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Full text of "Pentagon Papers"

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



V.B Justification of the War ( 1 1 Vols.) 

Internal Documents (9 Vols.) 

3. The Eisenhower Administration: (4 Vols.) 

b. Volume II: 1954-Geneva 



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UNITED 




■ VIETNAM RELATIONS 



1945 



1967 




VIETNAM TASK FORCE 



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 




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V. 3. 3. 

•jO'STIFIC I0J1 OP TEE WAS 



- HEBBHKAL C . SI'JSaENTS - 



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r 

he Eisenhower Aaininis tion. 1953 - i960 






m 

XJK II: 195'*- - ^xie Geneva Accords 



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V.B.3- (Book II) 






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TABLE OF CONTENTS 
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The Joint Chiefs of Staff recc nd steps which the U. S # 
might take to assist in achieving success c*f the Navarre 
Plan, Among these sTeps are: a renewed emphasis "by France 
on support of the Ravarre Plan; an assign i of addi- 
tional specialists to MAAfi, Indochina; an increase in un- 
conventional warfare activities; a reexamination of 
current national strategy; and ao interim revision of 
French EATO commitments. JCS Memorandum for Secretary 
of Defense, 15 January 195^* ....... . . . * 



212 



The President approves the statement of policy in NSC 177 * 
"United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Re- 
spect to Southeast Asia," which views the loss of Indo- 
china as having "most serious repercussions on U,S. and 
free world interests..,/ 1 (lISC 177 vas renumbered as 
IISC 5**05) HSC 5**G5j 16 January 195 1 - 



217 



Senator. S tennis informs Secretary Wilson that the U. S, 
should stop short of sending troops or airmen to Indo- 
china, "I do not think we can at all afford to take 
chances on be coining participants in Indochina." Stennis 
letter to Secretary of Defense, 29 January 19*"** • * 



The President's Special Committee decides to recommend 
action on certain urgent French requests for twnety-two 
B-26 aircraft and two hundred Air Force mechanics for 
Indochina, and to await* General O'Daniel's return he fore 
deciding on other requests. It is generally agreed that 
the importance to the U.S. of winning in Indochina could 
lead to intervention by U.S. air and naval forces — but 
"not ground forces." ISA Memorandum for the Record, 
30 January I95U , 

The President approves, and the CJCS notifies France of 
U. S. transfer to Indochina of ten B-26 type aircraft 
and two-* hundred USAF mechanics. This brings to twenty- 
two the total of B-26 aircraft slated for delivery to 
Indochina. Admiral Radford (Anderson) Memorandum to 
General Valluy, 30 January 195** 



239 




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55* General 'Daniel reports on General Navarre's lack of 
enthusiasm on having a U. S. "liaison officer" and his 
. disinterest In U. S. participation in psychological 
warfare. 'Daniel recoiar.ends that a small Joint Staff 
be approved 5 additional funds to STEM be approved, and 
the employment of liaison officers be approved. He 
comments that Dien Eien Phu can withstand any kind of 
Viet Minh attack, but would be untenable to a force that 
had several battalions of artillery with air observation. 
'Daniel Report to JCS, 5 Feb y 195- 



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Korean President Syng a Rhee proposes sending a BOKA 
Division to Indochina, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
recommend that the transfer would not be in the best 
interests of the Free World. JCS Memorandum for 
Secretary of Defense, 1 March 195^ . ■ . « • < 



e o 



The JCS express concern over developments in the status 
of the MAG Chief to Indochina relative to a considerable 
increase in personnel and scope of training responsibili- 
ties* The French feel that "it should be clearly under- 
stood that neither 'Daniel nor MAAG*vas. to have any 
powers , advisory or otherwise* 1 in planning operations or 
training the national armies. The JCS feels a demotion 
of 'Daniel in deference to Kavarre is detrimental to 
U. S. prestige, JCS Memoranda n for Secretary of Defense > 
5 March 195^ <■ 



General Ely feels that any air intervention at Dien Bien 
Phu would have to cone from Chinese territory and would 
carry gp ve consequences, "Can direct intervention by 
U. S* aircraft be envis. 1 and, if such is the case, 
how would it take place?" See Annex A of Document 63, 
page 277. General* Ely Memorandum to Admiral Radford, 
23 March 195 1 * ..».«..•...»•*•••.. 



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259 



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In the preparation of Defense Department views regarding 

negotiations on Indochina for the Geneva Conference 5 the 

JCS reaffirm their position concerning the strategic 

importance of Indochina to the security interests of the 

United States as reflected in HSC 5*1-05. JCS Meraorartdtsa 

for Secretary of Defense, 12 March' 195 [ t « 2 66 



general Erskine submits the President's Special Consul ttee 
■ recommendations on the military implied Long of the U. S, 
position on Indochina at Geneva. The analysis concludes 
that "no solution to the Indochina problem short of 
victory is acceptable o" The conclusions expressed are 
fel't to merit consideration by the NSC and the President. 
Erskine 1 orandum for the Special Cojamittee, NSC, 
17 March l$5k . ■ ~. 



Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, is fully in 
accord with the JCS views (Doc fit No. is 3) and General 
Erskine f s recommendations (Document No. Mi?)j and recom- 
mends to Secretary Dulles that they be carefully con- 
sidered in preparation for the Geneva Conference. 
Wilson letter to Dulles , 23 March 195'^ • 



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Admiral Radford shares doubts of other JCS members on the 
adequacy of measures taken by General Navarre at Dien Bi€ 
Phu. General Ely predicts the outcome at Dien Bien Phu as 
"50-50" and emphasises the great political importance of 
the battle- Radford is "gravely fearful" that Erench 
measures will be inadequate, the consequences could lead 
to loss of Southeast Mia, and to avoid this, the U. S. 
must be "prepared to act promptly and in force" to a be- 
lated French request for intervention. See Annex B to 
Document 63, page 2 77 • JCS Memorandum for the President , 
2k March 195U. * * <• .. 



288 



n 



General Ely, Chairman of the French Chiefs of Staff, is 
"unsympathetic" to the JCS view to expand MAAfi, Indochina 
to assist in training Vietnamese. Ely feels it would 
encroach on French responsibilities, would/ affect "prestige 1 
and shows lack of confidence in French leadership. 
(Annex A, Ely Memorandum for Radford; Annex B, JCS Memo- 
randum for the President) JCS Memorandum for President's 
Committee, 29 March 195^ , 277 



The IT* S. reiterates to the U. K, the following assumed ■ 
position: (l) that Britain supports our agreement to 
discuss Indochina at Geneva provided France would not 
turn over the area to the Communists ; and (2) "we shall 
not, however, be disposed to give Communist China what 
it wants from us merely to buy its promises of future 
good behavior .* Dulles 5090 to London , 1 April I95U 



291 



The U. Sc proposes a coalition of U. S., France, Associ- 
ated States , U. K„, Australia, Hew Zealand, Thailand, and 
the Philippines, which would fight in Indochina as an 
alternative to French Union surrender and as a position 
of strength going to Geneva. Dulles 3^76 ^o Paris, 
3 April 195U - c . . , 



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293 



66. The British consider partition the "least undesirable 

settlement" for Indochina and had not developed thoughts 
on a confrontation with a French sell-out. Dulles 5177 
to London, h April 195- . 



295 



The French request "immediate armed intervention of U, S. 
carrier aircraft at Dien Bien Pirn" to save the situation. 
Admiral Radford fead previously assured Ely that he would 
"do his best" to obtain the U. S. support. Paris 37IO to 
Dulles, h April 195^ 



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NSC Action No. 107^-A considers the problem of determining 
the circumstances j conditions, and extent to -which the U.S. 
should commit its resomrces to save Indochina, The prob- 
lem involves four issues: (l) the prospect of loss of 
Indochina; (2) the risks, requirements, and consequences 
of intervention; (3) desirability and form of U. S. inter- 
vention; end (k) the timing and circumstances of inter- 
vention. KSC Action ICT^i-A, 5 April 195U. .......... 



298 



The U, 3. Army position on intervention in Indochina cites 
the military disadvantages of such action. Spec if ic ally , 
the Army views are that air and naval forces alone cannot 
assure victory; that atomic weapons do not reduce the num- 
ber of ground troops required; that at least seven U. S. 
divisions with air and naval support are required to win 
if the French withd raw e^id the Chinese do not intervene ; 
and that the equivalent of twelve 0. S. divisions are re- 
quired if the Chinese intervene. Amy Position on KSC 
Action Ho. IO7U-A (undated) 



, 332 



The President's Special Committee studies the problem to 
secure the defeat of Communism and establish a "Western 
oriented couples: 11 ta Southeast Asia without resort to 
overt combat operations by U # S. forces. The report 
recommends implementation of courses of action previously 
recommended by the JCS (i.e., augment the French Air 
Force, assign CIA officials to Indochina, and allocate 
additional funds to Indochina) ; and that selective poli- 
tical, military, and psychological steps be taken as a 
matter of priority (i.e., expand MAAG, expand use of U.S. 
covert assets in unconventional warfare field, develop 
foreign information campaign, etc.). Part I, "Indochina" 
to the President's Special Committee Report on Southeast 
Asia (undated) . . , 

The President's Special Co ttee submits recommendations 
concerning longer range policy and courses of action for 
possible future contingencies in Southeast Asia not 
covered by KSC 5'i05- It is recommended that the U. S. 
accept nothing short of military victory, oppose a nego- 
tiated settlement at Geneva, pressure the Associated 
States to continue the war with U. S, support even if 
negotiations succeed, ancl seek participation of other 
nations. Regardless of the outcome of current operations 
■in Indochina, the U. S. in all prudence should develop a 
regional defense posture incorporating all the Southeast 
Asian states. Part II, Special Committee Report on 
Southeast Asia, 5 April 195**. \ 



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72. "U. S. is doing everything possible. •. .to prepare public, 
Congressional, and constitutional basis for united action 
in Indochina." However, such action is considered 
"impossible" except on a coalition basis with British 
Commonwealth participation. Dulles 3^82 to Paris, 

5 April l$5k .". ■•."..*• .,1 : ■ 359 

73- France feels that the time for formulating coalitions has 
passed as the fate of Indochina will be decided. in the next 
ten days at Dien Bien Fhu. Dillon (Paris) 3729 to Dulles, 
.5 April I95U • 360 

7^* The National Security Council receives recommendations of 
the Planning Board on NSC Action 107** -A. The Board recom- 
mends that the U. S. intervene if necessary but continue 
to pressure the French and to support a regional defense 
grouping in Southeast Asia with maximum Asian participa- 
tion. The NSC also receives an assessment of risks in 
intervention and alternative policies, KSC 192d Meeting 
(Item 1) , 6 April 195ft 36l 

75. Eden .feels the seriousness of the French military situa- 
tion is exaggerated — "French cannot lose the war between 
now and the coming of the rainy season however badly they 

may conduct it." London '[382 to Dulles, 6 April 195^. ...... . 3oo 

76. Dulles c £ls Izes that unless -a new clement is interjected 
into Indochina situation, such as an ad hoc coalition of 
nations prepared to fight, the French will "sell-out" at 
Geneva* The U. K, , Australia, and New Zealand attitude is 
the key to "united action" and it is believed that Red 
China would not intervene, Dulles 163 to Canberra, 

6 April 1951*. 367 

77- The Malbney mission, which reviewed the Indochina cost 
study with the U. S. Country Team in Saigon, concludes 
that "it is not possible. . .to arrive at any reasonable 
estimate of cost" to the U. S. of materials for the Indo- 
china war. The "crash requirements" and the French im- 
pression (from visiting U. S. officials) that all requests 
will be granted has kept the fiDAP prog] 1 in a "constant 
state of flux." Maloney Memorandum to Deputy Defense 
Comptroller, 7 April 195I1. . . . * . „ 370 

78. Should Co: list China intervene in Indochina with com- 
bat aircraft, the .Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that 
.talks should be initiated to provide for Implementation 
of military actions as outlined in NSC 5^05. JCS Memo- 
randum for Secretary of Defense, 8 April 1% ] \ . 378 



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79. It is noted by the KSC Planning Board that France has had 
the loan of IL S. carrier "Beileau Wood" for nearly a 

year without use in the Indochina war. Further ? the French 

"urgent ref|u?sts" for U. S, aircraft appear contradictory 

in light of • the sale of "Ouragon" jets to India and use of 

the "Beileau Wood" as a "delivery wagon-" General Bonesteel 

Memorandum for Robert Cutler y Presidential Assistant, 

10 April \0\ .• 380 

80. In view of the KSC actions on 6 April (l92d Meeting) and 
subsequent Presidential approval^ the Secretary of Defense 
directs the JCS to "promptly prepare the military plans" 
for the contingency of intervention at Dien Bien Phu. He 
also notes that the Presidential directed the State Depart- 
ment to concentrate its efforts prior to Geneva on organiz- 
ing a regional grouping for the defense of Southeast Asia. 
Secretary of Defense Memorandum to the Secretaries and JCS, 

15 April 195 1 ) .*. > 382 

81. The Department of Defense in&i< es concern over the lack 
of U, S • policy and pressures the State Department to 
come up with a U. S. position for the Indochina phase of 
the Geneva Conference. The Defense version of a draft 
position recommends a positive and definite stance that 
U. S* objectives in Southeast Asia not be compromised and 
that if France does not accept this position the U. S. 
should not participate at Geneva. Defense Foreign Mili- 
tary Affairs Letter to U. Alexis Johnson, "Coordinator of 

U. S. Delegation to Geneva, 15 April 1954 • 38U 

82. Eden informs Dulles that Britain is strongly opposed to 
intervention at Dien Bien Phu and # intends to lend only 
diplomatic surmort to France at Geneva in search of a 
settlement . DULTE 5 (Geneva) to Washington ?5 April 

195*1 



t»tf.tt.e..mwr. *..... ......... 



388 



83- Dulles expresses "dismay that the British are apparently 
encouraging the French in a direction of surrender which 
is in conflict not only with our interest but what I 
Jpxillas/ conceive theirs to be." DULTE 9, 26 April 195k 390 

8k. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reject a French proposal for 

additional aid because of the major nilitary consequences 

of involving U. &. planes and crews in the Indochina 

action as well as the little value of the project to 

relief of Dien Bien Phu. JCS l-Ieiuorandum for Secretary 

of Defense, 27 April 195U 392 



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85. Dulles and Eden exchange frank and heated words over the 
British pressuring France for a cease-fire* The U. S, 
indicates that the tripartite position is poor, i.e., 
not "very impressive or cohesive" and that "the other 
side" was worried — but not about Britain. The U. S. 
is also concerned over the affects on HftTO, KDC and the 
entire defense structure in Europe. DULTE 13 > 27 April 

195^ ,. . • . ; 



395 



86. Dulles makes an estimate of rapidly moving developments: 
(l) when Dieh Bien Phu falls , the French Government will 
change > probably to the left, committed to liquidate 
China.. A vi thdravral of forces to defensible enclaves 
under U.S. protection with subsequent U.S. training of 
native armies is considered. Open intervention at this 
point would be answered by Chinese intervention, (2) U.K. 
attitude is one of increasing weakness, (3) "the decline 
of France, the great weakness of Italy, and the consider- 
able weakness of England create a situation where... we ^ ■* 
must be prepared to take the leadership.../ 1 DULTE 21, 
29 April 195U ■ 397 

87* In the event of a cease-fire in Indochina, the JCS 
recommend that shipment of U, S. military aid under 
MDAP be i: liately suspended and the entire program 
of aid to Indochina be re- examined. JCS Memorandum 
for the Secretary of Defense, .30 -31 I95U 399 

88. The Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that the 
fall of Dien Bien Phu would have far-reaching and ad- 
verse repercussions, but would not signal the collapse 
of the French Union political and . military situation in 
Indochina, nor would it substantially alter relative 
military capabilities of French and Viet Minh forces. 
The French Union could retain control of the cities 
though &here would be a serious decline in the Viet- 
namese will to continue the var. KIE 63-5^ * 30 April 
195U. . . 9 l l00 

89- Major General Thomas J. K. Trapnell, former Chief of 

MAAG, Indochina comments in his debriefing on the French 
situation in Indochina, His comments cover in detail 
the strategic position of Indochina, the government and 
its prosecution of the war 3 the performance of I-tDAP sup- 
. ported forces, the objectives of the opposing forces, 
the organization and tactics of both the French and 
Viet Minh forces. In 3?rapnell l s vie-,;, few of the aims 
of the Navarre concept are pre ssing satisfactorily. 
"Dien Bien Phu is not only another II a San, but a grave 



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tactical and strategic error. " On the political aspects 
of the wet, Trapnell feels that "a strictly military 
solution to the war in Indochina is not possible. . , It Is 
doubtful if the ordinary people understand the issues at 
stake between the rebel and Associated States objectives." 
The solution in Indochina requires a strong French assault 
on the Viet Minli, training of National armies , a defensive 
alliance of Asian nations, and a guarantee of the Associated 
States "borders. Trapnell recommends a U.S. training mission 
for Indochina, and concludes that victory in Indochina is 
International rather than local and essentially political as 
well as military. Major General Trapnell Debriefing j 
3 May 195U 



• . * 



1K>6 









Indochina is the only nation that has the highest 2-IDAF 
priority and thus has precedence over every other 
nation for allocation of .critical military equipment. 
The JCS have completed a plan for military intervention 
in Indochina and, as well, planned for resumption of 
hostilities in Korea. CECPAC has directed that other 

* 

plans be prepared, i.e., blockade of China coast, evacu- 



ation of French forces from Tonkin, etc 
Plans Memorandum for OCB, 5 May 195?!... 



Joint Subsidiary 



1|21 



General Smith reviews the French proposal which has been 
sent to the Cabinet for approval. Fra proposes a 
cease-fire take place > n "international" control 
machinery, based on Lanlel's 5 March conditions, is in 
place. Regular troops would be regrouped into delimited 
areas and all other forces disarmed. France assumes that 
the Russians would propose a follow-on political settle- 
ment (coalition) end iTctiediate elections, S3CT0 106, 

5 May 195^ - 



The ESC- IS Meeting considers Secretary Dulles pessi- 
mistic report on Geneva to the President: (l) there is 
no responsible French Government to deal with, (2) the 
British reject the "regional grouping," (3) the British 
want secret talks on Southeast Asia, (k) the expected 
communist proposal is for foreign troop withdrawal and 
elections 3 (5) and the ILE. wants a settlement based on 
partition. ESC 195th Meeting, 6 Kay 195U 



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k2$ 



Dulles briefs Congressional leaders on the Geneva Con- 
ference and reviews the weaknesses of Britain's position. 
Congress members comments are adverse. Dulles states 
three conclusions; (l) U.S. should not intervene mili- 
tarily, (?) U.S« must push rapidly for a Southeast Asia 
community, (3) and the U.S. should, not "write off" the 
British and ?r 1 in s ite of their weakness in Asia. 

EEDUL 37, 6 May 195U . 



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9^. The JCS fc i their views on negotiations with respect 
to Indochina, to the Secretary of Defense for tr '^al 
to the Depart t of State in r. rd to S^CTO ICb. The 
JCS feel that > based on the Korean experiences and as a 
minimum, the U.S. should not "associate itself with any 
French proposal directed to.;:,rd a cease-fire *in advance 
of a satisfactory political settlement. 15 JCS Memorandum 
to Secretary of Defense, 7 May 195^4 ^30 

95. President Eisenhower makes it clear that the precondi- 
tions for U.S. intervention in Indochina are that the 
"U.S. would never intervene alone, that the indigenous 
people must invite intervention, and that there must "be 
regional or collective action. The IISC action of the 
meeting on 5 April as pertains to paragraph l.b. of the 
record (organizing a regional grouping) is approved "by 
the President. Memorandum by R. Cutler, Special Assis- 
tant, for Secretary of Defense and CJCS and Meeting 
Minutes, 7 May l$^k **35 



y 8 - July 21; Geneva Conference on Indochina* The 1st 
Plenary Session convenes on 8 May end hear: proposals by 
France and the Viet Minh for cessation of hostilities and 
participation in the conference. (Excerpts) The delegates 
to the conference are from Great Britain and the USSR 
(joint chairmen), France, the United States, Communist 
China, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam^ and the Viet Minh 
regime. (Final agreements are signed on July 20 and 21, 
and the main provisions concern" Vietnam are that (l) 
Vietnam is to be partitioned aloiig the 17th parallel into 
North and South Vietnam, (2) regulations are imposed on 
foreign military bases and personnel md on increased 
armaments 3 (3) countrywide elections, leading to the 
reunification of Korth and South Vie: i, are to be held 
by July,. 20, 1956, and (k) an International Control Com- 
mission (ICC) is to be established to supervise the im- 
plementation of the agreements. The United States and 
Vietnam are not signatories to the agree© s. The 
United States issues a unilateral deel lion stating 
that it (l) "will refrain from the thr or the use of 
force to disturb" the Geneva agreements, (2) "would view 
any renewal of the aggression in violation of the afore- 
said agreements with grave concern end as seriously 
threatening international peace and security , CI and (3) 
"shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free 
elections, supervised by the UK to insure that they are 
conducted fairly."") Excerpts from 1st p]er Session 
of the Geneva Conference, 3 May l$5h { 39 



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57- *£&& Defense member of the NSC Planning Boafd indicates 
the options available to the U.S. with regard to the 
Geneva results. General Bonesteel suggests that the in- 
creased risks associated with pressuring France to con- 
tinue the war and possible U.S. intervention to stop the 
corniaunist advance can "more surely and safely be accepted 
now than ever again." On the other hand, a compromise at 
Geneva would lead to communist subversion at a late date 
and U.S. involvement then might be inhibited by an in- 
creased Soviet nuclear capability. "Asia could thus be 
lost*" General Bonesteel Memorandum for Secretary of 
Defense, 9 May 195*4 .... . , ^ 2 

98. The draft instructions for the Geneva Delegation , which 
have been approved by the President are sent to the 
Defense Department for comment. According to the in- 
struct ions , the U.S. is n an interested nation which, 
however 3 Is neither a belligerent nor a principal in 
the negotiation." State Department Letter to R. B. 
Anderson, Deputy Secretary of Defense, 10 May 195 '^ ^3 

99* France is convinced it is facing Communist China at 

Dien Bien Phu not Viet Minh rebels. The French request 
the aid of competent U.S. military advice, i.e., a U.S. 
Genei-al to confer with Genera]. Ely on regrouping forces 
in Indochina. Paris U287 to Dulles, 10 May 195^ ^ 

100. The United States "posture" at Geneva is interpreted as 
"to cheer the players" rather than "to pitch." The 
draft instructions to the Geneva delegation imply a 
"profound point" — will the U.S. admit diplomatic 
defeat and cease to use the conference toward its ends 
if the conference appears to go against the U.S.? 
General Bonesteel Memorandum for Deputy Secretary of 

Def ens-', 10 May I95H. M*9 

101. The President approves informing the French of his con- 
ditions for U.S. intervention in Indochina. Even though 
premature, the decision to internationalize the war must 
be made. President Else: :er would ask Congressional 
authority to commit U.S. forces provided: (l) there was 
a French request, (2) that other nations would be re- 
quested and would accept, (3) that the UK would be noti- 
fied, {}\) that France gu ? - titers independence in the 
French Union to the Associated States, including the 
option to withdraw at any time, (5) that France would 
not withdraw its forces after the intervention, and 

(6) that an agreed on structure for united action is 

reached. Dulles k02^ to Paris, 11 May I95U 4 **51 



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102. The President approves NSG Action No. 1111 recommended 
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which immediately suspends 
"shipment of military end-i1 s under U.S. MDAP" to 
Indochina. HSC Memorandum for Secretary of Defense , 
11 May 195 } t • 1{ 5o 

103. Secretary Dulles forwards the basic instructions 
approved by the President for the head of the U.S. 
Delegation to Geneva. "The United States is not pre- I 
pared, to give its express or implied approval to any 
cease-fire, armistice, or other settlement.,.." which 

would subvert the local governments, impair territorial 

integrity, or jeopardize forces of the French Union, 

Dulles TOSEC 138 to Geneva, 12 May 195^ • • • • lf 57 

iOlf. A proposal tabled at the Planning Board meeting on 
13 May 195^; si sts that "the U.S. is endeavoring 
I to avoid the loss of Indochina and to resolve the 

colonialism problem by the creation of a regional 
grouping." General Bone steel Memorandum to NSC, 
13 May I95I4. • < '160 

IO5, Laniel and SgJvpazi appear well pleased with the U.S, 
position, especially that U.K. participation is no 
longer a prerequisite to U.S. intervention. The one 
serious objection to Eisenhower's conditions, however, 
is that "France publicly accord to the Associated 
States the right of withdrawal from the French Union , 
at any time . " Unless some way can be found around 
this, "the French will never ask for outside assis- 
tance . " Paris 1*383 to Dulles , I** May 195U **62 



: 



106« In referring to the French objection to Eisenhower f s 
conditions for intervention, Dulles indicates the U.S. 
might be flexible but "there cannot be any equivocation [ 
on the completeness of independence if we are to get 1 
the Philippines and Thailand to associate themselves." 
Without them the whole arrangement would collapse and , 

■ the U.S. is not prepared to intervene "as part of a 

white Western coalition which is slimmed by all Asian 

states." Dulles U09H (TEDUL 73) to Paris, 15 May V^k ... H65 

107. The "right of withdrawal" from the French Union is 

unacceptable to France because it reflects on French 

honor and questions the concept of the French Union. 1 

It is proposed that existence of a powerful Vietnamese ' 

National Army would clarify the independence status to 

other Asian states and therefore the U.S. should assume 

"primary responsibility for the training end equipping 

of a Vietnamese national Army.*" Dillon Wfc02 to Dulles, 

17 May 195^. - . ..* h <&9 



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108. The present acute crisis prevents successful debate on 
the European Defense Gorasomity (EDC) proposal in the 
French Parliament, Any attempt to force a vote -would 
lead to postponement or defeat of EDC. If the Laniel 
government falls because of Indochina, EDC w:L!l likely 
get buried for good. Paris WtO to Dulles, 19 May 195^ ^7? 

IC9. Secretary Stevens emphasizes the Army's concern over 
high-level official views that "air and sea forces 
alone could solve our problems in Indochina" and that 
the complex nature of these problems vould require a 
major logistical effort — "it explodes the myth that 
air and sea forces could solve the Indochina problems," 
Secretary of the Army Memorandum for Secretary of 
Defense, 19 May 195U **75 

1 

4- 

110. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that U.S. military 
participation in Indochina be limited primarily to 

naval and air forces, JCS Memorandum for Secretary . 

of Defense, 21 May I95I+. . . . . ; *77 

111. The JCS recommend against a "Korea-type" defense of 
Southeast Asia as unsound. Accordingly, the U.S. 
"should adopt the concept of offensive actions 
against the 'military power of the aggressor, 1 (in 
this instance, Communist China) rather than local 
reaction to the attack. JCS Memorandum for Secretary 

of Defense, 21 May l$5k . , . . » . **8<5 

112. General Smith cannot understand why the JCS down- 
graded U.S. military representation on the five- i 
power staff conference because the Russians and 

Chinese must, have known Ve really intended serious 

business . " DULTE 100, 23 May 195 J i J ' S 3 






113- The U.S. feels, as a minimum, France and Vietnam should 
sign draft Treaty of Indepei :ice, France should indi- 
cate "equal and sovereign" status of French Union 
states, and declare withdrawal of French Expeditionary 
Forces as soon as possible. Dulles to Paris U272, 
26 May 195^ • • . - 



kQk 



Hkn The JCS point out their belief that, from the U.S. point 
of view with reference to the Far East, "Indochina, is 
devoid of decisive military objectives and allocation of 
more than token U.S. armed forces in Indochina would be 
a serious diversion of limited U.S. capabilities."" 
JCS Memoranda for Secretary of Defense, 26 May 195U l *37 






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115* The White House views the JCS position on intervention 
In Indochina as not involving any new policy issue 
relative to 1ISC 5'-Q5* However, a pencilled Secretary 
of Defense marginal note indicates that the White House 
"misses the point 11 — the JCS was considering the 
"regional grouping" and others in the grouping, i.e., 
U.K. may object to NSC 5^05 policy. Hence the JCS is 
earning "not to get involved in such a grouping" unless 
all pai-ties accept direct action. White House Memo- 
randum for Secretary of Defense , 26 May 195*1- • • • • • ^9^ 

11 6. Ely emphasizes particular points to Trapnell and Dillon: 

(1) Ely was not in accord with 'Daniel's proposal to 
reorganize the VietnaiTtese army on a divisional basis, 

(2) 'Daniel's operational war plan was unrealistic, 

(3) the increasing frequency of American criticism of 
French conduct of the ~ - was not appreciated, (k) Ely 
was regrouping his forces for defense of the Delta, and 
(5) one or two U.S. Marine divisions could assure 

defense of the Delta, Paris k$6 to Dulles, 27 May 195^ **5?5 

117- The U.S. Delegation to Geneva clearly sees a forthcoming 
settlement which the U.S., under NSC, cannot associate 
itself with. Both the dangers of partition and impossi- 
I Mlity of armistice supervision in Indochina are recog- 
nized. "There is very little that the Defense Depart- 
ment can do to influence the negotiations, since a 
political decision has been made that the U.S. will 
continue to participate" even though partition will 
ultimately result in loss of Indochina to communism. 
Geneva Delegate Letter to Admiral Davis, 28 May l$3 h r •*. ■ M?3 

118. The French suggest that the U.S. take over responsi- ; 
bility for t^ainl the Vietnamese national Army and 
provide' assistance toward improving airfields for jet ! 
aircraft use in Indochina. Paris U58O to Dulles , 
28 May 195^ * - ; 500 

119* Dillon clarifies apparent misunderstanding in Washington 
on French understanding of U.S. intervention if Red China 
attacks Indochina. Peris 1*&7 to Dulles, 30 May I95U 503 

120. Schuman, Ely, and Laniel inform Dillon and Trapnell that 

France regards the present bilateral negotiations as a j 
"prelude to U.S. intervention should Geneva fail" or 
should the communists drag negotiations to uotain a 
military decision in the . Ita. The French pursue' re- 
assurance of U.S. intervention if Red China launches an 
all-out air attack. Paris H6l2 to Dulles, 31 May 195*1 506 



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121, There is no misunderstanding bet n U.S. and France if 
U*S, policy on a Chinese intervention would be "judged 
under the circumstances of the moment* 11 Dillon cites 
three courses of action open to the U.S a in such an 
event: (l) President will request Congress to act, (2) 
President would request authority to use forces , or (3) 
U.S. would act only as part of a collective action. 

• Paris i]625 to Dulles, l" June 195 ! + 503 

■ 

122, NSC Action $k21 incloses summaries of studies prepared 
by various departments and agencies with respect to 
"possible U.S, action regarding Indochin.a." Sunaaaries 
included here are of studies prepared by Departments of 
State , Justice, Defense and CIA, Office of Defense 
Mobilization, Bureau of the Budget, Foreign Operations 
Administration and Operations Coordinating Board. 
NSC 5^21, 1 June 195^ . . . 510 

123, Disagreement exists that the U.S. and Prance have "now 
reached accord in principal on the political side" on 
conditions for U.S. participation in Indochina. The 
U.S. needs a precise statement of France's commitments 
to meet the preconditions for intervention. Dulles Vj21 
to Paris, k June l$fik 530 

12H. Saigon suggests that in order to make a French declara- 
tion more palatable, the U fl 3. announce its intention to 
withdraw technical and military assistance as soon as 
practicable. In "neutralist Asian eyes > the U.S. Is the 
principal threat to Eastern Asia.... and not decadent 
France. 11 A review of terms of reference which limit KAAG to 
a logistical function is now essential* Saigon 2656 to 
Dulles, k June 195*4 531 

125. The U.S. seeks to avoid formal identification with open ' 
partition or the creation of two states. While U.S. ) 
military authorities take a "gloomy view" of the mili- 
tary situation, France has failed to decide to "inter- 
nationalize" the war on the conditions laid down in ; 
Paris. The French are not treating the U.S. proposal 
seriously but "toying with it just enough to -use it as 

a talking point at Geneva. " TEDUL 169, 7 June I95 1 * 533 

126. General Valluy evaluates the Tonkin Delta military 
situation: (l) If Tonkin Is lost, a military line will 
not be re-established, (2) in this connection,, there 
are no South Vietnamese who could oppose North Viet- 
namese, (3) Ho Chi Minn's objective is Tonkin and the 
political capital Hanoi, to be gained either by 



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negotiation or military force as necessary*, (k) if Tonkin . 

is lost j France will not fight in the South, (5) nor would 

Vietnamese fight ag st other Vietnamese and sooner or 

later the vliole of Vietnam will "become communist. TEDUL 

171, 7 June 195U 535 



533 



128. The U. S, .will seek firm views of others once the "French 
author it ively tell us they want to internationalize the 
Indochina war." Further, when France decides to request 
U.S. intervention, the U.S. must have the opportunity to 
make its own decision "based on prevailing circumstances. 
"We cannot grant the French an indefinite option on us 
without regard to intervening deterioration." TEDUL 175* 

8 June 195!* ..... 5>*0 

129. Because of 3 Hand's strong feeling the scope of appeal 
should not be limited to Thailand. The Thai government 
has a negative attitude on limiting the scope and they 
object to Chechoslovakia or other Soviet satellite mem- 
bership on the Peace Observation Commission (POC), 

United nations 810 to Dulles , 8 June 195 ] i . • 5^2 

130. Bidault replies to a conversation reported in DULTE I56 
(not printed here) in which "agreement in principle" with 
the U.S. had been reached. Wo major differences are 
noted, however, French military believe any JCS war plan 
would show the necessity of at least one Marine division 
for the Delta. General Valluy's 'conversations at the . 
Pentagon are seen as most crucial. "Thus if we want 
French military assistance. . .in. Southeast Asia... it is 
vital. 'JCS. . .approve a joint war plan justifying the 

use of Marines." Paris U766 to Dulles, 9 June 195^ 5H 1 !- 

131- Eden cites three major issues emerging on which "we cannot 
compromise": (l) separate treatment of Laos and Cambodia 
problem, (2) status and powers of international super- 
visory authority and (3) composition of the international 
supervisory authority. Britain feels negotiations have 
failed and little can be salvaged in Vietnam. DULTE l6H, 

9 June 195U 5U7 

132. The French are upset because Admiral Radford had said 
there was "no question of utilizai i of Marines in 
Indochina." The U.S. position, according to Dulles, 



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had been clear from the start that "we were not willing 

to make a cenr .' nt ahead of time which the French could 

use for internal political maneuvering or negotiating at 

Geneva. . . . " TEDUL 178, 9 June 195U . . 550 

« 
133* "General Ely has twice in lay presence stated that his 

keenest desire is for the United States to enter this 

war.* The purpose of General Valluy's statement (war 

assessment) is either to bring the U.S. and five other 

powers into the conflict or to prepare an "excuse before 

history" for an armistice. Saigon 271U to Dulles, 

10 June 195'f . . , , 552 

13*. The French military feel that a Tonkin decision will rest 
on U.S. intentions. The French are reluctant to request 
"internationalization" which would result in new talis 
and provoke new "hopes." The U.S., on the other hand, 
does not want to consider a U.S. training mission separate 
from the "overall operational, plan" on the assumption the 
conditions are fulfilled for U.S. participation in Indo- 
china. Murphy (Acting SecState) ^508 to Paris, 10 June 

1 95^ • 



553 






13-?. The French impression is that even after all conditions 
are met, the chances of U.S. participation are "nil." 
With this attitude it is only a matter of time until the 
French ccme to terms with the Viet Minh. The result 
would be disastrous to French public opinion and the 
"U.S. would be blamed" for having failed in the crisis. 
Therefore, it is recommended that the French be informed 
that "the President is no longer prepared to request ' 

military intervention" even if France fulfills all con- | 
ditions. France should strive for an armistice and thus 
avoid a^military disaster • A few months delay in commu- "j 
nist takeover in Indochina is not commensurate with ' 

"possible collapse of the defense of Western Europe." 
Paris li&H to Dulles, ik June 195U 555 

136* The French want, ajid "in effect have, an option on our 
■ intervention, but they do not want to exercise it and 
the date of expiry of our option is fast running out." 
TEDUL 197, Ik June 195^ 558 

0-37. Secretary Dulles emphasizes that events have shown that 
predictions he has made all along on the lack bf any 
real French desire for U.S. intervention but "as a card 
to play at Geneva." The U.S. does not see that France's 
bitterness is justified considering "prolonged French 
and U.K. indecision." Dulles ^579 to Paris', lU June 195U 559 



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138' It is in the best Interests of the U.S. that final ad- 
journment of the Conference take place unless France • - 
vents to keep it alive. Eden's departure on a recess 
is seen as evidence of no reason to delay "collective 
- talks on SEA defense. " TEDUL 196, Ik June l$j5»t 561 

139* The CIA estimates communist reactions to the participa- 
tion of U.S. air and naval forces at various levels of 
intensity and on various targets in conjunction with 
French Union forces in Indochina. Special Rational 
Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 10-ls-5 L ^ 15 June 195 1 ^ • • 563 

lUo. Dulles cites an alternative that "if and when" a French 
Government which had the confidence of the Assembly 
should decide to continue the war, as opposed to an 
unacceptable armistice j the U.S. would be prepared to 
I . respond- promptly. 5PEDUL 208, 16 June 195H 570 

lUl# Viet Minh demand all of Tonkin area including Hanoi 
and Haiphong in secret talks vith France. The U.S. 
informs France that "we did not wish to be. .. .abruptly 
confronted with agreement..." as a result of secret ] 

negotiations and suggest a U.S. liaison officer. 
DULTE 187, 16 June 195)4 572 

l*t2. China and the Soviet Union are "greatly concerned" 

over any break-up of the Indochina conference. Eden t 

expresses the view that China wants a settlement but 

doubts their degree of control over the Viet Minh, | 

DULTE 193, 17 June 195 1 ! * - S"ft 

■ 

lh% The " under ground military talks" at Geneva are point- 
ing toward a de facto partition of Indochina. "There 
can of course? be no repeat no question of U.S. parti- 
■ cipation in any attempt to 'sell 1 a partition to non- i 

communist Vietnamese . TEDUL 212, 17 June 195*1 576 

ihk. U.S. re-e ines possible de facto partition of * 

Vietnam in light of five -power staff report suggest- 
. . ing Thakhek-Donghoi line. TEDUL 222, 18 June X95^ 577 

■ 

1^5. The French feel that partition is the best settlement 
they could have worked for under the conditions laid 
down by U.S. for intervention which "no French l 

Parliament would approve." Partition should come ' 

.as no surprise to the Vietnamese since the Viet Minh 
I * . had made it clear to them -- "coalition government * 

or partition." DULTE 195, 18 June 195 J : 578 



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lA6« General Smith and Molotov conduct lengthy conversations 
on "making positions clear." The Soviet tactics were 
probably to forestall U.S. intervention in the Delta by 
a compromise formula if intervention appeared imminent, 
When intervention became improbable, the "ante" in 
negotiations was raised. DULTE 202, 19 June 195^ 580 

lh r [. In conversations with the French, China recognizes that 
"two goven its" exist in Vietnam and Chou En-lai 
regards that the final political settlement should be 
reached by direct negotiations between the two govern- 
ments . Paris 5035 to Dulles, 2h June 195^. • 589 

lh&. Dulles thinks our present role at Geneva should "soon be 

restricted to that of observer " TOSEC V?8, Zk June 

195^ 592 

1^9. A French aide-memoire indicates the French objective to 
seek a de facto division which leaves a solid territory 
for the State of Vietnam and further requests that the 
U.S. do nothing to encourage an anticipated "violent 
and unreasoning" reaction on the part of Vietnamese 
patriots who object to an indefinite period of division 
of the country. Dulles U852 to Paris, 28 June 195*4 593 

150. French negotiations with Viet Kinh are stalled and Mendes- 
France is perplexed by reference to the "Dong Hoi" line 
since France was holding out for the 18 th parallel. Paris 

5117 to Dulles, 30 June 195- . - - • - 5S& 

151. Dulles warns that Ego Dinh Diem has been "kept in the 
dark" on French negotiations and fears that if revealed 
as a fait accompli the reaction French wish to avoid 

will result^ Dulles 39 to Paris, 2 July X95 J * 597 

m 

152. France apologizes for not keeping the U.S. fully informed 
of French military withdrawals in the Delta, In addition, 
while France is holding out for an eighteen-month period 
before elections, Diem, to the contrary, has suggested 
elections within a year. Paris 32 to Dulles, 2 July 195^ 593 

153. The French speak most firmly to the Viet Minh that the 
proposal for demarcation along the thirteenth parallel 
is unacceptable. On Soviet interest in the line, the 
French threaten that the line they propose is acceptable 
to the rest of the conference and thus averts the "risk 
of internationalization of the conflict." SECTO 557> 

3 July 195*1 ......... 600 






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15*i. The U.S. does not vent to be associated with a settlement 
which falls short of the seven -point memorandum on which 
Britain agreed and now appear to be less than firm. "if 
either or both the French and COKanunists are operating 
on the assumption we will adhere to any settlement they 
agree to, then we may be healed for serious trouble/ 1 
Dulles 52 to Paris, 3 July 195^. . . ., 6 °3 

155. Dillon recommends that if the U.S. attempts to get the 
best possible settlement f we should (l) maintain a 
Geneva delegation, (2) have Dulles return to head the 
delegation, (3) offer French support to sell a settlement 
to Vietnam if it is satisfactory, and (k) pressure Britain 
to stick to the seven points of US-UK agreement. Paris kl 

to Dulles, k July 195U • &° 6 

156. The French welcome the US -UK 7-point agreement except 
that clarification was suggested on the conflict be- 
tween provisions for elections and the position that 
no political provisions should risk loss of the area 

to communism. The French felt that the elections could 

"go wrong/ 1 Paris 50 to Dulles, 6 July 195^ - ^08 

157- The French indicate they attach no great military im-" 
portance to retention of Haiphong and that they were 
"avoiding contact" with the Vietnamese in order not 
to have to answer their questions. SECTO 5&0, 6 July 
195H. 609 

■ 

158. Mendes-France will announce to the National Assembly 
that if a cease-fire is not agreed to prior to 21 July, 
it will be necessary for the Assembly to apjurove the 
sending of conscripts to Indochina. Paris 66 to Dulles, 

6 July 195H. ; , 612 

■ » 

159. Dulles informs Eden that it is "better if neither Bedell 
nor I went back" to Geneva since the French will probably 
settle for worse than the 7-point agreement, hence it 
would be embarrrassin^ to all concerned. Dulles NIACT 

101 to London, 7 July 195- • 6lk 

160. The U.S. feels that elections mean eventual unification 
of Vietnam under Ho Chi Kinh and therefore should be 
held "as long after a cease-fire agreement as possible 
and in conditions free from intimidation. .. - fl Farther, 
the U.S. believes no date should be set now and that no 
conditions be accepted which would affect international 

.supervision of elections. The U.S. would not oppose a 
settlement based on the 7-points nor would we seek to 
upset a settlement by force. Dulles 77 to Paris, 

7 July I95I1 ; . . . 616 



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162. 



163. 



16 k. 



165. 



166. 



Billon discovers that the U.S. complaints of not being 
informed are proved unjustified on the French withdrawal 
in Tonkin. Both State and Defense were notified via 
Trapnell's hand-carried plans and diplomatic cables. 
Public statements thus "can only serve to make our 
position here vis-a-vis Mendes and his government in- 
creasingly difficult and undermine the confidence of 
both the French Government and people in our candor,. 
Paris 81 to Dulles, 7 July 195^. . . , , 



u 



618 



"I have never harbored any thought of wilful conceal- 
ment. . -there is a certain lack of intimacy,.." in re- 
lations with the present gc nment. The U.S. intends 
to leave representation at Geneva but not Bedell Smith 
nor Dulles will return. The U.S. should avoid a 
"position at Geneva... " Dulles 85 to Paris, 8 July 

195*k - .- . 

The Chinese inform Ambassador Johnson that Chou En-lai 
had a "very good meeting" with Ho Chi Minh and that 
"results would be helpful to the French." The French 
believe that the Sino-Soviet positions have been 
coordinated with the Chinese views on Asian problems 
being given major weight. SECTO 578, 9 July 195U 



The Defense Department queries the State Department 
regarding equipping three French light infantry 
divisions for Indochina in view of (l) the Premier's 
promise to end the war by 20 July end (2) the con- 
siderable impact of equipment removal on NATO. 
Defense Letter to State, 9 July 195H 



President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles indicate 
firmly to President Mendes-France the rationale 
behind not sending Dulles or General Smith back to 
Geneva. Essentially, the rationale is based on fail- 
ure of the U.S. , U.K. and France to agree on a joint 
position at Geneva and lack of agreement on a 
"united action" proposal if t2ie position is not 
accepted by the communists • Dulles sees France and 
U.K. enhancing a communist "whittling- away" process 
by readily accepting less than the seven points. 
Dulles 127 to Paris, 10 July I95U 



France views the Dulles decision as (l) mailing the 
French bargaining position weaker and (2) that* Euro 
would interpret U.S. absence from Geneva as a step 
in the "return to a policy of isolationism." 
Paris I3I4 to Dulles , 11 July I95U 






619 



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625 



6TL 



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l67. France indicates the "necessity for a clear-cut U.S. 
guarantee that would protect the Associated States" 
if the communists did not honor a Geneva settlement, 
Mendes -France will resign if no cease-fire is reached. 
Paris 133 to Dulles, 11 July 195^ 633 

168* Views of the U.K. on collective security of Southeast 

Asia are summarized: (l) the British prefer a generalized 
collective arrangement with as many states involved as 
possible; (2) the preferred organization would have a 
general Council, a political/economic council, and a 
military organization; (3) in the event of no Indochina 
agreement, the British would move ahead with a military 
arrangement to meet the threat, admiral Davis Memoran- 
dum for Secretary of Defense, 13 July 195^ . . . 635 

169* Secretary Dulles reports on the Paris meeting: (l) an 

agreed French-United States position paper on Indochina 
which has the United States respecting terms conforming 
to a 7-point agreement; (2) the 7 points along the lines 
which were agreed during the Churchill-Eisenhower con- 
versations; (3) a 2-lendes -France to Dulles letter which 
tells Dulles that his absence from Geneva would produce 
an effect opposite to his intention; (k) a Dulles to 
Mendes -France letter which informs him of General Smith's 
return to Geneva; (5) and a letter from Eden to Mendes* 
France reassuring him of Britain's support. Paris 179 
to Dulles, 111 July 195 J + • • • • ° 38 

■ 

l70« Secretary Dulles reports on his trip to Paris at the 
NSC meeting, Dulles had told Mendes that France's 
troubles steiaraed from lack of a decision on EDC and 
the Soviets were successful in splitting France and 
Germany. If the U.S. cannot guarantee the Geneva 
Confer nee results or influence France to reject any 
settlement, the U.S. will he blamed and put a major 
strain on Franco-United States relations. NSC Minutes, 
15 July 195H ..... 6hk 

171 • Kendes-Franee is firm in a coclitail conversation with 
Molotov on Vietnam election dates. The French, how- 
' ever, conceive the military demarcation line and 
regroupment of forces to he the major outstanding 
issues". SECTO 626, l6 July 195U 6h6 

172. At a meeting .of Mendes, Eden, and Molotov, the outstand- 
ing issues are summarized: (l) demarcation line for 
Vietnam; (2) elections; (3) control arrangements; (is) 






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re groupment time; (5) prevention of arms importation, and 

(6) Laotian regrQUpsaent areas. France strongly opposes 

Molotov on holding elections in 1955 and placing the 

demarcation line at the l6th parallel. SECTO 632, 

17 July l$$k 6H8 



• 



173* The Vietnamese delegation to the Geneva Conference 
secretly passes the U.S. delegate a note of protest 
which had been handed to the French, The note complains 
that the "National Government of Vietnam has been left 
in complete ignorance" of proposals made by the French 
to other nations on Vietnam's fate. Vietnam rejects the 
. de facto partition proposal , a cease-fire, and requests 
that United Nations ec rol be established over all 
Vietnam territory. SECTO 633, 17 July 195^ • 65 1 

17^. The Chinese Communists inform the U.S. of their position 
via Seymour Topping, Associated Press. The despatch 
reflects the views of Chou En~lai and demands that the 
U,S # guarantee a "partition peace plan." Further, 
China is hopeful of a cease-fire but did not rule out 
the chance for one even if the U.S. refuses to accept 
the armistice. SECTO 639, 13 July 195U 653 

175* The U.S. fears Britain will push Prance into an agree- 
ment short of the 7 points resulting in a situation 
which had been previously discussed in Paris* TOSEC 565, 
18 July 195 J i - 656 

176» At the 23rd Indochina restricted session, Tran Van Do 
(Vietnam) states that Vietnam cannot associate itself 
with the final declaration of the Conference which is * 
to be reviewed. Vietnam does not agree to conditions 
for cease-fire nor have they as yet advanced proposals 
for a splution "based on peace, independence, and unity." 
SECTO 65H, 18 July 195k ! 6 58 

177* The Vietnamese delegation requests a plenary session to 1 
put forward their position (Document 171, preceding) . 
The U.S. replies that the Vietnamese position is "not 
practicable" and, in indicating that time is short, 
suggests that the Vietnamese "speak directlv with the 
French." SECTO 655, 18 July I95U 662 



1 7& Seymour Topping again supplies confidential information 
from a Chinese Communist contact, Huang Hua. J Vhen 
Huang Hua spoke of the possibility of American bases in 
Indochina, or anti-Co 1st pact in Southeast Asia,* he 
became very agitated, his hands shook, and his usually 
excellent English broke down... 11 Chinese are convinced 
that France and the U.S. have i.ade a deal. SECTO 66l, 

19 July 195^ • - ... 



663 



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I 

179. International control commission is to be compose! of 
Poland, India, Canada, or Belgium, The U.S. is satis- 
fied that this is better than Korea and is "within the 

spirit of Point 7." SECTO 666, 19 July 195*1. . - f ' 6 ' 4 

♦ ♦ 

180, General Smith makes it clear to France that the U*S, 
could, under no circumstance, associate itself with the 
conference declaration and recommends authorization to 
amend the proposed U.S. declaration of position. 

SECTO 669, 19* July I95J1 , . 665 

- 

181* Dulles has no objection on Smith's proposal to amend 

the declaration, but is concerned about including part 

of paragraph 9 of the Conference declaration, which 

seems to Imply a "multilateral engsu; ient with the 

Communists" which is inconsistent with the U.S. basic 

approach, TOSEC 576 HIACT, 19 July 195^ &&T 

182. The Vietnamese delegation proposes: ( 1) a cease-fire 
on present positions; (2) re groupment into two small 
zones; (3) disarmament of irregular troops; (h) dis- 
armament and withdrawal of foreign troops; end (5) 
control by the United Nations. It is noted that there 
is no provision for demarcation line or partition* 

SECTO 673 ? 19 July 195^ * 66 9 

* 

183. The United States, not prepared to sign the Accords, 
makes a unilateral declaration of its position on the 
Conference conclusions. The United S es declares 
that it will refrain from the threat or use of force 
to disturb the agreements and would view any renewal 
of the aggression with grave concern and as a threat 
to international peace and security. Unilateral 

Declaration of the United States, 21 July 195H. • 6?1 

18U« Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference, 21 July" 

195^ . . . . . . . , 6 



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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 



WASHINGTON 25 , D. C. 



15 January 1 954 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 



Subject: Steps Which the United States Might Take 

to Assist in Achieving Success of th< 
Navarre Plan. 



o 



1. In response to the action taken by the National Security 
Council (NSC) on 8 January 1954 on MSC 177, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff recommend for your consideration the actions shown here- 
after, Appendix "B M of which was prepared in consultation with 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to assist in achieving 
the success of the Navarre Plan. 

2. The actions are considered to be feasible within the 
framework of existing national policies and will not involve 
the overt use of U.S. forces in combat. However, in view of 
the continuing changes in the military situation in Indochina, 
together with their influence on existing national politico- 
military policies and commitments in other areas, the actions 
should be reviewed and re-evaluated on a continuing basis. 

3. Appropriate agencies of the government should undertake 
the to I lowing actions: 

a. Place renewed emphasis upon the attainment and main- 
tenance of the full support by the government of France of 
the Navarre Plan and United States measures in support of 
it. This full support by France of the Navarre Plan should 
include the augmentation of the French Air Force, Indochina, 
with maintenance and air crew personnel from military and/or 
civilian resources available in metropolitan France or else- 
where. The U.S. supporting measures should include necessary 
materiel and financial support but should not include military 
and/or civilian personnel except in certain highly specialized 
categories. 



Copy , 



of 



of £' Cop i es each 

"A" 



pages series 



T 



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Discussion : The French government is uhder strong and 
increasing domestic pressure to reduce the French military 
commitment in Indochina, French national sensitivity corr- 
tlnues — particularly upon points of prestige. Although 
General Navarre has adopted many of the recommendations of 
Lieutenant General John W, ! DanIel, USA, other recommenda- 
tions pertaining to training, tactics, strategy, and logis- 
tics have not yet been fully implemented. In some cases the 
reasons for this lack of cooperation may be political in 
nature, and therefore beyond General Navarre's control. In 
summary f . a renewed effort to obtain full support of the 
Navarre Plan and U.S. measures to support it, including 
those hereafter recommended, is essential. 

bj Approach the French with a proposal to organize a volun- 
teer air group composed of personnel from various ant i -communist 
nations or groups to serve with the French Union forces in 
Indochina as outlined in Appendix "A." 

Discussion : This examination was directed by the Presi- 
dent at the NSC meeting of 8 January 1954. While the Presi- 
dent emphasized participation by U.S. volunteer personnel 
he also mentioned the inclusion of other nationals. Since 
this is a definitive means by which the French can increase 
the Indochinese air effort as desired by them and thereby 
increase their over-all air capability this step is militar- 
ily desirable. Its feasibility is limited only by the pro- 
vision of sufficient U.S. funds, 

c:. Assign additional technical specialists to MAAG, Indo- 
china, in accordance with the recommendations of the November 
T Daniel report, so as to maximize technical assistance to 
the French Union forces. 

D iscussion : Additional technical advisory personnel are 
needed for MAAG, Indochina, to provide guidance and training 
to the French, 

d_. Convince the French military authorities that it is im- 
perative to increase unconventional warfare activities as sug- 
gested in Appendix T! B, n the substance of which is a broad gen- 
eral concept, for the use of guerrillas and can be used as the 
basis for discussions between General ! Danlel and authorities 
in Indochina in order to appropriately influence the French. 

Discussion : .The present French unconventional warfare 
effort in Indochina is considered to be relatively ineffec- 
tive. 



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e. Re-examine current national strategy with respect to 
Indochina, taking advantage of any unifying forces existing in 
Southeast Asia as a whole in opposition to the spread of Soviet 
Communism, and treating Southeast Asia as a unit with due re- 
gard to the long term objectives of the U.S. and France in the 
area. For further discussion, see Appendix M C. TT 

Discussion : The Soviet Communist campaign in Southeast 
Asia is waged on a regional and coordinated scale, rather 
than separate attacks on individual countries. By forming 
new coalitions of Western oriented countries, certain oppor- 
tunities can be expected to open up which will directly 
support operations in Indochina . 

£. Increase the pace and scope of the U.S. information 
program, and the U.S. advisory activities in furtherance of 
the French and Associated States military psychological war- 
fare effort in accordance with the recommendations of the 
senior U.S. officers on the ground. (See Appendix "D") . 
Consideration should be given to both unilateral action and 
action in conjunction with colonial French military and civil 
authorities, as well as indigenous leaders of Southeast Asia. 
The objectives should be to increase: 

(1) The willingness of the people of France and the 
U.S. to support the prosecution of the war* 

(2) The anti-Communist attitudes and active partici- 
pation of the native populations. 

(3) The morale of the French forces in Indochina. 

Discussion: To secure the maximum benefits of our pro- 
gram of assistance to Indochina and, simultaneously, South- 
east Asia by the cumulative and cooperative efforts of all 
propaganda media at the disposal of the Allies. 

j*. To render maximum and expeditious assistance in providing 
materiel and training to the French and Associated States Forces 
engaged in the Indochina war, the Services should be directed 
to accomplish (1) and (4) below and authorised to accomplish 
(2) and (3) below: 

(1) Expedite shipment of undelivered items on FY 50-54 
Programs in accordance with priority of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff for deliveries of MDAP. 






(2) Make changes in current programs as requested by 
Chief, MAAG, Indochina, and make deliveries against such 
changes and, if deemed necessary, without prior reference 
to or approval of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 



> * 



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(3) Increase monetary value of FY 54 MDA Programs for 
Indochina, as may be necessary and feasible to provide 
additional materiel and/or training requested by Chief, 
MAAG, Indochina. 

* ■ 

(4) Undertake the implementation of these instructions 
through such organizations and by such procedures as are 
considered necessary to insure prompt and effective re- 
sponse to valid requests for assistance.. 

Discussion : To date, restrictive criteria and proce- 
dures have seriously handicapped the administration of 
MDAP assistance in the support of the effort in Indochina. 
MDAP assistance is normally used to support a training 
and re-equipment program. In Indochina, however , such 
equipment is being used to support an active campaign. 
The purpose of the above is to free the Services of all 
restrictive criteria other than final legal limitation 
of available funds in order that prompt and effective 
response may be achieved in meeting all valid requests 
received from Chief, MAAG, Indochina, 

tu Give consideration to interim revision of French NATO 
commitments in Europe in order to allow provision of addi- 
tional French air personnel to Indochina. 

Discussion : Shortage of air personnel has been one 
major factor in prolonging the war, A reappraisal of 
French NATO commitments should be considered with a view 
toward releasing additional French air personnel for 
Indochina. 

i. Insure that personnel assigned to MAAG, Indochina, are 
qualified, to advise the French Union forces on U.S. tactics 
and techniques. 

Discussion : This would provide the benefit of U.S. 
battle experience for use in Indochina. 

jj, Consideration should be given at Governmental level 
to the proposition of declarations as follows: 

(1) By France: A declaration of intention to prosecute 
the war in Indochina to a successful conclusion and looking 
toward the more complete independence of the Associated 
States of Indochina. 



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(2) By the United States: A declaration to the effect 
that positive action will be taken to prevent the conquest 
of Indochina by aggression originating outside of Indochina. 

Discussion: A declaration of intent, as outlined above, 
would in general raise the morale of all peoples in South- 
east Asia and in particular would increase the determina- 
tion of the Indochinese to fight the war to a successful 
conclusion. 

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 



r r>< : ~n 



F« F. EVEREST 
Lieut, General, USAF, 
Director, Joint Staff. 



Enclosure 



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— 

January 16. l$$k 



NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 

* 

to the 

■ 

1 • NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 

on 

UHITgD STATES OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION 

WITH RESPECT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA 

Heferencesr A, NSC 177 

B. NSC Action Nos. 897, .1005 and 1011 

C. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, 
same subject, dated January 12, 195** 

D. NSC 12 k/2 

E. NSC 171/1 

P. Nls-63/1 and SE-53 



\ 



The National Security Council > the Secretary of the 
treasury and the Director > Bureau of the Bxidget, at the 180th 
'Council meeting on January i*f, 195** adopted the statement of 
policy contained in NSC 1?7, subject to the deletion of the 
last sentence of paragraph 1-a thereof and to the deletion of 
paragraph kS (rJSC Action Ho. 1011-s). 




The Council at its meeting on January 8 } 195 ! ;* 5 in 
connection v/irth its preliminary consideration of NSC 177 also 
: Action So. 1005- c and d): 

a. Agreed that Lieutenant General John Wilson 
'Daniel should be stationed continuously in 
Indochina j under appropriate liaison arrange- 
ments and with sufficient authority to expedite 
the flexible provision of U. S. assistance to 
the French Union forces. 



217" 

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b e Requested the Department of Defense, in collar 
"~ boration with the Central Intelligence Agency 5 
urgently to stud;/ and report to the Council all 
feasible further steps 7 sl-iort of the evert use 
of U» S* forces in cosibat, which the united 
States might take to assist in achieving the 
success of the ''Laniel-Havarrd 11 Plan, 

The President has this date approved the statement of 
policy contained in HSC 177$ as amended and adopted by the 
Council and enclosed herewith as NSC §fe05s directs its im- 
plementation by all appropriate executive departments and 
agencies of the U. S* Government; and designates the Operations 
Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency. A financial 
appendix is enclosed for Council information * 




JAMES S. LAY } Jr. 
Executive Secretary 



cc: The Secretary of the Treasury 

The Director. Bureau of the Budget 



The Chairman j Joint Chiefs of Staff 
The Director of Central Intelligence 



HSC ^m 



2 






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IMI TEP; STA TES CBJKCT1VES J^D C0URSE3_0F ACTION 
WITH* RESPi TO SOUTHEAST ASIA 



Table of Contents 






• - -- .- -fc ~»- - si -w -■ » ----- - 



'■j*-'^^* ^-Xfc-^ 



General Considerations .«.*•• * * * * * 



»'*•■ ^»W »^^^»-4 4-% S^A^Hr *m-i***m+~mM -«---.■, + ar#.r«J»> -■* +.+ *>+ mm r-> ^ i— ,_! m. Jk<ri 



Ob: 



t * 



jecxive. e 



c>tiC9c«»«a«c««ote* t-c* 



Courses of Action,. 



-1- Wrf» ■ 1. !■ "I ■ I' Mt_ ■ H 



.. • •— -r -n^. 



c t < * v ; t t « « c e * 



Southeast Asia in General 



c tccco«Cert««t« 



Irido china, • • . 

In the Absence of Chinese 
Aggression* »,*,»<«*.*«* 
In the Event of Chinese Coi 
Intervention. e , . . * 

J. li.<s J.J-d i'lv*, *fttttaaotft6tfi**tiftrc 



Malaya, ••»«,•, 



03G«4»t*94al 



««t«f*«e*«t«*«i 



.. 8 



tC«C4*««f«4**if U 



n 

w 



«««•• » c * t i C 5 | j . .1. 



c 



ccnmunist 



:•; 



VI 
munis t 



TO 



■ 000tt>PC«&«^C 



1.20 



Ann®?:, A - Public Statements Regarding Consequences 

of Chinese Cojnaiaiist Aggression in South- 



Lrmoxji « IISC Record of Action No. 897* "Further 

Support for France and the Associated 
States of Indochina . M ,».«••.«•- i *..».••••»», ,23 



£i.Banc i a 1 ^ A pqg nd j jc « . , . • ««.«*.»•«• *«•#*«••* t «#•••••«»• .26 



•*, * 



n 



^iy 



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« 









■ 



STATEMENT OF POLICY 
by the 

NATIONAL security council 

on 
MITSD STATES OBJ^CTms ; i?TD COURSES CP ACTIOS 

l/iiri hfjor^i J.U bUU-.:j.;.Khl Aoiil^ 



I. OEnHRAL CONS] LTIONS 



m— ,. , -—i 






3.. CoBsaunlst domination 5 by whatever means } of all 
Southeast Asia would seriously endanger in the short term. 



and critically endanger in the longer terra, 



United States 



security interests* 



a. In the conflict in Indochina ? the Couununist 
and no.n-«Coimauni.st worlds clearly confront one another 
.on the field of battle* The loss of the struggle in 
Indochina, in addition to its impact in Southeast Asia 
and in South Asia, would therefore have the most serious 

» 

repercussions on U. S« and free world interests in 
Europe and elsewhere . 



•"*■ 



* Southeast Asia is used herein to mean the area embracing 
Burma, Thailand. Indochina and Malaya. Indonesia is the 
subject of a separate paper (NSC 171/1.) 



NSC 



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b. Such is the interrelation of the countries of 
the area that effective counteraction would be im- 
mediately necessary to prevent the loss of any single 
country from leading to submission to or an alignment 
with communism by the remaining countries of Southeast 



Asia and Jndonesi 



Ot c 



Furthermore | in the event all of 



Southeast Asia falls under: communism ^ an alignment with 



communism of India, and in the longer term 5 of v. no 



Middle East (with the probable exceptions of at least 
Pakistan and Turkey) could follow progressively. Such 
vide spread alignment would seriously endanger the 
stability and security of Europe* 

c. Communist control of all of Southeast Asia 



and Indonesia would threaten the U. S. position in the 
Pacific offshore island chain and would seriously 
Jeopardise fundamental U* S. security interests in the 
Far East. j 

du The loss of Southeast Asia Would have serious 
economic consequences for ir.any nations of the free wo* Id 

* 

and conversely would add significant resources to the ! 
Soviet bloc Southeast Asia, especially Kalaya and 
Indonesia % is the principal world source of natural 

« 

rubber and tin^ and a producer of petroleum and ether, 
strategically important commodities, . Trie rice exports 
of Burns } Indochina and Thailand are- critically im- 
portant to Malaya-, Ceylon and Hong Kong and are of 



NSC J&05 



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Tf ■* # * * • 



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. . coisside^able significance to Japan and India, all 

important areas of ^rse Asia. Furthernore 5 this area 
• has an Important potential as a raarket for the' Indus- 

1 

1 tri&lised countries of the free world* 

o. The loss of Southeast Asia s especially of 
Malaya and Indonesia 5 could result in such economic 
and political pressures in Japan as to rcake it extremely 
difficult to prevent Japan's eventual accommodation to 
conmmisnu 

2, The Sanger of an overt military attack against 
Southeast Asia is inherent in the existence of a hostile and 

aggressive Cor^unist China. The v.se of U* S. forces to 

- 
oppose such an attack would require diversion of military 

strength from other areas* thus reducing our military cap- 



• 



ability in those areas. } as veil as over-all, with the 
recognized military risks involved therein ? or an increase 
in our military forces in being 5 or both* Toward deterring 

m 

such an attack, the U. St Government has engaged in con- • 
sultations with France and the United Kingdom on the 
desirability of issuing to Co^aunist China a joint warning; 
as to the consequences to Communist China of aggression i: 
Southeast Asia* Although these consultations have not ! 
achieved a £rC_l measure of agreement a warning to Communist 

■ a 

China has in fact been issued i particularly as to Indochina , 
in a number of public statements* (See Annex A for texts,) 

■ 

The U. S. has also participated" with France, the United 

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* 



Kingdom, Australia 5 and Hew Zealand in military talks on 
measures which Bight be taken in the event of overt Chinese 



Communist aggression against Inctochi] 



-. 



3* However s overt Chinese Communist attack on any part 

* 
of Southeast Asia is loss probable than continued communist 

efforts to achieve domination through armed rebellion or 

subversion* By far the most urgent threat to Southeast 

Asia arises from the strong possibility that even without 

overt Chinese Communist intervention the situation In 



Indochina may deteriorate anew as a result of weakening of 

* 

the resolve of Franco and the Associated States of Indochina 
.to continue to oppose the Viet Minh rebellion ^ the military 
strength. of which is increased by virtue of aid furnished 
by the Chinese Communist and Soviet regimes « Barring overt 
Chinese Co:::iunist intervention or further serious deteriora- 
tion in Indochina j the outlook in Burma 5 Thailand 5 and Malaga 
offers opportunities for some improvement in internal 

stability and in the control of indigenous communist forces * 

* 

H-« The successful defense of Tonkin is the keystone of 
the defense of mainland Southeast Asia except possibly Malaya 
In addition to the profound political and psychological 
factors involved j the retention of Tonkin in friendly bands 
cuts off the most feasible routes for any massive southward 
advance towards central and Southern Indochina and Thailand* 
The execution of U« s. courses of action v;ith respect to 
■• individual countries of the area may vary depending upon the 

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route of communist advance into Southeast Asia* 

5. Since I9yl the United States has 'greatly increased 



all forms o;C assistance to the French in Indochina, par tic 



rn 



ularly military aid, and has consulted contiuously with France 



v/ith a viol! to assuring effective use of this aid* Partly as 



a result of those efforts. French resumption of the initiative 



s 



under the "Lanlel-ITavarre Plan" has checked at least vempoi 
arily deterioration of the French v/ill to continue the 
struggle. Concurrently the French have moved toward per- 



*,^ 



footing the independence of the Associated States v/itnm 
the French Union, In September 1953 trie united States decided 
to extend an additional $3&5 million in aici, in return for a 
number of strong French assurances 5 including a commitment . 



that the French would vigorously carry forward the "Laniel- 
Kavarre Plan" * with the object of eliminating regular ei\e\xy 



forces in Indochina * § and on the understanding that if the 

- 

"Laniol-jlavarre Plan n were not executed 5 the United States 

n 

would retain the right to terminate this additional 

.* » 

assistance. (See HSC Action No. 89? } Annex B) 

p 

6. The French objective in these efforts is to termin- 

* 

ate the war as soon as possible so as to reduce the drain of 
the Indochina war on France and permit the maintenance of a 
position for France in the Far East, By a combination of 
military victories and political concessions to the Associ- 



i . 



ated States, France hopes to strengthen these States to the 



point where they will be able to nalntain themselves agains 






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Communist pressures with greatly reduced French aid* In the 
absence .of a change in basic French attitudes j the laniel- 
Havaxre Plan nay be ths last French major offensive effort 



. - 



in Indochina* There is not in sight any desirable alternative 

* 

to the success of a Franco**V ietnaaiese effort along the linos 

■ 

of the "Laniel-Mavarre" Plan. 

7. Notwithstanding the commitment and intent of the 



Laniel Government to seek destruction of Viet Minh regular 

forces 5 a successor French Government might well accept an 

> 
improvement in the military position short of this as a 

basis for serious negotiation within the next year. Politic 

i 

pressures in France prevent any French Government from re- 
Meeting the concept of negotiations. If the Laniel«Navarre 
Plan fails or appears doomed to failure, the French might 



seek to negotiate simply for the best possible terms, ir- 
respective of whether these offered any assurance of pre- 
serving a non-Cormrdmist Indochina. With Continued U. S, 
economic and material assistance 5 the Franco-Vie tnamese 
forces are not in danger of being militarily defeated by the 
Viet Minh unless there is large-scale Chinese Comatunist in- 
tervention* In any event % apart from the possibility of 
bilateral negotiations with the GoimnunistSj the French will 

■ 

almost certainly continue to seek international discussion 






of the Indochina issue 



3 • 



8. The Chinese Co£!?.unists will almost certainly con- 
tinue their present type of support for Viet Minh, They are 



8BC $}Q5 



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unlikely to intervene with organized units even if the Viet 

Minh are threatened with defeat by the Franco-Vietnamese 

■ f 
forces c ;In the event the United States participates in the 

fighting 5 there is a substantial risk that .the Chinese Com- 

munists v/ould intervene ~1 The Communists may talk of peace 

negotiations for propaganda purposes and to divide the 



anti^Gommunisis believing that any political negotiations 
and any settlement to which they would agree v/ould increase 

* 

their chances of eventually gaining control of Indochina, 

9. Actions designed to achieve our objectives in 
Southeast Asia require sensitive selection and application, 
. on the one hand to assure the optimum efficiency through 
coordination of measures for the general area 5 and on the 

+ 

other, to accommodate to the greatest practicable extent to 

« 

the individual sensibilities of the several governments ^ 

♦. 
social classes and minorities of the area* 



» 



use 5^05 



2 



2b 



TO? SECR£i\ 



* 



1 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET 



» 
. - 



* 
» # 



II, OBJECT IV 



i #«-■ „*« rffcfe-».« "^rf-rf- #*-» -f — ■< *: ■* 



10. To prevent the countries, of Southeast Asia froa 
passing Into the cbisniunist orbit; to persuade them that their 
best! interests .lie in greater cooperation and stronger 



affiliations with the rest of the free WorXdj and to assise 

■ 

them to develop toward stable, free governments with the 
will and ability to resist comrriunisn from within and Without 
and to contribute to the strengthening of the free world. 



-j i- -+\^ii^j.- 



III, COURSES OP ACTION 

a; southmst asm ih general 



11. Demonstrate to the indigenous governments tfiat 
their best interests lie in greater cooperation and closer 
affiliation with the nations of the free v/orld. 

12. Continue present programs of limited economic and 
technical assistance designed to strengthen the indigenous 



«j»_\_*rV. »>"W w w„ V"* 1 *^ 



nonvcormnunist governments of the area and expand such programs 
according to the calculated advantage of such aid to the 
U. S. world position. * 

13 • Encourage the countries of Southeast Asia to co- 
operate withg and restore and expand their commerce with, 
each other and the rest of the free world 5 particularly Japan 3 
and stimulate the flow of raw material resources of the area 

» 

m 

to the free world. 

l l h Continue to make clear, to the extent possible in 



< - 



agreement with other nations including France, the United 

■ * 

Kingdom, Australia, and Kew Zealand, -the grave consequence 
'VSQ 5*205 ^7 T0P SSSUSfc 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number. NND 633 1 6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



F 



» 



* 
• 

L 



• 



TOP SECRET 



i ' 



to Gomitiiuilst China of aggression against Southeast Asia and 

r 

continue current military consultations to determine the 



military requirements for countering such Chinese. Goiamtinist 

'» Cf p i^Ck c ■' *5 n *i 

1^* Strengthen $ as appropriate $ covert operations 
designed to assist in the achievement of U, S. objectives 
in Southeast "Asia, 

16. Continue activities and operations designed to 
encourage the overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia: 



— *. 

(a) to organize and activate antl-eoirQuriist groups an 






activities within their own communities; (b) to resist the 
# effects of parallel pro-cofiaauiiist groups and activities j 
(c) generally 3 to Increase their orientation toward the free 
world | and ? (d) cozisistent with their obligations and pri- 
Liary allegiance to their local governments* to extend 



sympathy and support to the Chinese National Government as a 

- 

symbol, of Chinese political resistance and as a link in the 
defense against -comraitnist expansion in Asia, 

17. Take measures to promote the coordinated defense 
of Southeast Asia, recognizing that the initiative in region 
al defense measures must come from the governments of the 



area 



18, Encourage and support the spirit of resistance 



among che peoples of Southeast Asia to Chinese Communist 

aggression, to indigenous CoFJSttnist insurrection, subversion 5 

• * 

infiltration, political manipulations * and propaganda. 



> 






228 



top secret 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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»«- » 



m 



TOP SECRES 



> 



19 « Strengthen propaganda and cultural activities, as 

» 

appropriate } in relation to the area to foster increased 
aligrnivjnt of the people with the free v*orlcL 



20. Make clear to the American people .the importance 
of Southeast Asia to the security of the United States so 
that they may be prepared for any of the courses of action 
proposed here in c 






223 



: 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 2011 



U 



. 



s 



* • 



TOP SECRET 



13. IKPOCHBTA 



.> 






In th e ^faggnce of Chi ngse C ommunist Agr ^ ressio n 

21. Without relieving France of its basic resp'onsi- 

* 

bility for the defense of the Associated States, expedite 

the provision of 5 and if necessary increase f aid to the 

French Union forces % under the terms of existing commit- 
mentsj to assist them in; - • 

a. An aggressive military, political and psycho- 
logical program ^ including covert operations, to elimiri- 
ate organized Viet Hinh forces by mid-195 1 ?* 






b. Developing indigenous armed forces- s includin 
independent logistical and administrative services j 

■ 

which will eventually be capable of maintaining in- 
ternal security without assistance from French units. 

* 

ward this end, exert all feasible influence to improve the 
military capabilities of the French Union-Associated States 
forces 5 including improved training of local forces } effectiv 
cor nd and intelligence arrangements, and the reposing of 



increased responsibility on local military leaders. 



i 



22, Continue to assure France that; (1) the United ! 

a • 

States is aware that the French effort in Indochina is vit 1 
to the preservation of the French Union and of great strategic 
importance to the security of the free world 5 (2) the United 



States is fully aware of the sacrifices France is making; and 

■ 

(3) U f S. support will continue so long as France continues to 

carry out its prinary responsibility in Indochina, . ' 



* A, r' 



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230 



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Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET 



23. Enq-Qurage further steps by both France and the 

n 

Associated States to produce a working relationship based 
on equal sovereignty within the general framev/ork of the 

* 

French Union. These steps should take into account France '.a 
primary responsibility for the defense of Indochina. 



a 



Support the development of more effective and. 



stable governments in the Associated States } thus 
making possible the reduction of French participation 
in the affairs of the States, 

b, Org'e the French to organize their administra- 
tion and representation in Indochina v/ith a view to in- 
creasing the feeling of responsibility on the part of 

* 

the Associated States, 

c, Seek to persuade the Associated States that it 
is not in their best interest to undermine the French 
position by mailing untimely demands, 

d< Cooperate with the French and the Associated 

States in publicizing progress toward achieving the 

foregoing policies. 

2h % Continue to promote international recognition and 
support for the Associated States, 

2>. Employ every feasible means to influence the 
French go^ernnient anfi people against any conclusion of the 
straggle on terms inconsistent with basic U.S. objectives. 
In doing so, the United States should make clear: 






■■ 



NSC 



5^0 



J 



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232 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



* • 



• . . * 






> • 



a. 



TOP SECRET 



The effect on the position of "France itself 



in North Africa, in Europe, and as a world power, 

* 

b. The free world stake In Indochina* 

c. The impact of the loss of Indochina upon the 
over-all strategy of France's free world partners, 

* 

26. Reiterate to the French: 

a. That in the absence of a marked improvement 
in the military situation there is no basis for 
negotiation v/ith any prospect for acceptable terms* 

b. That a nominally n on- Communist coalition 



regime would eventually turn the country over to 

■ 

Ho Chi Minh with no opportunity for the replacement of 
the French by the United States or the United Kingdom. 

27 « Flatly oppose any idea of a cease-fire as a 

* 

« 

preliminary to negotiations 5 because such a cease-fire would 
result in an irretrievable deterioration of the Franco- 
Vietnamese military position in Indochina* 

23, If^it appears necessary, insist that the French 
consult the Vietnamese and obtain their approval of all 
actions related to any response to Viet Minh offers to 
negotiate. 

29- If the French actually enter into negotiations 
with the coMnunists, insist that the United States be con- 

* 

suited and seek to influence the course of the negotiations. 



% 









TOP SECRET 



**\ r\ 



232 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET 



-'" * 30c In view of the possibility of large-scale Chinese 
Communist intervention ., and in order that the United States 
may be prepared to take whatever action may be appropriate* 
. in such circumstance's 3 continue to" keep current the plans 

necessary to carry out the courses of action indicated in 

* 

paragraphs 31 and 32 below. In addition . } seek UK and French 
advance agreement in principle that a naval blockade of 
Communist China should be included in the courses of military 

i 

action set forth in paragraph 31 below. 

* 

In the Event of Chinese Communist Intervention 



<-■#»' ■-»».». 



.<-*_#—-.- --^- -**.■**»-*.-»»..**..;■« -rf.—*-^- a . OT«*,.*4»ip-<hn_***r- te ..*wr *.»-«.. »..- 



31. If the United States, France and the Associated 
States determine that Chinese Cois&unist forces (including 

■ 

volunteers) have overtly, intervened in Indochina,, or are 

■ 

covertly participating so as to jeopardize holding the 
Tonkin delta area, the United States (following consultation 
with France j the Associated States, the UK ? Australia^ and 
Nov; Zealand) should take the following measures to assist 
French Union, forces to repel the aggression, to hold Indo- 
china and to restore its security and peace: 

a. Support a request by France or the Associated 

■ 

States that the United Nations take immediate actions, 
including a resolution that Gomstiinist China had committed 



an aggression and a recommendation that member states 



• * 



take whatever action may be necessary, without geographic 

• * 

* 

limitation } to assist France and the Associated States 
to r.eet such aggression, 



nsc 5*f05 



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TO? SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






* 
» 



. 



• » • 



TOP SECRET 



. b. Whether or not the United Rations so acts, 



seek the maximum international support for participation 
in military courses of action required by the situation, 

* 

c. Carry out the following minimum courses of 



1 



*.#>* 



[military action, either under UK auspices or as pa: 



of a joint effort with France , the UK 5 and any other 
friendly governments.; <-1 uvw^Xvt&A^M \J^A^J^^^ f ^K/ 

(1) Provide j as say be practicable j air and 
naval assistance for a resolute defense of Indochina 

■ * 

itself; calling upon France and the Associated 
States to provide ground forces # 

(2) Provide the major forces to interdict 
Chinese Communist communication lines , including 

■m 

those in China; calling upon the UK and France to 
provide token forces and such other assistance as 
is normal among allies, 

(3) Provide logistical support to other 
participating nations as may be necessary - 
d f< Take the following additional actions, if 

appropriate to the situation: * 

- (1) If agreed pursuant to paragraph 30 above, 
establish jointly with the UK and France a nav&a. 
blockade of Communist China, 

(2) Intensify covert operations to aid I 
' ■ guerrilla forces against Communist China and to 

4 

interfere with and disrupt Chinese Communist lines 



of co sraun i c a t i o n . 



NSC 5*f05 



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TOP SECRET 



«■> 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NW'D Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET 



(3) Utilize j as desirable and feasible 5 
Chinese National forces in military operations in 
Southeast Asia, Korea, or China proper, 

CO Assist the British in Kong Kong, as do- 



. sirable and feasible 



* 



(5) Evacuate French Union civil and military 

i 

v 

personnel from the Tonkin delta 3 if required. 
32 t £• £f 5 after taking the actions outlined in para- 
graph 31**£ above 5 the United States , the UK and France 
determine jointly that expanded military action against 

r 

Communist China is necessary 3 the United States, in con- 

¥ 

junction with at least France and the UK 3 should take 

* 

air and naval action against all suitable military tar- 
gets in China which directly contribute to the war in 
Indochina, avoiding insofar as practicable targets near 
the USSR boundaries. 

b. If the UK and France do not agree to such e;<~ 
pandect^ military action, the United States should consider 
taking such action unilaterally, 
33- If action is taken under paragraph 32 3 the United 

* * 

States should recognize that it may become involved in an 

* 

all-out* war with Communist China 5 and possibly with the USSR 
and the rest of the Soviet bloc s and should therefore proceed 



to take large-scale mobilization measures. 



■ - 



KSC 5V-05 



TOP SECRET 



^00 



r- 



r~i f i ,r-i i — i r~i 



t 



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FINANCIAL .APPENDIX 
POLICY ALTERNATIVE: NO CHINESE COMMUNIST AGGRESSION 
ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES IN CONNECTION V/ITH U. S. COURSES OF ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 

~ till — - r | | - - | | | I I II II ■ II I ■ I I I 1 I I • - ill 

illions of Dollars) 



I ndochina 

FY 1950-53 



FY 1950-53 

•FY 195V " 
FY 1955 
FY 1956 



Total 



969.7 



102.7 

^9.5 

53.0 

^P 



3 



Financial 
MDAP and Support 

Common- use thro u.?A 
Programs 1/ France 



5V8 



cr 



■ 


FY 195 ] + 
FY 1955 
FY. 1956 


839.5 

1159.5 

713.5 


3c 1 -:- 

333 
287 




Burma 









hi 

■ ■ 


FY : 1950-53 

FY 195^ 
FY 1955 
FY 1956 


18.6 

,5 


2 

r 

* 


H) 


Thailand 







375 

*+oo- 500 
750-800 
Woo- 500 



•88 

4-2". 5 
4-6.0 



^ 



5 



Technical 
and Economic 
Assistan ce 
Grant Loliii 



5+6 

25 
25 
25 



16 



4 



13 



1 



o 



Information 

Activities 



.7 3/ 



.5 

1.5 
1.5 



.6 3/ 

.5 
.5 
.5 



.7 3/ 



.5 
1.0 

1.0 



Other 2/ . 









o 

H 



m 

H 

ir 1 



2: 
2; 

o a 
3 i 

ft 8 



2 ^ 



g" 



71 £ 

Pi r - 

u> O 

— s 

p 8- 



o 

I-* 

O 



CO 

~-4 



o 
o 

Si 
h 

rn 

> i 



t 



. • 



i 



Total 



Ma lava ' 



FY 1950-53 

■ 

FY 195V 
FY 1955 
FY 1956 



.7 

.5 

.5 



Total 



FY 1950-53 1,092.7 



FY 195V 
FY 1955 
FY. 1956 



89^.0 

1,213.5 
766.5 



-— 



*Less than $500 thousands 



MDAP and 

Comon-use 

% Pror--ra::-is 



6 






3^6 
378 






3 
Financial 



Suopor 



\t 



Lf 



URAL 



thro 

"^ "*"* n ?**. r* o 



375 



^00-500 
750-800 
irGo-500 



if 



5 



Technical 

and Economic 
Assistance 

w tmn u 1 ■> ■ 1 ■ ■ ■ ■ 



7 






36 
32 

32 



7 



Information 
Activities 






*%& 



.7 2/ 

.5 

.5 



2.7 2/ 
2.0 



1/ Represents value of end itera shipments plus expenditures for packing , handling ? . , " 

crating and transportation, training and cor.r.:on-use items, 
2/ Estimated cost** of covert operations not available. 
;v TV 1953 only ■■ - 

!£/ Estimated costs to the U. S. of evacuation of Chinese troops fror.i Burma not available, 

K/ Additional expenditures o£ appropriately *.2-.0 million in 1$1>$ nnd *\J m million in 1$$& ndofrb be . 
** * generated by a proposed rozd prc^ra^: currently wider consideration,, 



< 

y 

! 

h 

u 



z 




^ 




a 


a 


• 1 


n 


y 


n 


*^ 




<2. 




o 


— • 


^» 


3 


1— 









^ 


-j 


CX 




re 

-1 


- 




X 


2 


ro 


t: 




d 


-^ 




<; 


u* 


tt 


UJ 




*jj 


O 


__ 


-1 





Cl 


* 


<l> 


Da 


-1 


*< 

4 * 


Ut 


Z 


f -J 


£ 





a 


00 


a 


r. 


si 

ft 

* T 


5" 


1 J 


<*> 


O 


r ->j 






CO 
CO 



O 

o 



o 
o 

PS 

M 

a 

H 
m 



/. * 



* 



PERTINENT ASSUMPTIONS 



t 



• 



Indochina 

> — *--> ■ i n ■■■ .■ ■ ■■■ « 




2 - ^in anGi^j^Si^^ort tlrroi^h Franco (Col. 3) expenditures for FY 1950-^3 

reflect start estimates of amotaats of aid to France which is attributable 
to Indochina, 

3* ffconom ic Assistance (Col. V) includes no specific estimates, for re 



habilitation on. the asstjmption 
reduced military expend itiires. 






uch costs could bo offset againsl 



r 

J+ « Info r rna t io nal_ A c t iy ;l t i o s (Col. J) are assumed to continue in FY 1956 



at a relatively stable race. 



5- pthor (see footnotes Z? and 37 ^° table) 



o 
o 

i-a 
M 



21 








^ 


(0 

n 


►■I 




c 


D3 


_ • 




n 


E» 


i— ► 


=1 


Z 


3. 


3 


3 


-1 


w 




X 


2 


r. 


z 




3 


p"» 




< 


o 


ft 




O 


^— 


-i 


o 


G- 


■ 


<J 




*■) 


CO 




*< 


U> 


2 




3 




O 


00 


o 




£3 




^* 


u 


■fl p 


3 


to 


U> 


o 


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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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COMMIT I ill ON ARMED 5£RV!C£S 






Jnnuaiy 2?> 195*1 



Honorable Charles E* Wilson 
Secretary of Defense 
Washington^ Do Co 

■ 

Dear Mr« Secret ary: 

I have been impressed for some time that we have been 
steadily saoving closer and closer to participation in the war in 
Ir/lo-China* I £®t not objecting to any annoimced policy thus far^ 
butt a decision must soon bo mode as to bow far we shall go$ I fool 
that you will be highly influential in formvl&ting this Important 
policy* 

It seems to n:e that wo should certainly step short 
of sending our troops or airman to this area 5 either for participation 
in the conflict or as instructors© As always* when we send oogroupj 

vo shsll have to send another to protect the first and ye shall thus 
be fully involved In a short time© ' . 

* 

With consideration of our conf5r.ied promises arc! assumed 
obligations in Europe., in the Pacific area* in Korea and elsewhere* and 
with consideration of our homa defensesj I do not think we can at all 
afford to take chaneos on becoming participants in Xndo-China© 

Further j I have understood that the Air Force has a 
special request to send twenty-five to fifty civilian airplane mechanics 
to In:3o-Chi'n?.* It seems to me that almost the same reasons apply in 
this instance* France has a great abundance of such mechanics, 7 : a 
sure* as I saw many French mechanics last September at our military 
installation at Chat e corpus; engaged in overhauling jot engines* 

I appreciate the fine contribution your are making .,o our 
national welfare as Secretary of Defense and as a member of the Security 
Council© I shall appreciate your consideration of this important 3 far- 

reaching quest ion 

With best wishes 9 I am 




C ord tally j&urs If 

hi "of ~ - 

jjphn Stennio 
CUnitcd States Senator 



?» 



23S 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



r* 



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OFFICE or 



the: assistant secretary of defense 

. WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 



30 January 195** 



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS 



MHSdORAlDm FCR TIz3 K2C0HD 



BUBJ2CS: 



Keating of President's Spools,! EJasaittee on Indoeairaj 
29 January 195^ 



1. The Special Ccmittee i;et In I-Ir. ICyes 1 office at 3:30 p.m. 
29 January L95^., 

2, The first matter discussed t*&3 the disposition ol" urgent French 
requests for additional U.S. assistance. The Under Secretary of Stats j 
General "v. B. Si^ith, raentionect that there has as yet been no reply to 
Prime Minister Laniel T s letter to President Disc: hover on this subject. 
It vas necessary to answer this substantively as soon as possible. 



> 



3- Afcairal Radford said he had been in touch with General Ely, 
French Chief of Staffs through Getierfel Yalluy. Ten B-2-S aircraft are 
on the way to Indochina this veeh. These would contribute to filling the 
French reouest for aircraft to bring t&to, B-2o squadrons up to o sti'ength 
of 25 operational aircraft each. However } an additional 12 are reeded 
to fill the full requirenent because a total cf 22 are reeded (12 to 
fill the annual attrition plus 10 to fill the additional French request) . 
there vas sciiie discussion on the seen:' ; differences in requests reach 
Washington via Paris and those. co:air^ through the MAAG. Subsequently 
in the meeting it vas agreed that the French should be inforjaed that the 
U.S. Vouid act only on recites ts vhioh had "been approved by General 'Daniel 
after Genera.! Daniel was set up in Indochina. 



h. Admiral Radford indicated that to fill, the entire requirement 
for 22 3-23 *s on an urgent basis would Eie&n ta&ing Bosie of the:/; frota 
U.S. operational snuadrons in the Far East; but this could be dene. 



rt: 



■» * 



r 



t: 



.4- 



me aircraix vouia noc aii. nave zero mainTenance tizae on tne 1. 



5 



„o une 



As to the additional French request for 2p B-So's to ecuip a 

1 decision to furnish then should 
return of General O'Banieh* However, the Air Force has been 

■ 



third squadron ^ it uns decided that final decision to furnish the* 

Etta 

alerter 



th 









to be furnished on short notice. 



-.*-:- *• 



6. As to t'ie provision of a snail "ditgible* , it Has decided to in 



.»."« 



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3 - : 

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. 



I 



7, Rej^&ing the French request for ^00 nsc^ardes trailed in the 
1 / v;. --ere of B-2o ard C-^7 aircraft, there was considerable discussion. 
Admiral Hadford said he hnd informed General Ely. through General Vall^yj 
that ths O.S, does not celieve the French have exhausted, all efforts to 
get French civilian Eiainteneiice creirs* 



1 - 



.' 



;u-;££5'C2a x-ie jfreiici* -cry -co 



\JO 



find thea through * : Air France, Mr* Eyes mentioned the possibility 0:1 



obtaining French peraourtel fron their eight aircrafs factories or frc 
the big Chatsauroux naiiTben&iiee on^e Tfhere the U.S. employed French 
laechv: ics. general Snith iiicrairod about the possibility of lo*reri:ig 
French ITATO censnitsaents to enable transfer of French military Esectanics- 
Ad-iiral Kadford said General Valluy had info; d hid the French Staff 
"have carefully Gonsideraci the idea "but the French Air Force does not have 
enough iuilitary mechanics trained in B-2S or C-^7 maintenance to fill the 
requirement. Therefore , there would he such a delay vhile their military 
mechanics vere being trained on these aircraft that the urgent rocuireaent 
could not oe net. He had also said that the eroioyiieut of French c .dliau 
xseehanics presented a difficult problem in security clearance. 

- 

8, General Sr.ith recc jaded that the U.S. send 200 U.S. Air Force ^ 
mechanics to MAIS. Indoehinaj and tell -the J^ench to provide the rest. 
Admiral Radford said this could be done and that the Air Force is, some- 
what reluctantly, ©aiding plans to this end. Jle had let the French know 
that if American mechanics vere sent they nust he used only on air "bases 
vhich vere entirely secure from capture. General Smith wondered, in light 
of additional Fresch recmests, if the Committee should not consider 

sending the full 400 neehanics, v - 

1 

9. Mr. Ryes questioned if sending 200 inllitary neehanics vould rot 

so coanit the U.S. to support the French that ve must he prepared eventually 
for complete intervention, including use of U.S. combat forces. General 
Smith said he did rot thick this would result - \ie vere sending maintenance 
forces not ground forces. Ke felt, hovrever, that the irrportan.ee of winning 
in Indochina vas so great that If worst cane to the vorst ho personally 
vould favor ^intervention with U.S. air and naval forces - not ground forces. 
Admiral Radford agreed. Mr. ICyes felt this consideration was so important 
that it should he put to the highest level. The President hinseli should 
decide, General Smith agreed, Mr. Allan Dulles vonclered if our preoccupation 
vith helping to van the battle at Men Bien Fhu yas so great that ve vere 
not goin^j to bargain vith the French as ve supplied their rest i\z\ at 
needs. Mr. Eyes 33.16. this was an aspect of the question he was raising* 
Admiral Hadi i read from a cable just received fro*! General T Daniel 
\ hich indicated Ge:.eral Navarre had "been most cordial to General 'Daniel 
at their meeting and had licated he was pleased vith the concept of U.S. 
liaison officers "being assigned to his serai headcu^rters and to the 



'O 



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cram in;- c ;and 



*.' 



1 1 



to vorl; out a mr::h:,rni'of collaboration at the military ^evei, 

10* later in the seetingj !Ir.. AllaTi Dulles raised the question as t^ 
setting the CA? T>i> t- the ?:-; V 1 ov-i: recuetsted. It *r&3 agreed that 





1 

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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, 




the Vrerch apparently wanted the:! r.o.i. th&t vhey should be sent; and CIA 
should arrange for the necessary negotiations uith the French in ItidocMna 
to take care of it, 

I 11. Mr, Kyes said that if ve meet the French urgent deraanas they 
should be tie? to tvo thirds: first 3 the achiev^nert of r.:?;:lr.:ua collabora- 
tion with the French in training and strategy ^ and secondly ^ the strei ytheni uj 
of General f 3ardel f s hssd in every way possible. General dvith agreed and 
felt y;a should, reinforce Genera?, O f I)aniel f s position not only with the 
French in Indochina but also at the highest level in Paris. 



12, ^inp^:y_cf Action A -reed ; Ur gent French Request s 



%i- 



v y&s agreea; 



a, To provide a 



tot 



of 22 B-2:; aircraft as rapidly as 



practicable . 






b. To provide 200 uniformed U.S. Air Fores neehnnics Mho 
vculd be assit^ed as an att^eiltatios to VA\G ? Indochina. These 
rechanics to be provided only on the utidir standing that they would 
be used at bases vhere they vould be secure fron capture and vould 
not be c::y:sed to coi^at. 

c. To send the CAP pilots ; vith CIA arranging necessary 
ne got iat ions . 



fiU Hot to provide a "Mrigible . ,! 



e. To avait General T Daniel f s return to UaGhinyton before 
making a decision on the other Preach recnasts* Efforts should 
continue to set the French to contribute a mxiniun number of 



,%* 



Liecnanics. 



It was fur cher agreed that General Snith vould clear these reccr; ded 



"O 

actions vith the President. 



13. The next ite:*i discussed vas the status of General Daniel, 
Mr, }:yes said General Trapuell^ the present Chief of MUG, is bein^ re- 
placed at the normal ercoiration of his tour. General Dabney had been 
chosen to replace Gereral Tr&taell ard is about to leave for Tndoe'^-r 
Adrdiral Radford pointed out that General 'Daniel could be nade Chief 
of liAAG without any further clearance vith the ?reuch Government. Gene 
Smith said this vould be all right but should not preclude further aeti 
'to increase the poz^icn o'Z General 'Daniel. General Ershine pointed 
out that the IdlAC' in Indochira is not a 'military nission" but only an 
administrative grouyi concerned vith the provision, of 12)AP esuip:v£ut. E 
thought the JIAAG status should be raised to that of a nisslon vhich coul 



ral 

on 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



* * 






* 



« 



. 



L±~.LjJ J.t. U»i_-j-.i..LU » X O >'w.^ i'.j_tw^, Ui£« u ire* t_~.j- ct-L v i/cil±Jvw.L £> i v.-J -C/„ ^ . ^Ua*^ 

.be first assigned as Chief of MAAO and ihs,tj for this reason* General 
DaSmey's departure for Indochina should be teisporarily hold up. Ge . " 
Dnbney should, hovever, go to Indochina to assists Goner al 'Daniel by 
heading up the present i-l^AG functions* AOmral Davis tfas req,u&st&& to 
assure that General D&hriey did not depart until further instructions were 
given. 

1H. Thoro \r<?.s sects discussion ; initiated by Mr. Kyes, about vays 
"by vhich the French Foreign Legion in Indochina inigbt* oe augmented. 
}to felt that if the Geman and French Cover. r/ents wuld facilitate it,, 
considerable numbers of Gernans night bo enlisted to increase the j "on, 
Mr. Kyes mentioned sav iral other general courses of action he thought 
should he further considered "by the Special COCTiittee and the:: suggested 
that General Ersl;lne rend his paper on the subject of Indochina. Mr. Kyes 
j taa&e it plain he considered this paper only a point cf departure for 
further vork by the Special Goss'alttee. General Erskine then read the paper ? 
copies of which vore give:: to the oenbers of the Special Connittec . 



15- Adiiral Radford said he thought j in general j that the paper 
covered nauy important fields but he had one or two reservations, Jle 
felt* vith regard to the recommendation on regional coordination ; that 
CIIICPAC vis. and should be, the nan to head up regional coordination oi the 
MAAGs. Mr. Kyes reiterated that the paper vac only a point of d rture 
and said he felt the basic trouble in trying to help in Indoehira Mas 
the attitude of the French Government. Hr« Allan Dulles said the French 
do not want us to become too involve:! in the conduct cf operations in 
Indoehira because they vant to keep one foot on the negotiations stool 

lo. Admiral Bedford said he felt the paper iras too restrictive 
in that it was premised on U.S. action short of the contribution of U.S. 
coribat forcps. He said that the U.S. could not afford to let the Viet 
Minh take the Tonkin Delta. If this were lost, Indochina vould op' lost 
and the rest of Southeast Asia vould foil- Ebe psychological inn zi 
of such a loss vould be unacceptable to the U.S. Indochina riust have 
the highest possible priority in U.S. attention. He suggested the paper, 
vhen redrafted, should have tvo parts, one based on no intervene! n vizh 
combat forces and a second part indicating what should be doae to prepare 
against the contingency vhere U.S. coribat forces vould be needed. 
General Smith vns generally agreeable to this approach. 

17. It vas screed not to use the OCB facilities to support the 
Special Co.vr.ittee^ but instead to set up a voriinj; group of representatives 
of the principals of "the Special Coviittee to revise General Srshi;e's 
paper by the piddle of the veelij 31 January - 6 February. 



2^3 






t • • 



.* 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






-I 

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18. Tixe vorkios croup would c: iprise : 

Adniral Davis (C3D) 
\ Mr. Godel (CoD) 

Captain An&crs-on (JCS) 
Hr. Bonsai (Stats) 
Mr. Aureil (CIA) 
General 3or.es teal (C-3D) 

ereral Snlth reeonnieB&sd that a representative of the Air Force be 
included in the working group. 



-o O' 



19* At the felose of the meeting, General Smith inquired as to 

done to speed up the delivery of spare parts for 3~£5 f s 
and C-llS^s. He iras inform e3 that necessary actios had beau taken. 



what vas being 



20. Mr. Allan Dulles inquired if an uncor-venticuml warfare officer, 
specif ic&lly Colonel Lansdale, could not "be added to the group of five 
liaison officers to vliicli General Kav&rre had agreed. Aeniral Bedford 
thought this might be clone and at any rate Colonel Lans&ale could 
iioediately be attached to the I-AAG, but he riondered if it vculd r.ot "be 
best for Colonel Lonsdale to avait General O'ln- iel's return before goi^ 
to Indochina. In this w&y, Colonel Laus&ale could help the vorkir^ group 
**n its revision of nor* .:»*■■£» i ■!?v»w'*!"'ir->n tr -ni^av 

Allan Dulles. 



enera 



Srskine's paper. This vas agreeable to Mr. 



* • 



21, Present at the rieeuin^ vrere; 



Department of Defense 
Davis , General Srskine, Mr 



- Mr. Kyesj Acniral Sadford, Adniral 
Godelj b/g Bonesteelj Colonel Alden 



tfepart&ent of State - General Smithy Ilr. Robertson. i 

CIA - Mr. Allan Dulles, General Cabell, Mr. Aureil, 
Colonel Laasdale, 



C- H. Bonesteelj HI 



Eri£adier General, USA 



r-i « 



' W 



Lit 



i » .- * ^« 



>■ 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number. NND 633 1 6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 









30 January 1934 



roFUORANDUIU FOR: It. General Jea» VaUuy, 

French Military i&i&sion tot-he United States 

Admiral Radford. Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, has 

anlvccl me to convey to yon the following message which he is certain yoxi 
would be interested in receiving as &o*?n as possible. 

Admiral Radford has received approval from higher authority for 
the transfer to Xndo-Ohina Immediately of 10 additional F>-26 type air- 
craft to bring the two cssl sting J5-2& squadrons of the French Air Force 
up to a strength of ES pianos each. This will bring to a total ox 22 the; 
airplanes of this type now in process of delivery" or to be delivered to 
Indo-China in the immediate future, Directives for the movement of 
these aircraft have already been cent to the Commanding General of the 
U.S. Air Force in the Far East, 

The U.S. Air Force in now assembling for immediate transporta- 
tion to Indo-Ghlna 200 uniformed U.S. Air Force mechanic Sj who will 
augment the United States Military Assistance Group in Indo-China for 
the purpose of assisting the French Air Force hi the maintenance of C-47 
and B~2o aircraft. 









The matter of the provision of 25 additional 5i-?.6 aircraft for a 
third squadron is Mill under consideration. Decision v/ill be made sub- 
sequent to the receipt of reports from General O'Bsniel upon retttrn to 
Washington about 7 February from his current mission in Indc-China, 
and informatic?n which Admiral Radford is c.xp&ctifi i , from Genera] Vallv. ■ 
an to ability of the French Air Force to obtain from £ ranee additional 
maintenance personnel, either civilian or military. 



cc; Admiral Davis 



G, W. A-NDE&3GH, Jr, 
Captain, USM 






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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 L 






SDilJECT: Report of U*S* Special .Mission to Indochina 



tp> 



TO: 



The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

(Thru Cofijmander-in-Chief, Pacific) 



\ 



i 
% 

> 



& 



1* The attached report of my visit to Indochina covers the results 
ccoiaplished, action taken, and recousnendations* The outstanding points 



are covered herein e 

p m 

2o During this visit I talked vdth General llavarre and other senior 
French officials, as vrell as officials of the Vietnamese government a All 
conversations \;ere conducted in a spirit of frankness, v/ith a free exchange 

» 

of vievrs and information* 

■ 
■ * 

3* During my stay in Indochina I had tv;o conferences with General 
Navarre, in which we discussed the purpose of my visit and means and methods 

■ ■ * 

by v/hich I could be of assistance to him. Relative to establishing myself 
in Indochina as a liaison officer to him, he emphasized that he did not 

* i 

desire UoSe overt participation at this level for political reasons but 
that he would not object to periodic visits by me and my staff. 77c agreed 
on my visiting Saigon at about six: weeks 1 intervals, Navarre said we 
could try this out and discuss the matter further at ziy next visit . 

< . ■ 

k° In the field of psychological warfare, he was not particular! 
interested in U<,S<> participation* On the other hand, the Vietnamese are 

* 

amenable to it* 

* ■ 

5* General Navarre stated that while he felt some concern over the 
present situation, he scqs no reason for changing his original plans for 

* 

a fall offensive* The continued development of the Vietnamese forces is 



l 



naming possible the recover;/ of more units that should give him a 

• * 

vrependerance of forces v/ith which to strike the enemy. 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






- 



• - 3* ' 



' 



• 



l6 e ?ha 7rench and Vietnamese Navies arc fully employed to the lisait 

- 

of their capabilities in transporting troops arid supplies ^ amphibious 
operations^ mine sv/eepirigj shipping recbrinaissancOj blockade and patrol, 
and training* There arc insufficient personnel and small craft to permit 

• V m 

progressive maintenance, or rotation of crovrs from hazardous and exacting 






x es 






11. V/hilo approximately three fourths of all naval operations are 

■ 
■ * * 

currently taking place in the Tonkin Delta area, less than half the 

•A 

personnel of the F.U. Navies is assigned there. Eschevdng criticism, it i wy* -< 
still appears that the staffs and easy billets in the Saigon area are 



overmanned 



to di 



that the staffs and easy billets in the Saigon area are tv* 

__- -^ m . y 

Requosts from the Nort h for personnel and a dditional LSlPs ' \y\ \ 



. » , 






ischarge missions assigned hayO not bggh jxegded by An no. ra 1 Auboyn ea u, U— ^:<\ 
CINC, KE. ",'""'-• 

12 • There is an obvious lack of coordination in joint operations, 

• k # 

r - 

and small craft troop convoys in ambush country have not received either 
observation or air support, cither of which v;ould normally ensure a J 
safe journey, barring the ever present threat of mines. 

13* Casualties in both ships and personnel continue unabated, 

• * * 
testimony to the efficacy of point blank bazooka fire and ne~.r mine tactics 

(See Annex A) ♦ 






The- French Naval Air squadron of Privateers is a first class 

* * 

aggregation. of pilots and crev; s . They provide the only night bonibing 
: stent ial in Indochina, and engage in varied operational tasks suited 

■ 

to the P3l|Y. 

* - 

lit* ^e French light carrier "Arro:nanche ,: provides close. air supoorfc 



4 



<~ «<- J- 



?hogo reconnaissance and armed reconnaissance sorties in ansv;er to requests 



•« 



root GATAC. 



248 



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: 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP ■■' 

15. Naval amphibious assault units (Dinassau) are active in their 
assigned areas, A review of their small craft requirements is now under- 
way, and will be the subject of another report. Meanwhile, training of 
new assault units is progressing. 

16. Vietnamese personnel are now considered by the French Navy to 
be capable of handling all small craft and, with some French supervision, 
larger ones. Accordingly, recuit and NCO training at NHA TRANG has been 
stepped up, and more Vietnamese officers are being sent to France for 
technical training. 

17. With U.S. programmed support, the F.U. Navy has been fully 
committed to operations that strain to the utmost their personnel 
involved. They are employing sound tactics and appear well lead in the 
field. 

18. A requirement for additional maintenance and logistic support 
exists if the operational capabilities of the FAF in Indochina are to be 
maintained or increased. The arrival in Indochina on 5 February 1954 of 
USAF maintenance personnel will largely satisfy the requirement. No recom- 
mendation as tp additional personnel needs will be made until the work 



of this group can be evaluated. 

19. The training school for Vietnamese airmen at NHA TRMG is well 
established, and the program is considered adequte for the contemplated 
employment of personnel. 

20. My current arrangements with General Navarre do not include 
establishment of myself,* with a small staff, in Saigon. However, he 
assented to periodic visits and agreed to my liaison personnel. A 

* 

small permanent Joint Staff is needed to prepare detailed operations 



249 



MP. SEC. I 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number. NND 633 1 6. By: N WD Date: 201 1 



' ." \ ■■*- ■ 






aid training plans, to develop sound advice, vhich can be furnished in a 
coordinated ntenner through the liaison officers to all levels of the 

■ 

?2"€Tich command* It employs as its fiold agency the five liaison officers 
recently approved^ and is capable of quick movement* to Indochina in 
echelons or as a group, on either a temporary or permanent basis* The 
Intelligence Division is a translation, liaison and security agency only, 
drawing its intelligence material from facilities available to DXNCPAC* 
Since KAAG, Indochina, is a logistic staff in being, the logistic division 

m 

of the proposed organisation is limited to joint planning and coordination. 



Tho Plans and Training Division contains representatives from all services 
and will include the diverse planning skills required* Officer requirements 

• for the activation of this staff have been furnished CINGPAC 

* ■ 

21 1 General SfciteynOlds, Chief of STEM, reported that the people in 
r areas liberated fro;n the Viet Jlinh v/ere badly in need of food and other 
■ necessities , He believed that additional funds should be allotted STS«- 

■i 

or some other U S agency for such use He stated that food and clothing 
provided- by the U S through local, aathori ties' would form a powerful 



psychological weapon in allied hands 
22, BSOCBfiiEKDATlQHS., 



D 



!«•■-. «_ — , . 



, I recommend? 
a. The organization of the small Joint Staffs set forth in ' 
paragraph 20 above, be approved* 

• * * 

■ 

b* The two officers for psychological warfare be attached tc 
* * 

*n appropriate U S organization in Saigon to assist trie Vietnamese 

; -*v e i nrr.cn t in psychological warfare training and development* 



250 









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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316* By: NWD Date: 201 1 




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re 



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f* >"f* Pj r V 

OL~V<».i \L it 



•'■ - • ; - .1 

*c. Additional funds bo allotted -ST&.J (or some other U.S., agency) 
to assist in the rehabilitation of v;ar ravaged areas recovered from the 



^st Minlw 



do 



The employment of liaison officers, nov; ♦being assigned, to 




* * 

ug my spokesmen to the French be approved as an interim measure 




■-" i :-> 



^Vt« ^' *.-»*^-< *»"~ » " 



JOHN *.V\ Q^MBJM, 

Lieutenant General, U.S. A 
Chief of Mission 



^ 



^ 



-^•^ 



Annexes: 

A. Naval Situation 

B. Training of Kinh Quan Bn 

C. Summary of French Union and Viet Minh 
Forces Indochina 












2 



: 1 



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: 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



Tn 
or o t 



14. On February 2 and 3, I went by U.S. aircraft to Hanoi and from 
there by French C-47, a commercial chartered airlift plane , to Dicn Bien 
Phu, arriving there at 1400. I was met by Colonel de Castres, CO of troops 
at Dien Bien Phu and was briefed by him and taken on a tour of battle posi- 
tions. There are twelve French Union Battalions in the area, supported by 
what I consider sufficient air, armor, and artillery. The defenses lie in 

■ 

a valley and are sitting across the road intersection which joins there. 
Hills rising as high as 1000 feet or more surround the area at a distance 
of 3000 to 5000 yards. The defenses are heavily wired- in in with barbed 
wire, bunkers have been built and a good job of construction of fortifica- 
tions is being done. Dugouts and bunkers are topped with timber and dirt. 
« I had the impression that wet weather would cause much trouble through 
crumbling walls and leaking roofs. The defense area is twelve kilometers 
long and six kilometers wide. I feel that it can withstand any kind of an 
attack that the Viet Minh are capable of launching. However, a force with 
two or three battalions of medium artillery with air observation could make 
the area untenable. The enemy does not seem to have this capability at 

present. The morale of the troops is high; they are confident that they 

- 
can stop any attack. 1 believe, that if 1 were charged with the defence of 

the area, I would have been tempted to have utilized the high ground sur- 

rounding the area, rather than the low ground, and when I asked abou? this, 

the commander said that fields "of fire were bettei~ where they were, I re- 

turned to Hanoi arriving there at 1820 after a flight of one hour and 

twenty minutes. 



252 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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•— •. - , 



- T - i 

15- I called at General Cogny 's Headquarters and had a profitable 

* 
talk with him. He is a fine officer and is sound in his thinking. He 

is greatly concerned over having to send so much of his mobile reserve 
from the Delta area. He stated that the enemy has increased infiltra- 
tion in the southern part of the Delta and that the 320th Viet Minh Divi- 
sion, as well as other units are involved. At the present time, Cogny 
reports twenty regular Viet Minh battalions in the Delta area, plus sev- 
eral individual companies. I feel that this infiltration will no doubt 
continue until Navarre has more troops to continue the clearing of the 
Delta or adopts a plan to wire in the Delta with tactical wire, covering 
it with fire, and then conducts a deliberate campaign to eliminate all 
enemy. I expressed these ideas to Cogny* He was non-committal but was 
interested when 1 attempted to show him by a sketch how I thought fenc- 
ing in could be done. 

16. I also talked with Cogny 1 s Deputy. He expressed the idea that 
the political war had to be won before the military. I told him that I 
did not agree at all with such a concep.t and that the military had to be 
won first. I am sure that Cogny is of the same opinion that I am* Cogny 
is anxious to stay in Indochina until the war is won, although he has been 
there now for more than thirty months. Navarre has high regard for Cogny 
and no doubt Cogny will stay. I certainly hope so, 

17. The impression I have gained as a result of my visit to Indo- 
china is that the French are anxious to get on with and win the war; that 
the military definitely want to stay until the war is brought to a success- 
ful conclusion. The French are sadly lacking in known-how in many fields, 

253 • 






I 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 



tad :t 

! l - 1 



including planning and maintenance matters. They are proud and sensitive 
to criticism. They need help. A step in the right direction has been 
made in removing obstacles standing in tlie way of furnishing necessary 
supplies; in establishing closer liaison with Navarre and in supporting 
the maintenance effort by sending additional U.S. maintenance personnel 
to Indochina. I believe that with careful handling, \*e can implement 
many of our ideas as to the conduct of the war strategically and in 
training matters. The machinery is in motion and my desire is to follow 
through in every way possible. Navarre stated that he intended to fol- 
low his plan in the conduct of the war by continuing the recovery of 
battalions, forming regiments and divisions, and by launching an all-out 
offensive in the Fall. The Vietnamese army is making progress mainly 
the sound action of Secretary Defense Quat, 



/s/ JOHN W. 0' DANIEL 

Lieutenant General, USA 
Chief of Mission 



Tfr mm \ C* r ~ r * '"■ "•"-*• 
J 



254 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






i 



Visit of Lieutenant General John W. 0' Daniel to Vietnamese Defense 
Minister* 1 February 1954 at Saigon. 



I called on the Minister of National Defense of Vietnam, Dr. Pham 
Huy Quat, accompanied by the Deputy Chief of Mission who served as in- 
terpreter. 

Dr. Quat told me that the plan for augmentation of the Vietnamese 

» 

national forces had been approved by the High Military Committee at its 
meeting on January 18. This called for an increase of 66 battalions in 
1954 j plus 16 specialized companies. However, Dr. Quat had proposed a 
new system of accelerating the increase of the Vietnamese National Army. 
This consisted in drawing on the local militia as the initial base for 
recruitment to the light battalions, and the light battalions, in turn, 
would serve as the base for filling out the regular battalions. Dr. Quat 
felt that, by the adoption of his system, it would be possible to decrease 
the present training cycle of four months to only two months. He said 

that if his system were adopted (and stated that it had already received 

i 
the approval of Bao Dai) he could raise 130,000 additional troops in the 

current calendar year. 

The Minister of National Defense said that one of his great pre" lems 

was that of cadres. There simply were not enought officers of field 

grade to go round. He had an absolute ceiling limitation of 800 Frt ^h 

■ 
officers for the Vietnamese National Army, and a large proportion of these 

were employed in training activities. If, by chance, he could secui 

American officers as instructors, this would liberate an equivalent num- 

ber of French officers for combat service. 



255 



TOP SEC I 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



• 
• 



n 



-• 



However, Dr. Quat added in strictest confidence that when last in 
Paris he had discussed this problem with Marshal Juin. The Marshal asked 
why the Vietnamese had not found it possible to find officers "elsev/here." 
Quat at that time had made a request of Defense Minister Pleven for French 
reserve officers, promising the pay and accoutrement of active officers 
in the line plus an insurance policy. However, the French replied that 
their reserves were very scarce in number and that most of the ex-officer 
personnel were now in civil life. 

I inquired whether, if it met with general agreement, it would be 
possible to pay American reserve officers, should they seek employ meat in 
the Vietnamese National forces, at the rate of salary they had received 
when serving in American uniform. I likewise inquired if retired American 

* 

colonels who were qualified to serve as Generals of Division could be given 
division command, rank and pay. The Defense Minister thought that, if the 
principle were accepted, means of payment and rank could be worked out. 
Dr. Quat said, again in terms of strictest confidence, that he had 
received permission from Bao Dai to elaborate plans for development of a 
national militia. -He said the matter was a delicate one, as it had not 

- 

met with complete French acquiescence, and he requested that the matter 
be discussed with the French, However, his studies of how to improve the 
militia were almost completed, and he thought that soon His Majesty would 
authorize him to approach the Chief of MAAG, the American Ambassador, or 
the reporting officer with the request for American aid to arm, train, 
and equip a Vietnamese National Militia. 

I queried the Minister as to what progress had been made in psycho- 
logical warfare, stressing his belief that competence in this field was 

"half the battle" in such a war as that which prevails in Indochina, 

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Dr. Quat described in detail the present psychological warfare activ- 
ities undertaken in "Operation Atlanta" in the three provinces extending 
between Nhatrang and Hue, He said that not only were GAMO teams close be- 
hind the expeditionary force, but that a new technique was being tried for 
the first time in Vietnam. Hitherto the French Union and Vietnamese forces 

had been content to overwhelm an area and then leave it relatively empty, 

•- 

with the result that the Viet Minh returned to territories officially 
listed as "pacified," Nov;, however, two new systems were being tried. 

The first was in the treatment of villages in the line of allied advance. 

— • 

Instead of following the old system of obliteration, three categories of 
villages were recognized, The first was the village which offered all- 
out resistance. This was subject to all-out attack and was wiped out, 
either by aerial bombardment or land assault. The second class of village 
was one which showed sporadic resistance, and this was encircled by Viet- 
namese troops and called upon to surrender. Following capitulation, the 
inhabitants were divided into three sub-categories: those who were clearly 

- 

Viet Minh and who were used for battle intelligence before being made pris- 
oners; those who were merely suspect and who were placed in concentration 
camps where, by means of psychological warfare, they might be induced to 
come over to the Vietnamese side; and those who were clearly the mass of 
the people - peasants who were promptly given work, paid in good Vietnamese 
piasters, and set free, although still kept under surveillance. The third 
type of village was that which offered no resistance whatever, but on the 
contrary, welcomed liberation from the advancing French and Vietnamese 
forces. These people were given immediate assistance and an opportunity 
to work with prompt payment. The Minisjter felt that the outcome of this 

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experiment in the three provinces which had been entrusted largely to 
Vietnamese hands would be of utmost importance in developing future 
guidance in the realm of psychological warfare. 

In response to my question, Dr. Ouat likewise indicated that his 
Ministry was preparing plans for training in guerrilla warfare. He was 
interested in the suggestion, although it did not apply specifically to 
Vietnam, that in the present conflict in middle Laos prompt action in 
bringing Laotian guerrillas, backed up by regular battalions, to confront 
the Viet Minh who had invaded that area might be successful in preventing 
the Viet Minh from settling down in these remote jungles and mountains 
and so establishing themselves that their eradication would prove a time- 
consuming and difficult problem. 

The over-all impression given by Minister Quat was one of quiet self- 
confidence in his ability to get on with the war and to succeed in his 
program, provided that, he had sufficient backing from the French High 
Command and if an increased amount of American aid, both in officer train- 
ing instructors and in arms for his proposed militia, were forthcoming. 

Acknowledgment for this detailed report of my meeting is made to 
Mr, McClintock, Deputy Chief of Mission, American Embassy, Saigon. 



1 9 

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TOP 9 l T 

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 



WASHINGTON 25, D. D. 



1 March 1954 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Subject: Consideration of the ROK Offer to 

Send a Division to Indochina 



c ~ — L 

of- /• 



1. In two messages, C-66980 dated 2 February 1954 (DA IN 
36799) and KCG 2-4 dated 5 February 1954 (DA IN 37583), 
CINCFE has reported President Rhee's proposal, subject to 
United States concurrence, to offer a Republic of Korea 
Army (110KA) division to assist the Government of Laos in 
resisting the Viet Mitih invasion of that country. In dis- 
cussing this matter with General Hull on 5 February 1954, 
President Rhee stated that he did not' wish to make any move 
which would be embarrassing to the United States Government 
and that he would do whatever the United States Government 
desired him to do in this case. He felt that early action 
should be taken if any reinforcements are to be sent to 
Indochina, as the situation there appeared to him to be 
quite critical. He stated that, in his opinion, whatever 
decision is taken should be taken quickly. 

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the impli- 
cations of this problem, and submit herewith their views in 
the premises. 

3. Provided the withdrawal of a ROKA division from the 
United Nations forces in Korea for transfer to Indochina did 
not bring about a general movement on the part of our United 
Nations Allies to reduce their contingents in Korea, such a 
withdrawal would be acceptable from the standpoint of the 
military situation in Korea. 

4. The augmentation of the French Union forces in Indo- 
china by one ROKA division would not, of itself, increase 
their military capability vis-a-vis the Viet Minh to a 
degree likely to be decisive. 

5. In addition to the purely military considerations, 
there are involved a number of important political and 
psychological factors having military implications which 
should be carefully weighed in evaluating the over-all 



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effects which the introduction of a ROKA division into 
Indochina might have. Since the substance of President 
Rhee's offer has now been publicized, certain psychological 
benefits have probably already been realized. The political 
factors involved cannot be finally evaluated unless and 
until the reactions of our Allies in Korea are determined. 

6. President Rhee does not have at his command the resources 
required to initiate and subsequently to support his proposed 
project. The French Government has repeatedly indicated that 

it is unable to increase above the present level its contribu- 
tion to the Indochina conflict. Therefore, the material sup- 
port of the project would inevitably devolve upon the United 
States. It follows that no matter how President Rhee's offer 
is presented, and no matter what the proclaimed attitude of 
the United States Government might be, the sponsorship of the 
project would be generally ascribed to the United States in 
the eyes of the world. 

7. It is not possible to predict with any degree of depend- 
ability what the reaction of Communist China would be to the 
introduction of a ROKA division into Indochina. While a deci- 
sion on the part of Communist China to intervene overtly in 
Indochina is more likely to be governed by other considerations, 
the entry of ROK forces into the Indochinese conflict might pre- 
cipitate overt intervention by the Chinese Communists. In view 
of publicly announced United States policy, i.e., that open Red 
Chinese aggression in Indochina would have lf . • . grave conse- 
quences which might not be confined to Indochina. 11 (See para- 
graph 4, Annex "A 11 to NSC 5405), implementation of President 
Rhee's offer could have grave military implications involving 
United States armed forces, 

■ 

8. A direct and exclusive offer of a ROKA division to Laos 
would probably be regarded by the governments of the other 
Assoc? ited States and of France as an affront, and could 
cause serious embarrassment in the matter of command relation- 
ships. Furthermore, should the forces invading Laos be with- 
drawn by the Communists as was done in the previous instance, 
the employment of a ROKA division solely in Laos could develop 
into unprofitable garrison duty even though it freed other 
forces for active operations elsewhere in Indochina. Therefore, 
if President Rhee's offer is to be formally made, it should be 
addressed individually and simultaneously to the governments 

of France, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam with the stipulation 
that the ROKA division would be made available to the Commander 
of the French Union forces in Indochina for employment subject 
only to the condition that the integrity of the division be 
maintained. 



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9. In addition to the foregoing, it is considered that 
the transfer of a ROKA division to Indochina would be at- 
tended by the following advantages and disadvantages having 
military implications: 

Advantages 

a^ It would augment the present "foreign forces" of 
192,000 French metropolitan and colonial troops by about 
15,000 men. This would enhance the capability of the 
French to implement the Navarre Plan for offensive opera- 
tions designed eventually to achieve a military victory, 
and could furnish to the French Union forces the new 
impetus required to accomplish this objective; 

b^. It could create a situation that would make it more 
difficult for the French to withdraw from Indochina or to 
negotiate a settlement with the Viet Minh of a nature prej- 
udicial to the future freedom of the Associated States. A 
rejection of the offer by the French would tend to place 
increased onus on them to bring the Indochinese conflict 
to a successful military conclusion with the forces now 
available or planned; 

c_. It would represent a concrete step in fostering 
unity of action by anti-Communist Asiatic forces in 
countering Communist aggression in Asia, with immense 
psychological gain to the Free World; 

ji. It would open the way for a well-trained, battle- 
experienced ROKA division, by exhibiting a high standard 
of performance in combat, to inspire and stimulate the 
Vietnamese forces to greater efforts; 

£*.. If a ROKA division performed well in Indochina, it 
would serve as a demonstration of the effectiveness of 
United States training methods in Korea, and might speed 
the adoption of comparable training methods in Indochina; 

Pi s advan t ag es 

f , It would provide President Rhee with an opportunity 
to exploit the situation to his own ulterior purposes. It 
might be his hope that the transfer of a ROKA division to 
Indochina would lead to a renewal of hostilities in Korea; 

£. The burden of moving and providing logistic support 
for the ROKA division would most certainly devolve, directly 
or indirectly, on the United. S es. This would impose 
additional responsibilities, commitments,' and costs on the 
United States Government and on the United States military 



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departments. The arrangements for furnishing logistic 
support to the ROKA division would undoubtedly involve 
numerous difficulties ; 

h_. It would add to the complications and difficulties 
of French command relations in Indochina. 

jL. It would be difficult to explain and justify to the 
American public the transfer of a ROICA division to Indo- 
china while still requiring the retention of United States 
ground forces in Korea. In all probability, serious crit- 
icism by the American public. would ensue; 

j . The governments allied with us in Korea would experi- 
ence similar difficulties, and this would impose additional 
strains upon our relations with our Allies in Korea; 

k. The situation would, in all likelihood, be widely 
exploited by Soviet bloc propaganda as a case of United 
States employment of hapless oriental puppets for the 
benefit of the white imperialists; 

_1. A ROKA division committed in Indochina would be 
fighting a type of warfare entirely new to it, under con- 
ditions of climate and terrain completely foreign to its 
previous experience, and without the accustomed United 
States advisors at hand. It would lack the incentive of 
fighting in the defense of its homeland. If under these 
conditions the performance of the division were poor or 
indifferent, the reputation of United States training 
methods would suffer accordingly; 

■ 

m. The language barrier would be a considerable obstacle, 

10. In the light of all of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs 
of SteLjff conclude that, from a military point of view and hav^ 
ing due regard for the principal political and psychological 
factors having military implications, the transfer of a ROICA 
division to Indochina at this time would not be in the best 
interests of the United States. Therefore the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff consider that while President Rhee should be commended 
by our Government for his determination to combat communist 
aggression in Asia even outside the borders of Korea, he shou 
be told that we do not consider that the transfer of a ROKA 
division to Indochina at this time would be in the best in- 
terests of the Free World and therefore that we request he not 
make a formal offer to the Laotian Government. 



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11. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that, subject to 
your concurrence, the foregoing views be presented by the 
Department of Defense for consideration in the formulation 
of the United States position on this subject and in the 
preparation of a formal reply to President Rhee. 



For the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 



/s/ Arthur Radford 



ARTHUR RADFORD, 
Chairman, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. 



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4 



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 



WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 



5 March 1954 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

SUBJECT: Reappraisal of General 'Daniel's 

Status with Respect to Indochina 



1. Subsequent to decisions made at levels above the 
Department of Defense concerning enlargement of Military 
Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Indochina, and appoint- 
ment of a new chief thereof, information has been received 
which points to the need for a reappraisal of the matters 
involved. 



2. A recent message from the United States Ambassador 
to Indochina, states that General Navarre informed the 
Ambassador that Navarre's "very willing acceptance of 
General 0' Daniel [USA] was predicated on the understand- • 
ing that the latter's functions were limited to military 
assistance," that "any good ideas the General or any [U.S.] 
officers might produce would be put into effect wherever 
practicable [but that] it should be clearly understood 
that neither 0' Daniel nor MAAG was to have any powers, 
advisory or otherwise, in the conduct and planning of 
operations, or in the training of national armies and 
cadres*" 



3. Information available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
relative to plans of the United States Government indicates 
that a very considerable increase in MAAG, Indochina, per- 
sonnel and in the scope of its training responsibilities 
is contemplated. Recent messages from the U.S. Ambassador 
to Indochina and the U.S. Embassy, Paris, make it apparent 
that General Navarre would be strongly opposed to granting 
increased training responsibility and authority. From this 
it appears that the Chief, MAAG, Indochina, will not have 
authority, primarily the authority of command supervision, 
to accompany the proposed greatly increased responsibility 
of the MAAG, Without this capabiity to exercise command 
supervision* no training program can be assured of success. 
In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this places a 
completely different complexion on the entire matter of 
General 0* Daniel's appointment as Chief, MAAG, Indochina, 



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Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that it 
is more essential than ever, in the. interests of the United 
States, that this basic issue of authority commensurate 
with responsibility be satisfactorily resolved in advance 
on a governmental level and in a manner acceptable to the 
United States. 

5. Inasmuch as this basic matter requires reconsiderci- 
tion, we believe that the question of the rank proposed for 
Lieutenant Genera] 'Daniel, USA, as Chief, MAAG, Indochina, 
should be reconsidered. The Joint Chiefs of Staff hold it 
to be distinctly detrimental to the prestige of the United 
States Military Services in general,. and to the United States 
Army in particular to demote a distinguished senior United 
States Army officer already well and widely known in that 
region. The repercussions of such action in the Orient are 
well known. 



6. In light of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
recommend that: 

_a< The basic issue of increased responsibility of 
MAAG, Indochina, with respect to training be satisfac- 
torily resolved on a governmental level, and in a man- 
ner acceptable to the United States. 

Ik The despatch of General 'Daniel to Indochina, 
and his demotion both be held in abeyance until the 
training issue is satisfactorily settled. 



For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 



D 



ARTHUR RADFORD, 

Chairman, 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 



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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 



WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 



12 March 1954 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 



Subject: Preparation of Department of Defense 

Views Regarding Negotiations on 
Indochina for the # Forthcoming 
Geneva Conference 



1. This memorandum is in response to your memorandum 
dated 5 March 1954, subject as above. 

2. In their consideration of this problem, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff have reviewed UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND 
COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA (NSC 5405) , 
in the light of developments since that policy was approved 
on 16 January 1954, and they are of the opinion that, from 
the military point of view, the statement of policy set 
forth therein remains entirely valid. The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff reaffirm their views concerning the strategic impor- 
tance of Indochina to the security interests of the United 
States and the Free World in general, as reflected in NSC 
5405. They are firmly of the belief that the loss of Indo- 
china to the Communists would constitute a political and 
military setback of the most serious consequences. 

' 3. With respect to the possible course of action enum- 
erated in paragraph 2 of your memorandum, the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff submit the following views: 

ju Maintenance of the status quo . In the absence 
of a very substantial improvement in the French Union 
military situation, which could best be accomplished 
by the aggressive prosecution of military operations, 
it is highly improbable that Communist agreement could 
be obtained to a negotiated settlement which would be 
consistent with basic United States objectives in 
Southeast Asia. Therefore, continuation of the fight- 
ing with the objective of seeking a military victory 
appears as the only alternative to acceptance of a 



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compromise settlement based upon one or more of the pos- 
sible other courses of action upon which the views of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff have been specifically requested in 
your memorandum. 

b^. Imposition of a cease-fire . The acceptance of a 
cease-fire in advance of a satisfactory settlement would, 
in all probability, lead to a political stalemate attended 
by a concurrent and irretrievable deterioration of the 
Franco-Vietnamese military position. (See paragraph 27 of 
NSC 5405,) 

£. Establishment of a coalition government . The ac- 
ceptance of a settlement based upon the establishment of 
a coalition government in one or more of the Associated 
States would open the way for the ultimate seizure of 
control by the Communists under conditions which might 
preclude timely and effective external assistance in the 
prevention of such seizure. (See subparagraph 26b of 
NSC 5405.) 

fL* Partition of the country . The acceptance of a 
partitioning of one or more of the Associated States 
would represent at least a partial victory for the Viet 
Minh, and would constitute recognition of a Communist 
territorial expansion achieved through force of arms. 
Any partition acceptable to the Communists would in all 
likelihood include the Tonkin Delta area which is acknowl- 
edged to be the keystone of the defense of mainland 
Southeast Asia, since in friendly hands it cuts off the 
most favorable routes for any massive southward advance 
towards central and southern Indochina and Thailand. 
(See paragraph 4 of NSC 5405.) A partitioning involving 
Vietnam and Laos in the vicinity of the 16th Parallel, 
as has been suggested (See State cable from London, No. 
3802, dated 4 March 1954), would cede to Communist con- 
trol approximately half of Indochina, its people and 
its resources, for exploitation in the interests of 
further Communist aggression; specifically, it would 
extend the Communist dominated area to the borders of 
Thailand, thereby enhancing the opportunities for Com- 
munist infiltration and eventual subversion of that 
country. Any cession of Indochinese territory to the 
Communists would constirute a retrogressive step in the 
Containment Policy, and would invite similar Communist 
tactics against other countries of Southeast Asia* 



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e * Self-determination through free election s . Such 
factors as the prevalence of illiteracy , the lack of 
suitable educational media > and the absence of adequate 
communications in the outlying areas would render the 
holding of a truly representative plebiscite of doubt- 
ful feasibility. The Communists, by virtue of their 
superior capability in the field of propaganda, could 
readily pervert the issue as being a choice between 
national independence and French Colonial rule. Further- 
more, it would be militarily infeasible to prevent wide- 
spread intimidation of voters by Communist partisans. 
While it is obviously impossible to make a dependable 
forecast as to the outcome of a free election, current 
intelligence leads the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the 
belief that a settlement based upon free elections would 
be attended by almost certain loss of the Associated 
States to Communist control. 

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that 
any negotiated settlement which would involve substantial 
concessions to the Communists on the part of the Governments 
of France and the Associated States, such as in c^ and d_ 
above, would be generally regarded by Asian peoples as a 
Communist victory, and would cast widespread doubt on the 
ability of anti-Communist forces ultimately to stem the 
tide of Communist control in the Far East. Any such settle- 
ment would, in all probability, lead to the loss of Indo- 
china to the Communists and deal a damaging blow to the 
national will of other countries of the Far East to oppose 
Communism. 

5. Should Indochina be lost to the Communists, and in 
the absence of immediate and effective counteraction on 
the part of the Western Powers which would of necessity 
be on a much -greater scale than that which could be deci- 
sive in* Indochina, the conquest of the remainder of South- 
east Asia would inevitably follow. Thereafter, longer 
term results involving the gravest threats to fundamental 
United States security interests in the Far East and even 
to the stability and security of Europe could be expected 
to ensue. (See paragraph 1 of NSC 5405.) 

6. Orientation of Japan toward the West is the keystone 
of United States policy in the Far East. In the judgment 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the loss of Southeast Asia 

to Communism would, through economic and political pres- 
sures, drive Japan into an accommodation with the Communist 
Bloc. The communication of Japan would be the probable 
ultimate result. 



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7. The rice, tin, rubber, and oil of Southeast Asia 
and the industrial capacity of Japan are the essential 
elements v/hich Red China needs to build a monolithic 
military structure far more formidable than that of 
Japan prior to World War II. If this complex of military 
power is permitted to develop to its full potential, it 
would ultimately control the entire Western and South- 
western Pacific region and would threaten South Asia and 
the Kiddle East* 

8* Both the United States and France have invested 
heavily of their resources toward the winning of the 
struggle in Indochina, Since 1950 the United States has 
contributed in excess of 1.6 billion dollars in providing 
logistic support. France is reported to have expanded, 
during the period 1946-1953, the equivalent of some 4.2 
billion dollars. This investment, in addition to the 
heavy casualties sustained by the French and Vietnamese, 
will have been fruitless for the anti-Coramunist cause, 
and indeed may redound in part to the immediate benefit 
of the enemy, if control of a portion of Indochina should 
now be ceded to the Communists. While the additional 
commitment of resources required to achieve decisive 
results in Indochina might be considerable, nevertheless 
this additional effort would be far less than that which 
would be required to stem the tide of Communist advance 
once it had gained momentum in its progress into South- 
east Asia. 

9- If, despite all United States efforts to the con- 
trary, the French Government elects to accept a negotiated 
settlement which, In the opinion of the United States, 
would fail to provide reasonably adequate assurance of the 
future political and territorial integrity of Indochina, 
it is considered that the United States should decline to 
associate itself with such a settlement, thereby preserving 
freedom of action to pursue directly with the governments 
of the Associated States and with other allies (notably the 
United Kingdom) ways and means of continuing the struggle 
against the Viet Minh in Indochina without participation 
of the French. The advantages of so doing would, from the 
military point of view, outweigh the advantage of maintain- 
ing political unity of action with the French in regard to 
Indochina* 

10, It is recommended that the foregoing views be conveyed 
to the Department of State for consideration in connection 
with the formulation of a United States position on the Indo- 
chine problem for the. forthcoming Conference and for any 



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conversation with the governments of the United Kingdom, France, 
and, if deemed advisable, with the governments of the Associated 
States preliminary to the conference. In this connection, atten- 
tion is particularly requested to paragraphs 25 and 26 of NSC 
5405; it is considered to be of the utmost importance that the 
French Government be urged not to abandon the aggressive prosecu- 
tion of military operations until a satisfactory settlement has 
been achieved . 

11. It is further recommended that, in order to be prepared 
for possible contingencies which might arise incident to the 
Geneva Conference, the National Security Council considers now 
the extent to which the United States would be willing to commit 
its resources in support of the Associated States In the effort 
to prevent the loss of Indochina to the Communists either: 

- 

-a. In concert with the French; or 

Ik In the event the French elect to withdraw, in con- 
cert with other allies or, if necessary, unilaterally. 

12, In order to assure ample opportunity for the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff to present their views on these matters, it is requested 
that the Military Services be represented on the Department of 
Defense working team which, in coordination with the Department 
of State, will consider all U.S. position papers pertaining to 
the Geneva discussions on Indochina. 



For the Joint Chiefs of Staff 



s: ; 



< ARTHUR RADIO UD 3 



Chairman, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. 



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TOP SECRET 



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MEK0RAEDEE FOB TEE SPECIAL COMMITTEE 



1 ; OU 



SUBJECT: Military implications of the U. 3. Position on 

Indochina in Geneva: 



1, The attached analysis and recoinniendations concerning 
the U. S. position in Geneva have been developed by a Sub- 
committee consisting of representatives of the Department 

of Defense 5 JCS 5 State, and CIA. 

2. This paper reflects the conclusions of tine Depart- 
ment of Defense and the JCS and has been collaborated with 
the State Department representatives who have reserved 
their position thereon. 



3. In brief } this paper concludes that from the point 
of view of the U. S. strategic position in Asia-*, and indeed 
throughout the world, no solution to the Xndociilha problem 
short of victory is acceptable. It recommends that this be 
-the basis for the U. S. negotiating position prior to and 
at the Geneva Conference, ' . 

h 9 It also notes that, aside from the improvement of 
the present military situation in Indochina^ none of the 
courses of action considered provide a satisfactory solution 
to * the Indochina war. 

5. The paper notes that the implications of this posi- 
tion are sue}] as to merit consideration hy the KSC and the 
President. 



6. I recommend that the Special Committee note and 
approve this report and forward it with the official Depart- 
ment of State views to the NSC. 



/s/ G.B. ERSKI?m 

■ 

G.B. Ersklne 
General, USi'C (Ret) 
Chairman, Sub-eoDimittee 
President 1 s Special Committee 



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I. PR03LEF 

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I 

To develop a U. 3. position with reference to the 
Geneva Conference as it relates to Indochina, encompassing 
the military implications of certain alternatives which 
might arise in connection with that conference, 

II. ! r AJ0R S08SIB3 ■ 101:3 

■ 

A, The Department of Defense and the JCS have reviewed 
NSC 5^05 in the light of developments since that policy 
was approved frosa a military point of view and in the light 
of certain possible courses of action as they affect the 
Geneva Conference* These are: 



i; 

i. 
5. 



Maintenance of the status quo in Indochina. 
Imposition of a cease-fire in Indochina. 
Establishment of . a coalition government . 
Partition of the country. 
Self-determination through free elections* 



B. The Department of Defense and the JCS have also 
considered the impact of the possible future status of 
Indochina . on the remainder of Southeast Asia and Japan 
and have considered the effect which any substantial con™ j 
cessions to the C nunists on the part of France and the 
Associated States would have with respect to Asian peoples 
a^j a whole and U. S. objectives in Europe* 

C Indochina is the area in which the Communist and 
non~ Communis t worlds confront one another actively on the I 
field of battle. -The loss of this battle by whatever means 
would have the most serious repercussions on U. 3, and fre~ 
world interests , not only in Asia but in Europe and else- 
where. - . • • ; 

D. French withdrawal or defeat In Indochina would 
have most serious consequences on the French position in 
the world;; the f ree world position in Asia; and in the II. 
on the domestic attitude vis-a-vis the French. It would 5 
furthermore j constitute a de facto failure on the part of 
France to abide by its commitment in U. K, to repel aggres- 
sion. . .' 

E. Unless the free world maintains its position in 
Xr&ochlz&j the Cc::.:r.uni3ts will be in a position to exploit 



S. 



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■ vhat will be widely regarded in Asia as a Communist victory. 
Should Indochina be lost to the Co; unists, and in the 
absence of.i: diate and effective count sracti on by the 
free world fahich would of necessity be on a much greater 
spale than that required to be decisive in Indochina) ? the 

" conquest of the remainder of Southeast Asia would inevitably 
follow. Thereafter, longer term results, probably forcing 
Japan into an accommodation with the Communist bloc, and 
threatening the stability and security of Fur.Q-pa» could bo 
expected to ensue. 

■ 

F. As a measure of U, S. participation in the Indo- 
Chinese war it is noted that the U. S. has since 19?Q pro- 
grammed in excess of $2 A billion dollars in support of the 
French- Associated States operations in Indochina* France 
is estimated to have expended during the period 19^6--1953 
the equivalent of some S5.H billion. This investment 5 in 
addition to the heavy casualties sustained by the French 
and Vietnamese v to say nothing of the great moral and 
political involvement of the U. S. and French > will have 
been fruitless for the ant i -Communist cause if control of 
all or a portion of Indochina should now be ceded to the 
. Communists. 



III. FACTS BEARIRG OK THE PROBLEM 



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A. IISC 5*+05j approved January 16, 195^* states U. S. 
licy with respect to Indochina * 



pol 

B. The French desire 

at any cost represents our 
Geneva talks. 



for peace in Indochina almost 
greatest vulnerability in the 



IV, DISCUSSION 

9 

For the : views of the JCS see Tab A. 



V. CONCLUSIONS 



A, Loss of Indochina to the Communists would consti- 
tute a political and military setback of the most serious 
consequences and would almost certainly lead to the ultimate 
Communist domination of all of Southeast Asia. 

B. The U. S. policy and objectives with respect to 
Southeast Asia as reflected in NSC 5 1 '0? remain entirely valid 
in the light of developments since that policy was approved. 



C f With respect to possible alternative courses of 
action enumerated in paragraph- II A above, the Department 
Defense has raachsd the following .conclusions ; 



of 



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1 • H§Jl^£iXS^^ *t 

is highly improbable that a Co mist agreement could be 
obtained* to any negotiated settlement; which would be con- 
sistent v/ith basic U. S. objectives in Southeast Asia in 
the absence of a very substantial improvement in the French 
Union military situation. This could best be accomplished 
by the aggressive prosecution of military operations. 



r-o 



2. Imnqstipi' of 
a cease-fire in advance of 



&J&&2§$*z£$££l&, Tk G acceptance 
a satisfactory settlement would • 
in all probability lead to a political stalemate attended 
by a concurrent and irretrievable deterioration of the 
Francos-Vietnamese military position. 

3 • - Jgsta^ljlsh^eait;,. Q,j*..a ; ponlition , government . The 
acceptance of a settlement based upon this course of action 
would open the way for the ultimate seizure of control by 
the Communists under conditions which would almost certainly 
preclude timely and effective external assistance designed 
to prevent such seizure, 

h. Partition of the country. The acceptance of 
this course of action would represent at the least a partial 
victory for the Viet Minh and would constitute a retrogres- 
sive step in the attainment of U. 3, policy and would com- 
- promise the achievement of that policy in Southeast Asia* 

5 • Self -J e termination through free elections * 

Vany factors render the holding of a truly representative 
plebiscite infeasible and such a course of action would 5 
in any ease, lead to the loss of the Associated States to 
C oiaamn 1st control. 



IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 



ft* That the U. S. and U. K. and France reach a 
ment with respect to Indochina which rejects all of 
courses enumerated above (except No, 1 on the assume 
that the status quo can be altered to result in a mi 
victory) prior to the initiation of discussions on I 



China at Geneva. Failing thiSj the U. S. should act 
oppose each of these solutions } should not entertain 
eussion of Indochina at Geneva 3 or having entertain 
should ensure that no agreements are reached. 



n agree 

the 
tion 
litary 
ndo- 
ively 

di s « 
ed it. 



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If, despite all U. 3. efforts, to the contrary 5 the 
French Government elects to accept a negotiated settlement 
which fails to provide reasonably adequate assurance of the 
future political and territorial integrity of Indochina 5 
the U* S« should decline to associate itself with such a 



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settlement and should pursue, directly with the govern^en : 
of the Associated States and with other Allies (notably the 
Ui KJ 5 ways and means of continuing the struggle against 
the Viet Hinh in Indochina without participation of the 
French. 



c 



\ C; The Special Committee has reviewed the findings 
i'ad ^recommendations of the Department of Defense and con- 
siders that the implications of this position are such as 
warrant their review at the highest levels and by the 
National Security Council 7 after which they should become 
the basis of the U, S. position with respect, to Indochina 
at Geneva, The Special Committee recognizes moreover that 
certain supplementary and alternative courses of action 
designed to ensure a favorable resolution of the situation 
in Indochina merit consideration by the NSC These* and 
the Special Committee recommendations with respect thereto ^ 
are: 



to 



: 



1 • The^nol j t ical js tep s _ m , t o . be taken to ensure „an 
agreed U* S.»U, K. -French uosltion concer n in s Indochina _ 
at Geneva. That the NSC review the propose political action 
designed to achieve this objective with particular attention 
to possible pressure against the French position in North 
Africa j and in KAT0-, and to the fact that discussions con- 
cerning implementation of course 2 and 3 hereunder will be 
contingent upon the success or failure of this course of 
action, 

2 « Overt U» ,_ S« involvement in Indccfaina^ That 
the MSC determine the extent of" U, S, willi ,ss, over and 
above the contingencies listed in NSC 5*f0§, to commit U. S. 
air, naval and ultimately ground forces to the direct re~ : 
solution of the war in Indochina with or without French 
support and in the event of failure in course 1 above. That 
in this connection the NSC take cognizance of present - 
domestic and international climate of opinion with respect 
to U. S, involvement and consider the initiation of such 
steps as may be necessary to ensure world-wide recognition 
of the significance of such steps in Indochina as a part 
of the struggle against communist aggression. 

3 • The dexelotjmgnt _of 3, JPJjfe ? % i tute base , o f 
pper at ions « That the H3G consider whether this course of 
action is acceptable as a substitute for 1 and 2 above and 
recognizing that the hope of implementation thereof would 
be one of major expenditure and long-term potential only. 



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THE SECRETARY 0? DEFENSE 
Washington 



Dear Mr. Secretary: 



V 



March 23 , 195^ 



Pursuant to a recommendation of the Under Secretary of 
State 5 the Department of Defense has considered the mili- 
tary implications of a negotiated settlement to terminate 
the hostilities in Indochina. The views and recommenda- 
tions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter were sub- 
mitted to me in a memorandum dated Karch 12 9 195^- These 
views, together with the views of General G e B. Erskine. 
USKC (llet) 5 Chairman of the Subcommittee of the Presidents 
Special Committee s were submitted to the Special Committee 
in a memorandum dated March 17 3 195** « It is understood 
that the Department of State is presently considering 
General Erskine f s report. 

■ I am fully in accord with General Erskine r s recommen- 
dations and the views and recommendations of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff in this matter. Accordingly , there is 
forwarded herewith for your information a copy of the afore- 
mentioned documents which represent the views of the De- 
partment of Defense, It is recommended that these views , 
be carefully considered in preparation of the United States 
position on Indochina for the forthcoming conference at 
Geneva. 



Sincerely yours, 
. /s/ C.E. WILSON 



C* E, V/ilson 



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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 



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Washington, D.C. 



29 March 1954 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON 

INDO-CHlNA; 



SUBJECT: Discussions with General Paul Ely. 



1. During the period 20-24 March I conducted a scries of discussions 
with General Ely, Chairman of the French Chiefs of Staff, on the situation 
in Indo-China, I am setting forth herein a summary report of these dis- 
cussions with particular relation to those items which were included in 
Phase A report submitted by the Special Committee* , 



2. General Ely requested urgent action for the United States to effect 

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early delivery of various items of material that had previously been re- 



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quested through the MAAG-lndo-*China, These requests were all met to 

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the satisfaction of General Ely with exception of: f 

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a a 14 C-47 aircraft which arc in critical supply and were 

not in the urgent category, 

b. 20 helicopters and 80 additional U.S. maintenance per- 

i 
sonneU An alternative solution is now being worked put through 



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3, In connection with the foregoing is the solution that was evolved 

to meet the French request for 25 additional B-26 aircraft for a third 

* 
squadron. There is no doubt that French capabilities for maintenance 

and aircraft utilization fall far short of acceptable standards and that the 

supply of additional aircraft alone is not the remedy to inadequate air power 

in Indo-China t However, in view of the importance of the morale factor 

at the present time in relation to the struggle for Dion Bien Phu t it was 

agreed, and the President has approved; to lend the French these aircraft* 

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Certain conditions were imposed which General Ely accepted; 

■ 

a 

a, A special inspection team headed by an Air Force General 
Officer would proceed to Indo— China immediately to examine French 
maintenance, supply problems, and utilization of U.S. aircraft fur- 
nished the French. A report will be made to the Secretary of Defense 
with a copy being given to General Navarre. 

. b f The aircraft will be returned to the U.S. Air Force at the 
end of the current fighting season about the end of May, or earlier 
if required for service in Korea, Decision as to permanent ac~ J 
ccptancc and support of the third }?»-2& squadron will be made after 
the report of the special examination (para 3 a above) has been 
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.4. General Ely Informed rne that steps had been taken by the French 

- 

Air, Force to supply additional aviation mechanics to Indo-China and to 
replace our 200 U # S f Air Force mechanics along the following lines: 

a. The tour of duty of ZOO French mechanics due for early 

■ 

return to France is being extended two months. This .will permit 

i 

the operation of the 25 additional 3 -26s without need for more U.S. 
personnel, 15 Air crews now in training in France and North Africa 
are being sent by air to Indo-China. 

b ft Fifty mechanics are being sent from France within the 
next month and beginning 1 June, one hundred additional per 

month will be sent to a total of 450 f 

* 

c. The 200 U.5, Air Force mechanics can be released 
"within 8 days of 15 June*'* 



5 t General Ely raised the question of obtaining authorization to use 
the C-119 transports to drop napalm at Dicn Bicn Fhu, Although the U»S« 
dobn not expect spectacular results, tins was approved on condition: 

- 

* 

a, No U«S« crews were involved. 

b. The French high command requested the diversion of this 

* 

* 

air lift capability to meet -the emergency situation at Dien ftien Phu. 



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6« 1 presented to General Ely our views in regard to expanding the 

* 

MA AG to assist the French in training the Vietnamese, indicating to him 



the importance which we attach to this action, first, to obtain better r 



e 






suits, secondly to release French officers for combat service. General 

4 

■ 

■ 

r „ 

Ely was most unsympathetic to any encroachment on French rcspOn-sibiU— 

* 
i 

ties or significant expansion of the MAAG, The reasons given related to 
French "prestige 11 , possible lack of confidence in French leadership by the 
Vietnamese, M the political situation in France 11 etc, The only commitments 

1 was able to get from General Ely were; " • 

* 
a. He would urge General Navarre to be most sympathetic 

to the advice given by the officers recently assigned to MAAG 

(such as Colonel Rosson). 

b» He would request General Navarre to discuss the utili&a- 

» 
■ 

tion of U»S f staff officers with General O'Danicl ll on the spot in a 

■ 

broad, understanding and comprehensive manner 11 . 1 would make 
a similar request, of General O'Danicl. 

c, He would make some informal soundings in Paris on the 
subject of increased U.S. participation in training and would com- 
municate further with me - informally - through General Valluy. 

1 conclude that the French are disposed firmly to resist any delegation 

of trainifig responsibilities to the U # S, MAAG. 






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7. Much the same attitude was manifested by General Ely in regard 
to U.S. operations in the fields of psychological, clandestine and guerrilla 

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warfare. Mo commitment was obtained except that General Ely would 

■ 

* • 

discuss the matter. with Mr» Allen Dulles (which he did), 

8. General Ely submitted fi request iii writing, copy attached as 

Enclosure ll A ll l as to what action the U.S. would take if aircraft based in 

>. • 

China intervened in Indo- China. I exchanged the following agreed minute - 

* 

with him on this matter; 

■ 

,f In respect to General Ely's memorandum of 23 March 1954, 
it was decided that it was advisable that military authorities push 
their planning work as far as possible so that there would be no 
time wasted when and if our governments decided to oppose enemy 
air intervention over Indo-China if it took place; and to check all 
planning arrangements already made under previous «?greemcnts 
between GINCPAC and the C1NC Indo-China and r-end instructions to 
those authorities to this effect. 1 ' 



9. The particular situation at Dicn oien Phu was discussed in detail. 



« 



! General Ely indicated that the chance for success was, in his estimate, 

"50-50 11 . He discounted any possibility of sending forces overland to re- 

I lieve the French Garrison. He recognized the great political and psycho- 

logical importance of the outcome both in Indo-China and in France but 
considered that Dicn Bien Phu, even if lost, would be a military victory 



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for the French because of the cost to the Vict Iviinh and the relatively 
greater loss to the Viet Minh combat forces. Politically and psychologically 
the loss of Dien B-ien Phu would be a very serious setback to the French 



,■■ 



Union cause, and might cause unpredictable repercussions both in France 
and Indo-Ghlna, 



10. In regard to the general situation in Indo-China General Fly 1 



s 



* 



views were essentially a3 follows. The Joss of Indo-China would open up 
all of South East Asia to ultimate Communist domination. Victory in Indo 

China is as much a political as a military matter. The French hope to 

■ 
get agreement with the yict Nam in current discussions in Paris which 

will implement the July 3rd declaration and lead to more enthusiastic eor 

m 

operation and participation in the war by the Vietnamese, They hope also 



to get more positive leadership from Bao Dai who, at this time, is the only 
potential native leader* From the more optimistic point of view, assuming 
that Dien Bien Phu was held and native support assured, he expected that 

■ 

military successes but not total military victory would be achieved in 

< 

1954-1955, following the broad concept of the Navarre Plan and within 
presently programmed resources. Ultimate victory will require the crea- 
tion of a strong indigenous army, extending operations to trie north and 
west, manning and defending the Chinese frontier and the commitment of 
resources greatly in excess of those which France alone can supply* He 

* 

envisages some sort of a coalition or regional security arrangement by the 



nations of South Fast Asia. 



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11,1 raised with General Ely the question of promoting General 
Navarre in order that General O'Oanicl might retain his rank of I>t, General 

■ 

without embarrassment to Navarre. General Ely made no commitment, 

t 

< 

pointing out that rank in the French Army resulted from a Cabinet action 
depending upon seniority. He indicated that the Cabinet might possibly 
consider a promotion for General Navarre if Dicn Bien Fhu was held, 

12, General Ely made quite a point of explaining in "great frankness 11 

i 

actions on the part of the United States which were causes of friction. 
Those mentioned specifically were: 

a. Americans acted as if the United States sought to control 

* 
and operate everything of importance; that this was particularly true 

at lower levels and in connection with FCA operations, 

b. The United States 'appears to have an invading nature as 
they undertake everything in such great numbers of people. 

■ 

c. French think that McCarthyism is prevalent in the U.S. 



and actually is akin to Hitlerism. 

* 

d. Americans do not appreciate the difficulties under whic? 
the French must operate as a result of two devastating wars. 

- 

c. Many Americans appear to favor Germany over France. 



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f, U,S. administrative procedures arc enormously wasteful, 

irritating and paper heavy, 

* 

g. In Germany' the U.S. forces have the "benefit of better 

— — 

» 

weapons and most modern techniques, whereas the French forces 

» 

do not, 

h. In connection with offshore procurement, the U.S. appeared 

% ; 

i 

to lack confidence in the French in the manufacture of most modern 

weapons and equipment, 
I endeavored to set the record straight on each of these particulars, and 
stressed the fact that /. mericans were growing very impatient with France 
over its lack of action on the EUC and German rearmament and French 
tendencies to overemphasize their prestige and sensitivities. 



13, General Ely indicated that the leaders of the present French 
Government were fully aware of the importance of denying Indo-China to 

the Communists and the prevention of Communist domination of South 

* 
East Asia, He stated that they would take a strong position at the Geneva 

Conference but, inasmuch as France could make no concessions to Com- 

munist China, they looked to the United States for assistance as the United 

States could contribute action that the Communist Chinese sought, i#c,, 

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recognition and relaxation of trade controls. 






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14, During the course of the discussions General Ely stressed that, 

from the military standpoint, one of the major deficiencies in Indo- China 

* 

was offensive air power* I took'this opportunity to pose the proposition 
of incorporating an air component within the framework of the Foreign 
Legion or alternatively forming an International Volunteer Air Croup for 
operations in Indo-China, General Ely manifested casual interest but 
made no commitment to do more than consider the matter further on his 



> 






'-7 



return to Paris, 



15, As I stated in a brief memorandum to the President, copy at- 

* 

tached as Enclosure ,r B M , 1 am gravely fearful that the measures being 



* 

undertaken by the French will prove to be inadequate and initiated too late 

to prevent a progressive deterioration of the situation in Indo~Ghina f If 

Dicn l" ion Phu is lost, this deterioration may occur very rapidly due to 

the loss of morale among the mass of the native population. In such a 

situation only prompt and forceful intervention by the United States could 

avert the loss of all of South East Asia to Communist domination* I am 



I 



convinced that the United States must be prepared to take such action 



/s/ ARTHUR RADFORD 






ARTHUR RADFORD 

Admiral, U.S«. Navy 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 



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ENCLOSURE "A" 



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Washington, 23 March 1954 



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MEMORANDUM FOR: ADMIRAL ARTHUR W, RADFORD 

• Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

FROM: GENERAL PAUL ELY 



The absence of enemy air has been n characteristic of the military 
situation in Indochina since the beginning of operations. Therefore, an 
enemy air intervention would carry grave consequences. 



On the other hand, the lack of jcttable airfields in Viclrninh con- 

< 

trolled areas leads to the conclusion that any intervention by modern air- 

i 

ft 

crafts would start from Chinese territory. 



Without prejudging decisions of a general nature which our govern- 
ments could take in the event of an air aggression starting from China, 



oo 



it seems to me it will be of some use to study the best way of limiting 

- 
the effects that such an attack might have on the French Air Force units 



and on the Corps Expcditionnaire even if it were carried out by aircra c 
of a doubtful nationality; tills last assumption has not been made so far, 




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Can direct intervention by -U.S. aircraft be envisaged and, if such 
is the case, how would it take place? 



Contacts have already been made in the past by CINCPAC and the 

■ 

French CinC Indochina on this problem, I feci they ought to be renewed 

m 

and pave the way for more precise studies and more detailed staff agrge- 

* * 

ments with a view to limiting the air risk which characterizes the present 



situation. 



/s/ P. ELY 






Enclosure "A u 






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ENCLOSURE ««£" 



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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 



. 



Washington, D ( C. 



• 



24 March 1954 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT 

SUBJECT: Discussions with General Ely relative to the situation in 

Indo-China. 



1, During the period 20-24 Ivlarch I conducted a scries of discussions 
with General Ely, Chairman of the French Chiefs of Staff, on the situation 
in Indo-China. In addition, General Ely conferred with the Secretary of 
State, Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of CIA 

■ 

and the U.S. Military Representative to NATO* 



2, General Ely requested urgent action to make early delivery of 
various items of material that had previously been requested through the 
MAAG Indu~China. These were all arranged to the satisfaction of General 
Ely except for 14 C-47 transport aircraft which are in critical supply and 
did. not come in the urgent category. Noteworthy is the supply of 25 addi- 
tional b-2 6s for a third squadron which will \\o. furnished immediately on 

- 
* i 

a temporary loan basis. A recent request for 20 helicopters and 80 addi- 
tional U.S. maintenance personnel was discussed and he was informed that 



it was not possible to grant the request at this time. 

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3, Genera! Ely made no significant concessions in response to sug- 

* 

gestions which would improve the situation in Indo-China. He explained 

* 

French difficulties involving domestic problems and maintenance of prestige 

* 

as basic reasons for his non-concurrence* He agreed to explore informally 

* 

the possibility of accepting limited U.S. assistance in training the Vietnam- 
esc, but is generally. in opposition, 



i.'l ' 












4, General Ely submitted a request in writing as to what action the 
U.S. would take if aircraft based in China intervened in Indo-China. No 



■» 



commitment was made. The matter is being referred to the Secretary of 

* 

State* 



5. General Ely affirmed the gravity of the situation at Dion liicn Phu 

stating the outcome as 50-5Q f and emphasized the great importance of that 

« 
* 

battle from the political and psychological standpoint. In this I arn in full 

■ 

accord but share the doubts of other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

- 

as to the adequacy of the measures being taken by General Navarre, He 

* 
was given .approval to use C-119 transport aircraft to drop Napalm pro- 
vided no U.S«. crews were involved. 



* -» <— 1 —V T\ "^* *?% ' * **-^'~3 

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



§ | [J \ ■ A 



6. General Ely expressed the view that military successes but not 

* 

total .military victory were to be expected in 1954-1955, with the presently 
programmed resources In pursuance of the Navarre P 4 lan, He considers 
the problem in Indo-China to be political as well as military. Ultimate 

■ 

victory will require the independence of the Associated States, develop- ' 

fa 
ment of a strong indigenous army, manning and defending the Chinese 

frontier and commitment of resources greatly in excess of those which 

France can supply. He envisages some sort of coalition by the nations 

of S. E, Asia, 



1 



7, As a result of the foregoing conferences I am gravely fearful that 
the measures being taken by the French will prove to be inadequate and 
initiated too late to prevent a progressive deterioration of the situation, 

* 

The consequences can well lead to the loss of all of S* E f Asia to Com- 



munist domination, .If this is to be avoided, I consider that the U.K. must 

i 

m 

- 

be prepared to act promptly and in force possibly to a frantic and belated 
request by the French for U.S., intervention* 

/s/ ARTHUR RADFORD 

Enclosure "B" 




290 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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FTI We were disturbed at Berlin by Eden's position on Indochina which 
waa in effect that this was problem between US and Franco, with CDs UK 
standing on C^ sidelines as an uninterested party, situation which actually 
encouraged French sock negotiated settlement. This was not only unhelpful « 
but unrealistic ; since if Indochina goo3, Malaya, Australia, and New Zealand 
will be directly threatened (areas whore UK has definite responsibilities ),*•*• 



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as will be Burma, Thailand, r.;j Philippines, Indonesia, and over period of 
time Japan and whole off-shore island chain. 

It s coins to us one of best ways keep French from taking any step:, which 
jfiight prove disastrous re Indochina is for US and UK have solid alignment 

« 

and let French know we will not only not be party to but will actively 
oppose any solution of any kind vrhich directly or indirectly in near future 

* 

or over period of time could lead to loss Indochina to Conmiunists. To bring 



V 







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iK to greater recognition its own responsibilities, we are talking very 



frankly to Australians and !Iew Zealanders here regarding problem (vrhich 
j/f involves their vital security) in hope they will press British stand finrly 

- i 



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v;ith uz on above fundamental principles. Secretary also is calling in Makins 



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(who is absent from town) April 2 and will irnpress upon hiiu forcefully oui 






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Cleared in substance *»ith Secretary 

Hi?. - Mr, Kerchont '..V^ " 
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B;.'A - Mr. jR-';-7mo.v --'--' ' . 

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views. Knd FYI 

With above in mind and following Secretary* 6 talk with Mo kin s which 

■ 
will be reported to you, you should see Eden and reiterate to him our position 



i 



along following linos; 



1, If e clearly understood from Biclcai.lt at Berlin that our agreement to 
discuss Indochina at Geneva i*/as on condition France would not agree to any 



arrangement which would directly or indirectly result turnover area to 
Communists, We presume British because of vital security interests in area 



as well as their role in free world would solidly support this position 



& 



2, Our views on any specxal position for Communist China at Geneva have 



-» 



already been made clear (DEPTEL 4932 "repeated Paris as 3340). 

* 

3» Our basic position on Conununiet China: in contained in Secretary's 
March 29 speech of which you should give copy to Eden if you have not already ^ 
particularly emphasizing e ' th paragraph from end in which is contained 
following sentence: "V/e shall not however be disposed to give Co-rrnunist China 
what it wants from us -merely to buy its promises of future good behavior," 

4. Insofar as development US position is concerned > our preliminary views 
on substance and procedure contained numbered paragraphs 1 and 2 DEPTKL 3401 

■ * 

to Paris (repeated London 506?, Saigon lfil4) and tho^e views should also be 



convey fed Eden 



a 



5, We believe it essential at this time have understanding above basic 



points on which we would hope for strong British support with French 



6, Ro foregoing JDEPTEL 3353 to Paris repeated London as ,._gQ7? 



also 



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292 

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FYI Following ai>3 main points made by Saorot&py in 

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lon^ conversation with Bonnet this morning* 

* 

1} We soo no prospect of negotiated settlement 
at Go nova which does not boil down to one of following 
al t em a t i ve s : ( a ) Fa ce - s aving To vrawl a to cov or surr and er 
oi' French Union forces, or (b) Pace-saving formula to 
cover surrender of Viet 2iinh* 

2) Division of Indochina impractical. QU0T3 Mix^d 
IJNQuOTS government would be beginning of disaster. Both 



» Z X, 

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would lead to (a). " - 

3) In addition to consequences in Southeast Asia 

* ■ 

solution (a) would create gravest difficulties Top France 
in Surope ana !Torth Africa. Future of France as great 



33321 — '~¥~Y 1 

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power is at stake 



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4) If we aro strong and resolute enough to ma3 > 
Chinese Coninunists see clearly that their conquest of 



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Classification 



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Southeast Asia v/111 not bo permitted without danger of/ 

extending war they nay desist and accept (b) 



5) This requires strong coalition of nation 






(U.S., Prance, Associated States., U.K*, Australia, Hew 
Zealand, Thailand, Philippines) who will recognize threat 

* 

to their vital interests in area* and will he prepared to 

continuation 
fight if necessary. This pre suppose s/zorih* " i of 

French military effort in Indochina* 

6) If coalition established U.S. would' play its 

full part. 

■ 

7) Establishment and announcement of coalition 
should precede Geneva in order permit us to go there with 
position of strength « 

8) Although UN action not excluded and U!T would 
in any event need to be notified in soma formal way, we 
probably could not count on it.' (Soviet veto in SC and 
long drav/Q debate in Assembly*) ' 

9) Formal approach to other governments will depend 
on French de sires • . . 

10) Bonnet said he would report immediately to his 



Government and seek their viev/s 



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problem aion^/sar.ie general lines his talk April 5'v/ith Bonnet 

i>09(f to London rptd Paris 310.8 and DSPTBI/ 3k76 to Paris, 
(see Departments / ). Maklns indicated our thinking 

5175 to London) « v .. 

considerably more advanced than British which had apparently 

not yet gone beyond examination of possible political solutions 

Indochina under existing conditions. 

Partition seemed to London least undesirable settlement 

* 

according Matins but it was clear UK had not yet developed thoughts 
Tor dealing positively and constructively v;ith situation which woulc 
confront us if French determined to cell out. ' - 

Secretary emphasized to Making essentiality of UK and US befoi 
and at- Geneva maintaining solid front to stiff eft French attitude. 
^afcins agreed latter point and promised report entire talk fully ^ 



7 



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dnd urgently. He suggested desirability British sailltarj 



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FROM: Par- is 

TO: i Secretary of State 



1 715 

April 4, 1954 

9:^5 p;m. 



}i0: 3710, April 5, 1 



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NIACT . • 

* 

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION ' ' 

URGENT. I was called at 11 o'clock Sunday night and asked .to 
oome immediately to i-latignon where a restricted Cabinet moot- 
ing was in progress. ' 

On arrival Bidault received me in Laniel's off ice- and was 
joined in a few minutes by Laniel. They said that immediate 
armed intervention of US carrier aircraft at Dieri Bien Phu 
is now necessary to save the situation. 

Navarre reports situation there now in state, of precarious 
■ equilibrium and that both sides are doing best to reinfor.ee — 
Viet Hinh are bringing up last available reinforcements which 
v will way outnumber any reinforcing French can do by parachute 
drops. "Renewal of assualt by reinforced Viet Hinh probable' 
by middle or end of week. Without help by then fate of "Dion 
Bien Phu will probably be sealed. * * " 

Ely brot t back report from Washington that Radford gave him 
his personal (repeat personal) assurance that' if situation at 
Dien Bien Phu required US naval air support he would do his 
best to obtain such help from US Government., Because, of this 
information from Radford as reported by Ely, French Government 
.now,,^gklngr for US carrier aircraft support at Dien Bien Phu. 
Navarre feels that a relatively minor US effort could tur. 
the tide but naturally hopes for as much help as possibl 



,r I i 









I 



--M Frenon 



report Chinese intervention in Indochina already f • lly 






established as follows: 



u 



!_l 



First. Fourteen technical advisors at Giap headquarters plus 
numerous others at division level* .All under command of 



i /Chinese CotsffiOnlst General* Ly Ghen-houfvho is stationed at Giao 



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* e .* 



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:■' TOP SECRET 



. 



-2- 3710, April 5, 1 a.m., from Paris. ' ' ■' 

■ ■ 

* 

» * 

Second, Special telephone lines installed maintained and 
operated by Chinese personnel . ' 

Third. Forty 37 bhh* anti-aircraft guns radar-controlled at 
Dien Bien Phu. These guns operated by Chinese and evidently 
are from Korea* These AA guns are now shooting through clouds., 
*to bring down French aircraft. 

Fourth., One thousand supply trucks of which 500 have arrived 
since 1 March,, all driven by Chinese army personnel. 

Fifth, Substantial material help in guns, shells, etc., as is 
well known. 

a 

Bidault said that French Chief of Air Staff wished US be' in- 
formed that US air intervention at Dien Bien Phu could lead 
to Chinese Communist air attack on delta airfields. Never- 
theless, government was making' request for aid, "' I 

* 

Bidault closed by saying that for good or evil the fate of 
Southeast Asia now rested on Dien Bien Phu. He said that Gen- 
eva would be won or lost depending on outcome at Dien Bien Phu. 
t hi s w a s_ It#^son^o^^^ch_reg uest for _. this, ye r y serious a c t ion 
on our part, " ~~ ■ "" 

m 

He then emphasized necessity for speed in view of renewed attack 
which is expected before -end of week. He thanked US for prompt 
action on airlift for French paratroops. He then said that he 
had received Dulles 1 proposal for Southeast Asian coalition, 
and that he would answer as soon as possible later in week as 
restricted Cabinet session not competent to make this decision. 

■ 
» * 

New Subject, I passed on Worsted's concern that news of air- 
lift (JEFEEL 3^70, April 5) might leak as planes assembled, 
.Pleven was called into room. He expressed extreme concerp as 
any leak would lead to earlier Viet Minh attack. He sale at all 
costs operation must be camouflaged as training exercise an til 
troops have arrived, Ke is preparing them as rapidly as pos- 
sible and they will be ready to leave in a week. Bidault and 
Laniel pressed his to hurry up departure date cf troops £ d he 
said he would do his utmost. 

* * 

DILLON ■ 

AB:MRS/l2 

NOTE: This message was read by Mr, MacArthu-r (C) at 10:15 p.m. 
end he informed the Secretary, Undersecretary Smith/ 
Mr, Merchant (FJJR) and Admiral Radford at -10: J>0 p.m. 
V'V^ CW0/FED 

• * 

TOP SECRET 

• 297 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 









--% 



TOP SECRET 



SPECIAL SECURITY I CAUTIOES 



COPY ICO. W 
April 5^ 195^ 






(Revision of Report distributed ftpril 3) 



* 



Pro bier, i 



1, To analyze the extent to which, and the circumstances 
and conditions under which, the United States would be willing 
to commit its resources in support of the effort to prevent 
the loss of Indochina to the Communists, in concert with the 
French or in concert with others or,. if necessary, unilaterally. 
Is sues_ Involved 

2« The answer to this problem involves four issues: 

a. Will Indochina be lost to the Communists unless 

■ 

the United States commits combat resources in some for::? 

* 

■ 

b. What are the risks, requirements and cense- 
quenees of alternative forms of U. S* military inter-- 



- 1 nn 1 ? 



vencionv 

a 

ft 

c. Should the United States adopt one of these 
forms of intervention rather than allow Indochina to be 
lost to the Communists and if so which alternative should 
it choose? 

* 

d. When and under what circumstances should this 
decision be taken and carried into effect? 



** 



29° 



U 



TO? SECRET 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



- * 



TOP SECRET 









Prospect of Loss rf; Indochijia 

'* 

3* i;Iio first issue turns on whether the French Union can 
and will prevent the. loss of Indochina and what further actions 5 
if any j the United States can tahe to bolster or assist the 

■ 

French effort* Some of these cuestions were covered by the 

* * * 

Report 6i the Special Committee of March I7 5 19>V. Others are 

matters of continuous intelligence estimates <> At the present 
time there is clearly a possibility that a trend in the direc- 
tion of the -loss of Indochina to Communist control may become 
irreversible over the next year in the absence of greater 0*8, 

» 

participation 5 There is not 5 hoirever 3 any certainty that the 
French have as yet reached the point of being willing to 

accept a settlement which is unacceptable to U.»S. interests 

« * * 

or to cease their military efforts. Moreover, regardless of 
the outcome of the fight at Dienbienphu ? there is no indiea— 
tion that a military decision in Indochina is imminent * It is 

- 

clear that the United States should undertake a maximum diplo- 
matic effort' to cause the French and Associated States to con- 
tinue the fight to a successful conclusion-* 



h* The attached Annex- addresses itself to the second 
issues The risks ? requirements and consequences of certain 

■ ■ 

alternative for&s of U.S. military intervention. In order to 
permit analysis of military recuireraents and allied and hostile . 



TO? SECRET 



2S3 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 2011 



1'OP SECRET 



'V 



reactions., this annex assumes that there will be either; 

M 

(1) a French and Associated States invitation to the United 
States to participate militarily; or (2) an Associated States 
invitation to the United States after" a French decision to 
withdraw j and French willingness to cooperate in phasing out 
French forces as U. S t forces are phased in, If neither of 

these assumptions proved valid the feasibility of U, S. inter 

* 

vent ion would be vitiated t If the French 5 having decided on 

■ 

withdrawal and a negotiated settlement, should oppose U, S. 

intervention and should carry the" Associated States with the 

\ 
in such opposition 5 U. S. intervention in Indochina would in 

effect be precluded. If % after a French decision to withdraw 

+ 

the Associated States should appeal for U. S. military assist 

ance but the French decided not to cooperate in the phasing 

* 
in of U. S. forces s a successful U. S, intervention would be 

very difficult. 

Desirability and Form cf U, S. Intervention 






-.** — — >•■ 



5. The third issue is whether the United States should 

■w 

intervene with combat forces rather than allow Indochina to 
be .lost to the Communists , and which alternative it should 



select? 



a.« U. S. commitment of combat forces would involve 



strain on the basic western coalition, increased risk of 
war with China and of general War, high, costs in U, S, 



300 



TCP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP 'SECRET ". 



manpower and money s and possible adverse domestic political 
repercussions* Moreover 3 the United States would be 
ndertaking a commitment which it woul£ have to carry 



through to victory * In whatever form it mi&h-t intervene, 
the U.Si would have to take steps at the outset to guard 
against the risks inherent in intervention « On the other 
• hand, under the principles laid down in NSC.5^0?*- it is 
essential to UoS* security that Indochina should not fall 

* 

under Communist control. 

- 

b. Of the alternative courses of action described 
in the Annex. Course A or D has these advantages over 



\ 



Course C» ITeither Course A or B depends on the initial 
use of UrS« ground forces* For this reason alone, they 
obviously would bo much more acceptable to the American 
public c For the same reason 7 they would initially create 

■ 

a less serious drain on existing U*S C military forces. 
But either Course A or B may turn out to be ineffective 
without the eventual commitment of U,S fl ground force^. 



e 



A politic?! obstacle to Course A or Course 3 



lies in the fact that, the 'ore sent French effort is con- 

m 
* 

sidered by many in Southeast Asia and other parts of the 

i 

world as essentially colonial or imperialist in character 
If the United States joined its combat forces in the 



: 



.ndochl 



iria conflict 



3 



it woul be most . imTiortant- 



to attempt 



3 






TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECR. 



to counteract or modify the present view of tills struggle* 

This would also be essential in order to mobilize maximum 



support for the war within Indochina 



B 



i ■ 



d. An advantage of Course B over* Course A lies in 



fci* 



the association of the Asian States in the enterprise 
which would help to counteract the tendency to view Xndo~ 
china as a colonial action* There would be advantages 
in Course B also in that U C S C opinion would be more 

favorable if the other free nations and the Asian nations 

■ 

I were also taking, part and bearing their fair share of 
the burden * 

e c As between UtI and regional support it appears 



that regional grouping would be preferable to UK action 3 
on the ground that UI! support would be far more difficult 
to get and less likely to remain solid until the desired 



objective was reached 



* 



6« In order to make feasible any regional grouping 3 it 
.will be essential for the United States to define more clear ly 
its own objectives with respect to any such action • In p«r- 
ticular, it would be important to make perfectly clear that 

r 

this action is not intended as a first step of action to 
destroy or over thro 1 ./ Communist China « If the other members of 
a potential regional grouping thought that we had such a broad 
objective j they would doubtless be hesitant to join in it* 
The 1/0 stern powers would not' waft t to increase the risks of 



302 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET 



general war which would, in their opinion, flow from any such 
broad purpose. The Asian countries would be equally reluctant 
to engage in any such broad activity. Both groups would doubt- 
less want to make very clear that we object essentially to the 
expansionist tendencies of Communist China and that, if those 
ceased, we would not go further in attempting to carry on 
military activities in the Far East. Furthermore, to attract 
the participation of Asian States in a regional grouping, the 
United States would undoubtedly have to undertake lasting corn- 

- 

mitments for their defense. 

Timing and Circumstances of Decision to Intervene with U.S. 
Combat Forces 

'7. The timing of the disclosure or implementation of 
any U.S. decision to intervene in Indochina would be of par- 
ticular i mporta nee . 

a_. In the absence of serious military deterioration 
in Indochina, it is unlikely that France will agree to 

■ 

the arrangements envisaged in Alternatives A, B, or C in 
light of the hopes widely held in France and else- 
where than an acceptable settlement can be achieved. 

fe. On the other hand, inaction until after exhaus- 
tive discussions at Geneva, without any indication of 
U.S. intentions, would tend to increase the chance of the 
French government and people settling, or accepting the 



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* 

inevitability of settling, on unacceptable terms. Hints 
of possible U.S. participation would tend to fortify 
French firmness, but might also tend to induce the Commu- 
nists to put forward more acceptable terms. 

£. On balance, it appears that the United States 
should now reach a decision whether or not to intervene 
wHh combat forces, if that is necessary to save Indo- 
china from Communist control, and, tentatively, the form 
and conditions of any such intervention. The timing for 
communication to the French of such decision, or for its 
implementation, should be decided in the light of future 
developments. 

8. If the United States should now decide to intervene 
at some stage, the United States should now take these steps: 

a_. Obtain Congressional approval of intervention. 
Jb. Initiate planning of the military and mobiliza- 

tion measures to enable intervention. 

* 
a. Make publicized U.S. military moves designed 

to make the necessary U.S. air and naval forces readily 
available for use on short notice. 

d. Make maximum diplomatic efforts to make it clear, 
as rapidly as possible, that no acceptable settlement can 
be reached in the absence of far greater Communist con- 
cessions than are now envisaged. 



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e, e Explore with major U»S. allies — - notably the U::- 
Australia* and !Tew Zealand, and with as many Asian 



nations as possible, such as Thailand and the Philippines^ 

i 

and possibly Nationalist China.) the Republic of Kbreaj 

■ 

and Burma ■**• the formation of a regional grouping * 

fa Exert aaxiiaxaa Siplomatic efforts with France and 

# 

the Associated States designed to (1) brln-g about full 
agreement between tlieia, if possible prior to Geneva 3 on 
the future status of the Associated States; (2) prepare 
them to invite U*S and if possible group participation 
in Indochina, if necessary., 






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Mill 



- »» .—...- 



I, GENERAL 






Scona of This Annex 






1. This Annex seeks to assess the risks., requirements, 
and consequences of alternative forms of U. S t military in- 
tervention in Indochina, • - 

Objective of U« S. Intervention in Indochina 

2. The immediate objective of U. S, military interven- 
tion in any form would be the destruction of organized Viet- 
m.inh forces by military action limited to the area of Indo- 
china 5 in the absence of overt Chinese Co: lixnist interven- 
tion. However, whether or not the- action can- be limited to 
Indochina once U. S« forces and prestige have been committed y 
disengagement will not be possible short of victory* » 
Risk of F-xnandin?' the War 



^'r>«rtf^^4n • — 



3* The increased risk of such Chinese Communist inter 
■ ■ 

vention is assessed under each alternative form of U. S. 
military intervention. . U» S, action in the event that the 
Chinese Communists overtly intervene in Indochina is covered 
by existing policy (ITSC 5 l *-05) . 

k. The implications of U. 3, intervention go far beyond 

- * 

the cornmitnent and support of the military requirements , 
identified below under the several alternative courses. To 

4 

meet the increased risk of Chinese Coinmunist intervention 
and possibly of general war, measures must be taken inside ■ 



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the United States and in areas other than Indochina to im- 

■ 

prove the defense posture of the United States, Military 
measures would include the Increased readiness of the existing 
forces and the re-positioning of U* S* forces outside the 
United States. Domestic measures would include those out- 

- 

lined below under "Mobilization Implications." A re- 
examination and possibly complete revision of U. S, budgetary 



and fiscal policies would be required 



U- * 



ailabilitv of Military Forces 

5* The military forces required to implement the various 
courses of action described in this paper are presently as- 
.signed missions in support of other U. S. objectives. A de« 

■ 

cision to implement any of these courses would necessitate 
a diversion of forces from present missions. It would also 
require the mobilization of additional forces to assume the 
functions of the diverted forces and to meet the increased 
risk of • general war. The foregoing is particularly true with 
respect to U. S. -ground forces. . • - 

Mobilization Implications 



+ V ^^- ->- at --m » *j- v »•» *w.^ »• 



6, All the domestic consequences of U. S. intervention 

■ 

cannot be forecast, being dependent on such factors as the 
degree of opposition encountered 5 the duration of the conflict 

* 

- 

and the extent to which other countries may participate, but 
in varying dogrcQ sc?'ie or all of the following steps may be- 

* ■ 

come necessary: 






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a. Increase in force levels and draft quotas, 

b. Increase and acceleration of military procluc 



• 

* 



tion. 



c, Acceleration of stockpile programs.- 

■ 

d. Rciraposxtion of materials and stabilization 
controls . ■ * 

e* Speed-up of readiness measures for all con- 

a 

tinontal defense programs. 
Whether or not general mobilization should be initiated, 
either at the outset or in the course of U. S„ intervention, 
is a major question for determination, 
.Use of Nuclear Weapons 



^ * i».*i Ta » ■ » ■■■— »-— ■ f- "■****■**'» p <-*-«V'— -^ - » ■ 



7. Nuclear weapons will be available for use as re- 

* 

quired by the tactical situation and as approved by the Presi- 

* 

a 

dent. The estimated forces initially to be supplied by the 

m 

United States under the alternatives in this paper are based 
on the assumption of availability. If such weapons are not 
available, the force requirements may have to be modified. 
The political factors involved in the use of nuclear weapons 
are assessed under the various alternatives-. 
Political Conditions 



,^ r- *- -■**• .—•-*>— - . i 



. 8. U. S* military intervention in concert with the 
French should be conditioned upon satisfactory political 






* State considers the military effect of use or non-use of 
■ nuclear weapons should be made clear in the estimates cf 
military requirements to assist in making a decision. 



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i* 



- 



■ ■■:.- 



v 



I r „,.,- -■••• A --.-.TOP SECRET 



■> 



cooperation from the French and French agreement to grant in- 
dependence to the Associated States in a form that will con- 






tribute to their maximum participation in the war. The 
. \ 

Associated States undoubtedly would not invite U. S, or allied 

! 

intervention without lasting guarantees of territorial in- 
tegrity, U. S. contribution to a full-scale reconstruction 

- 

and development program in Indochina must also be anticipated. 



(No paragraphs 9 and 10) 









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. » 



II. ALTERNATIVE F0: i OF COl-iMITKENT OF U, S. 
CO; T FORCES FOR OPES X CHINA 



-. *-^^."- - — -* ,i «.»» 



*._-.',.•-.,«,,,.. j-.-,. ..._^- »*-,-., ^. 



. » - ... _ w-~- . . 



Ac In Concert with the French 



Assumptions 



ti 



11. The Associated States and France invite the military 
participation of the United States, 

12 # It is impracticable to organise a UN or regional 



military effort 



« 



% ' 



13. The military situation in Indochina is approximately 
as "at present i i s e M stalemate with element's of deterioration. 
Ih. France and the Associated States will carry forward 

* 

the scale of military effort envisaged in the Laniel-Navarre 

= ■ 

- 

Plan, 

* 

- 

■ 
» 

Military., jtaoalZfiBfi^ 

15, Estimated forces to be supplied by U* S, initially, 

&* Ground Xorces •?■ (None, provided French Union 

forces afford adequate security for local defense of 

* 
U f S, forces in Indochina,) 

* 

b. ' Kaval for ces ~ (Total personnel strength of 



35,000) 



(1) 1 carrier task group plus additional ur^ts 



3 * 



consiscmg ox : 



Amphibious lift for 1 HCT 

Mine craft 

Underway replenishment group 



VEROK » s 



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£• Air Force forces - (Total personnel 



strength of 



8 , 600 ) 



\ 



* 



(1) 1 fighter wing 



defense capability) 



(3 sqcii-s with integral air 



(2) 1 light bomber wing 



& 



(3) 1 troop carrier v/ing 
(**) 1 tactical control* sqdn, 
(5) 1 tactical re con* sqdn« 
16, P^^^^^^^^^r^tv^r 1 ^ 1 ^z^Jl&r^Cojirnan^ 



/ 



a* This should be U, St, since this command must 



be a combined as v;eil as a joint coatsaand and U, S 



/ 



, coriander s have had considerably more experience in 
commanding combined and joint co::iuiand3* Further, should 

/ 

it become necessary to introduce U, S< ground forces 3 it 

/ . 

would be much better to have a U, S* commander already 

/ 

operating as theater commander rather than effect a 

\ / 

change at the time U, S ( ground 'forces become involved. 

All services -of the United States, France, and the 

/ \ 

Associated States will have representatives at the 

\ 

combined headquarters. Similar representation will be 
necessary at the Joint Operations Center (JOC) to be 



established, 

• b. Political considerations and the preponderance 

\ 



of French Union forces may dictate the assignment of 

■ 

* 

theater convene! to the French, at least during the- early 



o 1 1 



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"phase of- UV S c participation, 

# 
!?• ]^E^^9..^9J^y:l:R^^K:^:Il' This course of action can be 

- log^s tic ally supported with the following effects: 

a. No delay to NATO deliveries, f 

b, No drain on Array logistic reserves } negligible 

■ 

drain on Air Force logistic reserves^ a partial drain 
on certain logistic reserves of the Navy, particularly 



aircraft and ammunition s 

c« Borne Navy production schedule increases in 
aircraft and ammunition (depending on extent of opera-- 

* 

tions)^ seme increases in Air Force production schedule 
• with emphasis on ammunition } no effect on Army produc- ■ 
tlon schedules* 

d. No additional facilities at bases in Indochina 
required t 

.18, The training of indigenous forces is crucial to the 
success of the operation. The United States should there- 
fore insist on ah under standing -with the French which -will 



i 



insure the effective training of the necessary indigenous 
forces required including coiBma&ders and staff personnel at 
all levels, The United States must be prepared to make con- 
tributions cf funds 7 materials j instructors and training 

devices as agreed with the French, A United States prog ran 
» 

for the development of indigenous forces would stress the 



organization of divisional size units. The battalion 
organisation does not particularly well fit the approved 

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■ I 



concept for operations formulated by General Navarre, nor 



doss it represent the bast return in striking power for the 



manpower investment made. 



A reasonable } attainable goal in 



o 



Associated States forces which the United States might develop 
and train is on the order of 330 s 000 (an increase of 100,000 
over the present forces.) This would be accomplished by 
a re-orgarii^ation of the presently formed battalions into 
divisions followed by further training stressing regimental 
and divisional exercises. New units would be developed as 
necessary to complete the program* 
Political Aspects 



*-tv»* -«-».■• >r>-_w »•■ V— »^-. Hi; tT ■"» * <v<l>«t>r<'*> *■ 



19c French Reaction: The French would expect U. S 



military participation in Indochina; 

a, To relieve them from the prospect of defeat or 
failure in Indochina and to this extent they would 
welcome U* S. intervention. 

b, To highlight the inability of the French to 
handle the situation alone, with resultant weakening of 



the general international position of France. 



■ 



e. To lead to a strengthening of the position of 
the Associated States as against the French, and a 

■ 

weakening of the French Union concept, 

do To tend to result in channeling u. S. support 

* 

for the Indochina war directly to the theater of opera- 
tions, thus reducing the financial benefits to metropoli 
tan France. 



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_e, To increase the risk of Chinese 'Coimnimist in- 

4 

tervention and, through a series of actions and counter 

f 

actions, to increase the risk of general war with the 



USSR , 






On balance, the French would prefer to find a solution of 
the Indochina problem which did not involve U, 8, military 
participation, although such solution might in our opinion 
risk the ultimate loss of Indochina * In the event of U. S, 
military parti cipation the French could he expected to attempt 
progressively to shift the military burden of the war to the 
United States, either by withdrawing their forces or failing 
to make good attrition, • 

20. Associated States Reaction: The Associated States 






-P» * ™ ■ r- * 



would not be interested in U c S, intervention unless they 
were satisfied (1) such intervention would be on a scale 
which seemed adequate to assure defeat of the Vietminh organ- 
ized military forces and to deter Chinese Communist aggres- 
sion, and (2) the United States would assume lasting respon- 
sibility for their political independence and territorial 
integrity. On these terms non~ Communist Indo Chinese leaders 

+ 

would welcome U, S. intervention s and would be unlikely to 
succumb to Communist peace proposals,. The war-weary Indo- 

Chinese people, however, might be less favorable, particularly 

* 
if U. S* intervention came at a time when an end to the 

■■ 
i 

fighting seemed othorv;ise in sight, The Associated States 



would expect to profit fro:; U, S, intervention in terms of 



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" increased independence from the French , and would constantly 

■ 

seek to enlist U, S* influence in bolstering their position 

« 

* vis-a-vis France f The Indochinese, however, would be worried! 

- 

over the possibility that U, S* intervention might invite 

■ 

Chinese Cosiiattftlst reaction and make Indochina a battleground 
of destruction on the Korean scale. Accordingly 3 they would 
be expected to oppose the use of nuclear weapons in Indochina, 
21i Fre e World ^g&P.jjion:; The U.K., apprehensive of the 
. possibility of war with Communist China } would approve a 
U, S. intervention in Indochina only if convinced that it 
" was necessary for the prevention of further expansion of 
- Communist power in Asia. Australia and New Zealand would 
fully support such a U. S e action , and f&nacta to a lesser 
extent. Nationalist China and the Republic of Korea would 
welcome U* 8, intervention in Indochina , since both would 

■ 

hope that this would lead to general war between the United 

« 

States 'and Communist China. President Rhee, in particular, 
might be tempted to believe that his chances of involving 
the United States in a renewal of Korean hostilities were 

■ 

greatly enhanced. Thailand, if assured of U. S. guarantees 
of adequate permanence would probably permit the use of Thai . 
territory and facilities. The Philippines would support 
U. S, intervention. Japan would lend unenthusiastic diplo~ 
natic support. India and Indonesia strongly 5 and Ceylon end 
Burma to a lesser extent, would disapprove U. S. intervention. 
Other members of the Arab-Asian bloc would be unsympathetic 



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' 



-especially because of seeming U. S. support for French colonic 

- 

alism, The NATO countries, other than those mentioned above, 

* 

% 

would generally support U, S« military action, but their 
support would be tempered by fear of expansion of t3?3 hostilities 
and the effect oa the NATO build-up. The attitude of most of 



the Latin American countries would tend to be non-committal. 

> 

22. Free World Reaction in the Event of U, S. gaotical 
Use of Nuclear Weapons: U, S« allies would almost certainly 
consider that use by the U, S« of nuclear weapons in Indo- 
china (a) would remove the last hope that these weapons would 
not be used again in war, and (b) would substantially increase 
the risk of general war, Our allies would, therefore, doubt 
the wisdom of the use of nuclear weapons in Indochina and this 
doubt would develop into strong disapproval if nuclear weapons 
were used without their being consulted or against their wishes . 
On the other hand, France and, if consulted, the UK, Australia, 

■ 

Hew Zealand* and possibly the Netherlands, might support such 
action but only If convinced by the U. S, that such action 



was essential to keep Southeast Asia from falling under C' i\- 
munist control and to preserve the principle of collective' 
security* Other KATO governments, if similarly consulted 

* 

would probably not publicly disapprove of such U. S t action, 
if they were persuaded during consultation that such action 
was essential to prevent collapse of the collective security 



system. Nationalist China and the .Republic of Korea voul* 

■ 

probably approve such action in the hope that this would 












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•result in general war between the U.' S. and Communist China, 
-. Japan would almost certainly publicly disapprove, Most 

* 

Asian states and those of the Arab Bloc would probably object 

■ 

strongly to such U. S. action. Certain of these nations led 



•o * -**« 



by India j would almost certainly seek to have the OH censure 

the U. 5. 

23. Soviet Bloc Reaction; 

■ 

jw The Communist Bloc would almost certainly seek to 
create differences between the United States and the French > 
and for -this purpose would probably put forward "plausible" 
peace offers to the greatest extent possible in the light 
of the Geneva Conference, It is Unlikely 3 in the first 
instance , that the USSR would take any direct military 
action in response to U* S, participation in the Indochina 
war. The Soviet Union would, however, continue to furnish 
to the Chinese Communists military assistance for Viet- 
rainli utilisation in Indochina, 

* 
* 

b. The Chinese Co-nmunists probably would not im- 
mediately intervene openly, either with regular or 
"volunteer 11 forces, but would substantially increase all 
other kinds of support. However, if confronted by im~ 

■ 

pending Vietininh defeat. Communist China would tend to- 

ward intervention because of the prospect that Communist 

prestige throughout the world would suffer a severe blow 

and that the area of IT. S 3 military influence would be 

« 

brought to the southern border of China. On the other ' 



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31 7 









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hand, Communist China's desire to concentrate on domestic 
problems, plus fear of what must appear to Peiping as the 

■ 

virtual certainty of U, S. counteraction against CoRaaunist 

> 

China itself, would tend to deter over.t intervention. The 



chances are about even that in this situation Communist 
China would decide upon overt intervention rather than 
accept the defeat of the Vletmlnh#* 

£ ■ Soviet B loc Reaction In the, E vent of p.. S. 
Tactical Use o.f Nuclear W eapons , Initial Communist 
military reactions would probably be substantially the 
same as in tne case of -no nuclear weapons. Politically y 
the Communists would intensify their world-wide campaign 
to brand the U, S, as an aggressor, with the expectation 
that considerable political capital could be realized 
out of the adverse world reactions to U, S. use of nu~ 
clear weapons. If U. S, use of nuclear weapons should 
lead to impending Vietminh defeat, there is a split of 
opinion within the Intelligence Advisory Committee as to 
whether the Chinese Communists would accept the risk in- 

volved and intervene overtly to save the Communist posi- 

i 

tion in Indo China: three members believe the chances 
they would not openly intervene are greater than assessed 



* For fuller discussion of the split of opinion within the 
IAC on this question, see SE-53^ n Probable Communist Reac- 
tions to Certain Fossible U. S, Courses of Action in Indo- 
china through 195^ n (published December 13, 1953) 

318 

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in par. 23 «b above; throe members believe the chances 
are better than even they would openly intervene. 
2H, Foreign Aid Considerations: Military assistance to 
finance the French and Associated States military effort and 



to supply military hardware would continue at approximately 
current rates (Fl 195 1 *- - £800 million; FY 1955 z £1130 mil- 
lion)* Expenditures for economic assistance in Indochina 
would be substantially increased ever the present rate of 
expenditure ($25 million). These figures do not take into 
account the cost of U. S* military participation or the pos~ 
sible cost of post-war rehabilitation in Indochina. 



315 



(Re vis eel) 



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, f 



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B. Tn Concert tfith ths French and Others 



Assumptions 



25. The, Associated States and France invite the military 



participation of the United states and other nations 



* 



26. It is practicable to organize a UI! or regional mill 



■ 



tary effort* 

27. Th<f military situation in Indochina is approximately 
as at present. i,e M stalemate with elements of deterioration* 



28 , France and the Associated States will carry forward 
the scale of military effort envisaged in the Laniel-llavarre 



Plan 



Military Requirements 



■-i..-j ,*a-+f*. --*■<„•. * .. — ..i>»-»i.*. t4-«t 



■ •r.Oj *•- 



29- Same as II-A (pars* 15-18 above). Ground forces 
contributed by other nations will, supplement French Union 
ground forces ., air or naval forces contributed by other 
nations might substitute for U* S* air and naval forces. 



Po 1 i t i ca 1 A s p e c z s 



30. a. Uil* Action* An appaal to the UN for assistance 



against Communist aggression 5 in order to secure the 

- 

requisite two-thirds majority in the General Assembly^ 
would necessarily have to come from the Associated States 
acting as independent states 3 and be supported by the 
French. A request for assistance by France alone would 
probably fail of passage as being merely a request for 
assistance in a colonial war, Even with an appeal from 



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the Associated States* it is probable that, though a 
two-thirds majority might be secured } there would be not 
more than 3^ affirmative votes , and many abstentions e 
During the course of the debate. the£"e* would bo major 
efforts to incorporate in the resolution a call for a 
cease-fire and negotiated settlement s or provisions for 
limiting the conflict to Indochina * U> S*. control of the 

■ 

character of the resolution would be extremely difficult, 
although not necessarily Impossible ■ In stua s it might 
be possible to secure DH action for armed assistance to 
the Associated States'-* but the difficulties in staving 
off UN pressure for a negotiated settlement or UII 
mediation would be considerable* The majority for a 
satisfactory UII resolution would, at best, be slim and 



} 



conceivably might take more time to a era eve than is 
available » Failure to obtain UII action^ if attempted 5 

# 

would seriously prejudice the prospects of any effective 
intervention* " ' 

b. Regional Gr outline. Any regional grouping should 
enlist maximum Mian participation. It would be pos- 
sible to develop a regional grouping which would lend 
moral and some military .support to a U. S* intervention, 
in Indochina if it were clear that the United states 



had decided (1) to undertake the coramitinsnt of U* S 



■■i 



forces to the Indochina area, and (2) to assume cdmrai 
stents of a lasting character for the defense of the 






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Associates States ^ -Thailand and Malaya. Australia and 

Hew Zealand j while concerned about the effect on the 
* 

AHZftJS organisation, would probably be willing to par- 



ticipate in a broader organization fo» the defense ox 
mainland Southeast Asia, Xhe U. Kc , already disturbed 
at its exclusion from Ai-IZUSj and in general ready to 

p 

support Hi S* intervention in Indochina 5 would be pre- 
pared to enter a South East Asian regional grouping 
which carried with it u« g, guarantees for Malaya. 
Thailand j if given lasting U* S, defense commitments % 



would also participate in such an organization and would 
probably provide bases and facilities for support of 

I 

* m 

military operations in Indochina and possibly modest 

* 

military forces* The Philippines would also support a 

■ 

regional organization and might provide modest military 

* 

forces. The Nationalist Government of China end the BOX 
would seek inclusion in any regional organization which 
sponsored military action in Indochina 5 in the hope of 
an extension of hostilities to Communist China, Foi 

■ 
+ 

this reason 5 their inclusion would probably be opposed 
by at least the UK and French governments . Such a 
regional grouping v;ould almost certainly be less inclined 
than the UM to respond to plausible Ccroirrunist peace 
offers 5 and more likely to persevere to an acceptable 



solution in Indochina. 



* 



322 



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31* French Reaction; The Preach -would prefer a regional 
grouping to UN sponsored assistance* They might consider 
sUch a grouping as less desirable than U* S« intervention 

* 

alone. The French would probably £eel, however 3 that they 
would have to go along with the formation of such a regional 
grouping if they could sec no other way out of their dif- 
ficulties in Indochina, After active multilateral armed 
intervention in Indochina, France would probably seek pro- 
gressively to reduce its share of the military burden* 

32* Associate States Reaction; The Associated States 



***.>**---'-' v-;^ -* ft •-* -ta «* w * ?U^>^w-% i 'Mi'«iiin i *i h -*»'*<e>-w* -— * j« _-%r 



would probably prefer US sponsored military assistance to 
any other form of outside intervention. They would, however, 

■ 

be more than vailing to accept such assistance from a regional 



£ 



grouping • and would be eager to participate in such a grouping 



if it included effective U* So military participation, 
3*-U Free World Reactions 

a 

a f In gei ral f The reaction to U* S# military inter 



» * 



vention<in Indochina under the aegis of a regional group- 

■ 

ing would be somewhat more favorable than the reaction 
to U. S. 'military intervention alone, UN sponsorship 

i 

of U« S. military participation would materially de- 
crease the hostility of the Arab-Asian bloc to U, S. in- 
tervention , and night also strengthen somewhat the support 
for such action in Latin America and Western Europe, 






rr. 



TOP BEC335? 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 









TOP SECEE2 



b 



To U 






.J. .. - ,.— ,» < .— -■» 



Tactical Use of Nuclear Vfea'oonR* T.c - 



actions of 



.»- 1, 



j, .* 



caner nacions 



including the participating 



nations % would be substantially the sams as in par, 22 

above * 



3Vf Soviet B'ioc Reaction? 



rrv 



I'ne 



fact that the United States 



was initially only one of a group would probably not appreciably 
reduce Peiping*s apprehension at the presence of U. S* power 
on the southern borders of China * Peiping might well believe 
that in the., end % as in the case of Korea s the situation would 
evolve into a continuing and largely U. S. unilateral com- 



-r a- 



mitffient. Thus, the chances of overt Chinese Communist in*- 
tervention would remain substantial, 

3f?« Soviet Bloc Reaction in the Event of IL 8\ Tactical 



Use of Nuclear Weapons: Whether or not the other participating 
powers concurred in U« S* use of nuclear weapons 3 the chances 
of Chinese Columnist overt intervention would be the same as 
stated in paragraph 23~c above. 

36, Foreign Aid Considerations s In addition to the in- 
creased program under A above (par. 2h) the United States, 
would probably have to provide additional expenditures for 



provision of military equipment and supplies to the force 

- 

of some of the participating states. 



s 






TOP S3GRI 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 201 1 



rn 



TOP SECRET 



C. 



In the R.-oviv of a ProTJoseei 3 ntch Vftthdraval, tha Units 

States Acting in Cone t v;ith*0thers .or Aloxi 



Assignations 



37 * France refuses to continue participation in the war 



in Indochina 



* 



38* The Associated States invito the military partici- 



pation of the. United States with others or alone* 

39 • There has been no serious deterioration in the French 

Union military situation prior to U ( S» take-over, 

ho* The French will so phase their withdrawal as to 

permit orderly replacement of their forces. 



e 



l H. The Associated States will cooperate .fully with th 
United States in developing indigenous forces. 

h2. It may be practicable to. organise a UN or regional 
military effort, / • - • 

Military Re-quirments 

**3« a. Ground forces. (Total personnel strength of 

605,000) 

(1) Indigenous forces of 330 5 000. 
>v (2) U. S. or allied forces of six infantry 
and one airborne division (each the equivalent of 
a U. S. division in strength and composition) plus 
necessary support personnel totaling 275 } 000« 
b. Air Force forces. (Total personnel strength of 



12,000) 



3 



1 air defense fighter wins 






1 light boiib 



mi n 



*~ t *■"' r* 

^ t-_ %,> 



TO? SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 1-3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316- By; NWD Date: 201 1 






- 



TOP S3CKET 



• 



i " 



1 troop carrier wing 

2 tactical recoil* sqdns 



■■ 



1 fighter bomber wing 

1 tactical control sqdru 

* 
e, Naval farces. (Total personnel strength of 



35>' 5 ooo) 



1 Carrier Task Group plus additional units con- 

- 

sisting of: . ' , 
Mi nee raft ' - 
VPROHS 



m 



Amphibious lift for 1 RCT 

# 

Underway replenishment group 
cl. Train: ns forces. (included in above) 

■ 

e. Logistic implications* This course of action 
can be logistically -supported with the following effects; 

(1) Effect on NATO deliveries,: 



Army and Navv - JIo adverse impact, 



Air Force 



* .' 



No effect until second 

i 

quarter of FY 1955 * vtien 

* 

certain units schecUiled 
for vath&r&wai from C THCFB 
are retained in that area, 
due to the Indochina, com- 



mitment and are not avail- 
able to fulfill the NATO 
commitment, 



on n 



m 



TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



*...- 



TO? SSCRET 



(2) Drain an logistic reserves; 



Army 



Navy 



•--* 



Negligible on all items that 
are in production, assuming 

necessary adjustments in 

« 

production schedules 

■ 

(par, L J-3-&C3) below). 
Partial drain on certain 



_ » 



Air Force 



logistic reserves 1 , prin 

cipally aircraft. 



Negligible in all instances 







(3.) Effect on production schedules: 



Ar ray 



*• Require revision of assMiini" 



tion schedules for 105 and 
Xffimm howitzers and for k*2 
60mm and 8lrora mortars which 
are currently being cut 
back, 



Navy 



*.-«.- 



Increased production 
schedules for aircraft and 
ammunition may be required 
depending upon the extent 



• • 



Air Force 



*a ) -»8.vv^ 






01 operations • 



~ Some increases in certain * 



p rod ue c i o n is c 1 1 s d ul e s wi t h 
emphasis on ammunition de- 
pending on the extent of 



operations t 



TOP SECRET 



r~ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 1-3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



*■- > 



TOP SECRET 



(h) Additional facilities required at bases 



in Indochina 






Air 



TlTiV 



l<. 



A logistic support base 



similar to but 021 a smaller 

scale to that established 



Wavy 



at Pus an j Korea * 



*- Base requirements can be 
met with existing mobile 



logistic support units now 
in FECOil and by expansion 
o:f bases in the Philippines 



Air Force 



Light and fighter bomber 
and interceptor wings will 

operate from existing faci- 
lities in Indochina. This 
operation may require tv;o 
wings to operate from one 
airbase. POL can be supplied 



The majority of FS<lF<s 
airlift capability must be 
made available to insure 






effective operation if units 
are required to move in on 



short notice. 



: ' 



in 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET 



' 



■ 



f. Materiel Reouirements: The major share "of the 
burden for provision of replacement equipment, ammunition 
and over-all logistic support for all forces involved will 



have to bo undertaken by the United states. Ihe equip- 
ment and materials relinquished by the 'French forces 
should assist in meeting the initial materiel requirements* 

£* Impact on U, S* Military P] crams; This course 
would undoubtedly have the following effects : an in- 
creased calculated risk of war with Co-umunist China or of 
general ..war ^ adversely affecting war plans.; alterations in 
fiscal and budgetary policies and programs dependent on 
the scale and duration of operations i and a reversal of 
policy planning to reduce the .size of the U. St armed 
force So 
Political Aspects 



><■<,» ■•*.».» i»-*»«— r~*«v t*"* ^*r-^;-*w ■* % •».*■*■— »> -«» -. \ v* 



hh* U W. Actions French disassoeiation would largely 
remove Asian suspicions that the actions of the United States 
and the West were directed toward perpetuating French colonic 
alism in the area and thereby enhance support for UIT action. 
However, there might be increased pressure for a negotiated 

D 

settlement and UN mediation 3 and equally strong pressure for 
limiting any hostilities to Indochina * 

h$* Regional Action: It would be feasible to secure 
support of a regional grouping for U# S. replacement of French 
forces in Indochina, In the contingency of French withdrawal 



Thailand ^ in particular 5 and the other states in general 



5 



0£$ 



TOP S3CR3T 









Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 1 1 



■ ■ _ 



top SEC:;: 



would wish to assure thesaelves that the United States was 
really committed to fully replacing French strength in the 

are?.. If 'they were convinced this was the case } and if the 
nature of French witiidrav/al nade replacement by U, So troops 

■ 

practicable 5 they would support a; tu S« effort* 

■ 

l J-6* Effect on Frances A French decision actually to 



* • , - '-,--' C * J - - ■ " _■>■ * ^i^A- «.* 



withdraw would signal a aa^or change in the French position 
in the world* France might be expected to lose interest in 
the Far East 5 to resign itself to a diminution of U, S. assis 
tance and support 5 and to an abrupt loss of its role as a 
major power* The French political position in North Africa 
-would be seriously prejudiced* The effect on French policy 
toward NATO and EDO or in Europe has not been est:! mated* 

*i-7. Associated States Reaction; The Associated States 

r 

would be concerned by a French withdrawal largely by reason 
of the practical obstacles which they would believe would 
have to be overcome in any replacement of Trench forces* If 

■ 

convinced 5 however 5 that these obstacles could be overcome s 

# 
they would, continue to fight in stopper t of U. S. s regional,. 



<jk 



or DH military efforts in Indochina j but the war-weary Xn&o 



*.* 



Chinese people would be less willing to fight, particularly if 

# 

intervention comes at a time when the end of the fighting is 



4* V - 



oxnerwise m ^rosneci,. 



l ;-S. Free World Reactions 



0- "*.'- fc.- W- 



— -••;--*— *»-t^-« —4 »«j--« *-*■•'«—■*.* 



a 



>. Jn eeneralo Free world reaction would vary* 



If 



the French withdraw the rest of the free world would prob« 

- 

ably orefer ffi, action to u. S- intervention alone. But, 



*"S *"* if* 

3oU 



TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NW'D Date: 201 1 









■ 



TOP SECRET 



i. 






convinced that the only altern tive to Co:. ramiist 



domination was unilateral U« So action, most of the free 



world would support such action. The NATO conn "cries 
would be concerned with U* S,- diversion of resources to 



the Par East and the increased risk of general war 



B 



b« To U, S, Us a of Hixelear ITeaoons* Reactions of 



«■ — 1 ■ •■ , l# l >J ■ H l U ~ **C»i < »' ■« » S — J W »I> Jlf J l * »t" C ■ J- *". C-.V-t-r * ■•■«»■._ • •_ *-r^ «■- ■" I . -»^ W *— -• 



other nations^ including; any participating nations } would 

be substantially the same as in par, 22 * 

*f9« Soviet Bloc Reactions (Same as In paragraph 23 above,! 

t 

50 • Soviet Bloc Reaction in tha FJvant of IU S. Use of 
Tactical Nuclear Werroons. (Saae as in paragraph 23~c above.) 
Foreign Aid Considerations 

* 

51. In addition to the increased economic aid set forth 
in previous contingencies (pars. 2h and 36 above) 5 the United 

+ 

States would be required to replace key French advisors to 
governments of the Associated States with U. S* personnel and 
greatly increase expenditures for relief and rehabilitation. 

In addition, the requirement for military aid for indigenous 

« 
forces "would be at least as great as under present plans. 

» # 

- 

The savings in the U. S. contribution for the support of 
French forces in Indochina would partly serve to offset the 



gi*eatly increased 



costs of Uo S. 



forces 



taking their place 



1 



«3 O .'. 



TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



COPI 



. ■ 



i 



I-- . ■* ■ 



&mZ POSITION ON NSC 'ACTIOS NO. lOJ^-A 

■ » ■ ■ -i-i — - ■ ■ -— » -— i ■ — • ' ■ ■ . 

1. There are important military disadvantages to intervention 
in Indochina under the assumptions set forth in NSC Action No, 
lO^i-a. 

2, A military victory in Indochina cannot be assured by U.S. 
intervention with air and naval forces alone: . 

3- The use o f atomic weapons in Indochina* would not reduce 
the number of ground forces required to achieve a military victory 
in Indochina* 

- 

k. It is estimated that seven U.S. divisions or their equiva- 
lent, with appropriate naval and air support, would be required to 
win a victory in Indochina if the French withdraw and the Chinese 
Communists do not intervene. However, U.S. military intervention 
must take into consideration the capability of the Chinese 
Communists to intervene. 






% It is estimated that the equival ent of 12 U.S. divisions 
would be required to win a victory in Indochina, if the French with- 
draw and the Chinese Communist intervene, 

6. The equivalent of 7 U.S. divisions would be required to 
win a victory in Indochina if the French remain and the Chinese 
Communists intervene. 






■ 



7- Requirements for air and naval support for ground force 
. operations are : 

i 

a. Five hundred fighter-bomber sorties per day exclusive 

of interdiction and counter -air operations. I 

b. An airlift capability of a one division drop. \ 

- 

c. A division amphibious lift. 

8. One U.S. airborne regimental combat team can be placed in! 
Indochina in 5 days, on e additional division in 2^ days, and the re- 
maining divisions in the following 120 days. This could be accom- 
plished partially be reducing U.S. ground strenght in the Far East 
with the remaining units coming from the general reserve in the 
United States. Consequently, the U.S. ability to meet its NATO 
ccssm&tment would be seriously effected for a considerable period. 
The time required to place a total of 12 divisions in Indochina would 
depend upon the industrial and personnel mobilization measures taken 
by the government. 



ill &M w--; '->3 * - ' 






O M i. 



(0-1) 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



'• ■ * * ouced >.-uhout psriPiissxon o; 



the originating office 



PAR? 1 



■ « 



IKDO-CHIKA 



I - THF, FROBL! 



- 



m t B— -** *~ **,» *«-"l-— » 



To set forth a program of action without resort to overt combat operations 
by U,S C forces* designed to: (a) secure the military def oat of Coramuntst forces 

■ 

in Indo-Ghina; ana (b) establish a western oriented complex in Southeast Asia 
incorporating ln:lo-Chir<a ; Thailand; Burma; Malaya; Indonesia* and the Phil- 



ippine s o 



II 



*.» 



MAJCR COi'iSj ATI CMS 



i fc ^ MM ■ n > »m ■ %.»-< 



(A) Indo-China is considered the keystone of the arch of Southeast Asia; 



arid the Indo-Chinese peninsula must not be permitted to fall under Corr^unist 

u * 

■ 

domination* This requires the defeat in Indo-China of military and quasi- military 
GoHsnunist forces and the development of conditions conducive to successful 
resistance to any Communist actions to dominate the area* Neasures takeii in 
Indo-Chiiia; however; must be in consonance T-;ith U.S. and allied action taken 
in the Far East and Southeast Asia to defeat Communist efforts to extend their 
control of the area* 

.(b) Feasible actions to provide for the immediate TJ.S* assistance 

■ 

requested by the French for operations in the Dien Bien Fhu-- Central Laos sector 
have been takers The measures recoiraendcd herein vill hardly affect the immediate 
tactical situation in these areas (which? while serious ; is not as critical as 
public pronouncements suggest)* They are designed to effect a general improve^ 
Fiont in the over- all situation in ln:lc-0hin^ which is such that all actions 



This doe v.-int contains 13 pages* 






1 

KJ 



33 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NW'D Date: 201 1 



AJU'Jf. &W^lS*i&Fi ft 






nust be considered a matter of urgency to be implemented without delay 



#J1> ^ - r 






are also designed to achieve the desired results in indo-China without overt 



involvement by U«S* co-ibat forces 



vJ fc 



(c) The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence* Agency have 

* ■ - 

developed a program of support for tfha Kavarre Plan in Xndc^Chinao This plan 
considers certain basic iiasiediate requirements for continued U«S e support for 
Franeo^Vie&namese operations and sorie of these recommendations have been imple~ 
mented-. The remaining actions have been incorporated hereunder in paragraph 
III (A) * Hoy over j there is implicit in many of these proposals a requirement 
for a stronger French political and military effort as -well as more ef foe live 
support for Vietnamese participation* The alternative to more precise and 
extensive action by the French and Vietnamese,, as proposed by the ILS.^ appears 
to be a continued stalemate or debacle in 3"ndo-China» 

■ * • 

(D) It vould appear that France cannot idt&b*av her forces 'from Indo~ 
China without serious deterioration of her position as a vrorld power, 

■ * 

(S) The key to the success of military operations continues to be the 
generation of well- trained j properly led indigenous forces effectively employed 

ft 

in cornbat operations against the Gonsvonist forces in Viet Kinhu The eventual 

* 4 

goal must be the development of homogeneous indigenous units vath a native 
officer corps a In this ihe French have had; for whatever reason ; insufficient 

■ * 

- 

success j Such success id 11 ultimately be dependent upon the inspiration of the 
local population to fight for their own freedom from Corrrttnist doirination and tile 
willingness of tbe French both to take the measures to stimulate that inspiration 



a 



nd to more fully utilize the native potential, At the s?:v;. time, French sensi. 



tivities id-th respect to their sacrifices^ responsibilities^ and capabilities 
*ust be respected^ as m persuade and assist them to correct existing deficiencies, 

* 



*" . r 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



* 



'I u ) i ■*•> f J - '' ,u IA i 1 



• -. 



i 






(F) The U*S* objective in indo~China should be centralized U W S* control 

- 

■ 

and coordination of all U t S* military ; military aid; and "unconvcri bional varfarc 
(uhieh includes 'Psychological warfare^ guerrilla raarfarej and certain aspects 
of pacification operations) inechanisras in Indo-China 5 



(G) There is in Indo-China, or programmed for Iridc- China (and anticipating 
continued U„S* assistance) a sufficient snounb of equipment and supplies and 

a potential manpower., pool sufficient eventually to defeat the Communists 

■ 

i ■ 

decisively if properly utilised and maintained and if the situation C-Ont&nu to 

+ 

permit this manpower to be converted into military effectiveness c In their o:;n 
report the French have acknowledged that U S e aid in many areas has exceeded 
French capacity to absorb it* 

(H) Measures advocated by tb3, U ? 3» must be so characterised by determina- 
-tion* strength; confidence; and justice that they serve to enhance the support 

m 

of all Asians viho seek freedom, both fix>m Coi^unist domination and western 

colonization a Asians must be convinced that they vill have a far better future 

Kith the Free *- T orld than under Communism and th/it there is not to be reins titu- 

^* 

tion of colonialism© 

r 
* » 

(l) The Corar.ujiists in Indo-China^ Southeast Asia ; China , and Moscow must 

* 

be jpade aware that "the United States j France; and the free governments of the 
Far Bast are united, steadfast j and capable of accomplishing their ainso 

(j) The U*S. must take the initiative in persuading the French and Viet- 
namese to overcoiae these deficiencies « Such initiative must; however j avoid 

* 

French exploitation in its unilateral interest and must avoid actions -which till 



S 



*» 



lead to, in voluntary UrSc corfoat participation 



5 



.»..VW«'. . fin -;Wl_vJ'i j; 






^ O O 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



* y~> 



Ji.sJJ *v - w « :! J -^ s& t * » 



III « ACTI0E3 REQll ^:D 



— ■_• f — w^ m mm * 



(A) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination vith the Central Intolligenc 

t 

Agency* have recoroendod certain courses of action which aro suscoptdbj.e of 



immediate implementation* Of those not already undertaken^ the following should 
be completed as a matter of urgency: 



1* The French air forces in Ind--China should bo augmented; 
particularly vdth respect to air and ground-crovr personnel from 
military and/W civilian resources within the framework of the 
French- Vie tna&ese arred forces* Steps should be taken through 
existing contacts vdth the French Government to satisfy those 



v <•- 



requir assents j to explore the possibilities of establishing 



a 



.^: 



^* 



*v< 



V 



%r\ volunteer air group; and to make the necessary arrangements to j 

— 

replace the uniformed U«S e military personnel being temporarily"^ 
assigned to assist the French in maintenance functions, 
** Action; Defense 

2c The present arrangements fcr the assignment of U*3. 
officials to Indo-China should bo altered to include the assign-Tie nt 

of an-'additional representative* of the Central Intelligence Agency 

* 

to an appropriate U.S. activity in the area* 

i 

Action: Defense. CIA 

> ■ — *-^~— — *_« * 

— ^— ^*». «*^» 

3? A source of funds in the amount of $12ii millions to meet 

' -. : :- 

additional urgent requirements for Indo^China for all services 
;• ; must be determined* Currently for FY !£?!* there hzs been provided 
■* - to the French effort in Indo-China a total of $1 ; 115 millions in 



••> 



t 



t- 



military assistance, defease support; and r/alitary support projects* 
Unless a source of fun :1s other than IDA? is made available to neet 



mi?, sucaHTr 



d b 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



l j\ ^iiT 



c^Vi* i^iHj Jt 



- 






! ■ 

1. 



( 



these additional requirements^ the materiel action and training 
support for Inde^China will have to cc*:e at the expense of the 



>jor3.d-*v:ide Fi 1?5U HS* progr: 



t 



Action: Defense 

- 

(B) The present situation In Indo^CMnaj however j indicates that in 
addition to the jbjtm&dl&te actions outlined above, the following steps must b 

■ 

taken as a matter of priority; 

1* . As a result of events which have occurred during recent neelcsj 
and particularly in the light of the forthcoming Geneva convent ion j 



certain actions which might have been susceptible, of direct negotiation 
with the French Government now require more pircunspect negotiation, 

■ 

Nora the less i it should remain the U & 5* objective to obtain French ccym'?. 



"> 



acceptance formally or Informally of the following: 



a* Modification of the Mission of the U*S, MAAQj Indo-China- • 



H , 



. to provide for expanded strengthj including a planning stai 



X 



(composed initially of up to 10 highly selected officer personnel): 
•authority to conduct liaison vdth senior training and planning 
staff sectionsj and authority to fljakq reconpendations concerning 

■ k 

the conduct of operations * This relationship may be justified 
entirely within the framework of the present agreement with the 
French Government that "the French Government will continue to 

- 

facilitate exchanges of information and TJLevfi on a continuing 
basis between French and U S S* mllitaiy authorities and "111 
take into account ths vievs expressed by the latter with 
respect' to tfoa development and carrying out of the French 






<** ^, -», 

441 



* 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



T.W. &&&&&& « 









strategic plans without In any wajTj of course j detracting 

from exclusive Frenob responsibility Tor adoption arid exocutic 

* 

thereof 4 " It should be present ed that the 0*3 « has complete 

- 

confidence that France can win the struggle against the Cor?, a- 
nists in Indo-China and that expanded U*S Representation at 

* 

the French Headquarters is designed to provide the maxinum 
and most effective assistance In aiding the French to achieve 
common free world objectives in Indo-China 

bo Gradual assignment of additional U C S* personnel up to a 
- level of $0 specially qualified personnel in Indo-China as 
such assignments become feasible P These individuals should 

■ 

have the mission of acting as instructors,, principally with 
the Vietnamese forces and in non-*conbnt areas as recommended 

by the Chief, MAAGj and concurred in by the local Coriander* 

m 

Co Expanded utilization of U*S» covert assets * particu- 

■ 

larly in the unconventional warfare field and particularly 
in bilateral US-Associated States unconventional warfare 

operations t 

■ 

Actio n-; State ^ Defense } CIA ' -* 

2 t It should also be a U 3 S» objective to seek (both with the a.rfiV-G- 
French and other appropriate governments as well as with the necessary 
U. S* authorities) the methods of attaining the folio ving: 



o t 



m 

a. Modification of present Foreign Legion enlistment 

* 

requirements with reduced enlistment period for service 
in Indo-China and expansion of the Foreign Legion to 



include the formation of air units* 






-TV ^. 



338 















Declassified per Executive Order ^Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 









flF/f^ PS © v*> if* pa m *;* 



b c Recruitment in certain foreign countries 5 
especially GermaiVj Xtaljj and possibly Asia/ of non-French 
personnel with appropriate technical qualifications for 



*% 



\ 



service in Inco-China. with the Foreign Legion 



j 






Co Provision of certain U e S & personnel- on a voluntary 

* •.* ■* 

basis ; for service in the French forces without sacrifice 

of their UcS, citizenship* 

Actio n; Defense j State • 

3* In addition to the urgent actions outlined above^ the following 

additional actions are suggested as contributing to the advancement 

- 
of U.S. interests vjith respect to Indo-China: 

a* The U*Sd should continue to stress and emphasize 



in every way our purpose in helping the peoples of Viet nam j f\ 
Cambodia^ - and Laos through the French is to maintain their 



\ 



^v 






independence^ and should reiterate our position regarding 
that independence 9 _ . 

Action: Operations Coordinating Board 

■ 

b© A vigorous U*S» effort might be made to restore 
Bao Dai f s health and to persuade him and possibly the King 

■ 

of Csiabodia to take a more active part in 1 the struggle 
against the Viet Kinh c This effort should include action* 

designed to encourage Bao Dai to vithdravr from his semi- 

■ 

isolation to visit his troops^ to reside in his capital 
and otherwise to comport himself like a dynanic Chief of 
, "State t This effort Plight be correlated with measures 
designed to have some U.S inilitary assistance delivered 



A 



V- o o 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



t@t WMH& 



* -- * 



* 



• 






directly to the Associated States instead of through the 

French* Such action might appropriately be taken upon the 

-- 

conclusion of or during the latter phases of the Geneva 
confer encs ft 

Action: Operations Coordinating Board 



Militarily 

■ " — - * ■! —~m ■■ » . ■ ■■ i — 

lo A general officer of two-star r-ank, as designated by ths 
Department of Defense, should be appointed Chiefs KAASj Jndo-China, 
upon relief of the present Chief in February 19$k* He v/ill be 
subject to the coordination of the U f S Ambassador to Indo-China- 
but idll be under the military coismand of U*S* Cor^iander-in-Chicf, 
Pacific * He vill command all U«S t military personnel and covert 
assets in Indo-China relative to his mission and will be personally 
responsible for presenting the involvement of uniformed U*S« 
personnel in combat* 

2 G Subsequent to the receipt of French- gov eramental approval 
(and desirably at their invitation), but at the earliest possible 






• •**. 






time j the Chief } HAAG, mdo-China, should be provided vith necessary : 
staff sections, and assigned additional duties involving expanded 
liaison with the French and Vietnam forces* He should be directed 
and authorized to advise and assist the Franco-Vie tnamose cqma&d 
in training and planning, and to make recommendations concerning 
the conduct of operations. In this connection he should urgently 
seek the following: 

. a* Development and implementation of a sound 
concept and operational plan for the conduct of operations 



in Indo-Ghina* 



mi?. SiiCi 



'■-.■■ 



iR.ii 






I 






1 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



• 



r 






1 y^JJ o WJ I --i sv* tSV* M 1> 



b e Intensive and aggressive operations with a view 
to idnning a victory of consequence at ths earliest tlme-j 



• 
* 



and exploitation of this success politically and psycho- 
" logically* ' 

£c Effective pacification of Fronch-Viotn^.iosc hold 
aroa&j emphasising security of individuals and property 



s 



through proper utilisation of defense groups and guard 
and institution of adequate lecal civil administration, 

4- 

d* Training and properly equipping Vietnam units" 
/ uith arinhasis upon the institution of adequate officer^ 
NCJO, and technical training courses « 

£■• Improvement in intelligence and security agencies 

T 

- 

j f* Expansion of unco: itional warfare operations* 

Action: Defense. CIA 



3o Concurrently with the tasks assigned atove^ arrangements 



* 
v 



should he made to develop an over-all concept designed to achieve " H 

Q> 1' 
the subjugation of Corrnunist forces in Indo-China and the pacific "\ - " 

cation of the area B This concept should be provided the Chiefs 

MAAGj Indo-Chinaj as guidance in seeking the accomplishment of 

» 

the task assigned in paragraph 2 above* 

■ 

Action: Defense^ CIA ' 

Information ar.d Psychological 



_».. — .. ... 



1 ? Concurrently with the political, and military actions 
outlined above,, and under the coordination of the Operations Coordi 

> 

nating Boardj a specific domestic and foreign information campaign 

+ 

should be developed and fcatrtfcsiriedj particularly for the period 

■f& r?i\ n ci -. •'' ff > -~> v? r tr 



I' 






V * 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



rift jfV fr^ fc* \:' /^-C*^ H 1 c " -** 



leading up to the Geneva conference- to de~c sise "hysteria 11 

publicity snd to bring about siidespread recognition of and 

* 

appropriate attention to the foHo.id.33g thermos: 



& France, in supporting the fight of t he "Associated 



States of Indo -China against CoramUnist domination., is the 
principal nation nov shedding its blood for the freedom 

■a 

of others* 

b« The French Government has made major sacrifices 
in terms of its young military mgnpororj its economic 
resources^ and its political position in order to def end 
the cause of liberty and freedom from Communism in Indo- 

China * 

* 
Op The French Government has accepted the principle 

of self govern. i :nt and sovereignty for the Associated 
States of Indo-China and has in fact more than satisfied 
tho initial demands of Ho Chi Minhj thus providing 
•evidence that the Viet Hinh are fighting not for freedom 
but for the "Communist cause* . 

d* The cause of the Associated States of Indo-China 



is the cause of all countries in South Asia who desire 
freedom from Communist domination and self determination 
with respect to their political and economic objectives*) 
j2 The cause of Viet Minn as Kith all Communists is 

the cause of colonization and subservience to Kremlin 

•p 

rule as was the cause in China^ in North Korea and in 
tho European satellites* 



x 






Action: St&t'Qj Defense; CIA, U3IA 



-,r- ^t 



f^4 /*\ r\ c* \ - : /ps -^ r '' : '-*- 




I 



\ 



I 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



< - 






2* A specific U*S* psychological warfare program for Indo- 

i 

China should be developed ii-tviediately, including overt and covert 
projects*" wider Operations Coordinating Board coordination^ with 

t a 

paramount emphasis on the establishment of a climate of opinion 
which associates all outside support wd.th the achievement of Indo- 
Chinese national aspirations* Benefit vail accrue from UrSc 

■ 

courses of action in direct proportion to the degree they arc 
implemented through indigenous peoples rather than through direct 
support of the French;,* The U*S< psychological warfare program 
should therefore provide for the following; 



u 



* 



■* 



8® The establishncnt under the U C S^ Ambassador 
to Indo-China of an operations advisory group ; including '. 
• . representatives of the U«S* Military Mission in Indc- 

China^ the Department of State } and the Central Intelligence 






■ 



Agency as appropriate to coordinate the non-salitary aspects 
of U^So psychological operations within IndcMGhina* The 

■ 

Chi of > KAAGj Indo-Chinaj should be responsible for coordi- 
nating all psychological warfare activities directly 
relative to his expanded mission with this group* 

Action: State, Defense, CIAj FOA, U3IA 

hj Appropriate psychological warfare equipment and t .„ 









" t, v 



supplies should bo assigned to the French and Vietnam 



* v 



« 



forces, and Vey technical personnel should be assigned to the 
HAAG for such use as the Chief. KAAOj rcay desire * 
A cti on: Defense } CIAj FOA . 













Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number. NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



;/;:s r> El* 



./I ii> ii nS £-1 &* LA I A il 



c 9 A specific mechanism should be established within 
* — 

the U*S* to provide for the orientation of all official ■ 

% 

UftS* personnel assigned to duty or visiting Xndo-China 
so that maximum favorable psychological effect is derived 



frcrn all their activities and contacts 



t 



Action; Operations Coordinating Board 



dc Development of indigenous leadership which mil be 
truly representative and symbolic of Indo-Chinese national 
aspirations and v;ln the loyalty and support of the people* 

■ 

Action: State. Defense, CIA 

Hi " -■■■■■ ■■ * * 

c c Subsidization of indigenous newspapers and public 

- 

information media^ including provision of equipment and 
supplies as vreH as air transport to remote population 



.!. 



centers* „ 

Action; CIA, USIA 

jf Upon establis hnont of nece ry agreements vith the 
French Government as prescribed above, augmentation of the 
US-Vietnam guerrilla warfare potential In Indo-China, 

Action: Defense, CIA 



- 1 



IV - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOKGNDATICKS 



(A) If the above actions can be completed at an early date x-dth lull 
French support (and on the assumption that the Chinese Communists do not 
intervene overtly in Indo-Chin^) ; it is considered that this program v;ill have 
the effect of reversing the present situation and give promise of leading to a 



n 



Itimate victory in Indo-China viihout evert use of U,S 3 military forees 



e 






r-1 P.-i 



O '"t *? 






• 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 2011 






- - fi 1 "tt\i F$ <5l r? (t * •• 3 f? V 



(b) Ho\*joverj should the iiraediate situation in Indo~China deteriorate 
drastically or should French intransigence make the substantial aceoinplishinsnt 
of the program outlined herein impossible^ the U & S P ray id-sh to consider direct 
military action in Southeast Asia to ensure the Maintenance of our vital interests 
in the area* Under such circumstances^ an area concept inolitding Malaya, 
Thailand^ Burma, Indoisosiaj and the Philippines^ as well as Indo-China* would 
appear essential e These ramifications are to be considered in Part II of this 



% 



stud/ as assigned to the Special Committee 



< 



(C) It is recorira ended that this program be approved by the Operations 
Coordinating Board and submitted to the President for immediate implementation 

(D) It i_s al so repomnended that the Department of ' Defense develop; 



for the iiamodiato attention of the Special Cornrdttoe^ a concept of operation 
v jBprid considerations involved in the use of U,S* armed forces in Indo-Chlnaj 
should such involvement be determined upon* 



s 






3 *i 5 



JC RAFT 
$ April 193^ 



I 



THE PRC' : 'i : DM 



.()■■- - «*% -w— * 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 3 
NhJD Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 J I 



This doer it must not be repro 



ta.J»K fe&L] &fe3£ clucad wit.- at permission of the. 



1 origi nati r.% ox fie e 



Sp Lai Cc : ttse Revert On 
SOUTHEAST ASIA —~ P/j;V tj 



To set forth rscoinmandations concerning longer range policy and 



courses of action for possible future contingencies in Southeast, Asia net 
covered by NSC £ttG*J« 



II ~ MAJOR CONSIDER ATI CiIS 



-.-*—-•■— 



A* The Special Conmittee has reviewed NSC $\\Q%$ "lUS* Objectives and 
Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia% dated 16 January 19$l\ > 



and considers that this statement of policy remains valid and should be 



. 



continued in effect insofar as it concerns the specific contingencies enumer- 

* 
ated therein i 

Be NSC $hfi> covers the contingency of possible Chin Corantoist inter- 

vention in Indo-China and along vith Part I oH the Special Corrjnittee Report 



* 



establishes UeS* courses of action designed to secure the military defeat 



V A V 



. / 



i \ .* -• 



. % v * * * 



of Communist forces in Indc-China in the absence of Chinese Communist # # *y ^ %i ,* 

t T 



intervention! 



Ct There are ; hovever^ at least tv.o additional factors not cove-red 
by NSC $h0$ Which BBrit additional policy consideration of the U.S. Govern- 
raont;. These are: 

(1) The fact that the Communist threat to Southeast Asia will 

■ 
* 

continue to be a major obstacle to IUS* policy and objectives in 



*/- 



Southeast Asia even though a solution to the Indo-Chinese war 



which is satisfactory to the UVS« say be obtained 



B 



Phis doc irs n£ co r.t si ns 
XO par;es a 



9TOP BE? >^t Copy 7 of J 












Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 201 1 



* fir V VI & ^S M t l " J :> \'£ W" 

JL k'!/ h . ; i-Ji 2* kW iy& & . B. 



(2) The fact that the threat of Co&fflurdst destination in Southeast 



T, .>.-.?- - # . 



Asia v;ill be infinitely increased in the event that Indc-China should 

■ 

fall. under Corniunist domination despite the pres&nt efforts of the 
S-> to the contrary* 



III - FACTS BEARING ON TrS PROBLEM 



_^TrS_ _. 



Aa Southeast Asia comprises some 170 Trillion people in an area just 
eiaerging from the colonial era$ Standards of living and of literacy are very low* 
With the exception of Viet Ua:.\ ; military forces are inconsiderable* The number 
and quality of leaders^ adniini stoat or s^ and technicians is far below minimum 
requirements* The prospects of political or econor.de stability during this 
. generation are diin ; except in the Philippines and perhaps in Thailand* 

Bo The peoples of Southeast Asia are accustomed to the rule of the many 
. by the very feu at the level of their central governments Their principal 
national political vitality expresses itself as "anti-colonialisrri" and the 



termination of all foreign (Semination rather than in a desire for political 

V 

democracy or- for the political liberties upon which the Western concept of the 
world ideological struggle is based 

Co Southeast Asia is a part of and ethnically associated with the 

* 
Asian continent; principally China * China today is the base of international 

Corrar-unisn in the Far East Kith the exception of Australia ; to which Southeast 

» » 

* 

Asian states are not ideologically oriented; anti-^Communist bases are very 
distant* Certain of them are associated s&th colonialism in the minds of the . 

* 

a 

people of Southeast Asia 3 Western influence; both in Southeast Asia and in 
Xbreaj has not been effective in preventing the spread of Commimism« This 
results in increased vulnerability of scree Southeast Asian countries to Corinunist 
influences c 

Si i f ' 






I 



I 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 201 1 



Ds Nationalism that expresses itself in Asia as anti-colonialism^ if 
properly guided^ is also a potential ks )n against Qoirnnunlst imperalisis* At 
the present tim-3j however ; some Asians tend to regard "Western coloniali^" as 
mare evil and pressing than the possible future threat of Co^vunist iiape-ilraXism* 

Eo Economically,, the countries of Southeast Asia vary in their products 

* ■ 

and rcarkots* Many major export products o.f the are?, (rubber ^ tin ; copra ; etc*) 

• * 
» 

are absorbed by the West 8 However $ rice production is a natter of pan-Asian 

■ 

concern as is o5.1 production* - 

Fc Southeast • Asia as a region is less homogeneous than the Atlantic 



Community or the American Republics in the factors making for real regional 
consistency and strengths There arc major ethnic and religious differences as 
well as traditional emnities,? There is no sense of a common danger as regards 

Coiumni st iinpexlrOLissu 

* 

G© Current developments^ including military operations in the Associated 



1 States and the forthcoming Geneva Conference^ will have a major influence on 

- 

"future U»S* policy throughout Southeast Asia*, 

Ho UcS* position and policy in the area are nost effectively represents" 



* «, 



in the Philippines and in Thailand^ from which countries - outside of Indo- 
China - any expanded program of Western influence may best be launched^ 



IV *> CONCLUSIONS 

Ac The Special Committee considers that these factors reinforce the 
necessity of assuring that Ir.do-Ch5.na renain in the non-Conp;unist bloc^ and 
believes that defeat of the Viet Kinh in Indo-- China is essential if the spread 
of Communist influence in Southeast Asia is to be halted ^ 

B$ Regardless of the outcome of military operations in Inda-China and 
without cc:-prcrds: _ in any way the overvheSLTiiiig strategic importance of the 
Associated States to the Western position in the area, the U*S* should take 



3^8 



rrcr^rj 'Q\Srr»rtr?'*& 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



* 

r:?^' /T^v v^i ( - V- o -o rr^ r ; *■*"» 



j * » » 



all affirmative and practical, ",'s tops* vrith .<;■:. &i'fcnoit& its Evvopezn. allies^ to 



■ l-U, 



provide tangible evidence of Western strength and determination to defeat 
Coramunl'^aj to demonstrate that ultimate victory will be won by tfe free isorldj 
and to secure the affirmative association of Southeast Asian states vith the* 



purposes* 



C$. That for these purposes the Western position in Indo^Chiiia must be 

* 

maintained and improved by a military victory* 

•~ * 

Do That without coEiproiaiso to C* above > the U c Sc should in all prudence 
reinforce the remainder of Southeast AsdLaj including the land areas of Malaya,, 



Burma j Thailand; Indonesia, and the Philippines 



V *4 REG0MEND3D COURSES CP ACTIO! 



a & 






A* The Special Committee wishes to reaffirm the following recommendations 
.which are made in KSC $l\Gu 9 the Special Committee 'Report concerning military 

operations in Indc-Chinaj and the position paper of the Special Commit tee^ con- 

* 
curred in by the Department of Defense^ concerning U C S courses of action and 

policies with respect to the Geneva Conference: 

(l) It be U*So .policy to accept nothing short of a military 

victory in Indo~ China* . - 



(2) It be the U e S« position to obtain French support of thi 

* 

position; and that failing this,, the tUS* actively oppose any 



s 



negotiated settlement in I-dc-China at Geneva© 



flfthe Department or State representative rcccv^ends the deletion of 
paragraphs A and B hereunder as being redundant and included in other documents* 



Hl:Q 



ro 



rT* <T\\ Vj Q i ? f -^ F> F? *£■ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number. NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 







8C0I2 SK&Ui&H 



- '■ (3) It/ be the U t S* position in event of failure of (2) above to 
initiate irii'.iediate steps with tho governments of the Associated 
States aimed toward the continuation of the war in *I neb -Chip a; to 
include active U 6 So participation and vithout French support should that 



be necessary p 



(10 Regardless of whether or not the U d S* is successful in obtaining 
"French support for the active IKS* participation called for in (3) above-; 
every effort should be made to undertake this active participation' in 
concert with other interested nations ;» 

* 

B* The Special Coirauittee also considers that all possible political and 
economic pressure on France must be exerted as the obvious initial course of 
action to reinforce the French vill to continue opera tings in Indo*-China 3 The 

■i 

Special Corr^dttee recognizes that this course of action v/ill jeopardise th 



■ 
e 



existing French Cabinet; may be unpopular among the French public; and may be 

considered as endangering present U*S<j policy *ath respect to EBC* The Committee 

t 
nevertheless considers that the free world strategic position; not only in 



Southeast Asia but in Europe and the Middle East as well; is such as to require 

■ 

the most extraordinary efforts to prevent Gosnnmnist domination of Southeast 

• • • 

Asia The Committee considers that firm and resolute action now in this regard 

9 * 

may well be the key to a solution of the entire problem posed by France n 
the free world coirciunity of nations, 

r 

C* In order to make the maximum contribution to free world strong >n in 



Southeast Asia; and regardless of the outcome of military operations current!; 



iy 



in progress in Indochina; the U«S» should; in all prudence; take the following 
courses of action in addition to those set forth in II SC $\&$ and in Part I of 

■ 

the Sp2ci?i C0y-.7i.ttee report: 










rT 1 ~(T'\ D' <s j V ^ J p k r 1 ? 

[;[. M i\. t3 bk .it; I *> (& . 11. 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number. NND 633 1 6. By: N WD Date: 201 1 



r JTW>I<? rm^MiO 



. * 



Political and Military; . \ . ... 

(1) Ensure that there bo initiated no cease-fire in Xncb-China 

■ 

prior to victory whether that be by successful military action or 
clear concession of defeat by the Coriirivnists* 
Action: State, CIA 

(2) Extraordinary and unilateral; as veil as jru?lti~ national^ 
efforts should bo undertaken to give vitality in Southeast Asia to 
the concept that Communist imperialism *is a transcending threat to 
each of the Southeast Asian states* These efforts should be so 

* 

Undertaken as to appear through Xccal initiative rather than as a 

> * 

result of U*S-> or UK, or French instigation^ 

* 

Action; USIA, State, CIA 

(3) It should be U*S* policy to develop vithin the U1I charter a 
Far Eastern regional arrangement subscribed and underwritten by the 



major European povers with interests in the Pacific ^ 

* * 

a* Full accompli shmonfc of such an arrangement can only be 
developed in the long term and should therefore be preceded by 
the development^ through indigenous sources, of regional economic 
and cultural agreements between the' several Southeast Asian 
countries and later tilth Japan» Such agreements right take a form 
similar to that of the OEEC in Europe t 
Action: ■ State, CIA, FOA 

b* Upon the basis of such agreements j the U«S* should 
actively but unobtrusively seek thsdr expansion into imitual 

* ■ 

defense agreements and should for this purpose be prepared to 
underwrite such agreements with ralitary and econonic aid and should 

i 



*V* m*J — •_ 



hSJj a . f-J) l*?* 5>W Li kk Jl 



t 

j 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



?r?n\r3 co ^ t\ - i^ R 1 c fr 






be filing to become a signatory to such agreements upon invitation, as 

in Korea; Japan, the Philippines, and For,v.osa 3 

Action: - State, Defense^ CIA ■ ■ ■' 



i 



t««a^|ra*"r^ 



working t 



Co As an immediate move in this direction* the U C S« -* 
hrough indigenous channels *» should sponsor the negotiation 



of a 



mutual defense treaty directed against Co;:vmnist aggression 



between the several states of Indo-China and Thailand, and particu- 
larly between Cambodia and Thailand 

m- * 

Action: CIA, Defense, State 

(k) The tUS* should undertake the immediate organization vithin 

the several states of Southeast Asia of an increased number of military 

■ 

units, including guerrilla and paramilitary organisations, as well 
as anti-subversion police forces© In. particular? this should be 
accomplished in Thailand and if possible in Indonesia and Burma* 
This should include the establishment of U»S.« military missions through 
the assignment of U.S« officers who might, where necessary, serve on 
a contract basis vdth local military forces v In addition, the U*S B 

should stand ready to offer such assistance in Malaya as the UK 

* 

may require/ 

Action: State, Defense, CIA 

■ 

($) The U S. should take the initiative in establishing an 
International Volunteer Air Group to be used in Indo-China and 
elsewhere as required-) In addition, the U*S* should consider the 
advisability of establishing an International Volunteer Corp of 
ground forces for use in Southeast Asia? So long as the French 
retain the major responsibility for rrilitary operations, such 



^ 



fr:i /ff rS r ► * "• $ Wi *^S i^r vt 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NW'D Date: 201 1 












■n 



tOP. SKOKEl 



forces should only be utilized with French eoitsen 






Actipm Defense^ CIA 

(6), The U Sc should support when appropriate any Asian-inspi rod 

development of regional or area organisations; bonferencesj and 

« 
agreements and should seek unobtrusively to promote such inter "Asian 

rapport » 

Action: State, U3IA, CIA. FGAj Defense 

(7) Kith respect to Malaya j Burma j and Thailand ; the U«S* should 

seek UK agreement to measures designed to ensure the retention of 

these areas in the free vorlcU A statement that any change in the 

present security status of these areas would be considered a 

fundamental threat to US^UK interests in the area might be appropriate 



Action ; Defense, State-; CIAj USIA 

(8) The U e S e should^ largely/ through covert means., take steps) 



s 



a To promote and support energetic^ able and honest 
indigenous anti- Coirauni st leaders in Southeast Asia in order to 
provide more effective government in the area* 

b© To exploit opportunities to strengthen v;os tern-oriented 
anti^Communist political parties and other influential indigenous 
groups in Southeast Asia* 
Action: CIA 



t 



Economic 



(l) The Uj,S<s should be prepared^ as in Korea j to under v.Tito the 

i 

economic potential of the Associated States in the event of a satisfactory 

solution in that area? A statement to this effect at the present tirr.e 
Blight have a favorable effect en the Geneva Conference* 



Action; State, FOA 

— — - — 



)C 



CO 



3 



Ji. .W ii i i-J 1-3 •>-.■> J,\ ••.: i k 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



XWT.Sft.^*^ n 









.* * 



(2) The U a S# should affirmatively attack the economic problems 

■ * 

that grow out of the instability of demand for primary products (such 



as 



rice j tin , oil; ete«) in ths area^ and should give najor attention 



*to the development of mutually desirable economic programs and 
assistance as befofeszi the Up§ 9 and Southeast Asia** 
Action; FOA* State* Dpisimeroe 



•— • — - »— i— * * 



(3) Technical programs^ particularly those designed to achieve 

improvement in agricultural skilled and serni. -skilled labor ^ should 

be stopped up Leadership progransj however useful; cannot alone 
overcome; the deficiencies in these areas© 

a 

Action: Stats, FOA 

(h) Capital investment associated v.dth indigenous interests in 
the area should be encouraged© This includes the establishment of: 

■r 

a c A climate of opinion in the countries concerned favorable 

• I r 

to foreign investment « 

b 6 The establishment by treaty of the rights and obligations 



*— » 



of UcSo investors in the countries* 

Cg The creation in the U ft S c through a system of guarantees 

of adequate .and attractive investment opportunities* 

Action ; State;. Consaeroe. F0A- Treasury ^ 

-. - 

(5) The ExporUXnport Bank and the Inter national Bank should be 

encouraged to extend loans to Southeast Asia for economic development 

* 
Action: St ate > FOA 

(6) The UcSo should discreetly pror.ote reasonable reparations 
settlements betvraen Japan and Southeast Asian countries. 



Action 



Stat* 



.-_-♦. 



KJ D *f 



' it 3 }f*\ n> c < s ■?' \< v p> r? •> 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number. NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 2011 



%0& ^^i^^ 



_«; * - 



h 



* 




The courses of action outlined above arc considered as mandatory 



regardless of the outcosne of military operations in Indo--Chinao 

(l) If Indo-China is held they are needed to build up 
strength ami resistance to Communism in the entire area© 

(?) If Tndo- : .Cbana is lost they are essential as partial steps: 

■ 

a's To delay as long as possible the extcntion of Communist 



u 



domination throughout the Far East; or 

he In conjunction with offensive operations to retake Indo-* 
*~* 

China from the Coi.rcunistso 

(3) Should Indo-China be lost; it is clear to the Special Cosmttc 

■ 

that the involvement of U v Sv resources cither in an attempt to stop 
the further spread of Coimrainisra in the Far East; (which is bound , except 
in terras of the most extensive military and political effort , to be 
futile) or to initiate offensive operations to retake and reorient 
Indo-China; (which would involve a major military eanpaign), will greatly 
exceed those needed to hold Indo-China before it falls© * I 

(h) Furthermore,, either of these undertakings (in the light of the 
major setback to V C S national policy involved in the loss of Indo- 
China) would entail as an urgent prerequisite the restoration of Asian 
morale and confidence in U©S© policy which vail have reached an , 

unpreced.ented.ly low level in the area© 

(S>) Eaeh of these courses. of action would involve greater r5.sk 
of war with CoKSHunist China,, and possibly the Soviet Union, than 
timely preventive act5.on taken under more favorable circumstances 
before I ndo- China is lest a 



^ U K" 

ODD 






tm swcr] 



• - 



• - 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 201 1 



ttftP. umUU'i; 



5 April 1954 



• 



Proposecl Implementing Procedures for the Establish £ 
of a Southeast Asian Regional Concept 



. 1, In considering various laethods by which a pro loot to develop 

re jJoj-^L fi V- 1 :• v. ^ ,-j fJ; 5 rt y 

a reasonable undors*&nd£ng in Southeast Asia Might be undertekrr^, it 

* 

appears th&tj in any case, considerable time may elapse before an effective 
organization nay be developed* However j it does appear that a preliminary 
survey should be made by the individual appointed by the President for 
the development of this project, For initiation of this preliminary phase 
it is believed that the procedure outlined in the following paragraphs 
should be undertaken e 

2. The President should appoint an individual of inter national 
standing as a special and personal representative of the President, Such 
an appointment > during the preliminary phase, should not be limited to 

■ 

any specific assignment. This individual should not be 'classified 

m 

■ 
* 

as a "roving Ambassador 11 but he should have anbassadoral rank. 



3# Having appointed this individual, the President should immediately 

■ 

and, publicly request this special representative to undertake a survey 

of Southeast Asia for the purpose of making a detailed report on con- j 

* 
ditions and problems directly to the President, This report to form t.G 

basis for further development of the regional arrangement among Southeast 

Asian States. 

■ * 

4t The special representative should have no other official assign- 

i - 
inent and should be relieved of any duties vhich would tend to restrict 

■ 

his interests to any one country or particular area. 

5. The President's special reorc sfentat ive should be emoovered to * 



enter 



■into discussions with all U.S. military .and civilian of^icir.lsjln 

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NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

■ 

I the area and with the chiefs of state of the several Southeast Asian 
• countries. Ho should go to Formosa, the Failippinesj Thailand, the 

Associated Sfiotesj lalaya, and Indonesia* Thereafter 7 he should probably 

* 

also pa to Korea and Japan, It is not thought that the* special represen- 
tative should £o to Basse except upon receipt of a specific invitation 
fron the Burmese government.* 

6, The special representative should enter into any discussions 
with the governments of Southeast Asia through the respective Ambassadors 
and any arrangements made with those governments should be consulted 

by the Ambassadors or by the government itself, 

* 

7« It should be the publicly announced mission of the special repre- 
sentative to undertake a fact-finding mission. He should not himself 

■ 
publicly .interfere or intercede in the continuing relations by the U # S, 

and the Southeast Asian countries or among the several Southeast Asian 
states themselves. ? 

■ 

8, On the contrary, the special representative should act only 
as a catalytic agent and should offer to assist in the solution of 
problem areas by appropriate intercession in the U.S. For this purpose, 
the special representative should initially be based in the U.S. although 
for his initial survev he may v/isb to establish an advance headquarters 
irith a small staff in some appropriate Southeast Asian country, 

■ 

9* It should also be the mission of the special representative to 

* 

seek an expansion of bilateral and multilateral agreements between the 
several Southeast Asian states such as those already established between 

+ 

Cambodia and Laos and between Thailand and Viet Earn* 

10. Initial agreements nay probably best be obtained in the field* 



of economic or cultural agreements j crStjusc arrai lents should initially 



be secondary. 



°57 



HtoE secree 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 2U1 1 



4 -. JJ 

fir* 



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' 11, The special representative should, of course, report throu-h 
he Department of St.^te but should specifically have access to all 
departments of government for the purpose of expediting the solution 
of any probieuis in vhich the 0,S, may contribute to the achievenent of 

m r 

m 

better regional understanding and association among the Southeast Asian 
countries, • 

12. Upon the completion of his initial survey, the special repre- 

* * 

sentative should return to the U.S. for the purpose of -making record sneta- 

tions to the President and to secure the implementation of recommendations 
developed during the survey. 



5386 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Projeel Number: NND 63316. Bv: NWD Date: 201 1 



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As I personally explained to Ely in presence of Radford, it 
is not (rpt not) possible for US to commit belligerent acts in 



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Indochina without full political under shading with France ana tit other q 
countries/ In addition, Congressional action would be required, 

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After conference at highest level, 1 27111s': confirm this position. '" wt 

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US is doing everything possible as indicated my 517o to prepare public/ 4 * *"■ 

Congressional and Constitutional basis for united action in Indochina, 

However, such action is. impossible except on coalition basis with 

active British Commonwealth participation. Meanwhile US prepared, 

as has been demonstrated, to do mc everything short of belligerency. 

C 

FYI US cannot and will not be out in position of alone salvaging > 

CO 

British Commonwealth interests in Malaya, Australia and New Zealand. 

This matter now under discussion with UK at highest level. 




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FROM: Paris 

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I!0: 5729* April 5, 8 p.m. 



Doatmli 2055 
Bee'dJ April 5, I95H 
2:26 p.ra. 



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.1 delivered message DBPTEL 3^82 to Bi&ault Monday evening. • 
He asked me to tell Secretary that he personally could well 
understand position US Government and would pass on your 
answer to laniel. 

He asked me to say once more that unfortunately the time for 
formulating coalitions has passed as the fate of Indochina will 
be "decided in the next ten days at Dien-Bien-Fhu, As I lef" 
he said that even though French must fight alone they would 
continue fighting and he prayed God they would be successful. 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



6 April 1954 



TAD Q 



ITEM 1 (For Consideration) 



POSSIBLE U» S. INTERVENTION IN INDO-CKINA 

(NSC Action 1074-a) 

* 

PROBLE M 

1. To consider and make recommendations to the President on appropriate 
action regarding Indo-China and on the need for U.S. military intervention. 

SUMMARY 

2. The paper consists of a brief report from the Planning Board and an 
annex which analyzes alternative forms of U.S. intervention. The annex is 
summarised in TAB A:* 

3. The report stales there are four issues to be decided by the Council 
These are: 



a. Will Indo-China be lost unless the U.S. commits combat forces? 



This involves several specific questions: 

(1) Is the military situation critical? (The report says not 
yet but that it is deteriorating.) 

(2) Are the French likely to negotiate an unsatisfactory settle- 
ment at Geneva unless the U.S. is prepared to intervene? (The report 
says this is uncertain.) 

(3) Have we exhausted all practicable political and diplomatic 
measures to encourage the French to live up to their commitments? 

(The report says the U.S. should make a maximum diplomatic effort 
to cause the French and Associated States to continue to fight to a 
successful conclusion.) 

b. What are the risks, requirements, and consequen ces of alternative 
forms of U.S. military intervention? ■ 

(See the annex or TAB A - The alternatives, to be valid, involve 
assumptions: either the French and Associated States both will invite 
U.S. military intervention or the Associated States will issue the invi- 
tation alone if the French intend to withdraw. The annex also discusses 
the question of use of nuclear weapons.) 

£. Should the U.S. intervene rather than lose Indo-China and if so 
on which alternative? 



(The risks of intervention are high, but the loss of Indo-China 
would result probably in, at least, the loss of South East Asia. A re- 
gional grouping (Altern. B) would bring Asian allies to help fight and 
thus be good, although it would require time and a need to give defense 
commitments and assurances that intervention is not intended to overthrow 



361 




D 03 J 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number. NND 633 1 6. By: N WD Date; 201 1 



T " C" ' f 



Communist China. A UN action is not desirable. Unilateral intervention 
(Alterns. A or C) might be politically difficult at home and abroad.) 

d. When and under what circumstances should the decision to inter- 

, - - - . — . ■ — — — ■ — ■ - 

vene be taken and carried into effect? 

(The report says - par, 7-_c, page 7 - "on balance, it appears that 
the U.S. should now reach a decision whether or not to intervene with com- 
bat forces, if that is necessary to save Indo-China from Communist control 
and, tentatively, the form and condition of such intervention." The real 
issue , however, in light of the French request for urgent help at Dien 
Bien Phu, is that the Council must decide whether it is essential to in- 
tervene now with little or no time to (1) work out arrangements with the 
French (including acceptance of conditions, command arrangements, etc.), 
(2) condition public and Congressional opinion - intervention may involve 
our drafting men for Indo-China where the French have never yet sent a 
conscript - and (3) try to prepare a regional type arrangement. Decision 
to act later may take care of these difficulties but might come too late 
to save Dien Bien Phu.) 

COMMENTS 

A. In reaching any decision the Council should affirmatively decide that 
regardless of the numbers or types of U.S. military forces initially involved 
once the U.S. physically intervenes we mus t be prepared to expend whatever re- 
sources are necessary to secure vict ory. Involved are increased risks of Chi- 
nese Communist intervention or general war, steps to prepare the U.S. to meet 
these increased risks, and reversal of plans to reduce the size of U.S. armed 
forces. 

5. The views of the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
should be available at the Armed Forces Policy Council meeting at 11:30 a.m., 
6 April. | 

6. [An associated problem is that the U.S. has accepted an invitation 

to meet with the French on 12 April 1954 to exchange views on Indo-China, pre- 
paratory to the Geneva Conference, It is important that the U,S. representa- 
tion at this meeting be at a high level (at least Mr, Robertson), with Depart- 
ment of Defense representation,] 



RECOMMENDATIONS 



7. It is recommended that you: ' i 

■ 

a^ Agree that the U.S. must intervene if necessary to avoid th*s loss 
of Indo-China, but advocate that no steps be left untaken to get tl 
French to achieve a successful conclusion of the war on their own* 

b. Support Alternative B (regional grouping with maximum Asian par- 
ticipation) as the best of the alternatives for intervention, subject to 

discussion in the AFPC. 

■ 

c. Base your decision as to whether immediate intervention at Dien 
Bien'thu should be approved on the results of discussion in the AFPC, 



362 



TOP. SECRtl 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP. SEC I 



SUMMARY OF PLANNING BOARD ANNEX TO ITS REPORT ENTITLED, "NSC ACTION NO. 1074-a" 



1, Problem : To assess risks, requirements, and consequences of alternate 
forms of US military intervention in Indochina, The objective of intervention 
is, in the absence of overt Chinese Communist intervention, destruction of or- 
ganized Vict Minh forces by military action. 

2. Nuclear x^eapons : Nuclear weapons will be available for use as require 
by the tactical situation and as approved by the President. Estimated force re- 
quirements contained in this paper are based on assumption of such availability. 

3 - Alternative A : Commitment of US forces in concert with the Frenc h. 

a - Mil itary re quir ements : Assuming military situation is approxi- 
mately as at present, US military requirements would be: 

(1) Ground Force s : None, provided that French Union forces afford 
adequate security for the forces in Indochina, 



(2) - Naval Forces : 1 Carrier Task Group, plus additional support- 



ing units. 



(3) Air Forces : 1 fighter wing, 1 light bomber- wing, 1 troop 
carrier, 1 tactical control squadron, 1 tactical reconnaissance squadron. 

b. Logistic requirements : Case I can be logistically supported without 
particular difficulty. As the training of Indigenous forces is crucial to the 
success of this operation, the US must be prepared to support a training program 
for 330,000 Indigenous troops, an increase of 100,000 over present forces. 

c. Political aspects : The French would prefer a solution which did 
not involve US military participation, but would not seriously oppose same. The 
Associated States would welcome US intervention if given appropriate security 
guarantees. The Free World would generally support this action. 

d. Free World reaction to US tactical use of nuclear weapons: Our 
Allies would probably disapprove if nuclear weapons were used without their be- 
ing consulted, but if consulted would generally approve their use tactically , 

e. S ovie t _b >lo c reac t ion : Generally Soviet reaction would be the same 
as though the US were assuming unilateral responsibility. The chances < e about 
even that in this situation Communist China would decide upon overt intervention 
rather than accept the defeat of Viet Minh, If US use of nuclear weapons should 
lead to impending Viet Minh defeat, chances are better than even that th^ Chi- 
nese Communist would not openly intervene, 

■ 

f . Foreign aid considerations : Military assistance would continue at 
approximately current rates: i.e., FY-54, $800 million; FY-55, §1130 million. 
Economic assistance would be substantially Increased ovei" present rate of $25 
million per year- 

■ 

4. Alternative B : In concert: with the French and others , 

a. Mi li t a r y re qui r em en t s : Same as In Case 1, although allied air or 
naval forces might substitute for US forces. 



363 



r 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



1 ' i ' 



b. Political aspects : While it might be possible to secure UN ac- 
tion for armed assistance to the Associated States, It would be difficult to 
stave off pressure for a negotiated settlement or UN mediation. It would be 
possible to develop a regional grouping with maximum Asian participation if 
it were clear that the US had decided to commit forces to the area. Franc 
would prefer a regional grouping to UN sponsored assistance. The Associated 
States would prefer UN sponsored assistance. The Frre World reaction would 
be somewhat more favorable to action as a part of a regional grouping than 
to US unilateral action, 

c. Reaction to US use of nuclear weapons: Same as Case I, 

_ — . ■ 1 . — , — . * 

d. Soviet bloc reaction : Even though the US was participating as 
one of a regional group, the chances of overt Chinesr Communist aggression 
would remain substantial. 



e. Foreign aid considerations : Expenditure would probably be 
greater than in Case I because the US would be called upon to support the 
forces of the additional participating states. 

5. Alternativ e C: US acting in concert with others or alone. 

a. Military requirements : Assuming no serious deterioration in the 
military situation prior to US take-over from the French of responsibility 
for military operations: 

(1) Ground Forces : Indigenous forces of 330,000; 6 Infantry 

and 1 Airborne Division of US or Allied troops, plus 275,000 support personnel. 

(2) Air Forces : 1 Fighter Wing, 1 Light; Bomber Wing, 1 Troop 
Carrier (Wing), 2 Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons, 1 Fighter Bomber Wing 
and 1 Tactical Control Squadron* 

(3) Naval Forces: 1 Carrier Task Group, p l us additional mining 
and support units. 

b. Logistic 'implications : Case III can be supported without major 
logistical implications provided production schedules are maintained at ap- 
proximately Korean War levels. 

c * I mpact on US military programs : As this course would involve 
accepting an increased calculated risk of war with Communist China or c c 
general war, it would require a reversal of present policy planning to _e~ 
duce the size of the US armed forces. 

d. Political aspects : French disassociatiou would enhance support 
for UN action or for a regional grouping. It would also end France's role 
as a major power. Most, of the Free World would support US intervention. 

e. Soviet bloc reaction : Same as in Case II, 

f . Foreign aid considerations : Same as in Case II, although savings 
in the US contribution Tor the support of French forces in Indochina would 
partially offset the greatly increased cost of US forces taking their place. 



364 



TOP ; 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



. 



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. - 



SOUTHEAST ASIA - ALTERNATE POLICIES 



1. General, The basic decision confronting the United States in 
Southeast Asia is whether to cut our losses in that area and to grad- 
ually withdraw our commitments with the least possible loss of prestige 
or to implement fully the provisions of a policy calculated to guaran- 
tee the retention of the area in the free world provided the U.S. is 
willing to take the full range of measures which are necessary to make 
its stated policy effective. If the U.S. is not willing to do the lat- 
ter it may consider two possible alternatives to Communist control. 

m m 

2. Japanese Alternative . Recognizing the lack of decisive U.S. 
military objectives in Southeast Asia, the apathy of the indigenous 
people toward Communist encroachment, the improbability of any realis- 
tic Indian reaction to responsibility for Southeast Asia, to this end: 

a. assure the Japanese Government of U.S. willingness to ac- 
quiesce in a Japanese sphere of influence in Southeast Asia provided 
they will cooperate in preventing Communist control of the remainder 

of Southeast Asia by accelerating their rearmament program sufficiently 
to assume responsibilities there; 

b. divert a considerable proportion of MDAP funds programmed 
for Indochina to an offshore procurement program for Japan for the pro- 
duction of ground force weapons for Japanese and other free Asian forces; 

c. encourage maximum Japanese participation in organizations 
and programs designed to stimulate the economic growth of Southeast 
Asia. 

3. I ndian Alternativ e. Recognizing the proximity of the Colombo 
powers in this region, stimulate, with U.S. support, Indian interest 
in and responsibility toward Southeast Asia, to this end: 

a. ^assure the Indian Government of U.S. willingness to sup- 
port an Indian area of moral influence in Southeast Asia, provided 
they will act to prevent Communist control of the remainder of Indo- 
china; 

b. utilize the Colombo economic development organization to 
stimulate the economic growth of Southeast Asia; 

c. utilize to the maximum Indian officials in assisting and 
advising the indigenous governments. 



— 






J >■ 



■ 



365 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



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FROtf: London 

TO: 8eoa?e-baa?y o£ Stato 

110: *K582 April 6, Jip-s. 

PRIOR ITY 

EYES OMLY FOR SECRETARY. 



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C&a*i»US512 
RtKS'dJ April 6, 1954 
'11:04 a.m. 



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In compliance with DEPTEL 5090^ I saw Eden this morning and 
made points referred to therein and embodied those in an 
Informal memorandum which I left with him* a copy of which 
is going forward to you by. do uch. ,-,-t 

Eden had already seen President's letter to Prime Minister 
(HEPHBL 5179)- Eden stated questions covered would be \ m 
considered at highest .level as soon as possible and that in r ■ 
meantime he wished to say that he felt seriousness of military 
' situation in Indochina hod boon exaggerated saying,, "French 

cannot lose the war between now and the corning of the rainy 
* seasoq however badly they may conduct it/ 1 He will consult 
with Prism Minister, Cabinet and Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
-will let as know soonest' whether it is thought that you or 
■ Bedell Smith might profitably come here prior to meeting 
in Paris o 



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if£E&« Following are main points made by Secretary 
in conversation with Ambassadors Spender and Munro April 
(1) Situation in Franco is deteriorating and 

+ _ 

there is very real possibility that unless new clement 

interjected into Indo-China situation French will seek 

settlement at Geneva which will amount to a sell-out. 

I (2) We see no prospect of negotiated settlement at 

Geneva which does not boil down to one of following 

alternatives: (a) a disguised surrender of the French or 

Sfefebcs ">; retreat 
(b) a disguised/ :rwi:r; of the Communists* V/e have 






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carefully studied other possibilities including division 
of Indo-Chlna and consider them impracticable* f 

(3) In our view required new element in situation should 



be creation before Geneva of an ad hoc coalition of 



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states directly interested in area who had pledged themselves 



I to work together and, if necessary, to contribute f roes 



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Class if teat io n 



United Kingdoms Australia, Hew Zealand* Thailand, Philippines <g 

effort 
Proposal presupposes continuation of Stench military/in 



^ 



Indo-China. US is prepared to contribute and play its 

xP^th part in such a comvion effort* 

(4) Secretary stressed attitude of UK, Australia, 

and Hew Zealand, particularly former $ was ) * to problem 

and 
V/ith passage of time danger would increase i uiS/bz capacity 

for united action would be induced. It v/oulfi be difficul 

if 
to hold unity of free world rr.i'r we waited until danger 

was at our very doorstep* If danger not recognised by 



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United Kingdom and Qoaaaon&ealthj whi oil £& much closer to 



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it than we are, we cannot move* 

f';(5)Matter would at. some time be laid before UN with 
view to broadening support as much as possible. Howev 



s 



coalition we had in mind was indispensable and we could not 
count on UN for effective action. : 

^(6) (3") We believe action by coalition would not lead to 
Chinese intervention* However, if this happened we would 

all consult* 

* 

Spender referred to Austrlian election Way 29 and 



obviously' feared interjection of issue in campaign 



■ 



However, he personally felt action should be taken if we. 

« 

believed French situation would deteriorate irretrievably 



in next two riontnrw 



A r ? H 7 



O rv o 



1 Uj?tf BSij a;o n 



* 



/ 



• .ft 



r 



V 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



.3 of telegram to Cftfo flnft * tllJfogfrori 



TOP SECBIvJ? 



Classification 



*»» 



Munro referred to New JSeeiaiici commitments in Middle 

■ 

East which would need to bo changed and said attitude 
of United Kingdom v/ould be of greatest significance to 
his government * 

In reply to Inquiry concerning expected Australian 
and Nov/ Z@EL.axid contribution Admiral Radford indicated 
Australian carrier and Hew Zealand naval effort comparable 
to what it had contributed in Korea, would be satisfactory* 

r 

Ambassadors indicated they v/ould consult their 
g o ve ram e nt s inane d i a t e ly o 

- 

■ 

For Peasleo: As Spender raised Australian election as 
possible difficulty* Merchant at Secretary T s direction today 
had supplemental talk with Spender suggesting matter might 
be manageable politically if Australians took Initiative 
and thereby gained credit as they had on creation of 
Anzus-i You may have opportunity plant same seed with 
Menaiejs or ' Casey « 

* ■ 

For Peaslee and Scotten: Please folic?/ up urgently with 
Australian and New -Zealand governments at highest levels witl* 
vlev/ to early favorable response « 



o *** o 



mm 



TO? SECRET 




J.- 



r : r. Si 



l .; /•■ 



Classifies t i o n 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number. NND 633 1 6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






zr^^m.uo Form t^° e« 



.*; 



5" - f 



"i 



k 



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0-zU 




office 



1 






o 



TO 



FROM 






Hr* John &* feicoabs 

Bsputy DqJPosoq Controller, £rropo 



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 

* 

- 



• 



SUSJ5C7 i b .?rolfc5-?.ry &&W7 Report, I-UiUB, 







i«V 






* IHd foXlo^jjis in g. pralteiz&ry report ca t&o :^^- to Ssd^Kii 

PBKPOSgs KSslO purpose? of this session rats to oorrolot^y ravie? t&tfc 1Sso 
IS'Covi^y tag* 5a Sjdgaa* Ih&cMei, ths cojt cte<?y for Z^&h&Isr 
perform/ by tfco E-pui^ r>^?o:i^o C^ptrollo? %rop0 i;i feria* 2*© rovie t 
v&a to consist of choo&i&g fore?? W^is utilise & p fcsitia! rcgaircmo:!^ 
for supplies r^id e^cips&nt for tho approve* foroaa* eo^scqpidoa rat?3j 
etod: 3.cval csd oporfitloial raserro ri^airo&onts rasi &H otaor ^rfelr^sit 
isfoiia&tloa &a roXatio^ to t>? rsport in or&o? to dollop a raaco^Hy 
cour.d basin for prdji&tlag futiiro t^cfviii^ao&ta r?i{l fimdo fej 
tho &G0$ptD4 pl&s for ultimata victory i^i Xi\fio$M&a© 




t 



It in sat po-ffjsiibla Siithis t!o p:-c t logistic e>1 &2& oporatUrol 
■ e^ssgepast in Ssdooliina to rariva ftt a^ rer-xos^iblo ostiaato of ct-t 
to t&a fcit&fi Stntec of n-t.Tv.oj. re^irsismts for tho tear ia Sxid^Ghina* 
With c&33*s$*91 feroo gools^ crash rot^ir^snts for currcrt oil&tsrjr 
oporutior;^ Xao!: of Srsi/lQ&ga of French epsr&iiQSsi plastaj rad so:?ioii3 
gaps in l^gistiosl, data^ th:t corrts. for FY 3i;£v: c^o i« ^ constcat at^bo 
of llta T xr.i Air Forco SDi? gro£ : ^ for o^aal^ tAii<tb vaa origi: n.jy 
O0tir^tDd vd co:it Gpproxinat3i7 5S5 nillion dd'U^fl In ^ iQ5-i io 3 -";:/ ovd? 
$!t00 7iii.l?.o: tI-Si hd 0224 in sigit cu ta fis^l oo^fc for tliio ficorC yo:r* 
Kio Av.:^ 1:^2* progrrzT ir. la tJao csco position xriih n pro^riTi of ^251 
EiilliOB iTitU :i^t/ roc^xoDt3 $?o^&£d$s for eicoLiblo i^oro^oo^c Fo2* K ^.9Co^ 
r<? JiSjp ccot cstfesatoa ha^ b:=oxi d^valopsct cr ct& bo daroloppd until 
forco (fivln Ca?a fir::or P rac^ircsiaiats tad aswfes of nilitary o:.d it;;^B 
■ ost:'.blir>oup r^ad ba^io por^^ivTi>l cost data Sstoraizsdo 5:ho2Q b^aio ?^64»3 
nitst t3 ol»t:d": 5cl tron tho ft •-;..,.-;. , i to hzoo^s a b^nio for tlao -LMG tD 
porfo^a ito :.;Tj^r fi^iotlora of roTicTi;_g and &or©^sir:s r&$&l#9£!ga&a t3 
fisv^lcp a fira pr^^rcn Ji^conc^ry for d^temini^ ^^> iogistiosl and 
fundtii^ r; %J.rcr3nt:u 

Aft^r ro*^s:T of i&© i!\foiTi^tio:i Brs&Isbie to tho Corrtr^ 2o^:i In 
SMgaas it i*j rvcom^^^floci that th-> oost study p^apared by tha Deputy 
^fci>^3 ^CTptT^llor I2rv-*opj ho ztzozp+^S. "/1th s^ioh iiodiiiQv.^io:-:; z.3 or-^i 
bo dstsH^ii^d as n result of \iio EMgoa visit by tfeo cost sta^- to:o 
Bteoo tlio cost Efculj v/o.g prcyvj.'^<3^ doyjlou/^^ts haT5 occurred ^h£eH v.-ill 
effect t5i3 eost 8t\icy e Spcolficolly thaco c.DTo3.o^::or 4 to era* (l) tlo 
p^B0:».r.2 5CD liillior. piaot;r Q8«5 nillion) iv>roa50 in tb.o cost of tri 
Cr^b^d5.rL i-Jllit^ry progjsa^ (2) tho ptoftidg ^iet of t:io Vict Secst t:^? 
ec!.T^r.oo (or ^robr-.blo ctlio;* pny ir^roass) ©Ovr.tatod i:^ bost £00 to 6 CO 
■nillicii pi^tsarn {'}2*5 « 05? nillion)j (q) t!i£ aoas» rao^d aoti*7?*tIo:i *;f 
cort^5.ii y^aoticd a:^d Tiefer^oss m-:d forego by th3 Fronch High Qzzzzz&4 
m (rough ©strata fi?Q4-iO sUlioa)^ (&) tb.3 po^ible ij^lusioa of 
/porsonnsl cost CI54 CI55 



* • i" 'T ^ 



3TG 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



costs of certain regional call tic; units in Associated States military 
budgets -of which the first installment is estimated at S6 million and 
(5) the additional costs of pacification of areas liberated by operation 
"Atlante" estiiB&t$.d at 200 million plasters ($5*1 million). Those 
developments plus adjusti its such as changes in force goals and con- 
sumption Rnd initial provisioning requirements where known should bo 
incorporated* in. the cost study* Kowe -, it should bri made clear that in 
revising the cost study eased on the known factors those areas more or 
less, tend to increase the estimate* It is estimated that there &ra many 
unkupwn areas that would j if kno^iij in all probability reduce the estimate 
considerably, With these revisions, the report of DC/E should bo accepted 
as the bsst possible estimate of cost of the Indochina military operations 
until such finis as the French and 2JAAG Saigon can provide improved experience 
factors and costs* Prom an overall standpoint* it should be noted that &AAG 
Saigon has no basis for do tor mining tho costs of the FY IS 54 and FY 19^5 
HDA Program at**this time. The MAAG feels that until su<?h time as tho French 
inform thorn of future plans it is impossible to develop a costing of the 
FY 1954 and FY 1955 Indochina operations. Thus, any estimates contained 
in the FY 1955 Budget and Congressional presentations are illustrative only 
and in no way reflect what the costs for FY 1955 Y/ill bo, 

BSHERAL RBGO fKMTLQBS A11D C :,1IT3: The MAAG must b3 given authority 
to review requisitions along the lino indicated in this report in order 
that they nay no longer merely act as a transmission agency for French 
requisitions • 

* 

' Y/hen and if the French provide the required logistical data ; the UAAG 
must make some* fundamental changes internally, designed to establish a system 
of supply control which will be geared toward the screening of requirements. 
This will necessitate a proper integration of the present record system with 
the needs of the screening and review process. 

There is no question that requirements of the French and Associated 
States Bust be met, but the problem is one of providing sufficient equipment 
of the right type needed to support the military mission. Otherwise j both 
funds and effort will be dissipated and the military mission weakened by 
providing equipment in excess of requirements or not of a type that can be 
utilized* For ever.iple, 2094 rocket launchers 3*5" have been delivered 
along with 66,000 rounds of asHaunifion* and an additional 190,000 rounds 
programmed, which the French do not want or use. Without close liaison 
v/ith the French in the planning and logistical phases, which will enable 
the IiIAAG to have an understanding of future operations, assets, and require- 
ments, there will be continuous problems of an unbalanced supply situation 
and inadequate data for U3 logistical and funding planning* 

An improved system of inspection of end use of SjQtfJP equipment must 
be developed. At present the L1A.AG is permitted 30 inspections of units 
a month* The MAAG must give 60 days notice of proposed units to be inspected 
which necessitates assuming that specific units will be non— operational and 
at a given location 60 days in advance. Even when the schedule is approved 
by- the French, units to be inspected are mad© operational without notifica- 
tions to the &AAG* who, upon arriving at the site find thgt inspections 
cannot bs accomplished because the unit was made operational* Hore freedom^" 
of choice of units to be inspected 



O t 1 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



QFf! - i 






must be worked out with the Frendi* Because the £335 million dollar 
program includes pay sad subsistence of forces of the Associated States • 
this problem of inspection becomes an even more acute area^ since it 
is proposed that those units will to visited by the ISAAC at least once 
. a year to follow up on its imple©i3ntlition* 

The major reasons for the lack of program information and logistical 
back up material within the I IMG are more or less a direct result of the 
following: ." . « ' 

The 1-ItA.G members have,, in the past., been expected to be experts in 
relation to rc^&remsnts for supplies sad equipment to logistieaHy 
support a war for which they have no part 5j\ the planning or execution* 
Hot only do they have no part in the planning but the plans j if any> which 
are prepared by the French are not made known to the II-iAG for the most 
part until after execution or on a crash basis. It is believed that the 
KAAG has made a valiant attest based on the limited information provided 
then to screen aid evaluate the requests for supplies and materiel in 
order to provide the necessary requirements to support the war* Due to 
the very limited justification presented with requisitioned it has in the 
past been incumbent upon the MMG to ask the French for additional 
information prior to recommending approval to Washington* An example of 
a reply from the French is shown in (Tabs A and Al)« The Commander-<Ln™ 
Chief of the French Forces ^ General Navarre,, forwarded a letter (Tab B) 
to General Trapnell, Chief of the M&AG* wiiich resulted in a cable being 
forwarded from OSD Nash to the HAAG (Tab c)* As a result of the above 
correspondence and General Ravarre f s discussion of the situation here 
with visiting US officials who have given him the impression that all 
his requests will be granted, this attitude has filtered down tlirough 
General Kavarre's staff to the point that they feel that an official 
request for equipment or assistance from the French High Cosamand is 
sufficient justification^ and that their needs should not be put to 
question. The KiAG 5 as a net result^ has become to a great extent a 
transmission agency for requisitions for supplies and equipment except 
in those limited areas where MAG personnel are able to extract reasonable 
justification from the French* In many cases the KAAG has recommended 
disapproval of requests and the French have gone to higher authority and 
gained approval, A recent dispatch from* the #&AG to Headquarters U3AJF 
in connection with French requests for aircraft support is attached 
(Tab D) as an illustration of the difficulties under which MMG action 
is taken* 



• 



The following is a brief analysis of the problem areas and recom- 
mendations* It is believed that the following recommendations are 

essentials if the US is to furnish logistically support for the ware 
in Indochina in a reasonably efficient and economical manner* 



.JL 



TORCB BASIS: Since the completion of the 6 February 19$k DCS cos 
study there have been a number of changes in Force Plan objectives of 
the Army* Navy aid Air Force* Some of the changes were under advisement 
at the tins of the 6 February report and in those cases where considered 



6 






"s* .- 









Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number. NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



,*i -« 






firm were included in the study. There are indications thao further 
changes ?re being considered by the French aasd/or Vietn §e Which 
have not yat bean officially cramJ&icated to the I&AG* For the most 
part obliges as of this date vill increase the cost estimates over 
those included in the original study al though th*y are relatively 
minor ifhon % cohered to ths- overall force levels.. 

The logistical irp^cations of thoae freqetent changes are 
in^ortant* For 62aqple 3 since it&d-^amiary 195H the Country Tessn has 
becooa arsaate of throe different plans for the build-up of Standard 
liifasstry Battalions and Light (Ehin Qocm) Battalions in the Vietnamese 
Army* These plana ?re siu: -■■■■; iscd as follower: 



Tims Periods 



Infantry Battalion (Stan* 
dard) (T/G PersbimaL s829 ) 



Plan A Plan B Plan C 



Ligjit Battalion (K.Q.) 
(T/0 Personnel : 6I.1O) 



Plan A Plan B Plan G 



. » ^-.p,i 



In being Doc' £3 86 
Planned Dse'5>l> .86 
Plawiad D3e>£5 66 



85 


66 


9? 


87 


97 


HA 



©Is 

i?.o 



108 

120 






Flan As Officially sifedtted to KUG on ?S January 1?5U as basis for 
"logisTiefl planning* M&AG has subattted to JCS for approval. Probably 
in costing study bass.. 

Plan B z Unofficially subr,jittsd to M'iAG in sutraort of request for change 
in equipment programing on 2 March 19xu MAAG has requested official 
submission; request as yet uSaosveredt 



Plan C; Learned of throurh inforiaal .sources on 2 April 19 Sk 



• 



The equipment required by a light battalion is significantly 
different from that required by a standard infantry battalion. Shifts 
in planning of this magnitude over such short periods of time could , 
easily result in US finishing equipment of the vrong type for the 
missions of forces that Kill actually bo activated. 

Attached is table P v:hich illustrates the utilization of assigned | 
aircraft. As you will note in the table of the total F-8-F aircraft 
assigned^ only 6$% are operational or projected to be operational at aay 
one tir.ie. Like ; ,<rise ; for the B-2o 5 only $$% of the total assigned aircraft 
are operational or projected to be operational at any one time* 

RECOMMKKD.A.TIO-I : While it is recognised that a fluid situation requires 



.-*. * — __ « „ ». • * ■ » .» * — • ,.- ' 



changes in planning^ the necessity of keeping H&AG fully and promptly 
informed of chenges in thinking should be stressed to the French. Further^ 
force plans and T/Q's should be stabilized to the rasedEsaa extent permitted 
by the military situation as soon as possible in order to parrtiit orderly 
and effective logistical support, • . 

REQUIPJS-S;?fS ; The KAAG has available for the most part* tables of 
organisation and equipment for major 4rjny tactical units but they gr$ 

not available for most sector or static units* Where T/0:-3s are' 



crpRTT 

OLA/llUl 






13. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



, ■■ -• • StGfiti 

" " P availab3Le initial requirements have oeen computed by the cost sway teaau 
The Air Force- and the Bavy have T/Ci-^s for a limited number, of units, but 
the H&AO does not accept t as firm en i to be a basis for rstfoireme&ts 
coaptations* The t/g^s available represent a small scg tt of the total 
materiel requirements. Sherefore,, the Army, Havy, and Air Force have been 
accepting retirements a© stated by the French except in those cases *;here 
sufficient information is available to modify the requests* 

■ 

Table (l) attached is a cor.p prison of requirements and assets indicat-* 
ing the incomplets nature of the requirements data available to the EV&G* 
For some items such as rif3.es j heavy machine gun, 57r^i recoilless rifle, 
CO.vjn mortar*, all trucks*, armored cars M~3, personnel carriers half tracks 
and most si&nal equipment, the requirements are less than assets, as much 
as $0% is some cases* So data is available as to the basis for the require- 
ments for the difference between the T/0&3s and the stated assets* Sirsilarly, 
it is impossible to determine whether there ere additional requirements for 
those end itmes inhere requirements exceed assets* t r ould all the require- 
beats be met if the apparent deficiency were funded? The HAAG is in no 
position to answer that question or to provide an answer as to the definitive 
requirements irhich Must still be met* 

logistic and plsnning 
signed to General Nararre's staff in an advisoxy capacity 
in order to determine logistic requirements for projected prograsiiTiBd 
operations* If it is not possible to assign US personnel to the French 
Staff then it is imperative that the US logistic officers be kept inforstiad 
of the planned operations in order to effectively ar.i efficiently support 
those operations* Furthermore , the French and the MJL&G should meet and 
agree on approved T/Q&Es for ell units including tactical, sector and static 
units j and the H&AG must be advised immediately of changes or revisions 
to the approved T/0&3 




'4. C 



INVENTORIES: No firm information is available on actual inventory position 



4, — » -• ,» _* 



as ox any given date and actual deliveries from I3DAP are not knoun in m*ny 
areas • The Air Force, for example, does not have actual delivery informa*- 
tion on ISA? ai.LT.unition. This is due to such things as; (l) Ho manifest 
being forwarded pith shipments; (2) shipmate arriving and unloading ■with- 
out knowledge of M&&G., etc. Ho information is available as to Ereneh 
contributions of end itens or deliveries from off-shore procurement. The 
inventories ap submitted by the French for the- cost study Vary as much as 
$0$ plus or minus from the inventories contained in the KAAG records. * 

As illustrated in Table 1, the status of inventories is not firm. 
The table corcpareD asset data as of 31 December 1953 available at the ' 
M8AG rath that presented by the French in their Paris report to DCS* There 
is no consistent pattern or explanation as to the variation existing at^een 
the tvio ssts of stated assets,, -since for sor^e items such as the carbine and 
8linm mortar the KiAG assets are "double those stated by the French, vhile 
for the rifle and light machine gun 5 for exsraple, the French indicate assets 
double those stated by the KAAG* It should be recognised that the IfflAG do 
not provide for combat losses or for OSP snd indigenous financed shipments 
of evA itsus to Indochina* This table indicates that vithout the collets 
knowledge 



PS 5? 



*•* 



r- *% r*, ' 

■■-. ! ;■:.--' 



^ 



S7Ji 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 201 1 



t r" \ 



fcECRtl 



U t.vJ 



** 



ox assatsj tho H&itG nay apprpvs end item requests to$ag& on their liiiitod 
asset date ^^o?i in roality they nay to in long supply, or vice versa, 

A further complication to the end item inventory prohlea is 
CM>»iainod in tho Ke^orsaadraa of Understanding "tas-tveon the US .end tie 
Franc*! raith relation to the §5&5 million aid progsua to the Associated 
SJA^es* S'ho I&i&oran&Tn posits esg^nditqros for axscaeKurij notosiaod 
egmWontj O'acssufiieatitfas o<£Uipia§nt : and ©nginsering equipment for the 
A soeiated States out of tie 038? nillion. It is Wdjs&tod that o?0 million 
v£ll>? lor uateriolj vhieh vdll not bo controlled oj the M- /.Go thus, if 
tho I'AiG rejects a request for 2IDAP end item &id$ there is nothing to 
prevent tho ASS0CXAS&& States froa procuring that it on out of tho S32f> 
million program, FlBTHernoroj tho K\&G trouXd bavs* if tho present r.tato 
of logistical ooBjfusioa continues* no information as to the natericl on 
order from the 038;} udllion or that which is stocked as a result of tho 
6385 Billion. 

KBCCgSi?gfMfI03*Sj Fho 1L1AG imaadiaiely bxiag their racoreds un -fco data in 
relation to r&&& equipment and supplies havo actually been shipped to 
Indochina under all programs and vhat is planned to ho shipped by data* 
this isill necessitate complete cooperation of all Department of 3)e£enso 
agencies in the US and Fre.no e T/ith I1AAG Saigdn, . „ 

A request he nade to tho French to furnish to the HAAQ all biov;n 
assets^ including nateriel from Francs ; off-shore procurement and materiel 
to ho procured from tho ?385 Million Associated States aid progress * ffihoso 
stated assets^ in turn- must be reconciled with the 1£AA0 records in order 
to proYido a firm basis for computing future requirements. 

QOnsmSWIGBs The latest information evailablc to the 21AAG on actual 
Ariay consumption la contained in a French report elated April 1933 for 
the calendar year 1952 ¥/hich does not take account of the major increased 
effort since that period 7/hen consumption information is furnished to 
the IIAAG it is usually on a crash basis for tho purpose of justifying 
air lift of additional supplies. Jfeperieneo has 0hown that the French 
are requesting Material on a crash "basis v/hon they actually have 
sufficient Quantities in their ovm depots hut say it is nuch easier to 
have tho US air lift additional quantities than to redistribute the 
nateriol withjfn Indochina. S&ia io particularly true in the case of 
ammunition, Sossstiins during the month of April! the French Bill vx :ait 
another list of consumption factors^ hut these v/ill he based on CY 1953 
and ^.rill not refloct the full impact of the ITavarro Plr;n or the present 
fighting at Dion Bien P!hu. 

* 
RSC0;.i'x;r.av?I0:f: Tha'o -the French "b 5 rea.uss-tcd to provide crcoari encricl 
conru;.iption retss on all typos of ©quipnent and eitpi^lics on a monthly 
recurring hoieia, or- v/hatevor hasis is reasonahle iTithin their capahility. 

STOCK J^v73LS « 0?3?A^XonAL F3S^SV^; Inasmuch as the assets, consv- .tion 
and r^coiptu a:oe tiore or less urJcnov^nj it is not possible for tha 3IAAG 
to determine Y/hat ute^S: levels; or opei^.tie:ial irznovyvz vrra being main- 
tained in depots, r.er the s*ao«nt of r.erviceablo and reparable equipment 
in depot z^ or th'j arioimt of equipment in the hands of troops, There are 






x.' ! -J 



orpon 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



•«* -- 






• • 



tunc 



*p 



a'fov,' escoptions to thiSj euoh as army r.v ■ nuiition, r&aro monthly reports ■ 
a:ee Eu&aittod by the French on stoolc lowla and consumption* Eo*£*3lrer$ 
tho stack lovolr- for tho "bull: of tho sjttpplioa and eqtdpfltont cannot bo 
dotossainsd jcr reconciled to any opsoifio levels £hc SXL4G in their 
ccnt&ont on ths corjt study stated that tho Pronoh Dust have/art least 
a aix-^o&ih atooS: l©YOl of cvLpplieru in the thsator« However, the }?MQ 
was unable to state in ^pacific tortus v/hat actually constituted a 
Bi: &&nth Icrol o?? tthkt constitutes any militarily satisfactory lorol 
fore- Indochina* % . 

lij tho stray asnsunition area; as noted in fable II; if tho current high 
consumption rates continue a a ohortaga of 60 et-i raortar shells and 105 ^a 
howitzer shells aill occur, while prscont IDl'JP progregsssing mil result ±-& 
an oYorsupply of 30 calibaS carbina cartridges^ 57 bkm rifle sheila, and 15; 
hovTitaar shells* ITith available consu option data 5 rough ro^nlre&antg can 
bo developed to s-oarco as & has is for logi&tioal planning to provent tho 
orach approach that has bson nocossary recently. Yrhile soise oon&idoration 
laust bo given to tho UkLG position that lacking data on the opor&tional 
plana of tho X^conch, it io impossible to stats what constitutor a 
definitive operational lov:l 5 estimates for planning purposes ara 
ncoossary and can be &ado has 3d on tho ava5,lablo consumption date 



% 



Stj 1 1 



aOOCasaK^paSi Sho French should bo requested to furnish the HUG tho 
qiiantity and location of stock levels v&A operational icosorvoa currently 
iiaintainod by typo of ooiuprioiit and supply and v/hat is projected* 

5?ho levels of supply required in Xndoohina arodopohdont on the extont 
of logistical back-up outsido tho theater, the capabilities of tha l©gia-« 
fical organisation in Indochina end such othor factors a# transportation 
rvnd ooi3iunioation faoilitios \?ithin tho thsator* It is rocor.^-ondid that 
^u^lifiod losistical porsonaol bo aspignod to nako ?, study of tho logistical 
mipport situation in Indochina in o3?dor to determine v/liat IotoIo a:ca 
reciui^od in tho thoator to support tho operation* 

MPagABT P^S0MI?4 COSggs fho^ is ineufficiont information cvailcOao from 
Asio-ric&n eotircso' "in Sivigon to ralidato oitlior tho Pr^xich or DC/s ostimston 
of pay end allot^tneosj 3io:e in thoro a rovisod porsonnol plcn available to 
f;hov; tho of foot of rooont changes in foroo gooilo on the pareonnol build- 
up* Kabaosy^and S5EHCI &oun»ds c&nsidor a pay incroarjo for ABsooiatsd States 
military porsojmol r, diotinot probability cost likoly taking tho form of 
non**3Eop&y&ont of tho anniusi STou Toar'o (i7/i) adYaaco of ono nonth'o tj?,v* 
Avoraga pay data inibgni-ttdd to rf 3>C/E in faris indicatos IPronoh 032?3otaMon 
of a 20^ pay inoroano £02? those Associatod States porsonnol as \70ll an 
indig^ous porooinol v^lth S*ronoh £V>£ooa by c^i of caiord^r 1955$ although * 
tMfj van not inoludod in tho bud^ot* S^.ch information as is available 
021 food and oXothing poltita to cono i\p;;^rd rwioion of tho DO/S ©stiH^to* ^ 



i Kiat the Pronoh b^ roquo.etod to fitsniBh rOTiood p3afooir::ol plans 
chowlnj: tbo pliaood build— i@ co it rolatos to latest foroa objootivoa, 

2* Shat in ordor to validate ostiisatos of food costs, tho French bo • 

rociioctcd to ^r/ovic'.os 



o 



;T 



cc 



n 



w 



1 I *:,'?- 5 






». 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






(a) Host recent data on aToragia coal; of food p$y men 
for both Sroaoh and Associated" States Forces, by 
norvico* 



* • 



o 



<*. 



. (b) Lists of tho-'£uc^titiG3 and kinds of food in th 
authorised nation fotf (l) Fronob Steocoa (2) A»8 
Fo:?c?3 and (3) any iiajor ?oedjL&£ group's (such an 
supplotiTos) v.Mch era furnishoft a'sapasato ration* 
the Itsts should indicate those iteos procured 
locally ami thoso in nvrtropolitan Frazioaj and the 
current psdeos boi&s paid for each* 

(c) Latent available inventory position rnA explanation 
"of basis for ©took levels iaaintair.odo 

(d) ]3ata on unit cost, consumption abates and inTcntory 
status of any special or operational rations usod* 

3* Por ootimates of clothing cost a, th© French should bo yeqtuestc 
to provicLoi " - 

(a.) A general eirplanation of the nyrton or systems used 
"by each service in providing olothing to (l) P^oaoh 
Porcos and (?.) Assooiatod States ForoftBj including 
the sigalfloanod | if any, of doploynont on clothing 
requirements* 

* 

(h) A list of the items and quantities of clothing 

furnished iadiTiduals upon entry into the stjrTico, 
and the value 'of this initial outfit ("by service)* 

(c) Latest available data as to annual clothing 3*aplaoo« 
wont costs per &an, (i#o* consumption factors). 

(d) Current inventory position and explanation of basic 
for stock levels aaiiitaiiiodt 

4« Inaomuoh ts the US combined Group Saigon vdll have definite 
responsibilities in tho adainl strati oil of the S3S5 nillion aid program 
for the support of nilitary personnel of the Associated States, proced- 
ure!; should be set up to keep currently adTised of (a) changes in 
personnel plans as cha&gea are made in force plans, (b) progress made 
tov/ard meeting goals (or slippages) in force plans and personnel plans, 
(c) cj-rperience data on food and clothing consumption, prices^ and stock 
levels &s v/ell as (&) experienced ezependituro rates for pay and allow- 
ances, 

IiOSSSS 55E0P&H CIU gggB US TOH BOJiIARS TO mSEBBSt The official rata 
of evchaiije is 35 piasters to the dollar, v/hilo the present purchasing 
poirov parity in Indochina is about 72 piasters to the dollar. It is 
apparent that for those items purchased locally, there is a.n average 
50/o less of dollars as a result of the differences batvresn the exchange 
rate and the dollar piaster purchasing pcrcrar parity 

*\ -1? *-? * 

3 



# 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
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T Q 



z 



4. Should the Communists operate an air force from South 
China in sufficient strength to jeopardize French retention 
of the Tonkin delta, the resulting situation would warrant 
active consideration of implementation of appropriate actions 
as outlined in paragraph 31 of NSC 5405- If and when the in- 
troduction of Communist aircraft into the Indochina War ap- 
pears imminent, the U.S. should initiate talks at a political 
level as set forth in NSC 5405 to provide for the implementa- 
tion of the military actions outlined in paragraph 31 of NSC 
5405. 

«- 

5. Although there is no reliable evidence to indicate that 

Communist combat air units, POL, or other aviation supplies 
have been moved in strength to South China, this could be 
accomplished without too much difficulty. However, until there 
is some indication of such an enemy development, the Joint 
Chiefs of _Staff are of the opinion that any commitment which 
restricts or limits freedom of action by the United States 
would be premature and unwarranted. Accordingly, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff recommend that the reply to Mr. Pleven indi- 
cate that United States action in such a development would de- 
pend upon the circumstances. 

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will acquaint Department of 
State Representatives with the substance of their views as 
expressed in this memorandum when the subject of Indochina 
is again discussed at a State-JCS meeting. 



For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 



Signed 



ARTHUR RADFORl), 
Chairman, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. 



TOPSEGIfci • 



379 



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i 






THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 



WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 



8 April 1954 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Subject; U.S. Reaction to Chinese Communist 

Introduction of Air Power in Indochina 



1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed a memorandum by 
Department of State Representatives , dated 12 March 1954, sub- 
ject as above, tabled at the 12 March 1954 State- JCS meeting. 
In substance, this memorandum requested the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff to present their views on the military significance and 
implications of the following: 

a. The appearance of, and Communist capability of 
maintaining and supplying, an air force using only 
airfields in Viet Nam or Laos in the face of French 
opposition. 

b_. The appearance of, and Communist capability of 
mounting, an air force based principally on airfields 
in Communist China, and how large a force would be 
required to counter French defense capabilities* 



In regard to subparagraph 1 ji, above, there are no in- 
dications that the Viet Minh currently possess an air force. 
Therefore j the appearance of combat aircraft in Minh would 
warrant the assumption that they were supplied by and operated 
from Communist China. It is estimated that the Communists, 
in the facje of current French capabilities, could not maintain 
and supply an air force operating exclusively from airfields 
in Viet Nam or Laos . 

3. In regard to subparagraph 1 h_, above, the Communists 
have the capability of mounting a ersious air threat to the 
French with an airforce based principally in South Cina. 
The French air defense of the Indochina area is inadequate. 
Consequently, a Communist air force of from 100-200 aircraft 
(including jet bombers) could readily overcome French air 
strength in the Tonkin delta and severely affect other French 
strengths in Indochina. 









3l. 



SecDef Cont, No. 2855 



_ _/ Copies 



378 



TOP SECRE 



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1 i. » 



s 



4. Should the Communists operate an air foxce from South 
China in sufficient strength to jeopardize French retention 
of the Tonkin delta, the resulting situation would warrant 
active consideration of implementation of appropriate action 
as outlined iri paragraph 31 of NSC 5405* If and when the in- 
troduction of Communist aircraft into the Indochina War ap- 
pears imminent s the U.S. should initiate talks at a political 
level as set forth in NSC 5405 to provide for the implementa- 
tion of the military actions outlined in paragraph 31 of NSC 
5405. 



5, Although there is no reliable evidence to indicate that 
Communist combat air units, POL, or other aviation supplies 
have been moved in strength to South China, this could be 
accomplished without too much difficulty. However, until there 
is some indication of such an enemy development, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that any commitment which 
restricts or limits freedom of action by the United States 
would be premature and unwarranted. Accordingly, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff recommend that the reply to Mr. Pleven indi- 
cate that United States action in such a development would de- 
pend upon the circumstances, 

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will acquaint Department of 
State Representatives with the substance of their views as 
expressed in this memorandum when the subject of Indochina 
is again discussed at a State-JCS meeting. 



For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 



Signed 



ARTHUR RADFORD, 
Chairman, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. 



T 



■ j ■ 
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Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



_ 



I Ui v. L J\ i . i 



In reply refer to I 11594 



MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT CUTLER 



SUBJECT: The Aircraft Carrier ,r Belleau Wood" 



1. On the 23rd of May, 1953, France requested the loan of an additional 
aircraft carrier for use in the Indochina theatre. They asked that the ship 
be turned over to them on 1 Octobrt. Accordingly, the President on 26 August, 
1953, under the terras of P.L.188, 83d Congress, approved the loan of the 
"Belleau Wood" to France effective on or about 5 September, 1953, 

2. The US Navy actually transferred the ship to the French on 5 September, 
1953, but, owing to France's delay in supplying a full crew, she did not arrive 
in France until about 24 December, approximately two and one-half months later 

than originally scheduled- 

* 

3* Latest reports indicate that the "Belleau Wood" was scheduled to sail 
from Toulon on 7 April, 1954, to begin her first tour in the Indochina theatre. 
Enroute she will deliver 32 French-built "Ouragon" jet aircraft to the Indian 
Air Force at Bombay. It is estimated that it will take her approximately one 
month to make the voyage from France to Indochina with a stop at Bombay to un- 
load the jets. Furthermore, when she arrives in the Gulf of Tonkin she will 
relieve the carrier "Arromanche" which will return to France. MAAG Paris 
points out that if the Ouragon 1 s were unloaded and replaced by one and possibly 
two available Corsair squadrons it would be possible to keep both the "Belleau 
Wood" and the "Arromanche" in the Indochina combat. There is no indication, 
however, that the French Navy is considering such action. 

4. The French government's sale of French-built jets to India is particu- 
larly interesting. At the same time these jets were being built, we have been 
delivering, as a part of our military assistance program for France which at 
the end of FY 1953 had exceeded a total of 3.8 billion dollars, US jets to 
France in order to help them meet their NATO force goals. (We have already 
given them more than 700 jets.) 

5* In view of the current crisis in Indochina, the repeated frantic 
French requests for additional US aircraft, and the recent proposal by Pleven 



380 



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_^c__. 



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that the US provide a large carrier and aircraft of types familiar to French 
pilots for French air strikes in support of the Dien Bien Phu battle (see 
attached cable) it would appear that: 

* 

■ t 

a_. The French will have had the "Belleau Wood 11 a whole year without 
making use of her in the fight for Indochina, 

b^. She is currently being used as a delivery wagon rather than as 
a combat vessel. 

c^. Despite France's urgent need for additional fighter aircraft 
in NATO and in Indochina the French will manage to find time to build, 
sell and deliver 32 jets to India. 



.Enclosures 

1. Cable D/State to Paris, 3541 
dtd 8Apr54,sgnd Dulles, Secret 

2. Naval Mes 7048 dtd 061330s, Secret 

3. Cable DA IN 49168 frm Paris 
dtd 3 Apr 54,Top Secret 

4. Cpy Memo to Sec/Navy frm ASNA 
dtd 16Mar54, Secret 

5. Cpy Memo to Sec/Navy frra AS0Air 
dtd 3Sept53,Restr. w/inel. cpy 
memo for Sec/Navy frm Sen • Buff ner, 
dtd !Sept53, Conf. 



C. H. Bones teel, III 
Brigadier General, USA 
Defense Member 
NSC Planning Board 



Prep : Col Black/isc/10Apr54/OASD (ISA) 
NSC/2E853/79349 



Cpy #1-Mr. Cutler 
2-R&C Files 
3 & 4-0SD Files 

5-SW0 Lewis, Comeback, 2B853 



381 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



T I 

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

WASHINGTON, D«C. 20301 



April 15, 1954 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY 

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 
THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SUBJECT: NSC Action No. 1086-a, b and _c 

REFERENCE: Planning Board Report on NSC Action No. 1074~a, 

dated 5 April 1954 






1. At its meeting on 6 April 1954, the National Security Council 
agreed on the following, which has been subsequently approved by the 
President (NSC Action No. 1086-a, b and c) : 

a. Noted and discussed the reference report and postponed 
decision on tbe recommendation in paragraph 7-c_ thereof, but agreed 
that military and mobilization planning to be prepared for this 
contingency should be promptly initiated. 



Agreed that the United States should direct its efforts 
prior to tbe Geneva Conference toward: 

(1) Organizing a regional grouping, including initially 
the U.S., the U.K., France, the Associated States, 
Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines, 
for the defense of Southeast Asia against Communist 
efforts by any means to gain control of the countries 
in this area. 

(2) Gaining British support for U.S. objectives in the 
Far East, in order to strengthen U.S. policies in 
the area. 

(3) Pressing the French to accelerate the program for the 
independence of tbe Associated States, 

c_. Noted the President's view that, if agreement for the 
organization of the above-mentioned regional grouping could be achieved 
Congressional authorization for U.S. participation therein should then 
be requested. 



ihis document must not be 
reproduced without permission 

of the originating office. 



T^-'x f, "This document contains c£ pages. 
0j OtUklLl Copy No. 3__ of 



o~ copies. Series 



382 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Pro j eel Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOR SECRET 



2. The action set forth in paragraph 1-a above has been referred 
to the Secretary of Defense and the Director, Office of Defense Mobili- 
zation for appropriate implementation and was discussed at the Armed 
Forces Policy Council on 15 April 1954. The action in paragraph 1-b^ 
was referred to the Secretary of State, 

3. It is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff promptly prepare 
the military plans involved under paragraph 1-a^ above. It is further 
requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in close collaboration, under 
existing arrangements, with the Secretaries of the Military Departments 
and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense (Supply and Logistics), (Man- 
power and Personnel) and (Cpmptroller) , promptly develop the supply, man- 
power and other requirements arising from these military plans which 
might affect production, manpower and budgetary planning by the Depart- 
ment of Defense and the Office of Defense Mobilization. This military 
planning and the development of requirements should cover not only spe- 
cific intervention in Indochina, but also any augmentations in forces 

or supplies required to permit the United States to maintain at present 
levels its present defense commitments and to be prudently prepared to 
face possible increased risks of (1) Chinese Communist intervention and 
(2) general war. 

4. It is further requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff report 
to my office on the above by 10 May 1954. If it has not been possible 
to complete the planning by that date, a progress report on 10 May 1954 
is requested. 

5. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense (Supply and Logistics) and 
(Manpower and Personnel) will collaborate with the Office of Defense 
Mobilization, as appropriate, in the preparation of production and man- 
power plans based upon and required to implement thp. military plans. 

i 
5. • Because of the security sensitivity of this planning, appropri- 
ate security precautions will be taken by all concerned. 



/s/ 



C. E. WILSON 



cc: ASD (Comptroller) 

ASD (Manpower & Personnel) . 
ASD (Supply & Logistics) 
ASD (ISA) 
Office of Special Operations 



TO? ;.. I 



383 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



T 






Dear Alex: 



April 15, 1954 



This Department is becoming increasingly concerned regarding 
the lack of a U.S. position In preparation for the Indochina phase 
of the Conference to be held at Geneva. I fully appreciate the dif- 
ficulties which j up until this time, have made it very difficult to 
draft a position on Indochina. However, in- view of the short time 
remaining until the Conference convenes at Geneva, it is essential 
that consideration be given to the U.S. position. 

It appears to me that ample guidance is available to provide the 
basis for an initial draft of a U.S. Government position on Indochina 
for Geneva. NSC 5405 as well as reports of the Special Committee set 
forth, in positive terms, U.S. policy with respect to Indochina and 
Southeast Asia. At the meetings of the Indochina Working Group the 
need for a U.S. position on Indochina has been discussed at consider- 
able length, but to date no progress has been made. In order to 
initiate action on a draft position, the Defense representatives at 
the working level submitted an outline of views to the State members 
of the Indochina Working Group, A copy of this paper is attached for 
your information. 

In view of the foregoing I strongly recommend that immediate 
action be taken to draft a U.S. position paper on Indochina for the 
Conference at Geneva, I would be glad to discuss this matter further 
at your convenience or at a meeting of the Assistant Secretaries. 

Sincerely yours, 

For the..Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) : 

SIGNED 



1 Attachment 

Draft U.S. Position 

on Indochina for Geneva 



A. C. DAVIS 
Vice Admiral, USN 
Director, Office of 
Foreign Military Affairs 



The Honorable U, Alexis Johnson 

Coordinator, U.S. Delegation to Geneva Conference 

Department of State 

CASullivan/jg/14 Apr 54 
OASD(ISA) 2E832 79271 
1-11,691 



i 






f- f iv . 



J OLul\ 



38 



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: 



•T> 



E2AF1 



| tl ULi^B«ii 



warn) STAiss pcsitioji en bsbcchika to ee 2&xes at ckssa 



Assumptions 



-^ 



le ESC £IsO£j approved l6 SstLVtaxy 19>h $ continues to bo the policy 
of the United States Kith resssot to Southeast Asia* 



to 



2. It is highly improbable that Ceraninlst Sgrosnent could bo obtained 
a negotiated cattle iont uhich ::onld to consistent v:ith bacie United 
States objectives in Eoutlioast Asia* (JCS :..; norcr.dv-v^ 12 '"arch l?5'-0 • 

3« At Geneve.; the French Cover, at under continued ex ic pressure 
Kill favor a negotiated scttl^iont of the figxiting in Indochina at al-ost 
any price* .* - . 

m 

Discussion 



The French Covorrr:ont has "be-on \mdar considerable do^oetie prepare to 
tcr.rdr:at3 the hostilities in Indochina* in order to forestall a 3ho:;do;-;i3 
prior to Geneva j M. Laniel^ in a public stateneixt^ proposed six points ac 
.conditions for a ceaae-fire in Indochina. Thooe c5zi points uoiild usqtf&s- 
ticii " ~y bo unacceptable to the Co:v:niists^ particularly if reinforced by 
addition:-! conditions to assure enforcement of tho arustica terra. I:o;;avar^ 
d: eatic pressure on ths French Oovornncnt to *c iato hostilities ic ex- 

pected to increase dnrins tho cenroe of tho Geneva Coherence:,, rather then 
decrease* In viev: of this., it uould be c:ctro~oly difficult for the French 
Govarsrrant not to accept an agr&ensnt uhich ironld be lece than the conditions 
of tho la.nicl proposal* It should bo noted that although tho above f ac bora 
ssake it almost certain that tho Franch Government vill cod: a^ree^ent at 
Geneva at practically any price > there *hac boon no indication that this 
Vprice" has been considered realistically Vj tho Franch Govern:: jnt or public. 

Co::::mi^t tacticc at Geneva are likely to follow closely thoae tactics 



-%• 



employed by CcrrlTrilat negotiators at Panama j on . Corvceniet intransigence 
rnd other tactics,, chert of actually brcaliin;- off negotiation:^ led tc pro- 
longed diecueeions t;hieh ^orhed to tha disadvantage of our side. As a 
result, the Korean A^ree-ant in its final for" produced an nrruetica bring' 
in ^ about a coaee-firo but idth uhich. it haa bean irroooaible to aasure 
Co'aianiat compliance* On tha other hand^ in Korea tha United Nations .en- 
rand if required to live up faithfully to tha tcr^a of tho amietice. It 
should be noted that this prohlen ;;onld bo considerably r>ore co:;plc;: and 



- ,n. 






/ . 



The Tapart^ant of Eafenae hec considered tho r^ilitar^' iiplication^ 
of taridnatin^ tne fi^htin^ i>i Indochina under conditions loac than a 
nilitary d;:fcat of oxs^nissd Viet ::inh forces.* It tfas tha conclusion of 



•i 



. "«?# /t\ tj>i Ar j a-,:4 

SMit t- ! -^ r 4 



-5 ok; 



33 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



o 



D C ~7 

re ;i 



United States objectives in Southeast Asia, a continuation of fighting 
with the objective of seeking a military victory appears as the only 
alternative in Indochina. (JCS memorandum, TAB A). 

Conclusions 

If the Communists follow the same tactics they employed at Panmunjom, 
they will be prepared for a long and difficult negotiation. The French 
will find it almost impossible to withstand presures for a weakening of 
their position (the Laniel proposal) and will most likely give way under 
these pressures. Further, the French, once engaged in a negotiation, will 
of necessity be required to seek every possible means of settlement. 

The United States should not join with the French in any Indochina 
negotiations at Geneva unless there is prior French commitment not to ac- 
cept terms leading directly or indirectly to the loss of Indochina. This 
commitment should be positive and definite, for it would be difficult, if 
not impossible, for the United States to disassociate itself from the nego- 
tiations once they bad begun. Thus, if the negotiations result in a set- 
tlement leading to the ultimate loss of Indochina, the United States would 
have participated in this loss. 

Recommendations 

It is recommended that: 

a. The United States adopt the position that it is highly improbable 
that the Communist agreement could be obtained to a negotiated settlement 
at Geneva which would be consistent with basic United States objectives in 
Southeast Asia; 

b. The United States position for Geneva be positive and definite 
that we will agree to no settlement which would in any way compromise our 
objectives with respect to Southeast Asia; 

c. The French Government be informed of the United States position 
(a and b above) at 'the earliest possible date; 

d. Concurrently with informing the French of the United States posi- 
tion, consideration should also be given to the following pressures to be 
brought on the French if circumstances dictate: 

(1) If France through one means or another countenances a Com- 
munist takeover in Indochina, it will mean far more than the end of 
France's position in the Far East. Rather it will be a public ex- . 
hibition of France's inability to carry on any longer as an equal 
member with the United States and the United Kingdom of the Big Three; 

(2) The effect of abandonment would be so severe in North Africa 
as to have serious repercussions not only on the French position 
there, but also on the nature of the relationship between France and 
the United States in that area; 



TOP SE J 



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386 



Page , ? of 



opxes 



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. 



(3) I££ the Indochina :;ar ends on tcr;:3 considered i^atisf<~3£ory 
by tbo United States^ cur dollar aid to France would^ or ccur;::^ 
automatically cease* 






();) Beyond these pojL.ritj^_conei: si .<: <:i of negotiations P7 Pr^ni 
resulting in Con ittniet domination of Indochina^ an area of ektre-te 
strategic interest to the free worlds Kotild roeult in c: sqesnaes 
in Europe as veil as elsc&here v;hose ceriGU.5iio:;3 viould h£ft£ no 
pparent limitation. 



e 



Cc If the French Government refuses to agree to the United States pc:ii< 
tic:^ the United States Government should not participate in the Indochina 
discussions at Cenova; 

f* 5-he United States immediately detcrsnine whether in the event of (c) 
above^ ve should approach the Cbvernrpnts of the Associated States and ou^ 
allies tfith a vic;r to continuing the strusslo in Indochina either jo5^it3y 

I * 4 f*.Vl *J* *i ■-■• "H** >*" *ir»'-. ** "n ^ rtw**V5*^" **-!■'" Vi o - - *-* *i "1 *1 v ~ *v /*i **• "T "P T" !>/* r* "^ r " ? "i 1 * ; ' 1 %T\ *^ 1 r< 1*. ->-^r* 1 "J - .- 






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FROM: Geneva 
* 

TO: Secretary o:? Stats 

HO: DU1.TS 5, April 25, midnight 



Caatot! 10^-79 

r-j'd: April 25,195^ • / -< ? - r - -v- v -<--* 
11 : 18 p . rn . . < ..' ; , 77^ . ■ . - <£J 

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NIACT ' , . , _ 

I MuJiff-tjZ* ill ^1 

EYES ONLY ACTING SECRETARY FROM THE- SECRETARY }/ C y ,' ; '. i 

- — (pvs? c -^^^" 5 y 

1 met with Eden this evening at 10:15 p.m., following his arrival - 
from London, He had consulted Churchill, the Cabinet and British 
chiefs. He said that the United Kingdom is strongly opposed to *%4 
any intervention at Dien Bien Phu because it does not think it 01 ■ 
vrill have decisive effect and will not be understood by United ~- * 
Kingdom or free world opinion. He indicated that the views of ^.Q ' 
the British chiefs differ with ours and that British chiefs looks 
forward to a discussion and estimate with Radford in London, ln(j\ 
summary the British position is as follows: (l) The United 
Kingdom is prepared now to join with the United States in a 
cret study of measures which might be taken to defend Thailand 
and the rest of Southeast Asia if the French capitulate. 



L' *-^ 



1 

ro 

Eden saw Bidault at Orly tonight on bis way through Paris ( where Q] 
he stopped to pick up Mrs. Eden) and outlined, to him the British «> 
position as follows: (1) The United Kingdom will give the 
French all possible diplomatic support in Geneva to reach a satis- 
factory settlement on Indochina. (2) If such a settlement is 
reached the United Kingdom will be willing to join with United 
States and others in guaranteeing that settlement. (5) If 
fails the United Kingdom will be prepared to join the 
to examine the situation urgently" to see what should be 






Geneva 
others 
done . 



C 



<* 




I said to Eden that while I hacL reservations myself about air * 
intervention at Dien Bien Phu at this moment without an adequate 
political basis for such action, his r.eply was most discouraging 
in that it seemed to leave the French nothing to fall back on. 
If French are to stand loss of Dien Bien Phu they must be strength- 
ened and a declaration of common intent would do this. In essence " 
the United Kingdom was asking the French to negotiate and at the 



„\ - 



same time telling them that if the negotiation failed that they 
-would be glad to examine what could be done. Given the present 
t/ Ereoch situation with which Eden is fully familiar, I said to 
* -Eden that I doubted that there would be French will to stand *\m 



•:-- 



to their adversaries at Geneva-. 



*"» 



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... — Eden mads^quite clear that the United Kingdom J.s opposed *to*air 

f . ... ' . 4716V 5S8 intervention - WfclCTia m "} 

pjl • o This copy must be returned to*t R^G^Sw with notation of action taken o C ''.!' 'L c ; :; :v » ' 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number. NND 633 1 6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET 
-2- DULTE 5, April 25, midnight from Geneva : 

intervention at Dien Bien Pbu and also opposed to becoming 
directly involved in any way with the Indocbinese war. 

■ 

Referring to the rest of Southeast Asia, he said the British 
were confident that they had the situation in Malaya in hand 
and mentioned that they had 22 "battalions there and 100,000 
native police. He said that there was no parallel between 
Indochina and Malaya. ~ ; # ■ , •]■ 



% 






• 



Eden also showed me a map of Indochina prepared by Alexander 
and the British chiefs. The map indicates that virtually all 
of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia is under or subject to imminent 
control by the Viet Minh. The British believe that the only 
way to cope with the situation is to commit a strong force to 
the Hanoi delta and generally work outward concentrically con- 
solidating their position as they go with loyal natives. This 
they believe is a "tremendous project involving lots of time 
and considerable forces." . • 

if 

I said to Eden I felt the position which his Government had 
taken would have so little in it in way of comfort to the- 
French that the prospect of the latter standing firm here was 
very slight. It would be a tragedy not to take steps now which 
would prevent Indochina from being written off. "'-*-. - 

Eden said that there was obviously a difference In the United 
States and the United Kingdom estimates and thinking but the 
United Kingdom proposals which he had outlined above vere as 
far as the British Government could go. 



DUIIES 



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FROM: Geneva 

TO: Secretary of Stats 

HO: DULTE 9, April 26, 9 p.n. 

NIACT 



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SENT DEPARTMENT DULTE 9; REPEATED OT0RMTI0N LONDON 73, PARIS 
122. 

DEPARTMENT EYES ONLY ACTING SECRETARY -PROP 1 SECRETARY 



PARIS AND LONDON EYES 0NI.Y AMBASSADOR 



at 



met for about an hoar this afternoon with Eden and Bidault 
latter 1 s villa. Meeting was called at latter T s request . 
with no (repeat no) indication its purpose. 

After some discussion procedural problems Indochina conference 
(reported separately) discussion turned to Bao Dai's declara- 
tion in Paris and current attitude, Bidault told us that he 
understands Bao Dai named as his personal representative and 
• observer a former member Ho Chi Minh f s cabinet but that Bidault 
has not (repeat not) been able to confirm observer's arrival at 
his station in Evian. 

Bidault then launched into rather confused discussion of prob- 
lem his government faces with regard to establishing position 
for Indochina negotiation which he said was extremely diffi- 
cult during nrogress of Dion *BIen Phu battle. He touched 

*1_ — te -m. - 

lightly on 'whole range of possibilities Including collective 
defense j cease-fire and partition. He mentioned further de- 
terioration in political situation in Associated States. 



01 



' » 



\ 



; 




Eden picked up the question of cease-fire and encouraged fur 
ther discussion by Bidault this subject with cryptic remark 
that a month ago 'British had felt cease-fire due to general 
| infiltration was dangerous but that now without having any 
'(clear view they were not (repeat not) so sure, I pointed i 
1 that cease-fire at Dion Blen Phu locally would be in fact 
! surrender and that cease-fire generally would Involve serious 
risk of native peoples l rising with resultant massacre- of 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



T . 



TO? SECRiS 



-2- DULTK 9, April 26, 9 P-^o-, frdtn G: va. 






general cease-fire lacking any-control or safeguards would 
make it impossible for French Union forces to resume fighting 
once cease-fire established, Bi ult Said that the French 
Government bad queried French High Command in Indochina and 
bad received; a reply that there would either have to be a final 
cease-fire or further reenforcetnents would have to be sent to 
Indochina during the conference. 






^ 



As indicative of Bidault's continuing courage 9 he said that . 
when he saw Molotov tomorrow he intended to stand on L&niel's 
statement of March 5 and attempt to draw Molotov out without 
■ ceding ground himself and without getting involved in detailed " 
discussions of substance on an Indochina settlement. 

In my Judgment, Eden has arrived with instructions actively to 
encourage French into almost any settlement which will result 
in cessation hostilities in Indochina. My guess is that behind 
"this lies British fear that if fighting continues ^ we will in 
one way or another become involved j thereby enhancing rlslc 
Chinese intervention and. possibility further expansion of war. 
This estimate of mine is confirmed by facVth^t Ghauvel told 
MacArtbur that French believe Eden's instructions are to pre&s 
actively for a cease-fire. 

I made clear to Bidault privately that we would have- no (repeat 
no) part in settlement at Geneva of Indochina war which con- 
stituted surrender of Indochina to Communists,, and that France 
has better chance by fighting on rather than by attempted with- 
drawal which would be under most difficult conditions*, i in- 
tend to see Eden alone tomorrow morning to talk with extreme 
bluntness to him expressing my dismay that British are apparently 
encouraging French in direction surrender which is in conflict 
not (repeat not) only with our interest but what i conceive 
theirs to be. 



JJL/12 



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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 201 1 



LlUi OLuhL.1 



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 



WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 



27 April 1954 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 



Subject: French Request for Additional Aid 

References: a. NIACT 4085 

b. SECTO 14 



1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff lack verified logistical infor- 
mation, including the comments of the Chief, MAAG, Indochina in 
regard to feasibility of the aid requested by the French. This 
information has been requested as soon as possible. 

2, Pending receipt of such data and comments from Chief, 
MAAG, Indochina, which may materially alter the observations 
on feasibility which follow, the comments of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff on the French request are indicated below: 

a^. From the viewpoint of military effectiveness the pro- 
posal offers little insofar as relief of Dien Bien Phu is 
concerned. 



b_. It would appear that the psychological aspect could 
be satisfied by confining the operation to one field only — 
that at Seno. 

£. The Seno airfield appears also to be the only one in 
which rehabilitation and preparation are feasible within any- 
thing like the timing proposed. Preparation of the two other 
fields included in the French request would require from 2 to 
4 weeks and greatly increased supply, logistic and construc- 
tion effort. 

d_. It should be pointed out that the proposal is by no 
means a "one shot 11 affair but represents a continuing logis- 
tic supply requirement of no small proportions with a corre- 
sponding reduction of the airlift capabilities of CINCFE, 



Copy / of 7 Copies each 



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SecDef Ccmt. No. 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






T 



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e. The matter of local defense of the fields, when opera- 
tional, adds to the continuing logistic supply effort. 

f. The project, even reduced to consideration of the one 
field at Seno, unquestionably involves continuing participa- 
tion of U.S. military forces in active operations. The pros- 
pects of disengaging them appear remote if the fields are to 
remain in active operation, as the capabilities of the French 
to take on the continuing supply effort are questionable. In 
fact, the probability of continuing and expanded participa- 
tion by U.S. military personnel is high. Increased risk of 
U.S. personnel casualties is also involved. 

£. The question resolves itself really to whether or not 
we are, under the guise of a last minute effort to relieve 
Dien Bien Phu to commence active participation by U.S. forces 
in the Indochina war, 

h. With regard to the furnishing of privateer aircraft 
this request can be handled through regular MDAP channels, but 
expedited. The first ten airplanes. are now being assembled 
and prepared, and air delivery to Saigon will be expedited. 
The additional ten can be provided at a later date. 

3. In summary: 

a_. Employment of U.S. planes and crews, and GOA and 
supervisory construction personnel, on missions stated, 
would have the following major military consequences: 

(1) Involve U.S. Armed Forces in direct participation 
in military operations in Indochina. 

■ 

(2) Mounting scale of U.S. Armed Forces participation 
due to requirements for local security, and increasing de- 
mands for combat and service support for both U.S. and 
French forces. 






(3) Greatly increased risk of U.S. personnel casualties 
due to enemy action, including capture. 

(4) Some increased risk of armed intervention by Com- 
munist Chinese forces. 

Jd. Within the approximate time limits suggested, the re- 
habilitation and extension of the field at Seno appears to be 
feasible. 



393 



top: 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Projeci Number: NND 63316. By; NW'D Date: 201 1 



TO? SEC,:! 



£. From the military viewpoint, insofar as relief of 
Dien Bien Phu is concerned, the project is of little value. 

<i. Psychological aspects might well be satisfied by 
confining projects to the field at Seno only. 

e t Maintaining Seno field operational would require 
a continuing supply effort of considerable proportions. 

f_ . Local defense of field and any ground line of com- 
munications would have to be increased to counter Viet Minh 
guerrilla operations which would increase with the added 
importance of the airfield. 

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider* that: 

au From a military viewpoint, the propoi- of the French, 
except for supply of naval aircraft, should be rejected. 

b^ If, for other than military reasons, the proposal is 
approved, the U.S. commitment should be limited to rehabilita- 
tion and extension of the Seno airfield. 



* The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army invites attention to his addi- 
tional views expressed at the 6 April 1954 meeting of the Armed 
Forces Policy Council and submitted through the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff to the Secretary of Defense for his information by a cover- 
ing memorandum, dated 22 April 1954, subject: "Indochina." 



For the Joint Chiefs of Staff 



s 



for ARTHUR KADFOKD, 

Chairman , 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. 



394 



i 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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from: Geneva 

i 

TO: Secretary of St'ito 

no: CULTS 13, April 27, midnight 



lbs*dJ April 27, 
9:25 p.m. 



195^ 



1 ' 
•_ . 

v 



NIACf 

SEN? DEPARTMENT DOLTS 13 REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 77 PARIS 
127. 

EYES ONLY ACTING SECRETARY. 
EYES ONLY AMBASSADORS. 



CI 

***** 

r,-, 

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o 

I saw Eden and his immediate,!! advisors for a few minutes befors ^ N 
his luncheon April 27. I opened by saying that I wanted to speeds 
frankly concerning our own immediate affairs. I said I con- y t 
sidered it great mistake to push French in direction cease-fire^ 
whisb I believed would bo a disaster. I said I considered it *£ 
of utmost Importance that we both keep French in mood to fight 
on in Indochina. If that mq'od is lost surely disaster would 
follow with little chance of limiting its scope and indeed 
little chance of French extricating themselves. 

Eden replied with some heat that ho was not advocating a cease- 
fire though he admitted that he had told Bidault that he was 
less sure today than a, month ago that a cease-fire was out of 
the question. He insisted that all he had been thinking of had 
been a cease-fire with adequate safeguards and controls. His 
purpose he said -had been to concentrate French thinking on latter 
points, '< w , 




I interjected that I did not think three of us were presenting 
a very irrpressive or cohesive position. I reminded him that I 
wanted immediate ad hoc plans covering Southeast Asia including 
Indochina if Geneva failed but that British were against this. 
French I said had in effect no government and were atr a loss as 
to 'what to do. They were drifting toward disaster. I was con- 
cerned that we were not doing all possible between us to shore 
up French resolution. I said there was a basic difference be- 
tween us in that British seemed to think that plans for a "joint 
defense were more apt to spread .conflict tha^i absence of a ij : + 
plans. ;.''"'" 



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Eden said that what worried them in London apart from political . 
aspects was that they felt military intervention would" be "terrj: 

bigger affair then Korea , which could get us r 

where . 
SECRET 

385 ' ■ 










43 BIS 



CC/V, 1 ? CU 

Fr:;ii'iY;) 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 




! 



SECRET .". ' 

- '- 'i:r. :i.y?, -O, April 27, midnight, from Geneva , 

■■i 
* 

where- They just did nob believe that It was a realizable 
Liitapy exercise considering the military means available. 
yioi^aovov Eden said it would be* most unpopular in Asia let alone 

v ■ British home opinion, 

* ■ 

den -hen asked if our tripartite position was really as bad 
as 3 bad pointed it. He said he felt that other side was properly 
vorr Led , « 

t agreed but said in all frankness they were more worried about 
United States than British, 

Eder did not deny tbis J and said that we must see how things go 
here In next few days and do what we can to buck French up par- 
ticularly if Dien Bien Phu falls, 

1 laid I was deeply worried over French situation not alone in its 
relation with Indochina. NATO was directly affected, The fall 
of Laniel might result in a left- of -center government corning to 
power which would exist by Communist sufferance., thereby in- 
creasing*' Communist influence domestically in France and by con- 
tagion in Italy which country was also a source of serious con- 
eern, 1 said EDO would be affected 3 and our entire defense 
structure In Europe, At this point Bidault arrived and we broke 
off our col • : -tion* 

DULLES 

JEF:11 . ' 

?;QTi<;: Mr, Oilman (s/s) notified 4/27/5^ 11 p.m., EH. 






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Control: 



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FRO.'!: Geneva 



April 29, 195 
6:10 a .ra. 



TO: Secretary Ox State 

110: DULTE 21, April 29, 10 a.m. 



« 



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EYES ONLY ACTING SECRETARY FOR PRESIDENT FROiM SECRETARY. . 

Developments.. have been so rapid and almost every hour so 
filled with high-level talks that evaluation has been dif- 
ficult. My present estimates follow: 

(l) Indochina- Delay in fall of Dion Bien Phu has resulted 
in some French discounting of this development. Nevertheless , 
it must be assumed the French will not continue in any long- 
range operation unless it will defeinitely relieve the strain 
on French manpower in Indochina . Present French Government 
holding on because their Parliament in recess and probably 
no one eager to take over at this juncture. Bidault given 
considerable discretion because present Cabinet cannot make 
up its mind on any course. Therefore, we do not have anyone 
on French side with whom we can make any dependable agree- 
ments. After deputies return and Dion Bien Phu falls , there - 
may veil be a change of government, probably to the left, 
committed to liquidate Indochina. However, this is more 
easily said than done and it is possible that as this fact 
develops a French Government might 'be prepared to sit down 
with us seriously and consider some joint program which is 
something that so far they have evaded- 

I do not know whether from military standpoint it would be 
deemed feasible" to end the scattering ahd exposure of mil- 
itary forcYs for local political reasons and withdraw present 
forces to defensible enclaves in deltas where they would have 
US sea and air protection meanwhile retail^ enough territory 
and enough prestige to develop really effective indigenous 
army along lines suggested by ! Daniel. This might, I suppose, 
take .two years and would require in large part taking over 
training responsibility by US. Also full Independence and * 
increased economic aid would probably be required to help 
maintain friendly governments in areas chosen for recruitment. 



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I .do not have any 
and Admiral Davis 



idea as to whether this is militarily feasible ~ 
inclines to view that it is not. However. ' 



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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






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TOP SECRET 

* 

DULTE 21, April 29, 10 a.m. from Geneva. 



from political standpoint this type of program appears oo 
offer best hope of France staying In war. If France and US 
agree on such" a plan, there vould. be fair chance of Australia 
and New Zealand coming along. However, this estimate can be 
improved in next day or two. after I have conferred further 
with Foreign Minister Casey and Prime Minister Vfebb. It is 
unlikely that tVie UK would initially participate and vould 
probably use its influence to prevent participation by 
Australia and New Zealand. The UK situation would be dif- 
ficult internally and externally, and there would probably 
be undesirable repercussions upon other NATO partners. 
Thailand could be expected to cooperate if we act promptly. 
Foreign Minister Wan gave further assurance today and urges 
quick military conversations. 

The attitude here of Molotov and Chou En-lai's statement 
yesterday lead me to rate more highly than heretofore the 



(2) UK attitude Is one of Increasing weakness. British see 
to feel that ve are disposed to accept present risks of a 
* Chinese war and this, coupled also with their fear that ve 
vould start using atomic weapons. -has badly frightened them. 
I have just received a note from Eden referring to my paper 



m 



. read bef< ^M^o restricted courie {J^^ave^W^eh again urges 
necessl 't:y bT consultation before\any use. He says. "You 
know our strongly -held views on twe need for consultation 



before any decision Is taken- n 

(5) General; The decline of France^ the great weakness of 
Italy , and the considerable weakness\in England create a 
situation where J think that if ve ourselves are clear as 
to what should be done, ve must be prow red to take the 
leadership in what ve think is the righk course } having 
regard to long-range US interest which Includes importance 
of Allies. I believe that our Allies will be inclined to 
follow, if not immediately, then ultimate%, strong and 
sound leadership. In saying this, 1 do not underestimate 
the irnrnese difficulty of our finding the right course in 
this troubled situation. Nor do I mean to imply that I 
think that this Is the moment for a bold or war -like course. 
I lack here the US political and NSG judgments needed for 
overall evaluation. 



HTM/8 



DULLES 






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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 



WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 



30 April 1954 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 



Subject: Suspension of U.S. Military Aid to 

Indochina in Event of a Cease Fire* 



1. The possibility exists that a cease fire in Indochina 
may be agreed upon either at Geneva or unilaterally between 
the French and the Viet Minh. In that event, the Viet Minh 
would likely covertly extend their control over large areas 
currently held by French Union Forces and cause major defec- 
tions of these forces. This would result in a quick deteriora* 
tion of the entire French Union position and enable the Viet 
Minh to seize large amounts of U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance 
Program (MDAP) materiel and supplies, 

2. In light of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
consider it necessary that the United States adopt the follow- 
ing position reference future MDAP assistance to Indochina: 

In the event of a cease fire in Indochina, the shipment 
of military end itesas under U.S. MDAP provided under the 
"Agreement for Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina 
between the United States of America and Cambodia, France, 
Laos, and Vietnam," will immediately be suspended, except 
forfor such spares and associated maintenance items necessary 
to the maintenance of equipment in operations. The entire 
question of U.S. aid to Indochina will be re-examined in 
the light of circumstances then existing. 

3. It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the 
"Agreement for Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina between 
the United States of America and Cambodia, France, Laos, and 
Vietnam," of 23 December 1950, provides adequate legal basis 
for subject suspension. 

* 

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you secure 
governmental acceptance of the position proposed in paragraph 
2 above. 



399 



Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






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HIE 63-54 
Approved 28 April 1954 
Published 30 April 1954 



The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this 

estimate on 28 April 19SL The ABC and FBI abstained, 

the subject Icing outside of their jurisdiction. 





CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 



AGENCY 



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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 20) I 



SECRET 



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of 



CONSEQUENCES WITHIN INDOCHINA OF THE FALL 
. • ' OF DIEN BiEN PHU' 



THE PROBLEM 

To estimate the probable consequences within Indochina, during the next two or 
three months of the fall of Dien Bien Phu within the near future. 



;ei 



Xh 



Oi 

;c]- 



SCOPE 

The consequences of the fall of Dien Bien Phu on the political situation in France,, 
and the repercussions of major decisions in France or Geneva on the situation in In- 
dochina, are excluded from the scope of this estimate. 



CONCLUSIONS 



1. The fall of Dien Bien Phu would have 
far-reaching and adverse repercussions, 
but it would not signal the immediate 
collapse of the French Union political 
and military situation in Indochina. As 
a consequence of the fall of Dien Bien 
Phu, the morale of French Union forces 
would receive a severe blow, A crucial' 
factor in the military situation there- 
after would be the reliability of native 
units, particularly the Vietnamese. There 
would almost certainly be increased de- 
sertions, and the possibility cannot be ex- 
cluded that the native components of 
French Union forces might disintegrate. 
However, we believe that such disintegra- 
tion would be unlikely during the ensu- 
ing two or three months, and that for at 
least this period the major part of the 
native troops would probably remain 
loyal. 



2. Assuming no such disintegration, the 
fall of Dien Bien Phu would not in itself 
substantially alter the relative military 
capabilities of French Union and Viet 
Minh forces in Indochina during the ne 
two or three months. The French stand 
at Dien Bien Phu has produced certain 
compensatory military results. It has 
prevented an overrunning of Laos and 
has resulted in the inflicting of casualties 
upon the Viet Minh comparable in num- 
ber to the total French force committed 
at Dien Bien Phu. The bulk of Viet Minh 
forces released by the fall of Dien Bien 
Phu would probably not be able to move, 
regroup, and re-equip in time to be em- 
ployed in new major operations during 
the next two or three months, although 
some lightly equipped infantry battalions 
might be made available more rapidly ,f or 
operations in the Delta region, ■ 



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3. Although the Viet Minh have a sub- 
stantial capability to organize demon- 
strations and carry out sabotage and 
terrorist activities in the major cities of 
Indochina, we believe that French Union 
forces could maintain control in those 
cities. 

4. The political consequences in Indo- 
china of the fall of Dien Bien Phu would 
be considerably more adverse than the 
strictly military consequences and would 
increase the tempo of deterioration in the 
over-all French Union position in Indo- 

l china, particularly in Vietnam, There 
r would probably, be a serious decline in 
the Vietnamese will to continue the war 
and to support the Vietnamese military 
[ programs. However, we believe that gen- 
eral collapse of French and native gov- 
ernmental authority during the next two 



■' 



or three months would be prevented by 
the continued existence of organized 
French Union forces and the hope among 
Indoehinese that the US might intervene 
in Indochina. 

5. We believe that although the fall of 
Dien Bien Phu would 'not immediately 
lead to collapse of the French Union posi- 
tion in Indochina, it would accelerate the 
deterioration already evident in the 
French Union military and political posi- 
tion there. If this trend were not check- 
ed, it could bring afaou' a collapse of the 
French Union position during the latter 
half of 1954. It should be emphasized 
that this estimate does not consider the 
repercussion of major decisions in France 
or Geneva and elsewhere, which could* 
have a decisive effect on the situation in 
Indochina. 



DISCUSSION 



6. We believe that the fall of Dien Bien Phu, 
if it occurred as assumed in the problem, 
would result from: (a) French capitulation; 
or (b) an overwhelming of the French either 
by assault or ay gradual constriction of the 
French position. 



.* 



7. If the French were to capitulate without 
further heavy fighting, the adverse military 
and political consequences would be essen- 
tially similar in kind, though possibly of 
greater intensity, to those accompanying the 
fall of the fortress through heavy fighting. 
Viet Minh losses in the event of capitulation 
would be less than those which would be in- 
curred during further heavy fighting. 

8. In any event, the Viet Minh would have 
suffered heavy losses in the prolonged fighting 
at Dien Bien Phu. Estimated Viet Minh cas- 
ualties in the fighting there to date are ap- 
proximately 13,000; roughly 50 percent of this 
number have been killed or rendered perma- 



nently ineffective. Although a few experi- 
enced units have been sent as reinforcements, 
individual replacements for the most part 
have consisted of partially trained personnel. 
As a result of the Dien Bien Phu operation, 
the effectiveness of the Viet Minh offensive 
striking force will be greatly reduced dining 
the next two or three months. \ 

9. French Union casualties at D n Bien Phu 
to date have been approximately 5,500. The 
defeat of the force now at Dien Bien Phu 
would add another 11,000, thus ringing the 
total French Union losses to roughly 17,000. 
At least two-thirds of these troops are experi- 
enced, professional units from Algerian colo- 
nial and foreign legion forces. Moreover, six 
of the thirteen parachute battalions in 1 
French Union forces in Indochina are at Dien 
Bien Phu. The lo'ss of these elite French 
Union troops would reduce the French Union 
offensive striking force by approximated one- 



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quarter, thus markedly reducing over-all 
French Union capabilities for offensive opera- 
tions in Indochina. 

10. As a consequence of the fall of Dien Bien 
phu, the morale of the French Union forces 
would receive a severe blow. Their will to win 
would be diminished, largely because of a 
widespread belief that military victory was no 
.longer possible. The loss of morale would 
probably not be sufficient to reduce the effec- 
tiveness of the professional soldiers"" of the 
French Expeditionary force. However, a cru- 
cial factor in the military situation thereafter 
would be the reliability of native units, par- 
ticularly the Vietnamese. There would al- 
most certainly be an increase in Vietnam 
desertions, and the possibility cannot be ex- 
cluded that the native components of French 
Union forces might disintegrate. However, we 
believe that such disintegration would be un- 
likely during the ensuing two or three months, 
and that for at least this period the major 
part of the native troops would probably re- 
main loyal. Therefore, we estimate that the 
impact upon the morale of the French Union 
forces would be severe, but not of such severity 
as to preclude their employment as an effec- 
tive military force during the next two or 
three months. 

11. The fall of Dien Bien Phu would not in 
itself substantially alter the relative military 
capabilities of French Union and Viet Minh 
forces in Indochina during the next two or 
three months unless there were large-scale 
desertions from the French Union forces. The 
victorious Viet Minh troops at Dien Bien Phu 
would have suffered heavy casualties and their 
efficiency would be reduced. In order to bring 
these forces up to full strength, the Viet Minh 
would probably move them from Dien Bien 
Phu to their main supply and training areas 
adjacent to the Red River delta. Prior to the 
rainy season, this redeployment would require 
at least three to four weeks. After the full 
onset of the rainy season, which is unlikely 
before mid-May, the movement would take be- 
tween two and three months to complete. We 
therefore estimate that the bulk of the Viet 
Minh troops at Dien Bien Phu would not be 
available for major operations elsewhere in 



Indochina during the next two or three 
months, although seme lightly-equipped in- 
fantry battalions "might be made available 
more rapidly for operations in the Delta re- 



i 



gion. 

12, Although the over-all capabilities of the 
Viet Minh \v9uld be reduced as a consequence 
of the losses inflicted upon their main striking 
force, Viet Minh forces elsewhere in Indo- 
china would have the capability during the 
rainy season to maintain and in some in- 
stances increase military pressure against 
French Union forces. In the Red River delta, 
they could intensify efforts to sever land com- 
munications between Hanoi and Haiphong, 
ambush French detachments, attack villages, 
air bases, and other installations, and lay 
siege to isolated French delta strong points. 
The scale of Viet Minh operations in the 
Delta, however, would be restricted by the 
adverse effects of heavy rains on maneuver- 
ability. The Viet Minh could use their force 
concentrated in the Pleiku region in southern 
Annam to launch fairly large-scale attacks 
against French forces engaged in the 
"Atlante" operation. They could also use 
units from this force for raiding operations 
in the Mekong River area or to reinforce the 
Viet Minh battalions now in Cambodia. Com- 
bat operations in southern Annam, the Me- 
kong valley, and in Cambodia would be re- 
stricted by the tenuous nature of resupply 
of ammunition and other military equipment 
for these units. The Viet Minh could at the 
same time organize demonstrations and carry 
out sabotage and terrorist activities in the 
major cities of Indochina. The Viet Minh 
capability in this regard is probably sub- 
stantial. 

13. French Union forces, assuming no major 
Vietnamese defections, would have the capa- 
bility to maintain their present major forti- 
fied positions in the Delta, and elsewhere 
maintain control in the major cities, prevent 
the permanent severing of land communica- 
tions between Hanoi and Haiphong, repulse 
Viet Minh attacks in southern Annam* and 
the Mekong River area, and retain the area 
liberated In the "Atlante" operation. If the 
Viet Minh were to undertake a major military 



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. . 



TROOP STRENGTHS AND DISPOSITIONS 



FRENCH UNION 

Regular and Light Bns 274 . . . 402,000 

Semi-Military . . .... . . . 203,500 

Total , 605,500 



VIET MINH 
Regular and Regional Ens 155 
Semi-Military 

Total . .* 



185,000 
106,000 

■* 

291,000 



MAJOR CONCENTRATIONS I 



65 Regular Bns (35 Fr. Ex. Force) 
19 Light Bus 
83,000 semi-military 



DELTA 



DIEN BIEN PHU 



16 Regular Bns (15 Fr. Ex. Force) 



NORTHERN TONKIN 
(Less DB Phu Area) 



NORTHERN LAOS 



14 Regular Bns (10 Fr. Ex. Force) 



2 Light Bns 



THAKHEK-SAVANNAKHET 



17 Regular Bns (13 Fr. Ex. Force) 



3 Light Bns 



CENTRAL VIETNAM 



35 Regular Bns (10 Fr. Ex. Force) 



16 Light: 



COCHIN CHINA 



17 Regular Bns (3 Fr. Ex. Force) 



20 Light Bns 



SOUTHERN LAOS and 
NORTHEASTERN CAMBODIA 



8 Regular Bns (3 Fr. Ex. Force) 



WESTERN CAMBODIA 



11 Regular Bns (0 Fr. Ex. Force) 



3 Light Bns 



22 Regular Bns 
10 Regional Bns 
35,000 semi-military 



28 Regular Bns 
2 Regional Bns 



13 Regional Bns 



3 Regular Bns 
2 Regional Bns 



8 Regular Bns 
4 Regional Bns 



14 Regular Bns 
7 Regional Bns 



10 Regular Bns 
2 Regional Bns 



4 Regular Bns 



Elements 



1 These dispositions cover only infantry units. The regional breakdown does not include the total nurrvber 
of Viet Minh and French bns. 



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operation against Cambodia, the defense of 
Cambodia would require troops from other 
areas. French Union forces would retain the 
capability to launch limited offensive opera- 
tions before the full onset of the rainy season, 
either in the Reel River delta region or on the 
coast of Annam. 

14. The political consequences in Indochina 
of the fall of Dien Bien Phu would be con- 
siderably more adverse than the strictly mili- 
tary consequences, although the two are in- 
terrelated. The defeat would increase the 
tempo of deterioration in the over-all French 
Union position in Indochina, particularly in 
Vietnam. The principal political consequences 
would be: (a) a major blow to French prestige 

- among the Indochinese, and an increased 
•conviction oh their part that the French were 

. unable to protect them against the Vict Minh; 
(b) a serious' decline in French and Indo- 
Chinese will to continue the war, and in par- 
ticular a further decline in popular support 

m fa Vietnam for Vietnamese military pro- 
grams; (c) exacerbation of French-Indo- 
chinese relations, partly as a result of in- 
creased Indochinese suspicions that the 
French will "sell out" to the Viet Minh; (cl) 
a sharp increase of "flense sitting*' among 
politically conscious groups previously dis- 
posed to support the Vietnam Government; 

" and (c) a sharp increase, particularly among 
Vietnamese, of covert support of the Viet 
Minh. However, we believe that a general 
collapse of French and native governmental 
authority during the next two or three months 
would be prevented by the continued exist- 
ence of organized French Union foi'ces and 



the hope that the US might intervene in In- 
dochina. 

15. The political effect in Laos would probably 
be similar to that of Vietnam. However, the 
Laotians would probably display a greater dis- 
position than the Vietnamese to stand by the 
French and tQ continue the war effort. 

16. The political effect on Cambodia would be 
extremely uncertain. The internal security 
of Cambodia and a certain minimum stability 
might be maintained, but Cambodia's vulnera- 
bility to future Viet Minh pressure would in- 
crease. 

17. The Viet Minh would make every effort to 
make political capital of their victory at Dien 
Bien Phu. They would concentrate on in* 
creasing the sense of hopelessness in the Asso- 
ciated States, and would seek to convince the 
Indochinese that the triumph at Dien Bien 
Phu signalled their imminent "deliverance"* 
from colonial rule by fellow countrymen. 
They would intensify current efforts to en- 
hance the status of the so-called "People's 
Governments" of Laos and Cambodia. 

18. We believe that although the fall of Dien 
Bien Phu would not immediately lead to col- 
lapse of the French Union position in* Indo- 
china, it would accelerate the deterioration 
already evident in the French Union military 
and political position there. If this trend 
were not checked, it could bring about a 
collapse of the French Union position during 
the latter half of 1954. It should be empha- 
sized that this estimate does not consider the 
repercussion of major decisions in France or 
Geneva and elsewhere which are likely to have 
a decisive effect on the situation ir Indochina. 



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I OO C H I N A 

The following are comments made by Major General Thomas J. H* 
Trapnall, Junior, former Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group 
(MAAC-) Indochina, at his debriefing, 3 May 195^. 

GENERAL 

The battle of Indochina is an armed revolution which is now in its eighth 
year. It is a savage conflict fought in a fantastic country in which the battle 
may be waged one day in waist-deep muddy rice paddies or later in an impenetrable 
mountainous jungle. The sun saps the vitality of friend and foe alike, but par- 
ticularly the European soldier. Torrential monsoon rains turn the delta battle- 
ground into a vast swamp which no conventional vehicle can successfully negotiate. 
It is a war of many paradoxes - 

Where there is no popular will to win on the part of the Vietnamese. 

Where the leader of the Rebels is more popular than the Vietnamese 
Chief of State. 

Where a sizeable French army is composed of relatively few Frenchmen. 

Where the partners of the Associated States regard each other as more 
dangerous than the enemy. 

Where a large segment of the population seeks to expel the French at 
any price, possibly at the cost of extinction as a new nation. 

This is a war which has no easy and immediate solution, a politico-military 
chess game in which the players sit thousands of miles distant -- in Paris, 
Washington, Peiping, and Moscow. 

STRATEGIC "POSITION OF INDOCHINA 

■*— — ^— ^— ^— ^— — ■ - — - 

i 

The autonompus Associated States of Indochina consist of Viet Nam, Laos, 
and Cambodia. They occupy a blocking position against the expansion of Chinese 
Communist influence along the principal routes of communication in Southeast Asia. 
If this area, approximately the size of the state of Texas, defects or is neutral- 
ized the frontiers of Burma, Thailand and Malaya would immediately be exposed 
and eventually the positions of Austi-alia, New Zealand, India, Ceylon, Pakistan, 
Indonesia and the Philippines would be weakened. A state of Civil War presently 
exists in Indochina, which pits the Communist Viet Minh against French Union 
forces essentially deveoted to the ideals of freedom. Other issues, such as 
varieties of Nationalism, are involved as well. Moreover, a state of transition 
is concurrently ruiderway in which a formerly strong Colonial power is crumbling. 
France is giving way to a self-determination movement by the indigenous peoples, 
who, while numbering more than 30 million, lack stability and security. The 
population of the three states is not completely compatible in matters of economics. 

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culture, religion, ethnic origins, philosophy or political goals. Therefore, a 
compromise position has "been reached in which the principal state of Viet Nam, 
eonibirdng the former protectorates of Annam and Tonkin with the ex-colony of 
Cochin China, has entered into a loose state of alliance with the lesser states 
of Laos and Cambodia, and with France. This federation is called the French 
Union. The exact relationship of each autonomous state to France has as yet 
not been completely determined. This indecision is, moreover, complicated by 
natural rivalries existing among the states, even extending to political tribal 
groups within the states. 

The topography of Indochina is varied and consists of extensive mountains, 
jungles, rivers, canals assd major deltas* A remarkable compartment at ion results. 
Military operations in a given area may be conducted with almost complete disre- 
gard of the situation in the adjacent compartment. While essentially the ground 
war presently is the dominant military activity, great potentials in amphibious, 
naval and air warfare by French Union Forces exist which should be exploited 
increasingly. Poor internal communications and 1,599 miles of coastline are 
factors dictating the advisability of utilizing more effectively the combat power 
of the combined arms. 

The political situation in France and Indochina requires a complicated 
system of military administration. Four national armies comprise the French 
Union Ground Forces. The French Far East Territorial Force, numbering roughly 
^ million troops, equals the combined totals of the three indigenous armies, 
of which only that of Viet Nam may be considered as significant. Military 
responsibility is being delegated to the Associated States to the degree that 
their state of military development and capabilities so warrant. The pentalateral 
agreement of 23 December 1950 is the authority for existing relationships. The 
United States Is a signatory to this document which extends MDAP Into Indochina, 
Significantly, the conflict in Indochina has not been "internationalized" such 
as in Korea. Of the French Union partners, only France is a member of the United 
Nations., France has specifically opposed UN intervention on the presumption that 
its control of the Union would eventually be weakened by UN participation. On 
the enemy-side, the rebel army of 300,000 troops could not be supported without 
the substantial aid presently provided by Red China. ' 



GOVERNMENT OF INDOCHINA 



L 



The prosecution of the war against the Viet Minh in Indochina is a joint 
responsibility of the sovereign governments of Viet Nam, Cambodia, Laos and 
France, under the leadership and direction of the latter. The local representative 
of the French Government Is the Commissioner General, M. De Jean. He represents 
M. Marc Jacquet, French Minister of State, in charge of relations with ^he 
Associated States. The Ministers of the Associated States, the French commissioner 
General and the military- Commander in Chief, Lt General Henri Navarre, prescribe 
the conduct of the war. Existing protocols define the degree of military control 
enjoyed by the Commander in Chief over the armed forces of the individual. 
Associated States. Essentially, the French exercise operational control over 
all forces in strategy and tactics. Each of the Associated States maintains a 
Chief of Staff and a General Staff who are primarily concerned with recruit! no- 
training, personnel actions and limited logistical activities. The long range 
program envisages a progressive turnover of responsibilities to the Associated 
States, although a requirement exists that adequate coordinating powers be vested 
in the hands of the French for many years to come. 

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Political decisions affecting military operations are reached in sessions 
of the high committee by representatives of .the States, France 9 and the Commander 
in Chief. Essentially military problems are resolved in a permanent military 
committee in which the military chiefs of the Associated States together with 
the Commanding General of Headquarters , Joint and Ground Forces , Far East, par- 
ticipate. 

Although a quadruplication of facilities exist in the form of several 
national general staffs and territorial organizations, actually a reasonably 
efficient channel of command is maintained by the French, Diplomatic liaison 
with the States counterpart organizations is exercised wherever coordination is 
required. This highly < plex arrangement of joint and combined staffs and 
pooling of national forces may be likened to a miniature NATO at war, except 
that by necessity, the senior and more professionally qualified partner, France, 
exercises the dominant role. The governmental structure of each state is more 
or less oriented toward support of the war against Communism and the principal 
portion of each State's budget is devoted to defense expenditures. Viet Nam is 
the most vigorous state in this regard, Laos is cooperative to the French, but 
without sizeable^ resources of men or money. Cambodia views the entire struggle 
as secondary to what it considers more important, the determination of future 
relationships among the States themselves. In consideration of the fact that 
hostilities are more or less normal in the life of the Indochinese, the States 
may be considered as mobilized for war, although with less dislocation to 
private enterprise and fewer restrictions and austerity measures than would be 

expected by Western nations in a counterpart situation. 

■ 

Both Laos and Cambodia are constitutional monarchies, while the Vietnamese 
respond with less solidarity to the government indirectly controlled by the 
Chief of State, Bao Dai, nominal descendant of the Emperors of Annam. He is 
potentially a capable leader but unfortunately out of favor with many extreme 
Nationalists and non-Communist dissidents. 

The overall attitude of the population borders on indifference. The 
failure of friendly propaganda toward both, development of a National attitude 
and the fostering of patriotism is an important deficiency. The uneducated 
native is inclined toward himself, his family and his tribe, or stock, in that 
order. The Japanese- inoculated spirity of Asia for the Asiatics has been adopted 
by Nationalist! leaders and the intelligentsia. The peasant, whose way of 
life has not been changed for centuries, is mostly apathetic. 

The principal targets for Communism are among the educated classes, whose 
immediate resentment is the domination of the French through force of arms and 
political and economic controls. These people, when converted to Communism, 
muster more effective support from the peasantry and city workers than do the 
French and the educated Loyalists. Communist influence is strong and its 
organization very complete, particularly within the large cities. The contending 
leaders compete with each other for recruits ~ the Communists holding forth 
idealistic rewards reinforced by threats, and the Loyalists stressing fear of 
the enemy as well as other inducements, some of which approach impressment. 

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The effect of the Ho Chi Minh bid for a negotiated peace and the French 
inclination to seek a settlement has had strong repercussions among the people, 
particularly those who pay double taxes, and whose villages are invaded, fought 
over and destroyed periodically by the opposing forces. 

It is natural that the Communists will support the line of negotiation 
since implementation of any such peace will set the stage for Communist absorption 
of the entire area, without fail and immediately. The Ho Demarche, and the proven 
ability of his field forces to threaten seriously the French Union Forces, has 
had a profound affect on metropolitan France as well, where a considerable portion 
of the population is in favor of terminating an expensive and seemingly futile war, 

PERFORMANCE OF MDAP — SUPPORTED FORCES 

French and Associated States Forces have received MDAP equipment in in- 
creasing amounts since 1950 » French Union Forces conduct modern joint military 
operations according to professionally accepted tactics and techniques, and in 
accordance with doctrines approved by the U*S. Armed Services, Applications 
vary in consonance with difficulties imposed by terrain and the climatic environ- 
ment. It has been noted that this is a war which pits a modern mechanized army 
against a large and well-led guerrilla force. However, the character of the 
Viet Minh forces has "been changing during the past year. Therefore, may in- 
efficiencies must be charged against the mechanized army since it lacks complete 
opportunity to utilize its capabilities fully. Since it is neither practicable 
nor completely desirable to meet the enemy on the basis of guerrilla versus 
guerrilla, the ultimate solution will require the isolation of the Viet Minh from 
his base of supply in Red China and then overwhelming him by materiel superiority. 
In any instance, a requirement for provision of quantities of MDAP equipment 
exists and will continue to exist for an indeterminate period. Generally , 
maintenance standards of MDAP equipment are below those of the U e S* Armed Services, 
although within well-trained units employing equipment in the intended manner, 
favorable comparisons may be reached. Since many of the personnel of the French 
Union Army begin their careers as illiterate peasants, completely unskilled, the 
training and indoctrination task toward better maintenance is evident. MAAG 
visiting teams proffer such guidance as is feasible. Specific notification of 
superior, as well as unsatisfactory units, are made officially to the French 
military authorities. Under the existing terms of reference, MAAG has no 
authorized direct contact with armed forces of the Associated States, A signifi- 
cant weakness on the part of the French is their failure to project the r system 
of field operations and staff planning beyond their experience in Indochina. 
Imagination is frequently lacking . Also evident is the fact that their limited 
experience in World War II has stunted their overall development in mod ern warfare. 
This is basically the reason underlying their poor staff work, logistic and "" 
operational plans. In addition, the French are sensitive and touchy and loath 
to accept advice. We frequently encounter outdated techniques dating back to 
Colonial campaigns and World War I. 

Another weakness of the French Union Force is the diversity of troops em- 
ployed. The French Expeditionary Corps is composed of Foreign Legion, Moroccans 
Algerians, Tunisians, Songaless and a small percentage of metropolitan French 

This document must not be ^09 

reproduced without permission 
of the originating office. 

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volunteers. These units are diluted nearly 59 percent by native Indochinese. 
The Associated States Forces are composed of varieties of native Vietnamese, 
Laotians and Cambodians. The whole effect is that of a heterogeneous force 
among whom even basic communication is difficult. Troops require a variety 
of clothe sizes and diets. They have different religious customs, folkways 
and mores. They vary in their capacity for different tasks and terrain. 
Logistically, a great problem exists in the support of such troops. 

On the other hand., the Rebels are mostly Vietnamese recruited largely from 
the hardy stocks of Tonkin and Annarru They are a truly homogenous army whose 
capabilities and requirements remain more or less consistent. 

The MDAP equipment furnished the French Air Force of Indochina has converted 
it into a modern air arm capable of performing its combat mission in a highly 
satisfactory manner. It is an effective offensive or defensive combat weapon, 
the full potential of which has not been realized. 

NATIONAL MILITARY SERVICE 

* 

a. French Forces: All French Army personnel in Indochina are serving in 
the Regular Army. The draftee in France is not required by law to serve in 
Indochina, However, he may volunteer for such duty. The period of service in 
Indochina was formerly 2*+ months, but due to a shortage of replacements, the 
period currently is extended to 27 months. French personnel receive substantial 
increases in pay for service in Indochina. 

b« Vietnamese Forces: The original law which drafted man for military 
service required all physically fit males to undergo a period of service for 
60 days. Until April 1953 > this law was not strictly enforced. In April, it 
became, with minor changes , the basis for the ordinance drafting ^0,000 men for 
duty with Kinh Quan t alions. Personnel are inducted into the army for the 
duration. They are selected on the basis of their family situation. Single 
men are taken first, A man enlisting for the Regular Army is taken on a trial • 
basis for one year. A t the end of one year, and if his service has proyen 
satisfactory, he can reenlist for a period of one, two, three or four ye\rs. 
Recently, the draft laws have been more vigorously enforced to eliminate draft 
dodging, . | 

INTER- SERVICE BALANCE OF FORCES IN INDOCHINA 



While the majority of resources are devoted to ground operations, the 



following factors must be considered: 



a. The enemy has no air forces or naval forces other than junks and sampans, 

b. Friendly ground forces maintain a large proportion of river squadrons and 1 
aviation units 



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c. Opportunities for employment of large tactical air forces and seagoing 
naval and amphibious forces are limited. 

d. Strategic targets are limited. Terrain and enemy skill in camouflage 
reduce number of tactical targets. 

e. A shortage of trained air personnel exists, with limited prospects for 
augmentation from metropolitan France resources, 

f . Commercial resources satisfy a considerable portion of naval and air 
logistical requirements. 

g. Airfield construction limits composition of air traffic to light and 
medium transports and propeller-driven fighters and bombers. The balance of 
forces is considered adequate , although recently the French Air Force, motivated 
by unanticipated operational requirements in Laos and Dien Bien Phu, has requested 
additional B-26 light bombers, an additional C~V? transport squadron, and the loan 
of U,S* C-119 heavy transports and maintenance personnel. Civilian CAT pilots are 
presently on contract to the French Air Force for logistical missions. The Army 
likewise has requested increased air strength in the form of helicopter companies 

and liaison aircraft. 

* 

OBJECTIVES 



<n • 



The missions of the opposing forces may be considered as follow 

VTET MIffi - To achieve, by attritive military and political action, a 

negotiated settlement of the war in Indochina upon such terms as will permit either, 

i 

a. Absolute control of a portion of Viet Ham arid Laos - generally considered 

to be north of the l8th Parallel, or ' 

b. Eventual control of the majority portion, or the complete entity, of 
Indochina as a result of a favorable political position achieved at the peace table. 

FRENCH UNION - To achieve, by overwhelming military pressure and political 
action, a cessation of hostilities upon terras favorable to the French uAon which wil 

a. Restrict the influence or "cne League of Independent Viet Nam Party-Viet 
Minh, to that of a controllable minority. 

b. Permit the establishment of sound, stable, solvent and harmoni as 
governments within the Associated* States, 

c. Enable France to maintain its position as the dominant member of the 
French Union - of the Far East - with extra territorial privileges and commercial- 
benefits. 

Naturally, the results of the Geneva Conference may be expected to have a 
strong influence on future political and military objectives in Indochina for 
both sides. 

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ORGANIZATION OF THE FRENCH UNION GROUND FORCES 

By the end of 195*f 3 French Union ground forces Kill consist of four French 
and one Vietnamese infantry division and one French airborne division. The ground 
divisions will he formed from 13 French ECTs and 9 Vietnamese RCTs. The airborne 
division will be formed from 2 French ARCTs and one Vietnamese ARCT. This force, 
known as the Battle Corps, will be supported by 5 armored battalions , 5 recon- 
naissance battalions, 5 amphibious battalions and 3 medium and 1 heavy artillery 
battalion. This represents the striking force of the French Union Forces, not much 
larger than a single U.S type Army Corps. To free this force for independent 
action against the Rebel strongholds, the French consider that a force of twice 
that size is necessary for static defense and pacification purposes. By the end 
of 1955j this surface defense force will reach a total of 86 standard infantry 
battalions, 132 light infantry battalions, 1100 suppletive companies, the equivalent 
of 70 artillery batteries and 36 armoi , ed car companies. All units of the Fr :h 
Union Army are equipped with a percentage of MDAP material. Amounts vary accordin. 
to date of activation, depot stocks, mission and replacement factors. A certain 
percentage of hard items, estimated at 30 percent of gross requirements, is provided 
by French procurement agencies and may consist of identical items to those of MDAP, 
having been acquired during World War II, or through other channels by which UoS. 
surplus stocks were distributed after 19^6. Indigenous production is practically 
negligible, since local industry is not developed and barely sufficient to provide 
maintenance for civilian requirements. A certain number of paramilitary agencies 
exist in this theater of operations which are not MDAP supported. These include 
militia, national police, plantation guards* and others. Obviously, MDAP items, 
mostly small arms and ammunition will find their way by devious channels into 
unauthorized hands. 

Due to the stress of constant warfare, circumstances are such that strict 
conteol is impossible. For example, an MDAP rifle, abandoned in battle may be 
acquired by a Viet Minh soldier y who vrill forfeit the same weapon upon his death 
or capture by paramilitary forces. 

LOGISTICS 'OF THE GROOHD FORCBS 

In general terms the organization and operation of the technical services 
which furnish logistical support to the combat arms is similar to that in the 
United States Army. The French Forces are handicapped by a insufficient number 
of units and trained specialists and consequently are unable to furnish the amount 
and quality of support given by comparable US units. For all technical services 
MDA Programs have furnished the spare parts and small items necessary to carry 
out adequate maintenance and repair programs. 

This document must not be 
reproduced without permission 
of the originating office. 






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French Forces: French Forces are, for /the most part, trained prior to 
shipment to Indochina, Training of individual replacements is done in the 
units to which they are assigned. French Far East ground forces operate 
schools for artillery, armor, engineer and transportation for their own forces 
and additionally provide generous quotas for Associated States personnel. 
Recently, four tactical training centers have "been activated for use as maneuver 
areas for large tactical formations and battalions rotated out of static positions. 

Vietnamese Forces: There are eight training centers for recruits of the 
Vietnamese Array. Four are for recruits for the Regular Army and four are for 
personnel to be activated into Kinh Quan (light infantry) battalions and companies. 
On-the-job training is conducted in technical fields for selected individuals 
upon assignment to a unit. In addition to this training, a limited number of 
specialists, technical, non-cormnissioned and officer schools exist. A con- 
siderable number of indigenous officers and men attend French schools both in 
France and Indochina. Training is not up to American standards. 

The Associated States training plan has an annual capacity of about 65,000. 
It is considered adequate to meet phased build-up requirements. By American 
criteria, certain training deficiencies are conspicuous, particularly in such 
areas as standardization of training aids, programs of instruction, troop 
training programs and training literature. Utilization of plant facilities 
with greater efficiency is a further requirement. It is apparent that the 
Associated States forces are developing with more stress on quantity than quality. 
It is hoped that American guidance will prove acceptable and valuable to the 
French. The use of MDAP equipment has not generated any critical training 
problems, however a need exists for management training to encompass stock 
control; organization of depots and other procedural-type activities. 

ORGANIZATION OF THS F RENCH NAVAL FO RCES , FAR EAST 

French naval strength is approximately 10,000. The only Associated States 
navy is a 1,000 man Vietnamese force. Naval forces are light units composed I 
of approximately 250 light vessels and 100 small craft. These are supported ' 
by an aircraft carrier on loan from NATO and a squadron of privateer aircraft. ' 
Command of river,, operations as well as overall logistic support is the responsi- 
bility of the C.irimander, French Naval Forces ashore. Direct coordination of 
naval river forces with the respective Army area commands is executed at the 
Naval area level. Commander, French Naval Forces, afloat, controls coastal 
operations including surveillance, blockade, and amphibious operations. Naval 
Aviation, Indochina, supports the Naval mission as directed. The aircraft 
carrier force is under Naval administrative command although embarked aircraft 
operate as directed by the French Air Force area tactical commands. 



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SUMMARY OF THE NAVAL SI fflQN 

The French Union naval forces in Indochina are reasonably effective on 
rivers and inshore areas. They have had much experience in river landings , 
combating a river ambushes and intercepting junk and small boat traffic on both, 
the ocean and inland waterways. Also, logistic support by water to all services 
is a constant and heavy undertaking. For guerrilla warfare along the waterways 
in the Red River and Mekong River deltas, they are uniquely qualified and 
equipped. In other more orthodox forms of naval warfare such as large amphibious 
operations , anti-submarine and anti-aircraft warfare, they are neither trained 
nor equipped. With the establishment of the Joint Amphibious Staff and the 
formation of an Amphibious Corps, part of this deficiency should be eliminated. 
Although enemy submarines and aircraft have not been a factor in this war, the 
possibility does exist. There is little in Indochina to combat the potential 
me nance. Limitations and restrictions for the conduct of the war at present are 
basically caused by a shortage of personnel rather than a lack of equipment. 
In addition, concrete and positive steps have been taken in the establishing of 
a Vietnamese National Navy. This will perform a two-fold purpose - that of 
easing the serious shortage of personnel and engendering a spirit of pride in 
the Vietnamese people through increased responsibility and participation in the 
conduct of the war in their homeland. 

ORGANIZATION OF THE FRENCH AIR FORCE 



As of 10 April 195** , the French Air Force consisted of 98 Bearcats, 
organized into k squadrons, 16 Bearcat Photo Recon Aircraft organized as a 
flight, 8U B-26 light bombers, expanding to 3 squadrons, a light tactical 
reconnaissance flight of modified B-26 bombers, h transport squadrons of 
11*1 C-Vfs — 65 MDAP — and liaison aircraft squadrons consisting of 8 C-:^5s, 
12 L-20 Beavers and 8 H-X9 helicopters. Additionally, 85 Army liaison aircraft • 
L-19s - will be delivered by 31 August. 22 C-119 packets with supporting (200) 
mechanics are on loan during the present emergency. 

SUMMARY O F THE AIR FORCE SITUAT ION 

The general, MAAG* opinion is that the individual flight and ground crews 
are very well qualified in operating and maintaining their equipment. However, 
there is not enough "- of them. Shortages of MDAP supplied equipment of he major 
categories has not restricted or hampered the operational ability of the FAF 
combat squadrons and support agencies. Some of the changes in methods and pro- 
cedures which MAAG believed should be placed in effect are actually beyond the 
capability of the FAF due primarily to the shortage of personnel and o\ rail 
restrictions imposed on the FAF by the political and economic situation both 
in Indochina and in Metropolitan France. 

The French are highly operationally minded, however, they do not put proper 
emphasis on their logistics support requirements to support their operations. 
In spite of the MDAP equipment and machinery received, the development of this 
country's self-sufficiency has been abnormally slow. 



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ORGANIZA TION AND TACTICS OF THE REBEL ARMY 

The Viet Minh is a well-led, veteran guerrilla army of approximately 
300,000 troops organized into 6 infantry divisions, a heavy division of artillery 
and engineers and numerous regiments, battalions and companies. It has a regional 
militia component as well as its regular troops. Its equipment and tactics are 
those of light infantry with a tremendous capability of cross country mobility 
and endurance, A high command is reputed to contain Red Chinese advisors. 
Until the pitched battle at Dien Bion Phu, the rebels followed the strategy of 
hit and run with much of its maneuver dictated by political objectives. The 
manner in which this force deployed its battle corps into assault infantry, 
and, with effective artillery support, captured several highly organized and 
well-defended strong points, indicates a versatility not fully appreciated prior 
to this campaign season. Additionally, the Viet Minh are skilled in psychological 
and political indoctrination and have been able to establish bases of operations 
behind French fortified lines, particularly in the delta. The recent capability 
of the Viet Minh to seize territory throughout Indochina, albeit temporarily, 
will have a profound effect upon the conferences at Geneva, 

CONDUCT OF THE WAR — MILITARY ASPECTS 

In June 1953s General Navarre formulated a set of principles for the con- 
duct of the war in Indochina. This was described in the 'Daniel report as the 
Navarre concept for successful conclusion of the war in Indochina, but it is 
less a formula for successfully concluding the war than a statement of short 
term aims, to wit: 

a To retake the initiative immediately through the carrying out, beginning 
this summer, of local offensives and by pushing to the utmost commando and 
guerrilla actions, j 

b. To take the offensive in the north beginning September 15, in order to 
forestall the enemy attack. To conduct the battle which will take place during 
the fall and winter of 1953-5^ in &n offensive manner by attacking the flanks 
and rear of the enemy, • 

c. To recoVer from areas not directly involved in the battle a maximum 
number of units. To pacify these regions progressively. 

d. To build up progressively a battle corps by grouping battalions into 
regiments and regiments into divisions and by giving to the units thus created 



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the necessary support - artillery , engineers , armor, communications - taking 
into account the very special character of the war in Indochina, the terrain— 
the enemy. To bring about a maximum of cooperation with the Air Force and the 
Navy . 

e. To maintain a reserve of special type units — armor, commando, light 
battalion, etc. , for attachment to groups and divisions in accordance with terrain 
and mission. 

f . To continue the effort of instructing and organizing the army of the 
Associated States so as to give them more and more participation as well as more 
and more autonomy in the conduct of operations, 

Note: The above was given to General 1 Daniel in writing by General 
Navarre on 29 June 1953 and was thereafter referred to as the Navarre concept 
for the successful conclusion of war in Indochina. 

Few of these aims are progressing satisfactorily. The training of the 
National armies is woefully inefficient and the series of tactical offensive 
operations engaged in during 1953-5^ fighting season, instead of retaking the 
initiative has lost it to the Viet Minh. After a rather encouraging beginning 
with the Lang Son operation, Navarre's later operations reveal that he is fol- 
lowing the same conservative defensive tactics as his predecessor, General Salan. 
Although Mouette was highly publicized as a successful offensive, it in fact was 
nothing but a reconnaissance in force with the objective of occupying a strong 
position and awaiting attack by the enemy in the hope of dealing him a crippling 
blow* The enemy refused to be taken in. The current campaign season has been 
dominated by the Viet Minh, and the present position of the French Union Forces 
is no improvement over that of last year. Pi en Bien Phu is not only another 
Na San but a grave tactical and strategic erro r. The only hope for gain from 
the battle novr raging is that the French can survive. The French have consistently 
postponed seizure of the initiative through failure to select and pursue vital 
military objectives such as the obvious enemy troop concentration depot and 
communications area in the foothills north of the Tonkin delta. Viet Minh leader- 
ship, on the other hand, has capitalized on this vacated opportunity by seizing 
and holding the initiative. The French battle corps, which was built up hope- 
fully by energetic withdrawal of implanted units, has now been dissipated into 
four sizeable components: (l) Dien Bien Phu — 12 battalions — an expensive- 
supplied airhead, is encircled and under heavy attack. (2) Seno-Savannakhet- 
Thakhek-Pakse area — 15 battalions — partially stipported by air with its 
overland communications threatened. (3) Operation Atlanta --25 battalions — 
a coastline sweep north from Nha Trang, which has uncovered no appreciable enemy > 
and (h) the Tonkin delta — 18 battalions — where the enemy is increasing his 
attacks on rear installations and lines of communications. The lack of initiative 
which the French have is emphasized by the day-to-day reaction of the French to 
enemy moves and activity as expressed in recent requests for emergency assistance 
in the way of U.S. equipment and maintenance personnel. 

French tactics are based primarily on defense, even though French Union 
Forces outnumber Viet Minh forces "by almost 2 to 1, have overwhelming fire 
power, and upopposed air force, a balanced naval force and strategic transport 
capability. The barbed wire concept is exemplified by the fact that the French 
have established a requirement of UOOO tons of this item per month over and above 
that furnished by France. The bulk of the G-119 airlift for Dien Eien Phu 
supply was utilized in dropping barbed wire. 

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French Union forces do not as a general rule attempt to gain and maintain 
contact with the enemy, but rather, they wait for the Viet Minh to attack. 
Patrolling is the exception rather than the rule. Viet Minh regular tattle 
corps troops have been avoided unless the French troops are well dug in behind 
barbed wire or have astronomical odds in their favor. 

Wight operations are never employed by Fx^ench Union forces although the 
Viet Minh use such operations most successfully, French forces retire to their 
fortified and secured areas at nightfall, and control only the areas of their 
fields of fire. Night operations training should be instituted and emphasised 
in their training programs , and French Union forces should be as adopt and suc- 
cessful in such operations as the enemy. 

At present there is no evidence that the French staff is working off- 
detailed plans for the final offensive which General Navarre has indicated 
to me as Chief MAAG will occur during the next dry season, 195 J l-55. 

Although Navarre demands that his requirement for U.S equipment should 
not be challenged by this MAAG, the fact is that the small inadequate French., 
staff handling this function is not capable of accurately presenting requirements 
for Indochina. Were it not for the screening which these requests undergo by 
MAAG, material would be wastefully supplied , and many critical and sudden 
shortages would occur. Many examples of this lack of planning foresight can 
be found in the files of this MAAG, such as requests for specialized equipment 
requiring specially trained operators with no companion plan to provide such 
operators -- request for a specific amount of ammunition in January is consti- 
tute a year, supply only to double the request in April - not because of an 
oversight or error but because of poor planning for the operations to occur 
during the intervening months. 

This lack of French staff capability and to a great extent the conservative 
and defensive attitude of the entire theater of operations, is due in large 
measure to the fact that many of the officers on duty in this theater are over 
age in grade according to U.S. standards, and are lacking in drive and imagi- 
nation. Lack of' command supervision is obvious in all echelons, the best evidence 
of which is the absence of command inspections and maintenance inspections of 
equipment of commanders . End-use inspections by members of this MAAG frequently 
reveal that higher commanders have never made an inspection of equipment in 
their subordinate units. Shortage of personnel is anothei^ contributing factor 
which- cannot be overcome except through more extensive support from metropolitan 
France. 



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POLITICAL ASPECTS 

A strictly military solution to the wai 1 in Indochina is not possible. 
Military operations are too closely bound to concurrent political problems , and 
most of the military decisions concerning tactics and strategy have their origin 
in the politics of the situation here- The governments of the three Associated 
States are comparatively weak, and are almost as insistent upon complete autonomy 
from France as they are on liberation from the Communists. It is doubtful if the 
ordinary people understand the issues at stake between the rebel and Associated 
States objectives. It probably appears to them that they are being ground be- 
tween the two political groups, one of which seeks to achieve autonomy by 
Communist methods. The other by political evolution. They are not aware of the 
dangers of domination by Communism nor of the 'difference between democracy and 
the Communist People's Government as we understand it. 

The French have a tremendous investment in Indochina and have made great 
strides in bringing the advantages of Western civilisation to the people, yet 
the French are not wanted. Colonialism is still the chief argument against the 
French and with some substance. The natives are still considered as second-rate 
people and the French have only made concessions reluctantly and when forced to 
do so. There is a lack of comaraderis between the native soldier and officer 
and the French. Separate messes are maintained, due in some measure to the 
difference in dietary preference, but also due to this lack of friendly association 
in a common cause. 

The Viet Minh, on the other hand, are fighting a clever war of attrition, 
without chance of a major military victory, but apparently feeling that time is 
working in their favor and that French and U.S. public opinion will force 
eventual favorable negotiation. 

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 

In 19^+9 the French, in a search for Nationalist support against Ho Chi Minh, 
recognized Bao Dai, playboy scion of the ancient Annamite emperors as Chief of 
State of Viet Warn which was given its independence within the framework of the 
French Union, Bao Dai is popularly believed to be very pro-French, and most of 
the people have a luke-warm feeling toward the Government which they feel is 
not earnestly working for their complete independence from France. The French 
promise independence, but only reluctantly give concessions. 

The key to this problem is a strong and effective Rationalist army with 
the support of the Populist behind it. When the people have confidence in 
their government and in its ability, through the Nationalist army, to give 
them the protection from Communist terrorism which is necessary for business 
and commerce, then complete victory will be in sight* 



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The key to this problem is a strong and effective Nationalist army with 
the support of the Populist "behind it. When the people have confidence in 
their government and in its ability, through the Nationalist army, to give 
them the protection from Communist terrorism which is necessary for business 
and commerce, then complete victory will be in sight. 

THE U.S COWTBIBDTION TO THE W AR IN INDOCHINA 

The U.S. has greatly contributed to the success of the French in holding 
Indochina from the beginning. In January 1951, material was rushed from the 
docks of Haiphong to the battlefield of Vinh Yen, then being fought under the 
personal direction of Marshall De Lattre himself. Since then, delivery of aid 
has kept pace with changing French needs, often on a crash basis, down to the 
present heroic defense of Dien Bien Phu. U.S. aid has consisted of budgetary 
support, furnishing of end items, military hardware, and of technical training 
teams. The magnitude and range of this contribution is shown by the following 
very few examples. All of these figures are as of 31 March this year. 

a. 785 million dollars has been allocated for the budgetary support of 
the French Expeditionary Force and the Vietnamese Army. This will assist in 
meeting budgetary requirements for pay, food, and allowances for these troops. 

b. Under MDA Programs , a total of more than 78^ millions of dollars has 
been programmed for the years 1950-51*. Of this, more than hhO million dollars 
worth of military end items have been received. 

c. To date, 31 March 195^ 5 Mil ships have delivered a total of U78 thousands 
of long tons of MDA equipment to Indochina. 

SOLUTION 

As in Korea, Iran, Malaya, and Burma, the war in Indochina is not a separate 
entity. It is another tentacle of the octopus, another brush fire on the 
periphery of the iron and bamboo curtains. The problem can only be solved com- 
pletely if the masters of the Kremlin decide that Indochina should be abandoned 
in favor of more profitable enterprises elsewhere. However, ways and means 
exist to achieve a degree of success with respect to Indochina, beginning at 
the political level -- specifically at the level of Chiefs of State. What is 
then necessary '-s as follows: 

a. An agreement must be reached with the French to deliver their strongest 
possible assault upon the Viet Minh as soon as possible to reduce the efficiency 
of that force to its lowest potential. 

b. Concurrently, the Associated States armies must be put through a train- 
ing cycle designed to produce leaders and units and to develop confidence through 
skill and achievement. Such forces must be developed to the level of the ROK 

or Greek armies under American tutelage and material support for these forces 
must be in being and capable of replacing the French when they retire. 

c. A defensive alliance of democratic nations of the Orient must be de- 
veloped to provide future stability for the Associated States. The U.S. must 
establish leadership in this area by relieving the French in a similar manner 
as was followed in relieving the British fc?r the responsibility of Greece. 

d. The sovereignty and territorial borders of the Associated States must 
be guaranteed - under no circumstances should the country be allowed to divide 
on an arbitrary parallel such as in Korea. 

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C0NCLUSI N 

i 

I recommend that the Department of Defense urge that negotiations for 
agreements to be initiated at the earliest time to achieve the foregoing objectives 
and that upon reaching an understanding with France and the Associated States, 
a full-scale U.S. training mission be established with the Associated States 
forces to achieve an effective training base by Spring of 1956. That the French 
overwhelm the enemy in the interim is a vital concurrent requirement , and, 
again, this objective must be achieved by governmental agreement, with the 
U.S. insisting that the French Government establish military victory as a 
primary objective and so instruct the field commander, who may then be 
relieved of his anxieties regarding casualties and indifferent political 
and moral support from France. 



In conclusion, I reaffirm my opinion that victory in Indochina is an 
international rather than a local matter, and essentially political as well 
as military. 



* 



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WASHINGTON 25, B.C. 
JOINT SUBSIDIARY PLANS DIVISION 



SPDM-173-5 1 * 
5 May 195^ 



MEMORANDUM FOR LT. COL, J. D„ SITTERSON, USA, DEPARTMENT 
OF DEFENSE MEMBER , OCB WORKING GROITP ON NSC 5^05 
(SOUTHEAST ASIA): 



Subject: U.S Objectives and Courses of Action 

with Respect to Southeast Asia (NSC 5^05) 

Reference: Secretary of Defense memorandum, 

h March 19 5*+ > subject as above 



In accordance with the above request from the 
Secretary of Defense , the following informal comments are 
submitted: 

a. Reference paragraph 21. 

(1) On Ik December 1953, the Secretary of Defense 
informed the Chief, MAAG, Indochina, that Indochina 
has the highest MDAP priority. It is the only nation 
with this priority classification and, as such, has 
precedence over every other allied nation and the 
UoS. armed forces for the allocation of equipment in 
short supply. Generally, military assistance equip- 

. ment is being delivered at the scheduled rates, which 
are up to the capability of Indochinese forces to 
utilize effectively, Thailand is being furnished MDA 
equipment under a limited program. This material is 
generally being delivered at the rate at which the 
Thailand forces can most effectively utilize it, 
Burma is not a recipient nation for MDAP grant aid. 
Initial arrangements have been made to provide Burma 
on a reimbursable basis, but no actual deliveries 
under this program have yet been made* 

(2) Major General 1 Daniel has been appointed Chief, 
MAAG, Indochina. This was as a result of an NSC action 
designed to increase the influence of the United States 
in the prosecution of the war in Indochina, particularly 
training of local forces, effective command and intel- 
ligence arrangements, and operational planning. 



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b. Reference paragraph 31 . 

(1) A military plan for U S e intervention in Indo- 
china has been completed and approved by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. This plan has been forwarded to 
appropriate commanders of airfield commands for the 
preparation of detailed plans, 

(2) The Joint Chiefs of Staff currently have under 
preparation an outline plan based upon concurrent 
renewal of hostilities in Korea and intervention in 
Indochina by the Chinese Communists. 

(3) CINCPAC has been directed to prepare plans as 
f oilows : 

(a) Blockade of China coast. 

(b) Assistance to the British in HongKong, as 
desirable and feasible, 

(c) Evacuation of French Union forces from the 
Tonkin Delta, 

(d) Participation defensively or offensively of 
Chinese National forces. 

(U) CIHCPAC Operation Plan No. Wi-53 is a plan approved 
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a naval blockade of 
Communist China. 

(5) Other CINCPAC Operation Plans have been prepared 
to cover the contingencies in paragraph (3) above , but 
have not yet been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

c. Although not directly part of the implementation of 
NSC 5^05 7 the Joint Chiefs of Staff have under preparation 
the military plans directed in NSC Action No. 1086 a. These 
plans cover not only U.S. intervention in Indochina but also 
augmentations in forces and supplies required to permit the 
United States to maintain at present levels its present 
defense commitments and to be prudently prepared to face 
possible increased risks of (l) Chinese Communist inter- 
vention j and (2) general war. 

* 

(Signed) 

M. 0. D0N0HDO 

Colonel, USMC ' 

Deputy Chief. 



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INCOMING TELEGRAM 



DEFAE3MENT OF STAIE 



ACTION COPY 






SECRET 



FROM: Geneva 

TO: Secretary of State 

NO: SECTO 106, May 5, 2 p.m. 



Control: 175& 
Rec'd: May 5, 195 1 ! 

1:09 ?•*&. 



NIACT 

SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 106, REPREATED INFORMATION PRIORITY 
PARIS 201, PRIORITY LONDON 121, SAIGON 33. 

Re SECTO 89, repreated Paris 186. 

Following is outline given this morning by Chauvel to 
Dennis 5 Allen and Achilles of proposal which Bidault 
last night sent to French Cabinet for authorization to 
make when substantive discussion of Indochina starts: 

1. Vietnam problem Is purely Vietnamese with no question 
of partition, only military struggle for control of govern- 
ment, 

2. Situation different in Laos and Cambodia which are 
victims of external aggressioia. 

3* Under Berlin agreement 5 purpose of Geneva conference 
is to establish peace in all three countries. To this end 
there should be a cease-fire guaranteed by adequate military 
and administrative controls under supervision. Cease-fire 
would take effect only when such guarantees had been embodied 
in armistic conventions, which might be different for each 
three states , and when control machinery had been established 
and was in place. Controls would be based upon Laniel's 
March 5 conditions. When cease-fire occurred, regular troops 
would be regrouped into delimited areas and all other forces 
disarmed. The control machinery would be "international" 
and would require considerable body of personnel. 

h. After peace had been re-established by the cease-fire, 
political and economic problems could be examined. 

In discussing this draft proposal Chauvel said French 
assumed Russians would propose immediate cease-fire followed 
by political settlement based on coalition and immediate 
elections, which would force West into position of opposing 



cease-fire 



K 



3536 

PERMANENT 
RECORD COPY 



U23 



SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



SECRET 
-2- SECTO 106j May 5, 2 p.m., from Geneva 

cease-fire* French public desire for cease-fire was emotional 
and French Government could defend its proposal, even though 
it ^ould in effect delay any cease-fire for long time if 
not indefinitely, on grounds that conditions demanded were 
essential for safety of troops themselves. The continued 
resistance at Bien Bien Phu long after public opinion had 
discounted its fall had conditioned French opinion to believe 
its loss would not mean loss of war. He did not exclude 
possibility of conference calling on opposing forces not to 
undertake new military operations during negotiations. He 
assumed very lengthy negotiations would be necessary to 
reach any armistice agreement and felt that during this period 
Communist uncertainty as to united action of US intervention 
might be increased. 

Allen inquired whether at some stage in proceedings working 
out of armistice details might be left to combattants them- 
selves as suggested in Colombo communique. Chauvel did 
not like this idea but said it might be considered. In 
response to question as to whether he envisaged conference 
turning into indefinite Fanimmjom Chauvel said it might turn 

■ armistice negotiations over to working group and adjourn to 

- reconvene when warranted. 

In response to Achilles inquiry as to whether "international" 
meant "UK" supervision, Chauvel stated French had no firm 
position on this but subsequent discussion indicated French 
continue to oppose use of UN machinery as establishing 
precendent which would be used against them in North Africa 
and elsewhere and that British definitely share their point 
of view* Allen suggested something like peace observation 
commission would be preferable to UN auspices. Achilles 
stressed importance of insisting on UN auspices. 

Chauvel said studies by French military had confirmed their 
impression that withdrawal of French Union Forces from 
Cambodia and itaos except for two bases in latter would be 
of definite military advantage rather than disadvantage* 

; SMITH 

JAK:MEj/lU 

NOTE: Mr. Hoey f s office (PSA) informed 3:15 p.m. 5~5~5^ JDP 

k2k 



SECRET 






3537 



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-, 



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iv : *?**&$%** i 



1I3C I95th Meeting 






ITEM 1 (Fur Discussion) 

* - 

- REPORT BT MB, DULLES On G^ISVA AIlD 1I!DQ-CH1I!A 



« 



1, Secretary Dulles , who was rather pessimistic, in reporting to the 
president yesterday morning on the Geneva Conference, made the follow irg 
points': (a) there Is no responsible "French Govern i::.t with which to deal; . 
(b) the British have declined to take a position regarding a Southeast Asia' 
regional grouping until after the Geneva Conference; (c) the British however 
are trilling to proceed with sec ret talks with us regarding the political and 
military scope of our plans for SFA; (d) the expected Cotmiunist proposal re 
Indo- China vfill call for evacuation of all foreign troops and elections to 
be supervised by a joint Vietiainh -Vietnam Co^nission; (e) French have no 
particular form of settlement in wind; UK is still thinking in ter^s of 
partition. 

• 2. It Is not clear how the ITSC discussion will develop, but it seems 
desirable that certain questions be clarified at the meeting. They are along 
this line: 






a* Should the U.S. resign itself to being unable to influence any 
•further the French and O.K. positions at Geneva? (i.e., is it still not 
possible to stiffen their spines by any conceivable means - Presidential 
talks, threats, sending Mr. Dulles back with a new mandate, etc, - so as 
"assure they will not accept a dangerous compromise. ) 



to 



b. Is or is not the U.S. prepared to commit its combat forces in tl 
near futuz^e, in some form of regional effort if possible, to save the 
partition or loss of Indo-China? '""(A decision In principle seems necessary 
now . As the situation is at present we are saying we will consider this if 
the parliaments of Australia, Nev Zealand, etc. agree, but it is not clear 
whether we mean before or after Indo-Chlna is lost . ) 

£ # is the U.S. prepared to acouiesce in the clearly engineered Communist 
aggression in and taking over of Indo-Chlna - with Red Chinese support - even 
though we evaluate this loss as very serious to the free world and even 
though we have the military means to redeem the situation? " (The A-bomb) 

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent you a memorandum several days ago 

(see TAB A) recommending that you "secure governmental acceptance" of the 

following position: 

■ 

"In the event of a cease fire in Indochina, the shipment of militarv 

end items under U.S. IDA? .... will ipmediately be suspended, except 

for such scares and associated maintenance items necessary to the main- 

■ tenance of equipment In operations. The entire Question of U.S. aid to 

Indochina will be re-e:o3mined in the light of circumstances then existing." 

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA.) has suggested you 
forward the memo to the E3C saying yo*i concur, but you hav^ not yet acted on 



4-i 



the ratter. 



You m&y wish- to rs.ise it dirrirrr the discussion. 



k25 



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v • * » ' « i 

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— -j- 



INDICATES D collect 
D CHARGE 70 



rn 



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C 1 a s s i j i \c a t i i o n 



SENS TO: AmGonsul GENEVA 



c-;; r .» 



Irfc. 



TEDU E 3 r j 



fl&j b. 7TJ1 

02 3 7- : 



tasmsssBsso - :;Ey:;a™~ JTOSJi^ C" 



- * 



PRIORITY 



* * 



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A hi 



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Socrotary held hour and half briefing of 25 loading 
members Congress yesterday Generally friendly, constructive 
atmosphere, no direct criticism, although consjd arable 
discussion on future plans and weakness of British and 
French. ' ,/ £ 

Secretary described set-up of Conference and briefly' 
went over Korean developments* Explained difficulty v/Ith 






D 






^Allies on a 11- Korean elections and trouble finding someone 
1 {?&** 

w-^u' to spegk up in defense of US against Communist^ vilification 

men "■ • 

Congress/ showed interest in this and asked about positions 



D*>;irod 

(Office) 
On!yJ 



u 

c 

r 

V. 

1 

c 

c 



- 

our various Allies 

Turning to Indochina, Socrotary traced developments 
in our thinking and plans- since inception massive aid 
program last fall* Three prerequisites demanded from 
French had then seemed to be met* understanding A*S* 
become Independent, effective program for rapid training \^ 
of natives, aggressive military plan. Prerequisites wo ul>l ~~\ 






Dfjti-d by.i 



m 



Ad 



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s/Sr- H*- Ft© eman Ma t tml #s , Jr • 



Cl-iraici;: 



S/s-J. Stewart Cottmanw-^ 



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' : Aoproved In f ?afostanco by 
' C/ B".MacArthui J C\;:?b' 



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( / > ' i COi'Y, i? C1ASS17JID '■ 

TO^ PECRK'T ' *.,,. ^ I PSvOtfiSRcB. 

- •** '— ■ — — — — ■ ■ — , — — — .. — 



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CJassi/icntfon 

* * 



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\LD° 















"* 









Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316* By: NWD Date: 201 1 



age*_2 of wtog&m co. amao^iaul jQ£ SH& ^. 



* 



xv j- ^.:^A^. 



rpnv c» T .-Y' s'V^ 1 



Clusfificdtion 



lead to ouv desired objectives, Navarre Plan still 
sound; but French will for* offensive action and 6 van 

ability govern felumaalvaa disintegrated* Following 
development unit ad action concept and as French 

■ 

military situation deteriorated,* wa began think of* 
US military int savant ion* In April 5 ma a ting with 



i 



Congressman agreed objectives of earlier prerequisites 



mi£9.t ba mat to incveeasrui degree and other interested 

I 

nations must join in In^fovs such intervention could be 



i 

i 



', authoriaedi Secretary described London* Paris trip 



and Eden's reneging on communique « Soma adverse 
Congressional comment on latter and Secretary said 
thought HahtHi had pressured British* 

Sa era t a r y do s cr ib a d fcvo in formal French requests 
for US air intervention on April 4 and 22 and his 

■ 

replies thereto. Described French mood of extreme 
urgency and British Cabinet confirmation of reversal of 
agreement in communique of April 13. British terr fied 
by H-bomb $ pressured by Hehru, contrasted their giving 
up India v/ith French call for help to keep Indochina, 
and gavo higher rating to risk of Chinese intervention 

and global wnv if V/est intervened. Secretary read from 

■■ 

memo of conversation in which he had chastised Eden for 
British standc Huaob.er adverse Congressional cosBuents on 

TOP SECRET 



C I a s s i I i c it t i o n 



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Pasef-LS—of telegram w teS^SUXSlXLJ^SSSA _;.. 






r 






British position, especially JndcU 

Secretary said had reached three conelunlonn 



< 



' 



US should not intervene militarily until and unless 
prerequisites agreed on at April 4 meowing were 

- 

fulfilled. Conditions must exist for succo sfiful 

■ 

conclusion of oa'p and such v/as not nov/ case© 
Particle t ion other allies academic sinco French had 
not fulfilled prerequisite s« Considerable opposition 
to internstionaiization of war in France anyway. This 
was Administration position on intervention. No 
Congressional comments on this, 

i 

Secondly, US must push rapidly for development of 

SEA community, probably without Vietnam but hopefully 

* . might 

with Laos and Cambodia* British ;.::r.A come in are! they 

■r I 

might want Burma and India too We wore agreeable to 

■ 

Burma* This community might offer fair chance 

quote insulate unquote rest SEA against possible loss of 



* 



Vietnam* 



Third conclusion ir/as v;o should not v/rite off British 



#* 



and French in spit© of their weakness in Asia* Lack of 
100 per cent GcopB^Stloai one of welcome dl^&d^antages of 






democratic sy/rtenu 

DULTE 51 then received and Secretary read partition 



V 



parts* Considerable discussion ensued on Eden 1 a idea .of 

428 

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Paw* V4 of t«fegram to. £$lQQ.nS-U l GEKSV .flu. 



TOP SECRE3? 



Classification 






quo to f XV 



white 



powers 



unquote 



cona ul t at ion and 



conclusions 2 and S above. Judd strongly against Edon 
quote plan unquote, wanted Asians in oven without UK 
and France* Knovrland agreed on importance of Asians 



i 



as did several others. Knov/land said we should have- 

■r 

commitments from UK, Australia, Nov/ Zealand and others 
to help us if needed in Korea or Japan, et cetera, if we 

m 

v/ere to have collective security pact with thorn for SEA, 
which he personally favoroo\ Secretary said Burma , 
Thailand, Philippines plus A.S« would holp and that he 
told Eden he wanted Formosa in if British brought in 
India o McCormack and Smith supported Secretary on 
conclusion three and several other a did too* *. 

Secretary described dffect of Indochina developments 
on PSench government and 3D0. Russell paid fine tribute 
to' Secretary for briefings and cooperation v;ith Congress 
and others expressed appreciation. 



o 




'JSC . 



' 



KB 



TQPSECBHE 



Clcssij'tcetion 



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r *» 






- .-- 






THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

WASHINGTON ?.5. D. C. 













-^* - - i. 






J. Uj, o r.iV'i 



7 May 195H 



MEMORiUJlWa FOB TII3 SECRETARY 0? DBFJ5HSE 



Subject: 



Negotiations vith Respect to Indochina. 



e 



1. Attached for your consideration (Enclosure) ar 
the' vievs of the joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to 
Department of State inessases SECTO 105 and SECTO 110, 
both dated 5 May 195 2 *, and message DA HI 5929-5, dated 
6 I-cy 195 J J. 

■ 

2. 5?he" Joint Chiefs of Staff reco&sond that their 
views be transmitted to the Department of State for 
incorporation in the reply to S2CT0 105 and SECiO 110. 

3. Copies Ho. 2 and I-Io. 3 of the Enclosure vere 
delivered in advance to the Deputy Secretary of Pefeas 



^e 



For the Joint Chiefs of Staffs 



f 



ARTHUR RADS0RD, 

Ohairisasij 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 



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SecDef ConU HO.-22— - 



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130 



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p 



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TO? SSCKl 






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cqk .'-::^;ts to bs furnished to the secretary of dtspkksjs 

RE R ADIOS SS0T0 106 AND SECT 110," DA TED 5 MA Y 19.5^ / 

D DA IN 59*96, DATED 6 MAY 19 :. J i 

^— — I t i m ^.^k m m ^ mm , ■ , ■ „ , ■■■■» , .-«-»«_. ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ n »■■■■ ■■ "■ ■ ■- ■■■■ i n ■ ■* ^.» ■»■ fcn 1 — — — •-» 



.« 



1. Having due regard Tor Interim development Sj the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff adhere to their views regarding negotiations 

■ 

on Indochina, as expressed in their memorandum to the Secre- 

■ 

tary of Defense dated' 12 March 195^ ; The Secretary of Defense 

i 

iorwarded that memorandum to the Department of State with his 
full concurrence on 23 March. Understand Defense Member of 
US DEL holds a copy- . - • 



2- Outline of French armistice proposal furnished in 
S2CT0 106 has been examined by JCS in light of their views 

+ 

referred to above. They consider that French proposal would be 
regarded by Asian peoples as a Communist victory, particularly 
in the light of the current military situation in Indochina, 



o 



l) 



An armistice under the proposed conditions would, in the 



ir' 



opinion, lead to a political stc lemate attended by a -progressive 
deterioration oi the Franco-Vietnamese military position 
ultimately resulting in the loss of Indochina to the Communists • 



3- Even were the Communists to agree 



to undertake armistice 



negotiations pursuant to the French proposal, such negotiations 

■ 

would be expected to result either in a rapid capitulation of 

- 

the French to obtain an early cease -fire or in a protracted 



j"-x —~* "?*. * "* ^^ 



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/ 

■wrangle characterized by steadfast Communist adherence to an 

* 

inflexible position on important issues and "by repeated sub- 
stantive concessions by the French- Moreover,, experience in 
Korea indicates that regardless of the military and adtninis- , 
trative controls which might be embodied in the armistice con- 
ventions ^ it is certain that the Communists would flagrantly 
■- 

evade, 'circumvent, and violate the agreements to suit their 

ultimate purpose of subjugating all of Indochina. Even though , 
the Communists should agtfee to' international control machinery, 

i 

Communist practices would render it impotent, as in the case of 
the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea. 

■ 
# 

H . Based on past performance, it is doubtful that the Com- 

i 

ffiunists would enter into a preliminary agreement to refrain 
from new military operations during the course of armistice 
negotiations. On the contrary, it is more likely that they 
would intensify military operations during negotiations 1 in order 

- 

to enhance' their negotiating position, whereas the French would 

- 

be under strong compulsion to avoid casualties during the 
negotiating period. •-••«-. 







tats^ tS b«= ■ 



• 



H 3 2 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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■ 



5. The Joint Chiefs of Sts.it share the view of the US DEL 
that once armistice proposals are made the French would" rapidly 
move toward acceptance of the probable Communist counterproposal 

of an immediate cease-fire- Should- the United States associate 

■ 

itself with the French initial proposal, the United States would 
in all likelihood be confronted subsequently with the painful 



■*' i . 



alternatives of continuing to support the French through retro- 
gressive positions* or of extricating itself at some point along 

the way . • 

■ 

m 

* 

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that it is no longer 
realistic to insist that the French continue aggressively to 
prosecute the Navarre Plan. At the same time, they adhere to 
their view that no satisfactory settlement is possible without 

■ 

a substantial improvement in the French Union military situa- 
tion, and that, in the absence of a settlement which would 
reasonably assure the political and territorial integrity of 
the Associated States, any armistice entered into would 
inevitably lead to the eventual loss of that area to Communist 



control. 



? 







133 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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• 



* ■ 

7. In the light of the current situation, the Joint Chiefs I 

of Staff consider that the United States should now adopt the K 1 \f^ 
following as It's milrimum' position, The United 'States will not £u4 

associate itself with any French proposal directed toward a *' .^t^ 

cease-fire in advance of a satisfactory political settlement, Jj ^v 
The United States urge 3 the French Government to propose that &A*^ 
negotiations for a political settlement ho initiated at once* 
During the course of such negotiations, the French Union Forces 
should continue to oppose the forces of the Viet Minh with all 
the rieans at their disposal in order to reinforce the French 
negotiating/position, In the meantime, as a means >pf strengthen- , 



ov^< 



£Cv.vv( *jc<f ^U-\r:\-^* vA C A &i*\ M K 'X tv**V . 

■lng thtr French hand, the United States will, intensify Its efforts ' 
to organise and promptly activate a Southeast" Asian coalition 
for the purpose of preventing further expansion of Communist 
power in Southeast Asia. / If the French Government persists 






in its intension to enter armistice negotiations or accedes 
to Immediate cease-fire negotiations 9 the United States will 

V 

* 

disassociate itself from such negotiations in order to maintain 

■ 

maximum freedom of action in taking whatever measures may be 
feasible for opposing the extension of Communist control into 
So uthea st Ad ia ;/ * - * 

A/ 



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+. 






, — z%, 



THE WHITE HOUSE 

WASH IN GTON 

* ■ 

rr!. 



May 1, 1954 



1": 



> 



MBX08ASDOU FOR: 



GHAXRMAS. JOIIiT CHIEFS 0? STAFF 



■p 






C 



At & meeting in the President's office with the President } 
J. F. Dulles and Cutler, the President approved Paragraph lb 
of the tentative Record of Actions of 5/S/yk Meeting of the 
Notional security Council, but wished that the advice to Smith 
relative to Eden's proposal should also make clear the follow- 
ing points 









1, Five Pover Staff Agency, elcne or vith other 
nations } is not to the United States a satisfactory 
substitute for a broad political coalition vhich vill 
include the South East Asian countries vhich are to 
be defended. 

2. Five Pover Staff Agency examination is accept- 
able to see hov these nations cen give military aid to 
the Southeast Asian countries in their cooperative de- 
fense effort. 



3. The United States vill not agree to a 'Vhite 
man f B party 11 to determine the problems of the South- 
east Asian nations. 



*• 



P d 



R035KT CUTIHR 
Special Assistant 

to the President 



N 









Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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TOP SECRET 

May 7, 195^ 

At a meeting in the President's office this morning with Dulles 3 three 
topics were discussed: 

1. Whether the President should approve paragraph lb of the tentative 
Record of Action of the 5/6/5*+ NSC Meeting, which covers the proposed 
answer to the Eden proposal. The Secretary of State thought the text was 
correct- Wilson and Radford preferred the draft message to Smith for 

Eden prepared yesterday MacArthur and Captain Anderson, and cleared by 
the JG3, which included in the Five Power Staff Agency Thailand and the 
Philippines. Radford thinks that the Agency (which has hitherto been 
not disclosed in SEA) has really completed its military planning; that if 
it is enlarged by top level personnel, its actions will be necessarily 
open to the world; that therefore some Southeast Asian countries should be 
included in it, and he Tears Eden f s proposal as an intended delaying action. 

The Presient approved the text of paragraph lb, but suggested 
that Smith's reply to Eden's proposal should make clear the following: 

_ 

1. Five Power Staff Agency, alone or with other nations , is not 
to the United States a satisfactory substitute for a broad political 
coalition which will include the Southeast Asian countries which are 
to be defended. 

2. Five Power Staff Agency examination is acceptable to see how 
these nations can give military* aid to the Southeast Asian countries 
in their cooperative defense effort. 

3. The United States will not agree to a "white man's party" to 
determine the problems of the Southeast Asian nations. j 

I was instructed to advise Wilson and Radford of the above, and have done so, 

2. . The President went over the draft of the speech which Dulles Is 
going to make tonight, making quite a few suggestions and changes in text. 
He though additionally the speech should include some easy to understand 
slogans, such as "The HS will never start a war," "The US will not go t to 
war without Congressional authority," "The US, as always, is trying V 
organize cooperative efforts to sustain the peace." 

3. With reference to the cease-fire proposal transmitted by Bidault 

to the French Cabinet, I read the following, as views principally of * Llitary 
members of the Planning Board, expressed in their yeaterday afternoon meeting 



1. US should not support the Bidault proposal. 

2. Reasons for this position: / 

a. The mere proposal of the cease-fire at the Geneva Conference 
would destroy "the will to fight of French forces and make fence-* 
sitters jump to Vietmirih side. 

COPY FOR GENERAL BOWESTEEL 

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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TOP SECRET 



b. the Communists would evade covertly cease-fire controls. 

3. The US should (as a last act to save Indo'China) propose to 
France that if the following 5 conditions are met, the US will go to 
. Congress for authority to intervene with combat forces: 

> 

a. grant of genuine freedom for Associated States 

b. US take major responsibility for training indigenous forces 

c. US share responsibility for military planning 

d. - French forces to stay in the fight and no requirement of 
replacement by US forces. 

(e. Action under JM auspices?) 

This offer to be made known simultaneously to the other members of the 
proposed regional grouping (UK, Australia, N2, Thailand, Associated 
States, Philippines) in order to enlist their participation, 

I then summarized possible objections to making the above proposal to 
the French: 

a. No French Government is now competent to act in a lasting way, 

b. There is no indication France wants to "internationalize" the 
conflict. 

£. The US proposal would be made without the prior assurance of a 
regional grouping of SEA States, a precondition of Congress; although 
this point might be added as another condition to the proposal. 

. d. US would be "baling out colonial France" in the eyes of the 
world, 

£, US cannot undertake alone to save every situation of trouble. 



— 



I concluded that some PB members felt that it had never been made 
clear to the French that the US was willing to ask for Congressional 
authority, if certain fundamental preconditions were met; that these 
matters had only been hinted at, and that the record of history should 
be clear as to the US position. Dulles was interested to know the Presi- 
dent's views, because he is talking with Ambassador Bonnet this afternoon. 
He indicated that he would mention these matters to Bonnet, perhaps making 
a more broad hint than heretofore. He would not circulate any formal 
paper to Bonnet, or to anyone else. 

The President referred to the proposition advanced by Governor St as sen 
at the April 29 Council Meeting as not having been thoroughly thought out. 

U37 

* 

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TOP SECRET 



He said that he had been trying to get France to "internationalize" matters 
for a long time, and they are not willing to do so. If it were though 
advisable at this time to point out to the French the essential pre- 
conditions to the US asking for Congressional authority to intervene, then 
it should also be made clear to the French as an additional precondition 
that the US would never intervene alone, that there must be an invitation 
by the indigenous people, and that there must be some kind of regional 
and collective action, 

I understand that Dulles will decide the extent to which he cares to 
follow this line with Ambassador Bonnet. This discussion may afford Dulles 
guidance in replying to Smith's request about a US alternative to support 
the Bidault proposal, but there really was no decision as to the US attitude 
toward the cease-fire proposal itself. 



/- 



^38 



TOP SECBET 



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H 



o 






o 





Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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* ■ 



Excerpts fi'om the First Plenary Session 

The Geneva Conference 

Indochina Phase 

May 8, 195^ 



The French Proposals 



fi 



* i * • 



The French Government is thus confident that it has done every- 
thing in its power to put an end to the conflict. Hot only has it re- 
moved all reason for this conflict to exist by recognizing fully and 
unreservedly the independence of Viet -Nam, Laos and Cambodia but, further- 
more, the French Government has manifested for a long time its readiness 
and its desire of obtaining a reasonable settlement which would allow for 
the hostilities to be brought to an end. This is the main and primary 
task assigned to this Conference. . . . 

"We propose that the Conference should , first of all, declare that 
it adopt the principle of a general cessation of hostilities in Indochina 
based upon the necessary guarantees of security. 



... 



"....in agreeing upon the withdrawal of the invading forces and the 
restoration of the territorial integrity of those states.... 



w 



...For France there is a Viet-Jism state of which the unity, terri 
torial integrity and independence must be respected.... 

"...•the most Just solution of the political problem can be found 
and finally assured only when the population is in a position to express 
in complete freedom its sovereign will by means of free elections. For 
the present moment I repeat the problem is that of bringing about a 
cessation of hostilities and the guaranteeing of that cessation. These 
guarantees, in our opinion, must be of two kinds. 



"....the regular forces of the two parties would be brought together 
in clearly demarcated regrouping zones.... the implementation of th 
agreement should be placed under the supervision of international com- 
missions. ... 

"....the agreement .... should be guaranteed in appropriate condi- 
tions by the states participating in the present Conference..., 



rr 



• • 



..The French proposal is as follows: 



"I. Vietnam 



1. All regular units to be assembled in assembly areas to 
be defined by the Conference on the basis of proposals 
by the Commanders- in-Chief. 



•Y O U 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 









2. All elements not "belonging either to the amy or to the 
police forces to he disarmed. 

3. All prisoners of war and civil internees to be released 
immediately. 

H, Execution of the above provisions to be supervised by 
international commissions. 

5- Hostilities to cease as soon as the agreement is signed. 
The assembly of troops and disarmament of forces as above 
provided to begin not later than x days (the number to be 
fixed by the Conference) after the signature of the 
agreement . 



. # 



"II. Cambodia end Laos 

1. All regular and irregular Vietminh forces which have 
_ entered the country to be evacuated. 

2. All elements which do not belong either to the army or 
to the police forces to be disarmed. 

3. All prisoners of war and civil internees to be released 

immediately, 

■ 
■ 

k* Execution of the above provisions to be supervised by 
international commissions. 

M IH* These agreements shall be guaranteed by the States partici- 
pating in the Geneva Conference. In the event of any vio- 
lation thereof there shall be an immediate consultation 
between the guarantor States for the purpose of taking 
appropriate measures either individually or collectively. 

* 

- 

"This 5 Mr. President, is the proposal submitted to the Conference 
on the responsibility of the French Delegation and by that Delegation. 
Thank you, sir.... 

The Viet Hinh Proposals 

i — * ■ 

"....In the same spirit, expressing the sentiment of the three 
peoples of Vietnam, Khmer, and Pat he t Lao, the delegation of the 
Democratic Republic of Viet Han proposes to the conference that it 
invite the official representatives of the governments of resistance 
of Khmer and of the government of resistance of Pathet Lao to take part 
in its work. We submit this proposal having in mind the following: 

"....the peoples of Khmer and Pathet Lao have liberated vast areas 
of their national territory.... 



kkQ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 









"•-..These governments represent the great majority of the people 
of Khmer and Lao, the aspirations of 'whom they symbolize.... 

"....Alas, the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Viet Ham 
"proposes to the conference that it adopt the following resolution: 

1,1 In view of the present situation of the countries of 
Indochina and in the interests of the thorough and objective 
examination of the question of the cessation of hostilities 
and the reestablishment of peace in Indochina, the conference 
recognises the necessity to invite the representatives of the 
governments of resistance of Khmer and Pathet Lao to take part 
in the work of the conference in regard to the question of the 
reestablishment of peace in Indochina. ' 

"Having submitted this proposal to the conference, I would ask the 
President of this meeting to authorize me to continue my statement 
when the conference has discussed the proposal that I have submitted 



u 



» f . • 



The United States Proposal 

fl Tbe United States proposes that any idea of inviting these non- 
existent, so-called governments be rejected.... 

The Red China Position 

■ ■ — — ■ — ■ " " mm ' — ■ ■ n " "• ■ 

a 

"....The delegation of the Peoples Republic of China fully supports 
the views of Mr.Pham van Dong. . . . 

The Soviet Union Position 

■ - ■— - — — ' — " - • m m .•- • — ill i , 

"in view of the aforesaid, the Soviet Delegation supports the pro- 
posal of the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Viet Rem to invite 
the delegates of the Democratic Governments of Pathet Lao and Khmer to 
take part in our Conference...." 



I 



r*r J. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
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" 






r 







OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

WASHINGTON 23, D. C, 



9 Kay 195 



-r 



v • 



/ 



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS 

KSMCRAiiDUM FOR 5323 SECB3TSBY OF nSESISE 

m 
* 
• + 

SUBJECT: Future U- S- Action Eegarding In&o-Chitia * 

1. In light of the French having tabled an armistice uroposal at 
Geneva; the United States rn.ua t now decide whether: 

a. To intervene actively in the Indo -China war to redeem the situation. 

b. To exercise all feasible pressure to require the French Government 
to avoid all compromise at Geneva and to take increased effective military 
and political action against the Viet Minh in Indo-China. This appears 
realistically possible only if the decision to implement a above is also 
made. t 

* 
- 

£. To adopt a passive policy toward the negotiations at Geneva while 
endeavoring to organize hastily a regional grouping, with U.S. participation^ 

to hold what remains of Southeast Asia. I 

■ 

2. Decisions a plus b offer the only sure way to stop the Conriirdst advene. 
They involve substantial risk of var with Red China and increased risk of general 
war. However j recognizing the steadily increasing Soviet capabilities in 
nuclear warfare and the consequent steady diminution of the present military 
advantage- of the U.S. over the USSR^ these increased risks can more surely and 
safely be accepted now than ever again. " I 

3. Decision £ would be a co, -promise involving clear possibilities for 
piecemeal advancement of Communist control over the balance of free Asia despite 
the best efforts of the U.S. to the contrary. The likelihood of further such 
advancement would be* somewhat diminished if the U.S. made publicly clear that 
the further support by Moscow and Peiping of Corronunist aggression or subversion 

:tion by the U.S against 



as Judged o-j- the U.S. , would entail direct military 
the source or sources of this support. However } it 



ac 



t might be raotiths or years 
before further subversion would enable such a U.S. judgment. By then the 
increased Soviet nuclear capability might well inhibit the U.S. Government 
from implement ing its announced, intention. Asia could thus be lost. 

■ km Therefore j it would appear that the U.S. Government must decide whether 
to take the steps necessary to certain Ccrsmunisra in Asia within Red China bv " 
intervention in Indo-China or accept the probable loss of Asia to Comu&isia. 



113 ftocaa^at cc::tai^s _L~ passs. 
Cow Ug. JL- of -X copies. Series 

- - + 

Ihiz docus&nt i«ust net fcj 
T*pTQ&ic&i rithout permission 

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.Ci the or: ::na^ai~ office* 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316, By: NWD Date; 201 1 



« • 



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♦» 






V 



Dear Boo: 



b": 



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lie? 3.0, X95^ 



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Secretary Dulles has asked r^e to send you the 
attached draft instructions to our Delegation in 
GoaGYSo 



Kc vould appreciate roc Giving the urgent comments 
or the Department ox" D&fensG 0:1 tlie^c instructions s 

ana if possible it vould uo very helpful if I could 
have at least your initial reaction by toncercv 

morning. 

« 

I ?l\ also sending a copy of this letter with 
enclosure to AcV;dral HadforcV 






Kiiclocaire; 



C:-' 



"1 . • 



Dinooroiy yours 5 



Bobort B. K-arplM 



v T 



Draft .instructions 






She Honorable 

Robert B # AncIor^on 5 

Deputy Secretary of Defense j 
The Pentagon j 

Washington* 






i*. » ■---■^■**» *>• -■%* fc-^r — «p ■■»** 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



i 



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CCWFIKiiTIAL 



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The following basic instructions ., which have bean approved 
by the President, will guide you, as head of the United States 
Delegation , in your participation in the Indochina phase of the 
Geneva Conference . 

J 1- The presence of -a United States representative during 
the discussion at the Geneva Conference of "the problem of restoring 
peace in Indochina' 5 rests on the Berlin Agreement of February 13, 
195^- Under that agreement the US, UK, France and USSR agreed that 
the four of them plus other interested states should be invited to 
a conference at Geneva on April 26 "for the vvrposo of reaching a 
peaceful settlement of the Korean question" and agreed further, 
that "the problem of restoring peace in Indochina" would also be 
discussed e,t Geneva by the four powers represented at Berlin, and 
Communist China arid other interested s fetes. 

* 

2* "You will not deal with the delegates o± the Chinese Com- 
munist regime, or any other regime not now diplomatically recognized 
by the United States, on any terms which imply politic?,! recognition 
or which concede to that regime any status other than that of a 
regime with which it is necessary to deal on a de f acto basis in 
order to end aggression, or the threat of aggression, and to obtain 
peace. * "•*- jp 

3- The position of the United States in the Indochina phase 
of the Geneva Conference is that of an^interested nation which, 
however, is ^neither a belli gernt nor a principal in the negotiation. 

K* The United States is participating ip the Indochina phase 
of the Conference in order thereby to a^slsN? in arriving* at decisions 
which will help the nations of that area peacefully to enjoy terri- 
torial integrity and political independence under stable and free 
governments with the opportunity to expand their economies, to realize 
ther legitimate national aspirations, and to develop security through 

;ainst aggression, frora withir or 
people should not be ar;ialgar.iatt,d 
into the Coirjmmist bloc of imperialistic dictatorship, ; 

5- The United States is not prepared to give its express o: 
implied approval to any cease fire, armistice or other settlement 
which would have the effect of subverting the existing lawful govern- 
ments of the three aforementioned states or of permanently impairing 
their territorial integrity or of placing in jeopardy the forces of 
the French Union in Indochina, or which otherwise contravened the 
principles stated in (k) above. 




I h U 







Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 




* t ■ ■ * 



- 1 - - =. 



■". 



::.- 






CaSFIDBRIIAL 



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6. You should j in so far as is cr ,tible with these instruc- 
tions, cooperate vith^the Delegation of France an:l vith the Delegations 
of other friendly participants in this phase of «the Conference. 

■ 

7. If in your Judgment continued participation in the Indochina * 
phase of the Conference appears likely to involve the United States 

in a result inconsistent with its policy, as stated above, you 
should ime&iately so inform your Government, receive riding either 
withdrawal or the limitation of the U.S* role to that of an observer. 
If the situation develops such that, in* your opinion, either of such 
actions is essential under the circumstances and time is lacking 
for consultation vltfa Washington^ you may act in your discretion. 

8. You are authorized to inform other Delegations at Ceneav 
of these instructions . 



* 



h 



a>5 



CONFIDENTIAL 






Q 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



INCOMING TELEGRAM 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



ACTION COPY 



TOP SECRET 



Control 
Rec'd: 



3907 

May 10, 195^ 

10:52 a.m. 



PROM : Pari s 



TO: 



NO: 



Secretary of State 
*}28?, May 10, 1 p.m. 



NIACT 

SENT DEPARTMENT bzQj; REPEATED INFORMATION SAIGON 509, NIACT 
GENEVA 20U. 

DEPARTMENT AND GENEVA LIMIT DISTRIBUTION 

SAIGON EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR 

Laniel asked ine to come to see him at 10 Sunday night. I 
found him in a strong and courageous mood reminiscent of the 
conversations I had last summer at the beginning of the ne- 
gotiations over the Navarre plan and quite in contrast with 
his mood of the past few weeks. He stated that he plans to 
take a very firm position in the National Assembly on Tuesday 
when Indochina problem comes up again. He plans to say that 
there are decisions of vital military importance to be taken 
daily at Geneva. If the National Assembly has someone else in 
mind whom they can put into office promptly to handle these 
decisions in a better fashion than he can, they should do so, 
but that if they are not (repeat not) prepared for the immediate 
reconstitution of a new government (which they are not) they 
should stop talking about Indochina and let the government get 
on with its difficult task, 

■ 

Laniel then expressed considerable concern regarding (l) the 
prospects at Geneva; and (2) and more important, the military 
situation in Indochina. He felt that Indochina phase of Geneva 
conference hud got off to a bad start and considered it very 
likely that in view of the division and weakness among the 
Western powers, the Communists will not (repeat not) accept the 
French proposal for a cease-fire with guarantees, but will press 
for what in effect would be total surrender. 

He said it had been made clear to the French delegation by the 
Communists that they could not (repeat not) have any conversations 
direct with the Viet Mirih at Geneva but must in all cases proceed 
through the Chinese. This, plus the fact of large scale Chinese 
intervention at Dien-Bien-Phu, made it clear that the enemy France 






is facing 



khG 



1*3870 



TOP SECRET 



PERMANENT 
RECORD COPY 















Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET ' ■ 

' -2- 1*287, May 10, 1 p.m., from Paris., 

is facing is not (repeat not) the Viet Minh rebels, but Communist 
China- Laniel observed that Communist China had fought the 
whole UN to a standstill in Korea. Obviously France alone was • 
no (repeat no) match for China. The strength with which the 
French could oppose Chinese propositions at Geneva would have 
a direct connection with the amount of support they received 
from the other Western powers, particularly the US. In the 
final analysis, the only such support, which he felt would have 
any real effect on the Chinese, would be the direct threat of 
US military intervention. He very much feared that the Communist 
side would attempt so drag out the negotiations by interminable 
procedural debates on such subjects as the admission to the 
conference of non-existent Communist Governments of Laos and 
Cambodia until such time as they could gain a military decision 
in the field. 

Laniel then turned to the immediate military problem. He said 
that the Viet Minh ha d^_ announced that they would not (repeat 
not) cease operations this year during the monsoon. Their 
next objective, after Dlen-Bien-Pbu, would in all probability 
be Hanoi. Under ordinary circumstances it should take the 
* Viet Minh approximately a month to move their troops from Dien- 
Bien-Phu to the Hanoi area. However, it might be possible to 
reduce this period to two or three weeks If the Viet Minh made 



p 



an all-out effort. He also feared that in view of the success 
which the Chinese have had with their military Intervention 
at Dlen-Bien-Phu, they would not (repeat not) now hesitate to 
intervene further with supplies and even with additional person- 
nel , to the extent necessary to gain a knockout victory at 
Hanoi. 



therefore was vitally important, as a first order of business, 
the French to decide how to regroup their forces In Indochina 



It 
for 

so as best to protect the expeditionary corps. Laniel said 
that he would much prefer to* take these military decisions with 
the aid of competent US military advice, rather than to' take 
them by himself. He also said that he would have to ki dw. In 
connection with making _his decisions, what, if any, military 
action the US might be prepared to take in Indochina and under 
what, if any, circumstances. If there was no (repeat r -> 
bility of US military help at any point, the regroupmei, c 
forces would have to be much more* drastic, and the first 
to be done would be the complete evacuation and abandonment to 
the Viet Minh of the entire territories of Laos and Cambodia. 
He stated that there were 15 French Union battalions presently 
in la os which vould have to be redeployed 'to the Delta or to 
some area near the sea. In addition, the French-held lines ity 
the Delta would have to be greatly shortened. 



possi- 
of 

thing 



• • 



W7 



As a specific 



43871 



TOP SECRET 



m 






* 



8S 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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V 



5/10/5 1 !, 2:4-5 p.m. 
CORRECTED PAGE 3 



j» 



\h-B ■ ' TOP SECRET 



\ 



' 



ActlQfrf^ -3- 4287, May 10, 1 p.m., from Paris, Control 3907 

: ■ As a specific request, Laniel asked that a US General officer, 
fully familiar with the terrain and conditions In Indochina be 
sent to Paris Immediately to confer witft General Ely, Pleven 
and himself. He said that at least In the first instance, <it 
P would be imperative to preserve the utmost secrecy concerning 
C this mission and that the only people who would be Informed of 
"UR it, in addition to the three previously mentio ned, w ould be 

Bidault and Ma urice S chumann. He s aid tTia't^ It was imp o ssTole 
to spa re G eneral El y at t h is time; f or a t rip to W ash it xm , 
whic h was THe" reason for hi s r equest" that a US o ffic er com e 
to Paris. He emphas ized the importanc e^ ofT he US of fi certain g 
fully u p to date" andTnfQ rmed regarding' the T e rra in "and po s sTb 1 1 ~ 
ties in Indo china, In a ddition to" the help which tbis oT_fiogr ~ 
could g ive, La niel said that he would also require definite 
inf orma ti on Trom me asTo what the ^B~GovernmerTtr might "5e ^ 
prepared to do in t he w ay of military effort. He empEa sized 
the great need for speecT and hoped tnat he could have an 
answer in principle very shortly to his request for advice 
from a US General. If the answer were favorable, the US General 
should arrive before the end of .the week in order to be fully 
effective. 



DU:VH/ll 



DILLON 7 :\ 



Mr. Sturm's office (FE) notified 5/10/2:12 p.m. 
Mr. Fisher's office (WE) notified 5/10/2:12 p.m 



•- 






> 
i 









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/ Bureau or 

S fAA tfijlch*' A* s Ait J -r "Z 






tml 01954 



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Omftftttt of St ;■:/ ^ ^ 






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TOP SECRET 



43873 M8 



i * 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 







10 May 195^ 



In reply refer to 1-11999 

MEI'lOR/uTDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

SUBJECT: United States "Posture 11 at Geneva Conference * 

Captain Grant and I vent over vith Mr. Hensel the State Department 
"Draft Instructions to the U.S. Delegation at Geneva." We all agreed that 
as presently drafted they imply that the U.S. is at Geneva to "cheer the 
players" rather than to "pitch/ 1 The following specific comments are to 
raise the basic question vith State, which is: are we in Geneva to try to 
the limit of our capacities to influence the outcome along the lines we 
want - or are we content to take a passive role? We think that to accept 
the latter is to accept defeat in advance. 

1; Regarding para, 3, the United States, while not a "belligerent," 
is certainly vitally interested in the successful handling of the Indochina 
phase at Geneva. Again, while not technically a "principal" in the negoti- 
ation it would seem the U.S. should act from its position as the strongest 
nation in the free world and endeavor cons i stent ly to influence the progress 
of negotiations towards our objectives. Consequently it is recommended that 
this paragraph be amended by the insertion of the word "vitally" before the 
words "interested nations" and the insertion of the word "technically" 
before the words "a belligerent or a principal." 

2. Regarding para. h 9 this could be strengthened somewhat to give 
proper guidance as to "posture," by changing the words "to assist in arriv- 
ing at decisions" to "to promote decisions." It is further suggested that, 
in the last sentence, the word "implies" be changed to "means 



II 



3- With regard to para, 6, the U.S. Delegation should manifest 
more positive efforts than merely those of "cooperation" with other Allied 
Delegations, ' To this end, this paragraph should be changed to read: 

."You should, insofar as is compatible with these instructions, 
cooperate with and endeavor to influence the Delegation of France and 
with the Delegations of other friendly participants in this phase of 
the Conference in order to further the attainment of U.S. objectives ." 

U» With regard to para. 7> there appears to be a profoundly 
important point involved. This point is, in effect, will the United States 
admit diplomatic defeat and cease to use all means to influence the Conference 
towards its ends, if the Conference appears to be going against us. It has 
been argued that this should be done so as to relieve the U.S. of responsi- 
bility and permit the U.S. to pursue, with complete freedom of action, such 



COPY 



TiHMj 

m 
MS 









Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



w * 

l 






steps as it then felt were necessary. Consideration must be given to what 
steps could be taken if we withdraw from a conference which we helped 
initiate and of which we were an inviting Power. If such steps to be 
contemplated include any direct militaxy action in the area, the U.S. 
vould be risking being called an "aggressor" if it tried to take action 
of this sort while the Conference was still in session. Para* 29 of , 
NSC 5^05 > "the approved policy on Southeast Asia, states "If the French 
actually enter into negotiations with the Communists, insist that the 
United States be consulted and seek to influence the course of the nego- 
tiations." You presumably will want to discuss this coinment of paragraph 7 
with Admiral Radford. 



In case you want to send a written reply to Mr. Murphy we attach a 
draft. Note that it says you have discussed it with Admiral Radford who 
agrees. We have not shown it to Admiral Radford so you should do so before 
sending it (his office has been given a copy) # Also note it questions the 
need for sending any such instructions on "posture" at this late date. 



SIGNED 

C. H. Bonesteel, III 
Brig. General, USA 
Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 
for National Security Affairs 



Attachment - 1 
Draft Memo 



V 



'Orig - DepSecDef 
Cy 2 - Acta Radford 

3 - Capt Grant, OFMA 
k - ISA(R&C) Files 
. 5 - Stayback 



CHBone steel/* WlO May 5U 
OASD(ISA) 21 840 78IOI 



COPY 



This document must not be reproduced 
without permission. of the originating 
office , 



* ft 1* \ 5 u - 1 ; ; - •, »*J -i 



t[ 5 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



OUTGOING 
TELEGRAM 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



TOP SECEET 



03630 
195^ MAY 11 B* ^:09 



SENT TO: Amembassy Paris NIACT ^023 



EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY 



RPT Araconsul GENEVA TEDUL 5^ 



EYES ONLY UNDER SECRETARY FROM SECRETARY 

REUKTEL U287 and our ^017 

1. We fully realize need for prompt decisions regarding international- 
izing the "war. Various factors combine to suggest that it may be premature 
to pose issue of internationalizing for decision at this moment. 

(a) If raised before French realize fully that choice is between 
internationalizing and virtual surrender, proposal to internationalize might 
well be rejected, leaving no alternative but capitulation. 

(b) British are more likely to support or acquiesce in interven- 
tion if Geneva has been shown to offer no prospect of solution, 

(c) Australian government would almost certainly not take a 
position until after elections at end of May, 

Even so it seems desirable for Laniel to know in general terms 
conditions Me would require for intervention because of influence on current 
French decisions in military field in Indo-China and in political field in 
Geneva. 



^6185 



2. President 



Drafted by: 



JED/ma 5-11- 5^ 
SS/S : JCK/ 



Approved by President Eisenhower 



U51 



TOP SECRET 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 633 10, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



• • 



.* 



- PSge^-2. 



of telegram ip. 






— -„J *--* — * l_ ^' 






CAT1 



Classification 



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"Pyt is e ^ ^ O **5 f" 

— J. *-" O -*r * 



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would ask~TCorssres3 ?or 



authority to 



* use erased forces of US in area to support friendly end 

+ * 

recognized governments against aggression or armed subversion 



fomented fro:s without, provided ho could then state fcr 



a *-. 



following conditions had been or Would "be 






i 



(a) Tb*t uS military participation had been 
formally requested by Franco and three Assoc:^ ted 
States: • '.-'■' 

■ 

•(b) That Thailar.cl, Philippines, Australia, 

» 

Xev; Zealand and United Kingdon a?. so had received 



similar invitations and that v;e v;ore satisfied that 
first two would also accopt at enco; that next two 

r 

would probably accept following Australian elections* 

' if US invokes AKZUS Treaty* and that U.K. would either 



participate or be acquiescent* 

(c) That s©2*e aspect .of matter rrould be ore sent e 



••--. 



to VZx promptly* such as n oy request f?on laos, Canbodia 

* 

cr Thailand for peace observation comiissionj 

■ 

(d) That France guarantees to Associated States 
complete independence j including unqualified option to 



v;it 



icirav; iron p-rencn union at anj 






46186 



TO? S T.-: 71 



Cltsssijictitior. 

452 



— 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
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v 



Page 



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(o) France would undertake -not to withdraw 

its forces from Indochlra ditriijLg period of united 

- principally air and ssa - 

action' so that forces, fron U. So/ and others would bo 

> * 

supplementary and not in substitution; 

(f) That agreement was rea eked on training of 

- 

native troops and on command structure for united 

act ion 4 • 

FYI Radford contemplates French Supreme Corciiand 



i ■ 



with U.So Air Coirjuaijcl. EW FYI 

* I ■ w 

m ■ • * 

So U*S» would require all these conditions to bo 
accepted by French Cabinet and authorized or endorsed by 
French National Assembly* Tals would bo e special ly 
important in view of uncertain tenure of cay French 
governments U.S* would have fully ccasaittod itself once 
it agreed to. intervene and would have to be ert>le to rely 
on adherence to conditions by any successor French government 



4 



You will realize that intervention nipht involve 



consequences of utmost gravity. Reactions of Cornrramist 
* bloc could not bs predicted. Also, if it bo can o necessary 
to proceed without active U,L participation, the 



'* 



4BJ.87 



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Classification 

H53 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



* *• 



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■ 



page 4_o£ telegram to AmQESbS S3^— PAR-IS— *-r- 

TOP SEC. 



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Classificfit io ti 



I • implications would be extremely serious and Tap- 

* 

reaching. , Removal any taint colonialism would be 

essential to success of operation in Indochina, to 

♦ ■ - 

attraction of potential Asian support, and to fore- 

stalling opposition by other Asian and Middle Eastern 

countries* In view of those factors, you will 



appreciate that conditions indicated would be absolutely 
indispensable as basis for our action* 

- 

5 The U.S. would continue its efforts to broaden 
united action operation by seeking to bring in other 
countries whose interests are affectod and to formalize 
* : the coalition as, for example 3 by negotiation of 
regional defense pact* 

. /-. 6. Unless you consider timing unwise in light 

of factors stated in para 1, you may outline foregoing - 

as . ■ 

orally to La ni el/your estimate of indispensable condi- 

■ 
tions in light of your knowledge of current high-level 

thinking in Washington in advance receipt by you of 

official reaction to your report of his proposal » Tou 

should leave nothing in writing with hinw You should 

make clear to him, however ; that we would not wish to 

proceed with any of this program unless National Assembly 

supports position of his government , as outlined first 

paragraph your cable Q If that occurs and X&niel wishes 

« 
TOP SEC S2 . - ■ 



4SJ88 • Classification 

k5H 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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Page 



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of idcgnim to ^Am^mbRfisy PARTS 



Classification 



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to pursue matter on basis outlinod above, he should 
formally roquost opening of di sou so ions with us on 
procedure for fulfilling essential conditions* At 
that stage U.S« Would expect to consult with U»K 

7. If you docifie unv/iso to ftsJC tall: with Lcniol 
now on above basis ; please cablo* 



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NND Project Number: NND 633 10, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



• rm Q\- i 



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDE] IT " . % 

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 
Washington 

May 11, 195^ 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE 

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

THE DIRECTOR, FOREIGN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION 

SUBJECT: Position of the United States Regarding the Provision 

of Military Aid to Indochina in the Event of a Cease- 
Fire 

REFERENCE: NSC Action No. 1111 

The National Security Council and Mr. Tuttle for the 
Secretary of the Treasury at the 196th Council meeting on May 8, 195*4, 
■ ■ discussed the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the sub- 
ject, and adopted the following statement of policy with respect there- 
to (NSC Action No. 1111 ) : 

■ 



In the event of a cease-fire in Indochina in advance 
of an acceptable armistice agreement, including inter- 
national controls, the shipment of military end- items 
under US MDAP provided under the "Agreement for Mutual 
Defense Assistance in Indochina between the United 
States of America and Cambodia, France, Laos, and Viet- 
nam 11 will immediately be suspended. In such event, the 
entire question of US aid to Indochina "will be re-examined 
in the light of circumstances then existing. The US also 
assumes that, in such event, military end-items previously 
delivered in Indochina by the US will be recovered or 
destroyed to the maximum practicable extent. 

< Accordingly, the above statement of policy, as approved 
by the President, is transmitted herewith to the Secretary of Defense 
for guidance and appropriate action, and to the Secretary of State and 
the Director, Foreign Operations Administration for information. 

It is requested that special security precautions be 
observed in the handling of the above statement on policy and that acce ss 
to it be very strictly limited on an absolute need-to-know basis. 



Signed: JAMES S. MY, Jr. 

Executive Secretary 



COPY 



^58 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



INDICATE; D COLLECT 
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FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY FROM THE SECRETARY 






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The following basic instructions, which have been approved by the 



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President, and which are in confirmation of those already givan you 
orally, will guide you, as head of the United States Delegation, in your 

participation in the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference, " |Y) 

01 

1. The presence of a United States representative during the discussion^ 

4 

at the Geneva Conference of "the problem of restoring peace in Indochina" 

rests on the Berlin Agreement of February 18, 1954* Under that agreement 

the US j UK, France, and USSR agreed that the four of them plus other 

» • 

interested states should be invited to a conference at Geneva on April 28 
"for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question" 

I • ^ 

and agreed further, that "the problem of restoring peace in Indochina" 
would also be discussed at Geneva by the four powers represented at Berlin 



and Communist China and other interested states, 

* 

2. You will not deal with the delegates of the Chinese Communist 
regime, or any other regime not now diplomatically recognized 



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3. The position of the United States in the Indochina phase of the 
Geneva. Conference is that of an interested nation which, however, Is 
neither a belligerent nor a principal in the negotiation. 

4. The United States is participating in the Indochina phase of the 
Conference in order thereby to assist In arriving at decisions which will 
help the nations cf that area peacefully to enjoy territorial integrity arid 
political independence under stable and free governments with the opportunity 

* 

to expand their economies, to realize their legitimate ;£T, national aspirations, 
and to develop security through Individual and collective defense against 
aggression, from within or without . This implies that these people should 

■ 

not be amalgamated into the Communist bloc of Imperialistic dictatorship). 

I 

5. The United States is not prepared to give its express or ii plied 

approval to any cease-fire, armistice, or other settlement which SE^<lkx would 
have the effect of subverting the existing lawful governments of the three 

■ 

aforementioned states or of permanently impairing their territorial Integrity 



or of placing in jeopardy the forces of the French Union in Indochina, or 
which otherwise contravened the principles s&Hsix stated in (4) above. 

• ■ 

«-<r58 



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kB13 



-CONFIDENTIAL, 



C las s i I icat i o n 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






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AMCQSJSSNE-VA — 









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You should, insofar as is compatible with those Instructions, 



cooperate with the Delegation of France and with the Delegations of other 
friendly participants in this phase oi the Conference.. 



*7 



If in your judgment continued participation in the Indochina phas 



se 



of the Conference appears likely to involve the United States in a result 
inconsistent with its policy, as stated above, you should immediately so 
inform your Government, reconimehdina either s withdrawal or the limitation 
of the US role to that of an observer. It the situation develops such that, 
in your opinion, either of such actions is essential under the circumstances 

- 

, and time is lacking for consultation with Uh v :^^ ; ^ix Washington, you may 

* 

act in your discretion. . 

S. You are authorised to infom other delegations at Geneva oi those 



ek instructions. END VERBATIM TEXT 




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H53 

.CONFIDENTIAL 

C I a i s t j i i - *i t i o n 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



, 






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. ftii ' CUSi: 



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A COHCi'Ff FOR AC r CICir WITH RKGARD TO 






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■ ■ ^ ' 

1. To find a way to resolve the numerous conflicting factors of the 
Indochina problem in a way which will preserve Indochina to the free world. 



FACTS EFARJRG 011 THE PRO^nilM 



* 



2. The loss of Indochina to Coiamunist control, cither by negotiation at 
Geneva or by force of Vietminh arms,, would have grave consequences to the free 
world . 

3. The United States might he willing, to intervene in Indochina if the 
following problems could be resolved: 

a. The U.S. must not be supporting "colonialism" in such intervention. 

b. The U.S. must intervene in some sort of allied action. 

c.. Th^ United IGtigdom and the Asian nations related to her, particularly 
India, appear to be opposing U.S. intervention. This opposition is presently 
being Manifested by "Asia for Asians" proposals based on the Colombo nations 
supervising and guaranteeing an Indochina settlement. 

k* There arc two further factors bearing on U.S. intervention: 

a* The need for Congress tonal agreement. This is at least partially 
contingent upon a clear resolution of the "colonialism" factor. 



b. The possibility of Red Chinese intervention, 
separate issue presently allowed for in I5GC 5^5- 



This is a somewhat 



5. The U.S. is ei:deavoring to avoid the loss of Indochina and to resolve 
the colonialism problem by the creation of a regional grouping. It is not 
clear that a grouping -adequate to resolve the colonialism problem could be used 
for intervention' in Indochina. 



DISCUSS IQU ■; .. 

6. To d.atc there has been some lack of understanding amongst our Allies, 
"in Europe and Asia" as to firm U.S. intentions with regard to Indochina. This 
may arise because of a lack of an overall concept which will guide the U.S. as 
to its objectives and actions, 

7. The following is an admittedly imperfect attempt to set forth a 
possible concept. 

a. The U.S. is unwilling to permit the loss of Indochina to Communist 
control by whatever raeans . 



Ihls document must not be 
reproduced wHjicjt permission 
of the originating office. 



160 



.Thin doeusrrht contains -U-- paces. 
Copy Ho. U K of — <*> copies. Series 

. 1-12163 



top mi i 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NNM) Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






\UY &Z&&] 



o 



The U.S. is prcj^arccl to join actively in tuo regional groupings 



The first such grouping will include nations ready immediately to intervene 
in Indochiia provide:! ccrta: conditions arc. met. The second such grouping 
should be defined, with wider participation j to guarantee agaiust Communist 
aggression or subversion , all of Southeast Asia with the exception of Iixic 
China go long as active figjitlng continues . 



j- 






c. The smaller regional grouping, for active intervention , should % 
consist of at least the U.S., France, the Associated States, Thailand and 
the Philippines, A precondition of its formation is the absolute declaration 
by France of the independence of the Associated State: 



5. 



d. The second regional grouping should be open to all countries vho 
wisrf~to join, including the Colombo countries } Korea and; perhaps, the 
Chinese nationalists. The Asian members 3 definitely including the Colombo 
countries; would be invited to maintain the peace and security of the area 
of Indochina progressively liberated according to the procedures set forth 

below* 

■ 

e. Intervention in the Indochina conflict by the first regional grouping 
would be on Invitation by the Associated States. Operations would be 
conducted from as Eiany Vietnam held areas as possible to destroy organized 
Vietminh resistance therein and to develop a "front" which would delimit 

the areas of independent Vietnam. These areas would be expanded as rapidly 
as was consistent with the destruction of organized Vietminh forces therein. 
As soon as a substantial area was "liberated", the "active" regional grouping; 
i.e,, the U.S. and France, would turn over the maintenance . of order, 
anti -guerrilla operations and anti -subversion to the Vietnam Government 
assisted by the Asian members of the second and "peaceful" regional grouping. 
Military installations necessary to support active combat could be kept 
as "enclaves" within the liberated area. 

- 

8. The above concept; complicated though it may be, would seem to resolve 
to a considerable degree the problem of U.S. intervention being construed 

as "colonialism. 11 It would further be an offer to the Colombo nations to 
guarantee the progressive settlement of Iildochina by force of arms in which 
they are not askel to participate. It would clarify to the world that the U.S. 
means what is has frequently said, that the U.S. is determined that Communist 
expansion by aggressive force of arms shall not be permitted. 

i 

9. The concept, to be effective in halting the deterioration of the free 

world position in Indochina and at Geneva, would, need to be publicly presented 
to the world, after the decision to do so was reached by the Executive Branch 
and Congress. It would have to be presented in its entirety to obtain the 
psychological as well as facttial resolution of the "colonial" problem. 

EECa-E-EHDATJOfJ ' ' 



1 



10, It is recommended that this concept be given appropriate study and 
further definition by the interested Departments and Agencies. 



481 









*/J 



v?Lh ■ . ._ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 J 6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






-i — 



TOP SECRET 



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THSSpRp JltfclMTJ " -UJ Wi rm uj- mm**. 



I % j 



ion 



ss 

Info 



FROM: PARIS 



Control: 6CC8 
L/d: MAY I'l , 1954 
6S39 P M 



TO: Secretary o:? Btato 

HO: 4 383, MAY Hi } 10 PM 



NIACT 



is ^ 

I 



i I 



SENT DEPARTMENT 4 383, REPEATED INFORMATION NIACT GENEVA 237, ' i 
LIMIT DISTRIBUTION 



EYES ONLY UNDER SECRETARY 

-y-)\^ 

I SAW LANIEL AND SCHUMANN THIS EVENING REGARDING DEPTEL 
/i023o BEFORE DISCUSSION STARTED ON REFTEL, LANIEL MADE A 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS AND ASKED TWO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS, 
HE SAID THAT HE WAS SENDING GENERAL ELY TO INDOCHINA IMMED- 
IATELY. HE WILL LEAVE ON SATURDAY OR SUNDAY AND WILL STAY 
IN INDOCHINA ONLY TWO TO FOUR DAYS. PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT IS 
TO CHECK UP ON MILITARY SITUATION ON THE SPOT AMD ON PHYSICAL 
AND MENTAL CONDITION OF GENERAL NAVARRE. BECAUSE OF ELY'S 
PROSPECTIVE ABSENCE FROM PARIS, LANIEL SUGGESTED THAT GENERAL 
TRAPNELL, OR WHOEVER ELSE WE PLAN TO SEND TO PARIS IN ANSWER 
TO LANIEL 'S REQUEST FOR AMERICAN MILITARY ADVICE, ARRIVE 
APPROXIMATELY THURSDAY OF NEXT WEEK. GENERAL ELY WILL UNDER- 
TAKE SUCH RE-GROUPING OF FRENCH FORCES AND SHORTENING OF 
LINES AS MAY BE NECESSARY. THIS WILL PROBABLY INCLUDE WITH- 
DRAWAL OF PORTION. AND MAYBE LARGE PORTION, OF THE FRENCH 
FORCES NOW IN LAOS, FINAL DECISIONS, HOWEVER, WILL ONLY BE 
TAKEN UPON RETURN OF GENERAL ELY TO PARIS, 



« , 

o 
o 

en 

6i 






LANIEL THEN POSED FOLLOWING TWO GUEST IONS J ONE, COULD THE 
UNITED STATES FIND A WAY TO GUARANTEE THE BORDERS AND THE 
INDEPENDENCE OF LAOS AND CAMBODIA. IF SUCH A GUARANTEE COULD 
BE MADE, HE FELT IT WOULD BE OF GREAT HELP AFTER THE FRENCH 
FORCES HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN. LANIEL'S SECOND QUESTION DEALT 
WITH ACTION UNITED STATES WILL TAKE IN THE CASE OF INTERVENTION 
BY MIG 15' S AIRCRAFT. HE SAID THAT FOR HIS OWN PROTECTION 
. . HERE HE WOULD LIKE DEFINITE ASSURANCE, WRITTEN IF POSSIBLE, 
«W* THAT U * S * AVIATION WOULD COME INSTANTLY TO THE HELP OF FRENCH 
u L~ FORCES IN DELTA IF THEY WERE ATTACKED BY MIG'S. HE SAID THAT 



a 



\ 



r&mj 



\/ . HZ WOULD HAVE NO DETEilSE BEFORE PARLIAMENT OR FRENCH PUBLIC 



V 



?*-•.. _-'. -._ OPINION IF HE WAS NOT ABLE TO OBTAIN SOME SUCH ASSURANCE AS 

THERE WERE NO ADEQUATE ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSES IN THE DELTA. 



r— m%T r \n-' 



FINALLY 






i 



peotm 

PIC2S8 COPY 



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%C>oU * TOP SECRET 

o This copy must be returned to DC/R central Hies with notation of action taken o 



MAURICE 

01 



: - 



* 






D;.:) f v.yrK:i ;. :i 

C7/, If CWSSlHi 

P.' : 1 D. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 633 16, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



*■ 



TOP SECRET 

* 

-2~ 4 383, MAY 1A, 10 PM, FROM PARIS 

FINALLY, MAURICE SCHUMANN TRANSMITTED A REQUEST OF BIDAL'LT'S 
THAT U.S. DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE "IH THE NEXT DAYS TO ACCEL- 
ERATE DELIVERY OF PLANES AMD EQUIPMENT IN THE EVENT THAT A 
CEASE FIRE SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED AT GENEVA WHICH WOULD 
NATURALLY BRING .TO A HALT SUCH DELIVERIES. 

I THEN REFERRED TO QUESTION OF LOCATION OF NEGOTIATIONS AND 
EXPRESSED DEPT'S VIEWS IN FAVOR OF PARIS. SCHUMANN AND LANIEL ' 
AGREED THAT PARIS WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO WASHINGTON AND ACCORD- 
INGLY IT CAN BE ACCEPTED AS AGREED THAT NEGOTIATIONS ALONG 
LINES OF REFTEL WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE PLACE IN PARIS. 

I THEN OUTLINED REQUIREMENTS LISTED IN PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 
3 OF REFTEL. LANIEL AND SCHUMANN LISTENED VERY QUIETLY AND 
SERIOUSLY AND ON THE WHOLE APPEARED WELL PLEASED WITH THIS 
CLARIFICATION OF U.S. POSITION, THEY SAID THAT NATURALLY 
.. THEY DID NOT HAVE ANY INFO REGARDING THE VIEWS OF OTHER 
COUNTRIES IN THE AREA AND THEY WOULD APPRECIATE BEING KEPT 
INFORMED BY U.S. OF PROGRESS TOWARD FULFILLING CONDITION 
INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH 2(B) WHICH WAS BEYOND THEIR CONTROL. 
THEY WERE PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED AND PLEASED BY INDICATION 
IN THAT PARAGRAPH THAT ACTUAL PARTICIPATION BY U.K. WAS NO 
LONGER A PREREQUISITE TO U.S. ACTION. 

• LANIEL AND SCHUMANN HAD ONE SERIOUS OBJECTION TO U.S. 
CONDITIONS. THIS, AS EXPECTED, MAS TO THE CONDITION THAT 
FRANCE PJJ?iLICLY_ACCO RD TO A SSOCIATED STATES M-MT^OFJllliiDRAWJL 

• FROM FRENCH UNIO N AT _&MY_ TIEE « WHEN I EXPLAINED U.S. 
REASOTfS FOR THIS POSITION AS OUTLINED IN DEPTEL k&Sk , THEY 
SAID THEY COULD SEE HOW SUCH A STATEMENT MIGHT BE OF SOME 
HELP WITH NEHRU BUT THAT FRENCH PUBLIC OPINION WOULD NEVER 
UNDERSTAND WHY IT WAS NECESSARY TO MAKE SUCH A STATEMENT 
WHEN IT HAD NEVER BEEN REQUESTED BY ANY OF THE THREE ASSO- 
CIATED STATES. THEY THEN POINTED OUT THE FACT THAT THE 
VIET MINH ARMISTICE PROPOSALS, DISHONEST THOUGH THEY WERE, 
NEVERTHELESS LOOKED TOWARD THE POSSIBILITY OF THE VIETMINH 
JOINING THE FRENCH UNION. (COMMENT; I AM CERTAIN THAT 
UNLESS VIE CAN FIND SOME WAY TO GET AROUND THIS REQUIREMENT, 

FRENCH WILL NEVER ASK FOR OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE.) AFTER 
HEARING STRONG STATEMENT ON THE SUBJECT BY BOTH LANIEL AND 
SCHUMANN, I SAID THAT I HOPED WE COULD CONTINUE CONVERSATIONS 
ON THIS SUBJECT IN ORDER TO FIND A FORMULA THAT WOULD SATISFY' 
U.S. REQUIREMENTS AND AT THE SAME TIME COULD BE ACCEPTED BY 
THE FRENCH PARLIAMENT. LANIEL AND SCHUMANN AGREED THAT WE 
SHOULD TALK FURTHER ON THIS SUBJECT. "' --■■•■ 

■ 

LANIEL AND SCHUMANN HAD ONE OTHER QUESTION REFERRING TO SUB- 
PARAGRAPH 2(E) WHICH STATES THAT FORCES FROM U.S. WOULD BE 



PRINCIPALLY AIR 



* 



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53905 • ■ 

TOP SECRET 

'"' "'• • -' • 1*63. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 J 6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



/ • 



> 



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3-. 4 383", MAY 14', 10 



TOP SECRET 



PM, FROM PARIS 



L 



PRINCIPALLY AIR AND SEA "AND OTHERS*, THEY ASKED ME TO 
FIND OUT WHAT WAS MEANT BY OTHER FORCES, LANIEL INDICATED 
THAT IT WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT TO HAVE ARTILLERY FORCES 
AS WELL AS SOME GROUND FORCES, IN THIS CONNECTION, THEY 
MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF THE USE OF MARINES. COMMENT: 
I FEEL THAT WHILE FRENCH GOVT WOULD NOT LOOK FORWARD IN PRE- 
SENT CIRCUMSTANCES TO THE NECESSITY OF ANY SUBSTANTIAL IN- 
VOLVEMENT BY U.S. GROUND FORCES, THEY NEVERTHELESS FEEL THAT 
IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT WE PROVIDE AT LEAST SOME TOKEN 
GROUND FORCES SO THAT OUR PARTICIPATION IS NOT LIMITED 
STRICTLY TO NAVAL AND AIR FORCES.) 






BOTH LANIEL AND SCHUMANN ACCEPTED WITHOUT QUESTION AS BEING 
WHOLLY JUSTIFIED U.S. REQUIREMENT THAT CONDITIONS BE ACCEPTED 
BY FRENCH CABINET AND ENDORSED BY NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. THEY THEN 
SAID THAT THEY WOULD PROBABLY WANT TO SPEAK TO ME OVER THE 
WEEKEND AFTER THEY HAD HAD TIME TO THINK FURTHER REGARDING 
U.S. CONDITIONS. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT CONDITIONS AS OUTLINED 
REPRESENTED PRESENT HIGH LEVEL THINKING IN WASHINGTON AND DID 
NOT REPRESENT AS YET ANY COMMITMENT ON THE PART OF U.S. 
GOVT. SCHUMANN THEN SAID THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE PURSUED 
IN THE GREATEST SECRECY UNTIL SUCH TIME AS FULL AGREEMENT HAD 
BEEN REACHED. HE SAID THAT PREMATURE PRESS LEAKS COULD MAKE 
THINGS MOST DIFFICULT AND HE REFERRED TO AN AP PRESS STORY 
TODAY FROM WASHINGTON, LANIEL AND SCHUMANN THEN SAID THAT 
THEY HOPED THAT NEGOTIATIONS .COULD CONTINUE RAPIDLY AND THAT 
WHEN AND IF FULL AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED, WE WOULD BE IN 
A POSITION TO MAKE PUBLIC DECLARATION OF A SORT WHICH WOULD 
INFLUENCE COMMUNIST NEGOTIATORS AT GENEVA, 



DILLON 



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TOP SECRET 

*64 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 






INDICATE:' D COLLECT 
□ CHA3GS TO 



jjepartmeiit ox o'cai 

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1, l-xsgzsas: Trapnell T s trip delayed as reouested* However, we are * ** ; 



inclined to question desirability of sending hira next week in light of ESy's 



trip. Request your recommendation. 






o\ 

-O 



ft 

2. We know no (rpt no) way to guarantee borders and independent pi V * 
Laos and Cambodia. From military standpoint such guarantee would be ^ 

01 



impractical, From legal standpoint the processes requiring Senate 



-N 



V. 






action would be too complicated to affect present situation. Believe best 
course regarding Laos and Cambodia is to have them join with Thailand 
in seeking UN Peace Observation Commission, This would carry at least 
certain moral implications if the move was strongly backed by US and other 



powers 



in 
i 



3, If collective defense arranged as contemplated, this would of course 



embrace situation resulting from intervention by MEGS. If such intervention. 



I 



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Admiral Radford ** 

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 J 6, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



Page 2 of telis gram to Amembassy PARIS 



TOP SECRET 



should occur prior to conclusion of collective defense arrangements , 

then the US reaction would have to be judged under circumstances of the 

moment, but in any case President would expect to make his action 

dependent upon Congressional author! z at ion, assuming US interests not 

(rpt not) directly attacked. However, Defense advises that their 

intelligence does not (rpt not) indicate that Chinese airfield situation is such 

as to make such intervention seem likely, 

km Our normal processes of delivery of planes and equipment are 
proceeding and do not (rpt not) plan any interruption. We must be vigilant 
to prevent what in effect would be turning over equipmwnt to the enemy* 
It is of course absolutely indispensable that any French cease fire or 
armistice negotiations should protect the right of the US to repossess itself 
of the planes and equipment which it has delivered for purposes of fighting 
Communists under agreements which give us the right to recapture ! 
if this use no longer contemplated. ' 

5, Note acceptance Paris as place of negotiations. 

- 

6. Respecting, conditions named our h023> would like your suggestion 
regarding condition 2(d). We believe there might be some flexibility on 
our side regarding formulation but there cannot be any equivocation on 

h 
I 

completeness of independence if we are to get Philippines and Thail?-»d to 
associate themselves. Without* them, whole arrangement would collapse 



1*66 



TOP SECRET 



1*6211 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 









Pag. 



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(rpt not) 
because we are not/prepared to intervene purely as part of a white 

Western coalition which is shunned by all Asian states, 

7. The phrase "and others 1 ' v;ss designed to refer to other forces 

■ . < 

than those of US and France, The formula ^principally air and sea. n was 
not (rpt not) designed to exclude anti-aircraft artillery, and limited 



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US ground forces for protection of bases which might be used by U3 fces 
naval and air forces. .. 



8. Will do best respecting secrecy. The press report referred to 
N Suggest Laniel that Fr Srnb Wash Tie instructed to exercise utmost discredit 
almost certainly came from French Embassy. /; re these negotiations. 



i 



9, FYI, we believe as suggested yens: last sentence principal French 

. 
motivation is to use US position to get better terms at Geneva. We have 

* ■ 

no (rpt no) objection to this, provided action is consistent with the 
principles which we think necessary and have reported to Under Secretary 

» 

at Geneva as essential to avoid thinly disguised capituation. We would 

expect if the French and our selves are working together to create collective 

- 

r 

defense of the area, we should also work closely at Geneva and the French 

■ 

Delegation soMa&x would -not fcDiiic (rpt net) agree at Geneva to terms 
which we felt involved virtual abandonment of area to Communist forces, 
Certainly we should have full opportunity to know what was going on and 
have timely opportunity to express our views^ and if they are ignored, 
pcclx publicly to disassociate cur selves , , 



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Classification 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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10. Re final sentence para. 6, TEDUL 54, we consider Laniel ! s comments 



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in Paris 4383 as preliminary observations and not (rpt not) as constituting 
formal request for opening discussions. Therefore we will not (rpt not) 
consult with UK and possibly others until we hear results of your further 

■ ■ 

talk with Laniel over weekend. We assume that French will talk to no one 

r 

but you at this juncture^ ' ■ ":";'•' 

■ 14 

_ 

11. We are also not (rpt not) clear how Laniel proposes to handle this 
question procedurally with Cabinet and Parliament and would appreciate 
your own comment on this. We ourselves would have to have consultations 

> 

* 
with Congressional leadership if we reach agreement in principle with the 

■ 

French prior to presentation by Laniel to French Cabinet which will most 
certainly leak. . , - " . ■ 




DULLES 



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-TOP-SF/::p,£-T- 



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NND Projecl Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 









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TOP SECRET 



FROM: Paris 



Pco'dJ May 17, 1954 
10:30 a.m. 



TO: Secretary o" BtatQ 
HO: W02, May 17, 2 p.m. 




/ 







NIA 



^- 1 







SENT DEPARTMENT 4402, REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 243- 



-A 



\ 



DEPARTMENT LIMIT DISTRIBUTION; GENEVA EYES ONLY UNDER SECRETARY 



Re DEPTEL 4023, paragraph 2D. 



t 



I would like to propose for consideration a radically different 
approach to the clarification of the full independence of the 
Associated States, and in particular of Vietnam. The estab- 
lishment of the right of withdrawal from the French Union seems 
to me to be a purely juridical approach, which does not go to 
the roots of the problem. It is also unacceptable to French 
opinion for a large number of reasons , among which are (l) that 
it throws into question the entire concept of the French Union 
as a union of free and Independent peoples, and (2) It casts 
doubt on the veracity and honor of France in her recent state- 
ments that Vietnam has now been granted full Independence and, 
subsequent to the granting of that independence, has chosen to 
retain membership in the French Union. 

The real problem to me seems to be how to establish in US and 
Asian opinion the fact that the Associated States have, or will 
have, a similar degree of independeee to that possessed by 
Indonesia, India, and Pakistan. * I consider that the two basic 
treaties rejently negotiated between France and Vietnam (A) 
granting full independence, and (3) establishing Vietnam 1 s 
membership in French Union do establish this type of independence 
for Vietnam. However,, the situation is obscured and complicated 
by the following factors: 



1, The presence on Vietnamese soil of a large French expedi 
tionary corps. 



2. The existence of a state of war requiring a French commander 
as supreme military commander in Vietnam. . jS 



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3. The absence of a truly powerful Vietnamese national arm$. t" 

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



r 






* TOP SECRET. 
-2- #4402, May 17, 2 p.m., from Paris 



The present situation Is Indochina is in some ways comparab! 
to that: during the darkest early hours o*f the Korean war, when 
there was treachery and disaffection on all sides in South 
Korea, when the lines were being held primarily by American 
troops, and when a large part of world opinion regarded the 
South Korean Government as a US puppet, 1-he real independence 
of the South Korean Government only became fully apparent when 
South Xor-ea came into possession of an army of its own capable 
of independent action, I feel that independence of Vietnam 
will become perfectly clear after a strong national army has 
been created^ and after the bulk, if not all, of the French 
Sxceditionary Corns has been withdrawn. 



I would assume that the agreement which we will require 
regarding "raining of troops would give uhe US primary res- 
ponsibility for the training and equipping of a Vietnamese 
national &rs*y'. There has in the past been doubt as to the 
ability and good faith of the French military command in this 
direction* An agreement giving this responsibility to the US 
should remove these doubts and do more than anything else to 
make clear the independence of Vietnam. In addition, I would 
think it pass Lb le for the French to make some sort of state- 
men": saying that after peace had been established, and a 
Vietnamese national army had been established, it was their 
intention to withdraw the Expeditionary Corps. In' this 
onneotioa, the base rights which the French have in Laos by 
of the recently negotiated Franco-Laotian treaty, and 
*hich ":ie;~ expect to acquire in Vietnam by virtue of 

aris, 






virtue 



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military 
they should 
or oh ah It 






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now under negotiation in ? 

, are of no more importance, and 
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Such a statement would be in accordance 
sire in France to withdraw troops from Indo- 
china and s'r.z^lz be useful as assurance to Chinese Communists 
that non-Asian troops were being withdrawn from proximity to 



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NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 201 1 



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/-^- #4H02, May 17, 



TOP SECRET * 
2 p.m. , from Paris 






If this picture can be presented in clear terms, which pr> 
sentation will in considerable measure be a US responsibility, 
I should think that the independence of the Associated States 
would be fully, clarified in US opinion and in the opinion of 
friendly Asian states. I would appreciate receiving Depart- 
ment T s comments on this type of approach prior to discussing 
it with the French. 



DILLON 



PIIR/5 



f 






43918 



TOP SECRET 



mi 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






INCOMING TELEGRAM 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



ACTION COPY 



TOP SECRET 



Control: 
Rec'd: 



FROM: Paris 

TO: Secretary of State 

NO: kkkO, May 19, *4 p.m. 

PRIORITY 

SENT DEPARTMENT 4MK), REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 257 

EYES ONLY UNDERSECRETARY 



DEPARTMENT LJfflT DISTRIBUTION 

Re DEPTEL Ul30 

I have "been much concerned abo\it EDC situation for some time. 
Two things are perfectly clear* 

1. That as long as present state of acute crisis exists re- 
garding Indochina there is no hope of a successful debate on 
EDC. The singleminded effort for a period of at least two 
weeks of all pro-EDC elements in government will be necessary 
in order to have chance of ratification of EDC by French 
Parliament. 



877U 

May 19, 1954 

3:11 p.m. 









2. Any attempt to force EDC to a vote before Indochina crisis 
has been further clarified would lead to indefinite postpone- 
ment or defeat of EDC. 

While pro-ECD members of French Government originally saw no 
connection between EDC and Geneva, the fall of Dien Bien Phu 
and present military crisis in Indochina has drastically changed 
situation, EDC is 'for the moment Inextricably intertwined with 
both Geneva and Franco-US negotiations regarding united action 
in Indochina. While there is no direct logical connection be- 
tween the two, the way in which we handle present Indochina 
negotiations with French is bound to have great effect on our 
friends in Fi^ench Government who are supporting EDC. The two 
key elements in this situation are (l) the finding of a so- 
lution to the clarification of- the independence of Associated 
States that will not require France to publicly proclaim right 
of withdrawal from French union and (2) the question of Marines 
for Indochina as raised by Schumann In EMBTEL hhl6. Unless we 
can satisfy this request for Marines, I am very much afraid 
that the emotional reaction here will be such that there will 
be no hope of EDC ratification at least for months to come. 



PERMANENT 
RECORD COPY 



U72 



Indeed, if we 



TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET 
-2- W+0, Hay 19 , h p.m., from Paris 

Indeed, if we fail to reach agreement with. French for joint , 
effective and hopeful action in Indochina, the Laniel govern- 
ment which is living on borrowed time granted by National 
Assembly in the hope that, thanks to United States support, 
an honorable solution can be reached at Geneva, will probably 
fall, A government pledged to peace in Indochina at any price 
is then likely and such' a government is also likely to bury 
EDC for good. As regards Geneva, I am sure that Soviets must 
be well aware of the reaction of Indochina crisis on EDO situa- 
tion here. Therefore, I would assume that they would, while 
endeavoring to appear reasonable in public and before world 
opinion, take action to prevent any agreement in Geneva other 
than ignominious surrender at least until July when there 
would no longer be time to debate EDC here prior to summer 
recess. Therefore, the only way that I can see to push EDC 
to a vote here with a reasonable chance of success is to bring 
present United States-French negotiations on Indochina to a 
successful conclusion in next two or three weeks. Such a re- 
sult would enable us to give solid support to French at Geneva 
and would recreate the spirit of alliance between our two 
countries which has been lacking since Dien Bien Phu. 

Meanwhile, technical progress on EDC has continued. I do not 
consider that French have failed to live up to agreement re- 
garding setting date for debate as Saar precondition has not 
yet been met. Delay on this is clearly a joint Franco-German 
responsibility and connot by any stretch of the imagination be 
imputed solely to French. There has been real progress in these 
negotiations which as reported are now concerned almost entirely 
with the two words ft corresponding relations" in Article 12 of 
Naters T report, Schumann told me that if Teitgen and Adenauer 
could not reach complete agreement at Strasbourg he expected 
another meeting with Hallstein. He also told me that if no new 
points were brought up by Hallstein, it should be possible to 
reach complete agreement at this next meeting. There has also 
been real progress on protocol signature problem as has recently 
been reported by Bruce mission. If Socialist Party Congress 
should live up to Mollet's expectations, Laniel ! s position re- 
garding EDC will he greatly strengthened, not only in Parliament, 
but also in committees and, in particular, in Steering Committee 
where first test of strength will take place. MRP Congress due 
May 27 and 28 also expected take strong pro-EDC position. 

In view of above, I feel that present is not quite the time for 
letter such as described in reference telegram. I feel we 
should concentrate our immediate efforts on conclusion of 
Indochina negotiations with France and on bringing about a Saar 
settlement and agreement on signature of the protocols, all 
prior to June 1 . 



Delivery 



^73 



TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET 

-3~ kkk0 9 May 19, k p.m., from Paris 

Delivery of letter of type indicated in reference telegram 
at this time, in the midst of crucial France-US negotiations 
on Indochina, -would in my opinion not have effect of exerting 
pressure on French, but would simply ensure defeat or in- 
definite postponement of EDC and would greatly strengthen 
group in French Government favoring peace at any price in 
Indochina. 

By June 1 situation should be much clearer and then if, after 
further conversations with Laniel, there still should be no 
progress on EDC I feel that the time would be ripe to consider 
seriously the delivery of a formal letter regarding intentions 
to the French. Status of Indochina crisis -will, however, still 
have to be taken into consideration in reaching our final de- 
cision. Meanwhile I suggest that our action be .limited to 
oral communications by me regarding importance of EDC to 
Schumann or Laniel or both the next time I see them regarding 
Indochina. 



DILLON 



MEJ/9 



k 7 k 



TOP SECRET 



i 



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* 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



DEPARTMENT Or THE AKmi 

V/ASHINGTCN, D. C. 

19 May 1954 



MEMORANDUM FOR; THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
SUBJECT: Indo-China 



1 # I am becoming increasingly concerned over tlie frequency of state r 
.ments by Individuals of influence within and without the government that • 
I United States air and sea forces alone could solve our problems in Indo- 

I China, and equally so over the very evident lack of appreciation of the 

logistics factors affecting operations in that area* 



2. Indo-China is almost totally devoid of local resources which would 
be of use to our Armed Forces. It has a tropical, monsoon climate with 
pronounced wet and dry seasons and the disease and morale hazard's are 
hioh for Caucasian trooos, The population, when act hostile, is uutrnst- 
worthy. However, the principal deficiency of Indo-China as a base for 
the support of large military operations lies in the inadequacy of its 
facilities for the movement of supplies. 






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3. The two principal ports are Saigon and Haiphong, with a comoined 
I daily capacity of 15, 100 short tons. Both are inland river ports requiring " 

1 * considerable dredging before maximum potential can be obtained. There 

are nine secondary ports whose tonnage capacities vary from 100 to 1,400 

tons, 

] 4, Because of the inadequacies of the road, railroad, and waterway 

j . systems north from Saigon, this port would be of very little use for the sup- 

I port of operations in the Tonkin Delta. Haiphong could not be used without 

augmentation of its capacity including full use of secondary ports and all 
beaches. The tonnage capacity of the road and railroad system from 
Haiphong to Hanoi is even now less than the port capacity of Haiphong. 

■i 

5. It would be necessary to make full use of the air for supply and 
evacuation as well as for tactical support. Much construction, to include 
lengthening and reinforcing of runways, of extreme difficulty during the 
rainy season, would be necessary. Only three airfields in lad o- China, 
Haiphong/ Cat Bi, Tourane and Tan Son Nhut (near Saigon), have runways 
* over 7, 500 feet long and have reported pavement strengths which could sup- 
port B-45 bomber operations. Fight fields can handle transport planes as 
large as a C-119; an additional seven fields can accommodate C-46's. Sus- 
tained operations could not be undertaken on most of these fields in the 
rainy season. Within the Delta itself/' there are ten airfields of all types of , 
which only one, Cat Bi, is currently being used by C-119 ! s or C-54 ! s. 



■w- — . r -- — . 

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 L 



■-•-r* 



• ■ 



* 6. Even were it decided to limit the employment o£ United States 
forces to naval and air, which in itself would be a basically faulty military 
decision, it v/ould devolve upon the Army to perform 'the bulk of the logis- 
tical services and it" is essential that the magnitude of the effort required 
be clearlv understood. 



7. The adverse conditions prevalent in this area combine all those 
which confronted united Stales forces in previous campaigns in the South 
and Southwest Pacific and Eastern A si?,, with the additional g.«£vs compli- 
cation of a large native population, in thousands of villages, most of which 
are about evenly divided between friendly and hostile. 



8. The complex nsfcur^ of these oroblerns would reouire a major 
United States logistical effort. It explodes the myth that air and sea forces 
could solve the ludo- China problems. If United States land -based forces 
are projected any appreciable distance inlan'd, p.s would be essential, they 
would require constant local security at their every location, and for their 
every activity. The Arrny would have to provide these forces, their total 
would be very large, and the time to provide them v/ould be extensive. 



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Robert T, Stevens 
Secretary of the Army 



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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 



PA 
i 






20 Way 195*t 



« 






MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 



Subject: U.S. Military Participation in Indochina. 



*- 



1. In recent discussions between the French and the Depart 
menfc of State relating to U.S. military intervention in Indo- 
chl-naj the U.S. Government specified certain conditions wh.lch 
would have to obtain If U.S. military intervention uere to be 
undertaken. Among these conditions v/ere 



• 



a. That France v-ould under take not to withdraw its 
forces from Indochina during period of united action do 
that forces from U.S. principally air and sea and others 
would be supplementary and not in substitution; 

b. That agreement would have to be reached on training 

. of native troops and on command structure fox* united action 



2. On the assumption that United States armed fore on inter 
vene in the conflict in Indochina^ the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
have agreed that a Department of Etefenae position should be 
formulated as to the size and composition of U.S. force con- 
tributions to b<s made and the command structure to be estab- 
lished. In formulating these views the Joint chiefs of Staff 
have been guided by several factors^ among which are: 



t« 



a. The limited availability of U.S. forces for military 
action 5n Indochina. 

b. The current numerical advantage of the French Union 
forces over the enemy 3 i.e. 3 approximately 5 to 3* 

£. Tiie undeslrabllity of basing lai'ge numbers of U.S. 
forces In Indochina. 

d. The primary need of en expanded and Intensified train 
ing program as being the current greatest need. 



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e. The lack of required facilities for siiperimpooln 
U.S. Air Force forcer; on existing facilities in Indochina. 

f # The implications of a reaction by the Chinese Commu- 
• nlsts in the event of U.S. participation. 

■ 

&. Atomic weapons will be usee! whenever it is to our 
mi 1 i t ary adv an t as e . 

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the basic prin-' 
cinle underlying any command structure for operations in Indo- 
china which Is acceptable to the United States must enable the 
U.S. to influence future strategy in Indochina. In addition * 
they believe that some nov; means to furnish the military Guid- 
ance which heretofore ha 3 come from Paris must be found, A 
possible solution for over-all strategic guidance is a Military 
Representatives Committee v/ith membership from those nations 
contributing the principal forces of the. coalition with a 
steering or* standing group along the lines of NATO.. Thin 
grx>up would be sei n ved by a staff organized along the lines of 
the U.S. Joint Staff composed primarily of U.S. and French 
officers. 

4. Although the Allied Commander in Chief in Indochina 
should be French, there must be a U.S. Deputy with sufficient 
staff assistance to provide liaison with the French arid coordi- 
nate U.S. activities with the over-all operations. CIHCPAC 
would exercise command over all U.S. forces based in Indochina 
and other forces assigned to him for operations In Indochina. 
In addition, a U.S. Air Advisor would be provided the French 
Goinmander In Chief for the purpose of advising him concerning 
the air effort. 

* 

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the best military 
course for eventual victory In Indochina is the development of 
effective native* armed forces. Thus far the French have been 
unsuccessful in their efforts to develop such forces. A firm 
coipaiitment by the French and firm requests from the respective 
governments of the Associated States for the training and de- 
velopment of native forces by the United States should be a 
prerequisite of U.S. participation. It Is estimated that an 
augmentation of IIAAG Indochina on the order of 225 0, with an 
appropriate logistic support force , would be required to 
initiate this program* The size of thin force and secui^lty 
arrangements therefor will be determined in light of recom- 
mendations requested from CINCFAC and Chief, MAAG Indochina. 



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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






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6. The Joint Chief o of Staff recommend that U.S 
tlon be limited primarily to Naval and Air Forces, 
position of these forces should be on the order of 



partlcipa- 

The com- 
the following 



o 



a. Naval Fore on. A fast carrier Task Force and supportlnj 
forces* as necessaiy In accordance with developments in the 
situation, 

Jb. Air Forces . U.S., Air Force unity operating from present 
bases outside Indochina as may be required. The order of 
magnitude of this effort cannot nov; be estimated since It 
will depend on developments in the situation. 



7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the principal sources 
of Viet Minh military supply lie outside Indochina,. The destruc- 
tion or neutralization of those outside sources supporting the 
Viet Minh would materially reduce the French military problems 

in Indochina. 

■ 

- 

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that commit ting to the 
Indochina conflict Naval forces in excess of the above or basing 
substantial air forces therein will involve malcleployment of 
forces and reduced readiness to meet probable Chinese Communist 
reaction elsewhere in the Far East, From the point of view of 
the United States, with reference to the Far East as a whole. 
Indochina is devoid of decisive military objectives and the 
allocation of more than token U.S. aimed forces to that area 
would be a serious diversion of limited U.S. capabilities. 






Foi 1 the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 




Aj<XA 




ARTHUR RADFORD, 

Chairman, 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 633 10, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET 



THE JOIHT CHIEFS OF STAFF 
WASHINGTON 25, D C. 



21 May 195^ 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Subject: Defense of Southeast Asia in the Event 

of Loss of Indochina to the Communists 



1. As a result of recent military and political develop- 
ments , including certain public statements by high-level 
officials of the United States , the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
consider that it is incumbent upon them to determine what 
military forces and resources would be required to hold 
Southeast Asia against farther Communist aggression in the 
event Indochina is lost to the Communists. 

2. Currently approved United States Government objectives 
regarding Southeast Asia are based on the considerations 
that: 



, 



a. The passing of the countries, of Southeast Asia 
into the Communist orbit would "be inimical to the security 
interests of the United States, and 

b. The loss of Indochina to the Communist orbit could 
lead to the eventual loss of the other countries of South- 
east Asia to the Communist orbit. 

■ 

3- In the event that Indochina is lost to the Communists, 
the United States must take as an objective the prevention 
of the loss of the rest of Southeast Asia (Thailand, Burma, 
and Malay) to the Communists. 

U. There are two basic military concepts for the defense 
of Southeast Asia: 

a. Static type defense (Korea type). 

■ 

b. An offensive to attack the source of Communist 
military power being applied in Southeast Asia. 



h80 






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SecPef Cont. No, 3195 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






TOP SECRET 

5. The force requirements and inherent logistic implica- 
tions for a "static" defense of the remaining countries of 
Southeast Asia-Burma, Thailand, and Malaya are of' the order 
of magnitude as shown in Appendices "A" and f, B" hereto. So 
long as Burma and Thailand are not under Communist control, 
the geography of the area and the lack of a Chinese Communist 
capability for a major overseas attack renders Malaya secure 
from external attack. Therefore, the force requirements are 
limited to those necessary to defend Burma and Thailand and 
to provide internal security against infiltration and sub- 
version in Malaya, Should Burma and Thailand be lost, to 
the Communists prior to an Allied decision to hold a line 

in Southeast Asia, the defensive position would have to be 
established in Malaya. 

6. A study of the above requirements and implications re- 
veals the following extensive and damaging weaknesses inher- 
ent in this concept: 

a. It is estimated that it would take a minimum of 12 
months to build up the necessary base complex and facilities 
required to support the forces indicated. 

b» These forces would have to remain for an extended 
period, 

c. The eoimnitment in manpower and material incident 
to maintaining these forces in Southeast Asia for such 

a period would be unacceptable from the overall viewpoint. 

d. The presence of large numbers of United States 
Commonwealth, and French troops in this area would provide 
a basis for Communist propaganda to develop and intensify 
anti-Western sentiment. 

e. The dissipation of allied strength through the com- 
mitment of forces of this magnitude to a "static" defense 
of Southeast Asia would contribute to the Realization of 
the politico-military objectives of the USSR vis-a-vis 

the free world. 



f . Execution of static defense plan would result in 
maldeployment and seriously reduce the flexibility of 
employment of United States forces. This could seriously 
jeopardize the United States capability of supporting 
logistically our present war plans. 

7. It* view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
consider that from the military viewpoint the concept of a 
static- type defense is unsound. 



481 - 



TO? SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






TOP SECRET 



8. In stating certain irapl eme nti rig actions to the current 
military posture of the United States > the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff stated inter alia : 

"Certain other countries such as Indochina, to which 
the United States has no specific commitment, are of such 
importance to the United States that an attack on them 
probably would compel the United States to react with 
military force either locally at the point of attack or 
generally against the military power of the aggressor." 

It is considered that the rest of the Southeast Asian countries 
are included in the above category. 

9* In view of the above , the United States should adopt 
the concept of offensive actions against the "military power 
of the aggressor/ 1 in this instance Communist China, rather 
than the concept of "reaction locally at the point of attack/ 1 
which is the thesis of the action outlined in paragraphs 5 
and 6 above. 

10. The force requirements and the logistic support for 
the operations envisaged in paragraph 9 above are being con- 
sidered but have not been fully developed. However , it is 
felt that adoption of this concept would provide a more 
acceptable return for the manpower and resources expended 
than would be the case in the concept of a static defense. 

11 • Upon the decision to implement either one or the other 
of these courses of action, it would be necessary to insure 
the degree of mobilization required to take care of the in- 
creased possibility of a general war. 

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 



ARTHUR RADFORD, 
Chairman } 
Joint Chiefs of Staff 



Enclosure 



^82 



TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


















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Your TEDOL 107. 

I will advise Eden in accordance with your instructions and 
provide him with a confirming memorandum. Will omit paragraph 
four, since Australia and New Zealand have been informed and 
are participating and our relationship to ANZUS is well under- 
stood . * ' 




* 



With regard to final paragraph of TEDOL 107, it is completely 
impossible for me to understand the reasoning which prompts 
the decision by our Joint Chiefs of Staff that they should 
downgrade the rank of our representation on these five power 
staff conferences. Regardless of the actual outcome, the 
simple fact that very senior military officers of the five 
powers were meeting in Washington would convince the Russians 
and Chinese, who inevitably would know about it, that, regard- 
less of protestations or statements to the contrary, we really 
in tender! serious business. I really regret this decision more 
than r can 3a y. 






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We have given consideration (Ssibtel 4514* repeated Geneva 267 3 Saigon 542)** 

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to question of further clarification of independence of Associated States and M 

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following views should guide your discussions with French: * 

1, While fully aware of importance of juridical and constitutional factors 

in establishment of permanent and complete independence of Vietnam, it sesnis to' 



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convincing impact on world opinion and above all on Vietnamese themselves. We 






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cannot wait for abolition of all deep-rooted abuses end extra-territorial 

■ 

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privileges in times like these. We can, however , attempt have it made 
unmistakably clear that the Treaty of Independence between France and Vietnam 
represents full .and unqualified conuidtraent on part of France which vrill be 
carried out in practice* \ 

a- 

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2, Our present thinking is that in order achieve this, certain declaration 
and measures ''are required in immediate future, both by France and by other 

countries associated in regional grouping for collective defense. United States 

* • 

in addition to such atmropriate statements as might be made by President at 'time 
of his goin^ to Congress for authority to intervene, right join with other .-. v^ 
.countries concerned in a f oxtt&L pledge of fulfillment of full independence arid Ci 



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sovereignty provided by Article I of Treaty of Independence. This statement, couched I 
in form of a common declaration of purpose , would have to be simple and explicit so 
there would be no room for doubt as to validity of pledge or as to intentions of 
countries participating in it, ; 

3. Following represents certain minimum measures which we believe French should 
take now, and which we feel will not (repeat not) place government in more difficult 
position than it is already: 

a. France and Vietnam should sign draft treaties promptly, 

b. At moment of signature, President of Republic, in his capacity as > 
President of French Union, should make statement to effect that Union is 

■ 
- 

'composed of equal and sovereign states, 

c # A declaration that French will withdraw their expeditionary force from 

■ 

Indochinese states at earliest practicable date after end of hostilities, 
consistent with France's obligations to Associated States, unless invited by 
respective governments of Associated States to maintain their forces, (Comment i 

m 
* # 

We consider this to be at heart of any action French could take to convince world 
opinion they are in earnest, V?e feel such declaration should be made at actual 



tine of signing or at least immediately after. Would appreciate your viewer a 



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how and by whom this could be most effectively made,) This provision would not 
(repeat not) prejudice any base agreements which might be reached with Associated 

* 

States. If United States or any other forces have been ccsanitted, v;e and any 
other countries v.ould join in or make similar declaration. 
/j. Unless above are followed promptly by concrete actions which bear out 
professed intentions of f,ood faith, hoped-for favorable reaction vrill not (repeat" not) 



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take place j and disappointment will set in correspondingly quickly. Vie suggest 
therefore that following measures be taken simultaneously, or as soon as practical; 

a. Participation of Associated States in programming all aid snd direct 
receipt of military materiel aid. (This night require eventual renegotiation 
of pentapartite military agreement j but should not (repeat not) delay 2a 



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implement a t ion . ) 



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b. French should promptly find specific ways of giving Associated States ; 



ese 



and particularly Vietnam/ Ministry of Defense and Vietnam national army greater 

sense of participation in Measures required for defense of their territory. Ke 

* 
conceive such participation as being progressive in character. 

■ 

5# Fundamental to problem is establishment at earliest date possible of 

- ■ 

representative and authentic nationalist governments, We would hope insofar as 
Vietnam concerned that French would join vrith us in impressing Bao Dai with necessity 

* ' adopting prorapt and effective measures to this end. ■ I 

I m 

6. Furthermore, we believe series of measures could be taken locally, even in 

advance of full implementation Treaties , which should have favorable public effect in 



Associated States. These could take form of liberalization existing Franco-Associated 

of 
States accorcls in such manner as to attain sone/objectives toward which we are vrorkin/% 

Ov/ing to rapid military and political developments in Associated States, we are 

- 

unable specify at this time exactly what these measures ir.ay'be, but believe Smbassv 
Saigon and Corjoissariat General in consultation may be able make appropriate 



recommendations to Department and Paris* 



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Classification 

M- 8 B 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET 



THE JOIMT CHIEFS OF ST AIT 



WASHINGTON 25, D,C. 



26 May 195 J i 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 



Subject: Studies with Respect to Possible U.S* 

Action Regarding Indochina 

1. Reference is made to the memorandum "by the Acting Secre- 
tary of Defense, dated l8 May 195^> subject as above, wherein 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested to prepare certain 
studies, and agreed outline answers to certain questions relat- 
ing thereto, for discussion with the Acting Secretary of Defense 
on or before 2k May, and for subsequent submission to the 
National Security Council (NSC) . 

2. a. The studies requested by the Acting Secretary of 
Defense were developed within the parameters prescribed 
in the memorandum by the Executive Secretary, NSC, dated 
18 May 195*** subject as above. This memorandum is in- 
terpreted as assuming no concurrent involvement in Korea. 
This assumption may be quite unrealistic and lead to mal- 
employment of available forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 
desire to point out their belief that, from the point of 
view of the United States , with reference to the Far East 
as a whole, Indochina is oid of decisive mulitary objec- 
tives and the allocation of more than token U.S. armed 
forces in Indochina would be a serious diversion of limited 
U*S. capabilities. The principal sources of Viet Minh mili- 
tary supply lie outside Indochina, The destruction or 
neutralization of these sources in China proper would 
materially reduce the French military problems in Indochina, 

b. In connection with the above, it may be readily 
anticipated that, upon Chinese Communist intervention in 
Indochina, the French would promptly request the immediate 
deployment of U.S # ground and air forces, additional naval 
forces, and a considerable increase in MDAF armament and 
equipment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated their 



SecDef Cont. No. 321? 



48? 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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belief that committing to the Indochina conflict naval forces 
in excess of a Fast Carrier Task Force and supporting forces, 
as necessary in accordance with the developments in the situ- 
ation, of basing substantial air forces in Indochina, will 
involve maldeployment of forces and reduce readiness to 
meet probable Chinese Communist reaction elsewhere in the 
Far East, Simultaneously, it is necessary to keep in mind 
the considerable Allied military potential available in the 
Korea- Japan- Okinawa area. 

£. In light of the above, it is clear that the denial of 
these forces to Indochina could result in a schism between 
the United States and France unless they were employed else- 
where. However, it should be noted that the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff have plans, both approved and under consideration, 
which provide for the employment of these forces in combat 
operations outside Indochina. Nevertheless, it is desired 
to repeat that this pax-ticular report is responsive to the 
question of U.S. intervention in Indochina only. 

. .' ASSU MING THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS INTERVENE 

^ *- i J i w w m-mm — i ■■ ■ ■———— ^ ^ — ■■- ■ ■ ■ n - -■- ■- i — ^^^^ 

3. Strategi c Concept and Plan of Operation 

Seek to create conditions through the destruction of 
effective Communist forces and their means for support in the 
Indochina action and by reducing Chinese Communist capability 
for further aggression, under which Associated States forces 
could assume responsibility for the defense of Indochina, In 
the light of this concept the major courses of action would be \ 
as follows; J 

a. Employing atomic weapons, whenever advantageous, as 
well as other weapons, conduct offensive air operations 
against selected military targets in Indochina and against 
those military targets in China , Hainan, and other Communist - 
held -offshore islands which are being used by the Communists, 
in direct support of their operations, or which threaten the 
security of U.S. and allied forces in the area. 

b. Simultaneously, French Union Forces, augmented by 
UoS, naval and air forces, would exploit by coordinated 
ground, naval, and air action such successes as may be 
gained as a result of 'the aforementioned air operations 
in order to destroy enemy forces in Indochina. 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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c. Conduct coordinated ground, naval, and air action to 
destroy enemy forces in Indochina, 

d. In the light of circumstances prevailing at the time, 
and subject to an evaluation of the results of operations 

j conducted under subparagraphs a and b above, be prepared 

I to take further action against Communis t China to reduce 

its war-making capability, such as: 

(1) Destruction of additional selected military targets. 
In connection with these additional targets, such action 
requires an enlarged but highly selective atomic offensive 
in addition to attacks employing other weapons systems. 

(2) Blockade of the China coast. This might be insti- 
tuted progressively from the outset. 

(3) Seizure or neutralization of Hainan Island. 

(h) Operations against the Chinese mainland by 
Chinese Nationalist forces, 

■ 

km Forces Required of Each Nation Participating 

The forces which would be employed under current plans 
during the initial phases of the above operations are those 
indicated in the Appendix hereto. The duration of the commit- 
ment of these forces would depend on the succes of French 
Union forces operations supported by U.S. naval and air opera- 
tions in defeating communist forces in Indochina. 

5. Normal Service logistic arrangement for United States 
Forces would prevail. CINCPAC would be responsible for pro- 
viding logistic support. CINCFE would assist by providing 
material and logistic support as mutually agreed with CINCPAC, 
or as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The facilities 
of MATS and K3TS would be made available to CINCPAC as directed. 
Existing U.S. bases in Western Pacific are available. Bases 
with limited facilities in Indochina and the Philippines (other 
than U.S.) \v T ould be available. Effort would be made to obtain 
or utilize bases on Formosa^ if required. The French would pro- 
vide their own logistic support within capabilities. United 
States logistical support of French Union Forces and Associated 
States would be provided as required. The Military Assistance 
Advisory Group, Indochina, would coordinate and arrange for 
utilization of facilities and services and would provide 
logistic support to the United States Liaison Groups and Train- 
ing Missions. In the event operations should involve the use 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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TOP SECRET 

of NORC Forces, United States logistic support above the 
current NORC MDA Program would be provided, 

6. Plan for Command Structure 

. — — i — -.. — , . . .. 

In accordance with the Unified Command Plan, CINCPAC 
would exercise unified command of assigned forces. He would 
insure the coordination of all operations in Southeast Asia and 
provide for the necessary ground- air coordination between French 
Union Forces and U.S # Navy and Air Force forces which operate 
in support of the land battle. In addition, CINCPAC would 
select targets and conduct air operations with assigned forces 
against military targets in Indochina and those in China which 
directly support Chinese Communist aggression, COMSAC would 
support CINCPAC in these operations , and in addition would con- 
duct air operations to further reduce the Chinese Communists 
war-making capability, as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
CINCFE will continue to provide for the security of Japan and 
the Ryukyus in accordance with his priority mission elnd in 
addition would support CINCPAC and COMSAC in their operations 
as agreed mutually. 

7. Plan for Training Native Troops 

For the United States to initiate training of Associated 
States Forces, it is estimated that approximately 2 , 270 U B S. 
personnel would be required, as an augmentation of the existing 
Military Assistance Advisory Group, to carry out this program. 
In additio, U*S. personnel would be required to provide appro- 
priate logistic support. The exact si&e and composition of the 
training mission, the logistic support requirements, and the 
security requirements and arrangements till be determined in 
light of recommendations which have .been requested from CINCPAC 
and the Chief, MAAG, Indochina. The training of Associated 
States Forces would be patterned after the training program 
conducted £ov RCK forces in Korea.* 

8. Plan for World-Wide Military Aid 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that action should be 
taken to insure appropriate degree of mobilization to provide for the 
greater risk of a general war and be prudently prepared under 
this alternate assumption. In view of the increased risk of 
general war involving the Soviet Bloc, immediate action would 



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have to be taken to strengthen our allies. However., due to the 
overriding mobilization requirements for U.S forces , such 
aid would be limited to those allies who could directly support 
the U.S. strategic concept for general war. Tills aid would 
further be limited to combat essential material, essential 
replacements, and spare parts which are beyond the capabilities 
of the individual countries to provide from their own or other 
allied resources. 

ASSUMING THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS DO NOT INTERVENE 

i i — - — i — i — ■ — - — - 

9« Strategic Concept and Plan of Action 

Seek to create conditions by destroying effective Commu- 
nist forces in Indochina, under which the Associated States 
Forces could assume responsibility for the defense of Indochina. 
In the light of this concept , the major courses of action which 
would be undertaken are as follows: 

a. Conduct air operations in support of allied forces in 
Indochina . The employment of atomic weapons is contemplated 
in the event that such course appears militarily advantageous. 

b. Simultaneously , French Union Forces augmented by such 
armed forces of the Philippines and Thailand as may be com- 
mitted would, in coordination with U*S. naval and Air Force 
forces, conduct coordinated ground, naval and air action to 
destroy enemy forces in Indochina. 



I 



10. Forces Required of Each Nation Participating 

The forces which would be employed under current plans , 
during the initial phases of the above operation would include: 

a. French Union Forces currently operating in Indochina I 



b. A U.S* Fast Carrier Task Force and supporting forcer 
as necessary in accordance with developments in the situation. 

■ 

c. U.S. Air Force units operating from present bases outside 
Indochina as required. 

* 

d. Forces as may be contributed by other friendly nations. 

The duration of coimaitment of these forces cannot be determined 
at this time. 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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11. Plan for Logistic Support 

The plan for logistic support would be the same under this 
assumption as under the assumption that Chinese Communists inter- 
vene (see paragraph 5 above) — except for the last sentence of 
paragraph 5. 

12. Plan for Command Structure 

Although the Allied Commander in Chief in Indochina should 
be French, there must be a United States Deputy with sufficient 
staff assistance to provide liaison with the French and coordi- 
nate U.S. activities with the over-all operation. CINCPAC would 
exercise command over all U.S. forces based in Indochina and 
other forces assigned to him for operations in Indochina. In 
addition, a U.S. Air Advisor would be provided the French Com- 
mander in Chief for the purpose of advising him concerning the 
air effort. This officer would have no command responsibilities 

but would .be under the direction of the U.S Deputy. 

■ 

13- Plan for Training Hative Troops 

The plan for training native troops would be the same under 
this assumption as under the assumption that Chinese Communists 
intervene (see paragraph 7 above). 

lk. Plan for World-Wide Military Aid 

a. Initially, there would be no requirement for additional 
material and equipment over and above current IDAP for the 
French and other allied forces in Indochina. MDA programs, 
however, would require augmentation within approximately 
6 months to provide equipment and support necessary to 
equip initially and maintain a total of 3 new ROK- equivalent 
Associated States' divisions. Thereafter, increased MDA pro- 
grams would be required to support additional Associated States 1 
divisions as developed. The maximum number of such divisions 
probably would not exceed 20. 

b. All other military assistance should proceed as 
currently programmed. 

_c. Current programs for equipping and modernizing 
U.S. forces must not be curtailed as a result of any of 
the foregoing. 



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NND Project Number: NND 633 16, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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METHOD OF FINANCING COMBAT OPERATIONS 

15. Whether or not the U.S» intervenes in Indochina, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff consider that it is vital that the war in Indo- 
china be financed by a method separate and distinct from the 
world-wide MDAP. It is imperative that the commander be pro- 
vided with the necessary equipment to wage war effectively 
without the financial and legal restrictions imposed by MDAP 
procedures. The current practice of diverting MDA funds from 
approved programs to support emergency requirements such as 
those resulting from combat operations in Indochina has al- 
ready had the effect of hindering the attainment of our world- 
wide strategic objectives. Only by divorcing the fluid require- 
ments which exist in local combat situations from the normal 
MDA programming methods and procedures can the orderly achieve- 
ment of our objectives in other world areas be achieved. 



For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 






(Signed) 

ARTHUR RADFORD y 

Chairman 
Joint Chiefs of Staff 



Enclosure 



•r 



^93 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



i • 



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THE WHITE HOUSE:' 

V/ASH IN GTON 



May 2 °> l?? 1 * 



TO? SSCRSi 



M5ilORAITDu]I FOR SHE SECB&CAIS 05 1 IBF31I3E 



1. I wish to ae!mo*rlo&gs the receipt of your rie::.orandu~u Bay 
2> ; 195^, subject: ,f Dsfense of Southeast Asia in the Event of 
IjOss of Inioohiua to the Corrciunists", vith an attached iaer.orar.duia 
to you frost the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated May 21, 195 ! o s^^ 
subject. 












2. Your neKioranduin indicates that the paper or the Joiuo 
Chiefs of Staff deals with the military defense of the rest of 
Southeast Asia, if Indochina is lost, "against an overt Chinese. 
Ccrasttunist attack* 1 (although these specific vor&s arc not used in 
the paper) • Given this clearification, the paper takes the posi- 
tion, in the event of overt Chinese* Cos&EMfiist attack, that a static- • 
type defense is militarily unsound and that* the proper concept is 
an offensive against Cc mint China. . j 

3* l*t is cleea? in the current policy of the United States 
toimrds Southeast Asia that, in the event of "overt Chinese 
Columnist attach 11 against Bunaa, Shailaiid, or Ilalaya, the United 
States vill "take appropriate military action sgainst Consaunistj 
China" (paragraphs 1:2, K6 } and IfS, H3C 5**05) rather than employ a 
static-type defense. . . I 

k* In viev of this existing policy, the Joint Chiefs' paper 
does not appear to involve a nev policy issue necessarily requir- 
ing its circulation to the members of the national Security Council 
at the present tine * On the other hand, if you feel that it vould 
he desirable to circulate the paper on a limited basis, vith an 
appropriate e:cplanatory note as above, I shall be very glad t* do so. 






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Special Assistant 
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FROM: Paris 



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State 



Secretary o 

H566, Hay 27, 6 p.m. 



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SENT DEPARTMENT 4566, REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 505, SAIGON 550. 









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EYES ONLY SECRETARY; GENEVA EYES ONLY WIDER SECRETARY; SAIGON EYE 
ONLY CHARGE 

■ 

PASS DEFENSE FOR DEPARTMENT ARMY FOR RID3EWAY 

•a 

THIS IS J0.ii:T EMBASSY-TRAPNELL MESSAGE 

After arriving Paris, Trapnell called first on Ambassador for 
general background discussion and subsequently on General 
Gruentber for same purpose. He vas originally scheduled to 
call on Laniel May 28 before seeing Ely but because of Prime 
;. Minister's preoccupation with Cabinet meetings and other urgent 



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t\ business meeting was postponed. Trapnell accompanied by Ambassadors 
/$■ seeing Laniel at latter's home tomorrow morning. Meanwhile Laniel C5 
V suggested that Trapnell make direct contact with Ely. 



rnis was 



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I done this morning when Trapnell, accompanied by Embassy Officer, 
LV«C ^ a d hour and half interview with Ely, accompanied by Colonel 
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As conversation opened, it became apparent that Ely vas not 
fully aware of reason behind Trapnell ! s presence in Parish After 
this was explained Ely launched into a general review of the 
Indochina situation giving particular emphasis to following 
points: < • ' . 

■ * 

1. He recounted content of talks he had had in Indochina with 
'Daniel. He vas agreeable to principle of American instruction 
Vietnamese forces but not entirely in accord with 'Daniel f s 
proposal that national army be reorganized on divisional asis. 
He believed that divisional units were perhaps too weighty and 
■that" lighter units of perhaps 6, 7 or 8 battalions per division 
! were more practicable. Yet, he did not wish to press this point 
as he regarded it as a detail which could be* worked out sub- 



* 









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:;r-;. ; y sequently. He pointed out that if 'Daniel's concept was followed^ 

/ and US instructor-advisers remained with units upon completion of 



v/ 



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.training, they would have to accompany units into battle and, 
therefore, major question of whether US prepared to participate 



in combs t operations would arise. Only alternate to this would 
be replacement of US instructor-advisers by French as units' were 



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TOP 



SECRET 



'«i If 7 CtASSJFjcr) j 
381 SITED 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET 



- 



2- 4566, May 27, 6 p.m., from Pari 



s 



prepared to enter combat. This* would be unsatisfactory because 
training and advising methods of French and Americans were dis- 
similar. 

2\ Ely stated that 'Daniel had presented^an operational plan for 
continuing the war but that he found it unrealistic on basis that 
It gave priority to operations in the south while the principal 
and immediate threat is in the north. 

j5. Ely referred to Increasing frequency of American criticism 
of French conduct of var. He explained that it was easy to 
criticize post facto and when things went wrong. As Trapnell 
knew, the war in Indochina was "of a very special nature and it 
was unfair for people who perhaps didn't understand this fact 
as well as he and Trapnell to criticize. It was useless to 
compare the wars in Korea and Indochina; they were entirely 
different. He hoped that Trapnell could use his influence to 
reduce the degree of present US criticism of past and present 
French performance In Indochina in the Interests of good Franco-"* 
American working relations in the important joint tasks at hand. 

4. At about this stage of the conversation, Ely remarked that 
it was virtually Impossible to discuss specific military questions 
in Indochina without getting into the major political questions 
including the possibility of US Intervention, the prospects for 
a Pacific pact and the whole question of where the defense of 
Southeast Asia was to take place and by whom. Trapnell referred 
to his* terms of reference which prevented him from discussing 
other than specific military questions, particularly that of the 
regrouping of existing forces In Indochina for the defense of 
the Delta . 




5- When Trapnell asked Ely what the immediate military prospects 
were in the Delta , he replied that the five Viet Minh divisions' 
released from Dien Bien Phu were moving rapidly forward and should 
be at the Delta perimeter between the 10th and 15th of Jrne. 
Normally at that season they would return to their regrouping 
areas for rest, "self -criticism" and general revision. Whether 
they will do so this year or not is still uncertain, although 
there are Indications at the moment that some Viet Minh ; >rees 
are .moving to regrouping areas. - r ... . 

f . • - V- . 

6. When Trapnell asked what Ely was doing to regroup his forces 
for the defense of the Delta he replied two basic things: First, 
removing units from pacification and other "static missions to the 
Delta to become part o± mobile defense groups; secondly, he was 
recovering units from inactive posts in Laos, Central Annam and 
other areas for transfer to the Delta to become part of these 
same mobile forces. 



.' 



£5 <j J y \: 



TOP SECRET 



7. Ely's plan 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 






J 






f 



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-2- ^566, Ifey 27, 6 p.m., from Paris 

7. Ely's plan for the defense of the Delta con tors around the 
defense of what he termed the Hanoi-Haiphong axis. No specific 
detail was given as to the number of units* whore they were to 

be retained, or the exact orea to be clef ended. He was particularly 
and /no doubt, designedly pessimistic on the aspects for the 
defense of this axis, stating that if Hanoi had to be surrendered 
French Union Forces would move to Haiphong, and if Haiphong wei'o 
lost they would at least be able to move out from there to 
"possibly another stand in the south". This, too, depended 
entirely, according to Ely, on what was decided about US inter- 
vention and other pending high-level political decisions. 

8. Trapnell pointed out that French superiority in aviation and 
armor could be extremely effective against a Viet Minh coordinated 
attack in the Delta because of the terrain- Ely not only admitted 
this fact but stated that it "is our trump card . 

■ 

9- When Trapnell pressed Ely for an opinion as to what was > 
required between the period of the immediate threat and the 
period when, it was hoped, the Vietnamese army would be on an 
effective footing, Ely replied that the General was obviously 
thinking of how many US Marines would be required to assure the 
defense of the Delta. He went on to say that in his opinion, if 
one or two US Marine divisions intervened "there would be no 

in f r 






Comment: The conversation was large ly unsatisfactory from our 
standpoint because our efforts to obtain specific corns Ltmettt 



s 



rom Ely, including any s 



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ement regarding Frencn intentions 
concerning despatch cf reinforcements from metropolitan Prance 



and JTorth Africa to Indochina, were unsuccessful. Nor did i Ely 
appear particularly interested in Trapnell f s recommendations 
concerning the redeployment of forces. We attribute this to 

yls still busily engaged in consultations with 


















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and the High Council of National 



Defense .j and was probably being very careful not to make ? ly 
commitments which had not yet been cleared by the government. 

seeing Lb n lei tomorrow morning 
time more specific matters my be 

that Trapnell continue 



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DILLOE 






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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i 






TOP SECRET 



DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 



28 May 195*+ 



Dear Admiral Davis: 



Developments over the past few days very clearly indicate that we 
are approaching a stage in the conference where it is evident that the 
French are going to settle on terms which the U S. could not, under present 
NSC directives j associate itself with. The British have long favored an 
Indochina settlement on the basis of partition. The Viet Minh in their 
proposals submitted at the restricted session on May 25 (TOSEC 302) made 
a proposal which would in effect be partition. The Russians and Chinese 
have, of course, supported the Viet Minh proposal. In the face of this, 
the French have no firm position, nor has there been an indication that 
they have a minimum position. As a result, I feel that we are moving toward 
the probability that there will be a settlement which will, directly or 
indirectly, result in the partition of Indochina. 

I have discussed the foregoing points at considerable length with 
Herman Phleger and Alex Johnson. They both recognize the dangers of parti- 
tion and the impossibility of supervising an armistice in Indochina. There 
appears to be a feeling of hopelessness inasmuch as the U.S. is not in a 
position to control the situation. The U.S. position is not at all clear. 
Someone indicated before the conference we should be flexible - I would say 
we are now fluid. At the morning staff conferences, during the past two 
days, there have been discussions of U.S. tactics, and General Smith has 
indicated that the U.S. should remain firm. He has indicated, however, 
that we should be realistic, and face the probability that there will be 
some soi^t of a negotiated settlement which will result in a loss of at 
least part of Indochina, and will result in some type of partition. There 
has been no mention of the point at which the U.S* will disassociate itself 
from the negotiations. On the contrary, there have been indications that 
the U.So will probably have to go along with a settlement even though it 
is unsatisfactory to the U.S. 

Yesterday I attended a meeting with General Smith, Alex Johnson and 
Ambassador Heath in which we met with Eden and Bidault. The subject of 
discussion was Eden's proposal which he put forth at the sixth restricted 
session. Bidault had thoughts of his own on the subject taking a slight3_y 
different approach as you will note from the enclosed copy of his proposal. 
The thing I noted most in the discussion was the all-out effort that the 
various conferees are making to develop a position to which they feel the 
Communists will agree. Both Eden and Bidault referred to international 
supervision of the cessation of hostilities. However, it was quite clear 
from the discussion that neither are aware of the many difficult problems 
which will be involved in enforcing an armistice in Indochina. The question 



U98 



TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET 



was raised by one of Eden's staff regarding the number of troops required 
to enforce the cessation of hostilities in Indochina. Various estimates 
were discussed. However , it was generally agreed that the number of 
troops required would be in excess of two divisions. 

Since it is obvious that the conference is headed toward partition, 
I feel it significant to bring the foregoing information to your attention. 
There is very little that the Defense Department can do to influence the 
negotiations , since a political decision has been made that the U*S. will 
continue to participate even though we know that partition of Indochina, 
whatever form it may take, will ultimately result in its loss to the 
Communists. The view seems to prevail in the U.S. Delegation that there 
is very little "the U.S. can do to influence the French and no useful 
purpose would be served in disassociating ourselves from the negotiations. 
I have little to offer in the way of recommendations. I have continued 
to point out the views of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs 
of staff that from a military viewpoint a settlement in Indochina which 
results in leaving the Communist military forces intact will ultimately 
result in the loss of the area to Communist ;control. Also, there should 
be little doubt that there is no form of international supervision that 
will effectively stop further Communist infiltration and their eventual 
control of Indochina. Although there seems to be general agreement with 
the U.S. Delegation on these points there is a feeling that we cannot dis- 
associate ourselves from the negotiations. 

In outlining this gloomy situation I would like to mention one bright 
spot. As a result of your recommendations to General Smith I have been 
given every consideration and there has been complete cooperation. Due 
to the small number of U.S representatives who can attend the restricted 
sessions on Indochina, I have not been to all of them. However, I have 
been included in all important discussions. Though there is obviously 
a difference in view between the Defense and State Department representa- 
tives here on Indochina, it is a frank, honest and friendly difference. 
I fully appreciate the State Department's difficulties, and though they 
share our view on what will ultimately result from partition, they feel 
compelled not to bi*eak with our Allies. 

I shall keep you informed of further developments. 

Respectfully, 

(Signed) 

- 

CHARLES A SULLIVAN 



U99 



TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 









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Carols 15397 
r&tfl way 28, 195^ 
6:32 p.rr. 






Secretary oT St&t© 

■4-S0S, May 28^, 8 p.ra 



r * - 
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****, 






- ■ ■ • :. 



PRIORITY 

SE?<T DEPARTMENT 450, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY GEKEVA 309 . 







LIMIT DISTRIBUTION 

I saw Schumann this afternoon and' gave him information contained 
in DEPTEL k2S$\ He made careful note of points 1 and 2, and 
said he felt personally that they were entirely satisfactory. 
He did not get into any discussion of details so subject matter 
in FY1 portion of DEPTEL 1*286 never came up. Schumann also. 
told me that he had been informed by Pa rod! regarding my dis- 
cussion with him yesterday and that Schumann again personally 
"was very pleased with the" information in DEI TEL J 427<5. 

While we do not as yet have formal French answer on either of 
these two DEFTHLa, Schumann said that only things that now re- 
mained unsettled were military conversations to arrange details 
of training, command structure, and war plans. Ke said that 
French were roost anxious to get at these conversations immediately 
He then read ire portion of telegram from BIdau.lt in which 
BIdault said that an Increased show of Franco -Airier lean solidarity 
in Indochina was now vitally necessary in order to have any hope 
of sound progress at Geneva. As possible concrete steps Fddault 



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suggestea: 



1. US promptly take over responsibility for training Vietnamese 
Rational Army; 



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P. US agree to provide assistance toward improving airfields 
ItTJ Indochina for use of jet aircraft. 



\ uj Schumann told r-e that at Cabinet meeting this morning it was 

;, &a — ~ 4ided to leave 



-'U-J4UW* mw ^w«*w to Pleven's discretion decision as to whether 
j/Elv or Valluy should represent France at 5*-power military 



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suasions opening In Washington next week, in view of French y \ 
srstanding that Radford will not be present for these nioetin^a 



it ;.- has told Trapnell that he Is • disinclined .to go himself. 

~~4&vrever, Schumann today asked whether it would be possible to 






undertake 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011 









*_•- ■ •' TO? SECRET ■• 

-2- # ! o03, May 23, 8 p.m., from Par-is 

undertake these Franco-US military negotiations in Washington at 
the same time or parallel with 5-power raili-tsry talks. If so, 
he said be felt it was most important that Ely attend and he 
would so inform Pleven, who, he was sure, would agree. He 
requested a prompt answer so French could take necessary decision 
as to whether or not to send Ely. He said French had been anxious 
for some time to initiate these military discussions and he hoped 
that US was now ready and willing for them to begin. « 



x oC \j . 



During course of my visit he had a telephone conversation with 
Massigli in London regarding a telegram which Massigli had 
sent reporting en British attitude regarding Southeast Asia 
Schumann showed ft© the telegram, key portion of which indicated 
British reluctance, as expressed by Sir Ivone Kirkpa trick to 
undertake any sort of military operations in any portion of 
Indochina, as they thought that all Indochina, including Cambodia , 
was Infested with Communists and so it was not practical for military 
operations. Schumann was quite upset by this telegram which he made 
clear to Massigli on the telephone^ saying It was now clear that 
British were only interested in defending Southeast Asia when 
question became an immediate problem of the Defense of Malaya. 
Schumann then brought up another question which he said was giving 
great concern to Pleven. 'This was possibility of Chinese air 
attack on the delta. He said that French Air Force has Informed 
Pleven that Chinese Communist planes operating from present bases 
had capability of remaining over Hanoi* for 15 minutes. This would 
be enough time to cause great destruction and Pleven felt that It 
such an attack were not opposed immediately by US jets, Communists 
in 3 to 5 days could cause enough damage to make the delta 
effectively indefensible. Schumann wondered whether something 
along following lines might be possible. Provided French decided 
to strongly reinforce the delta and use conscripts in Indochina, 
could the President go to -Congress and ask for discretionary 
authority to use US air power to defend the delta if it should be 
attacked by Chinese Communist planes. A request to Congress comine 



after the eve^t would necessarily cause a few days delay which, 
in Pleven's view, would be fatal. Schumann thought present 
United Action Program might not be ready In time as he did not 
know what If any progress US was snaking with other powers in 
order to satisfy point 2B of conditions posed in DEPTEL ^023. 



I told Schumann naturally I could venture no opinion as to whether 
the President would be able to make such a limited request for 
discretionary authority but that from my personal knowledge of 
Washington thinking I felt that it would be absolutely necessary 
in any event that French take action along lines of paragraph 3 
of DEPTEL 4272 regarding clarification of independence of 
Associated States. 



As I left 



Mho 4 



501 



** 






rpAT> 3LI?^ POT1 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






* . * 



V 



TOP SECRET 

* 

-5- #^503, Kay 23, 8 p.m., from Paris 

As I left Schumann again emphasized his hope that a prompt 
reply would be forthcoming from Washington regarding possibility 
of holding Franco-UK military talks in Washington next week. 



DI1L0H 



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£3988 



502 



TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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TOP SECRET 

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.^-iCA-- U— ' * Bbc** May 30., 195H 



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FROM: Par-Is " 12:41 p.m. 




SS TO: Secretary of Stat© 

G 

SP 110: ^607, May JO, 3 p.ai 

EUR 

FE - • 

PRIORITY. 

SENT DEPARTMENT 4607, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY GENEVA 321. 



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GENEVA EYES ONLY UNDER SECRETARY. I C^Vs f 

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION. ■ *i£lV 

Reference: Department telegram 2 rjS25. 

Second paragraph of reference telegram may Indicate extremely { 
serious misunderstanding between US and French. French draw 
sharp distinction between (1) US intervention In present cir- 
cumstances with Viet Minh bolstered by Chinese Communist . I 
materiel, technicians and possibly scattered troops and * ( 
.(2) US reaction against full-scale air attack mounted from ( 
Communist Chinese bases. Regarding point (1) French fully * ( 
understand that conditions outlined Department telegram 4023 \ 
apply to any possible US intervention. As regards point (2), j 
however, the French fully count on US military reaction against 
such an open Chinese Communist attack. The only limitation on 
such US reaction which French recognize Is the time required 
for Congressional action which they would hope to be a matter 
of not more than a day or two. In second case, they feel that 
US statements to the effect that full-scale Chinese Communist 
Intervention could not; be permitted are still binding whether 
or not there 'is time to create collective action. The Secre- q 
tary's radio speech of May 7, Indicating that while Chinese had S 
given very considerable support at Dien~31en Phu they had £ 

avoided full-scale Intervention, was taken to mean by French 
that if there had been full-scale Chinese Intervention US 
would have responded differently to their request for 
military assistance- . * 

Schumann reverted last night to this question of protection fl 
against a possible air attack and gave me more accurate Infor- 
mation than that contained In Embassy telegram hjQQ regarding 
French apprehensions. He said that what French General Staf? 
fear is an attack from bases on Hainan Island against Haiphong.^ 
Best French estimate is that Chinese jets coming from Hainan 



- . 

- <■ 

—I 



RtfrllD DOPTf o This copy must ho returned to IC.i (SfelfcEis with notation ot action lad-en o ^ |p gJ^V;; ..^'J: 



/■/7S 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






i ■ 






• 


TOP SECRET , 

■ 


-2- 


l \60J , May -JO, 3 p.m. from Paris 



could remain over Haiphong for 20 minutes on each mission* 
A massive Chinese air attack (Schumann mentioned figure of 
100 planes) could completely knock out French air capabilities 
in .the delta and could so seriously damage the port of Haiphong 
that it would be impossible to conduct a successful withdrawal 
of French forces through the port. The loss of French air 
potential would drastically tip the scales In favor of the 
Viet Minh and make total defeat of French forces in the delta 
inevitable. It is against this eventuality that the French 
wish to have protection. Paragraph 9 of, Embassy telegram 4605 
indicates Ely's belief that he already has commitment from 
Admiral Radford on this type of attack. What French feel they 
are asking for now is not, in fact, a new commitment from US 
but assurances that OS reaction will come within a matter of 
hours and even, if possible, in time to meet attacking Chinese 
planes. Schumann said he felt that only circumstances in which 
Chinese would make such an attack would be if they felt that 
US, for one reason or another, was not in a position to re- 
spond promptly and effectively. Therefore, Schumann suggested 
that if it should be impracticable to obtain preliminary ap- 
proval of such military action from US Congress, it might be 
equally useful to have a clear warning from either the Secre- 
tary or the President that a massive Chinese air attack would 
meet with US opposition. Schumann said he felt certain that 
.if Chinese realized that an air attack would cause US inter- 
vention they would never take the risk of mounting such an 
attack. 

I have -previously stated to Department that if we allowed delta 
to fall to the Viet Minh without a successful evacuation of the 
French expeditionary Corps, the effect here would be disastrous. 
If such a disaster should come about because of open Chinese 
Communist air attack to which we had not responded by US 
military action, the result here would be nothing short of 
catastrophic. Vfe would have to count on a strong movement 
in France that could well be successful in favor of making 
peace at any price with the Soviets rather than continuing to 
count on US support through NATO- The effect of such action 
by France on the North Atlantic Alliance is obvious^ In 
addition, I do not feel that we could exclude possibility, if 
the Soviets play their cards right, of a popular front govern- 
ment » arising to carry out such a new policy. This naturally 
would incur the danger of an eventual Communist take-over in 
France. I do not have any means of evaluating effect in Asia 
of a unilateral US response to a Chinese attack, but Depart- 
ment should be constantly aware that lack of US response to a 
full-scale Chinese Communist air attack on the delta would 
place in jeopardy the North Atlantic Alliance and our whole 
position in Western Europe. 



SStJO 



a 



TOP 



Schumann ha 



c;S 



f" ^ fr 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






TOP SECRET ' 



-5- H607, May '50, 5 p.m. from Paris 



Schumann has never asked me whether US response to a Chinese 
attack would be subject to same conditions posed in Department 
telegram i|023 and I have never, In any way, indicated to him 
what the US requirements would be for reaction in such an 
emergency except to point out that full clarification of the 
independence of Vietnam would be most Important. See Embassy 
telegram 4580. 



■ DILLON 



MRM:VRS-11 






\ 



4010 



,f .i 



505 



TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



INCOMING TELEGRAM DEPARTMENT OF STATE ACTION COPY 



TOP SECRET 

Control : IU09I 

Rec'd: May 31, I95U 

FROM: PARIS 9:32 A.M. 

TO: Secretary of State 

NO: k6l2, MAY 31, 1PM 

PRIORITY 

SENT DEPARTMENT 1*512, REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 327 

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION 

WHEN TRAPNELL AND I ARRIVED AT LANIEL* S HOUSE FOR MEETING 

TRTS MORNING, WE FOUND MAURICE SCHUMANN AND ELY ALSO PRESENT. 

THE MEETING WAS SHORT AND IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT ELY WOULD GO 

TO WASHINGTON FOR BILATERAL MILITARY TALKS. HIS MISSIONS WILL 

OSTENSIBLY BE TO ATTEND FIVE-POWER MILITARY TALKS, AND IT. IS 

FULLY UNDERSTOOD THAT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WILL REMAIN SECRET. 

ELY IS UNABLE TO ARRIVE WASHINGTON THIS WEEK AND VALLHY HAS BEEN 

AUTHORIZED TO REPRESENT HIM BOTH AT FIVE-POWER TALKS AND AT 

COMMENCEMENT OF BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ELY STATED 

HE UNDERSTOOD WERE TO COVER TRAINING OF LOCAL TROOPS, COMMAND 

STRUCTURE AND WAR PLANS. VALLUY WILL ALSO ARRANGE DATE FOR 

ELY'S ARRIVAL WITH JCS. ELY SAID HE WAS GOING LONDON TOMORROW 

FOR ONE DAY VISIT WITH HARDINE WHOM HE DOES NOT RPT NOT MOW 

WELL, FOR PURPOSE OF MAKING FRIENDLY CONTACT PRIOR TO OPENING ! 

OF FIVE-POWER TALKS. j 

LANIEL ONCE MORE MENTIONED FRENCH FEAR OF CHINESE COMMUNIST AIR 

ATTACK, HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT FRENCH REGARD PRESENT BILATERAL ' 

NEGOTIATIONS AS A PRECLUDE TO U.S. INTERVENTION SHOULD GENEVA 

FAIL OR SHOULD COMMUNISTS DRAG NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEVA 

WKLLE ATTEMPTING TO OBTAIN A MILITARY DECISION IN THE DELTA. , 

ON THE OTHER HAND, LANIER CLEARLY CONSIDERS THAT AN ! 

ALL-OUT AIR ATTACK ON THE DELTA BY THE CHINESE, WHILE NOT RPT 

NOT LIKELY, IS A POSSIBILITY AND SHOULD BE PLANNED FOR. ; 

HE FEELS THAT SUCH AN ATTACK WOULD COMPLETELY CHANGE THE PRESENT : 

SITUATION AND WANTS THE BEST ASSURANCES POSSIBLE OF PROMPT 

U.S. HELP IN THE EVENT OF SUCH A CHINESE ATTACK. ELY 

CONFIRMED THAT HIS UNDERSTANDING WITH RADFORD ON THIS SUBJECT 

WAS PURELY A TECHNICAL ONE BETWEEN CHIEFS OF STAFF AND WAS SUBJECT 

TO POLITICAL DECISION BY U.S. HE SAID THAT RADFORD HAD PLANS 

READY SO THAT U.S. ASSISTANCE COULD COME VERY RAPIDLY ONCE | 

THE POLITICAL DECISION HAD BEEN MADE, I INFORMED LANIEL THAT 

AFTER MY MEETING WITH SCHUMANN SATURDAY NIGHT AT WHICH 

SCHUMANN ffAD RAISED THE SUBJECT, I HAD SENT AN INQUIRY ON' 

SUNDAY TO WASHINGTON EXPLAINING IN FULL FRENCH VIEW THAT 

(l) U.S. INTERVENTION BECAUSE OF CONTINUATION AND AGGREVATION 

OF PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION IN INDOCHINA, AND (2) U.S. 

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-2- k6l2, MAY 31, 1 P.M., FROM PARIS 



REACTION TO AN ALL-OUT CHINESE AIR ATTACK WERE OHO VERY 
SEPARATE PROBLEMS, AND THAT SOME ARRANGEMENT SHOULD BE MADE TO 
HANDLE A CHINESE AIR ATTACK IF IT SHOULD OCCUR PRIOR TO CREATION 
OF A SEATO ALLIANCE. 

IF WE SHOULD INFORM THE FRENCH THAT WE WILL NOT RPT NOT REACT 
TO A CHINESE AIR ATTACK EXCEPT AFTER MAKING THE NECESSARY ARRANGE- 
MENTS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION, I AM AFRAID THAT THIS WOULD HAVE 
A PROFOUND AND IMMEDIATE EFFECT BOTH ON FRENCH ATTITUDE IN GENEVA 
AND ON PRESENT FRENCH PLANS FOR BOLSTERING THE DEFENSE OF INDO- 
CHINA. WE GAVE LANIEL GENERAL TRAPNELL'S OPINION THAT ELY'S 
OVERALL PLAN SEEMED GOOD AND THAT FRENCH SHOULD BE ABLE TO HOLD 
AREAS WHICH ELY PLANS TO DEFENS. ELY THEN ARRANGED FOR FURTHER 
TECHNICAL DISCUSSION WITH TRAPNELL LATER IN MORNING. SEE 
FOLLOWING TELEGRAM. 



DILLON 



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.in.?'!'' -.-=.-• -*-' 

"TV ") - .• I l:^-' ; Control! 242-* ^ ^'3 1 

';.=- - ; ' .. R*« June 1, 195^ W\w L 

Pfjo;^; Paris 11:28 a.m. X 

TO: Secretary of State v - -j_ ^^ 

* 

DO: 4625, June 1, 1 p.m. 







SENT DEPARTMENT 4625, REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 354 
LIMIT DISTRIBUTION " ., & 

EYES ONLY 0M3ER SECRETARY 
Re ^DEPTEL 4352 ^ } ' 'to/ ^ 

Information contained in paragraph 3 of DEPTEUjK)94- was con- . ". & j 
veyed by me to Schumann Immediately upon receipt and he^fully 
understands it. My concern as evidenced In EMBTEL 4607 ""stemmed ( 
from fact that last sentence of DEPTEL 4325 clearly goes much J 
further than paragraph 3 of DEPTEL 4094, which reference tele- , 
gram now confirms to be Department's policy. Last sentence of { 
DEPTEL 4325 carries clear implication that U.S. would not parti- v 
cipate under any circumstances, except as part of a broader collec- 
tive effort, while paragraph 3 of DEPTEL 4094 states that U.S. v 
reaction to Chinese air attack would be "judged under the 
circumstances of the moment", but that, in any event, the; ;. " 
President would require congressional authorization. If in J \ 
fact last sentence of DEPTEL 4325 was not intended to indicate ;? * : 
any change in this policy, there is no misunderstanding be- 



tween our governments . 

! 

Pi 

However, we must bear in mind that French for practical purposes 
draw the Inference from instructions in paragraph 3 of DEPTEL 
.4094 that the President would request Congress for authority to 
- act in the event of a sudden and unprovoked mass attack \ y Chinese ^ 
aircraft. They realize, however, that this is only an Inference % 
on their part and that U.-5. position, as expressed in paragraph 
3 of DEPTEL 4094, makes no commitment one way or another re- 
garding what action the President might take. From theii point 
-of view this is an unsatisfactory situation. All trie recent 
French requests from Schumann, Lanlel, Ely, et cetera, regarding 
^guarantees against a possible Chinese attack were brought about° 
^4028^ the vagueness of U.S. policy as expressed In paragraph 3 of 
" DEPTEL 4094 . ' ■ , 

French are now attempting to clarify what .U.S. position actually 
J will be in the event of a Chinese air attack on the Delta .prior 
to the conclusion of collective defense arrangements. As JI see' 



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it ve have three possible courses open to US: £9 ""* 

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+ 

■ ~2-. H625, June 1, 1 p.m. from- Paris 

1. Maintain position outlined in paragraph 3 of DEPTEL 409H. 
In this event "French will continue to believe in their hearts 
that President will in fact request Congress to act if there 
should be an all-out Chinese air attack. 

•2. Tell French that if there should be such unprovoked attack, 
President would expect to request Congress for authority to 
use U.S. forces. 

3. Tell French that U.S. would not come to French assistance 
even in the event of a Chinese air attack except as a part ' 
of a collective action. . . 

If in fact -intention is to give assistance to French in event 
of a Chinese air attack, it would seem immaterial whether we 
follow courses No. 1 or No. 2 and I can see many reasons in 
favor of sticking to course No. 1. However, if we stick to 
course No. 1, and then do not come to assistance of French in 
the event of a Chinese air attack, I feel that the results here 
in France will be as outlined in ©©TEL 4607 • 






refore, tf we do not intend to react to Chinese air attack 
except In the framework of collective action } I feel that It 
would be better to adopt course No. 3 so as to avoid the risks 
described In EM3TEL 46uf • If we adopt course No. 3, however, 
we must realize that it will corr-e as* a shock to the F -ench 
and would probably have a prompt and serious effect on French 
attitude in Geneva and on present French plans for reinforcing 
Indochina. If it became public knowledge that course No- J 
was our policy, it would probably hasten fall of Laniel and 
generally militate against our European policy, though nowhere 
nearly to the extent indicated In EMETEL ^60?. 

When Ely arrives Washington next week, he will be under specific 
instructions to attempt to clarify U.S. policy on this point 
if answer has not previously been given. Therefore, if our de- ■ 
cision is, to stick to policy outlined in par eaph 3 of DEPTEL 
409<; with no further explanations, all personnel who will be 
talking with Ely should be carefully briefed regarding the 
subject. . 



DILLON 



LkS : BLK/5 



££030 



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use 5 l '-2i 

June" 1, 195^ 



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NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 

to the 
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL * 



on 



STUDIES WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE 



U. S. ACTION REGA r IMQSSM& 
References: A. NSC WOy 



B. NSC Action Nos-. 1086~b and c, 
110 l hb, 1106, 1110 and 1112 



Tho enclosed studies with respect to possible U. S. 
action regarding Indochina have been prepared by various 
departments and agencies in response to requests authorized 
by the President. In the event that conditions established 
by the President as prerequisites for United States inter- 
vention in the conflict in Indochina are net, these studies 
will provide the basis for further consideration by the 
Council of the question of such intervention. 

These studies were prepared on the assumption that 
United States armed forces intervene in the conflict in 
Indochina j and on the alternate assumptions that the 
Chinese Communists : (a) intervene with armed forces in 
Indochina 5 or (h) do not intervene with armed forces in 
Indochina. 

A draft of a Presidential message is being prepared 
by the Department of State and will be circulated later for 
insertion in Part I of this report. Additions and amendments 
to the enclosed reports may be circulated from time to J irae, 

Pursuant to Presidential directive, distribution of 
this report is being limited to one copy to each Council 
participant, which is being transmitted through the Pie- ling 
Board members. 









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vxtihout fefeo oormission of this office i 



* 



JAMES S. LAY 5 Jr« 
Executive Socretary 



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DISTRIBUTED II 






The 
Tho 
The 

The 

The 

The 
The 



The President 

The Vice President 

Secretary of State 

Secretary of the Treasury 

Secretary of Defense #5 

Attorney General 

Director, Foreign Operations Administration 

Director, Office of Defense Mobilization 

Director, Bureau of the Budget 
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Director of Central Intelligence 

Secretary of the Army 

Secretary of the Navy 

Secretary of the Air Force 

Chief of Staff, Army 

Chief of Naval Operations 

Chief of Staff, Air Force 

Commandant of the K?.rine Corps 



The 
The 
Tats 
The 
The 
The 
The 

The 
The 



* 



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STUDIES WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE 






G ~ S. ACTION REGARDIN G INDOCHINA 



Table of Contents 



■ 



- ► 



• 



I. By the Department of State 

I 

Economic Warfare Against Communist China 

United Nations Action in the Event of United States 

Armed Intervention in Indochina 
Juridical Relations in the French Union; Giving 

' Effect to the Independence of the Associated States 

of Indochina 
Draft of President's Message (to he circulated) 

I I * By. the Department of Justice 

Constitutional and Legal Aspects^ Including Appropriate 
.Form for Joint Resolution, of President's Request for 
Authorization fl to Intervene in Indochina" 



III, By the C entral Intelligence Agency 

Communist Capabilities in Indochina 



IV. By the Dertart&en.t of Defense ' 

Under Alternate Assumptions that Chinese Coiainunists 
Intervene or Do Not Intervenes 



S 



trategic Concept and Plan of Operation 
brces Required of Each Nation Participating 



. 



Foi 

Plan for Logistic Support 

Plan for Command Structure 

Plan for Training Native Troops . 

Plan for V/orld-V/ide Military Aid 



V • By the Office of Defense Mobilization 

Industrial Mobilization 
Manpower Mobilization 

Economic Stabilization Mobilization 



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VI . By the Foreign O p a r at ion s 



Plan for U. S. Economic 
of Intervention 



Actmini str at ion 
and Technical Aid in Event 



VII. Bff^ jjfejjL Qgg x : a t ipng^ gp or dina t ing^ , Bo ar £ r 

Plan for Gaining Maximum Support for U, S. Intervention 

in the Associated Stater, from the Indigenous Peoples 
Plan of Political Warfare (Including Guerilla and 

Paramilitary) Action Against the Vietminh 
Plan for Gaining Maximum Support of Other Free World 

Countries 
Plan for Political Warfare Organization as Integral 

Part of Intervention 
Plan for Keeping China out of War or Reducing Its 

Effectiveness 



VIII. B%; , the Bureau of. the Budget * 

Preparation of Any Necessary Request for Supplemental 

Appropriations 
Preparation of Any Necessary Requests for Additional 

Statutory Authority Required for Appropriation, 
Revision of FY 55, 56" Budget Plan 



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Section 1 t 

SUMMARY OF STUDIES BY THE DEPAPvTMENT OF STATE 



'i 1. There are three parts to the State study: 

a. Economic warfare against Communist China. 

b. U.N. action in the event of U.S. armed intervention in 
Indochina. 

c. Juridical relations to the French Union: Giving effect to 
the independence of the Associated States. 

2. Economic warfare against Communist China .- The paper seeks to 
determine whether, in the event of U.S. intervention in Indochina, 
intensified and broadened economic warfare measures would deter 
Communist China from openly intervening or hinder its military effort if 
it did intervene. The study concludes that the divisive risks of seeking 
an international program of broadened and intensified economic warfare 
measures against Communist China would be too great to be undertaken if 
the full support of the United Kingdom were absent. Even such a program 
as could be obtained with United Kingdom support would nevertheless not 
constitute a serious deterrent or count ermeasure to open Communist 
Chinese intervention in Indochina in terms of economic impact. It 
might be possible , however, to achieve some deterrent psychological 
impact through the device of an advance multilateral declaration of the 
economic consequences of massive Chinese Communist intervention. 

The paper does not deal with the question of a naval blockade, which 
State considers to be a military measure. 

3. U.N, action in the event of U.S. armed intervention in Indochina 
With the exception of action under Article 51 (individual or collective 
defense against "armed attack") the U.S. as a U.N. member is obligated 
not to use armed force except in response to orders or recommendations of 
the U.Nc . Therefore, "united action" without prior U.N. authorization 
would have to be t&ken under Article 51 • 

There are three possible types of U.N. action related to "united 
action" : 

a. U.N. action prior to U.S. intervention, designed to lay 
the foundation for "united action." 

b. U.N. action following and supplementing the "united action." 

c. Possible U.N. action in the event the Chinese Communists 
resumed hostilities in Korea as a result of "united action" in Indochina. 



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k m Jurdical relations in the French Union: Giving effect to the 
independence of the Associated States - Our goal Jiere must be to have 
France make it unmistakably clear to world opinion, and above all, the 
Vietnamese that the Treaty of Independence between France and Vietnam 
represents a full and unqualified commitment on the part of France 
which will be carried out in practice. Since the peoples of the Associated 
States are still mistrustful of French promises* French actions must be 
underwritten by the U.S. 






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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

"WASHINGTON ?.5. D. C. 



8 June 195h 



rrtRMATlO.VAL SECURITY AFFAIRS 












1 ' 



HEMOa&HHn-I FOR ElIGADIHi ffiSKSUL KtfSSTiiza 

S0BJSO2s Ccrjr.snts on Study of Poss5.blo U-,Sc Antion Eegai'dins Indochina. 



pursuant to your memorandum dived l;. Juoe IS'pKj 
are submitted 



tfaa following ccc&ents 






r 



&, Economic Warfare Against Coasaunlst China 



-**-~»^*. 



"g» «*-«*— ' ■»■—— 



3.c It is noted that this pr.psr d~>33 not cb&l Kith tho 
■ question of a naval blocfctda* This office h&s r;o eosg&s&t o:: 
the iiOB«rilitary economic fffflffeate r^asure.s discuiocd in' thic 

2o Dssplts the ir .probability of ebts&nirg eg^eais^nt of 
©11 ths ispcrUnt allies of ths United States to a full 
economic eslbaFgo of goods and ssrvicas to Co; rctaist CMnaj 
• it is racon?r!3ndsd that t&s tfoited States s&wld att$j£&t to 
ofetsda such a^es&sat in th3 event of further involvement in 
Inciocbii":^ 



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3o U3 should maintain that a totsQL naval bloolrads rovld 
ba the only effective economic warfare fciaasiare against Corsmanist 

Chin:;* 

b United JTations Actiovi in the Event of United States Armed 






• *—«v-*-' 



by 



In terven tion in Indcohina 

l c No consent except that p^Egraph 3 has been overtrJ^n 
events*. 



c 



Juridi cal Eolations in tKs fiei3Qh r T UaiotVf plying BiTfeo t 

ths Ind3oand^Rco of th^ Associated St?,t gs* o£ Ir.d.ccjSrA 

* * 



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^!lJl^?ZJl£^^yJI^^ psct to P ossible Unitad States 
Action R |g r^d i n g IndocMr^ 

lo Concur ^holoher^todly in the entire paper* 






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d. (Continued) 

■ 

V 

2. A firm stand should be taken to support particularly 
paragraph lk 9 "Plan for Worldwide Military Aid." 

e. FOA paper "Studies with Respect to Possible United States 
Action Regarding Indochina" 

1. Concur on the condition that the paragraph iH of the JCS 
paper is made applicable. 



Attachments: 

1. State Study dtd 25 May 5** 

2. State Study dtd 26 May 5^ 

3. State Study dtd 25 May 5^ 
k. DOB Study dtd -2? May 5^ 
5. FOA Study dtd 2k May 5^ 



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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 



8 June 195 1 * 



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS 



MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL BOiffiSTEEL 



SUBJECT: Comments on Study of Possible U.S. Action Regarding Indochina. 









Pursuant to your memorandum dated k June 195^ > the following comments 
are submitted: 

a. Economic Warfare Against Communist China. 

1. It is noted that this paper does not deal with the 
question of a naval blockade* This office has no comment on 
the non-military economic warfare measures discussed in this 
paper . 

2. Despite the improbability of obtaining agreement of 
all the important allies of the United States to a full 
economic embarge of goods and services to Communist China, 
it is recommended that the United States should attempt to 
obtain such agreement in the event of further involvement in 
Indochina. 

3. We should maintain that a total naval blockade would t 
be the only effective economic warfare measure against Communist 
China. I 

b. United Nations Action in the Event of United States Armed 
Intervention in Indochina 



1. t T o comment except that paragraph 3 has been overtaken 
by events. 

£. Juridical Relations in the French Union: Giving Effect to 
the Independence of the Associated States of Indochina 



1. Concur. 

■ 

JCS paper "Studies With Respect to Possible United States 
Action Regarding Indochina" 

1. Concur wholeheartedly in the entire paper. 

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' I sir 



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The interest of" the Department of Defense in the legal conclu- 
sions summarized above would appear to be far less than that of the' 



* i. 



Stale and Justice Departments, So lonj; as the action tslcen is broad 
enough in scops to permit the Department of Defense to carry out the 
responsibilities which vd 11 be assigned to it, there would appear to 
be no grounds for objecting to the Conclusions offered* This study 
cor.cludes that the v&rticie power of the President ray be exercised in 
a state of emergency and that the proposed Resolution provides a 
political solution of the constitutional question v/hich is broad 
enough to cover a possible extension of hostilities. These arc the 
principal points of concern to the Defense Department and since I 
agree* with these conclusions and also with the practical conclusion 
regarding- the Red Cress, Prisoner- of-Y."ar, and related conventions, it 
seams to *ne that there is no reason for this Department to challenge 
the conclusions of the ELe-ftorandttru 



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Eotwith standing the foregoing, I venture to offer two oovs&ents on 

the general problor. presented. First, it sesns to sie that the term 
"intervention" might just as vrell be avoided altogether. It nov; appears 
prominently throughout the Department of Justice study, but not in the 
draft resolution. The political connotations of the vorci are, as you 
knov.*, the subject of much anti-American. coni?ient in Central and South 
America, Iforeovor, apart frow this, as a matter of technical inter- 
national lav* the word implies a dictatorial 1/ interference in tho 
affairs o? another state, I understand there is no thought of going 
into Indochina except on the basis of an invitation on the part cf the 
lav.'ful recognized government. Our action would not, therefore, be 

"intervention" in the strict sense of the term as used in International 
lav.% 

I- recognise that tho vnord "intervention" does not now appear in 
tho text of the draft Joint Resolution" and it se-zzis to ine, for the 
reasons set forth above, that it should not appear, either there or in 
the public declarations of Administration spokesmen. 



m j/ Thus professor Opper.heirc states; "But it nust be emphasised that 
intervention proper is always dictato rial interference, not inter- 
"' f crones pure and siuple. Therefore intervention must neither be 
confused TS&th good offices, nor with mediation, nor vrith interces- 
sion, nor with co-operation, because none of these imply a dicta- 
torial interference. Thus, for example, in 1826, at the request of 
the Portuguese Government, Great Britain sent troops to Portugal in 
order to assist that Government against a threatening revolution on 
the part of the followers of .Don JCiguelj and in 1849, at the request 
of Austria, Russia sent troops into Hungary to assist Austria in 
suppressing the Hungarian revolt. 
Law* ( 1943} £75. 



I. Oppsbheim, Int -itional 



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Second, I think it preferable that* the word "justified" be 
used in place of the word "authorized" in both paragraphs 3 and k 
of the draft Joint Resolution. The Joint Resolution of Congress 
approving "President Wilson's action at the time of the Tampico in- 
cident designedly employed the word "justified" in order to avoid 
the implication that Congress was exercising the power which it 
alone has to declare war. 2/ Moreover , I have taken the position 
internally within the Department of Defense that, as a matter of 
constitutional law, the President has authority to use the armed 
forces to repel aggression abroad without specific approval from 
the Congress where the circumstances of the situation require it. 
If this draft '"Joint Resolution is passed in its present form it 
will be a precedent for the proposition that the President must 
under the Constitution have an authorization from the Congress be- 
fore he can use the armed forces to repel aggression abroad in cases 
of this sort in the future where the time element may be even more 
critical than in the present case. 



I think the first of these two points is worth mentioning. I 
think the second is worth pressing for. 



(Signed) 



Wilber M. Brucker 
General Counsel 



2/ See 6 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 19^0 (1952). 






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SUKIARY-OF III. 
STUDY BY THE CENT! :L BTELLIGEHCS AGENCY 0? 
001:115": CAPABILITIES I!" BllXXJHINA 



1* Corimunist capabilities to oppose U.S. ar^^ intervention in Indochina 
are estimated on two assumptions s (a) Viet Kinh alone j receiving indirect 
Chinese Comunisl aid; and (b) Chinese Cc nist and Het Minh forces receiv- 
ing Soviet support, H ovrever 3 th^fe T . gttedy doe s not consid er. the effect on enegiy 
c^P a cDl ti^s of _U 4 S , c » t er~ac tlon^or of ene?y action not directed against 
indoch£na ( This assumption is very misleading 1 especially in view of the 
fact that national policy toward Southeast Asia ( I ; SC 5U05) in the event of 
Chinese Conmimist intervention calls for U.S. military reaction not liiaited 
to the area of Indochina. 



oi : 



2, Under assumption (a) (Viet ^inh a3.one) , the Viet Minh will be capable 

m 

a* Maintaining guerrilla warfare throughout Indochina and mounting 
attacks in northern Indochina vith a force of up to six divisions - almost 
complete logistic dependence on Chinese ConLnunists. 

b. Expanding the present combat forces of 2 £0^000 by an additional 
1^000, 

c* Making air fields available j although the Viet Minh do not possrrs 
an air force. 



d, Negligible naval activity* 

e, Regarding political warfare, aopealSxg to nationalism and denounc- 
ing U.S. intervention as colonialism: subverting and itttinldating the 
Ifidochxnese people. In spite of Allied victories, a hard core of Cor.- 
munis ts would regain. 

3- Under assunption (b) (Chinese intervention) * the Chinese Communists 
will be capable of; 

a. Comnitting five of their thirteen armies (36,000 men each) within 
■ 10-20 days, 

b. Supporting Communist combat forces^ over present lines of com- 
munications ^ of 600^,000 men. This capability exists in the dry or rainy 
season, * * 

c. Intervening immediately with an air force of 120 aircraft (fighter 
and bomber). 

« 

d. Limited naval activity. 



var 



e. Regarding political Warfare,, infiltrating and conducting guerrilla 
fare in suooort of Viet Minh activities, " 

to - 






2 * 



4 ^.Li 






• 



\ 1 
I 1 













Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET 



SUMMARY OF SECT I OH IV 



STUDY BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 



This study Is based on the assumption that there will be no concurrent 
U.S. involvement in Korea. It points out that from the point of view of the 
U.S. j Indochina is devoid of decisive military objectives and that, 
consequently , the committing to the Indochina conflict of naval forces in 
excess of a Fast Carrier Task Force and supporting forces , as necessary 
in accordance with the developments in the situation, or basing substantial 
air forces in Indochina, will involve mal-deployment of forces and reduced 
readiness to meet probable Chinese Communist reaction elsewhere in the Far 
East. 

Assuming the Chinese Communists intervene, we should, inter alia , 
employ atomic weapons, whenever advantageous, conduct air operations 
against military targets in Indochina, China, and Communist -held offshore 
islands, blockade the China coast, seize or neutralize Hainan, and have 
Chinese Nationalist forces undertake operations against the mainland. In 
accordance with the Unified Coimnand Plan, CINCPAC would exercise unified 
command of assigned forces. To train Associated States Forces, 
approximately 2,250 U.S. personnel would be required to augment the 
existing MAAG. Meanwhile, action should be taken to insure an 
appropriate degree of U.S. mobilization to provide for the greater risk 
of a general war, and we should undertake to strengthen those allies who 
could directly support the U.S. strategic concept for a general war. 

In the event the Chinese Communists do not intervene, we should, 
inter alia, conduct air operations in support of allied forces in 
Indochina, employing atomic weapons if such a course appears militarily 
advantageous. Although the Allied Commander-in-Chief should be French, 
there should be a U.S. Deputy and a U.S. Air Adviser. CIKCPAC would 
exercise command over all U.S. forces based in Indochina and other 
forces assigned to him for operations in Indochina* The plan for 
training native ttoops would be the same as under the assumption of 
Chinese Communist intervention. ) 

Whether or not the U.S. intervenes in Indochina, the UCS consider 
that it is vital that the war in Indochina be financed by a method 
separate and distinct from the world-wide MDAP 



522 



TOP SECRET 









Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET 



summary of odm studies re mobilization elans in the event of u.s. 
arm™ intervention in indochdia without Chinese intervention (situation 
a) or with chinese interve^jtion (situation b) 



GENERAL 

The need for mobilization actions depends far more on the induced 
effects of public interpretation of events than on the direct impact of 
military outlays. The expectations and interpretations of the public mil 
lead to serious economic consequences unless offset by appropriate 
government action. The Increased direct effects of the military programs 
would be moderate for either Situation A or B in FY 55 and FY 56. The 
induced effects of either situation could have a very serious result 
particularly on price level and less seriously on the supply and 
distribution of materials. They would have only a slight effect on over- 
all manpower availability. The measures which ODM proposes are most 
comprehensive in the field of stabilization and least so in manpower, 

INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION 

1. The Defense Materials System will continue to be a key element 
in industrial mobilization. 

2. The rate of stockpile accumulation for a selected few critical 
materials will be protected. 

■ 

3. Inventory controls will be imposed In both Situations A and B, 

J+, Funds will be requested to erect plants and acquire equipment 
to overcome deficiencies in the mobilization base. 

5, Preparatory work for more serious military conditions will 
go forward. 

MANPOWER MOBILIZATION 

, m 1 ii i^g». ^ ^^^ ■ ■ 1 ■ 1 

a 

1. The potential supply of military manpower available in the 
selective service pool and military reserves is sufficient to meet 
anticipated requirements under Situation A or B. However, certain 
policies and actions would be required to meet the demands of Situation B. 
Briefly they are: 

a. Statutory authority for involuntary recall or reservists. 

b. Statutory authority for extension of terms of service. 

c. Elimination of fatherhood as a basis for deferment. 



523 
TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



i f* r " s " " " ■ 1 









gC^pmC STABILI2MS0S 

Ksasures to fca t&&3i2 in thia area £i^e: 



1* Frio^ s rant n:^l wags eositroXsa 
', 2, Dlrcot cor^uxor Eationi;?gi 

3* Credit control* 
! / >0 An oflequato to:-: j^ogvam to offset tho isflatio&sry effect 3 
of direct onlays* 

03M v!3J. regroup its activities to f era four r:ajor divisions: 



1-faterials cjd prediction 
2* Kanpover, 
3* Stabilisation* 

/;i Tel ecov Altaic at ions* 



/ 



s 



52M- 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



i 



•y 









• 



- 



- 






P 



r at* 

Jtu. 



- VI 

SlkJMARY 01? STUDY BY F 0A 

"of - 

■ ■ 

FCB U.S. ECONOMIC A 7 ^) T^C?U:ICA T , AID liT T:B 5T?S£TT OF I:^;R\^;:?I0TT 



1. The objectives of the plan for economic and technical aid 
to the c our.tr ies of Southeast Asia in the event of IKS. action in 
Indochina would be (a) to gain the support and cooperation of the 
indigenous peoples 3 (b) to strengthen fcSeir ability to support the 
military effort , and (c) to strengthen allied appeal to neutral or 
hostile i'ndigencus peoples . 

2, The nagnitude of the aid is dependent on the size of the 
area o"oen to operations, the speed vita which developments take 
place and the out come of the military activity. The type of program 
would be cieteirr.ined largely by the c^e^rc:^ of stability in the area 
involved. 

3- a. Activities necessary whether conditions are stable or 
unst? £z those vhich supplement the.var effort or contribute 
directly to the needs of the people: activities involving economic 
control • 

b. Additional activities as re^r ar^as prc^ressi-ely 
stabilize: projects vhich contribute torrard building the basic 
strer^th of a country and its peoples: projects vliich assist 
indigenous ^rover^^ts to ooerate efficiently and gain popular 
support- i.e., agriculture and public vorhs, health and educational 
standards . 

k. Outlines for the specific countries of Viet Has^ Caiiibcdiaj 
Laos ; Thailand and the Philippines are presented (p graph 21). 



525 



Shis docn::;>enl rust not be 
rcprciiiG'-d vrithoul psrinission 
of th« ori£i:^tI:;:- office. 



This dorcntnl cental::' 
Copy Bo. — L- of J— 



_^__ D3C3S. 
copies. Seris 



~ > 



. 5 bf 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



HM 



M 






' 



SO&9HX OF S2CTI0I: 7 
S5S3DIES BY r ri3 0PSRA2ICS-TS COQSDX2a$3$G 30SRD . 



1. The 0C3 studies present five plans designed to facilitate U.S. ob.jectr 
after ve have intervened in the Associated States as a sentjer of a regional 
grouping. These plans or a: 



. -,. s 



a. Plan for sain: 
indigenous peoples . 



,ng jrjaxirius! support for U.S 



.«?. 



lu'cervercion rrc 



b. Plan of political warfare campaign against Viet Minh 



c . Plan for gaining xaaRitioai support of other free world countries . 

&. Plan for political Warfare organisation as integral part of interventj 

e. Plan for keeping China out of var or reducing its effectiveness in 
var "by Political warfare means . 



V *- 



2. Highlights of the various plans are e«s follows: 

* 
a. Maximm support for U.S. intervention fro© the indigenous peoples 
should "be achieved by clarifying for then the issues involved. 




rv 



c« A Korean-tvpe training prosram should he established fo" 
nanese AnSjfj and training programs for Laos and Casibodia should 
established. 



w. .».. , _ .. ij — 

also he 



d. As fast "as practicable; the people of Viet Sam should 



voice in **~ne Koverrsnatrt . 



^xven a 



o- 



o- 



e. Political "nrfare against the Viet Minh should include continued 
support for the 10,000 French- controlled -juerrill&s in Viet Hart and Laos 
and sabotage tea&s should he developed and trained to operate in Southeast 
China ^ I'orth Viet I; am and Hbrth Laos. Escape and evasion safe areas and 
"rat lines" should he established to the coast or to Thailand, CAT has been 
alerted for any necessary logistic or operational air support requirement'- ~~ 
unable to he net by military air support. In order to increase Allied sunno-- 
in the absence of Chinese Co/.v:u::ist intervention , -;e should continue our er?f 




If order to increase Allied support in the event of Chinee:- c-'—-i— * - 



intexnrention, \te should rsafce every effort to restrict 






a 
s 



tne conflict to e>- 
v:I the Associated States and se^> a favorable hasis for a ----- .^ 

ctoq 

hi? S& >! 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



? 

* 



I 






! , * 



w * I ■' - ; I « \ 



r 



g. Political varfare measures designed to prevent the er of 
Chinese forces into the var should include: 

(1) Tlireats to retaliate ^ ineludir.3 a show of air and raval 
strength i" the area.* 

\ ' 

(2) Assurance that hostilities "rill be United to fee Associates 
States if China dees rot intervene . 

h. In the event of Chinese Cor. mist intervention^ we should try to 
minimize the effectiveness "by; 



(1) Indicating that South Korea and Nationalist China will "be 
encouraged to attack j thus confronting the Chinese ylth a %-£ro&t var. 

(2) CocEsenelug rapid rearming of Ger&any in order to put pressure 

on the USSR and to increase Soviet logistical support of China. 



^\ 



f 






27 



•5T r* f? ^, r* r> ps ^ t 

ISjy ",■••• * ■ 



~tt 



* 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






l 



/-*. rzi f~\ *v\ »■» 

\ x ;_ k~ i J>_ 



R i 






# « 






SECTION VIII 



STUDIES OF THE BUREAU OK TIES BUDGET 



SUMMARY 



J. A sugary of the studies prepared by the Bureau of the Budget is 

attached as Tab A. 

* 

COMMENTS . ■ 



1 



2* The Acting A5D (Comptroller) , whose cotn&ents are attached as Tab B 3 
feels that the sums for economic aid appear excessive in relation to the 
mutual military assistance program. He further notes an increase in addi- 
tional new obligational authority for "economic stabilisation l selective 
service* stockpiling. etc**" while the amount of additional funds for 
stockpiling is not known* He makes the point that there is serious doubt 
vhether the U.S. should accelerate its stockpiling program in the event of 
U.S. action in Indochina,, or "whether the stockpile should be insnedi&tely 
utilized, Ke questions whether the several agencies contributing studies 
have based their programs and program estimates on the sane policy guidance. 



528 



7CY : j 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



SUKKAIft OP' SECTION VIII 



STUDIES OF TKS BUREAU OF THE BUDGET 



1. The Bureau of the Budget was asked to prepare studies to cover: 

a. Revisions of FY % $$ and l $S budget plans. 

: b. Preparation of any necessary requests for supplemental appro- 
priations, 

- 

- 

c. Preparation of any necessary requests for additional statutory 
authority j these studies to be made under the alternate assumption re 
Chinese Cocnmunist intervention. 

2. The key to the upward revision in budget plans centers around Defense 
programs (60 per cent) ; plus mutual military aid and foreign economic assist- 
ance. The submissions by agencies indicate that without Chinese Cc mist 
intervention j additions to current budget plans villi be of the following order: 






19$$ 1956 

(in billions) 



s. Nc-vr obligations! authority 



•A 



S2.1 



b« ixoenoi cures »•*«»**. •>» «*«.*#« •*«•*•*• jl • J. 






3. Under the assumption of Chinese Corun.unist intervention, additions 
to current budget plans of the folio g order have been indicated: 

195$ 19^6 



(In billions)' 



a* New obligational authority . •., $5*7 



b . Exc end i t ur as 



2.5 



8.9 



l«. Regarding necessary requests for supplemental appropriations, 503 
says merely that supplemental appropriations vrould be necessary. 

5. Regarding necessary requests for additional statutory authority , BOB 

says that at this stage , they have not prepared any legislation. 



O c. \j 



.-•"' 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



w « _ J -.. 



•U 



' 



INDICATE i D collect 

G GMA*G( TO 



jurepars .eax ok 



ui 






r 



• * ^ 



TO? SSCR1 



Origin 



Infoi 



fOtfJees 

CM,J 



C Ia.s5 ifi cat i on 



J/t/cZ / 



SENT TO : Aiceufrassgr PARIS t-tht? D335SIE0TIO3" f 



RPT TO s ArAconsul s Geneva 



ILS 



^F-.»-^,-». — - *]g 



"psrart 






/3 



c/ 



'6 



0-180 o 



DC/1 



! 
I 
t 



Land el 1 3 vicms reported Enbtol h$$8 that IT0 attd French have Quote no~? -■ 

i 
reached accord in principle on political side Unquote on conditions for US 



i - 



» i 



military participation Indochina seem to U3 serious overstatement this stance 
and potentially dangerous for reasons given Dsptel b3£6 (repeated to Geneva 
TEDUL ll$)« ...... • 

Irihile one major obstacle to agreement removed noix that fomula proposed r 

■ 

Deptel 4272 for clarification independence Associated States acceptable 



(subject to discussion in. th Bitiaultj ceo XULT. 7 ; 135 repeated Paris 3^7) ^ 






ve need from French soonest possible? prsd&d Gtat: .';:at he;-; tlioy propo 



O 

o 



j *; 



handling their action or cosTaittasn to to meet our conditions listed Dsptel 

- — ——— — — ^— — ^ * - •— ■ - 

1»023 paragraph 2 as modified by Deptel l|£72<> Until to have obtained such 
statement from Lanxel v;o cannot (repsat not) be (rare b&sis for any firm 
agreement does in fact exist* Once such statement received and judged by 
us fulXi.1.1 conditions \;e would then be in position proceed accordance with 



c 



other necessary steps vhich vould have to bs taken, assuming situation 



warranted it 



56238 



t' i't-i bjfi 



v^> 




', 




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La 



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f- 



FUR:V,T::h r f:lyle:^nt 6/3/5h 



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Ct3SfSJ*s ->i 



4 






G - Mr, Murphy 






1 T ^___ 

»«^w t Eoj - Mr. SfawhanfcN^ S/p - Kr* BaidL*\Q\v! 



C - Mr. KackrtbQsSQ(f PS - Mr. Drunr.irV/, v < 







fs/v- p r ; 



/ 



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TO? SEC 



n-.!-.":DDt'CT!o:i paorj v:: " 

COPY, i; : •::..•.".-.;:?), !.; 

PS0HISJI2D, 



r> 



'k> 



Cfa 



s si/ifrt tior. 



530 



Declassified per Executive Order 1 3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



L 









Action 

EUR 

Info 

S3 
G 

SP 

c 

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• ^TOP SECRET' 



Control: 2^93 

Bac'd* June 4, 195*1- 



1 






F.ROM: Saigon , . : 5. A;.i 7 ! r - 10:35 p.m. 

TO: Secretary o2 State /bJJ" .J 

fJO ; 2656, June 4, 5 p.oi« 



y5r 






^r 



SENT DSPARTiXENT 2656; REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 9^2, GENEVA 192 ... 

Department telegram ■ 4272\sent Paris repeated Geneva T03SC 269 5 § 
Saigon 2^418 was delayed In receipt due to extensive servicing* » 
This accounts for our tardy comment, 

I am in full agreement with general tenor of reference telegram - 
ana have only minor observations to make. Those are: 



Re numbered paragraph 3-C s ±t might make French declaration 
more palatable both* in France and in Asia generally were we 
likewise to announce Intention to withdraw US technical and : 

I military assistance as soon as practicable. It must not be ;. 

'"forgotten that In Communist and" neutralist Asian es US is 
principal threat in Eastern iHTia ane[ riot "what" IV generally re -re- 
garded to be a decadent France. Since Communist propaganda 
has already overs tressed alleged unduly large role of FOA 
Mission here and Peking radio daily proclaims that US is send-' 
ing military equipment to slaughter* Asiatics J such a declaration 
might be useful from psychological 'warfare point of view. 



6 

c 
( 



I Reference paragraph 4~ A, it is essential that we commence 
forthwith to review terms of reference which now limit MAAG 
to purely logistical function/ Under present set of rules^ 
General Q 'Daniel is being asked to train Vietnam e troops 
> with ever present French veto hanging over his head. In my 
I opinion , we should approach French Government on terms of 
September 29 j 1953 agreement , point out that Navarre plan no 
longer exists 3 that conditions have changed, and that new 
terms of reference for MAAG should be drafted forthwith. 

Implicit in paragraph J-A but not specifically touched upon is 
problem of ancillary agreements which will spell out turn-ovei 
by France to Vietnam of sovereignty in specific fields as, foi 
example, control of currency, Custom Union, Civil Aviation, 
and Mixed Courts* French, whether through incapacity of govern- 
ment to move in present Parliamentary crisis or by deliberate 
design, have not moved at all in completing these* agreements" ^ 
although telegrams from Embassy Paris have Indicated that so o 
far as experts were concerned, these accords were almost, ready- 



H 
O 



*. 
L 



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VI 



5 

» 



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for signature. £f; : 

KMHHSCTIOir 

cew.iFcussif 

r. tk;c fr,iiv .-.>--■? f,n rftii.-nf>rl 1 1 DC/B central filns with notation cf ac'ion tsken © ^' 3H18IT£0 



64043 

** ».* w * 



531 



TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET 



-2- 26565 June k, 5 p.m., from Saigon. 

for signature. Likewise Vietnamese experts , feeding at the 
flesh potSj have shown no alacrity in pressing for final 
action. It is not enought to broadcast a fine -sounding treaty 
of independence without knowing exactly where Vietnamese will 
find themselves in respect of control of their finances, their 
courts , and their right to request technical assistance from 
any quarter, and not exclusively from France. 

As for question of elections to which Department quite rightly 
attaches importance, it is now of less significance in Vietnam 
than before owing to general feeling of panic and anxiety lest 
entire country be lost through unfortunate armistice terms. 
Press has announced that decrees will presently be signed by 
Bao Dai providing foi^ municipal elections and, with exception 
of Saigon-Cholon, for direct election of mayors. This should 
to some extent meet Department *s requirement in this regard 
although it is far less than national elections or preparations 
for National Constituent Assembly. 

Upon DeJean's return from north today, I plan to discuss with 
him measures which should be taken locally as suggested number 
paragraph 6. I intend to suggest to DeJean necessity of pro- 
viding Vietnamese administrators and technical experts with 
know-how derived from actual participation in the affairs of 
government. Likewise, Department heads and Ministers should 
be given greater opportunity to participate in forward planning 
as this will result in sense of responsibility to the nation 
which has heretofore been lacking. Another suggestion which 
has frequently been advanced is that French, by turning over 
Norodom Palace to Vietnamese, would give graphic evidence of 
their intention to retire from this country and to confirm 
Vietnamese independence. Main question, however, would be 
whether Chief of State would return to occupy Palace* 



■ MCCLIM-OCK 



MAM/lk 






kkOkh 

532 



TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



INDICATE; D couEcr 

G CHARGE TO 



JL/eparanezK: ox orase 

TOP SECRET 



* 




Classification 



* r: 



•m 



,,- PRIORITY 

SEN1* 10: Amconsul GENEVA TEDUL /&<} 3 .-....: X 



OiSyfi 






Jrifoi 



'"<S<6V 



1 & 



ft 




2 o i o 

1954 JUM 7 p;.] s *aj 



DC/f 



» •« 



H 



■ 



I have your Dulto 157. I Share the views there expressed, 
emphasizing however your rarjs mark 'that we should seek to avoid 



un 



T 



formal identification wun^partition opohe creation of two states where 



y^ 



one now exists. 



/ 






'M 



C'i.r. 



/ a Referring to your SECTO 389 I feel that Heath has somewhat 
overstated the esse, perhaps deliberately for morale reasons. 

b 



a 

o 



• 



Our military authorities do in fact take a rather gloomy view of 

- 
* * * * * T 

military situation and the QTE explorations UNQTE Jfesdx designed 
to strengthen military and political position are pretty much at a 



. ! 
C 



I 






standstill not by cur election but because the French themselve 

{ f) £- #■ • _^ L» v* 



s 



have never ^et^gfess^ they want the war to be 

QTE internationalized tINQTE ar/C-on the conditions which long 



ago we laid down at Paris. Therefore Dupony's advice to us 

* ■ 

* 

to make up cur mind QTE quickly UNQTE is rather irrelevant, 

■ 

- We made up our mind sometime ago with the qualification however 

* » - 

that we reserve the right to review the situation* if by the time the 






S:Jl\D:sg 6/7/54 






S:JFD 



CUttfiftCvsi 




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fcv" 



-TV. 




TOP SECRET 




- \ 



-VVn -*7; 



* 



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C I a s s i / i c t 1 1 i o n 



53 - : 



r«~* 



■/ .'COPY, 17 tUSS!?iS», 15 
JPSOMDiTED. 



Declassified per Executive Order 1 3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






.f 



CI 



?_.of tdem-am r» Amconsul G ENEVA TEPUL NI&CT. 



1% 



TOP SECRET 



Classification 




French acted the situation had deteriorated beyond salvage. Th 

A 

latter seems, to be happening. 

I have long felt and still, feql that the French are not treating 
our proposal serious ly hu t r- ,' ' v.-ith it just enoug h to u se_it_a; 



a talking point at Geneva- 




U735 



. 



5 3 IV 

* 

TOP SECRET 

Classification 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



- 
■ * 



. -.- 



INDICATE; D CQLUa p 
rj] CHMOS TO 






TOP C*T->f-**7" t tri 



- - 



v^i^u.c; 



i . 



C lassificdtio n 



•• 



i 1 j * 

1,34 JUN 7 R 

Dc/r 



Origin 



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SENT TO: iUneonsiilate Geneva TiSDULj / 7/ 

* 

Hotel to; ^iierubassios Paris. <J K f J r o 






aigon . . «% .^* 2 7 



KYlSS QHL2 AKBASSiffiORQ v 4/ / I? 

IlK SKGTO.3C9. _^ 6 f-" 

Defence licpt reports that five-power military conference at 11 





6 27 



i : 

«-■ 



-^ 



C£ 



plenary cession of June *h, under chairmanship General Valluy P aiaen<Io 




and approved Conference Study ITo. Is "Intelligence Survey of llilitr 
Situation in SUA Area." 



In connection with review of intelligence survey, C-en valluy 



C 

c 



presented nxs 01m evaluation military situation Tonkin Delta as 






follows : 



1, If ffonkln is lost 3 militar y lina will no t rpi^n.qt bo * 

- 1 



J . - .\ . 1 -! 



roes Ga uxi sued, an ywhere * 



2* Anyone can find on map a lino with tactical charac- n 



teristxes which theoretically should permit rccstabiishment 






such as L 



aos bottleneck or eighteenth parallel, but Valine spiri 
he could affira there would be no forces to nan this line, 
3. Valluy said he was not rpt not speaking of French 

• * 

forces in this connection but mean t to indicate that there vo\ 

no_rj>t^n o so u them .Vie tnani cse \vl io_could oppose northern Viet- ^ 
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^-. Ho Chi Klnti'-s objective is 3?oiil:in« to bo attained either by 



• --- 



negotiation at Geneva or by assault on Hanoi. 

5. lio Chi ianh wishes to entangle us in rio^otiationji by adtuifctinj 
now | for fir:; I tiiao 7 that there is a Co&BifuniSt northern state and a non 

» 

Co.iunuaist southern- state and saying that both wi^Ut bo incorporated in 

» ■ 

i 

French Union* - 

6. What Ho Chi Hiuh seeks la Tonkin and its political capital Han 
from which he was driven in 1?H6. He wishes obtain 'Tonkin cither by 
negotiation (Valluy admitted "among military won" that ho Chi Hlnh i'lads 

teross negotiating table receptive French oar:;) or by military action, 

* 

To prepare for such action, ho in drawing out negotiations to gain tiuio 

■ 

Tor his battle corps to bo in positlohand ready, IS action is called fo 

7. In course of negotiating toward a ceasefire (which is demanded 

by French public opinion) concept of partition appears 9 as Ho CM Kinh 

■ 
wants occupy all Tonkin* If conditions arc too hard anil talk:; are broken 

off he will strive to obtain Xonkin by force. In siicli a aJ&ddteuQEjc lalli L; 



a 



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actipn hi:: chancre of success are ;:ood # 



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o. It has been caicl at this Conference that if Tonkin Iz ^nx lonfc 
we will fi^ht in couth* However French will nob rpt not fight nor will 

YietnartUi To &&n lino in south 9 conferees will have to provide own imn* 

* . 

Koreo.vor it will bo an artifical lino for dQj!on::o of will oh Laos, Catribod:« 

. ■ 

and Thailand czxi do nothing 



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9- Decisive point in military conference is this; if other 

■ 
conferees do not rpt not underwrite today's, battle for Tonkin 5 

■ 

tomorrow they will fight without French In Saigon and Bangkok** Vail- 

- — 

said he could af firm that i f Tonkin were lost 3 no Vietnamese would i 



fight against -other Vietnamese a and sooner or later (probr .^sooner 



whole of Vietnam will become Communis! 



Oo 



10, Valluy said he did not rpt not mean to dramatize hut only t« 
be realistic among soldiers. Truth cannot be disguised* 13a ch of 
allies has share of responsibility and if battle for Tonkin is lost, 

allies will have to fight alone on actual main line of resistance 

» 

much Itsti&ssr. farther away. y • 

Admiral Carney remarked that Gen Valluy f s appraisal was 



j-* * 



ox interest 



ana 



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important to all conferees and suggested It might be p\it 

* 



in wr I ting 



and appended to intelligence survey as representing unilateral views of 
one representative. Bad Defense Dept sususary. " . 

- 

Foregoing for your own info only. Valluy was speaking in confidence 

■ 

and as an Individual* Your comments requested* 




kl2 



537 



TOP SUC?^? 



Classification 






OUTGOING 
TELEGRAM 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



DEPARTMENT OF 'STATE 



SECRET 






SENT TO: Amconsul GENEVA TOSEC 368 

RPTD INFO: USUN, New York 626 

Aiueiribassy LOMDON 6632 

PARIS kh5k 

Bangkok 2^38 

Secretary believes it is of overrriding importance to push on with action 
on Thailand appeal, and to avoid getting bogged down in argumentation about 
geographical scope of sub -commission activities. Nevertheless , it seems clear 
UK and French will not agree to move along in SC jntil we have reached 
understanding on this question, SECTO 366 and SECTO 371 indicate language 
included TOSEC 229 and in Thai speech to SC June 3 should meet Eden's desire 
that resolution not specifically (repeat specifically) extend scope of POC 
. beyond Thailand, while allowing actual observation to be extended later without 
further SC or GA action. However, French delegation in NY has firmly contended 

■ 

sub-commission must be restricted to Thailand alone while British were most 

* 

concerned that there be no immediate request by Laos and Cambodia for observation. 

Since we now desire quick action, suggest you meet with Eden, Prince Wan 
and Bidault to work out agreement wMch will permit delegations in NY to press 
matter in SC. Hope we could get their agreement next meeting of SC should be 
held preferably Friday and certainly not later than Monday or Tuesday, Juno Xk 
or 15- Possibly they would agree on text contained TOSEC 229. 



UFA : UITP : DHPopp er : r s 6/7/5*1 



UNA - Mr. K 



SECRET 



538 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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constructive suggestion they have* -i^^oon as agreement on resolution reached 
>re would want to have it Introduced in 3C 5 although m would hops no::b meeting 

could bo scheduled even if text of resolution not yot firm, In this event 

-■ 

next meeting would he limited to sceech-caaking* 

Foregoir.^ dismissed with Thai Ambassador hara today, He rcoct eager avoid 
delay in SC and feels strongly v;c should not give up our bargaining position by 
ridding on scooe of US observation at least it this fcjjfts* H G j,a notifying 



»an you may discuss matter with hia 






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INDICATE: Qcovtcr 
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Numbered paragraph 1 Reftel. We would bo interested any specific ideas '' 

Bidault teight propose with view simplifying request to other nations, so long 

they meet basic condition that U3 will not (repeat not) intervene alone, Until 



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wo have full agreement, at least in principle, with French on conditions U3 
military participation there would be no actual negotiations with other •» 

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J interested nations. So far we have kept them generally informed concerning 

• * • , 

current discussions in Paris and have obtained their tentative views. Me f ^ 

autn^atiYol/.toll us ttjey Kant to inter- 
would seek finn views once Frond? czz:l c::"ifec l '.:. ■:'...: . !&&■;/■ -, * 

, \ .- almost" certainly 7* 

Keanwhile, UK views are well known and sounding indicate/'C;r^tealdTD<rc';:c%Nev; '!' 
and probably Australia C ! 

Zealand/would not (repeat not) participate without Di£, kso^xSfeigfiXI^ 
^^S$3C#^^^ Our soundings indicate Thailand and Philippines 

would rr.osfc likely coma along. 



Numbered paragraph 3» Sfe agree undesirable President should make fornal 

pledge unilaterally and refer you paragraph 2 Deptel 4272 ^ repeat eu Geneva 

■ 

IfOSSG 269j 'which stressed joint character any such uledgc, President would 

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I Numbered paragraph 4. Ifnile we ;would agree substitution words Quote after 
" re-establishment peace Unquote for Quote after end of hostilities Unquote vrc feel 
our phrasing for rest sentence definitely preferable to that proposed by Bidaulw 

■ 

His text carries overtone Franc© retaining right decide timing first and then getting 



i 



Vietnamese Government to agree after , /whi ch pr ecisely type 3.rnplicat ion we cons ider 

- — , — ■ — ■ ■ - ■ ■ ■ . ■ 

it necessary avoid if independence of Viet Nan to be cryabal clear. 



Numbered paragraph 5* We feel Bidault's proposed text for paragraph 2 of 
Deptel 42o6 > repeated Geneva TEOUL 133, conflicts with assurance sought by our text. 
VJhile Bidault's language might be helpful for 3DG debate it provides loopholes for 

■ 
■ 

abusive interpretation justifying later claims right withdrawal on one or other of 
counts listed. When occasion offers suggest you point out to Bidault that we could 
not (repeat not) commit forc es &n dJJ3_prg3 tlg e in situ ation when there would be any 
question concerning premature French withdrawal their forces. 



N\u;ibered paragraph 6. After full agreement reached on all conditions and French 

Government has reached decision it wishes requeot U3 intervention, US must have 

opportunity, at that time make its own 
We^can not gran CTrer.ch- nn Sile? irtl 

implementation of formal stej 




. decisions taken would we expect Laniel submit agreement and request for interoation- 
alization to Parliament for endorsement and ratification; -also he nust not (repeat not) 
prejudice our liberty of decision by approaching- Parliament in such way that we would I 



aDpear be morally coirznittcd intervene prior to our decis5.cn. 



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New York 

Secretary of State 

8l0, June 8, 7 p.m. 



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fiSWrS 3877 

Ibe'ds June 8, 195*1 

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understanding of the 
I told him I understood 




Dixon (UK) asked me this morning our 
present status of Thai appeal in SC. 

Smith had been instructed to urge on Eden and Bidault importance 
we attach to very early meeting. I also indicated our under- 
standing Thais strong feeling scop e sh ould,_not_be___tQ,a ^strictly 
limited. Dixon said his instructions remained (A) timing should 
tie dependent entirely on developments at Geneva; (B) scope should 
be limited to Thailand. He said if Russians veto resolution in 
SC" limiting the scope to Thailand, consideration could then be ^j 
given to broadening scope in GA resolution. We pointed out ft* 
broadening the scope in GA after Russian veto of limited scope 
, resolution in SC would be likely to alienate votes; it was our 
j impression there is more give in' UK position on scope than 
vindicated by Dixon but that there is probably very little give 
■on the question of timing. - ■ 

Lucet (France), who was present, indicated to us in an aside 
that he personally thought a reference to "the general area of 
Thailand 1 ' was too "broad and that perhaps language could be 
worked out which permitted POC group to go into "neighboring 
states at the request of those state 






0*' 



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Hoppenot is in -hospital and will be out of circulation for at 
least week" or two/ We agreed to get in touch this evening or 
tomorrow morning if any of us have any word from Geneva. 

.Khoman (Thailand) came in this afternoon for general discussion. 

He very strongly em- 



1 ;v> 



Knew about Sarasin's talk with Key. 



1 
1 



phasized Thai Government's negative attitude towards limiting 
scope to Thailand. He also recorded strongest opposition-^to^ 
I have Czechoslovakia or any other satellite as member of PQC > 
\ group. He asked if we thought it would be useful for fritirrx). 
talk with other delegations in order to build up support for--: 
GA action in event of Soviet veto in SO. We advised him it ^ 
would be desirable to begin laying strong foundations now (Kf k 
in favor of convening GA promptly, and (B) in support of de— J 
sir able objective when GA convenes. He would like to know US? 
thinking at present on resumed GA or special session. He wo'bld 



mmm 

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* • CONFIDENTIAL 

■ 

-2- 810, June 8, 7 p.m. from New York. 

? also like to know our thinking on composition of FOG group 
'in the event India cannot be persuaded to serve. He men- 
tioned Iraq as one possibility. 



Khoman also asked us to ascertain the Departments latest 
thinking on sponsorship of SG_.re.s.olutlQn^' He indicated 
Thailand would be quite willing to introduce resolution itself 
on understanding, of course, that United States and others . 
., would ask it be put to vote in accordance with rules as useful 
/ debating material. Khoman mentioned recent story in PRAVDA 
/ or some other Russian paper on active fighting in Cambodia - 
/ close to border of Thailand, 






At lunch today Johnson (Canada), although noncommittal, 
seemed generally more sympathetic to our ideas of timing and 
scope than Perry (New Zealand) who tended to argue current 
UK line in New York re limiting scope to Thailand. 



PBH/l^ 



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TO: Secretary of State 
HO: ^766, June 9, noon 



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SENT DEPARTMENT 4766 REPEATED IITEORMATION GENEVA 570. 

DEPARTMENT LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - ' 

GENEVA EYES ONLY UNDER SECRETARY 

Reference: CEP TEL 4421 and DULTE 156. 

I sew Schumann yesterday afternoon and endeavored to explain to 
him oar need for a French statement as to how they proposed to ^ 
handle their actions as described In second paragraph of refer- 
ence Department telegram* Schumann had difficulty understanding 
just what It v/as we wanted at this time as he considers that the 
basis for an agreement in principle has" been reached and that it 
was impossible^ to go further until the Geneva conference had 
definitely failed.*" He pointed out that since the basic US re- 
quirement was that any French request for military assistance 
must be approved by the French Parliament, such a request could 
not (repeat not) be made while there was any hope for progress 
at Geneva because of the s trong feeling 'In the Parliame nt that 
everything possible should^be done~to reach an agreement at 
Geneva . * - . 

He then told me that Under Secreaty apparently agreed that agree- 
ment hat* been reached in principle and he read me a telegram^from i 
Bidault reporting same conversation as that reported in D'JLTE 156 # J 
Bidault reported that Under Secretary had expressed pleasure that* 
agreement in principle had now been reached. Regarding numbered a 
paragraphs of" DULTE* 156 .3idault 's report had following Items "of ^ 
interest: Tj^TT . 

Paragraph 1, Bidault reported that Under Secretary agreed with 
him that this problem was over-complicated and should be simpli- 
fied . • 



/ 



Paragraph 2. Bidault stated that he felt that the Thai resolu- 
tion took care of this problem and he stated that the Under. 
Secretary agreed with him that this problem had now been solved 






* 






Paragraph 5. NO difference. 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET 






_2- U766 , June 9 j noon from Paris 

Paragraph k* No difference. Schumann however pointed out the 
great importance of this change of wording as "the end of hos- 
tilities" could well he interpreted to mean a state of armistice, 
whereas what was really meant was that troops should only be 
withdrawn after peace had been established. The whole Viet Minh 
effort has been to reach some sort of armistice that would force 
the withdrawal of the French troops and leave the country to 
them. 

Paragraph 5- No difference. However , Schumann stated that he 
had told Bidault prior to his interview with Under Secretary 
that he felt that new language suggested by French was too broad 
and that US would require more specific pledge. Bidault reported 
that Schumann had guessed wrong as Under Secretary had seen no 
(repeat no) difficulties in proposed language pointing out that 
conditions named in new draft were inherent in sovereignty of 
any great power. Bidault also reported Under Secretary had said 

he would refer this language to Department for final decision. 

■ 

Paragraph 6, No difference. 

Schumann then stated that in view of meeting of minds between 
Bidault and Under Secretary he was sure that with the possible 
exception of new wording suggested in paragraph 5 of DULTE 156, 
there were no (repeat no) political differences between us. He 
then said that he had just received a very disturbing cable from 
Bonnet. Before he could read it to me a call came through on 
the telephone from Bonnet in which they talked further about the 
same subject. 



*-' a 



Subject is Valluy r s negotiations regarding use of US Marine 
Valluy has reported to Pieven and Bonnet that it is very doubt- 
ful if US would agree in any circumstances to sending a Marine 
division to Indochina. I pointed out to Schumann that US re- 
sponse on this subject had never been blanket pledge to use 
Marines but had only stated that their use would not (repeat 
not) be excluded provided an agreed upon war plan required their 
presence. I further said that it would depend upon the war plan 
which Valluy submitted as to whether or not our JCS would be con- 
vinced that Marines should be committed. Schumann said he fully 
understood this and would explain it further to Pleven, but no 
emphasized crucial impoi*tance this matter. 

Comment: As I pointed out in EI4BTEL U503 French military have 
assumed that any war plan which was satisfactory to our JCS 
would show necessity for the use of at least one Marine division. 
While from our point of view this problem quite pz^operly should 
be judged on its military merits, we must realize that it also 
has strong political aspects here and that French Parliament in 
my opinion will not (repeat not) in any circumstances vote to ask 



kh068 



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HO 

TOP SECRET 



for US 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



j 






■( 












* 



TOP SECRET 






■ 

-3- H766 y June 9, noon from Parts 

- 1 
-t 

for US assistance in Indochina unless government can at least 
make strong inference that Marines will "be sent to Indochina. 

- 

» 

Thus; most crucial part of present Franco-US negotiations from 
both military and political point of view would seem to "be 

conversations Valluy is carrying on at Pentagon. 

* — . __ , 

If our JCS takes position that US has not (repeat not) the 
military power to be able to afford the commitment of even one 
Marine division to Tonkin delta, French will draw the obvious 
conclusion that arguments which force JCS to such a conclusion 
apply with approximately five-fold effect to France. This will 
push them irresistibly toward .abandonment of Indochina, Thus 
if we want French military assistance in showdown with Communists 
in Southeast Asia it is in my opinion vital that JCS find it 
possible to approve a joint war plan justifying the use of 
Marines . . . ^ \ 

TT/11 ■ -"'.''■ ■ i 






£4009 



546 



TO? SECRET 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 J 6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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TOP SECRET' 



Action 






Inf. 






FROM: Geneva 



Control: 4526 

fcse'*: Jane 9, 3-95** 
l'A r o p.m. 



2 



TO: Secret ary of Sto/co 

K0: BOLTS l6*L June 9, 10 p.m 



KIACT 

EYES OKLY SECRETARY 



* 


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I had a long talk with(Eded' this morning- He said that we are 
clearly ji' ominp to end here e _n_ _Indop hlna . Three major issues # 
have emerged on which we cannot compromise and on which Comaun-ls-tQ 
svhow no intention of receding. These are (1) separate treat nt p 
of iaos and Cambodia, which are clearly victims of Viet Minh 






^ 



L aggression; (2) status and powers of impartial international 
supervisory authority; and (3) composition of international 
s ape r v ; ory a it hority . 

He is convinced that we can get no further on these issues and 
Should b reak within next f ew d ^ys« While he feels no useful 
negotiating purpose would be served,, he is inclined to think 
that for public opinion it would be desirable that he privately 
see Molotov once more before a break in order to make clear to 
.Molotov firs -33 our -position and obtain Communist position. 
He is hopeful of forcing Molotov i nto p ublic rejection Colombo 
power^ f or s uoervi sorv^orga: ' Tion. TfTis~¥tll~hav very^bene- 
STal effects in soutS and southeast Asia- I pointed out, 



^ * 



c 

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an:! he • s.r:'55: . that French situation is such that we would prababivj 
have to leave the French and Viet Minh military officers here 

v .o:^s In Vietnam.- 












lr.in^:d": a^ ely foil owirig^b reak bS feels Cambodia and Laos should 

cases to L^e~T 7 7~errci ty divoTg^-~frDsr1g li^llaii d - s ^ 



O'J 









"I gathered that- he was Lamping oz s ome tTTI^TgnTTC»Ttri7han 
jar.:, a POO. J He thinks it highly important that they move rapid r? 
trie conference is wound up, but equally important until v * 



ft^t-p-" 



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be no hints or press leaks whatever that such 
ted. He feels that if properly handled and 
appeals are spontaneous on their part, with no implication of 
US-UK initiative or prodding, they will receive general Asian 






■ 



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Thailand an; 1 to Laos and Cambodia. He rightly points ;iut 

,_iacaaemlo, si it wlii in any event be vetoed, Resoluti ian ' :i • 

way that appears desirable at the time matter ioi ; L - 



5 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






TOP SECRET 



u 




-2-#DULTS 164, June 9, 10 p.m., from Geneva ' 

" before General Assembly. He said he would send Instructions to 
Dixon to try to work out with. Lodge some .language that would 
meet his point, while not necessarily precluding POO operations 
outside Thailand. I am sending separate telegram repeated* tb" 

• USUK replying to your T03EC 378 giving only latter part this 
paragraph. 

■ 

« 

Eden said he had not yet put to cabinet bis Ideas with regard 
to UN appeal by Cambodia and Laos, and therefore asked that the 
matter be treated with strictest secrecy. 

Eden also said he was considering recommendation reduce strength 
of Commonwealth division in Korea by about half or one brigade 
in order to reinforce Malaya, If things eased up in Egypt, he 
was also hopeful that forces could be spared from there for 
Malaya, I told him that in view of more critical situation in 
southeast Asia and our ability within the armistice to train and 
equip ROK forces as replacements, I thought we would have no 
objection. ... 

* ■ 

Clear that Eden now considers negotiations here have failed. 



r 




FTeve he - IT prepared to move ahead quickly in southeast Asia 
coalition which would guarantee Cambodia and most of Laos under 
umbrella of some UN action with respect to those two countries. 
He expects active cooperation from Burma, and hopes for benevolent 
neutrality from India. Efe Apparentl y dn^s not feel much can be 

salvage d . In Vietna m . 

* 

As you know, Bida ult is n ot here and we will not know where 
French 4 stand urrElT Assembly debate completed, if then. If French 
continue negotiations, point will probably arrive shortly when 
deteriorating military situation will force them accept simple 
cease-fire in attempt temporarily, salvage something. Therefore 
^ne^ gu^stlon we ma y sho rtly f a ce is what we and UK do if Fran c e 
Insists en ccntl - ny n egotiatio ns som ewhat lon ger. It - is one 
thing to withdraw if France negotiates an agreemSTrt with which we 
cannot publicly associate ourselves, and another to withdraw 
prior to that time. 



Aden's tactics recommend -themselves very stronsly to me. 




>ha\£ve^spoke to me after the above was dictated. In Bidault ! s 
absence he and others have been considering recommending to 
Bidault that France and three Associated States together make 
appeal to UK. He had reports from Valluy, part pf which he 
read to me. He is obviously convinced that things will go badly 
in Delta.- I made no comment except to suggest that Laos and 
Cambodia commanded a certain sympathy in Asia and Middle East 
which France plus Vietnam did not. I asked hi® categorically 
if rranoe want ed to internationalize on conditions we had v led 
some time ago, saying neither you noi; I knew where France stood.. 



5H8 

nrr*' c* t» H c r t ,rr > 

. iUr ujii^rjjj. 



He replied 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



JL Ui fcJJJjWJ. ID _L 



-3-//DULTE l6h 9 June 9, 10 p.m., from Geneva 

■ 

He replied that he did not know: ' — that "Bidault st i ll ho ped 
to get someth^g^lieTe^^ 

I would appreciate your thoughts and guidance. 

With respect Korea* Eden indicated he would probably speak 
next plenary (which we plan for Friday or Saturday) . He would 
not be adverse to making this last session -on Korea. However , 
not all of sixteen are yet prepared to do this. I do not knew 
whether we will be able get them lined up. If not, ono more * 
plenary may be necessary. 



SMITH 



JJL:12 



* 



n 



POP SECRET 



5*; 9 



OUTGOING 
TELEGR/ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



TOP SECRET 



PRIORITY 



SENT TO: Amconsul GENEVA TEDUL 178 

Rpt to Amcmbassy, PARIS 1+^76 
Amembassy, SAIGON 2551 

Amembassy, LONDON FOR MERCHANT AND DILLON 
EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADORS 



6684 






Ambassador bonnet came to see Secretary Dulles Wednesday 
afternoon and raised question of participation of US Marines Indochina. 
He said lie had received telegram from Maurice Schumann expressing excite- 
ment and dismay at information from Valluy that Radford had said there was 
no rpt no question of utilization Marines Indochina* Ambassador said this 
conflicted with what French Govt had hitherto understood to be intentions 
US Govt this respect. He further stated suggestion made by Radford to 
Valluy that three Korean divisions might be used in Indochina was unacceptable. 

Secretary said US position had been clear from start and that we were 
not rpt not willing to make commitraent ahead of time which French could use 
for internal political maneuvering or negotiating at Geneva and which would 
represent a kind of permanent option on US intervention if it suited 
their purpose, A month ago^ French had been explicitly informed conditions 
which must pe met and fulf illed by them before President took decision 
whether to go to Congress and ask for authority use American armed forces in 
relation Indochina. Among these conditions was need for French and 
Associated States to request US and certain other interested countries to come 
in. We were still in dark as to what French intentions really were. 



EUR : WE : WRTyler : e j f 



FE - Mr. Drumright 
EUR - Mr, Barbour 

k62k0 



(signed 



Douglas MacArthur 



Cleared with: Secretary 



550 

TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 









•■ f - 






; . TSDOL - AnisEb'aia'dy PAEIS, A: b&osy SAIGON- f --, / 

!of telegram in ,•=.—.■* — «*_ _- — 



TO? SECRET 



CldssificGtion 






Secretary said hs felt French desire obtain firm coi-nitsisnt from u^ on / - " 
vhich they could draw ma understandable* but equally imderatandablo in I 

circumstances is our determination not rpt not to give them such blank chock* 
Seeretaxy confined US position as stated by Dillon (H766 from Paries) that use 



— »«_ 



of Marines would not rpt not &6 excluded provided an agreed operational '■ 



plan required their presence* He said it was useless and illusozy to 
attempt to obtain from us at this time a ecEHflitas&nt more specific on this 
point than that which we had already given* 

m 

p. - ■ 

With regard to what we would do in event act of open aggression by 

(last four paragraphs of section 2Z Roy,::m four) 
Chinese j Secretary read relevant extractG/frcn his Los Angoleo speech 

which is being separately transmitted© 



Bonnet expressed surprise that W3 considered that French Govt had not 

- * 

rpt not made up its mind with regard to internationalization of Indochina war 
.and said ho considered request, had already been made by French, Secretary 
pointed out that our offer on basio certain fjpecifie conditions had been made 
a month ago in context of situation at that time* irhich confirmed and nade 
precipe much earlier representations* , SincD then things had changed 
rapidly and would doubtless continue to change* For this reason delay was 
regrettable j and further delay would not rpt not improve situation With regard 
to any role rcs might consider playing* ■ - . 




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551 



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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 









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W7 

June 10, 195*} 

6:33 a.m.. 



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Ci r; 3- 
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FROM: Saigon 

TO: Secretary oJ State 

}10: 2714, June 10, 2 p.m. 



SENT DEPARTMENT 271^, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 967, GENEVA 
21^1. 

PARIS FOR AMBASSADOR. " • ~ 

GENBftA FOR IKDER SECRETARY, 

General Valluy's appreciation of the situation "as set out 
Department telegram 2527, sent Geneva TBDllL 171, repeated 
Paris WlS is exceedingly good- -in fact almost too good, . * 
Although there are one or two points to which we might take 
exception from purely military aspect, I desire to confine 
my comment to political connotations of Valluy ! s statement, 
I have impression that under instructions he made this very 
concise evaluation less with military considerations in mind 
than with political objectives in view. I think that Valluy 
was looking as much at the French Parliament as he was at the 
"Tonkin delta when he made his speech. General Ely has twlc_e 
in my^resmice— stated . " . 

St ates to enter t his war . Only yesterday his Chief of Staff, 
Colonel Brohan, repeated this comment. My belief is that 
purp ose of Va lluyL-i^taterrient was either to bring us and, if 
possible, other five powers into .conflict here or, failing 
that, to prepare excuse before history' for* an impending armistice 
which French would then request of Viet Minh, 



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o This copy must b". returned to OCR c?ntra! files v/ith notation of aciion taken 6 

552 



r-:.;:iiC!T>D 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NKD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



OUTGOING * DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

TELEGRAM TOP SECRET 



SENT TO; Amembassy PARIS ^508 



Undersecretary, Geneva TOSEC 392 
EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR 



Following translation text message from Ely to Radford received evening 

June 9 : 

QUOTE: I have not yet made a survey of the military situation, especially 
in Tonkin. However , it seems to me that the decision I will have to take 
regarding the operations will rest on the US intentions, in the present 
situation ^ as well as those they anticipate in the future. 

QUOTE: Therefore, I would very much like to have, either in Paris, where 
I expect to be possibly on the 19th June, or here in Saigon, as soon as possib.1 
an exchange of views with a qualified representative of Admiral Radford, in 
order to know what I can expect on the part of the U*S.A. UNQUOTE* 

Prior to French decision to request internationalization, we consider 
undesirable to start yet another series conversations which would inevitably 
provoke on French side all kinds hopes and interpretations with regard basic 

issue US intervention which would only cause further confusion. In other words, 

i 
it is our feeling that we should not be eased into a series of 



piecemeal commitments resulting from collateral military conversations in the 



EUR: V?E :WRTyler : vh 6/10/5*4 Robert Murphy 



C - Mr. Mac Arthur 



TOP SECRET 



553 
k6Zk6 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






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absence of cm urder steeling with the French G-vorr^ut bas§3 on our general 
proposal clescrilod in T3DUL y., Bedford has accorolb-ly inferred Gsssral 

Valli^ orally that US position vas given to Jbth&ssador Boanot l;y Secretary* 

* 

ffsns 9 asd that he is not (repeat not) :ln position at this tins to respond to 
Ely's request for conversations on subject r-ai~?'i hie massage^ 

With regard to US trailing VietB^aeea troops, va fool that situation 

* - I - 

Viet Ram has degenerated to point v:;?ora any oosmitrbnt at thin tims to &encl 

* — -» « ■ 

ever VS ingtruotere in near future' riirht expose 1*0 to fesd&g faoecJ with 



situation in which it would be contrary to otir interests to bava to fulfill 

eueh cor^itr.^r;t ( Our posit! otj accordingly 1b that ve do ftot (rojoat ££&£ 

not) wish to consider 13 training s&ssion or progrsoa eepkrat&ly from oyc'2*-*&il 

- 

operations! plsn en assumption conditions f t&fillcd for OS participation 

war Iriioc^iir.s., 



WRFH1 



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46247 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NKD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






• 



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Control: 6854 
fbc'cJ? June 14, 1954 
7 : 26 p . m . 




JJ? C! -*. 



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TO: Secretory ©£ Btoto 
DO; 4841, June 14, 5 P-"'- 







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SENT DEPARTMENT 2 i84l; REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 393. ^ /v,J^>f<^ 

A 



Q 



DEPARTMENT EYES ONLY SECRETARY 
GENEVA EYES ONLY UNDER SECRETARY 




&£ 



1. In all probability one of first acts of any new French 
Government v/ill be request precise statement Immediate and 
future US Intentions regarding military intervention Indo- 
china. 

2. During past week, I have gathered the very definite im- 
pression that because of (A) our reluctance to send ground 

'forces to Indochina; (B) deterioration of military and po- 
litical situation in Indochina during last month; (C) extru me 
reluctance, If not refusal, of ANZUS partners -to consider 
joining US in any military intervention in Delta area, the 
chances of US responding favorably to French request for mil- 
itary assistance even after they have met all conditions are 
approximately nil. "~ . 

3. Hardening of Communist position in Geneva as indicated by 
Molotov and Chou En-lai last week .would seem to Indicate that 
Communis ts no longer fea r pos slbility of US m j ] itar y Inber ^ 
v ent Ion In Indochina providecTThere is no overt Chinese attack. 
X1T would seem, therefore, that Viet Minh and Chinese will not 
accept any armistice which does not clearly pave the way for 
Communist takeover In Indochina, 

4. Lacking the possibility of US military support, it would 
s eem to be onl y a quea.tlQn_^Qf.-J;lme-,^Keeks or a fev/_jponths_at 
very most, be -e French are forced to accept Vlet JKl nh teri 
ttiPttie meantime, there is the constant risk of an all-out 




c\ 





)0fi\ % issault on the Delta which could lead to a serious French 



I 

/ 



re- 



erse, If not total annihilation of expeditionary corps in 



Inai--— ■ 'Tonkin . 



K* — 



v 






9*41 



have continually pointed out that such a reverse might have"-:! 
A disastrous effect on French public opinion. Today I am morej 



Jf* 



^^^^vrtain than ever that such would be the case. Rightly or V 



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esse. 



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£4108 












wrongly.;.;; 



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555 e- %1 '- pgeiHBiTEo 






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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET 

» 

-2- ^841 June 14, 5 p.m., from Paris. 

■ 

wrongly j US would be blamed by French public opinion for hav- 
ing built up French hopes of intervention and then for having 
failed in the crisis. The result could well be a .neutralist- 



government in France that wo aid reduce French military eorrmitraents 
to NATO and would, at the same time, be completely intransi- 
geant on question of German rearmament « Such a government , 
would also, in all probability, make a strong effort t to streng- 
then relations with the Soviet Union and to recreate the war- 
time Franco-USSR alliance in order to prevent German rearma- 
ment. 

■ 

■ 
From this distance, I cannot judge what the effect of such 
French actions would be on American public opinion and particu- 
larly on our Congress, but I suspect that it might lead to an 
irresistible demand for the recall of some, if not all, of 
our troops from Europe, which, in effect, would mean the end 
of the North Atlantic Alliance followed eventually by the iso- 
lation of the Western hemisphere. 

p- 1^ view of these very serious *and grave dangers which we 
will run if we allow the French to be defeated militarily "in 
the Delta, and if my assumption in paragraph 2 above is correct, 
I recommend that you give serious con alteration to pg ptly 
Inf drming - tSS French~^£i atn D ecause^ f e ither (Aj~the deteriora- 
€ Ion^or^t h e~m 1 ] it ary~s Tt tiat ion in Ind oc hina or ( B ) the re luc- 
■ timcF - "^*^^ the""" Preax- 

j from the Congress e veTT~Tf~ Zfie F r e n c h s ho uld" n ow f ully meet our 

; cpn^l :^C^~V( r tt"l:e^^uch"'a"ctron'"on~^ oiir^part would^hastefTl^hau 

now appears to be the inevitable loss of Vietnam and might 
cause a certain additional temporary loss of face for the US, 
it w ould put the Fr ench _on_nojblcj)__t h at t he y should promptly 
g^cepuI The^Vl e t Mlnh s 1st i ce t erms and thu s would save the 
Fre n c h Expedit ionar y Cor ns_£mm .possible mil itary dl sas^er"7~ 
•I n the event of a wit hd hbX f rotn I ndochin a under sacSTir ^um- 
stences 2 __^/oul d not f o^see_anv_^eri^o us or long term re jer~ 
cuss ions on France's po sition in the No rth Atlan tic^ ATliance . 
If we allow the French to continue to fight in the false hope 
that in the event of a crisis in the Delta, they may get T JS 
military assistance, the best we can hope for is to delay th 
Communist conquest of Vietnam by a few months, while we J?isk 
' the very existence of the Korth Atlant ic Alliance, 



ra 



Prom my viewpoint ho re in Paris, the possibility of a few! 
months delay in the Communist takeover of Indochina does not 
seem at all commensurate with tho risk of the possible collapse 
of the defense of Western Europe. . . 



6. Vhile 



• .. 



&4101 T0P SECRET 

" ' r . \ 556 



% 



V*« 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



J 



f 



•TOP SECRET 
-5- 4841, June 14, 5 p.m., from Paris. 



. ' 



6. While I have several times made it clear, both to Laniel 
and Maurice Schumann , that, as indicated in paragraph 8 of 
your TEDUL 185 from San Francisco, our decision would have to 
be made in the light of "conditions at the # time 11 ; this is not 
at all clear to French public opinion and # is not even very 
clear to Schumann, himself 3 as he has no means of knowing how , 
we will judge "the conditions at the tits© 11 * Therefore, what * 
I am in effect recommending is that we adopt your suggestion 
contained in paragraph. 8 of TEDUL 185 of pu tting a time li mit— 
on our lnteryen t iorj^ offer with the additional proviso that I 
wo ul cPa uggernrtibat the tima limit he now,. 



DILLON 



JEF 



44102 



TOP SECKET 
557 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 i 






INDICATE: D COLLECT 
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Department is giving this thorough consideration with Defense, My 

personal opinion is that we should try to carry situation along with • 

» . * 
avoidance of either formal refusal now train Vietnamese and also 



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strong political overtones and might raise Congressional complications. • --* 

' ' ' E exoedite ■' 

With reference to your last paragraoh suggestion on QTE/sxpEglisi ' -•; 

* 

conclusion of final agreement with French UNQTE this is quite impossible | 
so long as French have >txxto£x not made up their mind whether or not they 
want to internationalize war and now are further from internationalizing 
it than ever before. They v; ant t and in effect have, an option onjyir 



XT" 



inte rventionx-'ec^ but they do not want to >x exercise it and the date of 



* 



expiry of our_optjon is fast runn ing out. 







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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






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C lass ification CJ 








SENT TO: Amembassy PARIS ^579 g PRIORITY 

RPTD INFO: Amconsul GENEVA TEDUL 199 -PRIORITY. 



5 7 9 A 



1554 JUN 14 FM 8 58 






DC/T 



- 



EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR AND UNDER SECRETARY FROM § I 



SECRETARY 
FYI 



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* J 

It is true that there is less disposition now than two months or one mont>i . f ! 

ol 

it A 

■c ' 



ago to intervene in Indochina militarily. This is the inevitable result of the 



steady deterioration in Indochina which makes the problem of intervention 
and pacification more and more difficult. When united defense was first 

broached, the strengt h and morale of French and Vietnam forces were such 

■ 
that it seemed that the situation couldbe held without ..anyjjreat pouring - in of 






] 1 

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U.S. ground forces. Now all the evidence is that the morale of the Vietnamese,; 

~~ ~~ has *- 

Government, armed forces and civilians iaasa deteriorated gravely; the French 

6 

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* 

Tonkin Delta population in hostile hands and the Saigon area is faced with r 

' r - - J ■ ( 

] 

political disintegration. 



are forced to contemplate a fall-back which would leave virtually the entire 







What has happened , has been what was forecast, as for example by my 

jr < 

Embassy Paris 4117 TEDUL 78 of May 17. I there pointed out that probably ^ 



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the French did not really want intervention but wanted to have the possibility 




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as a card to play at Geneva. I pointed out that the Geneva game would doubtless 

« 

be a long game and that it could not be assumed that at the end the present U.S. 

m 

position regarding intervention would necessarily exist after the Communists 
had succeeded in dragging out Geneva by c^rdicg winning military successes m 



Indochina. This telegram of mine will bear rereading. That point of view ha 

- , ■ 
been frequently repeated in subsequent cables. 



s 



1 deeply regret any sense of bitterness on Bidault's part, but I do not see tha: 



T 

■n* 






+ 

he Is justified in considering unreasonable the adaptation of U.S. views to events 



* 

and th e consoqi:--ces of pr olonged Fren chand U.K. i ndecision. 

I do not yet exclude' possibility U.S. intervention on terms outlined td:k PARI 



IIS 402 



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TEDUL 54. UK it seems is now more disposed to see movement in this direction 

m 

4 

but apparently the French are less than ever disposed to internationalizina the war. 




' 



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560 



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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






INDICATE* n cotltCT 
Q CHARGE lO 



IJepartment ox Sfai 



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SENT TO: Aaiconsul GENKVA TKPUL 196 






Origin 



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Re DULTE 179 and 180. 




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- ' - • 

1# It is our vievr that final adjenarnment of Conference is in 

our best interest provided this can be done vrithout creating an 

Shu 

impression in France at this critical moment that France has been 
deserted by US and UK and therefore has no choice but capitulation 
on Indochina to . Communists at Geneva and possibly accomodation 
vdth the Soviets in Europe* Because of this, if the French v/ant to 
keep the Conference at least n omin all y ali ve> vq Tfould go along vdth 
the idea of recess and the maintenance of th e _ snail obser vation group 
as you propose in Geneva, V/e trust that the developments at Geneva 

■ 

trill have been such as to satisfy the British insistence that they 

did not Tiant to discuss collective action until either Geneva v;as 

over or at least the results of Geneva v/ero knovm. I v/ould assume 

that the departure of Eden v/ould bo evidence that there was no 

collective 
adequate reason for further delaying/talks on SEA defense* 

2« Re paragraph 1 above tre assume any recess "would only relate 

to the Indochina phase of Conference and the Koi^ean phase would be 

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Submitted qij the 

77i£ following intelligence organizations -participated in the 
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency 
and the intelligence organisations of the Departments of 
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff. 

Concurred in by the 

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY C&aajTSSSE 

on IB Juris 1954, Concurring were the Special Assistant, In- 
ielligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, 
G~2, Department of the Anny; the Director of Naval IrzielH- 
gence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Direc- 
tor for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the Director of Intelli- 
gence, ABC* The Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of the 

jurisdiction of the FBI, 

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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET 






LIMITED DISTRIBUTION 



COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US COURSES 
OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA 



■ 



* .-' - THE PROBLEM 

To estimate Chinese Communist and Soviet reactions to the courses of action and 
consequent situations indicated below. 1 



THE ESTIMATE 



PART I 



• • ■ ASSUMPTIONS 

* 

A. The treaties of independence between France and the Associated States will 
have been signed, . * 

• ' B. A regional security grouping including at least the Associated States, Thai- 
land, the Philippines, Australia, France, and the United States, and possibly including 
also New Zealand and the United Kingdom, will have been formed, 

C. The Associated States will have publicly requested the direct military partici- 
pation of members of the regional grouping in the war in Indochina, 

+ 

* m 

D. The French will have undertaken to continue at least the present level of 
their military commitment in Indochina. 



REQUIREMENT 1 

* To estimate the initial Chinese Communist 
and Soviet reactions to the 'participation of 
US air and naval forces loith French Union 

■ 

forces and token Thai and Philippine forces 
in coordinated ground, naval, and air opera- 
tions designed to destroy the Communist viili- 






*The assumptions and estimative requirements 
stated herein were furnished to the intelligence 
community for the purposes of this estimate. 
We interpret the hypothetical action as occur- 
ring within the next twelve to eighteen months. 



tary forces in Indochina. Air operations 
would be limited to targets in Indochina. 
Nuclear weapons would be employed if their 
use were deemed militarily advantageous but 
nuclear attacks on the Indochinese civil pop- 
ulation as a target system would be avoided 

Chinese Communist Reaction 

1. The intervention of US and' allied forces 
in Indochina probably would cause the Chi- 
nese Communists to believe that sooner or 
later they would have to decide whether to 



TOP SECRET 



56 a 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By; NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET 



" 



accept the defeat of, the Viet Minh or to in- 
tervene In force in order to try to prevent such 
defeat. Their decision would probably rest 
mainly, though not exclusively, upon their 
weighing of the risks and disadvantages aris- 
ing from the Viet Minh defeat against the 
likelihood of involvement in major war with 
the US and the probable consequences of such 
a war for Communist China. Available evi- 
dence gives no unmistakeable indication of 
what the Chinese Communist decision would 
be. On balance, however, we believe that the 
chances are somewhat better than even that 
the Chinese Communist would decide to take 
whatever military action they thought re- 
quired to prevent destruction of the Viet Minh, 
including when and if necessary, open use of 
Chinese Communist forces in Indochina. 23 

2. The nature of the assumed US action is 
such that ample warning would almost cer- 
tainly be given in advance of actual opera- 
tions. The Chinese Communists have the 
capability now to intervene quickly and in 
such force as to drive French Union forces 
out of the Delta. The Chinese Communists 
might choose to exercise this capability before 
US intervention could be effected. * 

3. We believe it somewhat more likely, how- 
ever, that even if the Chinese Communists 
had determined not to accept the defeat of 
the Viet Minh they would not intervene open- 
ly immediately following the assumed US in- 
tervention. They might estimate that US air 



■The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint 
Staff, recommends deletion of the last sentence 
of this paragraph and would substitute the fol- 
lowing: 

"However, their decision would be largely de- 
termined by the Chinese estimate of the probable 
extent and eflect of US initial action." 

3 The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes that 
the last sentence of this paragraph should read 
as follov/s: 

"Communist China will probably not choose 
knowingly any course of action likely to expose 
its fundamental national strengths in war with 
a major pov.-ei\ However, we believe that Com- 
munist China's strength for conducting various 
kinds of warfare is such, and the motives and 
judgment of its leaders are such as to make 
Communist China's courses of action dangerously 
unpredictable under outside pressure of any ap- 
preciable magnitude." 



and naval forces could not, in the absence of 
US ground forces, decisively alter the course 
of the war. They might therefore consider 
their intervention unnecessary at this point 
and might postpone final decision as to their 
course of action until they had observed the 
initial scale and success of the allied military 
operations and had estimated the probable 
nature and extent of US aims in the conflict. 

• 

4. In this connection, US use of nuclear 
weapons in Indochina would tend to hasten 
the ultimate Chinese Communist decision 
whether or not to intervene. It would prob- 
ably convince the Chinese Communists of US 
determination to obtain a decisive military 
victory in Indochina at whatever risk and by 
whatever means, and of the consequent dan- 
ger of nuclear attack on Communist China. 
Whether this conviction would precipitate or 
deter Chinese Communist intervention would 
depend on the military situation in Indochina 
at the time, the observed military effect of the 
use of nuclear weapons, and the observed 
political and psychological effect of such use, 
particularly its eflect on the coherence of the 
regional security grouping and the Atlantic 

' alliance. 

5. In any case, the Chinese Communists 
would almost certainly greatly increase their 
logistic support, delivery of arms and equip- 
ment, and technical assistance to the Viet 
Minh. The Chinese Communists would prob- 
ably increase their deliveries of A A weapons 
and might send in Chinese AA gun crews. 
Moreover, the Chinese Communists would 
probably deploy ground and air units near 
the Indochina border in order: (a) to warn 

* the US and its allies, and (b) to have forces 
ready either to intervene on behalf of the 
Viet Minh or to defend the southern border 
of China. 

6. While maintaining a posture of military 
readiness, the Chinese Communists would in- 
tensify political and propaganda activities de- 
signed to exploit anti-Western and anticolo- 
nial feelings of the indigenous population of 
Indochina and the war-fears of neutralist 
Asian nations and of certain US allies. They 
would also seek to label the US as an aggres- 
sor. In the meantime and throughout ' th 



* 



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m 



SECRET 



17 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






TOP SECRET 



3 






period of military operations, the Commu- 
nists would almost certainly agitate and prop- 
agandize for a "cease-fire" and political settle- 
ment, which would preserve the Communist 
position and prospects, 

■ 
Soviet Reacfion 

7. In the assumed situation, the USSR prob- 
ably would estimate that the US action, 
though limited to air and naval forces, would 
considerably increase the risks of unlimited 
war between the US and Communist China. 
The USSR would probably prefer that such 
a war not develop out of the Indochina situa- 
tion. Nevertheless, the USSR would assure 
Communist China of continuing military 
assistance. The USSR would also give com- 
plete diplomatic and propaganda support to 
Communist China and the Viet Minh regime. 

REQUIREMENT 2 " 

■ 

To estimate Chinese Communist and Soviet 
reactions to the success of the operations en- 
visaged in the assumptions above (i.e., to the 
impending effective destruction of the Com- 
munist forces in Indochina).* 



Chinese Communist Reaction 

8. As stated -in Paragraph 1, we believe that 
the chances are somewhat better than even 
that the Chinese Communist, in the assumed 
situation, would intervene militarily to pre- 
vent the destruction of the Viet Minh. If 
they decided # to do so, we believe that the 
exact timing and nature of their action would 
depend on various factoids, but principally on 
the scope and character of the US/allied oper- 
ations they were seeking to counter. 5 6 

Soviet Reaction 

9. In this assumed situation, the USSR would 
probably continue to support the Chinese 
Communists. If the Chinese Communists 
intervened openly in support of the Viet Minh, 
the USSR would rapidly Increase military 
assistance to Communist China. The Soviet 
diplomatic and propaganda campaigns against "* 
the US would continue full-scale, and the 
USSR might ask the UN to condemn the US 
as an aggressor. Thinly veiled threats of So- 
viet involvement in the fighting and refer- 
ences to the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950 would 
multiply. 



.« 






I 



•The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 r Department of 
the Army, believes that the results in this re- 
quirement could not be achieved by the unbal- 
anced and insufficient forces envisaged. 

3 The Director of Intelligence, TJSAF, believes that 
this paragraph should read as follows: 

"Communist China will probably not choose 
knowingly any course of action likely to expose 
its fundamental national strengths in war with 
a major power. However, we believe that Com- 
munist China's strength for conducting various 
kinds of warfare is such, and the motives and 
judgment of Its leaders are such as to make 
Communist China's courses of action danger- 



ously unpredictable under outside pressure of 
any appreciable magnitude." 

•The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint 
Staff, believes that paragraph 8 should read a* 
follows: a as 

"Communist China would conclude from thn 
assumed impending destruction of Communis* 
forces in Indochina, by limited forces employing 
nuclear and conventional weapons, that its o 
military intervention would invite an exten^* 1 
of similr-.r. action to Communist China ^°d 
would, therefore, probably not Intervene* nttii 
taTily." ™ n ~ 



T* 



TOP SECRET 
566 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NKD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



rr 



TOP SECRET 



4 



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% 









PART II 



. . ... • ' ASSUMPTIONS 

■ 

A. The treaties .of independence between France atlfl the Associated States will 
have been signed. • , 

B. A regional security grouping including at least the Associated States, Thai- 
land, the Philippines, Australia, France, and the United States, and possibly includ- 
ing also New Zealand and the United Kingdom, will have been formed. 

' C. The Associated States will have publicly requested the direct military partici- 
pation of members of the regional grouping in the war in Indochina. 

D. The French will have undertaken to continue at least the present level of their 
military commitment in Indochina, 

E. The Chinese Communists will have openly intervened with military forces in 
Indochina in order to counter US direct participation as defined in Requirement 1, 



REQUIREMENT 3 ■ . 

To estimate Chinese Communist and Soviet 
reactions to an extension of allied offensive 
air operations to incln.de military targets in 
Communist China directly supporting Com- 
vntnist military operations in Indochina or 
directly threatening the security of Allied 
forces in the area. 1 Nuclear loeapons would 
be employed in these operations if it were 
deemed militarily advantageous to do so, but 
nuclear attacks on the Chinese civil popula- 
tion as a target system would be avoided. 

Chinese Communist Reaction 

10. We consider it probable that before inter- 
vening in Indochina the Chinese Communists 
would have accepted the likelihood of US air 
attacks against military targets in China. 
Consequently, they would not feel compelled 
to withdraw their forces from Indochina solely 
as a result of the initiation of the air opera- 
tions assumed above. At the same time, we 



f In this requirement we interpret targets "direct- 
ly supporting" Communist military operations to 
be generally south of the Yangtze River and to 
consist primarily of transport lines, troop con- 
centrations, and air fields in the area. 



. believe that the Chinese Communists, in order 
to prevent further destruction to this area of 
China and particularly to avoid the spread of 
unlimited US attacks to the whole of China 
would intensify efforts to induce the US to 
enter negotiations for a settlement which 
would preserve the Communist position and 
prospects in Indochina. 

11. Meanwhile the Chinese Communists, to 
the full extent of their capabilities, would 
prosecute the war on the ground in Indochina 
and attack allied air bases, aircraft carriers 
and other installations directly supporting 
allied operations in the area. They would* 
however, probably try to keep the war cen- 
tered in Indochina and, as a consequence, 
probably would confine their attacks to such 
directly supporting bases and installations. 

12. The use of nuclear weapons under the 
restrictions given above would greatly in- 
crease Chinese Communist concern about US 
intentions but probably would not by itself 
cause them to adopt new courses of military 
action at this time. However, they would 
threaten nuclear retaliation. They would 
also exploit to the fullest result ant psycho- 
logical opportunities and in particular would 



TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






TOP SECRET 






charge that the US was using weapons of 
mass destruction on the civilian population. 8 

13. The Chinese Communists would attempt 
by all means possible to convince other Asian 
nations that the US had undertaken to de- 
stroy the Chinese Communist regime in order 
to thwart its efforts on behalf of an indi- 
genous independence movement. If the Chi- 
nese had not previously done so, they would 
probably appeal to the UN to brand US action 

as a threat to the peace. 

■ 

Soviet Reaction 

14. In this assumed situation, the USSR 
would greatly increase its military assistance 
to Communist China, especially supplying 
modern aircraft and small naval vessels, pos- 
sibly including submarines, with Soviet per- 
sonnel to train and advise the Chinese and 
probably to participate in air defense opera- 
tions. The USSR would probably not openly 
commit combat units of the Soviet armed 
forces and probably would not release nuclear 
weapons for Chinese Communist us« 



;e. 



15. The Kremlin would also continue its diplo- 
matic and propaganda campaigns against the 

•The Deputy Director far Intelligence, The Joint 
Staff, believes this paragraph should read: 

"Nuclear weapon attacks on Communist China 
would undoubtedly result in a much greater Chi- 
nese Communist reaction than nuclear attacks on 
the Indochlnese battleground. In addition, such 
attacks would probably indicate to the Chinese 
Communists a US willingness to exploit its supe- 
riority in nuclear weapons and delivery capa- 
bility to force them out of Indochina. Since the 
nuclear attack coutempfiaied in this requirement 
is of a limited nature, the Chinese Communist 
rulers would retain control of the government 
'and country and, with the initial attacks, they 
would probably make urgent appeals to the USSR 
for nuclear weapons and additional military 
assistance. They might also increase the tempo 
of their military operations and would undoubt- 
. edly endeavor to induce the United States to 
enter negotiations in the hope of forestalling 
further attacks. A Chinese Communist decision 
to withdraw or not would be dependent primarily 
* upon continued or increased US nuclear attacks 
and other US action as well as upon Soviet reac- 
tion. It is believed, however, that the Chinese 
Communists would be willing to withdraw from 
Indochina rather than be subjected to further 
destruction of their homeland." 



US, undertaking in the UN to brand the US 
as an aggressor if this had not previously 
been attempted. The USSR would support 
Chinese charges concerning the use of nuclear 
weapons against civilian populations. At the 
same time, the USSR would probably advise 
the Chinese Communists to negotiate for a 
cessation of hostilities on the basis of the 
status quo at the time and would try, to 
establish a position as peacemaker. 

- 

REQUIREMENT 4 

To estimate Chinese Communist and Soviet 
reactions to the following additional allied, 
courses of action, undertaken subsequently to 
those above: 

a. Extension of allied offensive air opera- 
tions to additional selected military targets in 
Communist China, including the use of atomic 
weapons under the same conditions as above. 

b. Naval blockade of the China coast 

c. Seizure or neutralization of Hainan. 

d. Chinese Nationalist operations against 
the Chinese mainland. 

■ 

Chinese Communist Reaction 

16. As a consequence of this allied broaden- 
ing of the war, the Chinese Communists 
would probably conclude that the US was 
prepared to wage unlimited war against them. 
They would continue to defend themselves to 
the limit of their capabilities and would prob- 
ably make vigorous efforts to secure the full 
participation of the USSR, At the same time, 
they would intensify their efforts to end the 
war by negotiations, and might eventually 
indicate in some way their willingness to 
withdraw from Indochina in order to obtain 
a cease-fire If unable to obtain a^ cease-fire 
agreement, the Chinese Communists would 
accept the fact of unlimited war with the 
US and would wage such war to the full ex- 
tent of their remaining capabilities. 



•The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint 
StaiT, and the Director of Intelligence, USAF, 
suggest that the words "might eventually" in 
this sentence should be replaced with "would 
probably/ 1 



TOP SECRET 



• 



563 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 









TOP SECRET 



6 



Soviet Reaction 

17. In this assumed situation, the USSR 
would continue to provide military assistance 
to* Communist China as indicated above, but 
would probably refuse Chinese Communist 
demand for full Soviet participation in the 
" war. The Kremlin would strongly urge the 
Chinese Communists to negotiate for a cessa- 
tion of hostilities on the basis of withdrawing 
from Indochina. 10 If the Chinese Commu- 
nists could not obtain a cease-fire agreement, 
the USSR v/ould provide Communist China 
with military assistance in every way short of 
openly committing combat units of the Soviet 
armed forces in operations against US and 
allied forces outside Communist-held terri- 
tory. The USSR would provide military re- 
sources and equipment for Chinese Commu- 
nist attacks on US bases or US forces any- 
where in the Far East. At this stage of the 
conflict, the USSR might provide Communist 
China with nuclear weapons and the tech- 
nical personnel required for their use. 11 12 

18. The USSR would continue its diplomatic 
and propaganda campaigns against the US, 
insisting that the Soviet aim was purely the 
defense of China against outright aggression. 
The USSR would also begin at least partial 
mobilization of its own military forces on a 
war basis. , It would issue thinly veiled 
threats of general war, suggesting attacks on 



Western Europe and on the continental US, 
but would probably confine its operations to 
the defense of China so long as the US did not 
attack Soviet territory. 

REQUIREMENT 5 

To estimate Chinese Communist and Soviet 
reactions to the success of the foregoing oper- 
ations (te* t to the impending effective destruc- 
tion of the Chinese Communist capability to 
conduct military operations outside the bor- 
ders of Conuminist China).™ 

Chinese Communist Reaction 

19, Unless the USSR was willing to make an 
unlimited commitment of Soviet forces to 
prevent the success of the assumed US and 
allied operations, we believe that the Commu- 
nist Chinese, under the assumed circum- 
stances, would accept any US terms for a set- 
tlement which preserved the integrity of 
China under the Chinese Communist regime. 

Soviet Reaction 

20. In this assumed situation, we believe the 
USSR would urge the Chinese Communists to 
accept any US terms for a settlement which 
preserved the integrity of China under the 
Chinese Communist regime. 14 So long as the 
fighting continued, however, the USSR would 
continue its aid to China. 



"The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department 
of the Army, recommends the deletion of "on 
the basis of withdrawing from Indochina," be- 
lieving that at this state of the conflict the 
Kremlin would not willingly acquiesce in the 
surrender of any Communist-held territory in 
Indochina or elsewhere. 

■ ■ 

11 The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint 
Staff, and Director of Intelligence, USAF, be- 
lieve that this sentence should read: 

"We do not believe that the USSR would re- 
lease nuclear weapons for Chinese Communist 



use. 



" 



* 



"The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; Department of 
the Army, substitute for the last :tence: 

"Itjs also believed that the US^R would give 
serious consideration to making a substantially 
greater military contribution including nuclear 
weapons and the technical personnel required 
for their use." j 

"The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department 
of the Army/ believes that the results assumed 
in this requirement could not be achieved by the 
unbalanced and insufficient force envisaged. 

u The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of 
the Army, would add "and retained a Commu- 
nist foothold in Indochina." 



TOP SECRET 
5G3 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i 



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FOR UNDER SECRETARY AND AMBASSADOR 



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Bonnet has just left after reading a long message from Bidault, the sub- 
stance of which was that the French no longer felt that US was committed „. 

to intervention on the conditions stated in our May 11 basic cable to Paris 

■ \ ?* ft 

and that this left them in a very difficult negotiating position at Geneva. % * 



I said that it was quite true that the French could not have a continuing 



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option to call US into war at some future undetermined date and under con- | 






ditions which could not now be foreseen, On the other hand if and when then r 

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was a French Government which had the confidence of the Assembly and if •% 



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it should then decide that it could not conclude an honorable armistice and 

* 

that it was thus necessary to continue the struggle, the US would be prepared 
promptly to respond and that response would probably be along the lines of 
ur May 11 telegram unless in the meantime the situation had further de- 
teriorated to a point where the making of a stand in Indochina had become 



impracticable or so burdensome as to be out of proportion to the results 






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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NNB Project Number: NND 633 J 6, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



m -*- ■». 



Anicons'ul GENEVA 



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obtainable. 



I said that I regretted not being able to make a response that would be more 

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the US would give a third power the option to put it into war at times and under 



conditions wholly of the other's choosing. 



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I suggest that Under Secretary or Aifik£$iador paren whoever sees Bidault 

■ 

first end paren should summarize foregoing to Bidault as am not confident that 
K3Si&X Bonnet who was in highly emotional state will adequately report. 



* * 




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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 633 10, By: NWD Date: 201 1 






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SENT J3^AKEMSH5! DULTE 187 REPEATED I*iF0RMTI0N>PARIS 1^3 . f^ ~~~^~' 
FARIS EXES ONLY" AMBASSADOR ' ' g ? 

c t- > 

- Reference TSDITL 19S repeated information Paris 4850 Saigon 2601* £ 

\ * I Chauvel Informed rr.e this morning that in Franco -Viet Minh - X 

"underground military talks" ( conducted by Colonel de Brebisslon ' 
\^ y on French^side ) Viet "Minh ha d d emanded all of Tonkin and entire^ j 

\ \ delta area Including Hanoi ( to beocne Hea dqu arters V iet Minh 

Ar^y) and Haiphong be turned over to Viet Minh. French without | 

agree 1 ng_had_jjr: pl"iea that if an y,thing_lik e tHrs^eTTul ejngnt^e re 
^aae"7~Fren o h "could demand fre e hand in^ south, indicating area 
s qZZVTcT~. n ne starting approximately IS "paralle l on Laotian 
border and running southeast approximately to iJadon ( this line 
marked sc:;:evhat indef initelj^ oh map in Chauvel 1 3 office)/ French 
had also indicated necess it y for enclave and port in delta a f-ea,- 
implying temporary tenure for troop withdrawal. Chauvel indicated 
Ely felt he could not defend delta area and better have French 5w~- 
forces therein by negotiations than lose them in battle. ; French 
raised Question evacuation their troops. French citizens, and 
\ Vietnam Catholics frorn Tonkin area but had received no reply 
; froni Viet Minh. Chauvel also stated French had made clear that 
Laos and Cambodia were not involved in this proposed settlement. 
No mention was rnade rg£TL0Hp^ n g Viet Minh f orces_ southjbhj s line. 
Last conversation three days ago and nothing has developed since. 
Chauvel continued that Vietnamese had no knowl edge this proposal 
and if acceptable to French it .would be most difficult t sell N, 
It to them, which might be necessary within next few days. He ) 
implied that Ambassador Heath might be of real service this / 



connection. . ' t 



■ 
■ 



I informed Chauvel of Zhukov-Kingsbury Smith conversation (SECTQ 
* 423 repeated Paris klB) emphasizing advisability French retaining 
foothold in north preferably Haiphong-Hanoi area, but at least 
Haiphong - This, with possibly, sni all co mpensati ng encl ave for 
Viet Minh south of line, would -avoid appearance of outright 
partition. Chauvel was somewhat dubious whether this would be* 
possible but thought that maybe foothold on delta coast at Hon Gay, 
^ whore there are important French coal interests, might be retained. 

mmm £1% ut . CT , -, , Brawrioa m\ m 

iJFC023 E2?Y o This copy must be reiurtiea to DG'fl control RIes mln notation ©FActica.uUen *> r,-./ if c : - ■*li"i^ 






" ■ 



, 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 i 



m 






TOP SECRET 






-2- From Geneva DULTE 187 



I told Chauvel that we did not wish be suddenly placed in 
position where these secret negotiations might have result of 
our being abruptly confronted with agreement or proposed settle- 
ment which we would not feel able accept" and from which we might 
have to disassociate ourselves , and stressed need our being, 
informed on continuing basis of converstations. Suggested- 
Colonel Dwan be liaison officer this respect. Chauvel agreed 
entirely. 



SMITH 



PEP 



- 

Note: Advance Copy to Mr Draper SS 6/16/54 4:15 P-m. PEP 



X" 






■ 






- 






TOP SECRET 



573 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 J 6, By: NWD Date: 201 1 







TOP SECRET ■ . , 1 / / , 

June 17, 195 2 t J^fc ■:••••: 



Roc 1 ;! 



FROM: Geneva - .._ v . .... 2:49 n.m. 






•5^ TO: Secretary of State 



V- > -_"■ ' 



-I 






SP ho: DEJUEE 193, June 17,75 p.V* -V-0 ^^ :'- " '^ ^ fify&* 



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UNA SENT DEPARTMENT CULTS 193, REPEATED 17\F0RMATI0N LONDON 293* c 
PARIS 49&, SAIGON I76 

LONlbN, 3?ARTS AKD SAIGON EYES ONLY Af'IBASSADQRS/ 1 ^ -,. jj-gg b 

Reference SECTO 46;?, repeated Information LonSfcn 297, Par^ " % *"' 

451, Saigon 175 M / ' - *\ H I 

; " '. . / f \ Q^? 

Dennis Allen (UK) gave Johnson this morning additional details " (ry 

on conversation with Chou-En-lai, Chou stated that in cess 

Cambodia^ resistance forces vers small and all that was needs- * 

sary wa&* a political settlement by the present royal government 

-with thein "which could easily' be obtained." In case of Laos, 1 

V , -the resistance" forces were larger, .and it would be necessary £5 



- 
t 






recognize this fact by formation 'of regrouping areas_along_the^ 
nrrprte-r* with VJ^jff?Aip: fgjfl fjllli?* r The task in botfi states wan ; 



** 



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1 .twofold: The i*s.moval of foreign forces and dealing with the £ 0> > 

problem of domestic resistance movements. The military staff / t 

should get down to this task. $4 ^* n 

- r \' ■;.-;.• ' . ' 1 ' ' ^ m- 

;In reply to Eden T s query as to whether it would not (repeat not) (jj 

be. difficult obtain Viet MInh admission Viet Minh forces were 4^ 
In "Laos and Carfoodia, Chou stated it would "not (repeat not) be 



*i 



"l/> » "* CJ 



v. -» 



difficult" to get Viet Minh to agree to withdrawal their for- 
fro;n those two states in context with withdrawal all foreig" 
forces. Chou made no (repeat no) direct reply to Eden's refer- 
ence to French-Laotian treatypn French bases in laor-. • Eden 
expressed personal view that ifhbu wants settlement, hut has so~;e 
doubt with regard to degree of control he exercises ever Viet O 
MLnh. 



In long talk with Bidault this morning (first direct contact be- 
. •• ' - tween Chinese and French Chou substantially repeated what he told 

Eden yesterday (in conversation with Bidault, Chou referred tc 
Viet Minh forces in Laos and Cambodia as "volunteers"). Bidault 
had also seen Molotov this morning and reported that loth Molotov 
■ /and Chou are obviously greatly concerned over any brealc-up 

// Indochina conference in pattern of Korean conference as well as ■ 
•/of lowering level conference below level of Foreign Ministers. 
' "Bidault said the*/ clearly want to keep the conference goir^. _ • 
Bidault and I agree (Eden did not (repeat not) cowr.eut) tr.at -~z. . 
; was .important we do nothing dispel Chou's worries over US bases 

in Laos and Cambodia. ■ 57*r T n -, c ,^ . it<t. .%■-,-•» r -vi '•■" 

- Si I E0?Y o This copy must b 2 returned to DC/R. c^r^fe^vith notation of action take;. ***?> ^j 1 :^' ■'' s - 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316* By: NWD Date: 201 1 



* 



-. 



TOP SECRET 






2- BULTE 193, June 17 5 p.m., from Geneva. 



* ■ 

I also expressed personal opinion that important" Laos and 
Cambodia move ahead as quickly and as vigorously as possi- 
ble with appeal to UK. Eden and Bidault agreed, Eden add- 
ing that Important Vietnam not (repeat not) get mixed up 
with Laos and 'Cambodia cases UN. 



Chauvel showed me handwritten note from Ely, in his political 
/capacity, urging against attempting hold any enclave In delta 
/and recommending straight partition formula, I could not 
i (repeat not) resist expressing contempt for such an easy rr sell- 
's out f! of lastL remaining foothold in north and said we could 
J under* no (repeat no) circumstances publicly associate ourselves 

with such a solution. 



: RSP:M2J/12 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






OUTGOING 
TELEGRAM 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
TOP SECRET 



SEWT TO: Ameonsul GENEVA TEDUL 212 PRIORITY 



Prom your DULTE 187 it is evident that QUOTE underground 
military talks UNQUOTE., even more than conference proceedings , 
are pointing toward de facto partition under conditions such 
that Communist take-over of all Vietnam looms ahead clearly, 

Chauvel's mention of difficulty of QUOTE selling UHQUOTE 
Vietminh proposal to Vietnamese and his doubt that Hanoi- 
Haiphong area can he held indicate to us that French may end by 
accepting any Vietminh proposition which offers hope of 
extricating Expeditionary Corps. In this connection we note 
failure of Vietminh thus far to react to French question 
regarding evacuation French troops and citizens and Vietnamese 
Catholics. 

There can of course be no repeat no question of US 
participation in any attempt to QUOTE sell UNQUOTE a partition 
to non-Communist Vietnamese. 



'*■ 



(Signed) 



Dulles 



FE: PSA: PJSturm : tas 6/17 /5h 



J. F. Dulles 



C - Mr. Mac Arthur 



EUR - Mr. Merchant 



FE - Mr. Drumright S/F - 



Mr* 

Bowie 



576 
TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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INDICATE i fJ collect 

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deterioration, is leading ua to reexamine possible do facto 

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577 • 

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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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NO: DUI/EE 195, June 18, 35 p. 

PRIORITY 



Centals 9200 

Poo' d: June 18, 195 J ± 



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SENT DEPARTMENT DULTE 195, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 4 
SAIGON 177- 

FARIS EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR; SAIGON EXES ONLY AMBASSADOR 

Johnson saw Chauvel this morning and discussed with him 
conference situation in light TJ3DUL 211. Johnson stated 
seemed-:* to us that such fundamental questions as composition, » 
voting procedures and authority or interna/clonal control com-" 
mission should be dealt with in conference rather than by \ 
committee. If conference reached decision on fundamental ; 
principles j working out of details could be done by committee *■ 
of exports of principally interested parties in same pattern 
as present Franco-Viet Minh military conversations. 



0) 
i 

03 



C ha live 1 said thi-s -would "be agreeaoie except that question of 
authority, which he termed " relationship between international 
commission and joint committees" could be dealt with by techni- 
cal committee, thus implying France not (repeat not) prepared 
to maintain principle ''of subordination joint committees to 
international commission. As French have already circulated 
proposal contained SECTO 460 through secretariat, it was agreed 
we would make suggestion along foregoing lines at today's re T 
striated ueeting. Chauvel said they did not (repeat not) yet 
have any further indication as to what attitude Chinese would 
take on French proposal entirely clear from conversation with 
Chauvel that his main interest is in keeping some conference 
activity or nine going and that if regardless of level repre- 
sentation we prepared continue some conference meetings would 
probably meet French point of view. Appears French proposal -^ 
ma&e on assumption that there would be complete recess of conii 
ference with departure of Smith and Eden. ' r^v 

Chauvel made reference to his conversation with Smith yesterday 
(DULTE 195--iast paragraph), making inquiry as to exactlv what; 






K? 



we had in mind. Johnson in reply read to him paragraphs 5, 6 
and 7 basic instructions (TOSEC 138) stating that French willir^- I 
ness surrender even minimum enclave, in north of Haiphong* would so 
clearly contravene the principles which the US considered essen- 
tial as to require our public dissociation with such a solution -•"- 

5 (8 In reply __. C 

mwm * " ./«;?.*. RtpRocy£ Tion na T .i 

immWi * This copy must be returned to pCSsstfBl' Bltt with notation of awon taken ejer-y, J F a/331 F| 



1 oc 



i\ {} i 3 









Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



5-DULTE 195 , c/Line 18, 5 p, m. from. Geneva 






In reply -to Chauvei T s questions, Johnson made It clear we were 
.speaking only of public disassociatlon from such a settlement. 
The US had in the past and of course would continue working with 
and supporting Prance In every possible way and who rover we could . 
Chauvei Indicated full understanding our position. He said they 
had come to conclusion that what he termed any " leopard spot' 1 so- 
lution was entirely impracticable and unenforceable. From stand- 
point of future It would be much better to retain a reasonably de- 
fensible line in Vietnam behind which there would be no (repeat no) 
enclaves of Viet Minh and do all possible behind that line to t 
build up effective Vietnamese Government and defense. They had no 
(repeat no) intention of "any Immediate surrender of Haiphong 11 
which in any event must remain under their control for a consider- 
able period for* purely military reasons to effect evacuation of 
French Union Forces from the north. However, If, as appeared 
likely, choice was giving Viet Minh an enclave In south in ex- 
change for French enclave in Haiphong, they thought it preferable 
to give up Haiphong. He said no (repeat no) French parliament 
would approve conditions which the US had laid down for its Inter- 
vention, and_ French had no (repeat no) choice but made the best 
deal they could, obtaining as strong position as possible in soilh. 
Chauvei understood fully we would probably not (repeat not) be 
able to publicly associate ourselves with such a solution, but he 
hoped that when It came time to put it to the Vietnamese the US 
would consider It possible very discreetly to let the Vietnamese 
"know that we considered it best that could be obtained under the 
circumstances and our public disassociation would not (repeat not) 
operate so as to encourage Vietnamese opposition, Johnson replied 
he did not (repeat not) see how it would be possible for us to do 
this, and In any event he would of course have to see what the so- 
lution was „ Cj2gjivgj 1 _saj 1 d that_j3uch a sol ution as p artition should 
come as no (repeat no) surprise to tEe~Tle t name s e_a sH3utrTjTTc~"~had 




anawoiilcTlirofrabljr prove to be "dlff iculte 1 



\ Chauvei said the line French had In mind had been made available' 

to US defense representatives at some five-power talks, tit was 
vague about" tisse and place. He referred to It as "line of the 
chalk cliffs", which he said was defensible position running from 
the sea across Vietnam and Laos- to the Mekong. Undersatn ' this is 
g line roughly 19 parallel running from vicinity of Dong Hoi to 
Th&kbek. Replying to query, Chauvei said French Union Forces re- 
moved from the north would be deployed along that line. 



Chauvei said all indications were Me ndes -France would succeed in 
forming government next day or two and would probably himself as- 
suae Foreign Minister post. Said he had been in .touch with Mendes- 

I France and had sent emissary to Paris this morning to brief him on 

! f situation in Geneva. Chauvei said was anxious to show complete" con - 

I I iw-4 3§tinulty °£ French effort here In Geneva arid hoped there could be 

: ^ - "*' another restricted meeting tomorrow, Chauvei said, "Under-ground 
^ military talks 11 last night Ivicl been completely unproductive, Viet 
f T Minh c Lously taking strong line in view of French Government sltua 



** ? ,-* 



; 1 on , 



R7Q 



GB:L0?/12 o»«»d ° iLUH 



r~ 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



June 19 , 195'i 



Sent to: SECSIAITE DULTE 202 



RPTD INFO: Amerabassy Moscow 138 EYES 0Itt.Y FOR AMBASSM30R 



I saw Molotov at his villa yesterday evening at my 
request to inform him of my departure, and because I felt 
time had come to sound a note of warning. Talk lasted 
more than hour and a half, Molotov asked what I thought 
would be best thing to do with Conference, to adjourn it 
teniporarily or to keep it going. I replied as far as we 
concerned should be kept going while there was hope of 
reaching reasonable settlement, but that thez*e was no use 
referring to "committees" matters of major policy which 
must be decided by the Conference as a whole. Before my 
departure I felt It would be desirable to exchange views, 
in order that mistakes of the past should not be repeated 
as the result of ni sunder standing of our respective positions. 
With regard to Korean phase, I had only to say that in 



* 



TOP SECRET 
OUTGOING TELEGRAM 1^26 



3^073 580 

TOP SECRET 



reserving our position re final Chinese proposal had not 
implied to exclude Communist China from future discussions 
on Korean question. As matter of fact, China was belligerent 
there against UF and for practical reasons would have to be 
party to settlement. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 11 






TOP SECRET 



DULTE -2- 



Regarding Indochinese phase Molotov said he had 
impression US avoided reaching solution and cited in this 
regard Robertson objection in yesterday ? s restricted 
session to acceptance ChouVs proposal on Laos and Cambodia, 
I said that while proposal might be satisfactory in some 
respects it made no mention of Vietminh withdrawal or of 
adequate supervision. So long as regular Vietminh forces 
remained in Laos and Cambodia we could not help but view 
situation in very serious light. Molotov cited Pham Van 
Dong's remarks regarding withdrawal Vietminh "volunteers" 
and emphasized importance of beginning direct negotiations 
regarding Laos and Cambodia of type now taking place regarding 
Vietnam. I regretted that I was not at all convinced that 
Eham Van Dong really meant what he said. His statements 
sounded well enough, but his written proposals did not bear 
them out. 

I said I wanted to make our position on Laos and 
Cambodia entirely clear. In addition to regular Vietminh 
forces in these countries, which I enumerated, there were 
some dissident elements in Laos and a much smaller number 
in Cambodia. If regular Vietminh forces were withdrawn, 
elections could be held, with guarantees that individuals 
would be discriminated against as regards their electoral 
rights for having supported either side. Dissidents would 



581 



TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 i 



TOP SECRET 

DULTE - 3 - 

be able to vote for any candidates they chose , Communists included. 

However, while Vietminh forces remained in these countries , there could 

■ 

be no peace nor could free elections be held. 

In private conversations with Mr. Eden and others , Communist 
delegates , in particular Chou En-lai, had taken an apparently reasonable 
view on Laos and Cambodia, but that here again, when we came to the 
point of trying to get open agreement on specific points we were unable 
to do so, I specifically mentioned Chou En-lai's statements to Eden 
in which he said that China would have no objections to recognizing the 
kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia or to these States having forces and arms 
sufficient to maintain security, or their remaining in French Union so 
long as they were not used as military bases by the United States, We 
could not disagree with any of this, although if we kept out the 
Chinese would have to keep out, and these small states would have to be 
allowed to join with their neighbors in whatever regional security arrange- 
ments would best protect their integrity without constituting a threat 
to any one else, Chou En-lai might be anxious about possibility of US 
bases in Laos and Cambodia. We wanted on our part to be sure that these 
countries were not handed over to the Chinese. Molotov said that while 
he did not know about what attitude Chinese might have on other questions in 



TOP SECRET 



582 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET 
DELUTE - k - 

future, he could asuure me that Chinese attitude on this particular 
questions was not at all unreasonable, and that there was nothing 
in it which would give rise to conflicts. He added, however, that 
if we continued to take a one-sided view and insist on one-sided 
solutions, he must u in all frankness say that this would not succeed/ 1 
There were, he said, some differences of view "between us on Laos and 
Cambodia, especially in regard to our refusal to recognize resistance 
movements j point he wanted to make, however, was that basis for reach- 

- 

ing agreement was present and that agreement could be reached so long 
as neither side "adopted one-sided views or put forward extreme pre- 
tensions." This, he said, could only lead to other side's doing same. 

Resistance movements existed, in Laos and Cambodia, Moletov asserted. 
About 50/S of the territory of Laos was not under the control of 
official government. It was true that much smaller resistance move- 
ment existed in Cambodia. He said that in fact conditions in all 

three Indochinese countries were different — --large resistance move- 

i 

ment controlling three- quarters of territory in Viet Nam, substantial 

r • 

movement in Laos controlling, as he had indicated, about half territory, 

and much smaller movement in Cambodia. I said, with regard to two 1 rtter country 



TOP SECRET 



583 



DULTE 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET 



5 - 



solution was simple. Withdraw invading Vietminh forces and let 
dissident elements elect communist representatives to general 
assemblies if they wished. But the elections must be actually 
"free"* Regarding Viet Nam, I said we recognized relative strength 
of the Vietminh but theywere demanding too much. It seems Vietminh 
demanded all Delta, including both Hanoi and Haiphong. The French 
were our allies, and we took grave view of this extreme pressure. 
Molotov said that if French were to have something in Sought and 



something in North, and probably in center as well, this would add 
up to three-quarters of country or better, which was •-'holly unreason- 
able. He said there was old Russian proverb that if you try to chase 
two rabbits at once you are apt to miss both of them, and added that 
in this case wanting something in Worth and in Sough was like chasing 
two rabbits. If French were to give way to Vietnimh in North, they 
would gain territory probably greater in extent in Sought in recompense. 
I said appearance of "partition" was repugnant to US, and that as 



~f 



far as proverb about rabbits went I felt that Vietminh were chasing 
two rabbits in wanting both Hanoi and Haiphong. Vietminh demands 
for all the Delta, or efforts take it all by force prior to reaching 
political solution through elections, was serious 






TOP SECRET 



58U 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



DULTE 



TOP SECRET 
- 6 - 



matter in view of my Government* Molotov disagreed, stating that 
present French position in area was due only to Vietminh restraint, 
and that two cities did not even have normal communications between 
each other. In regard to US aversion to partition, he said that this 
problem could easily be solved by holding elections at once, which 
would decide "one way or the other." He repeated that important 
thing in reaching agreement on any of these questions relating In- 
dochina was to be realistic about actual facts, and to avoid putting 
out one-sided views or extreme pre tens ions. If French were encouraged 
to disregard actual situation and to ask for too much, he said, one 
could only expect conflict to continue, (He made it clear that he 
considered US as party likely to do the encouraging. ) I replied that 
US was not one of principals to Indochinese dispute and did not cast 
deciding vot, to which Molotov remarked "maybe so, but you have veto, 
that word I hear you use so often." and went on to say that among other 
delegations present at Conference there seemed to be real willingness 
to reach agreement. Agreement had in fact, he added, very nearly been 
reached, althgugh he hoped I would realize this was not informlation 
for publication. (This remark, obviously, referred to private French- 
Vietminh military conversations which I have mentioned.) I said I must 
emphasize my Government held serious views on issues involved in 
Indochina situation, 



TOP SECRET 



585 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



DULTE 



-7- 






more serious , perhaps, than did some of other govei^nments 
represented at Conference. I hope he would give consideration 
to this ? and assist in overcoming some of the deep-rooted 

i 

suspicions of Asiatic participants, which became apparent 
every time we tried to reconcile formal proposals „ 
eOl'MENT: 



Throughout conversation Molotov maintained friendly 
and mild tone evident in all informal conversations. He 
is completely sure of himself and of his position. What 

> 

he had to say regarding Delta, Laos and Cambodia confirms 
Communist intentions to play all the cards they hold. His 
avoidance of endorsing Chou*s remarks to Eden concerning 
Laos and Cambodia indicated that simple withdrawal of 
Vietminh forces from these countries was not acceptable 
and that some form of de facto partition was intended in 
Laos, at least* His remarks seemed to indicate that 
Communists have eye on as much as half of country. This 
conversatiqn, together with the inflexible position which 
Kolotov took during his last conversation with me regarding 



the composition of a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commis 
for Indochina, as well as Ms speech on Tuesday, June 8 



and all subsequent speeches on the Communist side, which 
took firm positions on points the Communists know to be 



sion 



3^079 



586 



TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






\ 



TOP SECRET 
DULTE -8- 

unacceptable to Eden, Bidault and me, are highly 
significant. The recent emphasis by all three Communist 
spokesmen that France should carry on direct political as 
well as direct military negotiations with Vietminh show 
their interest in having a convenient way of holding out 
for greater gains in their direct negotiations with the 

■m 

French as well as within the framework of the Conference. 

Molotov in effect told France in his June 8 speech that 
her position and that of the Government she was supporting in 
Indochina were hopeless and that she had best face up to facts 
and capitulate in direct negotiations with the Vietminh, His 
speech, of course, was in large part intended to assist in 
the destruction of the French Government for the implications that 
that would have on the European as well as the Asiatic 
scene. Nevertheless, his harsh and even insulting language 
seemed to reflect the confident, nearly triumphant mood in 
which he has been lately. It would be misleading to ascribe 
the harder -line which Molotov brought back with him from 
Moscow entirely to Soviet tactical considerations in regard 
to the French Government crisis. While the Soviets may 
think that the blocking of EDC through the destruction of 
the French Government would reduce future threats to them 

+ 

in Europe, the fact remains that the Indochina conflict 
potentially involves a much more immediate threat 



. 587 

3k080 TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET 



DULTE -9- 



of general war. 

It is probable that initial Soviet tactics were to 
forestall US intervention in the Delta by some kind of a 
compromise formula involving Hanoi and Haiphong if it 
appeared that such intervention were imminent. The recent 
raising of the ante in the negotiations here by the 
Communist side probably reflects an estimate on their part 
that our intervention is improbable and that they are safe 
to go ahead there, keeping, of course, a sharp eye out for 
indications of change in our attitude. 

While the Communist position on Laos and Cambodia 
remains more flexible than their position in regard to 
the Delta, they will get all they can in Laos now. In the 
whole are the determing factor for the Communists 
will continue to be their estimate of the likelihood of 
US or joint intervention and nothing short of a conviction 
on their part that this intervention will take place will 
stop them from going ahead with their plans for taking all 
of it eventually, through military conquest, French 
capitulation 5 or infiltration. 

Realize much of above is repetitious, but it will 
serve as final summary. 
3^081 SMITH 



USDEL : JKeppel/ph 588 

Rewritten : YIBSmith: hed 

19 June 195U TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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TO: Secretary of StatO f ^Mt- ©SIESa «f» ;SK [, 

I!0: 5055, June 24, 10 p.m. : l J '-' r ; r : C > 

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SinceQfend.es was tied up in National Assembly today, he asked.; 
me to B6o "Parodi and Chauvel regarding his t alk wit h Chou. 
Chauvel did all the talking and described the meeting as^ fol- 
lows: 






^1 



He said «bhat Mendes opened the meeting telling Chou that he 
. had been glad to agree to Chou ! s idea of a meeting and that 
he was interested to hear anything Chou had to say. Chou then 
spoke very fully and most of the time at the meeting, which 
lasted a little over two hours , was taken up by Chou ! s state- 
ments and the necessary translations, 

Chou in general followed the same line as he previously had 
taken with Eden and Bidault, with certain important excep- 
tions, which Chauvel considered to represent a considerable 
advance over Chou ! s previous position. \ 

Chou started by talking about Laos and Cambodia- He said that 
the immediate problem was to obtain the withdrawal of all for- 
/eign forces "including Viet Minh from the entire territory of 
both countries- He said that then the governments of tin two 
countries should arrange political settlements within their 
own' countries based on the will of the majority of the people, 
Chou said that while there should be no persecution of minor- 
ities, he had no objection to the two countries retaining 
their monarchical form of .government if they so desired. The 
one thing upon which he insisted was that there should be no 
(repeat no) US bases in either Laos and Cambodia, He stated 
that he saw no objection to Laos and Cambodia remaining within 
the French Union, provided they so desired. * 

The talk then turned to Vietnam where Chauvel considered im- 
portant advances in Chou's position were -revealed. ^Ch^i^said^ 
that he recognised that ther a were now ± wo ^n vprnm^^fFT^T ^c^^ 



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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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TOP SECRET 



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-2- 5035, June 24, 10 p.m., from Paris. 



territory of Vietnam, the Viet Minh Government and the Viet- 
namese Government. According to Chauvel, this was the first 
time that Chou had recognized the valid existence of the 
Vietnamese Government, * * 

Chou then said that the settlement in Vietnam should be 
reached in two stages. First, an armistice which should be 
reached as soon as possible, and second, peace, which would 
obviously take longer to achieve. Chauvel said that Chou 
clearly accepted, and for th e first^time, the French thes ls_ 
^ab~ucie re_s_flD D "iii l.^ i ,vv u~ph"Sses ; rirst military and second 
political to the eventual settlement of Vietnam. Regarding 
military settlement, Chou said that there should be regroup^ 
ment of troops in large zones in order to stop the fightingT 
Chou said that he was ready to discuss the division of zones 
if Mendes so desired. Me rides answered that he was not yet 
prepared for such a detailed discussion and said he preferred 
that It be handled by the delegations at Geneva. Therefore, 
there y&B no discussion in detail regarding th© make-up of 
I the eventual zones. 



• 






, 



Regarding the final political settlement , Chou said this should 
be reached by _ Street; negotiations between the two povernme nts 
in Vietnam, t.'e., the Vietnamese Government and the Viet MihTT~ 
Government. Chou further said that France might be able to 
help in these negotiations. He added that he saw no reason 

\/ why the eventually united state of Vietnam should not remain 

' within the French Union. 

Mendes at this point said that since the war had been going 
on for 8 years and passions were high, it would take a long 
time before elections could be held as the people must be 
given a full onpoz^unity to cool off and calm down. Chou made 

iv no objectlop^o^m^ statement by Mendes and did not press 

i.for early /elections/ 






Mendes then told Chou that negotiations with the Viet Minh 
for reasons not very clear to the French had been at a prac- 
tical standstill for the past week or ten days and he sug- 
gested, that a word from Chou to the leader of the Viet Minh. 
delegation might be helpful in speeding things up which 
I seemed to be Chou's desire as well as Mendes 1 . Chou agreed 
j to Intervene with the Viet Minh and ask them to speed up 
negotiations. 

The conversation never touched on any subject other than Indo- 
china. According to Chauvel, no other item of Far Eastern 
policy was touched upon, nor was Europe nor the UN or possible 






* . 



S' 



WHO 



590 

TOP. SEC R 



recognition 



■s -j * 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



■f 



i 












• • TOP SECRET 

-3- 50J5, June 2H, 10 p.m.., from Paris. 



recognition of China by France ever mentioned. 

Chauvel is returning to Geneva tonight and will see the head 
of the Viet Minh delegation tomorrow in an attempt to get the 
military talks under way again . 



ER3/12 



DILLON 



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5*J?I 



581 

TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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Reference 35CT0 512, 

Our position remains that in TQSEG l f6l 






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The imminence of a settlement between Mendes-France and th^ 9J 
Communists 5 which in some form will probably be brought before a : 



revived conference for its approval, emphasizes the importance oZ 

• 



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adhering to these instructions. Otherwise we may be involved ±r 



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committee work leading to the making of decisions which we miphtr-^ 

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be obliged publicly to dlsavov;* ". , ■ ". KN 

IV) 

We should avoid being drawn' into the French effort to give rC 
conference semblance of vitality by means of a series of *^ 



committee operation 



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FYI Our thinking at present is that our role at Genera* Q htmla 




s_o on b e r^ trictod to th: t of observe r, and/ 2 ? 
has^tiepariea, you sh ould leave in a few days. ^ 
^sm^M^^^X^^^^^^^^^^S^^^^^^J Bonsal/could continue 

as chief observer in accord with terms of TED1IL 211, Let iu 



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have your views 






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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 









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EPTD INFO: Amsrr.bassy LOHD0N ■( DY-: -X-JUOKO 7 / */ to 
Amembassy SAIGON A '/^ ^ 

Amconsul GENEVA SBGT O vfr / • -(HfrPOUOH} 



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Following is translation aide memoire delive red by Bonnet to Secretary and' 



en June 26, Text coordinated US-UK reply contained next following rue 



ssage. 



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"The coming weeks will be of decisive importance insofar as Indochina is 
concerned. Following hie conversation with Mr, Chou En~lai, the head of the 



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French Government has instructed H. Chauvel to approach 1-1, phan Van Dong with 
a view to carrying on with hita directly negotiations to ascertain whether a 
b&sis can be found ^ in his opinion, for a territorial settlement in Vietnam or 









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not 



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"The objective of the French Government is to arrive at a regrouping which ■' j 

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will assure the State of Vietnam a territory as solid as possible, and without hi 

6: 

the de facto division which will result being too cut up- That is the reason 



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why the French Govermisnt will insist on* maintaining Haiphong as long as possible 
and on obtaining the neutralization of. the bishoprics of Bui Chu and phat Die:u„ 
"It is difficult to predict the result of this negotiation in which the^ 
French authorities must face two sorts of difficulties; on the one hand it> <N 

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frill be most difficult to obtain concessions from the Viet Kinh in the *mkk C\ 
lorthj and on the other hand the negotiations risk causing, if the agreezuentSv ■ 



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. Page_2 of Ingram to AmphaSJSy^E&IO^ 



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is concluded j dangerous reactions by the Vietnamese Government whose citizens 

* 

are serving at the present time under the orders of the French command ^ comprising 
a major proportion thereof a 

"The French Prime Minister feols that the allied American and British 
governments should be as veil informed as possible of these possibilities* 
Km Hendss-France wishes especially to call the attention of these two Governments 
to the following aspects of the situations 

* 

"(1) If the Viet Ilinh appears disposed to negotiate, it is for a series of 

■ ■ 

reasons among which figure without doubt the fear of a spreading of the conflict, 
a spreading which nothing at the present time would lead us to expect , but which 
the general world situation does not permit us to exclude. Although the fear 
of such an extension of the conflict may have a determining influence on the 

■ 

i 
decisions of our adversaries > the French Government realises that precise 

declarations on this subject are not possible at this time. But it considers 

it would be very useful if the final communique of the Anglo-American talks in 

■ 

Washington could state in some fashion or other that, if it is not possible to 

■ 
reach a reasonable settlement at the Geneva Conf erence, a serious aggra* .tion 

of international relations would result* r 

,r (2) The problem which is posed with regard to Vietnam is diff ercri « It 

is to be feared that any solution providing for an indefinite period a division 

of the country will cause a violent and unreasoning reaction on the part of the 

Vietnamese patriots, While this reaction may be in a large measure inevitable 

every effort should nevertheless be made to canalise this reaction in a directi6n 



5Si| 



TOP SECtfET 



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NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 












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in conformity v/ith the interests of Vietnam, France and their allies c 

"To this end it appears highly desirable to the Prime Minister of France to 
obtain the assurance of the United States Goverxunent that nothing will be done 

- 

by the latter which might even implicitly encourage such a reaction. Under 

present circumstances such action could lead to no result but to ruin any hope 

of seeing Vietnam consolidate herself in such a fashion as to create in the 

face of the Viet Kinh an authentically national- and independent force. It is 

for this reason that the French Government strongly hopes it can count on the - 

United States at the proper moment to intervene v/ith the Vietnamese to counsel 

upon them wisdom and self-control and to dissuade them from refusing an agreement 

* 
which, if it is reached, is dictated not by the spirit of abandoning them, but 

on the coritraiy by the desire to save in Indochina all that can "possibly be 

i 

saved, and to give the Vietnamese state, under peaceful conditions, opportunities 
which have not always been possible heretofore because of the war," 



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Control: 15292 
fioc'd: June' 20, 195^ 
6:59 P-ra. 



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TO: Secretary of BtSGU© 



5117j June JO, 7 p.m. 



I'M 1 ~ -'"" : . 

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SEN? DEPARTMENT 5U7, REPEATED INFORMATION SAIGON 6j4, GENEVA *Mf9. 



DEPARTMENT LIMIT DISTRIBUTION 

EYES ONLY MCCLINTOCK SAIGON, JOHNSON GENEVA 



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Jebb came to see me this morning after his interview with -**j 
Mendes -Prance in the course of which he delivered reply to French" 1 Oi 
aide-memoire of June 26 (DEPTEL 4853) in the form of aide-memoire, -^ . 
followed by verbal comments along lines outlined in paragraph 2 
reference* telegram, . - 



Jebb reported that Mendes was pleased with text reply and stated 

that Parodi would give us definite French position in day or so, 

Mendes also confirmed that ne gotiation s ^wit h Viet- Mi nh at Geneva 

were_siail-ed (Geneva SECTO Sm, repeatedTParis as 51*57^ " 



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Mendes 'was somewhat perplexed by reference to "line running general': 
west from Dong Hoi" as possible partition line' for while Dong Hoi £sf 
J approximately at I7.5 degrees French had been holding .out for I8th4^ 
parallel in face Viet Minh wanting IJth. en 



(~0n question of (elections^ Jebb quoted Mendes as stating that the 



(j 



Viet Minh wan tea thguTTo be held in six months but that the French 
were taking the position that they should be delayed for e year 
after final settlement and withdrawal of troops bad been thieved* 
This, as presently envisaged, would mean a year and half to two 
years from now. M i - c* 

fisAS 

As reported EMBTEL 5099, we delivered reply_jto aide-memoiie to 
Foreign Office this morning. ■ • ■ -' 



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RPTD INFO: A memo assy SAIGON *o / 

Amconsul GENEVA <f 

REDEPTEL 4852, June fee; Saigon 2746; Geneva 489 
It seems to me that new Vietnamese Prime Minister 
Ngo Dinh Diem, who has reputation of uncompromising 



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nationalist, is quite in the dark about developments critically .' 
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hira as. a fa it accompli, the very reaction Preach wish to avoid Cf) 



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'and ascertain their* own intentions with respect to consulting 

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him or minimizing his resentment and their views with respect \N 
to plans and prospects for maintaining order In South V'ietnsv.v.*^ 



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1>54 JUL 3 AM 7 2(f c ' d: *** 2 > ^ 



To: Secretary of S*a% SFARTM r HT ,.. ?T , y , 
HO: 32, July 2, 8 p.m. 



11:12 p.m. 
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SENT DEPARTS T 32, REPUTED INFORMATION GENEVA 2, SAIGON *k 

Re DEPTELs 5 and 8. 

I took up reference telegrams with Mendes this afternoon. 
Regarding present withdrawals in the delta Mendes said that 
these had been planned in Ma^ by the Laniel government and 
he had made no change in toe" original plan- The withdrawals 
represent a definite shortening of the French lines to protect "* 
Hanoi, Haiphong and the connecting road. 

He said he had been much surprised to read in the papers that 
a State Department spokesman had said that the US had not had 
prior information regarding these withdrawals. He had assumed , 
he said, that Ely had fully informed O'Daniel of his plans. 
He then accordingly asked Ely this morning if that was not 
the case and Ely had told him that he had not informed f Daniel. 
Mendes accordingly offered his apologies and said that he had 
instructed Ely in thg^^turejbo keep ! Daniel_fully ^informed 
on the spot. " * ~" " 

Regarding withdrawals themselves he said they were necessary 
to ensure the safety of the French Expeditionary Coras. He 



Q 

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O 
O 



i 



said that the French had offered to take with them those me *rs 
of the loca-1 population who desired protection and that the 
French forces had provided transportation for such people. 
He said he had not seen the latent figures but a fairly sub- 
stantial number of people had availed themselves of this oppor- 
tunity. On the other hand,, there had been many who preferred* 
to stay where they were. 



V- 4- 



In this connection he said that since Dien Eien Phu the Viet M*rihJ 
had not conducted reprisals when they occupied new territory J -'; 



V 




was worth, It was the fact. He then said that the withdrawals 
were not yet completed and showed me on a rough map where 
.furtter withdrawals were scheduled. These include the Phu r,- ' 
i^XBOarea £"nd a portion of the area to the west of Hanoi. 



5S8 



Regarding 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






- . \ TOP SECRET;. ■ ' , ■ 
-2- 22, July 2, 8 p.m., from Paris 

Repa^dipo- the right of population transfer as contained in . 
paragraph 6 of DEPTEL ^853 , Mendes said that he was thoroughly 
in accord that this would be a good thing * :>m the French 
point of view. He said that it had been mentioned to the 
Viet Minh in Geneva and that they had made no answer either 
favorable or u'nf avorable ♦ When 1 reiterated the importance 
that we attach to thi ; subject, Mendes made a note of it and 
said that he was wr-iting Chauvel tonight and would include , 
in his letter of instruction a reference to this subject. 
I think it would be useful if Johnson would stress this sub- 
ject in his next talk with Chauvel. 

Mendes then said negotiations in Geneva had been at a stand- 
still and that he had instructed Chauvel to go to Berne for 
two days to show that the French were in no greater hurry 
than the Viet Minh. He said that the Soviet representative 
at Geneva had told Chauvel not to worry about the slow pace 
of the negotiations as at conferences such as these everything 
was always settled in last few hours. ■ 

j Regarding DEPTEL 8, use of word "withdrawal 11 vras intended 
only to <vean deployment into agreed regrguEra^t^area^ , "Mendes 
said ~ that "the ''Frenchmen timing *"Pf "election are~~ftolQInfr out 
for l8jiian±ha^a£ie^ which, he said, 

would mean 22 or 25 months after cease-fire. Viet Minh are 
asking for elections six months after cease-fire. Mendes 
expects the f lnal_ re sult_wlll be a^compx^oiiiise^ somewhere in 
between. * 







He then commented that Die m had made an u nhelpful spp.anh 
ot her da y _in_Saigo n wb glQi e was q uoted as haying said_JJiax_ 
he~~was in I'avor of the elections within a year. Mendes thinks 






m 



€Rat this is too soon and not in -the interests of Vietn 

and It runs counter to what the French were trying to obtain 

at Geneva. 



DILLON 



SMD: HER/5 






Him 



589 



TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






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FROM: Geneva 






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5 09 P-m. 



TO: Secretary of State 

NO: SECTO 557, July 3, 8 p.m. 



* 



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In Johnson's absence, Chauvel this afternoon, informed Bonsai 
regarding his talk wiurTlIuZnSTBov last night and with Dong this 
morning, * — — — — - 



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Chauvel raised with Kuzne.tsov pending questions orvc_o^tro^. : He 
found Kuznetsov adamant on necessity of inclusion Coraffilialst 
pov/er and rejection thesis Communists can not (repeat not) be 
neutral. Kuznetsov added that Colombo po wers are afterall sworn 
to Influence or London which in turn is ini monc^S— ax 



L-: 

(/- 




UpstnTC oi talk on this point was that matter of composition 
might be set aside for present and left for Ministers to settle 
when they return. Concerning acceptance by parties of decisions 
or recommendations of interna tiqnal commission, Chauvel stressed 
importance of establishing "rule of lew 11 accepted beforehand 
by both sides. Chauvel had impression Kuznetsov not (repeat 
not) unmoved by his arguments this point, although he gave no 
(repeat no) indication of change in Soviet position. 






On QllitaixQH^^ 2 ^^ Chauvel made clear to Kuznetsov' that 
theseare held up because Viet Minh have made unacceptable pro- 
posal of de ma real- 1 on„l i ne along; thirteen th par alle l (about Tuy 
Hoa). On other hand, Chauvel stated Fren crThave -proposed line 
acceptable not (repeat not) only to French, out, one which Fre nch 
have reason to believe would be acceptable to con ferenc e as _a~"~ 



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whoTe 7~and thus would avert risk of I nternational izat ion o f 
conflict. Kuznetsov replied that difficulty arises from fa 
fhet three provinces south of Faifo have been held for many . - 1 - 
years by Viet Minh (area in question would appear to run frcr, 
just south of Faifo and include provinces ox" Quang Mgai, Qui 
Nhon and perhaps all or part of Sons Can; Department will recall 
in this connection, recent violent Viet Minh attack against 

" ri ^BQO French ftsmw&m fm 

o This copy mus! be returned [S&tfPc. Iss with notation of action taken o COPY, IF Classify 






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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



* 



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i 

..." ■ ..' ■<- 

TOP SECRET 
-2-#SECT0 557, July 3, 8 -p.m., from Geneva. 

French forces withdrawing from Ankhe which" is in this general 
area). Kuznetsov suggested French and Viet Minh might examine 
area between fourteenth and eighteenth parallel and exchange 
views as to specific areas of particular interest to each party. 
Chauvel stated this could not (repeat not) .be considered and 
repeated position regarding line French have already offered. 

Chauvel r s talk with Dong took place this morning at residence 
of Chinese Communist delegation. There was an exchange of 
views about control and particularly regarding prior agreement 
to accept decisions or recommendations of international com- 
mission. Dong stated that he would consider this further. He 
is aware that French, British and Soviet delegations are work- 
ing on specific proposals (SECTO 553)* * " 

Chauvel reports that he spoke most firmly to Dong regarding 
military discussions. He Said French have accepted Viet Minh 
proposal that Viet Minh receive Tonkin area, including Capital, - 
but that further Viet Minh proposal for demarcation line is 
I unacceptable. Chauvel reiterated in strongest terms fact that 
French proposal for demarcation line just north°of Dong Hoi 
wduld be acceptable to conference and would thus eliminate danger 
of extension of war. (Chauvel stated to Bonsai that of course 
French would have to hold Haiphong and adjacent zones for con- 
siderable period. ) 

Dong raised question of Viet Minh troops and sympathizers in 
area sputh of Faifo. Chauvel stated he assumed regular troops 
would be evacuated and others would return to their villages. 
He said that presumably there would be no (repeat no) objec- 
tion to any persons desiring to do so removing to Viet Minh 
controlled territory. (Bonsai expressed interest and empha- 
sized United States view this subject as set forth paragraphs 
of aide memoire contained Department telegram ^853- J 

Dong endeavored to raise question of eventual political s ,-ttlement 
but^Chauvel stated that in present discussions must be limited ' 
to military matters and reaching of armistice. He stressed 
purpose of present conversation is to make arrangements f p 
removal from Tonkin of 300,000 Franco-Vietnamese troops. He 
said that French have no (repeat no) aggressive military in- 
tentions, although obviously it is essential for French to re- 
inforce their position both by regrouping their forces in delta 
and by measures agreed on in Paris in order to insure so far as 
possible, security of their troops. (He told Bonsai he did not 
"(repeat not) believe either French or Viet Minh would take ag- 
gressive military action under present circumstances. ) 

Alluding to political matters, Chauvel took occasion to point 
|! out to Dong that elections have not (repeat not) yet been held 
in Communist China and that Dong would probably agree on need for 
considerable period of pacification and reconstruction before 

bul elections 

TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 









•■J 



■ TOP SECRET 

-J>- #SECT0 557, July 5, 8 p.m., from Geneva. 

- 

elections would be held. Bong made no (repeat no) comment. 

Chauvel read Bonsai passages from letter fie had received from 
Mend- 3 -Prance Indicating that French negotiators should avoid 
appearance of overeagerness to reach settlement. Deadline 
date of July 20 which Me ndes -Prance has set himself Is not (re- 
peat not) so pressing as to induce French to accept Viet Minh 
proposal of thirteenth parallel, 

In view Department telegram 9* Bonsai drew Chauvel* s attention 
to presence here of new Vietnamese representative Tran Van Do 
end" to latter 1 s Interest in seeing Chauvel. (Chauvel apparently 
not (repeat not) fully Informed by his subordinates on this 
score. ) • 



JOHNSON 



ARL 






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TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316* By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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We are considering here what position we should take as regards.* ' ; , 
the French negotiations in Indochina. These negotiations appear to O 

- ' 

have gone underground and we have little reliable knowledge of what ^ J 

is really in the minds of the French Government or what is likely X U 
- . O \ \ 1 




to emerge. We have ourselves agreed with the British on the(7 points) ® 



previously communicated to you. However, we have the distinct impressic 



that the British look upon this merely as an optimum solution and that 



they would not encourage the French to hold out for a solution as good ^ 

—I . . — ■ — — __ __ ,^^__^ J __ 

H 

as this. Indeed, during the talks here the British wanted to express these 
7 points merely as a "hope" without any indication of firmness on our part. 



J 



The word r respect was agreed on as a compromise. The fact is however 



that the US would not want to be assoc iated in any way with a set tle merit 
which fell mat erially shor t_gf the 7 point memorandum. 






We fear the French may in fact without prior consultation with us of 
more than perfunctory character agree to a settlement which though ■ V] 



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' '. u : final L-..i COPY, if CLASSfFK IS .' 

.„„., TO P SECRET ,->' PUOKiSiTuD. '• V .!. 

• &063& ~ • Clarification Eev..^„. .., V 

bUo : f -A 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 633 10, By: NWD Dale: 201 1 






* Page. 



.of telegram to- 



Amembassy PARIS 






TOP SECRET 



1 



Classification 

■ 

.1 S3 • ' 

superficially resembling the 7 points will in fact contain such political clauses and 

« 

- 

restrictions that Laos, Cambodia, and Southern Vietnam will almost surely fall 
in a few months under Communist control. No doubt such a solution would be 
accepted with satisfaction by the French people -and parliament who would rejoice 
in the ending of the fighting and close their eyes to the possible future implications 
of the settlement, At this point the US may be asked as one of the powers which 

convoked and participated in the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference to sign-* 

4&M&& Also 
or otherwise adhere to the settlement* ^SE^^^^^^^sss^s^^^^^^^^& the 

Communists may insist upon this and take the position that if we did not do so that 

would be a violation of the understanding upon which the armistice was negotiated 

and they might even threaten to withdraw mid their armistice terms if the US did not 

adhere to them. This Communist tactic v/ould well serve their purpos e of creatine] 

animosity between France and the US at a time when the defeat of EDC is a major 

Soviet objecta/e. 

- 

We are giving consideration to various possibilities such as the withdrawal of I 







were public and if it were public it might be looked upon as a threat which would 

create the French em gsssfero antagonistic reaction which we want to avoid. 

■ 

Possibly you could find out ihs: whether or not there is the danger which we 
.apprehend and whether or not the French are negotiating on the assumption that we 

- . 60U 



£62^5 



TOP SECRET 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






Page. 



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Amembassv PARIS 



TOP SECRET 



Classification 



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may not be a party to the settlement. If the French are operating on this basis 

« 
and if they know that the Communists also accept this premise, the situation 

is not dangerous. If either or both French and Communists are operating 

on assumption we will adhere to any settlement they agree to, then we may 

be headed for serious trouble. I would like your personal thoughts on this 

matter . 




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NND Project Number; NND 633 10, By: NWD Date: 201 1 






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FROM: Paris 

to: Secretary of State 



Central: 1719 
Cae'd: July 4, 1954 

2:53 p.m. 



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HO: 41, July 4, 3 p.m. 



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I can veil understand difficulties we face as described In 
reference . telegram. I feel that French position is fairly 
clear as of bow but difficulty may well arise In. last days 

I or hours of conference after Ministers have returned to 

[Geneva. 



In that cqnnection we face following problem. If., we wit ha 
delegation from Geneva we lose all possibility of inf luetic 
French to stand firm, and we also throw away whatever rest- 
ing influence we may still have on Communist delegations. 
French would feel abandoned and, with only Eden to advise } 
would undoubtedly accept a result more favorable to the 
Communists than If we stayed at Geneva. The same effect 
but to a lesser extent would result if neither Under Sec re 
nor you return to Geneva for closing negotiations. 



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I)n_the_oib£iLJiarid even if we do maintain a full delegation at 
Geneva headed by you or Under Secretary there Is always the 
possibility and maybe even probability that French will accept 
a settlement that does not fully accord with 7 points in 
US-UK agreement. This will be particularly apt to happen l! 
.Eden does not stand firm in final negotiations. 

I do not feel that public statement of our position would be 
helpful as It would create the antagonism mentioned in next 
to last paragraph of reference telegram. 

Even if we do not consider final settlement satisfactory to 
X feel that unless we asree not to use force to u^set it we 



us 



,., ^"v.flll be in an untenable position her 
^^^tieutrallst propaganda that will Diet 



e vis-a-vls Soviet and 
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/ which by its acts clearly shows that it wants war. 



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*/ Hendes i s fu lly consclo^^thatj/re may 
——-"a ; party to the settlement. However, 



feel -that we cannot be 
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feel triat - Ctiia 
weiga very neavliywitii him In final s 

obtain Sden r s support. ^Na turally 
Lnd of Communists on this score . 



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o This copy mist be returned to'p.Srf? csnftahfites with notation of action taken f -> cr^uictTcr. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 









*• . 



TOP SECRET 



■ -2- Hi, July 4, 3 p-m., from Paris 



We have <Q ne str ongjgajjg 3 which so far we have apparently not 
cared to use . "TEaTE^Ts we can tra de will in gness to give full 
d .i p'l oma t i c s uppo£ t_Jio_Frei^^ t 

t o Viet n am in retur n f or a settlement that we car: support. 
The indication whicfiT~Frencii now have tnaz no raat:ter"Wim"tn:he 
settlement may be, we cannot be counted upon for support with , 
Vietnam obviously greatly weakens our influence with French, 

In conclusion if we base our actions solely on the attempt to 
get the best possible settlement I feel that we should (l) 
maintain our delegation at Geneva, (2) have you or the Under 
Secretary return to head the delegation when the other Foreign 
Ministers return, (3) tell the French at once that we will 
support them in selling settlement to Vietnam provided that 
settlement is satisfactory to us, (4) maintain close contact 
with and pressure on Eden so he sticks to 7 points US-UK 
agreement, 

I fully realize that domestic political considerations must 
also be ta]<en into account, but I am not in a position to 
evaluate them so I have confined these thoughts to a description 
of the best method available to US to influence the final 
settlement at Geneva in the direction we desire. 



• 






DILLON 



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July 6, 1954 

10:07 a.m. 



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Paroai this morning gave me Trench reaction to US -UK terms 
for I^o china -set t lame n_t._ f He~~said the terms generally 
p arallel p resent F renc h jags It Ion and are welcomed by French 
Government? - However, they have one important rese rvation in 
that they consider that paragraphs 4 and 5 may be mutually 
contradictory. 



% 







French feel that^evguiua^l agreement will have to contain 
provisions for (Qlectiojs which would comply with paragraph 
5 of US-UK agreement. However, if elections should go wrong 
way, this would seem to contradict paragraph 4 of US-UK 
agreement, which says there should be no (repeat no) political 
provisions which would risk loss of the retained area. 
Accordingly, they request clarification from us as to US an d UK 
po a lt-ion rega rdin g elec t ions . ~ - . . 

In addition Parodi said that French do not (repeat not) fully 
understand what we mean when we' say we would be wii-M-ng^o 
"respect" agreement. Parodi said that the word 'u^ gspec^' 
s^eeroecLweak a nd unclear a nd French would like clarliTcation if 
"*" -all possible. _ 



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■ This morning Chauvel expressed to me serious concern re reports 
he hsd had from Bonnet of two statements "by Secretary and one 
by Under Secretary to effect US not (repeat not) being ade- 
quately informed. He asserted with much emphasis that he had 
and would continue keep me fully and frankly informed. My own 
belief is that Chauvel has not (repeat not) deliberately with- 

[ held information. 



Chauvel had seen^ong* this morning. On question of demarc ation, 
lines, Dong again referred to status of populations sympathizing 
with Viet Mltih who would be left south of demarcation line pro- 
posed by French. He said this question would be easier for* him 
if he could get some general political assurances regarding 
eventual status these people. Chauvel said Dong indicated' that 
with such assurances he might be able to accept Dong Hoi 




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In reply to Dong Chauvel stated that such assurances would have 
to be very general. They might refer to such matters as eventual 
unity, territorial integrity, democratic conditions, et 



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Chauvel told Dong that, any attempt to go further into detail 
on political matters would result in prolonged discussion end 
delay in achieving the armistice which all desire , 

Chauvel suggested to Dong that it might be advantageous to have 
the agreement on the armistice purely one be tween * th e ?.o?si*rJisL 
of each side and not (repeat not) between governments, This -" 



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REC3R0 COPY 



Agreement "would, o:' course, nave to ir.ciucie 
,.uo u-o.wco uvoj yuroiA- military. The sgreexent could 

then be 

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peat net) purely military. 

**■ L 609 



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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET 
-2- SECTO 560 j. July 6, 7 p.m., trow Geneva 



. 



'then be* submitted to the conference. Perhaps conference might 
then make a general statement of political principles which 
would be included in a final declaration by conference. Dong 
ag reed with this general approach. He referred to his own - - 
statement of May 12 in which he had advocated that agreements 
regarding cessation of hostilities should be bilateral, • - 



J 



o- 




(Jtasuvel stated that In his talk with Dong he referred to fact, * 
military conversations not £ repeat not) moving well. He won- 
dered whether it might not (repeat not) be possible to supplement 
- them with some conversations between civilians on certain subjects 
\ net (repeat not) purely military. Deng agreed and Chauvel 
) designated Offrcy while Dong indicated that Tran Cong v.uong 
} (Vice Minister of Justice in Viet Minh Cabinet and member Viet 
I Minh delegation here -•- he was also in Founts inebleau Confer- 
ence in 19^6} would be his representative. 

Chauvel told me French delegation is working on draft of paper 
on control system which will be submitted to British and Russian - 
delegations and of which he will give us a copy as soon as 
completed. Although his position, remains that parties should 
. agree accept decisions or recommendations of international 
commission, he is somewhat skeptical on how system will work in 
practice on major questions. He stater] that decisions could be 
by majority or unanimous vote, but that in case of majority 
decisions on major questions implementation would obviously be 
difficult. He pointed out that eventual recourse to guaran- 
teeing powers , i.e., conference powers will obviously not (rej)eat 
not) work in event serious disagreement., He stated that it will 
be necessary in this case "for us to work out something among 
ourselves" . 



/ 



Chauvel told us that he is leaving for Paris tomorrow t 
Mendes -France in order to get his instructions. He ind 
that Mendes -France .has been in touch with London regard 
future plans for conference. He has impression from Ma 
that Reading or Caccia will be returning here shortly a 
Eden is expected about 12th, (lamb subsequently told me 
no (repeat no) information on Eden's plans and knows no 
8bout Reading or Caccia returning in advance of Eden), 



o see 

icated 
ing 

ssigli 
nd that 
he has 
thing 









/ 



Mendes -France himself may come here between 10th and 12 th, 
probably not (repeat not; before Eden, The Chinese Communist 
representative apparently indicated to Chauvel that Chou En- 
lai f s return is expected, but gave no (repeat no) details, 
Kolotov is apparently still due about 8th, although Soviets ha 
not (repeat not) dLrectly said anything on this. 

I again raised matter Haiphong enclave by asking Chauvel if 



. 



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44214 



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TOP SECRET 



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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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TOP SECRET 
-3- SECTO 560, July 6 7 7 p.nu, from- Geneva. 

any recent Viet Minh reaction on this. Chauvel said that Dong 
had given no (repeat no) definite indication regarding maintenance 
French enclave there. Chauvel said French would in any event 
obviously have to remain there for some time to come. In reply 
\ rny further question, he said that French military do not (repeat 
J not) attach great importance to r g t e n t job— e£-j fc i i phon g from 
[military point of vie*/. 

I also again raised with Chauvel question of anti-Communist 
civilian population in zones evacuated by French under any 
agreement. Chauvel said he expected Offroy to take this up 
with Dong's representative. Such matters as amnesty for alleged 
political offenses could also be discussed* Chauvel stated that 
problem of forcible repatriation of prisoners had not (repeat riot) 
risen and that he did not (repeat not) expect that it would. 

I asked Chauvel regarding liaison with Vietnamese. He replied 
he was handling this through members of his staff and was avoiding 
direct cootact with Vietnamese in order not (repeat not) to have 
to answer their questions , 




JOHNSON 



VH/8 



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&42i3 



611 



TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 










- nftoue vsasm 






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FROM: Parts 

TO: Soci'crbc^y 02 G'to'uO • 

!10: 66, July 6, 11 p.m. 



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July 7rl954 

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SENT DEPARTMENT 6, REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 8, SAIGON* 11. 



i --- - 



f 



After finishing discussion of Kerr article, Mendes said that^-.f 
the second major thine which he wished to discuss with me was ::_r 



the question of the resump tion of the Ge neya L _talks_,g ? t the 
Minis teriaTTe vol. He saiar^Ti_rf'iT~was ""now ''clear that the 
Ministers would have to make the decisions as the technical 
committees had been unsuccessful; Therefore, and in view of 
his July 20, deadline, he personally hoped that Ministerial 
discussions could commence as soon as possible. 



S 



_D 

• 



O 

o 



I 



1 In this connection he mentioned a report that Molotov might 

return to Geneva on July 8. He said that Chauvel had tried 
to confirm this with the Russians at Geneva but they replied 

I " that they were without information, Mendes said he very much 

did not (repeat not) want to be in a position of talking at 
Geneva with only Molotov and Chou En-lai. Therefore, he would 
like very much to find out what US intentions and plans were asr^' 
to when the Secretary or Under Secretary would return to Geneva T"" 
He said that Masslgli was making similar inquiries of Eden on 
his arrival today. 

I said that I was unfamiliar as to US plans and asked Mendes what 
his understanding was as to when the conference would r sutne. 
He replied that it was his definite understanding that all five 
Foreign Ministers had agreed to return to Geneva not (repeat !^ 
not) later than July 12, to recommence their discussion-. 
Referring to US, he indicated that he expected that eit _er C: 
the Secretary or the Under Secretary would return at that time. 
I told him that I was not informed but^ that I would inquire " < 
and let him know as soon as possible. 

Mendes then informed me that he will announce tomorrow to the %\ 
Rational Assembly that if a c ease-f ire is not (repeat not) agreed*' 

l^^rjjQJ?— tCL. July: . 2 .L,— i tTwi IT~b e _ n e c e ss^J^ Tov^X^' AssemET^Fp > 

approve the sendiiag Picons c rip ts to IadOctxipa ana thaL tne~la&t 
act 5f"Tiis goverGBfant before resigning wiTl be to introduce a° 
£*42!1 las to authorize the sending of conscripts to Indochina. This 

lav would be introduced on July 21, and the Assembly would be 
required to vote on It tbB^pame day as they will have had two 

o This copy must be returned io DC/ft central files with notation of- ; ^i7^£afTon c 'o n tC?/, IF CU3a|V| p -i'"t 









<■ > 






1 

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 















I 



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- ■ ' ' TOP SECRET 

-2- 6c July' 6, 11 p.m., from Paris 



"': - 



% 






\ 



weeks from the date of his announcement to consider the matter. 
He said that his government would definitely, not (repeat not) 
resign until such a law had been passed. Mendes also said that 
the shipping to move the first group of conscripts to Indochina: 
would be ready on July 25, so that his schedule for parliamentary 
action would cause no (repeat no) delay in the movement of 
troops. : 

I then mentioned DEPTEL 39* and Mende3 said that he recognized 
that this posed a real problem. He said that Ely had been 
instructed to keep Dier:* as fully informed as possible and that 
he had stressed the matter again in a telegram to Ely. Mendes 
said, however , that no (repeat no) matter what occurs or what 
action is taken, he exp ects there would be difficulties w ith 
Dien, and he said^tTTaif he wanted again to ask for our assistance 
alTThat time. He said he r ealized that the US would, prob ably 
be unable to under write any sertinreTireTrt^ 
Geneva. lie salcTKe also realized that it would not (repeat not) 



be easy for us to- tell Dien, to accept everything. Mendes sala 
he did not (repeat not) want to ask us to do anything we could' 
not (repeat not) do, but that he hope d we j gou ld by unoff i c ' 1 
means di sc o urage_Dlen_^ 
~a soiutlori~along general lines of US -UK formula had beej3_reached * 



DILLON 



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613 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 633 10, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



•- 



INDICATE: D COLLECT 
Q CHARGE TO 



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EYES ONLY ALDRICH AND DILLON FROM SECRETARY 

Please deliver following personal message to Eden: 

QTE Dear Anthony: We have an inquiry from Mendes-France as to 



fc-„ 



whether or not Bedell or I will return to Geneva and if so when. He apparent^ 
contemplates a reunion at the ministerial level July 12 . I understand he is \ 



making a similar inquiry of you. 



• • 4 

It is my present feeling that it v/ould be better if neither Bedell nor I went*-* 



back. As you know, it would not be feasible for us to be parties to a settle- • 

~ d 

ment which fell below the seven point paper which we drew up together in 0| 

Washington and gave the French through our Ambassadors, Our position in 
that respect is perhaps a little different from your own. In any event, I fear fvl 
that the French, whether or not Bedell or I are there, will take a solution 
considerably worse than this and in that event our high-lavel presence at 
Geneva might prove an embarrassment to all concerned. In view, however ^\ 
of our joint efforts for this area, I wanted to let you know of our present !-^-i 



S JFD:ma 7/7/54 



cbiviftcaJjon approve i by: 



S JFDulles 




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6 1 1 Sr . 

TOP SECRET 



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Classification <JS \ 

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I COPY, If CLASSIC T 

prohibited. ' • m\ 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 









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.of telegram to. 



Amembassy PARIS 



TOP SECRET 



Classification 



[ thinking and I would welcome quickly knowing how you yourself visualize this 

■ 

matter working out. Sincerely yours, Foster. UNQTE 



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Classification 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16, By: NWD Dale: 201 1 



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SENT TO: Amembassy PARIS 7/ 
RPTD INFO: Amembassy LONDON }& f 
— Amembassy SAIGON & jf , 

Amcongen GENEVA T.OSEC -_-2--6*-* 

Re EMBTEL 50 -"" * * 





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We see no real conflict b e t w e en p ar agr aphs j 4_ancL5_IIS--U'K terms. We £) 

realize of course that even agreement which appears to meet all seven O 

— — O 



points cannot constitute guarantee that Indochina will not one day pass into 

*> 

Communist hands. Seven points are intended provide best chance that 






Din. 
Duiifcd 

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this shall not happen. This v/ill require observance of criteria not merely £>. 

* 

in the letter but in the spirit. Thus since undoubtedly true that elections 
might eventually mean unification Vietnam under Ho Chi Minn this makes 



it all more important they should be only held as long after cease-fi-re 
agreement as possible and in conditions free from intimidation] to give 



democratic elements best chance. We believe important that r 




' V /■ <r should besetnow and especially that no conditions! should be accepted 



4 



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>*by French which would have direct or indirect effect of prevent in :r 

\y - "■- 

^ __, _ _ _ ____ »^^---^~"~-~*~ ' " _-_— ~- — — *-~H i 

^y effective international supervision of agreement ensurina politic 



as well as military guarantees. Also note paragraph 3 of President 

— _ — — i ■ — i ~*~ — — — — -* ■ ____——— i _»_________— i 



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d. ,-.f» e j -/ , S: tP ? D: scf , 

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ci««^«. ~C - Mr. MacAr tnur 
FE- Mr. Storm 
EUR IMr. Merchant in draft) 







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616 

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 J 6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



i- 









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P, e / : 2 a * telegram to A me iTibassy P ARIS 



SECRET 



. 



Classification 



I and Prime Minister j oint declaration of June 29, regarding GTE unity through 

* 
free elections supervised by the UN UNQTE. * 

• Our interpretation of willingness QTE r_espect UNQTE agreement which might 

- 

be reached is that we would not (repeat not) oppose a settlement which conformed 



to seven points contained Deptel 4853. It does not (repeat not) of course mean 

~ _ — . 

we would guarantee such settlement or that we would necessarily support it 
publicly. We consider QTE respect UNQTE as strong a word as we can possibly 
employ in the circumstances to indicate our position with respect to such 



r 



arrangements as French may evolve along lines points contained £)EPTEL 4853. 

* * 

QTE respect UNQTE would also mean that we would not seek directly or indirectly 

1 ■ _ ■ I, — ■ ■ I ■■ _ 

^ — * 

■ 

to upset settlement by force. 



You may convey substance above to French, 



o 



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DULLES 



• * 



• 






617 

SECRET 



Class i f i cat ion 



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. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






U9 an THKaao- Department of State [~\ 




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VWMPofflfiBP?AK AFFAIRS 

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'-FROM: Paris 



1954 JUL 8 



Control: 2757 

fce'd: July 7, 1954 

' 29 5^6 p.m. 



1 



TO: Secretary of mam 
U0: 81, July 7, 8 p.m. 



% 






NIACT 




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FOR SECRETARY AND LIMITED DISTRIBUTION 

- - !■ . 

In going over file since drafting EMBTEL Tt> we have determined 
that Department as well as Defense were informed of French plans 
to withdraw to inner perimeter of Tonkin delta on May 30. At 
that time Generaly Ely handed General Trapnell, former chief. 
MAAG Saigon j who had been sent to Paris by General Ridgway to 
take part in Indochina talks $ copy of new Defense plan and per- 
mitted Trapnell to make notes on it. EMBTJEL 4- 6 05, repeated 
Saigon as 318, Geneva as 56O for Chiefs of Mission and passed 
to Defense for Ridgway informed Department of new plan In numbered^' 
paragraphs 4, 5 and 6. Details of plan were carried to Washington^ 
few days later by Trapnell himself.. 

It therefore cannot be alleged that French did not (repeat not) 
inform us in advance through both military and diplomatic chan- 
nels of their plans to withdraw to Inner perimeter of Tonkin 
delta. We cannot (repeat not) help but feel that Kerr Article 
pi us^ what Department's own spokesman has been quoted as saying 
can only serve to make our position here vis-a-vis Mendes and 
his government Increasingly ..difficult and undermine the confid- 
ence of both the French Government and people In our own candor 
in these rao'st difficult times. 



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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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SENT TO 



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Amembassy PARIS &<3 EE&XK PRIORITY 

Rptd Info Amembassy LONDON &"/ PRIORITY. 

- Amconsul GENEVA PRIORITY TOSE C S ?-— C 



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* FOR DILLON, ALDRICH AND JOHNSON 

true 
I think it is probably tarns that if we had put together all of the bits of 

at 
information given at various times and /Various political and military levels : d 



faj 









at Paris, Geneva, Washington, Saigon and Hanoi, the result would have beeri'Q- 



K' 



a reasonably clear picture of French military intentions as now revealed, ■* : — 






I have never harbored any tho ught of any wilful con cealment. Also I have al- &} 

■ 
ways conceded that the French were clearly within their rights in making * 

their own plans. I have repeatedly said at press conferences that we recog- ( 

nize that the French had the primary position in Indochina and that our role 4^ 

was that of a friendly observer who wanted to help if and when our help was 






wanted. 



r 



■» » . 



I do fee] that there is a certain lack of any intimacy which is perhaps 
due to the fact that we have not in the past worked closely with the personali- 



ties of the present Government who have been plunged into an immense and 

_.^ 

engrossing task. In this respect they have our sympathy and I hope that vV X 



, r^ 'ML 



S JFDana 7/8/54 






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S JF Dulles 






EUR Merchant 
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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 633 16, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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Pavic- 



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.of telegram to. 



Am embassy PARIS 









TQ3? SECRET 

Classification 



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you will try to remove any impression of carping criticism on our part. JIIZ&-C& We' 
are quite prepared to agree that France has been overextended in relation to 
Indochina and v/e are not quarelling with present French policy designed to limit 
its commitments more nearly within the bounds of its strength. 

Our present intentions to leave representation at Geneva at the present level 









i 



of Ambassador Johnson is primarily because we do not want to be the cause of any 
avoidable embarrassment by what might be a spectacular disassociation of the 
United States from France. Whatever France may be determined to do, we 
accept as v/ithin its prerogatives. We only regret that we cannot agree to associate 



w 
ourselves in advance with an end result which* we cannot foresee. Equally, we do 



not want to be in a position of seeming to obstruct an end result which from the 
French national standpoint seems imperative to its parliament and people. 

Since starting to dictate this ; I have received through Bonnet a message from 

»™ ■ -w * — _ 

Mendes-France strongly urging that either Bedell Smith or I should come back 
__ . ^_— — - ' 

This apparently based on my today's press conference statement that neither of 

us had any present plans for returning, • . : ■ 

* 

I told Bonnet the substance of the preceding paragraphs to the effect that while 
v/e would be only too happy to contribute to a united front, we could not do so . 

■ • 4 

without knowing on what position that front was based. If there were a position 
which France was able to define and state that she would not accept anything else 
' then we would be able to judge whether or not that afforded the foundation for a 

620 



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iijiooA 



3PQP-- SECRET— 

Cla s s i J I c ti i t o n 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 2011 






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■ 



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p. ^ 3 _ of telegram to. 



A to embass y P ARTS 



TOP SECRET 



Clctssificdtio n 



| united- front. At the moment, it seems t o me that there is less danger of doing 









Unless you perceive objection , I would like you to explain orally my position * 
/ to Mendes-FrancS, making clear that we are motivated by our estimate that in the 
end our presence at Geneva, even though initially it seemed an asset, might 
subsequently prove a liability to Franco- American relations. 



Code Room: - Pleise note 







FOR LONDON ONLY 

Please show Eden portion of this cable which follows first two paragraphs. 
Portion beams QTE We are quite prepared, etc UNQTE 



irreparable injury to F ranco-American relations if we avo icl .getting, i nto a 

position at Geneva which might require a disassociation under spectacular conditions 

*— - 

which v/ould be deeply resented by the French as an effort on our part to block 

* 

at the last minute a peace which they ardently desire, 

» * 

* We have not yet taken any irrevocable decision and even if no one from here 

| comes over for the 12th, we would be standing by here under circumstances such 

* 

. . that if developments at Geneva seem to indicate that our preserxte there would serve i 
a really constructive purpose one or the other of us could get to Geneva overnight. 












48852 






621 



TOP SECRET 



Classification 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011 



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FROM: Geneva 






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TO: Secretary o:c btcvco 






Control: 35983 

Fvoc'dJ ...July .9,.. 195^ 

5:^7 P»toV -x *" ... 

i '.-..:; rl-' , / ■ 



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SECTO 578, July 9, 9 p.m. 









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SENT EEFARTMEK5! SECTO 578; REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 28, 
SAICKDN 19. 

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION 

- 

PARIS EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR 

■ 

SAIGON EYES OKLY AMBASSADOR * ■ * 



'/ 



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yp I called on Gha-ivel following restricted meeting today. He 
has just returned from Paris • His impression is that Mendes- 
Prance position unchanged and that he does not intend make 
further concessions to secure agreement v/ith Communists. 
Mendes-France anticipates active week of discussions followed 
possibly by last minute agreement on evening July 19- Mendes- 
Prance arrives here tomorrow afternoon. He will see Molotov 
tomorrow evening*. 

Chauvel dined last night with Communist Chinese. LI Konu rig 
and Chano; Wen-tien . Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and 
Ambassador to USSR who has just returned here, were present. 
.Atmosphere was "very cordial 11 . Chauvel informed Chinese that 
military discussions with Viet Minh not going well and tb t 
latter had made both for Vietnam and for Laos unacceptable 
proposals wholly cu*; of harmony v/ith what Chauvel had understood 
Chou En-lai f s position to be. Chinese expressed surp rise but 
did not go into details of situation. He told Chauvel tb t 
. Chou En-iai would probably, return here early next week saying 
it takes three to four days to fly here from Peking depending 
on weather. ^ice^ Minister stated Chou En-lai had had "ver^ __^ 
good meefrlDRlL. with Ho Chi Mi nh and results M would be he lp?ul~ 
to Fr_ench n , Vice Minister has spent last- -:wp weeks in Moscow^ 



I 

CO 

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* - 



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and Chauvel b eliev es Comm uni st Chinese and ioviet positions 
re ga raing prob lem have been coord tnated JL ^jiI^ 
o?i Ksl an problems oelns: Riven major weight . 



>* 



-■- 

CJ1 



- There was an "u nderground 11 meeting between French Colonel 

Brebisson and "Viex; ftiina mixicary representative yesterday. At 
this- meeting Viet Minh made two proposals (I) A demarcation 

mmn c« ? i *'/// J+vft***/* L • ~* 822 line reproouctioh from ms 

^.JSnfl Wl .. .- ° This copy must b3 returned to DC/^^tr&Pjtes^vitli natation of action taken o C0Pr. if CUESiPiPn i- 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






* * 



( 



Cl 



\ 




TOP SECRET 
-2- SECTO 578, July 9, 9 p.m M from Geneva 



line about 40 kil ome t era ga r t h^o f 'Stiff faoa line and (2) "neutra- 
>ization !l of delta In orde^Vo'permit total evacuation of 
French Expeditionary Corps in three months period. French rep- 
resentative stated both these proposals wholly unacceptable ■ 
and not even worthy of discussion. He refused to set date for 
next meeting, 



Chauvel sai^ Molotov this morning. Molotov expressed Interest 
In being Informed of progress of conference, Chauvel gave him 
general review touching particularly on question of demarcation 
line, attitude cf extreme intransigence being adopted by Viet 
Minh in military talks and problem cf international controls. 
Molotov expressed Interest but claimed unfamiliarity with details, 
Chauvel suggested desirability of contact between French military 
representatives and members cf Soviet delegation In order that 
Soviet delegation might be fully informed of difficulties being 
encountered and of attitudes adopted by Viet Minh. Later in 
day Soviet delegation got in touch with French delegation and 
these contacts will be set up, Molotov stated that he had seen 
Chauvel T s working paper (SECTO 575) and that while there were 
points requiring clarification and further study he thought 
it was a i aeful contribution, 

Chauv el has impression both Russians and Ch inese g ive Viet Min h 
fairly iree hand t o see how far th e y can go' but that when the y 
f ^id~VIeT"Mintrdemanas nave gore beyond limit which French can 7 
b e expected to" accep t, the y interven e. Chauvel made point to 
Molotov that any agreement reached must be acceptable not only 
to Franco -Vietnamese side and to Viet Minh but also to other 
conference members, He is hopeful that, as he says occurred 
previously, Chinese-Russ ian moderating influence will now be 
brought to bear on Viet Mlntio C ha u v e 1 expr e s s ed confidence 
that If he were' negotiating oaly with Russians and Chinese, 

i he could almost certainly achieve a settlement in line with 

\provIsions of US-UK aide-memoire, 



Chauvel told me that he is having his staff prepare drafts of" 
an armistice agreement and related documents so as to be ready 
in case ministers reach agreements on major matters. Ke stated' 
that information we had furnished regarding Korean armistice 
was most useful to them and was much appreciated. 



AW/6 



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TOP SECRET 

THE SECRETARY OP DEFENSE 

WASHINGTON 



JUL 9 195^ 



Dear Mr. Murphy: 

I refer to iny letter of June 19th regarding U. S. assistance 
to the French in the formation and equipping of three light infantry 
divisions for use in Indo-China. The evaluation referred to in that 
letter has been prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as set forth 
in the attached memorandum, with which I concur. 

Since no additional indication of French intentions has been 
received in the Department of Defense and the new Premier has prom- 
ised to end the war in Indo-China by 20 July or resign, I shall 
leave to you the timing of any additional U. S, actions which may 
be desired. I desire to point out, however, that in the event a 
formal request is received there is., in addition to the points con- 
tained in the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum, the additional 
problem raised by Section 10oa(l) of the Mutual Security Act of 195^ 
(Ri chard s Amendment), as approved by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
which could bar the United States from replacing this equipment. 

In the event that you determine that this French plan is worthy 
of farther action, I suggest that the above point be included in 
those requiring resolution since the impact on NATO of the removal 
of equipment, if permanent, would be considei^able. 

Sincerely yours 

(Signed) 

■ 

R. B. AHDERSON 
Acting 



Incl, - 1 

Copy 3 of JCS Memo, 2k June 195^ 



The Honorable Robert Murphy 
Deputy Under Secretary of State 
Department of State 

cc: General Bone steel 



62U 



TOP SECRET 



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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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Dillon to Kendes-France in person" as promptly as possible 
as instructed by separate cable. 

BEGIN TEXT: " My dear Btr. President j 

President Eisenhower (who has been kept closely 

t 
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informed) and I have been greatly moved by your earnest 
request that 1 or General Bedell Smith should return next 
week to Geneva for what may be the conclusion of the Indo- 



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the course which will best preserve the traditional friend- 
ship and cooperation of our countries and which will promote ^ 

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the r^;oals of justice and human welfare and dignity to which 

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our two nations have been traditionally dedicated* V;e also 



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attach great value to preserving the united front of France, 
Great Britain and the United State a which has during this 



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postwar period so Importantly served all three of us in our , 
dealings with the C ornraunfeb s . 

a 

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What no -7 concerns us is fch-£<£?:ais: that we ajtS v&ry 

:. a. In relation to- Indochina, 

doubtful as to whether there is 53^&39& a united front/ 

and we do not believe that the mere fact that the hijrh 



representatives of the three nat ions physi call y reappe ar 
together at Geneva will serve as a substitute for a clear 



agreement on a joint position which includes fl-gw*ttwftr»fc a<^ 



to what will happen If that position is not accepted by thj, 

' : ' " "" s uc h 

Coiranunists. \7e fear that unless there is the reality of /a 



united front, the events at. Geneva will expose differences 

.*'.;•_■■- f 

under conditions which will only .s erve to accentuate them 

•- 
with consequent strain upon the relations between our two 

r 

countries greater than if the U3 does not reappear at Geneva. 



■ at 

in the person of General Smith or myself. 






Beginning early last April the US worked intensi\ sly 
with the French Government and with that of Great Britain 



in an effort to create a common position of strength. 



xhixs 



This did not prove possible. 
and derived from fundamental 



The reasons were understandable 
causes 
&XSX&&& »M ch still s ub s is t 



and influence the possibility oi' achieving at the present 
time a genuine "united front". 



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During the talks of Prime Minister Churchill and 
Foreign Secretary Eden with President Eisenhower and me, 
an effort was made to find a common position which might x 
be acceptable to the two of us and, we hoped, to the French 
Government. This was expressed in the seven-point memorandum 



~\ 



.of which you are aware. I believe that this represented a 
constructive contribution. However, I do not yeb feel that 



-T* 



there Is a united position in the sense that the three of 



us would be prepared to stand firmly on this as a minimum 



. acceptable solution and to 3 ee the ne gotlatipns break ofx 

— ■ . — — *■■ — - ~~ 

and the warfare resume if this position was not accepted 

; by the Communist side. We doubt very much that the Co: m- 

■ 
nlsts will in fact accept this seven-point position unless 

they realize that the alternative is some common action upon 

which we have all agreed* So far, there is no such alternative. 

Under these circumstances, we greatly fear that the 

seven points which constitute a minimum as far as the US is 



concerned will constitute merely an optimum solution so fa 



<r.r 



as your Government and perhaps the UK are concerned, and 
that an armistice might be concluded on terms substantially 

less favorable than those we could respect. 

■* « 

V/e gather that there is already considerable French 
thinking in terms of the acceptability of departures from 



certain of the seven points. For example: 



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Allowing Communist forces tg remain Jja Northern Laos; 

military aeniar ea t ion * •"" 
accenting a* Vietnam line Q^/yiv::d^^^i considerably south of 
Donghoi ^ " ' *\ 

^Mfes&gQ&'i neutralizing and demilitarizing Laos, Cambodia anti^ 



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Vietnam so as to impair their capacity to maintain stable, 
non -Communist regimes; accepting elections so early and so 
ill-prepared and ill- super vised as to risk the loss of t he 

* 

entire area to Communism; accepting international super- 
vision by a body v/hich cannot be effective because it in- 
eludes a Communist state which has veto power, 

% These are but illustrations of a whittl r lng-away proces s, 
each stroke of which may in itself seem unessential, but 
which cumulatively could produce a result quite different 

m 

from that envisaged by the seven points. Also* of course, 
there is the danger that the same unacceptable result 



might come about through the Communist habit of using 

words in a double sense and destroying the significance 

principles * . 
go od- ^vC^^cfex^x^^^^: 1 v/i t h s t ui t i i ying imp lemen t at i ons , 



of 



We do not for a moment question the right of the French 
Government to exercise its ovm judgment in all of these 



respects. Indeed, v/e recognize that the issues for Fran, 






are so vital that the French Government has a duty to exer- 
cise its own judgment. I have from the beginning recognized 

■ 

the preponderant interest of your Government as representing 

* - 

■ 

the nation which has borne for so many years the burden of 



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a cruel and costly war. However, my Government equally 

• ■ * 

has the duty not to endorse a solution which would seem to 

us to impair seriously certain principles v/hich the US 

*, 

believes must, as far as it is concerned, be kept unimpaired, 
If our ov/n struggle against Communism is to be successfully 
pursued- At the same time, we do not wish to put ourselves 

■ 

in the position where we would seem to be passing moral 
judgment upon French action or disassociating ourselves 
from the settlement at a moment and under circumstances 

v/hich might be unnecessarily dramatic • * 

- 
xkxiiK^xuf. It is also to be, considered that if our 



n 



conduct creates a certain uncertainty in the minds of the 



Communists, this might strengthen vour hand more than ou r 

% — 

presence at Geneva in a form which would expose probably 
to the world, and certainly to the Communists themselves , 
differences which the Communists v/ould exploit to the dis- 
comfiturC of all three of us - 

Under all these circumstances, It seems to us that tho 

* 

interests of both of our countries are best served by con- 
type 
fcinuing for the time being the present izvi/i^n^Kv'rairinri of 

- 

US representation at Geneva, This consists of able and 
responsible persons who are in close contact with tho Presi- 



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If circumstances should alter so that it appeared that 



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our coiTii'fion Interests would be better served If higher 
ranking officials became our representatives , then we would 

be alert to act accordingly. -, - . * 

* 

It is because I am fully aware of the serious and 



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solemn nature of the moment that i have gone Into the mat- 
tor at this considerable length* It is possible that by 
the first of the week, the Co^iunxst position will be Buffi- 
ciently disclosed so that sonie of the answers to the fore- 

going queries can be foreseen. This might clarify in one 

- 
sense? or another the thinking of us all- * 

In this connect! on } let hi© emphasize that It ic our 

ardent hooe that circumstances mi/rht become such that con- 

slstently with the foregoing either General Bedell Smith 

* 

or I can personally come to Geneva and stand beside you 
ESSD TEXT 




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FOR SECRETARY PROM AMBASSADOR 

I delivered Secretary's message Department telegram 127 to 
Mendes *in Geneva after lunch Sunday. At same time,, I gave ■: 
him personal message contained in first paragraph Department, 
telegram 128. In view Eden's absence (SECTO 585). I did not 
(repeat not) see him. Johnson will deliver message to Eden ;. 
tomorrow, if Aldrich has not (repeat not) already done so. * V; " 

Mendes' was very touched by personal message in Department 
telegx^am 128 and twice asked me to be sure and thank Secretary 
on his behalf for this thought. 

Regarding Department telegram 127, Mendes expressed extreme 
disappointment and gave concern at United States decision 
not (repeat not) to be represented at Ministerial level. He 
divided his remarks into two categories , first, the effect of • 
our decision on Conference itself, and second, the overall 
effect of our decision on world affairs. ! 

Regarding first category, Mendes stated that our absence made- 
French bargaining position far weaker. He stated that if 
Secretary was present, France would not (repeat not) ac "spt 
anything at Conference that was unacceptable to United states . 
As he put it in his own words, presence of Secretary would 
give United States in effect a veto power on decisions of 
Conference. He felt it particularly important that we have 
someone at Geneva, who could take strong personal position with; 
Molotov, if and when necessary, and without having to refer to : " 
Washington for instructions. Mendes also feels that United 
States absence at Ministerial level will lead Communists to 
increase their pressure and be more demanding in order to 
deepen the obvious rift between the Western powers. He said 
France had not (repeat not) as yet departed from the Seven 

,- 331 ■ Point 

-TOP SECRET , . t'"*' fcF/ ( if iisift 

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Point United States -United Kingdom position and he did not (repeat not) 
make any commitment to hold to these points during coming week, except 
for statement regarding United States veto power if Secretary present, 

* 

On the overall effect of our decision, Mendes pointed out that this will 
be first time since the war that United States not. (repeat not) represented 
at equal level with other powers in an important conference. He said he 
felt certain that Europe would interpret United States absence as first 
step in return to a policy of isolationism. This he felt, would have 
catastrophic effects not (repeat not) only in Far East, but also in Europe 
and would be great cold war victory for Communism. According to Mendes, 
we would in effect be saying "do your best, you have our sympathy, but 
result is no (repeat no) real concern to us." 

I tried hard to dissuade Mendes from this viewpoint, but without much 
success* His statement regarding United States veto power if Secretary 
present, led me to point out "that there must also be an agreed alternative 
if Conference failed. Mendes promptly replied that only alternative to 
cease-fire at Geneva would be internationalization of war with United 
States military forces coming promptly to assistance of French. This 
aspect of our talk being covered more fully in separate telegram, being 
repeated to Saigon. 

Finally, Mendes asked if there was anything he could do specifically to 
create a situation that would nake it possible for Secretary to come to 
Geneva. He asked me to pass this question on to Washington. In this 
connection, he specifically questioned sixth paragraph of Secretary's 
letter, and said he knew of no (repeat no) French thinking along such 
lines, except possibly on subject of international supervision. He 

wondered where United States had got the ideas expressed in this paragraph. 

• 

While I was talking with Mendes, Johnson talked with Chauvel and showed 
him a copy of Secretary T s letter. Chauvel showed Johnson a cable from 
Bonnet which indicated that Bonnet may have given Secretary the impression 
that French were considering ret rating from Seven Point program. 

Chauvel and Johnson joined us at end of our talk, and Johnson and I 
suggested that if Mendes developed any concrete ideas which would help 
meet United States fears, it vould be helpful if he put them into a reply 
to Secretary's letter. While Mendes was non-commital as to a formal reply 
I rather expect he will make one. In closing, Mendes said he would keep 
in. close touch with Johnson, During talk, Mendes made it clear that while 
presence of Under Secretary at Geneva would be most helpful, he very much 
hoped that Secretary himself could come. 

DILLON 



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SEKT DEPARTMENT 135 REPEATED IW0RKATI0H GBXEVA 20, SAIGON 12, 
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FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR DILLO^L c t~ti(<> \ 

During conversation with Mendel at Geneva s I informed him of 
. contents* of DEP1BL 8<t~and of our feeling that Vietnam Govern- 
" ment should be kept more fully Inf ormed^by French , I told him* 
that we felt time had now come for * Vietnam to be i nfor med of 
ge7^ r aX~Tixres^ tfendes aaia, ne would [ il 

(TOTisttter^Tni orraitlg Vietnamese after discussing matter with his 
f advisors during afternoon: He Bald he had originally felt it 
referable not to inform them until he could assure them that 
^^ was prepared to guarantee "chem against further aggression 
I or subversion. 

He then spoke at length of jrieeessity for a _c leer -cut US guar an- 
tee thalLJfciauld— ^ Sp ates irf the event that the 



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Communists did not honor the spirit of any agreement that might 
be reached at Geneva . Without such a guarantee he said that a 
settlement would not be worth the paper It was written on - 
Meudes asked me to Inquire as to whether if a settlement with- 
in seven point framework was obtained, Secretary would then be 
willing to come to Geneva to close conference and to work out 
necessary guarantees to protect Associated States. 

■ 

■ 

He then discussed in seme detail the situation which would arise 
if no settlement was reached* at Geneva He said the sending* 
of conscripts to Indochina would then.be debated on July 22^and 
2j5* If the National Assembly approved , the first division would H 
leave on July 25 and the second division about 10 days later,.. '-: 
It would take a month to reach Indochina and three more weeks^to '■-"' 
get troops ready for action Therefore the first division of 1 •■ 4 
conscripts would not be ready in Indochina until about September V^ 



P«i-IA!!EHT 



This schedule for reinforcements 

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vould.be known to Vie fc Mlnb^and 

the result 



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assault 



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Mendes said he doubted if French. a lone could successfully 
resist such an assault. He said that Fretrch .-Government would / 
officially inform U5 of these facts at end of July if no cease- 
fire reached. 

I reminded him of US requirements for action on our part, and 
he said he could not foretell how French Parliament might react 
They might react strongly and request US help to continue the 
war or they might have wtrat he termed a "nervous breakdown" and 
push for capitulation at any price to save expeditionary corps. 

If no cease-fire , Mendes will resign ,. but in view of the above, 
I fedl it. is possible that if* no cease-fire is reached the 
French Government which will succeed Mendes raa^ appeal for US 
armed help, and may meet all US terms. Not possible to esti- 
mate tirnihg or such an appeal but it could "occur 'during August 
.when US Congress no longer in session. 



MRS/1 



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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

WASHINGTON 25 f D. C. 



JUL J 3 19^4 



asrssoKDiia ?Q$ she sbgr£Ti\?.£ of defuse 

SUBJECT: l T .S./u\K. Discussions on Southeast Asia 



Three meetings of the Joint U.S./u,K. Study Group on Southeast 
Asia, established as a follow-up to the Eisenhower/Chttrohill discus- 
sions, have been held. In addition, there have been several meetings 
of the U.S. Side. Under Secretary of State Walter Sedoll Smith is the 
Senior U.S. Representative* The U.K. is represented by 'Sir Robert II. 
Scott. 

* 
The views of the U»K. with respect to collective security in the 

Southeast Asia area may be summarized as follows: 

a. It is the British view that a collective security arrangement 
for Southeast Asia should be considered in two contexts, (l) on the 
basis of a settlement in Indochina, and (2) on the basis of no settle- 
nnnt. In the event of a settlement which does not nose an immediate 
military proble.n, the British would prefer a generalized collective 
security arrangement designed to bring in as many states as possible. 
This approach would include such states as India, Indonesia, and 
Bursa. On the other hand, if there is no Indochina settlement at 
Geneva the British would agree to immediately establish en organiza- 
tion to meet the military throat. Such an organization v/ould pre- 
sumably be limited to those countries who would make military .commit- 
ments to halt the Communist aggression* 

b. Under the arrangement which the British prefer be established 
in the" evon't of a settlement, there would be three principal elements 
to the organization: a council which would include oil participants 
in the organization, an economic end political council which would 
include as ncny of tho statas as possible and v/ould deal with the 
economic and social problems of the area, and a military organization 
which v/ould have fewer members, since states such as India v/ould un- 
questionably not wish to participate in the military aspects of the 
organisation. 

c. In the event that tnere is no agreement in Indochina, the 
British would immediately move ahead with an effective military arrange* 
rn-jiit designed to obtain as much support as possible x'or an organisation 
to resist further Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. 






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In addition to the for-cgoingj there arc? several points whicn hnv*€ 
come out in discussions with tho British v;hich are worthy of mention: 

a. Tho British ::<>" e no in tent. ion of "pressing forward* with a 
Southeast Asia Collective SocurLty Ur^r nizatio:\ until the Indochina 
phase of tho Geneva Conference has been terminated. 

* 

b. Tho British representative has referred on a number of occa- 
eions~"to use of military force to repel overt Communist aggression. 



1 



However, the British attitude v/ith respect to infiltration and 
is vague. 



S 



rorsion 



c. The British consider that the principal problem in dealing with 
Southeast Asia after an Indochina settlement would be a large-scale 
economic assistance program. Although there has been no discussion as 
to support of the economic assistance program for Southeast Asia, there 
is little doubt which state would be the principal contributor. 

During the course of the meetings. General Smith has maintained 
that regardless ox whether there is a settlement in Indochina it ia 
necessary that an effective collective security organization be estab- 
lished. Further, it is necessary that the organization be established 
immediately in order that we will be in a position to deal with the 
probable adverse political and military repercussions in the Associated 
States that will result from an unsatisfactory settlement of the Indo- 
china conflict. It has also been pointed out to the British that inas- 
nuch as the principal danger of further Communist aggression in 
Southeast Asia will probably* take the form of infiltration and subver- 
sion, the organization taust be in a position to deal effectively v/ith thi 
situation* 



s 



Sinco approval of a collective security organization would probably 
require considerable tifca for action by the various governments concerned, 
the United States representatives have proposed that consideration be 
given to the establishment of an interim organization to deal v/ith the 
situation. The British have indicated tentative agreement v/ith this 
idea. A further point has been made by tho V. S. representatives that 
no geographical limitation should be put on the treaty covering the col- 
lective security area. I re commended., and Secretary Dulles agreed, that 
the area covered by tho treaty should not be restricted to Southeast Asia 
but rather should be open to permit inclusion of non-Communist states of 
the en tiro Far East area. Although Sir Robert Scott did not object to 
this view, it is possible that when the formal British position becomes 
clear they might not agree to leave open the area to bo covered by the • 
Treaty. . - 

■ 
* 

. An additional point which has been discussed with the British has 
been the question of a declaration to be made in the evont of a settle- 
ment at Geneva on Indochina. Secretary Smith informed the British that 
tho U.S. is planning to make a unilateral declaration and hopes that 



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•- 



declarations which the British and other, allies make would not vniy 
substantir>lly froni the {.VS. declaration. Sir Robert Scott indicated 
that blio Britislt prefer a nuxltila toral declar • tion to include at least 
Australia j Sew Zealand,, and possibly India and other nations having an 
interest in tlio area. The British do not exclude the possibility of a 
multilateral declare tion. including CoEtinunlst parti/jipotioa. £he 
British were informed th ? .*.t it would bo impossible for the United States 
to participate in a multilateral declaration v/hich includes Communist 
China. 

Several documents have been exchanged by the U.S. and U.K. delega- 
tions. At a meeting on 10 July a U.S. draft treaty v/as submitted to 
the British for their consideration, British comments are expected at 
a meeting on 13 July. Following receipt of the British comments, it is 
planned that the draft treaty will be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff for consideration. If the views of the U.S. and U.K. on a draft 
treaty can be resolved, the Department of State plans to establish, a 
working group consisting of the U.S., U.K., and other countries which 
are likely to participate in a collective security organization, with a 
view to developing an agreed draft of a treaty, I shall koop you 
informed of further developments in this matter. 

FOR THE ASS1SIASI SBCESlARY OF DEFENSE (ISA} : 



cc; The Joint Chiefs of Staff 



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FROM: Paris . . 7:35 P^ w -JE2u ' "" 



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SP NO: 179,. July 14, 9 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO). ^"': :■ ~±^ £ * 



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SENT DEPARTMENT 179; REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON k5 t GENEVA 27.. c J 



Paris Talks - III 



. «■ — ■« 






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QUOTE 



In addition to the following agreed texts of Paris meeting, 
the Secretary's party will bring full memoranda of conversa- 
tions: (The following documents are classified and not (re- vJ|| 
peat not) for release.) . • \ "T *'' 

A, Agreed French-United States position paper on Indochina, * 

6 

1. Prance and the Associated States of Vietnam, Laos and ■ "^ 
Cambodia are recognized to be those which, on the non- ' 
Communist side, are primarily interested in the Indochina *°* 
phase of the Geneva Conference. 4^ 

The United States Is Interested primarily as a friendly na- 4^ 
tlon which desires to assist, where desired, in arriving at 
a just settlement , but who will* not (repeat not) seeic, or 
be expected, to Impose Its views in any way upon those prl- " 
mariiy interested. - 

2. The attached 7 points constitute a result which France 
believes to be obtainable by negotiation at Geneva and which 
would be acceptable to France and, France believes, to the 
Associated States. The United States, while recognizing the 
right of those primarily interested to accept different terras 
will itself be prepared to respect terms conforming to. the 
attached. The United States will not (repeat not) be -asked. 
or expected by France to respect terms "which in its opinion . - 
differ materially from the attached, and It may publicly c: 
disassociate itself from such differing terms. j - ^ .?' ;v| 

3. If the settlement is one which the United States, is pre- 
pared to "respect 11 its position will be expressed unilaterally 
or in association only with non-Communist states in terms 



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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



' * *■ - . 



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• * 

-2- 179, July l4, 9 p.m. (SECTION. ONE OF TWO), from Paris 



which apply to the situation the prlnci 
forces which are embodied in Article 2 
Charter of the United Nations. - 



ties of non-use of 
4) and (6) of the 



4. The United States is prepared to seek, with other in- - / 
terested nations, a collective defense association designed 
to preserve, against direct and indirect aggression, the 
integrity of the non-Communist areas of Southeast Asia fol- 
lowing any settlement. . 

5. If there is no (repeat no) settlement, the United States 
and French Governments will consult together on the measures 
to be taken. This will not (repeat not) preclude the United 
States, if it so desires, bringing the matter before the 
United Nations as involving a threat to peace as dealt with 
by Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 

6. France reaffirms the principle of independence for the 
Associated States In equal and voluntary association as mem- 
bers of the French Union, 

UNQUOTE 

*- 

B. Annex to above document consisting of the 7 points regard- 
ing a settlement which could be respected as agreed during 
Churchill-Eisenhower conversations. (Please note following 
phrase which has been added with the full consent of Eden and 
Mendes-France at the beginning of paragraph 2 of the 7 points.) 
"In connection with the line of military demarcation, preserves 

"Memorandum of points referred to in paragraph 2 of the France- 
United States position paper. 

An agreement which : . 

* * 

"1. Preserves the -Integrity and independence of Laos and Cam- 
bodia and assures the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces therefrom; 

"2, In connection with the line of military demarcation pre- 
serves at least the southern half of Vietnam and if possible 
an enclave in the deltas; in this connection, we would be un- 
willing to see the line of division of responsibility drawn 
further south than a line running generally west from Dong Hoi; 

- 

"3- Does not (repeat not) Impose on Lacs, Cambodia or retained 
Vietnam any restrictions materially impairing their capacity 
to maintain stable non-Communist regimes; and especially re- 
strictions impairing their right to maintain adequate forces 



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-y- 179 j July Ik, 9 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO), from Paris. 

■ 

for Internal security, to Import arms and to employ foreign 
advisers; 

n 4. Does not (repeat not) contain political provisions which 
would risk loss of the retained area to Communist control; * 



"5. Does not (repeat not) exclude the possibility of the 
ultimate unification of the Vietnam by peaceful means; 

"6. Provides for the peaceful and humane transfer , under 
international supervision, of those people desiring to be 
moved from one zone to another of Vietnam; and 

"7. Provides effective machinery for international supervision 
of the agreement . " 

C. Letter from Me ndes -France to Secretary (unofficial trans- 
lation of French text). 



.QUOTE ; 

■ 

Dear Mr, Secretary: 

"Following our frank and friendly conversation of last evening , 
I believe I understand fully the position of the United States 
with regard to the negotiations at Geneva concerning Indochina. 

If I Interpret your views correctly, you recognize fully the 
primary right of France," the Associated States of Vietnam, 
Laos, and Cambodia, to decide the conditions for the settle- 
ment of a war in which they are the only belligerents on the 
non-Communist side. You wish to aid us through you good 
offices in obtaining a just and honorable settlement which 
will take into account the needs of the Interested people?'. 
However, you are not (repeat not) prepared to participate ,/ith 
the Communist countries In any settlement which might appear 
to retain for them the benefits of aggression or the domina- 
tion of non-willing peoples. In any case, if a settlement 
should be arrived at between the parties holding the prim: ry 
responsibility, you would agree to indicate that you would fj] 
comply with the principles which are contained In Articles 2 f~- 
(h) and (6) of the United Nations Charter and you would con- •"- 
sider any violation of the settlement by the Communist regimes ;\ 
as being of grave concern. - I ,.\ 



. DULLES 
MRS/1 • • . 

NOTE: Mr. Drumright (PE) notified 10 p.m., 7/14, MPL (CV/0) 

6140 

4&?.&3 • SECRET 



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_ PRIORITY 

SENT DEPARTMENT 179 REPEATED . INFORMATI Civ LONDON 45, GENEVA 27 

It being your belief that the continuation of the war would 
involve a serious risk of an "ex tension of the conflict, both 
as concerns the combat areas and the belligerent countries, 
the .tfUestlon of the participation of the United States -would n 
be guided by the terms defined in the fourth paragraph Sbf the 
letter addressed on Ju>,£ 16, 195*1* by President Eisenhower to 
President Coty. - * 

You have indicated to me that you would fear, in the present 
state of negotiations, that the sending by the United States 
to Geneva of representatives chosen at a high levfel and bear- 
ing instructions from President Elsenhower to adhere to the 
principles noted above, could cause a situation capable of 
giving rise in France, under the most regrettable circumstances , 
to a feeling that our two countries are divided and that it 
might risk affecting seriously th£ir good relations which are 
so important to the whole free world, 

I have noted your hesitation to come to Geneva in the fear 
of having eventually to disassociate yourself from ah agree- 
ment, or certain of Its terms, which you might not (repeat' not) 
be able to respect. This appears to me to be understandable, 
but In my opinion it does not (repeat not) respond to the : 
situation. In effect, I have every reason to think that your 
absence would be precisely interpreted as demonstrating, be- 
fore the fact, that you disapproved of the conference and of 
everything which might be accomplished. Not (repeat .not) only 
would those who are against us find therein the confirmation of 
the 111 will which they attribute to your government J concerning. '- 
the re-er.r.^blishment of peace in Indochina; but many others ^ " 
would r@£-l in it a sure sign of s division of the western powers; 
Finally, the negotiations would thus be deprived of the element: 
of balance indispensable to the seeking of a solution fas recom-' 
mended Iw the memorandum of June 30. I 



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I consider thus that such an absence would produce an : effect 

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.iro™ JOMWCTIOB raw TBI! 

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SECRET 



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_2-#179, July 14, 9 p.m. (SECTION TWO OP WO) from Paris 

diametrically opposed to the intentions which you have ex- 
pressed and which I have cited above „ In a situation as 
difficult as this only the unity of the western democratic 
front, supported by the immense potential which we have in 
common, can bring about the very military and strategic unity 
which we should seek eventually to establish in that part of the 
world a 

It is in this spirit that the French Government envisages, aside 
from the assurances which the conference itself could furnish, 
the establishment of a^collecJaj/ ^ guarantee by virtue of 
which the signatories would declare themselves prepared to 
intervene if, In Indochina, one of the three states was a 
victim or aggression, 

I am fully conscious of the position of the government of the 
United States and I have noted with care the consequences 
which it might Imply; but for the reasons which I have just 
enumerated^ I have the profound conviction that the common > 
. interests of cur two countries and of the three- Associated 
States would be effectively defended only if you, yourself, 
or the Undersecretary should represent In person your govern- 
ent at Geneva. . ; 

If the situation should nevertheless evolve In a manner which 
would confirm your fears, I engage myself, on behalf of France, 
to make known publicly the conditions under which you have 
acceded to my request. ' , 

UNQUOTE j 




D. Letter from Secretary to Mendes -France. \ 

■ 

QUOTE ' f- 

• i 

■ My Dear Mr/ President: ■ j 

I have received your letter of July lh with reference to par- 
ticipation by the United States in the final stages of the 
. Indochina phase of the Geneva conference. 



lO 



In th e lig ht of what y xn a say and after c onsultation with 
Pre sldent Eisenhowe r, 1 aoTgladl to oe able tro^irfurnr^^Lt 
jRa T^Ene ^reside n t ancT l are askiTig~trhe" Under s e^reirarj "erf— state 
Ge heral~~t ; raTter~" Bedeii Smith, t;q prepare z o re uurir"aTTtri s r 
earliest convenience to Geneva to s re in -the work of the 
conference on the basis of the understanding which we have 
arrived at. • 

I greatly appreciate the opportunity which we have had to' 



ghp " confer together 



4 i m 



fj .. SECRET 












Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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i 






SECRET 



-.• 



_3_#179, July lh, 9 p.m., (SECTION TWO OF TVfO) from Parts 

confer together and I believe that it has added a new chapter 
to the honorable and precious tradition of Franco-American 
cooperation. 

UNQUOTE 

E. Letter to Mendes -France from Eden. 

QUOTE 

My Dear Mr* President: 

Thank you for providing me with copies of correspondence ex- 
changed today between yourself and Mr. John Foster Dulles on 
the present phase of the Indochina conference at Geneva. 

I have noted their contents and wish to assure you that, as 
a friend and ally, I shall do my best to help you to achieve 
a settlement on the basis set out in this correspondence, 

I am sending a copy of this letter to Mr. Dulles. 



1 



UNQUOTE 



DUI1E3 



EL/6 



Note: Mr. Drumright (FE) notified 10 p.m., 7/l4, NPL. 









£4248 



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643 



SECRET 









Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



V?J'../i. :j! J 






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• » * 



SECRETARY DULLES' SEF02T Oil HIS RECETriT TRIP TO PARIS 



s 



■ 

+ 



At the NSC nee ting of 1$ July,, Secretary Dulles reported on hi 
recent trip to Paris as follows: 

■ 

j 1. He had been iri practicality continuous meetings with Kendes- 
I France and !lr, Eden from the time of his arrival to his departure ^ 
:• : sometimes with one oz* the other individually and sometimes with tjie 
two together. He had told Kendes thaij in his opinion, most of • 
Prance ! s troubles stem iron a lack of French decision on ZDC* Be- 
, cause of this, the Soviets were b§ing successful in splitting France 
and Gernariy. Therefore, he put the greatest urgency on French 
action" on EBC. Ilendes said that it might not be possible now to 
get a constitutional najority of 321*, votes in the Assemble without 
some face-saving formula • He hoped this could be aov.e through 
minor amendments which, would not reouire renegotiation i but in any 
event j Hend.es had promised Secretary Dulles action by the /assembly 
by early August. Mr, Dalles had pointed out that the U.S. public 
was getting a trifle short-tempered on the EDC topic and that if 
Kendes was not careful^ the U.S. Congress might terninate aid to 
NATO which would be detrimental to trie military effort of all 
Europe , cspec5.ally France. " .. 

2. a. Regarding the dilemma of U.S. participation in the 
Geneva Conference j Secretary Dulles had pointed out that if 
the U.S* participates in the Conference and then finds itself 
\mable to guarantee the results > a violent French public reac- 
tion against the U.S. would ensue. Similarly j if the U.S. par- 
ticipates and so stiffens French will that France does not 
accept the Co:nnunist best offer 3 then again, the U.S. would be 
blamed and a major strain placed upon U.S. -French relations. 
• Therefore j the U.S. was seeking to play an inconspicuous role. 

b. The original. 7K proposal had been for a partition line 
along the liflh parallel: their second proposal; along the 16th 
" parallel. Both had ocen rejected and the French position was 
to hold out for the l6th parallel j along with the guaranteed 
independence of lacs and Cambodia. 



1. WL< 









W 



c. The Secretary had worked up with the French a Joint 
U.S. -French paper along the lines of the seven points of the 
U.S. -U.K. paper which had resulted from the Churchill-Eden ■ 
talks. Er.« Guiles had said there would be no U.S. guarantee 
of the settlenent, but rather a unilateral declaration that 
the U.S. would not attempt to change it by force. Hendes had 
provided Mr, Dulles with a letter of reply and acceptance of 
the U#S. -French position paper. Accordingly, Gen. Smith was 
returning to Geneva with his instructions contained in these 
two oaners. 

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3. Kr. Dulles said that the liendes Government put isiors emphasis 
on the granting of independence to the Associated States than had 
the Xaniel Government. Ifenaes even agreed that French ft?nctionHircs 
t and eventually aiiaf-d forces vroyld have to leave the area. It was 
current French planning to hold Haiphong until French forces and 
their equipment could be evacuated but not to attempt to maintain 
\ Kaiphong as a peMianent enclave. 



Um V3ien asked if the VH would agree to the seven ooints, the 
Secretary said he was not sure but he could count on support from 
Laos and Cambodia. Mr. Allen Eulles felt the possibility of VH 
uprising against the French was a real one. 

■ 
■ 

J># Kendes had assured Secretary Dulles that if the Geneva 
Conference was a failure s he would send two additional French 
divisions to Indochina j although they could not arrive before 
September j 195k • 



."I 



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FROM: Geneva 

TO: Secretary of State 

HO; SECTC 626, July 16, 7 P-ffi. 



Control: 70^4 

Roc'd: July 16, 1954 

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SEKI DEPARTMENT SECTC 626, 
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REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 72, 




S3W Cliauvel this afternoon., He told me that Mendes -France and 
Molotov had dinner last night, and Soviets had launched into 
substantive discission even before cocktails were served and 
continued throughout dinner, and Mendes -France icd Molotov had 
discussion following dinner with only interpreters present which 
lasted more than J :*ours until almost 1:00 a.m. * Discussion eov- 
ered whole range of outstanding questions at least once; accord- 
ing to Chauvel some of them "twenty times". Chauvel said Mendes 
had stuck firmly to French positions a n d_w 1 th very minor excep r _ 
tions of elections mentioned below, Molotov H£ r d7~v. r hite^be Trig 
vef 7 T> lee sarrg. .. no t"("repe at ~ho u) " *b udged s n inch. Q n ele c tions 



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are somewhat confub; 



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at his firmness, aid are still testing bim. 



There have been no (repeat no) other major developments. I called 
Chauvel 1 s particular attention to paragraph 3 of position paper on 
Indochina agreed at Paris and noted that I-'rench were still using 
term "guaranteeing powei^" in draft armistice, and asked how he"' 
perceived the situation in this regard. He said that he conceived 
guarantee to be more than that embodied in French draft of confer- 
ence declaration (SECTO 597) • I pointed out that position paper 
i made it clear that US will express its position unilaterally or in 
| association only with non-Communist states, and was not quite sure 
y Yio\: French concept of conference declaration fitted therewith. I 
said I had particularly instructed Bonsai reserve our position on 
last paragraph of French draft providing for consultation among w 
conference powers on reports of violations by supervisory commis- 
sion, Although I had no (repeat no) instructions on subject, I C 
did not (repeat not) believe US would be willing assume continuing! 
obligation consult with all conference powers' including Communis t°" 
China and Viet Kinh* Chauvel said that in light of paragraph 3* 
of position paper, French draft provided only for conference "noLi 






ar-aiis tice agreement . 



6*i6 



s mm 

tuM ESPY 



Chauvel 

"S REPRODUCTION frc: THIS 

o this copy must ba returned to DC/RrCerifat,glas,wUh notation of action taken Q C0?V, IF CLASSIFIES 15 

lUr on* v -r v . r .'< ■ -- * 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET 
-2- SECTO 6265 July 16, 7 p.m., from Geneva 

Chauvel said French were concerned over reports continued con- 
tacts between Fran Van Do and Dong, They did not know exactly 
what was happening, they know very little about Do, but they 
had impression he was unsophisticated and might be "taken into 
camp" by Dong, They felt after zones between defined and two 
governments each clearly responsible for own territories, such 
contacts would probably be desirable and necessary, but in pre- 
sent situation might be dangerous and could even result in sur- 
prise more bringing about something in nature of coalition govern- 
ment. Chauvel said De Jean was going to see Bao Dai to determine 
what Bao Dai knew about the matter and whether he had approved. 

In reply to my question on what French conceived to be major 
outstanding issue, Chauvel listed: (l) military demarcation 
line in Vietnam, (2) regrouping in Vietnam, particularly in delta 
area, where Chauvel said Viet Minh would be required to move out 
two divisions from areas that they now occupied so as permit 
separation from French- Vietnamese forces. In Laos he said major 
question retention small number French troops there (consideration 
was being given to "changing their flag" from French to Laos), 
and also political questions in Laos. He said there were no major 
issues on Cambodia. 

* 

Chauvel also mentioned international control and asked whether I had 
any new instructions on subject. I said I had not and subject had 
not been discussed at Paris in any detail. 

UK informed me today that meeting was proposed this afternoon 
between Mendes, Eden and Molotov to go over present stage of work 
of conference and make catalogue of work to be done. They asked 
whether I wished to be present, pointing out if US were present 
Soviets would probably insist on "presence of Chinese, thus turning 
meeting into "five power affair". I replied that I had no objection 
to their goind. ahead on three-power basis. 



1 



JOHNSON 



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TOP SECRET 



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SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 6^2; REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS ' 79, ^rJLc 
SAIGON 50. • ,,^.io*> to Dfi/9 ^~~~ ' ' 

♦ 

Following account of Mendes-Franee-Eden-Molotov meeting last 
night is based on report of this meeting to Foreign Office 
made available to Johnson by Caccia. This telegram expands 
upon and supersedes preliminary account transmitted in first ■ 
three paragraphs SECTO 6^0 (repeated information Paris 76, 
Saigon 48) . 

At Eden's, suggestion, French enumerated "document^ before 
conference: , 

■ 

(A) Armistice agreements to be signed by local commanders-in- 
chief. French have prepared drafts for Vietnam and Laos and 
Cambodians draft for Cambodia. Viet Minh delegation prepar- 
ing counter draft for Vietnam. 

(B) Control arrangements, French have circulated papers for 
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. 

(C) Political arrangements. After having seen military docu- 
ments, certain delegations might make unilateral statements. 
For example, Laos and Cambodia are preparing statements on 
their willingness to limit their' armed forces. Conference 

as whole would then agree upon common statement taking note 
of military agreements and unilateral declarations. French 
have circulated draft of such statement. Soviets have pre- 
pared counter draft and French second redraft. 

French explained that if conference did not (repeat not) have 
time to agree on all details of armistice, it might approve 
only parts providing for cessation of hostilities and first 
stage of regroupment. Remaining aspects, of agreements could; 
be covered by statement of general principles for guidance z"~ < 
of experts who would work out details after conference had ^ 

dispersed, ',*.'/ 

__■■ 

It was agreed that British, French, and Soviet experts would 
meet July 17 to consider various drafts, 

6^8 " • At Men's 

, 1*258 



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Th is copy must bo returned to DC/R central files with notation of action taken o 



REPRODUCTION FRc | liij 
COPY, IF CLASSIFIED J 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



' " • • SECRET 

* » 

1 -2- SEGSO 652, July 17, Tp.m., f*om Geneva. 






t 






At Eden ! s suggestion, Mendes-Franee summarized main outstand- 
ing problems as (A) demarcation line for Vietnam; (B) elec- 
tions, and (C) control arrangements. QonoernijQg-iiernar-cation 
1 in e, he said French had p r c gesed line near l8th oar aXlgl 
vlg^a^J^le^y. lnh -proposed ibtft parallel^ On elections in 
Vietnam, he said question was whs ther to fix firm date now . 
( rapes t now ) ( Soviets h ad pro posed J'-jne 1Q 55 ) or whe t he r , as 
French proposed, to- settle now (repeat now) only manner in 
which date would be set* Elections in Laos and _Jlamb-Odla- 
already provided for in eoos t Itatj jcgis for August and Septem- 
ber 1955 y respectively 
were: Whether there s 



Cn /c onrrclj , he said m ain q ^g ^jops 
hoiild^oe one commission cirxhree, 



composition, voting, execution of commissions 1 recommenda- 
tions, and freedom of movement for inspection teams; 

ftIoloto2_ adcie d. to cut standing; issues : (d) time required for 
regrouping (French have proposed JSC days end Soviets 6 months};"' 
and (E; prevention of importation of new arms and military 
personnel subject to certain exceptions for Laos and Cambodia, 
prohibition of foreign military bases, and prohibition of mil- 
itary alliances by three states, 

Fden_sd£gjcLj£ , 5 question of regroupment areas for resistance 
forces in Laos » 

Discussion then turned to substantive issues: • 



(A) Election s in Vie tnam . 
date" I or eYect ions » 




said conference should fix 



i-fe conceded more flexible formula might 
be found than firm date of June 1955 previously proposed by 
•j Soviets and suggested a greement mere ly that elections be held 
during 19^5 Wtth precise oate to be fixed by Vietna 



tnamese ana 



\ Viet Minh authorities . 



; 



Mendes -Franee argued that it would be imprudent to fix d..ite_ 
as early as tue end of 1955 * He suggested two ways of pro- 
viding necessary flexibility in arrangements: Date for elec- 
tions might be fixed after completion of regrouping; or tact 
date might be fixed now (repeat now; end international con- 
trol commission te given authority to advance date if neces- 
sary, 

» 

Eden_ supoorted Men des -France cnn eed for f iexlbll ley a nd 
suggested that two parts~ci*^Tietnam ilx. date after -completion 
of regrouping. Ken&es -France agreed to consider, this sug- 
gestion, but Kolotov continued tc urge elections during 1955. 



I 3 3 



Gfe9 

SECRET 



^259 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



[7 






■■. 



"i 



;. . 



SECRET 



-3- SECTO 6j52, July 17, 7 p.m., from Geneva. 

(B) Demarcation line, Molotov argued that in moving from 
13th^Ec"T6t"H parallel , Viet Mtnh had made substantial con- 
cession which called for proper response from French* 
Mendes -France disagreed, arguing that Viet Mlnh would be 
giving up mu c h les s in Annam thsn_JA£^jw 



Tonic in 



He said tEa^ThamTan" Dong had admitted that line 

on l6th parallel would require special arrangements for 
Tourane, Hue, on route No, 9 leading Into Lacs. Mendes - 
France stated that necessity for such special arrangements 
showed how unnatu ral- demarcation line at i6th parallel would 
be; -Ke said that thsre was no (repeat no) chance of pei 1 - 
su^ding French Government to accept line which excluded 
either Hue or route No* 9. Eden supported Mendes -France. 

Molotov suggested that discussion move to question of con- 
trol arrangements. Mendes -Franc e- replied might be better to 
postpone such discussion. He observed that questions of 
el ections a nd demsrcation line had bee rud.lac.us^ecL-XQgeth^ 1 
and migqt bi~Tinked in sense that conceivably one party might 
yield en one question and another party on ether. 



SMITH 



MRS/8 



NOTE: Read by Mr. Sturm (FE) 5: 30 p.m. 7/17/5^ LQ3. 



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TO: Secretary of Stc/fco 

HO: SZCIC 633, July 17, 8 p.m. 

prior rir 



*fi5Wtt 7478 __ 

Eoc'dJ-.-- -'July 17, 195^ -fT/ 



4:22 p.m. 'r.v- 



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SENT DEP_4RfM2N2 SECTO 633, RPTD INFO PARIS 80, ^. SAIGON 51 






^ o ct 



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Nguyen Huu Chau cf Vietnamese delegation handed USDEL copy ol/ 

note watch was given to French delegation today. He'" said 

French requested contents be kept secret for moment > andjthat 

French not aware copy given to this delegation. Following is 

unofficial translation: 

* 

Just as the French High Command In Indochina evacuated, without 
fighting and in spite of the strongest protests by President 
Ngo Dinh DIe~, zones vital for the defense and the existence of 
a free Vietnam, the delegation of the Vietnamese National 
Government learned only by the papers and by the messages viilch 
vere sent to It yesterday, July 16, that the French delegation 
appears already to have accepted abandoning to the Viet Minh 
all of that pert situated north of the eighte enth parallel and 
the delegation of the' Viet Minh might claim an even ciBre 

-« f* *"\ *. * ff* *> 1*% »"•* *r- tn f% r*> -*- 



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The National Scwemrsefit of Vietnam has also been left in com- 
plete ignorance of the oreoosais on the fate of Vietnam made bv 



ij 



me .-rencn government to the American and British Governments s 
particularly at the meeting in Paris, 



The delegation of the State of Vietnam must express its surprise 
This delegation finds it hard to understand that peace in Viet- 



nam is Lag negotiated without previously consulting with its 



Qualified representatives. 






.«**'. 



ki 



The de facto partition which seems to have been adopted from 
the outlet by the delegations of France and of the Viet Minh-X. 
at discussions bearing only on the materialization of tpe parti- 
tion — does not take any account of the unanimous will 
tional unity of the Vietnamese people. 



for 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



SECRET 
-2- SECTO 633, July 17 > 8 p.m. from Geneva 



On the other hand the regroupment of non-national armed forces 
in the zones resulting from the partition implies their con- 
solidation outside of any danger of combat and thus reinforces 
t the threat that they constitute to the free expression of the 
will of the people . 

Therefore not only does such a cease-fire not lead to a durable 
peace, since, ignoring the will for national unity 3 it provokes 
the people to "unify" the country , but, by the consolidation of 
the armed forces now facing each other, it violates in advance 
the liberty of the future elections. 

The delegation of the State of Vietnam, which more that any other 
wishes the return of peace, is pleased with the efforts put forth 
by the other delegations in favor of this object. However , it 
greatly fears that the cease-fire, such as it seems to be accepted 
by certain delegations, far from leading to peace, makes peace 
improbable and precarious. 

Aware of these very grave dangers and certain that it is expres- 
sing the profound aspirations of all true Vietnamese, including 
most of the Viet Minh fighters themselves 5 and in full accord 
with the Chief and the Government of the State of Viet nam , the 
Vietnamese delegation asks not only a cease-fire but the dis- 
armament of all the belligerent forces in Vietnam. 

The Vietnamese delegation asks that the entire territory of 
Vietnam be placed provisionally under the control of the United 
Nations pending the complete re -establishment of security, of 
order and of peace in their minds and in their hearts which will 
permit the Vietnamese people to decide their destiny by free 
elections. 

His Majesty Bao Dai, Chief of State of Vietnam, thus shows once 
more that he places the independence and the unity of his country 
above any other consideration, and the National Govern- 
ment of Vietnam would prefer this provisional control by the 
United Nations over a truly unified and independent Vietnam to 
its maintenance in power in a country dismembered and condemned 
to slavery. 

The Vietnamese delegation reserves its right to develop its 
proposal at a later time. 

bsd quote 

smith 

AB:PAF/3 652 

Note: Read by Kir. Sturm (FE) 5:30 p.m. 7/17/5 1 *. 1Q3 



SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



■ 



-«. 



i ^<m& wxzm - Bepomzem of 'State r~mmM 

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TOP SECRET 

Action / *■*»*■ 7566 



.Ah -'' ' Roc'd: July 18, 195^ ■ 

^ FROM: Geneva . 9:58 a.m. . -M 

Info 

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TO: Secretary or &r&o$G ■ • ■■ . \\ ; \> •- f , v> 

HO: 



SECTO 659, July 18, 1 p.m. - ( . V I 



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NIACT 



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UNA 

5 FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE UNDER SECRETARY Vi 



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Following despatch given us in advance by po pping ; of Associated r 
Press apparently represents official Chinese Communist position " 
and was given Topping in order that we would become aware of it. 
It begins: 

QUOTE • 

The Communist bloc has demanded that the United States guarantee CS 

the partition peace plan for Indochina and join in an agreement 0'; 

to neutralize the whole country, a responsible Chinese Communist • 

informant said today. . -* 

i 

The informant, who reflects the views of Red China Premier Chou ff) 

En-lai, said the Communists are hopeful of a cease-fire agree- hi 

ment by next Tuesday 1 s deadline if the Western powers agree to ^ 

'bar ail foreign military bases from Indochina and keep the ^ 

three member states out of any military bloc* 1 , i I 



^\ 



The informant said the Communists are pressing for the stamp of . J3 
American approval on the armistice agreement — already okayed in Ol 
principle by Britain and France ---which would divide Vietnam be- -^ 
tween Communist leader Ho Chi Minh f s Viet Minh and Bao Da f s pro- 
Western regime. 
> 

*\Ie believe that the US as a member of the conference she -Id and • 
is obligated to subscribe to and_guaranie^_anjL_seit lenient Morally 
there is no reasbrr-for- tfrerrUS to avoid this obliaationT' *~ 



. 



| Bat the informant did not (repeat not) rule out the chance of an 
Indochina cease-fire even if the US refuses to okay the armistice 1 
I agreement . • r „ q 

The Eisenhower administration has told France and" Britain that*" 
they can go ahead with their plan for an Indochina settlement "*"•: ^. ■. 
based en partition of Vietnam. 'But Washington has made it clear- ~ ' 
that it is not (repeat not) ready to associate itself forraally""" •-. J 
^272 w ith the plan which would sanction putting millions of Vietnamese ' i 
^-- under Red rule . • • • ;•■ - 

mm ^%t4^t 9 c l 4f S.^-* <*fc *-. 653 The Communist REPfKHWCTJoa rsqi t ^ s 

ROT CfJ?V 3 A'oiliis copy w , ustS>%turnddlo"DC- t 'R/C^ntcft!. ( fi[.?s.witl! notation of action taken o CC?r, IF CLASSIFIED, IS 



Declassified per Executive Order J 3526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



. . v 



-♦'. 



TOP SECRET 



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-2- SECTO 639, July 18, 1 p.m., from Geneva 

* 

The Communist Informant said the 'crucial Issue 1 now in the 
Geneva peace negotiations revolves around whether the Western 
powers will agree effectively to neutralize Indochina. 

Refusal to join in such a guarantee, 1 the* informant said, ( 
'could seriously deter a final settlement. On other important 
points in the negotiations we are in agreement or close to It, 
We are hopeful and we believe that there is time to reach a 
settlement by July 20 . ' 

J/\ French Premier Pierre Mendes-France has promised to resign with 
\ his Cabinet if he fails to end the bloody eight -year -old war 
by next Tuesday. Fall of the French Government probably would 
doom the Geneva negotiations. The informant declared that 
American efforts to organize a Southeast Asia Treaty organiza- 
tion (SEATO) is 'a threat to any possible Indochina agreement. 1 

'Success or failure of the Geneva Conference may depend on^ the 
attitude of the American delegation In this regard, 1 he adcied. 






V 




END QUOTE 

The above seems to me extremely significant, particularly in 
view of the fact that in my discussion with Eden last night 
he expressed pessimism, which he said was now shared for the 
first time by Krishna Menon. latter had begun to. feel, as I 
do, that Molotov wishes to force Mendes-France 's resignation. 

Eden remarked th at Mol ntniL-harLnnw hpnnms t.hft wnat. rtlffMppI f; 

a nd intra nsigent m ember of Comm unist dele_g£Ltion . You will note 
obvious intention to place on shoulders of US responsibility 
for failure of Geneva Conference and fall of French "Government 
if this occurs. 

• 

Molotov is -insisting on a meeting this afternoon which French 
and British are trying to make highly restricted as they are 
apprehensive of what may occur. If such a meeting is held and 
if -demands are made for US association in any agreement, I win 
simply say that in the event a reasonable settlement is arrived 
at which US could "respect", US will probably issue a unilateral 
statement of its own position. If question of particiDation 
Laos, CamDodia and Vietnam in security oact is raised,* I will 
reply that this depends on outcome of conference. 

Eden has already told Molotov that securitv pact is inevitable 
that he himself favored It some time ago and that he wouTa~noT' 
(repeat not) withdraw from that position, bu£_he made the mi*- 



take of paying that _ no . consideration had" been £iveFToTn"clusT^n 
of -Laos and Cambodia . " " " -~ "™^* - ' •W-J£%#i22£m 



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. TOP SECRET ' 



This -final 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






/ 



> * 



TOP SECRET 















-3- SECTO 6^9, July 18, 1 p.m., .from Geneva / 

This final gambit is going to "be extremely .difficult to 
, play and I do not (repeat not) now see the moves clearly. 
However, my opinion as expressed to you "before leaving, 
i.e., that Mol otov will g ain more bgiJ brlnging down Men ded 
Govo:onraent^ft5rTT)y a settlement, has grown stronger. 



SMITH 



DU:MEJ/^ 



Note: Mr- Halla (SS) notified 10:^0 a.m., 7/18/5^, CWO/FED 



• . 






K21'h 



655 * 

TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 633 10, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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□ CHARG£ TO ' . 



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Kr> O g 77 

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Does SECTO 637 fourth paragraph mean that Eden has 



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given away & position which Men&@s -France took In Paris > ^-; 

I 

. namely that he was willing to have Communist state on q 

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Control Commission without veto, or unanimity if no 






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Communist state a member, but he would not (rpt not) take \ 



e 



both a Communist state and unanimity rule? 



Your SECTO 639 received. 



It may be useful for you ^ 
to bear In mind that Executive has no Constitutional 



01 



power to give "guarantee"* This can only be done by 

treaty, ratification of which would surely be rejected, 

■ 

Executive can only reaffirm In relation to Indochina 

its general undertakings expressed in US. Charter. 

* 

j£*a JB$flft£ut3i Eden will try to push Kendes -France Into 
agreement far short of 7 Points which will confront us with 
dilemna of either agreeing to "respect 11 it or repudiation ^ 



% 



* 



which might involve our resoonsibility for breakup* 



This 



* 






precisely result which i apprehended and fully discussed wi±j 



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:,"endes~ Prance Paris and I must count on him to strive 
to protect both our countries against consequences o.f 
this Communist maneuver which Eden might unwittingly 



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INFO: J5-2 NMCC-I S/DEF-7 ASQ/f.SA-9 DIA-ip 
. . • CSA-1 CM0-9 CSAF-1 CHC-3 C'JCS-1 DJS-3 



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55684 



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FROM: Geneva 



Ccairai: 7ol3 „ , . 
fccvd-s July 18, D-SB 1 -- 

9:33 P«ns' 



CALC53337 
fUfflTffSC'C/HC 

. SERVICE 



TO: Secretary oi' Soats 



ilO: • SSCTO 054, July IS, 11 p.tn 



(section Gm ( m^o)_ 



> p-»r n 20. , 9. 49 2 

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•LONDON 19, SAIGON 65, TOIQTO 6, MOSCOW 7. 



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SEN? DSEASSaffiHT SSCTO 654, EEEE933EE) INFOH^ilON PifelS 1 94'/"v;->. Cn I 

■ ■ ' ' • • " " • '" ' p * <* 0)1! 

EES&RSWiT PASS DEFENSE; TOSfO PASS CINCFE; •a^IGOK'.TASSf—^Tl • 3 ~ 

VIENTIANE AM) PBNOM PSKE • MlB 

.T 4 . -;•-.* ■■■- \.v.-. i« *"/*** 

Twenty- third Indochina restricted session Sunday > July Xo^ 
Molotov presiding. This session -called at urgent request 



> 



Soviets: French ana British had requested that par ux expands 
"be confined to chiefs of del plus one adviser- Thi3 latter- 
relaxed to permit two advisers. * ' 



Molotov spoke first, noting that last meeting. ox F:or-eig2 
Ministers held on Jane 19,. just one month ago,- He believed 
that today's session presented good opportunity to gue^s ■ 
importance of period which had passed since last meeting 
and work performed by deputies. He believed that results 
achieved through private meetings and discussions MS been 




Art 






.- ^^ 



^-> 



not (repeat notj inconsiderable. Gf course^ not (repeal QGujl 
ail of the questions had been resolved nor everytbing done 
which bad to be done, but one should recognize the value of 
what had cean achieved. - '"' :.-. V 



Molotov said first of all he wished to note that as far as ;' ,. 
the most ccnplicated problem was concerned^, that of peaoe iiSi'V 1 
Indochina^ a basis for reestablisl^rient of peace had been k ae~ 7 
hieved as a result private negotiations which baa opened" 1 possi 
bility of agreernent on that c^es'tion. Ee believed ail ps3?ti- ' 
clpants would attach appropriate significance to this accoui« 
plishzneat. He felt it was also important to recognise the 
work done with reference to estahlislimsnt of peace iti Lacs 
and Cambodia. m : this connections it is perhaps true that __ 
everything had not (repeat not) been done that could be. done'^ 
but it appeared conference was on way to agreement concerning^ 
Laos and Cambodia. • . 







f 2 

• -it- 



- 



! * 



C 

talks have 



Molotov said that ail this shows, recent private 

-had success and he expressed belief that such success would 



- 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NKD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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CONFIDENTIAL 



July 13, 11 p.m. (SECTION OSS OF TWO), from 



x. 



con cinuo - 



Tv^"t»lbt T i*r oifcu&tion as it appeared to him, Molotov noted thai 
drafts for agreements on cessation of hostilities in Vietnam 
and La^s bad beerj presented to conference. Two drafts would 






soday* The same Fas also true "for Cassbodia* He 



honed parties concerned would display goodwill necessary to 
a*p&3 on unresolved points in these drafts. 



Molotov noted also were two drafts of Geneva conference 
felon dealing with Important political matters. 









^ • 



i 



i ' 



Tvo drafts have also been presented concerning the question of 
International control pertaining to implementation of the agree 
Bents* Question of control commission has long been discussed 
and Molotov felt .that final agreement on this subject would not 
(repeat not) require great deal o'f titrse. 

-a 

Molotov concluded by saying that he had made these observations 
in order to give general picture of the conference at present 
and that his remarks were naturally not (repeat not) complete. 
He believed that today : s meeting could make progress re the 
Questions under discussion and would contribute to solution of 
problems facing conference. . | 

After long pause Tran Van Do (Vietnam) spoke next, saying he . 
had learned this morning that; today r a meeting was to. review .\ 
final declaration of Geneva conference. In order to avoid any 
misunderstanding^ he wished to state firmly that Vietnam eel 
could not (repeat, not) associate Itself with any .discussion of 
this declaration. Vietnam position based on following noints 



■O 2T 



1. Vietnam does hot agree to conditions advanced for cessation 



ox hostilities* 



j o 



ft 

2. Vietnam delegation has not' (repeat not) as yet advanced 
proposals on behalf of Vietnam Government for solution of prob- 
lem based on principles of peace*; independence and unity. 



With regard point number one, Do referred to French draft, of 
July 16 of conference declaration (SEG20 628 repeated Paris 7^ 
• Saigon KS) • This' draft spoke of division of Vie tnanf Into zones 
For example, article 6 said settlement must permit Vietnamese 
people en^cy fundesie&vaX liberties guaranteed' by democrat!* 

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TO: Secretary or EPSQi&s 









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1)0: SE0T0 6511, July 18, 11 p.m. (SECTION TWO 01? TW0) v _._ 



'• 



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PRIOR ITT ' • " . . • ■ " • ••?,., ,-, 

** •* .• *** - y #>-< x^ 

SE25T iJEPARSHBHS SKCTO 65^, .REPEATED IWORMATION PAKIS/9 ? *7 I&EB '5N 

19. SAIGOJS 65, "TOKYO 6, MOSCOW 7, V3EEEEEA2IE, PMOM EEHH TJ 223SRED, ■ 

T0Ki:0 PASS CHKBE . * "• /' -^JU-. / ' 



DBPARgaMBRf PASS DEFEASE. 

supervised by international commission. ^ectian3\¥Cu ( M t-ake place* 
when it) opinion of competent representative authorities In each 
zone restoration of peace. in country has made sufficient progress 
et cetera. Article 7 speaks of a settlement which would give 
Vietnamese people right decide freely as. to zone where residence 
desired - 



i 



i 



Vietnamese representative next referred to Soviet draft of July 15 
(SECTO 6l5, Repeated Paris 6p, ' Saigon 35)* Article 8 of Soviet 
draft speaks of "consultation between competent representative au- 
thorities of northern and southern zones of Vietnam 11 . _ Article 10 
states that representative authorities in northern and southern 
zones of Vietnam, as well as authorities of Laos and Cambodia, will 
not permit persecution of persons who have collaborated with othe^ 
side. 



- 



In view Vietnamese delegation, this indicates that Vietnam will be 
divided into north and south zones . Everyone is talking of the cff.. 
vision of Vietnam and mention Is even made of parallels at which"" 
division will be accomplished- Delegation of Vietnam:, can s>nlf pro- 
test the idea of partition/ Bas"ed on point number one cited eeri**U 



in statement of Vietnamese representative, Vietnamese delegation 
flatly rejects both drafts submitted to conference. *~ _ 




express owe vievs. It reserves its" right to submit a draft d§ci* 







Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NNl) Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






CONFIDENTIAL 
-2- SECTO 65k, July l8, 11 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO), from Geneva. 

Do noted further that there was no mention of State of Vietnam in 
either French or Soviet drafts. Vietnamese delegation cannot 
accept declaration or agreement where Vietnam, which invited to 
conference as existing state, not even mentioned. 

* 

After pause following Molotov f s request for other speakers, General 
made following statement: 

"If no one else desires to speak, I think it would be helpful if 
I made clear position of US in these last critical days of con- 
ference. I do this because I have recently seen the advance drafts 
submitted to the conference and have had a chance to review them. 

"One position of the United States with respect to this conference 
has consistently been that it is willing to assist, where desired, 
in arriving at a just and honorable settlement which will contri- 
bute to the establishment and maintenance of peace in the area. 
The United States is not a belligerent in this conflict and it has 
not and will not seek to impose its views in any way upon the belli- 
gerents, who are the parties primarily interested. 

"If the agreements arrived at here are of a character which my 
government is able to respect, the United States is prepared to de- 
clare unilaterally that, in accordance with its obligations under 
the United Nations Charter, and particularly Article Il(^), it will 
refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them, and 
would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the agree- 
ments with grave concern. 

Since no other representatives requested floor following General 
Smith's statement, Molotov suggested intermission. After intermission 
had lasted for U-5 minutes, it was informally agreed that meeting 
should be adjourned without returning to conference room. No com- 
munique issued. 

Comment : Today's restricted session strangest performance to date. 
Apparent Molotov had not set stage even with Communist colleagues 
for any particularly important announcement despite his insistence 
that meeting be called. Molotov had said to Mendes-France just be- 
fore meeting that he thought would be well underline progress made 
and to show how close conference was to reaching agreement. 

During recess, Chou En-lai said he had no desire make any statement. 
He seemed as much in dark as everyone else as to why Soviets had 
called meeting. 



SMITH 



SMD:JG/ll 



661 



Note: Passed Army, Navy, Air, OSD 7/l8/5^> 11 p.m. <IEF 



CONFIDENTIAL 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NNM) Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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FROM: Geneva 



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Secretary of State 

SECTO 655, July 18, 11 p.m. 



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S2.7T IJKl'AHTMtiH't 3ECT0 655, HEPE&E&D INFORMATICS PARIS '95, SftlSON ©fi 

r 1 ^ - ■ ' ' • " ' ; 4 ^ cJuf. 

At recess after today's meeting / Tran Vhn ir? }r ind'"Tr^>j Van Ohuong 

immediately approached Johnson stating- they wished, F3 rclearly qj 

understand reasons they felt court; "Tod fna!ie---'Uiei>' statement at ^q 

today's meeting (SECTO 6^4) and why they were asking for a x plenary qj 

session. They said they desired at such a plenary s-ea^ipn put for-, 

ward position contained their note to French (<$ JJCT0 § 5#) and asked,^ 

.Johnson's opinion on position. C':) nson replied that, did not feel * , 

Lb was practicable proposal, to which they responded they fully q 

realized that it w as not pr^hTr^vir.- nnr] wou]d be ^rejected by : r« 



other s Lde^ JJyl[_they Prill; t hey mu st make mora J. p os Axon tneir 
^jyei' niii(;inr 'clear to world and to Vietna mese peopl e n ccrter sloe ^J 
rejected lx>, position of [.riexr"j7UTurhTnelTt would have been improved . j 
Upon ro;icctlo n_by other side th ey w ould be prepared accept sett : - ,. 
iMcnt a Jong lines now beinr: discussed". = — — - r« 







KK'.on pointed out that time was short and it v/as late for each 
proposal to which they replied that Meudes could of course ask for 
and obtain additional time from French Assembly. " hnson expressed 
strong doubt and urged they speak directly with French. After- re- 
peated strong urglngs tboy ^finally a p proached Mendes , who listen ed 
sympathetically and at length . He suggested and they promised to 
consider formulation their proposal in writing and circulation to 
other delegations. He ont^nrip.nlly wl-.Ml-.ori hnVmiM not even If he 
so jjcslrod astc Assembly for any extension time he has givon's oTj'." 

Johnson told Meudes he wan concerned over reaction to Vietnamese 
sta tome tit and reminded Mendes of IK'-, position o>i' VI ot,f.-irru><--.,-- ; cen- 
i ? a.i rret, ice with any agreement . [ vjun des stated be was very ^orsciou o 
ol • anu was asking Do Jc.ui immediately ro to uannes • t o see Ban 

.11 . 

CJhanvel said that from Do Jean 1 a previous 
appeared Bmo Dal had no knowledge of Do 1 3 
and In. general bad giv c delegation hero 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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....FR'OM: Geneva 

TO: Secretary of State 

HO: SECTO 66l, July 19, 1 p. 



Re SECTO 639 



Control: 7750 " 

Rec'd: July 19, 195^ 
8:55 a.m. 



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Topping has supplied in 'confidence following bac* . round infer- ; 
mation concerning his story on views of Chinese ,onmunist 
delegation. 

■ 

He stated his informant was Huang Kua, whom he has known for 
many years. Interview was at Huang's initiative, was called 
on short notice, and was conducted In extremely serious manner 
without propaganda harangues . 

Topping said he had reported Huang's statement fully in his 
story but had obtained number of visual impressions" during 
interview. Vhen Huang spoke of possibility American bases in 
Indochina or anti-Communist pact in Southeast Asia, he became 
very agitated, his hands shook, and his usually excellent Eng- 
lish broke down, forcing him to work through interpreter. Huang 
also spoke seriously and with apparent sincerity concerning his 
belief that I have returned to Geneva to prevent settlement* 
/ Topping believes Chinese Communists convinced Americans made 
deal with French during Paris talks on basis of which Mendes- 
France has raised price of settlement. 



SMITH 






' MEJ/6 



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Control: 7917 
Roc'd: July 19, 195^ 
2: lo p.m. 



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FffON: Geneva 

TO: Secretory of Bi-cvbo 

HO: SECTO 666, July 19, 7 p.m. 

NIACT 

■ • .- i l- 

FOR THE SECRETARY PROM THE UNDERSECRETARY. ' \ 

The outlines of l<rfbern ational contr oIJ)now clearly emerge, N 
Composition -will proUafaly be Poland, India, and Canada or Belgium 
The French prefer Belgium and so do I, Both Poland and Canada 
or Belgium will have veto on important questions. Commission 
will have full freedom of movement in demilitarized zones which * 
will separate forces at each stage of regrouping and in all 
frontier- and seacoast areas. 



s 



—fi Taking everything into consideration,.! strongly feel this i 
I satisfactory and much better than we were able to obtain in 
|| Korea, French feel, and Eden and I agree, that with such 
composition built-in veto will work to v - our advantage. This 
setup is best French or anybody else could get, and I feel it 
is within spirit of point 7. 



SMITH 



BB:BD/11 



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-■Control: 7974 
.Roc'd: July 19, 1954 
j:^l p.m. 



TO: Secretary of State 



--•• 



HO: SECTO 



9 



July 19, 8 p 



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NIACT 



-, 



. . - - ,- 







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FOR THE SECRE2AHZ FROM THE UNDER SECRETARY 



. I had long talk with Mendea -France this afternoon, as I told 
you. He urgently asked that we expand our proposed unilateral 
declaration so as take note not (repeat not) only of agree- 
ments between military commands, but also take note of para- 
graphs one to nine proposed conference declaration . (See 
6rSECT0s 628 aod 647), 1 made It clear that we could under _no 
k j "girouffl3tances_a3 3 0ci ate_ ourselves, with conference decl aration 
evenjt hough it is anfficijiate^T^ 

do^ut^ t e~~o r other- 

wise imply any acquiescence in or approval of paragraph 10 
which provides for consultation among conference members on 
questions transmitted to them by international control 
commissions, ' " 

Text of declaration not yet agreed between French and Communis ',s , 
but I am transmitting immediately by following telegram French 
estimate probable final text. I am also transmitting texts of 
unilateral statements to which Laos and Cambodia have agreed 
which are referred to in paragraph h draft declaration and 
draft French trilateral declaration referred to in paragraph 8. 



01 

CD 

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01 



EJ^gnc^jgosi^J^ is this conference declaration is integral part 
of agreements reached at conference and they will be sorely dis- 
appointed if we simply disassociate ourselves from declaration 
without even taking note in same manner as with respect to 
cease-fire agreements » I recommend that I be authorized to 
amend our proposed declaration (Annex B my instructions) by 
inserting a brief addition taking note of ^arajgraphs one to 
nine cf conference declaration if its final conten1rnctoe3--tie4r 



• i 

Zfpfer , 

too greatly differ from that which French have indicated they] : . 

prepared to accept a I would like some latitude on this, and 
am sure I knotf what would be acceptable to you, I will, of 
course , have to state in conference bhot the US is unable to 
join in a arultilatersl declaration (since. the one planned would 
include the Ccrj^iunists) but it is making a declaration of its/ 
own position j et cetera n This may /cease to a head tomorrow - 
ill] p afternoon or evenings and while it - would be possible to make 7 

ope T 2 

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--2- SEOTO 669 , July 19, 8 p.m. from Geneva " *- 

our declaration later It is infinitely preferable to do It 
at th'e time of settlement. Otherwise we will have to dis- 
associate ourselves with a lengthy and detailed conference 
declaration without anything of our own to offer except the 
very brief declaration we already have prepared. 



TT/l 



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SENT TOs Amconsul GENEVA TOSEC &y£ N JACT 

~~ FOR TOTDER SECRETARY FROM SECRETARY 

Your SECTOS 666^667, 668, 669/ 

As requ est ed 669 yo umay expand proposed unilateral Eetesx 

. declaration so as to take note of paragraphs 1 to 8 of the proposed 

Conference declaration with understanding that US obligations w$M 

QTE with regard to aforesaid agreements and paragraphs of 

• Declaration UNQTE are limited to those expressed Subparagraphs 1 and-$ 

of Annex B of your instructions. * Ol 



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• The ek foregoing is on the assumption that the Declaration in its 

- 

final form does not materially differ from SECTO 667. As to non- 
materiality of differences, -would like you to obtain Phleger's legal 

judgment. 

- 

- 

Have no objection to including first portion of paragraph 9 of proposed 

. . . (■■.■■■ 

Conference declaration a but am concerned as to effect of inducting second 

r - * 

• port ion of paragraph 9 as this seems to imply a multilateral engagement 
with Communists which would be inconsistent with our &asa§ bs ic 
approach and which subsequently might enable Communist China to ch 
us with alleged violations of agreement to which it might claim both 






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T OP SE CRET 



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■ TOSEC 

Amconsul GENEVA 1H5DUL 



NIACT 



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Classification 






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I governments became parties. 

1 While we don't want to take responsibility of imposing our views on the French, 

# 7? 

I feel particularly concerned about provisions of paragraph 6 which gives the Control 

Commission constituted as per SECTO 666 authority also to control the general 

~i ^ -^— — — ^ .^ _^^^_^^^^^^ 

elections. The ink is hardly dry on the Declaration of President Eisenhower and 



Prime Minister Churchill ofuune 29 to the effect that "In the case of nations now 



I divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free 

■ 
elections supervised by the UN to insure that they are conducted fairly. M It is 

( 
■ [ rather humiliating to see that Declaration now so quickly go ^&wxk down the drain 

j with our apparent acquiescence, 

« ■ ■ * - 

. * With reference to 668 believe something like this is acceptable if obtainable. 

( 

I Believe that this would not necessitate these states dealing only with or through 

■ 

IF 

France as suggested your 650 and 652. V/e hope that this possibility of direct 
* 

assistance for genuinely defensive and internal security purposes and not involving 
1 • ' . very 

any US bases can be preserved as it may x\orx well be that as a result of surrender 

in Tonkin Delta French will become so highly unpopular that their effort to maintain 

* 

authority in other areas would in fact lead to these other areas surely fallina under 



Communist domination. 



/ I" 



LiLV^' t? ^* « O 



JB8 

TOP S.iCRET 



1^829 



Classification 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 633 10, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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moment of State 




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F.KGM.: Geneva ' / 

TO: .S^creta^T oj? Sisato 

HO: SECTO 675. July 19, 9 p.m 

I 

PRIORITY" • " • 



Octroi: 8058 

Roc'd: July 19, .195^ *"-'--• 
• 6:51 p.m. 

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SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 6?5 REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 106,* r~ r ,, 
SAIGON 75. ■ ^ £ -)JU. (o 

f rt) 

Vietnamese DEL handed us late this afternoon their new proposal. ^ 
It is elabor ation of Idea in note to French ( SECT O 633 Land con-^ 
ference^was advised of its preparation in yesterday ! s restricted"^ 
session. Unofficial translation follows: * ' X 

m 

QUOTE 



French, Soviet, and Viet Minh drafts all admit the principles of j 
a partition of Vietnam in two zones, all of North Vietnam being ^ 
abandoned to the Viet Minh. ^ 

Although this partition is only provisional in theory, it would V 
not (repeat not) fail to produce In Vietnam the same effects as ** 
in Germany, Austria, and Korea- * _ ■ 

It would not (repeat not) bring the peace which is sought for, 
deeply wounding the national sentiment of the Vietnamese people, 
it would provoke trouble throughout the country, trouble which 
would not (repeat not) fail to threaten a peace so dearly ac- 
quired. s ... 

Before discussing the conditions of a de facto partition with 
disastrous consequences for the people of Vietnam and, for the 
peace of the world, th e DEL of the state of Vietnam renews i t3 
proposal for a_ ge s.se -fire without a demarcation line , w I thou t 
partition, even pro visionally , " 



The Vietnamese DEL therefore proposes ; 

1. A cease-fire on present positions 

2. Regroupment of troops in two zones which would be as 
possible. 



3. Disarmament of Irregular troops 



^ 



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' • SECRET 

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-2- SECTO 673, July 19, 9 p.m., from Geneva 

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5. Control by the United Nations: 

A. Of the cease-fire 

B. Of the regroupment 

C. Of the disarmament and the withdrawal ; 

D. Of the administration of the entire country 

E. Of the general elections , when the United Nations be.lieves 
that order and security will have been everywhere truly -restored. 

This proposal made on the formal Instructions of His Majesty Bao 
Dai, and of the President Ngo Dinh Diem, shows that the chief of 
state of Vietnam once more places the independence and the unity 
of his country above any other consideration, and that the 
national government of Vietnam would prefer this provisional UN 
control over a truly Independent and United Vietnam to Its main-*" 
tenance in power in a country dismembered and condemned to 
slavery.* * 



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■ Vietnamese DSL renews its request that a conference session be 
devoted to the study of its proposal for a cease-fire without 
partition-. 

In adding this proposal to those of other members of the con- 
ference, the DEL of the state of Vietnam means to bring a positive 
contribution to the'* search for a real and durable peace which 
conforms to the aspirations of the Vietnamese people. 

Geneva, July 19, 1954. . { 

■a « 

END QUOTE ' . 



Comments follow. 



SMITH 



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(7M& wnilaicraZ declaration hy the United States Government sets 
forth its position with regard to the Geneva Accords % which it did 
not sign.) 

STATEMENT BY THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE' 1 
AT THE CONCLUDING PLENARY SESSION OF THE 
GENEVA CONFERENCE, JULY 21, 1951 2 

* * 

As I stated on July 18, my Government is not prepared to join in a 
declaration by the Conference such as is submitted. However, the 
United States makes this unilateral declaration of its position in these 
matters: 

Declaration 

The Government of the United States being resolved to devote its 
■ efforts to the strengthening of peace in accordance with the principles 
and purposes of the United Nations takes note of the agreements con- 
cluded a& Geneva on July 20 and 21, 1954 between (a) the Franco- 
Laotian Command and tho Command of the Peoples Army of Viet- 
Nam; (b) the Royal Khmer Array Command and tho Command of 
.the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam; (c) Franco-Vietnamese Command 
and the Command of the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam and of para- 
graphs 1 to 12 inclusive of tho declaration presented to the Geneva 
Conference on July 21, 1954 declares with regard to the aforesaid 
agreements and paragraphs that (i) it will refrain from the threat or 
tho use of force to disturb them, in accordance with Article 2(4) of the 
Charter of the United Nations dealing with the obligation of members 
to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force; and (ii) it would viow any renewal of the aggression in violation 
of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern end as seriously 
threatening international peace and security. 

In connection with tho statement in the declaration concerning free 
elections i:i Viet-Nam my Government wishes to make clear its posi- 
tion .which it has expressed in a declaration made in Washington on 
June 29, IS* 54, as follows : 

In tlie ease of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to eee?c 
to achieve nelty through free elections supervised by tho United Nations to insure 
that they are conducted fairly. 

With respect to the statement made by the representative of tho 
State of Yiet-Nam, the United States reiterates its traditional position 
that peoples are entitled to determine their own future and that it 
will not join in an arrangement which would hinder this. Nothing 
in its declaration just made is intended to or does indicate any de- 
parture from this traditional position. 

. We share the hope that the agreements will permit Cambodia, Laos 
and Viet-Nam to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty. ■ 
in the peaceful community of nations, and will enable the peoples ox 
that area to determine their own future. .- . ♦ 



* Walter BftfcU Smith. 

1 Department of SUto Bulletin, Aujj. 1 t 1954, pp. 162-1G3. 



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IC/43/Rev, 2 
21 July 1954 
Original: FRENCH m 



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* . * 



GENEVA 



CONFERENCE 



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INDO-CHINA 



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FINAL DECLARATION, dated the 21st July, 1954, ■ of" the' Geneva 
Conference on the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China, in which , 
the representatives of Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, 
France, Laos, the People's Republic of China, the State of Viet-Nam,- 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States of America took part, " . "« 



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■IC/43/Rev. 2 • . 

page 2 

* 

1. The Conference takes note of the agreements ending hostilities in 
Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam and organizing international control and the super- 
vision of the execution of the provisions of these agreements. 

* 

2. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the ending of hostilities in 
Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam; the Conference expresses its conviction that the* 
execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agree- 
ments on the cessation of hostilities will permit Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam 
henceforth to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the 
peaceful community pf nations* ' 

W m * 

■ 

3. The Conference takes note of the declarations' made' by the Governments 
.of Cambodia and of Laos of their intention to adopt measures permitting all 
'citizens to take their place in the national community, in particular by par- 
ticipating in the next general elections, which, in conformity with the consti-' 

'tution'of each of these countries, shall take place in the course of the year 
1955, by secret ballot and in conditions of respect for fundamental freedoms. 






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/♦: ■■*' 4. "■■"vThe Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the 
" cessation. of hostilities in Viet-Nam prohibiting the introduction into Viet-Nam 
of. foreign troops and military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and 
munitions.' The Conference also takes note of the declarations made by the 
Governments of Cambodia and Laos of their resolution not to request foreign aid, 
whether in war material, in personnel or in instructors except for the purpose of 
the effective defence of their territory and, in the case of Laos, to the extent 
defined by the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Laos. i- 

* * 

■ 

5. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation 
of hostilities in Viet-Nam to the effect that no military base under the control of 
a foreign State may be established in the regrouping zones of the two parties, the 
latter having the obligation to see that the zones allotted to them shall not 
constitute part of any military alliance and shall not be utilized for the res- 
umption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy. The Conference 
also takes note of the declarations of the Governments of Cambodia and Laos to 

the effect that they will not join in any agreement with other States if this 
agreement includes the obligation to participate in a military alliance not in 
conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or, in the 
case of Laos, with the principles of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities' 
in Laos or, so long as their security is not threatened, the obligation to • '• •' 
establish bases on Cambodian or Laotian territory for the military forces of - 
foreign Powers. * -■*...'. 

6. The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the agreement 
relating to Viet-Nam is to settle military questions with a view, to ending hos- 
tilities and that the military demarcation line is provisional and should not 
in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary. 



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IC/43/Rev. 2 
page 3 



The Conference expresses Its conviction that the execution of the provisions 
set out in the present declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of 
hostilities creates the necessary basis for the achievement in the near future 
of a political settlement in Viet-Nam. ■•' . . *. 



7. The Conference declares that, so far as Viet-Nam is concerned, the 
settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the 
principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity, shall permit the 
Viet-Namese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, "guaranteed by democratic 
institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. 
In order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been 
made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the 
national will, general elections shall be held in July 1956, under the supervision 
of an- International commission composed of representatives of the Member States 
of the International Supervisory Commission, referred to In the agreement on the 
cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this subject between the 
competent representative authorities of the two zones from 20 July 1955 onwards. -> 



> The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities intended 
to, ensure the protection of individuals and of property must be most strictly 
applied and must, in particular, allow everyone in Viet-Nam to decide freely in 
.which zone he wishes to live. .• : 

9. - The competent representative authorities of the Northern and Southern 
zones of Viet-Nam, as well as the authorities of Laos and Cambodia, must not 
permit any individual or collective reprisals against persons who have collabor- 
ated in any way with one of the parties during, the war, or against members of 

such persons' families. 

* * 

* * • 

■ 

10. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the Government of the 

French Republic to the effect that it is ready to withdraw its troops from the 
territory of Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam, at the requests of the Governments 
concerned and within periods which shall be fixed by agreement between the 
parties except iu the cases where, by agreement between the two parties, a 
certain number of French troops shall remain at specified points and for a 
specified time. . 

11. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the French Government 
to the effect that for the settlement of all the problems connected with the 
re-establishment and consolidation of peace in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, the 
French Government will proceed from the principle of respect for the independence * 
and sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam. 

12; In their relations with Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, each member of the • 
Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the Independence, the- 
unity and the territorial infcegrtfcy of the above-mentioned states, and to refrain 
from any interference In their internal affairs. 






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•■IC/43/Rev.2 
page 4 ; 



' 13. The members of the Conference agree to consult one another on any 
question which may be referred to them by the International Supervisory Commission, 
in order to study such measures as may prove necessary *to ensure that the agree- 
ments on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet -Nam are respected. 



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