperate with French 
and are suspicious of Viets* 






2. .Puzzled by paragraph five Deptel 136, March 9. Ky under standinj 
was that this Mission v/as instructed Gable program recommendations from 
field after examination (fact finding) proposals and that subject had 
urgency. We have repeatedly informed French and Viets of our hope that 
they have meeting of minds at least on essential and urgent items so that 
US could act .-no re promptly* We have not tried to force either party to 
consolidate its prograi.1 with the other and we have not urged any course 
in the sense second sentence of your paragraph 4* In fact our concern, 
clearly stated in Legtel reference, has been to preserve our government 
from being put into such a position* 



5* I understand that ours is an economic aid mission and our remarks 
in sense of paragraph 2 above have been confined to economic aid. However, 
two programs should be mutually supporting and will possibly overlap to some 
extent* Dept is entirely right in foreseeing grave friction on distribution 
of military aid* The controversy on military aid which is budding without 
any help from the mission could jeopardise success of economic pro :ram* 
(Legation believes Department's views about not venturing any remarks on 
subject -reconciling views on military aid nay be inconsistent with Deptels 
122, March 4 and 12f, March 8) . In view of offer Je see nee in press and 
French and Viet Govt circles over AFP report that all aid would be through 
France, mission and Legation have thought opportune to let things giianer 
down before trying sell Bao Dai and Carpentier on views in referenced 
;- "Is* Ky denial of agency report should calm natters somewhat* 



290 



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* 



4. Extremely urgent to prepare and initiate program at earliest 
:ate or political benefit will be vitiated. Fact finding hero should 

roduce report reasonably believed to be acceptable Pignon as well as 
lao Dai« If entire matter is put aside for negotiation in remote 

apitals in future sometime, efforts to make good-will for and with 
^.o Dai ele ts Slight be destroyed, vfe have just been informed by 
LIDOtDC on his arrival from Paris that economic aid program for fifteen 
million submitted directly to lYashington and being studied by interested 
agencies there. From Ledoux's brief comment on m>e-up this Paris/ 
■Yashington submission not realistic economic or political being desimed 
-ore to relieve French balance-of-paynents position than achieve US 
objectives of political economic support in Indochina. (See Le,~tel 165, 
T .!arch 9 paragraph 10 ( c) . Ledoux requesting permission Pignon jive us 
copy this evening. Composition of program is of course very important, 
iiust emphasize strongly that how American aid is extended and how rapidly 
are factors at least as important as how much. 

5. LIPS , DICKISSGH and BLUl! havo worked most usefully with 
Mission. Dr. jXYER's presence has been immeasurably helpful. 

6. You may anticipate at least recommendation that five million 
dollars 3CA funds if they can be made available current fiscal year 
should be employed here. We will suggest what phases program should 

be allocated that fund. You may also anticipate that in this particular 
country GRIFFIN and GULLIOH may recommend 3CA Hiss ion take complete charge 
all economic aid under coordination by Chief diplomatic mission. This 
respect perhaps EGA should be alerted as top job will require person 
good stature and capacity (Dickinson and Blun have seen, concurred this 
proposal and Li^kinson will discuss on return)- 

7. Cambodians and Laotians welcome technical aid prospects. Viet 
have hitherto insisted without much documentation they well furnished with 
Viet technicians. '.Ye learn today they under misapprehension they would 
have to pay salaries American US technicians sent here which may account 
for their past attitude. They now preparing requests for considerable 
technical assistance* French have demonstrated great technical capacity 
here in past and have many able technicians. They show no enthusiasm Tor 
Point TVi **hile Karsh 8 Agreements provide priority French technicians, 
French might show some latitude this connection. Their skepticism reported 
due belie Point IV has too little money and drive behind it and will not 
v .ear fruit for many years. 

8. Guillen -iicurs. J 
* 

- 

. / • gullioi; 

-<?•- i / v. / 

-HGullion/v' : -la 



281 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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SECRET 



SECSTATE 

WASHINGTON 



MARCH 16, 1950. 



Sent Dept as * : Dept pass Paris and EGA from 

Saigon 

PROM GRIFFIN 

A- The visit of this mission in Indochina has resulted in fol conclu- 
sions: 

1- The "wave communism is riding in Indochina is predominantly a 

■ 

nationalist movement ^ not econ, social or ideological- 

2- While situation is serious it does not justify defeatism, but does 
justify effective application US aid in endeavor to strengthen Bao Dai Viet 
Govt versus communist-controlled. Vietminh* 

3- Viet Govt of Bao Dai is not a puppet , but an intensely nationalistic 
Govt struggling to secure more control and authority from Fr. Most these 

■ 

Viet elements with whom we have come in contact are outspokenly anti-Fr. 
U- It is feasible thru econ aid program help win from HO's Vietminh 
the non-Communist elements that continue support Ho, as well as large pro- 
portion of present numerous fence-sitters It is believed this can be 
promoted by application Amer aid thru means Bao Dai Govt, increasing its 
appearance of independence, its local and international prestige, its 
ability to conduct useful works for benefit of common people. US aid wld " 

- 

thereby become major contributing factor psychologically and materially, 
provided it is bold, quick and generous. 



SECRET 
COPY 






292 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



SEGR2F 



1 

5» Ft Aray altho under severe pressure is gradually achieving ita 
iir^ortant liislted objective of 'clearing Tonkin and Saigon deltas j moat 
iicportant population* ric3«produci;:3t corrznnicatiom and urban coo tors, is 

+ 

far as ire able observe locally, Fr ivrny and Viet unlto of oama ttoll led of- 
ficiant* will not withdraw in face of Ccraie throat & US aid following clccaly 
in wake of operations will spaed teals by villeso rchabltation prolan* 

6# Chi-Corsnie invasion throat does not appear in~3&# U3 aid will 
tot tor prepare is and Yiots to ohacknate it and aterlliss areas of vlotaidi 
infection which micht linlc up with thr • On other hand* nil intolli£3r.oo 
has verified that limited tut potentially increased Cfc&^ConstfteB tutorial 

m 

support to HO hao bagun t ov»c3^otir3 advisability epeedy V3 aid* 

7*. Purely econ justification lies in exfeezsa poverty liberated arcaa 
deterioration public worl:3 e irrisation egretem* rice culture^ destruction 
by Viotninh of farfisstaads, villoma t tsloccr Lcationaj health facilities* 
etc. 9 as personally aurvoyed by mission in Teniiru Doplorablo health con- 
ditions of pooplo inTor&in warrant timed relief* 

B* Above facta Govern typo and tc~po of U3 aid* 

In general it ehldi 

lo Concentrate on projects which will iSasft oupport nil and polit ob- 
jectives^ 

2e Show dr static and tacsd results and orouso wldo and realisable 



hopDs cf prompt offset* 
* 

3» Ba deaicn3d Improve nolfaro t living co: 7 V;icna oa r.^ry pooplo a3 

ooon as possible in preference long^'twa projects cc projects Juatif: 
ref _ ooa to ET balance of paynsnt needs* * 



.. [ 



293 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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• 









4* Develop ccopstonco in nevy CrOTt administrations and create bdoic 
earvices and begtfiuliago loag-tfasg© ptfqgraia. 

■ r 

C* Fol oro apooifio indent prc3rcn3 for 15 nonths endips Jan 30, 195* t 
totailir^ $23,500,000, exclusive of nil aid and pre-emt iadiroct U3 aid 
thru Ft, end derived r:j as result of etudy rogues ta of local Govts for 
$304,000*000 abort tora and $316,000,000 lor?s-^^^ projects, Incl both dollar 

ojs3 piastre cooto* 

1* Rural rehabilitation 

- 
* 

e) Iteelth and sanitation, cod cupplioo arsd oqiupr::>nt, incl robilo ur.its, 
educational eupplioo, bld^a for clinlca, rator purificatioa-°C^»000,000- 

b) Ensinc-orir.3 Unlto»-20 centora, to £3 pilot nichcniroQ oporatioria* 

Requirement for each canton 5 tractco? units, attacbosntei ocd porta for 

* * 

laftd prereration, Irrigation ditch repair© total £0 centers, O 2 o000,000 
(Incl Eaintonsnca and cuppliea)* B»$fc*EDyi?S oqulpnaat for dike oporations 
and canals $1,500,000* 

* 

c) ./wrrioultural euppllea 

20,000 tons arcEoaiun pboaphato-- $2,0G©,000 

Faro vosatablo ccod $50,000. Fern tools ($1,000,000) 

d) Blco nills. $2,000,000 

o) sbort-tcra construction roods, $1,000,000. 
2. Ccraoaities— $2,500,000 
cotton and cot 1: on yarn 
Rainforoir3 etcol 

■ 

GaLvaaiaad t ' rtius 

Re:? oil!: 



» 






POL 



r 

29«* 















Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






SEWE.T 



.3. Telocoizatfii cat ions— $1,C00»QC0 

■ 

4. Technical equipment # publications f traiains aids— $600 f 000 

5. Trainee to US (50 at $5 e 000) — $250*000 

6» Po;ver f light and e^ir.corirj, ininsn and ports* bridges, fich 
n 
reduction plants* Grcall craft— $3 e C0O*QQ0 

7« propaganda funds supploisantiisg U3IS program— $500*000* 

Program at thia tin:} obviously prollninary. Coir? let o fiacal info 

not yet available j nil security c^ny regions in flux* end pending Interstate 

* 
> 

Conf may change bases entire program* There shld be continued development 

_ 

details of prosram by Leg at Saigon., pondics ostablishont operatic aid 
mission* Understand ooon staf? or Lag to be auj mted and recouped bo 
dona without delay so studies can proceed vigorously* Fact that these racon- 
nsndatlons tentativo floes not reduce urgency that Cfperatlflg mission be put, 
in field with w&kwm ©peed* Even after operating mission erstatftiefesd. nust 
ortpeot continued changes prosraa viev; of fast- cb englsg a it nation and additional 
fact-finding. Above . progran contained nithin moderate Units duo to 
limitation of funds believed to be available* Prcrjraa capable quick sub* 
stantial expansion aiid therefore wider* stronger irpaot if China aid residr.o 
Eado available general area- Further study would also reveal additional 
cutlets useful expenditures * 
D* Field Dr^nlz^ticn 

- 

Pol niosion oocgaalsation recor ~z&i 



a) all ecoa aid programs* whatever legislative authority utilized, to 
be administered by single coon nission* St io reconsr ~ d tint ECA set up 
the field organization and direct the operations of Indochina econonlc aid 
prc^raria 



3 



o 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
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SECRET 






b) Objectives of econoziic mission to be eetabliahod in egreeft^nt dip- 
lomatic aiBslorii ?sd detailed activities havir3 political icroact to ta under- 

r * 

taicen t lAodifiedi or teralnated in agreement diplomatic mission. 

c) Chief of econoniic iziasion (CEGOU) to have responsibility for of- 
foctive contribution of all irercbers of mission to objectives go oatafalichcdj 

■ 

and foi coordination of their activltloa with policies established with diplo- 
ids tic Aisdion; and to have administrative authority ovor ell ceoibera of 
mission whether on payroll of mission or of another govcrn^nt agency parti- 
cipating in economic prosrecu * * ' 

d) Activities of mission to fc3 carried cut only on the bosia of renoi?- 
able project or old agreeiaft&tSi tiegdtiatefl by chiof of dipicritic raiaaion 

r 

and GECCB4 In bilateral or nuiti-latoral bodies cat up ainllar to 3CRR or 
cervlcios^ head U3 reprooontativeo to be yeepoasible to CECOM. 

e) CAP'):! to be appointed by EGA reoosDis&tog teat C3Gcy imst also dorivo 
authorities under 303* Point I? f cr other legislation cover ir* available 



f unda* (50085 end ac misy ncabors of miosion as possible ebld havo good work- 
ii?3 knc/lcdgg Er languaso* 

f ^ Raoommend consideration be given to Joint Admini3trativo Staff to 
faandlo Ul house-tee oping functions for location and Econ Iliaaion* 

2* Propaganda* 



* ' -»«* 



Separate cable prepared crt thio subject 

■ 

F. SO: 3 PHOBU3M3 



._ _- , _.- ..« 



(1) Financial Considerations 
Principal financial question is extent to rhich Viet ;~ :i and oth^r statoa 



» *. 



^ ■ 



A f ir.aaco jtaatre requirements to support S«*S« aid progpem possibly Including 

V 

peyrosnt jfcaatro counterpart for at least boes itcrj U«3* aid* 



SSCRET 



2SS 


















Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



r 



/ * 82CHEP 



Viet Em budgetary deficit, not including local French civilian and 
military Itona, approsicately 1*5 billion plea tree current fiscal year* 
Expenditures about 2.8 billion3 acd revenues about 1*3 billions. Thio de- 
ficit bolus financed £y Bani of Xndo-CMna advanceo to Viot Nan Treasury 
secured by prornlee French Treasury nalca francs available to Bank. Do not 
yot knerc ho:? it ia planned finance deficit after Bauk of Indo-Ghina 1b no 
lon<rcr Ean2c of Xaaiie* 

Host of proposed U#S* aid rould bo tbroi^h Go^crnnent-typo projects 
rather thsn directly to private eonsiaasra who cculd be ejected pay plsetroe* 
Ability Viet Tain provide counterpart uould dopor/1 on level its cash balance 
uhich we do not yot fcaewj on whether ^nk Xndo-China or nstr £ar£t of Issue 
would lord to Viet Era end on what tom3j end on whether Viet ISm would be 
ablo di-rsrt present entity to counterpart paynenta U*3# aid. Uot to bo 
expected ?iot I&a would be able incrosna non-lean baflgatary receipto cr 
borrow by Beans of security icauoa* Possibility of borrowing from the l&w 
Eanl: of leans cannot be determined until it a po~era established by forth* 



conies intor»stato conference. 

« 

i 

To certain astent counterpart roqiiironant nay reduce polit.\cal effoct:iTa- 

E2C3 of aid because aid is no longoa? ou:' v *t gift. - Eo"37er f this probably 

outweighed by usofulnesa of counterpart nhich can be very great in shaeaal- 

lr3 local currency ertperditurea for coratrr.otire purposes* recauao aid uill 

probably co^a frcn several funda* possibly ifieladiog EC A uhich generally 

requires counterparty it aaasts doairnblo have rule requiring oouaitarpart ia 

> 
principle but walvlrj wherever justified • Oefl* nfcera no local currency 

available or no economically prodisotiva reaulto ejected*. In thie connection 

* 

SBCi '' 

297 






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SECRET 






fiug^oat you consider poc 3 Ability c^ 0370 ** 1 ^ pinatro counterpart through 

; 

direct prosraniirs EGA dealer aid Indo-CMna ncTt goins indirectly through 

Franco* 

(2) Loo^s of Regotlatioi 

Vietn? mo very auspicious of all negotiations conducted in Paris. 
They have aa yet no official representatives abrczd. llDreovor e they esem to 
tru3t Pigeon more them other ifronch. Consarjuently, as trxich economic and 
political negotiation as possible should to carried on in Saigon t if it io 
our dosira increase etatua no^ governz^nta* 

(3 ) Ad m i.n iatyati c'n of nH 

In principle Viotnrjn, Xax>s» and Canbedia should to direct reolpiorr; 

■ 
of economic aid end it io so roc: jndad. Allocations deriving from French 

funds already appropriated or allocations of French counterpart would of 

I 
course require inronch authorisations, proforably large scale en bloc* 

■ 

r 

Aid asreoirsnta ehould bs nith each separata stato f but Fro nch r/ill 

I 
fcavo to fc3 handled with £*LGves* Extonaion of bomb kinds of aid to associated 

1 

otatea en bloc has r;any rjaritaj tends to prcr.ote rosional under standi 1131 bit 
otrorsly opposed by Vietnam and to lesser erctont by other states as 3evic© 



for continuing French control • French repudiate any idea such control t clnin 

1 ■ ■ 

quadripartite cooperation aa provided in ISrch 8 agreement is necessary to 



present wracking compleirzeiitary econcraieo IndoOhineae countries, to preserve 



» 



lacs and Cambodia fron enproachrante of Viet l?^m prevent corruption and in- 
efficiency. Claim tfceir only interest ia as counselors*. (See Leg. tel ). 



Frcsonl intranaisency on both s:\cV», Viet e motloaaiieiB, their in- 

patience at delay in applying conventions for application of l.::*rch 8 Agree- 

, r tag feeling that latter la already outroded, bode no good for fcrthco:'- 









S2C? 

: 298 

1 









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S2GR2T 



Intsretato confaronco ancl premies ssrioua difficulties in relations yivnch 

and three states In future* 

(h) Proneh Atti tude Po ijif> l\ r rA U» ft» Technlclar'j3 

With respect to possible Viet t:$n requests for U» 3. Technician^ 
just before final rceetins lest ni£ht» French tforlcins civil representatives 
expressed very literal vicv? of Section 4 1*3* ch 8 AgreeirentB reserving priority 
for French technical advisers* W© have not yet had opportunity to confirm 
with (Pignon) French claim I!areh 8 a^roer^mta rBpreeented baaio their rela- 
tione Indochinoee states and ehoxUd not to torporod trith. Indicated poa- 



cibility soice latitude in definition of technicians and raadineae to eccop 






American technicians in g peculiarly u»S« field, hut their general attitude 
raa suoh aa to cause ue dtegnlet as to possibility crorclaing even miniCTm 
U«S. euperriaicn of U«St program* 

(5) Maintaining cquilitetn 

- 

Silas ion aware local national goTornz^ento hold unrealistic vJ.ovto 
tor/ard nsmy gotfor.nnient p^obleisa end that any precipitous weakening French 
influence and control Eight in near future lead to chaos playing into hands 

* 

of Ho Cni Mint* LUsoion doubtful if local governments bava adrini^tratlve 
nachin^ry capable moat efficient handling aid but accepts this condition ea 
ineTitahle calculated risk in complex situation. Mission reiterates this is 
delicate situation* and efforts to build up ixzv gO70rnr.^nts afcould not 
under mini French preatige and. tcoralG here end in France* 
(G) KESD F0 3 PRGSWT ACTION 

» r <»J». ■ m n I I !■.« ■ ■ ■■ !■■ ■ ! ■■■■■ » ■ I ■« llf OT I^. 

Obstacles and difficulties innate in thie conple;^ and turbulent political 
situation B4st not be pernitted to retard decision to allocate aid noney 
recjiiiradt to c r negotiations for aid agreements* to appoint end axyedite 



S3CRHT 



— , 



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operating mission^ to hare ships arrive earliest date with aid materiel. 
The crux of the situation lies in prompt decisive action if desired politi- 

> 

cal effect is to be attained. 

(H) Gullion, Dickinson, Blum have collaborated in preparation this 
cable and concur. 



COPY 



SECRET 



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751G . 00/3 -2950 iSECRET FILE 



OOTG0IKG TELEGRAM 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



SECRET 



6 P.M. 

MAR 29 1950 

AKEHBASSY, 

# 

PARIS. 

1363 

Dopt has predicated its course of action in Indochina since FSB 2 
this year on assumption that fundamental objectives of US and Franco . ■ 
in Indochina are in substantial coincidence. Dept assumes: 

1 # That French are determined to protect IC fron further COI'2-IIB 
encroachments by FOLIT, ECOII as veil as MIL measures* 

2* That French understand that success of MIL operation* i.e. 
containment of northern border against COMMIE penetration as veil as . 
reduction of Ho's forces elsewhere IC, depends, in the end on overcoming 
opposition of indigenous population Q 

3* Therefore France proposes in support of this policy to strengthen 
Bao Dai and the Kings of Laos and Cambcdia in every practical way, to end 
that non-C0i-2CC3 nationalists abandon Ho, support Eao Dai and Kings and 
can thus reduce guerrilla activity # 

It is evident from reaction Asian states to IB and FR effort to 
secure their recognition Bao Dai, from att5.tude Scandinavian powers and 
from reactions US press that largo segment public opinion both East and 
West continues to regard Bao Dai and two Kings as French puppets not 
enjoying nor likely to enjoy degree of autonomy within FIl Union accorded 
then under Mf*R 8 agreements, analogous to that accorded^ IHDQ by IBM* 

US Govt has used its PC LIT resources and is now engaged in measures r _ 
to accelerate its EC0N and financial assistance to IC states. As you 
know Dept has requested Joint Chiefs of Staff to QTE assess the strategic 
aspects of the situation and consider, from the nil point of view, how 
the United States can best contribute to the prevention of further . 
Communist encroachment in that area, UEQjjE You are of course familiar 
with position Jos sup has takes KB SEA dirring his recent tour, Dopt 
accordingly considers that its position is clear and that the character 
of its past actions and proposed undertakings justifies its suggesting 
to PR a course of action which it believes requisite to success of 
•operation Indochina-, 

DLiU£i£*l 

. ." 301- 









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7510.00/>2950:SEC;R3? FI1E 



SECRET 



As said foregoing it appears to Dcpt that true char act or FR con- 
cessions to IC nationalist! under K/Jl 8 agreements and ultimate intentions 
$n that area arc clear to Dept but not RH" not clear to other interested 
parties « DEPT believes that Indoehincsc NATL movement, interested 
Asiatic state c and large segiiont public opinion Western world unsympathc- 
tic and apathetic to this great issue because FR have not made theso 
clcnents sufficiently clear. You will surely understand that DEFT docs 
not RFT not believe that present situation IG calls for further sub- 
stantive concessions fron FR at this tine involving parliamentary action 
to Bao Bai or two Kings c Obviously Bao Dai and company barely able to 
discharge responsibilities they are now facing t llo part of representations 
""Vhich DEFT suggests you noko to FR SHTD be construed as arguing for 
increase in concessions at this tine. This connection, DEIT strongly 
of view that transfer of Palace to Bao Dai most inportant single propaganda 
novo possible nowj Abbott emphasises this, suggesting suitable attendant 
ceremonies. It must be clear to you and through you to FR that DEFT's 
concern at present is only that FR make its present position and future 
intentions clear to non-COl'2-HE neutral world* 

DEFT had previously considered asking that you transmit in appropriate 
form to FR F0N0FF noto quoted below* Upon reflection in the course of 
vhich views Jcssup and Buttorworth UECD DIPT believes you SHID pake strong 
oral representations FR F0NQFF using F0L linos as basic guidance in such 
manner as UID in your judgment best serve the achievement objectives 
identified foregoing© Your advice as to manner and timing of such approach 
awaited by Dopt ft 

■ 

QTE The US Govt has expressed its gratification at the ratification 
by the FR GOVT of tho agreements with the GOVTS of Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambcdia* The real and continuing interest of tho IS in the strengthening 
and stabilisation of anti-C0l£!I.E NATL regimes in Indochina is well known 
to the GOVT of France as is the full confidence of the US in tho intentions 
of the FR GOVT to adopt all measures requisite to providing the three 
states with the strcnth, F0LIT and MIL, without which they will bo unable 
to defeat Ho Chi Kinh and his foreign GQMHXE allies 



QTE The Go\ ts of Franco and the US have long considered that the 
recognition of the GOVTS of tho threo states ty Asian states was a 
matter of prime importance in order that the anti-COMHE NATL movements ] 
in Indochina be accorded, in the eyes of the world, their true characters 
as genuine MATL movements and not ; as world communism alleges, the 
creatures of IN1T3R QTE Western imperialism SHD TBOBX QTK> The US Govt 
has, during the past several weeks, approached the several Asian GOVTS 
most IKt-ED concern with the state of affairs in Irdcchina, impressing 
upon thorn the desirability of their BJMS3D recognizing tho GOVTS of tfeb 



wET 



30° 

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751C* 00/3-2950 :SSCR3T FIIS 



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three new states « The Thai Govt recognised the Indeehineso states on 
FEB 28 # Unfortunately, the US REPS accredited to the remaining Asian . 
countries have been inferred by the officials of those countries that 
they regard the GOVTS of the throe states as FR puppets and that, noro 
important, they are not convinced of the genuine character of FR intention 
ult irately to accord the states of Viotnan, Laos and Gsdbodia the full 
neasu/J3" of independence and sovereignty which have recently boon trans- 
ferred by the K5TH to IIJDO. The responsible ministers of the Asian 
powers concerned have stated in substance that wore the Republic of 
Franco to announce publicly that the present agreendnts wore the first 
steps in an orderly evolutionary process, the end and purpose of which 
is to accord the throe states of Indochina complete independence! 
sovereignty and administration of their own affairs (within the FR Union) , 
those Asiatic states WID bo prepared favorably to consider recognition 
of the throe states in Indochina even before such additional transfers 
of sovereignty WED have actually been nadc* Therefore, while Dopt 
obviously unable guarantee recognition and support fol such statement) 
Dopt believes that in absence such statement further acts of recognition 
by Asian states not forthcoming, Dopt keenly aware of self-evident fact 
that IHDOS cannot administer complexities Indeehineso affairs without FR 
assistance,, Dept determined as matter of general policy to emphasise 
interdependence France and Indochina as was successfully done in case 
HETH and Indonesians* DEPT belicvos that independence and autonbry of 
three IC states must clearly bo understood to lie within FR Union* 

The GOVT of the US is aware of the concessions granted by the 
Republic of France in negotiating and ratifying the Agreements, The US 
GOVT has indicated to the Govt of Franco its desire to bo of assistance 
to the three states and to the FR ABJHM in Indochina in enabling thorn 
successfully to contain and liquidate conmunisn in Indochina* The US 
GGtfT is aware of the fact that the GOtfT of Franco shares its concern 
that communism be excluded not only from Indochina but from the entiro 
SEA region. The execution of this policy requires, above all things, a 
unanimity of support on the part of the nations of SEA of the anti-COKMjS 
Indochinoce nationalist GOVTS of Indochina 3 

QTE With full consciousness of the difficulties involved, the U3 
GOVT requests the Govt of Franco seriously to consider the issuance at 
the earliest possible moment of a public statement of the character 
identified in the foregoing* While it is not for the DEPT to suggest 
the part ioulari ties of the text of such a statement, the DErT believes 
that the FR G v SHIO nako clear therein the concessions to Indochineso 
nationalism which it cade in the l&Rr 8 agreements, and the supplementary 
accords lest both FR aceonplisfejnts and Intentions in this great matter 
be tragically iiisvndor stood not only in Asia but in the Western world as 



s 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
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;cq?y . Q ' Q . TOP SECRET 

* • 

■ 

(10) April 1950 

r ... ' 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OP DEFENSE ' ' (SEQQEF fJAQ pr^i 

SUBJECT: Strategic Assessment of Southeast Asia* ^*v 

* 

■ 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied your memorandum, 
elated 10 March 1950* with its enclosures,* in which you requested 
their views regarding: 

a. The strategic importance, from the military point of 
view, of Southeast Asia; 

.. » 

b. NSC 6^, a report by the Department of State on the 
position of the United States with respect to Indochina, 
which is now before the National Security Council for 
consideration; 

c_ # The measures that, from the military point of view, 
might be taken to prevent Communist expansion into South- * 
east Asia; 



-. 



• 



d. The order of magnitude and means of implementation 
of such 1;. .sures; and 

e. A French aide-memoire on the subject of aid for 
Indocnina, dated -16 February 1950. 

l f In light of U..S. strategic concepts, the integrity of 
the offshore island chain from Japan to Indonesia is of critical 
strategic importance to the United States, 

2, The mainland states of Southeast Asia also are at present 
of critical strategic importance to the United States because: 

a- They are the major sources of certain strategic 
materials required for the completion of United States stock 
pile projects; 

* 

b. The area is a crossroad of communications; 

£. Southeast Asia is a vital segment in the line of con- 
tainment of communism stretching from Japan southward and 
around to the Indian Peninsula. The security of the three 



*See letter from Mr. Rusk to General Burns, dated March 7, 1950, 
. oduced at the end of this memorandum. 

3Q£> TOP SECRET 






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O . O T0P SECRET 



major non -Communist base areas in this quarter of the world -- 
Japan ^ India, and Australia—depends in a large measure on 
the denial of Southeast Asia to the Communists, If Southeast 
Asia is lost, these three base areas will tend to 'be isolated 
from one another; • 

d. The fall of Indochina would undoubtedly lead to the 
fall of the othor mainland statos of Southeast Asia. Their 
fall would: 

(1) Require changing the Philippines and Indonesia 
from supporting positions in the Asian offshore island 
' chain to front-line bases for the defense of the Western 
# Hemisphere, It would also call for a review of the 
strategic deployment of United States forces in the Far 
East; and 



.. * 



(2) Bring about almost* immediately a dangerous con- 
dition with respect to the internal security of the 
Philippines, Malaya, and Indonesia, and would contribute 
to their probable eventual fall to the Communists; 

£, The fall of Southeast Asia would result in the * 
virtually complete denial to the United States of the Pacific 
littoral of Asia. Southeast Asian mainland areas are important 
in the conduct of operations to contain Communist expansion; 

f . Communist control of this area' would alleviate con- 
siderably the food problem of China and would make available 
to the USSR important strategic materials. In this con- 
nection, Soviet control of all the major components of Asians 
war potential might become a decisive factor affecting the 
balance of power between the United States and the USSR. 

"A Soviet position of dominance over Asia, Western Europe, 
or both, would constitute a major threat to United States 
security 11 ; and 

g. A Soviet position of dominance over the par East 
would' also threaten the United States position in Japan since 
that country could thereby be denied its Asian markets, 
sources of food and other raw materials * The feasibility 

of retention by the United States of its Asian offshore 
island bases could thus be jeopardized, 

- 

3* In the light of the foregoing strategic considerations 
pertaining to the area of Southeast Asia, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, from the military point of view, concur In the conclusions 
in EFSC f 64. 

h. Military forces of both Franco and the United Kin^don are 
now actively opposing communism in Southeast Asia, Small indigenous 



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forces are allied with them. In addition, the generally inadequate 
indigenous forces of tho independent states are actively engaged 
in attempting to maintain internal security in the face of Communist 
gression tactics. . '. 






5 



It appears obvious from intelligence estimates that the 
situation in Southeast Asia* has deteriorated and, without United " 
States assistance , this deterioration will be accelerated. In 
general, the basic conditions of political and economic stability 
in this area, as well as the military and internal security con- 
ditions, are unsatisfactory. These factors are closely inter- 
related and it is probable that, from the long-term point of view, 
political and economic stability is the controlling factor. On 
the other, hand, the military situation in some areas, particularly 
Indochina, is of pressing urgency, ■ 



6, • ...With respect to the measures which, from the United States 
military point of view, might be taken to prevent Communist 
expansion in Southeast .Asia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend 

, ^early implement at ion , of .. mili tary aid programs for Indocliina, 
/* "Indonesia, Thailand, the PhilTppThes~ahcl Burma, Malaya might 
also be included provided the British by their actions in the 
areas in Asia where they have primary interest evince a deter- v 
mined effort to resist the expansion of communism and present i 
sufficient military justification for aid. The effectiveness of 
these military aid programs would be greatly increased by appro- 
priate public statements of United States policy in Southeast Asia. 

7, The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the military aid 
from funds already allocated by the President for the states 
of Southeast Asia be delivered at the earliest practicable date. 
They further recommend that the presently unallocated portion 
of the President's emergency fund under Section 303 of Public 
Law 329 (8lst Congress, 1st Session), be planned and programmed 
as a matter of urgency. 

8, Precise determination of the amounts required for military 
aid, special covert operations s and concomitant economic and 
psychological programs in Southeast Asia cannot be made at this 
time since the financial requirements will, to a large extent, 
depend on the success of aid and other programs now in the process 
of implementation. In the light of the world situation , however, 
it would appear that military aid programs and other "measures will 
be necessary in Southeast Asia at least during the next fiscal 
year and In at least the same general over-all order of magnitude. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, strongly recommend that 

J appropriations for over-all use in the general area of Asia be 
sought for the next fiscal year in terms similar to those under 
Section 303 of Public Law 329 (8lst Congress, 1st Session). It 
is believed that approximately $100,000,000 will be required for 
the military portion of this program. 



°io 







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v/ 






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/ 



9, In view of the history of military aid in China, the 
1 Joint Chiefs of Staff urge that these aid programs he subject, in 

any event, to the following conditions: 

a. That United States military aid not be granted un- 
. conditionally; rather, that it be carefully controlled and 

that the aid program be integrated with political and 
economic programs; and 

b. That requests for military equipment be screened 
"first by an officer designated by the Department of Defense 

and on duty in the recipient state, These requests should be 
subject to his determination as to the feasibility and 
satisfactory coordination of specific military operations. 
It should be understood that military aid will only be con- 
sidered in connection with such coordinated operational plans 
as are approved by the representative of the Department of 
Defense on duty in the recipient country. Further, in con- 
formity with current procedures, the final approval of all 
programs for militaz^y materiel will be subject to the 
concurrence of the Joint chiefs of Staff. 

10, The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a Southeast Asia 
/iid Committee be appointed with State, Defense and EGA representation 
which will be responsible for the development and implementation 

of the program for the general area of Southeast Asia, Requests 
for aid should be screened by the field representatives of the 
committee in consultation with the local authorities in the 
countries concerned. 

11, Present arrangements for military aid to Indonesia through 
the military attaches and to the Philippines through the Joint 
United States Military Aid Group appear to be satisfactory and 
should be continued, ' - ■' 

12, A snail military aid group should be established in 
Thailand to operate in conformity with the requirements in paragraph 
9 above, Arrangements for military aid should be made directly 
with the Thai Government, 

13- In view of the very unsettled conditions in Burma, the 
program for military aid to that country should, for the time » 
being at least, be modest. The arrangements Should be made after 
consultation with the British, and could well be handled by the 
United States Armed Forces attaches to that country, Arrange- 
ments for military aid to Malaya, if and when authorized, should 
be handled similarly except that request should, in the first 
instance, originate with British authorities, 

■ 

14. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognise the political implica- 
tions involved in military aid to Indochina* It must be appreciated, 



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/ 



/ 



however, that French armed forces of approximately 1^0,000 men 
are in the field and that if these were to be withdrawn this 
year because of political considerations, the Bao Dai regime 
probably could not survive even with United States aid. If the 
United States were now to insist upon independence for Vietnam 
and a phased French withdrawal from that country, this might 
improve the political situation .. The French could be expected 
to interpose objections to, and certainly delays in, such a 
program. Conditions in Indochina, however, are unstable and the 
situation is apparently deteriorating rapidly so that the urgent 
need for at least an initial increment of military and economic 
aid is psychologically overriding. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
therefore, recommend the provision of military aid to Indochina 
at the earliest practicable date under a program to implement the 
Presidents action approving the .allocation of 15 million dollars- 
for Indochina and that corresponding increments of political and 
economic aid be programmed on an interim basis without prejudice 
to the pattern of the policy for additional military, political 
and economic aid that may be developed later, 

> 

15. In view of the considerations set forth in paragraph Ik 
above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the immediate estab- 
lishment of a small United States military aid group in Indochina, 
to operate in conformity with the requirements in paragraph S 
above. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would expect the senior member 
of this group to sit in consultation with military representatives 
of France and Vietnam and possibly of Laos and Cambodia, In 
addition to screening requests for materiel, he would be expected 
to insure full coordination of military plans and efforts between 
the French and Vietnamese forces and to supervise the allocation 
of materiel. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe in the possibiltiy 
of success of a prompt coordinated United; states program of mili- 
tary, political, and economic aid to Southeast Asia and feel that 
such a success might well lead to the gaining of the initiative 

in the struggle in that general area, 

16, China is the vital strategic area in Asia. The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff are firmly of the opinion that attainment of 
United States objectives in Asia can only be achieved by ultimate 
success in China. Resolution of the situation facing Southeast 
Asia would therefore, be facilitated if prompt and continuing 
measures wore undertaken to reduce the pressure from Communist 
China, In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted 
the evidences of renewed vitality and apparent increased effective- 
ness of the Chinese Nationalist forces. 



17. The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest the following measures 
with, military implications: 



a. An increased number of courtesy or show the flag" 
visits to Southeast Asian states; 






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b. Recognition of the "port closure 11 of Communist China 
seaports by the Nationalists as a de facto blockade so long 
as it is effective. Such action should remove some of the 
pressure, direct and indirect, upon Southeast Asia; should 
be of assistance to the ant i -Communist forces engaged in 
interference with the lines of communication to China; and 
should aggravate the economic problems and general unrest 
in Communist China; 

c_, A program of special covert operations designed to 
interfere with Communist activities in Southeast Asia; and 

d. Long-term measures to provide for Japan and the other 
offshore islands a secure source of food and other strategic 
materials from non -Communist held areas in the Par East, 



1-8. Comments on the French aide-memoire of 16 February 1950 $ 
are contained in the substance of this memorandum. The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff do not concur in the French suggestion for 
conversations between the "French and Amor icon General Staffs" 
on the subject of Indochina since the desired ends will best 
be served through conferences in Indochina among the United 
States military aid group and military representatives of France, 
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, The Joint Chiefs of Staff are not 
unmindful of the need for collaboration and consultation with 
the British and French Governments on Southeast Asia matters and 
recommend, therefore, that military representatives participate 
in the forthcoming tripartite discussions on Southeast Asia to 
be held at the forthcoming meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 



FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF: 



/s/ OMAR N, BRADLEY 
Chairman 
Joint Chiefs of Staff 



,» 



313 



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JC3 Cc:- -it: Repeat and r: iphasise their vieiTs and 
reoci .:.::: iaticns on Thdechina 7. r h5.ch you forwarded to 
Secretary of 31 i on 14 April 1950, Hec-or.ir.and these 
r ec cr^endati ons b:= reflected in State paper* 

Reooi lend that, besides telling French, U. 3* 
prepared to assist 7r£o?h and Ihres Associated States* 
French also be told that arra; for U# 3, military 

aid bo ftade as a result of cc&ve _ .tions in Indochina 
bet,. U* 3t j French, VI sti ;e, Laotian and @a!sfaodian 
military representatives* ilsc re id State i :e 

ufcaisfcsj *b! "reiijoh the ;?iiv; zli ire c the U« 3. to 

3c * a ziili \:l grcup to I fe< earl3 ;t 

j bio c . 



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SECRET 

C-O-P-Y 



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 
Washington, 25 , D.C. 



2 May I95O 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: 

Subject: Indochina 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have,, from the military point 
of view > reviewed the Department of State draft position 
paper entitled "Indochina" (Fii D C-3a, dated 25 April 1950) 
and have formulated the following views thereon: 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff stated their views and recom- 
mendations concerning measures which,, from the United States 
military point of view, might "be taken to prevent Communist 
expansion In Southeast Asia in general and Indochina In par- 
ticular in a memorandum to you, dated 5 April 1950 > which 
views were forwarded by you to the Secretary of State on 
Ik April 1950. Among other things, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
stressed in their memorandum: 

a. The urgent need for early arrival of military aid; 

b. The requirement that such aid be integrated with 
political and economic programs; and 

c. That a small United States military aid group be 
established in Indochina Im mediately for the purpose of: 

(1) Screening requests for military material, the 
requests to be subject to determination by the senior 
member thereof as to the feasibility and satisfactory 
coordination of specific military operations; 

(2) Insuring full coordination of military plans 
and efforts between the French and Vietnamese forces; and 

(3) Supervising the allocation of material to those 
forces . 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff further recommended therein that mili- 
tary representatives participate in the forthcoming tripartite 
discussions on Southeast Asia at the meeting of the Foreign 



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C "°" P " Y SECRET 



Ministers. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would reaffirm their 
views and recommendations expressed above, as veil as in the 
remainder of their memorandum of 5 April 1950/ and recommend 
further that they be reflected in the basic draft position 
paper, 

- 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff would make further specific 
comments on the basic draft position paper as follows: 

a. The seventh unnumbered paragraph under the heading 
Background should be revised along the following lines: 

The "missing component ,f in the picture consists 
of three factors, namely, political, military, and 
economic. The first two are at present the most im- 
portant and should be emphasized. In the military 
field the greatest defect has probably been the lack 
of coordination between the French and the indigenous 
forces , coupled with immediate deficiencies in various 
items of equipment and material and with uncertain 
morale on the part of the Indochinese and the French. 
Very early, and continuing assistance is needed by the 
Indochinese and the French forces in order to meet 
their present needs. Such assistance must consist in 
general of additional equipment within reason 
(unavailable to the French from other sources) and of 
appropriate military advice. 

b. The second unnumbered paragraph under the heading 
Discussion should be revised along the following lines: 

9 

The success of the military program depends upon 
the support given by the French, Vietnamese, Laotians, 
and Cambodians to the coordinated operations plans pre- 
pared in Indochina, and, to a lesser extent, upon the 
receipt of specific items of military material from the 
United States. la view of the larger aspects of the 
struggle against world communism, judicious political 
concessions in Indochina by the French, and timely 'and 
adequate, but controlled, aid on the part of the United 
States will eventually pay dividends to both. 

c. Under Rec ommenda t ion s , the paragraph headed Discussions 
with the French should be revised to: 

(l) Incorporate in Recommendation 2) a provision that 
the arrangements for United States military aid be made 
in Indochina as a result of conversations there between 
United States, French, Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian 
military representatives; and 



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C-O-P-Y 



SEC T 



(2) Change Recommendation 5) so as to make 
unmistakable the firm desire of the United States 
to send a military aid group to Indochina at the 
earliest possible date for the purposes indicated 
in your memorandum to the Secretary of State, dated 
Ik April 1950- In this connection, the Joint Chiefs 
of -Staff regard vith strong disfavor the desires and 
continued attempts of the French to settle, on the 
political level, the military and internal security 
problems of Indochina in Paris. 

Recognizing their own responsibilities in the matter, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the point of viev of the military 
security interests of the United States, again urge the immediate 
establishment of an authoritative United States military aid 
group in Indochina. 



For the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

■ 

/s/ Omar N. Bradley 

CMAR N. BRADLEY, 
Chairman, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. 



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C- 7 

■ 




THE JOUST CHIEFS OP STAFF 



Washington , D.C. 



2 May 1950 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: 



Subject: Southeast Asia 

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have formulated the following comments, 
from the military point of view, on the Department of State draft position 
paper entitled "Southeast Asia" (FM D C-2a, dated 25 April 1950) . 

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur fully in the expressions in the 
subject paper as to the importance of the area of Southeast Asia to the 
United States. They concur in general as to the need for British and 
French action along the lines indicated in the draft position paper. 
Moreover , the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the currently unfavorable 
situation in Southeast Asia, an area important both to the United States 
and to the Communist movement, warrants assumption by the United States of 
a much more forceful and positive position than is expressed or implied in 
the draft position paper. 

3. As stated in the CONCLUSIONS in NSC 68 , -- "Our position as the 
center of power in the free world places a heavy responsibility upon the 
United States for leadership. We must organise and enlist the energies 
and resources of the free world in a positive program for peace which will 
frustrate the Kremlin design for world domination by creating a situation 

in the free world to which the Kremlin will be compelled to adjust . Without 
such a cooperative effort, led by the United States, we will have to make 
gradual withdrawals under pressure until we discover one day that we have 
sacrificed positions of vital interest." 

k. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United States and the 
other Western Powers should take immediate and positive steps to achieve 
the initiative in the present conflict. Further, they consider that suc- 
cess in Southeast Asia might well lead to the gaining of the initiative in 
the struggle within the Far East. 

■ 

5. In light of the foregoing and in order to retrieve the losses 

restating from previous mistakes on thepart of the British and the French, 

as well &s to preclude such mistakes in the future, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff consider it necessary that positive and proper leadership among the 

Western Powers be assumed by the United States in Southeast Asia matters. 

They, therefore, recommend that the draft position paper on "Southeast 

Asia" be revised along the lines of NSC 68 and paragraph h above. 



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6. In addition to the foregoing general re commendation ^ the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff would make the following specific recommendation regard- 
ing that part of the third paragraph of the subject paper headed* 
REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS which states; 

"For the United States to underwrite a regional coalition 
including Japan/ the Philippines s Australia and Hew Zealand 
does not increase American commitments; we must accept respon- 
sibility for assisting in the defense of these powers against 
aggression 



n 






The Joint Chiefs of Staffs from the military point of view, disagree in 
principle with such a single far-flung regional arrangement and do not 
concur in the statement that American commitments would not be increased 
by underwriting such a coalition. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would from 
the military point of view agree to appropriate military arrangements 
between nations in Southeast Asia capable of effective mutual support, 

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to reaffirm their views on this 
subject as transmitted by the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of 
State on 1^ April 3 and re emphasize the need for immediate consideration 
and implementation of an integrated and effective U.S. course of action 
for Southeast Asia. 

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff 



(SIGNED) 

OMAR N. BRADLEI, 

Chairman j 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 



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k 



State Payor: Southeast Asia 



:ssxcns 



in the State 



JCS Can at: Cosisur fully in the c:;prc: 

paper as to the inipoHsanco of Southeast Asia to u. 3. Urge 

tsxoh Eore forceful and positive U. 3. position than expressed 

I plied in Stat paper* Believe U. 3. and Western pcrr/ers 
should take i! lists and positive st to achieve the 



4-V« 



initiative i:i the present conflict . Consider it necessary Tsnat 
positive and pro] r leadership arton* rfestern Pov/srs be assuned 
by 17. S. in Southeast Asia scatters* Rec emend revision of 
State x along i£xe Xii&s of IISC Go and the above v^ ;, 



D:' : : that u* 3, i f iting of a regional ooalitic 

in Asia vrould not inorea.se V* 5* ca::]it::-:v',, A^ree to 
appro^iato i Llitary arr - i< - t s&tic i !■-. 5 fih&Rst 

&sia capable of effective : bual support* 






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7$lG*5-MAP/!>-3$0: Top Secret File 



AMEMBASSY , 

ill 

LOKQCffi . 
20^9 

FOR MERCHANT. 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
OUTGOING TELEGRAM 



May 3, 19 50 



PRES on KAY 1 approved allocation of ten million DOLS 
from 303 to Defense to cover current early shipment urgently 
needed MIL aid items to IC* Also approved was three 
million for Indonesia. 

DBPT has requested Defense IKMBD to start supply 
action on two hundred thousand rounds 37 ram ammunition 
plus 9>000 links to Army of FR Union IC consigned COiiDR 
in Chief Saigon, At some time Dept has requested Defense 
to initiate supply action equipment (less small arms) 
for 12 infantry battalions for' the Vietnam State Army 
(as separate from FR Union Forces )• Dept has requested 
at least a part of latter equipment if at all possible 

.a. -^ — m. _ _._ i » . .. -^ 



be included in same shipment with 37 
consigned High MIL COMITS for VIetnas 



mm ammunition and 



.......... ..aa /nay* Thus first 

shipment V/LD contain items for both Army FR Union and 
Viet Army. Defense has no timetable yet for departure 
date of such shipment but Dept has pushed for early action. 
Aid will be subject usual bilateral agreements if in view 
Dept those required. Airplanes now under discussion be- 
tween MAAG Paris and FR authorities. When mutual agree- 
ment is reached on airplane types and firm program emerges, 
DEPT will request further funds be allocated since ten 
million insufficient. 

In view requests for INFO on US MIL aid to IC from 
both FR and Viets Dept believes above IEFO SHLD be com- 
municated to both FR and Viet Govts for their confidential 
RPT confidential INFO. 

■ 

Dept proposes communicate this INFO this week to FR 
AiMB WASH, US DSL London notify FR DEL, EMS Paris notify 
FR Govt and LEG Saigon notify High Commissioner and Viet 
Govt SU3J to comments USDBL, Paris Er3 and Saigon LEG. 

tpb. nov vva ' ACHE30N 

TOP SECRET 



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■-> 



DEPART P OF STA'IZ 



FOPv TUB PBSSS MAY 11, 1950 

NO". J l85 ' 

At his press conference today, Acting Secretary 
Wetrt) made "the following statement: 



AID TO SOUTHEA ST ASIA 

A special survey mission, headed by R. Allen Griffin, 
has just returned from Southeast Asia and reported on 
economic and technical assistance needed in that area. 
Its over-all reco nidations for the area, are modest 
and total in the neighborhood, of $50 million, The Depart- 
ment is working on plans to implement that program at once. 



Secretary Acheson on Monday in Paris cited the 
urgency of the situation apply: ; in the associated 
states of Viet-Mamj Laos 1 Co: dia« The Department is 
working jointly* with EGA to implen^nt the economic : I 
technical assistance recc sndations for Indochina as 
veil as the other states of Southeast Asia and anticipates 
that this program will get underway in the irradiate 
future. . 

Military assistance for Southeast Asia is being 
worked out by the Department of Defense in cooperation 
with the Department of S~ate, and the details will not 
be made public for security reasons. 

Military ass&staiiee needs will be met from the Presi- 
dent's emergency fund of $75 million provided under MDAP 
for the general area of China. 

Economic assistance needs will be - met from the EGA 
China Aid funds, part of which both Houses of Congress 
have indicated will be made available for the general - 
area of China i Pinal legislative action is still pending 
on this authorization bv.t is expected to bo completed 
within the n :t wolc. 






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TOi- SE CltBT 

TKli 3 aTI T ^ iiBCO Up 

MIN/Tifl/DEC/5 
l ?th May, 1950 



• MI N ISTS iff AL' TALKS 
UKI.TI^ STATES/OTI'i££ KIKGOQivi/PKANGE 

Summary of conclusions reached at the Fifth 
Heet inp_ o f the Uni ted States/Uni ted Ki n gdom/ 

Prance Ministerial Talks held at Lancaster 

fcW^p— J. ■■—— ^. "FI ^B M » ■ ' ^ * ■»■ I * — jl 1 M — ■>■■% ■■ ™ f M» lfc.W-W*-fr- ■■!■ >■ *M^M ^II ■■ ' ■ ■■■ . .—J — MM — M^ ^ MMMg— MM— -^|».* ■ h#*-«fcM^MM— — * ■ M fc ■*■*— 1 1 I ■< I m*JF 'M* M« j" 

Kous e on S a turd r/ y 13th May, at IQqO aoflu 2/ 



• 






I * Item 5: South East Asia (M1N/TKL/p/9) 

It Mi SCHUIRM gave a short reviev; of French commit 
ments in Indo-China and explained the difficulties 
facing the French Government . He emphasised that it 
should be recognised th^t France was serving the 
interests of the common cause and that the French 
Government needed urgently extensive military help* 

2«, The Ministers agreed th^t paragraph 7 should be 
amended to read: 

- 

7. Although the security of South 3ast Asia is 
of strategic importance to the United States 3 the 
British and French have direct responsibilities 
in the area which make its security of even 
greater concern to them« The forcible expulsion 
of French and British forces from Indo-China 
and ^alaya, respectively , would be both a mili- 
tary and politico! disaster. The United Kin dom 
therefore reaffirms its intention to continue 
• "to discharge its responsibilities in British and 
British-protected territory in the area* The 
French Government considers that it is only 
within the framework of close and active co- 
operation vi th the United Kingdom and United 
States Governments that it will be able to 
continue effectively to discharge its particular 
responsibilities in this region* " 



3-Copy held in S/S-R 



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TOP D2CRET 



M. Schuman thereupon withdrew the French reservation in 
regard to paragraphs 7 and 8. 

3, MR, BEVIN said that the United Kingdom representatives 
in the field were unenthusiastic about either a joint 
declaration or individual declarations by Governments 
with respect to their attitude towards South East Asia. 
There was the particular question of relations with 
Pakistan, India and Ceylon, He would prefer not to 
make a declaration of any sort. 

M. SCHUMAN said that the French view was still that a 
joint declaration should be made. However, he recognises 
the difficulties of the United Kingdom position. 



BEVIN suggested and the Ministers agreed that this 
question should be followed up through the diplomatic 
channel after the Commonwealth Conference at Sydney 
with the possibility of a more fruitful outcome than 
at present . 



TOP SECRET 

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INCOMING TELEGRAM 
Department of State 



SECRET 



FROM: London 



TO; SECTO 2$G, May U, 9 p,n 



Ree f d Hay 14, 1950 
4:4.6 p.n f 



NIACT 



SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 256, REPEATED PARIS 8/,S, FRANKFORT 23 

Reference TELAG fea May 12, 

Following suramariged highlights tripartite meetings 2 



* 



« 



• • 



7 # SEA .- Indochina. Based on our preliminary bilateral 
conferences there was agreement reached on the assessment 
of the situation and our coinmon objectives in SEA. It was 
decided that no tripartite declaration on the subject would 
issue frora the conference. The British objected to such a 
declaration, partly because it would exclude Commonwealth, 
I did not advocate this and the French reluctantly recon- 
ciled to its absence, * Me also trilaterally agreed to take 
cettain common measures in an effort to suppress gun-running' 
into French Indochina and to cooperate on our information 
policies and activities in the area. 



• 



* . 



There follow highlights bilateral talks Schvasan on matters 

not duplicated tripartite discussion* 

■ 

1. Indochina, This was main subject discussed in detail 
Paris, Mr, Schunan in his opening statement to me sub- 
stantially met us on the points which we have been impressing 
on the French without success up to this point. Mf, Schuman 
reaffirmed the acceptance of responsibility for Indochina by 
France; he acknowledged that US assistance riust be supplemen- 
tary and not substituting; he assured us that the March 8 
agreements would be loyally executed and liberally implcnanted; 
he stated that the Cabinet had taken the decision to establish 
a new ministry for handling the affairs of the Associated 
States, Mr, Schu&an did not lhake exaggerated requests for 
aid and seemed gratified with what I was able to tell him. 
In effect > I said that I was hotoful that for the balance 
of the fiscal year amounts might be found for both military 



■V 



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- dECRET 

#SECT0 256 r liay Uj 9 pja from London 

end pccsioaio rid coalttg up to the neighborhood of $20 million/ 
that we were proceeding urgently on the top priority military 
items requested by the French and that I was hopeful favorable 
action on legislation now before Congress would enable us to 
continue military and economic support in the fiscal year 1951 « 
On balance I feel that the talks with the French on the subjee' 
of Indochina vera successful. 



* 



. SECRET 



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• 



DEPARTMENT OP STATE. 

FOR THE PRESS MAY 25, 1950 

No. 5^5 



U.S. FORMALLY ANNOUNCES INTENT TO ESTABLISH 
AN ECONOMIC AID MISSION TO THE THREE ASSO- 
CIATED STATES OP INDOCHINA 



On Wednesday, May 2*t, Charge d'affaires 
Edmund Guillen delivered the following letter to 
the Chiefs of State of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia 
or their representatives at Saigon, Simultaneously, 
Ambassador Bruce delivered an identical letter to 
the President of the French Union in Paris, 

The text of the letter follows: 

n I have the honor to inform you that the 
Government of the Unitod States has decided to 
initiate a program of economic aid to the States of 
Cambodia j Laos, and Vietnam. My Government has 
reached this decision in order to assist Cambodia, 
Laos, and Vietnam to restore stability and pursue 
their peaceful and democratic development. 

"With these purposes! in mind, the United States 
Government is establishing, with headquarters in 
Saigon and associated with United States Legation, . 
a special economic mission to Cambodia, Laos, 
and Vietnam. This mission will have the responsi- 
bility of working with the Governments of Cambodia, 
Laos, and Vietnam and with the French High Com- 
missioner in developing and carrying out a co- 
ordinated program of economic aid designed to assist 
the three countries in restoring their normal 
economic life. The members of the American economic 
mission will at all times be subject to -the authority 
of the Government of the United States and will not 
become a part of the administrations of the Asso- 
ciated States. . • 

"The Government of the United States recognizes 
that this American assistance will be complementary 
to the effort made by the three As socked States 
and France, without any intention of substitution. 
American aid is designed to reinforce the joint 
effort of Franco and the governments and peoples 



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of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam* on whom rests 
primary responsibility for the restoration of 
security and stability. 



th 



ie 



"United States economic aid will be granted 
accordance with separata bilateral agreements 



tj>- 



in 

between each of the Associated States and the 

United States of America, The approval of these 



'eeznezits will be subject to legal conventions 



o 



existing between the, Associated States and France. 
Initial economic aid operations, however, may 
begin prior to the conclusion of these agreements • 

"The United States Government is of the 
opinion that it would be desirable for the three 
governments and the French High Commissioner to 
reach agreement among themselves for the coordina- 
tion of those matters relating to the aid program 
that are of common interest. The American economic 
mission will maintain contact with the three Assp- 
. o la ted States, vrith the French High Commissioner 
in Indochina and, if desired, with any body which 
may be set up by the Associated States and France 
in connection with the aid program- 

■ 

*"Mr. Robert Blum has been appointed Chief of 
the United States special economic mission to 
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam* 

> 
"Identical letters are being addressed today 
-.to the governments of Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and 
the President of the French Union," 

The letter of intent refers only to economic 
aid which will be based on the recommendations of 
the Griffin mission which recently made a survey 
trip to Southeast Asia and carried on consulta- 
tions with the leaders and technicians of Indochina. 

Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced the 
policy of United States aid to Indochina at Paris 
on May 8 when he released this statement following 
an exchange of views with Foreign Minister Schuman 
of France; 

■ 

"The Foreign- Minister and I have just had an 
exchange of views on the situation in Indochina and 
are in general agreement both as to the urgency 
of the situation in that area and as to the 



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necessity for remedial action. We have noted the 
fact that the problem of meeting the threat to 
the securityoof Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos which 
now enjoy Independence within the French Union is 
primarily the responsibility of Prance and the 
governments and peoples of Indochina. The United 
States recognizes that the solution of the Indo- 



Sta 

china problem depends both upon the restoration 
of security and upon the development of genuine 
nationalism and that United States assistance can 
and should contribute to these major objectives. 

"The United States Government convinced that 
neither national Independence nor democratic 
evolution exist in any area dominated by Soviet 
imperialism, considers the situation to be such 
as to warrant its according economic aid and 
military equipment to the Associated States of 
Indochina and to Prance In order to assist them 
in restoring stability and permitting these states 
to pursue their peaceful and democratic development . " 






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DEPARTMENT OF ST/TE 



FOR TIE TRESS 



JUIJE 3, 1950 

NO. 5B3 



The following is the text of a letter of June 2 from 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson to the Honorable Robert Allen 
Griffin, upon the conclusion of his assignment as Head of the 
Special Economic r<iiss:Lon to Southeast Asia: 



"Dear Mr. Griffin: 

"I congratulate you upon the successful conclusion of the 
Special Economic Mission to Southeast Asia which you led and 
extend to you and those on your staff my warmest personal thanks 
for the careful and thorough job you did. In surveying so large 
an area under conditions which called for constant diplomatic 
tact and skillful technical appraisal under the severest time 
pressure you performed with outstanding ability a most difficult 
assignment . 



o< 



rl 0n the basis of your recom tlons the United States 
Government is launching a program which will offer rapid economic 
aid to those countries for which you drew up plans. The ourpose 

you well know, is to mobilize the natural 
these countries for the improvement of 
the people and the strengthening of 



of 



this assistance, as 
and human resources of 
the general welfare of 
democratic governments 



throughout Southeast Asia. 



"The fresh approach you took, unhampered by preconceived 
plans 3 and the creative ability which you displayed in workir 
out a program with the approval of the Asian governments con- 
corned have contributed much to the auspicious launching of 
this important program. 

"Sincerely yours, 



"DEAN ACHESON 



"The Honorable 

"Robert Allen Griffin, 

"Pebble Beach, California." 



* # 



335 



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IMMEDIATE RELEASE 



r4*H» 



JONS 21, 1950 



StATEMEMT BY THE PRESIDENT 



In Korea the Government forces, which were armed 
to prevent border raids and to preserve internal 
security , were attacked by invading forces from 
North Korea* The Security Council of the. United 
Nations called upon the invading troops to cease 
hostilities and to withdraw to the 38th parallel. 
This they have not done, but on the contrary have 
pressed the attack. The Security Council called 
upon all members of the United Nations to render 
every assistance to the United Nations in the execu- 
tion of this resolution. In these circumstances I 
have ordered United States air and sea forces to 
give the Korean Government troops cover and support. 



The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all 
doubt that Communism has passed beyond the vise of 
subversion to conquer independent nations and will 
now use armed invasion and war, It has defied the 
orders of the Security Council of the United Nations 
issued to B preserve international peace and security. 
In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by 
Communist 'forces would be a direct threat to the 
security of the Pacific area and to United States 
forces performing their lawful and necessary func- 
tions in that area. 

Accordingly,! have ordered the Seventh Fleet 
to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary 
of this action I am calling upon the Chinese Govern- 
ment on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations 
against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see 
that this is done. The determination of the future 
status of Formosa must await the restoration of 
security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with 
Japan, or consideration by the United Nations. 

I have also directed that United States Forces 
in the Philippines be strengthened and that military 
assistance to the Philippine Government be accelerated. 

I have similarly directed acceleration in the 
furnishing of military assistance to the forces of 



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• 






France and the Associated States In Indo China 
and the dispatch of a military mission to pro- 
vide close working relations with those forces. 

I know that all members of the United Nations 
will consider carefully the consequences of this 
latest aggression in Korea in defiance of the 
Charter of the United Nations, A return to the 
rule of force In international affairs would have 
far reaching effects- The United States will 
continue to uphold the rule of lav/. 

I have instructed Ambassador Austin, as the 
representative of the United States to the 
Security Council, to report these steps to the 
Council, 



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751G. 5-K&P/7-150! Secret- File 

OUTGOING TSLSGKAM 

AMLKGATIOF , July 1. 1950c 

* 

SAIGOM. . 
No B k. 

TOMAP ' 

DBPT desires clarify principles governing US MIL aid 
Indochina and ascertain that all parties to agreement 
fully understand and concur in arrangements for division 
of aid, TRAITS of title, reception, distribution, account- 
ing, maintenance and use this aid. 

A« Princip3.es. ■ •• 

Basic principles governing grant of aid are: 

• 

1* Provide MIL assistance as supplementary to FH 
assistance and with their concurrence^ to the thre^ ASSOC 
States in order assist them in achieving internal security. 
It is fi ly believed that such security is essential pre- 
requisite ESTAB of stable cc omy and conditions wherein 
ECON assistance 1 aid such as Point IV can effectively 
be applied * Aid to St: s will enable them develop their 
regular armies and to extent considered desirable in ac- 
cordance Section D 5 below , their irregular forces (garde 
civile 5 auto-defense units )■ Fighting conditions Indochina 
make it desirable utilize to greater extent native troops 
adaptable to conditions of area* 

2* Provide assistance army of FK Union so that this 
force may be strengthened in its resistance to COMMIE 
aggression booh from within and without Indochin-i* 




3» Hecent ctevel.oj its Korea indicate possible diver- 
sionary efforts elsewhere by COMMIES. Events : , therefore 



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involving addi- 



reQuire reasses :;nfc aid requirements FR, involving 
tional assistance by US at expense aid ASSOC States. 
Until such eventuality develops DHPT will continue give 
strongest support possible to ASSOC States in order develop- 
ment independent and stable GOVTS shall not be impeded 
and their position strengthened in eyes IFTURFATL public 
opinion. ■ " 



B. Military Aid Agreement. 




C Application Agreement* 

1. TBAKS titles receipt, distribution, accounting ^ 
maintenance cf US MIL assistance furnished, 

DEFT desires be assured MIL aid prograra will be ad- 
ministered in most efficient manner * Since forces ASSOC 
States are not yet fully organized DEPT hopes PR and ASSOC 
States will ESTAB mutually .suitable working arrangements 
(RE? LEGT3L l :-60) and subsequently will work in close COO? 
\ LEG and its 11AAG to assur SATIS handling and utilization 

of US JUL aid provided, 

REFTEL PARA II indicates FR and ASSOC States already 
developing such working arrangement for HIL EQUIP destine^ 
ASSOC States, DEPT and I proceeding assumption pro- 
. - cedures outlined now effective f and particularly that 

(a) HMC is official consignee >UIP destined each ASSOC . 
Si&tej (b) I i or RE? of lillG has been or will be designated 
to take title to and receipt for such EQU1 and (c) actual 
ttnlo; ; reception 3 asr-v-.bling, distribution, protection^ 
and continued iraintenance,, including stroking of spare 
parts 5 such EQUIP vriil.be as indicated c I^e:ire LEG eon- 
fii;::u ' . 



si m 



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751G.5-KAP/7-150 



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D* Aid to Unofficial Forces. 

. DEPT concurs MIL aid SHLD be supplied units such as 
Caodai, Catholics, etc* Such &%& f however } SHLD not ho 
given direct either by US or Fit* DEPT strongly feels aid 
to these units* must be distributed only by ASSOC States j 
at discretion of Chiefs of State with concurrence FPU ( 
Such aid SHLD prove excellent POLIT weapon encourage inte- 
gration these currently useful but potentially troublesome 
groups with regular forces ASSOC States. As active part 
of KATL forces these units SHLD prove to be valuable as sis 
tance guerrilla fighting. Uncontrolled , with possibility 
direct aid, they may well become embarassing liability. 



ACHESON 



FE:PSA:D:;Coor3 . 
S/J©A:V/Galbraith 



SECR^ 



* 



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>"S ) - C s~\tzmt*& Hooting 

5 O V* 25 July 195 






Indor C hlna 




a. U.S. Folic;- v&th respect to Indo-China as approved by the 
resident .. .-. ■ pi'il 1950 concludes that: 

(1) :*: -CMna Is a key area or Southeast Asia and Is under 
l; sdiato tlix eat. 

(2) ' neighboring countries of Thailand and Bnma could bo 
c; iii tall under Co; mist donination. if Indo-Chins were 
cc rolled by ^ Coaaamist-ddninated government. 33i& balance 
of Southed it Asia uould then to In grave hazard* 

* 

■ 

(3) Accordingly, the Departments of State and Defense should 






.b. On 10 April 1950 the JCS concurred in the above conclusion 

and" early iiapleiaentation or railitary aid programs for 

I: .-China,, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines ansa Buanaa* Such 

pre is to be closely controlled and be Integrated with 1 
political and economic programs. * . 

» 

c. c : v Jnly 1950 the JC3 (o'.c.S. 192 V**) approved the folleslng 
in their :.-vi- of :;SC 73. 

■ 

**X£ the Chinese Cc:i:.;unists provide overt military assistance 
to South b Asian Consaunist elements* the United States should 
prevail upon the British to reverse their proffers of recognition' 
to Co: " nist China and to provide such nilitary assistance as lo 
practi blc to assist the Bur ?>e and/or the French in resisting 
Chinese 0:: --unlet aggression* In additions 

V„ If overt military assistance Is provided the Viet Minh 
fore of Xnda-Chlnaj the United Stater* should increase its 
!£DA? assl ice to the French and ur^e the French to continue 
an i ivo Cofense^ with the United States Giving consideration 
to the provision of air and naval assistance* 



n p* SSie United States should ask the United Kation3 to 
call UT>oa r ":>or nations to Rialce forces available to resist 



the CI e Coassomlst aggression* 11 



Chi: o CosEiunlst Military ooves agaixst Southeast Ania 
st in ■ near future are possible and in such an ant the 

tf«3, shou! v prepared to* provide military assistance short of 

acl - ion of U.S. Ar^ed Forces at this tine* 



• 



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* i 






t ou h 



> 

; i . - -^ 



Ji-w 



/N 



b 






J5 



I 14 



K -* 













JSPC sul tittod a report (J.C.5* 192 V 2 ^ ■ 
consideration by the JCS which included the* 
eronce to Southeast Asia: 

"She Trench military position in Indo-China has continued 



V/' 






Ho unusual Chinese Cciiiaunlot or Yietmlnh 



activ - vo occurred sine© tho Koroan invasion* VJhile the 
entire JSaot Asia situation Is potentially explosive thosva are no 
present indications that the situation Bill bo isaraediately worsened 
una ts the Korean situation further deteriorates • l/ith respect to 
; \ P 5 3 j and Kalaya, i: ^rnal subversive noves will 

;.':,y r; In the chief threats to the established savexssaenfcs* 
ChSjios > Co-:rr.v:Ists i;ould probably novo against these countries 
only if first successful in Inclo-China* « 



« 



„ i 






n (l) In the event of Chinese Conaaunlst noves against In&o- 
China or Burma, U-S* military equipment and supplies, would 
be required on an increased scale and U,»S # naval and air 
forces Eight bo called upon to assist the Preach in Indo- 

It is unlilcely that U*S forces would be errployed in 
Shis is considered to bo an area of British respond- 



China* 



ility. 



?{2) :c? Isdo-China, Br a and Ehailand :;^ro to fall under 
Ccszsunist domination, British forces in Malaya should be 
i tig nentcd* Except for' possible naval support, it is unlilcolj 
that U.S„ arc^ci forces would be employed in HaXaya since this 



a 



*3 >*^ *•* » -^ 



V .... 



a of British responsibility, 



-■! 



— 



• 



3i»2 

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SECRET 



751G.5MAP/8-750: Secret File 



IK COMING TELEGR* 



FROM 
TO: 



NO: 



Saigon 



Rec'd: 



Secretary of State 
170, August 7, 5 P**a 



August 7, 1950 
7:10 p.m. 



Survey mission has completed initial report on military 
assistance for Indochina which is being dispatched to FMACC 
by courier". Basically the French objectives appear to 
coincide with US objectives in the country. The military 
situation confronting the French in Indochina is 
internal against the Viet iiinh and impending external 
against Coia-nunist China. The French forces after approxi- 
mately ? years of warfare are stalemated against Ko Chi 
Minh and appear to have lost considerable amount of offensive 
spirit This failure to restore internal security is at- 
tributed by French bo lack of cooperation of noncommunist 
people and deep seated hatred and distrust of French 
which exists among large part of the population. Military 
action alono cannot solve this internal security problem. 
A political solution which includes concessions on the part 
of France and definite plans possibly backed by the US or 
the UN for eventual independence if Vietnam Cambodia and 
Laos is a necessary complement to military action. The 
overall assistance (military, economic and political) re? 
quested up to this time is considered inadequate to fully 
consummate US broad objectives in Indochina and assistance 
will have to be provided to the French Indochina on an 
increased scale to resist the encroachment of Communism 
in SEA. ; . « 






« 



HEATH 



JAK-.RFB 



SECRET 



• . 



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TOP SECRET 



7 51G. 5/8-2350: Top Secret File 



OUTGOING TELEGR/M 



AMLEGATION 
SAIGON 



September 1, 1950* 



NO 238 

DEPT has viewed growing signs of POUT and MIL de- I 
terioration in Indochina with increasing concern. The : 
failure of the Vietnam GOVT and its leaders to inspire 
support} the slow pace of the Pau COKF and inability or 
disinclination of Bao Dai to assume leadership as exempli- 
fied by his prolonged stay in FR are among disturbing 
POLIT factors. Of even greater immediate import are MIL 
considerations - the increasing indications of CHI COMMIE- 
Vict Minh military collaboration and ever present threat 
of CHI invasion,, 

Whatever prompt action we can take ourselves or recom- 
mend to FR to stem unfavorable tide must bear FOL objectives 
in Blind: 1) Have sufficient dramatic impact to stir all 
factions of Vietnamese POLIT thought, preferably to extent 
of swaying fence sitters; 

2) Serve to repudiate claim that FR are not sincere 

in implementing MAR 8th Accords and are using "independenca 
within FR Union 11 as a cloak for colonialism; 

3) Have sufficient psychological attraction to na- 
tionalists to appease, at least temporarily * their hung 
for further evidences of autonomy; 

h) Will not in any way jeopardize the already inade- 
quate FR and allied MIL potential in Indochina; 

# 

5) Attract other potential non-C01UllE combatant units 
(Cao Daists, Hoa Hao, Catholics) to side of FR Union 
troops; 

6) Cause no further depletion of '/est EUR MIL poten- 
tial and even improve it by releasing FR troops from ser- 
vice in IC. 

TOP SECRET 



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o 



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751G. 5/8-2350 

i 

DSPT concurs fully with Paris and Saigon that forma- 
tion of NATL armyj at least in Vietnam and possibly to 
lesser extent in Laos and Cambodia, is action which ap- 
proaches closest to these requirements while still remain- 
ing within realm of possibility. 

We are, nevertheless, conscious of complexity of 
technical and other problems involved in accomplishing 
task and aware that it might be matter of years before 
armies actually exist in usual sense. We, therefore, are 
seeking means whereby psychological benefits of action 
may begin to be harvested IHKED even though full realiza- 
tion must, in fact, be delayed. The FOL plan is therefore 
submitted for your study, cc 3-wfc and discussion with ap~* 
proprlate Fr authorities and possibly Bao Dai. 

1) At earliest moment it be solemnly (and simul- 
taneously) declared by FR (Auriol?) and Bao Dai that in 
keeping with provisions of March 8 Accords, Vietnam KATL 
Army under command of Emperor will become fact and that 
all indigenous troops then serving in FR Union forces are 
incorporated into new NATL Army. 

2) That pursuant to ART 3 of Mar S Accords it is. de- 
clared that a state of KATL emergency exists and that Kis 
Majesty as Commander in Chief has therefore placed KATL 
forces under command of FR High Command in the face of 
threat of FON invasion. 



3) That FOL emergency 1IATL Army will be released from 
service under FR command to resume fundamental task of 

.d that in meanwhile off i- 
proceed. 



assuring internal order, etc., an 
cer and NCO training urogram will 



These are bare outlines which if found feasible may . 
later be enlarged to include invitation to other partisan 
forces to join colors, provide for Viet staff officers on 
FR staff, devise program for replacement FR officers by 
Viets, etc. 

In suggesting such, a plan DEPT does not seek to 
oversimplify problem or overlook drawbacks. It is realized 
that for the time being this will only be .a paioer transfer 
which will be SU3J to customary Viet criticism of another 



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75iG.?/8~2350 



TOP SECRET 



meaningless gesture,, However, it wld legally establish 
a Viet Army presumably with distinctive insignia and to 
this extent represent a step forward. Vie believe need 
for action so great we must give consideration every possi- 
ble action within practical limitations* 

- 

Nor does DBPT intend ignore obvious corollary Alphand 
Pleven request 200 billion francs two year period for 
establishment Natl Army a Paris may inform French this 
question receiving active consideration and comment 
thereon will be forthcoming soonest » 

For UR GOKF INFO matter of formation KATL Armies will 
be brought up in conjunction our discussions IC at 
FONMxITCONF preliminaries of which commence today, UR 
and Paris recent reporting this related SUBJS of which 
UR 265 Aug 23 outstanding have been very helpful. 

. ACHE-SON 






FE;PSA:DMCoors 

WMGibson. 



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* 



TRIPARTITE MEETING 
FOREIGN MINISTERS OP FRANCE, UNITED KINGDOM, AND UNITED, STATES 

New York, New York - September 1950 



4 . 



* . 



SUMMARY MINUTES * 
Fourth meeting, Thursday , September . 14, 3:00 p.m. 






/ 



• 






IV. Southeast Asia (Agenda Item 7 A) 

10. M. Schuman expressed his approval of the state- 
ments on Indo-China in the paper on Southeast Asia 
(Doc. 8, Sept.- 1, 1950) 2 . He wished, however, to 
make a few additional comments. France favored 
large national armies in Indo-Chlna. There were 
already 77*000 troops in the armies of the three 
Associated States and 44,000 Indo-Chinese nationals 
in the army of the French Union. Great diffi- 
culties were being encou ^ed In building up the 
national armies. There was difficulty in finding 
an adequate staff of trained officers and in 
financing the equipment for the troops. The French 
Union army in Indo- China now numbered 150,000 men. 
Financing of this army also Imposed a heavy burden 
on France and assistance was urgently needed. 
The proximity of Communist China was an additional 
threat which made it necessary for France to request 
direct tactical air support from the United States 
in the event of Chinese Communist aggression. 
This was in addition to the present need of France 
for aircraft in Indo-China. Finally, in connection 
with the tripartite conversations mentioned in 
part B of Document 8 f France would selcome Jslc/ in 
particular military talks to discuss the means of 
meeting Chinese Communist attacks on Indo-China. 



i 



i 



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Not included here. 



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— ** 



11- Mr. Acheson stated that his government at- ' 



tached the greatest importance to the increase 






of military forces in Indo-China, including both 
national and French Union forces- The U.S. had 
given substantial assistance in the past and was 
prepared to increase this assistance. As to 
financial aid, the United States would be able 
to furnish items of military equipment manu- 
factured in the United States, but could not supply 
money to be used locally. Mr. Acheson stated 
that the United States could not furnish the direct 
tactical air support requested by M. Schuman, 
Finally, the military discussions described in 
Part B of Doc. 8 should take place soon in the 
Far East and should Involve military commanders 
now engaged in operations in that area, to study, 
among other things, measures to be taken. 



SECRET 



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» : 



P0*y ff59 ■■*"" r ^~'' ~~ ' ~* »' 
1 




TOP SECRET 



SEAC D-21, Rev. 1 



October 11, 1950 



SOUTHEAST ASIA AXD POLICY COMMITTEE 



Proposed Statement of U.S. Policy on 

Indo-China for KSC Consideration 



The attached paper 9 prepared by the Department of Defense and the 
Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs of the Department of 
State, is a revision and expansion of the brief draft statement con- 
sidered by the Committee on October 6. It is now being considered by 
the JCS. 



Martin G. Cramer 
Secretary 



COPY 



., ...J3 1 



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3 a 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AMD DEFENSE 

FROM: Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee 

The Committee is. submitting for approval by higher authority, 
the attached draft joint memorandum to the National Security Council 
on Indochina. This draft joint memorandum contains a statement of 
U.S. policy with, respect to Indochina. It is the Committee's view 
that the U.S. Government should decide, In principle, to contribute, . 
in whatever ways are feasible and desirable, to the formation of 
national armies in Indochina. Such a contribution appears to the 
Committee as the most effective method by which the U.S. can, at 
present, strengthen the security of Indochina and add to its stabi- 
lization. 

The Committee would like to point out that the extent and char- 
acter of the contribution which the U.S. might consider furnishing 
for the formation of national armies in Indochina can only be deter- 
mined by negotiations between officials of the French and U.S. Govern- 
ments, on a ministerial level. During the course of those negotiations 
French officials may be expected to present, for the first time, de- 
tailed information on their plans for the formation of these armies. 
Approval of the draft joint memorandum ■would provide the authoriza- 
tion from the President for U.S. representatives to consider and act 
with full Knowledge of the plans of the French. 

It is recommended that, if negotiations are conducted with 
representatives of the French Government, U.S. representatives secure 
French acceptance of the following conditions which shall attach to 
the extension of U.S. assistance in the formation of national armies 
in Indochina: (l) French Union forces would not be withdrawn from 
Indochina until such Associated States armies were fully trained and 
ready to act effectively in replacement; (2) France would not decrease 
its outlays for Indochina below the 1950 rate during the period of the 
American military aid requested; (3) the national armies projects would 
have the approval of the three Associated States governments; (k) the 
High Commissioner for Indochina, the French Command, and the three 
Associated States would maintain full consultative relations with the 
Legation and MAAG during the period of the formation of the armies. 

If approved, this joint memorandum would provide the measures 
called for by NSC 6k - "Position of the U.S. with Respect to Indo- 
china", approved by the President on 23 April 1950. It is under- 
stood that the draft of this joint memo will be reviewed by the 
JCS before it is finally approved by the Secretary of Defense. 




I B 



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copy . in 



'V : J ^ ' P 4 



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l *" '^V 






I . 



DRAFT STATEMENT OF U« S. POLICY ON INDOCHINA 

FOR USG C0KSIDE5A7I0N 
(Reference NSC 64, NSC 73 A) 



1. Firm non-Communist control of Indochina is of critical, 
strategic importance to U. S. national interests. The loss of 
Indochina to Communist forces would undoubtedly lead to the loss 

of Southeast Asia as stated in NSC 6k m In this respect , the National 
Security Council accepts the strategic assessment of Southeast Asia 
which the Joint Chiefs of Staff made on 10 April 1950 (Annex No. 1.). 

2. Regardless of current U. S. commitments for provision of 
certain military assistance to Indochina, the U. S. will not commit 
any of its armed forces to the defense of Indochina against overt , 
foreign aggression, under present circumstances. In case of overt 
aggression, the Department of Defense will immediately re-assess the 
situation, in the light of the then existing circumstances. 

3 # To strengthen the security of Indochina against external 
aggression and augmented internal Communist offensives, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff are authorized to conduct military talks with U. K. 
and French military commanders in the Far East. Such talks would 
seek, first, an agreed military plan for the internal defense of 
Indochina and, second, the coordination of operations in Southeast 
Asia in the eve it of invasion. Such talks should clearly indicate 
to French authorities that increases in U.S. military aid will be 



provided 



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. 



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A if .- ; V--. . ' ' . ;; 
Hi : \ J 



provided in accordance with operational plans which are acceptable to 
the U. S. and are compatible with U. S. capabilities In the light of 
other U. S. commitments, 

k. The JJ. S. should secure plans from the French and the Asso- 
ciated States for j and assist the French and the Associated States in 
the prompt acceleration of the formation of liew national armies of the 
three Associated States (Annex Mo, 3 contains descriptive information 
on the magnitude of such plans). The employment of such armies would 
be for the purpose of maintaining internal security with a view to 
releasing the buTk: of the French forces in Indochina for other duties, 
in accordance with the strategic plan for the defense of Indochina. 
In due course , as these national armies are able to assume responsi- 
bility for the functions of national defense, the U. 8. win favor the 
phased withdrawal from Indochina of French forces In order to strengthen 
the defense of Metropolitan France under the NATO arrangements, U. S. 
and French support for the formation of national armies in Indochina 
should be given wide and vigorous publicity. Since it is a policy of 
the United States (HSC ^8/2) to use its influence in Asia toward resolv- 
ing the colonial-nationalist conflict in such a way as to satisfy the 
fundamental demands of the Nationalist movement ^ while at the same time 
minimizing the strain on the colonial powers who are* our Western allies, 
the U. S, should ? for the time "being, continue to press the French to 
carry out 5 in letter and spirit , the agreements of March 8, 19^9 and 
the conventions of December 30, 19^-9 providing for self-government 



within the French Union, 



5. Since 



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5. since the security of the Associated States of Indochina TrfLll 
"be affected, to seme extent, by the capabilities of neighboring or 
nearby countries to resist Communist encroachments, the U«S # should 

use its influence, i?herever appropriate, to promote close relations 
and firm understandings > in political, military and economic fields, 
among the Associated States and Thailand, Burma and the Philippines. In 
particular > the U.S. should seek to envelope full diplomatic relations 
between the Associated states and other countries in Southeast Asia, 
collaboration among military staff officers of these countries on the 
security of neighboring or adjacent frontiers, and effective agreements 
on the control of arms smuggling and the movement of subversive agents. 
The U S W continues to favor the entry of the three Associated states 
into the United Nations. As a culmination of these efforts the U.S. 
should encourage the Associated States, in due course, to participate 
in such arrangements for regional security under Article 51 ^id 52 of 
the United nations 1 Charter, as mil effectively contribute to the 
common defense of the area. 

6. The U.S. Tri.ll have to devolte substantial resources if the 

■ 

policies stated above are to be carried out effectively enough to 
assist in strengthening the security of Indochina. It is impossible 
at this time to set the exact cost in dollars to the United States of 
the formation of the national armies. When the details of the U«S 
contribution have been determined, after discussions -with representatives 

of France 



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of France and the Associated States, The U # S plan for assisting 
in the formation of the national Armies of Indochina Trill be 
submitted to the National Security Council for approval. 



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AMEX NO. 1 



STRAEEC-IC ASSESSMENT OF SOUJHEAST ASIA 

1.. On 10 April 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made the following 
■ 
strategic assessment of Southeast Asia, including Indochina: 

"%, The mainland states of Southeast Asia also are at 

present of critical strategic importance to the United States 

because : 

a. They are the major sources of certain strategic 
materials required for the completion of United States 
stock pile projects; 

b. The area is a crossroad of communications; 

c 9 Southeast Asia is a vital segment in the line 

of containment of communism stretching from Japan southward " 

* 

and around to the Indian Peninsula. The security of 
the three major non-Coumunist base areas in this quarter 
of the uorld — Japan, India, and Australia — depends in a 
large measure on the denial of Southeast Asia to the Com- 
munists. If Southeast Asia is lost, these three "base areas 
i "will tend to be isolated from one another; 

a. The fall of Indochina would undoubtably lead to 

< 

the fall of the other mainland states of Southeast Asia. 

Their fall "would: 

(l) Requrie changing the Philippines and 

Indonesia from supporting positions in the Asian 

offshore island chain to front-line bases for the 

* « 

defense 

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defense of the Western Hemi sphere. It would also 
call for a review of the strategic deployment of 
United States forces in the Far East; and 

(2) Bring about almost immediately a dangerous 
condition with respect to the internal security of 
the Philippines, Malaya, and Indonesia, and would 
contribute to their probable eventual fall to the 
Communists; 

e* The fall of Southeast Asia would result in the 
virtually complete denial to the United States of the 
Pacific litteral of Asia, Southeast Asian mainland area 



s 



are iinportant in the conduct of operations to contain 
Communist expansion; 

f . Communist control of this area would alleviate 
considerably the food problem of China and would make 
available to the USSR important strategic materials. In 
this connection, Soviet control of aJJL the major components 
of Asia f s war potential might become a decisive factor affeet5.ng 
the balance of power between the United States and the 
USSR» *A Soviet position of dominance over. Asia, Western 
Europe, or both, would oonsistute a major threat to United 
States security 1 ; and 

g # A Soviet position of dominance over the Par East 

could also threaten the United States position in Japan 

■ 

since 



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since that country could thereby be denied its Asian 
market s^ sources of food and other raw materials. The 
feasibility* of retention by the United States of its 
Asian offshore island bases could thus be jeopardized, TT 



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AEMEX HO- 2 



MILITARY SITUATION HI EIDOCEBIA 



• 



1. View of the Joint Chiefs of Staff . In a memorandum of 

7 September to the Secretaiy of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
stated the following: 

"Prior to 1 January 1951* the currently planned level of 
United States military aid to the French and native allied 
forces of Indochina should increase their military capa- 
bilities but not to the extent of counterbalancing Viet 
Minh capabilities. In view of these considerations, the 
Joint Chiefs* of Staff suggest that the proposed United 
States position take cognizance that the situation in 
Indochina is to be viewed with alarm and that urgent and 
drastic action is required by the French if they are to 
avoid military defeat in Indochina. Such a setback would 
not only be detrimental to the prestige of the French and 
the United States but it could also jeopardise the United 
States military position in Asia." 

2. Conclusions of Joint MDAP Survey MissioH. After observing 

conditions in north and south Indochina, General Erskine, Chief of 

the Military Group of the Joint MDAP Survey Mission in Southeast 

Asia, reported the following conclusions on 5 August 1950: 

"(a) Military assistance will have to be provided to the 
French in Indo -China on a considerable scale if the 
broad objective of assisting in resisting the 
encroachment of Communism in Southeast Asia is to be 
successfully achieved. The assistance which has been 
requested, up to this time, is considered inadequate 
to fully consummate the U.S. broad objective. Additional 
material and equipment will require* additional personnel. 

"(b) The French forces in Indo-China, after approximately 

five years of warefare, are Ltalemated. Casualties in 
this type of warfare have been very high. 

"(c) The French Command and troops, after a very brief study 
and observations, appear to have lost a considerable 
amount of offensive spirit and have been frustrated 
in their efforts to restore interna], security. 

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"(d) The failure of the French to restore internal security- 
is attributed to the lack of cooperation on the majority 
of the people in Indo-China and a deep-seated hatred 
end distrust which exists amont a large part of the 
population. A large measure of the distrust and non- 
cooperative action on the part of the people has 
undoubtedly "been inspired by Communist propaganda and 
the desire of the Oriental to f push the white man out 
of Asia. f 

tr (e) Military action above can not solve the internal security 
problem in Indo -China beaause of the lack of cooperation 
on the part of the people, the distrust and hatred of 
the French, and the effect of Communist activities and 
propaganda. A political solution, which includes con- 
cessions on the part of the French, and definite plans for 
eventual independence of Viet Nam is a necessary com- 
plement to military action. 

"(f) The failure to organize Viet Nam armed forces as a 

separate entity and employ them as Vietnamese troops, 
not as French Union troops, has been the source of 
much dissatisfaction on the part of the people and 
has created a considerable amount of distrust which 
has •withdrawn the support of many people from French 
efforts . 

"(g) The Viet Minh still controls the major portion of Indo- 
China and, for all practical purposes, have the French 
forces pinned to their occupied and garrisoned areas 
to the extent that French movement is impossible through 
partically all areas without armed eucort. 

"(h) The Viet Minh forces ha,ve steadily grown in strength 

and improved their discipline and combat effectiveness. 
Much of the succes in these fields can be attributed 
to assistance and supplies from the Chinese Communists 
and Communist propaganda. 

"(i) A serious and dangerous external threat from Communist 
China exists along the northern frontier. 

"(j) The French forces disposed throughout Indo-China, with 

.their present equipment and organization, are not capable 
of dealing with the Viet Minh within the boarders of Indo- 
China and resisting a strong Chinese Communist attack 
from the north. The defenses along the frontier of Tonkin 



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are veal; and inadequate. The absence of artificial 
obstacles, demolition plans and adequate mibile re- 
serve s, adequate aircraft support , and the very small 
amount of ancillary, "which is now disposed so th^t it 
is ^practicable to coordinate and mass fires, appear 
to "be the most outstanding weaknesses in the Tonkin 
area. .Another important deficiency is to lack of 
sufficient personnel now available. Anti-tank defenses 
in the Toiikin area are practically non-existent. The 
Viet Minh activities in this area mil probably prevent 
the free movemtnt of such reserves as are maw available 
there . " 

♦ 

3. CIA Estimate of the Prospects for Chinese Communist Action 
in Indochina During 1950 (ORE 50-50, 7 September 1950T 

"Communist China at present possesses the Capability for a 
successful invasion of Indochina, If Communist China, as a partici- 
pant in the world Communist movement, were called upon to invade 
Indochina, it could probably be persuaded to initiate such 
an operation, Chinese Communist military commitments elsewhere 
would not necessarily militate against and invasion of Indochina 
because the Chinese Communists posses the forces necessary for 
military action - separately or simultaneously - against Indochina, 
Korea, Taiwan, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macao. 

"Despite this general capability and despite the existence 
of Chinese Communist military concentrations along the Indochina 
border, adequate for the task, it is estimated that an open Chinese 
Communist invasion - While possible and capable of being 
launched with little or no preliminary warning - is. improbable 
in 1950 because considerations ( from the standpoint of Ho Chi Minh, 
the Chinese Communists, and international Communism) favoring 
such action appear to be outweighed by considerations opposing it. 
It is highly probable, however, that the Chinese Communists will 
continue to expand military assistance to the Viet Minh forces (by 
measures short of open invasion) on a scale sufficient to provide 
those forces with the capability of achieving significant, but 
limited, objectives in 1950 and assuming that the French receive 
no more aid than is presently programmed, of eventually expelling 
the French without the add of a Chinese Communist invasion." 

k. Chinese Communist Military Capabilities (ORE 50-50) 

"Any invasion of Indochina by the Chinese Communists would 
probably be undertaken in cooperation with the forces of Eo Chi Minh, 
Sizable Chinese Communist military forces are in position 
to intex-vene in Indochina* Despite reports of actual and scheduled 
northward movements of certain Chinese Communist field forces, 
approximately 100,000 t roups remain deployed along the Indochinese 
border. These units could launch an invasion of Indochina without 



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appreciable f orewarning • Although reliable reports do not indicate 
the presence of armored units on the Indochina border, a 
division of armored cars, plus a "battalion of tanks attached to 
the Fourth Field Army, are stationed in South China -within 700 
miles of the frontier. Moreover, approximately 150,000 additional 
Chinese Communist troops could arrive at the Indochina border wi th- 
in ten days to "bolster initial invading forces. Even in the 
event of a simultaneous as suit on Taiwan, these feinforcements 
would he available and would bring the potential invading force to 
a total of at least 250,000 troops. In view of the Chinese 
Communists * improving capability for waterlift, it is possible 
that some Invasion forces might be moved by sea to Viet Minh-hold 
sections of the Indochina coast . There is no evidence, however, 
of Chinese Coiomunist preparations for such a move, 

"Although there have been no indications of any significant 
build-up of Chinese Communist Air Force strength in Southwest 
China and although this air force has not yet appeared in combat, 
the estimated 200-250 operational combat types (including fighters 
and light bombers) in the Chinese Communist Air Force could 
furnish effective air support to operations in Indochina, 
There are six airfields in China -within 170 miles of the Tonkin border. 
In addition, construction of new airfields and the restoration 
of others in Southwest China are reportedly in progress in the 
Tonkin Kwangsi border area and on Eeinen Island." 

5. Viet Minh Military Capabilities (OKS 50-50) 

"The forces of Ho Chi Minh, which have been engaged in resist- 
ance activities against the French since September 19-1-5; &^e 
capable of expanding their operations. Eo ! s organisation, 
commonly known as the f Viet Minh 1 , possesses approximately 92,500 
regular troops and an estimated 130,000 irregulars. The Viet 
Minh forces include 2,000 Khmer Tssaraka in Cambodia and 500 
Issaraks in Laos. 

"The Viet Minh forces are geared primarily for guarrilla 
■warfare. The demonstrated effectiveness of a few task forces, each- 
totaling as many as three to five thousand men and equiped with 
adequate infantry weapons and some artillary, points to a developing 
capability for more conventional warfare. Under present cir- 
cumstances, the Viet Minh should have little difficulty in main- 
taining relative j? reedam of action throughout most of indochina 
while simultaneously supporting pockets of resistance within 
French-occupied territory and continuing to harass French lines 
of communication. In addition, the Viet Minh is capable of 
seising one or more French border outposts and holding them for 
a short time at least. 



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"Following the de jure recognition of the democratic Republic 
of Vietnam* by Communist China and the USSR, a general plan for 
closer collaboration between the Chinese Communists and the Yiet 
Minh probably was formulated. As many as 10 to 20 thousand Viet 
Minh troops are being trained in Communist China. There is evi- 
dence that the Chinese Communists have supplied the Viet Minh 
with significant quantities of material, probably confined to 
small ams, ammunition, mortars, and light artillery. Access 
to training facilities in Communist China, the expansion of 
routes and facilities for supply, and the possibility of acceler- 
ating recruitment give the Viet Minh the potential capabilities 
for initiating a large-scale offensive against the French at an 
early date." 

6. Ca pabiliti es of French-Controlled Forces (ORE 50-50 ) 

■ ■ ■ ■■! !■ !■■■■■■— — ^ I Ml I | II ■ ■ »■■■■■ ■ I. . P ■ ■■ ! 1 ■ ■ ■ 1 ■ !■ L ■ 

"French ground, naval and air forces in Indochina are under 
the operational control of GEQ, Armed Forces in the Far East 
(FAE0). As of 1 July 1950 French regular ground forces totalled 
approximately 150,500 men.- An estimated 66,700 troops in the 
armies of the Associated States, although subject to the nominal 
political control of these states, are under FAE0 operational control. 
In addition there are 122,500 quasi-military and miscellaneous 
indigenous troops under over-all FAE0 control. Of these 
local forces, only the Vietnamese army, at present weal: and 
ineffective, has the potential for developing into a significant 
force. French ground forces are capable of penetrating the 
Viet-Minh held areas of Indochina but at the expense of 
garrison strength engaged in pacification duties elsewhere. The 
French have demonstrated a lack of aggressiveness. The French- 
controlled ground forces have a dual problem - the elimination of 
the Viet Minh. forces and the defense of the China border. Indi- 
cations are that current emphasis is on the former. Under these 
circumstances, the most they can hope to achieve in the immeidate 
future is the destruciton of enemy supply caches and the consequent 
postpomnent of a large-scale Viet Minh offensive. 

"The strength of the French Air Force in Indochina, which is 
severe strained by its actions against Viet Minh forces, presently 
totals 8k fighters and fighter-recormaissance aircraft, 68 
transports and 50 liaison planes. The level of serviceability 
of fighter aircraft, now about 55 percent, will probably continue 
to drop as maintenance shortages become more acute. Many of the 
French air Installations - few in number pjid generally in poor 
condition - a:re vulnerable to sabotage and some even to direct 
Viet Minh attack. 



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"French naval forces are adequate for supporting the army 
in small-sca3e amphibious operations and for conducting raids 
against the rebel-held sections of the Indochina coast. Their 
inability to maintain a complete "blockade of the coast is 
demonstarted by the extent of over-water arms smuggling now in progress. 
French Naval Forces, Far East, stationed in Indochina, consist of 
166 small craft and ships and 21 aircraft manned by 8,750 personnel. 
Vessels in the most important categories currently stationed in Indochina 
waters include one old cruiser, 11 fleet minesweepers, two LST's, 
nine submarine chasers of various types and a number of supporting 
service and repaid craft. Ilaval aircraft include nine patrol bombers 
and 12 reconnaissance aircraft." 



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. L . item* 



ANNEX NO. 3 



BJF0IMATI0N ON THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL 
AEMIES OF THE ASSOCIATED STATES 



1. General Considerations . The organization and utilization 
of manpower in the non- Communist countries of Asia is possibly the 
key to the successful development of the security of Indochina and 
of Asia* In several years of warfare, the French have discovered 
that the Vietnamese fighting for Ho Chi Minh provided tough and per- 
sistent forces. The military campaign in Korea has demonstrated that 
Koreans can handle modern weapons and caiduct sustained offensive and 
defensive operations. It may be presumed that Communist China, under 
the tutelage of often reported Soviet assistance, in developing inte- 
grated amies along modern lines. In addition, it would appear that 
Communist China has, for some time, actively benefited the North Korean 
armies and now is training and equipping the Viet Minh for operations 
in Indochina. The basic problem for the western powers is to find ways 
and means to utilize the manpower resources of Asia in order that the 
military forces of the west are not committed to actions in areas of 
limited or less strategic importance. 

2. The French Position , On 17 August 1950, U.S. Ambassador Bruce, 
in Paris, reported to the Department of State that Premier Pleven, in 
discussing with him the situation in Indochina, had stated that (a) the 



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only possible solution Fas to build up a strong and sufficient native 

i 

aiiny to make possible the gradual withdrawal of the French army for use 



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in Europe, (b) this was the only program that would convince the people 



of the three Associated States of Indochina of the honesty of French 
intentions to give then f ilLL independence within the French Union, " 
and (c) the French Government would welcome the replacement of French 
troops by indigenous forces and would aid in every way possible short 
of assuming an added financial burden which would directly impair its 
ability to increase its forces in Western Europe. Premier Pleven 
further stated that it was impossible for the French Government to 
implement this program due to the lack of funds. 

On 22 September, the French Ministers of Foreign Affairs and 
Defense inforaied the Secretaries of State and Defense of "the need to 
create immediately powerful national Indochinese armies due to neces- 
sity of repatriating as many French forces as possible, since 20 per- 
cent of French regular officers and ^0 percent of French noncoms were 
frozen in Indochina." Schuman and Moch stated that there were 72,000 
men in local armies but "the desired substantial increase in this 
number would present budgetary problems which neither France nor the 
Associated States could presently meet." 

Although the French have stated their objective, they have not, 
as yet, provided the U.S. Government with any firm figures on the 
size or the costs of the proposed national Armies. The French High 
Commissioner in Saigon has frequently used the figure of a regular 
Vietnamese forces of 120,000 men to be organized by July 1951* 



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3. Views of the U.S. Minister in Saigon . On 19 September, 

i 

Minister Heath, in Saigon, reported as follows: 

"There is little doubt in our minds here that it we are to find 
a fairly rapid cure for this 'civil war' which invites further Chinese 
intervention, native forces in the field must be greatly increased. 
This will, of course, involve more equipment and cash. Legation can- 
not state, of course, whether or how much it would be possible for 
French Government to increase its cash outlay in Indochina at this time. 
French finances might be able to afford some increase in their Indochina 
budgets. If they cannot, however, meet full bill for maintenance of 
increased national army and urgently needed pacification troops, then 
we shall be obliged to contribute some direct financial aid if we want 
this dangerously festering situation cleared up. I trust that French 
delegate now in Washington can provide prcanpt estimates as to French 
and Associated States financial possibilities in this regard. 

"Politically, I strongly hold opinion that purpose of national 

■ 

army concept will be dissipated unless Vietnam (and Cambodia and Laos 
as well) are brought into discussions, their wishes consulted and their 
desires met to the extent that military efficiency will permit. In 
this connection president Huu's most recent press conference, in which 
he declared that only Viet forces could obtain necessary rallyings and 
pacification brought him close to position advocated by nationalists 
of Nguyen Phen Long- Lam Viet stripe. Key figure in such consultations 
will, of course, be Bao Dai and I cannot emphasize too insistently my 
belief that the U.S. should make no definite large-scale commitments 

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for the support of the national army project without consultation 
with Bao Dai and determination exactly where he stands and what role 
he proposes to assume vis-a-vis the Viet national army. 

"Finally, but vith equal importance, I would strongly urge that 
definition of U.S. participation in policy and strategic decisions 
affecting the use of national armies and of American assistance fur- 
nished to them accompany any underwriting of the sort French have 
requested. This participation would involve continuing consultative 
relationships with French commanding general, with French military 
missions to the Associated States and with the high military committee 
and cannot he worked out, in its initial phases, away froa Indochina." 

h* Summary of Eon-Communist Indigenous Forces in Indochina * 
According to the military agreanents concluded, "bet ween France and the 

+ 

Governments of the three Associated States, in 19^9/ the French High 

Ccsnmand retains operational control over all military and security 

forces in Indochina as long as an emergency exists. The total number 

of non-Communist forces in Indochina, French and indigenous, amounts 

to 3^0*000 troops. French ground forces number about 150,000. These 

include kk, 000 indigenous regulars. The remainder of the total forces, 

amounting to sane 190,000, are divided approximately as follows: 

Vietnamese Regulars 28,200 

Vietnamese Auxiliaries 29,000 

Royal Khmer Army (Cambodia) 6,900 

Laotian National Amy 2, 600 

Forces of the Racial Minorities K, 500 

Semimilitary Forces 78,000 

FTE0 Auxiliaries 40, 000 

Total non-Communist Native Forces 189,200 

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TOP SECRET 



The Vietnamese Regulars and Auxiliaries , the Royal JChmer Army, and the 
Laotian National Army constitute some 66,000 troops aimed and trained to 
restore and maintain Internal security. The other categories in the 
above list are essentially local police or militia. The 66,000 troops 
presumably vould form the nucleus for the expanded national armies „ 



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OFFICE OF TEE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 



13 October 1950 



MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MALONY 



I have been reading over the draft statement of US policy 
on Indochina, in the light of the message which the French 
Premier sent Defense Minister Moch, who gave it to Secretary- 
Marshall. This message, along with other French expressions, 
highlights the cncc of the Indochina problem - the French 
are trying too little, too late, and not very hard. They 
have shown no vigorous leadership nor enlightened capacity. 
This observation leads to a number of implacable principles 
regarding U*S policy on Indochina. 

We must avoid, at all costs 5 the commitment of U.S. armed 
forces, even in a token or small scale fashion, for combat 
operations. Such a commitment would lead the French to shake 
off responsibilities and show even less initiative in Indochina. 
There are too many undone things to even consider such a 
commitment at this stage. And, even as a last resort, there 
would be serious objections to such a commitment from the U.8 d 
point of view. U.S. officials must be on guard against French 
attempts to pressure or panic us into some sort of a commitment. 
Failing to get a satisfactory statement from the U,S e , the 
French, over the next few months, may try a little psychologic el 
warfare on us, .They may speak hopelessly of a coming Dunkirk. 
They may intimate the necessity t-» come to an understanding 
■with the Chinese Communists. They may threaten to throw the 
problem into the United Nations, either in a political or a 
military way. The best defense against such tactics will be 
to make the French pull themselves up by their own efforts. 

All the current phases of the Indochina problem seem to 
lead to the conclusion that the proposed military staff talks 
will provide the most effective leverage for reversing the 
present defeatist management of the military aspect of 
Indochina. Our talks with the military representatives in 



■ 
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Washington were unproductive since it was impossible to 
discuss the actual situation in Indochina. The French 
Government in Paris has not yet been stunned into forthright 
and vigorous action. It is my impression that the U.S 
Government has not yet spoken frankly and bunt ly to the French 
regarding Indochina. Consequently ^ the staff talks should 
provide such an opportunity. 

The draft statement of U.S. policy in Indochina is 
weak from the political side. In the drafting stage the Defense 
representatives argued for a strong, hard-hitting policy on 
political and economic concessions. The State Department 
representatives flatly refused and continued to refase to consider 
Indochina in that manner. Consequently, the paper ended with 
a compromise. However, consideration should be given to making 
any large scale military, political and economical aid program 
conditional - the French talking vigorous political measures 
and reforms in Indochina. As it now stands, military aid will 
be given when iifes use appears acceptable to U.S. military 
authorities, from the military point of view. The conditional 
factor should be introduced with the french on a ministerial 
level so that the French Government knows of the American 
position in this matter. With respect to political measures 
and reforms, the Department of Defense is beyond this 
jurisdiction. However, we should have sepcific measures in 
mind since the State Department representatives reiterated 
their question "What more can be done in a political way in 
IndocMan?" 

Finally, we must resolve the problem of influencing the 
French to take a number of steps in Indochina, on the one 
hand, without our assuming the responsibility for the success 
or failure of the overall program to strengthen Indochina's 
security. 

K. T. Young 



COPY 



370 












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^ DEPAKfoblNT OF STATS 

FOR THE PRESS . OCTOBER 17, 1950 

No. 1066 



In the course of conversations vhlch have taken 
place during -the last few days between Messrs. Dean G. 
Aches on. Secretary of State: John W. Snyder, Secretary of 
the Treasury; George C. Marshall, Secretary of Defense; 
and William C. Poster, Economic Cooperation Administration 
on behalf of the United States, and Messrs. Jules Moehj 
Minister of Defense; and Maurice Petsche, Minister of 
Finance, on behalf of Prance, a review has been made of 
the United States contribution to the implementation of 
the French Rearmament Program within the framework of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. This review has 
included the question of additional United States military 
aid to Indochina, 

The United States Government has expressed the view 
that a military effort of the general magnitude and 
character planned by the French Government would be a 
vital contribution to the defensive strength of the North 
Atlantic area. Out of the suns appropriated by the United* 
States Congress under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act 
for fiscal years 1950 and 1951/ about $5 billions have 
been earmarked for military equipment to be delivered to 
the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 
zation. France has been assigned by far the largest 
single part of these amounts* 

In addition, the United States Congress has ap- 
propriated for military assistance in the F^r East 
approximately one-half billion dollars. In view of the 
importance of the operations in Indochina, the major 
part of this sum is being uaed to provide military equip- 
ment, including, light bombers, for the armed forces both 
of France and of the Associated States of Indochina 



La « 



This assistance will provide a very important part 
.of the equipment required by the forces contemplated for 
activation in 1951 in France and for current operations 
in Indochina, Deliveries of equipment are being expedited 
and, wsr-rh respect to 'Indochina, e particularly high 
priority has been assigned. 

Moreover, the following agreement has been reached 
during the talks with respect to production assistance: 



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(a) On an interim basis, and within the funds al- 
ready appropriated under the Mutual Defense Assistance 
Act by the Congress for the fiscal year 1951* the Govern- 
ment of the United States will make available in support 
of the French Government l s increased military production 
program assistance in the amount of $200 million, those 
funds to be obligated prior to June 30, 1951* 

(b) The final amount of American "assistance to 
support the expanded French defense effort will, subject 

to future provision of funds by the Congress, be determined 
on the basis of multi-lateral discussions within the 
framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
directed toward an equitable distribution among all the 
North Atlantic Treaty members of the economic burdens 
of the common rearmament effort. 



:• 



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O. V 



KJ --I *' - - - - 



lUr A 



tmOBASDTM W3. TSS R3C0HD 

- 

SUBJECT: Informal State-Defense Meeting on Indochina 

1? October 1950, 1000 hours 



/ ' 



— i 

. - 1 ■ 



v- ■ 






- 



Participants s 



General Harxy Malony, Defense Member of 

Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee 
Mr. K. !E. Young, Office of Foreign Military 

Affairs, Department of Defense 
Commander 3. Caiman, Office of Kilitaiy 

Assistance, Department of Defense 
! f r* William B. lacy, Director, Philippine 

and Southeast Asian Affairs, State Department 
Mr, Robert Hoey, Officer- in-Charge, Indociiinese 

Affairs, State Department 
Captain G. A, Lange, QP-35, Department of 



i_V 



vy 



lit. Colonel Jack B. Matthews, International 
Branch, G*-3 f Department of Army 

Colonel P. Barnes, Policy Division, Air 
Force Operations 

Mr # George Doyle, Policy Division, Air Force 
Operations 



1. Meeting was held to recapitulate the talks with the French, 
to analyse Saigon's views on the Indochina situation, and to review 
the proposed NSC policy statement en Indochina. 

■ 

2. Talks With the French Ministers and Staff. According to 



■—-——*• 



available information, the principal results of talks with the French 
on their military budget were as follows, With respect to Indochina: 

■ 

(a) Sotal budget for Indochina - 208 billion francs, or 
approximately ^600, 000,000, This is an increase of 60 billion 
francs over the 1950 budget. This increase is not directly 
related to the formation of the National Armies, It inclur;.es 
a deficit of 35 billion francs carried over from 1950, which was 
due, in part, to payment for native troops. It was difficult to 
get adequate explanation from the ?r h of this increase. U.S. 
representatives stated that the budgetary assistance to mako up 
the overall eilitary deficit has no relation to the formation of 
the national Armies, In other words, the French could not take 



■ i j 



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■7 0.?, £ | :^-> 

I - 



. ■ ! 



I 



a portion of whatever budgetary assistance is hereafter pro- 
vided the French and apply it to equipping the Rational Arry 
contingents* 

(fa) Major difference over 1950 is addition of about m 
20,000 indigenous troops* Increase in total troop strength 
is iron 331,515 to 351,550, 'These figures were presented 
before tl recent troop loss in Tonkin. Bie 20,000 increase 
is made up largely of the net addition of 18 battalions to the 
Vietnam Army. Equipment for this increase is over and above 
requests made to the Melby-Srskine Mission- Equipment for these 
18 battalions is not included in the 1951 budget. It has not 
been programmed by the French* Apparently, the French do not 
give the formation of these battalions a very high priority. 
U.S. representatives emphasized to the French that equipment for 
the national Armies nust co^e fron the equipment requested of 
the Kelby-Srskine Mission. The U.S. representatives also em- 
phasised that, with respect to U.S. military assistance, the 
first concern was to equip French Union Forces to meet the 
immediate threat, but that the French could readjust the dis- 
tribution of this equipment in such a way as to provide some 
materiel for the national Arngr contingents* 

(c) French Hini&ters fully agree on formation of National 
Armies. They asked U.S. finance pay and maintenance, which 
U.S. representatives did not accent. 

(d) 33ie French accepted the U.S. suggestion that the 
distribution of U.S. equipment between French Union Forces 
and the National Army contingents shall be determined in 
collaboration with UJS. authorities in Saigon, i.e., Genera! 
Brink, The State Bepartnent has included this point in a 
draft aide-memoire to the French Government to eliminate o.ny 
possibility of misunderstanding. 

(e) The French Ministers stated that no reduction in 
the Indochina budget was possible, that France is giving 
highest priority to equipment for Indochina, and that no 
evacuation of Tonkin is contemplated at the present time, 
but that any eventual evacuation will be taken only after 
consultation with the U.S. and the U.K. 



(f) Defense Minister Koch asked for a squadron of B-SS's 
which French authorities had requested of the Kelby-Er shine 
Mission. Secretary Marshall informed Hoch that SJXB-SS's and 
5 spares would be made available out of the U.S. pipeline to 
Korea. Delivery date is anticipated as early Decenber, with 
some of the planes arriving in Indochina in Kovenber. The 
question of whether or not the French have the personnel and 
naintenance facilities for these planes was not raised with 
the French representatives.. 



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m a p ,c Ti f] x* *p g 



(g) It is understood that the French are planning to 
send re info orients urgently itoti Branca and North Africa 
to replace the losses incurred in the evacuation of Caobang. 
These reinforcements may include the 10,000 non-conrcissioned 
and enlisted personnel planned for normal replacement in* 
Indochina. In addition, there is a report that General 
Garpsntier has ^requested 15 battalions for immediate rein- . 

forccoent- 

* 

3. Saigon ! s Analysi s of Situation (CIT£ 187c). Heconnenda- 
tions in para c add nothing that is not already in process in 
Washington, other than calling in ths U.N. to put out the big fire* 
Kr. Lacy opposes referring the Indochina problem to the U.K. He 
read his memorandum of conversation (attached) with Counselor of 
the French Esbassy on Saturday, October 14* Ke and Mr, Eoey briefly 
noted the State Department's proposed reply to Saigon's cable. 

4. Estimate of ,the_Sj^TatiQn^ Today's State-Defense informal 
meeting developed the following opinions on the overall situation, 
based on current information; 

* 
Political : 

(a) There is no evidence of a French intention to With- 
draw fron Indochina. There is considerable evidence of a 
French intention to withdraw from Tonkin or a part thereof, 

■ 

(b) There is strong evidence of a French intention to 
throw the Indochina problem into the U.1T. (see attached memo- 
randun of conversation on 14 October.) 

(c) There is no new evidence "of a French intention to 
make a deal with the Chinese Cor lists. It should be noted 
that French reports fron Saigon, particularly iron High 
Commissioner Pignon, have begun to emphasize the presence of 
large numbers of "Chinese troops 11 on the Vietnamese side of 
the frontier. 

Mili tary: ♦ . 

(a) It is expected that the French will evacuate the 
posts of laokay and longson, in& the entire border area to 
the snail post of FDnkay on the coast.. Since this post can 
be supplied by sea it is possible that the French may try 
to hold it. 

■ (b) According to the nost recent estimate of C— 2, the 

French can hold the Eelta area because of their superior firo 
power and air cover. 



""375 






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I @ 51 



5, Draft S ta teme nt of 1130, ^Folic.v,, It v/as pointed out that 
this policy statement is no-.: before the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
the Joint Secretaries within the Department of Defense. The neet- 
ing today specifically did not consider the Question of a cennitnent 
<^f U.S.' armed forces since that question is beyond its authority and 
since the draft statement contains a policy statement on. this question* 
It was the consensus of the meeting that the draft policy statement 
is quite adequate, even in the light of the deteriorating military 
situation which had been anticipated in the formulation of this draft 
statement* She nesting felt that the nub of the Indochina problem 
is this ~ "Can the French stabilise the military situation long 
enough to increase their troop strength sufficiently to natch and 
overcone the rapidly growing manpower superiority of the Viet Minhf 11 
Accordingly, the increase in available manpower is the primary need 
in Indochina, The draft statement of NSC policy addresses itself 
mainly to this problen. It was Vr. Lacy's opinion that this policy 
statement should be processed just as rapidly as possible. 

■ 

G. General 1'alony emphasised the greatly increased importance 
of the forthcoming lailitary staff talks with the French in the ?ar 
East; they may generate an invigorated determination to take the 
necessary measures to hold Indochina within the free i/orld. The 
meeting felt that these talks should concentrate on Indochina and 
be held as soon as possible* Accordingly, it is necessary to obtain 
USO consideration of Indochina shortly* 



£• 3J t Young 



Attachments - 2 



37S 

ft 

/i >-_ .. .. i 

TOP S 3 C S 2 5 



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D R A F i 1 



AIB&4QHGIS5 



It Is the under st a: ;; of the United States Government tha,t 
the> conve: fcions bet : the Trench Ministers of Defense and Finance 

i 

I 

and the United States* Secretaries of State and Defense produce the 
following results: • 

!♦ She Secretary of Defense informed the French Delegation 
the United States would dispatch to Indochina one squadron of 3-25 
bombers, these aircraft to be diverted from the American supply pipe- 
line to the Korean Theater. The French Delegation Was informed that 
there planes would be completely equipped for combat but that no 
American personnel would be involved in their operation after delivery 

• 4 

had been accomplished* The Trench Delegation was advised that it would 
be impossible for logistic reasons to deliver these planes before 
December 1. 

2. The Secretary of State advised the French Delegation that, 
without reference to the French request for budgetary assistance to 
Indochina in the amount of 60 billion francs, the United States 
Government would undertake to supply all those items identified in the 
French request for assistance of March 1950 as confirmed and supple- 
mented by the Kelby-Erskirie report of August 1950- The French Dele- 

* 

gat Ion was further informed that, since it was apparent that the 
French request for 60 billion franc-s, for budgetary assistance in 

i 

Indochina bore no important relation to the project of forming large 
national armies in Indochina, the United States would expect the 



C 

o 

■y 377 



> •» 



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r 



' French authorities to accomplish the equipment of the Indochinese 
national amies (described by the French Delegation to til© American 

+ 

Delegation in preliminary conversations) out of the equipment to be 

supplied by the United States, The French Delegation pointed out that 

- 

- 

equipment for French Union forces now engaged in combat took prece- 
dence over equipment for national armies? the Secretary of State 
observed that the United States Government considered the formation 
of national armies a prerequisite to the final military and political 

- 

solution of the Indochinese problem and, therefore* the United States 
Government oast emphasise* its desire that the French authorities ac- 
complish the formation and training of the national amies described 

■ 
by them and the equipment of those armies iron the military assistance 

program based on French requests of March as confirmed and supplemented 

by the Kelby-Erskine report, 

3o The French Delegation was advised that the United States had 

assigned to the initial military assistance program to Indochina the 

highest priority; that delivery of ear lent under this program, 

totalling about $31 million, would be accomplished for the most part 

by the end of the year. The French Delegation vas further assured by 

the Secretary of Defense and by the Secretary of State that the United 

States Government vrould assign the highest priority to the delivery of 

military assistance identified in the French request of March 1950 as m 

conf irmod and supplemented by the Kelby-Erskine Report, The French 

Delegation stated that of its request of March 1950 the first three 

categories (a), (b), and (c) will have been supplied by the end of the 

■ * 

year; that their r.c-xt priority requirements were expressed in categories 



C 



? 



4 



y . 378 



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r 



(d), (c) sn d (f) in that order (the references are to the French 
request of March 1950}* 

- 

4. It \rzs agreed that the technical representatives of the- French 
Delegation would meet immediately with the technical representatives of 
the Secretary of Defense to roviev/ present priority assignments to items 
embodied in the French prograri to the end that deliveries under that 
program conform to the realities of the military and political situation 
in Indochina as v/ell as to the serious supply limitations under which the 
United States Government is no*/ operating. 

5# United States Government expressed the viev;, and the French 
Delegation appeared to agree, that the allocation of Ano.rican nilitary 



assistance as between amies of the French Union and national army con 



tingents should be approved by French and American authorities in 
Indochina. 



Depart nont of State, 



Washington* 



379 



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DEPAIi Ef OV STAT; 



Memorandum of Converse. tlon 



SUi 



SB* October 16, 1950 

BJ£CT: Desirability of French Government Bringing Indochina 
Situation to the United nations. 



PAESICIPA^S; Mr. Pierre Millet - Counselor, French Embassy 



COPISS TO; 



Mr. lacy ~ PSA 

T£ 
EUR 

A - Kr. Hickerson 
- Hr. Matthews 
S/A *• Ambassador Jessup 



American Embassy Paris 
American location Saigon 



Mr. Millet asked to see me during the afternoon of October 
14. Daring the course of convei sat ion on the military situation 
in Indochina (see Memorandum of Conversation entitled ^Military 
Situation in Indochina 11 , October 14) Hr* billet said that his 
Ambassador had asked him to secure my entirely personal and un- 
official vievrs on the attitude of the Depart it toward the 
desirability of the breach Government bringing the Indochina 
situation, in some unspecified manner, to the United Nations-. 
He seemed to inply by several elliptical statements that either 
General KacArthur or the Department might consider that the 
success of the United Nations operation in Korea argued for a 
reproduction of the same operation in Indochina* 

■ 

- 

I replied that any views I might express v:ere entirely w\y 
o\m and that, as he knew, this subject could be more profitably 
discussed with Mr* Hickerson, The rest of ny remarks v;ere 
designed to convey to Mr. "I'illet the idea that; (l) the decision 
as to vrhether to take the Indochina situation to the United ITations 
lay with the French Government and not with the United States. 
(2) I did not. think that the Department had developed, . during the 
last few veeks as lh\. Millet implied^ a senti^e^t in favor cf >he 
French submission of the Indochina situation to the United Nations* 

mm * * 

that so far as I knew the JJspart r.ent continued to adhere to the 
position "In respect of this problem agreed en between the United 
States, .French ancl British delegations during the course of their 
discussions preliminary to the Foreign Ministers Conferences in 
Hew York, (3) United Nations activity in Indochina seer.ed to ire 



I J 



SSCB5T5 



C 



'380 



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If 







to require either a border observation team or mediation 
, between two parties at interest. I observed I thought that 
the border team, whose function would presunably be to ob- 
serve indirect Chinese aggression, would necessarily include 
Asiatic membership and that as he well knew, the attitude, 
of certain Asian countries toward Chinese Communism and toward 
Ko Chi Minh differed from the views held by the Western Powers; 
that I presumed the French Government did not look with favor 
on the treatment of Ho Chi Minfa as a party of interest in any 
case* 

■ 

I had the impression from Mr, Millet that in its despera- 
tion the French Government was for the first time seriously 
considering United Nations action in Indochina, I did not 
thin!: it wisfc therefore, to give Millet even in personal con- 
versation anything that he could describe as a Departmental 
position beyond that already discussed in the preliminary 

conversation with the British and French Delegations in 
September* 

■ ■ ■ 

Mr, Merchant aid Mr. Godley were given the sense of 
the foregoing on October 14. 



• ■ 



PE : PSA : SfSBIaey ; db 



SECSET 






• 



C 







381 



' . M *ec-»t 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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' 



w 



D IT OF THE NAVY 

OFFICE OF THS CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 

VVA5K::::yc. : 25,0. C. 

■■ , . 



S/ *.' , - 



IN P.-PS-Y RFFEH TO 

0o*S22Fl3/hb 



i ! 
it- 



i 1 



I I & ! 

* 

gubjs Ths Current Situation in Fr Sh Indochina* 
fii&exi (A) Military Ftirceg Fro-ieh 3&dochina# 

1« Tli3 fo;r year old rdlitar;- deadlock in Indochina has apparently been 
brolcsn by tha c ft ;: at Vict llnh offensive* This off iva action along the Sino 
Tonkin bordar is forcing the French to izitfadrar* to ths Hod Rivar do3t :; &nd is 
threatening ths entiie French position in northbm Indochina It no/? appears 
that the aid vhich Viet S&nh h^vo r ' been receiving from th3 C; ' i :js© 



* * . 



Cc lists ovsr ths ?.. . st six mas 
this stales in their favor « 



.s baen the deciding factor in broking 






t 



2* Ths successful Viet l&nh eperati< ~: " ' Dtfng Kha en 15 go?1 bor 
r : : : . ; ay & S ;t th3 rat: a.1 lv.z J?& ' " an frosa Geo Bsng 3 3 .v 

revealed unc ' - strongtJi xi tha ;. :t of the \ ' I h* Shtgr havs " ^ sci 
thsir for:::- 1 1 i i~: tics and •? nctf c ; * " ■ >f cos " a cor '-' ■. " \ 

c?:? V.; 3 in genasral of v _"- ; r. cc . . " '. . a 01:;:% 35 :; 5I1 
adsslt " it tha forces ?ihicb d I oat alr-o ! all of •: ) ] : & troops 

on tl: -v b :'-..- . J ? i ad I^sij - * ■ rs 2 .." -1 to ih3 Frs *■ in c \ ' j - it/ 

trail " - - ■ ■ 1 u Ifcporbc - " b! : vj : : Inh, 53 i :• < hava fc 



excellent artillery so; ; sera vbi-cj 



**j 



' "3 



- - -1 



* 



! - - 



_ - - 



■j* 



3 






engage in ofxensxvo Dparatxons oj* to counter fciV3 ojut -- Vico ;i 



O' c» 



I. 






r.-t 






-• 



3 



■IV 



-■ 



laclc of ra3orves has becosao especially acute sines tha French lo^t thj.bot 
part of e^ven battalions r : Cao ; duiins tha vraok of 5 October !SSO f 

over thj creation of a loyal vi^tr-. sss Hationa-1 ^rsy has not proji suf 

ficiently to release as adequate ni ^r of Yr:.. " ^es for offensive qpex*ations 

The French have be -. further handica] _;1 by inadequate intolligencej r.- jilting 
p: rtly frca a reluctance to fly roconnaies^ lob missions over or : r Chinase 
territory*- Finally, ths * sh rr>ve c-lf J in ef 3 noc^c : y tp*ctical 

Tiithdi .^.13 in ['. 1 to pr , :t tha garrisons of border ports fr^..i bsing over- 
whe3jnsd by superior eneniy forc^. 






: jh'Kigh Ccaarand bas n;.; 1 " ^he ;:aad to 3 ' 3 foz^es 



Lcip?-t5 j :T a suited ." v. : .:-t rinh 1 ■*■ : E^noi and iTsiphong;- l is re 

2 v/ill ' 9 m •"•^./ the early c -' ? all* border pc 3 :\ v -" 

To: i u .' . • i ; s 1 : - ■ rch 3 jiost lC ■ : :ditio^?.l battalia s T.v 

5 quickly " itcdi Ir> this area - i s ? . - ■" ' ^■■:". " - is yAtb a r 

str fch or 7,200 e33j arc nc r .-'• " . ■; aj . ". Xy 13, CQ0-CL4 9 0G0 '.V ! 2i 

r: si^ys* It is :-" ;j dc " Tul fc£ , 



1. ' 



*i « 



.. :-.n 



ontpc - fcs c.\ b3 heldg 



7** >""•♦? 

JL- - . 



- i d o ; C:o Frsnch trobpa ai*« V ', ,C00^5jCC0 Viet 1 '- forces 






■--■* 



-,—-'»i% .- 



evac ' 1 of t-io entire ! " . : . is ^i!;ely to hv/: 



- 






* 

382 



3 '• r 



■ 



r 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 201 1 



J IE/ha 

rb? t ' 



Stthj'i - C;w. 4 : Sit&sti t la Preach I SochJ l 



Yi;t ! ' h for thair cc ?f Lvo hg^inst the : ain Fj th positions in t ' 

3 •/ -: \'.;u ■ . , 

(b) It \;ould rsSuca bile fxelcl of vision of Frs&ch intelligeiaea* 

- 

(c) It voulcL c p3.et.e3y xicoot proviov.3 French plans for eoctendisg th-idr 
hold on th: ric®»grovZn$ delta area of TorJtin, 

(d) It Yfould opoa up a corridor from tho Vict Ettrih ©oiantaisi stronghold 
in Tonkin into La$3« 

(e) It tjouIcI have aa unfort to psychological impact on ths already 
dotorio ,tlrg political DituatioB t: ding to e: o a large tt&fltbor of VietBcsiesa 
in areas v ' v R each control to r k n accommodation vith tho Viet Kiiah or eyea 
to revolt Qpsa3y* 

i 

6« A : ; of ths situation in Is&ocbi: . in tho light of recent d^relop- 
stes&s lc- is to tha following ccaelustcciss 



(a) '. & oilltary azkl political efforts 3 'o failed to flats to restos 

ord ■ :•-■ T- ,, The fell of C..-\ ; to iks Y." it ! Li i yitl ;■ Fr* ich r%- 

ai * : -■ will j " bly go the V ;:■ h fori 3 to firt?tj ■ aggs 
act:* 



('>) To significant fa * : "•■ p of Chii: C 1st grc 1 and b? fore a 

has bos ' re] o: *: 3 is " v-r or ac ■:_'■ . ".■■_ -. C " i § cV\ Ii re) tbilitation 
el cc . stion of airfic 3 and r ,&s in tho ration :'. in proeaas* 

+ 

(c) It is estiaaisd that Vict UixSx forces eve:* building for a large- 
^.•eealo of : re to aaisse complete c trol in j " " ■« Tali Lid v/> is 1 riLtsg 

fostered tv aid frost Chi 1 :; d Go^rnmiet c in the fields of trrd g a&d 

arms supply aad i reportedly, hj Soviet technical assis 3e« 

(d) 3?he ffiet 21b& attack and capita of Dq . She : 'I BaShaj ana tho 
subsequent nithdras&l of 1 h ±o:: .- . froia C ,o! g azsd othsr border posts 
are cog -' ! ?ed i i . .1 ion0 that th-3 iiiii ! il ;' s of the ol sive • tTO 
conasBcode 

■ • 

(o) A carofull ' k! Viet 1 ' * offci^siva trith clo; " bi53 particip; 
mora li": •' G7 Ci * - :• Cc * v 3 " , I 






i 






(:?) l&a l r : ■' » - a not conaic : ■ J bis of cc 3 ictiz>2 ari offai _•! ■, 

3ia Toi\:5. - with tree* 5 and equi; i *t prose itly aY< 



• 












Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






TO? : 



SuVgj Tob Current SltuaMoa in Fr ■*-. 3 iochina 

■ 

(g) Pri to 1 S'zmxay 1951, ttoa pro ,; 1 1 of U„S milii ry aid to 
tK French and bive allied forces vrlll iaeressa their capabilities i:rb not 
tc the ;:it of cc " . big tha \ j1^ increase of V&et 33 capabilities 

(h) In samssy, the Viet H .'"'i intention to attack the French forces 
is establ:". * 3 and the initial ;' ^ of tlio operation has comniencedo It in 
estimated that ths Vict I '.\: h forcss *7J11 continua to (l) attack isolated 
border posts ai:d French linos of eoxaaunications raiihout cc: sraittiag lr,vg3 
i;v ibsrs of troop3, (2) open additional supply routes to China, and (3) re~ 
oergaaiM and consolidate their forces prior to laimcbiag en all out attack* 



J/J ;-> I .-..- lUJL . - -■ - 

soo. . 

OP-QQ 
0?«09 

CP-03 
CP-30 
OP. 31 

QP-32 

C0P-33 
CP-35 

cs»-3aaFiTi(4) 



$Aa 




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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



F-. 



j. 



tHIiIWRY i : ISDOC -I . 



Pa g fitfos bhj 352,970 Total 



Ar. ! •; 



339", 8 67 

■ ■ ■ 

Fremh-lvmy 8 liars: 150,667 (loss 4*000 lost at Cao Bring) 



Tonkin* 



AI3JP 9 F2: 

Cochin Chins.: 

Laos; 

C: ; 



53,500 (/I battn) 
23*500 (16 batta) 
56,000 (23 battn) 
7,000 

5,500 



) ( Franc h: 

) ( 



For# Lcgxna: 



) ( ±C Native: 

) ( 



Ife African; 



) ( Ssneg&lese; 



49,267 
IS, 500 

44,000 
25,100 
13,800 



Loyal Katlire Forces; 139,200 



Permanent Vi« b i ray 

(Paper sti 1 ' fegfahj 9 mobile battns 

are i i be ' ; of fchesa 5 s . ,i in 

op :-: iti 3a) 
Viet i ^sa Militia ( Supple ti-fs) j 
Eaoti . :ir .y; 

c 

H&cial minority fcrsops? 

Sam.-r*ali o is 

(plaa&atio; is, etc».) ; 

FISO Attrsiliari : 

(Suppletifs to regular ^rcncli 
Army) : 



28 ■ 230 



29, CC0 

n Ar\r\ 

6,900 
4, 500 

73,000 



40,000 



Navvj 






8,75-4 (including 3,234 fuseliers marins) 
Air Force: 5,349 (including 262 pilot-) 

161 lotal 



Old Light Or " s&r (OCL): 
Gun Eoats (Hi): 

looor j,lL m»sv. upar (A: >}s 
i b &&y£] _; Ship (— '-) : 

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10 

1 

2 
1 

2 
1 

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NND Project Number: NND 633 16, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



s 



Hav al V€ ' s (Cor 

Ocean Tug (Fle^t) £33?) s 
Loading Ship (faak) (1ST): 
landing Ship (Support) (LSSL): 
Tascel sous itjig Craft: 
Satssarine Chaser (175') (Fc): 
Submarine Chaser (110 f ) (SC)s 
Harbor Defense Lamich (Z?): 
Harbor Tug (little) (iTL): 
Motor Fishing Vessel (l5Y): 



1 

5 (l en route) 

6 ( en route) 

?3 (13 en rout-) 
5 
6 
7 
7 
o 



/ire raft 



202 voial 



/:".r Force 
I Acres 
3?ra _ ;-t: 



81 

60 



(40 edditd ' I J? planes bed to arrive ftcsi US in Bcnfe; * : ; 



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to FIG) 
12 



VIST IffflH..: > 

RoOT-l^.r Forces 



ri 



1 _? 



romcinj 



92,5 ( 

40,000 (73 battns) 



fear .Office fcmdoa estl bos 60*000) 



£nr. 

Cocliin Qbioai 
C Jias 
Laos: 

Irregular Forces* 
People !s iSL2itias 

. I Jot c ; i in ba 






22,000 ('v.3 batons' 

21; (•;?, b tsi 

4,5GQ (inc] uSIng 2 3 000 i" sr I k) 

5,000 (iacJ 500 £ao Issarek) 

130,000 

5:;' : ) (6 I torn) 
Sv/. : ) • 



.3 



A French ' .' ' . tsly i / 1 strong. 

.\ Vi&t 1 i ' 1 attalioa is ' ; ";■ "30 i.,n : . ■•; 



386 



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NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






751G. 00/10-1850 



OUTGOING TEISGRAM 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



SECRET 



T-<V 



OCT 18 1950 

2 P.M. 

PRIORITY 

AMLEGATION ' ' ) 

SAIGON 

38^ . ' • 

DEPT wishes to have FOL MSG delivered to Bao Dai personally by 
MIN BiMED after Chief of State's arrival- in Saigon. It SHLD he 
delivered informally without submission irritten text with sufficient 
emphasis to leave no doubt in Emperor's mind that it represents 
DEPTS studied opinion in matter now receiving ATTN highest auths 
US GOVT. Begin KSG: 

Eao Dai will arrive in Saigon at moment when Vietnam is facing 
grave crisis outcome of which may decide "whether country will "be 
permitted develop independence status or pass in near future to one 
of Sino-Soviet dominated satellite, a new form of colony immeasurably 
worse than the old from which Vietnam has so recently separated 
herself* 



e 



The US GOVT is at present moment taking steps to increase 
the AM? of aid to FR Union and ASSOC States in their effort to 
defend the territorial integrity of IC and prevent the incorporation 
of the ASSOC States within the COMMIE-dominated bloc of slave states 
but even the resources of US are strained by our present UN 
commitments in Korea, the need for aid in the defense of Western 
Europe and our own rearmament program. We sometimes find it im- 
possible to furnish aid as we. \JLD wish in a given AIQ? at a given 
time and in a given place • 



SECRET 



380 



{ 



I 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3-3 
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SECRET 



Leadership of Vietnam GOVT during this crucial period is e 
factor of preponderant importance in deciding ultimate outcome. 
GOVT must display unusually aggressive leadership and courage be- 
fore a discouraged people, distraught and floundering in the wake 
of years of civil war. Lesser considerations concerning the 
modalities of relations between the States of the TR Union and the 
REP of TR must, for instance, be at least temporarily laid aside 
in face of serious threat to very existence of Vietnam as autonomous 
state, within KR Union or otherwise. 

We are aware (as is Bao Dai) that present Vietnamese GOVT is so 
linked with person of Chief of State that leadership and example 
provided by latter takes on extraordinary importance in determining 
degree of efficiency in functioning of GOVT. Through circumstances 
of absence in FR of Eao Dai and other Vietnamese leaders for prolonged 
period, opportunity for. progress in assumption of responsibilities 
from FR and extension authority and influence of GOVT with people 
was neglected. Many people, 'including great number AMERS, have 
been unable understand reasons for Emperor's GTE prolonged holiday 
U1IQTE on Riviera and have misinterpreted it as an indication of 
lack of patriotic attachment to his role of Chief of State* DE?T 
is at least of opinion that his absence did not enhance the 
authority and prestige of his GOVT at home. 

Therefore, DSPT considers it imperative Eao Dai give Vietnamese 
people evidence his determination personally take up rein§ of state 
and lead his country into IMMED an<i energetic opposition COMHE 
menace. Specifically he SHLD embark upon IKMED program of visits 
to all parts Vietnam making numerous speeches and public apperances 
in the process. Chief of State SHLD declare his determination plunge 
into job of rallying people to support of GOVT and opposition to VM 
IKMED upon arrival Saigon. He SHLD announce US, FR support for 
formation HATL armies and his mm intention assume role commander 
in Chief. He SHLD take full advantage of FR official declaration 
of Intention to form MAIL armies (confirmed yesterday by 1HIT ASSC 
1 States Letouraeau) and set up precise plan for such formation 
BiKED." 



SECRET' 



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u-xu (page 3/ 



SECRET 



Finally, it SHLD "be tactfully suggested that any furhter dis- 
play procrastination in facing realities in the form prolonged 
periods of seclusion at Dalat or otherwise WLD confirm impressions 
of those not as convinced of Emperor's seriousness of purpose as 
DEPT and LEG are and raise questions of the wisdom of continuing to 
support a Vietnamese GOVT which proves itself incapable of exercising 
the autonomy acquired by it at such a high price # End of MSG« 

Endeavor obtain private interview soonest possible after 
arrival for DEFT regards timing as of prime importance. Simulateously 
or IMMED FOL inform Letourneau and Pignon of action* Saigon advise 
Paris in advance to synchronize informing FONGFF 



/ 



\ 



\ 



ACEESOIT 



SECRET 



% 



390 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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fco 



, 



T!^* 



. 



i 



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFEASE 
WASHINGTON 25, D C. ■ 



19 October 1950 



MEM)RAHBUM FOR SECRETARY FBiLETTER 

■ 

SUBJECT; Indo -China 



Item 1. Sr. NSC Staff Agenda, Thursday, 19 October, 2:30 p.m. 

The Southeast Asia Policy Committee has prepared the 
attached, which furnishes background and a proposed policy. 
This is now under review by the Joint Secretaries and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. 

Military Aid 

We have been giving military aid to the French and 
Vietnamese in Indo -China. The Melby-Erabine Mission have com- 
pleted a survey as to the needs. We Are preparing to give 
greater aid, and according to priorities to be furnished by 
Brigadier General Brink, USA, Chief of MAG, now on the spot In 
the Tonkin area. As you know, this speed-up has been under 
discussion "with the French authorities this past week. A total 
of 6 French battalions have either been destroyed or isolated 
by the Viet MInhs. This leaves 15 Battalions available to the 
French to oppose about twice that number of Viet Minhs, with 
some 300 miles of the Chinese border open, with an open line of 
supply from China and with some 10,000 Vietnam troops in 
training in China. The French are planning to retreat further 
but to hold the Delta area. They should be able to hold, with 
the addition of K replacement battalions now enroute and the 
capability of moving some other troops from Cochin China. The 
arrival of General Juin and the French Minister for Colonies 
should ensure an adequate appraisal of the situation. 

Political Steps 

With our eye on the main objective in Western Europe and 
our policy against colonialism, and for nationalism (except 
where our worthwhile allies would be undul-r weakened) our ends 
could best be served by bringing about on the part of the French: 

a. Definite announcement by the French of a 
decision on their part to phase out their political government in 
Indochina (action on their part similar to ours .in the Philippines) 



COPY 





viJ^, 


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b . , Building up the prestige and strength of the 
troops of the Associated States and giving them greater autonony. 

c. Giving greater governmental powers to the States > 
within the framework of the French Union. 

It is > of course j most important that the French do 
not quit cold and leave a political vacuum behind them. 

UoS* Military Intervention 

The case of the French military in Indo -China is not 
believed to be hopeless. We are not desirous of being a party 
to colonialism. We should therefore avoid military intervention, 
at least for the present » Instead, we should do what we think is 
to their best interest and ours in the long run; that is, rely mainly 
On the political sternps noted and give increased military aid, 
aimed primarily at enabling the Associated States to protect 
themselves against the encroachment of communism. 



SPS 



392 



- 






n 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



t 

DEPARTMENT 0? STATE 
OUTGOING TELEGRAM 
SECRET 



" * 



" . , * OCT 25 1950 
ALLEGATION 

SAIGON 
436 



In view both State and Defense IMMED POLIT and MIL 
advantages sought in NATL army plan must be found THRU 
IMMED integration into NATL army commanded by Bao Dai 
of armed native contingents such as Caodists, Koa Hao, 
Catholics, etc. Technical difficulties inherent, in this 
effort well known but must somehow be overcome. * 

Caodists offer (LEGTEL 638) development of highest 
importance in DEPTS opinion. We believe every possible 
effort SHLD be made by LEG, EMB Paris and DSPT to get 
these men in the fight as part of the nev; NATL army. 

Discussions with Bishops Thuc and Chi and Mgo 
Dinh Diem during past month centered in large part 
around DEPTS expressed conViction that MIL forces of 
Bishop must become part of NATL army at once. DEPT 
believes that these conversations will bear fruit and 
will advise developments soonest. 

Technical conversations PRELIM to Moch-Petsche con- 
ferences FR MIL stated that siventy-six thousand supplet ives 
CLD be incorporated ULTLY into the NATL armies* These 
they describe as three state forces including regulars 
and irregulars (see DSPTEL 307, SEP *27) . 

LEG advise DEPT and Paris of any steps believe 
practical to expand Caodists offer and incorporation • 
supplet ives NATL armies. * 

ACHES ON 



SECRET 



* 



393 



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751,5-MA?/lO-2750: SECRET FILE 



0UTG0IKG TELEGRAM 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



' SECRET 



OCT 27 1950 



AMEMBASSY 



PARIS 



2250 



TOMAP 



MAAG TEL France 663, OCT 25, signed Richards, PARA 1, approved. 

In order effect cornpliacce with bilateral agreement which 
covers r-IDAP assistance, you should hand note to French Govern- 
ment in following sense: QTE My government has noted the request , 
of your government concerning the disposition of certain items of 
military equipment previously furnished your government pursuant 
to the terms of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between 
our two governments, dated January £7^ 1950 • This request affects 
2^ howitzers (105 mm.) and 6 howitzers (155 iam.) which your 
government desires to transfer for use in operations now being 
conducted in IndocLina. Having in mind the urgency of these 
operations, I am pleased to inform you that my government, pursuant 
to the terms of Article I of the Agreement referred to, gives 
its consent to the use of these items for the purpose requested 
by your government # It is understood, of course, that if it should 
become necessary in the future to devote these howitzers to any 
other purpose, your government 'rill again request the prior consent 
of my government, and that the provisions of any agreement to which 
our two governments may adhere generally covering equipment furnished 
by the United States for use* in Indochina \;ill apply to these 
howitzers* U2TQ3E. 



ACHES0N 



SECRET 



3% 









* 



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.-wJ 



751G. OO/II-I65O: Sec ret File 



SBC h 2 T 



OUTG OIEu 'JELSG LikU 



h 



DlirA/ffiSNT OP STATE 



V; ashing ton, 
Kovember 22, 1950 
6 p.m. 



USUN, 



NKii YOAK 516 

iS UnTEL 833 NOV 16: 

1. DEFT does not favor Peace Observation C omnia - 
sion use in Indochina situation nov; although we cpii see 
that PCC can provide evidence of CHI Commie aid to Viet 
Minh which^may be helpful in vanning support for our 
position itS necessity military aid to Fit-Vietnamese. 

2, However, the Asian UN members -MD undoubtedly 
insist that, ^iven the present relationship of France 
toward the Associated States, the UH SHLD examine the 
whole IG situation rathe* 1 than merely send ins a ?0C sub- 
committee v/hose mission, if able to be accomplished, v jLD 
only look toward cutting down CPU Commie aid to the Viet 
Minh so that the Fit mi^ht be able to reduce the warfare 
to Guerrilla activity. 



3. Vie a a ree tfcut if IC subject is to come into 
the Url, it is obviously preferable PR do it. However, 
we see no benefit in Pk appeal to UN without FR declara- 
tion of intent to grant eventual independence to IC, 
alon^; lines Letourneau's statements at Saigon press 
conference (Saigon's 657, OCT 2I4J . Without such declara 
tion by FH, we believe any attempt to secure UM aid, 
including use of POO, vfiJD lead to ZB insistence on 



scrutinizing 



SliC &h T 



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t 



ssc a k t 



rn 



scrutinizing entire IG situation ono l ; n role toward 
both associated States and Viet uinh, with unforeseeable 
but hazardous results, attempt to use f'CC is not worth 
the risks we see inherent in UN consideration of the IC 
ituation at the moment. 



s 



Consequently, we do not consider it desirable for 
you to explore this question further jointly with UK 
and l |P ii j-SLS. 



ACK5S0N 



SBC it 



T 



3S6 



Declassified per Executive Order 1 3526. Section 3.3 
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i> 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



FOR THE PRESS 



NOVEMBER 27, 1950 
No. 1187 



STATEMENT ON INDOCHINA BY THE 
HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

OF STATE FOR FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS 
November 27, 1950 



/ 



I ■ 






The United States Government welcomes the defini- 
tion of the policy of Franco in Indochina as described 
in the statement of Monsieur Letourneau, the Minister 
of Associated States, as confirmed by the Prime 
Minister, Monsieur. Pleven > and by the resolution of 
the National Assembly which approved that policy. 
It will be particularly reassuring to nations of 
the free world to know that the independence of 
the Associated States of Indochina within the 
framework of the French Union is now assured and 
that the military and economic resources of the 
French Republic and of the Associated States of 
Indochina will be directed with boldness and re- 
newed resolution to the defense of Indochina against 
communist colonialism. 

To the end that the armies of the Associated 
States of Indochina and the French Union accomplish 
their mission and in order that the new states in 
Indochina attain stability and offer their people 
a better life, the United States is extending to 
them military and economic assistance. 

The United States Government hopes that other 
free nations will make every contribution within 
their power to enable the Associated States and 
their partners in the French Union to accomplish 
their mission of freedom. 



397 



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TOP SECRET 



Extract from Minutes of Truman - Attlee Conversat ions , 

;^L- Vtesnln ^ton / Dec erabe'r ^148^ JL950 * 
First Meeting , De cember ]+, 1950 

Secretary Acheson: . . .This moment for negotiation 
with the communist movement is the worst since 1917- If 
we do not negotiate and do not have a settlement, what 
do we do? We may fight as hard as we can in Korea, 
keeping going as long as possible, punishing the enemy 
as much as we can* Our negotiating position would be 
no worse then. If we are pushed out later and cannot 
hold Korea, we are still on the islands. V/e must refuse 
to recognize their gains. V/e could make as much trouble 
for the Chinese Communists as possible and hold Formosa, 
retaining what strength we can*. If the Communists are 
. successful in Korea, this may so weaken the French in 
Indochina that they will pull out. He doubted if any 
one of the Presidents advisers would urge him to inter- 
vene in that situation. 



j 



■'•Copy held in S/S-R 



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i ■-.-/! 



,; c3 r 21, 1950 



NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 

to the 



TOP SECRET 



RATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 



on 



1 



4S POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA 

Reference; NSC 6 1 ^ 



At the request of the Secretary cf Defense 5 the enclosed 
r.orandi-un by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject is circulated 
herewith for the Info: ation and consideration of the National Se- 
curity Council and referred to the NSC Staff for use in the prepa- 
ration of a report for Council consideration* 

In transmitting the enclosure s the Secretary of Defense 
siated that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained therein 
are based on their review of a proposed draft statement of policy on 
Ir::iochina which was formulated by the Southeast Asia Aid Policy Com- 
mittee early in October • 



JAMES S. LAY, JR. 
Executive Secretary 






i r -a 



Secretary of the Treasury 
.'he Director of Defense Mobilization 



* 






3BB 



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TOP SECRET 



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

Washington 25, D, C. 



28 November 1950 



! ' 



m ?CS TES SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: 



^ .a-rf-. ?sslble Future Action in Indochina 

50"J *■ ■ ' • 



5 



1 ":. accordance with the request contained in your memorandum, 
<U-f-d 13 October 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied the 
,,./,',..■ v statement of U. S e Policy on Indochina for NSC Considera- 
X\b'A , * c - vou enclosed, in the light of the message enclosed here- 
vj^-K ( losure "A"') from Brigadier General F. G. Brink (USA), Chief 
ivi x Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina ,' You will recall that 
V^t^oint Chiefs of Staff withheld final comment on the subject draft 
policy statement until the Brink report was received, 

2> The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the statement of 
0\\H<s:\ States policy proposed by the Southeast Asia Aid Policy Com- 
YAittcc-- forms generally to their previously expressed views, in- 
c\vA\v-3 i hose contained in their memorandum to you on Indochina dated 
1 2 C r 1950. They are of the opinion, however, that the draft 
St"fc*t *& of United States policy on Indochina proposed by the South- 
UyiY Mi Aid Policy Committee should be recast so as to meet more 
effectively the immediate and critical situation in that country, 
o-ccordirtsiy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have formulated the following 
<&*.+ of short-term and long-term policies which, they recommend 

be sov-'. : tuted for those included in the paper prepared by the South- 
wr/teia Aid Policy Committee. 

3- ihe Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the military prob- 
|««vs c£ Indochina are closely interrelated with the political prob- 
jtwfi-orthfi area. Accordingly, many of the policies recommended 
Ktrein he largely- in the political field, The Joint Chiefs of Staff 
W^U a er however, that the fundamental causes of the deterioration 
\* +ke. fisdochinese security situation lie in the lack of will and de- 




*.-*fk»3rt Joint Chief.* of Staff recommend the following short-term 
Okj-tMV'es : or Indochina: 



TOP SECRET 



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TOP SECRET 



1 



. r 



'. 



• 






: ■■- *i ■ 






SHORTS JKCTTVES 

a- The United States should take action, as a matter of 
■ ■^cy\ by all means practicable short of the actual employ- 
St of United States military forces, to deny Indochina to 

• : "r::vni sm. ■ 

b. As long as, the present situation exists, the United 
jtstes should continue to insure that the primary responsibil- 
:v for the restoration of peace and security in Indochina 
-V',ts with the French* 

c # The United States should seek to develop its military 
assistance program for Indochina based on an over-all military 
i-lm prepared by the French,, concurred in by the Associated 
tates of Indochina 5 and acceptable to the United States* 



l 



(1) Both the plan and the program should be developed 
and implemented as a matter of urgency „ It should be 
clearly understood, however, that United States acceptance 
of the plan is limited to the logistical support which the 
United States may agree to furnish* The aid provided under! 
the program should be furnished to the French in Indochina 
and to the Associated States* The allocation of United 
States military assistance as between the French and the 
national armies of Indochina should be approved by the 
French and United States authorities in Indochina. 

(2) Popular support of the Government by the Indochi- 
nese people is essential to a favorable settlement of the 
security problem of Indochina* Therefore, as a condition 
to the provision of those further increases in military as- 
sistance to Indochina necessary for the implementation of J 
an agreed over-all military plan, the United States Govern- 
ment should obtain assurances from the French Government 1 
that 



*/ 



■j 



! / 



V 



* 
• 



(a) A program providing for the eventual self- 
government of Indochina either within or outside of the' 
French Union will be developed, made public, and imple-* 
mentation initiated at once in order to strengthen the - 
national spirit of the Indochinese. in opposition to | 

communisnu 

« 

(o) National armies of the Associated States of • 
Indochina will be organized as a matter of urgency, 
While it is doubtful that the build-up of these armies 
can be accomplished in time to contribute significantly 
to the present military situation, the direct political 
and psychological benefits to be derived from this 
course would be gi : t and t would thus result in : : medi- 
ate, although indirect, military benefits. 



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# . 



(c) Pending the formation and training of Indo- 
chinese national armies as effective units 5 and as an 
interim emergency measure 3 France will dispatch suffi- 
cient additional an d forces to Indochina to injure 
that the restoration of peace and internal security in 
that country will be accomplished in accordance with 
the timetable of the over-all military plan for Indo- 
china » 

(d) France will change its political and military 
concepts in Indochina to: 

i Eliminate its policy of "colonialism* 1 * 

ii. Provide proper tutelage to the Associated 
States, 



k 

■ 



* 



structure, unh 
is established 
ate military o 
tat ion of thes 
efficient poli 
be able to cop 
try. 



iii e Insure that a suitable military command 

ampered by political interference, 

to conduct effective and appropri-^J 
aerations*- The effective implement 



e changes will require competent and 
tical and military leaders who will 



e 



with the conditions in that coun 



(3) At an appropriate time the United States should 
institute checks to satisfy itself that the conditions set 
forth in subparagraph c-(2) above are being fulfilled 

do The United States should exert all practicable political 
and diplomatic measures required to obtain the recognition of 
the Associated States by the other non-communist states of 
-cutheast and South Asia* 

e. In the event of overt attack by organized Chinese Com- 
munist forces against Indochina, the United States should not 
permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist 
China but should, in concert with the United Kingdom, support 
France and the Associated States by all means short of the ac- 
ual employment of United States military forces. This support 
hould include appropriate expansion of the present military 
ssi stance program and endeavors to induce States in the neighb- 
orhood of Indochina to commit armed forces to resist the ag- 
ression. 



\ 



► 

V 

s 



*j 



f > The United States should immediately reconsider its pol- 1 
-^y toward Indochina whenever it appears that the French Govern- 
ment may abandon its military position in that country or plans 
refer the problem of Indochina to the United Nations* Unless 
situation throughout the world generally, and Indochina 









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k r X* • » a • 



■ 



V >. 



i 



r 



I 



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specifically, changes materially, the United States should seek / 
to dissuade the French from referring the Indochina question to / 



to 

the United Nations * 

\ eu Inasmuch as the United States- sponsored resolution^ 
"Uniting for Peace" ? has teen adopted by the General Assembly 
of the United Rations « and should a situation develop in Indo- 
china in a manner Similar to that in Korea in which United Na- ; 
tions forces were required , the United States would then prob- 
ably be morally obligated to contribute its armed forces des- 
ignated for service on behalf of the United Rations* It is, 
therefore f in the interests of the United States to take such 
action in Indochina as would forestall the need for the General 
Assembly to invoke the provisions of the reso3.ution s n Uniting 
for Peace", ■ 

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the following long-terra 
.;:ctives for Indochina: 

LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES 



I 



> _■■-•»-* *-» 



a* United States security interests demand that this gov- 
ernment, by all means short of the actual employment of United 
States military forces, seek to prevent the further spread of 
communism in Southeast Asia generally and, in particular, in 
French Indochina. 

b. The United States should seek to insure the establish- 
ment of such conditions in Indochina that no foreign armed 
forces will be required for the maintenance of internal security, 

Ce The United States should continue to press the French 
to carry out in letter and in spirit the program referred to in 
paragraph V-c-(2)~(a) above , providing for the eventual self- 
government of Indochina either within or outside of the French 
Union. 

* 

d» The United States should continue to favor the entry of 
the three Associated States of Indochina into the United Nations* 

e. The United States should encourage the- establishment of 
sn appropriate form of regional security arrangement embracing 
Indochina and the other countries of Southeast Asia under Art- 
icles 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter. 



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6. There is enclosed (Enclosure ,f B n ) for possible, use by the 
National Security Council Staff the Analysis which was prepared for 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection with their study of the prob 
lem. This Analysis, however > has not received their detailed ap- 
proval, j 

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 






(SIGNED) 



OMAR N. BRADLEY, 



Chairman 



■> 



Joint Chiefs of Staff 



- 

i 



Enclosures 



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* 



• 



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II A U 



ENCLOSURE "A 



STATE DEFT M80 



- ' 



tth-i : 



US MINISTER SAIGON VIETNAM SGI) HEATH 



! 



I 



■, 



TO: 



NR: 



SECRETARY OP STATE 

* 
763 



TOMAP 
660718Z 



h November 1950 



Sent Dept 763 rptd info Paris 267; Dept pass CofSA for action. 
From Chief MAAG singned Brink. 

Reference unn Deptel 28, Oct 1950. 

French are gradually frithdvavlng from northern frontier and 
plan to hold general line Koncay-Laokay in Tonkin; in order protect 
Hanoi -Haiphong area and coal mining area north of Haiphong, Per- 
imeter of those areas is to he organized as main line of resistance. 
Pacification measures throughout ^est of Indochina will continue 
in. effect. Northern portion of new defensive area is mountainous 
with corridors running generally, but not invariably so, toward 
the Haiphong -Hanoi Delta area. No natural barriers lie between 
the new line and the Delta area, Haiphong and Hanoi are both 
surrounded by open Delta paddy country with numerous winding tri- 
butaries of the Red River. Railroads lead from Hanoi to Langson 
and Haiphong, The latter, along with the highway, are the main 
supply routes to the operational area f The presence of Viet Minh 
troops prevents land communications between Saigon and Hanoi re- 
quiring movements by water and air only. Average time for move- 
ments of troops and materiel from Saigon to Haiphong or Hanoi by " 
water and rail varies from 3 to 4 weeks. Airlift between the same 
places is 36 hours. 









Weather during November, December and January in Tonkin area 
generally excellent with intermittent thunderstorms; in central 
coastal area poor with average of 20 days per month heavy rain and 
low ceilings, In southern area generally excellent with intermit- 
tent thunderstorms. In the Tonkin Delta area February weather is 



extremely poor with heavy 



fog 



a 



nd mist. In central coastal area 



February weather conditions remain unchanged until June, Weather, 
therefore, favors .general offensive operations in next 3 months h'j 
the Viet Minh whi^h has not yet materialized. 

Army: The Army combat strength equals the combat strength of 
the Viet Minh. Army superiority in artillery, engineer services, 



L 



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* 
vsapons, transportation signal equipment and level of supply. It 
Js inf erior to Viet I-llnh in mobility. The Army needs: 

(A) Minimum 9 additional battalions in North Tonkin 
area to make a limited offensive possible. These battalions 
are not available in Indochina and must come from Prance or 
its possessions. 

(B) Weapons' and equipment to supplement materiel now in 
use and to replace unserviceable materiel. Adequate spare 
parts must be furnished, 

» 
Navy: Navy has complete Naval superiority and can operate 

freely along the coast; and inland waterways provided formations 

of armored craft are used. Navy mission is: 

(A) To support ground forces in shore operations by pro 
viding shipping convoys for the transportation of personnel 
and equipment; 

(b) To furnish gunfire support and maintain control of 
off shore areas fco prevent Viet Minh smuggling and possible 
amphibious assault. The Navy has moved additional emphibious 
craft and commando units to Tonkin 






s 
$ 






t 



I 

i 

I 






a) To reinforce the line 

b) To prevent possible fl 

c) To conduct operations 
inland waterways. The flexibili 
concentrations rapidly as needed 
ment of amphibious units, should 
tage in Delta fighting. At pros 
is still too far inland to allow 
tion in active combat. 



Haiphong-Moncay, 
anklng by sea and 
with ground force along 
ty and ability to move 
, made possible by employ 

prove a powerful ad van - 
ent the line of defense 

much Naval parti cipa- 



Air: Viet Minh air strength reported as 40 aircraft which 
can be successfully engaged by French Air Reserve, Viet Minh 
anti aircraft artillery is negligible at this time (a few 20mm 
guns have recently made their first appearance) , French have a 
small and highly coordinated efficient air transport organization 
for routine and emergency supply and troop movements which has 
been operating for 3 years from Hanoi Bay. It is capable of ready 
expansion. Military Air Transport can be supplemented by commer- 
cial airlines. There is a specific need for light bombers, fighter 
bombers, air transport craft and low level reconnaissance planes 
for photography, The potential of the French Army, Navy and Air 
supported by their greater resources of all kinds is greater than 
Viet Minh potential. But as present closer coordination of the 
action of these forces is needed, 






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The French state that they now contemplate changing their 
troop dispositions from a "pacification pattern" of widely 
scattered small units in North Tonkin intended to gain the good 
will of ths natives and keep down local incidents $ to an "opera- 
tional pattern"* This will require a political decision. 

- 

The present problem in Indochina under current plans is: 

(A) To regroup companies and smaller units not; in 
Tonkin area into combat fighting battalions or regiments 
with cross-country ability in order to maintain a flexible 
line of resistance, 

(b) To achieve the proper coordinated action of these 
forces in local area action, 



(C) To at least maintain the pacification statue 
throughout remainder of Indochina. 



ouo 



i 



I 



I 
I 
3 



+ 



A withdrawal to the Hanoi -Haiphong Delta area will permit a 
stronger coordinated defense in which combined French Army, Navy, 
end Air Forces can begin dual support and be employed to their 
utmost capabilities, when their action is properly coordinated. 
There are excellent fields of fire for Infantry and Artillery. 
Air will not be forced to operate in restricted mountainous areas 
and targets will be better defined and more accessible, Numerous 
waterways in the Delta area will greatly hamper Viet Minh movements 
because of the necessity to move on foot. Viet Minh routes of 
advance will be canalized and opportunity for rendezvous made more 
difficult, French troops will have greater ground, water and air 
transportation facilities which will afford greater opportunity 
for quick concentration of larger French troops against the Viet 
Minh forces. The withdrawal will also permit a regrouping of 
troops for local offensive action or a. general offensive, French 
supply lines will be shortened and Viet Minh lines lengthened forc- 
ing them to establish sub-arsenals and sub-depots south of the 
frontier where they will be subject to French air attack and ground 
penetration, The withdrawal, however will permit the Viet Minh to 
consolicate the area from which these units are withdrawn giving 
them airstrips, better bases in Indochina and permit political 
organization and their conscription of the population and may pro- 
duce an unfavorable chain reaction among the population of Indo- 
china, It is possible that relatively few weapons and possibly 
aircraft will be given by the Chinese Communists as token gift 
to the Viet Minh, Chinese Communists may be loath to spare many 
of these weapons because of their commitments in Manchuria, 
Shanghai -Amoy area, Kowloon, Canton and Tibet. 









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It must be assumed that, in general, French are fighting in 
unfriendly territory in all their military efforts in Vietnam. 
•Their military operations may bo jeopardized by transfer of loyalty 
to the Viet' Minh throughout Vietnam unless further politically 
effective concessions arc made by France to Vietnam and the for- 
mation of Vietnamese -Army is initiated t 



Weakness of present French military organization appears to 

be: ~ - 



(A) An excessibely static organization of defensive area 
with no provisions for mutual support, Detachments from 
general reserves are sent to the areas as needed ans pass to 
control of area commander, 



(b) There are not yet combat organizations greater than 
battalion sl^e and this does not provide adequate striking 
forces for strong military effort/ 

/ (C) Lack of proper coordination of forces. Few air- 
ground liaison teams exist, 

Conclusions: 

(1) There has been unduly exaggerated military impor- 
tance attacked to Cao Bang incident; political effect has 
been serious, 

(2) French military forces have been greatly shocked 
by this incident and better reorganization of their fighting 
forces can be expected , 



(3) Contemplated withdrawal will involve series of diffi 

I cult operations and further French losses must be expected, 

1 

I (k) If adequate military aid arrives within next two 

[ months and French forces in Tonkin receive an additional 9 

i battalions and are reorganized and properly trained as the 

[ French plan, serious penetrations by Viet Minh of Hanoi- 

[ Haiphong Delta area and coal mines north of Haiphong can be 

[ prevented, 

i 

■ 

J (5) Moncay-Laokay line is over-extended and can be 

j easily penetrated by Viet Minh forces. Laokay itself offers 

i little military advantage except as bar to Viet Minh advance 

i down Red River but can be by -passed or captured by Viet Minh. 

* Possession of Monday denies Viet Minh port on the gulf. This 

\ port and the port immediately south, if held, can be used 

; as bases from which to launch French counter-offensive. 



. in 



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(6) French at present are in no position Initiate ■ 
counter-offensive to drive Viet Minh to northern border, nor 
will then be in predictable future in view of increasing Viet 
Minh strength; unless additional trained troops ar.e brought 
in i from Prance or its possessions, 

, (7) Viet Minh activities Cambodia and Laos as well as 
Vietnam are increasing and no troops can be spared from these 
areas or operations In Tonkin, 

(8) Formation of Vietnamese Army is still under discus- 
sion, and not likely to become consolidated force within a 
year, and will not have any appreciable military value before 
1952 except possibly as police force In pacification areas, 
Conclusions are based on assumption that Chinese Communists 
will not openly participate In Viet Minh operations and 
immediate military aid requested in Legtel 566, October 16 
will arrive by 1 January 1951, 

Extremely fast-moving political situation in Indochina presents 
many complications for French Military Command, Current plans of 
French military here are at present still dependent on contro- 
versial negotiations and political decisions which must be made 
quickly, and the military is being delayed In Implementing their 
current plans. Three main questions at this time a,re: 

(A) Decision which must yet be made as to changing the 
• mission of military in Tonkin entirely from pacification to 

direct operational, 

* 

(B) Manner and speed with which Vietnamese Army will be 
activated, 

(C) Speed with which military air will be delivered. 
Current French plans will be successful only If these ques- 
tions are resolved successfully without delay. 

Participated In conference with Juin and have discussed sit- 
uation and plans with Carpentier here, Mlessandri In Hanoi, and 
chiefs of major forces. General Valluy, Juin assistant, has re- 
mained here with him and I have had similar discussion with him* 



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He has requested another conversation Monday 6th, General Harding 
visited here one day, gave him situation briefly but no prolonged 
discussion since he returned Singapore after Carpentier had denied 
him visit to northern Tonkin, Carpentier has given n«e free access 
to himself , his staff and commanders and authority to visit Tonkin, 
which I have done, including Hanoi and Haiphong* Will keep you 
informed, ■ - ■ * 



Note: DEPTEL 28 is CM IU 6^6 (30 Oct) G2. 
LEGTEL 566 is CM IN 6223 (30 Oct) G2. 

m 

ACTION: G2 



t 









1 



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INFO: G3, JCS Gk, MUN 



CM IN 



8337 



(6 November 1950) 



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ENCLOSURE "B 



T>T? I»TJ« 



*-1-l +,*+- >■! 1 ■ »l 



ANALYSIS 



le Ort 5 April 1950 the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded a 
-ssorandurai to the Secretary of Defense in which it was stated, 
Imong other things j that: 

"The mainland states of Southeast Asia also are at present 
of critical strategic importance to the United States because: 






Tl 



a. They are the major sources of certain strategic 



materials required for the completion of United States 
stockpile projects; 

"b. The area is a crossroad of communications; 

11 c_. Southeast Asia is a vital segment in the line of 
containment of communism stretching from Japan southward 
and around to the Indian Peninsula* The security of the 
.three major nonrCorrcunist base areasin this quarter of 
Ahe world- -Japan, India^and^AusJ — depends iri a " large 
measure on the denial of Southeast' Asia to the Coivrnmnists . 
If Southeast Asia is lost, these three base areas will tend 
to be isolated from one another;"' 

,f d. The fall of Indochina would undoubtedly lead to 
the faTi of the other mainland states of Southeast Asia. 
Their fall would: 

v (l) Require changing the Philippines and 
Indonesia from supporting positions in the Asian off- 
shore Island chain to front-line bases for the de- 
fense of the Western Hemisphere. It would also call 
for a review of the strategic deployment of United 
States forces in the Far East; and 

"(2) Bring about almost immediately a dangerous 
condition with respect to the internal security of the 
Philippines, Malaya 3 and Indonesia, and would con- 
tribute to their probable eventual fall to the com- 
munists J 






n 



e. The fall of Southeast Asia would result in the 
virtually complete denial to the United States of the 
Pacific littoral of Asia. Southeast Asian mainland areas 
are important in the conduct of operations to contain 
communist expansion; 



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"f , Communis t control of this area would alleviate 
considerably the food problem of China and would make 
available to the USSR important strategic materials . In 
this connection, Soviet control of all the major compo- 
nents, of Asia' a war potential might become a decisive fac 
•tor affecting the balance of power between the United 
States and the USSR. A Soviet position of dominance over 
Asia, Western Europe, or both, would constitute a major 
threat to United .States security; and 

• 

l? g. A Soviet position of dominance over the Par 
East would also threaten the United States position in 
S Japan since that country could thereby be denied its 
i * Asian markets, sources of food and other raw materials. 
j The feasibility of retention by the United States of its 

\ . Asian offshore island bases could thus be Jeopardized*" 

! 2. The series of defeats suffered recently. by the French in 
1 northern Tonkin serves to focus attention upon the urgency of the 
? current military situation in Indochina and points up the fact 
that the Viet Minhs now constitute a direct threat to the French 



military position in Indochina. ■ The current military situation 



is serious since the effect produced by the impact of French de- 
feats can gain momentum which may have dire repercussions upon an 
already deteriorating political situation in Southeast Asia. By 
taking over border posts, the Viet Minhs now can maintain unin- 
terrupted liaison with Communist China. At this time when a major- 
ity of the Indochinese are favorably disposed toward the Viet Minhs, 
as opposed to the French and Bao Dai, any increases in popular 
support of the Viet Minhs could have alarming consequences. -The 
deteriorating military and political situation in French Indochina 
demands that the United States policy toward Indochina be recast 
in order to assist in restoring the balance in favor of the French 
and Vietnamese. 






3. There is an important difference between the strategic ! 

importance of Indochina to the United States in a major war and 
its strategic importance in a cold war. Current war plans do not 
contemplate the deployment of United States military forces for 
the retention of Indochina in the event of global war. However, 
if the communists gained control of Indochina at any time other than 
in the course of a global war, this would bring about almost im- 
mediately a dangerous condition with respect to the internal secu- 
ity of all of the other countries of Southeast Asia, as well as the 
Philippines and Indonesia, and would contribute to their probable 
eventual fall to communism. Even India and Pakistan would be threat- 
ened. Thus the loss of Indochina to communism would have direct 
implications on United States security. In addition, this loss would 
have widespread political and psychological repercussions upon other 
non -communist states throughout the world. In view of United States 
security interests in the country, and the critical situation now 






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existing there* the United States should take action., as a matter 



o± urgency , by all moans practicable short of the actual employment 
of United States military forces, to deny Indochina to eoxsmunisn* 



4* It appears that the French are only now beginning to recog- 
nize the military and political measures which must be undertaken in 
order to secure the French position in Indochina. The French atti- 
tudes and actions j however j must not be permitted to obscure the 
United States interest in the solution of the Indochina problem • 

5* It has been suggested that if the French remain in Indochina 
that country might be lost to communism., regardless of the military 
aid programs which the United States may implement. This thinking 
presupposes either such a low order of military power in France and 
her colonies as to make it utterly impossible for that nation to 
cope with the Viet Minhs or such intransigence and unrealism in the 
French Government as to precli^de it from facing facts* Current 
intelligence estimates do not accord France and her colonies this 
low order of military power* While, up to this time, the attitude 
of the French Government toward French Indochina has been one of 
temporizatlon and consequently one of weakness, it is believed that 
the seriousness of the situation, particularly the political situ- 
ation, may now have been recognized by the French Government, 

6* The United States should urge France to meet its responsi- 
bility by taking the military, political, and economic action, 
including the injection of new leadership, necessary to save Indo- 
china from communism* If France decides to withdraw from French 
Indochina, there would, in all probability, be only 'a slight chance 
that the United Nations could retrieve the situation in that country 
in favor of the Western Powers* 



7* The following are the three major courses with military 
implications which might be adopted to achieve peace and security in 
Indochina against either the internal threat of the Viet Minhs or 
the external threat of Communist China: 






- 



a. Through armed action by France and the Associated States 

' of Indochina together with the forces of the United States and/or 
other Western Powers; 

b. By armed action by France and the Associated States of 
Indochina supported by United States military aid and assistance; 
and 

£. By United Nations action either under the United States - 
sponsored resolution, "Uniting for Peace, w or by French with- 
drawal from Indochina and action by the United Nations similar 
to that followed in the case of the Netherlands and Indonesia* 

8. In the event of overt attack by organized Chinese Communist 
forces against Indochina the United States should not nermit itself 



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to become engaged in a general war with Communist China and should 

ot, therefore, commit United States forces to that area: neither 
should the United States cc:n*nit its military forces to Indochina 
in order to assist the French in restoring internal security. The 
considerations underlying these views are: 

a* Involvement of United States forces against Viet Hinh 
forces would he likely to lead to war with Commmlst China* 

* 

b. A general war with Communist China would, in all 

probability, have to be taken as a prelude to global war; 

c» Our major enemy in a global war would be the USSR; 

di Our primary theater in the event of a global war would, 
in all probability, be Western Europe; and 

e. The forces of the Western Powers are insufficient to 
wage war on the mainland of Asia and at the same time accomplish 
the predetermined Allied objectives in Europe* 

9. While minor commitments of United States military forces 
might be sufficient to defeat the Viet Minhs in Indochina it is 
more probable that such commitments would lead to a major involve- 
ment of the United States in that area similar to that in Korea or 
even to global war. Accordingly, there would be great potential 

langer to the security interests of the United States in the 
coiamitment of any "token" or "jainor" United States forces in Indo- 
china * 

— 

10. Indochina is an area in which the French bear primary 
responsibility, and the problem of restoration of peace and security 
to that country should continue to rest v/ith the French, Overt 
intervention by any foreign power on the side of France would 

■immediately enhance the danger of a global war and would lay France 
and the other foreign powers open to a charge of imperialism, 

11. Thus far the French apparently have failed in Indochina to 
provide adequate political and military leadership, to develop 
sound military plans, and to utilize properly their military re- 
sources. The urgency of the situation in Indochina, however, is so 
great that the present United States military aid program for that 
country should continue, and steps should be taken to expedite 
shipment of the materiel earmarked for that area. However, it 
would be desirable for the United States military assistance program 
to be based on an over -all military plan for Indochina developed 
by the French, concurred in by the Associated States of Indochina, 

\ and acceptable to the United States. This plan should be developed 
&s a result of staff talks conducted in Saigon among representatives 
of the three countries. It should be made clear from the outset 



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that United States acceptance of the plan is limited to the 
logistical support which the United States raay agree to furnish , - 
If ■ time permits j military representatives of the United Kingdom 
also might be invited to attend. There should be a timetable to 
the plan* Estimates of materiel requirements which the United 
States would be expected to provide on an accelerated basis should 
also be submitted, 



3 



12 * Popular support of the Government by the Indochines 
people is essential to a favorable settlement of the security 
problem of Indochina. Therefore , as a condition to the provision 
of those further increases in military assistance to Indochina 
necessary for the implementation of an agreed over-all military 
plan., the United States Government should obtain assurances from 

the French Government that: 

— 

a. A program providing for the eventual self-government 
of Indochina either within or outside of the French Union will 
be developed, made public, and implementation initiated at 
once in order to strengthen the national spirit of the Indo- 
Chinese in opposition to communism; 



will be 
that the 
to contr 
the dire 
from thi 
immediat 



National armies of the Associated States of Indochina 
organized as a matter of urgency. While it is doubtful 

build-up of these armies can be accomplished in time 
ibute significantly to the present military situation, 
ct political and psychological benefits to be derived 
course would be great and would thus result in 
although indirect, military benefits'; 



s 



& 

^ j 



c e Pending the formation and training of Indochlnese 
national armies as effective xmits, and as an interim emergency 
measure, France will dispatch sufficient additional armed 
forces to Indochina to insure that the restoration of peace and 
internal security in that country will be accomplished in 
accordance with the timetable of the over-all military plan for 
Indochina; and 

* 

* 

d« France will change its political and military concepts 
in Indochina to: 

(l) Eliminate its policy of "colonialism"; 



and 



(2) Provide proper tutelage to the Associated States; 



(3) Insure that a suitable military command structure, 
• unhampered by political interference, is established to 
conduct effective and appropriate military operations. 

The effective implementation of these changes will require 
competent and efficient political and military leaders who will 
be able to cope with the conditions in that country* 



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D , At an appropriate time the United States should institute 
checks to satisfy itself that the conditions set forth in paragraph 
12 above are being fulfilled. The United States should also con- 
tinue to maintain the situation in Indochina under continuing 
review and should be prepared to revise its policy when conditions 
warrant 



» 



i 



lH. ; -In the event of overt attack by organized Chinese Communist 
forces against Indochina, the United States should not permit itself 
to become engaged in a general war with Communist China but should , 
in concert with the United Kingdom, support France and the Associated 
States by all means short of the actual employment of United States 
military forces. This support should include appropriate expansion 
of the present military assistance program. 

15* Any appeal by France to the United Nations would, in all 
probability, be embarrassing for the Western Powers since the rule 
of France over its colony is not likely to be well received by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations. The USSR has recognized 
the Viet Minh Government and, therefore, a veto by the USSR of any 
assistance for France would have to be expected in the Security 
Council. In view of the foregoing, unless the situation throughout 
the world generally and in Indochina specifically changes materially, 
the United States should seek to dissuade the French from referring 
the Indochina question to the United Nations. 

16. Inasmuch as the United States -sponsored resolution, 
"Uniting for Peace," has been adopted by the General Assembly of 
the United Nations, and should a situation develop in Indochina in 
a manner similar to that in Korea in which United Nations forces 
were required, the United States would then probably be morally 
obligated to contribute its armed forces designated for service on 
behalf of the United Nations. It is, therefore, in the interests 
of the United States to take such action in Indochina as would 
forestall the need for the General Assembly to invoke the provisions 
of the resolution, "Uniting for Peace." Should France > however, 
refer the question of Indochina to the United Nations, the United 
States should give consideration to adopting a position favoring 
early French withdrawal from Indochina and action by the United 
Nations similar to that followed in the case of the Netherlands and 
Indonesia. 

■ 

17 1 It appears that, in view of the unrest in Southeast Asia 
generally and in Indpchina specifically, any military victory in 
Incochina over the communists would be temporary in nature. The 
long-term solution to the unrest in Indochina lies in sweeping 
political and economic concessions by France and in the ultimate 
self-government of the three Associated States within. the French 
Union or their complete independence of France. From the viewpoint 
of the United States, pressure on France to provide the much needed 



leadership to initiate these reforms and to grant self -government 
frill prove less expensive in United States lives and national trea- 
ts than military commitments by us, 



< 






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m 



MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JAMES S. LAY, JR., 
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 1 



SUBJECT: Results of the Conversations Between the 

President and the French Prime Minister 



2. The following statements which are given in 
quotation are taken from the final communique of 
January 30, 1951/ the full text of which is attached. 
This communique' accurately reflects the agreements on 
the points covered. The statements which are not in 
quotation were not specifically covered in the jbint 
communique*. 



; . FAR EAST 

4. a. ,r The President and the Prime Minister found 
themselves in complete agreement as to the necessity 
of resisting aggression and assisting the free nations 
of the Far East in their efforts to maintain their 
security and assure their independence. 11 They agreed, 
however, that the US and France shpuld not over-commit 
themselves militarily in 'the Far East and thereby 
endanger the situation in Europe. 

b. "The President and the Prime Minister agreed 
that continuous contact should be maintained between 
the interested nations on these problems. *5 The Prime 
Minister's suggestion to create a US, UK, French con- 
sultative body to coordinate the three governments' 
Asiatic policies was not accepted by the President who 
preferred to rely on existing mechanisms. 



» 



^Copy held in S/S-R, drafted 2-21-51. For addi- 
tional information, see Historical Division, American 
p olicy "and Di plomacy in the Korean Con flict , part 10 
"f~Jan . -Mar . 1951) /section H,- pp^. 121- 123, top secret, and 
US MIN i;' "First Meeting, Jan. 'JO*, 1951"* United States- 
French Washington conversations, top secret, (on file in 
S/S-R). 

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I d* With regard tb Indochina, "the Prime Minister 
declared that France was determined to do its utmost 
to continue 11 its efforts to resist "the Communist on- 
slaught in order to maintain the security and inde- 
pendence of the Associated States, Viet Nam, Cambodia, 
and Laos, " 

e. There was agreement that it was desirable 
to build up the native Indochinese forces as rapidly 
as possible, but we held out no hope for the provision 
of US budgetary assistance for the National Army in 
Indochina, stating that we continue to believe that we 
cannot become directly involved in local budgetary 
deficits of other countries, 

f . "The President informed the p rime Minister 
that United States aid for the French Union forces and 
for the National Armies of the Associated States will 
continue, and that the increased quantities of material 
to be delivered under the program authorized for the 
current fiscal year will be expedited. 11 Additional 
measures for US aid to Indochina included: 1) an indi- 
cation of our willingness to relax the original re- 
strictions placed on the use by the French of the US 
aircraft carrier Langle y in the Mediterranean in view 
of cur inability to provide another US carrier for 
service in Indochina; and 2) an agreement to study the 
possibility "of reallocating funds now available in an 
effort to provide equipment for four Vietnamese divisions. 



/ 



The President said that the United States was 
agreeable to US, UK, French military consultations on 
Indochinese matters. 

h. In the event of a Chinese Communist attack en 
Indochina, the US agreed to give all possible assistance 
in the evacuation of French forces if such action be- 
comes necessary. The extent of the aid would be limited 
by other demands on our forces, such as Korea, which 
exist at the time any request for assistance is made. 



•• 



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c 



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.'.J 



T 



,# 



and are now engaged in detailed studies at specialists 
level concerning matter* Pot your ISFO it is very 
unlikely that this GOVT will en u a^e itself to finance 
the budgetary deficit of another GOVT but v/e hope to 
devise some othsi* method to assure that necessary funds 
for the development of the NATL armies be forthcoming. 

Although v/e did not accede to the Fft recjiect for 
another aircraft carrier, GSM Marshall informed Eleven 
th:.t the present restrictions on the use of the Langley 
XiLu be removed , thus apparently making Lan^ley avail- 
able to Pit for use in Par Eastern waters if they so 
choose. t#e assured the Pa thu.t the effect of the loss 
of Tonkin or of all of IC to rest of SLA is constantly 
under study by this GOVT. 



AChLSON 



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
Washington 



March 15, 1951 

P 

- 

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JAMES S. LAY, JR., 
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 

SUBJECT : First Pro gress Report on NSC 6 h t "Th e Position of the 

Unite d States with Respect to Indochina 7 ' . 

NSC 6h, r, The Position of the United States with Respect to 
Indochina 11 , was approved as government policy on March 27, 1950* 
It is requested that this first progress report as of March 1, 
1951, be circulated to members of the Council for their information, 



I - POLICY IMPLEMENTATION. 



Military Aid 



The Military Aid Program to Indochina enjoys the highest 
priority immediately after the military effort in Korea, The 
first deliveries began in June 1950 and by the end of January 
1951 military assistance totalling approximately $50 million 
had been delivered .to Indochina. Approximately $113 million in 
further military aid already has been programmed and is" at 
varying stages in the supply process. An additional $52 million 
of military aid is now being programmed out of remaining FY r 51 
funds and something approaching $170 million for this purpose 
has been included in the tentative budget estimates upon which 
the President's FY r 52 budget was based. This aid program 
follows in general the request submitted to the United States 
Government by the French Government in March 1950. * During 
August 1950 Indochina was visited by a Joint Survey Mission 
under the chairmanship of Mr. John Melby of the Department of 
State, of which Major General Erskine, USMC was the senior 
military member. The mission recommended that the United States 
continue its efforts to supply the assistance requested by the 
French in March 1,950, with certain additions, Equipment already 
delivered to Indochina, or enroute, includes various aircraft , 
naval vessels, equipment for twelve infantry battalions (less 
small arms), and miscellaneous equipment and ammunition, supplied 
both from the United States and the United States Far East Command 
In addition to the military assistance initially requested, 
materiel has now been requested for the equipping of national 
armies in each of the three States, The cost and availability 
of this materiel is now unknown. 



1(21 



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,* . . * 



U. S. military aid already received. In Indochina has in- 
creased the capability of the State forces and French Union 
forces considerably. If aid already furnished had not been 
supplied j those forces would not have been able to maintain 
theii^ present positions. It is realized however , that American 
assistance is supplemental to, and does not replace the primary 
responsibility of thg three States and of the French Republic. 

Indochina Foreign Relations 

The United States has continued to extend political support 
to the States of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam t Agrement has been 
granted for the first Cambodian Minister to the United States. 
The United Kingdom has sent a diplomatic representative to the 
three States. Vietnam. is planning to open a mission in Bangkok 
and has sent a minister to London. Cambodia has named a minister 
to Bangkok. 



■ 

The three State Governments have been recognized by some 
30 powers. They have been elected to membership in several UN 
organs such as FAO, WHO and IEO. The USSR and its satellites, 
including Communist China, have recognized the Ho Chi Minh move- 
ment as constituting the. legal government of Vietnam, but not of 
Cambodia and Laos. 

■ 

Although the Government of Thailand and the Republic of 
Korea have extended diplomatic recognition to the three Govern- 
ments, the majority of the Asian states continue to be apathetic 
toward recognition. This attitude is based on an anti -colonial 
rather than a pro -Communist sentiment. The result, nevertheless, 
has been indirectly to encourage the Communist-directed Viet 
Minh forces through failure to support the legal governments. 
The French Government has done little in the past to publicize 
the progressive transfer of authority to the three States, which 
was completed by the end of 1950. In external affairs, the 
French Government has the right to be consulted on the selection 
of diplomatic posts, designation of Chiefs of Missions and 
negotiation of International agreements. The continuing pre- 
sence in Indochina, however, of a French High Commissioner and 
some 70,000 French troops, as well as the fact^that France 
continues to finance, to a large degree, the budget deficits 
of the three State Governments, may constitute in Asian eyes 
evidence of continued French control, A withdrawal of French 
financial and military support would result in rapid successes 
by the Viet Minh forces and the formation of Communist govern- 
ments within the three States. Asian states are only slowly 
becoming aroused to this threat to their o,wn independence as a 
result both of United States efforts to Identify it and of Chinese 
activities in Korea and Tibet, in addition to Indochina. 



• 



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* j * 



/ 



Tndoch ina Internal Situation 

Internal administration was transferred by the French to 
the State Governments on December 30, 19*'9> except for certain 
powers reserved to the French High C ommis sioner and certain inter- 
state; matters to be settled by an interstate conference. This 
conference was concluded in November 1950 when it was agreed that 
all internal administration would be turned over by the French 
to the State Governments by December 31, 1950, However , the 
piastre would continue to be pegged to the franc (at a rate 
highly beneficial to the piastre;; the French have military base 
rights similar to those of the United States in the Philippines 
as provided in the United States -Philippine Treaty; and French 
functionaries would continue to carry out certain educational, 
war damage, and French military security functions. Other French 
functionaries would be employed by the Associated States only as 
desired by the latter. 

The three State Governments are now limited in their assumption 
of powers only by the availability of qualified indigenous officials 
their dependence on continued French financial support and their 
lack of popular support, The planned formation during 1951 of 
national armies is expected to contribute toward the actual 
attainment of sovereignty in each State, This, should have a 
beneficial political effect in winning additional popular support 
for the governments . 

; # The most severe threat to the continued growth and even to \ 

the continued existence of the State governments is the increased 
capability of the Viet Minh forces, resulting from the extension 
of military and materiel aid from Communist China." There is also 
some evidence of Soviet support. Such aid from Communist China i 
began in 'April 195° > a ^ d h&s increased steadily. Up to now, light* 

• artillery, mortars and automatic weapons have been shipped to 

Indochina for the Viet Minh. Training centers in South China 
have trained and equipped some 50 Viet Minh battalions which have 
returned to Vietnam, The capacity of the training centers has 
been estimated at 10 to 30 thousand men rotated about every three 
months with some 50,000 having already completed their training, 

: It has been reported that there are 15 to 20 Chinese technicians 

with each China-trained Viet Minh battalion, usually directing the 
artillery. The capability of these troops is rated as equal to 
that of French Union Forces, Chinese Communist troops in South 
China, within easy striking distance of the border, are estimated 
at two to three hundred thousand. Airfields at the border posts 
evacuated by the French are available to the Viet Minh, and air 
training is reportedly being conducted in China, However, no Viet 
Minh air power has yet been" used, and in this respect the French 
Union Forces hold a present advantage due almost entirely to 
United States Military Aid, French Naval power is also superio 



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but Is incapable of Interdicting all small craft smuggling arms. 

The Viet Minh forces have the present ability to continue 
to occupy the major area of Tonkin (North Vietnam), and to 
threaten the two large cities of Hanoi and Haiphong. Scattered 
elements throughout central and southern Indochina, continue to 
have a harassing ability, preventing peaceful conditions and 
the resumption of orderly life and trade* With continued assist- 
ance at the present level from Communist China, the Viet Minh 
forces will remain a serious threat to the ability of the States 
and the French Union Forces to defend and hold the major portion 
of Indochina. If massive Chinese Communist armies actually invade 
Indochina, such an attack could not be successfully resisted by 
the presently available forces and most of Indochina could be over 
run within a matter of months. 
\ 
The ability of the. State and the French Union Forces to 
maintain their present positions in Indochina, therefore depends 
only upon the absence of an actual Chinese Communist invasion in 
force. Their ability to improve their present position, that is, 
defense against the Viet Minh as presently augmented by Chinese \ 
Communist aid, will depend upon continuing materiel and financial 
aid from France and the United States, and the skill with which 
such resources are utilized. 



II - POLICY EVALUATION 



The policy adopted In NSC 64 and the measures taken to 
implement It have made a valuable contribution toward the 
stability of Indochina and of Southeast Asia. American military 
aid furnished the States' forces and the Army of the French \ 
Union may have been the decisive factor in the preservation of 1 



the area against Communist aggression 



Future policy with regard to Indochina will be the subject 
of new studies now under preparation for the NSC. 



/s/ JAMES E. WEBB 



k2k 



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NSC kS/5 . T0P SECRET 



May. 17, 1951 



NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 

to the 

* 

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 



on 



DNITED_STA TES OB JgC TITOS, POLICIES _AHp^C0URSES_0F ACT ION IN ASIA 
References: A, NSC ^8 Series 

B. NSC Action No, 1*71 

C. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same 
subject, dated May Ik and 15, 1951 

D. NSC 13 Series 

E. NSC 22 Series 

F. NSC 3^- Series 

G. NSC 37 Series 
. H. NSC 60/1 

I. NSC 81 Series . 

J. NSC 101 Series 



The President has this date approved the statement of policy 
contained in NSC k8/h as amended and adopted at the 91st meeting 
of the National Security Council (NSC Action No. k7D } and directs 
its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and 
agencies of the United States Government under the coordination of 
the Secretaries of State and Defense, 

The approved statement of policy is accordingly circulated 
herewith for information and appropriate action. Also enclosed for 
information is the NSC staff study on the subject contained in 
the Annex to NSC H8/3, appropriately revised. 

The President has also approved the Council f s recommendation 
in NSC Action No, V71-\C* Accordingly, the statements of policy 
contained in NSC *f8/2, the NSC 13 Series, the NSC 22 Series, the 
NSC 3k Series, the NSC 37 Series and the NSC 8l Series are super- 
seded herewithj further action on the NSC 101 Series is canceled,- 
but NSC 60/1 is not superseded, 

JAMES S. LAY, Jr. • 
Executive Secretary 



*i 



cc: The Secretary of the Treasury 

The Director of Defense Mobilization 






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STATEMENT OF POLICY 

on 
ASIA 



«•• 



General Consi derations 

■ 

1. United States objectives, policies, and courses of action 

in Asia should be designed to contribute toward the global object- 

* 

ive of strengthening the free world vis-a-vis the Soviet orbit, 
and should be determined with due regard to the relation of 
United States capabilities and commitments throughout the world. 

> 

However, in view of the communist resort to armed force in Asia, 
United States action in that area must be based on the recog- 
nition that the most immediate overt threats to United States 
security are currently presented in that area. 

2, Current Soviet tactics appear to concentrate on bringing 

the mainland of Eastern Asia and eventually Japan and the other 

principal off-shore islands in the Western Pacific under Soviet 

control, primarily through Soviet exploitation of the. resources 

of communist China. The attainment of this objective on the 

* 

v 

mainland of Eastern Asia would substantially enhance the global 

* 
position of the USSR at the expense of the United States, by 

securing the eastern flank of the USSR and permitting the USSR 

to concentrate its offensive power in other areas, particularly 

in Europe. Soviet control of the off-shore islands in the 

Western Pacific, including Japan, would present an unacceptable 

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* * 



threat to the security of the United States. 

3 # The United States should 5 without sacrificing vital 

m 

security interests, seek to avoid precipitating a general war 



. 



with the USSR, particularly during the current build-up of the 

military and supporting strength of the United States and its 

allies to a level of military readiness adequate to support 

United States foreign policy, to deter further Soviet aggression, 

and to form the basis for fighting a global war should this 

prove unavoidable. This should not preclude undertaking cal--- 

» 
culated risks in specific areas in the over-all interest of the 

defense of the United States. 

hi The United States should seek the firm establishment 

and effective application of the principle of collective security 

+ 

and should, except in those instances when on balance the need 
for unilateral action outweighs other considerations, act in and 
through the United Nations, preserve solidarity with its principal 
allies, and maintain the continued cooperation of other friendly 
nations . 



Lo ng-R an ge Obj ectives 

■ ■111 I II -,M ■ ■ « ■ ■ I . i II it ■ ■ »■■« « ■ i II 

5. The long-range national security objectives of the 
United States with respect to Asia are: 



a. Development by the nations and peoples of Asia, t JS 

V 



-' 



through self-help and mutual aid, of stable and self- 



/ 
- 1 

... • v" 

sustaining non- communist governments, friendly to the ^W 

* 

United States, acting in accordance with the purposes and 



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• . * 



- * ' 



principles of the United Nations Charter, and having the will 

and ability to maintain internal security, withstand com- 

* 

muhist influence , and prevent aggression. 

b, * Elimination of the preponderant power and in- 
fluence of the USSR in Asia or its reduction to such a degree 



that the Soviet Union will not be capable of threatening 
from that area the security of the United States or its 



v 



:V 

J 



friends, or the peace, national independence and stability of 



the Asiatic nations. 



• 



c. Development of power relationships in Asia which 

* 
will make it impossible for any nation or alliance to threaten 

the security of the United States from that area, 

m 

d. Insofar as practicable, securing for the United 



V 



S^- 



States and the rest of the free world, and denying to the 

communist world, the availability through mutually advan- x 

qc 
tageous arrangements, of the material resources of the x 

■ 

Asian area. 



•*j 



£« v 



Current Objectives 

.6, In view of the threat to United States security in- 

* • 

terests resulting from communist aggression in Asia, it should 
be the policy of the United States to: . ' 

• a. Detach China as an effective ally of the USSR and 
support the development of an independent China which has 



*- 



renounced aggression. 



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b. Maintain the security of the off-shore defense 

■m m 

line: Japan-Ryukyus-Philippines-Australia and New Zealand. 

t 

Deny Formosa to any Chinese regime aligned with or dominated 



A 



by the USSR and expedite the strengthening of the defensive 



Y 



-v 



capabilities of Formosa. Attempt by all practicable means 
to forestall communist aggression in South and Southeast 






Asia. 



frr* - 



— .»._■—.' 






c. Assist Japan to become a self-reliant nation 
friendly to the United States, capable of maintaining 
internal security and defense against external aggression 
and contributing to the security and stability of the Far 
East* 




■ ■ "■- 



■ 



d. Promote the development of effective security and ' 
economic relationships among the free nations of Asia and the 



* 



v 



r 






Pacific area, including the United States, on the basis of 
self-help and mutual aid, with appropriate United States 
assistance, . 

e. Continue as an ultimate objective to seek by 
political, as distinguished from military means, a solution of \ / 
the Korean problem which would provide for a united, independent 

* • 

and democratic Korea, Seek, through appropriate UN machinery, 
as a current objective a settlement acceptable to the United 
States, of the Korean conflict which would, as a minimum 
(1) terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrange- 






m 



ments; (2) establish the authority of the Republic of Korea 

■ 

over all Korea south of a northern boundary so located as to 



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* . * 



facilitate, to the maximum extent possible , both administration 
and military defense, and in no case south of the 38th Parallel 



r 



(3) provide for the withdrawal by appropriate stages of non- *^ v 
Koyean armed forces from Korea; (h) permit the building of 

1 * T 



sufficient ROK military pov/er to deter or repel a renewed 
North Korean aggression. Until the above current objective 
is attainable, continue to oppose and penalize the aggressor. 

f . Consistent with a above and the protection of the 
security of U. S. and Url forces, seek to avoid the extension 

» 

of hostilities in Korea into a general war with the Soviet 
Union, and seek to avoid the extension beyond Korea of 
hostilities with Communist China, particularly without the 



j ■ 



' 



i 



- 






- 






._. - 



support of our major allies, 

£. Assist the countries of South and Southeast Asia 
to develop the will and ability to resist communism from 

within and without, and to contribute to the strengthening ^ 

_— — — ~ ■ v*"** 
of the free world, P ■£ ! i ' -J**w r - - " r "^ % N N 

h t ' In accordance with $~& above, take such current^ "^ 

and continuing action as may be practicable to maximize the 

availability, through mutually advantageous arrangements, 

- of the material resources of the Asian area* to the United 






States and the free world generally, and thereby corres- 



y 



' y 






pondingly deny these resources to the communist world. 



<-£ 



«>.* , 



• 



In accordance with the above, the United States should 

1 r •* 



pursue in the respective areas of Asia the courses of action set 



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forth in the following paragraphs. 

8, While continuing to recognize the National Government 
as the legal government of China, the United States, with respect 
to Communist China, should now: 

a. Continue strong efforts to deflate Chinese Communist 
political and military strength and prestige by inflicting 
heavy losses on Chinese forces in Korea through the present 
UN operation.. ^ 

b. Expand and intensify, by all available means, efforts 

■ 

to develop non- communist leadership and to influence the lead- 
ers and people in China to oppose the present Peiping regime 

and to seek its reorientation or replacement. 

m 

c. Foster and support anti- communist Chinese elements v / 

■ 

both outside and within China with a view to developing and 
expanding resistance in China to the Peiping regime's control, 

* 

particularly in South China # \ 

d. Stimulate differences between the Peiping and Moscow / 
■ regimes and create cleavages within the Peiping regime itself 

> • 

by every practicable means, 

e # Continue United States economic restrictions against 
. China, continue to oppose seating Communist China in the UN, 

■ 

intensify efforts to persuade other nations to adopt similar 
- positions, and foster the imposition of United Nations politi- 
cal and economic sanctions as related to developments in Korea. 



NSC k8/5 # &3J . TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 



TOP SECRET 



f. In order to be prepared for Chinese aggression outside 
Korea, to protect the security of UN and U# S. forces, and to 

k 

i 

provide for appropriate military action in the event that UN 

forces are forced to evacuate Korea, expedite the development \ 

of plans for the follo\*/ing courses of action, if such action 
should later be deemed necessary: 

(1) Imposing a blockade of the China coast by naval 
and air forces, 

(2) Military action against selected targets held by 

Communist China outside of Korea. 

i 

J (3) Participation defensively or offensively of the 

Chinese Nationalist forces, and the necessary operational 

assistance to make them effective • 



J 



£. Continue as a matter of urgency to influence our allies I 
to stand with us and fully support the taking of such actions 



as those indicated in f above if military operations outside 

Korea should be required. 

9. With respect to the situation in Korea, the United States 






/ 



■ 



should: 



- 



a t Seek an acceptable political settlement in Korea that 



does not jeopardize the United States position with respect to 
the USSR, to Formosa, or to seating Communist China in the UN. 

b. In the absence of such a settlement, and recognizing 
that currently there is no other acceptable alternative, con- 



? 



s 

^ 



■» 



tinue the current military course of action in Korea, without 
commitment to unify Korea by military force, but designed to: 






nsc W"5 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
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.TOP SECRET 



» * ^i * ■■ — ■— » ■ 



* >— ■■ ! » ' «fc~ » P 






■ (1) Inflict maximum losses en the enemy, 

(2) Prevent the overrunning of South Korea by military 
aggression* * . / \ 

(3) Limit communist capabilities for aggression else- 

- 

• where in Asia, 

*i ■ 

c. Continue its efforts to influence our allies to in- 

crease their support of and contribution to the UN operations 

* 

■ 

in Korea, 

i 

d. Develop dependable South Korean military units as rap- 

■ 

idly as possible and in sufficient strength eventually to assume 
the major part of the burden of the UK forces there, 

e. If the USSR commits units of Soviet "volunteers" suffi- 
cient to jeopardize the safety of UN forces in Korea, give imme- 

■ 

diate consideration to withdrawing UN forces from Korea and plac- 
ing the United States in the best possible position of readiness 



for general war. \ . 

f. If the USSR precipitates a general war, withdraw UN 
forces from Korea as rapidly as possible and deploy United States 
forces for service elsewhere. - • 

£. Working in and through the organs of the United Nations 

■ 
where feasible, continue to strengthen the government and demo- 

cratic institutions of the Republic of Korea, and continue to 

contribute to the United Nations efforts for economic recovery 

and rehabilitation in the Republic of Korea and' in areas of 

Korea liberated from communist control. 






1*33 



NSC If 8/5 



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I 



Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 
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^ / ,-«■/"'■ i Jj •' • TOP SECRET 

* 

lO./^With respect to Japan the United States should: 

a. Proceed urgently to conclude a peace settlement with 



Japan on the basis of the position already determined "by th 






President, through urgent efforts to obtain agreement to this 
position by as many nations which participated in the war with 

IT 

Japan as possible. 

b. Proceed urgently with the negotiation of bilateral se- 
curity arrangements with Japan on the basis of the position de- 
termined by the President to be concluded simultaneously with a 
peace treaty. /i 

e. Assist Japan to become economically self-supporting and ■-, 

f ^ 

to produce goods and services important to the United States and \y> 
to the economic stability of the non-communist area of Asia, 



d. Pending the conclusion of a peace settlement continue 



to: 



JQ-. 



(1) Take such steps as \^ill facilitate transition from 
occupation status to restoration of sovereignty. 

(2) Assist Japan in organizing, training, and equipping 
the National Police Reserve and the Maritime Safety Patrol 

in order to facilitate the formation of an effective mill- 

[ 
tary establishment. _ 

■ 

e. Following the conclusion of a peace settlement: 






(1) Assist Japan in the development of appropriate mil- 
itary forces. . 



/ 



(2) Assist Japan in the production of low-cost military 
materiel in volume for use in Japan and in other non-commun- 
. ist countries of Asia. 

NSC 1 f8/5 - ■ TOP SECRET 



1 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NN'D Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



r - 









' '.';., . TOP SECRET 



(3) Take all practicable steps to achieve Japanese 

■ 

membership In the United Nations and participation In a 



regional security arrangement* 

(V) Establish appropriate psychological programs de- 
signed to further orient the Japanese toward the free world 
. and away from communism. 



» — .- -B , 



11. With respect to Formosa the United States should.: 

a. Continue, as long as required by United States security 
interests, the mission presently assigned to the 7th Fleet. 

b. Encourage political changes in the Nationalist regime 
which would increase its prestige and influence in China proper. 

c. Provide military and economic assistance to increase" 
the potential of the Chinese forces on Formosa for the defense 
of Formosa and for such other uses as may be determined t^s a re 
suit of the planning pursuant to 8-f aboveT^ 

12. The United States should continue the policy v/ith respect 
to the Philippines set forth in NSC Eh/2* 

13. The United States should continue the policy with respect 

* ■ 

to South Asia set forth in NSC 98/I. 



.* — . 



Ik. With respect to Southeast Asia, the United States should: 

a. Continue its present support programs to strengthen the 
will and ability to resist communist encroachment, to render com- 

i 

t munist military operations as costly as possible, and thus to' 
gain time for the United States and its allies to build up the 
defense of the off-shore chain. 

b. Continue programs of Information and educational ex- 



change in the countries 01 Southeast Asia. 



V V 



• 



NSC h%/5 ^35 TOP SECRET 



' l 






f 



• 



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' * t~ - * - 



c. Encourage the countries of Southeast Asia to restore \ 
and expand their commerce with each other and the rest of the 
free> world, stimulate the flow of the raw material resources of 

the area to the free world, and assist in establishing small arms 

! 
production in appropriate locations in Southeast Asia under suit- 

- ■ 

able controls. 

Si 

d. In Indochina: 

/ (1) Continue to increase the military effectiveness of 

V 

French units and the size and equipment of indigenous units 






'i 



by providing timely and suitable military assistance with- 

■ 

out relieving the French authorities of their basic military 
responsibilities or committing United States armed forces, 
(2) Continue to encourage internal autonomy and pro- 
gressive social and economic reforms. 
i (3) Continue to promote international support for the 

three Associated States. 
. * ■ e. In Indonesia, the United States should seek tc streng- 

then the non-communist political orientation of the government, 

- 

promote the economic development of Indonesia, and influence 
i Indonesia, toward greater participation in measures which support 

the security of the area and Indonesian solidarity with the free 

/ 

world. 






j 



*\ 



it 

b 



- - • 



• - ^-- _ 



15* With respect to regional security arrangements, the United 
States should: 

a. Conclude the post-treaty security arrangements with 

c 

Japan, as provided for in 10-b above. 
NSC W/5 k3& TOP SECRET 









Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
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b. Maintain the security relationships with the Philip- 
pines as provided for in 12 above. 

c* Conclude a security arrangement with Australia and. 



.*- 



* 
New Zealand. **' 



• 



d. Consider the desirability of security arrangements 
with other countries of Asia, either on a bilateral or multi- 
lateral basis. 

e. Encourage and support closer economic and political 
cooperation v/ith and among the countries of Asia in keeping 
with the objective stated in 6-d above. 



M * 



NSC Wj If 3 7 - TOP SECRET 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET 



. * . 



NSC STAFF STUDY 



on 



tFITED i STATES OBJECTIVES . POL ICIES AND COURSES OF ACTI ON IN A SIA* 



PROBLEM 

1. To determine United States national objectives, policies, 
and courses of action with respect to Asia. 

UNITED STATES LONG- RANGE NATIONAL OBJE CTIVES IN AS I A 

2. The long-range national security objectives of the 
United States with respect to Asia are: 

a # Development by the nations and peoples of Asia, 
through self-help and mutual aid, of stable and self-sus- 
taining non- communist governments, oriented toward the 
United States, acting in accordance with the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations Charter, and having the 
will and ability to maintain internal security and prevent 
communist aggression, K 

•i 

b. Elimination of the preponderant power and in- 
fluence of the USSR in Asia or its reduction to such a 
degree that the Soviet Union will not be capable of 
threatening from that area the security of the United 
States or its friends, or the peace, national independence 
and stability of the Asiatic nations, 

c. Development of power relationships in Asia which 
will make it impossible for any nation or alliance to 
threaten the security of the United States from that area^ 



d. In so far as practicable, securing for the 
United States and the rest of the free world, and denying 
to the communist world, the availability through mutually 
advantageous arrangements, of the material resources of 
the Asian area. 



*For the purposes of this report, "Asia 11 is defined as that part of 
the continent of Asia south of the USSR and 'east of Iran together 
with the major off- shore islands -- Japan, Ryukyus, Formosa, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Ceylon, Australia and New Zealand. 



NSC U8/5 k2Q T0P SECRET 



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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION 



3 # United States objectives, policies, and courses of 
action in Asia should be designed to contribute toward the global 
objectives of strengthening the free world vis-a-vis the Soviet 
orbit, and should be determined with due regard to the relation 



of United States capabilities and commitments throughout the 




>gni"ci 
security are currently presented in that area. 

k. Current Soviet tactics appear to concentrate on bringing 
the mainland of Eastern Asia and eventually Japan and the other 
principal off-shore islands in the V/e stern Pacific under Soviet 
control, primarily through Soviet exploitation of the resources 
of communist China. The attainment of this objective on the 
mainland of Eastern Asia would substantially enhance the global 
position of the USSR at the expense of the United States, by 
securing the eastern flank of the USSR and permitting the USSR . 
to concentrate its offensive power in other areas, particularly 
in Europe. Soviet control of the off-shore islands in the 
Western Pacific, including Japan, would present an unacceptable 
threat to the security of the United States. 

5. Asia is of strategic importance to the United States. 

■ 

a. The strategic significance of Asia arises from its 
resources, geography, and the political and military force 
which it could generate. The population of the area is 
about 1,250,000,000. The demonstrated military capacity 

of the North Korean and Chinese armies requires a re- 
evaluation of the threat to the free world which the masses 
of Asia would constitute if they fell under Soviet Communist 
domination, . 

b. The resources of Asia contribute greatly to United 
States security by helping to meet its need for critical 
materials and they would be of great assistance in time of 
war if they remained available. At least until stockpiling 
levels are met, this phase of the area f s importance to the 
United States v/ill continue. Further, the development of 
events which might lead to the exhaustion of such stockpiles 
would magnify 'the importance of this source of supply. * The 
area produces practically all the world's natural* rubber 
nearly 5% of the oil, 60% of the tin, the major part of 

various important tropical products, and strategic materials 
such as manganese, jute, and atomic materials, Japan's 
potential in heavy industry is roughly equal to 50JS of the 
Soviet Union's present production. Therefore, it is 



NSC WJ/5 **39 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



rn 



TOP SECRET 



r 




\ c, Control by an enemy of the Asiatic mainland would deny 
to us the use of the most direct sea and air routes between 
Australia and the Middle East and between the United States 
and India. Such control would produce disastrous moral and 
psychological effects in border areas such as the Middle East 
and a critical effect in Western Europe. 

6. The fact of Soviet power and communist aggression in Asia 
establishes the context within which the policies of the United 
States must operate. 

a. The problem of China is the central problem which faces 
the United States in Asia. A solution to this problem, through 
a change in the regime in control of mainland China , would fa- 
cilitate the achievement of United States objectives throughout 
Asia. Therefore, United States policies and courses of action 
in Asia should be determined in the light of their effect upon 
the solution of the central problem, that of China. 

b. The communist attack in Korea has transformed the Far 
East^into a theater of combat. Whether the Kremlin or Peiping 
intends that hostilities be extended into other areas of Asia 
or aggression committed in another part of the world is as yet 
unknown. The United States must expect either eventuality. In 
any case, the United States should use the resources which can 
be disposed, without unacceptably jeopardizing our objectives 
elsewhere, to prevent the communists from achieving a victory 
in Korea and to build resistance to communist encroachments in 
Asia. 

c. Our ability to achieve national objectives in Asia will 
be conditioned by the capabilities and global commitments of 
the United States and by the weight of the effort the enemy is 
willing and able to make. Consequently, there is required a 
constant and careful scrutiny of policies and actions on the 
basis of which decisions can be made which will advance us to- 

f ward our ultimate objectives without sacrificing immediate se- 
curity interests. 

7. The guiding principle of U. S. foreign policy as it relates 
to meeting the threat of Soviet aggression is the promotion of the 
establishment of a system of collective security based on the prin- 
ciples of the UN Charter, The United States, is consequently forced 
inevitably to weigh elements of policy toward Asia against their ef- 
fect upon the free world coalition x a coalition fundamental to our 

world-wide struggle for security against Soviet aggression. 

* 

KSC ls-8/5 I?k0 T0P SSCHET 



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" TOP SECRET 

8. The principal obstacles to the execution of United States' 
policy in pursuit of its objectives in the Far East are as follows; 

a. The p olicy and action of the Soviet Union. 

^» ■ U J I I ■«— » T" ~ " • * • m I . I ■ li«I..^J.«.i-il . ■ | ,| i i l ■ ■ | , | in , , | . MM , i ■ I.. I I I » > .1 ■ « I I I IM 

(1) The Soviet Communists have historically considered 
Asia as one of .their principal objectives; Bolshevik ideol- 
ogy devotes a prominent place to the capture of the "colo- 
nial and semi-colonial" areas of the world, by which is 
meant principally Asia. Soviet policy in Asia has been 
aided by the fact that communists hav© boon successful to 

a large degree in subverting indigenous nationalist movxr- 
mentsj the capture of these movements has been a goal of 
Kremlin policy. 

(2) The Kremlin has not yet resorted to the large- 
scale and* open employment of Soviet armed forces, although 
the aggression by both North Koreans and Chinese Communists 

/ indicates that the Kremlin is willing to undertake greater 
risks than in the past. 

(3) The Kremlin, besides supplying and directing lead- 
ership of communist parties in Asia, and building centers 
of subversion, infiltration, and revolution, is providing 
military assistance to communist forces in Asia, both in 
materiel and in technical personnel, 

(h) The fact that the Soviet threat is world-wide in 
character has prevented the concentration of free world ef- 
fort against the various forms of communist aggression in 
Asia. The combination of political, military, technical 
and propaganda support given by the Soviet Government to 
the communist assault in Asia confronts the United States 
and its principal allies with a major challenge which 
vitally affects world power positions. 

fe • The policy and action of Communist China # 

(1) Communist China is already involved in a major mil- 
itary aggression in Korea, is publicly committed to an at- 
tempt to seize Formosa, may attack Hong Kong, and may in- 
crease its support to Ko Chih Minh to include the use of 
Chinese forces in Indochina. Communist success in these 
efforts wuuld expose the remainder of Southeast Asia to 
attack and would sharply increase the threat to Japan and 
the remainder of the off-shore island chain. Such* pros- 
pects lend greater effectiveness t9 the ordinary communist 
techniques of penetration and subversion and cause many 
Asians to remain on the side lines during the present 
phase of the struggle. 

TOP SECRET 
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S trengthening of Southeast Asia 



41. It Is important to the United States that the mainland 
states of Southeast Asia remain under non-communist control and 
continue to improve their internal conditions. These states are 
valuable to the free world because of their strategic position 
abundant natural resources, including strategic materials in short 
supply £n the United States, and their large population. Moreover, 
these states, if adequately developed and organized, could serve to 
protect and contribute *to the economic progress and military de- 
fense of the Pacific off-shore islands from Japan to New Zealand. 
Communist control of both China and Southeast Asia would place Japan 
in a dangerously vulnerable position and therefore seriously affect 
the entire security position of the United States in the Pacific. 
The fall of the mainland states would result in changing the status 
of the off-shore island chain from supporting bases to front line 
positions. Further, it would tend to isolate these base areas from 
each other, requiring a review of our entire strategic deployment: 
of forces. Communist domination of the area would alleviate con- 
siderably the food problem of China and make available to the USSR 
considerable quantities of strategically important materials. 

42. In the absence of overt Chinese Communist aggression in 
Southeast Asia, the general problems facing the United States in 
this area are: the real threat of Chinese Communist invasion and 
subversion, the political instability and weak leadership of the 
non- communist governments, the low standards of living and under- 
developed resources of the peoples of the area, the prevailing pre- 
judice against colonialism and Western M interference ,f and the in- 
sensitivity to the danger of communist imperialism. Further acts 
of communist aggression in Southeast Asia can be expected to stimu- 
late resistance on the part of countries which have thus far failed 
to take a positive stand, \ . 

43. Therefore, the general objectives of the United States in 
Southeast Asia are: (a) to contribute to the will and ability of 
all countries in the region to resist communism from within and 
without, and (b) to aid in the political, economic and social ad- 
vancement of the area. For this purpose, the United States has 
developed support programs to strengthen the governments' adminis- 
trative and military capabilities, to improve living standards, to 
encourage pro -We stern alignments, and to stave off communist inter- 
vention. > 

44. Chinese Communist conquest of Indochina, Thailand and 
Burma, by military force and internal subversion, would seriously 
threaten the critical security interests of the United States, 
However, in the event of overt Chinese aggression, it is not now in 
the over-all security interests of the United States to commit any 
United States armed forces to the defense of the mainland states of 
Southeast Asia, Therefore, the United States cannot guarantee the 



♦NSC 48/5 



TOP SECRET 



kkl 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET 



denial of Southeast Asia to communism. The United States should 
continue its present support programs to strengthen the will and 
ability to resist the Chinese Communists, to render Communist mili- 
tary operations as costly as possible, and to gain time for the 
United States and its allies to build up the defenses of the off- 
shore chain and weaken communist power at its source, 

45. The United States should develop its support programs in 
such form and in such manner in each country as will effectively 
stimulate the use of its resources to the advantage of the free 
world, contribute to the development of sound economies and adequate 
military establishments, and take into account the ability of each 
country to absorb and its willingness to put to effective use Amer- 
ican aid. In any instance where a government friendly to the United 
States is conducting actual resistance to internal subversive forces 
or overt aggression, the United States should favorably consider 
contributions to the ability of such a government to continue resis- 
tance. 

46. The general security problems of Southeast Asia are the 
subject of military staff conversations among the United States, 
the United Kingdom and France. . . 

47. Programs of information and educational exchange should 
be continued in the countries of Southeast Asia and should be 
designed to develop on the part of the governments and peoples of 
the area, realization, and action in accordance therewith, of the 
vital objectives which they share with the United States and of 

the ways in which the achievement of these objectives are threatened 
by the aggressive purposes of Soviet Communism, 

48. At the present time, the United States faces the following 
major problems in Southeast Asia: 

a. Defense of Indochina . The loss of Indochina to 
communist control would greatly increase the threat to the 
other mainland states of Southeast Asia and to Indonesia. 
The Viet Ininh with the aid of strong Chinese Communist mili- 
tary intervention can conquer Indochina. Therefore, the 
forces opposing the Viet Minh must rapidly increase their 

" military strength, , Increased anti -communist manpower must come 

iron the Assoc^aued States, principally Vietnam. 

* " b. Chinese Imperialism . The United States should ex- 
pand and intensify the psychological warfare effort to increase 
an awareness in the area of the threat which Soviet and Chin- 
ese imperialism poses to the national independence, economic 
betterment and traditional ideals of each country in the re- 
gion. The United States should seek to reduce., the ties be- 



NSC 48/5 



TOP SECRET 



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■ 



r 

-' 



/ 



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f - 



tveen the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and the Pei- ■ 
pin 0, regime , to neutralize the pro -communist support among ' 
these communities, and to endeavor to direct the political 
power and economic wealth of the Chinese communi tie's toward " 
the \ support of the countries which they are resident. 

c . The Role of Singapore and Malaya in t he Defense of 
Southeast Asia . Thje location of the Malayan Peninsula makes 
it of great importance to Indonesia and Australia and New 
Zealand in the event Indochina and Thailand fall to the 
communists. Although the defense and internal security of 
Singapore and Malaya are British responsibilities } the Pe- 
ninsula cannot "be defended against an invasion from the 
north without outside support. Accordingly , the United States 
should coordinate its operational planning with the United 
Kingdom with respect to Malaya and adjacent areas. 

d. The Alignment of Indonesi a. Indonesia's strategic 
position, economic wealth including" oil reserves , and political 
importance as an independent , non-communist nation are assets 
to the security of the United States in the Pacific. Con- 
sequently, the policies and actions of the United States must 
be directed to strengthening and maintaining the non -communist 
political orientation of the government and to promoting 
economic health and development. At present the Indonesian 
Government Is pursuing a policy of political neutrality. The 
* United States must endeavor to Influence Indonesia toward 
greater participation In measures which promote the security 
of the area and toward solidarity with the free world. Among 
■ the factors which affect United States aid to Indonesia are 
(l) the results to be achieved in terms of United States na- 
tional interests, (2) the attitude of the Indonesian govern- 
ment, (3) the needs of Indonesia, and {h) the ability to use 
aid profitably. The United States should give particular 
attention to the problem of technical assistance, in view of 
the serious lack of leadership and trained personnel in the 
country. 

* 

49. With respect to Southeast Asia, the United States should: 

a. Continue its present support programs to strengthen 
the will and ability to resist communist encroachment, to 
render communist military operations as costly as possible, 
and to gain time- for the United States and its allies, to build 
up the defense of the off-shore chain, 

b. Continue programs of information and educational ex- 
change in the countries of Southeast Asia,. u ' 

" L . 11SC 43/5. ■ v * TO? SECRET^ 



J . 



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■ 



c_. Encourage the countries of Southeast Asia to restore 
and expand their commerce with each other and the rest of the 
free world, stimulate the flow of the raw material resources 
of the area to the free world, and assist in establishing 
small arms production in appropriate ■ locations in Southeast 
Asia under suitable controls, 

d. In Indochina: .. 

(1) Continue to increase the military effectiveness 
of French units and the size and equipment of indigenous 
units by providing timely and suitable military assistance 
without relieving the French authorities of their basic 
military responsibilities or committing United States 
armed forces. 

(2) Continue to encourage internal autonomy and 
progressive social and economic reforms. 

(3) Continue to promote international support for 
the three Associated States. 

e. In Indonesia, the United States should seek to streng- 
then the non- communist political orientation of the government, 
promote the economic development of Indonesia, and influence 
Indonesia toward greater participation in measures which sup- 
port the security of the area and Indonesian solidarity with 
the free world . 



: 



•* 



1^5 . 



::sc 4S/5 



TOP SECHET 






<r 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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SECRE3 

694.001/6-1^51 : Secret File 

Prom Paris, desp. 3607, ^ une ^* 1 951 

Paris, June 11, 1951 

Extract from Memora ndum of 

Conversation Between John Foster Dulles 

and Officials of the Frenc h Foreign Office 

4) Associated States . M. Parodi raised the 
question of participation of the three Associated 
States of Indochina. Mr, Dulles stated that he did 
not think the U.S. would be opposed in principle to 
such participation provided it did not constitute a 
precedent and commit the U.S. to treating these 
States as in all respects sovereign for other pur- 
poses, for example membership in the U.N,, as to which 
matter Mr. Dulles did not know what U.S. policy would 
be. Mr. Dulles stated however that he anticipated 
that some of the other prospective co-signers, such' 
as India, Burma and Indonesia, might object to signing 
with the three Associated States as sovereign, par- 
ticularly as there was a rival government of Viet 
Minh recognized by the Soviet bloc. He said that if 
this created serious difficulties it might be neces- 
sary for these States to participate through subsequent 
identical bilateral pacts with Japan. M. Parodi 
reiterated that it was very important for France to 
secure recognition of the independent sovereign status 
of these States. 



X 



« • 



SECRET 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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* 



69^.001/9-651: Confidential Pile 

CONFIDENTIAL 

From Saigon, desp. 152, Sept. 6, 1951. 

Enclosure no. 5 , ' UNCLASSIFIED ' - 

US Invites Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to participate 
in signing of Japanese Peace Treaty. 

No. 11 

The Legation of the United States of America pre- 
sents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the State of Vietnam and has the honor to transmit * * 
the following message on behalf of the United States 
Government, 

"The Government of the United States of .imerica 
and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom 
have the honor to enclose herewith two copies of a 
draft of the Peace Treaty with Japan, of two declara- 
tions which have been prepared on the basis of earlier 
drafts and observations thereon by countries which 
were actively concerned in the Japanese war. The 
draft protocol which is open for signature at any 
time has been proposed by His Majesty l s Government in 
the United Kingdom and is circulated for the informa- 
tion and comment of these countries whose domestic law 
permits them to sign it. It is believed that the 
. enclosed draft treaty and declarations combine and re- 
concile, as far as is practicable, the point of view of 
all the allied powers which were at war with Japan and 
will establish, with Japan, a just and durable peace. 

"The Government of the United States of Americana 
has the honor to invite your Government to a conference 
I for conclusion and signature of a treaty of peace with 
i . Japan on the terms of the enclosed text. The conference 
| will convene at San Francisco, United. -States of America, 
I - on September V, 1951* • 

i "Invitations have also been sent to the allied 

powers at war with Japan, except where special circum- 
stances exist. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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UNCLASSIFIED 

"The Government of Japan has advised the Govern- 
ment of the United States o : f America that it will be 
represented 1 at San Francisco by duly accredited dele- 
gates empowered to sign the treaty and declarations on 
behalf of the Government of Japan* 

"It will be appreciated if your Government will, 
in due course, notify the Government of the United 
States of America at Washington whether it accepts 
this invitation. 

"Any inquiries relating to the organization of 
the conference and the provision of facilities for 
duty [sic] accredited delegates, their advisers and 
staff, may be addressed to the Division of International 
Conferences, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C." 

The Legation will be pleased to be of any assistance 
It can in providing facilities to the Vietnamese delega- 
tion or In communicating with the Deparcruant of State 
or In other ways. 



American Legation, 

Saigon, August 22, '1951. 



• 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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* ECONOMIC "COOPERATION "AGREEMENT 

BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OP THE 
UNITED STATES - OP '■ AMERICA the 
v AND -THE GOVERNMENT OR-.VIETNAM..: 1 

Entered into force September 7> 1951 



- 

The Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of Vietnam; 

Recognizing that individual liberty, free institu- 
tions, and independence depend largely upon sound economic 
conditions and stable international economic relation- 
ships ; 



Considering that the Congress of the United States 
of America has enacted legislation enabling the United 
States to furnish assistance to the Government of 
Vietnam in order that the Government of Vietnam, through 
its own Individual efforts and through concerted effort 
with the other Associated States and other parts of the 
French Union, with other countries or with the United 
Nations, may achieve such objectives; 

Desiring to set forth the understandings which 
govern the furnishing of assistance by the Government of 
the United States of America, the receipt of such 
assistance by the Government of Vietnam and the measures 
which the t^a Governments will take individually and 
■ together in furtherance of the above objectives: with 
due regard to accords and agreements previously entered 
into by the High Contracting Parties; 

Have -agreed as follows: * . 

ARTICLE I 

The Government of the United States of America 
will, subject to the terms and conditions prescribed 
by law and to arrangements provided for in this Agree- 
ment, furnish the Government of Vietnam such economic 
and technical assistance ,as may be requested by it 
and agreed to by the Government of the United States of 
America. The Government of Vietnam will cooperate 
with the Government of the United States of America 
to assure that procurement will be at reasonable 
prices and on reasonable terms. Commodities or 



Similar agreements were also signed with Cambodia 
and Laos (Treaties and other International Acts Series 
2'j>i\3 and 23^4) • 



fir 



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j p, services furnished undel* the present Agreement may 

( be distributed within Vietnam on terms and conditions 

i * agreed upon between the two Governments. 

- 

! ARTICLE II 

j In order to assure maximum benefits to the people 

. of Vietnam from the assistance to be furnished under 
I ' the present Agreement by the United States of America, 

the Government of Vietnam will use its best endeavors: 

! A, To assure efficient and practical use of all 

resources available and to assure that the commodities 
and services obtained under this Agreement are used 
for purposes consistent therewith and with the general 
objectives indicated in the aid program presented 
by the Government of Vietnam and agreed to by the 
Government of the United States of America, 
■ 

B. To promote the economic development of Vietnam 
on a sound basis and to achieve such economic ob- 
jectives as may be agreed upon. 



C. To assure the stability of ; it s^ currency and., 
the validity of its rate of exchange, and generally to 
j assure confidence in its financial stability. 



D. To cooperate with other countries to reduce 
barriers to international trade , and to take appro- 
priate measures singly and in cooperation with other 
countries to eliminate public or private restrictive 
practices hindering domestic or international trade. 

ARTICLE III 

The Governments will, upon request of either of 
them, consult regarding any matter relating to the 
application of this Agreement or operations thereunder. 
The Government of Vietnam will provide detailed informa- 
tion necessary to carrying out the provisions of this 
Agreement including a quarterly statement on the use 
of funds, commodities, and services received under the 
present Agreement and to evaluate the effectiveness 
of assistance furnished or contemplated, 

ARTICLE IV 

The Government of Vietnam agrees to receive a 



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Special Technical and Economic Mission which will 
discharge th6 responsibilities of the Government of 
the United States of America under the present Agree- 
ment and upon appropriate notification from the Govern- 
ment of the United States of America will consider this 
Special Mission and its personnel as part of the 
Diplomatic Mission of the United States of America in 
Vietnam for the purpose of enjoying the privileges 
and immunities accorded "to that Diplomatic Mission and 
its personnel of comparable rank. The Government of 
Vietnam will further give full cooperation to the 
Special Mission, including the provision of facilities 
necessary for observation and review of the carrying 
out of this Agreement including the use of assistance 
furnished under it. 



ARTICLE V 

1. This Agreement shall take effect upon notifica- 
tion by the Government of Vietnam to the Government 

of the United States of America that all necessary 
legal requirements: in connection with the conclusion 
of this Agreement by the Government of Vietnam have 
been fulfilled. [1] This Agreement shall continue in 
force until the date agreed upon by the two Governments 
or may be terminated three months after a written noti- 
fication has been given by either of the two Governments. 

2. The Annex to this Agreement forms an integral 
part thereof. 

■ 

5. This Agreement shall be registered with the 
Secretary General of the United Nations. 

m 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorised 
Bor the purpose, have signed the present Agreement. 

DONE AT SAIGON this Seventh day of September, 1951 
in duplicate, in each of the English 1 / French, and 
Vietnamese languages, all texts authentic except that 
in the case of divergencies, the English and: French 
texts shall govern. 



For the Government 

of xhe ' 

United States of America 

Edmund A. Gulllon 
[seal] 



For the Government 

of 
Vietnam 

Mguyen-Khac-Ve 



ISept. 7, 1951. 



Ml 



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J 



MEETING OF THE l^S. - FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTERS : 
FIRST MEETING, WASHING': ■ .', SEPTEMBER 11, 1951, 



3: JO P-J5- 
Extract from Minutes 1 



Indochina 



1. M. SCHUMAN said that his Government was preparing 
a note on Indochina dealing with the present troop 
strength and casualties and containing a projection of 
plans and, problems for 1952. Without going into details 
it was clear that it would be impossible for France 

to carry out the proposed effort in Indochina and to 
fulfill its obligations with respect to the defense of 
Europe. France planned to spend a billion francs a 
day in Indochina alone and faced many problems in 
obtaining a maximum effort there* bvaclt wau. engaged to 
do. As to the financial problem the Finance Ministers 
would be discussing^it "^further, .In-brief , ^after . July.-.!, 
1952, the French would be unable to continue their effort 
at the present rate and would face a 150 billion 
franc deficit for the year This deficit incidentally 
was included in the French estimate on the dollar gap. 
It was not suggested that the U.S. finance French policy 
directly but it v/as hoped that the U.S. could assist 
by arms and other troop supplies, especially in establish- 
ing the national armies of the Associated States. In 
this connection General de Lattre hoped to expand the 
present strength of 25, battalions to 50 battalions. 

i 

2. Mr, ACHESON said that M. Mayer, French Finance 
Minister, had discussed this matter with General Marshall 
and had made a deep impression upon him. The need for 

a solution was generally recognized. There was general 
agreement on the principle as discussed during the 
talks with M. Pleven, that France should continue to 
be primarily responsible for Indochina, that U.S. 
•troops should not be used, and that first priority in 
t military aid should go to Indochina. This difficult 
problem needed careful study, since funds directly 
available for Indochina under the present aid program 
were not sufficient. Both General Marshall and Mr, Foster 
of EGA were examining' all possible ways to find other 
routes to reach the common goal. All that could be 



. 



"* l 'Cb py "held in S/S-R. For JCS position opposing 
commitment in~..Indoch;Lna' of US ^forces, "under. .such circv 
stances £a owert -Chinese ..Qopmmist agression", "see - 
memorandum of JCS to Marshall "(Defense), Aug. 31, 1951, 
top secret. 



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said now was that the importance of this problem was 
fully understood, that the question would be given urgent 
attention,, and that the U.S. had the will— even if it 
were not sure as. to the means--to assist in solving 
this problem. Perhaps General de Lattre would be able 
to make some helpful suggestions. 

3- M. SCHUMAN said that Mr. Acheson's reply was 
cause for hope in the future. He recalled the first 
promise in May 1950 for aid to Indochina which has been 
effective and well used. General de Lattre would 
develop more information on the long-term problem and 
relate it to the Singapore Conference. When he presented 
General de Lattre to Mr. Acheson personally on September 14 
it might be possible to explore this problem further. 



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7510,00/9-1451: Secret File , 

m 

SECRET 

Extracts from memorandum of conversation among 
Acheson, Schuman^ and DeLattre, Sept* lk 3 1951 



General de Lattre opened the conversation with 
the remark that he was particularly pleased to see the 
Secretary today for he had not expected to see him 
until after the Ottawa talks. That he should meet 
him on his first day in the United States and on the 
same day he had met the President was especially 
gratifying. He spoke of the cordial and "encouraging" 
interview he had had at noon with the President. He 
believed that the President had a thorough understanding 
of the Indochina problem and had been very reassured 
by his statement to the effect that "foe would not let 
Indochina fall into enemy hands". 

■ 1 ' r r -i 1 j i - ■ —M-w 

After the formalities had been completed, Mr. Schurnan 
made^particular point of stating to the Secretary that 
he was glad to be able to present General de Lattre 
himsblf and to state that General de Lattre would be 

^ ■ ii i L i i n . i . 

s peaking on behalf of the French Government during his 
visit to the United States' , The Secretary acknowledged 
this fact and remarked that General Marshall, Mr.Lovett 
and our own officials in the Department were all looking 
forward to discussing the details of the Indochina 
problem with the General. 



The General spoke in some detail on the subject of 
the national armies. ... He hoped more progress would 

be iliade after his return from the United States with 

news that the Americans had promised to support the 

Franco-Vietnamese program on the basis that in Vietnam, 

as in the rest of the Orient, nothing succeeds like success. 5 



At this point General de Lattre referred again to 
his hope that he would return to Vietnam, with news of 
a successful American trip. The Secretary stated, re- 
ferring to the Departments responsibilities in the 

"SECRET 



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SECRET 

matter, "we shall support you very strongly 11 * 

De Lattre referred to the prospect of peace in 
Korea and his hope that, If successful, it would 
result in the diversion of military materiel from 
Korea to Indochina, The Secretary answered that he 
didn't think the prospects of a cease fire in Korea 
were particularly bright at this moment. The General 
expressed his theory that the Korean and Indochina 
wars were "one war" and that in order to be effective 
there must be "one peace", 

• •■•«•* 

Finally, Mr, Schuman spoke of the excellent Im- 
pression the Associated States delegations had made 
at San Francisco. The Secretary agreed with this 
observation. 

The interview closed with the General's comment 
that "we must save these countries from the fate of 
communism"; the Secretary reaffirmed this conviction 
and the Department's intention to cooperate fully with 
the General in the course of his presentation to the 
United States authorities. 



FE:PSA:WKGIbson 



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DEPARTMENTAL DISCUSSIONS WITH GENERAL de. LATTRE de TASSIGMY 

"MINUTES 0? SECOND MEETING , WASHINGTO N 
SEP TEMBE R 17, 1951 , 3:30 p.m. ■«• 



MR MERCHANT said that fcfcg Department of State would 
re-emphasize to the Defense Department the political and 
strategic problems faced by Indochina and would make 
every e'ffort to insure that the question of equipment 
would receive proper attention at the Pentagon. It 
was the will of the Department of jgtate, he said, to 
speed the delivery of military equipment to Indochina, 
and the urgency of the situation was well understood by 
Mr. Young and Mr. Bingham, both of whom were most anxious 
to talk with the General's staff about the specific 
items needed, MR. MERCHANT inquired whether the General 
could estimate how long a period would elapse before the 
first new division of the National arijiy would reach the 
front, thus permitting French units to be released for 
European duty. GENERAL de LATTRE answered that three 
units of Vietnamese troops should reach the Tonkin I 
front next month. 

EGA Assistance 

MR. MERCHANT asked whether the General wished to 
comment on the US economic aid program in Indochina, 
adding that he should realize that the U.S- felt that 
it was to the common interest of both countries to give 
such aid directly to the governments of the three 
Associated States and to keep local French leaders in- 
formed of current economic arrangements. MR. MERCHANT 
understood, however, that the General felt that economic 
aid could be used more directly for military purposes. 
GENERAL de LATTRE replied that when he had first arrived 
in Indochina in December, 1950, he had felt that the 
aid program was not working out on a satisfactory basis. 
According to the General, the problem was caused by the 
fact that a number of young men with a ''missionary 
zeal" were dispensing economic aid with the result that 
there was a feeling on the part of some that they were 
using this aid to extend American Influence. The results 



1 Copy held In S/S-R-- 



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could only be bad, the GENERAL explained, if somebody was 
attempting to "put rocks" into the machinery of the 
Vietnam-Franco relationships and into the machinery of 
Franco-Anerican friendship, particularly when the French 
Commonwealth was involved. He had informed him that 
since such projects were not under State Department 
Jurisdiction , It would be advisable that the General 
explain his difficulties to Mr. Blum. Discussion had 
taken place with Mr. Blum early in August at which time 
the General explained that, while direct aid might 
rightly be sent directly to the Associated States, such 
economic assistance should remain within the frame- 
work of the concept of the French Union. He had also 
explained to Mr. Blum at that time that if economic aid 
were used to extend American influence, great harm would 
result. However, these discussions had proved most 
successful and a basis of agreement had been reached 
regarding the relationship between the economic aid 
program and the French Union. He had been informed 
that Mr. Blum was no longer in Indochina but hoped that 
his relationship with Mr. Blum's successor would be 
equally harmonious . MINISTER HEATH commented that he 
thought the past misunderstanding had been cleared up, 
MR, GRIFFIN concurred, saying that he did not feel 
that future misunderstandings would arise because 
liaison channels between ECA and the General's staff 
had improved and a continued exchange of information 
through informal talks had been planned. By a more 
acute examination of the places in which economic 
aid would have the most advantageous military results 
it would be possible to build greater faith in the 
program, MR. GRIFFIN added that the major purpose 
of the U.S. program was to make. the people of Indo- 
china feel that the economic aid was contributing to the 
welfare of all. GENERAL de LATTRE reiterated that the 
earlier disagreements were due largely to the overly 



zealous activity of the "young missionaries' 1 and suggested I 
that future programs should be directed more toward \ 



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strengthening the Infrastructure and toward building ^ 
roads, railroads , port facilities and factories- He * 
suggested that the allocation of aid funds might be 
handled through a % committee composed of defense 
representatives of France > the U.S., and the Associated 
States . 



MR. MERCHANT promised that the State Department 
representatives would work actively to help the General 
wherever possible and suggested that the General's 
staff discuss their individual problems with the mili- 
tary leaders. 



TOP SECRET 



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• 



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DEPARTMENT OP STATE 

FOR THE PRESS 
November 6, 1951 . NO, 996 

4, _ 

■ * 

FOR RELEASE AT 11:00 P.M., E,S W T,,(8:00 P.M., P.S.T.) 
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1951.... 

ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, ASSISTANT 
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, TO 
THE SEATTLE WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL, SEATTLE, 
WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1951 



In Indo-China, the United States has taken a 
friendly interest in the efforts made to resolve points 
of difference between France and the Associated States 
and has vigorously supported the determination of France 
and of the Associated States to restore security and' 
order in the country. Many Americans have been troubled 
In the past about the Issue of colonialism in Indo-China. ' 
We believe that that question is veil on the way to 
j solution, that the peoples of the Associated States are 

j free to assume the extensive responsibility for their own 

j affairs that has been accorded them by treaties with 

France. It is not surprising that doubts remain on this 
j point in Indo-China, among other countries of Asia, and 

1 among some heritage of bitterness and suspicion, those who 

• • have recently passed through a colonial experience are 

sensitive and distrustful of western influence, and the 
slowness with which the Associated States have been able 
to assume the responsibility which is awaiting them has 
not demos trated the extent to which the issue of coloni- 
alism has been resolved. The real issue in Indo-China 
is whether the peoples of that land will be permitted to 
work out their future as they see fit or whether *£hey will 
be subjected to a Communist roign of terror and be absorbed 
by force into the new colonialism of a Soviet Communist 
empire. In this situation, it Is generally agreed in 
the United States that we should support and assist the 
armies of France and of the Associated States in meeting 
the armed threat in Indo-China and should furnish economic 
and technical assistance to the Associated States as 
they shoulder the heavy burdens of independence. 



• 



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790.5/12-22511 Top Secret File 



■ TOP SECRET 
SECURITY INFORMATION 



FROM: Paris 



TO: Secretary of State 

k 

NO: 37o5, December 22, 10 p.m 



Rec'd: Dec. 23, 1951 

8:57 a.m. 



Informal translation Pleven note follows: 






"Prime Minister French Govt calls attention of US Govt 
to fact that possibility of Chi intervention in Indochina 
appears to be becoming more definite.- 

Analysis of entirety intelligence reports concerning 
South China and assistance given Viet Minh by Mao Tse- 
Tung Govt gives fol results: 

Effectives of Chi forces stationed southern provinces 
bordering on Tonkin have increased in last six months 
from 170,000 to 290,000 men. 

South China communications network and particularly 
roads leading to Tonkin border being constantly re- 
conditioned and already much improved in correlation 
this improvement of South China rail and road system, 
highways in Viet Minh area of north Tonkin are being 
reconditinned. For instance Kunming-Yen Bay road now 
open to traffic. 

Lastly, Chi materiel aid to Viet Minh has vastly in- 
creased over last three months. During recent opera- 
tions French have ascertained that great part captured 
equipment was of US origin and have seized arms dated 
1950 which apparently are part war booty Chi troops in 
Korea . 

Furthermore, analysis of Chi press over last few 
weeks shows that emphasis once more placed on struggle 
Of Viet Minh against F,rench Union forces Indochina. 



TOP SECRET 
SECURITY INFORMATION 



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Quite clear that while Franco-Viet forces are success- 
fully standing up to VietnMinh activities, nonetheless 
true that fortoer do not (rpt not) possess strategic 
reserves ("masse de manoeuvre") necessary to oppose 
Chi attack. 



Consequently French Govt considers it of utmost impor 
tance that conversations which were to take place 
between US, UK and French following recommendations 
of Singapore conference commence immediately. It 
desires that this wish be brought to personal atten- 
tion of President Truman. n 



BRUCE 



-> 



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7£lG.O0/l2-295l:TOP SECRET FILE 



Rec*d December 29, 1951 
7:52 a.m. 



., 



FROM: P/BIS 

TO: SECRET/ JOT OF STATE 

NO: 3856, December 29, 11 a.m. 

Foreign Office has given us aide memoire dated December 28 
setting forth French" Govt reply questions outlined DETTEL 
3613, December 21 and additional comment, informal translation 
• of which follows: 

"I* French command know military potential Viet Mlrifa forces and 
follows its development closely. It knows these forces already 
benefit from Chinese aid in form equipment nnd material all 
kinds, advisers and technicians in Tonkin and training Viet Kinh 
units or personnel in Chinese territory. There is, therefore, 
already certain Chinese Communist intervention Indochina, such 
^ intervention preserving for time being more or less concealed 

character. 

"In order define criteria according which justific ation wld 
exist for considering there is attack or aggression against 
Indochina by Communist China, French Govt eld take into account 
either effectiveness Chinese intervention or form under which 
it appears. * 

"From last point view French Govt wld be justified denouncing 
Chinese aggression especially in following cases: 

"Intervention by air forces under conditions such that their 
take-off from bases in Chinese territory eld not (rpt not) be 
technically contested (for example, medium or he^vy bombers, 
modern or jet pursuits, for which no (rpt no) air strip now 
(rpt now) exists in Viet zone); 



"Penetration martime forces Indochina territorial waters, when 
they clearly originate only from home ports outside Indochina 
peninsula; t 

f ' t "Identification Chinese combatants, volunteers or not, as individual 

reinforcements or as units incorporated among enemy forces. 

"From point 
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751G, 00/12-2951: TOP SECRET FILE 



"From point view effectiveness, Chinese intervention -under 
present forms can be intensified to point of upsetting, to 
Viet advantage, equilibrium of opposing forces out of propor- 
tion to known possibilities of Viet alone, French Govt in 
this case wld also consider Chinese intervention as genuine 
aggression.- 

"II. As French Govt has already made known to US Govt, it wld, 
in these eventualities, appeal to UN. It wld do so in agreement 
with Associate States Govts and wld not (rpt not) fail to 
consult beforehand with US and UK. 

"Ill* It wld ask China be declared aggressor and immediate 
application to China of political and economic sanctions under 
UN, Charter. Finally it wld request member states to have their 
available forces participate in defense Indochina territory, 

"IV. If its request met Security Council veto, French wld \ 
request meeting GA« 

n V# It is essentially on Atlantic Pact member countries and 
British Commonwealth dominions of white race, as well as SEA 
countries more directly threatened by Chinese aggression, that 
French Govt wld consider itself able to count principally for 
conduct military action recommended by UN* It wld furthermore 
anticipate adherence to other measures by all UN member states 
which have decided oppose Communist bloc aggressions in Asia 
and elsewhere in world* 

"French recourse to UN wld be effected without prejudice to \ 
requests for immediate aid by French to US and UK« 

"Massive increase Chinese aid to Viet wld clearly create situa- 
tion whose sudden aggravation wld not (rpt not) permit awaiting 
development slow UN procedures and wld call for immediate 
decisions on strategic plane,. 

"In contrary sense, it might happen that Chinese intervention wld 
be of character insufficiently defined to have UN decision 
interpose without very long discussion or. real character Chinese 
aggression while extremely grave threat' hanging over expeditionary 

corps* 

■ 

4 

"With this double hypothesis in view French Govt continues 
consider necessaiy speedy implementation Singaport conference 
recommendations r 

"It is not 
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"It is not (rpt not;) unaware such implementation poses certain 
number important problems for Washington as well as London, 
and it is with view facilitating their solution that French 
Govt has supported Eritish suggestion prior Rome conference 
have meeting % three powers Chiefs of Staff • 

"French Govt can, therefore, only confirm to US Govt its very 
keen desire have such conference convened immediately. ,[ 

End verbatim text*. 

Foreign Office tells us aide memoire approved by Prime Minister, 
Foreign Minister and Minister Associate States and stresses 
highly classified nature information therein, Tvlth reference 
SEA countries French Govt wld expect support military action, 
Foreign Office explains it wld expect such support only from 
Philippines and Thailand and apparently is dubious re support 
it wld obtain on any Measures in UN from Burma, India, Pakistan 
and Indonesia* 

Bnbassy is forwarding original text by air pouch. Both this 
telegram and original text being furnished USD EL. 



BRUCE 



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CD 

tr. 






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790.5/1-1^2 :T0? SECRET PILE 



OUTGOING TELEGRAM 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
TO? SECRET 



Ji^J 15 6:U2 PK '52 



Amlegation SAIGON 97U 
EYES ONLY HEATH. 

CODE CLERK: THIS MSG TO BE DELIVERED TO MR. HEATH 

* 

FOR HIS EYES ONLY. 

I 

Tripartite MIL conversations held Washington JAN 11 concerning 
defense SEA were convened through direct NEGOTS between three 
Chiefs of Staff « Only at last moment were single REIS of each 
FONOFF permitted to be present as observers* DEFT had no 
opportunity contribute to agenda nor formally participate in 
discussions. Nevertheless LEG TELS concerning this SUBJ were 
and are most helpful. 

Part one of agenda entitled "Exchange of Views with Respect 
to Southeast Asia" consists of two FTS. 

1. Problems of SEA in light of" world -wide impli- 
cations of situation, and 

2 # Defense SEA including action in event of 
deterioration of situation. 

Part two concerned recommendations of Singapore Conference. 

Summary of discussions covering both Tarts has been given to 
BARTLETT for transmittal to LEG. He is expected to arrive Saigon 
APPROX JAN 26. 

- TOP SECRET FOL IS 



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790.5/1-1552 :T0P SECRET FILE 

* 

FOL is brief summary of discussions on Tart one, 

1* GBI Bradley advised GEN Juin that he was unable 
to commit his GOVT at this time as to extent end 
character of US MIL assistance in event of massive CHI 
intervention. This SUBJ being considered at highest 
official level as matter of urgency. Field Marshal 
Slim concurred. Juin appealed for US and UK dispatch 
of air and naval support if not ground forces, Air 
cover necessaiy to allow his forces to retire on 
Haiphong. 
2. Jtain stated, under INSTRS from his GOVT, that FOL 



massive CKI intervention FH Union forces 



retire to 



Haiphong and fight to last man. Air cover needed for 

m 

this operation while naval assistance needed in 
evacuating 50,000 FR and Indochinese civilians. Juin 
stated that if Haiphong held, invasion of IC difficult 



or impossible, 

# 

3. Three Chiefs agreed to recommend to their GOVTS 
the transmittal of a declaration to Red China that 
aggression against SEA VIED bring certain retaliation 
from the three powers, not necessarily limited to 
the area of aggression. An AD HOC C0MITE of REPS of 
the three powers plus AUSTRAL and NZ was appointed to 



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study and report urgently on the measures the 
give GOVTS might take singly or jointly in event 
Eed* China failed heed warning. iJbove two steps 
resulted from mutual recognition that present 
problems consist of (1) discouragement against 

aggression and (2) retaliation. * * 

t > 

h* All agreed that CHI aggression against SEA 

might well mean war with China. 

5. Neither the recommendation as to proposed decla- 
"ration nor the report of ;.D- HOC COKITE have been 

M 

reed by DEFT. 

6. It SHED be noted th^t the language of proposed 
declaration must still be approved by each of the five 
GOVTS concerned as well as joint agreement reached 
concerning method and timing of transmittal to Red 
China, Likewise^ the recommendations of AD HOC 
COMITE which TiLD presumably be of very broad nature 

■ 

WED necessarily influence course of action of the 

■ 
five GOVTS with respect to transmittal proposed 

■ 

■ ■ 
■ 

. declaration. 
Bartlctt has been fully briefed and LEG vdll be informed 



of developments ?.s they occur. 



ACHESON 



FE:rS/,:REHoey 

TOP SECRET 



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'ANNEX TO NSC 12*f - ' " ■ ' TOP SECRET 

- • SECURITY INFORMATION 

February 13, 1952 

NSC STAFF STUDY 

on 

UNITED, STATES... OBJECT IVES ANT) COURSES OF ACTION WITH 
RESPECT TO COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA* 

- 

THE PROBL EM 

^^— w ■ ' » i m i ■■ i ii i ■■ i ■ 

■ 

i. To determine the policy of the United States toward 
the countries of Southeast Asia, and in particular, the courses 
of action which may be taken by the United States to strengthen 
and coordinate resistance to communism on the part of the 
governments and peoples of the area, to prevent Chinese Com- 
munist aggression j and to meet such aggression should it occur . 

* 
ANALYSIS 

I. CONSEQUENCES TO THE UNITED STATES 0? COMMUNIST DOMINATION 



» — - a - j 



OF S0UTHEAST_ ASIA 

2. Communist domination of Southeast Asia, whether by 
means of overt invasion, subversion, or accommodation on the 
part of the indigenous governments, would be critical to 
United States security interests* Communist success in this 
area would spread doubt and fear among other threatened non- 
communist countries as to the ability of the United States and 
the United Nations to halt communist aggression elsewhere. It 
would strengthen the claim that the advance of communism is 
inexorable and encourage countries vulnerable to Soviet pres- 
sure to adopt policies of neutralism or accommodation. Suc- 
cessful overt Chinese Communist aggression in this area, es- 
pecially if achieved without encountering more than token 
resistance on the part of the United States of the United 
Nations, would have critical psychological and political con- 
sequences which would probably include the relatively swift 
alignment of the rest of Asia and thereafter or the Middle 
East to communism, thereby endangering the stability and 
security of Europe. Such a communist success might nullify 
the psychological advantages accruing to the free world by 
reason of its response to the aggression in Korea. 

3« The fall of Southeast Asia would underline the ap- 
parent economic advantages to Japan of association with the 
communist-dominated Asian sphere * Exclusion of Japan from 
trade with Southeast Asia would seriously affect the Japanese 



*The term Southeast Asia is -used herein to mean Indochina 
Bursa, Thailand, the Malay Peninsula, and Indonesia, 

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economy, and increase Japan 1 s dependence on United States aid. 
In the long run the loss of Southeast Asia, especially Malaya 
and Indonesia, could result in such economic and political 
pressures In Japan as to make it extremely difficult to pre- 
vent Japan's eventual accommodation to the Soviet Bloc. 

4. Southeast Asia, especially Malaya and Indonesia, is 
the principal world source of natural rubber and tin. Access 
to these materials by the Western Powers and their denial to 
the Soviet Bloc is important at all times and particularly In 
the event of global war. Communist control over the rice 
surpluses of the Southeast Asian mainland would provide the 
USSR with a powerful economic weapon in its relations with 
other countries of the Far Best. Indonesia is a. secondary 
source of petroleum whose importance would be enhanced by the 
denial to the Western Powers of petroleum sources in the Middle 
East. Malaya is the largest net dollar earner for the United 

- Kingdom, and its loss would seriously aggravate the economic 
-problems facing the UK. 

5. Communist control of all of Southeast Asia would ren- 
der the United States position In the D acific offshore island 
chain precarious and would seriously jeopardize fundamental 
United States security interests in the Far East. The exten- 
sion of communist power via Burma would augment the communist 
threat to India and Pakistan and strengthen the groups within 
.those countries which favor accommodation. However, such an 
event would probably result In a stiffer attitude toward 
communism on the part of the Indian government. 

6. Communist domination of mainland Southeast Asia would 
place unfriendly forces astride the most direct and best- 
developed sea and air routes between the Western Pacific and 
India and the Rear East. In the event of global war, the 
development of Soviet submarine and air bases in mainland 
Southeast Asia might compel the detour of U.S. and allied 
shipping and air transportation In the Southeast Asia region 
via considerably longer alternate routes to the south. This 
extension of friendly lines of communication would hamper U.S. 
strategic movements in this region and tend to isolate the 
major no a- communist bases in the Far East—the offshore island 
chain and Australia- -from existing bases in East Africa and 

. the Near and Middle East, as well as from potential bases on 
the Indian sub-continent, 

7. Besides disrupting established lines of communication 
In the area, the denial of actual military facilities in main- 
land Southeast Asia- -in particular, the loss of the major naval 
operating bases at Singapore—would compel the utilisation of 

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less desirable peripheral bases. Soviet exploitation of the 
naval and air bases in mainland Southeast Asia probably would 
be limited by the difficulties of logistic support but would, 
nevertheless, increase the threat to existing lines of com- 
munication. 

♦ - 

II. REGIONAL STRATEG Y - 

3. The continued integrity of the individual countries 
of Southeast Asia is to a large extent dependent upon a 
successful coordination of political and military measures 
for the entire area. The development of practical measures 
aimed at preventing the absorption of these countries into 
the Soviet orbit must therefore recognize this interdependence 
and must , in general , seek courses of action for the area as 
a whole. 

9. However, it must be recognized that the governments 
and peoples of Southeast .Asia have little in common other than 
their geographic proximity and their newly • awakened nationalism 
and anti-colonialism. For the most part, their economies are 
competitive rather than complementary. The countries are 
divided internally and from each other by language and ethnic 
differences. The several nationalities and tribal groups are 
the heirs of centuries of warfare, jealousy, and mutual dis- 
trust* In addition, their present governments are sharply 
divided in their attitudes toward the current East-Vast 
struggle. The governments of the three Associated States of 
Indochina are not recognized by any other Asian states except 
Nationalist China and Thailand. 

10, In the strategic sense, the defense of Tonkin is 
important to the defense of mainland Southeast Asia. If 
Communist forces should succeed in driving the French Union 
forces from Tonkin, military action in the remainder of 
Indochina might have to be limited to delaying action and 
the perimeter defense of certain coastal areas pending rein- 
forcement or evacuation. With the appearance of communist 
success, native sunport would probably swing increasingly to 
the Viet Minn, 

11. Thailand has no common border with China and no 
strong internal communist element. It adjoins areas of Indo- 
china now controlled by the Viet Minh, but the border areas 
a're remote and difficult. Hence, communist seizure of 
Thailand is improbable except as a result of. the prior loss 

of either Burma or Indochina. 

* 

12, Communist control of either Indochina or Burma would 
expose Thailand to infiltration and severe political pressures, 

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as veil as to the threat of direct attack. Unless substantial 
outside aid were forthcoming, it is possible that in such a 
ease, political pressure alone would be sufficient to bring 
about the accommodation of Thailand to international communism- 
within a year, However 3 substantial aid, together with as- 
surance of support by the United States and the UN might be 
sufficient to preserve a non- communist government in Thailand 
in spite of any form of pressure short of overt attack. 

13. Thailand vould be difficult to defend against an 
overt attack from the east by way of the traditional invasion 
route through Cambodia, Thailand is more defensible against 
attack from Burma owing to the mountainous terrain and poor 
communications of the Thai -Burmese border. In either case it 
might be possible to defend an area in southern Thailand 
centering on Bangkok. Since any attack on Thailand would 
necessarily be preceded by communist encroachment on Indochina 
or Burma, the defense of Thailand would probably be part of 

a broader pattern of hostilities. 

* 

l^f • If the loss of Thailand followed the loss of Burma, 
the defense of Indochina would be out- flanked; and any sub- 
stantial communist forces based on Thailand would render the 
position of the French Union Forces in Indochina untenable in 
the long run. If the collapse of Thailand followed the loss 
of Indochina, the psychological and political consequences 
would accelerate the deterioration of Burma. However, the 
military consequences in such a case would be less immediate, 
owing to the difficult terrain of the Thai-Burmese border 
country. 

15. Communist control of Thailand would aggravate the 
already serious security problem presented by the Thai-Malayan 
border and greatly increase the difficulties of the British 
security forces in Malaya. However, assuming control of the 
sea by the Western Powers, Malaya offers a defensible position 



against even a full-scale land attack. The Kra Isthmus of the 
Malayan Peninsula would afford the best secondary line of 
defense against total communist domination of Southeast Asia 
and the East Indies. Such a defense would effectively protect 
Indonesia against external communist pressure. By thus de- 
fending Malaya and Indonesia, the ant i- communist forces would 
continue to hold the most important strategic material re- 
sources of the area, as well as strategic air and naval bases 
and lines of communication. 

16. The strategic interdependence of the countries in 
Southeast Asia, and the cumulative effect of a successful 



ANNEX TO NSC 124 



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. * * « * 



communist penetration in any one area, point to the importance 
of action designed to forestall any aggression by the Chinese 
Communists* The most effective possible deterrent would be a 
joint warning by the United States and certain other govern- 
ments regarding the grave consequences of Chinese aggression 
against Southeast Asia, and implying the threat of retaliation* 
against Communist China itself, Such a warning should be 
issued in conjunction with other nations, including at least 
the United Kingdom, Prance, Australia and New Zealand. Parti- 
cipation in such a warning involves all the risks and dis- 
advantages of a pre commitment to take action in future and 
unknown circumstances. However, these disadvantages must be 
weighed against the alternative of a costly effort to repel 
Chinese invasion after it has actually occurred. A second, 
but probably less effective, means of attempting to deter such 
an invasion would be to focus world attention on the continuing 
threat of Chinese Communist aggression against Southeast Asia 
and to make clear to the Soviet and Chinese Communist Govern- 
ments the fact that the United States views the situation in 
Southeast Asia with great concern* In fact, statements along 
these lines have already been made. Such means might also 
include a Peace Observation Commission, if desired and request- 
ed by the countries concerned, public addresses by U.S. offi- 
cials, and "show the flag" visits by naval -and air units. 

17. The Chinese Nationalist forces represent consider- 
able reserve upon which to draw in the event of military 
action against Communist China. The deficiency in equipment 
and training seriously limits the possible employment of these 
forces at present, however, continuation of our training and 
supply efforts should serve to alleviate these deficiencies. 
The manner of employment of these forces is beset not only 
with military but also with political difficulties. Hence 
the decision as to the best use of these forces cannot be 
made at this time. Nevertheless, we should be prepared to 
make the best practicable use of this military augmentation 
in light of the circumstances existing at the time. 






* 



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TO? SECRET 
SECUR ITY INFORMAT I ON 



III. INDOCHINA 



■ * *■ 



18. In the long run, the security of Indochina against 
communism will depend upon tha development of native govern- 
ments able to co^fiand the support of the masses of the people 
and national armed Jforess capable of relieving the French of 
the major burden of maintaining internal security. Some 
progress is being made In tho formation and development of 
national armies. However f tha Vietnamese Government has been 
slow to assume its responsibilities and has continued to 
suffer from a lack of strong leadership. It has had to con- 
tend with: (a) lingering Vistnaaess suspicion of any French- •• 
supported regime 3 combined with th3 apathetic and "fence 
sitting" attitude of the bulk of the people; (b) the diffi- 
culty j common to all new and Inexperienced governments ? of 
training the necessary personnel and building an efficient 
administration; and (c) the failure of factional and sectional 
groups to unite in a concerted national effort. 

19* ■ The U.S. economic aid program for Indochina has as 
Its objectives to increase production and thereby offset the 
military drain on the economy of the Associated States; to 
increase popular support for the Government by improving the 
effectiveness of Government services; to make the Government 
and the people aware of America's interest in their independ- 
ence and welfare 3 and to use economic aid as a means of sup- 
porting the military effort. Because of their strained 
budgetary situation 7 the Associated States cannot meet the 
local currency costs of the projects; about 60 percent of 
the program funds is 5 therefore, devoted to importing needed 
commodities which are sold to generate counterpart. 

20. The military situation in Indochina continues to be 
one of stalemate. Increased U.S. aid to the Franco-Vietnamese 
forces has been an essential factor in enabling them to with- 
stand recent communist attacks. However, Chinese aid to the 
Viet Minh in the form of logistic support , training, and 
technical advisors is increasing at least at a comparable rate. 
The prospect is for a continuation of the present stalemate 

in the absence of intervention by important forces other than 
those presently engaged. 

21. While it is unlikely under the present circumstances 
that the French will suffer a military defeat in Indochina, 
there is a distinct possibility that the French Government 
will soon conclude that France cannot cpntinue indefinitely 

to carry the burden of her total military commitments. From 
the French point of view, the possible means of lessening the 

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present burden include: (1) a settlement with the communists 
in Indochina; (2) an agreement to internationalize the action 
in k Indochina} (3) reduction of the NATO obligations of France. 

22. A settlement based on. a military armistice would be 
nio^e complicated in Indochina than in the case of Korea . Much 
of ] Indochina is not firmly under the control of either side, 
but subject to* occasional forays from both. Areas controlled 
by the opposing sides are Interspersed, and lines of contact 
are fluid, 3ecause of the weakness of the native governments, 
the dubious attitudes of the population even in areas under 
French control, and the certainty of continued communist 
pressure, it is highly probable that any settlement based on 
a withdrawal of French forces would be tantamount to handing 
over Indochina to communism, The United States should there- 
fore continue to oppose any negotiated settlement with the 
Viet Minn, 

23* In the event that information and circumstances point 
to the conclusion that France is no longer prepared to carry 
the burden in Indochina, or if France presses for a sharing of 
the responsibility for Indochina, whether in the ON or directly 
with the U.S. Government, the United States should oppose a 
French withdrawal and consult with the French and British con- 
cerning further measures to be taken to safeguard the area 
from communist domination. In anticipation of these possi- 
bilities, the United States should urgently re-examine the 
situation with a view to determining: 

a. Whether U.S, participation in an international 
undertaking would be warranted, 

b. The general nature of the contributions which 
the United States, with other friendly governments, might 
be prepared to make, 

2h 9 A cessation of hostilities in Korea would greatly 
increase the logistical capability of the Chinese Communists 
to support military operations in Indochina. A Korean peace 
would have an even more decisive effect in increasing Chinese 
air capabilities in that area. Recent intelligence reports 
indicate increased Chinese Communist military activity in the 
Indochinese border area. If the Chinese Communists directly 
intervene with large forces over and above those introduced as 
individuals or in small units , the French would probably be 
driven back to a beachhead around Haiphong, The French should 
be able to hold this beachhead for only a limited time at best 
in the absence of timely and substantial outside support. 



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25. In view of the world-wide reaction to overt aggres- 
sion in Korea, Communist China may prefer to repeat in Indo- 

a china the method of "volunteer 11 intervention. Inasmuch as the 
French do not control the border between China and Indochina 
nor large areas north of Hanoi, it may be difficult to detect 
the extent of preparation for such intervention. It is im- 
portant to U*S. security interests to maintain the closest 
possible consultation with the French Government on the 
buildup of Chinese Communist intervention in Indochina. ^ The 
Government of France has agreed to consult with the United 
States before it requests UN or other international action to 
oppose Chinese Communist aggression in Indochina in order that 
the two countries may jointly evaluate the extent of Chinese 
Communist intervention, 

26. If it is thus determined that Chinese Communist 
forces (including volunteers) have overtly intervened in the 
conflict in Indochina, or are covertly participating to such 
an extent as to jeopardize retention of the Tonkin Delta by 
the French forces, the United States should support the French 
to the greatest extent possible, preferably under the auspices 
of the UN. It is by no means certain that an appropriate UN 
resolution could be obtained. Favorable action in the UN 
would depend upon a change -in the attitude of those governments 
which view the* present regime in Indochina as a continuation 

of French colonialism. A new communist aggression might bring 
about a reassessment of the situation en the part of these 
governments and an increased recognition of the danger. 
Accordingly, it "is believed that a UK resolution to oppose 
the aggression could be passed in the General Assembly by a 
small margin. 

27. Even if it is* not possible to obtain a UN resolution 
in such a case, the United States should seek the maximum 
possible international support for and participation in any 
international collective action in support of France and the 
Associated States. Jibe U nit ed States should take appropriate 
m II 1 1 ar y a c t i o n a g a i n s fT C ommun 1 s't . JCh In £C'&$ T'p ar t" " of a "UK "cfoX- 
teat I v sL a c t ion" o rjDi ' c on j u n c t i on j& 1 1 h„. £ r a n c e an d the Un i t e d 

^Kingdom andJother,^friendly governments , ^However , In;the ^"* 
^absence of such support, it is highly unlikely that the United 
States would, act unilaterally. It is probable however, that 
the United States would find some support and token participa- 
tion at least from the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth 
countries. 

28. The U.S. forces which would he committed, and the 
manner of their employment, as well as the military equipment 

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* 

which could be furnished to bolster the French Union forces, 
would be dependent upon certain factors which cannot now be 
predicted with accuracy. These include the extent of progress 
in U.S. rearmament, whether or not hostilities in Korea were 
continuing 5 and strategic developments in other parts of the / 
world. It j^ould be._ desirable to, .avoid.. the use,. of major U.S. 
grown djforces in Indochina. Other effective means of oppos- 
ing the aggression would include naval, air and logistical 
support of the French Union forces, naval blockade of Com- 
munist China, and attacks by land and carrier-based aircraft 
on military targets in Communist China. The latter could be 
effective against the long, tenuous, and vulnerable supply 
lines by which Chinese operations in Indochina would have to 
be supported. In the event of a forced evacuation, U.S. 
forces might provide cover and assistance. United Kingdom 
participation in these measures might well result in the ,* 
seizure of Kong Kong by the Chinese Communists. \ 



i 



29. It is recognised that the commitment of U.S. military 
forces against Communist China would: (a) increase the risk 

of general hostilities in the Far East, including Soviet par- 
ticipation under cover of the existing Sino-Soviet agreements; 
(b) involve U.S. military forces in another Asiatic peripheral 
action, thus detracting from U.S. capabilities to conduct a 
global war in the near future; (c) arouse public opposition 
to "another Korea"; and (d) imply willingness to use U.S. mili- 
tary forces in other critical areas subject to communist ag- 
gression. Nevertheless, by failing to take action, the United 
States would permit the communists to obtain, at little or no 
cost, a victory of major world consequence* 

30. Informed public opinion might support use of U.S. 
forces in Indochina regardless of sentiment against "another 
Korea" on the basis that: (a) Indochina is of far greater 
strategic importance than Korea*, (b) the confirmation of UN 
willingness to oppose aggression with force, demonstrated at 
such a high cost in Korea, might be nullified by the failure 
to commit UN forces in Indochina; and (c) a second instance of 
aggression by the Chinese Communists would justify measures 
not subject to the limitations imposed upon the UN action in. 
Korea. 

■ 

31. JThe^m^itary^actlon contemplated herein^would con- 
stXtute^.in effect, a t j/ap_3galiis ^tf^Co^uri i sTfTShxna which would 
bp^llmited only as to Its objectives, "but '_would not" be "sub ject 
to any geographic limitations . Employment of 'U.S. forces in 
sT^e^facto war without a formal declaration would raise ques- 
tions which would make It desirable to consult with key members 
of both parties In Congress in order to obtain their prior con- 
currence in the courses of action contemplated. 

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Captain John A* rfebster, BSIi 
TOP SECRET 53976-h 



SECUrtlTY INFORMATION 



SPECIAL EST IMATE 



CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE US COURSES 
OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA, BURMA, 

OR THAILAND 



SE-22 
29 February 1952 



Advance Copy for the NSC • 

In order to expedite delivery, this estimate is being 
given a special preliminary distribution. 



The intelligence organizations of the Departments .of 
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint 
Staff participated with the Central Intelligence Agency 
in the preparation of this estimate. All members of 
the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this 
estimate on 28 February 1852. See, however, footnotes 
to paragraphs 1, 2, and 3b. 



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEN.CY- 



29 February 1952 



CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE US COURSES 07 
ACTION WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA, BURMA, OR 

THAILAND 



THE PROBLEM 



To estimate the consequences of certain possible US 
courses of action with respect to an identifiable Chinese 
Communist military intervention* in Indochina, Burma, or 
Thailand. 



ASSUMPTION 



The United Kingdom, France, Australia, and New 
Zealand will join the United States in waming~Communist 
China that the five powers will meet Chinese Communist 



*.x— 



* The term "identifiable Chinese Communist military inter- 
vention" is intended to cover either an open and acknowledged 
military intervention or an unacknowledged military intervention ■ 
of such a scale and nature that its existence could be demonstrated. 



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military intervention in Southeast Asia with military 
counteraction. Whether or not the four o'iier powers 
will join the US in such a warring is beyond the scope 
of this estimate. We are also unable to assess which 
of various conceivable me f hods of transmitting a warning 
would have the greatest deterrent effect 



ESTIMATE 



t THE EFFECT OF A JOINT WARNING AGAINST CHINESE 
COMMUNIST MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SOUTHEAST 
ASIA. 



On Communist Intentions 

h • 

n m 

■ 1. We do not believe that a joint warning against an 
1 'identifiable military intervention/ by the Chinese Communists 
in Southeast Asia would tend to provoke such intervention. If, 
however, the Chinese Communists contemplate an early "identi- 
fiable military intervention" in Southeast Asia, or if in the 
future they should contemplate such an intervention, a joint 
warning by the five powers would tend to deter them.* 



2. Even in the absence of a joint formal warning, the 
Chinese Communists probably estimate" that "identifiable 



* The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, 
would add the following sentence: "On the other hand, if 
the Communist leaders conclude from Western actions and 
statements that the West intends to attack Communist Chira 
regardless of Communist actions in Southeast Asia, the 
deterrent effect of a warning would be nullified, ' 



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military intervention 7 * in Southeast Asia would entail " 
substantial risk ol joint military counter action, and that 
such a risk is unwarranted in view of the prospects for 
further Communist gains in Southeast Asia without such 
intervention. They may, however, discount this risk, 
estimating that there are differences in policy among the 
five powers and that these powers may not be able or " - 
willing to take timely* and effective military counteraction. 






3. The effectiveness of a joint warning as a deterrent 
would depend in large measure on Communist conviction that: 

- 

a. The five powers were not bluffing, and were 
united among themselves as to the military 
counteraction to be taken. 

b. The five powers were actually capable of 
timely and effective military counteraction.* 

c. The counteraction would be directed against 
Communist China itself as well as toward 
repelling the Chinese Communist intervention. 



4. If the Communists were convinced on the foregoing 
points they would have to recognize that intervention in South- 
east Asia would bring military counteraction^ the probable 



* The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State 
holds the view that the Communists might be seriously con- 
cerned over the prospect of delayed military counteraction, 
even though they believed that timely counteraction need not 
be feared. He therefore believes that the words "timely and" 
should be omitted* 



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consequences of which would be general hostilities 
between Communist China and the five powers, if not* 
global war. It is improbable, therefore, that they v/ould 
initiate ai. "identifiable military inters ention" in Indo- 
china, Burma, or Thailand in the face of a joint warning* ' * 
by the five powers unless, on the basis of global considera- 
tions, they were willing to accept global war or at least ' " 
genera! hostilities in the Far East So far both Communist 
China and the U33R have shown a desire to localize the 
hostilities in Korea, Indochina, Burma, and Malaya. Further- 
more, the favorable prospects for the success of present 
Communist tactics in Southeast Asia make probable a 
continuation of these tactics, unless, because of global 
considerations, the USSR and the Chinese Communists 
decide to accept grave risk of global war. 



5. It is unlikely that additional signatories would 
increase the effectiveness of a joint warning. India would 
almost certainly refuse to participate in such a warning. 
It is improbable that Japan v/ould take such a provocative 
Btep at this time and uncertain whether Thailand would do 
so. Few, if any, additional governments would join in a 
formal warning. Even if the Philippines, Japan, and Thailand ' 
did participate, the Communists v/ould discount their adherence 
because of the military weakness of these countries and their 
existing ties with the West. The Communists would assure 
Chinese Nationalist support of the warning, whether or not 
explicitly expressed. 



iw 



Other Effects 



6. A public joint warning would considerably improve 
the morale of the Thai and Vietnamese governments. In Burma 



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any encouragement derived from the warning would probably 
be offset by fear of involvement in a conflict between the 
great powers and by general suspicion of Western "imperialist 
motives. 



»i 



7. Elsewhere in East and South Asia the effect 
would be mixed. There v/ould be a tendency, notably in 
Japan and the Philippines, to applaud this new manifesta- 
tion of Western determination to check Communist aggres- 
sion. On the other hand, the feeling would be widespread, 
especially in India and Indonesia, that the warning represented 
another instance of Western meddling in Asian affairs in pur- 
suit of colonial objectives. 



m 

8. The effect of a warning on other countries probably 
would not be of major importance. A warning might well 
revive the fears in the smaller NATO powers regarding the 
dangers of general war or of an overextension of Western 
strength in the Far East, but it is unlikely that the basic 
attitudes of these countries would be changed. 



9. The inclusion in the warning of a threat to use 
atomic weapons would produce a widespread and serious 
adverse reaction throughout the non -Communist world. 



n. INITIATION OF ACTION IN THE UN AND PROBABLE 

UN RE AC TIONS THE RE TO 



10. If identifiable Chinese Communist military inter- 
vention ir Southeast Asia actually took place, the UN could 



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p'robably be led to adopt cour/er measures similar to those 
taken regarding Korea if She US^ UK- and Frarce advocated 
these measures. Action by th^ Security Council would 
certainly be blocked by a Soviet veto, but ihe matte? could 
then be taken to Hie General Assembly within twenty -four 
hours under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, The 
General Assembly would probably begin by calling for a 
cease-fire. Were this action j.o be ignored (as it presumably 
would be), a two-thirds majority could probably be mustered 
for resolutions condemning Communist China as an aggressor, 
recommending military coutiteractioE to repel the aggression, 
and setting up a unified military command (though not 
necessarily under the US) to Ehal end. Most UN members, 
however, because o! their fears of a general war, would prob- 
ably not be willing to gire specific authorization for military 
counteraction against Communist China itself. 



"11. The willingness of the UN to adopt a stand against 
Communist intervention in Southeast Asia would be affected 
by the readiness of the victim to appeal to the UN, Indochina 
and Thailand would almost certainly be prompt in seeking UN 
assistance against Chinese- Communist military intervention, 
but Burma might fail to make a timely appeal or fail to 
support an appeal by another UN member. 



12 The degree of UN suppo; !: for action against Chinese 
Communist aggression would hinge on various other factors. 
A large number of Arab and Asian countries probably would 
abstain if Indochina., which they regard as a French puppet, were 
invaded. The Arab-Asian reaction might be more favorable if 
the victim were Burma, which has followed a policy of non- 
involvement. If the five powers look any counter measures 
without UN authorization, support of their action would be 
considerably lessened, • - 



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III. PROBABLE EFFECTS OF THE EXECUTION OF 

JOINT MILITARY COUNTERMEASURES 



Reaction of the Chinese Communist and Soviet Governments* 



13, If the Chinese Communists undertook an identifiable 
military intervention in Southeast Asia despite a joint warning 
against such a move, Chinese Communis I planning unquestionably 
would have considered the likelihood of Western counteraction 
and would have been coordinated with the USSR, It is possible 
that such an intervention might be undertaken in the belief 
that the warning was a bluff, or at least that the eourtermeasures 
would be confined to the area of the aggression* In this case 
the execution of forceful mill! / counter nseasu res might induce 
the Communists to seek a settlement, It appears far more 
likely, however 9 that such an intervention would be undertaken 
in full recognition of the 'risks involved, Under these circum- 
stances, the immediate reaction to such military counteraction 
would probably be an attempt to accelerate Chinese Communist 
military operations. The Chinese Commui Ists would probably 
attempt to extend their operations to other parts of Southeast 
Asia and, kaUrg already accepted the danger of expanded 
hostilities, they might well intensify operations in Korea 
and seise Hong Kong and Macao, Highest priority would be 
given, however, to the defense of Communist China. 



14. Chinese Communist defiance of a joint warning 
would almost certainly involve 'he prior consent of the 
USSR- The degree of Soviet aid to Communist China would 
depend upon (a) the nature, scope, and degree of success of 
the Western counteraction, and (b) the degree to which the 
existence of the Peiping regime seemed to be jeopardized. 



* SE-20: "The Probable Consequences of Certain Possible 
US Courses of Action with Respect to Communis i China and 
Korea" treats most of the material discussed in this section 
in more detail, 



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The Sec tarv of Defense? 



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*-H» f -J 



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT 
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 

WASHINGTON 



P SECREi 






COPY NO. 



ij 



March ^, 1952 



MEMORANDUM FOB TKE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 



SUB JEC T ; 



REFERENCES 



United States Ojbectives and Courses of Action 
with Respect to Communist Aggression in South- 
east Asia 

NSC 12V and Annex to NSC 12 1 * 



At the request of the Secretary of Defense 
the attached views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respec 
to the reference report on the subject are circulated here- 
with for the information of the National Security Council 
in connection with Council consideration of NSC 12 1 * at its 
meeting on March 5> 1952. 

It is request e d Jbh a_t_special security pre- 
cautions be observed in the handling of the enclosur 



,".0 



--K n ^i« T 




fi3s 



JAMES S. LAY, 
Executive Sec 




retary 



cc: The Secretary of the Treasury 

The Director of Defense Mobilization 



* pAuosit ory furnished Copy. 
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JUL 3 t3S 



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THE JOINT CHIEFS OP STAFF 
Washington 25, D. C. 



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SECURITY INFORMATION 



3 March 1952 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 



Subject*: United States Objectives and Courses 

of Action with Respect to Communist 
Aggression in Southeast Asia. 



1. In accordance with the request contained in your 
memorandum, dated 16 February 1952, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
have studied NSC 124, a draft statement of United States 
policy on the above subject, and a staff study relating there- 
to, both prepared by the National Security Council Staff . The 
views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the proposed 
policies enunciated therein are set forth below. 

2. NSC 124 recommends United States courses of action in 
the several areas of Southeast Asia. Taken either separately 
or together, acceptance of most of these courses of action 
and hen.ee of KSC 124, involves the making of a single basic 
decision. This basic decision is whether or not the United 
States, in support of the objective of NSC 124 stated as "to 
prevent the countri.es of Southeast Asia from passing into the 
Communist orbit, 11 would be WILLING to take military action - 
which would, in effect, constitute war against Communist 
China. An affirmation at this time within the National 
Security Council of such a willingness does not necessarily 
involve taking a decision now whether or not to go to war 

in advance o'f the nature and extent of the aggression becoming 
apparent. On the other hand, affirmation of this willingness 
should be made with a clear understanding of the implications 
which the adoption of these courses of action would entail. 
In addition, such affirmation of this willingness is essential 
in order to provide the basis for determining: 



a. The cost of these courses of action, in terms 
of men, money, and materiel; 

b. The impact of these courses of action upon the" 
economy of the United States; 

c-. The impact- of these courses of action upon United 
States military assistance programs with particular 
reference to the inevitable reduction in the United 
States contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 
zation (NATO) effort; and 



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d. The firmness of support of cur principal allies 
for our global policies generally and these courses of 
action in particular, 

3. The military action, as proposed in NSC 124, would be 
limited as to its- objectives, but it would, not be subject to 
any geographic restrictions with respect to Communist China, 
In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that 
any new communist aggression in Asia undoubtedly would stem 
from a deliberate design., in the formulation of which the 
possibility of counteraction by the United States against 

the source of aggression would, in all probability, have 
been considered, . * 

4, The making of such a decision now or in the eventual- 
ity of overt aggression by Communist China against a country 
of Southeast Asia is complicated by, among other things, the 
following: 

■ 

a. Whether or not the United Nations would be 
willing to call upon its members to engage in hostilities 
with Communist China; 

b. Whether or not the member nations of the United 
Nations would be willing to engage in military action 
against aggression by Communist China in Southeast Asia;" 

* 

■ 

£. Whether or not the United Kingdom and France would 
be willing to engage directly in military action against 
Communist China itself, other than action limited to the 
area of and /or the approaches to the land battle with the 
aggressor forces; 

d. The ability and the willingness of the United 
States to take the military actions involved including 
.-unilateral action against Communist China itself, in 
event of Communist Chinese military aggression in the 
countries of Southeast Asia, Such actions would call for 
considerable increase over current military production 
rates with a corresponding curtailment of the production 
of goods for the civilian economy; until increased U.S. 
production is achieved" these actions would reduce the 
military assistance programs to other nations, es- 
pecially those in high priority. 

£« ■ The possible effect upon United States alliances 
in Europe and upon the United Nations organization itself 
if the United States Government should consider it neces- 
sary 7 in its own interests, to take military action uni- 
laterally against Communist China; and 



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f. The" implications and the political effects of a 
probable refusal by the United States to provide ground 
forces for collective United Nations action or for com- 
bined military operations in support of France and the 
United Kingdom in Southeast Asia, 

i 5* The basic decision, in light of the factors set forth 
in paragraph 3 above, those developed in NSC 124, and the 
military considerations set forth herein, is essentially poli- 
tical In nature. Its resolution will have direct bearing upon 
future United States global strategy. Accordingly, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff believe that consideration by the members of 
the National Security Council itself of these factors and 
military considerations is necessary prior to any final deci- 
sion regarding the policy statement In NSC 124. 

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to report that, during 
the course of their preliminary discussions with representa- 
tives of the Chiefs of Staffs of the United Kingdom' and France 
on the matter of possible courses of action to meet Chinese 
Communist aggression against Southeast Asia, the British and 
French military position, opposed even the .concept of action 
against Communist China other than that limited to the area of, 
or approaches to, the land battle in opposition to the ag- 
gressor forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the 
British and French vould, at least initially, oppose taking 
military action against Communist China as a nation, even in . 
the face of aggression, 

7- The British and French appear to think almost ex- 
clusively in terms of defense, at least as far as Europe and 
Southeast Asia are concerned. Their unwillingness to take 
even those measures for the defense of Southeast Asia which 
are within their capability, Indicates £hst they may not 
recognise the actual long-term danger to themselves involved 
In the possible loss of Southeast Asia. 

8. Piecemeal actions by Soviet satellites, such as the 
overrunning of Southeast .Asia, can eventually lead to attain- 
ment by the USSR of its objective, among others, of dominating 
the continent of Asia and possibly the continent of Europe. 

It is emphasized that each Communist f.ain directly Involves a 
loss to the Western World, 

9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that there would 
be grave danger to United States security interests if South- 
east Asia should pass Into the Communist orbit, 

10, The military problems vhich vould arise as a result 

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* 

of any overt Chinese Communist aggression against Southeast 
Asia are different in character and in scope from those of 
Korean The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that any 
restrictions which would limit the military action taken in 
French Indochina, Thailand, and/or Burma to the area of, or 
the approaches to, the land battle in opposition to the ag- 
gressor forces would result in such military action "be coming 
wholly defensive in character. Such action would, in their 
opinion, at best be indecisive and would probably extend over 
an indefinite period. 

11. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that military 
measures taken to prevent the Chinese Communists from gaining 
control of Southeast Asia by military aggression should, from 
the outset, be planned so as to offer a reasonable chance of 
ultimate success. After consideration of the military factors 
involved, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that 
in order to offer such chance of success, military operations 
in defense against Chinese Communist invasion of French Indo- 
china, Thailand, and/or Burma must be accompanied by military 
action against the sources of that aggression, namely, Com- 

^ - munist China itself. Accordingly, and in view of the fore- 

going, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would recommend, SOLELY FROM 
THE POINT OF VIEW OP MILITARY OPERATIONS, that a strong de- 
fense be maintained against such Chinese Communist aggression 
and that concurrent offensive operations be undertaken against 
the nation of Communist China. They would point out, however, 
that this course of action, while offering promise of ultimate 
* success, might result in a long war, and an expensive one at 

least materiel-wise. 

* 

12, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of 
view, must, in any event, oppose acceptance of all .of the mili- 
tary commitments devolving from NSC 12^ without a clear under- 
standing that the United States must be accorded freedom of 
action and, if possible, support in the undertaking of appro- 
priate military action to include -action against Communist 
China itself. Failing such freedom of action, the United 
States should accept the possibility of loss of at least 

1 Indochina, Thailand, and Burma. Such acceptance would call 
for a United States policy which would limit United States 
military commitments in Southeast Asia to those necessary to 
cover and assist possible forced evacuations of the French 
and/or the British from their positions. The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff reaffirm their position that United States ground forces 
should not be commit ted in French Indochina, Thailand, or 
Burma and for the defense of those countries. Further, they 
t strongly oppose the United States joining a combined military 

command for the defense of those countries. 



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13. Military action "by the United States against Communist 
China would inevitably involve the acceptance of increased 
risks. Such risks, however, should not necessarily be an 
overriding deterrent to United States action. As NSC ^8/5 
pok.nts out, the risk of global war "should not preclude 
undertaking calculated risks against specific areas in t\ 
over-all interests of the United States." 



■ne 



l^f. If Communist China commits overt major acts of ag- 
gression against French Indochina, Thailand, or Burma and if 
in the face of such aggression the British and/or French 
refuse to offer either military or political support to pos- 
sible United States action against Communist China itself, 
the effect of United States unilateral action upon our mili- 
tary alliances and positions in Europe as well as in Asia 
should be appraised and the risk calculated. Further, in such 
an eventuality, the validity of our alliances might veil be 
re-examined, , • 

15. In the light of all of the foregoing and, to meet 
the contingencies: - 

■ w 

I 

a. That Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast 
Asia poses a threat unacceptable at that time to the 
position of the United States, both in the Far East 
and world-wide, and 

b. That the United Kingdom and /or France decline 

to support action against the nation of Communist China, 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, 
strongly recommend the inclusion in any national Security 
Council policy statement with respect to Southeast A.sia stipu- 
lation that the United States Government will consider taking 
military action, unilaterally, if necessary, against the 
nation of Communist China. 

16. Acceptance of the policies proposed in NSC 12^ would 
serve to increase the commitments of the United States. The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that such increase should be 
accompanied by a substantial upward revision of our economic 
and military assistance programs for Southeast Asia and for 
Formosa and by some (possibly substantial) increase in our 
forces in being. In this connection, current slippages in 
the military production programs have already reduced planned 
United States and allied military readiness. There should be 
no increase In the risk resulting from such shortages in 
military production. Accordingly, the increases in our as- 
sistance programs and cur ready forces, required by accept- 
ance of the proposed policies ■ would call for a substantial 



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and immediate increase in the scale of United States pro- 
duction, and pending that increase , would reduce the mili- 
tary assistance programs to other nations, especially those 
in high priority. 

■ 

* 

17. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in paragraph 6? of 
the study in the Annex to NSC 12 1 !-, which is quoted below for 
ready reference: 

* ■ 

"in order to pursue the military courses of action 
• * envisaged in this paper to a definite favorable conclu- 
sion within a reasonable period, it will be necessary 
to divert .military strength from other areas thus re- 
ducing our military capabilities in those areas, with 
the recognized increased risks involved therein, or to 
increase our military forces in being, or both. The 
magnitude of the United States military requirements to 
I carry out these courses of action and the manner in which 

they could best be met can be determined only after study 
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." 

^ Such determination will follow completion of the military 

studies called for in subparagraph 6c (3) °^ the draft policy 
statement in NSC 12^ dealing with the military measures called 
for in subparagraphs 6d, 7f, 8c, 9b, and 10c thereof. In 
this connection, an armistice £n Korea will not of itself 
permit major redeployment or redisposition of ground forces 
in the Far East in the near future except at the risk of 
losing Korea and endangering Japan in the event hostilities 
in that area are resumed. 



18. In Connection with the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff contemplate no employment of United States ground force 
units in French Indochina, Thailand, or Burma; rather the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff anticipate that the major increase in 
United States forces required for contemplated operations 
against aggression in that area would be naval and air force 
units. It should be noted that the creation of any new units 
would, in general, strengthen the United States military posi- 
tion for the eventuality of global war and that such forces 
would be capable of rapid redeployment in that eventuality. 

* 

19. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the United States 
military point of view, do not wish to join in a combined 
military command at this time or under present circumstances 
for the defense of Southeast Asia against Chinese Communist 
aggression. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
believe that the United States should not at this time con- 
template relieving the French of their responsibility in 
Indochina if present United States global strategy, includ- 



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ing France f s Aole therein, Is to be continued. Further, they 
feel that, while French Indochina, Thailand, and/or B.urma 
are being defended by other friendly nations, the role of 
the United States in support of such defense should be pri- 
marily military action against Communist China itself. This 
latter action should, of course, involve military support . 
from the British and French as veil as from other friendly 
nations, but should remain under the control of the United 
States, 

20, It vill be noted that the foregoing comments are in 
general limited to United States courses of action relative 
to Indochina, Thailand, and Burma, The Joint Chiefs of Staff 
consider it premature for the National Security Council to 
attempt to decide now as to the military courses of action 
which vould be taken with respect to Malaya, Indonesia, or 
in the Southwest Pacific in the event the integrity of any 
of these is directly threatened by foreign aggression vhich 
could only follov aggression In Indochina and/or Burma, Ac- 
cordingly, in the event that the Chinese Communists threaten 
Malaya or Indonesia, the United States should then, In the 
light of the vorld situation generally and the situation in 
the Far East specifically at that time, consider the military 
measures it might talce as a part of a United Nations collec- 
tive action or in conjunction vith the United Kingdom and any 
other friendly governments. 



21. In the light of all the foregoing, the Joint 
of Staff recommend that the National Security Council 



Chiefs 
con- 



sider: 



a, Whether the United States, unilaterally, if 
necessary, vould be vill ing to extend the var to the 
forces and territory of Communist China in event of 
Communist Chinese military aggression in Southeast Asia; 

b. Whether the United States should insist that 
French Indochina, Thailand, and/or Burma be defended by 
other friendly nations and that the role of the United 
States in support of such defense be primarily military 
action against Communist China itself; and 



c 



Itself 



Failing freedom of action against Communist China 
, United States policy should limit United States 
military operations to those necessary to cover and 
assist possible forced evacuation of the French and/or 
the British from their positions. 



22. Thr Joint Chiefs of Staff have a number of substantive 
and specific comments vith respect, to the statements of policy 



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in NSC 124. These comments are contained in the Enclosure 
attached. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the 
Enclosure and their vievs herein be furnished to the National 
Security Council prior to its action on this paper. The 
military studies referred to in the Annex to NSC 124 and in 
paragraph 1? of this memorandum vill be furnished in due 
course to the Representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 
the national Security Council Staff, if such action is in- 
dicated following National Security Council action. 



For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 



HOYT S. VANDENBERG, 
Chief of Staff $ United States Air Force 



. 






Enclosure 



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V C OP Y " SECURITY INFORMATION 

E N C LOSURE 

■i ■ — ■ ■ ■ i r i jwi «■ — ■ j ■ i i ■ 

DRAFT 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SENIOR STAFF 



' > - i • — 



Subjects United States Objectives and Courses of Action 

wtth Respect to Communist Aggression in Southeast 
Asia/ 

« 

1. The following specific comments by the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff on NSC 12 1 * are submitted in order that these may be 
reflected as appropriate in the revision of that document # 

2 t Change subparagraph 2 c to read (changes indicated in 
the usual manner) s - • 

* 
* 

"Communist control of all of Southeast Asia weuld 

ekaiR-gseeasp&oug would seriously jeopardise fundamental 

U.S. security interests in the Far East." 

REASON: In the interests of conciseness and 
accuracy. In the light of the discussion in the analysis, 
the original wording overstates the immediate military threat 
to the U.S. position in the Pacific offshore island chain in 
the event of the fall of Southeast Asia. 

3. Revise the present last sentence of subparagraph 5 d 

■ 

in such a manner as to refer to every paragraph in the paper 
(in addition to subparagraphs 6 d, 7 f > & n d 8c) which 

■ 

involves military measures against Comrunist China. 

h m Add the following sentence at the end of sub- 



paragraph 5 d: 



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"In this connection, it should he nade clear to the 
other nations that United States ground forces will not 
be committed to the defense of French Indochina, 
Thailand , or Burma," 

REASON: For consistency and accuracy and in order 

to preclude mi sunder standing, 

,* 
5» Change subparagraph 5 h to read as follows (changes 

indicated in the usual manner); 

"Take vka&tfrav such measures other than military _as 

may he practicable to promote the coordinated defense of 

the area, and encourage and support the spirit of 

resistance among the peoples of Southeast Asia to Chinese 

Communist aggression and to the encroachments of local 



communis ts, u 

REASON:' For preciseness and to preclude any 
implication that the United States will join in a combined 
military command for the defense of the area, 

6, Change subparagraph 6c (3) to read as follows 
(changes indicated in the usual manner): 

"In view of the immediate urgency of the situation, 
involving possible large-scale Chinese Communist 

■ 

intervention, and in order that the United States may be 
prepared to take whatever action may be appropriate in 
such clrctimstances , aake-^e-glana det ermine noy^t he, 
measures necessary to carry out the courses of action 

■ 

indicated in subparagraph d below." 

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i 



• TOP SECRET 
SECURITY INFORMATION 



» r 



\ 

REASON: This subparagraph as presently written 
directs the Department of Defense and other agencies to engage 

■ 

in certain formal planning which, in the case of the 
Department of Defease , would involve the formulation of 
specific war plans. In addition, formal military planning 
would have to be initiated with the French, with the British, 
with the Chinese Nationalist Government, with the Government 
of Burma, and possibly with other friendly governments, in- 
eluding States Members of the United Nations. The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff question the feasibility and desirability 
of such action and, in any event, from the military point of 
view, they would find it impracticable to formulate war plans 
for all of the contingencies suggested in the basic paper 
beyond United States military courses of action and force bases 
therefor. On the other hand, the Joint Chiefs of Staff support 

- 

the desirability of undertaking unilaterally appropriate 

- 

studies of the problem involved . 

7« Change subparagraph 6 c (h) to read as f oliows 

- 

(changes indicated in the usual manner): 

< 
i • 

tt£B-the-even£-1;>-a£-in^ 
paint~%e-£he-eeRG!u3^en-^ 



^e-oai^y^ke-bu^dea-^n^^ 



3S-?£I? 






I 

*ho-U^~oj?~d:-ree^y^ Oppose a 

Fr ench wi thdr awal a&&- o s&g%&%- wi%h~ ^ho- Fa?a& ek~ a».&- Bi* !^isV> 

* 
ai?ea-^i'c:-?.- es:~i=-nist-ao^i;t aiion? from Indochina," 

. - ^~° . TO? SECRET 



1 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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TOP SEC BET 
SECURITY INFORMATION 



r 



REASON: The United States should not at this tine 
contemplate relieving the French of their responsibility in 
Indochina if present United States global strategy, including 
France's role therein, is to be continued. There would, how- 
ever, be no objection to a discussion of this contingency 
appearing in the Analysis to the basic paper • 

8 # Change subparagraph 6 d (3) to read as follows 
(changes indicated in the usual manner): 

"Consistent with world-wide U.S. conimitments taice 
' appropriate military action against the forces and , . 

territory of Coramunist China as part of a Uh collective 
action or in conjunction with French and the United 

■ 

Kingdom and any other friendly governments , u 

REASOTT: To emphasize that any military action 
against Communist China must be without geographic limitations 

■ 

9» Insert the following new subparagraph immediately 
folio wing subparagraphs 6 d, 7 f, and 8 c and any others 
refolding to possible military measures against Communist 
China, renumbering subsequent paragraphs accordingly: 

"In the event that the United States, in the face 
of Chinese Communist aggression into Southeast Asia, 
overt or volunteer, deems it advisable to take military 
action against Communist China itself, and if the 
United Kingdom and/or Fran.ce refuse to support such 
action, the United States will consider in the light of 



1*3 



G"7 



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• TOP SECRET . , 
SECURITY INFORMATION 



* 

the world situation at the time, and in the light of the 
possible consequences upon the role of the United . 
\ Kingdom and France in United States world strategy, 
whether United States security interests require taking 



■ ! such military action unilaterally." 

REASON: In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff this reservation is vital to the security of the 
United States. ■ '--,". 

10, Change the first sentence of subparagraph 7 h to 

- 

read as follows (changes indiso.ted in the usual manner): 

"Arrange to conduct a full and frank exchange of 
views with the British Government with the object of re- 
examining policy toward Burma and seeking any joint or 
coordinated action other than military which might con- 
tribute toward an improvement in the situation in Burma," 
REASON: For preciseness and to preclude any implica- 
tion that the United States will join in a combined military 

■ 

command for the defense of the area. 

■ 
» 

• 11 # Change the first sentence of subparagraph 7 d to 
read as follows (changes indicated in the usual manner) : 

■ ■■ 

"Encourage the British to develop "united action and 
cooperation among indigenous, anticou^iunist groups in 
Burma: -to resist communist encroachments ." 

EEASOI": Burma is an area of British responsibility, 
12. Change subparagraph 7 f (2) to read as follows 
(changes indicated in the usual manner); 

- • • U^S ■ TOP SECRET 



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. * 



- TOP SECRET 
SEC URIT Y JliF OHM AT I ON 



•"Consistent with vorlcl-vn.de U.S. commitments take 
appropriate military action against the force s an d- 
terri tory of Communist China as part of a UIT collective 
action or in conjunction with France and the United 

— 
% 

Kingdom and any other friendly governments." . 

REASON; To emphasize "-any military action against 
Communist China must be without geographic limitations. 

13 • Change subparagraph 3 b (2) as follows (changes 
indicated in the usual manner) : 

"Immediately put into effect whatever measures 

■ 

** mother than military may be determined as feasible to 

forestall an invasion of Thailand or a seizure of power 
by local Thai eoiamunists. 11 

SEASON : Military operations by the United States 

in Thailand .would > in all probability, be inf easible in the 

* • 

premises, 

l*f. Change subparagraph . 8 c (2) to read as follows 
(changes indicated in the usual manner); 

"Consistent with world-wide 11,3. commitments take 
appropriate military action against the, forc es and 
- territory of Comnurxist China as part of a UN collective 
action or'in conjunction with France and the United 
Kingdom and any other friendly governments." 

REASOiJ: To emphasize that any military action 



against Communist China must be without geographic limitations c 



TO? SECRET 

^93 






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. t 



' TOP SECRET 
SECURITY INFORMATION 



15# Change subparagraph 9 h as follows: 

a. Revise the second clause of subparagraph 9 b to 
• clarify the statement "in addition to the appropriate 

military action contemplated above against Communist 

China." - 

•\ 

b. Change the third and fourth clauses of sub- 
paragraph 9 b to read as follows (changes indicated in the 
usual manner): 

"the United States should, assis* in the light 
. ■ of the worldjnj^ia^ the situation, 

in the Far East specifically, consider the military 



trl^-jr - -T7 **. *^-^Lrnr^rr^ ll_.?. 4—.. — - . .. . — ■ ■ ■ ~ - ■ . . — i ■ . ■ ». ■ i ■ ■ - ■- ■* ■ 



measures it might take for the defense of Malaya 
■ &3-ap?£8-pi'f:ate^ as part of a UN collective action 

or in conjunction with the United Kingdom and any 

other friendly governments." 

REASON: Although the world situation generally and 

the situation in the Far East specifically will be controlling, 

it may be possible for the United States to provide those ■ 

reinforcements which are essential for a successful defense 

of Malaya at the Isthmus of Ida, thus insuring the retention by 

the British of Singapore while concurrently decreasing the 

danger of a successful communist invasion of Indonesia. 

« ♦ 

16, Clarify subparagraph 10 b to indicate action the 
United States would take in the event of attempted seizure 
of power by internal communist action in Indonesia. 



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- ' TOP SECRET 
SECURITY INFORMATION 



17. Delete subparagraph 10 c and- substitute the 
following therefor: 

"In the event of the imminent or actual fall of 
i Malaya to coismunisza, consider in the light of circum- 
stances exi sting at the time, what if any measures, in- 
cluding military, the United States in its own self- 
interest should undertake to prevent the fall in 
'Indonesia to communism," 



REASON : 



It would he neither sound nor realistic 



for the National Security Council to attempt to determine now 
the course of action which would be undertaken in Indonesia 

h 

and in the Southwest Pacific if Malaya should fall to the 
enemy j rather, the course, of events, globally and in 
Southeast Asia must be re-examined at that tine in order to 



arrive at any valid decision 



■ 



18 # Revise the pauer where applicable to reflect the 
latest intelligence estimates. /■ 






501 



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£ 



lur ot»hci 



. * 



NSC 113th Meeting 
5 March 1S52 



IE! 5 (?0?. C0"SI?^?J.?I0>T ) 

i 

wiggt ssmsss o^jgcgXTiss ahb oonasss o? assicst kiss 
Hsspsog so ooiaactisg ABQ-Esssiay nr souses? asi a (itso 1 34) 

fc ■ ■ MM I — - - ' I" 1 ' ■ »n M ' ■■■»! I ■ I. J ■ ■ ■■ II ■ ■ I ■ ■ — I J I II . ■■■J ' ■ ^ ■ II — * -— » II 1 I II II I — »- »— ■ «« » 



SOffitABI 



». 



f 






A summary of our present policy and of the proposed policy contained 
in ESC 124 is annexsdt (Cab A), 

COMMEITgS 0? TBI! JOi :?? CRISPS 0? SgftTT 

■ M ^ l 11 1 ■ ■ I . > I — ■ — 1 . . . 1, 1 . , 

5Sie Joint Chiefs of Staff have submitted eight pages of consents, 
Including an Annex, vfiieh have oeen circulated to the Council . 5?he 
primary points made by the JCS are; 

1. 1JSC 124 involves the making of a single, basic decision, wnich 
is political in its nature, i.e., whether or not the United States would 
1)6 willing to take military action which would in affect constitute war 
against Communist-China to prevent Southeast Asis from passing into the 
Communist orbit. They propose in effect that the ITSC affirm this will- 
ingness in order to provide the "basis for determining the cost of the 
courses of action in terms of men, money, material, impact on the U.S. 
economy and upon U.S. military assistance programs. 

2. The JCS report that their preliminary discussions with the 
Chiefs of Staff of the UZ and Prance indicate that "both are opposed to 
the concept of action against Communist-China other than that limited 
to the area of or approaches to the land "battle in opposition to the 
aggressor forces. 

3. Che JCS believe that such limitations of the military action 
would result in the action "being defensive in character and at "best 
indecisive and indefinite in duration* They recommend solely fron the 
point of view of military operations that in order to offer a chance of 
success military operations in defense against Chinese- Communist invasion 
of French Indochina, Thailand, and/or Burma must be accompanied by mili- 
tary action against the sources of that aggression, namely, Communis t- 
China itself. Ebs JCS concede that this course of action night result 

in a long war and an expensive one, at least materiel-wise. 

4. She JCS therefore insist that the U.S. must ba accorded free- 
don of action and if possible support in the undertaking of appropriate 
military action to include action against Communist -China itself, bail- 
ing such freedom of action, the U.S. should accept the possibility of 
the loss of mainland Southeast Asia. !Tne JCS oppose the use of U.S. 
ground forces in S2A and oppose joining a combined military command of 



the defense of those countries 



< 



- - 



— 



- . 



""- * . 






L . ^<'U' 1 






&s&usnt tssmua 

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\m 



* * 



- . TO? SENT . . - 

5. (Piie JCS strongly recommend the addition of a stipulation that 
the U.S. Will consider taking military action unilaterally if necessary 
against Communi st-China. 

6. < Approval of the policies would require a substantial upward 
revision of our economic and military assistance progress for S2A, and 
Formosa j some (possibly substantial) increase in our forces in being — 
primarily, ravel and Air force units — , and a substantial and immediate 
increase in the scale "of U.S» production* 

?m Farther military studies relating to the magnitude of military 
requirements to carry cut these courses of action and the manner in 
which they could best be met will be furnished in due course to the 1TSC. 

•QOS&gSSgS 0? gg3 3FDIBS S3C355giaiES 

SEie Joint Secretaries have not yet submitted any written comments. 



»•—»—» - -m 



A CIA Special Estimate (SS23) (fall S), and 1TI3 S5/l, "ProD- 
able Developments in Indochina in 1952", (Sab C) , relate to 2TSC 124, 

BSCOMigmggI033 ■ 

1. That you discourage the mafcing of any policy decisions by the 
USD at this meeting. 

Eiis matter was put on the agenda of this meeting so that 
the President could discuss it with the Council before 
leaving on his vacation. He understands that the natter 
has not progressed far enough for final decision, ffhere 
has not been sufficient time for anyone fully to consider 
the comments of the JCS. Ehe JCS themselves need further 
tine to complete their studies of the military require- 
ments involved and the impact of fulfilling these require- 
ments on other programs and on our global strategy. 

- 

2. Chat the paper be referred back to the Senior Staff for revision 
in the light of the Council^ discussion and the additional information 
which will be brought to bear on the problem.. 

Eae Senior Staff would, of course, take into account the 
general ?n& specific comments of the JCS together with the 
further military studies which the JCS will submit to then. 



3» Stoat you advise the Council that in your opinion the basic 
decision involved in this paper should not be ta!:en until the military 
implications have been fully explored; that you are requesting the JCS 
to proceed immediately with studies of the nature referred to in their 
nemonndum, with a view to providing the fullest possible information 

to **~ m - fC!f% 



uilC -1£<J 



this on the planing assumption that the decision will be 



I i ■ 

■ «^i v^^w ....... 



C UJ 



* 






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*T'/"> 






^ Q 






» # 






taken and that the British and French will support the action. 

It would see-i inarrorcoriate to nake a decision as 
• to our willingness to go to war without having fully 
explored the military implications • It would axspear 
desirable for you to take the position that the 
Defense Department is not "orerared to ssake such a 
record endat'ion to the President until it is satisfied 
that the military implications are acceptable and it 
had full opportunity to explain its findings end con- 
elusions to the Council and the President. 

4# Chat you raise the question whether , in view of the crucial 
importance of reaching agreement with the Trench and British, the 
Council should contemplate reaching a firm national policy decision 
before such negotiations are undertaken! 

In view of the great conple:d.ties of the problem involved 
and the heavy reliance we necessarily aust place on our 
allies in regard to SHI, it Vfould "be perhaps more sensible 
to postpone a final Government decision on SH& policy 
until after further exploratory talks v.lth the British and 
French — either on the Governmental or the political- 
military level* 



+ 

5# ffiiat you indicate that in your view it is unnecessary and 
unwise for us to contemplate unilateral action against Conrranist- 
China under present cirevms tances; and in viev; of the possibility of 
leais, etc., you w-puld prefer that no reference be nade to this 
possibility in the present 1TSC policy paper. You night point out 
that as far as overt aggression is concerned, our main objective is 
to deter it by a joint warning* We should not engage in a bluff. 
Ehe primary need is, therefore, to reach sufficient agreement with 
the TJ.X. and France as to courses of action to permit the issuance 
of such a warning* 



6. Etaat you e:coress the view th--.t the present paper concentrates 
far too heavily on action to be taken against aggression; that by far 
the greater danger is that Southeast Asia will fall to subversive 
tactics; that in the absence of overt aggression it is probable that 
before long Trance will be unable or unwilling to continue to carry 
the burdens of the civil war; that the paper proposes no courses of 
action to neet these contingencies which are commensurate with the 
burdens and ris!~s which it proposes we assume to deal with the lesser 
risk of aggression; and that you propose that this deficiency in the j 
paper be remedied by the Senior Staff in their next draft* ■ J 

Ehis is a, icajor deficiency in the proposed policy* If nothing 
Is to be done beyond vrha.t is now baing done to prevent Qoftmunist sub- 
version in this area, there is grave doubt as to the wisdom of assuming 

■ 

■ 



i 



*.- - 






- - - 



. . * * 



i 

i .* 

• I < — • i 



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i * 



"•^ •--... 



- • ■ . ... — j j 



very grave risks of general v/ar in an attempt to save the area from 
further overt aggression. 



c ^ 



Most of the actions available to deal v/ith the danger of sub- 
version lie in the political and economic fields* One means of reducing 
this danger and of improving the situation would involve a greater decree 
of UoSo supervision over the use of U*$* nilitary assistance in Indochina* 
particularly vith respect to the development of the native amy. 



i 
I 
* 



3 



%. 



505 






' rr-- 



: 






■■ ; J 



* *T 



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* « 



hsc r/K 

Present Policy 

Our present policy in the Par Eastj as sot forth in r;SC Ui/5j draws the line 
lich the United States will go to war to eafcrld along the offshore island chain 3 ■ 
MJ sly j Jq?anj the 3yufctts> the rhilij^jines, Air-: 'alia and Iysie Selandj £±t& special 
treatment of Formosa. Kith respect to Southeast Asia, the substance of our police- 
is to continue our present supper fc tfTogr^s to streSL&then the will and ability to 
resist Comuniet encroach cent and render Cbsssrjoist military operations as costly 
as possible j and thus to gain tirae for the United States and its allies to build 
up the defence of the offshore island chain. With respect to the fighting already 
^oin^ on in Indoehd na^ the policy is tc give sralitazy supplies to the French Union 
forces on a hifji priority basis but to avoid relieving the French authorities of 
their basic* military responsibilities j and to avoid committing United States arned 
forces under any cireuratar cec. 



e present policy do^s not appear to result from & lack of awareness of the 
great iEportsr.ce of the Southeast Asian nations, both strategically and in ter&s 
of their ra;r material reso rare £Cj but on a recognition of the difficulties 
involved iri holding the area. The States cf tho^e ar*sas ar-a inherently weak arid 
tere btb f oraldable difficulties involved in building up the will of the peoples 
in the area to resist GoiiHunist encroachment. One of the greatest of ths^e 
difficulties is the inability of the French to enlist the support of the Indo- 
Chinese cr of neighboring states in support of their fight against Coinunis:.; due 
to the feelirg against French colonial rule. In the face of these difficulties^ 
the world-td-ds coadtments of the United States and the obvious military diffi- 
culties of utilising United States forces in an effective defers cf Btffis&j 
Thailand and Indochina,, it has been the Govci-mnefet^a position that it could not 
undertake to ccrrr.dt United States forces to defend the area agalrst aggression 
even 






Proposed Policy 

The policy paper under consideration, proposes several major 
proposes: 



cnanges* r 




E. That in on attempt to deter China fro:: such overt action, vre isf;ue a 
joint garsiiag with a aumbsr of other States that -:j shall take nilitai-y action 
in such an event, provided that at least the British and French m.11 agree to 
such a joint warning and to the general plan of action in case the gamins is 






506 







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r> 



• T 



' 



• ' 



* • 



Cm That ir. case cf overt a^rr^sclon, China ce KatiGnalist forces would 
be employed £s desirsfaLe s&d feasible in roilitary op^raticn^ in Sou 53st 
;^ia, Kcredj cr China proper. 



DJ lbs proposed policy "tfith refer -••: tc the Kalaj 



States arid Indonesia 



is that I appropriate military action should be taken to defend thesi^ thcreby 
in effect placing tlie& SJiihin the offshore island defense; ciuin# It is con- 
tei?3?iat£d that in case the three ss&inland States fall^ the British ground 
forces in KaGLaya, cor.binod sdth ^ritioh and United States naval and sir power, 
could d - 5nd these areas. 



j • 



With respect to the threat of Communist subversion of ths Southeast 
Asian Sta^a* the papsr contemplates nin:>r changes, such a: 






a. 



_ Strengthen psychologic al activities 

b. Encourage trade and ccop-noticn with Western countries 



d. 



Strengthen covert operations 

Prorata the co-ordinated defense of the area. 



j . 



So increase is coni* .plated in our ccon Lc and technical assistance programs 
or inilitarj aid prograr-ts. lilnor recognition i^ ■p.ven to th': danger that France 
itttf not ce filing ;.mc\i longer to carry ths burden in jfodochin&j but t! paper 
provides only fcr consultation >dth the French and British and opposition tc 
French withdrawal in this event* A raj or strengthening 'of our policy in Indo- 
nesia is contemplated by a prorrisiori that in case of seisur^ or attempted 
seizure of ±o\ix,r by internal Ccisinunist action* we would take a,;pro^riat~ 
military action consistent with our vorld-vide coininitinents to prevent Communist 
control of the area. 



507 



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i • 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE Copy 2 of 10 copies. 



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION 

■ 

TOP SECRET 
SEC URITY INFORMATION DATE: March 28, 1952 

J. * 

* 

SUBJECT: Interview with British Ambassador; Secretary's Presenta- 

tion of Preliminary Views Concerning British Memorandum 
of March 15th Regarding Indochina 

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary- 
Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador 
Mr. Gibson, PSA 

COPIES TO: The Secretary 



S/P 

EUR (2) 
IE 
S/S 



After the customary amenities, the Secretary proceeded to give 
response to the British memorandum of March 15th, point by point, as . 
\ outlined in Mr. Allison's guidance memorandum of March 25th After he 

had finished the Ambassador expressed his thanks and asked if he might 
summarize the Secretary's presentation in order to check* He did so as 
follows : f 

"We do not believe that the British concern regarding French inten- 
tions in Indochina is justified and cite Mr, Letourneau's comments made 
at his press conference March 12th to substantiate our point of view G 
We have no evidence that any of the rumors cited in the British memoran- 
dum as indications of French intention to negotiate with Ho Chi Kinh or 
withdraw from Indochina are true. We would be gratified to have proof 
of any or of all of them. If it were obtained we would consider it 
necessary to reconsider our policy concerning the French and Indochina 
generally. We believe that the French will stay in Indochina providing 
they have: (a) assurances of continued US military aid, (b) sufficient 
financial aid to assist them with that portion of their budgetary deficit 
attributable to the Indochina operation and, (c) reason to expect that 
a solution can be found to 'their manpower problem. It is suggested thct 
this solution lies in the formation of national armies. "We do not - 
believe that the French are negotiating with Ho Chi Minh if only for the 
reason that Ho does not choose to negotiate and could not even if he wishocl 
to do so* Wo do not believe that the French are planning a withdrawal 
if only for the reason that such an operation could not be accomplished 
successfully without the assistance of the British and ourselves 



TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION 



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I 






-ft Oc 



TOP SSGIET SECURITY IJIFOHKiVTION 



may therefore expect prior notice. We had hoped to be prepared to pre- 
sent moro specific US views on the nature and e:cbont of retaliatory 
action against Communist China following an identifiable aggression in 
Southeast Asia and other related subjects to the British by this timo 
but have not yet been able to do so^ We are finding it difficult to 
reconcile the proposed diplomatic and military courses of action. Pro- 
gress is being made and it is hoped that s one thing will bo ready in the 
near future." (Note: Here the Secretary apparently had KSC 124 in 
mind although he made no direct reference to it.) 

The Secretary confirmed to the Ambassador that these were our main 
points a 

The Ambassador referred to the increasing concern in London with 
Southeast Asia. H.M.G. is concerned not only with the present precarious 
situation in the area, a concern which has been greatly accentuated in 
recent weeks by their suspicions of French intentions in Indochina 7 but 
also with the snowballing effects of any action which might follow a 
further Chinese aggression. The question of Korea is of course related 
to their concern. 

The Ambassador then noted that the last Ad Hoc Military Committee *s 
findings were a failure in that they resulted only in the presentation 
of three parallel sets of views which never mot The time is now 
fitting, in the opinion of H.M.G. 7 to make a serious effort to reconcile 
US and UK views* It is therefore requested that we give urgent thought 
to the following proposal » A politico-military conference bo held as 
soon as possible in which a limited number of British and American 
military and Foreign Office officials should tako part. He spoke of 
himself 7 Mr. Matthews, General Bradley and Marshal Elliot. In answer 
to the Secretary's question ho replied that he did not propose that the 
Joint Chiefs or any other group bo brought from lend on in ordor to 
participate. He believes that the conversations should be concerned 
with the hypothesis that the Chinese Communists would commit an overt 
aggression in Indochina;, that we were resolved to oppose that aggression 
and that our objective was to combat the aggression itself and not 
necessarily to overthrow the Chinese Peoples Republic? On that basis 
we would concern ourselves with the following two considerations: (a) 
the kind of retaliatory action which we are able to take and its expected 
effectiveness , and (b) an assossmeht of what would be the results of the 
retaliatory action in bringing the Sino-fioviet pact into operation^ 

The Ambassador stated that H.M.G. believes that any Chinese aggres- 
sion could be countered not only whore it takes place but also, to a 
limited degree, at the base of the enemy's operations in China without- 
bringing the Sino-Soviet pact into operation . The question to be 
determined^ however, arises out of the difference of opinion between tho 
UK and the US as to where that limit is to be founds 

TOP SEC JET SEC URITY DfFORM/lTIO a 

1 ■ ■ ' I ■ I I ■ » ■ * » ■ 1 — - I II Ml ■ ■ I I 1 1 II I II J ■ I ^— «— 

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f 



TOP S2CT$T SECIfcTTY ^IFOKMATTON 



Tho Ambassador emphasised that it is suggested theso discussions 
vera to "bo carried on without any commitment of any kind by either 
^overnnent < 

3h commenting* on tho Ambassador T s suggestion the Secrotory noted 
that the studies of the last Ad Hoc Gonnittee appointed by the Tri- 
partite Military Conference had not achieved their purpose because 
tho British participants were hampered by the fact that they gave 
first consideration to tho policy questions behind any proposed 
military action while the American representatives thought only of tho 
effectiveness of tho action without considering policy at all* He 
said that there had not been enough advance thought concerning tho 
subject on either side* 

The Secretary stated in closing that ho would nake the British 
proposal known to the appropriate American officials on Monday, March 31st > 
and hoped to bo ablo to give tho Ambassador a prompt reply,, 






FE:JSA:U>:aibson 



' TOP SECRET SECURITY H'lFORVATION 



510 



• i 



r 



* 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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i 



751Ci. 00/5-2852: Top Secret Pile 



TO? SECRET SEOUitliY IKPOtfMATION 



■»*■ 



INCOMING TELEGrcAM 



DEPARTMENT OP STATS 



riec'd May 28, 1952 



Midnight 



Prom:* Paris 

To: Secretary of State 

No;* lk^b> May 28 8. p.m. 



1, Tripartite meeting held this morning on Indochina- 
v/ith Prime Minister Pinsy presiding snd Schuman, Pleven, 
(^uaville and Letourneau present* 

2. French stressed obstacles to rapid incresse French 
military strength under EDO commitments as (1) French 
effort Indochina (2) financial difficulties and again 
raised questions whether French effort Indochina regarded 
as In purely French interest or in general Allied inter- 
est and whether SEA considered of sufficient strategic 
importance justify continued French effort. French also 
emphasized Indochina part of European defense problem. 
They explained effort build up Associated States nation- 
al armies to total aporox 200, 000 men end described 
limits on French action as (!) financial (2) cadres and 
(3) material. frhile expressing appreciation US aid, 
Pinay, Pleven and Schuman made cle^r France could not 
(rpt not) continue bear alone such great share Indo- 
Chinese burden. They pointed out serious difficulties 
trench Govt would face In National Assembly in connec- 
tion ratification EDO treaty, approval military budget 
anc continuation Indochinese effort tnd Pleven earnestly 
asked that reply to French request for increased aid for 
nc. tional armies be &iven as quickly and as generously 



*••» 



as possible. 






TOP- SECitET SECUitl TY INFOiiM/. WON 



511 



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r 



TOP SLCit^P S'lCUnITT INfOittlATION 



as possible- Pinay concluded meeting wit> request we 
take Into account political difficulties Pleven end 
Sc human faced in National Assembly. 

3 # The Secretory addressing himself to Pleven's tv/o 
queries made clear US considered French effort Indochina 
in general international interest and as of great stra- 
tegic importance, failure in which would have important 
repercussions in £sia, Kiddle Hast and Lurope* He 
pointed out US in Korea, UK in i.Ialaya and Suez making 
similar effort in common interest and each of three 
powers had initial responsibility in its respective area 
and Allies had function aiding and supporting in every 
way possible, Lden agreed* nef erring to trench policy 
build up national armies and our previous vigorous sup- 
port, he said US would be willing to go into quection 
Increased aid for national armies with Letoumeau in 
Washington, lie explained bill now before Congress and 
no (rpt no) figures could be given but believed finally 
approved bill will permit Increased aid for this purpose 
and said we vx> uld be in better position talk in mid 
June. Pleven raised question possibility legis and the 
Secretary expressed belief bill sufficiently flexible 
but promised, in reply Letourneau request, Inform 
Letourneau through embassy Paris re degree flexibility 
and items possible and asked Letourneau Ive us list 
items French have in -nincU 

1+. The Secretary raised question position US-UX-Fr in 
event Chinese Commies took more active part in Indo- 
china end said US now prepared discuss question joint 
position with UK and Prance, at political and military 
levels. He stressed importance preventing action rather 
than acting after event, raised question joint warning 
to Chinese Commies, and stressed importance discussing 
possible action if vvarnin disregarded. He stated as 
preliminary view actions should be taken against Chinese 
attack in Indochina. Re said questions should be dis- 
cussed first in political talks <ind then military, per- 
haps at Paris. He added while not (rpt not) wishing 
anticipate mill t dry talks, US would not (rpt not) be 
able furnish ground forces SEA but would expect bear 
considerable share air and naval effort. He emphasized 
essential no (rpt no) leaks re consideration warning to 
Chinese Commies. 

5* French 
TOP SbCitLT SLCUnllY iKPOtfMfiTIOH 



512 



KT 



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C 



. .TOP SECKSi SECURITY ISr^jfchi&IQH 



5. French immed brought up ad hoc comite conclusions, 
said French Govt had approved them one month ago and 
wished have US -UK views* Lden said he could mske no 
(rpt no) conwii tment but he evlsaged, as he had stated 
at Columbia "University, UN action on basis similarity 
to agression in Korea* he reserved position and said 
would not discuss with collea b ues. he coalite conclu- 
sions he could not (rpt not) comment except to say they 
had been examined . French said attention should be 
given- both on timing and form of warning as wrong timing 
mi^ht provoke Chinese Commies and be used as pretext 
extending conflict. It was agreed this subject to uld 
discussed in future political-military talks. Letourneau 
asked that some perts ad hoc comite conclusions, on which 
there had been no (rpt no) difference of opinion, be 
lifted out for approval by three ^ovts, stressing ever 
present danger (although he did not (rpt not) consider 

it immed probable J of Chinese Commie massive attack 
endangering French Expeditionary Corps and civilians *-• 
Indochina and need, therefore, for advance planning on 
evacuation and transport. The Secretary vh ile noting 
lack of agreement in ad hoc comite conclusions, agreed 
. re-examine it and noted desirability picking out cer- 
tain points upon which action could be taken now. There 
was general agreement with desirability drawing ux^ 
general political principles as ^uide to military talks 
and the Secretary said Department would prepare draft 
for forv/ardin to London arid Paris Embassies vjuide for 
military talks after which Mins could later examine 
overall subject. 

* 

6. Importance French attach to question increased aid 
for Indochinese effort and concern French Govt feols 
over this question in face of National Assembly and 
general public attitudes are evidenced both by presence 
of rinay at this conference and tone and content of 
remarks of trench Represents tives. Pinay, Pleven and 
Sehuman each brought out that France could not (rpt not) 
increase its present effort in Indochina and that there 
was serious concern over difficulties vfclch ^ovt expected 
to face in Rational Assembly. Pinay, for example, while 
expressing agreement with principle that each of three 
nations had its Individual problems and responsibilities, 



said, that 



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■in i 



51 



o 



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r 



TO^ SLCiv.T Sl'JBlfhTJY Xill'-Oai.AllON 






seid that esch was part of over-ell picture and account 
must be taken of disparity of mecns, which, in view of 
long French burden in Indochina, justified French 
requests for increased assistance. 

7* As question UJ action in event Chinese a-^ression 
in Indochina adequately brought out by Lden and French, 
the Secretary did not (rpt not) consider it necessary 
to comment further on point on which there was general 
agreement. 



ACRES OK 



TO? STLC.e.T SLCUuIlY IKE 'OAitf TI OK 






511* 















Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 20 11 



_!*C 



751G. 00/6-1752: SECRET FILE 



SECRET 



SECURITY INFORMATION 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



THE SECRETARY 



June 17, 1952 

Following his telephone conversation with Sir Oliver Franks today, 
which is reported separately, the Secretary saw General Bradley and 
Mr. Perkins . Later Sir Oliver dropped in at the office following a 
meeting in Mr. Jessup's office* He asked if he could see the 
Secretary for a few minutes to get the further report on the matter 
of talks on Southeast Asia* He repeated what he told us earlier that 
he had had a second message from London following the report which the 
Embassy had sent of Mr. Perkins 1 conversation with Mr. Steele. 

The Secretary said that he had talked about this matter with 
General Bradley this afternoon and that Friday was the only day 
which General Bradley could possibly meet and that was very inconvenient 
for Mr. Aches on. He said, therefore, he thought that any talks were 
impossible to arrange. He then said that he would he glad to talk 
to Sir Oliver right at that ^moment and see where we stood. 

The Secretary reviewed the situation and the talks which took 
place in Paris. He said that in the earlier meetings which had taken 
place on Southeast Asia, everyone had started from a different 
point and there had been little in the way of conclusion reached. 

He said that he felt what was needed now was political decisions. 

» 

The Secretary then analyzed the situation as we saw it. He ;said 
that if the Chinese came into Indochina in force, we would have to 
do something. We could not remain passive. He said that none of the 
things we could do were very pleasant ones and we felt that a warning 
was highly lesirahle. He said that we felt we should not give a 
warning, however, if there had "been no agreement on what we did in 
the event the Communists moved in anyway. He said this would make us 
look very silly and would weaken the effect of any other warnings. 

SECRET 
SECURITY INFORMATION 

515 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



V SECRET 
SECURITY INFORMATION 



He said it was clear that it was futile and a mistake to defend 
Indochina in Indochina. He said we could not have another Korea. 
He said it was also true we could not put ground forces in Indochina. 
We do not have them and va could not afford to immobilize cuch 
forces as we had. He said we could take air and naval action, how- 
ever, and had discussed whether this should be confined to approaches. 

He concluded that our only hope was of changing the Chinese mind. 
He said that we could strike where it hurts China or we could set uo 
a blockade against trade. He said we had concluded that our mission 
would not be to destroy the Communist regime. He also said that we 
fully realized the danger of bringing the USSR into the show. 

The Secretary concluded that there was no point in getting our 
military people into any talks. He said we must get political decisions 
first. He said that if firm decisions could not be reached that we 
perhaps could reach tentative decisions. He said that it had been 
clear at Paris that he was somewhat "ahead of the play 1f while the 
French and the British had Urged us to discuss these matters and 
had wanted discussions before decisions were made. When the 
question actually came up, they were not ready to talk. 

The Secretary remarked that Mr, Letoumeau had said in Paris 
that the military talks had reached some decision as to how to 
evacuate the wounded, etc., in the event of difficulites* He said 
that our Navy had talked to Mr. Letourneau regarding port sizes, 
capacity of ships, etc., with regard to evacuation. 

Sir Oliver said he thought he understood the point, would report 
back to London and would let us know if there were anything further 

w 

on it. 

Mr. Acheson said that if his analysis were wrong and the British 
Chiefs of Staff had any different one, he would b,e glad to hear of it, 

S LDBattle ■ 



SECRET . . — 
SECUaiTT lir?0RMATTON 



516 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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\ 



jT^~^ 



■ 






751. 5-MSP/6- 1752: Secret File 

Outgoing Telegram 

DEPARTMENT OP STATE 

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION 

■ 

June 17, 1952 
TO: Amembassy PARIS 7404 6 45 p.m. 

* 

In course Letourneau talks today, US side informed 
FR that subject appropriations US WLD be prepared pro- 
vide up to 150 MIL DOLS ADDL FY 1953 aid in support 
overall FR effort in IC, which probably will remain, 
as stated in Letourneau memo (EM5TEL 7682 June 9), sub- 
stantially same next year. It might be considered this 
ADDL aid WLD in effect add to FR resources to meet 
increased overall FR requirements in EUR in 1953- 
Relation this ADDL aid to overall US aid to FR 2nFY 1955 
and total FR defense effort in calendar 1953 will be 
determined in course NATO annual review. 

FR Informed that in view Lisbon understanding, no 
ADDL aid available for FR calendar 1953 budget for IC, 
but that we are considering Pleven request for ADDL 
OSP in 1952. 

Copies US position paper and minutes being pouched 
marked Sprouse. Texft communique FOLS in separate TEL. 

ACHESON 



SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION 



517 ' 



z-* 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



r< DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

FOR TH3 PRESS 

■ 

JUNE 18, 1952 NO. 473 

Secretary Aches on made the following statement at 

his news conference today: 

* 

VISIT OP M. JJ2AN LETOURNEAU 

As you are aware, M. Jean Letourneau^ Minister of 
the Associated States for the French Government, has 
been spending the last few days In Washington exchanging 
views with representatives of various agencies of this 
Government, The Ambassadors of Cambodia and Vietnam have 
also participated in conversations with M. Letourneau 
and with our own representatives. 

A communique covering the substance of the talks 
will be issued later today and I will therefore not go 
into details now. Yet I would like to share with you 
the feeling of encouragement and confidence which M« 
Letourneau inspires. Els thorough grasp of the situation 
and his constructive approach to the problems involved - 
military, political and economic - have impressed us all. 

As you know, the Communist aggression, in Indochina 
has been going on for six years . It has heen greatly 
stepped up because of assistance received from Communist 
China during the past two years , Yet, unrler French 
leadership, the threat' to this part of the free world 
has been met with great courage and admiratle resource- 
fulness. The military situation appears to be developing 
favorably. It has been good to hear from M. Letourneau 
of the part played in achieving this result by the con- 
siderable quantities of American arms and material which 
the magnificent fighting qualities of the French Union 
forces, including those of the Associated States, have 
justified us in devoting to this area of the struggle 
against Communist aggression. The effort to make of 
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia secure and prosperous members 
of the free world community has made great progress, 

I have been particularly impressed by what M. 
Letoarneaa has told me of what is being done to enable 
the people of the three Associated States to play the 
constantly greater role In their own defense to which 
they rightly aspire. Much has been accomplished toward 
the creation, training and equipping of the national 
armies* Units of these armies have distinguished themselves 



518 



i - 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



in battle and are performing vital security functions in 
many parts of the country* They look forward with eonfi< 
dence and determination to assuming an increasing share 
of the burden of carrying on the struggle • Their ef^ 
fectivcness full justifies the program of expansion to 
which the governments concerned are committed and under- 
lines, I believe, the soundness of our own decision, . . 
subject of course to the availability of Congressional 
appropriations, to render increasing assistance in 
building these armies, M. Letourneau described these 
programs in the course of his address before the Over- 
seas Writers yesterday. 

Favorable developments have not been confined to 
the fighting fronts and to the national armies. There 
are increasing evidences of the growing vitality of the 
Associated States in handling their political, financial 
and economic affairs. M. Letourneau 1 s account of the 
marmcr:/ih.iViilch: those new member States of the French 
Union are envisaging and meeting their responsibilities 
was heartening. I do not think it is generally realized 
to what extent these new states in fact control their 
own affairs. Only a limited number of services related 
to the necessities of the war remain temporarily in 
French hands , > 

We in the United States are aware of the vital 
importance of the struggle in Indochina to the cause of 
the free world. We have earmarked for Indochina economic 
and materiel aid to a considerable amount during the 
past two years. We are doing our best to activate 
deliveries: as you are aware the 150th ship bearing Ameri 
can arms and munitions to Indochina arrived in Saigon 
within the last few weeks. We are now bearing a con- 
siderable portion of the total burden of the war in Indo- 
china expressed in financial terms, although of course 
the entire combat burden is being carried by the French 
Union and the Associated States with the latter assuming 
a constantly increasing share. 

The Communists have made a most determined effort 
in Indochina. Their aggression has been checked and 
recent indications warrant the view that the tide is 
now moving in our favor, Once again the policy of 
meeting aggression with force is paying off and we can 
I believe bo confident that as we carry out the plans 
upon which we have agreed we can anticipate continued 
favorable developments in the maintenance and con- 
solidation of the free world bulwark in Indochina, 



519 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






NSC 12V2 

June 25, 1952 



TOP SECRET 
SECURITY INFORMATION 



i 



NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 

to the 

■ a 

* 

• RATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 



on 

UNITED STATES C mjRfiTTWS &WT > fifWIBflga 
pP iL ACTI0N WITH RESPECT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA 

References : 



^»*~ -.-.— -. -,»»..,-.» . , », 



• »>-- — »».. 



A. 

B. 
C. 
D. 



E. 



F. 
G. 

H. 



NSC 12 VI 

NSC 121+ an( a Annex to N3C 12V 

NSC Action Nos. 597 5 6l l i- and 655 

Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, 

same subject, dated June 2h and 

June 25, 1952 

Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, 

subject, "United States Objectives and 

Courses of Action With Respect to 

Communist Aggression la Southeast Asia," 

dated March h. April 15, April 30 and 

Kay 21, 1952 

NSC W5 
nsc 6h 

SE-22 and SE-27 ' 






-1 



• - 



At the 120th Council meeting with the President pro- 
siding, the National Security Council and the Acting Secre- 
tary ox" the Treasury adopted NSC 12 l f/l, subject to changes 
in paragraphs 2-n, 3, 5, 10-c- (2) , 10~c-(3), ll-(l), ll-(3), 
and 12 thereof f as incorporated in the enclosure (NSC Action 

No. 655).. 

In adopting NSC 12Vl* as amended, the Council and the 
Acting Secretary of the Treasury noted the following state- 
ment by the Acting Secretary of Defense with respect to the 
views of the Joint Secretaries regarding NSC 12Vl: 



ir In our 
effective* it 
Ut S, policy 
reduce the de 
tary, economi 
States ' (par. 
to the French 
military nego 
into with the 



opinion, if this pol 

must be clearly rec 

'to make It possible 

gree of their partic 

c ar^ political affa 

8~d) must be eraphas 

at each and every p 

tiation which the U. 

Government of Franc 



icy Is to be truly 
ognized that the 

for the French to 
ipation in the mill- 
irs of the Associated 
ized and reemphasized 
oliticalj economic or 

S. Government enters 
e, especially those 



N3C 12V2 



520 



TO? SECRET 



/ s 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Sect it hi 3.3 
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NSC 12V2 



TOP SECRET 
SECURITY INFORMATION 



negotiations which deal with the providing of U. S. 
economic or military aid to France or to Indochina." 

\ The report, as amended and adopted s was subsequently 
submitted to the President for consideration. The President 
has" this date approved NSC 12U/1, as amended and enclosed 
herewith ^ and directs its implementation by all appropriate 
executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government 
under the coordination of the Secretaries of State and 
Defense. 

Accordingly, NSC 6 L i- and paragraph lh of NSC k&/5 are 
superseded by the enclosed report. The enclosure does not 
supersede, but supplements the statement of the current 
objective with respect to Southeast Asia contained in 
paragraph 6-z of NSC U8/5. 




JAMES S. LAY, Jr. 
Executive Secretary 



cc: The Secretary of the Treasury 

The Acting Director of Defense Mobilization 



* 



** 



NSC 12 V2 



521 



TOP SECRET 






. 



I 



* 






V 



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TOP SECRET 
SECURITY INFORMATION 



STATEMENT OF POLICY 
by the 
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 



i* 



on 
UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT 






TO SOUTHEAST ASIA* 

OBJECTIVE 
1, To prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from 

* 

- 

passing Into the communist orbit, and to assist them to 

■v 

develop the will and ability to resist communism from within 
and without and to contribute to the strengthening of the 
free world. 



GENERAL CONS IDERATIONS 



■ 



■ ■ « ■— kW ■ -■» ■* m*> 



2. Communist domination, by whatever means, of all 
Southeast Asia would seriously endanger In the short term, 
and critically endanger in the longer terra. United States 

i 

security interests, 

a. The loss of any of the countries of Southeast 
Asia to communist control as a consequence of overt or 
covert Chinese Communist aggression would have critical 
psychological, political and economic consequences • In 

* * 

the absence of effective and timely counteraction, the 

< 

loss of any single country v/ould probably lead to 
relatively swift submission to or an alignment with 
communism by the remaining countries of this group. . 
Furthermore, an alignment with communism of the rest of 



♦Southeast Asia is used herein to mean the area embracing 
Burma, Thailand, Indochina, Malaya and Indonesia. 

NSC 12 k/2 5?2 ' ' • TOP SECRET 



• k< 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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TOP SECRET 
SECURITY INFORMATION 



• > 



* * 



Southeast Asia and India, and in- the longer term, of the 

* 

Middle East (with the probable exceptions of -at least 
Pakistan and Turkey) would in all probability progress- 
ively follow^ Such widespread alignment would endanger 



the stability and security of Europe 



• 



b. Cosmunist control of all of Southeast Asia would 
render the 0« S. position in the Pacific offshore island 
chain precarious and would seriously jeopardize fundamen- 
tal U. S. security interests in the Far East. 

£ # Southeast Asia, especially Malaya and Indonesia, 

- 

is the principal world source of natural rubber and tin, 
and a producer of petroleum and other .strategically 

m 

important commodities. The rice exports of Burma and 
Thailand are critically important to Malaya, Ceylon and 
Hong Kong and are of considerable significance to Japan 
and India, all important areas of free Asia. 

d. The loss of Southeast Asia, especially of Malaya 
and Indonesia, could result in such economic and political 
pressures in Japan as to make it extremely difficult to 
prevent Japan's eventual accommodation to communism . 
3/ It Is therefore imperative that an overt attack on 
Southeast Asia by the Chinese Communists be vigorously opposed 
In order to pursue the military courses of action envisaged In 
this paper to a favorable conclusion within a reasonable 

w 

f 

period, it will be necessary ^tc divert military strength from 



NSC 12V2 



523 



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I 

* 



.-- 



9 * 

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SECURITY INFORMATION 



other areas thus reducing our military capability in those 
areas, with the recognized increased risks involved therein, 

MP 

or to increase our military forces in beings or both* 

k* The danger of an overt military attack against 
Southeast Asia is inherent in the existence of a hostile and 
aggressive Communist China, but such an attack is less 
probable than continued communist efforts to achieve domination 
through subversion. The primary threat to Southeast Asia 
accordingly arises from the possibility that the situation in 
Indochina may deteriorate as a result of the weakening of the 






resolve of, or as a result of the inability of the governments 
of France and of the Associated States to continue to oppose 
the Viet Minh rebellion-, the military strength of which is be- 
ing steadily increased by virtue of aid furnished by the 

> 

Chinese Communist regime and its allies. 

5. The successful defense of Tonkin is critical to 
the retention in non-Communist hands of mainland Southeast 

- Asia, However, should Burma come under communist domination, 
a communist military advance through Thailand might make 
Indochina, including Tonkin, militarily indefensible. The 
execution of the following U. S. courses of action with respect 
to individual countries of the area may vary depending upon 
the route of communist advance into Southeast Asia. 

6. Actions designed to achieve pur objectives in South- 
east Asia require sensitive selection and application, on the 

NSC 124/2 \. TCP SECRET 

52** • ' . ■ 



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■ 



TOP SECRET 
SECURITY INFORMATION 



if 



* * 



* * 



one hand to assure the optimum efficiency through coordination 
of measures for the general area, and on the other, to 

■ 

accommodate to the greatest practicable extent to the in- 
dividual sensibilities of the several governments, social 
classes and minorities of the area* 



.V 

m 



t 



• # 



NSC 12 V2 



525 



TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 J 6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



t. 

* 

r . 



TOP SECRET 
SECURITY INFORMATION 



COURSES OF ACTION 



■ ' J l I T- 



Southeast Asia 



KM 



7. With respect to Southeast Asia, the United States 
should: 

a. Strengthen propaganda and cultural activities, 
as appropriate, in relation to the area to foster in- 
creased alignment of the people with the free world, 

b. Continue, as appropriate , programs of economic 
and technical assistance designed to strengthen the in- 
digenous non- communist governments of the area. 

£ t Encourage the countries of Southeast A3ia to 

■ 

restore and expand their commerce with each other and 
with the rest of the free world, and stimulate the flow 
of the raw material resources of the area to the free 

■ 

world . 

d . Seek agreement with other nations, including 
at least France, the UK, Australia and New Zealand, for 
a joint warning to Communist China regarding the grave 
consequences of Chinese aggression against Southeast 
Asia, the Issuance of such a warning to he contingent 
upon the prior agreement cf Prance and the UK to parti- 
cip&te in the courses of action set forth in paragraphs 
10 c, 12, Ik f (1) and (2), and i; £ (1) and (2), an a 
such others as are determined as a result of prior tri~ 
lateral consultation, in the event such a warning is 
ignored . 

NSC 124/2 ~526 TOP SECRET 






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• . 



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% 



. TOP SECRET 
SECURITY INFORMATION 



e_. Seek UK and French agreement In principle that 
a naval blockade of Communist China should be Included 
in the minimum courses of action set forth In- para- 
graph 10£ below , ' 

f\ Continue to encourage and support closer co- 
operation among the countries of Southeast Asia, and 
betveen those countries and the United States, Great 
Britain, France, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, 
South Asia and Japan. 

- 

£• Strengthen, as appropriate, covert operations 
designed to assist in the achievement of U, S. objectives 






in Southeast Asia, 



# ■ 

Ml 



h, Continue activities and operations designed 
to encourage the overseas Chinese communities in South- 
east Asia to organize and activate ant i -communist groups 
and activities within their own c oaaruni ti e s , to resist 
the effects of parallel pro -communist groups and activi- 
ties and, generally, to increase their orientation toward 
' the free world, ■•-•••• 

ji, Take measures to promote the coordinated defense 
of the area, and encourage and support the spirit of re- 
si stance among the peoples of Southeast Asia to Chinese 
Communist aggression and to the ercroachments of local 
communists* 

j\ Make clear to the American people the importance 

■ 

of Southeast Asia to the, security of the United States so 

that they may he prepared for' any of the courses of . 
. action proposed herein, t 

NSC 12 \/z j 527 top SECRET 



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SECURITY INFORMATION 






Indochina 



8» With respect to Indochina the United States should; 

a. Continue to promote international support for 
the three Associated States, 






( 



* «* 



•i 



>. • 



b. Continue to assure the French that the U.S. 
regards the French effort in Indochina as one of great 
strategic importance in the general international interest 
rather than in the purely French interest, and as essen- 
tial to the security of the free vorld, not only in the 

- 

Far East hut in the Middle East and Europe as veil. 

e. Continue to assure the French that ye are cog- 



. 



. >. 



nizant of the sacrifices entailed for France in carry- .* 

m 

ing out her effort in Indochina and that, vithout over- 

+ 

looking the principle that France has the primary 
responsibility in Indochina, ve vill recommend to the 

i 

Congress appropriate military, economic and financial aid / 
to France and the Associated States. 

d. Continue to cultivate friendly and increasingly 
cooperative relations vith the Governments of France and 
the Associated States at all levels vith a view to main- 

■ 

taining and, if possible, increasing the degree of in- 
fluence the U,S, can bring to bear on the policies and 
actions of the French and Indochinese authorities to the 

- 

end of directing the course of events tovard the objecti\BS 

» 

ve seek. Our influence vith the French and Associated 



/ 



NSC 124/2 



TO? SECRET 



528 



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• .. 






i 



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TOP SECRET 
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*?* ~ * ♦ * * 



States should be designed to further those constructive 
political, economic and social measures which will tend 
to increase the stability of the Associated States and 

thus make it possible for the French to reduce the degree 

* 

of their participation in the military, economic and 
political affairs of the Associated States, 

e. Specifically ve should use our influence with 
France and the Associated States to promote positive poli- 
tical, military, economic and social policies, among 
vhich the following are considered essential elements: 

(l) Continued recognition and carrying out 






)■' 



by France of its primary responsibility for the 
defense of Indochina. 

(2) Further steps by France and the Associated 
States tovard the evolutionary development of the 
Associated States, 

* 

(3) Such reorganization of French administra- 
tion and representation in Indochina as will be 

conducive to an increased feeling of responsibility 

i 

on the part of the Associated States, 

(k) Intensive efforts to develop the armies of 

/ 

the Associated States, including independent logisti- y 

■ cal and administrative services. 

* 

(5) The development of more effective and stable 
Governments in the Associated States. 

NSC I2V 2 ' - ? .TOP SECRET 

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SECURITY INF ORMATI ON 



(6) Land reform, agrarian and Industrial credit, J 

» 
sound rice marketing systems , labor development , 

foreign trade and capital formation, 

(7) An aggressive military, political, and 
psychological program to defeat or seriously reduce 
the Viet Minh forces. 

(8) US-French cooperation in publicizing pro- 
gressive developments in the foregoing policies in 
Indochina, 

9, In the absence of large scale Chinese Communist inter- 



4. • 



* 
* • 



vention in Indochina, the United States should: 

a f Provide increased aid on a high priority basis 

> 
for the French Union forces without relieving French 

authorities of their basic military responsibility for 

- the defense of the Associated States in order to: 

(1) Assist in developing indigenous armed forces 

which will eventually be capable of maintaining in- 

> 

- ternal security without assistance from French units, 

(2) Assist the French Union forces to maintain 

progress in the restoration of internal security 

* 

against the Viet. Minh, 

(3) Assist the forces of France and the Associa- 
ted States to defend Indochina against Chinese Com- 



*- 



munist aggression. 



\ 



b. In viev of the Immec&ate urgency of the situation, 

4 

m 

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*• ■ - * - SECURITY INFORMATION 



involving possible large-scale Chinese Communist inter- 
vention, and in order that the United States may be pre- 

■ 

pared to take whatever action may be appropriate in such 

j. 

circumstances, make the plans necessary to carry out the 

- 

courses of action indicated in paragraph 10 below. m / 

iJ yjr c. In the event that information and circumstances /y\ 



r (O 




r 



point to the conclusion that Prance is no longer prepared, 
to carry the burden in Indochina, or if Prance presses 
for an increased sharing of the responsibility for Indo- 
china, whether in the UN or directly with the U. S. 
Government, oppose a French withdrawal and consult with 

i 

the French and British concerning further measures to 

be taken to safeguard the area from communist domination/ 

■ 
- 

H IP* I n the event that it is determined, in consultation 

V t 

with France, that Chinese Communist forces (including volun- 



* 



.—* 



teers) have overtly intervened in the conflict in Indochina, 

■ 
or are covertly participating to such an extent as to jeopar- 
dise retention of the Tonkin Delta area by French Union forces, 
the United States should take the following measures to assist 
these forces in preventing the loss of Indochina, to repel the 
agression and to restore peace and security in Indochina; 



oo 



a. Support a request by France or the Associated 

States for immediate action by the United Nations which 

i 

would include a UN resolution declaring that Communist 

China has committed an aggression, recommending that 

* 

NSC 12'?/2 TOP SECRET 

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. 



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■ 



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SECURITY INFORMATION 



member states take whatever action may be necessary, 
without geographic limitation, to assist France and the 
Associated States in meeting the aggression. 

b. Whether 02* not UN action is immediately forth- 
coming, seek the maximum possible international support 
for, and participation in, the minimum courses of military 
action agreed upon by the parties to the joint warning, 

w 

These minimum courses of action are set forth in sub- 
paragraph c immediately below, 

c. Carry out the following minimum courses of mili- 



1 # 



tary action, either under the auspices' of the UN or in 
conjunction with France and the United Kingdom and any 

■ 

other friendly governments ; 

« 

(1) A resolute defense of Indochina itself to 
which the United States would provide such air and 
naval assistance as might be practicable, 

(2) Interdiction of Chinese Communist communis 
.cation lines -including those in China. 

* 

* 

(3) The United States would expect to provide 
the major forces for task (2) above; but would expect 

- t ' the UK and France to provide at least token forces - 

therefor and to render such other assistance as is 
- normal between allies, and France to carry the burden 
of providing, in con junction, with the' Associated 

* < 

States, the ground forces for the defense of 
Indochina. 

532 

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I. 






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! 



11, In addition to the courses of action set forth in 
paragraph 10 above, the United States should take the follow- 
ing, military actions as appropriate to the situation: 

a. If agreement is reached pursuant to paragraph 
7-e, establishment in conjunction' with the UK and France 

- 

of a naval blockade of Communist China. 

b, Intensification of covert operations to aid 

* 

anii« communist guerrilla forces operating against 
Commimist China and to interfere with and disrupt Chinese 
Communist lines of communication and military supply 



areas 



A 

-- ■ 
« 

1 



* c. Utilization, as desirable and feasible, of 

r 

an ti- communis t Chinese forces, including Chinese 
Nationalist forces in military operations in Southeast 
Asia 9 Korea ? or China proper, 

d t Assistance to the British to cover an 
evacuation fron Kong Kong ? if required, 

■ e. Evacuation of French Union civil- and military 
personnel from the Tonkin delta, if required. 



12, If, subsequent to aggression against Indochina 
and execution of the minimum necessary courses of action 

! 

listed in paragraph 10-c above, the United States determines 
jointly with the UK and France that expanded military action 
against Communist China is rendered necessary, by the situation, 



KSC 12V2 



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'* 



• * * 



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SECURITY INFORMATION 



the United States should take air and naval action in con- 

junction with at least France and the U,K* against all suit- 

I 
able military targets in China 5 avoiding insofar as practicable 

those targets in areas near the boundaries of the USSR in 

order not to increase the risk of direct Soviet involvement* 

13 • In the event the concurrence of the United Kingdom 

and France to expanded military action against Communist China 

is not obtained, the United States should consider taking 

unilateral action. 



■ 



♦* 







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July 14, 1952 

MINIS 05 itlAL T'.Livb IE LP Hi) OH , JtffiS 1952 

Summary Minutes-^ 



5:00 - 1^:30 P.I.I., Thursday, June 2o, 1952 

British Foreign Office 



IXTiUCT 



Tl 









Uiu EDI,N opened the conversation on Indo-China by 
stating that it mi^ht. be *vell, durin u the bilateral dis- 
cussions, to s° over together v/hat could be said to 
Mr. Sc human in the trilateral discussions. He antici- 
pated that Mr. Schuman mi^ht take the by nous familisr 
line that there was little prospect for victory in Indo- 
China and that, unless a general settlement were reached, 
the best v/e could Lope for would be a stalemate. This 
did not accord to the understanding of the British govern- 
ment, v/hlch has the impression that the situation is 
iaiprovin some'v/hat; certainly there "is a better govern- 
ment, there is wider representation in the government, 
and active Vietnamese participation- Miti UJh-R said that 
he planned to discuss the situation vi th Ur* So human 
al on such lines in the hope of stimulating his morale 
and divorcing him from his relatively defeatist attitude. 
TEE ££CJS2$E£ replied that he had been discussing Indo- 



China with the French alon^ the lines he end Lir 






>den 

ex- 



had 



taken in the tripartite discussions in raris. 
pressed the opinion that the only avenue to success In 
Indo-China Is the rapid build-up of native armed forces 
end the assumption by the people of Vietnam of an 

Increasing 



i/ Copy held in s/S-ii,. The June 26 discussions are 
also described in tel* SLCTO 19, June 27, 1952, 
from London. 



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f? 



* 



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Security information 



increasing share of the financial and military burden* 
3HS S^CnLTAkY announced that the French had been informed 
that the United States was prepared to increase its milir 
tary assistance program for Indo-China by 4>150 million* 
Ee added that the United States, feeling that the French 
military training program was badly strained, had offered 
to assist them in this respect, but that the French, 
always skittish over whst they might regard as undue 
American interference, had not taken up this offer. 
Certainly it is not up to the Americans to press on the 
French assistance along these lines. THE SJXfuLTAfQT said 
that it was obvious that ivr. Letourneau v/as much encourr 
aged as a result of his visit to Washington. Ke asked 
Dr. Jessup to read the text of the Department's telegram 
20ll|, June 18* to Saigon, summarizing the discussions 
with i^r* Letourneau. 















THE S3Ci£TAJ-tY said that he had warned the French 
that success in the military field in indo-China carried 
with it certain dangers, including, the increased possi- 
bility of a large-scale Chinese Communist military inter- 
vention. He s^id th*t this xn turn points up the ques- 
tion, "how c-n we prevent this from happening?" he felt 
it would be desirable to issue a warning statement of 
soui 6 sort, whether public, privste, detailed and specific, 
or otherwise, but it vould be essential to have a general 
understanding as to the action vh ich we mi^ht take if the 
warning were to go unheeded! . To issue a warning and take ■ 
no effective action would be calamitous, perhaps the 
United States and the united Mngdon, preferably in con- 
junction with France, Australia, and jMsw Zealand, can 
reach a" tentative agreement on political policy in this 
regard which would form a framework for joint military 
plannin . r fhis, in turn, leads to the major question: 
"VJftt form could retaliation against aggression take?" 
The American military authorities are of the strong 
opinion that action only against the approaches to Indo- 
China would be ineffective. In f£,ct, the first problem 
which we would likely h&ve to face would be the evacu- 
ation of French military and civilians from iongking. 
Action confined to the air and naval arms directed against 
the Chinese Communists in* Indo-China '-vould likewise be 
ineffective and, in the li nt of world comruiouents, the 
United States has no infantry av^ilsble i'or operations 

* 

within 



TO£ §. £ £ £i ik Z 
Security Information 



538 





















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9 I 



T £ t^ C kLT 
t ec til* 1 ty Ini o rma t i on 



within Indo-China* Ihe United otates thinking is slon^; 
the lines of s blockade of the coast of China, combined 
with air action, dcsi ned to upset the economy of mainland 
Chine and to lessen the vill of the Chinese Communists to 
continue their :\ 00 ression. Such cction would cease v/hen 
aggression ceased, /-nd this would be mode clepr to every- 
one. JLvery effort should be made zo avoid stcclon in the 
areas of scute sensitivity to the Soviet Union. .,e are 
of the opinion ti:cz the Loviet Union ~oui; srob&bly not 
enter che conflict if it understood clearly that ws h~.c. 
no indention of attempting to overthrow the Chinese Com- 
munist regime by force. e must bear in mind that the 
Chinese Communists have t* formidable air force, and we 
may be forced to attack it vherever it is found. If the 
Chinese Communists do invade Indo-Chin* in substantial 
force, it will be a threat to the vit,*l Interests of all 
of us. . . 

Ma* EDLN said that he saw no serious objection to 
the issuance of c w^rnin^; he recalled that he had already 
issued t. public ..vrnin in his speech at Columbia Uni- 
versity* tie felt that, whether or not a varnin is 
issued, it would be important to have the Chinese Commun- 
ists know th:-t retaliation a rmst further Chinese agres- 
sion is bein^ urgently considered. 

XHL SLC iu/HulSl reiterated ttut there W£S ?n urgent 
need for basic political O uidunoe on the basic of which 
military tslks could proceed. i:ut. EDHK said thc.'c ue 
would wish to consult the Cabinet on basic policy, noting 
thut a naval blockade involving hong &ong was a serious 
question* 

■rhere was general t^reeiaent th-t the Secretary and 
Mr. Kden would conauct their discussions with Ivlr. Schuman 
alon^ the above lines. 



T j? SLCa^T 
Security Information 



537 






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751G.5/l2-552:TOP SECRET FILE 



INCOMING TELEGRAM 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION 



Rec'd: December 5> 1952 
7;l*.l a.m. 



FROM: Saigon 

TO: Secretary of State 

« 

NO: llA9j December 5/ Noon 

SENT DEPT 11^9, RFTD IIJFO PARIS. 182, HAEOI 127, MANILA Ilk. 

■ 

Re DEPTEL UAl, December 3. 

The French have not (rpt not) asked for additional aircraft * What 
they do request and General Trapnell is urgently recommending is 
that the 30 F-8 f s already programmed he expedited to arrive here 
not (rpt not) later than January aid that delivery of the 8 B-2o r s 
scheduled to arrive at rate of one a month during calendar year 
1953 he accelerated* , 



The French yesterday made, however, urgent request on which in 
Trannell's and my opinion immediately favorable action in some form 
or other should be taken. The request is that 150 American Air Force 
mechanics be detailed immediately to Nhatrang Air Base for one 
month to give 50-hour checks to 18 C-Vf's and 100 hour checks on 
another 18 C-V7 f s. Nhatrang was chosen presumably because presence 
mechanics would be less conspicuous than if detailed to at Tonkin 
base or to Saigon. The French have made the same imperative request 
of the French Air Ministry, but according local information, French 
Metropolitan Air Force has only a few if any surplus mechanics for 
immediate despatch, The French request is entirely legitimate. 
When Salan asked for and vas granted the 50 additional C-Vf's late 









^ ^^SECRET _S~,'^ ^rr^Ii"g'Q?J.IATIO:J,_ 






538 



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TO? SfebRET SECURITY INFORMATION 



last summer (21 vere provided by US), sufficient crews were available 
for normal maintenance* It was ejected these would be used for 
tactical drops of parachute troops. No (rpt no) sustained air lift 
operation was or could have been forseen at that tine. With loss 
of Nghialo and the ensuing necessary decision of French command to 
attempt hold Na San to prevent overrunning that country and Laos, an 
air lift had to be instituted. As a result, the C-Vf's are operating 
at several times the normal rate, entailing urgent increased 
maintenance. 






As an alternative to sending American mechanics, Trapnell and I have 
suggested possibility of the 3& planes being sent for repairs and 
checks to Clark Field, Trip to Manila vould add extra flying time 
to the planes, but that might be the more practical operation* I 
can see no (rpt no) policy objection either to despatching American 
maintenance crews for a few weeks stay here or providing maintenance 
at Clark Field. On several occasions we have provided mechanical 
specialists for brief periods for instruction and repair of certain 
American equipment, This emergency maintenance is vital to holding 
of Na San and for meeting any other emergency air-borne operations. 

General Chassis, CIIIC French Air Force Fe, arrives today froa Tonkin 
to consult with Trapnell. 






HEATH 






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a 












OUTGOING 
TELEGRAM 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



TOP SECRET 
SECURITY INFORMATION 



■ SENT TO: Amembassy SAIGON 1286 

PARIS 3523 



M 



EYES ONLY HEATH AMD DUNN FROM ALLISON . 



Dec 22 1952 
6:21 EM 



Saigon TELS 1190 and 1197. 

DEPT concurs in US participation maintenance C-Vfs by 25-30 
USAF personnel at Nha Trang on temporary loan "basis. Defense 
notified and has taken similar position. 

Defense has directed FEACOM to undertake such support and is in- 
forming MAAG Saigon. 

■ 

Defense additionally queries MAAG French intentions on possibility 
retention mechanics due rotation. 



ACHESON 









TO? SECRET 
SECURITY INFORMATION 



SkO 



\