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Full text of "Pentagon Papers"

Declassified per Bxecuiive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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V,B Justification ofthe War d I Vols.) 

Internal Documents (9 Vols,) 

3, The Eisenhower Administration: (4 Vols.) 

c. Volume III: Geneva Accords- 15 March 1956 




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UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS 

- 1967 



VIETNAM TASK FORCE 



OF THE S 



ETARY OF DEFENSE 



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The EJE anhover^Ac teiiriigtration, 1953 - 19o0 
B OOK II I^^G^ev:! Accords - 15 March 195b 



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!■ I M I 1 - . - — _^ '■ I 1 11 ^m^^—: 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

^1 1 III ' ^ — ' — ^^ 

The Geneva Accords - I960 



- f 



The State Department eicplains the rationale of \Thy the 
United States issued a unilateral declaration instead' 
of signing the 195 li- Accords on Indochina. Secretary 
Dulles vas unwilling to even consider signing accords 
on Indochina of the type concluded at Geneva^^ and hence 
was not ai;i" "alternative to issuing a unilateral declara- 
tion but vas a s^uhstitute sxzggested by the French 
leaders p The declaration vas based on the understandings 
of the lU July Franco-AmGrican Six Point position paper* 
State Eepai'tment Analysis - Geneva Declaration » 



i" 



676 



The KSG adopts the JCS reconimendation that the possible 
use of EOK forces in Indochina be kept under review. 
Secretary of Defense Mezaorandum to JCS^ 30 July I95U... 



679 



Dulles reviews the occasions when French officials sug- 
gested U.S, armed intervention in Indochina and the 
parallel U.S. efforts to organize "united action." 
The possibility of '^united action" lapsed in mid -June 
19511- with the French decision to obtain a cease-fire 
at Geneva. Dulles 689 to Londonj 3 August 195^* •• 



V . 



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650 



The CIA assesses the probable out loo}: in Indochina in 
the light of agreements at the Geneva Conference. The 
conclusions are:(l)that the coirciunists will continue to 
pursue their objectives in South Vietnaia by political, 
psychological and paraiiij.litary raeans; (2) that if 
elections are held in 1956 > the Viet Minh will vrin; 
(3) sind that the events in Laos and Cambodia depend 
on the developments in Vietnam. Nationd Intelligence 
Estimate, NIE 63-5-5^^ 3 August 195^ 



691 



The French view^ of Diem Government is that it does not 
qualify ^n three major points; (l) fully representative 
of the population; (2) prepared to carry out land reform; 
and (3) prepared to depose Bao Dai. Diem is seen as 
valuable f orchis high moral character but his mandarin 
background precludes his qualifications on the three 
points, Paris ^Sl to Dulles, k August 195U ,*... 



699 



I9O- The Joint Chiefs of Staff recoxomend that before the U.S. 
assume responsibility for training the Vietnamese Army 
that four preconditions be met: (l) "it is absolutely 
essential that there be a. reasonably strong ^ stable 
civil government in control"; (2) each government coU" 
cerned should formally request the U.S. to assume the 
responsibility; (3) arrangements should be made for 



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gi-anting fulJ_ independence and provide for phased with- 
draval of French forces; and {h) the force structure . 
should be dictated by local military requirements. 
JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense^ h August I95I1 



701 



The Chief *M4AG outlines bis point of view 'of the U.S. 
part in tVie future of Vietnain. His mission is tvrofold: 
establish U*S. coui^ses of action to insure survival of 
Free Vietnam as a nation and develop Vietnam as an 
effective barrier to Coiniaunist expansion. Saigon 302UAj 



8 August 



195^ 



/ 
703 



192. The Treilch have been lead to believe that Dulles made 
an offer of the use of atomic bombs at Dien Bien Phu 
and that Bidanlt "vras "much upset" by the offer and felt 
that they vould have done no good tactically. There is 
concern that Bidault — "illj nervous, hypersensitive 
■ and bitter^^ might attempt to publicize his version and 
take credit for preventing the use of atom bombs as 
*' suggested by the U.S." Paris 558 to Dulles^ 9 August 

195^^ 

J.93. Dulles has "no recollection whatever of the alleged 
offer" of atOHiic bombs to the French and indicates 
"it is incredible that I should have made the offer 

Dulles 501 to Paris, 9 August 195U • 



• 



705 



It 



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706 



On the offer of atomic 'bombs, the French agree that 
there has been a complete misunderstanding, possibly 
based on language difficulties. On the day of Dulles, 
"alleged'' offer, Bidault had been "ill, jittery, 
overvrrought " and, even to the French staff^ '^incoherent 
Paris 576 to Dulles J 10 August I95U ...,.,. 



708 



.195. The JCS revie^v.^U*S- policy in the Far East - KSC 5^29- 

They recommer^ that KSC 5^^29 be returned to the Planning 
Board for "exposition of U.S. objectives" and "delinea- 
tion of broad courses of action" in the Far East, Ex- 
tensive comments by the Army Chief of Staff on KSC 5i^29 
: (^'it is not a comprehensive review of the entire prob- 
lem. -.Vffi DO KOT KA"/E EITHER TO APPEASE COMIfUlIIST CifflTA 
OR TO DESTROY ITc") are Included- JCS Memorandum for 
Secretary of Defense ^ 11 August 195^ 



709 



The JCS comment on a draft State Department message for 
the French Prime Minister regarding U.S. policy towa.rd 
Indochina. They feel the message should state clearly 
that the assumption of training responsibility In Viet- 
nam by the U^S. is contingent on the preconditions stated 

in their h August memorandum (see Document I85) , JCS 
Meaorandum for Secretary of Defense^ 12 Au^st 195U 



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Eegarding., -the assumption by the U,S, of the responsi- 
bility for training the Vietnamese Army^ Secretary Wilson 
forvrards the JCS vie-,f as representing the Defense Depart- 
ment position to Secretary Dulles. Secrete^ry of Defense 
Letter to Secretary of State ^ 12 August 195^5- 



• * * * * 



717 



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The JCS concur in the viev that a statement of intent 
to conclude a treaty establishing a collective security 
arrangement in the Far East should be issued by the 
countries ^-rhich intend to be treaty members. The JCS 
list the provisions vhich the treaty should incorporate, 
JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense^ 13 August 195^* 



/ 



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Secretary ^.^filson expresses the Defense vievs on the draft 
"Southeast Asia Collective Seciurity Treaty" ^vhich include 
the JCS position. In his view^ the recent developments 
dn Geneva and Indochina increases the urgency for a 
"comprehensive United States policy irith respect to the 
Far East region as a vhole." Secretary of Defense Letter 
to Secretary of State, 1? August I95U - 



725 



Secretary Dulles replies to the JCS; h preconditions with 
the assertion that "one of the most efficient means of 
enabling the Vietnamese Government to become strong is to 
assist it in reorganizing the Kational army and in train- 
ing that army." Even though Vietnam could not meet the 
U.S. prereq^uisites, Dulles believes that strengthening the 
army vas a prerequisite to political stability. Secretary 
of State Memorandum to Secretary of Defense^ I8 August 

195^ • • • 

+ 

The U*S. policy ifith respect to Southeast Asia provides 
for negotiating a collective security treaty, considers 
appropriate action in the event of local subversion^ and 
outlines political and covert action. NSC 5^29/2, 
20 August 195^. 

a 

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The President has approved the policy that henceforth 
aid to Indochina Tjould be direct rather thsn through 
the medium of the French Government. Further, State 
feels the Government should respond affirmatively to 
Cambodia's request for assistance in training the Hoyal 
Cambodian Pjrn^, Secretary of State Letter to Secretary 
of Defense J 26 August 195^ 



723 



731 



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Australia velccmes establishment of SEATO and is pre- 
pared to mske an increased military contribution to ■ 
the defense of the area. Australian Aide -Memo ire , 
31 August 1954 • •'• * 



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The Manila Conference, del'egate submits comment on the 
SEATO treaty articles of special concern to Defense. , 
Among these are: "Article IV is the heart of the 
treaty" -- and provides that aggression against any 
member 5 or^ by agreement j any nation in the area^ would 
be met by .action in accordance with ""constitutional 
processes^'; Article V establishes a council which pro- 
vides for "m^^chinery" to achieve Treaty objectives; 
and Article VII provides that other nations may be 
invited to accede to the Treaty. ISA Memorandum for 
Secretary of Def ense ^ lU September 19-5^^ - * - ■ 



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Diem has" not demonstrated the necessary ability to deal 
with practical politics and administration. France^ 
apparently with no policy toward South VietnejiLj has 
failed to support Diem. Trends indicate enhanced 
prospects of Communist control over the area. SEIIE 
63-6^5^ J 15 September 195^ - 



Ambassador Heath goes on record vj^ith a strong critic 
cism of General 'Daniel's "impetuous action" in 
contacting General Hinh concerning the political 
crisis in Saigon. "Daniel prefers Hinh to Diem and 
rejects the exiling of Hinh to the United States as 
requested by Diem. Ambassador Heath Letter to State^ 
l6 September 195^^-* , 



751 



753 



The JOS see tlie Geneva -cease-fire agreement as a major 
obstacle to the introduction of adequate U.S.. lL\kQ per- 
sonnel and of additional arms and equipment. Further/ 
because of "uncertain capabilities of the French and 
Vietnamese to retrieve ^ retain, and reorganize the 
dispersed forces of Vietnam^" U.S. support to the area 
should be acccfniplished at "low priority." JCS Memoran- 
dum for Secretary of Defense^ 22 September 195^!- * 



756 



4 

The JCS recommend against the assignment of a training 
mission to J&AGj Saigon in view of the unstable politi- 
cal situation in South Vietnam. JCS Memorandum to 
Secretary of Defense j 22 September I95U. 759 -. 



209 • Total tonnage of MDAP material delivered to Indochina 

since December, 1950, is 737>000 tons. Prior to termi- 
nation of hostilities J there were 500,000 tons of eqiAP- 
ment and 20^000 vehicles in Noi'th Vietnam, As of 
13 September, there are ^50, 000 tons of equipment to 
be evacuated from Horth Vietnam. Military Assistance 
Keraoi-and^jm for ISA, 2k September 195^^ 



761 



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210- The U.S. and France agree to support Diem in the estab- 
lishment of a strong, anti-CoBimtmist nationalist govern- 
ment- The five key elements recognized which can provide 
a choice of success are: Eao Dai, General Hinh and the 
National army^ and the three sects. The Binh Xx^en sect, 
vhich controls the police and is tied to Bao Dai, is to 
,, he isolated' from Bao Dai and their strength minimised* 
" TOSEC 9y 30 September 195^- - '^^5 

to 

211. Secretary Dulles feels that U,S, policy on the magnitude 
of force levels and costs for Vietnam should he based on 

' '" KSC 5U29/2 which provides for internal security forces 
^ under SEATO: ''•••.it is imperative that the United 
- '. States Government prepare a firm position on the sl2e 

' of forces we consider a minimum level to assure the 
internal secui^ity of Indochina," Dulles Letter to 

_, ' ■ Wilson, 11 October 195^ • '^^ 

■ * 

« + 

212. Defense for^^rards Secretary Dulles letter (Docxauent 20H, 
page 7^6 ) to JCS and requests the JCS to reconsider their 

('^' previous estimates (Document 202, page 7^2) in light of 

( the more recent views of Dulles, ISA Memorand\:im for JCS, 

Ik October 155U 770 

2i3» The JCS5 in reply to the Secretary of State's letter of 
*' . 11 October (Document 210, page 765) ^ persist in their 

view that the U,S. should not participate in the train- 
ing of Vietnamese forces. However, if "political con- ^ | 
siderations are overriding-^," then the JCS agree to ' 1 
assignment of a training mission to KAAG Saigon "with ' 
' safeguards against French interference...," JCS^Merao- 
i . randum for Secretary of Defense, I9 October 195^ Ttl 

21^1-., Dulles reports on a conversation with Mendes -France on " .t 
the critical situation in Vietnam. The French position 
. is that plans should be laid for axiother government 
structure in the event of a Diem failui^e. They stress 
^ the importance of utilising the ^^tlxread of legitimacy j 

^-'' . deriving from Bao Dai.*.." Dulles requests the State : 

Department estimate on the political situation. 
":' ■..■,_- ' DULTE 3r 20 October 195^ • * W5 

215* A new approach to leadership training and "cross- 
*^ fertilization between Western and Asiatic ideas" is 

proposed in a psychological operations concept en- 
titled "Kilitant Libertj'." The iiaplement: tion of 
- ' "Militant Liberty" — a conceT^t which '^motivates indi- 
genous people to i.'ork toward a coinmon goal of indivi-- 
dual freedom" — is proposed on a test basis in Indo- 
china as a ;]0int militsry-CIA venture* Defense Memo 

for the CIA (Draft) , 20 October 195^ ^^^ 



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The State Department's estiinate of the political situa- 
tion is that Hinh holds a veto poi-7er over Diem; ^^jockey- 
ing for power and struggle for cabinet positions is 
resulting in paralyzing impasse"; French reference fo 
*' another structiire of government** implies a '^hankering 
to reestablish a political system*' vhich might involve 
direct colonial -type controls by France; andj. unless 
Diem receives U.S. -French support^ his chances of 
success appear slight. Paris TEDUL 11 UIACTj 21 Octo- 
ber 195^ • - 

This message contains the policy of the U»3* Government 
end instructions to the Ambassador and Chief of i^AAG in 
Saigon necessary to carry out the provisions of NSC 5^29/2 
pertaining to training of Vietnamese armed forces. 
Draft Joint State-Defense Message^ 21 October 195^ 



Pa.ge 



780 



The OCB draft recommendations on training in Vietnam 
outline the U.S. role in assisting the reorganization 
and training of the Vietnamese armed forces and ' . 
specifies the coordination required' beti/eea the Am- 
bassador and Chief J tIAAG. The question of ultimate 
size of the Vietnamese forces and U.S. support is left 
for "later determination-/' HSG 2l8th Meeting, 22 Octo^ 
ber I95U 



783 



789 



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220 



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The Report of the Van Fleet Mission to the Far East is 
discussed vith President Eisenhower. General Van Fleet's 
views are "sorae\:hat different from present policies," . 
As Van Fleet states th^ problem: "The probloai before u,s 
is the failure of U.S, leadership in the Far ^ast.*,.the 
future will reveal other prices we must pay for the free 
world defeat in Indochina." White House Memorandum for 
General Bonesteel, 25 October 195^ » * 



Diem is insisting on getting rid of General Hinh. 
Eisenhower's letter to Diem is being interpreted as 
superseding Washington agi-eements, that Diem has "full 
rein" withoilt meeting the precondition of ^'forming a 
strong and stable government." The President's letter 
can al^o be exT>loited oy the Viet Minh and is causing 
the French concern* State Memorandum of Conversation j 
26 October 195^ , 



I. 



792 



798 



Secretary Dulles f onwards the main points of General 
Collins' recommendations regarding force levels in 
Vietnam. In smnmary, the points are: (l) it would 
be disastrous if the French E::peditionary Corps (FEC-) 
were withdrawn prematurely; (2) the U,S, should continue 
to subsidise the FEC; (3) the Vietnamese Aimy should be 



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doKD to 77,000 and under Vidtnamese command by July 1955; 

(k) the U.S. should assume training responsibility by 

1 January 1955; ^nd (5) the French are agreeable to a slo^^ ^ 

build-up of MAAG. Dulles Memorandum for the^ President, 

17 November 195^ • - ^00 

'222. The Frencfi Acibassador is informed by the FOA that, sub- 
ject to agreemeritj the U.S. contemplates $100 million 
support for the FBC in Indochina for CY 1955- The 
Defense Department has *'never agreed to the original 
^position paper," which is based on General Collins' 
recommendations, vjithout details of his calculations. 
ISA Memorandum for Record, 2k Ilovember 195^ * * • • ^^^ 

223.' Senator Mansfield states his conclusions based on 
' General Collins' analysis of the Vietnam situation; 
(l) prospects for Diem "look very dim," elections in 
1956 would probably favor the communists; (2) the^U^S. 
should continue to support Vietnam as long as possible; 
(3) he sees no alternative to Diem; (k) he is certrdn 
refugees. Catholic bishoj>s and church officials would 
oppose replacement of Diem; (5) Paris should urge 
^ * Eao Dai cease his interference and, support Diem; (6) 
. ' ' ■ and Diem should be encouraged to compraniise on issues, 
^' State Memor andum of Conversation, 7 Decenber 195^ • • • ^^^ 

m 

22U. The French Government is considering the decision to 
accelerate withdravral -of the FZX; and evacuation of 
civilians as a direct result of the U.S. decision to 
provide only one-third the smount requested for 
maintenance of the FEC in 1955- Paris 2kk8 to Dulles, 
9 December 195^ • 809 

+ 

225, Diem "passes the buck" of convincing the sect leaders 
not to oppose the appointment of Dr. Quat as Defense 
' Minister to the U.S. Collins is convinced that Diem 
and his brothers, Luyen and Khu, are afraid of Quat 
or any strong man in control of the armed forces 
since with "spineless General Ty'' as Chief of Staff, 
Diem has effectively seized control of the army. 
Further, Collins comments on the alter]fiatives to Diem 
Government; though the alternative of gradual with- 
drawal from Vietnam "is least desirable, in all honesty, 
,^ and in view of what J have observed here to date it is 
possible this may be the only sound solution." Collins 
(Saigon) 2250 to Dulles, 13 December 195^ 8II 

I L 226. The Defense Depe.rtment reviews the military aid situ- 
ation in Indochina including the value of ^®AP ship- 
ments ($1,085 million) and losses of equipment at Dien 



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Bien Phu ($1.2 million) i/hich included 8 tanks ^ 2k 
howitzers^ and 15^000. small arms. Defense Letter to 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee^ ik Deceiiber 195^ 



4k 



227- Collins is convinced that "Diem does not have the 
capacity to unify divided factions in Vietnam" and 
unless decisive action or dramatic leadership gal- . 

. vanizes the country into unified action "this 

country \rill be lost to communism^ "Apparently^ the 
only Vietnamese who might be competent — is Bao Eai„" 
It is recorrmiende6, that the U, S. not assume responsi- 
■ bility for training on 1 January 1955 j ^^ give direct 
military aid. Collins 2303 for Dulles, l6 December 
195^ ^ ■ - • 

228- - Ambassador Heath suggests that General Collins' recom- 

mendations ignore the basic factor that withholding aid 
froisi Diem vrould assist a communist tal^eover. Duties 
has analyzed our situation in Vietnam as a "tine buying 
operation" and Heath recommends continued support of 
Diem in spite of a "Bao Dai solution," The fear that 
^300 million plus our national prestige vjould be lost 
in a gamble" is a legitimate one^ but >rithholding our 
support vould "have a fa'r worse effect." Heath Memo- 
- randum to FEj 17 Decennber 195^ 



820 



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Tripartite discussions on Indochina are summarized. 
To Secretary Dulles desire to continue strong support 
of Diem^ Ely indicates -that he and Collins have ex- 
erted pressure without result and ."were now convinced 
that it was hopeless to expect anything of Diem." 
Ely feels that he and Collins must decide now "vjhether 
Diem was really the man capable of national union." 
Four points are agreed upon; (l) support Dlem^ (2) 
study alternative Sy (3) investigate timing of replace- 
ment^ a.td (U) (added by Dulles) how much more U. £, 
investment should be made in Indochina if it is de- 
cided there ^is no good alternative to Diem? Paris 
2601 to State, 19 December 195^- 



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The President approves ESC 5ll29/^r as emended and " 
adopted by the Council as NSC 5^29/5* This statement 
on current U.S. policy in the Far East deals with the 
primary problem of the thjreat to U.S. security re- 
suiting from conmimist expansion in China^ Korea, 
and I^orth Vietnam. NSC 5-^29/5, 22 December 195^^^ 



*' 



835 



Dulles spells out guidelines for future U.S. actions 
in Indochina: (l) vre must create such a situation 



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that the Viet Miidi can take- over only "by internal 
violence; (2) investment 'in Vietnam is justified 
even if only to buy time ^ v:e must he flexible and 
proceed carefully by stages; (3) 'Ve have no^ choice 
but to continue our aid to Vietnam and support of 
Diem"; (k) Bao Dai's return vrould not solve the prob 
lem; (5) reyitalization of National army is hope for 
an improved security condition; (5) and "something 
should be done on our side" to exploit land refoxm 
issue, Dulles 2535 to Collins (Saigon) ^ 2k December 

195^.... 



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232,* Collins refutes most of the comments of Ely and Mendes 
made at the tripartite discussion and is disturbed over 
some of the suggestions and attitudes of Mendes and 
• Eden. He feels that he should be in Washington in Jan- 
uary if the KSC is to re-evaluate U*S* policy to avoid 
misunderstandings. Collins 2^t55 to Dulles ^ 25 December 

155^. ; .••,. ,. 856 

233* Secretary Dulles decides that the U. S* should proceed as 
scheduled and "take the plunge" and begin direct aid to 
Vietnam on 1 January and move ahead on KAAG negotiations 
in Cambodia, Dulles feels that the JCS prerequisite on 
eliminating the French from Cambodia is "too legalistic 
and unrealistic-" State Memorandum for the Pecord, 
29 December I95U , S59 



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1955 



23^. In light of the unstable situation in South Vietnam and 
conflicting views "between General Collins and the State 
Department J Secretary Vfilson requests the JCS to 
"reconsider" U*S^ military programs in Southeast Asia, 
' Secretary of Defense Kemorandiim for JCS^ 5 January 1955* 

235- The JCS provide additional courses of action in Vietnam 
to the Secretary of Defense. Specif ically^ (l) to con- 
tinue aid; (2) to iinilate rally institute ar^ '^advisory 
■ ^ sydtfem"; (3) if (l) and (2) fail, to deploy unilaterally 
or vith SEATO; (i) or to vithdra^'f all U*S. support from 
South Vietnam and "concentrate on saving the remainder 
of Southeast Asia,*' JCS Memorandum for Secretary of 
Defense J 21 January 1955 • • 



239' This memorandum describes the Department of Defense con- 
tribution to and participation in the Ban^ok Conference 
on SSACDT,' DOD M^norandum, foivarded 29 March 1955- --*• 



860 



862 



236* General J* Lairton Collins reports on the situation in 

South Vietnam* The major factors I'.'hich ^-iill affect the 
outcome of U.S. efforts are: (i) Viet Minh strength- and 
intentions; (2) French attitude and' intentions; (3) sects 
attitudes and intentions; {k) Vietnamese armed forces 
loyalties; (5) free Vietnam economy ^ and (6) Diem^s ] 

popular support* There Is no guarantee that Vietnam 
Vill^remain free ^th U.S. aid -- but without it, 
"Vietnam vill surely be lost to comuunism." Memorandum 
for the National Security Council^ 2U January 1955 . - ®^^ 

237. The Planning Board recommends approval of the Collins 

Report. KSC 23^t!i Meeting, 27 January 1955* **.•,**.%..-.--*• . ^^3 

238. The JCS recommend a concept and plans for the implemen- i 
tation, if necessaLry, of Article IV«1.^ of the Manila ^ 
Pact (SEIACDX) . ' The primary objective is deterrence of 

'^overt aggression by China or other Communist nations." 
^ .- The concept relies on development of indigenous forces 
and readiness to retaliate with U.S. power on the ag- 
gressor. JCS NemDrandum for Secretary of Defense, 
11 February ^1955 S85 






838 



2^0. The U, S, proposal on elections is based on Eden*s plan | 
at Berlin, i.e*. Free Vietnam will insist to the Viet ' ' 
Minh that no discussions on the type, issues, or other, 
factors of elections are possible unless the Viet Minh 
accept the safeguards spelled out, Dulles U361 to 
Saigon, 6 April 1955 * - ^9^ 



XL - TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



II 



Declassified per Executive Order J 3526, Section 3,3 
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TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



2U1. 



2H2. 



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2kk . 



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[J 



2k^ 



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General Collins submits a seven step recommendation t/hich 
centers on getting rid of Diem and reorganizing the govern^ 
nent structure. Collins kkkd to Dulles^ 9 April 1955 



Q9h 



Diem exists by reason of U.5- support despite French reluc- 
tance. If the French view prevails, ^^removal of Diem... 
may well be interpreted in Vietnam, and Asia as an example 
of U.S. .pa*ying lip service to nationalist cause ^ and then' 
forsaking a true nationalist leader when 'colonial interests' 
put enough pressure on us." Dulles* -li^f 38 to SalgoUj 9 Apr 55-* 90? 

Bao Dai recoinmends that the U.S, agree with the French to 
-create a "Supreme Council" or "Council of Elders" to govern 
in pla^e of Diem. The Binh Xuyen could have been used in 
the connnon effort if "Diem had not bungled matters." Eao 
Dai cannot rule for Diem by decree and considers Diem's 
strength" as a "mockery," Paxis U396 to Dulles ^ 9 Apr 55'*' - 



910 



Ely disagrees with the U.S. on maintaining Diem in office. 
The worsening situation is attributed to Diem by the 
French and "only by surgery > that is renoval of Diem^ 
can the country be saved." Ely feels that if Diem is 
retained, he could not be the responsible French repre- 
sentative or remain in, Saigon. Saigon ^^661 to Dulles 
(Excerpts) I9 Apr 55 * 



912 



Diem is seen as a barrier to forming an interim govern-, 
ment and the gap between him and other elements in the 
society is becoming wider. The U,S. , however, warns . 
Vietnamese leaders that if Diem is removed as a "sect 
victory" it would be "difficult to obtain popular support 
in the U.S. for continuation of U.S. aid." Saigon ^t662 
to Dulles, 20 Apr 55 '. * 



915 



Diem announces to the U.S. his. willingness to accept a 
coalition in the government but on his terms* This 
lincompromising attitude leads Collins to remark: "I see 
no alternative to the early replacement of Diem."* Saigon 
i*663 to Dulles, 20 Apr 55 * 



918 



Conclusions and recommendations are offered as a basis 
for future Department of Defense positions on the sub- 
ject of South Vietnam. Key recormnendations made are: 
to determine U.S, military action within the scope of 
SEACDT to prevent the loss of Southeast Asia as a 
result of the loss of South Vietnam, and to postpone 
^indefinitely the elections proposed by Geneva Accords 
for Vietnam. ISA Letter to State Department, 22 Apr 55 



923 



.* 



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253. 



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Page 



In a debriefing, General Collins is firmly convinced that 
it win be to the detrimeAt of U*S. interests to continue 
to support Diem. ISA Memorandum^ 25 April 1955 • • « 



937 



The U*S. tentatively proposes to maintain full support to 
Diem until an alternative supported by Bao Dai is developed. 
Dulles U757 ;bo SoJ-gon, 27 April 1955; .....>..-..* 



9ifl 



The State Department is being forced to talce a strong stand 
for Diem* Senator Mansfield is a strong backer of Diem 
and if Diem is forced out ^ there will be "real difficulties 
on the Hill," K,T* Young Memorandum for Hobertsonj 30 April 

1955 * ---* 

Bao Dai registers strong complaints against U.S. support of 
Diem, U.S*« inaction vhlch allowed the present civil strife, 
and against U.S. failure to urge Diem to go to France. 
Diem^ in Bao Dai's opinion, is a ''psychopath vho wishes 
tomartyrize himself," Paris U7U6 to Dulles^ 30 April 
195 5 - ; 

It is predicted that the success of Diem against the Binh 
Xuyen, Bao Dai^ the French and General Vy has created a 
potentially revolutionary situation in Vietnam and, given 
U.S. support and French acquiescence. Diem is expected to 
stabilise the situation in Saigon. SNIE 63. 1-2/1-55 ^ 
2 Kay 1955 - 

Tripartite discussions '5,g3An reveal basic disagreement. ' 
The French conclude: "Diem is a bad choice. ,. -without him 
some solution might be possible but with him there is 
none. . .Vlhat would you say if we prance/ were to retire 
entirely from Indochina- , , " SECTO 8, 8 May 1955 . . , 



9^5 



9^ 



I 



955 



959 



The French are increasingly bitter toward Diem and con- 
TTinced he must go- Steps are suggested to reconstitute 
a joint Franco-i^jaerican approach to the situation. 
Among these are steps to reduce the French garrison 
in Saigon, r^lace Ely, and fona a courts e of action 
after the crisis is over which persuades Diem to reor- 
ganise his governLient or else get rid of him, Saigon 
5071^ to Dulles, 8 Kay 1955^ 



r , 



967 



The JCS reject both 
as solutions to the 
mend that Dulles be 
promise for achievin 
U*S. cannot guarante 
and that U.S* action 
place FEC presence. 
Defense, 9 May 1955* 



alternatives suggested by Dulles 
Vietnam problem. The JCS re com- 
advised that Diem shows the^most 
g internal stability, that the 
e security of French nationals, 
s under SEATO could possibly re- 
JCS MemoranS^um for Secretary of 



971 



XLII 



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256. 



257 



' 258- 



259. 



260. 



261. 



A inov& to deal vith Dieia to protect French civilians 
in order to get the Frenth to withdraw "would clearly 
disengage us rram the taint of colonialism, . »" 
General Bonestecl Meinorandxicij 9 May 1955 ■ 



The recoinmendatlpns of the report of the Military Staff 
Planners ^CQnferencGj SEACDT and the recoimnended JCS 
actions are sursnarized. The "basic report is omitted - 
See Doctmient 257 j P^ge 
JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense^ 2 June 1955* ••^ 



The use recoimnsnds and President Eis.enhower approves 
that NSC reco3TiKLendations as to U.S. policy on all 
Vietnanr elections are not required and that in the 
event of renewal of Coiiimimist hostilities^ U.S. policy 
would be- governed by KSC 5^^29/5 > Meniorau^dUHi for the 
NSC (KSG IU15) ^ 13 June 1955 



A surimiary of those portions of the Report of the Staff 
Planners Conference which have political significance 
are foivarded t^o the Secretary of State, The parts 
'Summarised concern terms of reference for military 
advisors orgajiization to SEACDT ^ measures for improv- 
ing defensive effectiveness through nutual aid and 
self-helpj si^ial coirjinunications j snd futit^e organi- 
zational structure. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of 
Defensej 1 July 1955 



In probable developments- before July 195b ^ north 
Vietnam (DRV) , l^hough confronted by serious economic 
probletasj will consolidate its control north of the 
17th parallel* The DRV amiy has increased in strength 
but will probaaly not attack Laos before mid-1956- 
Tactics are lijcely to include activation of guerrilla 
units in South Vietnam and their reinforcement by 
, infiltration from the North* NIE 63. 1-55 j 19 July 1955 

The consequences of selected U.S, courses of action 
are estima-^ed in the event of Viet Minh aggression 
against South Vietnajn, While overt aggression is 
unlikely J U.S. efforts at undertp>-ing other steps 
to convince the Viet Minh that aggression will be 
met with intei'vention are expected to render overt 
aggression even less likely. Failure to intervene 
however^ could signal an expanded Cominimist Chinese 
effort in Asia, Sl'IlE 63.1-^-55. 13 September 1955 



Page 



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975 



976 



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985 



• • 



993 



997 



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The JCS assess the implications of U.S. military opera- 
tions to repulse and punish overt Viet Minh aggression 
or to destroy Viet Minh forces and take control of 
Korth Vietnsjn in the event of renewed hostilities.* 
Secretary of Defense Memorandum for NSCj 15 Septciriber 

195 5 ^ .,..,. . 

The State DepartiJlent relates the political actions 
necessary under a deterrent strategy and In a situa- 
tion of overt Viet Minh agression. In either situa*- 
tioHj the U.S. has to provide substantial economic 
assistance. State Department Draft Study^ 6 October 
1955 • 

The Staff Planners conclude that the suGcess]?\il defense 
of South Vietnam^ Laos and Cambodia is -v/holly dependent 
on timely deployment of SEATO forces ;, an unlikely event j 
or on the use of nuclear veai^ons to reduce force reouire 
ments* Other conclusions and recommendations are made 
irhich deal vith overt attacks ^ combating subversion^ 
logistics^ and psych-:)logical varfare* SEAGDT Military 
Staff Planners Conference^ 16 lylovember 1955 ,,*-•«.• 



Page 



1001 



1016 



1020 



Asian members of SEATO are press\aring for a peimanent 
SEATO Council and Military Staff organisation^' Th^ 
U,S, position to avoid such a coicmiitment is rapidly 
becoming, untenable. The Asian sigpiatories to SEACDT 
are losing f&ith in SEATO as a deterrent for coinmunist 
expansion. ISA MemorandxiH^ for Secretary of I^avy^ 
16 December 1955 « ' .-. .^. • ^ o • . < , * 



a« i ••*a4*o*o« 



10i^3 



* ' 



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r^ 




266. 



267. 



268, 



i * 



V 



TOP SECRET - Sensitivi 



ISA proposes a letter be sent to Secretary Dulles re- 
questing additional U.S. personnel be sent to Vietn^^in 
to protect against vast losses of IDAP eouipsiaent and 
to a-rrange "with the French for implementing the 
Collins-Elj agreement* Secretary of Defense Letter 
'to" Secretary of- State ^ 31 January 195^ 



Page 



• t. 



The position of the government of South Vietnam is 
appreciably stronger than it vras a year^ or even six 
months ago. Hev crises are expected in 1956^ in view 
of the CHICOM request for reconvening Geneva ^ the 
absence of election .prospects, and increased opposi- 
tion to Diem. Intelligence Brief No, 1876^ 7 February 
1956 

The President approves the statement on basic national 
seci^rity policy vhich has as its objective the preser- 
vation of U.S. security. The basic threat is posed by 
hostile policies and povrer of the Soviet-Communist 
Bloc; and the basic problem is to meet and reduce the 
threat without undermining the fundamental U.S. insti- 
tutions or economy. NSC 5602/1, I5 March I956 < 



10^6 



lOi^a 



1051 



« 
•' 



^^ 



^ 







i} ^ 



1 



XLV 



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Declassiried per Executive Order 13526, Section 3, 3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 1 6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Secdon 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16, By: NWD Dale: 201 1 




r 



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RM-735 
p/ho-157 



WHT THE UNITED STATES ISi^JED A OTIILATERAL DECLAMTION 
INSTEAD OF SIGNING THE 195^ ACCORDS ON INDGCfflNA 



Secretary of State Dulles was utterly unwilling to consider 
signing accords on Indochina of the type concluded at Geneva in 
195^' Signing of the Accords ^ therefore, was never an alternative 
in his mind J to issuing a unilateral declaration. On the contrary, 
the unilateral declaration was a substitute ^ suggested by the 
desperate French leaders as the most that they could obtain from 
the United States ^ for a partial or complete American withdrawal 
from the Geneva proceedings and for disassociation from the Indo- 
china settlement. 



To understand the Ajuerican position at the time of the Accords^ 
it is necessary to trace the evolution of our policy from the time^ 
in 1953? when Dulles reacted negatively to suggestions for negoti- 
ations on the Indochina problem. Dulles told the French at that 
time that negotiations with no other alternative usually ended 
in capitulation. Then in 195^ ^ after joining reluctantly in the 
four-power decision to hold the Geneva talks on Indochina , he pressed 
hard for action to strengthen the Western hand- -above all, for 
swift establishment of a coalition to meet the Coiamunist threat in 
Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the United States limited its role 
in the Indochina talks to that of an ^'interested" nation, as distinct 
from the role of a belligerent or of a principal in the negotiations ^ 
and it determined to dissociate itself from any disadvantageous 
solution. The United States battled British inclinations to accept 
a solution involving the partition of Vietnam and, in the instruc- 
tions to the American Delegate, Under Secretary Walter Bedell Smithy 
said that it would approve no armistice or other agreement which 
would have the effect of "subverting the existing lawful governments . 
or of permanently impairing their territorial integrity or of 
placing in Jeopardy the forces of the French Union in Indochina/* 
Beyond this, when the Geneva conferees turned to the discussion of 
control m.achiiiery for an Indochina settlement, Dulles rejected the 
idea of American participation in a guarantee of the settlement 
because, as he put it^ this would commit the United States to 
sustaining Communist domination of territory and thus would cut 
across "our basic principles for dealing with the communist world", 
(This was presumably a reference to the Republican goal of "liberating*' 
the captive nations of Eastern Europe-) 



* • 



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-2- 



As the Geneva Conference proceeded, however, Secretary Dulles 
somewhat eased his opposition to a solution involving partition. 
As early as June 9 he agreed with Smith that t&e deteriorating 
military situation might lead to de facto partition, though he 
wanted the United States to try to avoid heing identified with 
such a result. Later he told Foreign Secretary Eden that it would 
be difficult for the United States to guarantee a Communist success 
in north Vietnam or anywhere else hut that it could perhaps acquiesce 
in a settlement which it disliked hut would not upset by force- 
Accordingly., the United States and Britain informed France in a 
I joint message that they would "respect" an armistice agreement meeting 

T seven specified criteria ^ including the preservation of "at least 

the southern half of Vietnam, and if possible an enclave in the 
Delta". 

Fearing that a settlement would be reached which did not meet 
the seven criteria listed in the Anglo-American message, the United 
States in July contemplated the alternatives of completely 
withdrawing from the Conference or of participating in lower key 
and with a lower level of representation (i,e,, with Ambassador 
U- Alexis Johnson as the top American Delegate instead of Under 
Secretary Smith). Explaining the American position^ Dulles told 
- . Eden and Mendes -France tha't the United States could not be put in 

'the position of apparently approving the sale of Vietnam, Laos, 
and Cambodia into Communist captivity in a settlement which would 
be portrayed as a second Yalta. At the same time, he said, the 
United States did not question France's right to exercise its own 
Judgment and did not wish to put itself in the position of seeming 
to pass "moral Judgment upon French action" or of disassociating 
itself from the settlement "at a moment and under circumstances 
which might be ijunnecessarily dramatic," 

Mendes -France, however^ fervently urged that Dulles or Smith 
head the American Delegation even at the risk of having to disavow 
the settlement* All he asked, he said, was that the United States make 
a unilateral statement that it would take action if the Communists 
, ' broke a settlement based on the seven points. Dulles felt that 

such a statement would pose no problem. He agreed to a Franco- 
American Position Paper, in which the British concurred, incorporating 
the understanding that if a settlement were reached which the United 
States could respect, then the United States would express its 
position "unilaterally or in association only with non- Communist 
states". It was on the basis of the understandings in the Position 
Paper that the United States issued its unilateral declaration on 
\ July 21, 195^. 

t 

Attached hereto is an Annex which summarizes the six points 
in the Franco -American Position Paper- 



p/HP:ESCostrell:eln h-lk-63 



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SENSITIVE 



Jul 30, 195^ 



MEMORAiroUM FOR THE SECRETAHY OF THE AHMT 

TflE SECRETARY OF THE MVY 
THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SUBJECT: Possible Use of ROK Forces in Indochina 



1* At its meeting on 22 July 195^, the National Security 
Council (NSC Action No, 11 78) adopted the recommendation of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staffs concurred in by the Secretary of Defense ^ 
that the present U, S, policy with respect to the possible use 
of ROK forces in Indochina (NSC Action No. 105^-b) not be changed 
at this time J but be kept under reviev^ in the light of future 
developments, 

2. The above action^ as approved by the President ^ is trans ^ 
niitted for your general information, 

SIGMTURE AUTI-EENTI GATED BY: 



LESLIE R. KYLE, 1st Lt, 'AGC 
Correspondence Control Section 
Office of the Administrative Secretary 
cc: ASD (international Security Affairs) (2) 
Director^ Office of Special Operations 



Signed 



C. E. WILSON 



679 



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Rpt Amembassy PARIS /.L 3. ^ PERIORITY 



•^u..u :> r;.i 7 26 



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EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY 



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Fr ench Requests Involvina Possible Unit ed States 
Bellicferencv in Indochina 



, It"* 




01 

" » V . ' - .1 . ■ — 

The United States had made clear that it v/ould take a grave view of opep'^s ^. 

■ - . . ■ Ol ^ 

Chinese Communist aggression in Indochina. . . :\ . ■ ^ *\:^ ".} 

'ere come quotes from Eisenhower's speech of April 16, 1953 and ^ ^ 

Dulles' speech of September 2, 1S53J ' ^ ' ;^ - ; . - . 
That latter statement had been made after prior discussion with the French 
Ambassador in Washington;^ , ; ' /' - '/;-. . ' / [ / ^ V . ■ ' 

However, the foregoing statemantSj v/hile they v/ere intended to, and ^ 
did in fact, deter open military aggression by Communist China in Indochina 

■ * 

did not fully meet the French pre occupations > as the situation developed in 
relation to Dien Bien Phu. . . ■' . 

^ 1. OnMaixhSS, 1353, General Ely, French Chief- of-Stafi, called up on^^js 
Secretary of State Dulles to express appreciation for the sympathetic 




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I reception which he had had in this country in discussing the military problems ol 
Indochina. In the course of the conversation, General Ely raised specifically the 

V J ■ ■ 

■question of whether if MIGs from Communist China v/ere to intervene in the battle 

« 

' of Dien Bien Phu, United States air pov/er would in turn intervene to protect the 

m F 

French air cr ait which were supplying Dien Bien Phu and which would be helpless , 
against MIGs. The Secretary of State stated that he could not give, at once a 

• .■■■"' 

definitive ansv/er to so serious a question, Hov/ever^ he pointed out that before 
the United States intervened as a belligerent^ it would doubtless v/ish to take into 
account all relevant factors including the fact that such intervention could not be 

V 

looked upon as an isolated act. Any such armed intervention would commit the ^- 
prestige of the United States and v;ould require it to follow through to a military 



^^success. This in turn involved political as well as military factors and called for 






a partnership understanding on the part of those concerned^ v/hich among other 

i 

9- 

things should insure the patriotic participation of the local population and their 

effective military mobilization and training* 

General Ely^s request was not pursued and theie v/as notj in factj an y air 

^ * ■ ■ 

intervention from Communist China. — . 

21 During the night of April 4, 1354, at Paris, the French Prime Minister 

■ 

and French Minister of Foreign Affairs asked United States Ambassador Dillon 

■- a 

to meet with them and they expressed to him their opinion that immediate armed 
intervention at Dien Bien Phu by United States carrier^ based aircraft v;ould be 



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[liecessary cc S3.ve chat situation. 



The United Stato:? Anxbassador at oric^ repOi:tc^cl this opinion to the Depaz^ truant 

■■ 

. cf Stat^! ar'.ci Secretary -DiiU?? imrjediately replied through the United States 
Aiiica.ss?tiQr subs:ar,tlaUy as foUov/s: ' - . - 

- ,. -^^As X personally explained to General Kly at ^ covloreixoe at which ^ 
Admiral Radford was pr^si^nt^. it would r;Ot be possible for tho United States 

■I 
■I 

to bec.^ino a belli;:erent in Indochina without a fxUl political, understandincf wi^h 
^ * Frarice and other countries. In addition it Vvould be necessary that Congress, 
sho-ald act- I have co:ir:rn-;ed this position with the President, The Executive 

» ' ' . 

is pre pan- ed to consider united action in Indochina^ Ho\vevar> such, action i^ 



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*- • 






impossible axcept on a coalition basis which would, include active participant ion 
of British Cor.nnon wealth countries^ in view of their great slake in .Malaya^ 



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A' ?;*"c^^— A*^:i X-'^iL^" Z^?^^*"d " ' * , ■ 

?. Cn Apri: Co, it^^4., duvi-a the course oi a, NATO Mi!i!sterial Cour.;:il . 
meetinc! :r. Parli>. a: tended ov Secretarv oi Scate DuHes. the French For elan 

triB:t It inichtcc necessary to s^^ek a cease lire unless the:'e were hnniediate and 

* ■ ■ 

^ niasslve air. support by th:^ UiuU'^d Staiies, which, it was thought miaht stlU save 
Diea 31en Phu. ■ • ■ ■ 

■I 

• Th? next day, April 24, Secretary DlUIos, aJtex* consulting on military ascact 



I 



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, with Admiral Radford, tr.o United States Chaiinnau ol the ^Toinl Chiefs ox Statf who 



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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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1 Class 1 1 i cation 

I was then in Paris, advised the French Foreign Minister substantially as follov/s: 

""We have considered this matter most carefully. 

"The situation with regard to our participation is the same as v;hen ; 
I Spoke with you on April 14, ^ Under the cir cum stance Sj we should first 
need Congressional authorization for any such v/ar action ♦ ^ This cannot be 

■■ I ■ 

■+ ■* 

obtained in a matter of hours, nor do I think it can be obtained at all unless 

w 

it is v^ithin the framework of a political understanding which would include 

* a ' _ 

■< 
^' ■ ■ 

other nations dilrectly and vitally interested in Southeast Asia, 

"I may add that I have received military advice which indicates that 

% ,■ ' 

at this stage even a massive air attack v/ill not assiure the lifting of the siege 

■ ■ 

.' of Dien Bien Phu, *' * - ' " ^ . - ■ , ^ • 

The foregoing are the three occasions when French officials suggested United 



I ' 



► #* 



states armed intervention in Indochina. 



V » 



United States Parallel Efforts for "United Action" 

During this March-June 1954 period,- the United States v;as seeking to develop 

the possibilities of collective action in the Southeast Asia area^ on a basis v/hich 

would fairly reflect the free world interests which were involved. 

|Here come quotes from public speeche^ ' ' ' ' \' ^ - - ^ - 

intensification 
With the xxis-rtnetiDSissz of the Communist effort follov;ing the Berlin decision 



of February 18, 1954, it seemed to the United States more than ever important to 



L' 



develop a united front as a counterv/eight to the probability of intensified effort 



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of the Communist Vietminh, and increased in ate rial support to them from 

A 

~ ■ _ ■ 

Communist China. .- . ^ , ' 

■ - ■ - -. The following 'are steps by the United States in pursuance of this policy: 

1, On March 23, 1954, Secretary Dulles met with the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee and discussed the desirability of publicly calling for united action in 

■■-1 ■■ f ij-"" ■ 

^^ . , • ' * . 

the Southeast Asia area. He invited and received suggestions from the Committee 

■ ■ . * 

m embers in this respect. Thereupon, under the direction of the President^ 

* 

» ■ 

he drafted a statement on this subject v/hich he then discussed v/ith various 
Senators of both Parties. He then showed the proposed draft to the Ambassadors 

% ' . ' ^ ' ' , ' ' 

of certain; other countries principally involved and learned that their govern- 
mentSj v/ithout commital, sav; no objection to tiae proposed statement. The 
statement \vas then incorporated in a speech in Nev/ York on March 29. In that 



'. - *■ 



speech the Secretar j of State reviev/ed the threatening situation in Indochina 
and noted the steps which the United States had taken to assist in the situation, 

i r 

He sited cited the President's view (April 16, 1953) that the Korean armistice 



v/ould be a fraud if it merely released aggressive armies for attack Ise where 

V. * 

and recalled his statement (September 2, 1953) "that if Red China sent its ovm 

arm^ into Indochina that v;ould result in grave consequences which rjight not 



be corained to Indochina. " The Secretary went on to -say that 



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"Under the conditions of today the imposition of Southeast' Asia 

■■■■ 

of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist 






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ally^ by whatever means^ would b6 a grave threat to the v/hole of the 
free community. The United States feels that that possibility should not 
be passively acceptedj but should be met by united action. This might ■ 
involve serious risks. But these risks are far less than those v/hich will 

■r . 

. face us a few years from nowj if v/e dare not be resolute today, " 
'2. Upon his return from New York, the Secretary of State thereupon 



conferred further and on a broader basis with Ambassadors of countrie 



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which might be interested in '^united action" to save Southeast Asia from 

^ , ' ' 4- - 1 ■ 

Communist domination. " , . ■ ''..-• : \ 



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3. On April 3, 1954, the Secretary of Stale and Admiral- RadCord met 

■ 1 * 

with a group of Congressional leaders to review tlie situation in Indochina and 

■the possible course of United States action with respect to it. It was the sense 

01 the meeting that the United States should not intervene alone hut should attempt 

to secure the cooperation of othrr free nations concerned in Southeast Asia, and 

that if such cooperation could be assured, it was probable that the United States 

> 
Congress would authorise United States participation in such ^'united action. " 

+ 

4. On April 4, ■1954, the President met diuring tlie evening at the White 

■ V ■ ■ • ■ 

House with a grouo of his advisers, following V7hich communtation v/as made 

\ ' .■ . ■ ■■ 

to the Governments of tlie United Kingdom and of France inviting their prompt -' 
cooperation in organizing "united action" in relation to Indochina and Southeast 
Asia. This led to irivitations from the British and French Governments to 

y ■ ' 

Secretai-y of State Dulles to come personally to London and Paris respectively 
to discuss the matter. 

■ T " 

5. Between April 4 to 9, 1954, the Secretary oi State and other high 
State Department officers consulteyd in Washington with the diplomatic 

representatives c: Great Britain, France, Australia, Nev/ Zealand, Philippines, 



« d 



Thailcind, Vietnam,^ Laos and Cambodia, OUier Asia governments were kept 
Informed. ' '. " . - 



The Governments of Thailand and of the Philippines promptly indicated 
■J tlieir 7;iUingnes3 to join in united action in Indochina and other Amhassadors 



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6. On April 10^ 1954, Secretary of State Dulles left for London and Paris 
for direct personal discussions with the British and French Governments. 
On April 13, 1954, at London, after conferences v/iVa Mr. Anthony Eden, the 

+ 

British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, amd with Prime Minister 

■ ■ 

Churchillj Secretary Dulles and Mr, Eden issued a joint statement which saAd: 

"Accordingly, we are ready to talcepart, with the other countries 
principally concerned, in an exa'mination of t?ie possibility of establishing a 
collective defense within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, 
to assure the peace, security and freedom of Southeast Asia and the Western 



v' 2E^i;3^tf<5s:^ Pacific. 



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- ' "It is our hope that the Geneva Conference will lead to the restoration 
of peace in Indc zhina. We believe that the prospect of establishing a unity of 



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■ ■ defensive purpose throughout Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific v;ill 

I . . . . . ■ 

* contribute to an honorable peace in Indochina, " ■ ' ' 

7. On April 13 Secretary Dulles went to Paris and after discussions 
^ during that day and the next with' the French President of the Council and ivith 

■ ' the French Foreign' Minister, a joint statement was issued v/Mch said among 
{ other things: \ . * . ■ ■ 



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TOP SECRET 



Clas s i f i cat i on 



11- On May 8j 195^> the Geneva Conference held its first plenary session 
on Indochina. 

12. At this points the French Governinent indicated that it would like 
to discuss comprehensively with the United States Government the political 
and military conditions which would enable the United States to intervene 
militarily in Indochina. The French Government was thereupon promptly 

+ 

advised through the United States Ambassador in Paris (May 11, 195^) that the 
President would be disposed to ask Congress for authority to use the armed 

T 

forces of the United States in the area to support friendly and recognized 
governments against aggression or armed subversion promoted from without , " 
provided certain conditions were met- The conditions then defined were 
subsequently summarized by Secretary Dulles in his Jiine 11 j 195^? address 



:f * 



at Los Angeles as follows: 

"(l) an invitation from the present lawful authorities; (2) clear 

i 

assurances of complete independence to Laos^ Cambodia , and Viet -Nam; 

* 
(3) evidence of concern by the United Nations j (k) a joining in the collective 



effort of some of the other nations of the areaj and (5) assurance that Trance 
will not itself withdi:aw from the battle until it is won/' j 

With reference to (5)? the precise United States suggestion was th; 
^e French Government should not withdraw its forces during the period of 
the "united action", so that the forces from the United States — which it 



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was then thought would be principally bat not exclusively air and sea forces - 



^and forces from other participating countries^ wo aid be supplementary to^ and 
'not in sabstituion for^ the existing forces in the area,. ■ - ; 

* * r 

13 • On the basis of the foregoing, there occurred discussions at Paris; 
. as to which other interested governments were kept generally iniormed by the . 
United States. ' ' - ■ - ' ^ ^ ^ 

w 

w * ' • 

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14, The possibility of "united action" in the fighting in Indochina lapsed ^ 

with the June 20, 1954, decision of the French Government to obHain a cease- 

. " ■■--■' 

■ ■ 

fire in Indochina, a result which v/as arrived at by the Geneva Conference 

' . + '. ■ 

agreements of July 20^-21 , 1954, , UNQTE ■:■.."' 



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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 

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The folloining intelligencQ OTQanizailons -participated in the 
■preparation of this csiiviate: The Central Intelligence Ageiici; 
and the intelligence orrjanizations of the Bcpartinents of 
State, the Ariny, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint StaQ, 

■ Concurred in hi/ the 

on 3 August 1954. Co7icurring W3re the Special Assista7itj 
Intelligence^ Department of Stats; the Assistant Chief of 
StaS, 0-2, Departviant of the Army; the Director of Naval 
Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAP; the Deputy 
Director for Intelligence, The Joint StafJy^The Director of 
Intelligence^ ABC, and the Asdsta7it to the Director, Federal 
Bureau of InvesUuation, a'bstained, the subject being outside 

of their jurisdiction. 



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COPY MO. 113 
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POST-GENEVA OUTLOOK IN INDOCHINA 



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■ ^ . ' ' THE PROBLEM ' ' 

m 

To assess the probable outlook in Indoohina in the light of the agreements reached 
the Geneva conference. 



CONCLUSIONS 



1, The signing of the agreements at Ge- 
neva has accorded international recogni- 
tion to Communist military and political 
power in Indochina and has given that 
,pov/er a defmed geographic base. 

^. We believe that the Communists will 
not give up their objective of securing 
control of all Indochina but will, without 
violating the armistice to the extent of 
launching an armed invasion to the south 
or west, pursue their objective by political, 
psychological, and paramilitary means. 

3, We believe the Communists will con- 
solidate control over North Vietnam with 
little diinculty. Present indications are 
that the Viet Minh will pursue a moderate 
political program, which together with its 
strong military posture, will be calculated 
to make that regime appeal to the nation- 
alist feelings of the Vietnamese popula- 
tion generally- It is possible, hov/ever, 
that the Viet Minh may find it desirable 
or necessary to adopt a strongly repressive 
domestic program which would diminish 
its- appeal in South Vietnam. In any 
event, from its new territorial base^ the 
Viet Minh will intensify Communist ac- 
tivities throughout Indochina, 



<^4. Although it is possible that the French 
j and Vietnamese, even with firm support 
I from the US and other powers, may be 
able to establish a strong regime in South 
Vietnam, v/e believe that the chraices for 
this development are poor and, moreover, 
that the situation is more likely to con- 
tinue to deteriorate progressively over the , 
next yearA It is even possible that, at 
some time'^uring the next tv/o years, the 
South Vietnam Government could be 
taken over by elements that would ssek 
unification with the North even at the; 
^ expense of Communist domination, li] 
\ the scheduled national elections are held' 
|i in July 1956^ and if the Viet Minh does not' 
I' prejudice its political prospects: the Viet 
Minh will almost certainly win, 

5, The ability of the Laotian Government 
to retain control in Laos will de^-^end upon 
developments in South Vietnan . and upon 
the receipt of French military and other 
assistance. Even with such assistance, 
however, Laos will be faced by a growing 
Communist threat which might result in 
the overthrow of the present government 
through subversion or elections^ and in 
any case would be greatly intensified if all 



*: 



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Vietnam were to fall under Communist 
cona'bL • - ' , - 

6, We believe that if adequate outside 
assistance "is made available, the Cam- 
bodian Government" will, probably in- 
crease its effectiveness and the effective- 



ness of its internal security forces and will 
be able to suppress Communist guerrilla 
activity and to counter Communist polit- 
ical activity. The situation in Cambodia 
would probably deterior?vte, however, if a 
Communist government should emerge in 
Loa^s or South Vietnam, 



DISCUSSION 



/ 



'i, THE CURRENT SITUATION 

03„3.> . ■ ■ 

7- The signing of the agreements at Geneva 
has ended large-scale warfare in Indochina 
and has alnrmed the independence of Laos 
and Cambodia, It has, on the other hand, 

" accorded international recognition to Com- 
munist military and political power in Indo- 

, china and has given that power a defined - 
geographic base. Finally, the agreements 
have dealt a blow to the prestige of the 
Western Powers and particularly of France, 

North Vlefnam ' 

8- The Viet Minh has emerged from Geneva 
with international recognition 'arid with 
greatly enlianced power arid prestige in Indo- 

T china. The Viet Minh leaders, while ad- 

: mitting' that their ultimate objectives may 

have been temporarily compromised ''for the 

sake of peace/* are acclaiming the agreements 

' as denoting" a major victory and ensuring the 

■ eventual reunification of all Vietnam under 

Communist aegis. Ho Chi-Minh is generally 

regarded as the man who liberated Tonkin 

from 70 years of French rule, Tlie Viet j\'Iinh 

has initialed a program to absorb presently 

French-controlled areas in the Tonkin Delta. 

South Vietnam 

9. In South Vietnam, the agreements and the 
fact of the imposed partition have engendered 
aYi atmosphere of frustration and disillusion- 
ment, which has been compounded by wide- 
spread uncertainty as to French and US in- 
tentions. The present political leadership 
■. appears to retain the passive support of the 



mo're important nationalist organizations and 
individuals. However, the government's al- 
ready weak administrative base has been 
further dislocated, and it has only uncertain 
assurances of continued outside military and 
financial support Mutual jealousies and a 
lack of a single policy continue to divide Viet- 
namese politicians. Moreover, certain pro- 
French elements are seeking the overthrow 
of the Dierr. government v/ith the apparent 
support of ^French colonial interests anxious 
.to retain their control. 

10. The North Vietnam population is some- 
what greater than the South Vietnam popu- 
lation and, in any event, the loss of the Tonkin 
Delta has deprived South Vietnam of the 
most energetic and nationalist segment of the 
population. Although South Vietnam has 
the capability for agricultural self-sufficiency, 
the principal industiial establishments and 
fuel and mineral resources are located in 
North Vietnam, 

11. Provided that the terms of the cease- 
fire agreement are obs.erved, the combined 
French- Vietnamese forces :n South Vietnam 
now have the capability of maintaining in- 
ternal security, f 

Laos 

12. The relatively stable internal situation in 
Laos, which in the past has depended upon 
French support, remains essentially un- 
changed. The Laotian Army is poorly armed 
and trained and, without the suppoi't of 
French forces and advisers, does not have the 
capability to maintain internal security. 
Moreover, "Pathet Lao" Communists con- 
tinue to have de facto control of two northern 



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provinces adjoining the Communist-con- 
trolled areas of Nortliern Vietnam. Further- 
tnore, the Geneva agreements gWe members 
of the "Pathet Lao" movement freedom of 
political action throughout Laos< 

Cambodia 

13, The intci-nal eambodian situation, ex- 
cept for sharp political rivalries among lead- 
ing Cambodians, is at present relatively stable* 
Non-Communist dissidcnco appears to have 
abated and the principal dissident leader, Son 
■Ngoc Thanh, no. longer poses any real threat 
to the government The King retains wide- 
spread popular support for having obtained a 
large df^gree of eiTective independence from 
the French and for having safeguarded Cam- 
bodia's integrity at Geneva. Although the 
Communis Is are permitted freedom of politi- 
cal action in Cambodia, they have only a 
minimum appeal. The Cambodian forces, al- 
though somewhat weakened by the with- 
drawal of French forces, have the capability 
of dealing with current Communist sub- 
versive action- 

■ 

!I. OUTLOOK IN INDOCHINA 

General Con sfd era lions 

14. The Geneva agreements, although precise 



and detailed concerning the Ume and place 
of troop redeployments and related matters, 
are imprecise about matters pertaining to 
future military aid and training. Moreover, 
the agreements are vague with respect to 
political matters. Details on the implemen- 
tation of natlOiial elections are left for the 
interested parties to determine. Except for 
such influence as may be exerted by the pres- 
ence of supervisory teams from India, Canada, 
and Poland, there is no provision for forcing 
the parties concerned to implement or adhere 
to the agreements, 

15, The course of futux^ developments v;iU be 
determined less by the Geneva agreements ^ 
than by the relative capabilities and actions 
of the Cojnmunist and non-Communist en-; 
titles in Indochina, and of interested outside 
powers. 

16. Comviiinist •policij, Comnranist willing- 
ness to reach agreement for an armistice in 



Indochina, at a time when prolongation of the 
conflict could have produced a steadily dete- 
riorating situation in Indochina, was probably - 
derived in substantial part from the Comma- 
^ nist estimate that: (a) an effort to win a 
total military victory in Indochina might pre-^ 
cipitate US military intervention, and (b) the ' 
objective of gaining political control over all 
Indochina could be achieved as a result of the 
armistice agreement. The Communists also ^ 
apparently believed that an attitude of ''rea- 
sonableness" and the acceptance of an armi- 
stice in Indochina would contribute to the 
realization of their objective to undermine 
western efforts to develop an effective mili- 
tary coalition. They probably consider, 
therefore, that a deliberate resumption of 
large-scale military operations from their zone 
in the north would negate the political and 
psychological advantages the Communists 
have gained by negotiating a settlement and 
could involve grave risk of expanded wan 

17. In the light of these considerations, v/e 
believe .that the broad outlines of Communist 
policy in Indochina will be to: (a) refrain 
.from deliberately taking major military action 
to break the armistice agreement while seek- 
ing to gain every advantage in the implemen- 
tation of the agreements; (b) consolidate the 
Communist political, military^ and economic 
position in North Vietnam; (c) conduct in- 

■ - tensive political warfare against non-Commu- 
nist Indochinese governments and people; 
(d) work for the ultimate removal of all West- 
ern influence, particularly French and VS, 
from^ Indochina; and (e) emphasize and ex- 
ploit issues in Indochina which vnll create 
and intensify divisions among non-Commu- 
nist countries. In sum, we believe that the 
Communists will not give up their objective 

^"^■'M>f securing control of al! Indochina but will, 



^ without violating the armistice to the extent 
of launching an armed invasion to the south 
.or west, pursue their objective by political, 
psychological, and paramilitary means. 

18. French policy. It is impassible at this 
time to predict even the broad outlines of 
French policy in Indochina. The followinjr 
appear to be the main alternatives: 



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a. Gnuit or complete political independ- 
ence lo the Indochina states, accompanied by 
an atlcinpt to organize strong political re- 
gimes in those states. We believe that the 
French might be persuaded to adopt this 
policy by strong US-UK pressure, together 
with economic and militaiy assistance to 
France and a guarantee of the defense of the 
free areas of Indochina against further Com- 
munist military attache, 

b. Continuation of French Union ties with 
the non-Communist Indochinese states, vath 
indirect Fi'cnch political controls and French 
economic domination. We believe that Fi^ench 
policy may proceed along these lines if the 

.French estimate that: (1) the Communists 
will follow a conciliatory policy in Indochina; 
(2) the non-Communist leadership will offer 
veiy little difnculty; and (3) the US and UK 
wiH not exert pressure toward a gx'ant of full 
independence to the Indochinese states. 

c. Some form of agreement with the Viet 
Minh providing for expediting elections and 
achieving a unification of Vietnam, The 
French might be inclined to follow this line if 
the Viet Minh held out promises of the main- 
tenance of French economic and cultural in- 
terests, and of the continuance of some form 
of association of the unified Vietnamese state 

■r ^ 

^^1th France- 

d. Withdrawal of all French military, ad- 
ministrative, and economic support from In-, 
dochioa. We believe that this would occur 
only in the event of a hopeless deterioration of 
political, military, and economic conditions in 
the area_ 

■ ■■■ * " 

19. Intemational policies. The political sur- 
vival of the Indochinese states is endangered 
not only hy the threat of external Communist 
attack and internal Communist subversion, 
but also by their own inherent inexperience, 
immaturity, and weakness. We believe that 
^without outside support the Indochinese 
states cannot become strong enough to with- 
stand Communist pressures. The course of 
developments in Indochina will be largely in- 
fluenced by the attitudes and policies of other 
powers. In general, we believe that in the 
absence of firm support from the US, the non- 



Coznmunist states of Indochina cannot long 
remain non-Communist. If they are given 
opportunity, guidance, and matei'ial help in 
building national states^ they may be able to 
attain viability. We believe that the energy j 
and resourcefulness necessary for this achieve- 1 
ment will not arise spontaneously among the '■ 
non-Communist Indochinese but will have to 
be sponsored and nurtured from without. 

Outlook In Vietnam 

20. Outlook in North Yietnam. Communist 
activities in North Vietnam v/ill be concen- 
trated upon consolidation of Communist con- 
trol, with their efforts in this respect probably 
appearing moderate at the outset. The Viet 
Minh will probably emphasize social and eco- 
nomic reforms and the participation of all 
politicalj economic, and religious groups in 
state activity. At the same time, Viet Minh 
cadres will establish themselves throughout 
the Delta, will begin the process of neutraliz- 
ing all efiective opposition groups,\vill under- 
take the usual Communist program of popular 
indoctrination, and will prepare for the elec- 
tion scheduled in July 1956. We believe the 
Communists will be able to achieve the con- 
solidation of North Vietnam with. little difll- 

culty, 

I 

21. We believe that the Viet Minh will con- 
tinue to develop their armed forces. Althou'^h 
the armistice provisions forbid the Viet Minh 
from increasing their supply of arms, we be- 
lieve they will covertly strengthen and possi- 
bly expand their armed forces with Chinese 
Communist aid. Viet Minh forcri will almost 
certainly continue to receive training in 
China. 

22. Thus established firmly in No'^th Vietnam, 
the Viet Minh regime will probal j retain and 
may increase its symbolic attraction as the 
base of Vietnamese national independence. 
Its methods of consolidating controlwill prob- 
ably continue for some time to be moderate, 
and, its internal program together with its 
military pov/er, will be calculated to make 
the regime attractive to the remaining peonies 
of Indochina. It is possible, however, that the 
Viet Minh may find it desirable or necessaiT 



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to adopt a strongly repressive domestic pro- 

■ gram which \tou1c1 prejudice its psychological 
appeal and political prospects. Barring such 

'repressive Viet Minh policies, the unification 
issue will continue to be exploited to Com- 
munist advantage- throughout Vietnam. 
Meanwhile, the Viet Minli regime will con- 

-.tinuc to- strengthen the Communist under- 
ground apparatus in South Vietnani, Laos, 

' and Cambodia, aware that significant Com- 
munist gains in any one of these countries will 
strengthen the Communist movement in the 

■ others; It will s6ek to develop strong overt 
Communist political groups v/here possible 
and will generally use all available means to- 
wards the eventual unification of the country 
under Communist control, 

2d.. Outlook ill South Vietnam. We believe 

that the Viet Minh will seek to retain sizeable 

military and political assets in South Vietnam. 

.Although the agreements provide for the re- 

inioval to the north of all Viet Minh forces,^ 

j many of the regular and irregular Vict Minh 

* soldiers now in the south are natives of the 

* area, and lai^ge numbers of them will probably 
I cache their arms and remain in South Viet- 
Inam. In addition, Viet Minh administrative 
'cadres have been in firm control of several 
Jarge areas in central and sou tH , Vietnam for 
jseveral years. These cadres will probably re- 
jmain in place. French and Vietnamese efiorts 
*to deal with "stay-behind" military and ad- 
ministrative units and personnel v/ill be great- 
ly hampered by armistice provisions guaran- 
teeing the security of p re-armistice dissidents 
from reprisals. ^ ^ - 

24. The severe problem of establishing and 
maintaining securitj'^ in South Vietnam will 
probably be increased by certain provisions of 
. the Geneva agreements which prohibit the 
import of arms and military equipment, ex- 
cept as replacements, and the introduction of 
additional foreign military personnel, the 
establishment of new military bases", and mili- 
tary alliances. These provisions limit the de- 
velopment of a Vietnamese national army to 
such numbers as may be equipped by stocks 
evacuated from Tonkin, plus stocks nov; held 
in Saigon. Hov;ever, in the last analysis, 



Vietnamese security will be determined by the 
degree of French protection and assistance in 
the development of a national army, the en- 
ergy v/ith which the Vietnamese themselves 
attack the problem, and by the will of the non- 
Communist pov;ers to provide South Vietnam 
with effective guax^antecs. 

2d. In addition to the activities of stay-behind 
military and administrative groups, the Viet 
Minh will make a m.ajor eflort to discredit 
any South Vietnam administration, and to 
exacerbate French-Vietnamese relations, and 
appeal to the feeling for national unification 
which will almost certainly continue strong 
among the South Vietnamese population. The 
Communist goal v/ill be to cause the collapse 
of any non*Communist efforts to stabilize the 
situation in South Vietnam, and thus to leave 
North Vietnam the only visible foundation on 
which to re-establish Vietnamese unity. 
French and anti-Communist Vietnamese 
efforts to counter the Viet Minh xmity appeal 
and Communist subversive activities will be 
complicated at the outset by the strong re- 
sentment of Vietnamese nationalists over the 
partitioning of Vietnam and the abandoning 
of Tonkin to Communist control. It m?.y be 
difficult to convince many Vietnamese troops, 
political leaders, and administrative personnel 
in Tonkin to go south, let alone to assist ac- 
tively in the development of an efiective ad- 
ministration in South Vietnam. 

26, Developments in South Vietnam v/ill also 
depend in large part on French courses of 
action. J'rospects for stability in South Viet- 
nam would be"considerably enhanced if the 
French acted swiftly to insure Vietnam full 
independence and to encourage strong nation- 
alist leadership. If this were done, anti-French 
nationalist activity might be lessened. With 
French military, and economic assistance — 
backed by US aid — the Vietnamese could pro- 
ceed to develop gradually an effective security 
force, local government organization, and a 
long-range program for economic and social 
reform. Nevertheless, it will be very difficult 
for the French to furnish the degree of assist- 
ance which will be required without at the 
same time reviving anti-French feeling to the 
point of endangering the whole efiort. 



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27, On the basis of the evidence we have at 

this early date, however, we believe that a 

'favorable development of the situation in 

I South Vietnam is unlikely. Unless Mencles- 

* France is able to overcome the force of French 

traditional interests and emotions v/hich have 

I in the past gw^erned the implementation of 
\ policy in Indochina, we do not believe there 
I will be the dramatic transformation in French 
( policy necessary to win the active loyalty and 
[support of the local population for a South 
I Vietnam GovernmentJ At the present time, 
it appeal's more likely that the situation will 
deteriorate in Soixth Vietnam and that the 

'■ withdrawal from Tonkin will involve recrim- 
inations, distrust, and possibly ' violence. 
There v/ill be delays in the development of 
efTective administration in the south; the 
French military will probably be forced to re- 
tain a large measure of control for reasons 

■ of ''security"; and efforts by French colonial 
interests to develop a puppet Cochin-China 
state will persist It is even possible that at 
-some point, during the next two years the 
South Vietnam Government could be taken 
over by elements that would seek unlncation 
with the Viet Minh in the North even at the 

' expense of Communist domination. Even-if 

i "If the scheduled national elections are 



arrangement proved impossible, and the situ- 
ation deteriorated to the point of hopeless- 
ness, would the French withdraw completely 
from the country, 

Ou"fIoo!c in Laos 

29. Providing the French maintain the 5,000 
troops in. Laos v/hich the Geneva agreements 
permit them, and continue to develop the 
Laotian forces, the Royal Laotian Government 
should be able to improve its security forces 
and, excluding the two northern provinces, to 
deal, with isolated, small-scale Communist 
guerrilla actions. Also, providing the Lao- 
tians continue to receive French and US tech- 
nical and financial assistance, they probably 
will be able to maintain an adequate govern- 
ment administration. There is notliing in 
the Geneva agreements to prevent Laos from 
becoming a member of a defense arrangement 
so long as no foreign troops other than speci- 
fied French personnel are based in Lao; 



)S. 



30. However, if the French for any reason de- 
cide not to maintain their troops nor to con- 
tinue military training in Laos, it v/ill be im- 
possible for the non-Communist pov;ers to 
orovide efiective aid to the Laotians v/ithout 



aching the Geneva agreement. At the 
j held in July 1956, and if the\Viet llinli le time, Laos will be faced with a growing 
I does not prejudice its political prospects^ 



^thc 



17 



let y^Lmi 



nmunist threat, and the freedom of politi- 
vill alnost certainly liin,^' action permitted members of the Pathet 



28, In the interim, Viet Minh propaganda will 
find ample opportunities to influence Viet- 
namese attitudes- Within a year, Viet Minh 
stay-behind units will probably be active polit- 
■ ically, and possibly involved in open guerrilla 
* fighting. In these circumstances, the French 
will probably be able to maintain their "pres- 
'ence" in South Vietnam through mid-195G, 
but their influence will probably become in- 
creasingly restricted to major cities and the 
perimeters of military installations and bases. 
The French might be willing to resolve this 
situation by an arrangement with the Com- 
munists v/hich seemed to offer a chance of 
saving some remnant of the French economic 
anci cultural position in Vietnam. Such an 
arrangement might include an agreement to 
hold early elections, even w^ith the virtual cer- 
' tainty of Viet Minh victory. Only if such an 



Lao movement, strengthened by support from 
the Viet Minh, may result in the overthrow 
of the present government through subver- 
sion or elections. Finally, further successes 
for the Viet Minh in Vietnam will have an 
immediate adverse effect on the situation in 
Laos. 

Ouvlook in Cambodia 

31. We believe that the Communists, itf with- 
dravang organized units from Cambodia, will 
leave behind organizers, guerrilla leaders', and 
weapons. Initially, the Communists will 
probably minimise guerrilla action in order to 
concentrate on building their political poten- 
tial in Cambodia. 

32. Providing the withdrav/al of the Commu- 
nists is substantially in accord with the a^ree- 



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ment, the development of stability in Cam- 
bodia during the next year or so will depend 
* largely on two interrelated factors: (a) the' 
ability of the Cambodians to develop efiective 
government and internal security forces; and 
(b) the ability of the Cambodians to obtain 
external technical and financial assistance. 
There is no proiiibitlon in the Geneva agree- 
ments against Cambodia's obtaining outside 
assistance to develop its defense forces or on 
joining a defensive alliance, providing the lat- 
ter is in consonance with the UN Charter and 
that no foreign troops are based in Cambodia 
In the absence of a threat to Cambodian se- 



curity. If adequate outside assistance is 
made available, the Cambodians will probably 
increase the eiTectivcness both of their gov- 
ernment and their internal security forces, 
and v/ill be able to suppress Communist guer- 
rilla activity and to counter Communist polit- 
ical activity. The efiorts of the Cambodians 
to strengthen their position would probably 
be more -energetic if their independence were 
guaranteed by some regional defense arrange- 
ment. The situation in Cambodia would de- 
teriorate gi'avely, however, if a Communist 
government should emerge in Laos or South 
Vietnam. 



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'' IGOINS imimn Department of Stale ' f ^i^i W'" / 




TOP SECRET 8/5/5H 5 a.m. 

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* 






^^- ■ SET.^T DE?AKTl-IEKT-i^Si-;'*lS;PEATEL) IKFDT^MAMotI SAIGOK H^K ' ^-^ 

During weekend conversation with /La Charnbre, I had opportunity \ ^- 



*v 



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for full and frank discussion regarding his views of Diem V>; 
governnient.. La Chambre feels future Vietnatriese Governraent must: )^'J 

(1) Be fully representative of population' tn Southern Vietnam; p 

(2) Be prepared to initiate and carry cut agricultural reform: p 
(redistributiou of land) very promptly^ and ;, z^ ^ 



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^(>) Be prepared to,d5Dds8-Ba o Dai an d create a republic when "■' ^^^% 



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appropriate during cotntng riionths. He feels that Diem governnioht 
- ' does not (repeat not) qualify on any of those three points but;^ ..^ 

also feels that Dieni is valuable for his high moral character ' ^^''-^- 

and should definitely be a member of any future Vietnamese .-7 " '^^- 

Government if Diem should he successful in making his peace with i 

the sects in the south and ^ should obtain their support. La Chanibr-e 

- -^ said there would be no (repeat no) objection to his staying on • 

*-^ as Prime Minister, provided he would also act on points 2 and 3 

\ \ above* 1^ Chambre said his information was that Diem wouid not 

l^ (ropee-t not) be able to obtain the cooperation and support of 

y^ the populace of South Vietnam^ and that^ because of his 

-^J^ ^landarin background ^ would oppose both agricultural reform and 

^^<i,y\^Vae deposition of Bao Dal. ^ Therefore, la Chambre feels, tb^t a 

^il >:> ^new government will be required if there is to bo any chance 






i \ 



^O- of winning the cotntng election- la Chambre said that Jie__favored 
<\-\xTa.:n as the head of the new government and hoped that Diem would 
Etav on as Minister of the Interior^ Xo cootrci— the-^joolice or as 






C 

'\&Ilnister of Defense*- La Chambre also hapes that Buu Log will ^^ 
^oin the new government as he would be helpful when the time 
came to depose Bao Dal. 



.*^4 



o 

V Regarding timing, there apparently is nothing Immediate in the 0^ 
^^ ■ \ air- la Chambre plans to spend September In Indochina and wants C^l 

to look situation over there before any action is taken.- ^ •.; -(} 






X' 




"■"X^. --^ La Caambre feels Diem will bs helpful during evacuation of ths ■ ^f-i 
~'^\ north and will help to g et refu gees to move to the south"! W/ -\ ^--l 
•,;--^ " o':-ru guess Is tirir^t there v:iri be* no (repeat no) chsmge until : ^Jj* 
<"7-\ Koveniber at the earliest, i also assuuie that if change is decided'*' 

"^ ' ..BBS v\ 

y . upon EEP^OEOCTIC:^ FS:Vi^ 

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,^2" 4 Si J August 4/ noon J from Paris CN 15^6. 

upon at that time it vill be effectuated by Bao Dal- La Chambx^e 
said fj Bciflcally that there could be no (repeat no) action on 
the deposition of Bao Dal until a broadly based gover^nment sup- 
ported by all factions had been established in Southern Vietnam. 



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THE JOIIJT CHIEFS OF STAFF 



Washington 25} D-C. 



k August 195^ 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 



Subject: U*S, Assumption of Training 

Responsibilities in Indochina 



1, It has been recommended by the Chief M.^G Indochina 
that the United States assume responsibility for the train- 
ing of the Vietnamese Army, There are indications that 
both the Vietnamese and the Cambodian governments may 
request that the United States assume responsibility for 
training their forces as part of any U-S. effoz^t to check 
further expansion of Communist influence in Indochina. 

* 

■ 2, The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered this 
question and recommend that before the United States 
assumes responsibility for training the forces of any of 
the Associated States certa;-in preconditions which are 
essential to the success of'- this effort be met. They 
include the following: 

a. Frcsn the military point of , view it is absolutely 
essential that there be a reasonably strong^ stable 
civil government in control. It is hopeless to expect 
a U*S* military training mission to achieve success 
unless the nation concerned is able effectively to 
perform those governmental functions essential to the 
successful raising and maintenance of armed forces^ 
to include ^he provision of adequate facilities , 
drafting and processing of personnel, pay of troops, 
etc. Unless the foregoing conditions prevail, a U,S- 
training mission woijld lack the authority and govern- 
mental support essential to the successful accomplish- 
ment of its mission. 



.b* The government of each of the Associated States 
concerned should formally request that the United 
States assume responsibility for training their forces 
and providing the military equipment, financial assist- 
ance, and political advice necessary to insure internal 
stability. 

c. Arrangements should be made with the French grant- 
ing full independence to the Associated States and pro- 
viding for the phased, orderly withdrawal of French o^^'^'^^-m^Wvp 

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forces J Fi^ench ^officlals^ and French advisors from 
Indochina in order to provide ruotivatxon and a oound - 
basis for the establishnient of national armed forces. 
The United States frcr.^. the bs^^nning should insist on 
dealing directly v;ith the gcvemriients of the resp'3Ctive 
Associated Sta-tes^ corapj-tely independent of French 
particicatlon or cont.xl. . , * 



_ s 



a*-'T£io" sise and composition of ^ the forces oi ea.ch 
of the Associated States sh.ould te dictated hy t'le ' 
local iriilitfjry rGquxreirients and the overfall 
interests. 



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3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recouLuerxl that you approve 
he fore:;;oins pcsiticnj and Inforn the Departiiient of State 
of the viev;s of the Deuartruent of r^efense concerning the 
assiLniption by the United States of trainiri3 responsibilities 
in Indochina, 



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3 prepared study he^s cOU^-- p'bi'fft' of view US part future 
tuam includin;:^. estifrate situation aud concept ox^eratiOQ 



Have 

in sul)stance follovrlng: 



Missicn: Ssl-aollsh pDlltlcel psychological , military^ 
econot-iic courses acttcri for edoptlon ty U3 to insure i^'ree 
Vietnam^ survival as nation, 0-3 ve lop Vietnarn as effective 
barrier continued CornLr3uaist expansion as nation,- 

Concept operation depends fulftlllns following primary 
conditions; . " ^ - ' 



t .■ 



PUnanciel Enaterial and i^ei^sonnel support by US as required; 
successful 3>:ecutlon this program and open cooperatic-^. ^. 
French Govern:rent; Yletna^:T:ase acceptance US agsistanc^e; BtCi 
sctive supoort U3 r:)rQp,vatj:i within Free Vietnaairtiioans , 3r-^ 



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With indispensable support defined above j concept e'TiQj'aceS.: 
US advisors and operation agencies assist Free^yietnarj al£ 
echelons and in all functio.nal activities, Gshs^^a 11^^ every 
ee Vietnam official and gcverncjent ag6aS:y'^.^'lll'^lon^ 
r.e or {nor^ U3 speolallstij for steering iti aiscb^r^e,/ 



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key Fr 

resrjonsrollities J all vlth French concurrence^ 

K30 es^tablish national policies ^ et cetera^^US Ernbassy- SaiJ;oii . 
iriplernentlng agency through country tearr^, US Srr^bassy Saigonj 
GHQ under ccnirriand of Arnbessador for direction activities 
required under this plan, - Following tssks be accomplished: 

A. Political J psychological, US to use its Ov^n interpretation 
of the French Yietna:!! cease-fire agree^^ent to provide all -- 
possible freedoo: relations vith Vietns::?. US must undertake '-, 
major political psychological action re France ^ SF Asia and 
Vietnaau By agroer^^ents US assume dcnlnent: role cooperation 
vith P'ranee and Vletnem to develoo strong viable Vietnarn, Bv ^ 






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Nr^D Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECEET 



SENSITIVE 



t 

-2- Mj 302^ A, August 8 (Army Message) ^ from Saigon* 

US political psychological actions re SE Asia produce 
strong positive support from nations having primai-y inter- 
I est SE Asia, Develop strong democratic state oriented toward 
' West, By persuading Government Vietnam to announce complete 
independence J and for French to announce date of withdrawal 
French forces and date Vietnam becomes entirely free* 
Detailed implementation above included in plan. 

B. Military establish sound realistic modern system national 
military service- Specialists from US selective service 
employed this effort. Evaluate and establish sound personal 
policies* Establish national intelligence agency and other 
intelligence programs all fields. Study and reorganize 
Defense Ministry and Armed Forces, Establish for each 
military service streamlined and highly effective training 
organization to include staff training and field training 
agencies J develop division training camps, RTCj et cetera* 
Logistics development* Signal development- Budget and fis- 
cal development. Develop independent Vietnam army of 
divisional-sized units* 

C- Kaval and air establish sound economic program to provide 
for realistic development resources including rebuilding 
railroads J developing highway system^ agrarian reforms ^ 
housing construction^ schools , development sanitation and 
hygience. 

We believe such plan last rpsprt solution on salvaging 
remaining Vietnam and offer it for consideration in formula- 
tion US policy for SE Asia. Ambassador concurs* Ambassador 
generally concurs with objectives above outline and with my 
analysis situation. He approves entire report as a timely, 
useful initial plan^ although he has reservation as to some 
of methods proposed, as he doubts necessity of US to become 
q.uite so far involved in operation of this government except 
on military training side. Comment: I feel this Is war in 
every sense* Wartime methods, therefore, are in order all 
fields until emergency passed- 

SMS:BD 



70^4 
TOP SECRET otNol \ iV C 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 








(^rimefdi of Sim 







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TOP SECRET 



./ 



8/9/5^^ 5:50 p.m: 
CORRECTED COPiT 



FROMrParis 



Control O^W-9 

Tac'd: Auniusb 9, 1954 
. 2:% p.m. 



TO: 



SocTQiiBry 






i;0: 558, August 9, 7 P-m 



PRIORITY • - ■ . • ' , 

.... - • ■ . : . ■ • , 

EYES (m2£ SECRETARY 

^ . — — ' ^ ' . . 

Kev inforn:ation vrhlch baa just corao to my attention makes mo .. 
feel that it is irape:catlve to obtain c one urr once op acquieric- 
enco of Schumann and Blci.ault prior to publication of statemont ■ 
on Indochina. V/hen Jojce nho^/ed proporjod statotnont. to Jfergorie, 
Margopie commented that tho record Boemod to bo accuj?ate as far 
af3 it vent but that it otriltted all mention of XQ4?. offer of 
atomic bombs to Bidault. Ho said you had mjade "this offer to..;. 
Bidault during a private co'nvernatlon which took place during"^" 
Jan Inter.nrlBnlon of one of tho fornial talks at the Qual d' Or Bay, 
v;hich v;ere held during your visit here on route to Croneva, 

Joyce asked lyfergorie if this "offer" vas not perhaps merely a ' 
speculation as to whether atomic homhs could te useful at Dien 




tTTVY^n 



Blen Phua Margerie said "No 



XTci 



■le further said that Ridault 



told him and La Tournelld about your, offer Immediately a fter_he 
finished talking vith you and that Bidault had the dlBtlnct 
impression that you \ieve "suggesting the use, of at amr o ~^m bs 
which were to be given by the US^t^o the French* AGcbrdlng to 
Margerie Bidault vas much upset_about this offer and felt that 
the use of 'atomic bombs would have done no good tacticalTy and 
would have lost all support for the-v/est throughout Asia'"/" Our 
judgment is that Margerle fears that If Bidault should feel 
that publication of the statement as drafted pla ce d_ him ir 
unfavorable light and indicated that he favored continuation of 
the fighting and^was not doing his best to obtain a settlemsnt, 
he might respond by publicizing his version of the conversation 
regarding atom bombs and might attempt to take credit for .javlng 
-.prevented their use after 11: had been' suggested by US. I would^ 
^i hope to avoid any such eventuality by prior clearance of. state- 
'X ment with Schurriana and Bidault, ! " ' . . . 

y^ do not belie VG that Bidault would resort to any such irrespon- 
^ silble tactic which would damage Interests of free world and 
''" ■""'"'^^prestige of U3 but we must nevertheless bear in -mind that he 
13 ill, nervous hypersensitive and bitter, - - :^ 




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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Pioject Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



IMDICkIE: a COLUGF'gTr I . 



DepariLioaent of Stat; 



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SENT TO: Amembassy PARIS PRIORITY 



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EYES ONLY. AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY 

■ „. ■ -^^-^/pfo/yyry -■- ^ 

Am totally mystified by your 558. Eave no rec;ollection whatGVer ^of alleged 



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offer^ our notes oi co nversa tion do not reflect^mention of subject, and it is 









incredible that I should have made offer since the law categorically forbids it/'"*' 
as was indeed v^ell known not only to me but to Bidault because it had been ^^ ? 



discussed at NATO meetings. 



O 



I recall that at the restricted NATO meeting on 23 April 1954 I made a q ^'^ 



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statement on U.S. policy concerning use of atomic weapons^ in the coarse (SD 



i 






I 

which among other things I said QTE Such weapons must now be treated as '9 
fact having become conventional UNQTE. I am v/ondsring wli^ther what 
Bidault reported was not in fat^t what I had said at the restricted NATO Council 
meeting, ' . f 

See no objection to your showing statement confidentially to Schumann but 
we must not get maneuvered into a position where the President an^ I cannot^ 



respond to a Congressional request unless this is also approved by foreicm ^-' 

— ■ — ^ — ^ -t:^ 






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governments. 

^ Under the parliamentary system^ both British and French Prime Minis-'] 
.r^^e^s and Foreign Ministers are subjected to interrogations by Parliament -.:- : 



Vto^tvd by-. 



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Tt^tagraphEc trsnir;iTisfaft and 
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TOP SECRET 




Classification 



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NNDP '"•'■' xf ^"' ^'"'"'"^ °^^^^ '^-^26. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 1 6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 




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.of ttlcEi."" to. 



A me mb assy PARIS 



TOP SECRET 



C Id f 1 1 f ic at lo n 



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Pand make answers to questions. What we propose here is our counterpart of 



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that system. We naturally want to act with courtesy and consideration and avoid " 

- public controversy but we must not give others veto power over, our relations with 

Congress and the public! _ ■ 




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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 6?316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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■ 111 ■ ' — ' -^ ■ ' ■*' -"-■' 



-F^^ 



FfscM: Paris 

TO: Secretary oiT ^tZ'A>e 

110: 576, August 10, 7 P'tii 



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ccr^trai: 3859 iv:*<-.<" 

Pac'ii:- August 10, 19 5^ 
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pRioraaT - • 

*EOb ONLY SECRETARY. 



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At my dl^rection^ Joyce sai-/ r'brgei?ie today and conveyed to him 
sal:)fitance of first tv/o pax^agraphs of DKPTBL 501* He also told 
Hav^3Ti.o that he felt It \-m3 ouvlous that there had been a 
complote rd.s understanding by Bldault^ possibly based on language 
difficulties . 



:\ 



Margerle e*>ald that he fully agreed th^^t there niuBt have been 
such a misunderstanding. He added that he remembered April 23 
'very uell because on that day Biclault had been 111, jittery^ 
overwrought, and at his very i7or:it. I'!largerlo added that on 
that day Bldault had been "incoborent'' to raenfoex\o of his omi 
top staff. Therefore, he very readlD^y understood hov; such a - 
tnla understanding could have conie about on that pa3?tlcular day, 

Margerle said that he vds very grateful that thi?^ ?iubject h:id 
been c3.eared up and hoped i.hat Icaowledge of this nilf^iu_ndev*r.t^-:'ndlng 
vjould be kept strictly liriiited. He said that he i;ould undertake" 
to see Bidault personally and straighten him out' on this 
subject. 

*I remember Bidault '3 condition on that day very veil myself 5\hd 
I am sure tl.at It Is the coriiplete explanation for bis otherviso 
Incouvprehenslble misunderstanding. 



o 

Gl 



,1 hops to "be able to show statement to Schumann tomorrow. I 
vill empmsizQ to him that this is helng done merely as a 
courtesy. . . . ... 

In vlev of tense parliamentary situation here^ T thoroiv^ily 
agree vith Parodl and Margerle that publication of statement 
should be postponed until after EX debate-. 



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Declassiried per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Pmject Number: NND 633 1 6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



P 



► -J-T 



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 'YT- ^ r^ — ^ — ^=, 
Washington 25. B.C. (Of" ,\H 'M^' \ 



11 August 195^^ 






MEMORAITOUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Subject: Review of U<S. Policy in the 

Far East - NSC 5^29 



1. The Joint Cbiefs of Staff suhmit herewith their views 
with respect to a draft statement of policy prepared by the 
National Security Council Planning Board titled "Review of 
U.S. Policy in the Far East" (NSC 5^29) ^ which is scheduled 
for consideration by the National Security Council at its 
meeting on 12 August 195^. 

2- In their memorandim for you dated 9 April 195^+ j sub- 
ject "U,S, Strategy for Developing a Position of Military 
Strength in the Far East (l^SC Action No. 1029-b)"^ the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff recomniended that- the United States formulate 
a comprehensive policy in which the Par East Is viewed as a 
strategic entity and which would provide definitive direction 
for the development of a position of military strength in the 
Far East. NSC 5^1-29 lacks a statement of United States objec- 
tives with respect to the area as a whole and broad courses 
of action for the achievement of such objectives ^ and hence 
does not constitute a comprehensive statement of policy as 
envisaged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

3. Accordinglyj the Joint Chiefs of Staff recantuend that 
NSC 5^29 be returned to the Planning Boai^d with appropriate 
guidance for derivation and exposition of U. S, objectives in 
the Far East and delineation of broad courses of action 
directed toward their attainment. 

if. Specific cacnments of the Chief of Naval Operations, the 
Chief of Staffs U, S* Air Force and the CoiiLmandant of the Marine 
Corps on the material included In NSC 5^29 follow: 

"a. We concur in the view of the Defense ^ JCS, and 
OIM Members of the Planning Board^ contained in the foot- 
note on page 3 of the drafts that U.S. policy with regard 
to China should be considered and determined firsts and 
that the policy with regard to the peripheral areas 
should be established in light of this determination. 



* 



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709 



I op QFrorr 



S£NS!!T/P 



DeclassiHed per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



! 






L / We recommend J therefore^ that -when KSC 5^29 is prepared 
^ i in final form. Section IV, COMMUNIST CHINA, \>e brought 

forward and redesignated Section I. However, for con- 
venient reference, we have addressed our coimnents to 
the sections of the paper in their present order. 



SENS 



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1 



1 1 
1, 



I "b. The following detailed comments are addressed 

I to the bracketed phrases and alternative courses of 

action set forth in the draft statement of policy, as 
we3JL as to' amendnients and additions which are deemed 
desirable- (Changes are indicated in the usual manner.) 

"(l) Page 3, subparagraph 1 c and page ^1-, para- 
graph ^* No preference Is expressed with respect 
to including or omitting the bracketed phraseology, 

"(2) Page ^j subparagraph 7 a. Alternative A 
is favored. 

REASON: It is considered that the treaty 

— Ill I — ■ 

should provide for the prompt and positive 
application of retaliatory measures against Com- 
munis t China if it is determined that Communist 
China is a source of armed aggression, either 
direct or indirect- Any more limited provision 
would not constitute an adequate response to the 
aggression, 

"( 3) Page 6, paragraph 8, Alternative B is 
considered preferable. 

'*(^) Page 7^ subparagraph 9 ^* Amend to read 
as follows : 

'f- Continue to exploit opportunities to 
further U.S. long-range objectives toward uniting 
Vietnam under a democratic form of government. ' 

*'(5) Page 7, subparagraph 9 g * Delete both alternatives. 

R EA SON: In light of subparagraph 9 f ;. a further 
j statement" on this subject is considered unnecessary. 

''(6) Page 8, subparagraph 10 d. Stationing of token 
forces in or around Thailand is not favored* Accordingly 
it is recommended that Alternative B be rejected. Vhile 
th-ere is no objection to Alternative A, the necessity for 
its inclusion in a" statement of policy with respect to 
Thailand Is not apparent, since the visits of United States 
forces to friendly countries is a routine and well-estab- 
lished custom. 

^^7) Pages 9 through 11, paragraphs 12, 13, 1^, and 13 . 
Among the four statements of alternative courses of action 
with respect to Communist China adoption of Alternative C 
(paj'agraph 14), amended to read as follows, is favored: 



T^o SENSUiVE TOP qprRH' 



Decl^ffsined per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dute: 201 1 




I OP StCRFT 






* 



^l4, EedtLce the relative power of Communist China 
in Asia even at the risk of;, but vithout deliberately 
provokingj ^war: 

'a. (l) React vith force^ if necessary and ad- 
vantageous ^ to expansion and subversion recognizi- 
able as suchj supported and supplied by Communist 
China* 

'(2) React, with immediate, pasitive, armed 
force against any belligerent move by Communist 
China. 

'b. Increase efforts to develop the political, 
economic and military strength of non-Coramunist 
Asian countries, including the progressive develop- 
ment of the military strength of Japan, to the point 
where she can provide for her own national defense 
and J in time, contribute to the collective defense 
of the Far East. 

'£j d, and ^, Same as 13 £j dj and e^. ' 

REASONS; (l) Alternatives A and B would provide 
that the United States resort to armed action only in 
the event that Communist China itself committed armed 
aggression. Such a policy would be inadequate to cope 
with indirect aggression which experience indicates will 
be the most probable form of Chinese Communist aggression 
in the general area of Southeast Asia in the near future. 
It should be the objective of United States policy to 
block the further expansion of Communist China regardless 
pf the methods by which such expansion is attempted. 

(2) The proposed policy contained in Alternative D is 
considered to be extreme. It could hardly be expected 
that such a policy would receive the support of our major 
Allies. If adopted, it would require that the United States, 
in common prudence^ now embark upon a major expansion of 
military forces, and take such other steps as are necessary 
to place ^he United States in a position to conduct large- 
scale military actions In the Far East. In short, the pro- 
posed policy is considered to be provocative and one which 
inherently would greatly increase the risk of general war. 

(3) The objective set forth in Alternative C, as amended 
above, is consistent with previously expressed views of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff- It states a definite goal and pro- 
vides for a positive approach to the problem of reducing 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND C)3316. By: NWD Diite: 2011 







the threat or further Chinese Communist expansion in Asia- 
It would provide the basis for action against indirect 
aggression which is lacking in both Alternatives A and B? 
while avoiding the more extreme measures ^ with their 
greatly enlianced .risks, contained in Alternative D- Within 
the content of broader policies with respect to the world- 
wide threat of Soviet Communisnij the steady and consistent 
application of the courses of action set forth in this 
alternative hold promise of achieving results advantageous 
to the security position of the Free World*" 

' 5. The comments of the Chief of Staff, U-S, Arn^ on NSC 5^29 
follow : 

"a. FSC 5^29 addresses itself specifically to oiily the most 
fundamental aspects of the problem in the Far East, nam.ely: 
the off-shore island chain j general political and economic 
measures in the Far East; negotiation of a Southeast Asia 
security treaty; action in the event of local subversion; 
policy with respect to Indochina, Thailand, Indonesia and 
Communist China, It is not a comprehensive review of the 
entire problem* 

* 

"b- Moreover, the problem confronting us in the Far East 
cannot be stated, except in relation to and as an element in 
a United States foreign policy of global scope. 

"c, While I do not suggest just what such global policy 
should be, it seems axiomatic to me that one principal 
OBJECTIVE therein should be to split Communist China fi-om 
the Soviet Bloc* Quite aside from the great moral issue 
involved in the deliberate precipitation of general war 
the converse of this thesis is equally applicable* From 
the purely military point of view we must not, by our own 
act, deliberately provoke war against the combined power 
of the Soviet Bloc and Communist China, since to do so 

' would be to choose a war against the most potentially 
powerful enerr^ coalition with a strong probability of 
losing the active support of some of our present Allies* 

. This situation would have the most dangerous possible mili- 
tary consequences. We may well find ourselves in such a 
war, but it should NOT be our choice without having FIRST, 
taken every feasible step to increase our readiness to meet 
an explosion into general war, and SECOND, having mapped out 
and begun an approach to the OBJECTIVE stated above- 



wr* 



712 

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. Bv: NWD Diite: 20 1 1 




f 



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t* 






> '- "d. Tlio c::ecbfclcn of no one of the four alternative 
■ Q.'^^'aX'Z'::^::^ of act ion T/lth i^or^pocl: to Conirnunist China vrould 
2>ropjrly cerv^e TT-S* lon^-ransc intsrosts^ nor diGchai'^30' 
the reo';Gnsibllity i;hich tlio Ariiei-^iccin people havQ to nian- 
Irind Tor Ic-adcr^Iiio ox^ tlio Ffoe '/orld. -Thorc ara elorionts 
In each Ox taono coar^^oSj rhlch coralviriCd^ coulcl connSitute 
e prorcvci^olo andrroioor course of ac'^lon* VH 3>0 MOT HAVJ; 



tr 



_» In cIcciGiT;;^ upon a couroo of acti'.oiij^ the first; and 
basic noccl^, rliich I thinl: i:SC 1G2/2 docs not moot:, is foi? ' 
a Gi;aucrac:nt^ in a cin^lo cIocu::ii^nt of a U.S« tov^l^^i policy 
on a sicbal baoiCj \vVc\-i the principal OBJiX-riV^S ll^itad, 
Acsiinilrir; th^t one of fclicDe v;ould ^o^ the one Etatcd in para- 
graph £ abw.^e^ it doea not follou that its attaii^r.cnt re- . 
quires tho dc£itructlon of the nllitai^ pov/ai* of CorjTjnlG'i: 
China. In fact^ I uould rc:;ard th^ dosGruGtion of Gueh 
rallitar^^ poT/ot* as inlinical to tho ^ov.z^voxiz"^ ir/ceroi:;t3 of 
tho U-S, It v:ould ronult in fcho crc^ation of a pov;er vacuu:ii 
into ?;hich but ono other nation could liiovoj namoli^ Soviet 
Rue 



i^JL- 




rai-^fja conants dcrivo Tron fnlcr.dlincni; vilth America^, not 
-i?ltn tho LfSoIij irhlch castD Ecqulaitivo eyes cri its t-3Pri- 
toi-^v and" t^osouroos; thi 



I. 



■I 




and t>aIco steps co VGr.ovo. the Gtl[;na of ^'acc'^^'^spi^' vrith 
iJhlch it io nou branded. The adoption of such a- course 
of action and fcho cnployaont of cuch noaxsurc^s dicta to the 







*■ . 



For the Joint Chief c or Stafi": 



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. : . CirlciT 0:^ Staff, Uirited States Aiv por-ce 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Projeui Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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THE JOINT CHftFS OF STAT-'F 

^ WAStllNGTON 25, D. C* 






12 Auguut iy5''J 






..wJ ''^ 



MEMOUAimun FOiv THE SKCUETruTf OF DEFKUSK 



Subject: MesGaso to the French Priirie Minister 



1, This rjemorandum is in reKponae to the memot^andum 
from the Assi^^tant Secretar-y of DeTonr-e (ISA)^ dated 11 
August 195^ J vniich requested the coTTiinentr> and re coinn\end ac- 
tions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff vrith respect to a 
Department of State draft of a proponed raessai^e to the 
Prime Minister of France regarding United States policy 
to^^ard Indochina. 

■ 

2- In their memorandum to you dated 4 August 195^* 
subject: **U*S, Assumption of Training Responsibilities 
in Indochina's the Joint Chiefs of* Staff set forth certain 
conditions vrhich they considered, should be met before the 
United -Staterj assujiios responsibility for training the 
forces of the Associated -States . Particularly pertinent 
to the consideration of the proposed message are tvfo pre- 
conditions v/hichj In substance ^ prescribed: 



a. The existence of a reasonably strong^ stable 
government capable of performing those functins 
essential to tlie successful rai^iing and maintenance 
Its armed forces; and 



of: 



b. Tiie granting by France of full indepGndence to . 
the Associated Sl.ateo and arrangements for trie eventual 
phased v/ithdrat^-al of French forces^ officials and 
advisers from Indochina^ in order to provide motivation 
and a sound basis for the establishment of national 
armed force 



.s 



3, The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that neither of 
the above conditions can be said to exist nov/. The 
tenure of the present government in Vietnam appears to 
be in doubt and cvabject to final determination by the 
French as to the evf^nt-ual composition of that governmer.t 
Until tills matter has been definitely resolvt^dj tlie 
strength and stability of the Vietnam Govenment Kill 
hardly be cruel i as to liold promise of providing the firm 






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direction required fo'r tlie raiuj-nt; and nialnteiiance of 
ar^niod rovccn. UnJ/Ji^s a reasonably oUible govcrnnient is 
eGtabllt^iicd, the United States training laicf^ion i-roiad 
laclc authority and ^^ovcruinental support essential to tlie 
succeGGful accoinraiGhmont o£ its miction, 

4, v/liile the Fruncli Govoi'nriiei^t hLiij announced its 
liitenticn to srant ind'-pendeuce to the Ast^ociatod States ^ 
It has not announced a plan for tfie sciiedulcd relinquisli- 
inent- or French authority or for the vrithdravral of FrencJi 
officials from Indochina o.ffairs. The residual responsi- 
tility and authority^ if any, to be retained by the French 
Go\ern=uent . particularly with respect to the control to 

be exercised over the aimed forces of the Associated States 
has not yet been made clear. If, in fact, the French v^ere 
to retctin a degree of authority and direction in tlie 
or£;anization and training of the indigenous forces ^ the 
United States training mlsoion v;ould be prevented from 
discharging its responsibilities' "completely independent 
of French participation and control. 

5, The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the pro- 
posed message is not an unqualified coirunltment to furnish 
military aid or to provide training assistance to the 

suites. They are in "^accord v;ith tite stated 
the message J to reassure both the French a: 
States Govenunents of tiie United States in*^ 
assist in preventing an eventual Coimiunist 



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Associated 
purpose of 
Associated 
tention to 



take-over in Indociiina. Uovveverj the Joint Ch-iefs of 
Staff are of tlie opinion that the proposed message should 
state in clearer terms -that the final United States de- 
cision as to the extent'' o'f military aid and the assump- 
tion of. responsibility for training vnMl be contingent 
upon tiie establishment of the prereq^uisite conditions 
discussed in paragraphs 2. 3^ and h above, As presently 
Vforded/ the proposed message might convey to the French 
that U,S* deci£^ioris wlt!^ respect to ti'iese matters have 
already been taker\. v;itiiout definite French ccnimitments 
as to their intentions. Fuj/thcrj the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff feel that the me l^ sage should be more specific v:ith 
regard to the United States desire th^tt its representative 
deal directly v/iuh the Govern-ments of the Associated State 
and that all United States military material aid should 
eventiially be given directly to the Associated States ■ ^ 
rather than through the French Governraent, 



s 



s 



o. The Joint Chiefs of- Stai'f recouMcnd that the 
substance of tiio foi^cgoing vicv/s be transmitted to the 



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rosponnlLilitieG by the Uiutcci Statc^G in Indociiino.j and 
that the Joint ChioT^ oT Staff be e^vcn an opportiuilfcy 
to revlevf the aniendecl nicr.Gaj^e. , 



For the Joint 



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ofD or staff: 



General, United Slites 

Chief of Staff. 



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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
WASHINGTON 



19^4 AUG 13 Pf4 3 57 



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AUG 12 1954 



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ACTION 



Dear ViT* Secretary 








m:A[} OF 

FAR hA,Srf:RN AFFAIRS 

Tha Chief of l-IAAG^ Indochina ^ has rocoirmiendsd that the jUniied 
States a^ssiTTie ref^ponsibility xor the training of the Victnanie^'G Anry* 
As you Imo-r^ representatives of the Goveriiiiionts of ol\ tliree Associated 
' States hav3j in their contacts lath United States officials iji Indo- 
china^ aslced for United States assistance iti traioirig the indigenoiis 
forces of those States© 

The" Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered this quetstion ond have 
recommended that^ before the United States imdertaJkes the training of 
forces of any of the Associated States^ certain precondit5_ons essential 
to the success of such ^.n effort b3 not« As stated by the Joint Chiefs . 
of Staff 5 those preconditions includes 

>^Prom the nilitaxy point of vieu it is absolutely essential that 
there be" a reasona^bly strong ^ stable civil goveiiment isi controls It' 
is hopeless to e::p3ct a UeS* milit^^ry training ra-ssion to achieve . 

success unless the nation concerned is able effectively to perform 
those govonimsntal fxmctions essential to the successful raising and . ' 
Eiaintenance of arined forces^ to include the provision of adequate 
faci3.itieSj drafting' and procosning of personnel^ pay of troops j etc<r 
Unless the foregoing condi-tions prevail ^ a UoS^ train±ag nission t7ou!!.d 
lack the authority and govermriental support essential to the successful 
accoTTiolishiient of its ri!iss5_ono 

*^Thb government of each of the Associated States concerned should 
fomalDy request that the United States r^svims rosponsibi3-5,ty for 
. training their forces and pro-^^^Lding the riilitt?ry equipment^ financial 
■ assistcxice^ and political advice neccssoj^y to ^jnsiure internal stability <> 

> " , m 

k 

^'Arrangemonta should be riade vjith the Fi^ench granting full independence 
to the Associated States ajid providing for the phased^ orderly iriLthdravral 
of French forces^ French officials^ and French adv^-sors from Indoch'^na in 
order to pro^/id^ notivation rjid a eoi''nd basis for the establishinent of 
nation.'^l aiv.cd forces o Tho United States from the boginning should insist -"^ 
on dealing directly tilth the governments of ths respective Associated 
States^ conipletcly independent, of French participation or control,, 



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"The sise oJid copiposition of the forces of each of the Associated 
States shoiiLd b3 dictated b^ the local rrdlit^JTy requirements end the 
over-a3JL U*S, interests a" 



I £un in general agreement with the vieifs of th3 Joint Chiefs of ^ 
StaJ'f vliich I'cpresent the current DepartTr.ent of Defense position on this 
subject* 

A point tidditional to those made by tho Joip.t Cl^iefs of Staff is 
that international interpretation of the ceass-fire. agreement may in 
any event impose limitations on the extent of military training^ as Vi-sll 
as end" item assistanco, that could be undertalceii by ths United States 
in In do china « 

Sincerely yoiirs^ 



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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF" STAFF 

WASl-IINGTON 25, D. C, . 






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lonMORAiroUM FOTx THK S^'ICKETARY OF DEKIiyJSS 



Subjcci: 



Report of Jo 1110 
Southeant Asia 



UK^ 



US 



study Group on 



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<3ated 2? July 193^ and P August 195^ 
"South-3&i5t Asian Collc^ctive DefensQ 



1* In response to your me*n:j rand urn dated 22 July l^'f^*-^* subject 
as above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit hen;V/lth their vi^:v/r>, 
in tbe licnt of the ney situation created by the- recent develop- 
ments In Indochina J concerr^inc the proposed nc-go elation of a 
recional collective security treaty for the Far Kast. In addi- 
tion to the report of the Joint UK-US Study Group on Southeast 
Asia and the Draft Treaty submitted by the U.S- member of the 
Study Group J consideration has been given to the docu!rients fur-- 
nished by memorandums by the Assistant S^^crctary of Defense (ISA) 

J both on tlie subject; 
.._^^« i.^.^^., ^^^^j.^o y^ vp- i^cx'^;ei^c. Organization." - 

2. Reference Is nade to the previously expressed views of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the Far East reclonj as set 
forth in their memorandum for you dated 9 April 195''tj subject: 
"United States Soratefry for Developing; a Position of Military 
Stronsth in the Far Kast '(MSG Action Ho, 1029-b).*' In that 
memorandum J the Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed the need for 
a comprehensive policy for the Far Kast v;hich v7ould view that 
region as a strategic entity rjnd v:hich v/ould provide definitive 
diT"^ectlon for the develonr;tent of a position of military stren^"^;th 
in that region, Co<;':nizauce vras taken of the fact thatj in their 
ajssve?:atej current policies addressed to Individual countries or 
segments of the j^eneral are^. make It- clear Uhat Uie United States^- 
from tlie standpoint of its security . interests j attaches major 
imnortai^ce to th'^^ \^3.v East a.rea and v^ouId be prepared to react 
v/ith military force a.calnst an at^mcd aj^^^jress ton by the USSK or ■ 

Communist China in that- rej;5iori. 

■ ■ , 

. ■> ■ 

3* The Joint Chiefs of Staf T expressed the opinion that our 
Far Kastern no 1 icy should be directed tov;a\'d achiuvltK the 
follov;inf; objectives: 






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of the pui^poGu arid c-'Lpnhll Lty of tho non 
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Drrecclvely in or;;a:j;nr; thts- LiireaL oC af^ijrcsslve Coi;^auni;3!n. 



e 

"b. Eventual Oot:ablii?hniiiil: of a compuehcnGivo x^cj^Ional 
Becu"rit;v ri^n-angemcnt amonjj the non-CanimLnilB S; countries of the 
Fai- East, vrlth v/hlch the United States^ the United .Klnisdom, 
and possibly Franc n, v:ould be associated. 

"c , Keduction oC the pov/er and influence of the USSR in the 
-. ^ 'Far nasi' ^. Initially through the cont?inr,ient and reduction of 
the relative power position of Con^munlst China j and ultimately 
the decacliinent of China from the area of Soviet Communist con- 
brol." 

i|. In proposing courses of action foi" the accomplishment of 
these objectives J the Joint Chiefs of Staff recoiTiraended that 
the United States (a) be prepared to prevent further territorial 
expansion by the Chinese Copununists^ (b) retain freedom of action 
to apply countei^ac tlon, as appropriate j agains t the source of 
.any ag^t'^e ssionj and (c) foster a system of treaties v/hich Vfould 
lead eventually to a comprehensive and cohesive security arrange- 
mezit in the Far East area/ 

5. At the time these viov,^3 v:ere expressed , France vras ma.ln- 
taininc a position of considerable military strength in Indo- 
china J and the Associated States vrere counted among those 
coui^. tries v;hich could make 'a substPntial contribution to the 
aggregate of non-Co?:munist military strength in the general 
area. As the result of the Geneva agreement ^ the military 
position of Fraaice aiid the Associated States is considerably 
altered,' There jb some evidence that France intends to v/lLh- 
dravr the bullc of her ground forces from Indochinaj leavingr 
behind only a token force to conduct training of the armies 
of the Af^sociatcd States, It is novr \jnlikely that the prt « 
viously anticipated military potent! a], of the Associated , tates 
can be realized*^ Additionally , the Com[nun_ists iiave nov^ gained 
a psychological and military victory of far-reaching effect^ 
have substantially augmented their manpov/erj have acquire ' im- 
portant nev; food .resources , arud have expanded the territcy 
under their militar:; control, ' Tliese altered conditions do" 
not change the basic objectives v/hich our security interests 
require that \;o seeV: in the Far L':astj but they do hevo a con- 
siderable Influence upon the measuiH^s required for the achieve- 
ment of tiiose objectives. 



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G, The Joint CUi-jfG oT StaTf ar^ ol Ihe opinioTi that uhe 
rec^^nt dovelormeij!:?; Irj O'-ueva and Indochinaj coiinidered in 

V;esl:crn i^IoCj f;erv-r to iircrer'.ES'-^ t;he uri5t;u,cy of tiic nood rov 
p: coiw'-^vohunslvc Urit.:d 3-:^;:^.^^ polloy v/itlr ronnoot to tlv- l^ar 
Kas": ro':;iou ns t v:^'OlOj in oi-Ooi* to rive dlr_e'-/L:lonj cohcj^jivo- 
iiessj and c^rcater efroc tivcness to the pollfclcol and pAlitaT7 
actions which mr.z[\ movj be taken to prevent tiie loss of tlie re- 
ma i ncl ti r or So l j t h e a s ■ :- A s j. ^^ to C oium ii n i s i: c o n. t r o 1 . It is c o n - 
siderv?d that until Uic United States fon:iulnfce3 and adopts 
such an over-all policy* v/e shall be saverel;/ handicapped in / 
Bi\y ne20tiafcici:s Toi^ the ePtablic>hm-rj:nt of a collective defense 
.in*'the^gen(£;r?l"ar3a of Soi^thcast Asia and the Southvmsfc pacific. 
Before tlie prcvisior.s of an acceptable securLt,v treaty can be 
finall\' Grafted, it v;ould anuear necoszriry that certain basic 
decisions be made with respect to hov7 far the Uiiited States 
is v/llllntT; to gOj In concert viith all or certain of the non- 
ConKuunist natlona having interests ivv the Far East or, if neces-- 
sary, unllateially ^ in oppocinp; farther CoiiiiauniDt accretions in 
the a.rea under cone id oration, 

7. Similai^ly. ba^ric decisions v:ould annear to be i^eouisite to 
the adoption of ini;eri:n courses of action, dt^si^jned to check the 
moment uni created by recent Cormnunis t suoccsscr-j and to provide 
foi^ coordinated action eendinr; the formalization of a collective ' 
security ai^rangenient for the Far Ear;.t region. 

8. Vievrln^' the iramediate problein of treaty negotiations vrithin 
this context, th.e Joint Chiefs of Staff recoLa^ize that the Tjuited 
States ivas publicly coin:ai'tted to the sponsor Iny and support of 

a collective securi^^; e^rranger^ent for Southeast Asia even before 
the collapse cf the French effoi-^t in Indochina, but they have 
serious ml3 3ivinr;s co:\ceinii.n;: the military provlsio'ns of such a 
pact lest t]>ey Imply comriiit'neiits vrhich the UAiited States v/ould 
not be able to inee':. Failure to 5^atiofy ti>e expectations cf the 



signatories in 



the 






er of milltai"'y aid could, in turrij result 



in the alien _^t ion of friendly ^overnnients rather than the acquisi- 
tion of nevr allies; 

9- S'JbJect to th^; conimente^ set fortii belov;, some of ^'/hlch are 
made oy v;ay of ernph'?siG of eoints in the reports of the UK-U3 
Study Gronpj the Jo-nt Cliiefs of otaff nre in [r.encral agreejueut 
vfith the position taken by the United 3 t:\tes side of tl\e Group. 
The real evaluation of the product of the Study Group vrill, of 
course, dep^;nd upon the manner in vjhich t^te differ^aices in the 
United States and United Klr.jjdom positioiis are resolved. 



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10, It is the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a 
Southeast Asia defense treaty should incorporate provisions 
responsive to the following considerations having military 
aspects r ' ^ 

a 

a. The clear purpose of the treaty should be to form a 
collective security arrangement to deter andj if possible ^ 
prevent any further extension of Communist control ^ by 
whatever means ^ within the general area of Southeast Asia 
and the Southwest Pacific, 

'b* The initial membership should be limited to those 
nations willing to join in the type of organization which 
can be effective in accomplishing the purpose set forth 
in a above - 

c- The treaty should provide for the future accession 
of other powers having interests in the Far East which may 
subsequently desire to join- (it is considered that the 
pact should ultimately include Japan ^ Korea ^ and possibly 
nationalist China.) 

d* There sho-old be no built-in power of veto. The treaty 
provisions should permit concerted action by a lesser number 
than the total of the signatory nations in the event that 
the political or territorial integrity of any signatory is 
threatened by Communist aggression in any foi^- 

e* Careful consideration should be given to the 
practicability and desirability of providing voting 
machinery in the governing council which would preclude 
the possibility that^ at some tinie in the future when 
the membership is expanded ^ a bloc of "neutrals" or a 
British Commonwealth bloc could exercise a controlling 
voice. 

t* The treaty should establish the moral justification 
and provide the political framework and necessary machinery 
within which and by which any act of overt Communist 
aggression could be met by prompt military counteract ion^ 
not excluding military action against the real source of 
the aggression. 



.722 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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£., Pnraisraph 2, Article III^ ol" the briift Security 
Treaty '1-6 addrc::r;cd to indirec*; b/^i^rer^^^louy the racst 
lilcely aiid insidAorio Tomi^ oj7 Cai;uiiiui.!.:iU a/^firenrlon . 
Tiie treaty Bhciild GoeciiMcolly nrovldu -tr-ak ai\y Tui^ther 
c^: ten 3 icn o T C c;:v . r vi i i ^^ t con t vo 1 t h v-o u j^h i t^ iM 1 1 x\:i t lo 1 1 o ?-^ 
Bubversior.j or through cny obhor indirect moan^j jihould 



as in bhe cose of ovt^rb ^;:x2reGsio 
approp ri ate c o tu j t era c t ion , 



be 



et by prompt and 



h. It sliould be ma^dc clear in the prelii:ilnary 
nei_,o);iabicny and in the provi:;ionr> of the treaty itself 
that no conimitiiU^nt by the United States to support the 
raisjngj eoiulprcj'.^;^ eaid tiialntenance o£ lndi£enou.^ forces 
and/or to deploy IJni-jed States forces in Guch strent^thc 
as to provide for tai effective defense of all of the 
national territorj^ of cncli sl£;natory ±3 implied or 
intended. Military a5.d by the United Stated to the 
Southeast AGlan countr^ieG v/ho are riieniberG of the pact 
should be limited to that neceGsary to permit the 
countx^ies coiicerned to ralsCj equips and mavintain 
military forces aa necesr^ary to insure internal sta- 
bility^ to contribute tovmrd o treasonably effective \ 
oppc.sition to any attempted invaaion, and to in£:tlll 
national ccnfideiice* ' 

i^. It yliould be made equally clear that tlie treaty 

would net co^runit tlio United States to a larr^e-^scale 

procrc-Jii of cconotaic aid to the .sif^natory coun tries in ^ 

lieu of military aid 'Gijice^ in the final anaJys^s, fimd^ 

for Gconoiric aid muGt come from the total c*;iiount of money 

available for the national Liecurifcy proerajns of the United 

Stcitea, ' 

* ' f 

11. The Joint Chl.?fs of Staff^ concur in the vievi that^ ' 
, having in mind the length of time required j^or a treaty to 
be negotiated and ra-tiCied^ Mh interim statement of lm:crt 
to conclude' a treaty estabrij^hint^ a colleGtive security 
arran-;i;ei:ient in ^tho Kar Jiiaat siiould be Issued jointly by those 
covjitricG vrhich intend tD .become founder members of such a 
treaty. The draft statement of Intent fur-nlGhed to the i '^Int 
Chiefs: ot Staff for coirjivHnt by the raomorandvjn by the Ass..,f5tant 
Scoreta.ry of DefenGc (ISA) dated 2 AUL;i'.Gt 191>^:j 1-* coiisideredi 
to be sati^^if ^ otory Cror:i the sallitary point of viev;. It is 
su;^,^,eGtcdj hov/over^ that it v;ould bo niaidont to wit}ihold any 
formal doclar'ation of Int-rijt until GubGtant;lal a^rccirerit has 
been r^^ached vrlth the United ICin^jdoii; as to the px^incipal 
provisions of a treaty. 



723 






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12. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the opinion that the 
security treaty itself should he drafted by a working group 
representing all of the probable initial signatories* Subject 
to the comments contained hereinbefore ^ the informal and un- 
official first United States draft, furnished by your memorandum 
for the Joint 'Chiefs of Staff dated 22 July 195^, is considered 
to be satisfactory as a point of departure- However^ several 
of the technical points raised by the United K ngdom side of the 
Study Group appear to merit favorable consideration. 

13- It would appear desirable to keep the Japanese Govern- 
ment advised as to the progress of treaty negotiations, 

lU. It is recommended that the foregoing views be given due 
consideration in the fon:iiulation of the Department of Defense 
position in connection with further negotiations concerning a 
collective security organization for the general area of South- 
east Asia and the Southwest Pacific. 

15. It is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be afforded 
additional opportunities ^ as appropriate h, to submit comments 
concerning the draft treaty in the course of its development. 



'. r 



For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 



hi 

M. B. RIDGVJAY, 
General, United States Army, 
Chief of Staff. 



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frv-i'l M.i Hi-Mi / 



Aug 17 195^ 



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Dear Mr. Secretary: 

I refer to the Draft Southeast Asia Collective Security Treaty^ 
copies of vhich were made available to the Departiriont of Defense by the 
Department of State. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed their 
vieirs on the draft submitted by the United States member of the Joint . 
US-UK Study Group on Indochina, The conmients of the Department of 
^ Defense are made in light of the vievs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and in consideration of a revised version of the draft Treaty contained 
in SFAP U-2/lj dated 5 August 195^^. 

The Department of Defense considers that the revised draft Treaty 
is generally satisfactory subject to the following comments: 

" . a. In order to strengthen provisions of the Treaty vrhich 
pennit protection to be extended to countries of the area not parti- 
cipating in the Treaty ^ the word ''general" before "area of Southeast 
Asia and the Southirest Pacific" should be added in paragraph fourof 
the preamble as well as in paragraph one of Article IV* 

b. The Department of Defense believes that in further nego- 
tiationSj both preliminary and at the time of the meeting of the 
Ministers J it should be made clear that no commitments by the United 
States to support the raising^ equipping^ and maintenance of indi-^ 
genous forces and/or to deploy United .States forces in such strengths 
as to provide for an effective defense of elLI of the national terri- 
tory of each signatory is Implied or intended. Military aid by the 
United States to the Southeast Asian countries who are members of 
the pact would be limited to that necessary to permit the countries 
. concerned to ralse^ equipj and maintain military forces as necessary 
to insure internal stability^ to provide a reasonably effective 
opposition to any attempted invasions^ and to instill national confi- 
dence. Tills is consistent vlth the views expressed at our meeting 
on 2^ July 19 5^ j ^^^ 1^ your message IIo. 5S9 to London dated 
29 July 195^ • 



■I 

1 



c- It^ should equally be made clear that the treaty vould not 
commit the United States to a large-scale prograrn of economic aid 
to the signatoiy countries in lieu of militaiy aid since j in "he 
final analysis, funds for economic aid must come from the totdl 
amount of money available for the national security programs of 
the United States. 



c'** ^'^ -i-, 



SecDef Cont. No. TS-019it 



\ - .t 



-y j^, C 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Piojeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 




i. 






d. It is the vieir of the DepEa^tment ot Defense that if the 
Treaty is ultimately to result in the development of effective col- 
lective strength to halt further Communist control in the general' 
area of Southeast Asia and the South vrast Pacific^ those nations in 
the area V7"liich are potentially capable of making a substantial 
military contribution, i.e*, Japan, Korea, and possibly Ifational.ist 
Cliinaj should eventually be penialtted to subscribe to the Treaty if 
they so desire- Accordingly, this point should be made clear to 
the other signatories in the negotiations leading to the signing of 
the Treaty* 

The Department of Defense considers that it would be premature and 
tuadesirable to ..discuss,- either at the meeting of 14inisters or before, the 
formation of an organization associating the military representatives of ' 
the participating nations. The Council and the political machinery of 
the Treaty should be established first* This could be folloi.^d by the 
creation of military machinery necessary to maJ:e the Treaty effective,. 
In the viev of this Department such military coordination should be 
similar to the AIIZUS arrangements. 

It is recognized that it is not feasible to include in the Treaty 
itself details relating to implementation of the provisions by the Parties, 
Hovever, the Department of Defense strongly urges that in the formulation 
of implementing procedures by the Council, the United States take a posi- 
tion in support of permitting concerted action by a lesser number tha^a 
the total of the signatory nations in the event that the political or 
territorial integrity of any signatory is threatened by Communist aggres- 
sion in £iny form. In addition, careful consideration should be given to - 
the practicability and desirability of providing voting machineiy in the 
Council vMch vould preclude- the possibility that^ at some time in the 
future when the membership is expanded, a bloc of "neutrals" or a British 
Commomreslth bloc could exercise a controlling voice. 

The Joint CMefs of Staff have expressed the opinion, ^ri.th vliich I 
fully concur, that the recent developments in Geneva and Indochina, 
considered in conjunction \*Tlth the general retrograde trend within the 
Western Bloc, serve to increase the urgency of the need for a compro- 
hensive United States policy -^fith respect to the Far East region as a 
vhole. This is necessary in order to give direction, cohesiveness, 
and greater effectiveness to the political and military actions which 
must now be tal^en to prevent the loss of the remainder of Southeast 
Asia to Comjiiunist control- It is considered that until the United 
States formulates and adopts such an over -all policy we shall be severely 
handicapped in any negotiations for the establishment of a collective ■ 



-^^ 









jOi -tj r-y *--^ ^^ - J* 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 6?316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



fi3 



•.'^'J 






defense in the general area of Southeast Asia and the Southv/est 
Pacific « It vould aj^pear necessary that certaia basic decisions be 
made \Tlth respect to hoT^ far the United States is VTilling to go in 
concert with all or certain of the non-Coim3iunist nations having 
interests in the Far East or^ if necessary j unilaterallyj in opposing 
further Conmiunist accretions in the area under consideration, 

; _ ' .^ Sincerely yours ^ 



Signed/C.E, Wilson 



The Honorable 



The Secretary of State 



cc; Sec/state 
JCS 

0M4 (l/Co1 Alden) 

Anny CS (l/Co1 Queenin) 

Mr. Sullivan 



Cys 1&2 

Advance cys ; ^- 

5- 

9- 



State 

JCS 

Mr. Sullivan 

DMA (LColAlden) 

Amy GS LColQuecnin 

OSD files 

B&Cy 10-Chron^ 11-Holdback 



' LtCol JE&ran/mlc /l6Aug ^h 
OPIiVRni£DS36/Ext 79258 



1-1^231 



727 






h 



I ! 



Declassiried per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 1 6. By: NWD Date; 201 1 






SENSlTlVh 



Aug 18 J 195^^ 



SECRET 



Dear Mr. Secretary: : 

I have received your letter of August 12^ 195^? setting forth 
the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on requests from the Govern-* 
ments of the Associated States of Indochina for United States 
assistance in training the indigenous forces of these states- The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff established four preconditions for United 
States participation in such a training program and you add the 
further consideration that an international interpretation of the 
cease-fire agreement may in any event impose limitations on the 
extent of military training^ as well as end item assistance , that 
could be undertaken by the United States in Indochina. 

The first precondition of the Joint Chiefs is that there be a 
reasonably strong, stable civil government in control of the Indo- 
Chinese states requesting United States assistance. This condition 
applies to the Governjnent of Cambodia which is strong, stable and 
enjoys the whole-hearted loyalty of the population. A similar 
situation likewise exists in Laos but there, because of the restric- 
tive terms of the cease-fire agreement and likewise because the 
Laotian Government has never made a request for U.S. training 
assistance J the problem does not arise- In the case of Free Viet Nam^ 
the civil government, which has been under the presidency of 
Mr, Ngo Dinh Diem for only slightly more than a month, is far from 
strong or stable* However^ we are currently perfecting measures 
which may assist that Government rapidly to increase the effectiveness 
of its administration* I should like to point out that one of the 
most efficient means of enabling the Vietnamese Government to become 
strong is to assist it in reorganizing the National Army and in 
training that army* Hhis iSj of course, the familar hen^and-egg 
argum^ent as to which comes first but I would respectfully submit that 
the U.S. Gf uld profitably undertake two courses of action in Free 



Viet Nam: 



The Honorable 

Charles E- Wilson, 

Secretary of Defense. 



SECRET 



728 



SENSITIVE 



j* 



Declus^jficd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 








Viet Nam: one> to strengthen the government by means of a political 
I and economic nature and the others to bolster that government by 

' strengthening the army which supports it* 

i 

I The second precondition established "by the Joint Chiefs is that 

I the Governments of the Associated States should formally retjuest that 

' the U*S- assume responsibility for training their forces and providing 

military equipment. As indicated above the Government of Laos has 

made no such request and does not contemplate one. However, the 

Government of Viet Nam^ in a letter from Prime Minister Prince Buu Loo 

to the American Charge d 'Affaires dated June 28, 195^5 did request 

that MAAq Saigon participate in troop training and requested U^S- 

assistance in providing adequate armament and in financing a proposed 

expanded troup base- In the case of Cambodia j the Cambodian Minister 

of National Defense, General ffiiek Tioulong in a letter dated May 20, 

195^> addressed to General John W* O'Donnel, Chief of MAAG Saigon, 

stated that the Royal Khmer Government was anxious to complete plans 

to set up in the minimum of time three divisions according to the 

methods of accelerated instruction used in Korea^ on condition that 

the U*S, Government assured the Cambodian Government of indispensable 

financial and materiel support* 

The third precondition of the Joint Chiefs calls for arrangements 
with the French guaranteeing full independence to the Associated 
States and providing for the' phased withdrawal of French forces, 
French officials,, and French advisors from Indochina in order to 
provide motivation and a sound basis for the establishment of National 
armed forces. 

t 

The case of Laos may he ^set aside since Laos has not requested 
U.S* assistance and imder the terms of its military agreement with 
France is required to look to France for aid in training and other 
purposes. Furthermore^ under the terms of the cease-fire agreement ' 
Laos is estopped from introducing foreign military personnel other 
than "a specified numiber of French military personnel required for the 
training of the Laotian National Army-" 



In the case of Cambodia, de facto full independence already 
exists. Likewise during 1953 and early 195^ command of the Royal : 
Khmer Army was^'handed over to th4 King of Casihodia and French forces 
have been entirely withdrawn from Cambodian soil. There is a minir^im 
of French advisors still attached to the Royal Khmer Army* 

In the case of Viet Naia, practically the entire French Expenditionary 
Corps still remains in that country- It would be militarily disastrous 
to demand the withdrawal of French forces from Free Viet Nam before the 



creation 



-fC*! 



S iSSCRET ;^^^ : 



SENSITIVE 



729 



r 



1 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 201 1 



■at-* 



bW^^ SENSITIV 



- 3 - ■ 

I 

' creation of a new K"ational Array • However j as seen from this Department ^ 
there would seem to be no insuperable objection to the U.S* undertaking 
a training program for the Vietnamese National Army while at the same 
time the French forces commence a gradual phasing out from that 
theater. 

{ As for the point you raised regarding the limitations of the 

f Geneva settlement^ in the view of this Department there is a limitation 
on the degree to which the Vietnamese armed forces can be increased- 
However J in my opinion j there is no provision of the cease-fire 
agreement regarding Viet Nam which would prevent the existing MAAG 
Saigon from undertaking a training mission or which would impede 
MAAG Saigon from rotating existing personnel to bring in number for 
number new personnel especially versed in military training. 

In the case of Cambodia there is no obstacle whatever to the 
setting up of a U.S- training mission- The cease-fire agreement 
affecting Cambodia provides in Chapter III Article 7 that the Royal 
Government of Cambodia will not solicit foreign aid in war materiel^ 
personnel or instructors except f or the purpose of effective defense 
of the terri tory. This latter clause makes it entirely possible for 
the Cambodian Government to request a foreign training mission and for 
the U,S*, if it so desires^ to provide such a mission. In the opinion 
of this Department J it would be most helpful to the furtherance of our 
national policy in Indochina if the U.S, should reply affirmatively to 
the letter of the Defense Minister cited above j and it is recommended 
that the Joint Chiefs give their consent to the establishment of a 
MAAG/Phnom Penh which would provide both training and logistical -^ 
assistance to the Royal Kbm_er Army. The Department of State likevrise 
feels that sympathetic consideration should be given to the establish- 
ment of a training mission 'irr MAAG Saigon to assist in the development 
of an effective Vietnamese National Army* 

Sincerely yours ^ 
John Foster Dulles 






■ 730 



-« 



Di^classilied per Executive Order 13526» Section 3.3 
NND Prt^ject Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 U 



i ^' 



lOP SECRET 



( 



r V ■ 



STATE-IENT OF POLICY 
by the 
KATTOHAL SECURITY OOWJZTL 



on 



REVIEVJ OF U.S. POLICY Hi THE FAR 



*» 



■■■ t F- 



i_,i -' J J. 



\ 



PHgFACE 
CorLsecuencGS of the Gens^'a Conference 



Coinmun5,st successes in Indochina , cuLnlnating in the 



.r 



agreement reached at the Geneva Conference , have produced the 
follov;i-^g significant consequences vfhich jeopardize the 
security interests of the Ui^S, in the Far East and increase 
Conimimist strength there: 

a. Regardless of the fate of South Vietn^jiij Laos 
and Caral:5odiaj the Corni'iunists have secured possession of 
an advance salient in Vietnara froni v;hich military an.d 
: non-military pressures can be r^ounted against adjacent 
and Fiore remote non-ComrrJunist areas* ' 




c. By adopting an appearance of moderation at 
Geneva and taking credit for the cessation of hostilities 
in li^dochina, the Communists vill be in a better position 
to exploit their political strategy of imputing to the 
United S grates motives of extremism j belligerency ^ and 
opposition to co- existence seeking thereby to alienate 
the U,S* from its allies. The Comraunists thus have a 
basis for sharply accentuating their /^ peace Propaganda'' 
and '^peaco progra^m'^ in Asia in an attempt to allay fears 
of ConLm^Jnist expansionist policy and to establish closer 
relations v/ith the nations of free Asia, 






ISO 5^25/2 



,* 



1^1 



TOP SECREt 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 6?316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET 



d* The Coimuunists have incx^eased their military and 

political prestige In Asia and their capacity for expanding 

Coni::mnist iiiiluence by exploiting political and econoriiic 

weakness and instability in the coiuitries of free. Asia \^athout 

rdsort to ariiied attack, - ., 

\ 

\ e^ The loss of Southeast Asia would imperil retention 
of' Japan as -a key element in the off -shore island ch^dn. 



/ 



' J- 



■■:sc 5^29/2 



_i 



,t 



732 



TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Projeut Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



jff 



r 



I 

s 



TOP SECRET 



COimSES OF ACTION 



I. COivil'RJNIST CHINA* 

■^ ' a 111*' -1 1, u i i | ..,^ h» » I ^ .^^^^-M-^^ , m j^ _ 

' 1« I\ educe the pov/er of ConiLumist China in Asia even at 
th^ risk of. but without deliberately provoliingj v/ar; 

a. (1) Ileact with force/if necessary and ad^^anta- 
geousj to expansion and subversion recog^iizable as 

. such J supported and supplied by Communist China. 

* ■ 

. (2) React v;ith imraediatej positj.ve, armed force 
against any belligerent move by Conimvmist China, 

b. Increase efforts to. develop th^e political ^ 
economic and military strength of non- Communist Asian 
countries J inc3.uding the progressive development of the 
military strength of Japaj'i to the point vhere she can 
provide for her ov/n national defense a^nd^ in tii.rie^ 

' ^ contribute to, the collective defense of the Far East. 

'" - c^. Maintain political and economic pressures 

against Conimunist China, including the existing embargo 
and support for Chinese Nationalist harassing actions, 

■ 

d. Support the Chinese Ilational Government on 
Form.osa as the Gqvernr.^ent of China and the representative 
of China in all lil'I agencies, 

e^. Create internal division in the Chinese 
ComrfiUivist regime and impair Sino-Soxaet relations by all 
feasible overt and covert means. 



*. ' 



ft 



^ Section I is to be considered as a basis for'Turther 
consideration in the light of a review by the Secretary 
of State and report to the Council within approximately 



one month. 



KSC ^^t29/ 






133 



TOP SEC HEX 



Dedassitied per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16, By: NWD Dale: 201 1 



'n 



TOP SECRET 



II. THE OFF-SHORE ISI.^.ITD CHAIN 



'■ ^ n — —■ --■-—. ■ 



2, The United States must maintain the security and 
increase the strength oT the Pacific off -shore island chain 
(Japan ^ Ryiikyus , Fo rnio s a j Phi li ppine s ^ - Au s tra?.i a and Nov: 
Zealand) as cin ele:?.ent essential to U^ S, security. To this 
end: 

h 

I i 

. a^ Initiate and support appropriate measures vrhich 
will contribute to strengthening the economy of Japan ^ 
its internal political stability and its ties v-ith 
the free world. 

* •. - II 

• a. 

¥ a ■ PHI 

a 

' t. Increase the military strength of Japan and 
the Philippines = improve the effectiveness of existing 
military strength of the Republic of Korea and of 
Formosa J and continue participation in MZUS, 

c. Provide rela.ted economic assistance to the 
local governments in those cases vhcre the agreed 
lovel of indigenous military strength is beyond the 
capacity of the local econciny to support, 

d. Encourage the conditions which will make 
possible the formation of ^ and be prepared to partici-- 
pate in J a V/e stern Pacific collective defense arrange--- 
mentj including the Philippines, Japan^ the Republic 
of China 5 ajid the Republic of Korea j eventually linked 
v/ith tlie Southeast Asia security structure arid Ai\'ZIjS. 



•i 



[ . 



r ■ 



e. 



_e Intensify covert and 
strengthen the orientation of 
the free world. ' ■ 



psychological actions to 
these countries toward 



i:SC 5'-r29/2 



,« 



7 






TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 2011 



1 - 




■ r 




■' 1 




* 




■ 

• 




^ 

\ 


) 


w 


r 

f 
1 


- 1 . 




* 



. * 

} 

if 

i 
T 



I. 



n 



TOP SECKET 



III. 



GBLE|yi^POLITJ(^LL_ANp ECQUOl-^IC 
kEASufiE 



;S 



.!•; 



THE FAR EAST* 



: M **^'-^tt 



3* Encourage the prompt organization of bjx economic 
^grouping by the raay.ir^.ura number of free -Asian states j including 
\Japan and as nia^ny of the Coloribo Povj-ers as possible, based 
bn self-help and mutual a.idj and the participation and support 
'.(including substantial financial assist?Jice3 of the U* 5, and 
other appropriate V/e stern countries through vaiich^ by united 
action J these free Asian states will be enabled more 
effectj-Vely to achieve the economic and social strength needed 
to iiiaintain their independence* 

* ■ ■ * • . ., , , . .- , 

H, Take all feasible raeasures to increase the 
opportunities of free Asian countries for trade vdth each 
other and v/ith other free world countries* 

*. 

5. Provide teclmical assistajice to help develop 
political stability and eccnoniic health, ' - 

6, Develop and make more effective information^ cultural 
education and exchai^ge programs for the countries concerned. ' 



a - I ^^— » 



* See also Iirdiex B to- NSC 5'-r29 



KSC 5^r29/2 






TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Projeiu Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



r 



■ TOP SECRET 



IV . SQUTHEAsy ASIA 



h i 



,« K 



7* CT0nera_l, The U. S- must protect its position and 
restore its prestige in the Far East by a nev initiative in 
So'iVchoast Asia^ vhere the situation must be stabilized as 
socin as possible to prevent further losses to Commurdsm 
thi^ough Cl) creeping expansion and subversicnj or (2) evert 
agression. 




.a. Coimnit each member to treat an arraed attack 
on the agreed area (including Laos^ Cambodia and South 
Vietnaiii) as dangerous to its ovn peace ^ safety and vital 
interests 3 and to act prorr.ptly to meet the coriiRon danger 
in accordance with its ovrn constitutional processes, 

b. Provide so far as possible a legal basis to 
the " ' 
e 

the Mv.^^-^^ 
States. 




event 5 other nations 



c. Ensure that^ in such 
vould be obligated' in accci^dance with the treaty to 
supijort such U- S* action . 



d, Kot limit U. S, freedom to use nuclear weapons, 
involve a U, S- commitment for local defense or for 



or 

stationing U* S- forces in Southeast Asia* 

The U. S- would continue to pro'/ide limited military assis- 
tance and training missions^ vrherever possible, to the states 
of Southeast Asia in order £o bolster their will to fight ^ 



to stabilize legal governments p and to assist them in con- 
trolling subversion. 



9. 

requeste 



■ 

Action, in the^ E vent _ of L oca l Sub v e rsion * 
d by a legitir:iate local government vrhich 



If 
requires 




covert and overt support within Executive Pr^nch authority, 
the President should at once consider requesting Congressional 
' authority to take e.ppropriate action , which might if necessary 



i:sc 5^29/2 



*Vrt 



-p 



^ n n 

t6b 



TOP S3CRST 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Diite: 201 



c 



TOP SECkST 



r 



and feasib3.e include the use of XJ, S- military forces either 
locally or against the external soiurce of such subversion or 
rebellion (including Coniinunist China if determined to be the 
source). 

10 . Indochina ; Political and - Covert Ac tion . 



a^ Make 'every possible effort ^ not openly incon-- 
■ sistent v;ith the U, S. position as to the armistice 
agreeraonts, to defeat Corrjuunist subversion and influence j 
to maintain and support friendly non-Coroir.unist govern- ^ 
ments in Cambodia and Laos 5 to maintain a friendly non- 
Cciranuiiist Soutli Vietnamj and to prevent a Com2nunist 
victory through alD.-'Viotnam elections. 






' b. Urge \^ 
deal \/ith Cambodia 
sovereign nations* 



the French pror:ptly recognize and 
Laos and free Vietnam as independent 



*,* 



c. Strengthen U, S. representation and deal 
direc^tlyj vherever a.dva.nta<soous to the U. S-5 vdth the 
goverraiients of Carabodia- Laos and free Vietnairu 

d. V/orking through the French only insofar as 
necessary^ assist Carnbodia^- Laos and free Yietr^im to 
iriaintain (1) military forces necessary for internal 
security and (2) economic conditions conducive to the ' 
maintenance and strength of noii-Conununist regiiiies and 
comparing favorably with those in adjacent ConuaiUiist 
areas, ^ / ■ . ^ 

g^. Aid emigration from North Vietnam and resettle- 
ment of peoples imvjilling to remain under CorrL^iiuiist rule« 



th 






f . Ex:ploit available means to make more difficuH 
control by the Viet Minh of North Vietnam. 



i, 
o 



£. EKiploit available means to prevent North 
Vietnam Xrom becoming periiiaiiently incorporated in the 
Soviet bloc.^ using as feasible and desirable consular 
relations and non-strategic trade, 

h. Conduct covert operations on a large and 
effective scale in support of the foregoing policies* 



NSC 5^r29/£ 



10? SSCR3T 



>• 



■731 



I>eclai>siticd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. Bv: NWD Diite: 201 1 



TOP SS3RET 



11. Thai},ando 



i 



'a. Provide rdlitary assistanoe sufficient to in-- 
crea^e the strength of indigenous forcosj thereby help- 
ing to control local subversion ^ and' to make easier clear 
identification of instances of overV agresGion* 

■ 

1 b._ Pj:ovide economic assistance conducive to the 
■ maintenance and strength of a non-Con^mu^iist roginia, 

c. Concentrate efforts on deveD.cping Thailand as 
a support of U, S« objectives in the area and as the ^ 
, " '\ focal^ point of U, S. covert and psychological operations 
in Southeast Asia* 

■F 

12* IndonG^gJ^. Reaffiriii existing policy in NSC I7I/I3 
subject to: ' " 

a. In lieu of Daragra-Dh 19 substitute "Continue 

- efforts to influence Indonesian govornmont officials 
to oppose. CoiniTiujiist infiltration and siiovorsion. ^^ 

' ' b. In lieu of paragraph 21 substitute '^Take 
' appropriate actions to strengthen friendly relations 
betueen Indonesia and the United States." 



r[SC ^'r29/Z 



■z-^i 






738 



'TQF S3CRET 



^^te 



r 



* '-' — *-i 



^ 









fO 



a? 



COUNTRY 



Associated 
States 



Burma 



Forrao.na 



Tr;donesia 



■Japan 



I/- 



Koroa 



Malaya 



Al^_i 



Phil ,1:1 pplnos 



Thai land 



4 



TOTALS 



viT^ 



.X A 



FAJLJAST 
Proposed Assistance Pro;r:raramocl for F Y 19 5^-' - - FY 195? 



a ii 1 1 i o n s or Doll ars) 

^^^^^ ^™' I ^ JJ ' t ■ - - 11 I»M1MM11IM I 



p m 1^-1 ■ ^ 



M 'J: L3:TAH Y. : EC OK UM I C sOThliJi bj: TOTAL 

I ^M ■ " " I ■ " ^ ■ II 111 >^^^^B' ^^■•-^^^■■^-^■^ * ^^^m W^ " 1 I ^r 'T ■ 1 ■ 111 ^m- ' "IT^bf^^M^^^ 



C) 

1,093-0 



If 



^26.0 



: 77.6, 



J) 

5_.3. 



.7_. 7. 



31^^ 



Ll^i^. 



a) 
25.0 



82.0 



ao.o) 

320.1 



IJ 
15.0 



jiH-= 



V'-i-2 . 1 



r* 






.^ 






2.7 



*6 



r: 



1.5 




Q q 



1 . 118 . 5 



3.0 



^(•08 . 1 






80^ 



3'26„.0 

I m I m^- -MM! 



1^ 



pU J. 



51.6 : 



23.7 ; 2,017.1 



■ FY 19 55 

HILITAilM : £G 0NO>:iG : OTHbTTT 



1.108.5 



108.0 



102.1 

17 

7 



^■.i^ 






ikl- ^ } '' V I .^..k 



21,0: 



3,-.^- 



..5 



6^.ot 



^.0 



4 



5.1 



252.0; 



1.3 






12.^- 



It 



i..2 



• 



6,1+ 






_3it8^tL__i33^.Z 



TOT./iL 



1 1 "^^ n 



.5 



5.1 



105.^ 



T 5 



2.6.0 



2^4-. 1 



lJz,'-Z28^ 






17^.0 ; 



;i 



I 



258.7 ; 



FY 195^+ and FY 1955 TOTAL - S3^!^3 

SPHCIA L K^OTEG : a) Progranimed amoi^ints arc frorr. FY 1955 Congri^'sional Pro sentat ions of the Forei; 
Oporatlons Administration, U. S, IriTorriiation Agency, and the Educational Exchrjnge Division of th^ 
Do par tin en t of State ^ made prior to the conclusion of the Geneva Conference. 

b) -Funds vhich might hecoae available from tlie sale of U, S. surplus ayriculturi 
cbrrimoditie^ are not' 5ncludr»d. 

c) ^jLrect utS. Department of Defense expenditures in the area, v/hich have an 
imDortcjit effect on tlic eoonomy of eacli country are in addition to the above prograjitrned amounts. 



s J 

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a) "Economic*' includes Economic Assistance and Mutual Dof ense Support, 

b) "Other" includes Teclinical Assistance, Information Services and Educational Exchange. 



c) 



d) 



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f) 



g) 



h) 



1) 



j). 



This amount incli^des: Mutual Defense Assistance - ?p3^S million and Direct Forces 
Support - S7*+? million. _ , • ; 

m 

This a:no^uit was prosranu-ied prior to the Indochina Arinistlce as: Mutual Defense Assis- 
tance - :ii'308 million and Direct Forces Support - $800 million. A similar amount has been 
requested of the Congress for support of IJ. S. policy in the general area. 



r 

The Technical Assistance for Burriia ^^^as terminated on June 30? 195^+ '^hen the deliver! e 
made from contracts placed in prior years were completed. The termination v/as made 
at the roG'uest of the B'urr.:iese Governi.ient, 

This amount Includes: Mutual Defense Assistance - $296 million and Direct Forces 
Support - :i*^30 million. 

This amount includes: Mutual Defense Assist.ance - S83 million and Direct Forces 
Support - $2!? million. . . ' ■ 

This does not include material already transferred or to be transferred from the 
Department of Defense FECOM Reserve, As of March 31? 195^^-, materiel vath a replace- 
ment value of ;i^^!'00 million was earmarked for transfer. 

This aiTiount is to be finojaced by sales proceeds under Section 5?0 of the Mutual 
Security Act of 1953? ^s amended. 

This figure represents only the costs for training Koreans in the U, S. The bulk, 
of U, S. assistance to Korea is provided directly by the Department of Defense 
through Defease appropriations* Such direct military assistance, not included in 
the figures above, vere approximately '^p500 million in FY 195^ ^nd should be approx- 
imately S'+OO million in FY 195!;^ 



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k) , This amount represents all funds expended under the Korean Relief and Rehabilitation 
Program, 

1), This amount includes both Economic and Technical Assistance for this, year, 

m) A $25 million U. S* commitment to Thailand is in addition to these figures Dnd. 
v;ill have to be financed by a transfer frora other programs in the area. 



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Declassiried per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 1 6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



DEPARTMENT or STATE 
WASHffsiGTCN 



All£Ust 26, 1S54 



Dear I/Ir. Secretary; 



As you ^re av/^re, tho President h=is aoproTcd a colicy r^^ss^ne 
to the Prime Hinistsr of Prp.nce indic^^.tine th^t her-oe forth '^he 
United States v^ould providt; such aid as it deems necessary for the 
thrcf! str^tcs cf Inclcchinc clircctlyj rct\\^r tl^an through the 
ne-diura of the I^rench Govori^jneat. 






Th^ Cantbodian Gov&rninr^ntj on Uay 20 j 19?4j , office ?J.ly 
the assi^^'Uiice of the United States in trajjrin<7 the Ro-^^al C=;nbodian 
ia^ay ^.c cor ding to the accelerated j-v^thcds of instruction used in 
Korea \:2:m the objtxtive cf foir^Lxag three divisions la tha shortost 
possible tLrnc* 'To date no response has b;;en r-iado b/ this Cro^'crnn^: nt 
to the Ga^-ornr.'i^nt of CrrAcGi/f., 

Ih6 iiiprir GL^nt of Stat^ feels in tlie national interest thjit th5_s 
Gpvernnient should respond affii^ir^^ivr^ly to the Canibodian request 
and rocorpri-rirds that a bilatoral agreement be negotit'.ted vrith ' 

CaMbodia for the establishiri^nt of a Military Assistance Mvisory 
Group vihica \Tould like\dLse have a training function* 

It 5.S understood that th'3 present Chir-f of l-'AAG^ Saigon has 
undertaken prelii:dnc-j?y study of the requirerionts "for a l'AA.Q/?hnom Penh. 
If you concui' in the rccoi7ur.t:ndati02'i of this Dc^p^rtrient^ it Troiild bo 
our intsntion to authorise the nevr An-j-rican j'jjrfoassador to Cairibodia 
officially to irjCorin riis Iiajestyj the King of Cambodia j of our 
intention to accede to the Car-bodian request and proi^iptly to negofciato 
a iIAAG biJ.£ jcral agreement. If the Eepartnent of Defense agrees in 
this proposed line of policy and has special considerations nhich it/' 
desires should be incorporat^^d in the proposed bilateral agi^cemont ^ *' 
I shall te grateful for your coui^tcsy in indicating the main heads of 
agrcer.ent v.hich v/ould be desired oy the Eopart!?_ent of Defense. 

b 
* ' ■ I 

Sincerely yours , 






Acting Secretary 



The Honor able 

Charles E. VrilsoUj 



Secretary of Defense* 



I "til 







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f\\ 



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if /^"^So i 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



. »-c:z^ 



MESSAGE ■ DEPARTMENT OF THE AmCf 

STAFF COMf'IlMI CAT IONS OFFICE 

STATE SECRET 

PRIORITY PARAPmASE NOT EEQUIRED 

CONSULT CRyPTOCENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING 
KO UJICLAS REPLY OR REF IP DTG IS QUOTED 

FROM: SECRETARY OF STATE FROM (FE) MR WADDELL " 

TO: OSD WASH DC FOR ADMIRAL DAVIS OR MR SULLIVAH 

NR: UMIUMHERED 3II805Z AUG 5^ 

Sent Manila 819 rpted info London 120^ Paris 7^19 
Canberra 170. 

Manila- 
Following for your information text Aide Memoire 
delivered Department August 31 by Australian Embassy: 

Verbatim text. 

**1. The Australian Government has welcomed the establishment 
of SEATO on the assumption that it would provide a firm basis for 
military planning in the area and a means whereby preparations could 
he made to cope with direct or indirect Communist aggression- The 
Australian Government has given public assurances that if such an 
organization is established it is prepared to mate an increased military 
contribution to the defence of the area, 

*'2, This policy, w^s laid down at a time when the United States 
Government was calling for the urgent establishment of a defence organiza- 
tion in Southeast Asia and appeared to be willing to participate fully 
in it. The Australian Government is therefore considerably disturbed 
at recent reports which appear to indicate that the United States does 
not rpt not now contemplate that any concrete military functions should 
be carried out by the organization set up under the treaty. If 
this should turn out to be the case^ then the value of the propos'ed 
treaty to Australia would be drastically diminished- The diffic Ities 
with which the United States Government would be faced at the . 
present time ^n making precise commitments under SEATO are fully • 
understood. At the same time the Australian Government feels 
there is a real danger that the present United States attitude m jht 
lead to a treaty without 'teeth' of any kind^ or to a treaty 
into which it would be very difficult to put any 'teeth* subseq.uently. 

"3- I't would also appear that, at a time when United 
States policy regarding the military functions of the 
DA IN 81950 

(1 Sep 5^) 



7^3 

im^zmr SENSiTlVi: 



I 



Deciassified per Executive Order 13526, Sectit^n 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 1 6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



n\-^ ,E5>j 



MESSAGE 



DEPASTMEKT OF THE ARMY 
' STAFF COMMUHI CATIONS OFFICE 

NR: UfflUMBERED PAGE 2 

organization has undergone a change j the United States view 
.also seems to have hardened that the treaty should be aimed 
specifically at Communism. In these circumstances it seems 
that Australia might get the worst of both worlds . On the 
one hand Australia would be criticized in Asia for Joining 
an organization which v/ould be dominated by great non-Asian 
powers and which would.be criticised as constituting a 
provocation to the Chinese ^ while on the other hand Australia 
would obtain no rpt no assurance that additional military 
protection would be given to an area which is strategically 
vital to Australia. It will be appreciated moreover that 
such a treaty would involve the Australian Government in 
considerable embarrassment domestically. The Australian 
Government would be attacked for subscribing to a treaty 
which seemed valueless ^ and there would be a danger that 
present public support for an expanded Australian defence 
effort would-be dissipated. The Prime Minister recently 
impressed on Parlament that the present situation in Southeast 
Asia called for an international arrangement in the region 
under which all parties would be ready to undertake commitment. 
Australia's willingness to undertake such commitments in 
peacetime represents a real innovation in Australian policy, 

"k. In some respects the effect of present American 
thinking about SEATO is to provide little more than a commit- 
ment to act in the event of Communist aggression^ without any 
effective understandings among the Allies as to what that 
action should be. 

"5- It is the Australian Government's earnest hope 
that the United States Government will agree to the establish- 
ment of effective military machinery under the proposed 
organiz;:.bion and will themselves participate in planning 
for the defence of the area- To this end Australia viill press 
for inclusion in the text of the treaty of a specific undertaking 
that parties'^would 'concert their military planning*. The 
Australian Government hopes that the United States Government 
will be able to accept this. 

"6, The Australian Government fully appreciates the 
difficulties involved (partly for security reasons) in 
detailed military planning among seven or eight nations. 
But the Australian Government considers that close contacts 
among ^ and joint military planning by^ The United States ^ 
United Kingdom , Australia and New Zealand are essential. The 
latest American position^ as presently understood^ could give 
Australia less than the already existing Five Power Staff 
Agency; and the future even of this organization seems in 



'*M--«J 



DA IN 81950 (1 Sep 5^) Tp^ ^^R^J 

■ T-,". SEMSiTiVL 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Sectinn 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Dale: 201 1 



SENSITIVE 

MESSAGE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARM? 

STAFF COMI^OT^ICATIONS OFFICE 

m: UraUMBERED PAGE 3 



doubt in view of Its virtual suspension at the request of 
the United States, 

"7, Like the United States, the Australian Government 
also contenrplates economic activity being conducted outside 
SEATO. But a SEATO ^hich is coirrpetent to discuss all these 
things should exercise this function at any rate to some 
extent, even though effective work in some directions may 
be done by smaller groups and possibly outside SEATO, Con- 
sequently in the Australian Government's opinion^ regular and 
fairly frequent meetings of SEATO representatives are needed ^ 
and would be expected by Australian public opinion/^ 

End verbatim te^. 
Departments comments follow* 



i 



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I 



I 



, ACTION: OSD 

DA IN 81950 (1 SEP 3h) 

7^5 






L 



*r^ J'lv ^^ y^v ^m ,'r*., "^^ fm*^ 

SENsrnv 



c 



Decl^ffsined per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dute: 201 1 



Lj 



P 

r^FICE OF T}\k ASSIST.y-T SECRETARY OF DEFEilSE 
Ifiternations;! Security Affui.'^s 



Washington 25. D. C. 



.14 Scptcubcr 1"54 



lIEt^ORA?IB[IlI FOR THE SECRISTARY OF DEFEilSE 



SUBJiiiCT; Report oil -the Ken i la Confercnco 



4 

4 



As Dapartment of Dafensc r£^prGsentativa on the U.S» Delegation to the 
Manila Conference (6-9 S3pto:ribor 1?54) I submit for your Information tha 
' attached te?;t of a Southeast Asia Collective &3fcnsG Trosity (Tub A) as 

approved by the Conference, together vdth coiTLT.ents rslatiiig to aspects 
■ of tho Trtjaty of specit.1 concern to the Dep^rtinont of Doftinsc, 

■ 

General Gonnont 

As you knov;^ the Ifcnila Conference conv-^nod follov/ing Comr:Vjnist 
militeay achiGver::ents in Indochina- and political cind psychological sucl 
. cossos at Geneva- Against this background the effort of tho Manila Con- 
ference to construct a oolleotivo defense arranrerrrent for Southeast Asia" 
and the Soutriv/est pacific v;as directed in largs trie:;,sure to recovering 
■ ^ fron the psychologics.1 blov; thus administered to tiio Free Vforld, Huch 
" ■ of vih*:it v/as said at the ConfertBnce bora- vjitness to tho pree^Trinenco of 

psychological objectives in the thinking of the par ticix^- ting States, 
In & real sense, tho: Treaty th<it emerged at Manila is a response to 
the Geneva Agreeraents. 

Tho participating; delegations placed great e^iphasis on the effect 
the v/ording of the Treaty vjould hav^Oj not only on the Oojimunists j but 
also on their dom^st^lc popul^^cti'ons. Thus the Treaty is a document that 
speaks to many audiencc^s: it supports self-determination of peoples, solf^ 
goycrnment rnd independence in deference to Asian nationalismj it provides 

I, for econo::ac and technical cooperation as an indu:errLent to present Asian 

"neutralists^ countries to associate thetnselves with the Treaty; it pennits 
the accession of other State s^ thus avoiding the charge that the Treaty 
members forn an exclusive club v/ith aggressive designs ^^^gai^nst' other 
States; it .describes tho Treaty area so as to exclude for zivs present 
Poi-mosaj Japan J and Plorea, St-tes to'-vard v;hich the Trcvty membors hold 
differing policies- Thcao el£;:ac:;ts of the Treaty attest to the isnport- 

I ance the menib.:r States place on the effect of the docunier.t upon their 

respective puDlics, At the same time these eleniants give the Treaty 
, " ' the character of d. collective d-^fenso arrangement in cnore than a purely 

j ' military sense. The success that the Trei^ty n;ay have in enlianoing the 

defense of the arej. vrill therefore h:ive to be judged in light of the 
fact thvt it has ps/chological and econorrao as well as military objoc^^ 

\ tivos. 



4 



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Di^classilied per Executive Order ]3526» Section 3.3 
NND Projeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 U 



r- 



* 



Y 



mth respect to tha inilltary aspects of Vv^ Treaty, v\ozt of tho par- 
ti cip^^ ting Stc.to^, notably the Philippines and Thailand^ ur^ed provisions 
that\vo^.ild explicitly com,.: it tho Trtjaty Parties to tako mil itr. ry miction in 
event of GggrGssicn in tho Treaty area. "Hhe comrnitnient of the United 
States to such act! on J of course, v/as the purpose of those ur^^ings* 
Much v;as srdd about tho desirability of tho IJATO as opposed to tho 
allegedly viecikor AtCZUS for-iula. Host of the parti^cipatins Stut^s argued 
that explicit corLbitn^ents to take action v/-3ro nocsssr.ry if the Treaty was 

to have the dosircd deterrent of foot on tho Oomtriunists- 

+ ■ . * 

The United St^t^s v;as faced in this issue, I believe, v;ith tho dil- 
onma of attempting to attain ti7o objectives thr^t v;ere not coripletely coni" 
pp-tiblo: on the on^ hand th::2'e v/as a dcsiro to place t}io Cornniuviists on 
notice uz clearly as possible th^.t further aggression in tho area vould 
meet T;ith effective collective counter-action. Such unequivocal notifi- 
cation v/ould tend to enhance the psychological effect of the. Treaty on 
tho Free Tx^rld and tho doterrvjnt effect on tho Communists « Yet on tho 
other hand, in spite of tho greater psychological effect ^h:.t a strongly 
worded Treaty raight have, tho attainr.iont of this object- ve v/as necessarily 
limited by the extent to. which the United States, in it:? ovm interest, 
could undortr^kc advance military commitments under th'-' Treaty in restric- 
tion of its froedorr; of action. A further li:Tiitation v/as tho fact that 
the United States can corinit itself to take- rulitary action only in accord' 
anco vdth its Constitutional processes^ Thus, opposed to the objective of 
maximum .psychological effect v;as tho necessity that the United States re- 
tain essential freedom of action^ and r-void treaty con^rnitrr.snts that m^^to 
inconsis-cent v^ith Constitutional requiromonts and thorofore prejudicial 
to support for ratification of tho Treaty by the Senate, 

Iho Treaty as it stands agreed is in effect a reconciliation of 
these conflicting objective's. At the moment it servos tr:oro a psycholog- 
ical than a military purpose. The aroa is no better prepared than before 
to cope v/itfi Communist aggression. As time goes on, ho;vevcrj tho Treaty 
can provide a nucleus for coordinated defense, and may rally presently 
unconniitted States to the non-Comrr:unist" side. 



Military Aspects cf the Treaty 

' Yr»u day>ecall that follov/in;^ tho v;ork of the Joint U,S.-U*K. Study 
Group v:hich r.ot from 7 to 17 July 1954 in Tfcshington to lay tho groundv;ork 
for the Treaty, "Sho Department of State prepared a draft v;hich served as 
the basis for discussions among the United St: tos and other interested. 
Govcrr^T.c-ntst This draft v/as referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for . 
comrrrent on 22 July 1954, The viev;s of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sub- ' 
mittod to y^'U on 13 August 1954, fonned the basis of yrur letter of 
17 August 1954 to the Secretary of State. Trvis letter, together v/ith a 
letter of 13 /.ugust 1954 from Acting Secret 'j^ry Anderson to Mr, Robert 
ilurphy on the subject of rulitary machinery under the Ti'eaty, contained 



4 

<s r^ ?^ I^ W ^liin^ 7 

gi b b- k^^ i'-J -y' * ' 



Dedassificd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Nuinber: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 il 




TO? mw 

SENSITIVE 



the basic positions of this Department with respect to the Treaty ^ and 
guided Department of Defense representatives on the U*S* Delegation to 
the Manila Conference in discussions in the Eight Power Working Group and 
in the Conference itself. 

The following provisions of the Treaty are- of special concern to the 
Department of Defense: 

1. Article IV is the heart of the Treaty ^ and generally follows the 
wording previously used in the Philippine^ Korean, and AN?,US Treaties. It 
provides that "Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed 
attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State 
or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter desig- 
nate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in 
that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitu- 
tional processes," Secretary Dulles pointed out during the Conference 
that the wording of the North Atlantic Treaty, which speaks of an attack 
on one as an attack on all, nevertheless provides that the Parties will 
act in accordance with their constitutional processes . He persuaded the 
Conference that the final agreed wording of Article IV would be better 
received by the Senate^ would tend to minimize debate, and would facili- 
tate ratification by the United States. 

The Article further provides that the Parties shall consult imme- 
diately on measures of common defense if, in the opinion of any of the 
Parties, any Party in the treaty area is threatened by other than armed 
attack. This brings Communist aggression in the form of subversion and 
coup d'etat within the purview of the Treaty. ' 

,2. Article V establishes a Council to consider matters concerning 
the implementation of the Treaty- During the sessions of the Working 
Group it became evident that some countries would propose wording calling 
for the establishment of military machinery, possibly along MTO lines - 

; Recalling the position of this Department that military participation 

should be consultative along lines of the ANZUS arrangement rather than 
pexmanent and formal as in MTO, the Defense Representative in the Working 
Group, Mr, C. A* Sullivan, in a message to Defense (SEATO No, 1, 2 Sep- 
tember 195^) proposed that consideration be given to the inclusion qf the 
following v?ording after the first sentence of Article IV: "To this and 
the Parties to the Treaty will consult with regard to military plar^^dng 
as req.uired by the situation in the area-^' Shortly thereafter the Aus- 

I tralian delegation proposed the following addition to Article V: "The 

Council shall set up such subsidiary machinery as may be necessary 1 
achieve the military and other objectives of the Treaty-" Since the 
Australian proposal involved an open ended commitment, this Department 
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed it and accepted the wording suggested 
by the Defense representative.. The Department of State agreed, and 
instructed the U.S. Delegation to support incorporation of this wording 
in Article IV (TOSEC 25, 3 September 195^)- 



rl 



■ 7k8 



Dedassificd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Nuinber: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 20 i 1 



SEN 



|\;r 



In the course of negotiation on this point the U*S* Delegation per- 
suaded the Australian Delegation to accept a modification of its language 
removing reference to "machinery" and injecting the concept of consultation 
as the situation may require, as favored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
this Department* The UiS* Delegation on its partj accepted the placing of 
the amendment in Article Y^ and secured agreement of the Conference to 
wording which in substance reflected the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense 
views* Secretary Dulles^ with my advice^ succeeded in causing deletion of 
reference to ^'periodic" or "regular*' consultation as several delegations 
at one stage proposed* The amendment in Article V as finally approved 
reads: "The Council shall provide for consultation with regard to mili- 
tary and any other planning as the situation obtaining in the treaty area 
may from time to time require-** 

3- Article VII provides that other States may be invited to acceed 
to the Treaty by unanimous agreement of the Parties- Although the agree- 
ment of all the Parties to the Inclusion of I^ationalist China ^ Japan, or 
Korea is presently unlikely^ such a possibility is not precluded* 

k, Similarlyj Article VHIj in defining the "treaty area", provides 
that the Parties hy unanimous agreement can include other States in the 
treaty area or otherwise change the treaty area* The "treaty area" is 
defined as "the general area of Southeast Asia^ including also the entire 
territories of the Asian Parties ^ and the general area of the Southwest 
Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes 
north latitude." This wording brings West Pakistan under protection of 
the Treaty even though it is not in Southeast Asia. The word "general" 
permits an eventual broadening of the treaty area. 

5* All participating States except the United States supported, 
exclusion of the word "Coiiiraunist" from the Treaty. The U.S. draft orig- 
inally referred to "Communist aggression" in the preamble and in Article 
IV. The chief reason advanced by the other signatories for the deletion 
was the desire of most of the Parties that the Treaty cover any kind of 
aggression in the area- Pakistan, for example, wished that the Treaty 
would apply to possible aggression by India. The Unites States position 
was that the United States could not properly say that any aggression in 
Southeast Asia would endanger its own peace and safety, and that iti could 
accept the obligations of Article lY only in respect to Communist - rgres- 
sion. For this reason the United States attached an "understanding'^ to 
the Treaty in this sense. All other participants accepted the Treaty 
with the U*S* "understanding" - 

6, At French suggestion specific reference to Cambodia, Laos, and 
Viet -Nam was removed from the text of the Treaty, but these States are 
covered by the provisions of the Treaty in a separate Protocol (Tab B). 

■ The French felt that this method of extending the application of the 
Treaty to the Associated States v;as less likely to^be construed as a 

. violation of the spirit of the Geneva Agreements. 



7^9 






■SENSITIVE 






f 



I 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Dale: 201 1 



jt^ 









mmm 



7- I also attach for your perusal copies of the opening and con- 
cluding addresses of Secretary Dulles at the Conference (Tabs C and D) * 



I Implementation of the Treaty 



**: 



It can be expected that several of the participating States will 
shortly urge that an interim Council meet pending the time the Treaty is 
ratified and goes into effect, [Hiere is a general desire to keep up the 
momentuin established at Manila. In such an event the subject of consul- 
tations with regard to military planning as referred to in Article V will 
undoubtedly arise. This is a subject to vj^hich we are giving additional 
thought with a view to developing further details of a U*S» position. 



Conclusion 

I believe the Manila Conference accomplished the objective expected 
of it from the Unites States point of vie\^. In my Judgment our Defense 
representation in the U,S, Delegation succeeded in its efforts to insiire 
that the Treaty. is consistent in its military implications with the posi^ 
tions taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by this Department* 

I should like to pay tribute to the brilliant work of Secretary 
Dulles 5 Herman Phleger^ and -Douglas MacArthur II, These men carried the . 
principal burdens of the negotiations with forcefulness and intelligence, 
and advanced the interests of the United States by their efforts* 






A- C- DAVIS 
Vice Admiral, U- S- ITavy 
Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense (ISA) 



^ 



750 



SENSITIVE 



Dedassitied per Executive Order 13526, Secdon 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



C*r- #'^ ^^ f— *.-* 



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SNIE 63-6-54 

15 Soptanibor \95A- 



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NATIONAL IHTELLIGEHCE ESTIMAi t 



NUMBER 63-6-54 









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The foUoiDing intellhjence orgaiiizatlons 'participated in the 
preparation of this estimate; The Ceniral lnteUige.noQ Agency 
and the iiitcUigcncc organizations of the Dcparttnants of 
State, the Ariny, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff* 

Concurred in "oy tfia 






^^ 



on 15 Scpteviber 1954. Co?icurri7ig locre the Special Assistant 
Intelligence, JDevartmcnt of Siat^; the Assistant Chief of 
Staff, C-2^ DeparLvient of the Army; the Director of Naval 
Intelligence; the Director of Inlclligenco, USAF; the Deputy 
Director for Intelligence ^ The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy 
Com.missiop^ Ilcprescntative to the I AC and the Assistant to 
the Director, federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the 
subject oeing outside of their jn'risdictioji. 









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Declassiried per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 1 6* By: NWD Date: 201 1 



» 



SECRET 



* 



CURRENT TREMDS iN SOUTH VIETNAM 



v: 



£ 



ESTIMATE 



L 



1, Since assuming office Premier Diem has 
been confronted v/ith the usual problems of 
inefficiency, disunity, and corruption in Viet- 
namese politics and with the extraordinary 
problems of a mass evacuation of the Northern 
population and the hostiUty of many French 
officials. Despite his qualities of honesty and 
zeal, he has not yet demonstrated the neces- 
sary ability to deal with practical problems of 
politics and administration. Lacking an or- 
ganized political machine and finding control 
of the Army in the hands of an uncooperative 
chief of staff, Diem's freedom of action has 
been severely circumscribed. 

2< The French Government appears to have 
no definite policy tov/ard South Vietnam. 
While the Fi-ench Government has not openly 
opposed the Diem Government, France has 
failed to support Diem and there is' no evi- 
dence that the French are prepared to cari7 
out a policy based on unreserved support for 
Vietnamese independence and nationalism. 
Accordingly, close cooperation betv/een the 
French and Vietnamese governments, essen- 
tial for the survival of South Vietnam, has 
been lacking and French motives have become 
more suspect. 

3. Although little real progress has been made 
under Diem's administration m dealing with 
pressing* political, military, and social prob- 
lems, he still retauis considerable unorganised 
popul?a^ support, particularly among Catholic 
elements of South Vietnam, He has also 
made some progress in reaching agreement 
with the pov/erful Cochin China sects. 

4, At the moment the Dlcm Government is 
threatened by the insubordination of General 
Hinh, the politically ambitious Chief of Staff 



whom Diem has discharged. It does not now 
appear, that the present struggle between 
Diem and Hinh v/ill degenerate into civil 
strife. In fact Diem now appears to be mak- 
ing some headway in his eiiorts to control or 
exile Hinh, either of which would enhance his 
prestige and remove an obstacle to the 
strengthening of his government 

5. Bao Dai has remained in France and 
apparently is refraining from direct partici- 
pation in political aftairs in South Vietnam, 
His prestige among Vietnamese nationalists 
has been considerably lessened by his apathy 
tov/ard the fate of his country. We believe 
that if Eao Dai were nov/ to return to Viet- 
nam, he w^ould almost certainly become a 
center of political intrigue and would further 
complicate an already complex and confused 
situation and weaken rather than strengthen 
the ability of South Vietnam to achieve politi- 
cal stability. 

6. Trends in South Vietnam since the end of 
the Geneva Conference have enhanced the 
prospects of an eventual extension of Com- 
munist control over the area by means short 
of large-scale military attacks. A.lthou<^h 
Diem's government will probably survive the 
present crisis of Hinh's insubordination, and 
may achieve greater strength and popular 
sui^port, it will continue to be threatened by 
Vietminh activity, and hampered by French 
indecision. Diem appears to be the only fi^^*- 
ure now on the pohtical scene behind whom 
genuine nationalist support can be mobilized. 
However, his ability to create a government 
that could reverse the current trend in South 
Vietnam depends at a minimum on an early 
and convincing demonstration by the French 
of their wholehearted support. 



-.* 



SECRET 

752 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By; NWD Date: 201 1 



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THE FOREIGN SERVICE! 
or THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA .;' 



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Dear /'alter: 



'ADDRESS OFrlCrAt, COMMUHECftTlO^ia TO 

American Embassy 

Sctigon, Septerjiher 1$ ^ l95'h 

/ 

1 "believe that it is necessary to niake a/uiatter of regord 
a TiOre detailed account o± the recent impeti^oun action of gen- 
eral C Daniel repoj?tcd in Pimbassy telegrams. 9ol and 9^7 of; 
September 13 ^ 19 5 ''4- This is a matus^LJ^rhich 1 do not v/ish t^- 
broached vrith Defense, no matter how informally. I am convi.' 
vinced that I can handle the situation here, . * 'i'% 




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In this current political crisis involving the strurglK'V 
bett^ecn President Ditm and General Hinh , General O'Daniei has 
quite understandably been deeply, concerned* He has taken tlie 
position that, v;hile he re cornizes th e faults and shoxtcominp;G 
of General rlinh, he still believes him to be the best "soldier 
available to the Vietnamese to head up their National Army* 
This is not the vievr of General Ely or liis most experienced' 
and objective observer's Vfho see General Vy as preferable be- 



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experience , althour;h lacking in 



cause of his cliaracter and 

Hinh's vivacity of intelligence. At the same time, being a 
man of action himself j Gc*neral O'Oaniel is impatient v/ith the 
hesitancy and weakness of the Dien Government, It is not my 
purpose to comment upon these viev/s, imich are held in some 
measure by the Embassy as v/ell* The problem arises in the 
General ^s" tendency to believe that all matters can be portrayed 
in sharp* black and v;hite and can be solved by forthright and 
direct act:" on. General 0' Daniel is handicapped by his o^in 
strai^r:htforv;ardness £uid hc^nesty of character, v/hich make him 
an easy target for those who v/isb to take him in, and by an 
unfortunate impression that he is a master of tact and jraile. rv- 

The sit'aation in nuestion developed folloy:ing an_informar'^ 
* meeting held" in the I=mba33y on Sunday m6rnin°:i September 12, 

.he current political cris is .which h ad reachedr^a 



on 

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v;hen I discussed t _ 

a particularly delicate point v:ith members of i the r_nbas5y staflr/^^^* i: 
re^^roscntativcs of a^nother f-overnnient agency, and General -■^'^'*?'-'i 

■O^Janiel* The General v/as impatient to take action ar(ri', coh- 
'^-■-^^ vinced as he was by General Hinh^s disingenuous prote^stations 






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The 









Honorable VJalter S, .Robertson 
Assistant Secretary of State for 
Far Hastern Affairs 

Denarti^ent-sof StatBr--^'^' ..-^ 
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Declas^jficd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



SENSiTiVE 

that he had no personal political ambitions, believed that Diem, 
and Hinh could he brought together very easily- I agreed that, 
while ideally the solution might be for Diem and Hinh to bury 
their differences ^ the matter was a little more difficult and I 
believed that at this moment neither I nor others should get in 
touch with Hinh* Before undertaking anirtMng of "this sort, it 
would he necessary for me to see Diem^ which I did not plan to 
do until the following day. It had been clear for some time that 
General 0* Daniel was eager to take a hand in the problem and he 
had previously offered "to be anybody's messenger" should the 
need arise- This knowledge was one of the reasons that I stated 
definitely that no one should see Hinh at this time. 

Unfortunately, despite my admonition. General O'Banlelj ac- 
companied by his aide, went that afternoon to call on General 
Hinh at General Hinh^s house and had a two-hour conversation 
with him concerning the political crisis- This conversation was 
reported in summary in my telegram 98I. In essence ^ it appears 
that General 0' Daniel inquired as to Hinh's attitude toward the 
President and as to his personal political ambitions and re- 
ceived the usual story from Hinh depicting himself a loyal, 
patriotic soldier without political ambitions and only too ready 
to cooperate with the President, It would appear clear, as has 
been indicated by 0' Daniel himself, that 0' Daniel then suggested 
that, since Hinh felt that way, he should convey such a message 
to Diem in the hope that the matter could be set right by a 
clear understanding and differences between the two men thus be 
settled* Hinh made a phone call immediately in 0* Daniel's pre- 
sence to the Secretary of State for Defense Chan, who promised 
to convey Hinh's message to the President, It is probable also 
that 'Daniel discussed^ at least in general terms, his own 
solution for the Hinh-Diem conflict j which included the promotion 
of Hinh avray from direct command of the army and placing him in 
the presidential palace as the supreme military adviser to the 
President- 

O'Daniel's intentions in this action which he took were 
certainly good. The fact remains, however, that he took this 
action in direct contravention of my instructions, indulging his 
tendency to take matters into his own hands and to mix into 
political situa"£ions without proper clearance from the Chief of 
Miss ion • 

This is not the first time that 'Daniel has taken hasty 
direct action himself with regard to a political problem, VJhen 
difficulties began to shape up between Diem and Hinh and I had 
received a request from Diem ^to look into the possibility of 
having General Hinh invited to the United States in order to re^ 
move him from the scene while the President established his 



75^ ' 




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SENSITiVE 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



1 



f 



ciuth'jritv over the-fetional irniy, I diacu^sed the matter vrith 
C' 'Jau-' ?.l". General 0*=J''AniLl v;as very nuch opposed to the idea 
of reolacinr; Hinh an:l 'Lo t-iis maimer of doln,^ it. He expressed 
'^■^"^anr if aa preforrinft Kdnh to Diem, should he- have to make a 
choice betv;ecn the 'tv;o r:i0n* 






«^ 



Follov:inr our convc: 
c n '. -i o :i s to ne ^ Qc ^c. r al 
it, ''sounded him ouf on 
or not hc: would consider 
General O'Dsniel rcturnc 
sincerity and *patrioti3i 
operate "loS'^ally v/ith the 
would not consider \asit 
incident was reoorted ,in 



r sat ion, and 
0' Daniel v;cnt 
his attitude 

visitinr: the 
d to tell nc 

of Hinh and 

President . 
ing the Unite 

my telegram 



without indicating his in^ 

to sse Hinh and, as he put ^ 

toward Diem and on v/hether" 

United States at^thls time. 

that he was convinced of the 

of his willinrnoss to co-- 

0' Daniel also said that Hinh 

d States at this time. This 

706 of Au^'ust 2/ 



i:> 



Follov.'inf; his most recf^nt ■ two-ho'ur conversation with Hinh, 
0' Daniel immediately tried to get in tpuch with mo to report. As 
I was absent at a special church service, he ^^ave an account of 
his conversation v/ith Hinh J:ax Counselor Kidder, The following' 
day, oeptember 13, I shov/ed to 0^ Daniel the draft of a telegram 
which I had prepared reporting; this matter in detail to the De- 
partment. O'Dauiel insisted that hc bad not heard my instructions 
and upon this assurance I destroyed the telegram- It is possible 
that 0' Daniel actoaally did not hear my instructions , as at the 
tine he may vrell hcivo been immersed in his ovm single-minded 
thoughts. ' General Trapnell, v;ho preceded General 0' Daniel as 
Ghief of -MAAG, remarked to me at one time that the latter seldom 
listened when .he was told sbmethin^o;, particularly if he had any . 
scheme or idea of his ovrn in mind, 

>iy relations v;ith 0' Daniel have been excellent an^. I expect 
them to continvi- to be so.- OOaniel normally works 'in friendly 
and respectful cooperation/ /I believe that he will not again in 
the immediate future indul£:e in political free-wheeling, but in 
the long ran his impetuous temperament, which drives him to take 
action even in situations where action is inadvisable, vrill pro-, 
bably reassert itself. It is for this reason that I wish to be 
on record in this matter, * , ^ " . ' 



Sincerely yours, 




Donald R. Heath 




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Dedassifkd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 20 i 1 



WMMil StNSliiVi 



I 



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 
Washingtonj D. C. 20301 



22 September I954 



MEl^ORAIIDia-I FOR TtlE SECRET AEY OF DEFENSE 

Subject: Retention and Developmeat of 

Forces in Indochina 



M 



1 



!• In response to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense J dated 10 September 195^> subject as above, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff submit the following vievs and recommendations. 

2, The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the provisions 
of the Geneva Aimlstice Agreement and the latest National Security 
Council policies for the Southeast Asia area, 

3» The restrictions imposed by the Geneva Armistice Agree- 
ment on Cambodia are minor and can be overcome to a degree suffi- 
cient to carry out generally the U.S. national policies in that 
Eirea, The restrictions on Laos are major and permit training^ 
assistance and supervision bj French instructors only. In Vietnam 
the cease fire agreement constitutes a major obstacle to the intro- 
duction of adequate US MAAG personnel and of additional arms and 
equipment* 

k. Although the French have not submitted for U,S. study 
any plans they nay have for mthdrawal of French forces from 
Indochina^ some informal and general information has been 
obtained as to their present intentions. Based upon this 
Information and taking into account the estimated capabilities 
of the three nations of the Associated States^ the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff recommend that those forces listed in the Appendix 
hereto sho>0_d be retained or developed in Viet Kam and Cauibodia. 
The estimated costs thereof ^ listed in the Appendix hereto 
must be reexamined in view of the lack of data related to 
condition and quantities of equipment and clothing^ quantities 
of ICC, ammunition and arms to be reissued by the French* 

5» Under the terms of the Geneva Armistice Agreement the 
training of Laotian armed forces may be conducted by French 
personnel only. However military equipment can be furnished 
in specified quantities for the defense of Laos through the 
French - 



756. 




SENSITIVE 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Dale: 201 1 



SENSITIVE 



6. The development of the proposed forces for Viet ITam and 
Cambodia -will require extensive and detailed training which 
, will extend over a period of 3 to 5 years. The French should 
; relinquish over-all coitimand of the Armed Forces of Viet Nam 
; as rapidly as possible with complete removal of forces vhen 
f the Vietnamese are capable of exercising command of an effec- 
tive force. ' The Vietnamese capability along these lines 
should be developed by intensive training and by progressive 
promotion of Vietnamese officers to posts in command of larger 
units and to positions of increased responsibility* 

7* The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that prior to the 
assmrrption of support of the forces of the state of South 
Viet Nam^ a definite agreement should be obtained from the 
French Government with respect to the timing of their pro- 
grammed phased withdrawal. The phasing out by the French 
should be correlated with the ability of the Vietnamese to 
take over this responsibility from the French, and at the 
same time assume command. 

8. Although introduction of military equipment into Vict 
Nam above the levels existing at the time of signing the 
Geneva Armistice Agreement is prohibited , it is estimated that 
sufficient materiel is available in Viet Nam from that which 
^ms previously delivered to Indochina for the French Union 
Forces • The primary problem pertaining to m-aterlel would be 
to insure that the French ^ while executing their phased mth- 
drawal from Indochina ^ leave in Indochina the materiel and 
equipment required^ insofar'as availabloj for the use of the 
Viet Nam Armed Forces. It should also be eir5)hasized that 
this materiel and equipment should be left in good operating 
condition, 

9. The supply of items such as pay^ food^ uniforms ^ and 
POL J should be fui^nished by the Associated States to the 
maximum extent of their capabilities. However ^ it is fully 
recognized that^ due to economic conditions in the associated 
states J they would require extensive support concerning these 
items. Such sux)port as may be supplied by the United States 
should be furnished out of ly&itual Security funds administered 
by Foreign Operations Administration. 

10 Indochina is an important part of Southeast Asia and 
merits limited U.S. support in in^lementation of national 
PQHey in that area. The United States Is supporting military 
programs in this area, which possess a capability of producing 
effective military forces* In view of the uncertain capabili- 
ties of the French and Vietnamese to retrieve ^ retain^ and 



*■ 







SENSITIVE 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Prnject Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Dale: 201 1 



r 



fi^VKt' 




reorganise the dispersed forces of Vietnam^ it may be several 
years before an effective military force \rlil exist. There- 
fore, U.Sc Ttiilitary support to that area, including the train- 
ing and equipping of forces^ should be accoirrplished at low 
priority and not at the expense of other U.S, military programs 
and should riot be permitted to impair the development through 
MDA programs of effective and reliable allied forces elsewhere, 

11 » In addition J the Joint Chiefs of Staff note with con- 
cern the unstable political situation presently existing \rilthin 
the state of South Yiet Nam, and^ accordingly, consider that 
this is not a propitious time to further indicate United States 
intentions vith respect to the support and training of Vietnamese 
forces. 



For the Joint Chiefs of Staff 



(signed) 



ARTflUK RADFORD, 

Chairman J 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 



Enclosure: 
Appendix 



^ f 



758 



10 



reRFTSENSJT!\ 



4» i^- 







Di^classified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Dale: 20J 1 



rt**^ 



fOSmi SENSITIVE 






THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 



Washington 25 ^ D. C- 



22 September 195^ 



>IEMOMNDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEKINSE 



Subject: U.S. AsstuEption of Training Responsibilities 

in Indochina* 

1- This raemorandiim is in response to the memorandum by the j 

Acting Secretary of Defense ^ dated 31 August 195^? which re- 
quested the comments and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff on the State Department yiews on establishing a MAAG 
in Cambodia and a training mission in MAA.G5 Saigon, It also 
responds to the memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense (ISA) dated I5 September 195^ which transmitted 
additional State Department views on Cambodia to be considered 
in connection with the memorandum of 3I "August 195^^ ^^^ to 
the memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(ISA)^ subject: "Training for the National Police Force of [ 
Vietnam/' dated 21 September, 195^, 



*■ 

V 



2* In their memorandum for you dated k August 195^ > subject 
as above^ the Joint Chiefs of Staff set forth certain condi- 
tions which they considered should be met before the United 
States assumes responsibility^ for training of the Armed B'orce 
of the Associated States. In their memorandum for you^ dated 
12 August 195^j subject: "Message to the French Prime Minister" 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterated two of these preconditions 
in their recommendations concerning the proposed message to the 
Prime Minister of France. From a military point of view^ the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that all of the previously ex- 
pressed preconditions are still valid and desire to point out 
that conditions in South Vietnam fall short of meeting these 
preconditions - In the light of Presidential approval of the 
message to the Prime Minister of France and in light of Presi- 
dential approval of Sections II, III, and IV of NSC 5^29/2, 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff offer no further objection in the 
establishment of a l^IAAG in Cambodia* However j the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff note with concern the unstable political situation 
presently existing within the state of South Vietnam, and 



759 



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SENSITIVE 



i 

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND Cj3316. By: NWD Diite: 2011 



4 N-f *,':■! ' I 

accordingly consider that this is not a propitious time to 
further indicate United States intentions with respect to 
the support and training of either the Vietnamese regular or 
J police forces* Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs df 'Staff recom^ 
mend against the assignment of a training mission to 'MAACj^ 
Saigon. 



3, The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that special provisions 
of the bilateral agreement between the United States and Cambodia 
provide that all French advisors xiltiinately be withdrawn in 
order that the United States may deal directly with the Govern- 
ment of Cambodia J completely independent of French participation 
or control. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further recommend that 
no commitment be made at this time as to the size or composition 
of armed forces to be trained and supported ^ nor to the size 
and composition of the proposed MAAG in Cambodia, until further 
study can be given to these matters. 

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

A/ 

ARTHUR RADFORD, 



Chairman 



3 



Joint Chiefs of Staff 






760 

SENSITIVE 



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Declassilicd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






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" lecation VIS^7riANE ^-^-l j 

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for -trft-n.^miUal to rospeotiva liussions SAIGOM. ; ^^SC:'£e2f:=rc;£'rrprq^s:'Zt^OSni^^.K¥;< " 



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QUaXS; In French-'US discussions hero, ve and French b^v- reached conclusion 5^"' 

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ve should cUp_:jort Diem in establish-nGnt and iz:aintemaice ofxi strong, ariti- 
Cor^^iTjanist ^^c nationalist government . To thi^^ end France and >ty:o US will 
both iirge-all anti-Ooiri:.unist slerientc^ in Viet-rlam ±J5 coo^>:}rate full^'^ with 



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Ttos govorrjiiont of Ngo Dinh Diem 



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nationalist govarniTLcnt under Diern^s lead-':irehip v/ith chance of success: 



Via recognize fiva key eleir,^nts yhich. can urovido a stable anti-Gr!r::^:ani^ t ^^i 

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Eao Dai J HinJi ^nd national *arrny and three eccts. 

As :c re:3ult x:C our discuesions t/o ^ire giving consideration to action 
along ±x:.:> follcv/ing lines and dsi^ira yoijr coTiimsnt?: 

The ni'oble.T.s relating to >-bcic Chief of State ^'ill rccuire further 

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^consideration when ::t:ce "Cover rJbent of Viet-Nan: x^ consolidated. Under present 



circuinstanciis. further deir^rches should bs r^ade jointly or separat^jly to 

A 

Eao Dai emphasising ±x:o conseGuenc-ss in tcrins of US and French support of ^. v^ 



failure on his part ±0 act in such ^ \is.y y^iii to strengthen ^'j?^ Dies 



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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dai<:: 2011 



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2 of tclc^r^ni rr. SAIGON, PARIS, PHI^OM P SNTi, ^ ISirtlkll^, ^^^^ 



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Governir^ent. French and Uni-led Statos reprossntatlves :±^ Saigon, \jhD f^hould 

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1 be glv^ri X bread d^jlegation r-^ povex^s for ^his pvLrposo, should encourage- 



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Diem ±o support our actions re 5?.o Dai with appropriate noasuros vathin 

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^:r4 corjp^it^ince ii£v±;:^ Vietn8.me53 .Gov<irri!;:eiit# 

. ' ' '" it Gfi^ontial th^t Chief* Sttiff obey orcU^rs given by 

^ V/ith rezpscjt to Gensral yAi'^^j/:Vc^<X'^^::^^'T'^]irit^^^ 
civil axithority, Ilovcvir^ at sairie tirr.Cj it nost difficult 
JTr; findir.^:^ replaceinent for hin, CoiioCGUcntly, doiiarch'^s should b£; nistdo to 

Ganeral Kinh and t-iS President Dietn towards K rcGonoillatlon, It would bs 

e:nphasizsd t?iat Franc™ and :S>ri United States ars fir^-iily supporting Prssldi^nt 

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Dxerh aiid tl-iat once his position ;t?> consolidated and only than ?'4 ext^^nsive prograin 
designed to develop i^C'S national ar.tiy undi^r General HirJi could be^ undertaken. 



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here reraains '^-^s problem of v:ho would be Ninipter of Defcrxso over Kinh. 



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[^ the futurCj relations with Kinh as Chief ^x Staff, sho'Jtld be limited i:a, purely 

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t military nitters in ^^i effort ^:.^ discourage hiin froin entering into political 

afiairSfl ^ 
I S&H sects play an essential j^ole in their respective tex^ritories but 

have limited iT-iportance on tc national scale, ^^:as sects have ir^aint-^iined 
flexible positions viith regard tn Dicni, ti^ Viet MirAj Eao Dai^ Franco and 



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the United States* It yx of vital ir^oortance that France and the United 



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States nainta in' x carefully coordinated strategy to -^'ards i6cic' sects, x3ii.^ 



I scots should be inforiP.ed of tcvri intent of iizx United States and France vith 
regard fcc support for Diezii. Diera n:i£ht be aivised izx attenipt t:^ influence 



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yzixx s-cts through his handling of integration of taeir forces inL-o to^ 



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national amy and through l6:-:s. ability tix grant thera adirdnistrative control 



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Dccliissified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 6?316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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over ar^as being evacuated by Vict l-Iinh* The representatives in. Victiuua 
Ox Franca and t^>rx United States should bo given i;l'c^ broadest possible dole- 
gation o± powers to determine coordinated positions fcx these i?.&tters* 

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^ VJith specific regard to tJcs 3inh Xuvc>n Idco^*^ recognig&d that wl:atover 

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I their tmsatisraclory and iindGisirablo qualities r^ay be^ tboir position of 
povr^r should not be underastiiriatod particularly as they control fexpolicaj 



are closely tied in v/ith Bao Dai> and in iix:c p-ast hava beon resp:>n5=iible for 



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e>:tensivo t^^^rroristic acti^vity xn Saigon* 



Therefore^ cur course of action should bo to sesk to i.*^olate the 
Einh Xuyen partidularly from Bao Bai and to ninin-iisc their power and 



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influence through stren^th^nin^ tfex .national, army as E^: counter, ihis can - 
only bi achieved pr oppressively* At tco: present time it seorrL^ necessary 
to as£:ooiate them with the governnentj which uii^^'nt in :^^:3: loii^ riin be t'lir-t 
best m-3thod to bii In a: position i-:^ control then, UKQUCrTS* 

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As noted third ra^ragraph above j Saigon coiTLT.entii reqaested regarding 

* specific TT.eans by which we could carry out coutsos action included above text* 
French Delegation requests te:<t above included within quotes be given 



r Daridau vith explanation this sent by US channels their request for his 

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' fe-^cdlaj I believe thc:t' united' Sties ^ policy- i^liculcl T:;e b-c:Gd cii KSO 5^>29/&, ""~ 



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irnzc.i criv:„ca;:;c3 vno r:::anteii::::ee an ±iiD.Q'zi:r.ZL ci lorcos r.oc^Gcrz^y "co cc^^rs ^nc 
intarn-JL Gociirity o^ the crca^ crji uponuis arror^^z^-^nt:^ ccxi-^Lv5.nd at ll^^ixXo, 

^- n f\ ^>-^^*y* r" 'ViT'i-*??! ^ o -I >^-^^ •? Ti i^oT rJ**^0'^'r'-f* £^ '^ '^ n 1'h 'v j^h — ^^^ *-.^-i-'<*r I'-jn^^-"?^! i:"J *»rp ^ii^* Pi^Vpt'"' "*■^^.*■- 

Ar-'f o n^,"] "i''"^nt',?i"'p *\-%^\'%p'^!^ ^i^L-'tT*''v ^'"■'--htT r" "TT^V-^ vC'^^ v-^'+t'"!'.'^""^""^?^!^ r"^ v^r T r^tivp^ V "* p*.^"-.-^ 

cocuj:ity ^2"i^-'^'^ c:;tcrnD,l c^^Gi'csslcn, It cj;C-r3 to re th";b,tlio^r;ir;o5,cn,Oi, the__ 
yio%\r:z"^zc: i!atic:2til /trr^^d forces. c'r*c^ 5.ntGrnaL GcciTi'^lty. Eie 

ri:rzipc::er a:cd ccr^t c:;ti:r.atcG in the JC3 r/ctachrcrnt vould b^^^^ to "be cxceooive 
in tr*e accve ccnte:rb. . , 

Fi^on: the politicei vic^ijcnt co::e r^^ried i! or ceo 2x<i ncceGcax'/# pr cdccuatQly 
trained or/d ecuiT;r:cd tboy wou,ld give the people oT free Vict-l-CLm scire o^ciu'cncb 
cf internnl ceeurity and pi'ovide the Gevcx^nr:2r.t or Tree Vict-I"crA vritli r.n 
inercr„oed senze of stability* ^^113 vrould produce definite politicrd ai^i pcy- 
cholo^ic^l ad%'ents£eG end vorLd help fulfill the cbJcctiY03 cf K3C 5-i29/2, >: 
v;evld cpprceiate havir<; yoiir viei;3 ns to the forccG v;e chnuld conl.^ei:plc:-te to 
cc:cTj out this policy as \iolX as the axoi:jat of fund^ \:o znav3A devote to this 
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forcer; "blicra ars ti;o political cspecoc; pro-pccic czA -'ciTXriz- Sr'^ective cmccU" 
. tica c- rZQ. policy on" U.S. ciAppo;-^ Tor eu^n forces can tic;ve a Dic^iii:iccn,t hzc-^'hizr I 
on -l^ho poP-i'l^ic:'-! dbjcctiva OjT c^.'ctitins a zi'table^ cc-ipablc Witi-Ccii;.imlr.-b covcrn- 
!-,-:;■:■:; irTv^-Ot-Z'Tc^, ^vl en r.sriictir^^ it in cz-JC^yraz out ii vi^oro^^3 internal 
pro:;rciJ -rith Cc:i:j-'C;3c;icnaX cpr^rovrJ.^ C"0 crrcctivc v::^.y to L;trc-n:;Gn^n th-D Viet- 
n"::;:;so Govorrreiit io to ccoicit in t:i3 rodrG^^JiiEins ci-ii trr4n-ii:::i cf ita drz-d 
i-oir-ccr^j zr. T noted in r:y letter to ycu cr AuiiV^t l3j :.9>!-. I^is point u:io 
c.Z^-'^ referred to in the> j^ctin:: £eGi-,Dt;:Liv ' c letter cf Ecptcrcbor 7j 195 -ij to tlio 
Sorjuby CecrotoiT cf Defence. lii cadiitica to "btid-stcry c^-.pport, a direct necns 
of*h:;lpln2 to crecite Ci:::;i:2intcin political ot:^bilit7 vill do Ijy c^prcpriato 
"■•^articirjetion of the U.S. liUG in the ple;iL:d::s> developing cj'zX training cf 



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pro3ra:^a i'or plaimln:;;^ clovolcr}±i:z ^--i tr^'nin:;; Vict;nrrr:cc; cccuvj/ty rorcca bcih in 
. V;lct";in^ ar.5- porhcpa ovon in iic^rcy ccctj'ucIqo or iii -cho IL^tcd State:; l-tccl?. 
Wo could DifooL^^iiicJ-ly iiiflucnc:^ ^clio <lGYolc;?"::iri Ca pDliticaL^ c^ voU cr^ ;:ilit?,ry 
ctability in j?rce ViCv-ira:i if vo lao/i ci^.ca a training; projocu 'irit!! Vicv>il:^::'^oo Torc^ 
?na provirixcn of dii-cc*i budsooary cxtpporv vO tlicco ;Corccc vrciicL have far Iozq 

* "■ . *■'"•. ■"'""' 

' Shen tiibx^o ic tbo qi:c3ticn cf tir.iin^ roc^-^^n^;; 'the: (/.o^roc; of poli*^:lcei ota- 
"o±lity vhich tho Jcint G^icfc of S-^aff rcif-cd In their x:->uora::duri of Sc:po:::::bor £2^ 
19!;' ' X believe -that itjotcintial x>oiitlcal c.ovolop:r,^nt3 iicv v;arrciTt ycva* con^idcra* 
tion oJ' the noco^^caiy pr5lirjir*ary st^ps fci* v;orI;iri2 out nn apprcp:rxr.t^ U.3< 
. training f unction for Vietfc:::ccG cccvirity forces* •* ' - ' • 






With respect to th^se conDiderationG re5aA}.in:2 ^otc3 gocla ai^ training ia ' 
Vict-rajj vre need to tcOze fsc::^ decinicns prc:".r>uly to enable v.z to rcDiXCid to the 
Ca:-bodiaaj Victna^aeo^ crA French GcvonizentG conGcrnii^s finaccii?! ai:d othor . ' 

cupport Tor their forces in Inclochia?.* 

J, 

^ U^i3 Provident bes Ginned a letter to 'the Erl::j;a I^inist^r of Viet"!Tc^„^ airvhor* 
iziii^ the /^.oricen i^:basGadcr to Vieb-I^en to exanune vith hiia an intellii^ent pro- 
QTc:i of direct Av^^rican aid to acsiot Viot-^IJois, A oiijilar letter has already been 
delivered to the Xln^ of Ca^-rocdia* Xn tlie neantiire the Vietnenre^^e Govem-::ent has 
nid:D:ltted >a note to thio Covern:-eat stacin^ that it ia con^idorins increa::inr; the 
Vietna^ece oxf:^/ to a total force of £:30^CC0 :.:en in order to ''s^-'^^-rcntee the interr^al 

. cr:l e::tornal cecurity of the coiuatry"' and req\;e3tins United Gtaies aG3lnt:?.iiee in 
this crJ-oavor. Ehe French Finr^nce I-i^nieter in hiG recent talks in vreshin:j's;on . 
c:;preGScd a deoire for U.S^ fir^inciel i^upport for the Forench Ih.^peditionary Corps 
in In.uoe>J:i?,j v.^hich the French contei::p3.ats retaining ab an cWerai^o Gtx^en^th of 
about 150 J COO nen during 1955* ^-- united States reprejerit?.tives indicated thr.t 
vo vrould otriVG to give co:::e indicai^ion to the ITrench Govcrir::;nt of onr thirliinj 
on theco F;atterG by Deceirr^^er 1^ 195^i-» Eie plc:ii3 of the 7reneh z-.vA the Vietiia^:^-.^ 
both C3crn to L:e to be beyoi:d vhat the UmVted States sho'c^ld consider feasible to 

*'^;jii2">port for i.iaintainins the cecurity o:f free rCndcehinjL at thiH ti^ie* 

In vie:r of the political consider atlor^o CTrX the reouirei.ictts of tinin^;^ 
it is imperative that t:ie Un?.ted States G-overr^^^ent prep.ire a fii*73 position on 
th.e ci'-::e of the forces ve cor::::ider a pinirj-in level to a^;sure the internal seeiu^ity 
of Indcehina. ?his position 'jIIX also liave to iiielude the ai:oui-ts of noney ^;e 
\:1.11 be prepexod to r.aiie available for this pui^csOp otA the steps ^re irill bo 
irillin:;; to t^ize to assist in the training a-:d fonraticn of these forces* i:l 

^■ 

O 

cIdo appreciate yoiir vievrs on hcv? l^cst ve ohovld proceed in r^nddn^ this 

deternination* ' 



t;ee;:s. to i::e that'irc carmpt realistically enter into di-cussions v;ith the other 
roVcrrer^ents concer^^ed until .\:e have nade tiiis doterr;dnatlon* I vould therefore 



I esi sending G copy of this letter to Governor Sta::sen, 

* 

Sincerely yoaraj 

M 

John Foster EullG3 

. 763 -■ ■ 






Declassirit'd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Piojeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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In Reply Refer to 1-1550^' 



Oct 1^ 195^+ 



MBiORKromi FOR THE JOHIT CIIIEFS OF STAFF 



SUBJECT; Development and Training of Indigenous Forces in Indochina 



1* There is attached a letter from the Secretary of State which 
refers to tvo memoranda from the Joint Chiefs of Staff ^ dated 22 Sep- 
tember 195^^ on the subjects: "Retention end Develbpment of Forces in 
Indochina" and^tJ.S. Assiimption of Training Responsibilities in Indo- 
china." These memoranda ^-rere made available to the Department of State 
by a letter from the Secretary of Defense^ dated 28 September 195^* 

2. , In the attached letter Secretary I^Liiaes raises t\<7o related 
aspects of the military situation in Indochina; force levels of in- 
digenous forces^ and U.S. training responsibilities for Vietnamese 
forces. He points out certain political considerations which he feels 
affect both these subjects. ^ ,^ 

3, In the light of the views expressed in this latest letter 
from the Secretary of State ^, it is requested that the Joint Cliiefs of 
Staff submit their coi^iments and rccoimr.endations vath respect to the 
levels of forces that should be developed in Viet-IIam^ Laos and Gam- 
bodia^ including their concept of the objectives of such forces fron 
the U.S. militpay point of view and an estimate of the annual operat- • 
ing cost of training and maintaining such forces. 

4. It is further requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit 
their comments and reconmiendations concerning, a U.S. conunitment to 
train Vietnamese forces^ in the light of the considerations pointed 
out by the Secretary of State in IrLs letter. In view of the special 
emphasis placed on an urgent determination of a U.S, course of action, 
toi'/ard the tx^aining question at a m.eeting of the Operations Coordina^t- 
irig Eoai^d on 13 October ^ the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 
this subject are requested as a ma^tter of high priority. 



Signed - 



H. Stinive Hensel . 



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Declassined per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NKD 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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N^ControJ: 88l2 
Eur^aaoi: Rcc'd : October 20^ 19' 



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"TO; Secretary of Stato -CT2 -19b4 
NO: DJLTS 5j Octooer 21^ 5 p.m,. / 

KIi\CT 

SENT DEPARTT.EKT DIILTE 5, REPEATED INFORMATION SAIGON 209 

EYES OI^ILY ACTING SECRETARY PROM SECBETARY. 

SAIGON EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR. ' ' " ■ . . 

^ During and after dinner tonight -^-Jith Mendes -Francs j v/e 
* discussed Indochina. I said our recent reports indicated 
disturbing internal situation South Vietnam. Mendes-France 
agreed situation serious^ but said understandable ve should 
nov7 be at psychological low point follov/lng armistice. Ho 
was also firoi regarding importance giving Diem ever^ chance. 
He vent on^ however^ to say that plans should be laid for 
^'another structure of governviiont'^ v/hich /could be produced 
lu^verrLD^®^^ failure^. In response my question^ he vas un- 
clear as to Gleaning ffis phrase and indicated ^he had no other 
local political figure in mind as possible replacea:ent Diem. 
He stressed^ hov/ever^ importance of utilizing thread legi- 
timacy deriving from 3ao Dai^ although he was firaulc in dis- 
cussing latter^ s failures and spoke of necessity keeping 
him off front of stage. 

At conclusion conversation/ Moides -France indicated desire 
before my departure to discuss situation South Vietnam and 
vhat we might do about It at greater length. In anticipa- 
tion such further talk^ I would appreciate receiving urgently 
^Department' s* 'latest estimate ciolftical developments. 



DULLES 



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Note: Mr- Gleysteen (SS) notified 10-20-5^ 10:^5 P-m, EH 



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IK'ORj\r,^DU:! PO]t tW. DIRECT OR. CrTi'TRAL H^rfivLtlGET^'CE AGBICY 

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*- EU;U!-CT: Action In Indochina - . . ^ 



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If 

I# !To one is nove avare. than you that tlio neutralist '^rrorldj nov* voi£:hiing 

r " ' ' ' " ' ' , 

1^ thtcource of the fut^ire^ vill eventually make, a choice befeiGcn Corrimuni^ra cLud 



^-, frccdoia* The ultinat© Xate of the free portion of IndocMna uill bQcon:e a * 

■ ■ ■ ■ 

^ critical element in that choice for the vast rillions" living; in the uncorrjnitted 

f^ ■ regions of Ksia and the Iliddle East, Tho loss of the rest of Indociilna in con-* 

■ - ' sequence of the 1556 elections or othertiice, i-rotLld inevitably 5v;ay nony of 

[^ theoe millions to '';^^:jr.^iUnicm* Aeide from itD political aspects , this trend could 






p., be iiilitarily dicastrouc to the U.Sp strategic position 3ji the Far Iiast, If 
another frca uorld debacle in Indocliina natcriali^eSj as every intelligence 







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e5tir,atc jjredicts^ the U«S* r^iilitary position in the l-Jestern Pacific could b 

jeopardised. _" ' ■ r -' -" 

■ 

^ 2.. .You are J of course^ riirarc of the ^nany current proposals for political, 
econor^iic^ and military programa dcsi^nod to chcch the spread of Coirj^iinist 
influence to South. Viotnan* Tho Chief of liUG, Indochina has advcd repeatedly 
^, -^ foi" a govcrnncntal decision to enable tlie U,S, to begin the training' of native 

■ -mi 1 

arnics in Couth Yietnan and Cai^bod5,a* The Joint Chiefs of Staff have hesitated 



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L • to concur in General 'Daniel^ a recorriT:iendation ^ust as they hesitated ^oo 



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rccQ" '.::nd participation In the Indocliina \;or \rhile it vao in pro^reDs because 
the po?J.tical situation has so dctcx^ioratod that the indigenous support, re-.^: : 
ouired to r.:al:e aiiy Military efforts successful, i^eeriied doubtful of attainriont*'- 

n -i 

I understand^ tliat decisiono on certain economic pro^raris are bein^ iri.thh.eld for 

, ■ ■ 

a s'Jjjiilar reason. , " .- -^.^.-p. 



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NND Project Number: NND 633 16, By: NWD Dale: 201 1 



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r/. ■ ;:';■ *. 3» Xn any aGGoncrdent of tho situation in Indochina, it ccqv.z obviouo that 
■ . - ' \ - ■ ■ - . , ■ ' 

^ tho superiority of Corumnict poDLitical leadership in' that area ha^ not been. ^- ' 

f- ■ - ■'■''. 

- ■ accidental, 't'lia Copjrranists havo altJnys recognised tho necessity for preparing ^ 



. and trainiiif^ leadorshin cadreo in the areao. they have narked out for subveroivo 
oocrationa. In Indochinaj the French opf^oaition to the Ic^itinato nationalist 
aspi: tions of the Victnaxaeso has aided ckillcdj indoct^^inatcd CorrrnirJ-ct 
persorLnel in carrying out their plans* On the other hai^d, the lack of a basis 



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for X idcrstandins between th,e indigenous people in Indochina and the rrcnch' hao 



been one of the prinary reacons for tho free T>^orld'3 failure in Indochina, VJq 

' . . * * ■ ' ' - " 

have hesitated to face up to rrahinn decisions regarding proposals for Indochina, 

4 

tecaucG ire are not confident that vq can defeat the CorJiiunist at their o'iin gar^-a, 

I'he r;stl:ods u6 have tried to reach the minds 'of the actual and potential* pro- 

t . . . ■ 

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freedoi:: leaders in Indochina have not been cuccessful. \io have not tJucceedcd _ 

# ■ " 

in i.:al-d.n£j oui^ objectives in Indochina appear desirable to the x:!Coplc there in ' ' 

^ ■■ - 

terns of th:::ir ovm interests^ problcraa and anibitions* A nc;/ approach to le.adcr- 
ship training and cross fertilisation bet\?ccn V/cstern and Asiatic ideas in the 

■n » 

Indochina area is necessai-y* Bcca\ise the 19$& elections set cun absolute deadline 

■ * " ' ' ' . ' 

to ox3r efforts we nust seek forpsycholoclcal pro^raros tliat see their results 



in nonths rather than years 



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II, 'In thi^ corincction^ a osychological operat:.ons concept entitled 

■ '^Militant Liberty xv;hlch h^s recently corro to ry personal attention seems to 

> - , ■ 

possess the ingredients ve are gropin;^ for, "Hilitaiit Liberty'' is a concept 

vhich T:as successfully ttsted in Philippine battles a^^ainot the "Huks". 

■ ■ k 

I 

^^rillitont liberty"" no tiv at cs indigenous people to work tovrard a co-^jTion ^or.l of 
individual freedom by presenting to them the principles of frcedoinsj clearly 
stated J in a nahnor-uhtch can bo vigorously propa^^ated and faitluMlly supported* 

d. " 

ihc concept of ^'Militant I-iborty*' provides a clear ctatencnt of frcedora e^qpresG^^ 

-*-/ w -T f^ iP 'H! T> '^ 1^ * 

. . * ■ . { i % ' A r'p,?^-- I . 



Declus^jficd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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Ln Iv^TiZ^ir.z?. 1>hat r.en anytihora can undsratoiid in a short period of tir,o» 

* ■ ■ 

^'ililitnnt Libcr'^y" ctinalateo tho peoples of coiintric3 thi^esitencd b/ Corjt^imisia 
to net to achieve the pbje ct5.VGS of freedom t/irough cclf--c::^Tc3sionj proper 

* ' : ■ ■ ' ■ " 

orc^ni^^ation and prof^rcncsivc action; 



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.;T-'"^:v',?,p'^:.'il'iny' conf^^^ people qualified to render judnrxnt have been irr?r£ 
. vith.tho ir.erlt and value of the **!Iilitant liberty" awroach* As I sec it* the 

potential" succciJG "rdlitant Xiberty" could achieve In Xndcchina is so great that 
.- ', ' ■ - - ' . . "^ ' ■ - .' 

our joint efforts should bo doYoted to getting it undenray ;rf,th least possible 

■m 

dol::y, I should like to sucgeot tli:it Mr. Br^^lr^ t;ho is a consultant to the Joint 

Subsidiary Plans Ei^/ision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, be mado- available to 

■.-■■■■• - " • • . 

bi'ief you and Mc-nbers of yovur Innediate etaff in the neai' futta'e. There is ' . ' • 

attached hcre^rlth (Tab A) a co::!prchcnG5,vc paper cettinrj forth the concept* 

6, The heart of sny plan to Inplencnt ^^liilitant Liberty" is tho p:r:df;recG5,ve 



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training of groups of indigenous personnel in an understanding of the jr.eaning 

of a free, society to the ind5-Vidua3. azid the' individual's responsibilities in ^,.- 

creating and ruiintainj^g such a society. If the concept of '^Militant Liberty'' 

■ ■ • ' ■ . - * t 

■v:ero tested in Indochina^ indi{';cnous personnel irould hax'^e to be trained fron 
among tho rdlitai-^as KeU. as the civilian clenicnts of Vietnanosa society- ^If 
a slcnificcJit nilitary training pro^ran ^;cre instituted, the induction*- 
traiiiln£;-dls charge cycle pro^^-des ready access to indigenous perso:u^el uho could 
play an important role, in a revitalir.ation of Victnara both during theit' period 



of Military sorvico and subsequently ^ftor they had retui^^ncd to civilian li 



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For tills reason^ as veil as to insure unity of effort j the inplerxcntation of 

I 

"J^ilitcJit Liberty"' on a toot basis In Indochina should^ I believe, be accomplished 
on a joint loilitary-^IA baDis, I an inclosins an outline foru (TAB 3) the draft 
of a plan vhich can "be fuVthor dGVcloped for joint oxcciition "by yo-jr a£;ency and' 



CIi:C?AC. 



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NND Project Number: NND 633 16, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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7, Tho arrae'-' forces ai'e in a position to support tha pui-olj- nlli-tary 
ac^pects of this progra^t^. As the draft. plan c;u£;£;cGts^ hovevcrj the necer^i^it^ 



exists for consictorablo parallel action in the civilian con;Tiimity in South 
Tictn.i!:i. It Is n/ hope that onco you have ,had an opportunity to understand the 
concL^jt hchlnd "^^'ilttant Liberty^ you idll bo in a' position to assist in ;dndei"'- 
irritinc substantially the x^emaininc elcr^cnts of an integrated operational plan<>^ 
■ ,d* It is* my fii^i^ conviction that *^h'llitant Liberty^ of xers ug the r.eans 



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for \:;'iLch vro have bacn ccarchinrj to galvanize the Victnar.eae into ta^3.n{J the 
action they nust ta^^e if they are to rc^i.-dn free* I truGt^ once you have had tho 

' . ^ ' "-' :. '. 

opportunity to becone acquainted \;ith ^^rlilitant Liborty'^j that you also ;:ill sco 

* ' - ' * H y > ■ . 

as nuch value in it* " .- \ *■ " - . 



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Declassified per Execulive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 U 



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Amsmb-assy Hrts tEQUL // KIAGT 
Am-nibaEsy SAIGON '/^%3 . ■ 




Bf£S 0:1 LY SECRETARY FROM ACTjI\G SSGRST^RI 



EYES 01-3 LY HEATH 



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For your ready reference vs quote paragrach 4 <^f "the September 29 i^imiteO* 
of Under standinn: *^'' 



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QUOTE Vith ro'^poct to Viet -Nan ^ the representatives of France and the 



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United States a^ree that thair resoective' governnents support Ngo Dinli Dierd jr/^"j ,r 






tho establishnent and jnainton?,nce of a strong^ aati-Gorriir-uniEt and nationalitrt 0' '^- 



gov':;riLiient« To this end France and tha United Stat^? vill urge all anti-Corjrrcrilst 

- "^^^^^ * 

eloTr.ants in Viet-^Nam cooperate fully i;ith Governr.ient of Ngo Din}i Diem in order 
counter vigorously the Viet l-inh and build a strong free Viet-Na^^ UNQUOTE,- 
Brief cstiuiate political situation South Vict-Nam follows: 



1> Vfnile General HinJi's threat to execute militaiy coup £.^ er:}5 to hav e bean 
avertedj Hinh and his associates Xuan and Bay Vien continued hold virtual veto HI 



power over Diein and his governip.ent, Prolongation of crisis leads to inevitable 
deterioration of govez^riTicnt's position and prospects-j even if it is no longer 



' - ,- 



menaced by violent overthrow* 

Vc do not rooeat not feel that sufficient effort has yet been riLade tc /^n " . 

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honestly carry cut this agresiii^nt, fact that u^rrj French elements have never accepted 

It 

Diem solution jnus t hav e vsakoni:! Ely's efforts and encouraged Hinh carrarilla in its 

recalcitrance, PAPvEN In this connection ssc Pai^ls 1665 UM3.RlQIc* Ve reinain o? 

^ ■ . ** . ^ 

opinion that railitary porsonalities now oppor.ing Diem are more susceptible to Frot.ch 
pressure: and influence than any other sinillarly po'.vnrful eler,>:ints in Viet-Najn.. 



' Broad govern^n^nt of national union around Dlcn has not been achieved. Until 

the c'Lirrent civil-nilitai^^-^sect conflict is resolved any successor Pi^iir.s Minister 

would be faced vith substantially sirdlar proJblf^:n \;ith which he mght ba even less 

* pi'^ejudicial 
able to cops th^n Dic^m, except on conditions pr-o-jud^kra to estsbltshr=isnt of governs- at 



of 'integrity, . 



* » 




Current joohoying for pow-:::r and struggle for cabinet positions is resulting 
aly2;ing inpases^ Positive moves are necessary by Franco and the U»S, if this 
inipasse is to be broken, Ve rt^T^aln convinced that if anything is to be saved In 
Viet^lfam we cannot sacrifice indispsn^ablo qualities of honesty^ incorniptibility . 
and nationalisin represented nore conspicuously at this moment by Diem than by 



I anyone else 



a 



3, Mendes-Fi^ance's use of tera QUOTE another stinacture of government UNCJOTS 
suggests French han>:ering to reestablish political system similar to that of 194° 
Cochinehinese B.apublic, founded on police and military power- to be exercised by such 



figures as Taiii and Hinh/ In addition to such pro-French figiu^es, system raght. involv:: 
direct eolonial-tyce contro ls by Fre nch, Such a forrr.nla in French eyes would have 
advantage of facilitating elii^ination of Bao T^ai and non-Coohinchinese elements 



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%^ [ like Diem, A developnie 



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nt of this sort in or^ view vovild create conditions in 

' 781 

TO? SECRET ^''^^^'''^ 



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NND Prujeci Number: NKD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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ligon to be undertaken soonsst with^ personnel and other rsso'ir±'ces now fivdilable 



thorc. NacCEsaiy iiistnictions to M-VAG and Enibiissy now in process. Ua hops this 



Y South Vlet-^NaTa analogous to those vhich ended by delivering to Vist Kinh northern j 

half of Viet"Nam, even though it might in the short run restore internal order. 
^7^^5-;;^VJg agree with Ksndcs-France^s f^'oling that perpetuation of 3ao Eai in 
present role pret^erves tliread of legality, Ve believe hov;evcr that whsn eoiu^ 
legislative body can take over from hiia his present appointive pov.^ers the time 
vrLll have coi^e to rerciove hjjn froT^i the seene* 
^ ,^'6r" OCB on Oetobsr 20 approved initiation nllltary training program by llkkG 



> « 



step> together with delivery of President's letter to Dj-emj v?ill strengthen Diei^i \il 

I I 
in. his relations both with French and other Vietnarnose^ l'! 

/ * 

C? ^7^ In EiLTimary, unless Diein receives ur^eserved U.S, and French support, his 

chances 

cl^25s^zc of success appear slight, V'ith such support^ his chances are probably better 

than>4>3x5CQC even reusat evcHc 



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U.S. TRAlUINr- or. VIT^TITBTSr: FORcrs 



Iir^Tieciiatel;/ f ollouinp* this note Is a draTt jcint State-Defense 
cable on the ahove subject* Tliis cable carries out the fist' of the 
GC3 decision of 20 Cctober* It is beinp acted en this evening by 
tiie Joint Chiefs of Staff* General Erskine vail imde^take to j^et ' 

LKr. b'ilson's a^pproval of the JCS action first thinj: Friday morning 
and to cori'-ranlcate Kr. Wilson ^s reaction to Adr:i. Radford prioi-' to . 
the liSC ;neetinf# Mr. Hoover j ':ho has aj^rced not to s^nd the 
. Tfiessagc until final Defense clearance is obtained^ ^'^ill probably 
. ■ . ■ sgoa Defense .concurrence in' the cahle at the KSC riceting in 
connection* vdth his report on Indochina* 

j * ■■ Unless the JCS or Kr. Wilson have some objection which it - 

^ is not new expe^'/sed (Adu. Hadford will knc¥ in the riorning), it i 



IS 



s-if^gested thrt yoa concur in the dispatch of the cable as v/ritten. 



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NND Project Number: NND 6?316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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Copy /*-of ^ 



TO: itmaiibassy SAIGON 



JOUv'T STATE-DEFEiSS I>ESS/:GB TO US Al-mASSi'iTiOR SAIGON Ai© CHIS? OF US 



» 



MUG SAIGON 



. Tha f olloifing message coiitaiii3 the policy of ^ the tJS 'GoverruTient and yotir 

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instri:ctxons necessary to carry out paragraphs 10-a cud. 10 -d^ Part IV of 

V ■- ., • ■ . ■ • 

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PiU^T I US Governmental Policy 



* ' 



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(1) It is US Govt* policy to support the GovernriOnt of Free Vietnam 
under the Preiiziership of Ngo Dinh Diem and to assist that Government iioitiaAly 

a ■ 

B ■ ■■ B * 

(a) ,to promote 5 Jit em al secui^ity and political stability in Free Vietnam^ 

■ « ■ * 

■ • * r ' m 

(b) to establish a:nd maintain control by tliat Government thi^oughout the 

territory of Free Vietnam^ and (o) effectiveD^ to counteract Viet Minh 

. • . ■' ■ ■■ . ■ . " ' \ - 

» . ■ * ■ 

infiltration and parajnilitary activities south of the 17th Pai*all-el^> 

; ' ■ , . - . ^ ' . - ■ * / 

(2) For these ptirposes and uti3.i^zlng existing VietnaiTteso arsied forces. 



4 i- 



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it is the policy of the US Govto tliat al3- appropriate agencies and ViAAG Saigon 

■ - „ - ■ ( 

... ' * , - ■ - 

should irancdiately develop and initiate Kith the Vletnairicse Government a 



[ 



Dro^'rain for training that niuTiber of. Viotnanose Bxraed forces necessary to carry 



Declassified per Execulive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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out the aboTe rilssions* US agencies' novr sgx^ee no efforts siioiid be spared in 

* ■ ■ ' ■ ■ 

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finding \isr/s to begta and carry out such a program in the shortest possible 



r\^ * tixae. The use of area; 



s outside of Vietnam and various means of increasing 



' US training personnel should ba exploited to the fxtllest^ 



(3) , The initial target vdll be the reorganisation and tra^Jiing of those 



4 

.[ 

+ 

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\ • .Goyornment of Freo Vietn^i:!, Tlie \iltimato obJect.lvo and the co.Tpositionof. 
US^ support of Victna^T^Qso forces required to achive these or other longer 



armed forces reo^uired for the internal security and support of "the legal" 



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range ob^Jectives is presently. under study by the appropriate US Go^rbe agencies, . 

, ' , t ' . ' ^ . • . 

(ij) It is fully recognised that, to be offoctiva, US MAj^Ja Saigon must 

• .- * 

* 

have adequate authority^ responsiblJLity^ au^ij'-onted strength^ and full support 



■ ft 






[^ '' ' fron Vietnaiaeso and Fj^ench authorities. Tho activities and functions of 

■\\ ViASiG Saigon laust'be carried out idthout intorferonco by^ but vdth appropriate 

I ' ' 

r coordination and assistance fron Kronch authoidties* 



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INSTRUCTIOMS FOR mJ.Q Sl'iIGCJT 



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(l) In dji:ple:rientation of this policy^ US IWiG Saigon Imnediateli'' idUi 

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(a) Assist in the rcorgaaisaticn of ths Victnajiieso aitaed forces 



and provida such training and support as tdJj, contributo to tho 



r*aintensrice of the legal goveniniant of Vietnam on a broad national 



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basis and tQ:ider the IVemiership of Ngo CinJa Dic^in, 



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';(b) Seek initiaUjr tho roorgardaution and training of those 



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VietnauiesG ariaed forces required for interjial security and the support 



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.-:';. .- of- the legal goveraiueat* 



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:, .; ■; ' (c) Develop ir;medi.ately and taJce initial' steps to iinplenent 



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vrith the Government of Freo V5.etnan a progx^am for the training of those 
Vie-tnamese forces necessax^ to counteract ¥iet ilinh infiltratioa and 
paraEiilitary activities • ;- ' 



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■- >^-'^.^-."^' ^gj Corrtlrmo .-to. coorcliJiato closely r/lth tho US^ Ambassador to 



.\ . ensura that thooo activitloa aro consistont with the .pol5-oie3 of tho 



\ * '. ' '** 'Unitod States regardiiig the legal govoriBioirt of Frca Viotn-sjn, 

■ . .■ . ^ ■ ^ • - * ■ ^ . / 

• - ■ ■ . ■ . . . . 

* : ■, (2) .-In viow of tho critical international iriiplicatio'ns of this program, 



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(. tho major decisions to ho taken in Vfeshiagtonj and the continiulng rovisM of 



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tho longer rango 5j:iplications, it is requoatod "that US UAhQ roiX)rt regularly 

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and uako recommendationa concerning all significant dcvolopoients offocting 



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this progx^am. 



I " PAKT IX I XnSTTUJGTIQNS FOR THE Ar^ASS ADOR, SAIGQiT 

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(1) Yon are requo3tod.to undertake tho nscopsary dlG^cupsiona and 
negotiations with the Govornijient of Froe Viotnaia and local. Frsnch authoritiea 

I 

to ohtain agreoinonta (a) onsuping US UkhSk Saigon vrill -have tho necessary - 

■ ■■ . ■ \ 

authoi-ity, responslbniby and freedom of actioa to cai'ry out the abovo prosi'aa; 
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and (b) ass\n7ing tho coc^ rjration, coordination and asoistanca froai Viotnameso 

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and French authorities .and personnel at all levola in Free Viotnijxii* 

■ . ^ . \ 

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(2) You will imiaediatoly consult with Chiof MAG to foririiaatD tha 

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detailed af^i*eeBont3' and assurances nhich UAAG roqxiixoa. 

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NND Piojeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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.t'RT XV FOR rrs A^SASS/JDOR, PAT tIS 



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■ . (l) Xoii aro requested to infona French Govornmont of theso in3tructioa3 
and to SQok Its agraeraont Jramodlatoly to authoriso General Ely to concltida 
th3 necesaai*/ asreGmonto' vith tho US Anbassadop Saigon and Chief MAAG to 



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; FXT tlio Department of Stata ia ijiraGdla-tQ]y radertalciBg td obtajJi 
■ 'appropriate midoratandin- -and inoano of au-r^cn'dxg- tho IbUG ctrenstH. 



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Octobar 21 195'* ♦ ' ' 

'Statc.-:;^. Yordisj Dofonse-I.^r; Godol; £Tr, Sxtllivanj OCB-1^ .Staats , Mi% IlacDonald. 



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KSG 2l8th Meeting 
22 October 195?^ 



ITES-I J^ (For Infonnation) 

BTOOCHIIJA ■ ■ '. . -. 

1» This vill be an oral report on the subject "by the Chainnan of the OCB^ • . 
Herbert Toover^ Jr-j or sor^ieone designated by him. It vill probably incl-ude a 
£iiiivr:ary of the recent U.S. -French discuasions on Indochina as veil as of the current 
situation there. * . - 






2, The XBj at its 6 October meetingj requested its special l-lorking Group on 



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Indpchina to prepare a program of economic and military aid to the three Associated 
States to include both direct aid and aid to be granted in coordination with the 
French J these aid programs to be based on the tentative force ^oals developed by the 
JCS, This program is nov being developed. The JCS recoinmeflded force goals are 
attached as TAB A; State coininents thereon as TAB B, 



3. At its meeting of I3 October, the OCB agreed that State a.nd Defense j as a 
inatter of urgency^ should develop guidance on U.S. training of Free Vietnamese forces 
for approval by the Eoard at its meeting on £0 October, Mr, Cutler has expressed 

'considerable concern at OCB meetings over the failure on the part of the U.S. to get 
a military training prograia under^-;ay in Vietnam. The JCSj however j have been dubious 
regarding this sort of U.S. inilit^.ry i.nvolvement in Indochina because of the unstable 
political situation and the limitations on the. size of the I-IAAG imposed by the Geneva 
Agreement and recoirjnended- against such training unless political considerations vex^e 
overriding (see 'JhXBS C and D). At the COB meeting of 20 October ; State said political 

: considerations are, in ',fact^ overriding and. the OCB is, ve understandj directing in- 
*aediate commencement of U*S. military training in Vietnam. The OCB's draft recciimenda' 
>io'ns are at T^\3 K. ' ■ ' " < \ - • - , - * 



' r - 



'^ ' h. \ This OCB action inay have broken the log- jam of inactivity regarding : 

r' '^ Vietnam vhich has gripped the U, S. Government since Geneva. Hoveverj there are 
many, other possible psychological and political action programs vhich may deserve 



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■ a try in a real effort to keep free Indochina from being assjjnilated by the 
Comi^iunists . Tlierefore, continued, streamlined efforts by the Departments and 
Agencies concerned^ given highest priority, seem necessary. 

I 

RECC:-2-ru:ifDATI0HS - ' • - . ' - 

5. It is recommended that you suggest tliat the Council; 

'. ■ * 

a. Discuss vhether the cui^rent U. S, approach to the problems of 
Indochina is yet fully adequate to achieve our objectives there. 

■ ■ " . ' " - " •■ . - . - 

. b,' Reaffirm its belief tint the development and implementation of: 
■ effective programs with, regard to Indochina be given highest priority 
attention vithin the, Departments and Agencies concerned and that the 
present action machineiy be streamlined to the extent possible. .: 



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Tho CC3 tocloy toe": tho follo\;ins poriitloii on tMs natter in order to 
coriy c'-it paragraphs lo-^a G.nd lO-d oi" Pro^t IV of Iv3G 5/^^9/2: 

■ ■ ^ ■■ 

■ . 1) It' is ncccGsnr/' for us MUC/Saiscn to bo cutiioidacd irr.cdiatoly 
to unclertaTiG tho funotl dnn of i^ro-rf-din^ nilita^y aclvico and trainiiis as 

■ " ■ - " * 

■i ' . ■" ' 

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appropriate, to Yictncix:o:jo forcoa at oillovolo for tho development and 
I ' nc4^^icnanco of intornal accTirity* tJitliin its capabilit5.03^ 1-3 i-IiUG/Sai^on 



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. shoiild Qsaist in tho roor^^:lDi/Ja.tio-l of tho Viotnoj^eso arr<ed forces and £;ive 

then such traiiun^ and support as recjuirod to cuGtaiii the l-^^al EovcrTinont 
- of'Viotnajn, . -■ ^ \ ' ' - ■ . ^- . - -- 

■ ,•' ■ ', 2) Tho trainintj anh advisory activities or U3 M:".AG/Saic;on should to ' 

. ' ■ ' * - * » , . ' 

■■ ■■ 

"clo^ioly coor:linatod \-ath tho Ar.bac£:ador to aosuro that rllitory cd%dco and \^ 

\ training GXipport tho policies of tho United StatoG x*o^ardin:; '! tho malnte:3aueo ' 

' of a lo^al VlctnanoGo Govonracut having* a "broad baao of national union and 

^. '■■*'.' ^ ' , ^ 

' under tho jjrciAiorohip of lli% llgo Dinh Dicn# - ' ' ^ • ' ^ 

3) Utilising Cvd^jtin^ Viotn^ooo Ax^ri^isa-.'ForcoG the appropriato 

' a^cnclca of tho T33 GoYornTr.ont and ciclDtin^ U3 liULG/Saiccn should develop 

irr^odiatoly^ and ta!:o Initial atepc; to c::ocute vlth tho Viotnar:c20 Govern- * 

■ ¥ 

nont a plan for trainin^f Jainir.un Viotnanoso cociu-it/ f orcoc nccossaiy to 

' counteract Viet Kinh infiltration cjid pra^anilitar/ activitios. Tho rds:5iori 

of Guoh forces chould bo to onablo tho Govorrjnont of froo Viot Han to 

* 
cstahlish and isaintaln Its oontrol throughout that torritory* Ho efforts 

^. fihculd^^o aparod in finding va;>'n to besiu and':cai*ry out cuch ti^ainin^ in ^ 

■ * !■ 

tho rihortoat posniblo tine^. Tho uco of crcas oiitaido of Viot l\t^ ejid - 
YVX'ionn noans of ineroafjin^ VS training pcrsonnol should be o:):i5lolted:, 



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h) This traininc should bo curried out vithout Interference 
' ■ " ' • -^ , • . ■ 

jTroi;! but \ath ^^ppropriaoo coordination and arc;ictanca Xrom French 

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Kilitaiy nnthoritief>. .. ^ ' , 

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5) ■ 'i-'f'iQ initial tarcot iDJ,lbo tho reorganisation 'imd training 
of tho nirdjv/a^ ar;ncd forces required Tor intcmallsccuri-ty in support 
of. a Ic^al i:ovcraraont^ Tho o^uestion of ult.i:?atG total oi^o and Ij\S, 



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su port of YiotunmeGo forces \rillbG left for lator^ dctei^iT^iuationo 

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6) Tho state repart:;:cnt ^rlll uiac-ortake to obtain frori the Vict- 
nanoGG and French Govomnontfj tho necGsa-r/ a^reG^nenta a:; to adequate 
authority; ^*osponDibility| and aiigr-ionbGd Gtroni^'th of the \0 JiUvG/Saigon, 



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no ^o GUmnarino ao 'briefly ctnd aa ol)Jca- 
tivoly a^ I can tho ^u^olicy and General 



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or^olooo ny 6j?af^ oa ouch' a lijuijihar/. 



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P E '^JT^CTj Tlie Van Fleet Report on Ula Mlcr^ion vO tho F^-Jir Enat 

• . ■ • ^. ■ ■ • : ■'■ ■-. 1 

. t iofl;/ ulth the Prcoidcnt tho Van Ficot Rc^jort^. !::> fcclo that tna ' \ ; ' ; 
bro?jf!L vlcir^ Oj? General Van l?lc:2t shouxa ta noclo I;no"rn to tUo r:r::1;cr3 , 
\ [ oS tba irutioral Gcci'xlty Council, oven tbo-uc'^i P^'^:f ^^-y "^-^ Gcrci-'hat ' \ " j 

P dirrcront iVotn nrcGcnt polielcaj In orflGi* tlic/o it can;:ot 1:3 naiCl 

L "\ In tho ^tiiTO thct tliG Viagra o^ ouch cv aiatinculah'Ta poi'oon \:ha io , '-''-.♦ 

.^ ,. ' ^ -very familiar vlt:i tuG Fci' Eio-ti vo-^q riot conoiclcrocl in rovlc^rin^ 

' ■ . U* G* x^^li^y tQy::rd th'^ Ta^ Se^t* EIioroAorv^f, tlr. Cutloi' intends -^ 

■ ■■ to givo tba rise c-vo::::/ brJ-o:? j?rc::ontatlcn o€ Ccn^^ral Van Ploot'o - ■ ' 1 

vicuj dVh connection \7ith t!:a diccraGalcti o? t?io F^"* Eantj [::c!i:^Ll\ilca ., ■ 



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, , :/ : ■•. •' :..,'■.: .'■• C. H. EOJIBSTEEL, III ■ 

'". ■ • ' . •- ' ! >:■. ^■■.„ ' ■■' " iSricadior Gouornl, United State". Army 

CCS AGB (Cdirc^trolXc^) '' ' ■' '''. ' ' ■ ./ Bofonno M^mbor. NSC Planning Bagrd 

director, OPHA -./' ■'' ... " :'■ ■ :■■■■ ■ ■/ ' " ' ' ' "•, ' 



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RlilPORT OF THE YM FLEET MISSION TO THE FAR EA.ST 



\ 



SUM-aRY OF GENERAL AI^JP POLICY OBSERVAHONS 
Chapter 5 - United States Position in the Far East; An Appreciation 

1 

1,- The Problem : ' The problem before us is the failure of U-S. leadership 
in the Far East* In the light of enormous coimBunist gains in Korea and 
Indophina^ and the generally deteriorating situation throughout the area, 
the national security policies vje have been following are pointing towards 
ultimate defeat. We must exercise necessary leadership and develop 
ppropriate policies for that role* 

'2. The EnejHj^s Design : So long as the Chinese CoiP-iijunist regime exists ^ 
it will not abandon its goal of conquest^ or dominance of East and South- 

ast Asia. For the nezt several years , Comrminist China is a greater 
jmenace to the Free World than the Soviet Union itself. 



Implementation of the Design : Since the end of World War 11^ the 
Chinese Communist regime has waged a relentless v/ar against the free w^orld^ 
specifically the United States* The conquest of China^ Korea and Indochina 
have been stages. Geneva is but a first installment. It appears certain 
that Communist China vill press on towards the objective of controlling 
all of Southeast Asia. Her further aggressive aims have been publicly 
announced ("liberation" of Formosa — Ho Chi Minh's intention to take 
over all Vietnam) * Comi^iunist China regards the Korean armistice only 



as 



a deferral of the ultimate aim of control of all Korea. 



1+, The Coimnon Enemy : The common enemy in the Far East is Corrtmunist China^ 
aided and abetted by Soviet Russia. Communist China has pursued a middle 
course -- pushing forward her progra^n' of conquest ^ but never to the point 
of precipitating unliroited war mth the U.S. We^ by our actions and 
inactions^ have transformed a once weak coiiimunist regime itito a woi-ld power. 
Peace vith freedom cannot be restored to Asia as long as the Chinese Communist 
regime continues to exist. Unless we stop her noWy the results will be 
catostrophic and we will be forced to intervene eventually anyi^ray to restore . 
the balance. 

5. Implications of Free Worjjl Defeat : Further defeats could lead to a 
chain reaction and loss of the whole area^ including India^ to the Com- 
munist orbit — or its neutralization. Communist control of Asia would 
be an important step towards control of Europe, 



II 



\fe must reco,^nize that the defeat we 



have suffered in 



Indochina is merely a part of the price we ai^e paying for weakness 
in Korea -- for the Red Chinese victories in Korea that our self- 
imposed limitations forced on o\w commanders ^ for an armistice that 
relieved Red China of the strains of wajr , . . The future will reveal 
other prices wa must pay for the free world defeat in Indochina." 



79^ 



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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Dale: 20J 1 



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"Toward the last stages of the var in Indochina^ those who 
opposed interventioa . . . expounded the principle that t^-fo conditions 
^ere necessary to Justify o\ir intervention: Firsts that the local 
governrrLent must exercise effective control; and second^ that the 
local population must be friendly to the United States, In reality^ 
this principle is largely a pai-apbrase of the position developed in 
the State Department's * China VJIiite Paper' . , , to explain our 
failure to prevent the loss of the mainland of China to the Conmiumsts* 
Moreover^ it must be pointed out" that it is a very dangerous doctrine 
that invites explanations for future failures and defeats. Its greatest 
danger is that it overlooks a prime res'ponsibility of leadership^ i,e.^ 
to strive to create conditions favor d?le for positive action/* 

6, Defeat Unnecessary : — Our defeat is unncessary. There are large 
indigenous material and human resources in the are^ vjhich can be developed 
and harnessed in the event of hostilities with Red China* Twice we let 
slip the '^decisive strategic opportunity'* of subtracting Communist China 
from the Soviet orbit ^ and thus beginning the rollback of Coipjfiunist power 
in Korea and Indochina. V/hen Chinese communist aggression starts again, 
as it undoubtedly will, we must be prepared to strike back and seise 
strategic opportunity. 



that 



7- Free World Assets : Considered separately^ the problems of Korea, 
Formosa, Japan and the Philippines ajypear insoluble except through ultimate 
defeat; for these countries are in the line of mai^ch for communist conquest 
On the other hand, considered as a regional area, linked to U»St influence 
and power, they have assets of great present value, and even greater 
potential value, /General Van Fleet then analyzes the actual and potential 
strengths of these countries^ emphasizing the role they might play in a 
united offensive with the U,S. against Goi>miunist China/, 



8, Failure of Leadership : Despite the real and potential free world 
strength in Asia, we have continued to suffer one defeat after another. 
Oar failure in the Far East is one of 3.eadership; it is a failure to 
consolidate Free V/orld resources of the Far East and make of those con- 
solidated resources an instrument of Free World power and influence. We 
have failed to create conditions for the development of a strong, friendly 
role by Japan. We have failed to solve the Janahese-Korean problem. V7e 
have failed to solve the Japan-Fhilippines reparations problem. Our 
technical assistance and economic aid programs have been inadequate. 
Our educational and exchange programs have been weak and inadequate. 
Above all, we have failed to develop for ourselves a finn policy for the 
Far East J to decide what sort of a position we wish to build there. 
Under our present national security policies in the Far East, vre are in 
no position to solve the dilemna, save by compromise built on compromise. 
Equally, we cannot redress the balance in Asia if we give Britain and France 
a veto over our policies in the area. 



795 



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- 3 



- SENSi'TiVE 



9* Halting the Shrinlcage in the Free World : V/e are doomed to ultimate 
defeat in the Fax East if we continue to "be pi-ecluded from talcing strong 
action. If the shrinkage of the 'free ^rorld is to be halted^ ve nmst "begin 
the rollback of communist poller* We must exert constant pressui^e against 
China to undermine her position. In the event of Communist assault on 
Formosa^ we should take the offensive against China proper. Communist 
afttack on the offshore islands would present us the opportunity of 
destroying a large part of the Cninese ConMunist air strength^ and furnish 
the occasion for the start of the rollback V7hich might profitably begin 
with the recapture of Hainan. Merican opinion mil support such a strong 
rolicy in Asia. 

Chapter 6. Observations of the Cliief of Mission 

""O, This policy would have two aspects to be concurrently followed: 
^l) defensively^ the development of increasing strength and stability in 
■East Asia;, (2) the maintenance of continuous pressures against the 
Communist apparatus. A regional^ multi-national organization^ integrat- 
ing the assets of the nations in question^ mil insure the phased de- 
velopment of military^ political and economic strengths* In particular ^ 



"Under the conditions extant today , Formosa represents an asset 
which transcends considerations of pure defense. It constitutes the 
most im.portant springboard for the projection of all manner of opera^ 
tions against the Chinese Communist mainland. It is the potential 
rallying point for the totality of non-coFJUunist Cliinese in Asia^ 
under a liberal political platfoin which could have a profound appeal 
to the Chinese masses. It houses a vehemently ant i- communist govern- 
ment which could contribute significantly to a regional organisation 
designed to solidify the free nations of Asia as a pre-requisite to 
action calculated to undermine and weaken the Communist bloc.** 

Chax^ter 7 - Explanation of Approach to Survey 

11. "Cursory examination revealed that there were no positive and con- 
sistent United States policy statements . , . -^-^.th respect to East Asia 
and its component countries. Similarly lacking were clear and unmistakable 
prime military missions for the forces of the several countries * . , 
Consequently ;, certain hypothetical policies were established in order to 
secure a quantitative measxo'e of the forces required for the support 
thereof.'* The first envisages an intemiediate policy designed to develop 
increasing strength among the free nations of Asia while maintaining 
pressures to undermine and weaken Asian communist regimes and being prepared 
to exploit by offensive action the situations created by such pressures. 
This policy^ he states ^ is geared to the announced intentions of the 
Administration J although not adequately reflected in ctu^rent national 
security policies. The second policy considers preventive war* The 
third policy considers a distinctly defensive posture. 



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. -— -y- ). - SE^iSITlVE 



General Van Fleet* s analysis and recoimnendations as to the mission^ 
size and composition of military forces for East Asian countries are 
apparently based primarily upon the first assuined policy , as illustrated 
by General Van Fleet's statement of the general mission of the expanded and 
improved East Asia indigenous forces stated in his "Sijurji^ary of Recommendations 
on the Area as a Whole"; 

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(1) Maintenance of internal security; 

(2) Defense against external aggression; 

(3) Exertion of constant pressure- against the CoEimunist enemy; 

(h) Exploitation of oprjortunities arising from, the cumulative effects 

of constant pressure against the enemy ^ and 
(5) Development of an adequate "base for maximum mobilization in the 
^ event of war with Communist China or a general war, 

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DATC: October 26, 195/^ 



Copy No 



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SUBJECT: 



Indocliiiia » 



PARTICIPANTS: 



COPIES TO: 



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The 3 6C rotary 

The French Anfojir^sador 

lir, Tyler ^ T'/i5 



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Ambassador Eonnab called on the Secretary at his ovfn recusst. Ke said that r^ 
he had not been Instructed to rr^akc a donarche but had coine on his ov.ti initiative- 0) 
to express his p.dsgi\dngs and deep an^dety v;ith regr?.ixl to the com*so of events 
in Indochina. He said that the iniorn^aticn he had received officially^ and in 
'personal cor/jnunxcations frcm General Ely^ led hint to feel that the chances of 
Dieni succeeding in forming a govomnent of national iinity aiid of acquiring 
authority v;er3 very slight. 

He said that General Sly^ in V/iioni he had unbounded confidence^ had done 
everything he could to bring about a settlenent of the Diem-fiinh quarrel. He 
had succeeded in obtaining from Kinh the undertaking that he vrould liieit hiifts^lf 
entirely to nuLlitary affairs and v;ould stay avray from politics. He had brought 
H5jnh to the uo5-nt where he had agreed that he vrould take oilers fro:r. Dieni, 
Hov/ever Dion- had on hi^^^j^tjbeen^acl^^ 
Hinh. iTtTs" deadlocirhas created a dan.^erous situation in >.^iich sorr.e of the 



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troops but v/ould only look tovi-aixi its oitTi security* 



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■ ■ The Ambassador co^-i^ented in a rueful tone that "Prance nov had ever yone 
against her in Indochina." Ke said that the Presiderit^s letter to- Diej:: had 
^-cre^tted a 3s:isation in Saigon and vras being interpreted as superseding the 



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Vfesliington a^reejientsj by T-/hich ATubassador Heath need no longer consider hinsolf 
bourid. It v.^.5 felt that the President's letter had given Diem full rein i^athout 
requiring of him as a preliiidnary condition that he shoiild first succeed in 
fanning a strong a.nd stable goven:in-entj even though yii3._prelininai;:>;;_cot^ition 
had been_p?.rt -Of .-the.basis_of the Vfashington agreeuients, ' ^ ^ ■ 



/ further aspect of the President's letter vhich is gi^-ing the French 
concei-* is the use v.^iich the Viet Viinh could make of this step in relation to 
the Armistice agreerxient. Xhe Embassador said that the Viet Kinh ''.-.'OTiLd doubtless 
v-ash to e^q^loit this possibility^ especially if the situation \%ere to deteriorate 
furthe . In addition to the French It^peditionary Force no^^' located in Southez^n 
Vict Kam^ there v::-ts the natter of the troops in Kaiphong, v^hich v;ere not to be 
evacuated until Kay 1955- AH this added up to a very delicate situation, . 
potentially darigerous and of uncertain prospects. The /jr^bassador said that in 
all good faith J and despite the best vdll in the ^forld to inake the Diem cxnqriraent 
v;orkj the out3.ook seemed to be deteriorating rap5-dly. He vas also concerned 
bv what seemed to hin to be a lack of Franco -Ails ri can cooi^lination >rith roi=^ard 
to the course of action to be taken in Indochina and said he hoped it vrould be 
possible for us to consult each other again -more closely, and bring oixr positions 
together, . . ' 

The Secretary said that he vras gi^dng the situation in Indochina the 
gVeatest attention, and he agreed that it >ras a difficult and delicate problem. 
He pointed out that Diem needed all the support that he cou3-d get froa every 
quarter and that it was not enough to say that one vas going to support Diem 
but that he hadn't nuch chance. The support r.ust be positive and continuous' 
in orcier to be effective. The Secretary said that he had ha^d a talk vdth 
Preniier l-Iendes^-Frjance in Paris on Indochina and that he vould shortly be sending 
him a r^essar^e about the situation there. 






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November 17, 1953 

TOP SECR>]T 

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MElvlORATJDUI^l FOR THE PRESIDENT 

Subject: General Collins^ RecommendatlorLS Regarding 

Military Force Levels in Viet-Nain 

General Collins has submitted a report and his recommenda- 
tions regarding force levels in Viet-I^ram* A breakdown of the 
proposed forces as recommended is attached as Tab A. 

In simimaryj the main points of his report esxe as follows: 

1. It would be disastrous if the French Expeditionary Corps 
•were v;ithdrawn prematurely since otherwise Viet -Nam could 
be overrun by an enemy attack before tfie 'Manila Pact Powers 
could act* 

2. The United States should continue to subsidize the French 
Expeditionary Corps during calendar year 1955 ^ a-t least to the 
degree of one hundred million dollai*s, to encourage the French 
to retain sufficient forces* (The current rate of U,S. subsidy 
is four hundred million annually) . I 

3. The Vietnamese National Army^ now totaling 170^000 

should be reduced by July 1955 to 77,000, It should be placed ^ i 

under Vietnamese coEimand and control by that date. It 

would be organized into six divisions j three of which would - ( 

be field elements designed to reinforce the balance of the 

Army which would be stationed in reginaental and battalion 

garrisons tliroughout the provinces* A smaH Air Force and 

Navy is provided for. The cost to the U.S. would be tv7o 

hundred million dollars annually. (This is less than current 

costs). 



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NMD Project Niiniber: NND 63316. Bv: NWD Date: 201 1 



SENSITIVE 



TOP SECRET 



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k» The United States should assuiiie training responi^ibility 
for the Viet-Natu rlational Army by January 1^ 1956 with French 
cooperation and utilizing French trainers* 

5. General Ely, the French Comnander^ is agi^eeable to 
a slow build'-up of our MAAG for training purposes. 



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A/ 

John Foster Dulles 



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Enclosure : 



Tab A - Reconmiended Force Levels - Viet^-Nam 



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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

, WASHINGTON 73, D. C, 
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At a meeting held today at* 3:00 P-IU^ FOA Administrator 



Is en told French Ambassador- Bonnet that thtJ United States 
i;ould contemplate^ subject to an agreement being reached be- 
tv/een General s Collins and Ely^ and subject to, discussions 
i^^ith certain Congressional leaders^ the following future aid 

ranee with respect to Indochina: " , ' 



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(a) The sum of 100 million dollars for "support of the 
ch Expeditionary Corps during the calendar year 1955, 
counterpart French francs accruing after January 1^ 1955 

zn^^ U^ S^ aid with respect t o^ Indochina, would be applied 
ischargo of this commitment if sucji commitment is actiTally 
^ Likev/ise^, any savings effected as. indicated in Sub- 
si on (b) bolov; in expenditures of the 1954 budget programs 
d be applied against this commitment if andv/hen made 
not be an addition to xto ' ' 






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(b) The programmed 1954 budget expenditures in respect- 
to the French Expeditionary Corps would bo continued but would 
only cover supplies^ equipment^ etc, actually* sent to Indocliina* 
on or prior to December 31^ 1955<i As stated abovc^ if this 
arrangement resulted in any savings below the original 785 
million dollars programmed for this French budget support^ such 
savings would be first applied against the foregoiag 100 million 
dollar comraitmenl and not be made available to the French in 
.addition thereto* . . ... / " " 'S"- -^ . .. 

I had had no notice of. this meeting prior to 2:00 P»M, 
today v/hen I arrived at the airport on return from Ncv; York 
City where I, attended the Navy Le^ague Dinner last night. The 
time of .py return was dictated by the fact that I v/as traveling- 
by commercial transport and no scats v/ere available until the 
12:?-0 Pa^'s* plane from New York City^ The notice of the meeting 
to tiie Defense Department as distinguished from me personally 









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s not received until 1:00 P« M^ todayc* Both Stasscn's office 
ard the State Department disclaim responsibility for the lack 
of notice^ but i\olting of State indicated to mo over tlie 
p^^ono that the mec^ting vjas knov/n to 'the State Department 
last Saturday* . . ' 



t e 1 e - 
since 



Orally at the incetingj I stated that the Department of 
Defense had not had any opportunity to chock the details of 
the ICO million dollars mentioned for FEC support during the 

year 1955o Tjirough pencilled notcs^ I informed 
v/h 11 e he v/a s talking that the Depart nic n t of Defense 
Jiad never agreed to the original position paper in that respect' 
Trhich"v;as based on a recommendation from General Collins v/ith-- 

showing tJie basis of his calculations* Ii^ . 
notes made clear to Stassen that I had called 



c. aiGiiaar 
Stassen 






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Tierchant on Monday^ November 22^ and asked him 



v;hcther and v/hcn any meeting would be held v;it]i the Trench 
on the subj cct of financial aid to tlie FEC and othcrv/ise in 
Indochina^ stating that Defense had some ideas it would like 
to prosonto * I told Mr* Merchant . that I did not feel it v{as 
Defensors job to get in touch vfith the French^ that I assumed 
State v/ould take the lead in that respect and that State v^ould 
get in touch v/ith Defense so that v.^c might compare notes before 
, any meeting* Mro Merchant agreed vzith that position but did 
not at that time mention.tlie fact that any meeting \it\s scheduled, 
vjith the French for U^cdnesday^. NoVer.iber 24,^ 



'Ambassador Bonnet at the meeting indicated that the 
ICO million dollar support for the FEC during calendar yenr 
1955 v;as far below, the amounts v/hich the French had expected 
to receive from the United States in that respect and that 
if the United States remained firm at that figure^ General 
Ely v/ould probably have to make a substantial revision in his 
estimates as to the nurabers of .men in tl^e FEC to be retained 
in Indochina^ Ambassador Bonne-t stated that he would com- 
tnunicate Stassen*s statements to the French Government and that 
v;ould probably take some days before any reply could be made* 
n endeavored rather briefly to argue with Bonnet. that 
100, million dollars v/ould be sufficient in the absence of any 
war act ivity^ ^pointing out that only 256 million dollars had 
been utilized by the FEC (based on bills received to date) 
under the Lani el-Navarre Plan which required much greater 
activity on the part of the FEC* Bonnet replied that all of 
the bills are' not yet in and that while he could not make any 






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calculations^^ he v^as confident 

most the current Rly 






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that the 100 million dollars 
program witji respect to the 






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had 

1955 
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ted that certain 
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during calendar 
do not knoii v^hcther 

Furthermore^ 
ed that no budget 
pment^ etc. not 
ny"" limiting date, 
t of December 31^ 



After the meet in g^ I complained to Stassen about our 

lack of notice of, the 3:00 P*M« meeting todays He replied 
that he personally had not received any longer notice than 
I had and that the entire commitment as phrased vtas based 
on the Dulles desire to communicate as promptly as possible 
to the French that their expectations of receiving budgcti 
support in the amount of $300 million for calendar year 1955 
uere without foundation and that the 100 million dollar 
comaitment as made v;as based on the rocommcndat ion from 
General Collins^ I replied that I v/as fully aware that 
Secretary Dulles did not v/ant to give the French a valid 
excuse for pulling out of Indochina completely and leaving 
the problem in our hands v;ithout the French available to bear 
any responsibility^ but that Defense had not agreed^ insofar 
as I knev;^ to the original position paper on' this subject 
and had accepted the Collius recommendation of $100 million 
subject to an opportunity to check the basis of his calcula-H, 
tionso I further explained tli'at I had told the State Depart- 
ment (I believe it v^as Livingston Mercliant^ but it might 
have been Nolting) during the Mendes-France and Dulles talks 
that I believed we should express any statements made about' 
100 million dollars for the FEC as a maximum and give the 
iirioression that it mig};t be reduced^ 
Stassen and apparently my expression 
been co.'^irjiunicated t o himo. 



Such v;as not done by 
of' opinion had never 



I further made the point that Defense had a substantial 
interest in these matters^ that Defense approval should be 
sought in advance of any discussions v:ith tlie French or at 
least Defense be given an opportunity to express its opinion 
ar.d that any meeting scheduled should only be 'after adequate 






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to Defe nse* Stassen agreed v;ith such a propo 
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ow the slip had occurred with respect to today 
e would look into the matter* 



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rAemorancfum of Conversaiion 



D/VfE: DecQTuber ?/ 19!^; 



;UD JECT: 



Vietnam and Southeast Asia ' 



PARTICIPANTS: Senator Ilike Kansfield 

Assistant" Secretary Walter S* Robertson 
Assistant Secretary Thraston 3* Horton 
Hr* KeiVAGth'T. Young ^ Jr. 



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m £AST[aiI APfAiilS -'^^^i^^^ Embassy, Sai£oa 

DEC- 71354 



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At th3 Ssoretaiy^s request Yx, Rcb^jrtson^ Hr* Morton and I'll% Y<yo.r% 
went to see Senator Maii^field this morning vith respect to General Collins* 
analysis of the situation in Vietnaiii (Sai£;on:3 21Q3 of Eecex-iber 6). 
Ml', Robertson eiq^lained to &5nator Konsf ield . that the Secretary had a 
suTiT-iary oJE^ this telagran early th5-3 morning and had asked that it bo - ' 
brought to Senator KansfieldTc attention so that the State Leparteient 
night ha^/e the benefit of his reaction and advice. . ^ 

After reading the telesram and di.s cussing various points Senator^ 
Mansfield stated his conclusions as follc^fs: 

1. The prospects for he3,ping Ciem strengthen and uphold South Vietn?j;i 
look veiy diiii given the best- cf circurp.stanccs. Any elections in 19^6 
Hill probably f^-Vor the Co^Tjiranists. 

■ ^ 2# Nevertheless, the United States should continue to exert its 
efforts and use its resourcesj even if it will cost a lot, to hold 
Vietnani as long as possible e Arx^^- other course vould have a disastrous 
effect on Car:ibodia^ Laos and Southeast Asia, The Senator strongly 
cpoosed the idea of abandoning our eifoi^t in Vietnan, That coursi^ of ;■ 

action i;ould lead to -the absorption of Canibodia and Laos by the ComTiunlsts, 






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3. Therefore^ he felt vfe should cor.tijiua to do whatever was possible 
to suppoi'b the goV'Srixr^ant of Dien. Senator Ilansri^lcl sees no alternative 
Srir.e llinistex-^, Khils recoj^nising Dien's^ ^icakiiesses as an. adiriijniEtrator 
and manager J Senator Mansfield feels \^b ought to continue to p?.ok Diem, 
strongly encourage hiia to make Dr. Quat Mini.ster of Defense iniT-ediatel/j 
and ui'ge Diem to delegate as rmoh as possible of the day-to-day operations 
of the govornjr^ent to others* Senator Mansfield 7ias cf the opinion that 
Genexv^l Collins ' time limit of t;;o to thi'ee v:eeks \:b3 plying Trith "political 
^.amite'^ because it vas giving Diem such an ar.f fully short time iii vrfiioh to 
shcnv results or be replaced. . , * ■ - " 

It. Kith respect to lir. Robertson's point that the French vjould subject 
the Secretary to great press'ars on iiriinediately fij^ding a replacement for 
DisHj Senator Kansfield took the strong position that this line of action 
utJuld only confound the already great difficulties in Vietnam* It vould adi 
niich confusion^ take tiitie^ and probably increase the dD.visions v:5.thln 
Vietnam beyond vrhat they are to^lay. Senator Kansfield vas certain the 
refugees and many of the Catholic bishops and church officials vould oppose 
the replacement of Diem. The Senator felt, that Dieia represented ;rhat snail 
hope there Tnay be in building sonie thing jxi Vietnanfie He was against 
relinquishing oven tlie small chance vie have >rlth Diem for some unlcnorn 
and iiQoried combination* 

• 

5, Senator K^nsfield agreed with General Collins' reco-nmendation that 
Embassy Paris urge Eao Dai to cease the long distance wirepulling from the 
Riviera and to give Diotn complete backing and initiative to run the govern- 
ment i;ithout interference froii b^-*^ Dai* Senator Hansfield strongly urged 
that it vras so inport-snt to get this idea across to Bao Dai that A,mbassador 
Dillon hi-Tiself shou3-d make the approach as suiting the publicity of such a 
meeting could be kept to a min:b?rum. The Senator also felt veiy strotigly 
that Bao Dai should not return to Vietnaiji. 



6. In addition to the abovcj Senator Hansfield said that Dr. Quat 
in h-is opinion ;jas an able man trho. could do m.uch to help bring the arr.-vy- 
under control Sind into loyal support of the gov'em>:3nt. He hoped D5,em 
woitld appoint Qaat right avay.- The Senator said that the remai*kabla 
aspect of Diem vas unlike most of the Vietnamese ^ he really ivas honesty 
5,ncorrupti ble and a devoutly dedi cated nationalist as veil * Hovrevex'^ the 
Senator expressed the periohal view^that in politics one often has to maka 
some compromises in order to get results* He thought that Diem should be 
encouraged not only to delegate responsibilities to trusted and capable 
ministers^ but should also give in to a certain amount of comproirLise, The ^' 
Senator suggested that Di'* Fishel would probably be the best person to vork ' 
out with Diem the problem of delegation and political adjustments. It v/as 
clear that the Senator had great con:fidence in D^. Fishel. He hoped that the 
Department and the Ihibassy uoiad give the latter full leeway and since he 
appears to have the coiTTplete confidence of Diem. On Kr. Robertson's point 



that 



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that the French and the British irould continue to push very hard for 
Tairij iSenator I'lansfield was iir:nly oppoaed to our accepting Tam or 
exerting any pressure at all on Diem to include Tarn in his cabinet* 
Senator i-'ansfield agreed nith Mr, Robert son that to do eo rro^Jild comproirdss 
' the carbine fc and provide the Corrjn^mists with a ready jcade argirr^ent for ■ 
charging the Diem go\"ernnient viith being a puppet of the old colonial 
regirae. 



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2hkB^ DECEMBER 5, 5 PJ1. 



PRIORITY . 



.SENT DEPARTt^ENT 2hhS» 



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Rsc'^^ DECeKbSr ■ 9 J 195 4 
Sate of Aotio^ Hl^:.,^ 



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BELIEVE EMBTELS 2^133 AMD. 2^13^4, DECEMBER'S ANSl-JER IN GENERAL 
TERMS REFERENCE TELEGRA^5, OUR VIEl'S NUMBERED QUESTIONS 
REFERENCE TELEGRAM FOLLOvJl -' '• ' 



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ANSWERED BY EMBTEL 2435. 



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2. ANSWERED BY OUR COMMENT FIMAL PARAGRAPH 2^^33. 



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QUESTION OF BUDGET PRESENT AT I OMj BY WKICK WE UNDERSTAND 
YOU HEAN THE MATTER OF TIHXNG, OF COURSE INTENSIFIED PRESS-' 
URE REACH DECISIONS BY JANUARY 15j BUfIS NOT AT ROOT OF BASIC 
PROBLEM. AS INDICATED PARAGRAPH OE^E EMBTEL 2A33j FRENCH GOVERN- 
MENT ALREADY CONSIDERING DECISIOM ACCELERATE WITHDRAWAL EXPEDIT- 
IONARY CORPS AND PROBLEMS RELATED THERETO, INCLUDING CIVILIAN 
EVACUATlCNj .AS DIRECT RESULT UNITED STATES DECISION PROVIDE 
ONLY ONE-THIRD AMOUNT REQUESTED FOR MAINTENANCE F.E.C. IN 1955. 

k, VE BELIEVE FRENCH FOR MOST PART SINCERELY CONVINCED THAT 
UNLESS- EITHER DIEM GOVERNMENT PROFOUNDLY MODIFIED AND STREN- 
GTHENED OR ALTERNATIVE STRONG GOVERNMENT ESTABLiSHED_^.Y_SOME-' 
TIME DURING JANUARY AT LATEST j VIETMINK EROSION IN SOUTH 
VIETNAM WILL HAVE PROCEEDED TO POINT WHERE VIETMINH CAN REAS- 
ONABLY EXPECT TO BECOME PRINCIPAL FORCE PRESENT IN SOUTH BY 
TIME JULY 1S56 ELECTIONS, ' HOWEVER j WE WISH REFER THIS CONTEXT 
OUR COMMENTS EMBTEL 2QE3 REGARDING FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES INVOLVED 
VIETNAMESE SITUATION WHICH WE FEEL TRANSCEND AND TEND AGGRA-- 



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VATE MORE IMMEDIATE, THOUGH CRITICALj PROBLEM ACHIEVING 
POLITICAL STABILITY SOUTH VIETNAM, ' ' . * 

RECOllD COPY o This copy must be r.-tii?x93l fd^&W^ central files with notatir;l>^'r'i;i,.r^iV.^3^^ 



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~2~ 2kkSj DECEMBER 9j 5 P*r!, , FROM PARIS 



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5. IJE DO HOT BELIEVE FRENCH DECISIOM ACCELERATE WITHDHAHAL 
EXPEDITIONARY CORPS VIETKAH AND TO EVACUATE THOSE FRENCH CIVIL- 
IANS AND VIETNAI-:ESE WHO WISH LEAVE AS RESULT THEREOF, WILL 
AFFECT APPRECIAELY FRENCH ACTIVITIES LAOS AND CAMBODIA, 
OR FRENCH DESIRE TO HAIMTAIM ITS ir-IFLUENCE rlAXInUrl LEV-ELS THOSE 
TUO COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY'ECOMO^ilCAL AND CULTURAL FIELDS, 
SO LONG AS IT APPEARS REASOMABLY CERTAIN CAH30D1AK AND LAO 
BORDERS ARE TO BE HELD. BY FORCE IF NECESSARY- AG AIKST POSSIBLE 
FUTURE INTESIFI CATION VIETMIMH PENETRATION. 



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FROM! Saigon ' 

TO: Secretary of State 







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5865 

Decern'oer 15, 195^1 

7-.15 p.th. 




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250, Decembsr 13 ^ 7 P-m: [SECTION ONE OF THREE) 



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SSKT DEPARTMEI-'iT 2250 REPEATED IWFORIviATIOH PARIS 70 6 PMOM PSKFT 
VXSNIIANS DT^JIVUIvIBERSD, 

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Rs DSPTELS 2505 repeated Parts 209fl and 2578 repes ted '"Paris 
unnumbered December 10. ' .' '. 

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This messege in tvo parts. 



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PART I 

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Recent developments current situation follow: 
1. Relations vith French: 



Dat 

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{a) Earlier this weak Ely was en verge of signing minute of 
understanding on organization and training of Vietnsiiiese armed 
forces. Mo^-J French have come up with ne'^ amendments requiring 
US respect Ely's responsroilities ^'under Geneva .accprd s"'^ a nd. 



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Including long new protocol with several reierences to Geneva. 
V/hether these new proposals come from Ely's legal staff or Paris 
I do not (repeat not) know^ but inclined believe latter since 
.Ely agreed to resolve few remaining minor points directly with 
me and since he has said several times that Paris political 
circles would have to be satisfied. I intend refuse accept any 
reference to Geneva accord or make any further- concessions refer 
ence OT^yrile'l'sfull responsibility for training .under Ely^s broad ^^ 
direction. » - '"^^ ^^ 

(B) Interview with .Salnjteny^ to which Ely and his officers con- ^^V= 
tlnue to refer with Caligrinj appears reinforce view that our' ^"^ ^ 
relations with French" in Indochina may remain less clear-^ciit thgn:] -- 
Ely wishes and has^given me to believe they are q 

2. Latest developments re Quat: ' ^ li, 

... (A) . CO u^.^- 

REPM0Lrc7lOM FRO S/ THIS 
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'Since Lujen^s return froii! Paris, his open opposition to 
Quat has undermined Dietn's decision to appoint Quat Minister of 
Defense. On 11 December Diei^n Infortijed Flsh8l.e,a, follows: -six of 
seven cabinet members consulted by Diem have voiced strong opposi- 
tion to Quat, Generals Phuong (Cao Dal) and Soai (Ploa Hao) have 
declared they vill withdraw frotn gOf/ernment and threa-t-en-opsii 
rebellion if Quat appointed. Secause of location Hoa Hao terrl- 
tor* , Diem purportf^ to fear GeneraLSoal might cut off rice supply 
of Ljaigon-*Cholonj block road and waterway traffic through cop.stal 
areas and to Saigon ^ tnalce v/ar in Hoa Hao area^ against na.tional 
army which in present condition could not (repeat not) handle 
slti 3.tion. Diem fears also comparable action might be taken by 
Cao : Dai forces, including possible moves against government in 
Saigon and vicinity,. 

(b) Diem told Flshel that he had , informed Phuong and Soai that 
Americans wanted Quat as Defense Minister- The Generals replied, 
"a responsible American should speak for the Americans^'. Hence 
Diem asked Fishel to transmit these "facts" to me, sa^ying if I 
or "soiTiS other person" can convince' Phuong and Soai not (repeat 
not) oppose actively the appointment. Diem vrlll appoint Quat at ^ 
once, (A neat passing of the buck, we must admit). If sect 
leaders persist in their opposition. Diem says he v;ould be 
inclined raise present Deputy Minh to Defense Minister and give 
him full authority and responsibility over armed forces- 



r * 



(C) I am quite convinced that Diem and brothers Luyen and Khu are 
afraid to turn over control of armed forces to Quat or any other 
strong man. They may also fear Quat as .potential successor to ;" 
Diem and hence are doing everything they can to keep him out of 
any post in government- With General Hinh fired and General Vy 
replaced as Chief of Staff by spineless General Ty, Diem has fairly 
effectively seized control of army, I doubt Diem would delegate 
real authority to Minh, but would retain ineddltng hand on details 
to detriment O^Daniel^s training mission and effective development 
of armed forces. - ^- ^ 

(d) Through Colonel I^nsdale's group and GAS, I am canvassing 
attitude of 3ect la^iders and genulness of their alleged threats. 
Depending on lensdale^s findings, I will consider (l) proposing to 
Ely a direct US-French approach to General Soai, who Quat has said 
will bow to French pressure; (2) having Lonsdale suggest to Soai 
tb^t with Quat in defense all rice for arxed forces would be pur^ 
chased froui Hoa Kao (this was hint dropped some time ago by Quat 
as means of buying t)ff Hoa Hao); (3) sending emissaries to Seal, 
Huong and Cao Dai Fops (Pham Cong Tan) making clear that a ny 
rebellion wou ld lea d to withdrawal alTll m erlcan aia ana inev L t ab le 
victory for Ho Oi:ii Minh who would certainly not (repeTt noc) 
tolerate private empires of Hoa Hao or Cao Dai. 

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(E) I realize dts'aavantages of forcing Diem to accept "American- 



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^3- 2250^ December 13 J 7 p.m. ^ from Saigon 

choice" Ox Quat. Hov;ever acceptance of status Quo^ vith Mlnh 
elevated to Defense Ministry and sects reinforced in veto po^er 
over government^ Is simply postponing evil day of reckoning as 
to vhenj if ever^ Diem 'will assert type of leadership that can . 
uniTy this country and give it chance of competing vith hard^ 
effective J unified control of Ho Chi Mlnh. Such a delaying action 
vould appear to be justified only If ve are preparing vay for 
alternatives^ as indicated in part II, * ^■ 



3* Resolution of Phan 



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Rec'd: Deceinber I5, 195^^ ^' 
ll:05,-p-*W.j. 



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SENT DSPAHTMK^IT 22^0, REPEATED IHFOHZ>iA.TIOK PARIS 7O6, PMOM PErS^ 



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Rang-Pahn Thiet affair: ^ ■ ■ * . " 

* 

Coiripromise solution In inatter of rebellious officers has been 
found and l3 apparently satlsfactorj to arniy command and Prime 
Minister p ■ . \ 

' ' . ■* 

\, Army Chief of Staff and Inspector C-Dnsral: ,' ■ 

* It » 

At midnight 12-15 De-ce;Tib3r Generals Vy a.nd Ty took office as 
Inspector Genaral and Chief of staff Vletnan] ai^rriad forces, 
respGctively* Details of Vy's autlss net yet knowTi-. 

^5- Diem' 3 declaration of confidenca In Amiy: - 

December 13 Diem published decla.ration expz^esslng conftdenco in 
- Army and calling on all ranks to join v;lth people in building 
free, indepOjadent Vietnaiu. 

+ ■ 

Postscript. 

6. Re paragraph 1 (a) above; Ely and I this morning signed 
minute of under sta.nding on developrnent and training of aufccnomous 
Vietnatn armed forces and agreed to vording of separate axplana- 

: ' toryjtnemoranduti] for record to accompany it. Final text of 
minute is based on our draft and I consider it wholly satis- 
factory. Texts follov by separate inessage. , . ■ . 

7. Re para.graph 2 above: Ely and I agree this morning to take 
further steps to secure Quat's appointment. Ely discounts possl^ 
blllty sects will revolt if such appo^lntn^ent made. Sly said he 
vould at once see Generals Phuong a,ad Soai and inform them both 
"French and Amerlce.ns support Quart's appointment, Ely said he 
has little influence over Cao Dal Pope and racotnmended X see 

■ him, Ely will also Intervene ^#lth Deputy Defense Minister Mlnh 
and ask him to remain three to six months as Quat's deputv. 

i^ ' PART II ^ ^ 
TOP SECRET REPi:ooycTiOM Fr;oM nns 



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""^ — ■ ~. . iii^^iff^.'Wi:; Pis'. ^.-Tr**^.* <--*iJt- • — ^— ^* \ 



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Possible alternative 3 to Diem Government: 



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1, As I see Itj ve have 5 possible courses of action.^ia-3;:ie-tnet5: 

Bureau of N. 



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(a) Continue support of Diem Govei^nnrient. 



(B) Support establishment of another government v^nien-^ay-'b^e"'* • 
able to save situation, . k V'/^'rc. 1 X 

(C) Gradually withdraw support froin Vietnam, 

2. (a) Difficulties and risk of support Diem have been covered 
In EI^IBTEL 21C8 and FART I this message and other cables- Recent 
accomplishments have been minor considering- magnitude of task 
ahead. Favorable developments Include: ^ , ^ 

(1) Diem made first anti-Comtnunist appeal to people 16 November. 

(2) Dlem-Klnh feud has been resolved ^ for present at least. 

(3) Diem made trip to South Cochin China to observe work by- 
Army In its rehabilitai:ion program, 

(4) Phan Rang -P ban Thiet affair has been compromised, 

(5) V y and Ty have taken their new offices. 

-v(.6) 15 December Diem issued proclamation expressing confidence 
in the Army and calling on it to unite with people in the fight 
against Communtstn. 

(B) Realize abandonment of Diem would embarrass US in view our 
public. support present government. However j if it proves neces-- 
sary, believe such embarrassment would prove insignificant com- 
pared to blow to anti-Communism In Asia and throughout world if 
US-supported free Vietnam were lost to Communism. I believe It 
■ would" be better to take slight loss of prestige In near future 
vblle time to attempt other solution remains^^ rather than con- .. 
tlnue support Diem should failure appear relatively certain. V/e 
have not reached this point j though I have grave misgivings re 
Diem '3 chances of success. 



5. In view of possibility that Diem will fail to rally unified 
support of army in fight a gainst Communism^ believe we sncuTd ' 
GonFider other solutions. IVo alternatives (neither of which 
is too promising, but each of which should be considered in 
event of Diem's failure) are suggested: . , ^ 



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CORRSri'ED PAGE 5 
12/21/5^^ 2 a.m. 

CN 53gi 




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ilQ^~^- 2250, Dederaber 13, 7 P-ra., from Saigon. (SECTION 2 OF 5). 




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(a) Have Bao Dal' name Quat to replace Diem as President of 
Council, Quat Is able, forceful and resourceful and though 
ohstacles to his success exist, if given chance_ he ailght 
succeed where Diem failed. T^iTiether the various" selfish 
grpi^ps In the country vould give him that chance la question- 
He 3 northerner, has only slight political following and, as 
indicated in PART I, faces considerable opposition. With 
complete confidence and support of Eao Dal, hgwover, he might 
sue eed; i^ithout it he would surely fall. 

(b) ,(1) Second alternative is to have Bao Dai return to Vietnam 
under "state of emergency" conditions, assume Presidency of 
Council and rally entire nation to unified action, trnat is 
needed hero more than anything else is leader vjho' can fire 
ImGglnatlon and patriotism of pooplo ond instill in them 
dcterinlnatlon to flj^^ht for froodorn of Vietnam. Una Dol 

may bo the Inst posslhlo candidate for this tank. 

(2) I have been Irripx^essed with influence lino DU still 
exercises 'over leaders Vietnam. All leaders continue to 
refer to him ns *^His Majesty" and most regard him as the 
real source of authority Vietnam* 

(3) To ovez''come obstacles, dramatize return and establish 
self as leader of Vietnam, Bao Dal could take steps such as: 

■ 

(a) Turning over some of his holdings to government for 
distribution to peasant's as step toward agrarian reform; 

■ (b) Form an "emergency" Cabinet including best available' 
Vietnamese — Quat, Diem, ..others; 

(C) Announcing withdrawal jftench military forces by some 

specific date; - ^ . ■ - ^ ' 

■1 

*(d) Issuing temporary democratic charter to guide government 
during emergency; 



(G) Convening a representative assecjbly; 
•(H) Calling for a constituent assembly. 



Act:,**: 

6- Though course. 

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Rec'd: December 13, 1954 
FROM: Saigon 8:05 p.ra. 

TO: -Secretary of State . "" -v^ Enrc-auof 

f fAR E AST ESlRAf FAIRS ' 
NO; 2250, DecsEber I3 (SECTION THREE OF rHEES.) ' .pr.-n 1 /M3b4 





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SENT DEPARTME^IT 2250^ REPEATED IM^ORIv^ATIOK PARIS 70&, PHflOM PKI^IHj 

1"G (grodml vithdrairal form VJ.etnain) is Ica^t desirablCj In 
all honesty end in view of \iast I hove ohaerved here to date 
It Is possible this aay he only sound solution. Should this 
he neaer.saryj it r.-sy he'ulse to concentrate effort on saving 
Laos-Canihcdi3--Th3tland'-Bui*'ir.a'*India^ line — if possible ulth 
latter's active support. Realize Departrnsnt has probably given . 
consideration to Gonia such alternative. I v/ill not presume to 
advise steps to be taken 'at this tlroe^ other than suggest that 
ve attempt persuade India recognize Governa 



ients Laos and 



Cambodia soonest. 



7. Surrmation: (a) At present I arn highly dubious of Diem* 3" 
ability to succeed but prefer to reserve final judgnjent till 
e3P3-y\part of January; \h) alternatives to support of Dtetg should 
be thoroughly explored vithin US Governrrien 



^ * 



8, RecoLfliuendattons : (a) US continue to support Diera at Paris j 
' (h) not consider alternatives paragraph 1-3 ^^rlth French until 
after I have communicated tcy final judgment to Department. 

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^f:OT?D COPY » This CG0\' raust be return Fd &'.GCaR cei;tr?.I (lies with v.^\?1\q::-H, ^f^:^<^^^^^ 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Piojeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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SECRET 



Refer to: I-l6,521 
C-R 1-8270 (Unci) ' 



Deaj? I^. Chairman; 



Dec ll; I95U 



The Secretary of Defense has requested that I reply to your letter 
01 17 Hovember 195^^ to the Director of the Foreign Operations Adminis- 
tration requesting a report on the military aid situation in Indochina. 
' 1 ' - . 

The facts of the military aid situation in Indochina insofar as 
the Department of Defense is involved follow: 

■ a. The value of MDAP shipments to Indochina (in millions of 
dollars) J including value of equipment furnished from excess U, S, 
stocks J as of 31 October 195^1 ;, is: 



Regular MDAP 

Special Military 
Support 

Common Use 



Total 

■ 9^.0 

123-7 



Army 



Navy 



$76H .-£ $15^.3 



Air Force 



$167.0 



13.8 



633.1 

3.17.3 



13.8 



151.7 
2.6 



163.2 
. 3.8 







/ 



TTo official reports of losses of ai^mament and equipment have 
been released by the Trench. Hoveverj it is estimated by U.S, officials 
that the following items of equipa^ent^ valued at approxinately $1.2 million^ 
fell into Viet Kinh hands at Dien Bien Phu* 



8 ■ 


- 


U-2h Tanks 


1^ 


- 


X^^mn. Howitzer Guns 


20 


- 


lO^iim Howitzer Guns 


30 


^*i 


Slrnn & 12Qnim Mortars 


12 


—^ w 


75mm Recoilless Rifles 


150 


- 


Machine Guns 


15 > 000 


- 


Small Arms 



In addition to the equipment lost at Dien Bien Pliu, snaH quantities of 
small axmsy machine gunsj ammunition and personal troop equipment have 
been captm^ed by the Viet Minh during the prolonged military operations in 
Indochina. 



COPY 



SECRET 813 



Dedassiflied per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 20 i 1 



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' SECRET 

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c. The Departoent of Dt^fense has not supplied any fixed assets 
north of the 17th parallel* 

d* Since the signing of the Geneva Agreeir^ent^ all shipments 
of materiel to Indochina have ceased except those items required to avlle- 
Yiate suffering, prevent disease ^ and assist in the evacuation from North 
Vietnam. 

e. The Department of Defense plans to initiate direct aid to 
Vx^tnan and Camhodia on 1 January 1955* The details of the military plans 
and MDA prograins to implement such plans are under active study and de- 
velopment by appropriate agencies of the U.S. Cover raifent . There are no 
p2 ns to give military aid to Laos at this time "because under the terms 
01 the Geneva Agreement, no U,S, military advisors are admitted in the 
country* The fozui of the aid for the tvo Associated States is to be con- 
centrated on training a force capable of maintaining internal security 
and to eventually develop an anay capable of figliting a delaying action in 
case of invasion from the North* It is hoped that the French Expeditionary . 
Corps vill remain in the area until native troops can be trained to replace 
them. 

i * f . Negotiations with the French are being conducted at this time 
vlth the vlev of returning to U, S. custody all materiel no longer required 
in Indochina* 

g. When the Genevi^Agr cement vas signed, there vere 211,000 long 
tons of h'lDAF materiel in French depots north of the lyth parallel. As of 
20 November 195^^ over 50^ of this equipment had been evacuated- Fifteen- 
hundred long tons per day is the target for evacuating the above materiel. 
The daily averages of evacuation to date indicate that the French are more 
than meeting this target and it is estimated that all depot stocks irill be 
evacuated from the North by 1 March 1956 and retitrned to depots in the South, 
Equipment issued to the various military units is evacuated with the miits. 
The materiel in the South is being inventoried and upon completion, a deter-, 
mination xill be made as to the equipment that is no longer required for 
operations in Indochina. Materiel that is not required vrill be returned to 
the custody of the U*S. for distribution to other areas. As an indication 
of the thoroughmess of the French evacuation of military equipment ^ all 
pierced- steel planking used on airfield runvays and taxiT-,^ays have been 
dismantled and shipped to the South* 

Sincerely yours. 



Signed: E. STKUVE HHISEL 



Honorable Alexander Vfiley 

Chairman 

CoiiDiiittee on Foreign Relations 

United States Senate 



819 



COPY 




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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Piojeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






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cMMH DeparUnent of State 



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TOP SECRET 



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FROM: Saigon ■ .' ' 

-4 

TO: Secretary of State 

NO; 2303, DeGe::nber 16, 7 p. 



vlt>out prior consent 
Control: 7230 °^ I^ii--ctor S/s 
Rec'd: JDocsmfcer I6, 19^^ 
10:02 p.ra. 



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PRIORITX 







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T KIACT PAP.IS 7?_n ; FRIGRITx DEPARTI>'IE1?X 23O5 



DEFARTMET^'T PASS DE?E?iSE EZES Omj£ HETISEL^ J1\Y1S AND JCS 
DEPAETMEI^JT EIES OrvT:rr ACTIKG SEGRSTARX AI^ID ROBERTSOn 



01 

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PARIS PilES au:i SEGPJSIARZ STATE^ SECRETARX DEFENSE AlID RADECHD 



FROM COLLINS 






Re WiBTELs IS30. 2108, 2250 Dspartment 2285 (paragraph 8) 
.repeated Paris $02^ 665, 706, 717. 

1. Decision of Diem not to appoint Quat Defense Minister la . 
final develop-TenL that convince8_me tha t ■ Diern ^oes^aQJuIia vg J:he 

ca pa c 1 ty jto_un 1 fX..^J-X^ ^ ^'^ t ha t un 1 e s a 

stJrfr0~suGh action ia taken as indicated 'in paragraph 7 helov, 
this country will be lost to cor^jraunlsm. Reasons for Diems de- 
cision procabl^' compounded cf (l) unv;illingnes3 to' delegate 
control of Vietnan arrrod force3 to any strong man; (2) x'ear of ■ 
Quat as potential successor; (3) opposition of sects; (^) in- . 
fluence of brothers Luyem and Nhu; tS) desire to retain Mlnh in 
government. 

■ - ■ • 

2. Whatever the reasons^ the failure to utiltiae Quat epitomizes 
lack of unity anong Vietnarrese and lack of decisive leadership 
on part of Die;:3* Mlnh refused to submerge his personal am- 

bit ions J even for a fev ircnt-hs transition period under Quat or, 
anyone else. Luyen again demonstrated his ability to cause ^'^' 
Diem to reverse a dec is ion already taken (Diera had told tne 
prior to Luyen^s return from Paris that he would^ appoint Quat). 
The veto pcver cf the sects over any changes in the government 
that are likely to result in a veakenlng of their private dor:jalns 
has been confiru:ed." Another strong positive trjan^ Quat^ has 
been blocked fror.^ having a hand in reorganizing and controlling 
th.: 



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d forces. And all of these negative results have re- 



— quired a month of lengthy discussions ^ evasions of basic Issues ^ 

\ . ■ 820 - andcvasted 



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-TO? SECRET M 

liQt to be rcleone^'^ 



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COPY, IFCLASSlflED.i-y' "^ 



PaOKISiTED 



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Dedassiflied per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 20 i 1 






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-2 -#2505 /Decs step 16, 7'p.a., fr-oa Saigon 
and wasted opportu^iities . 



Vithcu<;prior conso 
02 Director S/S 



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3. Mlnh Is a good v:^an, though young and inexperienced. 0' Daniel 
feels that if Dleru delegates full authority to Mlnhj the latter 
may be able to heal vounds of Dieic-Hinhj T^-yy^ Ph^^ Rang-Phan 
Thtet affairs and bring stability end sanity" to governirjent^arniy 
relationships .,rr,3ut It is highly doubtful to me that Minh^ or/ 
anyone- else under present conditions ^ can create a single^ co- 
hesive national army from the five separate forces novr existing^*- 
the Geo Daist^ Iioa Hao, Binh Xuyen^, national guar-d, and the. 
present national aro^y. With anticipated opposition from the 
sects and scgs frotn DierG hiuiself^ vho is lostha to disband his 
o\in private force (national guard) ^ it will take stronger leader- 
ship from DioiL' and Minh than either has shovn to date to re- 
duce and a'i}alga;::ate these forces* 

h, Ifhat is true of the armed forces is likely to be true In 
the resettlej^ent of refugees ,snd land reform, ^^.on 1 told Die^i] 
recently that our FOA people vere having difficulty in getting 
dov/n to business v;lth the Vietnam agricultuj?a officials^ Diem 
reminded mo that the Minister of agriculture is a Hca Hao and 
the Eoa Hao are fearful of the effect bf land reforn] on their 
extensive control of rice lands. Government officials hesitate 
to place refugees on French- ovned rice lands or in the French- 
Gvned rubber plantations. And so on^ one excuse for inaction 
after another* ^ ' ^ . 

+ 

5- Fact is that of the fine program of refornis announced by " - 
Dietn in September ^ no definite progress has been achieved in 
converting' words into deeds in any field. - ' ' 

6. I had hoped Diem would broaden and strengthen his cabinet 
by addition of Quat and perhaps even Bay Vien, Latter^ despite 
his liu'id past, has demonstrated organising ability and his 
recently indicated desire to become ■'honorable " and to assist . 
government. With Quat in government ^ Quat might have done much 
gradually to get sects In line and thj^oagh his practical political 
ability have Injected sc:re flexibility and drive ^ both of which 
are now woefully lacking. At same time Quat might have acquired 
greater stat^ore in public eye which might later have rendered him 
more' eligible for higher post if later fcund necessary replace 
Diem. ' Unfortunate ly^ this was probably deduced by brother Luyeh 
and Die:u also. I feel sure that fear of Quat'a ability is at 
root of sects and Dlem's opposition. 



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7. After weighing all available evidence^ I am now convinced 
that in face of the positive threat of Ho Ghi Minh's rerirre '^^ 
will take decisive action and dramatic leadership frco: ^te '^He-^ 
namese themselves to save free Vietnam. Neither French nor A-erl^ 
cans can substitute for such" action and leadership. Apparently " 



821 



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TOP SEC-RE'^ 






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the cnly 

Bet to bo r5lop-,^(j' 
Without prior con^eat 
Qt Director S/s 



Dccliissified per Execiilive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



-jf- *"' 






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TOP SECRET' . Hot to be relcnsed 

■ vithciJrt prior coasent 






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the only Vletn^r^BEe Vho night be oczretent to galvanize the 
couritpy Inl-o unified action ts Bee Dal. T:io-^h I" do net kncv^ 
the tran^ snd reallr.e his manj disabilities^ it Is pcssible he 
might furnip-h the uecesnei^^ isipect if he vere to ret-Jirn and.t^ke 
active dir-ectlcn of the gcverc-rent, vhether he retsiaed Cie:^ or 
eppolQted Q:;Ht or someone else as Premier, or essuLied the orftoe 
hlt!]self . Merest all Yi6tn3n:68e with 7rhc:::i I heve talked^ In- 
i^iuding Die,:::, look Inst inotivel-v to. Eao Dai as the ultirate ■ 
soiiroo of authority* Of ocursa^ if ve and the Fi^ench vera to 

'support' his i^et;urnj specific conditions w'ould have to stipulated 
in^ advance^ g6ner?.lly a^ indioeted in Fart 11 ^ pap-jgraBh 53, 
Eli^^rEL 2250. I realize slso th^t Beo Dai^s rectum vould fiju-^^ 

^nish excellent "propTiganda xateri^^l for the CororQunists ^ but If 
they don-t have such ti^aterial in hand they vill tr-anufacture it 
anvvray. So vre should not per-: it this aspect to deterLilne our 
coui'-se^ after w-eighing all other 



f^jrt yt* "?~ f^. >^C3 



I 



8* I recognize that vre nust continue to support t^ie Diem Govern 
msnt for sor.s tlrre at least. But I r-eco^Tond th at yre not nov 
consummate an agreement with the Vietnamese to 3ss'c;r:e "on ^T^Jan 
uaiy responsibility for training their^ forces or for giving 
direct rnllltary aid, V/e should continue to place Arr^erlcan 
officers vlth staff of Vletnatn errrj and aid tn developing tral 
ing pla ns' a nd p a o If i c a t io n pla o s „ V/e s hould c o n 1 1 rL:xQ to t a Ik 
vlth Vietoair.ss with a viev to reaching corjixon accord, on siz^e ^ " 
"and cornioosltion of forces. But we should not coocl-;d9 forr^al 




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should noh coni:.nit ourselves to any given volurt^e of aid until 
US has adopted definitive pollcj vlth respect to Vietnav;. Mean- 
while I vould stroncrl;/ urge cons Iderst ion of bringing 3ac Dal 



back- under ozie or other of the variants indicated In paragraph 
above and paragri^ph^P EMoTEH* 2250* (See also paragraph 5j 

228o, repeated Paris 717, for Ely^s vie;^^s). ^'herefcre 



6 



1"FT— t" 



■oy present reoominard^tions are: 

A. Continue -to Svipport Dleo: along preser.t lines for short 
vhlle longer but vithout cot::u3ittir:g US to specific aid prograi^sj 

B, . Consider urgentlyj as possible alternative,- the early re- 
vcrn of Bao Dai; ' ' 

C. If after short period of further test Die^r Government f-^tls 
to achieve sub^.tantlal progressive ac-tioUj end if retur-n of :3a: 
Dai is acceptable to TS Govern:i:entj to support his prorcpt return; 

4 

D, If ret^jLi'D of Bao Dal is not acceptable to US Governnent^ 
assuuiirg Diec Governnent contirues to d^-onatrete inability zz • 
unite free Vietna?_i behind an aggressive prcigran]^ I reoovneod 

i 

reei^aluatlon 



822 



TCP sf/Ee: 



Kot to bo released 



Declus!>jncd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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SOP SECRET 



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consent; 



reev3lua"ti6n of our plans for SHSlSoing Southeast Asia with 
SDe^tal attention to pi^opcsal contained in par-agpaph 6^ Fart II 

9. I ara sorry to h3ve to make such a discouraging report^ b*:it 
in all honesty I have tc present to ycu ny present convict- ions 
"because of their possible effec^ on U3.19i'6 budget about to 
"be presented. to Congress. Should it be determined that in 
■vie'w of the unsound situation in Vietnsc the US should gre dually 
Vithdrav its support from this ccuntryj then it vould be necessary, 
in my opinion^ to Increase the aid to the French expeditiohei-y 
corps so that it vould remain strong enough during, the next 



-cj- -^ 



year to per-nit the US to vithdrav assent i^l eqtilpuienfc vhich 
might other^rise fall into Cornmonist hands. It appears to me^ 
therefore J that ve should retain as ti^uch flexibility as possible . 
vith reference to financial aid for the FEC. / 



[a 



10. Conclusion; It is possible that by a tuonth frcn: no^^*^ soir^ 
radical Iriipr overrent will have come about but I 'strongly doubt ^ -. 

X 

ox ., 

o^jr na t ic na 1 p: 

t-lnue to^ carry on along same lines x hBve been "follcv:lngj but 
will avait Instructions vhilo tea^por^rily dragging feet^ if 
necessary J vith respect to definite corr:raitnient3 , as indicated 
in paragraph 8, ■ 




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ETj/l ' ■ 

Note: Passed defense I2/16/5H 11 p. in. AL 



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823 



ITot to "bo rcl<>.^?!«(! 
without prior cony on t 
Of Director S/S 



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Declassined per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dute: 201 1 



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l^ce Msmorandum 



FE '* Mr* Rd>Qrv?on 



770^ 




« , UNITED STATES GOVEHNMENT 






DATE: Dec-Tri)ex' 17* V)$\> 



HtOM 



PS.\ « Ambassador Heath 



//c^ 



SUBJECT: Co:^ivaGnts on Saigon TalegraiTi 2303 










•7793 



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1* Tho' situation in Viet-Nam at ths time of Qcnevzl Collins * 
arrival on Novernber 7 night bodosoribed as foll.ori3r 

. At The Fronch had lost a disastrous battle at Dien Bien Phu ani ^: 
that ConiTiunist military victory had boon coiTipouiidcd by a h^jiiTtiliating 
d5,ploinatio defeat £ov the Froe Vbrld at Gonovac^ Tho GomJnuirl-sts had 
achieved a level of intfsrnatloiiol recognition and po.^ition tlirough 
these devFjlopnento far exceedliis any pro^dO'iiJ status* 

Bt Neo Dinh Diem took office on Jii3y 7o He T^jas tho first 
'^Nationalist^^ to assume the Frir.o Miixlstershipg He inis and i^> antl-» 
French J anti-Gonminist and personally honest a Ho is politically inept ^ 
stubbo3rn and suspicious » In his four raonths of i^sponsJhility hs 
had b3ca faced iriuh nassivo opposition^ inclucLijig a r-abolliou^ Ai'iV 
Chief Nho allegedly vras an unvritbing too?, of the Covriunlsts^ active 
Frohch opposition and xi^.d.'oy other dirjcoijiraging factccs* 

C*, There is ovcry ovidonce that the French did not ij^t Dle^i to 
succeed* Reli^otant acoeptanco by Jjx Cba"i>ro (Septer^^bnr) and liendes^ 
Finance (^Jov3Id:)er) of the U^S^ thesis' of suppox**b of Dien^^ principally 
because of the lack of a better qualified candidate^ nay have eased 
French pressures against ^h in but did not resul-i in full Fi^onoh support^^ 

2'a Sinco General Collins* ari^lvalj the latter has att?ir,pted to 
achieve a rapid solution^ at least pax^bially based on the concept that 
Collius* missicn is tennorary and a settlenent appeared called for by 
the time of his originally schedujl.ed departures in nid-Januaryo (Sines 
extended) General Collins* recoji^iondatiojis are no:f based on the clr« 
cu'.nstances of a satisfactory setblement prior to January 1. If no 
BOl\itionis founds he recoiT^nendsu 

a* Continued suooort of Dien for a shoru period but 

rib -db -H 

without comi!Littiag specific U*S* aid prograi^is^ 

h^ Recalling Bao Dai, if aeceptri)!? to Uc3« 

* 
0^ Revaluation of ovj^ plcns fox^ assistiriig Southeast As5a^ 

dft' rf the situation continues i-rithout substantial progressive 
action to withhol3 sx^port to the Viet«;ia^ Army and to increese < 
support of \hB Fi^ench S:<:peditionai5^ Corps i-hile evacuating our 
JIDAP inaterielj> 



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Declassined per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dute: 201 1 



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3» In our vi.e>Tj Genc^ral Co3.1in3* reco^ri^TiSudations igiioro 
tho basic factoi" that vje Kould assist a Goirimiiisb talcoover by a 
Tiithholding^ of o\xc ald^ even if it must necossarU^ bo |;iYen to a 
governnent v^aich is less th?,n perfect,^ 

^T^i^^ Secretary has analysed the situation as cno in vhich U3 
are conducting a tlm^ buying op3 ration & Xf vie >rLtbho?«d our support to 
Viov-*Nair:j it will bo taken over soonor than if x-js extend smaller aid^ 
at a figure of about a thJrd of la^t year^ In the mo ^n tine ^ ue irilX 
prooood to do T-7bat -^ja can to strengthGn Q9rL-yQ65.D. ^ Lao3 and Thailand ^ 
This is my understanding of the Seoretaxy^s policy^ * • ■ 

1|, r recoimend we inform the Secretary and General Coll"ln3 that 
WB reco£ni:?a the dangers posed by tho above policyj bi\t that in thfi 
lack of more usaful alternatives that v?3 vdll continue to support Dionij 
because tihere is no one to take his place irho uould serve UoSo 
obj! ctivas enj bottero This includes the Bao Dai solution vMch is 
opposed by the facts of Bao Dai^s lack of support in Viot-*:Ian and his 
past demonstrations of inability to govern> The fear that a fiscal 
coTiimitiaent of over 03OO million plus our national prestitja vovild be 
lost in a gamble on the retention of Froo Vict-'Nari is a logltin^p.t^a ono^ 
but the iri.-thhold5,n5 of our support at this ji\nctura uould almost 
ir;evitvibly have a far vorse effect o 

* » 

PLeoonmendation; 

That th3 attached tolegram bo approved and sent;. 




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lOGS 



TOP SECn^T 



825 



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Dccliissified per Execulive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






'w. -- 



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■.miW& TELEGRAM Departm.e?7i\of State f im.W 




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-Info 

33 






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FROM; PARIS 

TO; Secretary^ 0/ State 

NO: 2601 J DECEMBER 19. 






Control: S573' 
Rec'd: DECBIBER 19 
3J27 P.M. 



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^ P.M. CSECTION O^JE OF TWO) 



NIACT „ . ■ ' . 

SENT DEPARTMENT 2601, REPEATED 
LONDON €5^i. ■ 




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NF0R:'iATlON SAIGON 5S8 



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LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - SAIGON FOR COLLINS 



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TRIPARTITE SISCUSSIONS ON IKDOCHIhfA .TOOK PLACE THIS AFTER^!00^4 
AT MATICKOM. ■ • ~~ 

-» > 

I 

DULI,ES OPENED CONVERSATIONS BV GREETING ELY AND CITING AFPRE- ' 
CI AT I ON OF COOPERATION^ HE HAD SKOlvN U:S. AUTHORITIES IN ViETNA^'. 
ELY GAVE REPORT CURRENT SITUATION AT MENDES' SUGGESTION, HE 
SAID FIRST POINT TO BE CLEARED UP ' AFTER COLLINS ARRIVED WAS - ' 
SETTLEMENT GOVERNMENT -NATIONAL ARMY CONFLICT^ ACCOMPLI SHEU BY". 
MEANS BAG DArs RECALL HINH» SECOND WAS TO TRY PREPARE PROGRAM 
FOR DIEM GOVERNMENT. THIS DONE BUT QUESTION NOV/ HOW TO GET DIEM 
ACCEPT FORMULA. THEIRS WAS HOU STRENGTHEN DIEM. ELY AND COLLINS 
TRIED INTRODUCE QUAT WHO IS BETTER POLITICI;.N AND ADMINISTRATOR 
THAN DIEM INTO GOVERNENT BUT SECTS AND DIEM BALKED* HE SAID ONLY 
SUGGESTION EVER ACCEPTED 3 Y DIEM WAS APPOINTMENT MINH A3 MINISTER 
DEFENSE* 



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r . MENDES INTERRUPTED TO MAKE TWO POINTS, FIRST THAT COLLINS AND 

i-- ,- ELY- THOU Gl-n THAT MINISTRIES OF INTERIOR AND. NATIONAL DEFENSE SHOGId . 

"BE COMBINED. BOTH OFFICES ARE CONCERNED liflTH INTERNAL AFFAIRS ' ^C ;.^ 
f -^ AJ^iD IT IS UNNECESSARY- SEPARATE THEM AT THIS TIME,' DIEM HAD ^^ 

^ (3 REFUSED THIS SUGGESTION TOO, SECOND POINT ^AS THAT yORKING GROUPS .*""' 

HAD BEEN ESTA3LIS.HED IN SAIGON TO SUGGEST EEFCRNS TO GOVERNMENT - ;-.- 
r ■ -BOTH ADMINISTRATIVE At<d AGRARIAN, bWT A SIl'iGLK REFORM SUGGtSTEn 

ACCEPTED BY DIEM. MENDES DESCRIBED DIEM ^3 APPROACH AS WHOLLY . 

NEGATIVE. FRENCH GOVERNMENT NOy CONSIDERED THAT AS A RESULT Op-'- 

- TODAY -3 TALKS STRONG APPROACH UOULD HAVE '^'^ BE MADE TO DIEM. 

: „^^ :UGGESTIONS 

^>O^Fw. TO? SECRET 

Kto/UHJliNl REPRODUCTION- FKO'i 7hr 

v>vr'r^■oT^ onnv o T>ii<: r-nnv mr?;f h,-^ rptnrnGd to CC/R centrrd files \vith notitior.Oor,:ifcC!<:rfSl^ ;-;?,■.!>. '• 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Secdon 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16, By: NWD Dale: 201 1 



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-2- FROM PARIS, , 2501, DECEMBER 19, 4PM SECTION ONE OF T13 

SUGGESTIONS SHOULD BE PRECISE AND ENEPGETIC^ THERE WAS NO TIME 
LEFT TOO ALLOVJ FOS' ANYTHING LESS. MENDES UISHED REAFFIRM HIS . . 
PAST AGREEMENT UITK SECRETARY'S THESIS THAT WE MUST DO OUR 
MAXIMUM TO PERMIT DIEM GOVERNMENT TO SUCCEED. NOVJ KE WISHED. 
ADD THAT HE UAS NO LONGER SURE THAT EVEN MAXIMUM IJOULD HELP. 
KE SAID WE MUST NOW HAVE ALTERNATE FORMULA IN MIND. WITHOUT 
VARYING FROM OUR STATED PURPOSE OF SUPPORTING DIEM GOVERNMENT AS 
LONG AS IT EXISTS WE MUST NOW PREPARE IN OUR lUNDS FOR ALTERNATIVE. 



SECRETARY CONTINUED TO SAY THAT HE HAD NO RPT NO PERSONAL JUDG-. 
MENT OF PERSONALITIES INVOLVED, BUT OUR INDICATIONS WERE THAT ' 
DIEM UAS BEST MAN AVAILABLE IN SPITE OF FAILINGS. WE VISUALIZED 
CABINET WITH BROAD APPEAL AND AUTHORITY. THIS VISION HAS NOT 
RPT NOT BEEN' REALIZED, DIEM APPEARS TO BE NAN CONSTITUTIONALLY 
INCAPABLE OF MAKING DECISIONS. US NOT P-PT NOT COMMITTED TO " 
DIEM IN ANY IRREVOCABLE SENSE. WE HAVE ACCEPTED HIM BECAUSE 
WE KNEW OF NO ONE BETTER. DEVELOPMENTS HAVE CONFIRMED OUR 
FEARS AS' TO HIS LIMITATIONS BUT HO SUBSTITUTE FOR HIM HAS YET ■ 
BEEN PROPOSED, THOSE SUGGESTED IN PAST VARIED FROM MONTH TO 
NONTHt NOW IT IS CLAIMED THAT ONLY BAG DAI CAN SAVE SITUATION. 
IF THAT IS CASE, THEN WE MUST INDEED BE DESPERATE. SECRETARY'S 
VIEW WE SHOULD CONTINUE BACK DIEM BUT EXERT M'ORE PRESSURE OH 
• ■ ■ . ' ■ HIM TO 



44BS3' TOP SECRET 



827 



SECRETARY REPLIED THAT HE RECOGNIZED TASK IN SOUTH VIETNAM WAS 
■" -DIFFICULT ONE. DIFFICULT BECAUSE IT REQUIRED THAT GOVERNMENT 3E 
■'BUILT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES WITH LITTLE OR NOT EXPERIENCE. 
i_ MOREOVER, THEY HAD TO BUILD IN TIME OF GREAT STRESS FOLLOWING 

MILITARY. DEFEAT, TEMPORARY PARTITION AND WHILE THERE WAS GREAT 
Y^ INFLUX OF REFUGEES FROM NORTH, SECRETARY REGARDED BASIC FACTORS 
t- AS FAVORABLE, PEOPLE WERE OPPOSED TO COMMUNISM AND HAD GREAT 

NATURAL RESOURCES, THEY HAD EXPORTABLE SUPRLUS* THEY RECEIVED 
f~ GREATER AID FROM ABROAD THAN NORTH. BEGINNING OF JOINT FRANCO- 
*-- U*S. TASK DIFFICULT J BUT SITUATION , WAS MUCH IMPROVED NOW THAT 
._ THERE WAS FULL COOPERATION BETWEEN FRXNCH AND AMERICAN AUTHORITIES, 

PROBLEM MUST NOT BE APPROACHED BETWEEN FRENCH AND AMERICAN t 

■AUTHORITIES. PROBLEM MUST NOT BE APPROACHED IN SPIRT OF DEFEAT- 
ISM, ONLY SERIOUS PROBLEM WE HAVE NOT YET SOLVED IS THAT OF 
[ INDIGENOUS LEADERSHIP. WE CANNOT EXPECT IT TO BE SOLVED IDEALLY 
BECAUSE THERE IS NO TRADITION AMONG INDIGENOUS PEOPLE FOR SELF- 
GOVERNMENT. WE MUST GET ALONG WITH SOMETHING LESS GOOD THAN BEST, 






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Declassified per Execulive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 li 






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, TOP SECRET 
"3- FROM PARIS, 2601 DECEMBER 19, 4 PM SECTION ONE OF TWO 



HIM^ TO MAKE CKAKGES WE COMSIDER NECESSARY^ SECRETARY FINISHED 
BY ASKING WHETHER ELY HAD, WITH COLLINS, ALREADY APPLIED MAXiiMUM 
PRESSURES TO DIEM. ■ ■ - ■ . 

EL REPLIED TKEY HAD AND THAT BOTH WERE NOW VIRTUALLY CONVINCED 
THAT IT WAS HOPELESS TO EXPECT ANYTHING OF DIEM. NEVERTHELESS 
THEY "CONTINUED PRESSURES, SECRETARY ASKED WliETHER DIEM HAD 
YE BEEN CONFRONTED UIT)[ ULTIKATUtI THAT UNLESS SUCH AND SUCH 
WERE DONE BY CERTAIN DATE OUR SUPPORT WOULD BE WITHDRAWN," 
ELY SAID HE" HAD NOT RPT NOT.' HE CHARACTERISED DIEM AS EXTRE- 
MELY PIG-HEADED MAN WHO BECAME MORE SO UNDER PRESSURE, 
SECRETARY ASKED IF THIS MEANT THAT ULTIMATUM WOULD HAKE HIM 
MORE STUBBORN AND ELY REPLIED IT WOULD, 



MENDES THEN PURSUED SUBJECT WITH ELY WHO STATED THAT HE FELT 
THAT TO EXERT TOO MUCH PRESSURE ON DIEM WAS NOT RPT NOT IN 
KEEPING WITH THE NEW INDEPENDENT 'STATUS OF VirfNAM AMD THAT 
IN ANY. CASE SUCH PRESSURE SHOULD NOT KPT 'NOT BE EXERTED JOINTLY 
BUT SEPARATELY BY HIMSELF AND COLLINS. MOREOVERj HE DESCRIBED 
DIEM AS HAVING TENDENCY PLAY ONE MAN AGAINST OTHER IN 'TYPICAL 
ASIATIC STYLE AND THAT THIS WAS TO BE AVOIDED* HE COMMENTED 
ON DIEH'S OWN DlFnCULTIES,_ESPECIALLY JTHOSE HE HAD HAD IN 
RECONCILING SECTS. _P"R(NCIFAL QUESTION WAS T O DEC IDE NOX^JHETKER 

^S-J'iA^^-^-^ ^ ^'^^ AN_j: AP_AE LE_0_L N' AT i ON AL_UNION . HE AND"' Ct) LL I N S^ 
MUST DECIDE THAT O.UESTION. ~~ ^- 

SECRETARY STATED THAT HE WAS OPPOSED TO ISSUANCE ULTIMATUM 
UUTIL WE Kt'lEW WHAT WE WOULD DO IF IT WERE REJECTED, AT THE . ■ 
MOMENT WE HAVE NOTHING ELSE TO OFFER, HE COMMENTED. MENDES 
RECOMMENDED THAT WE APPROACH BAO DAI BECAUSE OF HIS LEGAL 
POWERS AfTD USEFULNESS AND FACT THAT PRESUMABLY WOULD HAVE TO 
/IPPOINT ANY SUCCESSOR TO DIEM, HE HAD PROVEN IN HINH CASE ■ 
THAT HE COULD BE USEFUL AND MENDES FELT THAT BAO DAI COULD 
AGAIN SERVE PURPOSE, HE COULD BE USED TO ?UT' ALTERNATE PLAN 
INTO EFFECT IF ULTIMATUM TO DIEM FAILED. SECRhH-ARY COMMENTED 
THAT HE REALIZED'THAT WE MUST BE PREPARED TO USE BAO DAI BUT 
FELT THAT WE MUST GO' TO Um PREPARED 'JITH OUR OWN IDEAS AND 
NOT RPT NOT SIMPLY TO ACCEPT HIS. MENDES AGREED BUT. COMMENTED 
THAT EAO' DAI'S PERSONAL POSITION HAD WEAKENED RECENTLY. 

,,^„IN SPITE 

. 44694 



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TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Pn^ject Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i 



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TOP SECRET 

-^i- FP.O:i PARIS, WYPG DECEMBER 19,, -tiPi-3 SECTICM^tJMK OF TWO ' 

IN SPITE OF THIS FACT, KE STILL REPRESENTED LEGALITY Ar!D 
COULD SERVE IN FUTURE IF ''LEGALITY^^ HAD TO BE PROVIDED TO ANY 
STEP UE WOULD ['JISH TO TAKE. 

KEMDES THEN SPOKE OF A PLAN FRENCH HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING,'. 

FIRST PHASE WAS TO ASK BAO DAI TO PLACE ON SPOT IN VIETNAM ■ 

A REPRESENTATIVE WHO WOULD EXERCISE BAO DAIS'S AUTHORITY. 

HE WOULD BE "DELEGATE" OR VICEROY. HE WOULD HAVE FULL AUTHORITY 

TO USE BAO DAI-S POWERS. USEFULNESS WOULD PERSIST EVEN IF 

DIEM SHOULD SUCCEED FOR HE COULD ACT AS SUPREME ARBITRATOR 

TO SETTLE SQUABBLES. 

MENDES SAID THAT FRENCH UERE NOW PREPARED TALK TO BAO DAI 
ALONG THESE LINES AND URGE HIM ESTABLISH VICEROY WITHOUT DELAY, 

FRENCH ALSO PROPOSED APPROACH BAO DAI WITH VIEW REINFORCING 
PRESENT GOVT AND PREPARING LEGAL GROUNDS FOR NEW ONE IF IT 
SHOULD BE FOUND NECESSARY. ^ , - 



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EDEN INTERVENED TO STATE- THAT IN HIS OPINION IT WOULD BE MISTAi:E 
FOR BAO DAI TO GO BACK NOW BUT BRITISH RECOGNIZED ADVANTAGE 
OF VIETNAMESE ROYAL TRADITION AND AGREED THAT "ROYAL COMMISSION'* 
OF SOME SORT SHOULD BE SET UP AND MIGHT PROVE BE BEST WAY OUT. . 

HE INQUIRED ABOUT PERSONALITY AND USEFULNESS OF EMPRESS AND 
KENDES REPLIED THAT SHE WAS EXEMPLARY PERSON WHO COULD PROVE 
VERY USEFUL IN VIETNAM, 

■ 

■ ' ' * • DILLON 



ROW/ ^2 



■ ■•' Note:' Mr.' 'Allen 




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notified 2:^5 P^ 12/l9/5^^ {F¥{R) 



TOP SECRET 

829 



• 4 



Di^classified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Dale: 201 1 




^GGMli^G TcLLGKAM Uepartment or biate / ^mw\ / 

'■ ■*■ ^ — - ^ j fr . ' . ' i. ■■ ■' ■lit - . - ■ — - '- ■-'--' ■^■^.t^- . J 



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FROM! PARIS 1S34 i:^^ 



20 




Control :S5 75' 
Rsc'd: DECEMBER 19 
1J39 P.M. 



1954 






C, 



TOj Secretary of State 

tjOs ?-eiil, DECEM3HH. 19,; '^ P.i-I^ 

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■I- ■ 

•MI ACT ■ 



1 



SECTION TWO OF TWO 



SENT DEPARTMENT 2601, REPEATED IHFORMATIOW SAIGON 3SS, 
LONDON 654, ■ ■ . * " 



/ 



_ 4 



SECRETARY STATED THAT IN CONSIDERING VICEROY I'JE WERE ADVANC- 
ING INTO TO SECOND PR03LEL1 I'^ITKOUT HAVING SOLVED FIRST, HE DID 
NOT RPT NOT EXPECT' VICEROY BE ABLE DECIDE ON ALTERNATE TO 
DISI'^i Ai\D TO SET UP MACI^INERY TO IMPLEMENT OUR IDEAS* 
HE STATED THAT OUR JOB I'JAS TO CREATE' THIS MACHINERY, AT ' 
PRESENT TIME UE MUST CONCERN OURSELVES WITH PRESENT PROBLEM, 
NOT WITH NEW INTRIGL^ES. KE ASKED -MENDES TJKAT HIS ADVISERS 
HAD SUGGESTED AS ALTERNATIVE* MENDES REPLIED NO RPT NO 
ONE SPECIFICALLY AS YET BUT THAT HE PREFERRED ALLOW ELY 
SPEAK ON THIS SUBJECT. . . . ■ • . 

ELY REPLIED THAT HE WAS MORE CONCERNED WITH CURRENT PROBLEMS- 
OF DIEM. GOVT THAN WITH aUHSTION. OF POSSIBLE NE'.J GOVT, ONLY . 
CERTAINTY. IS THAT NO RPT NO MORE TIME CAN EE-l.'ASTED, ELY 
MENTIONED HUU, TAM AND QUAT AS AMOMG MANY PERSONALITIES 
WHO MIGHT BE USED. MENDES ASKED IF THERE WAS NO RPT NO 
PREFERENCE, ELY SAID NOT RPT NOT YET» SECRETARY ASKED WHAT' 
WAS WRONG BETWEEN GUAT AND SECTS AND ELY REPLIED THAT IT 
WAS RESULT OF AN OLD FUED DATING FROM TIME QUAT WAS 
MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND HAD TRIED ABOLISH SECTS 
PRIVATE ARMIES. MEMDES ASKED IF THERE WAS NO RPT NO GOOD 
'PROVINCIAL GOVT AND ELY REPLIED WOT RPT NOT SUFFICIENTLY 
GOOD TAKE ON RATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES. 

* 

^ SECRETARY WENT ON TO SAY THAT WE MUST EXHAUST ALL OUR PRESSURES 



ON DIEM 



44855 



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i'lilKMANSNT -• errors ' " REPROOUCTlOfUROM THis; 

p!^CGrJJ COPY » This copy must be rbuu-ncdHo^GC/R central files with notatio7:c-:;^^n;etl-tf;SS£r;e;-,!3 I 

J ■ " FRCHISITED /-i ,,T 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Dale: 201 1 



TOP SECRET , ' . : ' 
-2- FROM PARIS, 2601 DECEMBER. 19, h?!-] SECTION TvJO OF TWO 

• - - - ' , ' 

T 

- • - • . ■> ■ 

ON DIEM TO GET THINGS DONE. BEFORE CONSIDEPJNG ALTERNATE SOLU- 
TIONS, RADFORD UILL SE IN SAIGON DEC 22 TO REPORT RESULT OUR 
CONVERSATIONS TO COLLINS^ SECRETARY AGREED WE MUST EXPLORE 
ALL POSSIBILITIES BUT WARNED THAT MERE FACT UE WERE DOING SO 
v'JAS SUFFICIENT TO UNDERMINE PRESENT GOVT. HE ASKED MENDES 
NOT TO THINK WE HAD OBSTINATELY 'CLOSED OUR MINDS TO POSSIBLE 
ALTERNATE SOLUTIONe WE HAD NOT PJ=T NOT BUT OUR INVESTIGATION 
OF ALTERNATE MUST BE DONE OM CAREFUL BASIS AND WE MUST FOR 
. RESENT SUPPORT DIEM. , ' . • ; 



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. • . - ^5E^^DES AGREED, TO SUMMARIZE HE HAD THREE MAIN POINTS: FIRST, 

r (J ' SUPPORT DIEM; SECOND, TO STUDY ALTERNATIVES, COLLINS AND 

L . "y ELY SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO EXPLORE FURTHER POSSIBILITIES - 

^ .\ INCLUDING 3A0 DAI WITH GREATEST DISCRETION* SECRETARY THEN 

■p- RETURNED TO VICEROY QUESTION ASKING IF* PROPOSED MAN VJOULD BE 

L- .INDEPENDENT OR DEPENDENT ON BAO DAI* MENDES STATED HE WOULD 

BE INDEPENDENT BUT WOULD DERIVE LEGALITY FROM BAO DAI. 

F GUESTiON WOULD BE STUDIED FURTHER AND FRENCH PROPOSAL PASSED 

^ ON TO COLLINS AND ELY FOR STUDY, *■ ' . 



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MENDES- THIRD POINT WAS THAT ELY AND COLLINS SHOULD 3E REQUESTED 
'INVESTIGATE MATTER' OF TIMING, HOW HUGH FURTHER DELAY CAN BE TOLERA 
MENDES ASKED? WE MUST SET DEADLINE, THE GENERALS MUST ' 
COME TO CONCLUSION ON TWO AND THREE AND MAKE PRECISE RECOMMEND- 
ATIONS TO US SO THAT WE CAN TAKE NECESSARY DECISIONS. 

■SECRETARY AGREED BUT STATED THAT FOURTH POINT' MUST BE ADDED. ' 
IT IS THAT IF US SHOULD DECIDE THAT THERE IS NO RPT NO GOOD 
D ALTERNATIVE TO DIEM WE WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER HOW MUCH MORE ' ■ 
INVESTMENT WE WILL BE PREPARED TO MAKE IN INDOCHINA. OUR POLICY ' 
WOULD HAVE TO BE REAPPRAISED. CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, ' ' 
PARTICULARLY THE TWO FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEES, LED BY MANSFIELD 
AND RICHARDS, WERE INTENSELY INTERESTED IN PROBLEM AND WOULD 
HAVE TO BE CONSULTED. THEY BOTH HAD STRONG FEELINGS* MANS.- 
FIELD BELIEVES IN DI£M_. SECRETARY WAS NOT RPT NOT FULLY 
COGNIZANT WITH RICHARDS' OPINIONS BUT THOUGHT HE DID TOO,' " 
SECRETARY BELIEVED THAT .EVEN SLIGHT CHANCE OF SUCCESS IN VIETNAM 
WAS worth' CONSIDERABLE INVESTMENT, US HAD ALSO TO THINK OF 
WHAT HAPPENED IN ADJACENT COUNTRIES — IN CAMBODIA, LAOS, 
THAILAND AND MALAYA^ US SITUATION WAS DIFFERENT FROM THAT 

OF FRENCH* 

. . ' TOP SECRET ■ • • 

44697 -■" ■ ■ 

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Declassified per Execiitive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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"5- FROM PARIS J 26^51 DECEMBER i'9, h?Vi SECTICiN TWO OF Tl'JO . 



or FRENCH. FRENCH HAD AN INiVESTIiENT IN LIVES AMD PROPERTY 
IN VIETNAM VJHILE OURS INVOLVED EFFECT THAT FATE OF„yiETNAi^ . 

SECRETARY CLOSED' 

POINTS WITH ADSITICH 



WOULD HAVE ON REST OF SOUTH EAST ASIA. 



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BY STATING THAT HE ACCEPTED KENDES' THR 
OF HIS OWN FOURTH* 



- MENDES REPLIED THAT HE SYMPATHIZED WITH US PROBLEM BUT TRUSTED 
THAT WE WOULD NOT RPT NOT ARRIVE AT NEGATIVE CONCLUSION. 
HE URGED THAT US AND FRANCE KEEP IN TOUCH AT ALL TXHES.; - - 
EVEN IF US SHOULD ARRIVE AT NEGATIVE POSITION, FRANCE V;OULB 
■NOT HPT NOT RENOUNCE KO?E, " . - _ .. 

EDEN STATED HE AGREED AND FELT THAT EVEN ADDITONAL SINGLE YEAR 
07 SUSTAINED EFFORT WOULD HELP EVERYUHEHS AND THAT WE MUST TRY 
AND KEEP U? THE FIGHT IN ORDER TO GIVE CONFIDENCE TO OTHERS 
IN AREA* THIS ENDED MAIN PART OF INDOCHINA DISCUSSIONS* 

.KENDES THEN SAID THAT HE WISHED TO RAISE QUESTITNOF LETTER 
SENT BY VIET MINH TO EDEN AND MOLOTOV AS C - C H A I RllEN OF GENEVA 
CONFERENCE, IT COMPLAINED ABOUT ViCLATIOMS OF GENEVA AGREF.- 
NENT BY FRENCH AND VIETNAMESE GOVT. HE SAID THAT SONE OF VIET 
MINH COMPLAINTS ^WERE NOT RPT NOT UNFOUNDED*'* yHOLE MATTER 
CONSTITUTED DELICATE QUESTION FOR ICC WOULD 3E SEIZED OF IT 
AND IT WOULD PROVE DIFFICULT, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW SENSITIVITY 
OF INDIANS ON ICC» MENDES BELIEVED WE MUST EXERT ALL OUR EFFORTS 
TO CONVINCE SOUTH NOT RPT NOT TO VIOLATE GENEVA AGREEMENTS* - 
-VIETNAMESE POSITION HAD BEEN THAT THEY WERE NOT RPT NOT SIG->JA'' 
TORIES^ THIS MIGHT PROVE USEFUL TO US LATER AS LEGAL POSITION 
BUT FOR PRESENT BELIEVED SOUTH MUST BE PERSUADED TO ABIDE 
BY GENEVA TERMS. ■■ • ' . . • " 

EDEN STATED HE HAD REJECTED LETTER EXPLAINING THAT ATTEi-lPT ' ' 
TO DELIVER IT KaD BEEN. MADE IN MOSCOUc MENDES CORRECTED . 
EDEN'S I'^EMORY 3Y STATING THAT LETTER HAD BEEN REPORTED BY 
BRITISH CONSUL IN HANOI. HE DESCRIBED LETTER AS NOT RPT NOT 
BEING IMPORTANT IN ITSELF — A PROPAGANDA INSTRUMENT — ■ - 
BUT THAT IT INDICATED START OF POLITICAL OFFENSIVE BY VIET 
MINH« ■ ■ • . ' - ■ . 



RELATED 'PROBLEM -WAS SAFEGUARDING OF 



PUBLIC UTILITY SERVICES 
IN KAI PHONG. 



44GQB 



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Declassiried per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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. . "h- FROM. PARIS, 2S3i DECEMBER 19, k?Vi SECTION TWO OF TWO 

* . . ' * ■ 

- IN HAIPHONG. VIETNAMESE GOVT HAD BEEK- BREAKING GEND/A AGREE- 
\^ MENTS ON THIS SCORE AS UELL, VIET MIMH HAD COMPLAINED 'aND 
■ JUSTIFIABLY, " - . ■ . 



'J 




MENDES THEN PROCEEDED TO QUESTION ABOUT CAMBODIA STATING THAT 
! . FRENCHHAD 500 OFFICERS IN CAMBODIA AS TRAINING MISSION AMD 

INTENDED TO KEEP. THEM THERE, HE ASKED SECRETARY TO LOOK INTO 
r4ATTER AND TO GIVE FRENCH US VIEVJS Of': SUBJECT. MENDES ADDED 
L THAT FRENCH CONSIDERED PRESENCE OF THEIR MILITARY MISSION THERE 
/ . • ■ • ' ■ AS CONSISTENT 

■ ■ ■ • • ' 833 ■ 

■ " '.'- 44B99' ■ ■ TOP SECRET • . . 



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- ANOTHER DIFFICULT PROBLEM WITH REGARD TO GENEVA 

^^J UAS TRAINING OF VIETNAMESE OFFICERS^" HE UOULD BE PLEA^SED TO 

' KNOW US POSITION ON INTRODUCING NEW MILITARY ADVISERS INTO ! 

. ..INDOCHINA AND POSSIBLE CONFLICT UITH GENEV-A AGREEMENT. .. \ 

■ 

SECRETARY STATED THAT ALTHOUGH WE ¥ERE ROTATIi>'G MA AG PERSONNEL 
¥£ WERE NOT RPT NOT INCREASING IT. RADFORD CONFIRMED, ELY 
STATED THAT COLLI NS- ELY AGREEMENT ON TRAINING REMAINED WITHIN 
FRAMEWORK GENEVA ACCORDS, MENDES STATED THAT QUESTION WAS 
-u/^ LEGAL ONE.; ROTATION_PERMITTED UNDER TERMS GENEVA BUT CAN TRAIN- 
r .. ING-OFFICERS BE SUBSTITUTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL? . ' 
L ^AS IT VIOLATION OF ACCORDS TO SUBSTITUTE OFFICERS FOR NON- 

CONSj ETC.? MENDES SAID THAT FRENCH GOVT WOULD HAVE TO STUDY- 
1- . . TEXT OF COLLINS-ELY AGREEt'lENT CAREFULLY FROM LEGAL POINT OF 

VIE'i TO ENSURE THAT IT FULLY ACCORDED UITH ARNISTICE_AND 
REQUESTED US DO SAME, HE SAID THIS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT •■ . 
[■ ■ ;:AS VM HAD ALREADY OFFICIALLY PROTESTED TO ICC RE US ASSUMPTION 
^ ■ toF TRAINING RESPONSIBILITY* SECRETARY EXPRESSED GENERAL 

■; AGREEMENT UITH PRINCIPLE THAT GENEVA ACCORDS SHOULD NOT RPT 
NOT BE BROKEN BUT STATED THAT OUR INTERPRETATION OF THEM 
MUST HOT RPT NOT BE SO REFINED THAT WE REFUSE TO SUBSTITUTE 
r- • ' ■ - X FOR Y IF Y IS ILL OR LESS COMPETENT THAN X= MENDES AGREED 
. L AND SAID THAT IN LAST ANALYSIS PEOPLE WHO MUST BE PLEASED 
; ARE ICC. HE ASKED THAT BRITISH MAINTAIN THEIR CONTACTS WITH 

INDIANS AND CANADIANS, WHICH EDEN AGREED TO DO. GENERAL DIS- 
CUSSION ENSUED ON QUESTION VIET MINH PROTESTS ON VIOLATION 
OF GENEVA ACCORDS AND SECRETARY CONCLUDED BV SAYING THAT IT 
WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE IF WE WERE TO 7l:'lD OURSELVES ON DEFENSIVE 
'..■ IN' THIS MATTER IN LIGHT' OF SMUGGLING OF MILITARY MATERIAL INTO 
= . NORTH VIETNAM FROM CHINA AND PERSECUTION OF CATHOLICS_BY VfET 

• r MINH. 
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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 6?316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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, TOP SECRET 

-5" FROM PARIS, 20;-31 DICB'IBER' 15, ^JPM SECTION TWO OF TUO 

AS CONSISTENT WITH FRENCH DEFENSE POLICY. 

MEETING THEN PROCEEDED TO OTHER SUBJECTS COVERED IN SEPARATE 
IMMEDIATELY FOLLOyiNG TELS. AT END THERE WAS A PROLONGED DIS- 
CUSSION ABOUT COMMUNIQUE AMD IT WAS FINALLY DECIDED NOT RPT 
NOT TO ISSUE ANY. . • , 

■^^MENDES ASKED AT END vJHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABCTUT INFORI^ING ASSOC- 
IATED STATES GOUTS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS IN KEEFKJG tJITH OUR USUAL 
PRACTICE. IT UAS DECIDED THAT THE HIGH COMMISSIONERS IN PARIS 
IvOULD BE INFORMED BY THREE -MAN GROUP REPRESENTING THREE DELE- 
GATIONSa (SEE SEPARATE TELEGRAM.) 



DILLON 



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Note: Mr. Allen (EUR) notified 3:?0 pni 12/19/3^^ 




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Declassiried per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 1 6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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DGccmber 22, 195^»- • 



TOP SECRET 



NOTE BY TliE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 

to the 



NAT ION /lL security C0U>ICIL 



CURRENT U.S. 
References:. 



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on 



POL ICY TOWARD THE J\AR^.AST 
■A. ' KSC 1^-1-2972, NSC 5^2^/3) i- 
B, . NSC 166/1 
0. HSC 152/3 

D, NSC 1^^6/2 

E, NSC Action No. 2?6 

F, NvSC 125/2 and NSC 125/6 

G, NSC 170/1 

H, NSC 171/1 • ■ ' 
I.. NSC 5^05 
J. ■ NSC 5^-^09 

K. NSC 5^1-13/r. 

L. NSC Action No. 1250 

M. NSC Action No. 11^8 

N. Memos for NSC from Exocut 

■ subject, "U.S. Objectives 

of Action v^ath Respect to 

the Chinese Nationalist G 

dated Septenber 28 and Oc 

•and 1>!6C' Action No, -1235 
0, NSC Action Nos. 122^+ and 
P. NSC Action Nos. 1258 and 
Q. NSC Action No. 1233 
R. NSC Action No. 1275 
S. Memos for NSC froa Execut 

same subject j dated Noven 

December 20, 195^ 
T. NSC Action No. 1292 



SC 5^^29/^ 



ive Secretary 
and Courses" 
Fornosa and ■ 
overnment"-, 
tober 5, 195V 

123'^- 
1259 



ive Secretary 
ber 29 and 



The National Security -Council, the Secretary of the 
Treasury, the Secretary of Connerce, the Director, Bureau of 
the Budget, at the 229th meeting of the Council on December 21, 
195*^^ discussed the subject in the light of the views of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the. reference memorandu.^ 
of December 20. ' The Council adopted the changes in the state- 
ment of policy contained in NSC 5^29/lf, which are set forth in 
"SC Action No. 1292-b. and:. '*.*'•• ■- 



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Doferred action on paragraph 5^^^ pending further 
, consideration by the Secretary of State, in 
consultation v;ith the Secretary of Defense , and 
■ ' renort at the meeting of the Council to be held . " 
January 5, 1955. (KSC Action Ko. 1292-c) 

! Deferred action on paragraj)h 7-^, other than the 
, ,. ;- MMajorlfcy Proposal'^ in 7"C.(2) , pending further 

consideration by the Secretary of State, In con- 
sultation with the Secretary of Conferee, and 
report at the meeting of the Council to be held 
January 5, 1955. CM3C /Action Ko, 1292-d) 

M ■■ - J. 

Requested the Covmcil on Foreign Economic Policy 
to undertake the study outlined in the ''majority 
proposal" in paragraph 7-C-C2) of I^iSC 5^1-29/^. 
(NSC Action I\o. 1292-e) 

>' The President has this date- approved the stateinent of ^ 
policy in NSC 5^29A, as amended and adopted by the Council 
(except paragraphs 5-^.S and 7'S.) and, enclosed herev/ith as KSC 
5''-^29/5J directs its implementation by all appropriate executive 
departments and agencies of the U*S. Govsrnnent, subject to 
review in' the light of final decisions as to basic national 
security policy; and designates the Operations Coordinating 
Board as the coordinating agency. 

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Accordingly J the enclosed nolic/ suoersedes NSC 5^\-29/2i 
NSC Action No. ll^i-S-^bj K3C Action No'. 1224'-b and NvSC Action No, 
123^-b; 1^1 3C Action No* 1258-0 and NSC Action 1^6 , l?59-c; itemo 
for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, '^U,S* Objectives and 
Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa and the Chinese 
Kationalist Government*', dated September 23, 195^r« The enclosed 
statement of policy is to guide the impleiP-entation of all other 
existing Far Eastern policies (reference S-L) modifying them 
where inconsistent j pending Planning Board and Council reviev; 
and revision of these more particular policies, 

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A Financial Appendix covering the Far East v/ill be 
prepared for the information of the- Coujicil at a later meeting. 



JA14ES S. LAY, Jr* 
Executive Secretary 



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The Secretary of the Treasury 
The Secretary of Commerce 
The Director, Bureau of the Budget 
The Chairman J Joint Chiefs of Staff 
le Director of Central Intelligence 



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STATEI-iENT OF POLICY 
by the 
NATIONAL SECURITY COUrJCIL 



on 



CURRENT U, S. POLICY IM THE FAR EAST 



GENEMT^^^CONSI^DERATJOfS 
1^ The primary problem of U. S. policy ia the Far 
East is to cope v;ith the serious threat to U, S. security 
interests which has resulted from the spread of hostile 
CoTDmunist power on the continent of Asia over all of' 
Kainland China, IJorth Korea and^. more recently, over 
the northern part of Viet !Tam, 

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2, In its five years of pov/er, the regime in . 

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Comiuunist China has established and consolidated effective 
control over the mainland and has maintained and 
developed close v;orlcing relations v;ith the Soviet Union, 
Miile there is novr no reason to anticipate an early 
collapse of the regime nor any means of seeing when one 
might occur J inherently such regimes have elements of 



-• 



rigidity and Instability v/hlch sometimes produce crises. 
We should be ready to exploit any opportunities v;hich ' 
might occur as a result of inherent internal weaknesses. 



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3. The task of the United States in coping with this 

■ » * 

situation is further coniplicated by; 

"a. The vulnerability of the" non-Cosnimist countries 

IF 

in the' area ^nilitarllyj and in varying degrees ^ politic 
';callyj economicallyj and psycholcgically , to further 
' CoDiraunist expansionist efforts* 

b. The deep-seated national antagonisms and differ- 
■' ing assessments of national Interest v^ach divide those 

countries from each other and severely hanper efforts to 
combine their collective resources for their ov/n defense 
and velfare^ ' . , , 

c, . -The intense nationalistic feelings j fed by re- 



* < 



sidual resentments against European colonialism coupled 

with a vddespread feeling of wea^Lness and inadequacy in 

the face of the worldv.ade pov/er struggle ^ v/hich inhibit 

many of these countries from cooperating closely with , 

the United States, ' ' ' ' 

d. The divergencies on Par Eastern policy with our 

European allies j principally with respect to our posture 

toward China, which limit the extent of political and' ■ 

economic pressures which can be maintainfed against the 

Asian Comjriunist regimes without divisive effects on t>ie 

basic United States-le'd coalition, 

^NOTE: In addition to the fore.golng 
"general considerations , attention is 
.• directed to r:iE 13-5^, "eorrjnunist ' .. 

China's Povrar Potential Through 1957," 
• published June 3, 195V, and KIE lO--?-?^, 
"Conraunist Courses of Action in Asia 
Through 1957)" published Kovenber 23, 
■- ■ 195^-. 



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# * 



OBJECTIVES 



} h^ Pursuant to a policy of being clear and strong in its 

?_ * . - 

1 resolve to 'defend its vital interests, if necessary at the 

[i^ risk of but witliout being provocative of vjar. the principal 

^T' objectives of .the United States in the Far East should be; 

-1 " 

^, ■ ^ a. Preservation of the territorial and political 

^ ' integrity of the non^Corrjnunist countries in the area 

.jff^ against further Coriununist expansion or subversion, 

■I ■ j 

^ ' b. Progressive improvement of the relative political. 



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economic and military position of the non- Communist 
countries vis-a^-vis that of the Asian Communist regimes. 

c^ Reduction of Chinese 'Cbmniunist power and prestige, 
or' securing by reorientation a Government on the mainland 
of China v;hose objectives do not co.nflict with the vital 
interests of the United States, * ." 

d. Disruption of the Sino-Soviet alliance through 

actions designed to intensify existing and potential areas 

of conflict or divergence of interest betv;een the USSR 
• ■ 

and Communist China. 

e. Creation in Asia of political ajid social forces 
which will zealously spread the greater values of the 
Free V/orld and simultaneously expose the falsity of the 
Communist ideological offensive. 

- . COURSES O F ACTIO H 

^- ■ I - !■ Mh.M » t ■!■■■ 

J. In order to preserve the territorial and political 



f" integrity of the areaj the United States should: 

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ci- Maintain the security of the Pacific off-shore 
island chain (J^^pan, Ryukyus, Formosa and the Pescadores, 
' the Philippines J Australia, and New Zealand) as an ele- 

i ' , 

' ment essential to U.S. security; assisting in developing 

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such military strength in each area as is required by 

U.S. security and is consistent v;ith each area's capa-^ 

bility and maintenance of domestic stability. 

b. In the event of unprovoked attack on the Republic 

. 

of Korea, employ, in accordance vith Constitutional pro- 
cesses, U,S. armed forces against the aggressor, VJhile 
supporting the unification of Korea by all peaceful 



J * 



means and maintaining appropriate safeguards against ROK 
offensive action, continue military and economic assis- 
tance programs consistent v.ath U.S. security interests ^ • 

and subject to continued ROK cooperation, 

« 

c. Ratify the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic ' 
of China covering Formosa and the Pescadores, and jointly . 
agree upon appropriate safeguards against Chinese r^ational- 
ist offensive action. Pending the ratification of such* a 
Treaty, continue the existing unilateral arrangement to 

■ * 

defend Formosa and the Pescadores (excluding the ifetiOxnaL- 
1st held off-shore islands). For the present, seek to pre- 

, ' ■ h 

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serve, through United Nations action, the status quo of ! 
the Nationalist-held off^-shore islands; ' and, without com-- 

a 4 

mittin'g U.S. forces except as militarily desirable in the 



event of Chinese Communist attack ox\ Formosa and the 



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Pescadores J provide to the Chinese Nationalist forces military' 
cquipmenl; and traininj^; to assist tneni to defend such off-shore 
islands^ using Forraosa as a base* Eoiiovorj do not a^ree to 
Chinese Nationalist offensive actions against rnainland Gopinun- 
1st China J o:ccept under circumstances approved by the President* 
Agree to Chinese Nationalist actions ajainst Coi?jnunist China ^ 
vrtiich are prorapt and clear retaliation against a Chinese Cora- 
munist attack; provided such retaliation is" ai;ainst targets of' 
vdilitari' sioHificance v;hich meet U, S. criterlc as to feasibil- 
ity and chance of success and vrhich are selected V7ith due con- 
sideration for the undesirability .of, provoking further Chinese " 
Comiaunist reaction ar;ainst FormCisa and the- Pescadores. 



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d,. Should overt CoriL^-iunisf aggression occur in the South- 
■■I" 

east Asian treaty area^ Invoke the W\ Charter or the SEATO 

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treat yj or both^ and subject to local request for assistance 
take necessary military and any other action to assist any . 
state or dependent territory in the SEATO area willing to re- 
sist Coniinunist resort to force: Provided^ that the taking of 
military action shall be subject to prior submission to and 
approval by the Congress unless the evaersency is deemed by the 
President to bo so ::;reat that iinniedlate action is necessary to 

->■ 

save a vital interest of the United States, 

* 

e. Employ all feasible covert uieans^ and all feasible 
overt meanSj includin^j in accordance v;ith ponstitutional pro- 
cesses J tlie use of arned force if necessary ^nd appropriate ^ to 
prevent Indonesia or vital parts thereof from fallin^^ under 



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Comniunist control by overt arned attackj subvorsioHj econoniG 
domination^ or other means j concerting overt actions with 
other ANZUS- nations, 

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f * In the 'event of Confaunist overt armed attack or im- 
minen'b threat of such attack against any other country in the 



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area (not covered by a security treaty to which the United 
States is a party) , this evidence of a renewal of Communist 
agpressive purposes would constitute such a grave menace to 
the United States as to justify the President in requesting 
authority from Congress to take necessary action to deal with 
the situationi including the. .use of U»S, armed forces, if 



appropriate and feasible* 



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g, (l) Issue a directive to its armed forces that 
in the event oT unprovoked Comniunist ariTied attack 

* . r ' 

against U. S, military or non -military personnel j 

■* 
aircraftj or vessels outside Communist territory^ 

XI, S, forces in the area v;ill take asainst the Com- 



o' 



niunist attacking force during the course of the attack 
aggressive protective measures^ including if necessary 
and feasible inimediate pursuit of the Communist ■ ' 

■I- 

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attacking force into hostile airspace or waters, 

(2) In addition to the action directed in (l) 

abovej and as constitutionally authorized and.speci- 
- 

fically approved by the President^ take such additional 



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punitive action as may be necessary and appropriate. 



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h. Encourage the conditions necessary to form as 

* 
soon as possible and then participate in, a Western 

Pacific collective defense arrangement Including the 

I 
FnilippineSj Japan, the Republic of China and the 

Republic of Korea, eventually linked with the Manila 
x^ct and AKZUS. ■ • ' 

I 

? '^ i^. If requested by a legitimate local government 
Vhich requires assistance to defeat local Communist 
subversion or rebellion not constituting armed attack j the 

I- 

United States should vlex/ such a situation so gravely that^ 
in addition to giving all uossible covert ,and overt 



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support v,dthin the Executive Branch authority, the 
President should at once consider requesting Congressional 
authority to take appropriate action, which might if 

I 

necessary and feasible include the use of U.S. military 
forces either locally or against the external source of 
such subversion or rebellion (including Communist China 
if determined to be *t:he source)* 

X* Assist where necessary and feasible non'-Communist 
^Goverrunent and other elements in the Far East to counter 



^ 



Communist subversion and economic domination* 

K, Maintain sufficient U.S. forces in the Far East 
as clear evidence of U.S. intention to contribute its 
full share, of efi'ective collective aid to the nations 
of the area against the Communist threat, and to provide. 



NSC 5^1-2 9/5" 



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assurance to the people of the Far East of U.S 



* 



intent and deterriiination to support them in^the 
event of Conmunist aggression. 



-:'■ ■ ' i ■ ■ s., -Increase efforts to develop tKe basic 

M " '. stability and strength of non-Comniunist comttries, 



. 6p In order to enhance the individual and 
collective strength of the non-^ Communist countries, the 
.11 ted States should; 



especially Japan and India^ and their capacity and 
will. to resist Communist expansion, 

b. Continue (1) to recognize the Government of. 



* 4 



i J the Republic of China as the only government of 
China and its right to represent China in the 



j-- ^ United Nations, and (2) to furnish direct support 

to its defense establishraent and its econoray. 



c^ Encourage the pronpt organization of an 

' econouiic grouping by the maxi^uin number of free 
* ' ■" 

Asian states, including Japan and as many of the 
Colombo Powers as possible based on self-^help and 
mutual aid, and the participation and support 
(including substantial financial assistance) of ^ 
the United States and other appropriate V^ stern 

■I 

countries,, through which, by united action, those 
free Asian states will be enabled, more jsffectively 
to achieve the economic and social strength needed 
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to maintain thear Independence, 



^- * ■ ' '^* Take all feasible measures to increase the 



opportunities of such countries for trade v;ith each 
other and with other Free World coimtries. 

■ e» Provide in South and Southeast Asia, 
through the economic grouping referred to in c 
above or otherwise^ such economic and technical 
aid over an extended period as can be us^d 
effectively to accelerate the present slow rates of 
economic grov;th, and to give to the peoples in these 
areas a sense of present progress and future hope. 



^ * 



v/hich is currently lacking. ' 

f. Develop and make more effective information^ 

fen ■ 

cultural J education and exchange progrems; and 

ii 
expand the program for training of free Asian 

leaders. • 

^, Encourage the countries of the area to use 

qualified Ainericans as ad\'isers and develop a 

m - 

program for training such persons. 

h. Seek, by intensifying covert and 



■ » " 

C psychological activities, and hy utilizing indigenous 

■ ■. persons to the greatest extent feasible, to (1) 

I.. 



increase :the understanding and orientation of Asian 

I- 

peoples toVard the Free V/orld and (2) exDOse the 

menace of Chinese inoeriallsm and world Communlsni, 



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.!_• Encourage and support, more vigorously and 

effectively, the application of private capital to 

the development needs of free Asian countries under 
I 
; a^^rangements avoiding ^^exploitation" yet acceptable 

H' 

■ to private interestSt 

' 7* In order to weaken or retard the grov/th of the 






. . ..power and influence of the Asian Communist regimes, 
especially Cominunist China, the United States .'should: 

a^ Continue to refuse recognition of the 
, Chinese Communist regime and other Asian Xonimunist 
i regimes, but deal v;ith each on a local basis and 



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with regard to specific subjects wheye the regime is 
a party at interest. ' : ' * . 

b. Continue to oppose seating Cominunist 

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China in the Sacurity Co-uncil, the Genera Assembly, 

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and other organs of the United Nations/ 



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p. • . . ' {pO&'ill . ■ TOP SECRET 

(1) Maintain the current level of United States export , 

V ' ' ' / 

import J and^financlal controls on trade with Comnujiist China, 

A ' / 

r Witriout derogaMng froD the basic principles of these pontrolSj 

administer them iii such a manner so as to endeavor noi: to lessen 

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oVt r Free V/orld^ couJli^^ies. 

.(2) Urge otherYree World countries*" to'^maintain the 

cur ent level of export corVtrols on trade v/itly Communist China, 

' \ / 

In aid of this effort ^ the Urtited States should j without frus- 
trating the multilateral embargo^ program j ^ndeavor to handle 
questions of routine exceptions iVj such ji>&nner as to preserve 



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and foster the willingness of other^^ countries to retain the 
■ ^ present level of controls* . * 



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(3) V/iienever it may be determined by the Secretary of 
State that further -effort to maintain the\ current multilaterally 
agreed level of export controls would be seriously divisive 



among our allies or lead nations needing trade with Cominunist 

/ ' \ 

China toward an accommodation/ with the Soviet ^bloc, the Secre- 
tary should report such determination promptly to the Council 

' - / 

for consideration of appra|)riate action, 

' / 

•T ' iS) In the meanwhilej the Council on Foreign Economic 

L' ••• ..---..■ ■ / \^ • . • 

Policy should study j on an urgent basis j all asnects of U.S. 

r / ' 

L economic defense policy applicable to trade with the Communist 

^ J. ' \ 

r bloc (including Communist China), akingjinto account in^.such 

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study, among other/ things , the matters set forth in Annex\Bj 
and should submit to the National Security Council at the 






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earlioat practicable date comprehensive and detailed* recoirmGn- 



ijiQh policy as may be required by 



dations for such revisi 




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national secm^i-ty intex'^ests ^ both long^'nd shoi^t range, 

dt Utilize all feasible overt and covert neans, consls-- 

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■ tent with a policy of not being provocative of vrar, to create 

4 ■ ' ■ 

f " ■ 

discontent and internal divisions within each of the Commun- 
ist-doninated areas of the Far East, and to inpair their re- 
lations with the Soviet Union and vjith each other , particular 
ly by stimulating Sino-Soviet estrangement. However^ do not 
agree to Chinese Nationalist offensive actions against main- 
land Comnujiist China, except under circunstances approved by 
the President,' Agree to Chinese Nationalist actions against 
Communist China which are prompt and clear retaliation against 

■w 

' a Chinese Communist attack j provided such retaliation is 
against targets of military significance yhich meet U.S. 
criteria as to feasibility and chance of success and which 
are selected with due consideration for the undesirability of 
provoking further Chinese Coinnunist reaction against Formosa 

F 

and the Pescadores, 

O4 Continue the policy towards Indochina and Thailand' ■ 

^ 9 

■ Stated in Annex A, 

■ S,' a. The United States should attempt to convince the other 
Free V/orld countries of the soundness of U.St policies toward 

Comi^iunist China and toward the Republic of China and of the 

* » 

advisability of their adopting similar 'policies , without, 

ft 

however, imposing such pressures as would be seriously 



divisive. ■ 



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b. In its Pacific role, the United States should be less 
) .-. . influenced by its European allies than in respect to Atlantic 
affairs* 
9* The United States should keep an open nind en the possi- 



r blllty of negotiating with the USSR and Connimist China acceptable 



a 



nd er orceable agreenents^ v/hether limited to individual issues 



now outstanding 



or involving a general settloDGnt of najor issues. 






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■ (Paras. 10 and 11 of rJSC 5^29/2 
• vith the addition of a nev; para. 10- h) 



10. 

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Indochin a: P oli tic al a nd Co ver t Action . 

a\ Make every possible effort , not openly incon- 



sistent \ilth the U. S, position as to the armistice agree-^ 
mentsj to defeat Communist subversion and influence j to 
maintain and slu3poi't friendly non-Corimunist governments in 
Cambodia and Laos\ to maintain a friendly^ non-Communist \ 

: / 

South Vietnarrij and to prevent a Commionist victory through 

\ 

all-Vietnam elections^ 

b. Urge that the i^i^ench promptly recognize and deal 

> ^ / 

with Cambodia, Laos and fr^e Viejsnam as independent , 




/ 



sovereign nations. 

c. Strengthen U* S. representation and deal directlyj 
vherever advantageous to the U, &• , with the governr:ents - 
of Cambodia 5 Laos and free Vietnam,^ 

d» V/orking tlirongh the French only insofar as neces^ 

sary^ assist Cambodia j Laos and free Vi^^tnam to maintain 

/ , ' 

(1) military forces necessary for internaX security and 

■ . / ■ \ 

(2) economic conaitlons conducive to the maintenance and 
.strength of non-Comniunist regimes and comparing favorably 
with those in adjacent Communist areas. 

/ 

e. Aid emigration from North Vietnam and rese-ttle- 
ment of pdoples unwilling to remaiil undei:^' communist rule, 

f . /Exploit available means to make more difficult 
the control by the Viet Minh of North Vietnam* 

'851 • ■ ■ 



NSC 5V29/5 



TOP SSCRET. 



Declassified per Execiitive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Pn^ject Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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£. . Exploit available means to prevent North Vietnam 

ft 

from .becoming permanently' incorporated in the Soviet bloc 
Using as feasible and desirable consular relations and 

^ non^strategic trade, v ' . 

'! ll. 'Expose Comm-unist violations of the Armistice in 



■■ i' 



Indoclilnai 



/ 



i» Conduct covert operations on the maximum feasible 
and productive scale in support of the foregoing policies. 
11. Thailand 

a» Frovida military assistance sufficient to 
increase the strength of indigenous forces j thereby 



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helping to control local subversion, and to make 



easier clear identification of instances of overt 
aggression. 



-;*'* 



b. Provide econoniic assistance conducive to 
the maintenanc.e and strength of a non-Comrn^onist regime. 

c^. 'Concentrate efforts on developing Thailand as 
a support of IT. 3. objectives in the area and as 
the focal point of U. S. covert and psychological opera- 

* 

tions in Southeast -Asia* 



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NSC 5^29/5 



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TOP SECRET 



852 



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Dccrassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 201 1 



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AmsKibassy PARIS ^3^^ 
-BTTD Ih'FO; Ar:2P.b?.s^y PiCIOI'f PEIlTi ^ 5.-^ 

AjJilesation VISNTmrr: /^^ 



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?;4 CZC 24 p;,i 2 2o : " 

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FOR 



I COLLINS Airj DlLLOI',- FROM SSGRSTAPv/ > ^ /? 




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pursuant r.iy talks concer ri.n^ Viet-Na-n vrith Mendes-Fr^nce aad Eden 



Paris (Pai^is 2601 repaat-d Saii^on 338) I feel it good occasion for us 
all review basic factors Vist-'ram r>roble:r;S and spell out sonie ^idde 



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linos cur actions "in nsar future 




I 

i 

1, Although there .TiP.ny complex and, difficult factors confronting % 

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Free Viet-IIani^ th.era no reason ad^dt defeat. During past five Pionths 
sincG Gsnava, situation has not disint2|{ratsdo reools fundainsnt^ll;:^ 
anti-Goru'^.unistt They have major resources in south. Hinh or obi am solved 



-4 ..I 

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and resettlement proceeding reasonably uello In aorne is^ysj developments 
better than vre predicted* Collins and Ely have contributsd ^r^atlv 
this situation and their coop 3 ration is najor asset. Direct aidj 
reduction rSC and pro\'i_3ion3 Manila pact aLl positive factors vrhich i;ilX 



affect develop.^.entSo pace may not please us but r^ajor changes such 
sta^^e of transition as Viet-:I?jn going through oorrias more slowly than in 
tJest. vFe must not overlook fact CorrjrLunists also face fonrAd^ble proole*T 



and if v:3 creata situation such that they c ?j:i only take over by internal 



3 



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rF-^"lles:?3?5A{;:TiCung;REHoey 1 2/2)4 Ajii^f^,,,,, ' 
'■: ense - Col. Tlirocka^rton (in substance) 



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violence^ v;8 will Have faced the.ii ;vith serious dileri-na because of unfavorable 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Pnjject Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Dale: 201 1 



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Paoc_2^"„of tacg:.-vni tD-_Saisor^^JP5.ris_H?lD II]F0:„^,Phnor!!.3enh-- 



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. effect such action on Asian countries !U>e India^ Their recent increase anti-Diem, 
and anti-Jtmerican nrxj^n^^jz^^cxi^a: prbpaga^nda may veil be resiili rpa-li^atlon in^-gnitude 
>:hat they face and chances ultimate Free "iizo^k ^vorld success, 

4 

I 

2, Withdrawal our support would h?.sten Comrtanist takeoi'-er Viet-^Tan and 

' ^ 

have adve se repercussions all Southeast Asia^ Consecruen.irl.i'^j investnent Viet-i^laia 



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justifiea even if only to buy tima build up strength else^fliare in area. VJe are 



going irj have uiaintain fci flexible policy and proceed cai^efully by stages . 
Viet-Najn. Simultaneously \ie are tninlan^ of 'nays and raeans strengthen Cambodia^ 
Laos and Thailand against contingencies. But i-re 'basically and irninediately faced 



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vrLth pz^obl^iTi strengthening Free Viet-Nai:! and must devote best efforts that task 

3* Under present circurr,stances and unless situatioa iai Free Viet-iTaiH 
clearly appears hopeless and rapidly disintegrating j we have no choice but 

T 

continue our aid Viet-Mani and support of DieM, There no other suitable leader 



« 



known to us a Can any successor raake uq for Dien's deficiencies vritnout also 
lacking Diem's virtues? Could we KrdAsjipi anticipate stable process of succession 
and not vrorse conJ^usion and weakness than now e:dLsts* These tou^h questions 

T ■ 

and would appreciate your views:* _ . - , 

* • ' ' .■ 

li# I agreed vjxth llendes-France at Paris four itenis concerning problcTi of 

F 

Diem* (reference telegrani) VJhile study of alternate leaaers ?jr.on^ these points 

w 

1 did not agree j=x Generals Collins and Zly should establish deadline for replace- 

1 

* 

i;:ent Diem by anotlier man. It agreed that Collins and Ely would report late 



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January on overall situationo 

$, I do not consider Sao Dai^s return Viet-lla.^ would really solve our 

basic 



854 



-TCCHL.iai.S'J. 



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Class ificatio:t 



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DeclassifK'd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Piojeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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- f "legra.: . »^_Saiqon_-^-JBar-is-?P-TB-ri5F0 -Fnnoni- Penh — -Yi en tiano .- - 

* ' Ciassijicnt'ton 



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basic probl^ns thsrSg Neither do ilenaes-^France cr Eden^ Nor do I se^ 
merit in French suggestion of viceroy, which j-lh:! Ilendes-France did not press 
after suggestion Kas analysed. I see little point takin^^/^iiccos create such ■ 
niachinery when no successor in sight and v:hich v;ould only add to intrigues n 

6, Early approval of France and then Viet-llani of Collins-Ely nemorand-on 
understandip-i; regarding training is basic need. \Ie should make every effort* 

fa- ^ 

ensure discussions with Viet-TIam proceed rapidly and effectively* Only when 

F 

we have taken steps reorganize ar^ revitalise Ifetional Arr^iy can we hope for - 



iir.Droved secuzdty condition and lesserin^- Cor^TLunist infLusnoe Free Vlat-Han, 



r This 'tvlll also require very best native l3adership available and I hcpa either 
General Ty or Vy is up to that task^ 

7# There also extraiielv delicate problem our influencing Dietti along 



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riKht lines* I know how fnastratin^ Collins' exoerience now and Heath's in 

# - 

past have been, land refom has powerful propagarxla value j which Coi^i'Ti'inists 
already not fail-:d e:oloit, So.iiething should be done on our side, vrith our 
T3:y^ help J put this a^.otional and basic element to work for us, 

8o Al-Uiough there mar^' other factors consider I am sure if we concentrate 
on solving problenis listed above we ;ri.ll make headway* I would appreciate 
yoiir com^ientSa 



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Classification 



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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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.jbi;L:,;vi3 kk^^/iRivi J^epariment or Stau..- [mmim^- 1 



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.FROM: Saigon 
- TOi 



12-26-5^, 9:56 a.q. 

, ., , ^ ^CORRSCTiD COPY 
Action ^.33i£^c:;trvbr:f:x?5^-5^5 






[ 







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NO; 



Secretary of State 
2^55, December 25 ^ 



8 



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i2-:l6 a. en. 



195^ 



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SENT DEPAR-EvTEI^JT 2453/ HEPEA'r^D INEOPu^LA,TION sP^RIS 7^2 
561, J^"" ^- ■ -J±2±lL 

UA EXCLUSIVE FOR RADFORD*"'^^"'''- "■' ^^-'^ 



i 



M^VNTLA 



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LB-IIT DISTRIBUTION 

■I 

PASS DEFENSE 



y/ Bureau of 

,0ECJ?^7J354 



Ttui:^! 



COLLINS 




OeoanT7i**it of Si ale 




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Reference Paris 



260^ 



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repeated Saigon 588. 



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Folloving commenta sutrnittsd for Inforcnation State and rtefense;n:; ^ 
ell paragraph r eferences are to refe rence tele gram unle ss \ g 

__. !_■<_ _ _ . " _ _ # "^^m. » '■ , ^-^ -^ - ' ^-- — — — ■ ' '■ -' J M I *■ " " ■■ ♦ 



otherwise Indicated; 



1* First parag r a xS a statement that "on l y su g gestion vhlc h 
lias been ac ce pLed^lpy Dierri was ap po intrigant i^l nh as Minis tap 
or~Def ense^ is not correco. See TDarap^raiDh '^A, ir^rt 11. 

^___. ■■- i| ^ ■—■ -.J n I ■■■> LI ^ «-_ ■■ ■ ■ 












my telegram 22z)Q. Most 01 acLJona listen 



zaeve vere ^£a5:en 



upon my recouirnendations 01 vhich Ely had bsen inior:::ed> 

2, Kendes stateTent in iDaras;raph two lik^vise naints unduiy 



^BXaclc picture, f^'aci: is that when Ely derj^rted Sai£?:on ou 

H- ^ ^ ^ ,^ .. "II— T^ * ' ■*■ '"^ ■ ""^ >-* ' ' 



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s Lai IS vere SLiii woricing ^ 

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n details oi sii^ programs outlined 



my telegram 2004. Ely -ana i nad reached g eneral agreen-:ent 
on e ac n oi t h ese progranis out: unLlx deualTs vere TurLher 
aevelopeaj ve vere not p re pared to preseni^ them to Dieoi 
g overnnient. , Subse q aenL ro Ely^s de p arture ve have discussed 

vlth D iem aetailed'^aggestions for lla uionai Assemoly ■ 

L-a n erally Lhese vere received lavoracly gj Diem. Ud staf f 

01 fleers nov actively stuaylng proposals viih small cc:r.:nT^tee 



CO 



axjnoinuea oy iJiem. 



While nou conclusive^ 1 airly 3ai;isi acuory 
prepress is celn^made. Sii^ilarly , s tatecien:^ auLributea lo 

1. ^ ■ 1 ■ ■ ■ ■ m^ ■ ■■ ■ ■ ■■ L MM I ^ ^ IBH ^ LM 1 !■ Ml^ ■ 1 ■ ■ ^1 ■ ^^M I I ^ 1 • ■ >— ^ .U ^m- 



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ji-iy in paragrapn b tnat ^ooza were nov virtually convincea 
tnat It was hopeless to expect anything ox Diem' 5,3 an ' 
overstate^.ent. I made no such staterient to Sly though he might '*T 
have deduced this from our discussions , reported -in paragraphs H 
h and 5 ^y telegram 2285- Reference para?y7aphs 6 andJ?^ \ce have-^ '' 
not submitted any ultimatum' to Diem although'l have t:^ed to :^ 1 
make clear to him. that no decisj^on has been reached bJrtr-i Uht tf^1 I 

- ^* b'oB . ^ p^ ^ ^^ ' 

States with J^^-^'^'^^ij^y\onno'\iM 



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DeclassifK'd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Piojeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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-2- 2^55, Dece[riber 25/ 8 p.m., fro^i SaiEon, CORRECTED COPY 



States vith respect to assumption of training responsibiltty or 
direct military aid and have indicated that my final recommenda^ 
tions vill he dependent upon the progress actually achieved by 
his. government during the' remainder? of my. stay here, I am in 
full accord with position taken by Secretary outlined in 
paragraph 8, . , ' . 

3-. I thoroughly disagree with the suggestion made by Mendes 
in paragraph 9 and .^t)y. Eden in paragraph 11* As I view situation 
there are only fou]? acceptable solutions with respect to Bao Dai: 
either (a) he should return to Saigon and u§e his full authority 
and Influence to force sects and all other elements of country to 
support progressive program of Dlemj or some ot>^er Premier if 
Diem Is replaced; or (bj he, should personally assume active di- 
rection of the governvment as Chief of State and Premier; or (c) 
he should cease pulling any strings from France or asserting any 
influence, excSpt as specif ically requested by French and 
Americans pending' establishrnent of constitutional monarchy; or 
(d) he should renounce his authority as Chief of State. I 
assume that these and perhaps other alternatives vlll be 
examined thoroughly in'Washington as indicated In Embassy 
telegram 2^77 and Departmient telegram 2599, repeated Saigon 3S5. 

4. Quite frankly I was disturbed- over the attitude assumed by . 
Mendes as Indicated in paragraphs 21 through 2H. Inference In- 
paragraph 25 that Vietnamese Government had been breaking 
Geneva agreements vith respect to public utility services in' 
Haiphong Is not factual to our best information. I told Ely 
that I had Issued positive instructions to our WAG and USOM 
representatives in Haiphong to cooperate fully with French in 
preventing violations of the Geneva Accord in Haiphong enclave. 
No single report of violations has been made to date. I wonder 
whether Mendes' reference is possibly a removal of US financed 
mining equlpuient which French commercial firms and Sainteny- 
Mission may be concerned with. Ely has promised to have more 
valuable and better conditioned equipm.ent of this character ^ - 
removed* However, Darldan only yesterday said there may be ' . 
some question as to whether this equipment could be interpreted 
under the Geneva Accord as pertaining to public utilities. 



4 



■B. ri 4 



5- statement in paragraph 2^ by Mendes that Collins-Ely agree 
ment reference military training would have to be studied 
carefully from legal point of view again raises question 
authority delegated Ely and extent to which be will be 
supported by Mendes government In agreements made as Indicated 
by Mendes in last Washington conference. If our conduct of 
training is to be hedged about with legal interpretations of 
the character in paragraph 24, then I would recommend that we 
not assume this responsibility. As indicated in an earlier 
message, Ely had agreed with rne that if necessary, strength of 



A 



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TOP SECEIET 



our MAAG 



Declusi^jficd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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-5- 2^55, .Dec emb-er 25, 8 p.m., from Saigon, CORRECTED COPY 

our KAAG training personnel could be Increased teyond the 5^2 
figure J If it vere done quietly and over a period of months, 
IThile I am not a lavyer^ I have carefully studied Article l6 
of the Geneva agreerrent vith respect to Vietnam and oaxi find ■ 
noxi^here In this Article any hasis for interpretations vhich 
Mendes appears to place on Introductions of US training 
personnel- Fact is the y\2 US total comprised Air Force 
technicians and MAA.G Logistical personnel. These must be 
converted largely to personnel competent to train the 
Vietnamese Ajr-my. . *■.''. . .; 

6. After discussing vlth Radford above details and other 
factors concerning situation here^ ye vere in accord that if NSC 
is to re-evaluate our policies in late January ^ to be 
iollov;ed perhaps by USj British^French consultations^ it would 
be desirable for me to be present Washington during these 
discussions, ©/en the best modern communications lack the ■ . 
personal touch and give-and-take exchange of Ideas vhlcH 
1 vould thirJc would be essential If we are to make sound 
e-evafuatlon of our policies with respect to Vietnam, 



LT'iS : JAK^6 



KIDDER 



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Declas^^jficd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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"I'Ei'iOil«MDUI^ FOR THE RECORD 






December 29, 195U 0, 

7.92U ' 



t J-l' "J J. v.* in^'uJ 

P/iRTICI?AlJTS: The Secretary-, -.-.'-.t'^nt 5Ei.;iF.T;'xY y 




V 



I . 



Hr. Robertson 
Mr, Yoiaig 



:y 



fJiA^Ojy^ 



SUBJECT: Indochina 




( *' 1/ ■ 



Mr. Robertson and I -went to see the Secretary thi-s jnornlng about 
beginning direct aid to Viet-llam in January and moving ahead >rith H\AG 
negc jiations in Cambodia, 




^.. 















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?^ 



1# The Secretary decided we should proceed as scheduled and "take 
the plunge" on January 1, Mr* Robertson and I stated the pros and cons* 
Kr- Robertson pointed out our prestige would be considerably more 
corakiltted in the three Associated States and our ability to disengage made 
more difficult by this step. On the other hand, I pointed~out~^it vjould give 
us m.ore leverage, put o\ir missions on a direct footing and carry out the ■ 
understanding reached with the French and the three Associated States last : 
Sept.e!T:ber and October. I explained to th3 Secret^iY tha.t Governor Stassen / 
had set up an operational mechanism v/hich would keep our dii^ect aid fluid . ,' 
and fle>:ible so that it could be tapered up or dovm quickly depending on '..7 _;^ 
developing circumstances* Nr. Robertson stressed that no amount of aid / 
would be announced at this tiJ^e or conveyed to the governments concerned. ^ . 
The Socretaiy xhdics-ted his approval of this general line or approach, -i^iiX' ^ 
thjat the progratn would be subject to discontinuance at any time, as a-^ ^^''5?3j;nt,C;5 . 

2# VJith respect to the JC'S prerequisite on elimination of the French --f^" 
in Cambodia J the Secret arj"^ stated that it was much too legalistic and 
mirealistic. It is the kind of thing that could get us into a great 
deal of complication without sufficient compensating advantages. He felt 
that this was the sort of problem which could be orJLy handled in time and 
by various methods* To attack it so directly would only create rmich more 
of a problem, * - . 



s>- 



o 
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Kenneth T. Toungj Jr 



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Appi-oved 
Disapproved 




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78? 



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Declassiried per Executive Order 13526, Section 3, 3 
NND Pmject Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 




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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i 









Jan 5 1955 



l^dORAT^lDUI^ POH TlIE JOUIT CHIEFS OF STA^ 



SUBJECT: Reconsideration of U. S. Military Progreins in Southeast Asia 

I ■ 1. In a recent cable (DA IN IO5690) General J. Lairton Collins 

*' Indicated that Premier JIgo Dinh Diem of Soutli Vietnam does not have the 

aapacity to unity the divided factions in Vietnam and that imless action 
is tai:en to achieve 5ueh unity the country -win be lost to ConMunisni, .. I 
He further stated that if measures to strengthen tfie governriient vere un*- 
acceptable to" the U, S.^ or \/ere unsuccessful^ the U, S. should re- 
p , evaluate its plans for assisting Southeast Asia* ' In addition^ it is 

[^ ' apparent that if the I956 Vietnam e3,ectiGns are held^ the CojTnnunists mil 

' probably emerge victorious. The political decision ijlth resijcct to 
Genez'al Collins' recoimJiendation has not yet "been made. 



2, In message Ho, 2585 darted 2^ December 195!!- to tlie Aiaerican 
Embassies in Paris and Saigon^ the Secretai^ of State vas more 
optlJEiistic and expressed the vievr that progress had been made in 
South Vletnaju during the past- five iiionths. 



1^^' 3- Referenced commmi cations indicate a delicate and unstable 

4^ ^ situation ^rithin South Vietnam, Under these clrcui<istanceSj It is necessary 
i: that the Department of Defense be pi^epared for any eventuality; hence it 

is prudent that all the iirip.lications of possible courses of action be 
■ examined. Accordingly^ It is requested that- the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
submit their vievs and I'^ecornmendations on the folloTring points as veil as 
any other vhlch they deem apxi^ropriate , ' : 



a. Assuming aid is cut off j the effect of tliis action upon 
the ability of the armed forces and the Government of Vietnau to 
jnaintain internal security in South Vietnam. 

b. Assuming minimal aid is to be given^ the nature and extent 
of the military aid required^ and the period for vhlch it should be 
granted. 

e. Force levels for the FEC vhich vould enable them^ in 
conjunction iTlth available Vietnamese forces^ to safeguard the 
evacuation from Vietnam of U. S. equipment, 

c ■ 

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SecDef Cont* llo*. TS-0786 









Dedassitied per Executive Order 13526, Secdon 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633] 6* By: NWD Dale: 201 1 



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^ d. I^es rmd levels of equlpnent to be retained by the 
TEC end the Vietnamese anned forces. 

e* Procedures for the rapid evacuation and disposition of 
excess U. S, equipment, . "_ 

f. The military iinpli cations of the possible loss of South 
Vietnam to the Communists. 



The type and level of assistance to be given to other 
countries in the area (Cambodia^ Laos^ Thailand j Bu]ana) in the light 
of the above. 

h. The extent to trhich these changed circumstances and 
revised prograias iTill effect the discharge of U, S. obligations under' 
the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. 

k. It is further requested that this information be for\7arded 
to me not later than 20 January 1955* 



^ 4 



Signed - 



C. E. Wilson 



Distx: 1, 2, 3 - JCS 

k - r/c 

5 - OYiAk Plans Comeback 

6 - OSD 



Prepd. by JICoffey/2E845 

Ee>iTitten by: IISHensel/ocp/30 Bsc ^h 

I -IT, 117 



V .. 



C,-TC 









ODl 



' ' I 



Declassiried per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Pmject Number: NND 633 1 6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



h-^r^r^ ri^fi^^F'n^ 






•IHE JOIIW, CHIEFS OF STAFF 
Washington 25 ^ D.C. 



21 January 1955 



MEMORArom FOE THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 



Subject: Reconsideration of U.S. Mlitary Programs ! 

in Southeast Asia. ^ 

1. In response to your memorandum^ dated 5 January ^955^ 
subject as above ^ the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit the fol- 
lo^^ing views and recommendations. 

2. In answer to the eight specific points raised in the 
above memorandum^ the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it ap- 
propriate^ in viev of the complexity of the problem and the 
difficulty of considering any of the questions in isolation, 
to fon-rard a discussion of the points raised. This discussion 
is attached as the Appendix hereto. 

3* The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the eight points 
mentioned involve only a portion of the over- all problem in an 
examination of the implications of possible courses of action. 
Accordingly J in response to your request to submit views and 
recommendations on any other points considered appropriate^ 
the following courses of action are considered available to the 
United States in the light of the current situation in South 
Vietnam. 

a. To continue aid to South Vietnam as currently being 
developed with the cooperation of the French and Vietnamese. 

b. To institute a unilateral program of direct guidance 
to the Vietnamese government through an "advisory" system. 
Under this course of action^ the amount of U.S. aid should 
be dependent upon Vietnamese adherence to U.S. direction. 

£* In the event the courses of action in subparagraphs 
a and b above ^ are not sufficient to insure retention of 
South Vietnam to the Free World, to deploy self-sustaining 
U.S. forces to South Vietnam^ either unilaterally, or as a 
part of a Jfenila Pact force* 



862 



N. 



ENSITiVE 



Declassified per Execiitive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



■-i I 







d. To withdraw all U.S. support from Soutli Vietnam and 
concentrate on saTing the remainder of Southeast Asia. 

Included in the discussion attached hereto are some of the 
advantages and disadvantages of each course. 

h. Although national policy prescribes making every possible 
effort to prevent South Vietnam falling to the Communist Sj the 
degree to which the United States is x-rilling to support this 
policy in men, monej^ materials ^ and acceptance of additional 
war risks is not readily apparent « Prior to consideration of 
military courses of action \fith respect to this area^ a firm 
decision at national level as to implementation of IT.S. policy 
in Southeast Asia is mandatory. In this connection, the Joiat 
Chiefs of Staff have recommended previously against a "static" 
defense for this area and therefore reiterate the previously 
recoiTjnended adoption of a concept of offensive actions against 
the "military power of the aggressor''. 

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

ARTHUR RADFORD, 
Chairman J 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Enclosure 






V .- 



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863 i 



Declassified per Execmive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



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TOP SECRu 



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF TrlE PRFSIDENT 

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 

V^ASl-llHGTOW 



January 2h. 195^' 



Copy f'!o 



o 



>13>;0a^l>!»Uii FOH T?K MATIO:^AL S-XL^.ITY COUXIL 



SUBJECT; 



R3FJ2l3^!C)i;S; 



Boport on Viotman for the ?Iational Security 

Council 

I 

A. Annex A to NSC 5^v29/5 

B, mc Action :>Io, 1259-e 



The enclosed report on the subject, prepared 



by General J. Lav/ton CoXllnsj iSpecial Representative, in 
Vietnam, is transmitted herewith for discussion by the 



J "4 



National Sacuvity Council at its meeting on Thursday, 



January 27, 19^'? 



In_the liF:ht of the nature of the reuort 



■ "■ -^r »■ +»-™t* P T " ""^^-j 



d i s tr Ihut ioj] Is. be in^ ka d t t o j^g absolut a ^ i^^^ an d _ i t . i s 

be on a 'Uioed to k>iovj^^ basis* . - 



■ >r ■^i-^..---ir^ ^ T 1 1 r-1 -|- 1 I .*.!. 



JAMiS S. LAY, J^, 
Executive S'ecretary 



cc: The Secretary of the .Treasury 

The Director, Bureau of the Budget 
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of ^/taff 
The Director of Central Intelligence 



I 



n /^ 1 






TOP SECRET 



*^i 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Dale: 201 



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'^' ' Ton Secret 

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January 20, 1955 



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, To: ' .jL'he Secrctar/ of -^tate 



•-» 



Froiii: J. Lav:fcGn Collins, Special Kepresentative in Vietnam 

* I 

Subject: Report on Vietnain Tor the National Security Council 

1, Tlic situation in Vietnam is riost conple,^. and clirricult 
to j.atho>Ti. Ky judgments arc conditioned by the fact that I have 
been in Vietnam only tv:o months. However^ duBing this period I 
have studied intensively the raajor Tactors vrhich vjill aTfect the 
out J.7ie of our effort g to save rVoe Vietnain from CorrL'fiunlsra, 
iheae najor factors are: 



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^) ^?il^'^1i^ZlS.^2l_,§:5^ Free 

r Vietnain car^not match the r:iilitary poiver of the Viet Kinh who 

L. have, and v:ill retain^ the capability to overrun free Vietnai^ 

i f th ey >r i sh * Free Vi e t n a :*^ ' s^ ul t irn a t o s ecur i t y lies in th e 

C military, and luoral support it may receive under the Manila fact* 

Strong af firnation by the sisnatorics. to the Kanila Pact of 
theix' determnation to react if hostilities were renevjed in '^ 

Indochina nay be an essential factor in deten^ing the Viet Kinh %J- 

; fron launching an open attack* Moreover such a declai^ation "^ 

^" 'would (s^eatly strengthen the Diera Goverr^icnt 's position* The ^^^* 

Viet Hiiih have left elenents throu^'hout South Vietnaju >jhich 
constitute a c^ontinuing throat to the nation's security* On - 
. thiS other hand** the Viet liinh have serious -ccononic problems in 
th e Ko V t h J vih or c s ova -- c o nf i ti c a t cry t ax a t io n a nd o t h or acts of 

L repress! on have erected much dissatisfaction, Knovledse of 

these adverse conditions of life in tbe J^orth, as it reaches 
Free Vietnam, is bo^innin^^ to have a salutary effect on the 

C attitudes of people in the Soiith and nay have considerable 

bearing on the eiection^i if they are held in 195^* 



^ ) /ho__At t rcj^ud Int e nt i o ns of ?r anc e : Th ere is 

considerable doubt in vx^ mind as to the real intentions and ob^ 
jectivos of France in Indochina* There is strong evidence that 
the French favor a nevj Vietnamese G-overnsient vhich will offer 
no serious resistance to the Viet Hlnh .or to French direction. 
V/ithout French support, and that support is far from assured^ 
the survival of Free Viotn^i-i is problematical* 






-.'C/: 



c) Attitude and Intentions of the Sects: The nolitlco- T'^'^- 
/jpL reli£;ious ai^med groups called the Gao Dai, Hoa iiao, and 3inh Xuycn 

L%t/ ^^^ anti-Comrriunist Ih orientation, but f c\i.dalistic and regressive 
in all other respects^ At present they have an 






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Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



~2- ' ^ . Top Pecre 



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feiieC:t3-ve veto povrtr over £overninent action. This pov:ur tiiey 
use to block reforms v;l:ich irdfht thryafjan their preferred 
!rdlit£!ry, economic ^md political status'^ They v;ill retain 
their power to thrt:atyn and harass the governnient until the 
National Army is strofi^; enough to- noutrVjlise their forceE;. 



f^ J li^i^^!!:iX-HlO:iLt?L£tiZPil§^S_or_ t he Vietnarr-ese Arrji 
Forcec: Wnen 1 arrive e in Vietnam the Government was terro: 



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p ^ by" a: "rebellious Chief of Staff, General Hinh. Hinh' 
[_^ ■ and dismissal shortly thereafter cleared the v;ay for 

render the Army subordinate to the Government. Dien, 

ra fair measure of control over the armed forces. The Army is 
bein^; deployed throughout the country to carry out a so-callec 
"^'ationol Security Action" program designed" to conibat Viet Kir 

[ 
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ed 

rised 
s departure 
steps to 
reridor the jlrrny ji-ubordinatu to the Government. ^ Diem noi/has 
a fsir measure oT control over the armed Torces, The Army is 

ed 

. ^ ^ nh 

infiltration' and restore civil government throughout the coun^ 
try. The Amy's degree of effectiveness in executing this pro- 
£rap- v;ill have a decisive hearing en the success or failure of ^ 
the Diem Government* It is too soon to predict v/hether or not 
the Nationa.1 Secairity Action pro£;raH v^ill succeed but a£;reement 
by the United States to assume training responsibility and to 
£;rcnit financial aid to a rcox"£f?ni3cd and revitalized national 
ari^iy should have significant stabilizing effects. 

■a 

e) E c on o rni c As !> e c t s of Fi'^ e e _ ?i e t n a ni : Free Vietnam 
is capable of maintaining, a viable econoiiiy, at modest levels- 
The territory is novi self -sufficient in food and formerly pro- 
duced a substanticil rice export surplus. Rice and rubber are 
tx'^aditionally the principal sources of Vietnamese foreign ex- 
chi^inge. As security improves^ export availability of these, 
products sliould increase, thus contrib^iting; tov/ard ''stabilisa- 
ion of t3ie economy, , . - 



*^ 



f) Ability of "^icn to Secure Broad Popular Suonort: 
There is still a serious question in my laind as to v/hetber Diem 
v/ill be able to estal^lish broad popular confidence in^ and sup- 
port for J his Government. Hov/everj he has enjoyed sor.^e recent 
successes in his dealinge v;ith the sects. This and his reten-- 
tion of active U.S, support have tended to enhance his prestige, 
Kov;ever^ Diea has iriuch yet to learn about practical politics ^. 
and public relations. 'VJhile at times he conveys the impression 
of being well over his depth, recently he has evidenced greater 
flexibility in handling* people s.nd increased self-confidence 
in dealing: v;ith his ministers and -public issues. On balance 
I bolieve'that Dieia^s integrity^ strong nationalism, tenacity^ 
snd^ spiritual qualities render him the best available Prime ^ 
Mnister to lead Vietnam in its struggle against GQ::iriunism, 

2r In or de'i'" 'to assist the Diein Government to capitalise' 



Top Secret 



,_..^ 



8G6 



* 



Declaitsified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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on its advantaf^es and to overcome the obstacles to its success, 
I have directed the principal error ts of the United States in, 
Vietnc-i:n^ in cooperation wit?i the Prcnch^^* toward aiding the 
Vietnapiuse, to develop and execute a series ox eniergenoy programs 
covt^ring the military estabiishpieht, agrarian voUovm^ refu.gee 
resettleiiient J fiscal mana:;^^-^-*^^^^ ^^^d the establishnent of a 
national assembly, dorao progress^ of increasing monentum is 
bciing inade in all these fields, with corresponding increase in 
the stability of the G-overixnent • The leo.st successful aspect 
of my mission has been my failure thus far to induce Dium to -^ 
b"^oaden his Governrtient by including other able^ experienced 
leaders, such as Or. ilian Huy ,;^atj former Defense Minister. : 

r ■ 3» Considering all factors, although the sitviation^ in 
V' etna:n is not bright, I believe that if -L^iem has firm U,3* 
support and guidance and active ?reneh cooperation, or at Least - 
acquiescence, his G-overra'aent . has a reasonable p;rcspect of success, 
Vihiie the a tr;:D sphere in Saigon has improved demonstrably since 
I\ovumbi.-r^ owing to the departure of vJ'eneral Hinh and the backing 
>jhich the "United states G-bvernment has given to Diem^ I have been 
u n ab 1 e to d e t e rm i ne the ox t en t o f inp r o v em ont i n tha c oiin t r y s i d e 
and villages of free Vietnam, There the Viet Mlnli vill maintain 
a siguificant degreo of control xintil the National Security 
Action prograM is well advanced* Moreover^ the sects, although 
dlsplayin;^ some un^jasiness that thtir days of political and 
financial ind^epcndence iriay be numbered^ remain devoid of any 
sens^e of national eonscicn.ce and still have the capacity to do 
great harm, I/ilceijise the prospect of national elections in 
1956 hangs as a threat, over free Vietnam* This threat may 
reach the stage of crisis by July 1955^ the period when under 
the Geneva Accord th's3 tv:o sides are to begin discuscions leading 
to elections, iv everthtjl.es s, in my Judgment, there is at least 
an civen chsnce that ViotnJ^^m can be saved from^ Commvinism if the 
present vrogram:^ of its Government are fully Implemented, 

k. a^c. Best available estimate of the cost^s for 0'£ 55 
financing programs of military and non-military aid that I 
recommend are : 



vl 



of 



G^l 55 



Xst Half 



Military 
Jjon-military 

Total Costs 
Less Viotnnmese Contribution 
Remaining Requirement for 



;jj) 152 o 3 

§ 206.^ 

T- ■*^ — ' - - 



2n d Ha lf 
;| 130.9 

f| 1S9.2 



^ . M 



b. In practice, beca.usc of delays in leaking nevr 



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867 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



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U.S. appropriations ?.v salable in Vietnan, . Vietna^nese calendar 
yesr expenses have norvoaliy been paid £ro^ funds appropriated 
for the. U.3, Tiscal year. ' -. , ^ * 

_c. However, if it is necessary to reduce Vietnam's 
share o.f tlie 8700,000,000 currently appropriated for Southeast 
Asia, it would be possible to limit the o.iiiount made available to 
Vietnari to ;:a72, 300, 000 (reaulred for 1st half of CI 195i^) if ve 
could be aysurod of 01^^5,000,000 (renui-red for 2nd half of GY 1955) 
frcm new ?T 195^ appropriations. 



d^. jistiraated costs for GY 1956 are: 



CY_JL9i6 



t'ilitary 
Icon-Kilitary 



1st Half 

91 .IT 



V 



m 



Total Costs 



Less Vietnamese Contribution 



ilem a i ni ng Re q u 1 r ein c n t Tor l) 






Funds 



t)l3l.7 
^^103.^ 



2nd Half 

-33 a 

U 21, 9 
-28^5 

^^ 93. li: 



e. The requiremevit for U.3, funds for the second half 
of 01 1955', ::?l55o0 million, added to'* the requirement for U.S. funds 
for the first half of CY" 1956, «103^2 million, or a total of 
:ji25o.2 million, would be the to'tal requireiient for U.S. py 1956 
appropriations, A contingency fund of -^2.0 riiilllon may be required 
for F'l 1956 as Indicated in Enclosure "3". 

5* In view of the importance o.f Vietnam to all of -Southeast 
Asia> I a:a co'ivinccd that tho United States should expend the. 
fui:ds, materiel^ and effor*t, required to strengthen the coimtry 
and help it retain its inde':?endenceo I can^aot guarantee that 
Vietnam vdll reniain free, even vrith our aid^ But I knovr th?.t 
uithout our aid Victna-^a will surely be lost to Cora^^unisn, If 
the chances of si^.ccess are difficult to calculate, the results 
of a vjithdrawal of Aiericar; aid are only too certain, not only 
in VietnaiTi but turou^hout Southeast Asia* Such a v/ithdrawal v:ould 
hasten the rate of Con-iunist advances in the ?ar ii^ast as a vhole 
and could result in the loss of Southeast Asia to Communism. in 
my opinion, the chance of success is not only Kprth the gainble; 
we cannot afford to l^it free Vietnari go by default* 




^y^. 



Jp Laivton Collins 
Special .Representative ^ 
of the United States in Viet nam 






8G8 



Declassined per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



K^^'' W^.1 ■^^'--" -i '^ ^^^^-^^ 



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SUPPLEMLK? 
■0 SHL RlilrOilT OH VIETrJAM 

.by • -■• 

GEIi. J. LAVTOiC COLLINS- 



.• • 



1. 

■ 



P03T-GEN7:VA CllISTS III VIZTHAM/ a, Ori^unjoTjy^ 
The "immediate 'cc-use" of the crisis* in Vietni^m vrhich 
-"a ocute phrase in the fc^Il of. 1954 v^^'i3 the Geneva 
This a{;retir3ent ended seven years of v/ar by dividing 



reacnca c>.i 
Accord, 

t^ e country at the l?th parallel and av;arded administration 
o^' Ton!<:in and northern .'mnam to a victorious Communist ^rmy 
and re,^;iTP.£i. Under French leadership Vietna?^! had oarticipated 
in the V';ar under conditionG which tended to perpetuc^te the 
e sentiol features of colonial rule. These conditions dis- 
coura^ed the grovrth of institutions v;hich mi£;ht have consti'-- 
tuted a lulv/ark a^:Ginct the Viet Minh in the South even after 
the enemy hcd prevailed Liilitarily in the North. Vietnairi 
eiaerg^rj froni the v/ar v:ith nominal independence, but this 
e'xertcd less popular appeal than the anti-colonial slogans 



of the Viet Kinh. Its so-called i^ational Ax^my at the raoment 
of defeat \^jas neither national nor .^ an ariny. Its civil ad- 
ministration V'-'as denoraliEed, Its government lacked effective 
control and v/as faced v;ith the pi^ospoct of national elections 
in 1956 which could reunite the country under Communist con- 
trol* iIov:everj this £Overn:.ient , headed by Mgo Dinh Dien- 
since June 1934, v;as the first nationalist government of 
Vietnam and vdth its moral force resolutely opposed the Viet 
I^Iinh » 



& 



J. JT 



k - I}i5Jil_5.lll J}i.^.^Ul2.^^ ( -^ ) Be c au se of its 
anti-A^ict Minh 'and' nationalist character, the Diem Governm.ent 
^vas unpopular vdth nearly the entire range of French official-- 
dorn, Sor:=e Frevich elements hoped for an accoir^modation betv/een 
North and South v.liich vrould permit the French to continue to 
do bvisinoBS v;ith the entire country. Others nourished the 
illusion that ^ quasi-colonial regime could be established 
and perpetuated in Cochinchina. Under pressure from bath 
'ides, the French Government through its representatives in 
Vr'a sh in ^t on -^ind Saigon ^ made repeated representations 
U.S. Government^ v^hich had publicly stated its support 
Diem Government, to the effect that Diem had had his 
chance, had failed, and should be replaced. The negative re- 
ply to these overtures v/as based on the U*S. contention that 
Diem, ov/ing to circuinstances beyond his control, had not had 
a real chance ^td prove himself j that to replace him v;ithout 
removing the impodiments to his success v/ould only lead to 
another failure; a.nd that the men suggested by the- French to 



Paris, 
to the 

of the 






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replace Di^ni vjere unacceptable ,10 r being eithor French puppots 



or cryptO"Vi*;.-tt i'linb. 






(2) The opposition to Diepi^.'in addition to the 
CoiiHiiunists f..n.c\ a Ic-ri^o element of the French, included the 
Ciiicr of tl c VietnriiTiC-se General Staff end the sectarian reli- 
glous groups. These S(i;cts have long teen more concerned, vdth 
mciintaining their private armies and domains than v;ith wording 
for the common national ^;ood. The sects finally joined the 
Diem Government, to protect their cvm interests. Kov/ever, 
General Hinh, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces ^ vjith 
some tacit support froi:! the sects , precipitated a prolonged 
crisis by threatening; for about tv:o months Xo overthrov; the 
Government by force > AlthQU£;;h this officer vras a French citi- 
zen and a lieutenant colonel in the French Air Force, no ef- 
fective French pressure v^rxs brought to bear on him to desist 
froin threatenin,-^ the Gcvernment. On the contrary, it appeared 



that a Vietnamese Keguib {or Nasser) would not have heen un- 
vjelcome to the French if he had been able to estcliiBh a mili- 
tary dict^otorsi-ip responsive to French direction* 

£' Situation as o f Hovepibgr 1954* (1) As of the 
date my mi'ssioir alrrivcd in Saigon, "Cenera'l Hinh^ the Chief of 
Staff J continued to threaten 'the Government , even thour?i he 
had been ordered by the Chief of State to proceed to France* 
The sects, although represented in the Government, were openly 
working tovjard their owi objectives, vnthout thought of the 
consequences of their action upon the nation, Thie Viet Ilinh 
v-ere in offoictivc control of ino;5t of the rural areas and vil- 
lages under apminaX authority of the 
French representatives v.cre pressing 
Hi em and hie rep la corn en t by one of t 



National Government. 
for the early removal of 
eir ov^n stoo.ees or else 



bv a Vict ;'';inh syi,ipathizer v/ho might reach some kind of under 




en 

nego'f^i^V'ing in rtanoi \w\zn ztie uiei: ::Linn zo me eiiu ufi^J^b n-ench 
businesses might continue to operate under '^normal*^ conditions 
in Viet r'inh territory. At the same time .the Government v.^as 
faced v.'ith the cru^^rdng problem of moving, caring for end 
relocating anti-Communist refugees iror^ the North \=ho now 
number nearly one -half million and may in the end total one 
million- This undertaking, which could ne^er have succeeded 
without the devott^d service of the French Army and the American' 
Navy and the financial support of the U.S. GoveririTsnt , v.dll ^ 
long tax the resources of the nation, involving as it does 
one of the mo.:-t ' significant population movements of moderrr ' 
times* ^^ ' 






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Declassified per Executive Order 1 3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 1 6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



^ ^ — ^^-^ ^^_^, ^^^ ^ 



V-J £*»- ^-" •" ^ ■ 




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tElyj I pro'ceeded thereafter to draw up a sovdn-point pro^:r 
or action to vx^uch l proposed to devote the limited period 
of my n^ission in Vietn-r^n, I had consulted "Ely in detail as 
this pro/;rai;i wag bein*: drav^n up, '7:ad had obtained his con- 
r ctirrence' and the cooperation of his staff nerifoers v.'ho v;orked 



Accordingly, my initial efforts were directed tovs"ara preparing' 
recor.^'iUidations on tlse flational Ax-^my which had to be dealt 
with before &ny of the ot'ner urgent problems of Vietnam could 
be solved • Fortunate ly^ shortly after my arrival. General' 
Ilinh obeyed the orders B?o Dai had been prevailed upon to 
issue J and left Vietna.ni for France, as I had urged him to. do. 
Kinh's departure rer^^jved some of the aspects-of crisis from 
the National Army pro^^ram but did not rob it oi its import- 
ance as t]ie nation's inost urgent problem. 

b. In accord vrlth the French Commissioner General 

t pro-;;r;^um 



. 871 



1.— 1-^ it 


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(2) From nearly every point of viev.-, ^'free" 
Vietnam apneai'ed headed tov)ai-l absorption by the Vie^t Minh, 
vdicther through a French-managed accommodation vith the Com- 
munists or through the restoration of a^ scarcely-^veiled ^ 
colonial syi'te):i in South Vietnam v;hich could have hecn sus- 
tained against the Viet I-Iinh only by the ^jeight of arms 
\v)iich^ paradoxically J the French had m.ade clear they had no 

intention of vising. 

to ' 

2' PUKP03K O F C0LLI ^i3 ^JISSIOH, In his letter of Novem^ ' \ 
ber Ij 19i^^4> instructing me to undertake a special mission ; 
to Vietnam J the President said he \ras ordering me to Saigon ' 
for a limited period to coordinate and direct U.S. activities^ 
in Vietnam, in support of U.S. policy objectives. To that 
^nd.^ he gave me broad authority to direct, utilize and con- 
trol all agencies of the U.3, Governm.ent in that country. 
My imm.ediate task vjas to attem.pt to check a rapidly deter- 
iorating situation in Vietnam and to help Biem^s Governnent 
establish internal security and political stability tlu^ough- 
cut its territories. The eniergency, rather than the' long- - • 
range, aspects of U.S. policy in Vietnam v/ere designated the 
principal task of my mission, . > 

3' SiiYr^iLlJ^^^^^^^ B,* ^ ^"^-s ^<^^^ impressed vdth 

the fact that' the r^ational Army" was the key to success or 
led. lure in Vietnam, The kvmj v/as under the command of- an 
avoved enemy of the Diem Government. So long as the Govern- " - 
ment could not rely on the Army, it v;as povjerless not only . 
aralust th& General Staff but also a.r-ninst the scents, each 






Declassirit'd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Pioject Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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closely with mine. Cur fclose collaboration v;ns confiri.ir;d in 
Decern: er by thm 3ccret;;ry of State and. 'the French Premier 
^.fte^■ tiieii- ineetini^ in T'Jashington. 

G. The seven-point program \je evolved v/as as follows: 
(1) Vietnamese Arir.ed Forces 

(a) A=;:roeaent to be" reached with French and 
Vietncauese on .tiie siae, composition and mission of the forces. 

■ k 

(b) As-airaption by MAAG of full rosoonsibility 
for training Vietnamo^se Armed Forces* ^ 



/a'TiJed Forces. 



(c} Full autonomy to be rrrontod to Vietnamese 



(d) National Arrny support, and subordination 
to J Vietnairjese Government to be assured. 

{e) Euployrricnt of National Array in National 
Security Action (pacification an/l .ant i- subversion program). 

(2) 3trenrtlicnin<£ and broadening of Ijien Governncnt . 

(3) Helocation of refugees and their absorption 
into the national economy, ^ . ^ . 

^ [l-r) Agrarian reform, particularly tho.<;e phases' 
designed to get refugees onto the land and restore all \mtxlled 
lands to cultivation* 

■i- 

(5) I^stablishment of a National Assembly. 

T 4 

(6) Financial and economic measures designed to 
strengthen the econor':yj iiVr:et U.S. requirements for receiving 
direct American aid and to support other points of the prorram, 

{7) Education and training^ pfirticularly in the 
field of public administration. 

d. It ivas agreed that as progress ";\^as achieved in 
each field a calculated effort vjould be made to give major^ 
credit to Px'esident Diein for such progress. Diem ,v;ould meke 
the public announcements through an im.proved and expanded ^ 
Vietnaniese Public Information Service, I charged the chief 
of our USI3 udth- the irriplementation of this most irr^portant - 
aspect of our program. . ■ 







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Decl^ffsiHed per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






-5-^ OC-V^^i \?-- ^- 



ci. - ■? 



Vi e t n a m G ^ A nn e d r o r c t* s . { 1 j Un U e c e ;-'■']> e r 13 G en e ra 1 Ely an d 
1 agreed on ^ lorce structure Tor ths Vietn/iiiiosG Arned Forces 
and on t)\e assu^rntion hy ^^AAG of full responsibility for ^ 
training thei-'^ forces under the overell authority of the Con- . 
mender- in -Chief in Indochina. Delay by the French Covora:rtent 
in approving our agreencnt on this subject has held up irnple- 
m c n t at i on of t ■ ] i ^ a d pe c t of t li e pi" o gr am , 

(2) The same agreement referred to above provides 
that the Vietna^nese Armed Forces v.dll be fully autonor^ous, that 
is staffed and coinmanded solely by Vietnamesse officers^ .by July 
1 V^^^ * 



iiient vJith Pre 



(3) Additionally, on January 19, i reached agree- 
;sident Dieui and the Vietnamese J^Iinister of i^at- 



ioaal Defense on a slightly modified force structure and on 
a program for reorganization of the Vietnamese A.rmed Forces, 
in v;hich General Ely concurred. This agreement is contained 
in rn exchange of letter? betv^^een the Vietnamese Government 
c'nd me* 



c 

c 

(4) The sti'^ucture of the Vietnamese Armed Forces 
n (shovm in Enclosure A) is designed to accomplish a t^vo-fold 
. - mission; the establis'irnxnt and maintenance of internal secu- 
'^ rity; and the capability of providing sufficient initial re- ^ 

' slstance to external attack to prevent the country from being 
[ rapidly overi^un before outside assistance can be brought to' 
^ bear, ?o ^^ccomplish these laissions the .Arrny is to ""be organised 

into six divisions: three territorial divisions ^ essentially 
existing regional co:mr.ands; and three field divisions to con- 
stitute a mobile brittle corps to reinforce provincial units 
and provide a delaying shield in event of aggression* 



(5) Tills structure is based on the concept that 
a relatively small force, properly trained, equipped and led^ 
can perform the above missions more effectively and at less 
cost t='.p.n a. larger force which would be disproportionate to 
the economic and manpo;;er capacities of the country. In any 



ex- 
ceeding Vv'hatever number of divisions free Vietnam could put 
into the field* 



[ . 
[ 

case J the Vict riiah enemy^ backed hy its Comriunist Chinese 

CcllVj could alv.-ays maintain the capability of matching anA 
rf^r'clir^.y whatever numhf:r of divislonr^ free Vietnam could du 

[ 

[ 
[ 

■ IB h 



,\6) Thus the Vietnamese Jirmecl Forces dascribxid 
^hQV&, fiiid the concept upon v.'hich their structure is br.sed,. 
do not in themselves insure the security of free Vietnam in 
the event of external attach. Such security nust depend ul- 
timately on the Manila P.ect Powers and tlie action they ^-:ould 






873 .- 



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Di^cl^ssined per Executive Order 13526» Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 U 



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"be prepared to take, bo ijhich VietnaTnesd forces thci^Gelvo 
vculdnake a vlt?J_ contribution. . 

m 

(7 J Significant progress has been maCio in attain- 
ing i^ational Arruy support of, and subordln^ition to^ the Viet- 
n^nose uovern:^,ent f or:iov:in:7; the depoxturo of General Kinli. 
VJhilc it may be too early to say that the Jlational Army is novj 
in alL GonGGs the riiilltar^y am of the. govGprjTientj I believe 
that thlG aspect of the orograri is on the ri^ht path and v;ith 
p tlont application will be fully realised. 



(8) ^he dcployTnent of the territorial force- of 

already begun, The 
c nectlves and methods o? thp- ilntlon.^l Security Action ?ro3ra>^ 



tne ivational Army to the i:.roYinccG has already begun, The 
P c^ jectives and methods of the ila^tlonal Security Action Pro^r 

h.a^e been explained to mlltary and civil authorities having 



s 



r^espon^iibilitles tVLrcug:iout .the country. This prograrri too 1 
of long range character and v:ill tal^e some months to execute. 
A good start has boon made. 



b» Strengthening^, and Broadeninq_ of Diem n-overn^Tient , 
Little pi' ogress has been vaade tovjard strengthening and broadc2iing 
the i^ler.i Goverinent. This failure, is attributable to the fact 
^that more than half of the present 'cabinet ministers represent 
the sects ai:d are opposed to accepting into the cabinet any 
laan i;ho i^iight threaten their position there or the place of their 
respective sect in the societyc Frii-ae Minister Diem contends 
that he v/ishcs to broaden his Goverix-nent but dares not do so 
U2itll the iiatilonal Army has been rendered capable of neutral iz^ing 
tho private^ military forces of the sects. The fail^ire of Diem ^ 
to accept Dr# Fhan Huy -^lat in the Government v?as a riajor 
p set-badv. 'J-hcro is still an urgent need for an effective 

[^ Minister of the Interior^ and the I'^Iinis tries of Inl*ormation 

and \griculture particularly need strengthening. Considerable 

L improvement has resulted from the appointment of Ho Tliong ifinh 

as Defense Minister and Diom^s reliri--LuishTrient to him of authorrlty 
to direct and control the Defense Ministry, The new Comvdissloner 
of hefugees, rha>n Van iiuyen, also represents an improvement, 

LI fear that no further progress on this front, hoivever, villi 
be made for. some time to come. 



^* j.^.f 1 o.c ^^t i o n _ o f ,3.oi^V-fiPPA* Kiis is likewise a long 
range and complex proV^.em*"" It has been under urgent study by 
members of uSCM and the appropriate ministries of the Govern- 
ment* Some progress has been made in developing plans to ; 
absorb the hundreds of thousands of refugees into the productive 
life of the nation, particularly in the field of agriculture. 



V .^ 



^» Ar^J'ari an He f orm^. President Dien intends to announce 
In his he\<f Year's message 1 January 2l;.) an agrarian reform prorr-ain 



87i| 



Declassified per Execuiive Order B526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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cc\'erin2 landlord- tenant relationships, conditions of land 
tenure, and an eriergency pi'Or;ra"M vhcrcb^y refugees and 
nllitary personnel doriobiii:ied as a result o.f the i-eduotion 
in thfe Arriod Poncos can be placed, npcn land abandoned by its 
ovrners or not nov: in x^ne, Tlie pro£^Pan will provide that ^af ter 
tj'iree years, ir certain conditions ez*o net, the rernj^ees can ob- 
tain poi^nanent posscGsion of the land on vhich they are placed. 



e^, ilM^abl i shr-i cnt o f 
ive arai'tcc 
t h e liTib a s sy a t aff , 



or 



h. 



a 1 ;a t i onal As 3 e:;ibl y, Yi g t narac s o 



Htul v;lth tne "close cooperation of r;ieTabops 
reyised a decree establishing a national 
a£ser:b,^y. This assembly >:ill be provifi onal, viill have some 
elective character, and v.dll have only liiYiitod pov7ers. This 
cinbly v^ill prepare for the later establiSnitient of a conriti- 






nt a?;serab?Ly but >:ill itself have no constituent pov;ers. 

s point is iranortant since to establish the poi*2nanant foi"^ii 



tne 

Thi 

of the r^ov eminent necessarily involves dcfinin,':?: the role of the 

pro 

gov 

the national ^^overrcaent is unable to cone with the sects and 



sent 



o 



"O 



Chief of '^tato 3ao Dai* The inclination o± the present 
ernvMcnt is to throi%^ over Bao Dai, but I feci that as ior^s 



as 



o 



other splinter f^rouo'^ vrithou.t his aid- it i^^oxO^d be both^prc^iiature 
end de/ngarous to rc:nove Bao Dai from lii,s position as Qilef of 
State, 



£* Financi al and r.;co non: l_c ^ Meas ur e s to _ S tr eng t hen the 
Kconop y , 1 1 ) y i o t nam no\^ iia s i t s ovj n na t i o nal b arilc and i s 
independent of the nrevlons quadripartite system* Am^rrican" 
e:^ports of the U^OM and 'iinbassy staffs arc ^vor-':in^ Hith Viet^ 
naxi-ese Governnent officials to establish procedures acceptable 
to the United States i:ith' regard to foreign exchange, import, 
controls, and related matters, Ivuch time has hoen cTonsarTied 
in explai/iin^i Ai-nerican requlre:iients but the Vietnai^iese offi*- ■ 
cials have displayed good %jill and I believe that they \/ill 
meet our objectives in this regard* 

(2) Daring GY 1955> tax receipts of tiae national 
government of Vietna?^ will be appro::ipjately ^39 liiillion, of 
wliich ■■pll6 rnillion will have to' be used for ordinary civilian 
experjditures of the governnent. This surplus on the civilian 
side of th.e bud;^et, plus borrovring and other extraordinary 
r e c el p t s of the n a t i o n al gov ernin en t , x^-ll 1 p emit ''" ^"^ ^ ^ .• ^ 4- « 
Gcveri-iraent to contribute approximately i}oQ milli 
extraordinary exp-^jnditures of the G-overri!aent, including niilitary, 
rerugees, and econoiTiic aid. The balance of necessary expenditures 
of arjnroxiiniately $32? tnlllion vrill have to be Tiiet by United States 
aid/ 'For FY 19i>6' it is estimated that receipts v:ill increase 
and expenditures decline, so that aid needed \-Jill decline to 
approximately i^2$^Q million. 



V, i^he Viet naj:ne s e 
ion to the 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Sectiun 3,3 
NMD Project Number: NND 63316. Bv: NWD Dute: 201 1 



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(3) ^^eqiiirenents for Uiiited States econoi^ilc aid 
are exoected to xncre?.£je rrcm aorsroxinafclv i-3lL rilT lion in 
FY 1955 to :-^50 million in Cr 19^5> cr.d to^ 1^66 nillion in L^J 1956, 
or au ^.pproxiiuatG doubling Trom I^'Y 1955 uo PY 1956, T}ie inajor 
increase is in transportation raid coinrauni cations, wit?i snsllcr 
increa.^es in agri cr.lt up e, education and public adnini titration, 
and rublic health. 



aid 
tbe 
the 



[h^) As shovm by the above fi^^uresj during 1955 
ai\6. 1956j economic aid rc^uiren^nts v;lll incraaso and ndlitary 
roquireraents v;ill decrease* Knclosuro ^'B^' shovis graphically 
ma^^nitudo of Vietnaraose Oovernrncnt extraordinary expenses, 
expected Vietnariiese contribution^ and the anounc of^ United States 
aid re conL=] ended for military and. non-nilitary aid prograras during 
1955 -nd 1956 J 



iS. • jiLducatio n and TraJ.nin .^ in Fi:i bli c Ad-^iini_st ration » 
The Vietnanese Goverr^-rient is aliout to sign a contract with 
Kichi^jan State Gollese, under the sponsorship of FOA, vaiich 

Hill provide a niuch-neodcd school of public administration and 
specialized training in police methods. 



5 



Ili!2!3LJ;;^_g?_T}I^ The normal probleiia of a divided 

e 




es 
sta- 



Bach or t::ese groups is rendered dangerous by its possession 
of arncd forces and its control of a considerable portion of 
the national territory* The sects and the 3inh Auyen, althoush 
they have afe various oirios olayed an anti-Fi-^ench role, are vestirt 
of the colonial policy of divide and rule. VAiile no rcliabl-e 
ti sties are avail able j thpse groups claim to embrace about oni;- tenth 
of the population of free Vietnava and to h.ave forces variously 
sri^.od tot oiling I|.0/50jOOO* The Frciich have incorporated sone 
thousands of these ar-ned forces into their iS:*:peditionary Corps 
and have provided ti^e financial means for the perpetuation of 
tl:o sects as serni-indcpendent principalities* "French subsidies^ 
to tho sects, hov/over, which have steadily dirjinished over 
recent months, \-jill, according to General Ivly, be entirely sus- 
penO,ed as of ^^anuary 31. This development, vjhile dangerous in the 
i2v>2aediate future, is of lon^ range advanta^ge to the Vietnamese 
Government in that it o*ffers tho opportunity, if properly exploited 
to end once and for all the a.cute threat of the sects to an orderl v 
central cover*iiin':-mt • Lachlng French support the sects will be 
obliged to turn to the national governments If the governiTient 
handles then skillfully, they can be brought into line and shorn 
of their power to create serious trouble* }Iov/ever, if the govern^ 
ment does not proceed cautiously in this natter, there is a pos- 
sibility that thp sects, or fragtn^^-nts of them, nay resort to ' 
open banditry at "a" ti^ne when the iiational governjai^nt 
not tvrenared to meet this noi-j nenace. 



V 
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Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Prciject Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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U.S. RJJjA TIQjMa :-agH '^Ji^AC'd III VXi^i^AIU One of the 

in Viotnori 



6 . 

ci^uclrxl Toquiromvjnts o:." U,ci, policy ana dperationr. 
Is to cleter^iiiiie precisely v;hat Frencli Intentions toward the 
country arc. It is cle^.r that tho/rcnch-in Vietnam do not 
£p 'i^alv with a single voice, I have entire confidence in the 
integrity ox Genoral i^ly and have no doubt that he believes 
i-jhat he has said to rac curing the ^ course of our association 
in Saigon* Kovcvor^ the presence in Hanoi of the Saintt^ny 
mission^ tha conv-cjrsation 1 had v:ith 3j3.inteny in KLy^s presence, 
and e:-: cell en t analyses made by our i:i>:ba£sy in Paris, lead pio 
to believe t/iafc ^^'^ener al li-ly is not t>ie sole representative in 
Vietnam o± th^ Fre2ich GoV'^rn='-erit • 'Ihis vlev? is rein'/orced by 
a continuing and undiSi;s'L;ised i^'rench desire to renove Prime 

Ki iii s t or Di c ni ^i n r avo r of one o f the 1 r own c and idatcs, I believe 
that the i-'rc :-,ch are prenarin^^ t^jo possible courses oi actiozi: 

a. If Tree VlotnaTi. should be taken over by the 
Coniiri uni s 1 3 J the -^"'r e n c ; \ m1 sh ' t o bo p rep ar e d to rial c o a d e al T-ri th 
lio Chi Hi^-ili in order to conti'nue trade and cultural relations 
with ho under sor«ie f ora of- '*co-existence''. 



It 



throunh lUS, 



If, on the othf^jr hand, free Vietnamj largely 
aid and support of the-. Manila Pactj can bo saved 
as an ir_do. endcnt state, the French still msh to retain their 
S;oecial economic and cultural status, claim a large measure of 
credit for such success, and thus, perhaps, held free Vietnara 
in the l^Vench Union, Ihe rrench Government^ however, is still 
undecided as to tho outccrae, and so testers back and forth 

our .^overnnient should 



0uc:;een 



( r* -<i c* (^ 



two policies. I feel 

Ju _ _ * J_^^ J_T_ _ "tt__ _' 



th at 



have Lhi£; raatter out with the I^rench Goverrjaient one o and for -all, 
Wltn full and faithful support from the French;^ Diem has a fair 
chance of success. V/ithout such support, particularly if instead 
there should be covert obstructionism fro:n the_French in the foroi 
of support of rival lea^ders, perhaps with 3ao Dai's con::ivence, 
Dieri'V chances v/ill be materially lessenedc 



( 



^ r. K 



a. Die>n*s virtues lie in hla 
and nationalism. His disadvanta.^es 



widely acVnovjled^jed proTxIt^^ 
as a head of governricnt are his lack of executive experience, 
his conspiratorial past vjhich tends to raahe him suspicious of 
t'^ose who do not openly su^oport him, his naive trust in those 
willlnrj to flatter" his eco', his lack of *'ki:;ow how" in selling 
himself to his peo2:»le, his n^.rrovrncss of view, his tendency to 
exaggerate his insight into the proble.as of Vietnam, and his 
great stubbornness* Moreover J^iem has surrounded himself vjith 
members of his family whose defects tend to intensify rather 
than offset his own. 



\^ ., 



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Deelassifi^ per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Project Number: NND 633 1 C. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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b* Hcvjevsr, since 1.1^ arrival in;S£-dgon I have observed 
some i!aprove:-icnt In I>ic-Ti'G conouct of public eSxpSrs^ and I believe 
Jbhat .with continued staunch Algeria an support he may be able to 
succeed* It should be noted that the problems he faces vjould daunt 
the iTiost oxpcrienqed statesviian, Ko on^i else is in sight at the 
present timo w/io could usefully replace Diemc However, as a last 
resort, it nay become necessary to call upon the personal presence 
and support of -5ao Dai to enable Diem to^ solve the coiaplex pr obi era 
of his' relations with the sects and. the ultimate position of these 
grouvs in the national society* This would have to be done;^ however, 
unde certain ^^larantees, firmly .agreed to in advance by 3ao Dai, * 
as indicated in pertin^^nt telegrams I have sent the Denartment, 




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873 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By; NWD Dale: 201 1 



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S E C R E r^ 



Enclorsurci "A" 



) 



PROPOSED FOnCS BASIS I'OR FRKE VIKT-IIAJ/ TOR CT 19^6 



^ AGTIV'ITT 



ARIAT 



Alined Forces Ileadqiiari.ers 
Terra torialDivisions (3 ) 
Per Div: 

Div Hq ^ 5p Trps ct 800 
Split among 3 Div: 

13 Security Regt Hq at 200 
39 Security Bns at 500 
Field Divisions (3 at 8^1^50) 
Airborne RCT (1) 
Army Troops 
Com2 Troops 
Schools and Caijips 
Pipeline 
RediicGid Tciy Trainees 



jr * 



TorAi, kimj 



a fk 4 4 4 « O 



IR FORCE 



Iiq a]id S\x Elornants 
Operatinf^ Units (!') 

2 Ln Sqn 

1 Trans Sqn 



TOTAL AIR FORCE . . ^ . ; 



NAVY 



Ho Staffs and Services 
Training: Scljool 
Ships Crev;s 



TOTAL riAVY 



«V Oo^e^OQvaaAe^O^ 



T0TA7. AT?:-!ED FORCES 

(1) During' so c end ysar add 

1 Ftr Sqnj 1 Trans Son, 1^000 ir.3n* 






STRSMOIH 



MILITARY 



2, 1^00 
2h,^C0 



3,700 
Ji^OOO 

5 J 000 
5>ooo 

lOj 000 



9}hOOO 



,000 
2^000 



3,000 



700 

Uoo 

;.900 



3,000 



I J ' ^ tfc l > » I I rt l ■ ■■ ■ HuJ 



100,000 



CI7ILUN 



h,coo 



ll,000 



150 



• 150 



2$0 



250 



kfh^o 



8 / Szz, i" ^ 

SECRET ^,^:? JL.^ ^- 



'."IL 






^ 



V:.^ S > ^^^-^ *" 



X 



fj K 'I !> ^'* '1^ 

U Jj v.r K .J J. 

^ MMM Mil ■ !■ I ■!! I ^» 1 

In Millions of U.S. Dollarr; 

' FY 55 • . 

Second Half First. }[nlf 



j-,ijij.t.uf..iii-cr "fc v-'-" J i'^i/Ju;.! / 



ti- I t, <l « l ■ T lt-^^-» 



rA 






193(1- 



1^33 



. I'T 56 
Second J In If Flrr;-;-- Ila^f - 

19 b -J 19^^ 



3ncond !.':ilf 
jTr;z 



;ra or d j. n ?.i"y 2xn 3 !"i E G ?- ' 



lalitary Eiq>ensGS 



19U.2 



152.3 



130.9 



9I-I4 



6Ba6 



r^ O 

C •= 

:: CD 

i- — < 

O ^' 

K 

S. e 

Q Q 



Demobilis^.tion Allo;:ai;^ce 



ncnt^ 



Rdfuree Settle 

':Zcor;Orrac Ai^d Total 
o£ ''rhich: 



,1 



.. .Af^ricvlture • 

'' .Trr-Xisr^ortation, 

f Industry '"- i;ird.ns 

' C crorairn. ty Dex^elopme nt 

^ t' ' Public iioalth 

' Sducation h Public 

Acbiird sti^ation 

>jLscoll^n';;oiio 



2.1 

2,2 



18 oO 
17.2 



al 2xtL-r.or:linp.ry E^ t pv^nf^^^? (Half Yrs Q ' 229 al^ 
?y Oasis 



2.1 

li.7 
2o2 



10.0 



27.0 
17.2 



206.5 



^ ' 



6.7 
12.1 

3.3 

7.1 
)i.l 



10$ ^9 



■y/:y-l 



10.0 
15.0 



1-P9-5 



6.7 
12.1 






7.1 

lul 



320,9 



f.l Vi-i.nar,'i3o CcntribiitionfHalf Yrs.) 



35.7 



3h.? 



-) 



3 



)!.? 



Vi ijaa.ls 
;^Y Basis 



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69.9 



6ti,). 



62.7 



7.0 

33.3 



131.7 



00 e 



P 



6.7 
12.1 

■3.3 



7.1 

lul 



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233.6 






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fi- 



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121.9 



■3.5 



37.0 



. Gon-lribiiUon (residual) (Half Yrs.) 



193.7 



172.3 



155.0 



103.2 



93. U 









.1 i^l^ O 1. r> 



366,0 



V>7 "> 



256. 2 



196.6 



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Knclo^'Te "3" 



In ^:illlon/5 of n.^.' Dollars 



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'otal Vietnair.esc Contribution 
br vjhich: 

' Civilian Budget Surplus 



S^icond Hair 

■ 19?II ' 

OCT 7 



2UO 



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First '{"?lf 

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11.).! 



Secon'l Half 

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n'in;^ re source 3-5/ 



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iPorrcf;'jin,(j fron Central Bank 



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17 a 



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2?^. 5 



17". 1 

5.7 



IS'!;''-: 



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17.1 

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5.7 



/ Fi>Dres shoim are on "budget ratlior than exponditiixe basis* 

/ In vlev; of tho iiriGxpected inTlvJC of refugees j the %\'S million precently pro^ranT^ed for ?Y ^5^ i^-^/ f^H short by 
%\$ mllion of anticipatod needs ♦ 

/ Ho prorran has been dravni up for July-Decenber '56; figures hare ai^e continuation of FY '56 prqiirajrio 

/ Corr.prised of $U5*6 million tp be reimbursed b^ the French for expenditures already made by the Vietnaraeso 
Troasuryp if ErAassy and French recoirjnendations for settlcnient of 195U irilitary expanditm^os are accepte'd,- 
Tills money will be available to be spent in CI '55 ^^^ CI *56* ^ • 






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Decl^ffsined per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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Certain additional costs not reriected in the above 

vjill "orobably require larger Vietnaracse 
X":enditure3 th^.n 't)rGsentlY estiriiated, Th 



coat estiinace 
Gov e r rx i e I'i t al ex;: g 
Klditional costs will be: 



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; (1) The financial support given hj the Vietnamese 

Go V ^s r^'iiu o n t to the s e c t ts ^ ' :lii ch ' v; ill i nor ease wh en the 1^ r o n ch 
c ^se t^ieir Tinancial support of the sects on 31 January 1S?55- 
Die:n will probably have to continue the subsidies he now gives 
the sects and' assume at least part of the support i:iow provided 
bv the l^rcr-ch for the time bein^, and until he is in a iTfOsi- 
t* :»n politically and militarily to cut off their subsidies. 
It is oiff i cul t to estimate the anount of support the VI et- " 
nariese Crove.rnj^.ent v;ill feel required to furnish* However , 
based on ore sent Vietnamese and French payment figures a 
total of a:proxi:nately j^jOOO^OOO nay be required in FI 19>o. 
fecpondi t\ re^ of this sum \vouid reduce the Vietnamese contribu« 
tion to its own "iiilitary e.nd economic aid px^o^rams and in- 
crease the require:T»ent for U*S. funds accordinrdv for P'l 19^6 » 



j-^ „' 



i * 

' (2) Another incalculable cost will arise If the 

refugee ev-'.^cuation tovjard the end of the 300--day period (Kay, 
1955) exceeds expectatloris. There raay be a reqiaii'^enent for 
an additional Ol5^000,OGO in this fields I therefore rocoTinend 
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to porrilt flexlbilit.f in copin^. with the above contingencies, 
if hecessG^ry. 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






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27 JsQiiiiry 1955 



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ESFORTo;.! v;ci;^y>fAypoii ?ns i!'L',eTO":^T. s-'n)RH:x cop^jiT, m cmmf^ coLhr.iH 



J,o General Collinr^ vSJ.l bo V';:'c:;Cji'?; "to flii;o"a"s3 his •E.THtcXi rcp:>i"k oj? 20 
^ JaiiUav-y 19:'5p (rico TA3 A)^ 'I'ho pr:lno5,i?j.l points in tbio vcporb f.i'o: 









be Thr-^^o ic a voal doubt as to j?VGi:':ola into?itionD a;ia objccitivea in 
li-^.orjViiuao Alt:iocrj;h Goncrcil }':lly iy coop::catiY£; in IVco Vic/L.i:?;i:j t}ic Sainton; 
vAe^i^on iri j^orth Victi^?A'.i rj7;:£^?jeD cc^^^-^"* '^^^ ^-eooylGo-* vritli tho Coi:-3Voii^tn<x Tn^ 
U* Sc. Govcjr-i\^:orit pIiouI/I }:avo t}iin n?;tb::^L^ out ^ath tliD FrGTiob GovG'i"iiJ.::::jt onoo curd 
for t01« 



to 



jDc Diom i[5 tlia best t->vailab:io Priuo. Iliiiiator 



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clc '/"lie p^rir.oipcil crfo:et5 of th^i Uc »^<. t.t X-^*o:^ont oro to o4 tho yioti::0u;}3:j 
to dGTolop cxd e::;..^ait& a cerlo3 ox ctirrgenay progri'J^s co^^ering t;iG lalit^c^;/ 
eritabli£:br.c^iit:, r2i\ii'5xi-a TzHovn^ rcfu^c^a i-ezattXczori's^ fircal iii;ii$=.sc:r,ontj e-ixl tbo 
or-teljli£ib:i^:^^t of a r>:vtion:a as^c::b]^<. ^£i*eoT:$;:il: by tho TJ^ B, to ar?r)UJ^3 ti^ainiiig 
re-^i:o3p5Jjility £u:^^ to £ViV:it firo.^i^oirtl aid to a ro^rg;Via;:cJ aricl r^vitali^ivL-cl ' 
ixationcil arj:-7 L'bou?.cl hrv'D a rtabili^jing effect * 



c* !iJ!io pi'onp^r-t of natiorial clcotioLin ±n 19^^^ bat^gs aa u tba^cat ovei' ^ 
R;co Viet-jon. 

^ f^o Tno U* S* f:b.oul.'l cc^cZiol t;V3 fu^nlG^ intox'iol; r.r:d cffci-t rcqira^cd to 
Lstvcnj^^hon tbo ooiv:.to'y ar,J holp it i-'ct^.ii-i itr3 irclcpendciccoc Without oi'ci* aid^ 
Viotnaii vdll f;ui^-0-y ba lo^t to Co:r.:^xviic':u If Dic:^ b:\fi f ix^n U. S, ^^uppo'^'t arid 
[iiulda^^30^ r;^a Kccnoli cooperation^ ho hz-.s a :cc?.GoncbXo x^o:yy^z:yi fo:c gv.cog^is* Tbis 
cb^^:coa of cucooe-f? is trcll vortb the ca::blo, . ^ - 

007:C-2nS3 i ' ■ . - 



a. It cor^xoh in tbo dosiv^bility of a ?Aroy:z rt:rfi:crr3tion ct Bzu-^^bo!i of 
allioil dctovi'UJi^ition to^ :Lv.iplor:oiit tho ibrJla Factj chouVa t}i3 need £;ri:JO^» » 

bo Tno tStato DDpartsr.cint corito".:^:^ tb%t ;:cv b^.vo bsci '-thia j;r?/;toi' exit irith 
tho ri"tn::li" tit v^reJxm^ hij^h^-lovcl coru^c^erfosa eX:^ tta* tbo Fre::vh bavo f :;roecl 
in x-r-i-aoivOx to o-jr position ii:i ^ritir^* Tae ?lc^^rA3.r:^ roai-a bolievo:; i:c cboald 



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Declassined per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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p^ir-^ijploj ^ah all rc;crp>oJ><36 For c:"^:r;>loj uo L^ould injii^t that *t!icy re;::DV3 th 
taq>^d^5ivo POA--?inDi:oc:l jf„vjhi5^.0A^y <Vo;t5 tho cool Jaino;^ riox'th o:? I'::no:lo Txp^a vSn 

r,rd c/g t:.-^c5cix1i as bcln^ i^cc^^;-;:! by 'c}io Ccc,7.T0.nifjtf5 fca* 'bhoir b:::uc€:lu(, Torjpioo 

M 
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!■ 

■ - ' 

in clot ail by tho dsp^v: 'orient b gjjI £:ie^oica coi^xjcanic-^Ao 

Co It coivy-scr^ th-at cirLup/o^o ^*Cjr?:cdi:o2 tho 19p6 clestio^iG is 3i^oeEi!3:iry 
ai^d tliat thicj rjhniilu ba clovclopzc\ i^rrl neat to G:::/iex*al Collins irltUip, tlia nzcco 
i:r:pi2th or six iraDlzc^ 

f:^. It co-ici'rG in tlrj orcl-:;^" c^ rLagrdtivlG o:? tho cor;t to t\id Uo S* of 
the i^Jlit^^;y riiXi 3aon-iiil5;b:vi?y tc-oc:^^>^ fo-? CY i55 (O^^^c^ ijlliion) cr^ OX 56 ■ 
(03^9^^ 06 loiUio'Oo ^Ph^rc c^ppc^-i^o to ]yj no i£iL.iiri:;ortri:'3r;Dlo o'i:>::;tr,olei3 to tlic 
fij:'Ci.ri-:;iii2 of tbcCvO pvo^rcji^o Kv3 foi^ce ^^oalrj ^o^r th:) ViotiiaT^^fio ai?:^:^ fo:?cer5 
have pn-TC'r/3y bean apr^roTcd by tho Joi:at Ghiu?3 of Staff* 



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fio You EPiM^ovG tiio :r;c;;:>rt o:? Gonce^ril CoLliiis aria c:;,pper:3 tlio appxccia 



tion of tlio DOD to^i las vo:d: in Inlcchin^ 



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bo Xou svvo7>DV't tho PliCii'oir::' Eor/rd positions rc3arcliz>g tho abovo i-:ajci^ 
jvjinta in tho event tlio Council is c.plccd to act on thcL^.i> 



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Declassiried per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 1 6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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Tl-iE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

' WASHINGTON £5, D,C, 






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11 February I955 



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tiEi:orvAiiDUii Fon the qilorwimiy of depeiisk 



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Concept; and Plans Tor the Iniplementation, 
if Hecennary^ of Article IV, Ij of the 
Manila Fact. 



1, Thifi is in rcnponrjo to. a nieriioi^anclum by th'" Deputy SeoL"^e- 
tary of BefenGC;, dated 6 January 1935, nubjccb a^ above, in 
v;h 1 c h ± t VI a n r c q u e r; t e d 1 1 1 a t the J o 1 n t h 1 e f G of S t: v f .f vo o oir.:nc nd 
a conocpt and broad outline plant: for fcUa application of U.3* 
milita'ry poucr under the na^iila Pact vrith a' priiaary objootive 
bain^ the clatorrence of ", ^ , overt asgroGGion by China or 
other Coiiuiiunlat nation 



a. 



2* There are three basic fovna in v:hich agGreGGion in South- 
east Aaia can occur 



i"i ** 

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a„ Overt arviied attack from outnide of the area^ 

b^. Overt armed attack froii v;ithJn the area of each of . 
the novere^tS^ states. 



9^^ AgsrenGlon other than aiViied, 
or "^ubyeroion* 



i o G . , pel i t i c al v;ar f are , 



3^ The Joint Chiefs of Staff ccnoider that their vic-vrn pre-- 
viouoly exprer.rjcd in a, ncn^ornnduni foi'' the fiea rotary of Dofenrje, 
dated B October 193^!^ rnbject: 'Tiilltary Conr:ult^:t lea Under th 
Southoar/c Ania Colilectivn Defanoe Treaty j" in vjhich the Joint 



e 



Cbiefr; of Staff ntated that U*S. ccr-piitr-Kntr> to rov;-:-ona-j Japan 
and Korea, vjhieh nations have boon CAcluded fr^oin the treatyj 
make it i)v:p.erative that the United States not be rea trie ted by 
force coi;ir:iitrp.Gnfca In tlic subject treaty area*' rei-ialn valid « 

h^ 7n orr3er to retain thifj freedoin of action it in coneldo'ced. 
that the United States aliould not enter into oonbincd i;ilii;ai^ 
planjiinfi for the; defcnne of the trc-'^ty area vrith t]\e other'- 
Manila Trat p-i'/err; nor Ghoul'-l iictailn of United fjl'ilcB unilatoral 
plann fov nilifcary 'action in the event of Cor":iLinia{; n^sv-eoalon 
in Sou the ant Ar-ia be dincloued to the other pov;c'ri>* 



of. _. V'. 



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NND Prciject Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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5, Bor;ed on .the above ocui^lcloratlonGj the Joint; Chiefs? of 
Staff raconrnenf^ the follovjlpg as a corxicpt; nnd broacl outline 
plim for the ?.ppXlcati03i of U^3, mililari' pov:Gr undoi"^ the Ilanlla 
Tact: ' . ■ . ' , 

, C on I; Inu ed C e v e lo pnicn t o f r.ChX oa t off oc t i ve 1 n a i(5.cnou r> 
To re e c J \i i t h t h e i i^* g t vv c v. u 'ce r nd . t rrj. n In r^ n n l: n al 1 y coo 'rd in a ted 
to develop local leaOeri^hip anti prcabl^o^ and vrith improvoci 
capabilltlc!Lj to ccaate a coheGive tishting force throu[^h 
integi^atlon of their opera tioiiB v:ith ndjacenl; iiidigGnOL^G 
forces a-nd v;ith support by operation's of forces of othct> 
Manila Fact irierabei'So 



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d^i, DiccuGfjlcn^ in general terms ^ of unilateral milit?,ry 

Cplanr; by tJio Ililit a ry Heprcit^cntativerj to the Council to the 
extent neceruOXi' to inaure maxir.mm participatio2i and cocpo\^a 
tion by other member natlonB but 'not to the eictent that U.S. 
c ^ ntratosic piano or the availability of U.S, forces for iiiiple 

mentins cuch piano niitjlit be revealed^ 



b. Read^.r^ecrj to retaliate propiptly v-itli a^ttaclra by the 
most effective combination of U,S* armed forces a^alnct the 
niilitai^y povrev of the BQ^^reoGov^ 



c_» Encourofjement of other Ilonila Pact count rie-u to irialn- 
tain forcea in readinefiD to counter af;KreGnion, 



e. Periodic vinitr; by U.S. forces into the area ao de-non- 
t rations of Intejit^ and for Joint and coiiibined trainlii^ , 
exercises. 



S^' 



f;, Availahilit:/ of appi"opriate rjcchanihm for the employ- 
ment of U,3. foixeG in support of friendly indiccnouG forces 
in the genci^al area. 

6, The concept of prorr pt retaliatory attaclcr^ doerj not envi^ 
ria^e attnclcn on tar^;et8 vrlthin the p^.f^rcGOor country other than 
on military. tarsetr> i^ivolved in the direct rupport of the 
"^'ZS'^'^ G C' o X' action. If au the r 1 z ed ^ at om 1 c v^ e apo n n v : o u 1 d be u n e d ^ . 
even In a looaL Gituation^ if such ur^e v:ill bring the asG^-^S3lon 
to a svfift ond ponitjvo ceBfjationj aj^d if^ on a balance of politi 
cal CJid military consideration^ Duoh use will ber/c advance U.S. 
security Intereot?. Under the alternative aor^umption that anther 
1 1 y to use a t o r '. i c \i e apo n n c an not be ass u x- ed ^ t li e abo v e c on c e p t 
vrould not req^rire chanije, but thlG af;sut.^.ptloji would not perjnifc t 
the moot effective errployii^ent of IJ.3^ armed foi^cen^ pakI con:3e^ 
cjuenf:ly mi^ht Tequlre greater forcers than the U.S* v;ould be ; 
juatificd in pi^o vicing from the over-^all point of viev7. 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i 



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7. In the event general vfai"* sliould clevclopj U.S. forcoc v^'ill 
bo deploy ed rrj Indic^^ted in emorGCJioy v:av plans ^ c^iid V7lth the 
principa^l effort ?^jvoLocI to 'ofci^ateElc areao conuidei^ed nore vital 
than Southf-not Ar^ln* Kov/evcrj r^horld <n a;_:5rc?3iorj result In 
a prolonged local! ;r.ec] coiU'lict of limited objcctivcGj additional 
U.S. f o re e a c ou 1 cl "be d c p ley ed t o th e ^ area i f r cqu 1 re d . The 
applioation of lh:lr; additional U.S. rrO itary povjerj in conjunc- 
tion \iXlh the tnllitp.ry pov/er of othor^Fcnbor natiOiiD of the 
Manila Pact^ vould involve the movenent^ doploynent;^ rnd nurporb 
o f U , S . f o re o no t v: i t h 1 n p re sen, 1 1 y appro v o cl f o re c 1 e vc 1 g ^ and 
V' .^ ri^oblllr.ation of the dofenoe ef fori/ of the Manila Fact nationn* 
1j. order for the Unj.tcd States to oupport this additional effort ^ 
the military brdget and pcrrjonnel ceilinrgy v;ould rcciulre con- 
oid er able increaoeo. 

I 8. The above ccnnidevationo are ba^ed on currently planned 
U.S^ military capabilltloG and on the a-^ouiiiption that the United 
Statec t;j.ii not enter into r>peoific agreement rj v;ith other IlDjviia 
Pact CPU n tries in vt^gai^d to coramitmont or eariaarlcins of U.S. 
forceo for emnlojnfTGnt in the Southeast Ania area or VFeGteini 
FacifiCc Sucli a poration v:ill per);nit the United States^ in 
the event of further Commiiniofc aggi^eBOion in Southeanb Asia^ 
freerlon of action in deter: linrln^ We type of U.S. forceo to be 
er-iployed and the method of their eiViploynient,, and can be eo 
iripleniented a a to retain the oupport of neinber nation a of the 
Manila Fact and other friendly or neutral cnuntrler. In the 
gonei-^al at^oa. It must be fully understood that the United 
Staterj cannot guarantee the territoi^ial integi^ity of any nienbor 
riation^. but at meet can help ace u re the inde pond once of tboie 
counti'^ieo v.^hof e peopleo dqpire it and vrho are v;illlns to under- 
take the reij"ponriibilitier:J of Gelf--£overii3nent.„ 

g. The Joint Chiefs of Staff conGidex-- that aucceoa in imple- 
ill en ting the above concept v;ill be dependent on the resolution 
ulth v/hich future U,3, deci^*ionf? concerning the Manila Fact are. 
made aJid carried out, Kovrevcr^ frequent pronounoeRont>?. by liigh 
Eovo'cniiKnt official g to inoure bettor public underotanding of 
our objeotiven and nececsary courses of action vjlll materially 
anoiGt in obtaining guccugc 



Por the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 



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CbaiiTio-n, 

Jo.lnt ChicCfi of Sbaf.C 



887 






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Declas^jficd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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Dcparteent of Defense conti^l button to end participation in the 
Ean^lvOk Conference conslcted of tv^o pho^Gs of activity.- the prellmi- 
ary phnoe end the conference phGGe, - ^ 

DLirin^i the preJ.liBljiary phase the D^partuisnt of Defense provided 
E-ev:berchip on the International World ns Group vrhich liiet in V/aGhin^ton 
during the period 30 iyoven:lDcr 195!^ - 7 February 1955 • ^n addition to 
repi^Gsentatives of the U.S, DGparti;;^nts of D3fence and "State, the 
n-eir-berchip of the International V/orlting Group consist'jd of the /giibaG- 
eedors of the seven other cisnatory countrieB vho, in turn^ vrere 
Burjported by their political and luilitary advisers . 

T*he prlrijary function of the International V/orking Group ^-^as to 
develop and give consideration to' the problems vhich would be discus - 
i^cd at the Eans^iok Coriferencej and to agree upcrn an agenda to be sub- 
tiltted for the approval of the Council- ll:ie report of th3 l-Jorlcing 
Group in the form of a proponed agenda vfa^ ccnpleted on 7 February 
and Gubmltted to the Council for consideratidn at the first cloced 
fiCGGion of the Council Conference^ at Bangkok^ on 23 February 1955- 
(T.'^U A) ■ . 

■I 

During this period^ the Departi^'^ent of Defense ^drof ted, and obtained 
agrecL^ent of the I}rternational V/orking Group to the 1^03 it ion paper on 
the orcanl^^ation of the Ullitary Advisers to the Council K:>ii]bers which 
\/M adopted by the Council at Bang! to!:- (TAB B) 

Further;, durin,^ this preliminary phase, the D3parti3:ent of Dcrfenae 
prepared nine position paperri for the U»S. Delegation on matters 
concidercd of x>rii;iary DepartT^jcnt of D^^fcnso interest. (TPJ^S C-K). 
Tnese vere as follows; 

Security iiieasures for th:^ Manila Pact Military 



Advisor 



s 



Further Status of the AT3ZU3 lilitary RcpresentativcG 

Possible diccUGGion \/ith the British and/or Australians 
on the defense of the Kra Isthr^ius 

+ 

U.S. Position on ths EstcibHalir^'-nt of a Ccziblnia 

InitiGl KoD'Gino o:r th^ SiilACro? jiilitary Adv3.scrs 
XaVoJXigonco Agrcc';T:ents in DEACBT 



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U.S* po:;ltion on the Vac of J military Forces to 
Suppress Gubveraive Activities 

Cc::^bi^ed Corcjnoxids for Forces of the SEAC.DT Count rieo 

« 

Military Mvisern to the Council cf the Jt.nila Pact 

(rno positions oi:itlined in the al:ove papers with the excoption of th:xt 
pertainin,^ to the initial irectin.^ of the SEAGDX Council Military 
Advisers (TAT^ O), provided adn(iu?.te guidance to the TJ.S- D3lcG-i'^^C)n. 
As a QUCGtion oi tactics j and in order to offset pressures by the 
A^ian sienntorlcG for a lJPSO-ty;(}C orc^mizaticnj the Defense Represen- 
tative proposed to the Secretary of State ^ prior to the first closed 
Ee^sion^ that the U,S. ta!;e the initiative and reccriOicHnd a lectins of 
the Militarry Advisers durni^ the Ban^iok Conference- l^iG proposal 
v:as accepted by the Secretary of State. 

IXn^ing the second or conference phar^n, it bcccnie obvious that the 
Asian nations r>ie:natory to the Treaty would strive for a U-S. coounit- 
ment of forces for the defense of the Treaty area, A^ain es a question 
of tactics, and in or^J.er to provide the assurance that tltese countries 
vere scouring ^/ith respect to U-S- intentions rcoardin^ the defense of 
the Treaty area against Coin:iunist ^[i^rc^^rAon^ the D^^fenue Representative 
proposed to the Secretaiy of State that he c3.early outline such U-S.* 
intentions and j^rcvide inforniation as to U.S-, foices currently stationed 



in the Far East as a deterrent to Cor.uiuniols ar/^i'cssion. Toe Secretary 



of State accepted this proposal and In his rcranrlts ot the firot closed 
,seG6ion of the Conference on 23 February, stated the U.S. intentions 
GO specifically that thG anticipated forcing tactics on the part of 
the Asioai nations in rel;ition to this matter did not develop. 

All of the Council ]r;cmber3, vith the exception of Mr. Bonnet of 
France accepted the Military Adviser* s papt^r vith minor revisions. 
Hovevcr, the French Delegation took exccptjon to certain tcnTjinolo{:.y 
used in outlining; the functions and responsibilities of the Military 
Advisers on the basis tliat this terminology ^'^^ not easily translatable 
into French. It subsequently becair,e obvious that the question of 
cCFjantics ^ms not the primary cause for concern on the part of the 
French but that they were disturbed over vhat :iilght be construed by the 



French Govcrmiient as a French delegation aerccrent to fovce cc:^::niti:::^nts 
v/ithin the scope of the pD.annin:^ responsibilities of the Ililitary 
Advisers. IXirins the period between the Doming and afternoon session^ 
the French and U-S* Delegations^ on an ad hoc basis cjiA v/ith D:fense 
representatives of both countries participvatingj revif:cd the language 
of the I-ilitary Advisers paper in order to overcoine Frcncli apprehension. 
^0rio revised paper vas 3.atcr accepted by all ii3r:inbers of the Council and 
the unitary Advisers iir^nediately convened in a separate closed session. 



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The Military Aflviser to the h03t country^ General Jira VichitsoncG^oiD 
^prcGldcd but .rJ'tcr opening the njcetins propor>ccl tl^at he vac cite the chair 
In' favor cf the IJilitrLry Advicer of the United Kincdc:n Oclccationj FicXd 
Marshall Sir John Hardin,^; the ccnior offi.cer present. With the coneur-, 
rence of the otlicr Military AdvicerSj Field liarshall n:^rdin2 accepted- * 

/3 a i;iatter of tactics it had bean agreed v;itliln the U.S< D2lcgatiDn 
th^t Adii]iral StUTO) uou]dj in his opening reF^arlrG, daB^onstratG U.S. 
sincerity in aiding in the deteiT^ination of :j:3thcd3 for the iiLplGr.:2ntaticn 
of the SEACDX by taking th.e initiative in arrongins for an early conference 
of the liJlitary Adviner's Staff Planners to be followed by an early 
msetfnc of the Military Advisers, A copy of Adiijiral Styjrip's oponin^ 
i^einarlcs is attached as T/iB L. 

During thiG Initial jr.ceting of the Military Advicersj iijreen:ont 
vcis reached en the following natters: /' 

Dates cud locations of the first ir^ee tings of the llilitary 
Advisers a:id Staff PXamiers 

Agenda for first nectings of Staff Planners and Military 
Advisers " \ 

Responsibility for preparation of position papers 

Procedural arrangenients 

CorCTuiiique 

i 

T!ic Philippine Militciry Adviser during this initial rreeting pro- 
posed that a nilitary organisation similar to that of IJATO be established 
for coordination of military action vdthin tlie Treaty Area. Hcr.-;evorj 
the PlUlippine Military Adviser acceded to the unanimous request of 
the otlier Military Advisers that this nnttcr be included on the agenda 
as a matter appropriate for consideration by the Staff Planners at 
their first meeting. 

Tnc second an'X final ir.eeting of the Military Advisers was held on 
25 February ai:! vas notable for the sorae degree of ujianiciity which 
CAisted at the first irocting. A record of dociDions reached at this 
Kseting is attached as TAB M. 

In conclusion, it is considered that U*S. military objectives 
vere attained during the conference- Hr^vever^ it is further considered \ 
that there v;ili be two major factors, V7ith nilitary ir'plicationo> to 
contend with in fiv^ure^n^ectings of the laiitary Advisers or Staff 
Planners* il:ioy are; 






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^nQ obvious dcGire *of the AGlcrn nations to cotciblifsh a 
KATO-tyi^c SSACLTT org^jiization uith. everything that it iinplies in the 
* nature of force co!i:i]3itr:t?nts/ 

■ + 

llie obvious cnxioty on the part of the French pertaining 
to cc;::niitir.-;nts of any type in support of the SEACDT yet their desire 
to participate in all policy ana planaing o.ctivities . 

Tlie J Military BtaTf Flann-^rG ere Gcbeduled to cect on 25 April 
1955 in Manila; and the I'lllitQry Advioero will meet in the latter 
part of Itay in Bangkok, 



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DEPARTI-m'T 0? STATE 



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SMT TO: Ainembassy S/iIGOH fRIOEITY U361 
EPT HOK): Menhassy PARIS 35^6 



Apr S, 1955 



LB!!'! DTSTEIBUTIOK 

FYI. We have been -^vorXing on pro"bl^^ of elections in Viet-Namj in great 

detail over last several weeks • KSC has asked Dejjartiient suhmlt policy 

i ■ 

for consideration iDy tnid-April and ve siire that elections vill be discussed 
during proposed U.S. -French talks VJashington April SO. The British have 
offered give us their views on elections prior these talks* 

We feel best solution is for us be in position inform French British 
our views prior talks and believe it best v^e can put such forv:ard"as support 
of policy of Free Viet-Nairi rather than as imilateral U. S^ recGi:TirLendations* 

Our proposal is based on Eden's plan put forward at Berlin-Conference 
for all German elections and has already been approved by France for use 

-k 

Gei7iiany and rejected by the Communists, The basic principle is that Free . ' 

Viet-Nam will insist to the Viet Minh that unless agreement is first reached 

by the latter 's accept £mce of the safeguards spelled out^ that no repeat no further 

discussions are possible regarding the type of elections^ the issues to be 

voted on or any other factors. 

After ve have Diem's general acceptance we can proceed inform UK and 

# 

Fremce of this plan vliich we thini onl^'- formula which ensui^es both satisfac- 
tory response to Geneva Agreement and at smne time plan which is unassailable 



in intent but probably unacceptable to ComQnunists because of provisions for 
strict coripllanc^ to ensiire genuinely free elections, EKD FYI, 



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You shou3.d spesli to Diem privately regarding elections^ without 
sho'vring hiJn Torjimla outlined next telegram. We axe not nov: atteLipting 
secure his approval as such to ovx position but to assure he understands 



o:ur vie\rpolnt £ind acceptc it to degree ve can proceed vith French British 
on broad assutnption Free Viet-Iiani's position similar our ov:n, 

1 

Be 11 ere best vay accomplish this is to remind him of his and foreign 
in?nisters conversations vith Secretary on this subject aiid to continue that 
ib specific cases of elections in Korea and Germany Free V.^orld has stood 

! 

firm on issue of guarantees of genuine free elections^ supervised by body 

4 

W 

having authority guarantee eleinents free elections PAElEi^T outlined last 
paragraph following telegrriin UITPAIffiJ:!. In each case CoiiMunists have re:rused 



^ 4 



accept these safeguards vhich ve think basic and fundamental, We believe 
unless such guarantees previously agreed upon i-:ould he dangerous for Free 
Viet "Nam be dra-\vn into further discussions of other issues of election. 

Ask Diem if ve can assume our thinking is alilie en this point. 

* ■ 

Since time exceedingly important j hope ve can have affirmative answer 
soonest. 



DULLES 



COPY 







093 



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NND Piojeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



i^- 



IKfCOl-ENG TELEGRAI-l 



DEPARTMEHT . OF STATE 



TOP SECRET 



SITiVE 

Control : 
Kec'd: 



FR014: SAIGON 



TO: 



Secretary of State 



EC: kkk8^ APRIL 9> 10 P.M. (SECTION ONE OF FIVE) 



NIACT 



ACTION COPY 



1+99)4 

APRIL 9, 1955 

1:25 P.M. 



POP SECRETABY FROM COLLINS. 

i 

T^EPARTKEITT TELEGRAI4S khll and ^^412, 

kmS MESSAGE IN WO PABTS. PAET I POLLOWS. 
I 

PART I, SUCCESSIVE STETS RECOMMEtlDED AS FOLLOWS: 



.1 



1. TRMSJ^R NATIONAL POLICE AJ^ID SUEETE FROM BINH XUYEN, 
TWO POSSIBLE 14ETH0BS OF DOING THIS DEPEICDING ON WHETHER 
OBJECTIVE IS TO SAVE FACE FOR DIEM OR BINH XUYEN^, POIW 
ABOU"! LATTER BEIJ^G TO SECURE THEIR PEACEFUL COOPERATIOH 

'WITH MIW GOVERNMENT* 

A. TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR DIEM TO RESIGM" AHD PEEVEIW BINH 
XUYEN FROM CLAIMING VICTORY IK PRESENT CRISIS, VJE WOULD INSIST 
AS H?IOR CONDITION ON TaU'SFER OF POLICE TO GOVEHKMENT BY 
ORDINAIRE ISSUED BY DIEM, BUT OPENTjY SUPPORTED BY BAO DAI 

AND POSSIBLY FRENCH AND U.S. PUBLIC SUPPORT BY BAO DAI 
PROBABLY ESSENTIAL TO AVOID -FURTHER BLOODSHED. IN THES CASE 
BINH XUYEN MIGHT BE FORCED TO BOW BUT MIGHT TRY TO SABOTAGE 
NEl^ GOVERNl^ENT IN VARIETY OF WAYS , (l SHOULD NOTE TliAT 
FRENCH V/ILL OPPOSE THIS STEP. ALTHOUGH HE ONCE FAVORED IT, 
ELY HAS NOW SAID HE COULD NOT AGREE TO IT. FRENCH FEAR 
BLOODSHED IF BINH XUYEN LOSE COBTROL OF POLICE UNDER DIEM 
AND BELIEVE NEW PRIME MINISTER SHOULD HAVE POLITICAL ADVANTAGE 
OF REGAINING CONTROL OF POLICE FOR GOVERTfl.ffiNT) . 

B, IN ORDER INDUCE COOPERATION OF BINH XUYEN WITH NEW 
GOVERNMENT, IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE TO OFFER BAY VIEN A CHANCE 
TO SAVE FACE BY HES "VOLUIWARILY" PROPOSING THAT CONTROL 

OF POLICE BE TRANSFERRED TO NEW GOVERMMEHT. I liAVE JUST HAD 

CONVERSATION V/ITH FOREIGN MNISTER DO, WITHOUT ItlDI GATING 



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TOP SEGEET QirMQU l^'t- 
-2- kkk8 APRIL 9, 10 P.M. (SECTION OKE OF FIVE), FROM SAIGON 



OUB POSSIBLE THIMKING, I ASKED DO IF IIE THOUGHT BAY VIEIT 14IGHT 
RELINQUISH POLICE CONTROLS TO ANY NEW GOVERKIffiMT . DO SAID , 
HE FELT THAT Wim PROPER APPROACH, THIS ICTGHI WELL BE POSSIBLE. 
HE INSISTS IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR DIEI4 TO ACHIEVE THIS. 
DO FULLY AGREES THAT ANT fM-J GOVSRNIvffiNT WOULD HAVE TO TAKE 
OVER POLICE CONTROLS, BUT FEELS STRONGLY THAT EVERYTHING 
POSSIBLE SHOULD BE DONE TO SECURE COOPERATION OF BINH XUYEN 
WITH NEW GOVERNl'.ffiNT. I BELIEVE THAT IF BAY VIEN VffiRE CONVINCED 
AHEAD OF TBffi THAT U.S., FRANCE, BAG DAI AJ^ID ANY NEl^ PREMIER , 
WOULD INSIST ON GOVERNMENT TAKING OVER POLICE, Iffi IG^HT VJELL 
AGREE TO MAKE THIS OFFER HIMSELF. I BELIEVE THIS METHOD 
PREFERABLE TO lA ABOVE UNLESS V7ASHINGT0N FEELS DIEM'S PRESTIGE 
AND PERHAI^ OUR am MUST BE PROTECTED BY FOLLOV^NG METHOD 
lA. 

2. PERSUADE DIEM TO RESIGN, OR IF HE REFUSES, HAVE BAO DAI 
RELIEVE HIM. 

A. BETTER SOLUTION WOULD BE RESIGNATION BY DIEM. IF ^ffiTHOD 
lA ABOVE IS FOLLOWED, DIEM COULD BOW OUT S01>IEWHAT GRACEFULLY 
"IN ORDER TO HEAL THE WOUNDS" CAUSED BY RECENT EVENTS, Tffi 
COULD POSSIBLY DRAi'T A STATEMENT FOR HIM. 

B. DISTASTEFUL AS . IT WOULD BE TO USE BAO DAI IP DIEM ^LL 
NOT RESIGN, I SEE NO OTHER LEGAL I4ETH0D OF REPLACING HIM. 

C. FOR TIMING AS TO NOTIFICATION OF DIEM, SEE • PARAGRAPH 
3F BELOW. 

3. CHOOSE SUCCESSOR TO DIEM AS PRESIDENT OF COUNCIL. 

A. I BELIEVE IT IS MCBT IMPORTAJTT TO PLACE ON FRENCH THE 
ONUS AND RESPONSIBILITY OF DESIGNATING DIEM'S SUCCESSOR. 
FRENCH AJtE ALL TO READY TO PLACE ONUS DIEM'S LACK OF SUCCESS 
ON U.S. IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE THEREFORE FOR THE HEAD OF 
NEl^ GOVERNMENT TO BE PROPOSED B¥ FRENCH AND CONCURRED IN 
BY THE U.S. ELY INDICATED THAT RE WOULD FAVOR QUAT, DO OR 
PERHAPS EVEN EX- DEFENSE MINISTER MINH. HE STIPULATED AS 
PRIMARY REQUISITE THAT ANY NEW GOVERNMENT IfiJST AVOID TAINT 
OF COLONIALISM. HENCE I BELIEVE THAT IF ELY'S ADVICE V/ERE 



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khhB APKI.L 9, 10 P,M. (section OME of five), from SAIGON 



FOLLOi*?ED FRENCH G-OVEEia.ffilJT WOULD WOT PROPOSE BUU HOI, TM 
OR HOU. OUR OPPCBITION TO THESE MEN HAS BEEN MADE CLEAR TO 
FRENCH. 

B. SEE m TELEGRAI4 ^^263 FOR DISCUSSIOH OF POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS. 
OF COURSE, ¥E WOULD HAVE TO COI^ TO AGREEffiNT WITH THE 
FRENCH ON A SUCCESSOR AND I WOULD NOW HECOtfEIffi EITHER DO 
OR QUAT. 



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INCOMING TELEGRAM 



ACTION COPY 



BEPAETtffiNT OF STATE 



Control 



TOP SECRET Qrr\iciTi'-/r^^''^" 



5011 

APRIL 9, 1955 

2:06 M. 



FROM: SAIGON 



TO: 



Secretary of State 



NO: UUl^S, APRIL 9, 10 P.M. (SECTION TWO OF FIVE) 



NIACT 



FOR SECRETARY FROM COLLINS. 

DEPAETl-ffiNT TELEGRAMS Ui+11 MID kkl2 



C. AFTER FRANCE AND U.S. HAVE AGREED ON A MAN, BAO DAI'S 
CONSENT MUST TiiEN BE OBTAINED, IKES WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE 
THROUGH PARIS, 

D. BAO DAI WOULD THEN SWMON THE N0:4INEE TO PARIS FOR 
CONSULTATION, IF POSSIBLE, THIS SHOULD BE DONE SECRETLY. 

IF QUAT VffiEE THE CHOICE, IT MIGtJT BE DOIffi ICTHOUT A LEAJC SINCE 
HE HAS MADE A COUPLE OF TRIPS TO PARIS WTHIN THE PAST YEAR. 

E. ASSUMING NOMINEE WOULD ACCEPT TPSK OF FORMING GOVERf&IEWT, 
HE WOULD HAVE TO RETURN AT ONCE TO SAIGON FOR CONSULTATIONS. 
THESE CONSULTATIONS SHOULD COMMENCE WTH DISCUSSIONS VflTH 
ELY AJH) ME, WHO WOULD INFORM 'HIM AS TO [^^TURE OF PROGRAMS 
WlirCH U.S. Al'lD FRANCE WOULD SUPPORT. ARMED WITH THIS 
KI'IOI'/LEDGE , HE COULD THEN PROCEED WITH CONVERSATIONS WITH 
PROSPECTIVE MINISTERS, REPRESENTATIVES OF VARIOUS POLITICAL 
PARTIES, AND LEADERS OF THE SECTS. 

F. I FEEL THAT AS SOON AS NOMIflEE HAS ACCEPTED, DIEM SHOULD 
BE INVITED BY BAO DAI TO RESIGN OR ELSE BE RELIEVED. UNDER 
NO CIRCUI'ISTANCES SHOULD DIEM BE TOLD OF PLAN BEFORE FRENCH 
AND U.S. IiA\'E APPROACHED BAO DAI AND GAINED IHS ABSENT: ■ 
TO INFOPJ^ HIM COULD GIVE HIM DAMAGING MATERIAL FOR HIS 
"WHITE PAPER". EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE BY BAO DAI TO liAVE 
DIEM RSI-iAIN IN OFFICE UNTIL HIS SUCCESSOR IS PREPARED TO 
TAKE OVER. IF HE SHOULD REFUSE TO DO THIS, IfflDCCH IS WHOLLY 
POSSIBLE, BAO DAI WOULD THEN HAVE TO DESIGNATE, PREFERABLY 
FROM PRESENT CABINET, SOIffiONE TO ACT AS IlfCERIM PRESIDEira 

OF THE COUNCIL. UNQUESTIONABLY, A3 SOON AS DIEI^ RECEIVES 



SUCH NOTIFICATION, 



PERMANENT 
RECORD COPY 



897. 






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Declassined per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dute: 201 1 



TOP SECIffiT.^f [\i3iTlVL 



KEPRESElslTATIVES 



898 



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or MClT'i\fF 



-2-I4U8, APRIL 9, 10 PM. (section TOO OF FIVE), FROM SMGOl 

SUCH NOTIFI CATION, HE VfILL CALL ON ME TO Fllffi OUT WHAT 
INFOffl.IATION I HAVE MtD PERU'VPS TO ASK FOR ADVICE. I WOULD 
PROPOSE REPLYING THAT I liAD BEEN NOTIFIED BY I^TY GOVEENMENT 
OF DECISION OF BAO DAI, PM) WOULD SEEK TO PERSUADE DIEI4 TO . 
REM/ilN IN OFFICE UIWIL HIS SUCCESSOR COULD TAKE OVER. 
WE SHOULD BE WILLING TO ASSIST HIM IN PREPARING A STATEMENT 
WHICH HE MIGHT ISSUE AS ITOI GATED IH PAilAGRAPH 2A ABOVE. 

h. REACH AGREEMENT BEWFEEN U.S., FRA3ICE, AND NEl'J PRESIDEIW 

ON PKOGRAl'I FOR SOLUTION OF SECT POLITICAL MD MILITARY 

PROBLEMS. IT IS BELIEVED THAT AW AGEEEI'.ffiNT WOUID HAVE TO ; 

BE REACHED BETl'JEEN ELY, THE NM-f PRESIDENT, AM3 MYSEM", ON 

A PROGRAM FOR SOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL AITO MILITARY PROBLEI^ 

OF THE SECTS. TIlES WOULD REQUIRE A PRIOR AGREEl-ffiNT BET.'.fEEN 

FRENCH AMD U.S. GOVERNl^ffiNTS ALONG THE LIHES OF OUR PROPOSALS 

COIWAINED IN EMBASSY TELEGRAM '+373. THESE PROPOSALS ARE 

BEING ACTIVELY STUDIED NOW BY GEiffiRAL ELY'S STAEF. Vffl 

EXPECT TO COME TO AGREEMENT HERE V7ITHIN 48 HOURS, APPROVAL 

WILL STILL BE REQUIRED PROM WASHIHGTON, PARTICULARLY AS TO 

ADDED COSTS WHICH ARE INVOLVED IN THE INDUCTION OF MORE SECT 

PERSONTffiL THAN ORIGINALLY COUNTEMPLATED , SE\rERAIICE PAY FOR 

SECT PEESONIffiL TO BE DEMOBILIZED, AND LAR'GER AVERAGE STRENGTH 

OF ARI'ffiD FORCES FOR FY 1955, CAUSED BY SLOW-DOVJIT IN DISCHARGE ' ^ 

OF VIETNAMESE ARMY PER30MEL AS A RESULT OF PRESENT SECT 

CRISIS . 

5. OBTAIN AGREEMENT OF SECTS TO PROPCSED SOLUTION OF THEIR 

PEOBLEI^IS . 

A. KEXT STEP WOULD PROBABLY BE FOE UM PRESIDENT TO MEET 
WITH LEADERS OF SECTS AITO OBTAIN THEIR AGREEl^NT TO SOLUTION 
ARRIVED AT UNDER PARAGRAPH h ABOVE. HE WOULD HAVE TO MAKE 
CLEAR TO SECTS THAT THIS WAS BEST PROGRAM THEY COULD POSSIBLY 
OBTAIN AI5D THAT IT WAS ONLY WAY TO CONTINUE AMERICAN AND 
FRENCH FINANCIAL Alffi MORAL SUPPORT, WITHOUT I-ffllCH THE COOTTRY 
COULD NOT POSSIBLY BE SAVED FROM VIET MINH AI-TO COMMUNISM 
WHICH SECTS PROFESS TO DETEST, 

B. IT IS OUR THOUGHT THAJ? SECTS WOULD NOT BE INVITED .TO 
PARTICIPATE IN CABINET, EXCEPT FOR POSSIBLY ONE OR -WTO MEN, 
WHO MGHT BE CHOSEN BECAUSE OF THEIR ABILITY RATHER THAN AS 



Declassified per Executive Order 1 3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 1 6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SE CEET " C p ^f 3 1 T i y E 



_3_ I+I4.I+8, APRIL 9, 10 P.M. (SECTION TV/0 OF FIVE), FROM SAIGON 



REPRESENTATIVES OF SECTS. IH LIEU OF CABII3ET PARTI CTPATIOIT, 
SECTS WOULD BE OFFERED POSITIONS OF HONOR IN THE HIGH COUNCIL, 
WHICH WOULD BE ADVISORY TO THE PRESIDENT. SEE PARAGRAPH 
7B BELOW. 

C. SOME QUID PRO QUO WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO BE OFFERED 

SECT LEADERS, PARTICULARLY BAY VIEN, IF LATTER IS TO AGREE 

"WILLINGLY" TO SURRENDER POLICE POWERS. I UlffiERSTAND THAT 

IN TliE PAST BAY VIEN HAS IMI GATED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO BE ' I 

MINISTER OF INTERIOR OR HAVE Olffi OF HIS HENCffiffiN IN THIS . j 

POSITION. SUCH AN APPOINTl^NT WOULD BE FATAL AlTD IT "MUST 

BE MADE CLEAR TO NEW PRESIDENT THAT UNDER NO CIRCUl-lSTANCES 

WOULD WE AGREE TO THIS . IT IS POSSIBLE THAT BINH XUYEN WOULD 

SETTLE FOR SOLIE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM THE GOVEEIt-SIfr IN 

THEIR COMiffiRCIAL VENTURES. BAY VIEN AND PERHAPS GENERAL 

SOAI MIGHT CONSENT TO LEAVE TliE COUNTRY ON SOME OFFICIAL 

MISSION IF THEY WERE PERIGTTED TO Tj\KE OUT BULK OF FORTUITIES 

THEY HAVE ACQUIRED. 



J "4 



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Dedassifkd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 il 



^ J 



INGOMNG TELEGRAM 



ACTIOIT COPY 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



TOP SECRET Qr^V\ 




IVE 



FROM: SAIGON 



TO: 



Secretary of State 



Control 
EecU: 



NO: khhB, APRIL 9, 10 P.M. (SECTION THF.EE OF FIVE) 

NIACT 

FOR SECKETAEY FROM COLLINS, 

DEPARIMENT TELEGRAMS i^Ull and )4)+12. 

6. FORM imJ CABINET. DURING TfHE PERIOD, THE NEW PRESIDEI-TT 
WILL HAVE BEEN CONSULTING WITH POSSIBLE f!EW CABINCT" JlEI-fflERS, 
AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, HE SHOULD FORM HIS NEW GOVERNMENT 

AND ANNOrjNCE IT. 



5012 

APRIL 9, 1955 

2:10 P.M. 



7. REORGANIZE GOVERNMENT STHJCTURE. 

A. OUR TEMTATCTE TIIINJCLNG ON THIS POINT IiA5 BEEN COVERED 
IN SOME DETAIL IN RECENT TELEGRAMS. ' '- 

B. WE FEEL IT WOUtD BE ADVISABLE UNDER CURRENT CtMDITIONS 
FOR PRESIDENT, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH HIS CABINET AND 
SEPARATELY WITH ELY AND ME, TO APPOINT A "HIGH COOMCIL",. 
CONSISTING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF VARIOUS INTELLECnJAL GROUPS, 
LABOR, SECTS AND OTHER RELIGIOUS GROUPS, REFUGEES, AND 
DISTINGUISHED PERSONALTIES SUCH A5 FORMER ERESIDEIi"! LONG, 

MY PERSONAL JUDGI^ilMT IS THAT THIS COUNCIL SHOULD NOT INCLUDE 
PEOPLE LIKE GENERAL IffNH, BUT HOI, TAN OR ICfU, THCOGH FRENCH 
MIGHT INSIST UPON INCLUSION OF SOME SUCH PEOPLE. 

C. DIEM liAS INDICATED THAT HE WOULD FAVOR APP0INB4ENT OP 

AN ECONOMC ADVISORY COUl\rciL, INCLUDING SOME FOREIGN EXPERTS, 
CERTAINLY TECHNICALLY COMPETENT PEOPLE WILL BE NEEDED IN 
ECONOMIC FIELD, THOUGH THEY COULD BE SUPPLIED TO G0VERNMET3T 
THROUGH FRENCH AND AI-ffiPICAN ECONOMC AID PROGPAMS. HOVJEVER, 
IT MIGHT BE WELL TO HAVE THE14 CARRIED OFFICIALLY TE AN ADVISORY 
COUNCIL. 

D. BASED ON QUE EXPERIENCE HERE, I FEEL THAT THE^ SHOULD 



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Dccbssined per Executive Order 13526» Section 3.3 
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TOP SECRET SENShiVE 

-2- khkQ, APRIL 9, 10 P.M. (section TIIEEE OF FIVE), FROM SAIGON 

BE A VICE HffiSIDESIT tffiO CA1>1 BE USED BY TliE PlffiSIDEHT AS A 
GENERAL EXECUTIVE AND TROUBLE SHOOTER TO HAirotE SPEC3:FIC 
PROBLET-IS AS 'THEY ARISE. IT MGHT BE ADVISABLE TO HAVE A 
SECOND VICE PRESIDENT BT CHAEGE OF rvJO MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE 
Airo INTERIOR, SINCE FOR THE COMNG YEAR THESE MNIS TRIES WILL 
HAVE TO WORK VERY CLOSELY TOGETHER IN PACIFICATION OF COUNTRY 
AND FERRETING OUT OF VIET MINH AGENTS AND INFLUENCE. 

8, ANNOUNCE COMPLETE PROGRAM OP NEW GOVERNMENT. THIS 
JNOUNCEIffiNT SHOULD INCLUDE: 



A. THE PLAN OF REORGANTZATION OF GOVERNMENT. 



■** 



] . THE BROAD PROGRAM OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AID MILITARY 
REFORMS EMBODIED IN THE ELY/COLLINS SEVEN- POINT PROGRAM. 
SEE ElffiASSY TELEGRAl^ 200^+. 

n 
i 

C. THE DETAILED FLAN FOR TIffi POLITICAL AND MILITARY INTEGRATION 
OF THE SECTS IN TliE NATIONAL LIFE. SEE EI^EASSY TELEGRAM 

9. ELECT AND CONVOKE PROVISIONAL HATIONAX A.SSEMBLY. 

A. THE NECESSARY ORDINANCES TO ESTABLISH THE PROVISIONAL 

NATIONAL ASSEIiBLY HAVE ALREADY BEEN PUBLISHED AJD MAY 15 
HAS BEEN AM0U13CED AS DATE FOR ELECTION OP THOSE MEI4BERS WliO 
ARE TO BE ELECTED BY VILLAGE AND OTHER COUNCILS. 

B. THE ASSEMBLY SHOULD MEET AS HIOMPTLY THEREAFTER AS 
POSSIBLE. ITS TWO MOST IMPORTANT TASKS SHOULD BE REVIEW 
OF NATIONAL BUDGET AND DESIGNATION OF A SPECIAL COtMTTEE 
TO DRAFT PLANS FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY. 

PART II. ' • 

PARAGRAPHS ARE NUMBERED AS IN DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM 41+12 

1. I BELIEVE FRENCH WOULD DO ALL POSSIBLE REMAIN ALOOF FROM 
ANY IvIILITARY ACTION DIEM MIGHT UNDERTAKE AGAINST BINH XUYEN 

BUT WOULD 



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3- iil|U8, APRIL 9, 10 P J.I; (SECTIOH THREE OF FIVE), FROM SAIGON 



BUT WOULD OFFER GOOD OFFICES TO EICD OR MIWIMIZE ANY CONFLICT 
FREJICH WOULD CERTAIMLY DO ALL POSSIBLE' IN SAIGON TO PROTECT . 
0>JN NATIONALS AND FOREIGNERS AlID PROPERTY OF BOTH FROM 
MEM, INCLUDING PUBLIC UTILITIES. : 

KIDDER 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
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INCOffiKG TELEGRAM 



ACTION COPY 



i. 



DEPAETMEHT OF STATE 



TOP SECRET ^ r jM Q I I { ' / P 



Control 
Kedd: 



FROM: SAIGON 



5013 

APRir. 9, 1955 

2:19 PM 



TO: 



Seci-etary of State 



NO: kkk8, APRIL 9, 10 PM (SECTION FOUR OF FIVE) 



NIACT 

FOR SECRETARY- FROM COLLINS. -^ 

DEPAETI4EM' TELEGRAMS U^ll and ^^12» 

2. OWING HIS SPECIAL SENSE OF MISSION^ DIEM WILL EROBABLY 
PUT UP IfflATEVER RESISTANCE BE CM TO BEING REMOVED, BUT I 
DOUBT liE WILL FIND SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT IN ANY QUAHTER, IN 
END HE WILL PROBABLY RETIRE IN OUTRAGE FROM SCENE AND VOICE 
ILTS PROTESTS AGAINST BAO DAI^ FRADICE AITO U.S. IN SaiE KIND 
OF 'VHTTE PAPER". , ^, ^^ 

A. CERTAIN VIETNAMESE NATIOJ^IALISTS WOULD SEIZE ON DIEM'S 
REMOVAL TO FAN ANTI-FRENCH SENTIMENT^ BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE 
DIEM'S REMOVAL WOULD PJESULT IN POPULAR VIOLENCE AGAINST 

FRENCH EXCEPT POSSIBLY SPOIUDIC INDIVIDUAL INCIDEIiTS. 

■ 

B . I BELIEVE DIEM WOULD ULTIMATELY ACCEPT REMOVAL AS STATED 
PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE, I THIM HE IS TRUE PATRIOT AND WOULD NOT 
TRY SABOTAGE CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRAM OF NEW GOVERNMENT, I DO 
NOT AGREE THAT HE STILL IIAS "CONSIDERABLE POWER" EXCEPT 
SUPPORT OF FRANCE AND U.S. I HAVE TRIED TO CONVEY TO 
DEPARTMENT HOW SLENDER BASIS OF DIEM'S PRESENT SUPPORT NOW IS 
IF FRENCH AND U.S. SUPPORT IS WITHDRAWN, DIEM OTLL BE HARD 
PRESSED TO MUSTER ANY ALLIES, AND FE'^ IF AI^ OF THESE ARE 
LIKELY TO RESORT TO VIOLENCE IN HIS SUPPORT. 

3. NATIONAL ARMY LOYALTY, WHICH DIEM DOES NOT FULLY 
COI#IAND, IS NOT COMPLETELY' TRANSFERRABLE TO ANY INDIVIDUAL. 
I BELIEVE, HOl'ffiVER, ARMY LOYALTY COULD BE SECURED BY NEW 
GOVERI^vEKT MORE BROADLY BASED, NOT RIVEN BY POLITICAL 
JEALOUSIES AND CRISES LIKE DIEM REGIME, AND FULLY BACKED BY 
FRANCE AND U.S. HOWEVER, THERE MAY BE INDIVIDUAL BATTALION 
COIMALIDERS IN CENTER VIET NAI^ WHO MGHT LEAD GROUPS OF 'MEN 



TO DEFECT, 



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, I ' " ^op SECRET SENSITIVE 



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_2- kkh8, APRIL 9, 10 PaM. (SECTION if OF 5) FHOM S/IIGON 

TO DEFECT. SUCH IKCIDEWTS. WOULD }IAVE VERY LII.IETED EFFECT 
ON BULK OF ARMY, IT SHOULD BE a^ID HERE THAT Uffl)ER NO 
CIRCWlSTAITCEg SHOULD GETffiRAL MKH BE ALLOVJED RETUH7 TO VIET 
NAM NOW, HE RETAINS CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE IN ARMY AND COULD ■ 
BECOME ONCE AGAIN MAJOR DISRUPTIVE rNELUENCE. 

k. COMPILATION OF ASSETS OF STRENGTH DIEM MAY HAVE IS 
• DIFFICULT TO MAKE. WITH RESPECT TO POLITICAL FOLLOWING IH 
CEItCER VIET HAM, THIS liAS BEEN FALLING OFF PARTLY AS RESULT 
OF POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF DIEM'S BROTHER NGO DINH CAN, 
AHD OPPOSITION HAS TAKEN FORM FOR EXAMPLE OF RECENT INCIDENTS 
AT EA LANG. THERE IS NO PROPER GRASS ROOTS SUPPORT OF ANY 
LEADER IN VIET NAM, LEAVING ASIDE HO CHI ICENH. DIEM'S 
VIRTUES AS AMTI -FRENCH LEADER HJiVE BEEN TARNISHED BY HIS 
DEPEICENCE ON HIS BROTHERS WHICH ]iAS LED TO QUITE GENERAL 
FEELING THAT A NGO FAICELY DICTATORSHIP IS IN EFFECT BEING 
I ESTABLISHED, FEW NATIOMLISTS OUTSIDE HIS FAMILY AND BftlEDIATE 

; _ ENTOURAGE WOULD LIF A FINGER IN DIEM'S DEFENSE. HOT GREAT 
!*'" HIS EOLLCWIKG IS IN CATHOLIC COMMUNITY IS liARD TO SAY, 
DIEM HIMSELF CLAIt© HIS SUPPORT IN CENTER, FOR EXAIJOPLE, 
COMES LARGELY FROM NON-CATHOLICS „ IN ANY EVENT CATHOLIC 
COMMUNITY IS NOT POLITICALLY ORGANIZED AND REPRESENIS LESS 
THAN 10 PERCENT OF POPULATION, CERTAINLY MANY REFUGEES FROM 
NORTH VJERE ATTRACTED BY FACT CATHOLIC HE/'J>S GOVERNI^NT OF 
SOUTH, BUT POLITICAL AND PHYSICAL STRENGTH OF REFUGEES IS 
ONLY A POTENTIAL FOR EXPLOITATION AT A LATER DATE. IN 
NATIONAL ARMY, SCARCELY ANY LEADERS ARE ENTIRELY PRO-DIEM, 
EVEN CHIEF OF STAFF TY; SOME ARE HOSTILE, AND TliE MAJORITY 
ARE HIOBABLY NO MORE THAN LUKE-WARM. I BELIEVE THERE IS NO 
REASON TO ANTICIPATE SERIOUS ADVERSE REACTION IN ARMY AT 
LARGE. IF DIEM IS REMOVED TimOUGH ORDERLY PROCESSES. 

5. VIET MINH REACTION TO DIElvl'S REMOVAL WOULD UHDOUBTEDLY 
BE TO EFFECT THAT FREE WORLD HAD SUFFERED DAMAGING SETBACK. 
APART FROM STEPPED -UP PROPAGANDA CAlvIPAIGN AND PUBLIC GLOATING 
OVER DEFEAT OF AN ENEMY, I DO NOT BELIEVE VIET MINH REACTION 
WOULD BE DA1>JGER0US. IN OTHER WORDS, I DO NOT ANTICIPATE 
VIET MINH WOULD ATTEMPT TAKE MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF DIEM'S 
REMOVAL. HOfrffiVER, VIET MINH, PLAYING MANY ANGLES AS USUAL, 
MIGHT ATTEMPT BUILD UP ANTI-FRENCH AND AHTI-tr,S. SENTIMENT, 
CHARGING OVERTHROSf OF NATIONALIST GOVERNTffiNT TO FRENCH AND 
U.S. "IMPERIALISTS." 



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Dedassiiied per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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IHCOMING TELEGRAM 



FROM: SAIGON 



DEPARTMEHT OF STATE 
.TOP SECRET 

^ ^ * • v t ' I b' 

\Ji^i iKJi i I '' 



ACTIOIf COPY 



Control: 501U 
Rec'd: April 9, 1955 
2:27 P=M<. 



WO: 



Secretary of State 

^U)4 8, APRIL 9> 10 P.M. (SECTION FIVE OF FIVE) 



HIACT 

FOR SECRETARY FROM COLLINS. 

I 

DEPARTI'EBT TELEGRAMS kklX and ^^^^12. "^ 

6. IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO MAKE CHANGE AFTER BANDUNG JTJ 
ORDER AVOID GIVING VIET MIM PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE FOR 
EXPLOITATION AT CONFERENCE. HOWEVER, SINCE DIEM IS STILL 
THREATENING TO TAKE INDEPENDENT ACTION TO REi>40VE SAJ^G AFTER 
EA.STER WEEKEND J OVER STRONG FRENCH OBJECTIONS, IT 14AY BE 
DESIRABLE EFFECT CHANGE AS SOON AS U.S. AND FRENCH HAVE 
REACtlED AGREEMENT ON CASE TO BE PRESENTED TO BAO DAI, 
WHILE I RECOGNIZE DIFFICULTIES THIS CRISIS CREATES FOR U.S. 
IN VIEW OF OUR >JELL-KNOVJN ASSOCIATION WITH DIEM, I FEAR 
CONTINUED DELAY VTILL LEAD TO EVEN GRAVER PROBLEMS OF 
DETERIORATING FP-ENCH-U.S. COOPERATION IN VIET NAM, 
INTENSIFICATION OF CIVIL DISORDERS CULMINATING, POSSIBLY, 
IN CIVIL WAR, AND NOT IMPROBABLE ULTIMATE LOSS OF AIL VIET- 
NAM TO VIET MNH. THIS EVENTUALITY WOULD BE DAMAGIITG NOT 
ONLY TO U.S. PRESTIGE BUT, MORE IMPORTANTLY I AM CONVINCED, 
TO U.S. SECURITY. MECHANICS OF POSSIBLE CHANGE OF GOVER]a.ffiNT 
ARE DISCUSSED IN PART I ABOVE, . 

7. OUR AGREEIiENT TO PJUPLACEMENT OF DIEM ADMITTEDLY WILL 

BE DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN TO AMERICAN AITO WORLD PRESS, I WCULD 
SUGGEST SOMETHING ALONG FOLLOOTNG LINES: 

A. DIEIvI HAD MADE A GREAT CONTRIBUTION TO HIS .COUNTRY AT A 
TIME WHEN HIS PARTICULAR QUALITIES WERE MOST VALUABLE. HE 
MAINTAINED CALM AFTER GENEVA, CONTRIBUTED TO EXODUS OF 
REFUGEES FROM NORTH WITH ITS GREAT PSYCHOLOGICAL Il^AGT, 
SUCCESSFULLY MUSTERED WORLD OPINION IN SUPPORT OF AID TO 
THESE REFUGEES AND WITH SUPPORT OF FRAI^jCE AND U.S. DEVELOPED 
SOUND AND PROGRESSIVE SOCIAL, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MLITARY 



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-2- ifl|i|8, APRIL 9> lOP.M, (SECTIOII FIVE OF FIVE), FROM SMGOU 
REFOFJ-IS FOR HIS COJHTRY. 

B. PERHAPS IT WAS INEVITABLE TliAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE 
PROGRAMS WOULD DEVELOP DEVISIVE IWLUESCE3 AJ'IONG THE PEOPLE 
OF VIETNAM, WHO HAVE OMLY RECENTLY GAIMD THEIR INDEPENDENCE. 
THEY HAVE HAD LITTLE EXPERIENCE IN IffiETING THE COMPLEX PROBLEMS 
WHICH THEY FACE, SUCH AS RECONCILING DIFFEREIW INTERESTS OF 
SECTS AND VARIOUS REGIONS OF THE COUNTRY. THIS HAS RESULTED 
IM CLASHES OF PERSONALITY, WHICH HAD MUCH TO DO VJITiT THE 
CURRENT CRISIS, INVOLVING THE "UNIFIED FRONT" ORGANIZATION. 
RESULTANT BLOODSHED, EVEN THOUGH NOT EXTENSIVE, HAS CREATED 
DEEP WOUNDS WHICH WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR PRESENT GOVERNMENT 

TO HEAL. 

C. DIEM WAS UNABLE OR UTJWILLING TO TAKE INTO HIS GOVERNI-ffiNT 
MEtBERS OF VARIOUS OPPOSITION PARTIES . ON"LY WITH BROAD 
SUPPORT CAN" THE PROGRESSIVE PROGEAT© DEVELOPED BY DIEM BE 
MADE EFFECTIVE. THE NEW GOVEfflMENT IS. HEADED BY A MAN WHO 
liAS HAD EXPERIENCE IN GOVERNl^ffiKT AND WHOSE PERSONALITY IS 
SUCH THAT HE SHOULD BE ABLE TO GET OTIiER STRONG MN TO WORK 
WITH HTM. HE HAS ADOPTED THE SAlffi BASIC PROGRAI-iS WHICH 
DIEM INITIATED AITD WHICH HAVE THE FULL SUPPORT OF BOTH 

U.S. AND PRANCE. DECISION AS TO WHO SHOULD HEAD GOVERNMENT 
OF VIETNAM IS, OF COURSE, ONE TO BE MADE BY THE VIETNAMESE 
PEOPLE UNDER THEIR OWN SYSTEM. WHILE CliANGE IN PRESIDENCY 
INVOLVES TEMPORARY LOSS TO VIETNAI^I OF A GREAT NATIONALIST 
LEADER, IT DOES NOT IN ANY SENSE MEAN A CHANGE IN THE POLICIES 
OF HIS GOVERNl/ffiNT WHICH HAVE DRAlffl U.S. SUPPORT. WITH THIS 
SUPPORT AND THE COOPERATION OF ALL ELEMENTS OF VIETNAM, 
THE COUOTRY CAN BE SAVED FROM C01«JNISM. 

KIDDER 



LFS/32 



Note: Read by Mr. Yound (psa) 2:30 p.m. k/9/^5 FMH 



906 



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Declassilicd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






DEPARTI-m^T OF STATL 



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SENT TO: Amembassy SAIGON HIACT U'138 



EYES OELY iU^IBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY 



Apr 9 1955 



I Have this laornlng discussed situation vith highest authority. We 
are disposed to back whatever your final decision is "but before you 
3'txially finalize Vg >rant to "be s'^jre you have weighed all of the factors 



vhich concern us here. 



■s 



We feel that "what has happened does not reveal anything new about 

i 
Diem but rather a basic and dangerous misunderstanding as "bet^ieen France 

and the U.S. 



/ 



have always known the qualities which Diem possesses and those 



)^hich he lacks. Nevertheless our two coutitries agreed to support him in 

i 

default of anyone possessing better qualifications. The only alternatives 

now suggested are the same persons who were regarded as unacceptable sub- 

m 

-stitutes scxne nonths ago. 



Wliat has happened is that whereas the United States has been pro- 
ceeding on the assumption that Diem would be backed as against any who 
might challenge him assitroing that he had the capability^ apparently the 
Erench have given their support only on the assusnption that the Binh Xuyen 
w^ould al^o be supported on an a^utonomous authority and that when they 
challenged Diem he would not be allowed to use force to assert his authority 
over it» . ' 

Vie can appreciate the reluctance of the French to see force used but 
If it cannot bemused then what is the point of our supporting at great cost 
the national arniy w^hich I thought it had been agreed was primarily to be 

w 

an ariny for domestic security rather than an anny to fight external aggression 












Dccbssined per Executive Order 13526» Section 3.3 
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U,S» recognises that Cao ,Dai and even the Hoa Hao are genuine sects 
with cuJ.t\iral religious and political roots which caiinot 'be forcihly torn 

■ 

up -without grave consequences \rluch should "be avoided but ve do not believe 
that any central government can exist as more than a figurehead if it does 
not have control over the national police and if this control is fariaed out 
to a gang which exploits its privileges to protect vice on a vastly profit- 
able scale and which exists by virtue of the backing of the self- exiled 
Bao Dai and the French. 

We ca2:inot see that replaceraent of Diem by ap^ persons you mentioned 
will of itself correct this situation and indeed we have hB.d. the iiapression 
that Quat w^as less acceptable to the sects than is Diem, 

There are two other factors to be -borne in mind. 

One is that it is widely known that Diem has so far existed by reason of 
U*S. support despite French reluctance. If^ how^ver^ when the showdown 
cones the French view prevails then that will gravely weaime oui^ influence 
for the future both in Vietnain and elsewhere. Eemoval of Diem under these 
circumstances may well "be interpreted in Yietnam and Asia as exsuiple of U,S, 
paying lip service to nationalist cause and then forsaking true nationalist 
leader when QUOTE colonial interests Ui^rQUOTE put enougli pressure on us. The 
French constantly assert that the U.S. has a primary responsibility in this 
pai^t of the world but it is difficult to have responsibility without 
authority. In essence, v/ill not the ouster of Diem on the present condi- 
tions mean that from now on we will be merely paying the bill and the ]?>ench 
will be calling -the t\ine- My successor of Diem >rill clearly know \vhere 
the real authority lies. 



COPY 






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The second factor is that there vill be rery strong opposition in 
the Congress to supporting the situation in Indochina generally and Vietnam . 
in particular if Diem is replaced imder existing circusistances. We do not 
say that this opposition may not in the last ^instance te overcome^ pax- i 

ticularly if you personally can maJve a case before the Congressional can- 

* 

loittees ^)ut Mansfield \jhQ is looked upon with gi^eat respect by his colleagues 
vith reference to this matter j is adsxaantly opposed to ahandoninent of Diem 
under present conditions, I wonder w^hether there is not sone intermediate 

■ 

solution between the present extremes now discussed and that Diem can be 
allowed to regain his daiiiaged prestige by an assertion of authority OYer 
the Binh Xuyen and at the same tlmq other .^elements be brought into the 

ft 

government under conditions which "will assure a real delegation of authority; 

I feel that as with most Orientals Di<^n must "be highly suspicious of 
what is going on about hiiu and that this suspicion exaggerates his natural 
disT50siti on to be secretive and untrustful. If he ever really felt that 
the French and ourselves were solidly beh:lnd him might he not really broaden 
his govern^nent? We must I thinl^: have soiae sympathy for his predicament as 
he is constantly called QUOTE the Diem experiment IMQUOTE, 

In conclusion I want to reaffirm the very great confidence which we ;. 
all have in you and in your judgment. You have done and are doing a w^onder- 
:ful job in the face of treraendous difficulties* 

Your UkkQ has just arrived in Department but is not yet decoded, V7e 
will comment on it: in subsequent telegi^am. * j 

m 



DUI.LES 



COPY 






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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i 



INCOMING TELEGRAM 



DEPARTIffiNT OF STATE 



ACTION COPY 



TOP SECRET ^pf'ISil iVE 



FROM: PARTS 



Control: 5026 
Eec'd: , . APRIL .9', 1955 

3:52 m 



TO: 



Secretary of State 



WO; ^396, APRIL 9, 3 VA (SECTION ITGffiE OF FOUR) 



PRIORITY 



DIEM'S FAULTY HANDLING OF THE PROBLEM HAS NOW RESULTED IN 
THE Blim rJYEN BECOMING A MAJOR FORCE, THE HANDLING OF WIi^CH 
IS OUT OF HAND, RATHER THAN A MINOR ONE WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN 
USED IN THE COMMON EFFORT IF DIEM HAD NOT BOTIGLED MATTERS. 
BAO DAI NOT BELIEVES THAT THE BINH XUYEN IvRJST GO EVENTUALLY 
BUT THAT TliERE IS NO POSSIBLE MEANS OF REMOVING THEM FROM THE 
SCEME UNDER THE STRESS OF THE PRESENT CRISIS BY SIMPLY ISSUING 
A DECREE TO IHAT EFFECT. THE DECREE WOULD BE IGNORED AI-ID EAO 
DAI'S AUTHORITY LOST. DIEM HAD BEGGED J'OR. FULL POWERS AMD 
HAD TOLD BAO DAI THAT IT WAS WHAT THE UNITED STATES I'JANTED 
HIM TO HAVE. BAO DAI HAD GRA3ITED THEM AGAINST HIS ADVISORS. 
NOW DIEM IS INCAPABLE OF GOVERNING EVEN WITH THESE POWERS AND 
WISHES BAO DAI TO DO SO FOR ICM BY DECREE. IF BAO DAI WERE -. 
TO DO SO, HE WOULD BE EXPENDING HIS AUTHORITY FOR A CAUSE 
WHICH IS ALREADY LOST, WHICH HE IS UWILLIIJ-G TO DO. DIEM HAS 
HOT THE MILITARY OR POLITICAL STPvENGTH TO CARRY OUT HIS 
ORDERS BY FORCE, AHD IF HE ATTEMPTS TO SUPPRESS THE BINH 
XUYEN IN THAT MANNER, IT WILL LEAD TO CIVIL WAR WHICH WOULD 
IN BAO DAI'S OPINION RESULT IN FREE VIETNAM PASSING UNDER 
VIET MINH CONTROL IN SHORT ORDER. EVEN IF IT VffiRE POSSIBLE 
TO BACK TliE GOVERNMENT TO THE EXTENT OF FORCING THE BINH XUYEN 
OUT OF TliE SAIGON POLICE (PRESUMABLY WITH OUTSIDE AID FROM 
THE FREireH OR THE UNITED STATES), IT WOULD RESULT IN DIEM 
BECOMING "EMPEROR OF SAIGON" AND WITH THE REST OF THE COUNTRY 
UNDER CONTROL OF LOCAL SECT TROOPS AND, EVENTUALLY, OF THE 
VIET MINH. DE QUOTED BAO DAI'S SOURCES IN SAIGON AS REPORTING 
DIEM'S STRENGTH AS A "MOCKERY". 



AFTER THIS PROLONGED EXPOSE, VfE ASKED DE WliAT BAO DAI THOUGHT 
SHOULD BE DONE. HE REPLIED THAT THE UNITH) STATES GOVERN- 
MENT SHOULD ARRIVE AT AN IMt^DIATE AGREEMENT WITH THE FRENCH 
TO CREATE SOI^ffi F0RI4 OF GOVERNING BODY WHICH COULD TAKE OVER 



PERMAHENT 
RECORD COPY 



910 



THE EXECUTIVE 






IlT,' 






r 



SENSITIVE 



Declassilicd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






^ 



TOP SECRET SENSIlJVE 
-2- i+396, APRIL 9) 5 BI (SECTION THREE OF FOUE), FROM PARIS 

TliE EXEOJTITO ROLE OF GOVERNING THE COUNTRY BEFORE IT IS TOO 
LATE. WE ASKED lOM TO BE MORE PRECISE AND HE STATED THAT HE 
HAD IN MIND A FORM OF "SUPRElffi COUNCIL" OR "COUNCIL OF ELDERS" 
V7HICH WOULD SERVE AS A GOVERNING BODY. IT WOULD FUNCTION UIIDER 
BAO DAI'S OVERALL DIRECTION AS CHIEF OF STATE, BUT WOULD EN- 
JOY THE SAME POVJE^ NOW ENJOYED BY DIEM. BAO DAI'S CHIEF 
F'lWCTION WOULD BE THAT OF "SUPRElvffi ARBITRATOR". THE COJNCIL 
, XJLD HAVE TO INCLUDE, IF IT WERE TO BE EFFECTIVE, REI^E- 
SENTATION OF ALL (ALL) FACTIONS IN VIETNAI4 INCLUDING THE 



n 



'ATHOLICS WHO MGIIT DECIDE THAT DIH4 IS THE BEST QUALIFIED MAl^ 
TO REPRE3EOT THEM* WE ASKED WHETHER IT WAS THOUGHT THAT THE 
\ OimcIL WOULD REPLACE THE GOVERP^IENT OR SIMPLY ACT IN CON- 
VICTION WITH IT AND DE SAID THAT FOR THE MOffiM HE THOUGHT 
THAT BAO DAI'S THOUGHTS WERE ALONG THE LATTER LINES BUT 
THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT. THE ONE RESTRICTION OF 
MEMBERSHIP IN THE COUHCIL SHOUIxD BE THAT ALL ITS MEMBERS 
BE ANTI-COMMUNIST. 






I 



■WE ASKED WHETHER EAO DAI HAD ANY VIEWS ON RETOEIRNG TO VIETNAM 
.AND VJERE TOLD THAT HE HAD NONE FOR THE MOMNT BUT WAS 
'prepared TO DO ANYTHING THAT WE AND THE FRENCH FELT WOULD HELP 
TOWARD A SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS. DE STATED THAT BAO DAI HAD 
WANTED TO RETURN ivIANY TIMES DURING RECENT MONTHS WHEN IT 
BECAME MORE AND MORE CLEAR THAT DIEM WAS INCAPABLE OF GOVERN- 
ING BUT THAT HE HAD BEEN PREVENTED FROM DOING SO BY DiEM Ilffl- 
SELF WHO ARGUED THAT THE UNITED STATES WA^ OPPOSED TO BAO 
DAI'S RETURN AND THAT IT WOULD BE INADVISABLE FOR HIM TO COME 
BACK FOR THERE WAS GREAT OPPOSIHON TO HEM IN VIETNAM AND 
THAT HE, DIEM, WAS "PRESERVING BAO DAI'S INTEREST". BAO 
DAI WA^ ]<fOT IMPRESSED BY ANY OF THESE Al^GUMENTS EXCEPT THAT 
THE UIHTED STATES DID NOT WISH HIM TO RETURN, >fflICH WAS 
CONFIRMED TO HIM BY LA CHAMBRE. HE HAD NOT PRESSED THE 
ISSUE BECAUSE HE FELT THAT, AS IN THE HINH CASE, HE MIGHT 
ACTUALLY WIELD MORE INFLUENCE PROM AFAR TfflERE HE WAS REMOVED 
FROM PETTY LOCAL SQUABBLES AND COULD EXERCISE HIS AUTHORITY 
FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNl-IENT AS HE HAD IN THE 
HENH CASE. 

DILLON 
AB/32 it5093 911 

Note; Read by Mr^ Young (i^a) 7:^5 V^-^^ V9/55 CWO-JRL 



TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Pn^ject Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i 



*- 
I 



INCOMING TELEGRAM DEPAEMENT OF STATE ACTION COPY 

TOP SECEET QFhlQjTiVr 

Kt L HOI ■ control : 10^92 

Rec'd; APRIL ±9, 1955 
FROM: SAIGOIJ 10:57 H-I 

TO: Secretary of State 

NO: h66l^ APRIL 19, 11 EM (SECTION TWO OF THREE) 



PRIORITY I 

SENT DEPARTMENT U66l, REPEATED IJjFORHAIION PRIOKLTY PARIS 120? 
FOE SECRETARY FROM COLLINS 
PAEIS FOE AMBASSADOR 

* 

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION. 

6. ELY REPEATED HIS BELIEF THAT PAST SUPPORT FOR DIEM HAD 
NOT BEEN AN ERROR. HS SAID T]'iAT WE 2-lUST NOV? ENVISAGE CHANGING 
PRIME MINISTER BUT NOT REPEAT NOT POLICY. THIS, HE SAID, 
CORRESPONDS TO WISHES OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. I ASKED ELY 

HOW HE COULD PROVE SUCH IS WILL OF VIETNAI/ESE PEOPLE IN ABSENCE 
OF AlIY ASSEMBLY. STATEMENT CAN ONLY REPRESENT ELY'S ESTIMATE. 
HE REPLIED IT IS OBVIOUS THAT PEOPLE WISH TO BE RID OF DIEM. 
I REPLIED DIEM COULD CHALLENGE STATEMENT AND, IN ANY CASE, 
NO ONE WAS IN POSITION TO PROVE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WISHED 
TO BE RID OF DIEM. ELY SAID PRESENT CEISIS ITSELF WAS 
EVIDENCE, I REPLIED THAT CRISIS HAD BEEN CAUSED BY SECT 
MINORITY LOOKING AFTER OWN SELFISH INTERESTS. SAME GOVEEIMENTAL 
PR0GRA14 UNDER ANOTHER PRIME MNISTER WOULD IWE\T:TABLY HAVE 
LED TO OPPOSITION FROM SECTS, ELY SAID THAT IF SUCH OTHER 
PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN SIMILAR TO DIEM HE WCULD AGREE, 
BUT DIEM HAD HANDLED SITUATION VERY BADLY, AND EVEN HIS OWN 
RELATIVES, DO AND THOAI, NO LONGER BELIEVED IN HEM. 

7. I TOLD ELY HE AND I I-JERE FOREIGNERS HERE AND EVEN BAO 
DAI WA^ TO SOM EXTENT FOREIGN. NONE OF US COULD SAY WHETHER 
VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WERE UNITED AS TO CHOICE OF ANY SUCCESSOR 
TO DIEI^. WITHOUT PARLIAMENT, IT CANNOT BE PROVED TO U.S. 
PUBLIC AND PRESS OPINION THAT DIEM IS NO LONGER WANTED. _ 

IF Dim WAS REMOVED IN ABSENCE OF SOtffi REPRESENTATIVE BODY, 
I COULD NOT PREDICT U.S. CONGRESSIONAL REACTION. THEREFORE, 

PERMANENT "' 912 

EECOED COPY ^51^9 

* 

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 



- ^i 



DeclassifK'd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Piojeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



»■" 



TOP SECRET OClMOi 1 WL 



-2- l(66l, APRIL 19, 11 H-I (SECTIOir WO OF THREE) FRCM. SAIGON. 

I URGED ELY NOT DISCOUNT S0LU110N UIMISS VIETNA!#;SE THEMSELVES 
REJECT IT, ELY REPEATED THAT DIEM EEI.IAIHS IN POVJER ONLY 
BY OUR INTERVENTION. I SAID IF HIS A1>IALYSIS WAS CORRECT , 
AN ASSEMBLY WOULD VOTE DIEI*^ OUT, AND IF AN ASSEIffiLY DID SO, 
I BELIEVED U.S. WOULD ACCEPT DECISION. ELY SAID HE KItEW HE 
COULD WOT PROVE HIS STATEMENT, BUT HE BELIEVED THAT TO MAINTAIN 
DIEM AGAINST POPULAR VfILL WOUTjD BE TO DIMINISH VALIDITjf OF 
EXPRESSION OF POPULAR WILL WHEN ELECTIONS BECOJIE POSSIBLE. 
I SAID THAT, ON CONTRARY, MODIFIED THOAI PROPOSAL WOULS 
WORK OI>ILY IF ACCEPTED BY CONSIDERABLE BODY OF VIETNAMESE 
OPINION. (#) BAO DAI IS FRAireO-U.S. CHOICEo I SAID I DID 
WOT KNOW WHETHER PROPOSAL WOULD WORK, THAT I INTENDED TO 
HAVE FURTHER COWSULTATIOEB TODAY AMD ONLY ASKED ELY WOT TO 
PREJUDGE OUTCOME. ELY SAID THAT, IN HIS VIEV'J, NO SOLUTION 
COULD APPEAR TO BE MORE 14ARKED AS FEANCO-U,S. SOLUTION THAU 
MAIWTENAWCE OF DIEM. I SAID I COULD NOT AGREE WITH TJCS 
SINCE FLAW WOULD NOT WORK UWLESS GOOD I-LWY VIETNAI-5ESE AGREED 
TO IT. 

8. ELY SAID THAT HE I€JST MARK THIS AS A POINT OF DISAGREEMENT- 
BETWEEN US SINCE IF PLAN DID WORK IT WOULD BE BECAUSE OF MY 
PUTTING PRESSURE ON VIETNAMESE. I AGREED THAT THOAI PROPOSAL, 
AS MODIFIED, WOULD WORK ONLY IF U.S. AND FRANCE BACKED IT, 
AND IF THE BASIC ELEMENTS WERE AGREED TO BY DIEI4, DO, QU^^ 
ET AL AITO BY BINH XUYEN. I REffiNDED HIM WASIIEHGTON HAD NOT 
YET AGREED TO WITHDRAW SUPPORT FROM DIEM, AND THAT IF IT DID 
AGREE TO WITHDRAW SUPPORT, SUCH WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE VERY 
HARD FOR SECRETARY AND ME TO EXPLAIN TO AlffiRICAN PEOPLE, 
ELY SAID HE WAS UNABLE TO SEE HOW AWYOWE WAS JUSTIFIED IN 
MAINTAINING DIEM IN OFFICE AGAINST BEST JUDGMENT OF PEOPLE 
ON THE SPOT. WTH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE WORKING OUT OF PROPOSAL, 
I TOLD ELY MY GUESS WOULD BE THAT PROVISIONAL ASSEI^ffiLY WOULD 
VOTE DIEM OUT OF OFFICE UNLESS HE HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO CHANGE 
HIS IvETHODS OF OPERATION. ELY SAID THIS WAS A DIFFSRMCE 
OF POINT OF VIEl'7 BETlffiEN US , EXPLAINED BY FACT THAT HS HAS 
SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES WITH RESPECT TO CRISIS WHICH RE 
FEELS CANWOT BE SOLVED AS LONG AS DIEM IS IN OFFICE. HE SAID 
SITUATION IS GETTING WORSE DAILY, MD HE ATTRIBUTES TMS 
WHOLLY TO DIEM'S INFLUENCE. SITUATION IS WORSENING IN Tlffi 
CENTER, A3ID UWDERGROUND IS GROWING. ONLY BY SURGERY, 1HAT 
IS REMOVAL OF DIEM, CAI-J COUNTRY BE SAVED. I SAID I DIQ NOT 



BELIEVE 



U517O 



'V. ,, 



TOP SECRET ^M-W^ 



IV 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 201 1 



* 






TOP SECRET- 



-2- ^i66Js /^"'^IL l?j 11 P -?•'!« < SECT I ON THRIVE OF THREE) FI10;V SAICOU 



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HAD MO CONNECTION WITH OUR PHODLEM HERE, -I -SAID' THAT, ON 
. C ON I R A R V 5 I N K A S H J. M G T U V I K '.•/ T HE R E ' I S I NT I U A T i: C m KCT 1 M , • 

VAN LAETHAI'J SAID FRENCH UNDERSTAND OUR PROBLEN WITH RESPECT " 

TO PUBLIC OPINION, BUT THEY HAVE THEIR OWN PUBLIC OPINION' 
. PROBLEM; AMD FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD TO ATTENPT TO PRESERVE 

SOrSETHiNG IN NORTH » THAT DID MOT MEAN, HOUEVER, THAT '" 
"^^ GOVERNMENT WAS PLAYING DOUBLE, GAKE. I AGAIN SUGGESTED THAT 



SHOUJ^D BE HADE CLEAR TO IMSHIMGTOM 



12n ; ELY SAID. THAT IF DIEM MUST BE RETAINED^AS PRIME HINISTER3 
HE FELT HE COULD MOT CONTINUE TO BE RESPONSIBLE FRENCH 
REPRESENTATIVE IN VIETNAM* ,. ■- • 

5,5. TO SUMMARIZE ELY^S POSITIONj I 'SAID ' WITH RESPECT TO 
MODIFIED THOAI PROPOSAL HE MADE THREE MAJOR POINTS 3 - 

(A) ELY SAID HE THOUGHT if WOULD KOT WORK AND WOULD BE ■ ' 
INTERPRETED AS A SOLUTION IMPOSED'FROM WITHOUT, 



')■ . ■ CB) ELY DOES NOT BELIEVE SITUATION COULD BE HELD IN BALANCE 
■ - ■ FOR SIX WEEKS « 



W I 

< i ■ ' _- 

CO) IT APPEARED 'ELY FEJ.T THAT IF CONDITIONS PR^IREQUISITE .* 
TO IMPLEMENTING MODIFIED TKfJAI PROPOSAL WERE MET;-' HE WOULD. 
S T I L .L FEEL HE CO UL D N T R EP E AT NOT R E N AIM ]^ E R E OR, C ON T I N U E " 
TO ACCEPT RESPO;.;SIBILITY DURING NEXT SIX WEEKS. 'I HAD " ■ 
UMDEnSTOOD ELY TO SAY }{E COULD NOT REMAIN IF DIEM REMAINED 
PERMANENTLY IN POWER, I WISHED TO KNCI^ WHETHER THAT STRICTURE 
APPLIED ALSO TO PROVISIONAL SOLUTIOH,, ' J • " 

• ■ • 
J.A, ELY SAID. HE DID NOT BELIEVE IN SOLUTION, THAT l{)i DID 
MOT THINK IT VALID j THAT' HE FELT THAT MEW CRISIS WOULD BE , 
UPOM US IN THREE WEEKS j AMD THAT WE WOULD LOSE OUR LAST ■. - 
CHANCE TO SAVE VIETNAM. I SAID IT APPEARED CLEAR ELY WOULD 
NOT ACCEPT SOLUTION. IN TH.^T' CASE, IT COULD OBVIOUSLY NOT 
WORKj ESPECIALLY SINCE THERE' COULD' BE NO QUESTION OF REPLACING 
ELY AT THIS POINT, ' ' . ■ 






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*• ■ .*■'■■■■, ol^l ; . ■ I BELIEVED 

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L . ■ '" ■ ■.. ■ ■ .-■ .TOP SECRET ■-: , ■;■ ■ ;..■; . / 



.'t5o I SUGGESTED THAT I RliPOnT LATER APRIL J.9 MY CONSULTATIONS 
WITH DO3 QUAT,, ET AL, AMD WITH DIEN, . I SAID TO ELY I DID 
MOT KNOW WHAT WOULD BE OUTCOME OF MY TRIP TO WASHINGTON* . ' 



Declassified per Execuiive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



_ . 



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^i^.^^'-fi.vi^:. r!dfUit?Hr;i ■ iJeparttncnt of State- 







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Control: X^')3C>1 

Rp'^'f^^ APRIL SSj 1S55 



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^SjCNT DEPARTIIICNT A^GS^ REPEATZD INFORMATION PRiORirY PARlS"^ i25)S . " 



Kanio or Ciri'i^^'... 



PAIUS FOP. AMBASSADOR 



FOR IKE SECRETARY FROtI COLLINS 



LIl'ilT DISTRIBUTION 



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I MET WITH DO J QUAT, MINH AND. TRAN VAN VAN 3.500 APRIL- 
1.9 TO REVIEW l.aTJI T}[Eri THEIR REACTIONS. TO MODIFIED THOAI 
PROPOSAL.. ■ I WENT OVER EACH STEP CAREFULLY j SO THAT THERE 
WOULD BE NO MIS UNDERSTAND It If: AS TO HY MEANING „ ,'. 



■ 3 

r * 



2. 



NiNir^'S REACTION VJAS T}[AT SITUATION V.'AS MOT MUCH WORSE 
THAN IN PERIOD BEFORE HIS' RICSIGNATIOM AMD CRISIS WOULD 3E 
iiUCH flORE EAS[LY RESOLVED WITHOUT DIEM THAN- WITH lUM, MIN-I 
SAID HE TENDED TO FAVOR EARLY GENERAL ELECTIONS TO SET U? 
A CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY IN TOR A MONTHS^ MEANWHILE, 
■A COALITION GOVERNMENT WOUD) BE NECESSARY j SUT IT WOULD 3E 
DIFFICULT TO FORM WITH DIEM AS PRIi^E MINISTER. •' ■ ' 



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3^ OUAT SAID HE HAD NG SPECIFIC COMMENTARY TO MAKE ON THE 
PROPOSAL BUT WISHED TO CONTRIBUTE AN ANALYSIS OF CRISIS. 

iW'Z y\^o MAIN elements/ ]{e SAiDy are'dieM'S. covernnent and ■ .. 

SECT^S POSIT ION A THIRD AND LESS CRUCIAL FACTOR IS POLITICAI 
OP I W I ON OF OP P S i T TON OTHER T H AM S E C T S , *' D I E N' ' S B V 1 U S ' 
ERRORS AND FAULTY i5ETH0DS " HAVE CREATED' MOAT BETWEEN HIM AND 
ALL OTHER ELEMENTS IN THE SOCIETY WHICH IS BECOMING BROADER 
AND DEEPERj AND CONTACTS BETWEEN DIEM AND OTHERS ARE BECOMIf^c' .' 
HO RE REMOTE. WITH REGARD TO SECTS; THESE GROUPS KNOW THE '/'' ■' 
PROBLEM THEY CREATE MUST BE RESOLVED.. HE FEELS ONLY WAY TO : : ■ 
: RESOLVE. J?i?OBLEM IS PROGRESSIVELY THROUGH MOBILIZING PUDLIC ; •■ 



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{declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Piojeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET 



-2- ^662, APRIL 19, 11 pIm., prom SAIGON 



StNSiTiV 






OPIKION Afro CREATING M ATMOSPHERE IN I'ffllCH SECTS CM BE 
iroUCED ACCEPT PEACEFUL SOLUTION. PR0BLEI4 COULD HAVE BEEN 
RESOLVED MORE EASILY AT AN EARLIER TIME, QUAT SAID HE DID • 
NOT THINK DIEM Alffi ANY TEAil HE MIGHT GATHER COULD EESUlffi 
EFFECTIVE COOTACT VriTH SECTS. 

h, QUAT DISCUSSED IN A GENERALLY UNFAVORABLE SENSE DO'S 
IDEA OF HAVING BAD DAI CONVOKE A CONGRESS, HE SAID THE 
CONGRESS WOULD BE MORE QUICKLY SET UP THM^ A PROVISIONAL 
ASSEl-BLY AND WOULD BE MORE MANAGEABLE. HOV?EVER, OVHNG TO 
BAO DAI'S ABSENCE IN FRANCE, PRESENT POLITICAL ROLES" OF 
SECTS AND ATTITUDE OF OTHER POLITICAL GROUPS, HE BELIEVED 
CONGRESS NOT PRACTICABLE. QUAT SAID HE THOUGH THE BEST 
SOLUTION WOULD BE PROVIDED BY A. PROVISIONAL ASSEI^EBLY, BUT 
POLITICAL GROUPS ARE FEAHFUL OF ANY ASSEMBLY CONSTITUTED 
UNDER Dini AS PRIME 14INISTER. 

5. DO SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW MEANS SHOULD BE FOUND TO ALLOW 
VIETNAMESE PUBLIC OPINION TO BE HEARD. HE HAD SUGGESTED 
CONGRESS AS A I^IEANS TO THAT EbJD. IF THEKE ^ffiRE AN ASSEMBLY 
PRESENT, CRISIS COULD BE MORE EASILY RESOLVED. A CONGRESS, 
OPERATING UNDER BINH XUYEN MENACE, MIGHT REMOVE DIEM AND 
THIS COULD BE INTERPRETED AS VICOTRY FOR SECTS WITH 
UICFORTUNATE EFFECTS IN U.S. DO SUGGESTED AS POSSIBILITY 
THAT CONGRESS BE REPRESENTATIVE ONLY OF POLITICAL GROUPS AND 
NOT REPEAT NOT OF SECTS, IF PROVISIONAL ASSEMBLY SOLUTION 
WERE ADOPTED, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FIND INTERIM GOVERNMENT 
TO FUNCTION FOR PERIOD OF PERHAPS SIX VffiEKS AND THUS PROBLEM 
REMAINS OF CREATING A NEW GOVERiMENT. DIEM IS A BARRIER TO 
SOLUTION OF Tins PROBLEM. DO REFERRED TO FACT THAT DURING 
NINE YEARS OF WAR NO GOVERNMENT COULD OBTAIN POPULAR SUPPORT 
FOR STRUGGLE AGAINST C0MI€JNI3M BECAUSE THEY WERE ALL FRENCH 
PUPPET GOVERNMENTS. PROBLEM NOW IS TO GAIN POPULAR SUPPORT 
TO CONTINUE RESISTANCE TO VIET MINH. DIEM'S GOVERNMENT HAS 
NOT SUCCEEDED IN CONVINCING PEOPLE OR POLITICAL GROUPS OF 
NTICESSITY TO CARRY ON AITII-VIET MINH STRUGGLE. ONLY A 
GOVERNMENT FULLY SUPPORTED BY PEOPLE CAN DO THAT, AITO SUCH 
A GOVERNMENT MUST COM FROM SOME KENT OF POPULAR BODY," 
EITHER AN ASSEMBLY OR A CONGRESS. AS A PRACTICAL TEST OF 
WHETHER PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT FOLLOWED BY PROVISIONAL 
ASSEIfflLY WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION, DO SUGGESTED ASKING 
SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS , SUCH AS QUAT AND MINH, l-ffiETHER THEY 



WOULD 



V 



916 



TOP SECRET 






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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 1 1 



/ 



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WOULD AGRE:]C to enter SlJCl^ PROVISIONAL GOVirRHHENT. ' MIHII SAIJ) 
THAT ]{E ,'vOUL)} AGREL TO EMTER A ?ROVISIO^;AL GOVKRiii'lZHT it 
POLITICAL GROUPS REPRESENTED BY QUAt AMD OTHKRS ACCEPTED/ 
BUT UK F7CLT THIS SOLUTION HAD DEEM OVKRTAXEH' BY EVENTS, 
aUAT SAID THAT IF AN IMMEDIATE A;;SvIER' FROM \\l\\ WAS RE^i^UIREPj 
IT ITOIJLD -HAVE TO PE NEGATIVE. .HE A'ODED TlIATj IN HIS OPIMIONj 

Yil Eiv ^ CANNOT MOW R G AM I Z E AM I NT.ER I N - G V ERMILENT c . ■ ' • - ■ 

,■. " • ' . - 

6/ VAN SAID THAT 'HE FELT DIEM MIGHT ACCEPJ THE PROPOSAL BUT 
,THAr PROPOSED NEMi3)i;RS OF NiCVI TEAM, T?!IKI(IMG JlXEt-i INCAPABLh! . 
OF CHANGE, WOULD NOT AGREE TO PARTICIPATE^ HE SAID THAT . 
DIEM DOES NOT HAVE SUPPORT IN TISE COUNTRYo AMI)' WHILE HIS 
GROUP WOULD R I S i C A L Vi ST ANY T 1 [ I [^ G • FO R' A. GOOD SOL UT 1 N 5 T HEY ■ 
WOULD NOT TAKE THE 'OIANCE OF PARTIC'lPATXNG j.N INTERIJ-I DIEM 
CABINET, .-■ * . • 

* ■ " 

7. I SAID THAT IF VIETNAHESE LEADEp,S..WEREJjnABLE. TO. Fjr_ND '' 
SOLUTION J AND DIEN WAS REMOVED ■ UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICii" ' ' 
POINTED TO SECT VICTORY 3 IT WOULD 'BE VERY DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN 
V POPULAR SUPPORT IN U,S, FOR CONTINUATION OF U.S^ AID. I . " 
THEREFORE! URGED PARTICIPANTS TO CONSIDER E^ATT^R F^iRTH^R AN:3 • 



f.^ .' • 



iu FIND 30NE OTIiER SOLUTION IF THAT WHICH WE DISCUSSI^D SEENED 



. IMPRACTICABLE TO THEN 



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Declus!>jncd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63516. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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IHCOMNG TEMIGRM 



DEPART^ffiNT OF STATE 



lOP SECRET S[:f^Si 



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Control : 
Rec'd: 



FROM: SAIGON 



ACTION COPY 



1053^ 

APRIL 20, 1955 

1:57 A.M. 



TO: 



Secretary of State 



«0: ^4663, APRIL 19, 11 P.M. (SECTION O.NE OF TWO) 



RIORITY 



SENT DEPMTMEOT h663, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY PARIS 120? 

I 

•FOR SECRETARY FROM COLLINS. PARIS FOR AMBASSADOR. 

LIMT DISTRIBUTION. 

1. I CALLED ON DIEM I8OO APRIL I9 AND-A^KED WHETHER HE HAD 
CONSIDERED FURTIiER MODIFIED THOAI PROPOSAL. DIEM HANDED ME 
FOLLOWING NOTE (iN ENGLISH) : 

BEGIN VERBATIM TEST. 

1) I AGREE WITH IDEA OF COALITION IF IT IS TRULY TO OBTAIN 
REPRESENTATION FOR THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE: 

2) THIS IS IN ACCORD WITH MY BELIEF IN G0VERN1^IEI^"T WHCH 
REPRESENTS THE PEOPLE — AMD TOWARD mCCH I HAVE BEEN TRYING 
KHARD TO BRING VIETNAM AGAINST SO MANY DIFFICULTIES; 

3) I DO NOT TEEIj TliAT THE NAMES GIVEN TO ffl AS SUGGESTIONS 

FOR MEMBERS OF MY CABINET -- MEN FROM SMALL OPPOSITION PARTIES 
WHO ACTUALLY REPRESENT ONLY A HAITOFUL OF PEOPLE -- ARE IN 
ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF HAVING THE GREAT MAJORITY OF 
THE PEOPLE REPRESENTED IN THE GOVERNMENT ~- WHICH I UNDERSTAND 
IS OUR I4UTUAL DESIRE. CERTAINLY TIIES IS TIffi POLITICAL 
PRINCIPLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN ITS OWN GOVERNMENT: 

h) I AGREE THAT NO Ol^ffi liM SHOULD MANIPULATE THE ELECTION 
OF A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SO THAT HE DOMINATES IT FALSELY. 
THIS IS THE VERY REASON ^ffiY I HAVE PROPOSED THAT WE HOLD A 
GENERAL ELECTION — IN A MANNER WHICH WILL BE MOST FAMILIAR 
TO MY PEOPLE — TO^ELECT A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY; 



PERMANENT 
RECORD COPY 



45178 



5) WITH 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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-V "2- h6C5. APRIL 19, il PJ-\. CSECTIOM ONE OF TWO), FROM SAIGON 

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, 5) WITH/ GENERAL ELECTION J THERE IS EVKKY REASON TO "EXPECT 
THAT TJ;E 'people WILL BE REPRESENTED BY PEOPLE OF THEIR 
r OWN CHOOSING — ANH NOT P^Y SELF -APPOINTED SPOKESt'lEN FOR THE 

PEOPLE5 : ..-.■.■■■ ■..'.:::■ ■ ■ - :. 



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■e> I DO NOT BELIEVE ANY FREEDOM-LOVING VIETNAIIESE -- AND 
WE ALL KNOW THAT WE ARE FACING A CLEAR DECISION BETWEEN FREEDOM 
AND COrii-iUNISN. liERE — IS FEARFUL 'OF CONMUNISTS 3EIMG ELECTEB 
TO HIG'H POSITION THROUGH THE MEANS OF A GENERAL. ELECTION^ •' - 



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rr S) ON THE BASIS OF THESE PRINCIPLES' DEAR TO NEj AND TO FREE . ^ 

; ,MEN TilROllGHOUT THE UORLDj I AM WILLING TO ACCEPT COALITION,.- ' 



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•END VERBATIM TEaTo 



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2^ WITH REFERENCE TO LAST PARAGRAP}( OF NOTE, I ASKED WHOM ' 
DXEN WOULD TAKE INTO A "COALITION''^ HE SAID'I'HAT HIS CABINET 
MINISTERS SHOULD BE " CAPABLE 5 'nEUTRAL"" MEN. HI MADE A POINT" 
WHICH THE NOTE DOES NOT REPEAT NOT MAKE CLEAR TK^T TH5 COALXTIon 
W ENVISAGES WOULD 'BE FORMED AFTER .(REPEAT ■AFTER)_ GENERAL.' ' " 
ELECTIONS TO BE HELD IN_.3. OR ^ jlONTHS. DIEM SAID THAT 'AlZ 

^GOVERNMENT MUST FIGHT" CONMU^flSN/'FEUDALI^H- AND COLOMMLISM. 

.IF IT HAD 5 OR U) YEARS If" COULD USE VARIOUS PEACEFUL 
MEASURES.. HOWEVER, OWING TO EXIGENCIES OF SITUATION, MILITARY 
PRESSURE MUST 3E USEDo HE SAID HE BELIEVED THE 'PEOPLE WERE 
IN ACCORD WITH THAT PRINCIPLE; ' _ . 



■ J<IDDER 



7) I WOULD PREFER TO LET AN ASSEMBLY CHOSEN BY ALL TilZ 
PEOPLE IN A GENERAL ELECTION BE THE. DECIDING FACTOR IN THE 
CONTINUE]) LIFE OF THIS GOVERMMEtJT -^ THAN TO. HAVE A COMPLEX . ;. 
SYSTEM OF CONTRIVED REPRESENTATION DO SO, NO MATTER HOW WISELY 
THIS. SYSTEM WAS DEVISED BY A GROUP. OF MEtU THE PEOPLE ' ARK ' ' 
THE ONES WHOSE LIVES ARE AT STAKE^ THEY SHOULD BE GIVEN .A ." . '• 
VOICE IN *HL*IR OWN FUTURE 5 ' • - ■■ ■ ■■■'... 



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FOR SECRETARY FROM COLLXN-Sj PARIS 'FOR Ai'iBASSADORc . • ' 

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5o I REMINDED DIEM T)MT THERE IS NO KLECTIOM LA^J AND MO 
ELECTION! MACHINERY, t SAID ALL THOSE I HAD COiiSULTED AGREED - • 
TilAT GE^!ERAL ELECTIONS WERE NOT NOU PRACTICABLE, .1 ADDED 
THAT IN MY VIEW HIS- GOVERNMENT COULD NOT CONTINUE FOR T}tREE 
MONTHS AS IT IS NOU„ DIEM REPLIED THAT HE DELIEVED WHEN 
PEOPLE KfJEy ELECTIONS lyOiXD TAKE PLACjC- TM THREE 'HONTHS THEY 
WOULD CHANCE vTHEIR ATTITUDEo I ASKED WHAT HE PHOPOS.ED TO DO ., 
IN THE MEANTIME, HE SAID' KE WOULD CARRY OUT REFORMS AMD ■ • 1 
rnOGRAMS ;^ITK which I WAS- 'FAMILI AR3 AMD TO DO THIS HE PROPOSED' ■ 
TO C^IOCSE ONLY ADDITIONAL CABINET MENoERS HAVING SANE POLITICAL' 
CONCEPTS AS HIMSELF. 'WZ SAID THE -STRUGGLE IS VERY HARD AND 
THERE CAN 3E NO COMPROMISE, "" ' •" ' ■-' i 



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• FKUDM,ISM AND COMMUNISM 
^'??ETHODS, 



I ASKED IF HE THOUGHT QUAT- WAS IM FAVOR OF COLONIALISM, 

-, HE SAID I^AT flUAT -FAVORS CCMPRCMISE 
I ASKED T'HE SAME ABOUT DO. DIEM.SA'ID DO AVOIDS 
DIFFICULTIES AND HAS NO- PLAN. .'l ASKED SAME ABOUT THOAI. ' ' 
DIEM SAID THAT THOAI IS ANXIOUS ONLY TO RETURN TO. HIS CHEMICAL 
LADCRATORYo ■ ' . ; - ^ ■ -. 






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■5o I TOLD DIEM :THAT I .DID NOT KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO HIS 
GOVERNMENT AND COUNTRY IF )\7, CONTINUED 0\\ ??:t.S7J^\i: COURSE 
SINCE I BELIEVED HIS SOLUTION TFUST LEAD TO ■ CtVUVWAR, DIEM 
R E? L I ED ■ T H AT ]-;E ?s E A L 1 2 ED R I S K S V; ERE I ;-rv L V ED , AND T H AT HE. 
NEVER CEASED TO REFLECT ON NATION'S PROBLEMS., HE SAID 
COMPROMISE .HAD LOST.-Ti;! WAR AGAINST VIET MINH^ I SAID THAT 
IN NY OPINION VIETNAMESE PEOPLE DID NOT" WANT CIVIL WAR a ■• 

r^Ej^ir.'TAiiSirT -' '■ 920 • diem replied ^^^S ' • 

VlECO'R;:) COPY ^ This cony rnu.=:t bs rcturncri to OC/l^ cervtrf-l files v;ith not<YuGj^^?P'?;}i5^[';^;,! ;,'l^ 



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-2- h663, APRIL 19, 11 P.M., FBOM SAIGON (SET KTO OF WTO). 

DIEM REPLIED THAT IffilTHER DID liE WISH CIVIL WAR, BUT ADDED 
THAT "FSUDALISTS" ARE UNS CRUHJLOUS . l' SAID THAT I trJST REPORT 

TO hff GOVERHlffiNT TliAT I BELIEVED DIEM^'S COUESE OF ACTION 
MJST LEAD TO CIVIL WAR. 

6. I TOLD DIEM THAT ALL VIETNAMESE WTH WHOM I HAD TALKED 
WERE LIKEWISE OPPOSED TO COLOIWALISM^ FEUDAilSM AITO COMMUMSH. 
HOWEVER, THEY DIFFER AS TO METHODS OF TACKLING- THESE PROBLEMS 
AID DO NOT APPROVE OF DIEM"S WAY OF WORKING. DIE1>J SAID THAT 
ON THE CONTRARY THEY DID NOT OPPOSE ES MTHODS, BUT' HIS 
POLITICAL CONCEPTS. HE ADDED THAT EVERY Tll-ffi A COMPROMISE 

IS MADE THE PROBLEM REITJRI^ Ilf MORE ACUTE FORM, TIE PEOPLE 
DO NOT LIKE THIS. 

7. I ASKED WHAT DIEM WOULD DO IF EAO DAI DECIDED TO 14AKE 
A CHMGE OF PRIME ICLHISTER. DIEM SAID BAO DAI HAS POVffiR 
TO DO SO AND OTLL DECIDE. HOVJEVER, EXPERIEITCE IN VIETNAM 
DURING THE WAR HAD PROVED COMl^ROMISE TO BE INEFFECTUAL. 

IT WILL BE UNFORTUNATE IP BAO DAI DOES .NOT ACCEPT HIS COURSE 
OF ACTION. I TOLD DIEM THAT I BELIEVED THAT IF NO COALITION 
WERE EFFECTED PRIOR TO ELECTIONS, BAO DAI WOULD l-iAKE A 
CliANGE. I HAD TRIED TO ASSIST VIETNAMESE TO AVOID DRASTIC 
SOLUTION OF THIS SORT, BUT UTn:£3S GOVERNI#;N"r IS EFFECTIVELY 
BROADEJffiD, I BELIEVE THERE WILL BE A CHANGE. DIEM SAID HE 
WAS CONTINUING HIS POLITICAL CONVERSATIONS TO TEST ACCEPTABILITY 
OF HIS IDEAS. I SAID I HOPED HE WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE 
TO AVOID OPEN CONFLICT DURING BY ABSENCE. DIEM SAID THAT IF HE 
HAD REI^IOVED SANG AS CHIEF OF POLICE IN BEGINNING, HE WOJLD NOW 
HAVE SAIGON WELL IN HAffl). 

8. I ASKED IF HE HAD HAD ANY REPORTS FROM LUYEN. DIEM REPLIED 
THAT BAO DAI WAS ABSENT WHEN LUYEN ARRIVED. HE SAID THAT LUYEN 
HAD REPORTED THAT PEOPLE IN PARIS HAD NO UTTOERSTAHDING OF I'/HAT 
WAS GOING ON IN VIETNAM. 

9. ON TAKING MY DEPARTURE I SAID THAT IN MY OPINION BAO DAI 
WOULD REMOVE DIEM IF HE CONTINUED AS AT PRESENT. I HAD DONE 
MY BEST TO HELP, I ADMIRED HIS ACCOMPLISmiENTS AN"D HIS 
CHARACTER, BUT NOT HIS METHOD OF WORKING Alffi ONLY REGRETTED 
THAT I HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO DO MORE FOR HIM AMD HIS COUTiTRY. 



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Refer to: 1-12691/5 



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22 April 1955 



Dear Walter; 



I refer to the c-orrent situation in South Vietnam and the 
probable necessity for review of the basic policy in that area. 

An analysis of the problems has been made by my staff in 
the attached staff study, I think it is an excellent study and 
I highly reeommead you and your staff read it. 

While I realize these problems have no easy solution^ to 
me the -basic issues are quite clear* I believe there are three 
major areas of weakness in South Vietnam as follows: 

a. The need for a solution of the problem of how 
we can achieve our ends in South Vietnam and yet live with the 
French, 

b. The need for a solution of how we can achieve 
internal order with particular reference to the sects^ the lack 
of internal comniuaicationSj and the lack of stren^h in the 
central government, (During my recept trip I conferred with 
Diem at which time he stated that if his government could be- 
come strong he felt the people would rally to it^ and that at 
present Ho Chi Minh offered the only strong rallying point to 
the people of South Vietnam. ) 

c. The need for a solution of how we can achieve 

a suitable government of South Viet nam ^ with particular reference 
to its relationship to Bao Dai^ the broadening of its base^ and 
the participation of capable people within the government, 

(l feel that in the past we have made a mistake in building the 
government upon one man,) 

In view of the probable nature of the problems to be 
discussed with General Collins during his visit ^ I consider 
that this inform.ation may Be of value to you* 

Sincerely yours. 



(siGDffiD) 



H* Struve Hens el 



Mr. Walter S. RobeHson 
Assistant Secretary for 

Far Eastern Affairs 
Department of State 



Prepd, by Col. Queenin 
Re^v-rtn by Col. Silver 



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?ro>j.cn: To rc-c;-:c;.::in3 current ii;:^')lcr,onuQtion of TJ<S- policy pertaining '•■ 
\o South Vict-ICa:a ia lii;>/c of curront events rc3.atcd to thut area. 

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CGncl ^ :.i:ic ".L:: 1. Interim or delcyin:; actiona in South Viet-JIojp should be - 
£cco::.pr;.;Uu:d by dcv'elo;;r:^-::nt of a ffivorcble situation in the rcr-cxinder . 
of tne Var SriCt in o-^rkCral t'.u:\ in Sc^utheast /vsia in particular as per-" 
taCn;> to CuiL^oiici^ I-co^j <.rA i'hiiilani* 

2> S'l::: GUcceGGful c.t^coiipliuVir.ont of U,S- prOL?:'cr:i3 for South Viet 
l':^:^ capjiot 1-e assured throu^^h r:'e;ich iirplc:r:ontaticn of ouch pro^o^rains 
as the rrench vill only :icccpt the concerit of tliet^e prosrc^r^s incofar * 
C.3 they further French policy in the oxaa. 



3- ?i^*e influence of '-^^o D?.l in hio ■po.-^ition as Chief of State 
is a constaiit r.annce to tl:c ;3ucces3ful ir.plcr.iontation of U-S. j/rograris 
in South Viet-llaa* . ■ . ^ 

-K AltornatiYcs to the Dle:a Govcrnuent diould he gi%^en t^.dcquate 
consideration in the event the" U.S. camiot loncor reasonably support 
DiOui. ' . . , 

■■ ¥ 

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5. A Gtronc; ctaolo^ viahlc Goverrxient cannot 'be developed ia. 
Gouth Viet -Kan unti,! a i^eaconable Golution to the T;rohleni of the S^^cts 
has been dote rained. ^ ." .-.. ' 

6. The Viet--';inh are capable^ even vithout resorting to overt 
vi/j^rei^sicnj of preventing the toi^al acco:i:plish?ncnt of U*^S- objectives 
in South Vict-Iferj* ^" ■. ■ ■. ' 



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7, The JiTiJ.itary defense of Vict^rrarj vould be extremely difficu],t 
if not i-LT^ocL-^ible should; V^iV- VilC ^,:ithdrav fro,:i South Vict-'Nar: a:id 
no other forecG b.? ir.'r:odiat:?ly available to fill the vacuu^i; the Viet - 
Ivinh then overtly intervene; and no IhS- eround forces be included in ^ 
''other'* forces ultimately used to fill the vacuum* 



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*3* '2':?.o loss of Vict-I'a-j and rivAvscquent political developn:ents 
would render the railitary dofc2-ise of tl;e rer^ainder of Southeast Asia 
:trer:ely difficult, if.not ir^possible. - .;./ . 



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9, :Ct is <iue.^ti enable that South Viet-ITara could at this tiino 
v;in an election pertaining to the unification of Viet-Iiam. , ■/- 






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r K ^co r:;::^nu^-:>:lo:i3: X- Direct U^S* idlitary aid and ci'pport ■pTOQri^Tr,^ at'tho> 
I " rcnid ani crficicr.t devcloT^nmt o'S lndi[;cnou3 forcoc^ purtlciilcrJ^ 

• ^ 'n-^allai:d ani C:u;;l^odia» /u:y U,f3i r^ilitary nid j)^'oc;-;"an in the la-'^ter_ '" 
*. _ o:*o*L)id CO cor.t'in::cnt upon U*G- control of the' orranliriitioa end traln^ ■ 

. 2t Obtain a xiro ot::<,:>:r.ont of Fi^cnch polic/ rclatinfi to Vlct-U^^i^ 
^ irjvoni tV.c French tact tho U*3- yill expect' cc:.:pletG yrench DTjr;port in 



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3* Obtain fron the Dop:i:ctr.::^at of [^t^tO; r.a iriiXrCdlate ciiu practical 
Golution to the prohdcr, cf Eao D^l. ("rom a Defense point of vicU/ be 
ehoiild ie CI fiCAirohead only^ v;ith a Lanltnun arrtOimt of ., control, over the* -^ 
Vict«!"^ni Covcr:izn2nt)- ; 

^. Accept Cr::::eri:l Celling* i\tcorMQpAc.tiQn(; on alternatives to tha . 
current Vlctna::<:je Gov:;ri-:r.x\nt l^ut i-^ahe certain tncit the prohlcn of the 
S3ct3 is also considered concurroatly- 






5- Kv;c-i'^lf'-33 of %'liothor Dicrn'or alternative ^ovcrrrjcnt is in - 
poverj it ^h.C'ijil cs ucderctood that the, B+nh Xijycn vill ii:rDediate?Ly t^ 
Litrippcd cf all po^^er and uuhjiir^/ited to the naticna.1 CovernTrx^nt; that 
the covor:ii:eiit \;.il3, i::clnd3 rcprooentatioa frou the other Sects; £iad 
that these other Sects •;iLl cventual?^y he cor^iplctcly subjugated to 'the 
ICcwional Governrcent* , ■ * i ' ' 



7. Deten^ine U,3, military action ^-ithin the Gco^'^.e of the ESACa? 
in order to prevent t'ao lo:;a of the rct.i-iinior of ^outheat^t /'^ia as 
a rc;5U],t of the Iodg of Goirth Vict-I^'oiK* ' ^ ,.^' \ 

G. n^jLl'.e every effort to aloli.^h or postpone indefinitely the 
cleetioriG proposed for Viet-IJt^jr/j under the Geneva. AccoixIdj for July ^ ' 



* 

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6. In rO" evaluating curi\'-nt or cGtabli:;hinij ne'J U.S. ohjectives , ^-:. - , 
P . in Soiith Viet-Ivaa inGiu^e adcqi:ato conGideratioa of Viet-I'Ilidi capabilities " ; :' 

rather than pc^Goiblc intentions. * ,. ."'**' 



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DISCUSSION: 



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1* The difficulties inherent in developing^ iEiplementing and sustaining 
a program designed to produce a stable ^ viable, government in South Viet-Nanij 
under the limitations imposed by current U.Sa national policy^ are recognized. 
EowevBTy recent recorranendations from the field for revision of such programs 
must be considered in the nature of delaying or interim actions which can 
be justified only if they are undertaken with a positive objective^ i»e*, 
to gain time for consolidation or development of a favorable situation in 
the same area of elsewhere. Although proposed interim notions in Vlet-Nam 
may be justifiable from the point of view of minimizing the psychological 
impact of the eventual loss of the remainder pf Viet~I?sm to the Communist 



J- d 



Bloc^ it is considered that ultimate failure of U.S. policy in Viet-Nam^ 
-even though limited by the extent of the U.S. commitment j would have the effect 
of furthering the loss of IT,S. prestige in Asia. 
-SXIBCONCLUSION : Interim or delaying actions in South Viet -Nam should be 

■I 

accompanied by development of a favorable situation in the remainder of 
the Fax East in general and in Southeast Asia in particular as pertains 
to Cambodia J Laos, and Thailand, 

2. The implementation of current U.S. policy and programs in South 
Viet-Nam and to a great extent 'in Cambodia and Laos is effected by the 
ability of the French to negate within these countries the accomplishment 

of U,S, objectives. The complex and flexible policies currently being fol- 

■ 

lowed by the French will not insure the continued cooperation and support |- 
necessary for the successful accompli slmient of U<,S, programs. France is i 
pledged to and is supporting a policy of internal sovereignty for the 



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Dedassificd per Executive Order 13526, Sectiun 3,3 
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Associated States, with full independence vithin the French Union. The 
Prench Union is an ultra-national^ coirtmonwealth-type arrangement ^ as yet 
loosely defined and suhject to further legal development. The statements 
of French leaders to the effect that ^'France intends to maintain its presence 
in the Far East" allude to the concept of the French Union, Further, the 
French are capable of negating U.S. programs by: (a) working to bring 
about the downfall of the Diem Government through an internal coup or 
through influencing Bao Dai to dismiss Diem; (b) refusing to cooperate 
in the training of the Vietnaiaese Army; (c) withdrawing completely from 
Indochina^ thus forcing the UoS„ to increase substantially its political^ 
financial and military commitments in the area; (d) unilaterally reaching 
a rapproachement with the Viet-Minh; and (e) insisting on executing their 
obligations under the Geneva Agreement by working towards holding the 
elections now scheduled for July, 1956* 

If 

The basic factors on French J^olicy with regard to Indochina are 
as follows : 

■ 

(a) The French desire to maintain a maximum of influence in Indochina, 

(b) The French believe, because of their financial investment and 
their historical position in Indochina, that their interests should be the 
determining factor in political developments in Indochina and they are 
Jealous of what they regard as'U„S* intervention. 

(c) French acceptance of the Geneva Accords recognized their military 
inability to defeat the Viet-Minh, and the consequent need for a political 
settlement of the Indochina problem on a basis which would minimize French 
political, commercial^ ^arid prestige losses resulting from such a settlement, ; 



Copy 



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,G?SE53 SENSiTiV 



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cczc^ clnce past dcvclcpr-i^ntG hcvo led the^a to believe that their f^round ' 

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:?cvccs v;gu1c1 \;QOii^ the Innuit of renewed ri^jhtlas*^ , . ,../ - ^ ' 

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(o) ^^:jcd^^zo or their dcjoendcnoo oa U*G* firianc5.Dl Gupx^ort to i;:.'iiritaia ■ 

tiioii* pre^enpe in Idochina^ they are inclined to go olon^ vitli tl:e U*S. - -. 
■ • ' . ' ' ^ - ' - . ' . ■■ 

^o?-icy in Eoutb Viet-I'ar: as one rjsarts of izaintalnins cojie influence in the 
i\rer.j altliOvCh eertaiu groups (eolonialists) are cctively uoders^inlns the - 
u,3. 'oro^^c-j locally in South Vict-irazi. -^ . " ^ ' •- 

^ (<r) S1:e French do^fot that t1:e U^S* pro^rara irill Guecced^ and c^ added 

■ ^ 

in5ur^^.1ee arc endctv/erdxis to establish an underctanv,iri2 vitlxthe Viet-Mlrfi 

vhlc-; i:>ic;>^t 'oe expa:;dcd to inclvde a politlgal Gettlei^ent for oil o? Viet-* 

• * 

ICar: in the cve:ifc thr.t U.,S* tn'osrcitio f^X, thus rctaiiiliis GO'X-e decree of - 



influence. 



♦ «■ 



(^) TVi^-j are heco^'ins apprehonoivo let^t U.S* policy should coinnletely >\ 
:railj aud loot their attcr.-T/tG to c^ln a scttlei::cnt vith the Viot-Xirih vill 



V 



Also fail .caia are thuG hoclnnins to conterrj^latc the poocihle necec^fjlty of a 

■ "^ ~ , ' * - ,- * . 

co::T/leto vl'^hdrairal frcra Viet-lxain Vcfore the clcctior:;: are heM* . " 

'^ » .***'** 

(h) Tr.cy uculd bo"\/ildin:j to Gtay as' lon^ as U*o- financial support 

■ 

i '' m. 

csiiuir.ucG and the U.S. £;iveD then a riojor voice in detaiTrinins x^olicy. 

(i) Z:cir -ori?r>ary ::otivatior;S arc (a) xinaxxoivXj bvA (h) pre^ti^e. 

^ ■ - * ■ 

^'hey are reluctant to vithdrav Tro::! I::dochlna hecauc;a they vould then " - / 

* ' * ' • ■'. 

■ • J, ' 

■ -i 

\^vr^hon their poGitio;i as a *'vcx*ld pjvcr'j as a iriCLX-er of the "Bis Fo-ur'!' 

4 ** ■ 

• - ■. ■ • 

or "Eic ^i"''^"/ ^-"^ ^'C'T.^'rA 1-^-^ '■/''-!> prcstls'i tlioy hold tui a- 'Tar Eag-tern" 

* ♦ ■ 

never* . * ' ■ " ^ ^ " ' *■ *■'.'■' * . 



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Dedassificd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NMD Project Number: NND 63310. Bv: NWD Date: 201 1 






I 






(j) In the final analysis^ they -will retain a position of flexil^ility 
in order to follow isrhichever course of action appears most likely to assure 
them the most advantageous position^ vhether that should he to continue to 
support U.S. policy J to seek a rapprochement >ri. th the Viet-Minh^ or to with.- 
draw completely from Viet -Nam, 

T 

W 

SUBC f^ 7CLUSI0N :_ The successful accomplishment of U.So programs for South 
Viet-Kam cannot be assured through French implementation of such programs 
as tl ^ French will only accept the concept of these programs insofar as 
they farther French policy in the area, 

;3- Bao Daij in his position as Chief of State^ has the authority to 
appoint or dismiss the Cabinet in Viet -Nam at any time. His attitude has 

recently been favorable to the U.S. but his^ yiilner ability to the influcence 

I 

and intrigue of the French and ant i -Diem Vietnamese could sway him at 
'any time to dismiss Diem and eliminate tbe Government on whose existence 
the U,S» predicates its policies. This factor tends to weaken the' basis 
on which current U.So programs are established. 

SUB CONCLUSION : The influence of Bao Dai in his position of Chief of State 
is a constant menace to the successful implementation of U.S. programs in 
South Viet"Nam. 

!|. Diem has proven to be an individual who^ in addition to being guilty 
of nepotism in his government and of being reluctant to utilize the capabilities 
of some of the more dynamic Vietnamese personalities available to him, has 
demonstrated, a marked inability to understand the political j economic and 

■ 

military problems associated with Viet-Nam. The concept of making Ut,S„ 
support dependent exclusively on Diem's continuance in power is not valid 

930 






I 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NKD 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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txnl vc-nd,; to portrety liiu g^ bcin^ inuicDCnca'blCj 1/hich nhovld not bo tli5 caoo. 

SltCJld lUo::: j?cJ.1, U.3. prcovi^'is ci^iit coiicolvaclc uc ccr.-tinucd mirier a . . 

DUJcerc-OV* ^oveiVjv^ntj parcict:Iarly if a noro d/nci^ic^ ccv):role leader (aj,beit. 

\riV.i Iczo initielppi^cGviG^) vcre placed in ccritrol* Forcer Foreign MinlG^er 
! ' ■ '' ■ . .■' 

Zd cr Di-^- i^aatj cs rcco;.':r*audf]:d by Gcncrcl ColliT;Gj ohould te ^ivea adcc^uatc ' " 



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E:C' ciVi:cr::aoivo oi vitV:d.ro7in£; U Si. ctipport should not be stated as a 



Ci c.i*-cut nGi^^ativc cour^o o.C action- If the X>lc:i cxjcrir;:cnt failo^ ani - \ .- 

■ 

w 

I 

t^.o U,o- dooG uot con^iuer continued j^upport to South Vict-ITGi!3 r.D bcin^ 

T 

varrant'jdj Wiero is a vide ycalc of courses ofactio-a vhich vouJ.d "bo adopted 
l>y the U^iited States to :};lni]c5.-e the cfjCcctG or a Coc^^uiUGt taI;o over ia 
South Vict-I'a::]* These ir.clude: (a) su-.'^port of i^rencli efforts to crec^te a 
Gouth VicBt^^t'r.e^e Govornr:L^:\t ^fhicu 'i:ould vork out a sott'ler:ent' trith the ^ 

■ 

Yiot-^;lrut; (b) clandcotine orcrationG to , hinder the consolidation ojT Cos- -" '" 

- * ' . ' .. ■ • ■ " , 

rjursilri^t control; (c) aur^ri^ntation q£ pro^jra^^^s to dcveloj? a.nti-Co3:niTniDt ^_. 
positioas cx streu^oh in CirahQiiaj T^ios ciid xhailcnd; mid (d) other X'^Htical^ 

+ 

.*.coiv::;uic £^ad i^o/cholociceJ, n-ifj^va'e*^ deGljyved to £aiii the Gjiirjjath-/ c?, and- ■ 



J. 

V 



bo d-;^vc'lo2 cupv-,ort from the "ne^itrol" nations of Scutheaat Ivsio.* Tx^ese 



r.:oa3uvej nl^l'it include contir.uation of U*S- * nut::auitarian" proGiro^s or . -^ - 

+ X 

eeor.c::-.ic and ^oeiel at3si:^tr:ace in South" Vict -ifen p^adina the aGiu:in>tlon of' 

V -n't 

ccsr? j.e b=j control, or tlils area hy u Co:^.-.;u:ilst i;av£rr^vent . • ".r ' " •■ '■' 
Slir:gG;:OTAv.UC^I: ./vlternativc3 to the Sieri Gorer/iTnoJit shoidd be ci^'cn adeciuate - ■ 

^ - -1 

cc.-:;;i>.Vjx'i^tion in the event tho U.;3. cannot lonj^cx- rerjs'oncu^ly suppo'i't Dien. 

5, dliy prcl'lep.pf thi Gncta luis been ccrzrcnted .on In recent coi-rosrsondcnce 

fa 
' m 

Cvon the field t-nd 'in nv.clyv.hi^s "^^^ cowrsc:} of action available in - ''.... 






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Declassined per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NKD Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



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rcl^uicii.lo^ttiecc dics^ldent facllonu it Ig l>oviou3 that their only consideration 
in rcit/Lio:! to the Mut^oniO, GGver::r:cr.t is a retention of poorer runi iraintcn^nce o? 



. \ 



a ''£^:'!':ero of irLfluciicL^'* in thoir cvn orcnrj- The Cao Dai and Hrx> ITor: vxq Gu^noDOdly 
rc'licio'^^^ croups vita ethnic ties to cpccirCic arena of South Viet-KcLn* 



if » Hcvrcvcr^^ tt:^jir rclici^'^^^ l:ac.^.^;rolu:dG arc in reality ucccl no abasio xor tho '" 



ctovclop:;,2:it of their v:olit:leal anci ncvor nc^iratlcns, %\^ Linh Xi^yen Sect - 
h.:t:s :::> 3:->::cific ctVinxc tico Vvit is conGidored to have oricinfitM in the area 
Gcut'* ot S i^on ond to hcvc neon r^^rincipally ent^:;:^^ ^^ the past in, 
river piracy r.ctivities. Ecccntly^ they have controlled t"..G gou^olins and- - 
oth.er vice aotlvitics in Svlron ct:d nearhy Caolcn^ and have ceen Bao 
Tol^s chief soru'ce of inoo'j;o. . " , ' / ' : - -^ 

It is considered tViat the prohleni o|* the Gocta ia one of tn^ Liajoi- 

h * '■' 

* . - * • * * ' , 

i'actora retr.rcJing th.e C3tablir>httent of a s table j viable coveroir^ent in' 

fa- 

Viot"ITc-:i ara tiny plan for tha ranlaccin^^nt of the Dii^ui Government nust ■ '* 
sIgo aIyc. adccaate consideration to t3iio isrchlorft Action to reduce the 
pov;er of th:; ^'1^1^ Xuyon should ho iu^jicdiute and i/cvld prol36"b3y result in 



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:■ *■ 






5oot £oinr: vJKle,0£:roi;nd o:3d livitictinc; c'^^erriLla activities* Ho'r.'ever, 



paratoilitary k\^:6. GXihversive activities are go x^xcvclent in South Vict-Keii ' / 
at present th':it it io not'holieved this ^roald seriously GiSr^ravate the cituationV 

A :^xjor effort shculd he i-ado concurrently to strerj^^then the i*at tonal / 
A.":x:y and; €13 good as po^oihl'j^ the other i^ccto sIiGi^ld tv> Gubju£;atei to the 



■* * 



Mill. Cv the Ivational Gcverrtrj^nt. - ^ ^ ^. , * ^ 

flI; BCv:rC:>U3T0N : A strong^ Gtahlo^ viable {^ovcrri^r.ent cannot 1-e developed 
in foi^tli Viet-Ifeii until 0; ro;^igon,ahlC' solution to the -proh:L3.xa of the Sect; 

•■ ■ ■/'' ■■ • . ■ ''■■■ ^ . •' •■ 

has teen coteriT^ined- , ■ ^ . ^ . ■ ^ ^ ■ ., 



■ + 



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S32 



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Dccrassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Pnijecl Nuinben NND 633 16. By; NWD Dale: 201 i 



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6* 5^1-iC :ioco:rnl±CuiT.::nt ot U*S. objectives in So*atli Vict-Kaa \dXl depend " .^ 
l.rxxoly u;^orL "the acblv^^itico o^ tUo Vict-Minh* The Dien Coverni3or-[t ic r.ot;-, ^ ' 

ii::;l oi'i^l clout Cc:^^Ui2inb poliiic^jl crur'nizGvion couth of the 17th i^^i\illQlp 
Glr?V"drtv^ locally by a covc-rt pjLi.Mri:ilitary or^arLl;::ition cCiX^able of vide-. 



^ '. 



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colo G'L^c^rrxHa action^ cxvl cvcrtlj^ cbovG the 17 th porrilel hy: a iiur.crlccilly 



!?-( r, 'rclixtlvoly letter ecuix^pi^^d reexilar crc^^ of 250^000 trocs:>s- llic Vict** 
' Kinh ecu be c>.^octcd to oi'-po^^o ofi^orts ly' t!ic Diea Covcvnvr^cnt to i^ticify ancl ■^*. 






** 



£ra^CC; X7,I;:;:lO:7: i-J^o Vicb-I-ilnli ni^i ccji^blc^ ' in the ^I-oence of a r,trc:;£; pcpiaorly 






o\vj:}6-^'t-z± ciovernr^ant iu Go^uth Vict-rTai:^^ eren withciit r^sorfcin^ to overt - '. 
C3i''*'>-'3-^^^-i> of T;revont:lna tao totol accoi^:pli3h:n'2nt of V*G. cIciJectivesHn South 



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;air control over all territory Gouth of the 17tli parallel^ particularly 
vhc;r. and if Guch ei'fortG pr^c-^ a Girrjific^nt t ro3.t to the Viet^Mlnh activities 

■ * " 

i:i that area. Such cppoGxtioa could ta^.o the for^; of: (a) x^GycholosicaJ. 

» ' . ■ ' . . . 

^rar-f^re iz^d subvort^ivc penotrfit^.cnj (b) Gabota^c r/al IocdI terrorist actions; ■ 
(c} initiation of vide -cockle £\;.c-z'rilla ci:cre^tion3; (d) Taiixtovc(iZ]:^nt' pi} this ._ ' 

« 

Guerrilla action by infiltration of liijited niJinber:^ of x^gulai* troops fi^om 
^thc north; ci^ finally (c) orert full-scale invnsioii of South Viot-Kaiis, Tne ' 

* * * " ■ r " 

F "■ 

Vietnan:3se Goveriri:oat currently ic^ incapable vXoiia of succei?ffiLlly counterin^i . - i 

any of thc:,^ courcc-s of action; Cijti:i5iQt:lc^lly; if the current U.S. jirosrcii . 

shcuj.u be £ucc33sfr<l l:i ;^-JLI fields j tho Dj.e:;i Govcrni^^^nt probably covild countci? * ' 

■ • . 

ccuroG (a).' ^^'^-'^ ix>dr>ibly could keep courc;e(b) xindcr control, Taa force level- ' '■ 
pro3i'*r:Ln^.:;d for tb^e Yietn'/j'-oae Arny vould preclude co^jiiteriiia succoosf uJ,ly ' • 
ccur^c-G (c), (d), and (c), , ■ : * '. ' " • ' \ ■ ..•.■■.• 



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neclassiiied per Executive Order 135^6 Sp.-fi„n 1 1 
NND Project Number: NND 63316 B.NWD Da" 2 



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7* Xu the cvcnv of a ex^lit tct".^"cen the U-.S- i^rid' French rcGultin^In . 



^ 



th.c vithir^Lv.'al or cJ.l Trench political £ivid tjilitary* support to South Vict-' 

■ * ■ 

;Cnr3; thi? vp.cuun creritc^d by t)*c \^it}}dri:^'nl of tli<? Frcncli Kxi^editionary Coi-p 
;:culd have to T;o filled hy other external forces i>endiii2 the dcvelo?:;::rr.t of 
ccrrarative strcncth in tlic V5.ctnar/:c3e /Xr^%' v/ithout i-cplaeiJi^ the F>2C l»y, cciz- o 

pc:rahle _force3^ South Vict-i'ojj vxuld he nt 15. tartly iri.'potentj and a den:orcll'j;a!i,iQa 

* 
* . - '* 

of the Yiotru'^:rc:?e Aru^/- nnd people could rcniJ.t*. . • - 



■ 



' • • 



Ivi connection ^rith the above, any thought of U S- intervention under the 
Zk^Tf2 should he considered in th,e li^ht of possible Jltidtatious of the " ' ^ 



v: 



■ * 

Geneve. Accordcj vith respect to intorvontion hy U'-*S*' Ground forccG." A Ic^i'all^tic - 
i:;torprct:;tion of the accord:s 7-y the Vict-MInh aiid the ICC would cbnaider 
cuch TJ*S» interv'ontion 03 a in^Jor violation* Trie U-S», vailo not a sienatory 
to the Genevii v^-ceords^ h:^ pxillicly declared it Vould not contravene its 



J 



■ . _* 



, * 



. Aooistance for intei*^/ention i}i South Viet^Ka.ii pr oh ably camiot he e:<pec'S^d 

+ "r ■ ■ 

frozi /i:3tra3,iaj Hevr Ifealondj the U.K. or P^^kiotr-n, Tliailand or the Pnilippiiies 



CLinr^ot provide suffieient troops to reinfox^ce adcqriately the VietnaniCGc' force 



a 



to the ext02it recLUircd. ~if^ under thcGe circunstuncesj Viet-MirJi re.^'ular £t3»rces i 
vero to he corr.rj?Vtted a;;,ain3t GiZACDl' forces , ^^\X no U»3- ground forces -^ ^ ;l 



V ' 



vei\::'' employed; the Vici:-:%^iriii v;ould be ccr)ahlc of defGatinG SBkCiJli forces 

suhGecucnt to the withdrrrw-al of t.ie ?!^C. U.S." air; and naval force 13 vould 

, * 

hinder thiO Vict-JIirili advance hut it is unlihely that they v:ould Gigoificaiit^v '* 

- - - . 

reduce the Yict^riinh capi:'h:Llity to overran Viet-IJ^xu ' -' 






a:'he parrtr.iilitary oporatieno of the Viot-rnnh in Go\Jth Viet-iraij.cannofe 

m ■* ■■ 

k 

he cU'r:r^;:;scd ty those r^eo^urer. auplicahlc in other countries^ i.e. tW 

^* ■ * , • 

Phildppino oUViprcGuion of the lUJICS. Tlie HU:C3 never had the decree of -" : 

i 

popular oyrjpathy and cupport 'rmich the Vict-IIlnh currently enjoy. / ^ ' 

• . , it. 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Piojeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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r,- IC tiiQ ?ii;c chou}.d vithdrav from South Vict-Jton^ other forces 

*• ■ ■ ■ ■ * : ^ ' ■ 

■ . . \ 

vc;:n.a \o y.ccCzd. to fill t!:a vacuuia*. . - ' '"•' . / •' 

V. ir ether forces are uc'cd to riU the vaciiun^ the Vict-1^5inh v^Il ' 

c* If U-3- c^^^^^^i forccG arc not included in these "other'' forces. 






ho Viot-Minh '^"111 ener^e victorious 



i ■ ■■ 



d. Vict";>iii]i pai^auiilitai^ cctivitiea in South Viet-I'ai3 cannot bo ovor- 
cg:;.o uy usin^ those r:c;tho5.G vhlch have proven succcGcful in other area^, 
i,c the Phili'^^elnGo* ■ -/ 

i ft I 

8. In considering the accoptacillty of the Iosg of Vict-Kam from 
the U,S* vic'^^point, U.S. policv ohjectives related to the entire Frr Si^stj 
GoutheCi^t and South Asia vould have to ho revlc:fed. The -nilitary iirj^llcationi; 



y • 



cf tho lo3G of South Viet-Kaiu have to tahc into ticcouat the prohahly 

eri.vuin;-; political developneatsj i,e, a CoLriiunist tai:eover in Laos aud Ctuubodia 

vrithaa resrJltant vrcahenlz;^^ of Tliailand's vill to rcaiGt Coinnixmii;^ and £,t a 

nirii::uLi the strcn^cticnins of the neutralist tazidenciCG in the other countries* — 
. . ■ . • - * ■ ■ '■.'■' 

of the area. - ' . ^ - ■„ . ' ^■ 

, * ' ' •' ' . ■ . - ^ -. . 

I ■ J- -■ -■ * 

£li3C0CvCLU3-CC'r; The Iogs cf Viet-lTati and suhGcnucnt xioliticai develoni:;ent3 vould 
rc;nd;vr the irllitary defense of the rciriaindcr cf So\;theaGt Asia ejxrcniely diffi- 
cult^ if not iirinoGsihl-;^. " ■ • *, ' 

h ■ 

* 

9- ., '^^- cor;:;iderln2 the oueaticn of elections j the aGGV-iiotion that 

th*o Viet-MirJ:! vould not a;;reQ to froo electlonG could veil he erroneous 

* 
* 
. de:3i:ite the ccnGir^tent Coi-'r;i;rjiGt rcjcctioQ of election pro^iJOGalG for the 

un'^"'f''''cat'o;i of Cknvrrny, Austria or/i Xorca* In cthor coiurtriesj the ConzLuniot 

conti^ol only a minority of tlie 7pox}ulationj ^/hore^G in Vict-Kaia they control 

• * * 

the majority. In cd'ditionj thoy have rcGidm^-l i>opular i^upiport in aroas cutGlda-' 



/■ 






_ ./ .,.* ■ 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Dale: 2011 



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t5;wdr coivtrol and tliey iz.^.y i^ccX that I'^^ir at:^'oci:.ovX to oloctioi^ij held under 
co::ait.ioi:3 vhich nJc'^t le tciirod "free" vcula ijicvltaToly rcuound to their 
,r-lvinta:;o'. Fur the more ^ natioiin-list D^i^ciL la VioAi-r-'^r, ic- go clozcl^j iCcrj^AUct 
i.'lt:i Ho Chl Minh and the Viot-Ilin!! novcL^snt 'chat, oven in aree.c outsiee of ' .' '-■ 
Cco:nuiiist control^ candidate 3 c:-jd iG:>uc3 connected vith *'nationallcn p.nA ■ 

T r 

£\;ppDrtc'd hy the Vict-Minji voiild probably to supported by the majority of 
t:;o people. ThiJGj the Co::rA:niDtG mii^t be so conTident of ^GUccei33 that they 
vould be vlU.inc; to perudt ""free" elections under international GupcrvSsica ; 



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wlccdt cor.tinuins to -utilize ell the standard C0L-:ri:uni5t proccsGCs and tac;tics 

* 
iii £Ln atten:pt to ascura the outcc:::^ thoy vould deaire. Should tlvey do bo^ 

there is no reasoa to doubt at this tir^e that they vrould via easily iu ^he" 
1555 elections- / - ' ' / ' , "• 

■ 

Zn ccnr.ection vith the above, the icsue of uxiif legation vould be a popular 
one in Viet-raa^ despite the x^J^^'obable conse«iuence3 of Coi^nnmlGt domination. 
It vould be da:i;£;erous to aGsun^e that South Viet^K-aia vould reject 
i:::iri cation vith the ICorth. The Gouth Vietnau:e30 Governnient vill not be 
cperatinj in a propas^mda vacuur^i in the Gouth; Viot-Klnh propaganda is , . : . 

■I ■" 

still r,cro intent?. ve and succecGful than that of the Dieo Governiiicnt, i'-urthei^j 
there is 1:0 guarantee that the people of the Sent a Trill reject unification, 
particularly if the rcforendu:n is relatively fi^eo and super^/ised by an 
:lr:te:;nationel cc;3ii3Gicn. On the other hand, there Is no doubt that the 
'■:cc ;le or the north vould apox^ove unification undex' any cxreur.Dtaj:ces vhich 

vill provide th:cu yith the opportvjiity to tt;I'tc over the territory of the 

■ 

fjouth, x"^^^'^-*^^^^^^'j eccr.onically cTid ralitar^'ly. 

£Ui:c;cc:OT.U:i:a:: it is ^ruestionc^Jla that South Vict-ITtiD could e.t this tls* 



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12 Col Gloried JC3^ 
13- Col . Cof i:ey I'lans -"' 
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oralHry' the folloviing vIgvig on prccedures and n ncu *2ovex"*]n"iont6 Chro vie.-zc ar*; .^.-^ / 

ba.'^od en cojisiiltnt:!.onGj.?ith General Collins^ a Cf^irerul study ox th^ French' 

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aido^jTicRoAre of Aiirll 17> lP5>!>j Bao Dai^o pVoponalGj and the Y:Le;js of 



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1) The 1>S will, have ,to naintrain posit ioa of full Gunport for Dic::^ 



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2) Bao pcii should bs informed by^ both goverpit^^nts that ^bgf pre^v: 



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t for 'pn;'_^cha_ngo J^-^ ^'^'■^'^^CJi'^^^.r-'''^'^^ that^ hisj^lll nonfrrni 
j Pri:n-2 I-^lnist^r's authority over police officials^ the 3inh Xu;-3n v/iLl b3 



^.-.l. xeniQV^d frci^^ -oolioo ,functions, and surete, and that tho fiocts v?ill a^rec to a' I 



"^'■'^V-j 'broad pro.^rc^Tn of theiro 5-nte?;ration J-nto_tb^,jiatic>nal.?.T0.1x^^ oyx " 

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:^^*_^..rj :t^J^^^ ba^is of QxE a sincle nation^ a single state^ a single ^^yj and a' sin£;le ""\j 
acnrinii^tration ljr'QTI5* Such decree by Pao Dai must be in process before Dion "^vv'^ 






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jri:v'7'-e"/'^rT::;c John Foster J>\nn- 






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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 6? 3 16. By: NWD Date: 2011 






,. /' , ', AT::cnibo5>:jy a^rOO^I * ^ ^ AniGrtiba,'7:jy PARIS 



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tL 5.n a noTi C'^^^pacj.ty^ if he.vj:^^.!^ and provido :uull rjnppox^t Sot tho no":3 govo.xT-inent; 



If^avcs .ond Jiov: priiiie Xiiii.'^'^.c.r instollodj to prevent clear Binh Xi^^yc^n QTS victory 
UMf^T«'J ovor pien: vMch iro-ald t^i:^3 to ploj^u^'j fiucoe^scr* ' . . 

\ * I . ^ ... ' .- ■ . 

V . -^; 3) J^r 33:^0 Pai {;:lvDn adoqv.at'-^ nn3'crti\')c*'yny Co3..1:vnu and }^ly r:lKAi?i,d 



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If D.1C7A rafuG03j the prcgran nhould novcrtholocG bo cavrfiod ouV'^nj-ivay. 

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' it) VJhile tho Vict)i^7jn^3e :ln SaxEon sliould r.j-::::^:-'^^^^ be tbe ."Trn^T^Gra o 
a nc--i\ govorrtir/:^nt^ CoIIiijs nnd Ely will probablj^' have to bs_:lix.practxG0..th2 
c^ital:/o;;-.ri» __J^ni^^ may result :ln storioG rog;ird:Ln£; a n-svr Cbll:lrjs-ii:li:J^X3_Aorjvj^^ 
'UI'QTIi; but v:c ahould viialco every attorript to keop'the yiotn?.-Ji3G'^ 2:f?]'i-^^ . " 

■ l^rr-m*^ - , ■ i' » - , 

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\^) Genex-al Collins and Ely should info:™ Dlcr;^ that as a. result of his 

inability to create a broadly based coalition noYorroieiitj and because ox ■ " 
.. ' ■ ^ ^ ■ ' - . ^. ' - 



atteiTiot to prevent his rei-ioval from bfficQ* Piciii^s patr5-otic qualitioG arx; p:- 

■ ■ ■ ' '* ■ 

groat potcr.tial valine to Viet^ari and it ±0 hr;p.:jd lie >nJJ,l'^nd bis soTvic*^^ to 

any ns;v £;ove:rr;.n:ent Khich ndeUt be appointed. ' , ' . - / 



• ^ 



6) CoIiJLinG ar.d Kly toc'^ther^ speaking* for their govei^ir.ientg rr^ay be able 

o^at lined sub-prxra /y above ■ , = • 

to aVi::''t ^-':"-';* for:nula /rre^n Viet;:^r.'=ir:*^ political leaders behind the scene?^. 



+ 

f" Xf thpse leaders^ including Diem if praotp.cablej .^dov)^ such a loriimla^ thc-^y. 

L ' 

con3,d osk E?.o Dr^i to conntorsi;;n it. If the Victnrri^nGe consulted cannot agree 



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nonr' theruselvec on a' candidate , then'Kly and Colliaa will have to recorrir.end a-. 






jia na-iC for }}ao Dai to doGignato to foarm a nevr covernir.erit under .the nn prope; 



terms and conditions* 



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J3» Our t*ento.tivo prcpor;als or^ a neu £;rjv or nrn^nt arc as fo 11 o:ro: 

■ ♦ ■ - 

1) C:^iVripj3t; The e.xocutivo aivlhorp.uy of JTull povrer,^ liluh Do or C^w^l ^.g 

' " -^ » ■*■ 

prcciciont rmd vice prer>ic;entj respectivolyj composed o^^ si'^^nll nuclcuG or r.o:itj 

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ablo nauioj'iali.'jt leac^Grs* it vrould be hipMy do.'^irablc IC the cabinet i^^fjelf 

covJci incltd':^ con^o frot^i ])iepi'/j cab 5. not and ?:oir.o 'ncv; faces- lit vrould op:5rate as - 

i . - *. - ■ ■ ■ - 

an interfjjTi corilition goveriiracnt until a fully elected National AasoTnbly io 
const itutod* The ir^modiate t-:iGks or the n-?>? cabinot iTould' ba (a) x'osolution o? 
fject problem^ (b) corr.plotion of reroriii of the ari"ied rorco3 and^polico> (c) natis-' 




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f.':cto::y :cc3T:ttlcrriOnt oT nrec>e:nt and future refufices, (d) cnerrotic political 



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pX"ogr^?m in province Sj (c) n^.oro active international i:)olicy in SouUieo^jt A:>l'i^ 

* ,^ ■ . 

and (f) con.^ultaticn v;ith the Viet MinJi on Geneva elections in 19?6 and- -> . 

preparations for elections and a. constituent asnevtibly in 7rco Viet-lJam at ccm'^ i\^-CA 






(' 



and fv^ov.n rr;prcr:'entativ^2rj;. includinfj the .sacts* Bien should ce pGrsixaoT^d if 



vrou?.d V-e to renera'iO coir it of unity ai}d ccoperatiGu ij:'.tT/d the. peo;:le a:'-:l rrcu^:; 
throupheut Free Vlctn^'ji. /^^ tha request of the presifienv or. the cabinet j it " .. 



v;ould advise the president and cabin-? t on n:aJor natters- of fstat-c* It should 
have no executrive or a-ininistrativo f mictions. It should continu3 until the 



* -1 



con^titutior, of a. poi^\anf:'.nt r;triicturo of oov,3rnfrent by a constituent aG:3:?.^bI'tr^ - . 

. ■ ■ . ' 

S) ?rovif:;ional riational Asr^embly: This quasi-le£i.slativo body of elect ^d 

. . ' ■ ■ } 

and appointed* candidates .:ilread/ erivisaied and sch^diiled to b3 set up ' • 



a 



' 2) Consultative Council: An adviso^-y boc>v of 2^-33' leading pernonalities" J 



■ - ► ■ 

£ possible to accept tr^e chairmanship of thin ccunc5A. _ Itri principal fuinticn .. " j 






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should bsj f oiTu':;d anrl convoked o.g soon as Dor:5;il)lo' dnco ?. nov: cabiricb is in ■ 

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QZ^r.ft Dl.-^nB for a conG'.rtucnc assernbly, . " ■ 






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United States Goverxinient 



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FROM: 



PE - Mr. Robertson. 



PSA " Kenneth T. Yoiaigj Jr 



EATE; April 30, 1955 



SUBJECT: Report on Collins Visit and Viet-Uam Situation 



Collins arrived Tliursdayj April £1^ and left ea:t'ly Friday moiTiingj 
April 29. He had limch i-zith the President -April 22^ sav the Secretary for 
the first time at a long luncheon meeting April 25. \-Je also met mth the - 
Secretary Tuesday , Wednesday and Thursday. V/e spent all day Fridayj April 22 , 
meeting lath Collins 'trith Defense and CIA represented. He reiterated even 
more vigorously and firiTily his vieVj strongly backed by Sturm, that Diem 
must be replaced and that a plan of action should go into effect immediately. 
They both favored Quat, 1^1 one of the questions 01? alternate considerations 
expi-essed by any of us at that or any subseqiient ineetir^s changed Collins' 
vie-tr. MondE^ norning, April 25/ \tq had a uoriiing jneeting mtli him at vhich 
I proposed basic question, do we or do ve not support so:rte political change in 
Saigbn, said (b) a specific plan of change • The reports at that time frojn 
Saigon shoved Biein iras steadily slipping. In the fe-ce of the adaiuant viev of 
Collins and Sturm most of us reluctantly accepted the need for" a change^ but 
we ttU insisted that ve stsy mth Diem at least for the first innings, Collins 
and particularly Sturm, rejected our proposition in arQf shape or foi^n. The 
basic shift in our approach vas tal:en at' a long luncheon meeting mth the 
Secretaiy, Unfortunately neither Bob Hoey nor I were invited to attend. 
Bill Sebald can fill you in .on this. The Secretary took the position iie 
vould support Diem until and unless genuinely Vietnamese elements turned up 
with another acceptable solution. Collins and. Stunu later told the vorking 
group this vas an ijiipossible condition. 

V 

2, 'The rest of Monday, Tuesday and 17ednesday ve spent \70rking up tvo 
long and complicated telegrajas to Paris and Saigon; At a full meeting \ri.th 
the Secretary, Mr, Hoover and Allen Dulles late Tuesday afternoon they vere ' 
api>roved. Collins fully endorsed these telegrams after he and Sturm had 
elin^lnated our proposal to try again to keep Die-m as head of a coalition "' - 
government, Tliese telegrajns envisaged a gradual and rather caiiplicated 
shift of our position in carefully vorked out stages. As \re suspected at 
the time- they vere imaiiediately overtaiien by events, TTone of us really 



believed in them but ve -^jere faced \ath Collins' strong recommendations 
and the fact that he liad been to the V/hite House the first dpy after Ms 
arrival- In aTiy event, this shift has never been carried out. Although the 
telegrams vere sent to Paris and Saigon, \/e have put out a. stop order holdincr 
up action on theiu indefinitely, " , 

■ 

3, Wednesday, Apxul 27, Diem changed the police^ chiefs and Tliursday 
the Binh Xuyen began military action against the government. Ely and the 
French have been putting the full bla^me for this situation on Diem, ks 
they tried to do for the Ma^'cli 29-30 incident. Events have moved very 






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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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rapidly' since then, Tlie national a'riiiy has seenied to be mnning^ groups are 
rallying to Diem^ Bao Dai is getting set to fire Diemj and the French have 
in effect mthdra"\'7n their support frcin Diem. AID. reports from Saigon 
indicate there is a revolutionaxy feeling developing against Bao Eai and 
the Ij^ench, Scene of this is instigated by the Diem group but some ^ of it ; 
may be spontaneous. As of this i^nriting ve may be faced vrith a choice 
between Diem and Bao Dai. In vievr of the fighting^ \ie liave felt in State 
it was best to continue support for the goYermaent under Diean and see irhat 
happens. But as tliis crisis develops ire are being forced to take a more 
and more unequivocal and strong stand for Diem, " 

4- Senator Mansfield issued a long statement in sujjport of Diem on : 
April 29, If Diem is forced out^ Mansfield would have us stop all aid 
, to Viet-Ham except of a humanataxiaji nature. Senators Kno^/land and 
Humplxrey have also backed Diem. A la,rge number of members of the House 
Porelgn Affairs Committee after hearing Collins have infoi^ned the Department 
through Congressvoman ICelly that they would not- favor the State Departijaent 
withdra^ring support from Diem, Collins met \vith tlae Far Rast Subcar-mittoe 
of the Senate Foreign Relations CcatMittee^ separately \n.±h. Senator Mansfield 
and TTlth about a dozen of the House Conmittee. \Jliile he and Stuim felt these 
legislators "vrouJLd give no trouble ^ Stuim infomiing us after seeing Senator 
Mansfield tliat there was nothing to it^ Bob Hoey and the rest of us here 
were much less sanguine about legislative feeling. In fact there is going 
to be real difficulties on the Hi,ll if Diem is forced out by what appears . 
to be Fx^ench-Bao Dai action* 



5- During the past ten days the French have been giiiet lath us^ but- 
irorking behind the scene, Kidder reports Ely as almost liysterical, 
* Bao Dai has been active, as he has submitted one plan to us and has also 

't- ■ taken another action pubUcly. Both of these are almost identical iTltH 

plans or ideas \rhich French officials had submitted to us several -^Teeks ago. 
If there 'were aaiy notion that Bao Dai acts independently of the French and 
Ely J that shoT-ild now be dispelled. Hovever, Fi'ime Minister Faure has 
indicated to Dillon that he does have no stanaeh for going off independently 

Cof the US in Free Viet -Nam. They \rlll follow our ].Gad even though they don't 
like the idea, providing the situation is not so, bad in Ssiigon that they have 
to move out French military and civilian personnel. We liave asked for pretty 
fundamental reassurances on basic French intentions In Viet-l^aL^j \je got them 
orally for whatever they may be irorth. 



6, We are in a bemldering, fluid situation, I believe more strongly 
than ever that we should stick ^riLth Diem now, Collins says he is a terrib].e 
administrator a:ad it mil vrreck Free Viet-I^Iani if we leave him in. That majr 
be true but that is not the issue at present. If Diem can lead the nationalist 
forces to a conclusive settlementj even to the point .of rendering Ba.o Dai 
ineffective or annulled, we should continue to support him. The key questions 
are:, „ * 



^ao^7 r-^r^r^ a-eiy^^i^ ^.l;S 






Declassined per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dute: 201 1 



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- 3.' 



a) Ifill the Vietnaniese Kational Amy as a group sticX mth 
Diem? 

b) Will the Binh Xuyen be broken up into isolated remnants? 

c) I'iill enough nationalist groups including sect leaders rally 
to the goveriicnent even against Eao Dai? 

d) Will Bao Dai fire Diem^ even if the answers to the above 
three questions are clearly enough in the af f iniiati ve . 

■■ 

4 

T-That I ajn airraid of is that the combination of continuing forces coalesced 
around Diem on the one hand and Eao Dai on the othSr may not enjoy 
preponderaxit strength, 

7. Eliere are possibly serioiis anti -French overtones in the Tietnamese 
political situation. Ihese a3-So Include aiiti-Bao Dai feelings. Vfe must 
not tal-^e any action vrhich vroiild tar us trith the saiiie accusations. General. 
O'Danielj om: tlxree Attache s^ and Lansdale infornied us on April 30th 
that "any change in leadership or command at this tiifie could result in 
chaos", 

8< There are sone personal aspects that I would like to ta]^e up 
-vdth you privately* 



I|10l|8 



FE : PS/l rKITYoun^Jr ; c s t 






Declassiried per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Pmject Number: NND 633 1 6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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Secretary' of State. 



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FOR YOUI\^G FROM GIBSON 



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FOLLOWING IS SECOND MESSAGE DRAFTED IN NICE APRIL 29 AFTER 
SECOMD INTERVIEW IMTH NGUYEN DE AND BAO DAIj RESUME OF WHICH 
TELEPHONED TO YOUi^G EVENING APRIL 29o ' . . " .■ , 



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1. AFTEH RXCKIPT ])EPTEL 27 ' TO NICJi: At^JD-lJOnD RECEIVED BY TKLKPHON^ 
FROM PARIS THAT AMB DILLON HAD CALLED ON FAUHE PURSUANT TO DIPTEL 
jS^ 9 ( R ESULTS RJCPO RT ED ' Li-^ BTEL h Ih j S A I G ON r>S 7 ) j GIB SON C ALLKD 

p'^! Fir .T ^:i'^UYEN DE and then IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING ON BAO DAI.. ■ ' ■■ 

2. V'E AN FORMED --DE THAT AMBASSADOR HAD SEE-N FAURE AMD 'Rp/ J El; ED 
UITH KIM IMPORTANT ASPECTS FRANCE -U.S. POLICY V.IETNAM, VJE 
REFERRED TO NECESSITY THAT EAO DAI.' /\S V/ELL AS FRENCH, GIVE FULL 
SUPPORT TO LEGALLY CONSTITUTED GOVT, VIETNAM. ' ' . ■: ■■.■:.'■ 

p ■ 

3. ^'E THEN HAD GENEP-AL REVIEU WITH DE IN COURSE OF .yHICH Iv'E 
HADE POINTS TO HIM GIVEN TO US OVER TELEPHONE FROM WASHINCTONo"; 
VE EMPHASIZED THAT ANY FURTHER STEPS TOvJA'RD -SOLUTION VIETNAM ■ 

cmsis ;;usT be hade on initiative vietma:^:ese nationalists 

THEMSELVES^ VE EMPHASISED U.S. VIEW THAT PRESENT "GOVT. AS LEGALLY 
CONSTITUTED GOVT. l-^'ST BE SUPPORTED AS LONG AS IT REMAINS 
SUCi{ AND THAT URGENT PROBLEM IS TO DEAL WITH PRESENT CIVIL _ '- 
IJAR AND NOT QUESTION OF FORM. OF ANY NEU GOVT. . • ■ '- ■ 



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tORD CO:?Y o T^io copy m;:st bs returned to CC/K central files with uotat^on^c-^JiVST/:^;.^^-^ n,,^ 



ii, DE AGREED FULLY VITH OUR REMARKS POINTING OUT THAT BAO^- 
DAI-S DECISIONS OF PREVIOUS DAY UERE IN KEEPING LLITH TiiZSE 
PJilNCIPLES, KE HAD MADE CLEAR TO DIEM' IN SUMMONING HIM TO 
CANNES BEFORE OTHER VIETNAMESE AND IN SENDING PERSONAL PLANE 



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-2- 4 7^J.6y APRIL :50j S PrJj FROi-: PARIS C SECT ION i OF 2> ' -■ 

TQ FETCH KIl''i THAT'hIS. STATUS AS PRIME MINISTER REMAINED UNaLTERI;:!}. 
B/iO DAI REGARDED PRESEi^iT . CRISIS AS YiZmQ IH TWO PHASESS. • '■ 

FIPSTj' TO BRING ABOUT END OF PTcKSirNT . CIVIL WAR AND SECOi-IDj 
TO" "DEAL J'JITH QUESTION OF GOVERNMENTAL REFORM. FIRST UOULD }!AVE 
T^ BE SmLK]) NOW, SECOND COULD BE DEALT WITR LATER. 



» • 

v./ 



5. TRENCETORTKj AND IN CONVERSATION IMMEDI/TTELY FOLLOViING 
U'^Til BAO DAI INTERVIEW CONCERNED WITH BAO .DAI *S" OBSERVATIONS • 
Oj* HOW TO PUT END CIVIL WAR RATHER THAN ANY QUESTIONS ALTERNATE 
GOVT« OR OTHER ASPECTS BAO DAI "PLAN",- - / 

« ■ 

: ■ ■ ■ ' • - . .■ • 

6;. BAO DAI STATED IN STRONG TERMS -HE WISHED U.Sc TO 'TAKE . 
IMI^EDIATE STEPS PERSUADE DIEM TO COME TO FRANCE TO RECEIVE" 
VIETNAMESE LEADERS WITH HIM AND DI-SCUSS MEANS ENDING PRESENT 
C R I S I S ^H E S TAT ED THAT C R R E C T J. Y ' OR I N CORP. ECTL Y T) I EM HA S ' 
CLAIMED. THAT HE HAS HAD U.S. SUPPORT IN STFPS HE HAS TAKEN 
DURING LAST FEW WEEKS" WHICH HAVE LED TO PRESENT BLOODSHED. 
HE VIOLATED TRUCE AND AT LEAST HIS BROTHERS IF NOT HE HIMSELF 
CLAIMED-' THAT HE DID SO WITH AT LEAST PASSIVE U,S« SUPPORT = 
IT WAS ALREADY BEING SAID^ BAO DAI CLAIMED;, T}:aT IKS, HAD • ■' 
"BY ITS REFUSAL TO COUNTENANCE ANY ACTION BUT BLIND" SUPPORT . 
FOR D I Ei'^ ' AL L WE D P R E S E N T -A B C E £ S TO F E ST E R U'N T I L I T H AD BURST 
IN FORM PRESENT CIVIL WAR AND THAT U.So HAD .PURPOSELY DONE 
THIS IN HOPE. DIEM WOULD TAKE ARMED ACTION. THIS ACTION HAD' '■ 
RESULTED IN DEATHS OF HUNDREDS OF INNOCENT PEOPLE AND WASTE 
OF NATIONAL FORCE NEEDED TO FIGHT COMMUNISM. UoS, IN ACTION .. 
COULD NO LONGER BE ADMITTED". .. ' •■ ■ ' ' '■ 



7o ALL OF Tins WE DENIED j POINTING OUT AGAIN THAT GENERAL COLLINS 
. . AND EMBASSY SAIGON HAS CONSISTENTLY URGED RESTRAINT ON GOVT, 

"BAO D A I CON I' 1 1 .' U ED J ST AT I N G T HA T U.S. RE S? Oi\' S I B I L I T Y I N P 'R E S ENT . ' ■ . 

SITUATION WAS HEAVY, HE HAD PUT OFF TAKING ACTION HE HAD 

WISHED TO TAKE WHICH MIGHT .HAVE SERVED TO AVOID PRESENT 
l^ BLOODSHED AT U,So REGUESTo ON TWO SUCCESSIVE DAYS U.S. HAD 

^ ASKED HIM TO REFRAIN FROM TAKING DECISIVE ACTION ON EXCUSE 
r WASHINGTON WAS STUDYING Pl^OBLEM WIl'H GENERAL COLLINS T][ERE' 
L ; AND WOULD HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY SHORTLY, ON APRIL 26 AND 27 • 

BAO DAI HAD AGREED 'TO OUR KECWESTS AMD HAD NOT TAK^^: ^CT10>: 



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.> ■ .■ ■ ■■.>■■. TOP SESt-nv ., . :'( 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3-3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

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9, IN EAO DAI'S OPIKIOU DIEM HAS NOU BECOME A PSYCHOPATH irKO 

v/iSliES TO MARTYRISE Xli^SELF EVIM AT PRICE OP THOUSA^vDS 07 LIVES. 

AND NATIONAL TREASURY. HE ENJOYS THOUG}iT THAT }[IS LIFE IS- 

IN DAMGEH AND WOULD VjELCOIJE 11ARTYRD0M ;JHICH IS INDEED UKAT ■ K?: • 

y ILL GET. SAID EAO DAI; FOR FEELIJ^'G -is SO I^■TE^!SE AGAIKST 

HIM THAT'sOi'jEONE IS BOUND TO ASSASSINATE HIH IK NEAR FUTURE ' • 

IF HE PERSISTS IN TRYING TO ESTABLISH jriS RULE BY FORCE •' ' 

"HITH THE SUPPORT OF NO ONE BUT- HIS OWN FAMILY. AND THE U.S,",- ■ 

3A0 DAI SAID, " ■ : •" ' -. :■■ 



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• g- BAD DAI ALLEGED THAT RESISTANCE TO DIEiL IS SO UNIVER- 
r ' SAL IN VIETNAM THAT SUPPORT OF 5IEM VJAS SERVING DISCREDIT 
'-• - ' U.So IN EYES OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. DIEM WILL UNDOUBTEDLY 

* S U C C EEE I N D R I V I N G S EC T S U T ■ F S A ICON OR "A T LEAST iU S U PFH E, 

SING NXLITARY FORCES. THERE BUT TIIEY v^ILL SXHPLY GO JO PROVINCES ., 

V;HERE diem has NO CONTROL 



, ~5~ A7A6j APRIL 30 J 8 PNj FROM PARIS (SECTION 1 OF 2) 

L ' \'yd\c\\ HIS JUDGNENT INDICATED .WAS NECESSARY. ON APRIL 2S HE . .' .". 

• . - WAS FORCED TAKE MATTERS INTO HIS" O^^N HANDS DESPITE THIRD . ■■ . ■ : 
r . ■ SUCCESSIVE REO.UEST DELIVERED. IN CANi>;ES ON APRIL 2S AFTER ,. - *' 

L . SHOOTING }{AD ALREADY STARTED c IN HIS OPINION IF HE HAD ACTED : .■ i 

■ . '■ LAST WEEK HUNDREDS OF LIVES WOULD }[AVE DEEN SAVED* IF U«So . ' 
f WAS, REALLY NEUTRAL IN MATTER IT MUST TA:<E STEPS TO AVOID ' •'. ^ 
^ GIVING OPPOSITE InPRESSION }IE ADDED. MDREOl^ERj IF U.S.. Dip NOT .'■ 
^ • . WISH TO STAND BY AND WATCH STATE OF CIVIL- WAR ESTABLISHED IN •' 
[ ■ VIETNAM J WHICH WOULD LAST UNTIL VIETMINH WON CuFiPLETE CONTROL j 

.WE MUST HELP IN BRINGING AN END TO THAT CIVIL WARo WAY TO DO ' " 

V 'this is TO INFLUENCE DIEM TO LAY DOWN ARMS AND COME TO FRANCE ' 
L. TO CONSULT WITH OTHER VIETNAMESE -ANTI -COMMUNIST NATIONALISTS. ■ : 

•. \, " I'iOMENT HE DOES J OPPOSITE SIDE WILL LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS 5 HE '. 

'■- . CLAIMED, . •••■.•:■.■■-./ . ■ . ■ . 



; 



1 



XQ> BAO DAI SPOKE OF DIEM'S ROLE AS A CATHOLICj. STATING THAT "' ' 
LATTER REGARDED : HIS TASK AS LEADING A HOLY WAR., INSiJ-.AD OF . . 
D 1 N G T 'HAT , H E H AD . T U RNED V I ETN AI-5ESE A G A I N ST CAT HDL I Ci SM . ' . 
F,AO DAI SAID HIS WIFE'S OWN FAMILY HAD BEEN CATHOLIC FOR GENERA- ' 
TICNS AND MOW REPORTED IT WAS UNSAFE TO GO OUTSIDE SAIG.ON - • 






.: ■ -^ ' .: - : , -' IT YOU 

TOP SECRET ' '^^ ■ ■ '■. ; 



Declassified per Executive Order J 3526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 2011 



rop SECRET SENSlTiVt 



-k" ll7^6, APBIL 30, 8 m, FROM PARIS (SECTIOI^ 1 of £■) 

IF YOU ™re Yimm to be a catholic because of the Ei'Saa^Y 



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AGAINST BIEM. 



DILLOH 



PAF/32 



NOTE: MR. HOEY (ISA) INFORMED 8:30 M, 14./30/55- CVJO/f^lD" 



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TOP SECRET Vt-i\!V[ Wf 



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Declassiried per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 1 6. By: NWD Date; 201 1 



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FROM I PARIS 




■ -i- ■■11 L;fj ■">■'• i :^^'- * - ;i /I • . 

;, .. ,. , .-n S^V.o'.i C-^--- Re c 'd : APRIL 5 f^ J i 955^ 

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Socre^lary of State '"^'. .- • '. )1 
): A7^:6n APRIL 50. S PM, (SECTION 2 0Fi-2')-'< ^..av .-^^le-v:, ! 



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SENT DEPARTMENT h7k6', REPEATED ■; IN FORMATION 'SAIGON 690 



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IKE 



iU UE REFERRED TO D I EM'S REFUSAL TO OBEY BAO DAI'S SUin^o:]S. 
BAG DAI STATED T?[AT IT DID NOT SURPRISE HIMo 'HE HAD EXPECTED 
IT ANDp IN A SENSE5 UELCOUE IT AS 'IT MIGHT SERVE TO CLEAR THE 
AIR AND PROVE TO PEOPLE THAT DIEM IS NOT ACTING AS SERVANT OF 
STATE AS HE CLAIi^ED BUT RATHER AS A SELF-SEEKIKG WAR LORD WHO . 
WISHED TO ERADICATE ALL OPPQSJTJON AND HOLD TOTAL POWER vJITHIK 
,HIS OWN HANDS AND THAT OF HIS FAKiiLY. ■ BAO DAI UOULD STAKE HI.S 
INFLUENCE UITH PEOPLE AND VIETNAMESE NATIONALISTS AGAINST DIEM^S 



* 



X2. 1:E ASKED UHAT BAO DAI INTENDED TO DO IF DIEM CONTINUES TO 

Disou::^' HIS orders* , bag dai stated he would tahi: legal stzps ■ 

TO HAVE Hi :v declared A REBEL AND IvOULD TilEN PROCEED TO UNIJE 
T}iE COUNTRY AGAINST HIi4 UNTIL HE WAS REMOVED FROM POSITION 
?IE l/AS USURPING, UE ASKED *BAQ DAI I? HZ INTENDED TO DO THIs'": 
IN PERSON :\ND IF SOj IvOULD IT MEAN A PROMPT RETURN TO SAISON;. •■ 
HE AN5v;ERED- THAT IT .MEANT' THAT }IZ MIGHT RETURN 'TO" SAIGON IN THH 



£ . N£AR FUTURE TO LEAD THE FIGHT BUT THAT WOULD BE DEPENDENT ON - 

! ■ ' TH£- ALLEGIAN'CE OF .THE NATIONAL ARMY, MOREOVER HE WOULD TAiO: ' 

NO SUCH SIF.P WITHOUT CONSULTING VIETNAMESE LEADERS j VHOM 'ilZ 

■ • mu SUMMONED TO FRANCE NEXT KEEK IN ADVANCE, ' :■ ' 

^ . . .■■■■■■ . ■■ A .. ■ \ -■ • 

Xc>. WE ASKeD WHAT EFFECT DIEM'S REFUSAL TO^'OBEY HIS ORDERS WOULD 
HAVE ON ARRIVAL IN FRANCE OF OTHER VIETNAMESE PERSONALITIES, . " 
■ BAO DAI SAID HE HOPED THAT THEY WOULD ALL COME AS IT WAS MOW HORE 
ESSENTIAL THAN EVER THAT THEY BE CONSULTED IN ORDER THAT COUNTRY 
■ COULD NOW ACHIEVE THE UNITY DIEM HAD FAILED TO ACHIEVE. 'WE ASKED 
FOR A LIST OF THOSE INVITED AND IT WAS SUPPLIED (BEING CABLED 
SEPARATELY), IT IS NOTED THAT CONTRARY TO B^O DAI'S FIRST 
STATEMENT APRIL 2S SECTS HAVE NOW BEEN INVITED AND ALL FORMER 
■ PRIME MINISTERS EXCEPT TAM ArRE INCLUDED, OUAT AND DO AS WELL. 
31 SHOP LE'HUU TUU HAS BEEN liCviTED BUT IT IS NOT CERTAIN HE CAN 
COME, ■ IKE LIST INCLUDES DUDDHISTSj CATHOLICS/ A R?^Y RFFS, 

fiECOHD COPY o Thio copy must be returnsd to 



urnsd to CC/n* central iiles vnxh noi..rL:c:/'^tv4^.'^;,WV--Fnr.v; 

TOP secr?:t- . . ■:■ - co?v. iFcussV--fV.i.; 



Declassified per Executive Order J 3526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TO? SECRET OC!rUniVL 



_2- lvjh6y APRIL 30, 8 BA, FROM PARIS (SECTION 2 OF 2) 

TRADE UI'aOIttSTS, FEASAWTS, ETC, BAO DAI SAID IT WAS KTS IIWEHTION 
TO JSiAKE REPEESEaTATION BROAD AS POSSIBLE, 

ikL BAO DAI STATED THAT HE IIAD DECIDED ON HINH AS S FECI AX EIGSSARY 
to' SECTS. WE PORTED OUT THAT THIS DECISION WOULD CG^ AS 
GREAT SHOCK TO AlffiRICAW PUBLIC OPINION WO LOOKED UPON HtNH 
.AS REBEL AGAINST GOVERMIffiKT. HE HAD HAD TO BE REMOVED FROM SAIGON 
FO^. THAT REASON. IT WOULD BE IIWERPRETE'd AS A SIGN THAT BAO DAI 
W. J SENDING HINH AS l^IEANS UPSETTLING NATIONAL ARMY'S LOYALTY TO 
GOVERNMENT. BAO DAI SAID THESE >JERE IHTERPRETiCTIONS HE COULD 
NOT HELP AND THAT CIRCUt^STANCES NO LONGER PERI^JTTED KH^ TO BE 
II^LUEKCED BY THEM. FACT WAS, HE SAID, THAT IHNH ENJOYED MOST 
SI PPORT IN VIETNAfi MILITARY CIRCLES OF ANY VIETNAMESE GENERAL. 
Ht; HAD BEEN RET-IOVED FROM VIETNAM BY BAO DAI AT OUR REQUEST IN 
ORDER GIVE DIEM FREE HAND IN ESTABLISIilNG HIS AUTHORITY OVER THE 
ARMY AND IN REESTABLXSHIHG LAW AND ORDER AI^ A GOVERNMENT OF NATL 
UNION. BAO DAI REMOVAi OF KM VJAS BEST EXAJ-IFLE OF EXTENT OF 
EFFORT TO GIVE DIEM EVERY CHANCE. DIEM HAD CONSISTENTLY FAILED,- 
NOW IT WAS BAO DAI'S PURPOSE TO Em PRESENT BLOODSHED BY P£i»IOVING 
DIEM FROM SCENE AND THUS PREVENTING NATIONAL Ara.IY ¥RCM TAKING 
FURTHER ARMED ACTION. AT SAlffi Tllffi, HE MUS-T MAKE CERTAIN THAT 
SECTS WOULD DESIST FROM SIMILAR ARMED ACTION. HE HAD ALREADY TAKE 
STEPS TO ACCOMPLISH FOK^ER BY DECREE. ONLY WAY HE COULD ASSURE 
LATTER WAS BY FORCE HIS OWN AUTHORITY BACKED UP BY HiAT OF MAN 
WHO HAD GREATEST INFLUENCE. MAN WAS HTNH. HINH WILL CARRY BAO 
DAI'S ORDERS FOR INTEGRATION OF SECT FORCES INTO NATIONAL AH4Y ' 
AND BAO DAI GUARANTEES SECTS WILL OBEY iOM AND MESSAGE HINH 
CARRIES IF DIEM IS REl^IOVED FROM SCENE. 

15. AT THES STAGE OF INTERVIEW, BAO DAI BECAJ^ SO EXCIETED 
THAT AT TIMES HE COULD BARELY TALK. HE SAJD THAT NO MAN HAD 
EVER ENJOYED THE POIffiES WHICH DIEM HAD HAD FROM VERY BEGIfCTING, 
MO DAI liAD TRANSFERRED AI.L HIS POVffiRS TO HIM. HE WAS FULLY ■ 
BACKED BY BOTH FRANCE AND U.S. HE WAS GIVEN LARGE SUMS OF MONEY 
AND HIS MLITARY FORCES >ffiRE CLOTHED, FED AND EQUIPPED BY 
FOREIGNERS. HE WAS CONSTANTLY HELPED BY FOREIGNERS TO DO 
THINGS HE WAS INCAPABLE OF DOING HIIvKELF. GENEPAL COLLINGS AND 
ELY AND BAO DAI HAD ALL BEEN IN HIS SERVICE, EVEN CHIEF OF 
STAFF OF THE VIETNAM ARMY WAS REMOVED FROM SCENE BECAUSE DIEM 



DIDN"T 



933 



lbs ^uU^ii.! 



nvE 






I 



Dedassiried per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By; NWD Dale: 201 1 



TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 



_3_ 1*71+6, APRIL 30, 8 BI, FRffl PARIS (SECTION 2 OF 2) 



DIDN'T LIKE KIM„ NOW THIHGS IIAD GOIJE TOO FAE AND CONSIDERATION 
HAD TO BE T^XEN OF WHAT WAS BEST FOR VIETKMIESE PEOPLE AND NOT 
WHAT WAS BEST FOR DIEM AND HIS FAMILY, VIETNAM VJAS SUPPOSEDLY 
AN INDEEEtlDEiW COUIWEY: SHE MUST TliEREFORE MAKE HER OWN DECISIONS. 
BAO DAI WAS CHIEF OF STATE, AND INTENDED TO CAEEY OUT HIS RESPONSI 
BILITIES AS SUCH. 

16. WE ASKED WHAT BROTHER LUYEN WAS STILL DOING IN CANNES AND 
ilHETHER HE WAS SERVING A3 INTERMEDIARY BETVJEEN BAO DAI AND DIEM. 
AT THIS POINT BAO DAJ REALLY EXPLODED AND STATED THAT BROTHER 
LUYEN HAD COl^IE TO CANNES NOT FOE ANY PATRIOTIC PURPOSE AS 
"DIEM UNDOUBTEDLY HAD TOLD AMERICAMS IN SAIGON," BUT EATHER ON 
SECRET fflSSION FROM DIEM TO ATTEMPT TO BUY BAO DAIo SOME DAYS 
AGO BEFORE ANY ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN TO SUMMON DIEM TO FEANCE 
OR OTHERWISE BAO DAI SAID LUYEN ARRIVED UNINVITED IN CANNES, 
BAO DAI KEPT HIM WAITING AND WHEN HE FII1ALLY RECEIVED lilM, 
LUYEN OFFERED BAO DAI THE SUM OF THREE liUNDRED MILLION FRANCS 
IF HE WOULD AGREE NOT TO TAKE ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD AFFECT 
STATUS OF DIEM OR PREVENT HIM FROM ESTABLISHING ICS AUTHORITY 
BY FORCE. BAO DAI COMMENTED WITH INDIGNATION THAT, OF COURSE 
HE HAD REFUSED AND "TIfflOTN LUYEN OUT OF THE HOUSE" BUT HE WAS 
STILL "GROVELLING" AROUND. HE STATED TliAT LUYEN HAD MADE VARIOUS 
ALLEGATIONS OF HIS CLOSE RELATIONS WITH "AMERICANS" IN SAIGON. 



L 



17, AT END OF INTERVIEW BAO DKL ASKED IF TO COULD GIVE HTM ANY 
FURTHER WORD ON WASHINGTON'S REACTION TO PLAN SUBMITTED WEEK 
AGO, Vffi EXPLAINED ONCE MORE TliAT GElffiKAL COLLINS WAS. LEAVING 
WASHINGTON THAT DAY FOR SAIGON WHICH WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 

OP V7ASHINGT0N'S RECOGNITION OF EMERGENCY NATURE OF SITUATION THERE 
IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT NO DECISIONS WOULD NOW BE REACHED UNTIL 
GENERAL COLLINS HAD ARRIVED IN SAIGON AND COULD COrlFEE THERE WITH 
EMBASSY AMD ELY. IN ^ffiANWHILE WE INFORMED BAO DAI TliAT HIS OBSER- 
VATIONS WOULD EE Pi^SED TO DEFT IN THEIR ENTIRETY. 

18. BAO DAI SAID HE WOULD SEND DE BACK TO PARIS MONDAY IN ORDER 
TO REMAIN IN TOUCH WITH US AICD TO RECEIVE ANY OBSERVATIONS WASH- 
INGTON CARED TO MAKE TO HTM. AT SAJvIE TIME HE WOULD INSTRUCT 

DE TO KEEP US AU COURAHTE, 

DILLON 

PAF/32 ^ , 

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Cor. a:'."rcS iti ov ^^'^s 

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ga7'.C3; tha Director oJ ijitslUyc^rico, l75/;7; a'r.d t'ae Dzpizty 
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Comv:iss-on RjprcC'sr^tcii-:^^ to ti,s lAC, cr.:^ tha Assiilcnt to 
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NND Project Number: NND {i33I6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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THE CURRENT SAIGOM CRISIS 



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TMH PR03LEM^ 



To assess the iJiipHcatioas of recent develoimients hi Saigon and to estimate the 
probable actions of interested parties in the current crisis. 



THE ESTIMATE 



[AMPLICATIONS OF CU.^RENT DcVELO?/Ac;s!TS 
IN SAIGON 

1. The success of Premier Diem m operations 
against the Binh Xuyen, and in his stand 
against Eao Dai, the French, and General Vy, 
has created a new and potentially revohition- 
?ay situation in Vietnam- While the situa- 
tion in Vietnam is extremely fluid, Diem ap- 
pears to hold the initiative in the phase that 
is about to begin. In this phase, the inter- 
ested parties — particularly the French and 
Eao Dai — v/ill have to adapt themselves to 
a radicaUy new political situation dominated 
by Diem or by more extreme nationalist ele- 
ments. If they do not adapt and if there are 
any substantial eiYorts by Bao Dai or the 

► French to frustrate Diem's governmentj the 
chances of an ti -French violence and the de- 
posal of Bao Dai would be greatly increased. 

2. Dicm's relations , with the Revolutionaiy 
Council which has been actively ijijecting it- 

. self into this situation have not yet been clari- 
lied. This council, designated by a self- 
appointed assembly, takes a more extreme po- 
sition than Diem, particularly in regard to 
the v/ithdrawal of French forces and the im- 
mediate deposal of Bao Dai. It is dominr^ted 
by Cao Dai generals Trinh Mhih Tlie and 
Nguyen Thanh Pjiuong and by Hoa Hao Gen- 
eral Ngo and includes a number of extreme 
nationalist politicians, • General Ely nov7 
charges that the Council is Communist infil- 
trated but so far has not produced evidence 
to substantiate this charge. V/e have no sig- 
nificant evidence to indicate that any of the 



inernbers of the Council arc Communist, In 
a proclamation the Council announced a 
broad program couched in social revolution- 
ary terms but including a denunciation of 
"red colonialism" in IS'orth Vietnam. Its ?x- 
tlvitics have been denounced by the Commu- 
nist radio in Hanoi as have those of Premier 
Diem, 

PROBABLE COURSES Or ACTION OF 
INTERESTED PARTIES 

3. Preinier Diem, The virtual expulsion of 
the Binh Xuyen from Saigon-Cholon has in- 
creased Diem*s prestige throughout Vietnam. 
The confidence of Diem, and his supporters in 
their ov/n strength, judgment, and popular 
appeal has h^en considerably enhanced. In 
this situation, Diem will almost certainly con- 
tinue to resist any efforts to remove him frora- 
office, 

4. Plis actions and those of his followers have 
taken on an -increasingly nationalistic, anti- 
French tone over the past fev; days and Diern 
may now be convinced that a continuation of 
this anti-French policy is essential to the 
rallying of popular support Nevertheless he 
has exercised a moderating ii^fluence on the 
anti-French and a,nti-Bao Dai position of the 
Revolutionary Council. However, if he be- 
lieved the Fi^cnch v/ere continuing their 
efiorts to depose him, he would almost cer- 
tainly permit intensified anti-FrcriCh manifes- 
tations. Such a course would carry "-rave 
dangers of anti-French violence, particularlv 
in Saigon. 



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5. So far, Diem and his j^rincipal Vietnamese 
National Army (VNA) leaders have appeared 
desirous of maintaining good xx^la lions '■Auth 
the French. Diem's attitude toward Bao Dai 
has been less clear and there have been in- 
dications that he has been considering the 
suggestions of tlic Council that Bao Dai be 
deposed. He may be using ultranationalism 
to bring prcssm^e against Bao Dai and the 
French. If he is thwarted in his objectives 
by the French or by Bao Dai, he wjll become 
more susceptible to pressures toward extreme 
action. 

6. Diem has rallied additional support during 
the current military phase, and from this 
position of strength, Diem v/ill almost cer- 
tainly continue to gain adherents, including 
defections from among the Binh Xuyen and 
the sects. 

7. The Vietnamese National Army, Aside 
from the Frencli Army, only the VNA present- 
ly has the capabi]ity to enforce Bao Dai's 
authority in Saigon or to back Diem in He- 
fiance of Bao Dai. There are some VNA offi- 
cers who dislike Diem and who are concerned 
by the developing rift betv/een Diem and Bao 
Dai. On the other hand, there is consider- 
able pro-Diem, nationalist sentiment in the 
army; Diem has gained additional support as 
a result of clearing the Binh Xuyen from Sai- 
gon; and most importantly, the VNA units in 
the Saigon area appear to be loyal to Diem, 

8. If Diem should move precipitously to de- 
pose Bao Dai, or if Bao Dai attempted to oust 
Diem, some elements of the army might re- 
main loyal to Bao Dai and attempt to over- 
throw Diem. Vv^e believe such efLorts would 
be unsuccessful, however, even if General 
Hinh had entered the country to rally support 
for Bao Dai. 

9. Bao Dat As a result of Diem's stand 
against Bao Dai and because of the latter's 
involvement in v;hat many Vietnamess na- 
tionalists consider^ to be a French-inspired 
political maneuver, Bao -Dai's prestifje has 
been greatly reduced, w-hatever the outcome 
oi the present crisis. Bao Dai's authority can 
only be enforced at this jhncture by the force 
of French arms and any such action would 



a 



Imost comx^Ietely discredit him in Vietnam, 

10. There appears to be considerable senti- 
TPJtnt for the dcposal of Bao Dai, and if Diem 

, gives his consent such action may be taken 
at any time. For the present, Bao Dai appar- 
ently feels that the tide is running w^ith Diein^ 
and is attempting to preserve the institution 
of the 3iionarchy by accepting the contintaa- 
tion of Sie Diem government, ■ \ ' 

11. The French Govermncnt. The French 
v/ill find it difficult to accept Di em's success 
which caznc despite theu* strong and v/ell- 
publicized opv;osltion. We believe tha,t fear, of 
large-scale violence and of adverse domestic 
and v;orld reactions will cause the French, 
to refrain from overi. action in Saigon to re- 
strain the VNA or to remove Diem, unless the 
situation should threaten serious loss of 
French lives. Kov/cver, the extent to \vhicli 
the French permit the VNA freedom of action 
and the nature of their dealings v/ith the 

. Binh Xuyen and Bao Dai can still have an 
influence on the outcome of the immediate 
situation. Furthermore, v/e believe that the 
French wiD continue pressures for Diem's re- 
moval; some French elements in Vietnam are 
likely to continue their covert assistance to 
Diem's enemies. If the French believe that 
Diem will succeed in corisolidating his posi- 
tion, they rnay decide that they have no 
choice except 'to repair theh' position with 
Diem as best they can v/hile making plans 
for accelei^ated withdrawal of their forces.^ 

12. The Binh Xuyen. Tiae military potential' 
of the Binli Xuyen will depend on the extent 
of support they receive, directly or indirectly, 
from the French and the Koa Kao. It appears 
that the morale of the Binh Xuyen troops is 
low, a number liave already defected, and that 
many of the troops may be susceptible to peace 



'The Special Assistant, InteHigencei Department 
of St:ite, believes that the last sentence of th!3 
paragraph understates the diHiciaUy the French 
would i^ave in accommodathi*^ to a strong, r^nti- 
French goveinnient in South Vietnam, and 
therefore believes the 5i?ntence shoii]d reed: "it 
these elTorts are i:nsiicccssJul zviO. I>ic:n appeared 
to be consolicip-ting his position, the Trench in 
the <^n^. may decide that they have no choice 
except to step up the v.ithciiav^'al of their forces 
from Vietnam/* 



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offers from the governnient We believe that 
a considerable Bumber of the Binh Xuyen 
may attempt to resume their life of piracy and 
extortion, The.VNA should be able to reduce 
the Binh Xuyen to the level of a local nui- 
sance. 

13. ■■The Sects, We believe that for the im- 
mediate future the Cao Dai military forces 
under Generals The and Pliuong v/ill continue 
actively to support Diem against the Binh 
X- en and Bao Dai. The Koa Hao are un- 
likely to play an important role in the im- 
mediate situation, although the Ba Cut forces 
nw continue their terrorist operations, 

14^ The Viet Mmh. The Viet Minli probably 
fear that Diem's continuation in office would 
limit the prospects of a peaceful unification 
of Vietnam under terms favorable to the Com- 
munists. They will probably continue covert 
efforts in South Vietnam to keep the situa- 
tion agitated. The Communists almost cer- 
tainly will not invade South Vietnam in the 
near future. , 

GENERAL OUTLOOK 

15, In present circumstances, we do not be- 
lieve that Diem could be persuaded voluntarily 



to resign. If he were forced from ofnce, many 
of Diem*s follov;ers would probably undertalce 
revolutionary opposition, includuig maquis 
resistance, to the successor regime. Some 
VNA elements in Saigon and in c en tiial. Viet- 
nam would probably join these elements in 
resisting the nev/ government. 

16. Assuming that the US continues to sup- 
port Diem, and that the French acquiesce, we 
believe the situation will stabilize in Saigon 
uiider Dlem's control. Diem's talents as an 
administrator are unlikely to improve. His 
success, achievt'd lai^gely on his ov;n initiative 
and v/ith his own resources, is likely to make 
him more independent ^and less amenable to 
policy guidance. Diern's government will still 
be confronted with manifold internal prob- 
lems — c.g,, integration of the sects, resettle- 
ment of refugees, land reform, extension of 
government authority in the provinces, and 
training of the army. Although Diem has 
iitiproved his position, w^e believe that it v/ill 
still be extremely dinicultj at best, for Diem 
or any Vietnamese government to build sufn- 
cient strength to meet the long-range chal- 
lenge of the Communists, 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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INCCMTNG TELEGRAM 



DEPARTIffiNT OF STATE 



ACTI01\F COPY 



TOP SECRET SrNbl iV 



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VL-A 



FROM: PARIS 



TO: Secretary of State 



'control: i|06l 
Eec'd: MAY 8, 1955 

5:37 m 



NO: SECTO 8, MAY 8, 5 M (SECTION Olffi OF THEEE) 



PRIOBITY 

SENT DEPAHTMEIW SECTO 8, REPEATED INFOEMATION PRIORITY 
SAIGON 716. 



FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY CONVERSATIONS ON INDOCHINA HELD WITH 

BRITISH AND FRENCH THIS AFTERNOON. FRENCH DELEGATION Iffi.ADED 
BY PRIME MINISTER FAURE, BRITISH BY FONNIN MACMILLAN AND US BY 
SECRETARY „ DURING FIRST PART OF CONVERSATIONS BRITISH TORE 
ABSENT, JOINING LATER AS NOTED. 

FAURE OPENED CONVERSATIONS BY REFERRING TO RATIFICATION PARIS 
AGREEi'ffiNTS AND DIFFICULTIES FFFINCH GOVT HAD SNCOUfJl'ERED IN 
PROCESS. HE OBSERVED TliAT PUBLIC OPIICCON ICFST NOl'J BE SATIS- 
FIED WITH EARLY FOUR- POWER TALKS . HE AGREED THAT Vffi WOULD NOW 
BE TALKING FROM STRENGTH AND THAT PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS TORE 
THEREBY INCREASED. HE REFERRED TO CHINA AND TO. FACT THAT 
FRANCE WAS NOW IGNORING GOVT WHICH HAD IN HANDS FATE OF 
lUIfflREDS OF MILLION OF PEOPLE BECAUSE OF IffiR RECOGNITION OF 
FACT THAT US VIEtJS MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. HE REMARKED 
THERE ARE NOW TITO AREAS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO FRANCE. 
THEY ARE NORTH AFRICA AND VIETNAM. HE WOULD CALL UPON LAFOREST, 
MINISTER OF ASSOCIATED STATES, TO GIVE OUTLINE FRENCH POSITION 
ON LATTER. 

SECRETARY REPLIED BY STATING THAT US RECOGNIZED COURAGEOUS 
STEP FRANCE HAD TAKEN IN RATIFYING PARIS AGRKEI-ENTS , BOTH HE 
AND PRESIDENT APPRECIATED MAGNITUDE OF POLITICAL TASK. THEY 
FELT STEP, HOI'ffiVER, WAS IN FRANCE'S OWN INTEREST AS WELL. 
SECRETARY EXPRESSED OPINION THAT IN RATIFYING FRANCE HAD 
REAFFIRMED HER POSITION AS "ONE OF GREAT NATIONS OF WORLD'*. 

LAFOREST THEN OPENED INDOCHINA DISCUSSION, HE STATED THAT 
GENEVA ACCORDS HAD POSED SEVERAL qpESTIONS INCLUDING THAT OF 



HOW TO 



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RECORD COPY 



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-2- SECTO 8, MAY 8, 5 K-l (SECTION 1 OF 3) FBOM PARIS 



HOW TO DEAL WITH FORTHCQMIIIG ELECTIONS. DIVISIOM OF COUIJTRY 
HAD GIVEN SOUTH VIETNAI'^ DISADVANTAGE IN COMPETING WITH NORTH 
BUT WHAT SOUTH LACKED IN AREA AITO POPULATION WAS COUIWER- 
BALANGED BY HER ECONOMIC SUPERIORITY. " FRAITCE BELIEVED THAT 
SOUTH COULD WIN OVER NORTH IN ELECTIONS IF SHE COULD PRESEIW 
MORE ATTRACTIVE REGIME TO PEOPLE. THIS COULD BE DONE ONLY 
WITH NATIONALIST, STABLE AND BROADLY BASED GOVT. Tll-ffi WAS OF 
ESSENCE FOR DISCUSSIONS PRIOR TO ELECTIONS WEHCH WOULD OPEN 
NEXT JULY AND ELECTIONS THELiSELVES IN JULY 1956. THERE ¥A^ NO 
AMBIGUITY IN FRENCH POLICY BETVffiEN NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM. 
PRESENCE OF FRANCE IN NORTH COULD NOT BE ERASED BY STROKE OF 
PEN. IT IS FRMCH DUTY TO PROTECT HER CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC 
PRESENCE THERE. SAJNTENY MISSION IS DESIGNED FOR ONLY THAT 
PURPOSE. FFvANCE HAD GIVEN UP THOUGHTS OF MIXED COMPANIES AS 
RESULT OUR OBJECTIONS AND HAD NOW SURRENDERED COAL IGNES. 
SAINTENY MISSION WOULD BE MAINTAINED ON ITS PRESENT TERMS. 
IT WOULD BE NEITHER ENLARGED NOR CHAITGED, 



LAFOREST CONTIlfUED TO SAY THAT FRANCE ^HAD LOYALLY SUPPORTED 
GOVT OF DIEM FROM BEGINNING. ANY ALLEGATION TO CONT'RARY IS 
UNTRUE. FRENCH CONSTAIJTLY TRIED TO REENFORCE DIEM GOVT. 
FRANCE REACHED AGREEMENT WITH US L^T DECEMBER TO PERSUADE 
"OR COMPEL" DIEM TO ENLARGE GOVT. IT WAS AGREED TO GIVE HtM 
UNTTIL JAIftJARY AT VffllCH TIME, IF HE HAD FAILED, WE WOULD LOOK 
INTO MATTER OF ALTERNATE DISCREETLY. THIS WAS NOT DONE. 
LAST MARCH PRESENT GOVT BROKE IWYO OPEN CONFLICT WITH SECTS. 
UNITED FRONT OF SECTS WAS FORI^IED AGAINST DIEM. BOTH DECEMBER 
AGREEMENT AND COIMON SENSE TOLD US AT THAT TIME THAT SOMETHING 
TO BE DONE TO AVOID CIVIL WAR. FRANCE WARNED THAT ARMED 
CONFLICT - FIRST CIVIL V7AR, THEN GUERRILLA WARFARE, THEN 
TERRORISM - WOULD RESULT IF WE FAILED TO TAKE ACTION. FRANCE 
UfiS ALWAYS DESIRED PEACEFUL SOLUTION. FOR THIS REASON JOINT 
ELY- CODLINGS APPROACH WAS TRIED. IT WAS HOPED THEY WOULD 
ARRIVE AT JOINT PLAN FOR SOLUTION. WASHINGTON APPEARED FIRST 
TO VJELCOME THIS CONCEPT THEN CliANGED ITS MIND. COLLINS LEFT 
SAIGON WHEN CIVIL WAR WAS ABOUT TO BREAK OUT. UNTENABLE TRUCES 
WERE DECLARED. WHEN THEY'WERE ABOUT TO EXPIRE BAG DAI SUB- 
MITTED HIS Om PLAN ON APRIL 19 IN ORDER TO TRY TO RECONCILE US 

AND FRENCH 



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SECTO 8, MAY 8, 3 H4 (SECTION OHE OF THREE) , FROM PARIS 



AKD FRENCH FAILURE TO ACT. US FAILED TO REPLY TO BAO DAI 

IK ABSENCE OF COLLINS FROM SAIGON BAG DAI ACTED. 



LAFOEEST CONTINUED TO SAY THAT WM REVOLUTIONARY COM^ilTTEE 
APPEARED TO HAVE CONTROL. COMtCTTEE IS STRONGLY UNDER VIET MINH 
INFLUENCE. A I4AN NAlfflD HOM PAN SON, STAFF OFFICER IN VIET- 
NAMESE ARI^, EDUCATED IN CHINA WAS VICE-PRESIDENT OF REVOLU- 
IIONARY COMClTTEE. NHI LANG WAS ONE OF VICE-PRESIDENTS OF 
VIET MINH GOVT, DOAK TRUNG CON IS NOTORIOUS VIET Mllffl AGENT. 
VIET MINH INFLUENCE OF "REVOLUTIONARY" GROUPS IS RBCOGICLZABLE 
THROUGHOUT AND THEIR INFLUENCE IS SPREADING TO COUI^'TRY. BAO 
DAI'S DEPOSITION IS DEI4AHDED. THERE IS VIOLENT CAMPAIGN 
AGAINST FRENCH AND FRENCH EXPEDITIONARY CORK. VIET MINH 
AGENTS MAKE GOOD USE OF IT AND CERTAIN AI^IERI CAJIS DO HOT SEEM 
SUFFICIENTLY AWARE OF THIS. FRENCH GOVT DOES NOT WISH TO HAVE 
ITS ARI^IY ACT AS PLATFORM FOR VIET MINH PROPAGAiroA. ARl^ff WILL NOT 
BE MAIIWAIHED IN VIETNAM AT ANY COST. LAFOFJEST CLOSED BY 
REFERRING TO GOVT CENSORSHIP AND SHOWED COPY OF SAIGON NEl'/S- 
PAPER, HALF OF WHICH HAD BEEN CENSORED,. AS EXA>DPLE OF EXTENT 
OF GOVT CENSORS I-EP. ' '- 

SECRETARY REPLIED REFERRING TO SERIOUSNESS OF SITUATION AND 
NECESSITY THAT FREl^CH AND US AS GOOD FRIENDS VfOEK CLOSELY 
TOGETHER. IT WOULD NOT BE PROFITABLE TO GO INTO DETAILED 
CHARGES MADE AGAINST EACH OTHER IN TWO COUNTRIES. QUESTION IS 
MIAT TO 



DULLES 



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DEFARTMKi^iT OF ST^SE 



YROU: Paris • 



TO 






Secretary of State 



KG. SECTO 8j May 8, 5 p-m. (SECTION Y\^0 OF THHEE) 

PRIORITY 

SLl-^T DEP.^RTliEI^T SECTO 8; REPRITED IIIFORI>iATXON ERIOKIIT SAIGON 7l6. 

vhat to do in face of present situation. He s^iMnarized present situation 
a£ follows : 



(1) There is a revolutionary movemGnt under way in Vietnam, 

i 

(2) We Relieve that Dien has the best chance of anyone of staying on top 
of r evolution and keeping it vithin "tolerable'" liraits. Diem is only means 
US sees to save South Vietnam and counteract revolution- US sees no one 
else who can. VJhatever US view has "been in pa^tj today US must support Diem 
■Kholeheartedly. US must not peiT:ait Dienl to bee 02^ another Kaxensky, 

Regarding Bao Dai^ Secretary said in his vie¥ he had irretrievably lost 
capacity to be anything but titular head of government if even that position 
could be saved for hiiji and that this vas solution Secretary preferred until 
election (of national Assembly), Bao Dai should support Diem and not tal;e 
away his power. Cao Dai and Hoa Hao could be used but no Binh Xuyen. Secre- 
tary expressed opinion that with support two governments Diem could sit on 
top of revolution. Dien is only force of moderation.^ FIDO a certain stabilis- 
ing influence- US was giving funds to support Vietnamese Army and could not 
see anyone else to give funds to but Dicra for that p^arpose. Concluded by 
stating that support of Diem was only way he ccuJLd see to deal with common 
problem pointing out that time was running against us and no successftal results 
could be achieved unless two countries worked together. 

Meeting was then joined by British for whom Secretary resumed US position as 
summarized above adding that in US view present revolution is not yet domi- 
nated or influenced by Coirununists to any appreciable degree. He remarked 
that prior association with Coi.^nunists was not in iteelf sufficient reason 
to believe that man vras a CoiTimujalst ncw^ citing that Bao Dai himself could 
be considered a Cor-omunist on this reasoning. Support of Diem did not indi- 
cate US non-recognition of his wealinesses. US had not taken part in his 
original selection and liad been and remained ready to support any other man 
who might be presented by orderly process of law. He remarked that just before 
outbreak of fighting US was prepared to consider altei-natives but he was not 
sure no\i that it would" have been practical. Secretary remarked h^ was told 
last March by Collins that we had already reached point of no return on Diem, 



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Faure continued tliat ranch of Fra^ice-US difficulty grows out of fact that \:e 
have never admitted our true thoughts from hegirming. Last Septeriber \;e- 
inight have had an agreed solution if \ie had expressed our douhts bx;t -v^e did 
not- Eao Dai is a ^^bad card" hut hy means of him something is possible hut 
vith Diem failtore is certain, VJe might have been able to save situation on - 
eve- of coup de force if ve had had tlxree-sided agz^eerient (USj France ^ 
Bao Dai) but again ve failed. Eao Dai has faults but he can serve a useful 
purpose and should be used for that. He cannot be excluded as a possibility 
for bringing about a riore productive solution but as long as Diem is there 
the view is obstructed and no situation is possible. To resuinej Faure said^ 
Diem is impossible and there is no chance for hliii to succeed or to improve 
the situation. Another man might not be able to improve the situation 'either 
and^ in fact^ there is^ no one specifically in mind but at least ^^ith 
another man there is a chance* ^ . 



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(l) It vould bring on a Viet Minh victory ^ , ' ■ . t| 

t_ ' (2) It irould focus the hostility of everyone on French^ and 

(3) It will begin on a France -US breach ^ Everyone believes that the US , i 
is baclcing Diem and encouraging hm in his anti-French sentiments even if - I 
the French Goverinaent knews US is not. 



There vas no practical i:ay of getting rid of him. Secretary vdshed to do 
everything to get Diem to enlarge goverzmient. It might be possible to 
change government at the time of forthconing elections but Question remains 
''vho is better thsn Diem," If there is a better man US is ready to consider 
him but re-submits no one has been suggested. Although Collins had reached 
agreement vith Ely in early April to change Diem he now believes we must 
support hijn. 

Faure replied that he thouglit it best that he speak himself. He wished to 
state that France is not in agreement with US views. In the past ^^e have 
concealed this fact from each other but now it is time to speak frankly. 
Diem is not a good solution. Joint efforts to prove lie is have resulted - ^ 
in failure. France is convinced that Diem is leading to catastrophe. Diem 
took advantage of Collins' a^bsence to effect a "coup de force" which v;on 
primary vlctox-y but which has not contributed to any lasting solution. 
His ant i -French sentiments are extreme. France does not object to his being 
anti-French if he is capa^ble but being anti-French is not a s'ufficient 
quality in itself, Faure will not continue with him for^ one way or 
another J he will bring on a Viet Minh victory. He is surrounded by Vietnam 
elements and there is not time to lose. Diem is not only incapable but mad 
(fou). He ruined our chances for a possible solution just when it was in 
the offing • France can no longer take risks with him. He could yield to 
the revolutionary groups. Continuing with Diem would have three disastrous 
results; 



DULLES 



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Dedassiried per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Dale: 201 1 



IMCOMm TELEGRAM 



DEPARH^IENT OF STATE 

o 



TOP SECRET 



U 



'~'*^ Control: 
Eec'd: 



FROM: PARIS 



ACTIOH COPY 



'4065 

MAY 8, 1955 

9:12 PM 



TO: 



Secretary of State 



NO: SECTO 8^ MY 8, 5 PM CSECTIOH THREE OF THEES) 



ERIORITY 

SEHT DEPARTMENT SECTO 8, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY 
SAIGON 716 

IS A CHANCE BUT V7ITH DIEM THERE IS NONE. 

FAURE THEN CONCLUDED WITH THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT STATE- 
MENT: "DIEM IS A BAD CHOICE^ IMPOSSIBLE SOLUTION, WITH NO CHANCE 
TO SUCCEED AND NO CHANCE TO IMPROVE TliE SITUATION, WITHOUT IHM 
SOME SOLUTION MIGHT BE POSSIBLE, BUT WITH HTM THERE IS NONE. 
flOVffiVER, I CANNOT GUARANTEE ANY OTIiER' SOLUTION WOULD WORK NOR 
IS IT POSSIBLE TO CLARIFY THE SITUATION. THERE SEEMS TO BE 
FIMDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENT BEBCEEN US . I COULD HAVE CLAIMED 
THAT SINCE FRENCH POSITION IS PREDOMINANT IN VIETNAM, YOU 
SHOULD ACC0M>10DATE YOU'R VIB'/S MORE TO OURS, BUT I HAVE REJECTED 
THIS, IfflAT SHOULD BE DONE UNDER THE CIRCUiiSTAATCES? WHAT WOULD 
YOU SAY IF WE WERE TO RETIRE EIfi!IRELY FROM INDOCHIKA MD CALL 
BACK THE EEC AS SOON AS PCKSIBLE. I FULLY REALIZE THIS WOULD BE 
A GRAVE SOLUTION, AS IT WOULD LEAVE FRENCH CIVILIANS AND FRENCE 
INTERESTS IN A DIFFICULT POSITION. THERE IS ALSO THE QUESTION 
OF THE RilFJGEES' FATE. IF YOU THINK THIS MIGHT BE A POSSIBLE 
SOLUTION, I THIM I MIGHT BE ABLE TO ORIENT MYSELF TOTARDS IT 
IF YOU SAY SO. IT WOULD HAVE ADVANTAGE OF AVOIDING ALL FURTHER 
REPROACH TO FRAITCE OF "COLONIALISM" WHILE AT Ti-IE S.AME TllvflS 
GIVING RESPONSE TO DIEM'S REQUEST THAT FRANCE SHOULD GO. 
SINCE IT CONTIMPLATES THE LIQUIDATION OF THE SITUATION AND THE 
REPATRIATION OF THE EEC, WOULD THE UNITED STATES BE DISPOSED 
TO HELP PROTECT FRENCH CIVILIANS AND THE REFUGEES? IF YOU DO 
NOT AGREE TO THIS SOLUTION AND BELIEVE IT WOULD HAMPER YOU, 
THEN WE CAN HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON THE VIETNAMESE 
SITUATION. 



SECRETARY 



PER14ANENT 
RECORD COPY 



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. TOP SECRET QF[\|S|T1VE 
-2- SECTO 8, MAY 3, 5 FM (SECTIOH THEEE OF THREE), FROM PARIS 

SECRETARY REPLIED TliAT ICE APPRECIATED FRA1K1>!ESS, IT IS 
ONLY WAY FRIEiroS SHOULD SPEAK TO EACH OTHER. THERE IS A - 
FUKDAl"ffiIWAL DIFFERENCE BET^JEEN FRAKCE AND US. US HA^ lilGHER 
REGARD OF DIEM'S CAPABILITIES THAN FRAIICE. US INFORMED 
"COUP DE FORCE" WAS ENGINEERED BY BINH XUYEN WilLE FRENCH SAY 
OTHEEt'lISE. SECRETARY HIMSELF HAD HAD DOUBTS TR^^T DIEr4 COULD 
SURVIVE. IT WAS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER ARMY WAjS LOYAL TO HIM 
AND HE DID NOT CONTROL THE NATIONAL POLICE. LOYALTY OF FRENCH 
GOVT ITSEU IN SUPPORT OF DIEM m3 NOT QUESTIOI-JED BUT THERE WERE 
DIFFICULTIES FROM OTHER SOURCES SUCH AS RADIO FRAHCAISE-ASIE. 
US DOES NOT AGREE WITH FRENCH OPINION OF DIEM, IF HE HAD BEEN 
A NON-ENTITY HE WOJLD liAVE COLLAISED BUT HE DID NOT. HF SliOvIED 
SO MUCH ABILITY THAT US FAILS TO SEE HOW HE CAJT BE GOT HID OF 
NOW. IT IS ASSUMED THAT FRANCE WOULD NOT V/ISH TO DO SO BY FORCE. 

DIEM IS STRONGER NOW THAN WHEN BAO DAI FIRST WITHDREW HIS 
POWERS. WOIST ASPECT IS THAT PROBLEM INVOLVES DIFFERENCE OP • 
OPINION BEWJEEN FRANCE AND US , VIETNAM IS NOT WORTH QUARREL 
WITH FRANCE, COMMON INTERESTS ARE TOQ GREAT TO BE JEOPARDIZED 
BY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION ON VIETNAM. SECRETARY AGREED WITH 
FRENCH STATEMEM THAT IT MUST NOT AFFECT FPAl-JCO-US RELATIONS IN 
OTHER AREAS. IF IT WOULD SOLVE PROBLEM, US WOULD WITHDRAW AND 
DROP ITS SUPPORT OF VIETNAM. FRANCO-US DIFFERENCES MUST BE 
RESOLVED NOW FOR SECRETARY DID NOT BELIEVE TILAT US CONGRESS ■ 
WOULD CONTINUE WITH ITS PRESEIW AID PROGRAl'l OTHERWISE. SUB- ^ 
STANTIAL SUMS OF i^ TO 5 HUiroRED MILLION DOLLARS ARE INVOLVED. 

CHOICE OPEN TO US IS TO HAVE DIEM SUPPORTED OR TO WITHDRAW, 
IT IS GRAVE PROBLEM WHICH THE SECRETARY WOULD LIKE TO THINK 
ABOUT OVEEICLGHT. FRENCH SUGGESTIONS ARE SERIOUS AND MUST BE 
WEIGHED CAREFULLY. ADVICE AND COUNSEL ARE NEEDED. US INTEREST IN 
VIETltAM IS SUffLY TO WITHHOLD AREA FROM COMMUNIS TS. US WILL GIVE 
CONSIDERATION TO ANY SUGGESTION FRENCH I-IAKE BUT MUST WARN THAT US 
FINANCIAL SUPPORT 14AY NOT BE HPECTED TO ANY SOLUTION IffllCH SEC- 
RETARY CAN THINK OF AS ALTERNATIVE TO DIEM. QUESTION MUST BE 
TAKEN UP AGAIN TOMORROW. 

MACMILLAN STATED THAT BRITISH INTERESTS IN VIETNAM WERE MORE IN- 
DIRECT BUT NONETHELESS VITAL BECAUSE (l) INTEREST IN AREA ITSELF 
AND (2) INTEREST IN COMMUNIST THREAT FROM ANY AREA IN WORLD, IT 
WOULD BE GRAVE ERROR TO REACH DECISION THAT EVENING. FOREIGN MIN- 
ISTERS ARE TO BE IN PARIS SEVERAL DAYS AND SHOULD LOOK INTO MATTER 
AGAIN. EVENTS MIGHT OVERTAKE OUR DECISIONS, ACCURATE REVIEW OF 



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topseci^t3[:|\j3|JjVF 
secto 8, may 8, 5 b.i, (section three of three) , from paris 



WHAT HAS BEEN SAID SHOULD BE UlffiERTAKEN AND EFFORT TO ASCERTAIN 
.FACTS SHOULD BE tlADE BY ALL SIDES. IT IS IMPORTAIW THAT NOTHING 
'he RELEASED OF ^fflAT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED DURING MKETING AS LEAK 
WOULD BE CALAMITOUS. BELIEVE EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE BY ALL TO 
THINK SERIOUSLY OF WHAT HAS BEEN SAID AND KEEP CONTEfjTS ABSOLUTELY 
SECRET. 

FAUEE AGREED WITH MACMILLAN, STATING THAT HE HAD tIEVER EXPECTED 
; DECISION TH.AT EVENING. EXPERTS SHOULD GET DOWN TO ^'JORK IM-IEDIATELY 
ajSD PREPARE FOR DECISIONS AS EVENTS ARE CHANGING HOURLY. 

i MEETING CLOSED WITH GEflERAL DISCUSSION CONCERIffNG SCHEDULE FOR 
■ FURTHER TALKS ON INDOCHTNA AND FORTHCQf.n:NG VISIT OF FOREIGN 
MINISTERS TO VIENNA, 

■ 
I 

A DISCUSSION ENSUED CONCERNING TEXT OF COMMnQUE, SECRETARY • 
REJECTED PROPOSAL OF MEETING OF EXPERTS BEFORE NEXT DISCUSSIONS 
ON INDOCHIM BY FOREIGN MINISTERS NOW SCHEDULED FOR MY 10. 



DULLES 



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DEPAETMEHT OF STATE 



moa: Sainon 



TO: 



Secretary of State 



Kay 8, 1955 ' 



ISOi: 507^ J May 5, 9 p.m. (SECTION TJfflEE OF FOUR) 
HIACT 

S" T DEPART^^2^T 507^4, REPEATED INiOK^IATION im^CT PAEIS 1305- 
7v French position, -^ 

A* French position determined by t>jo factors; 



(1) Ely's responsibility for safety EEC and for Erench lives and property; 
and as signatory of Geneva Accords j 

(2) French desire retain cultural and economic presence and to retain 
Vietnam as part French Union, 

B* Friction between French and Vietnemese'has reached serious proportions. 
It springs fran U<o major sources: 

(1) Ely J to meet his responf?ibi!llty for the safety of French lives and 
property, has established a French controlled secui^ity zoikb vhich includes 
large portion residential and business zone of Saigon proper* He has intro- 
duced new French battalions to protect this zone. Presence these forces^- 
reported refusals to permit WA tmits to move through French Zoncj and 
sanctuary provided to three Binh Zuyen posts located ivithin secxB:ity zone 
are constant irritants to Vietnaanese nationalists. 

{2) Ant i "Diem propaganda such as broadcast by Badio France -Asia and aDJega- 
tions of French support of sects ^ particularly Binh Xuyen, vhich widely 
credited by Vietnamese ^ have added oil to fire. 



Ely and French authorities here have finally concluded Biera must go* 
Increasing French bitterness toward Diem and their sensitivity to "anti- 
colonialist^* propaganda has to some extent been extended to US whom they 
blame for not joining with them in pressing Dien to seek cease-fire. French 
liltevjjse tend blatne US for recent bloodshed because we did not agree with 
tliem in finding political solution to governmental crisis some three weeks 
ago, ' ' ^ ^ 

D. Strong anti-French aspect of Revolutionary Committee has great appeal 
to large seg?nents of population which beneath surface has long nourished 
hatred and contempt "for French. 



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E. Quite regardless of future developments j episodes of last week, featured 
liy increasing strain in French-Vi^^tnainese relations, cannot help but severely 
jeopardise Fraaice's long range interests in Vietnen- Of late one hears less 
and less mention of maintenance cultural and economic interests and >" 
influence and more and more of threats that France will drop responsibilities 
and withdraw FEC. " \ie believe this to be passing phase ^ however. 



F- Keference the activities of Revolutionary^ Coirjuittee and States General 
local French. have same fears that we do. French are convinced that Revolu- 
tionary Committee is penetrated by Viet^Minh agents, but have so far been 
V ^ble to give us any conclusive proof- They are also skeptical about the 
States General being able to modify radical resolutions of the Revolutionary 
CcQimiittee, ^ -^ 

G I think it is fair to say that French are convinced that Diein desires 
overthrow Eao Dai and will continue efforts to do so irrespective of current 
activities of Revolutionary Coimnittee. 

H. As indicated in recent telegrams^ General Ely and the Coiiinissariat General 
in Saigon have becoine so enotional in their bitter opposition to Diera and 
his entourage, that I fear they have lost some of their objectivity as to 
popular reaction to Diem's recent moves, his hold on the Army^ and his ability 
to deal with the Binh Xuyen, They are q^ii'te convinced that serious \7arfare 
will be initiated by the Binh Xuyen, and that anti-French sentiment fomented 
by Diem and perhaps Viet Minh may still cause serious outbreaks in foreign 
sections of Saigon, 



KIDDER 



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t, 1 ■ k* f i# ' -it* J ii ' I 



DEPAET^a;RT OF STATE 



FROM: Saigon 



TO: 



Secretary of State 



KO: 507U, Kay 5, 9 p.m. (SSCTIOE ?OUR OF FOUR) 



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NIACT 

SEiW DEPARTl.IEIJT 50?^, KUKSATED BIFOHI.mTIOH KIACT PARIS 1305 

I T 

8- Conclusions; "^ ' . ' -* 

A. It -^'/ould appear to me that the essential steps in rec^^nstitution of 
Joint Anerican-French approach to situation in Vietnejn should be as 
rollovrs : 

(l) Dien governir.cnt should "be fully supported In bringing to a final and 
guiok solution its conflict vith the Binh Xuyen* 

(a) This mil requ.ire on part of French^ not only in Paris but more im- 
portantly in Saigon J that genuine ae si stance rather than passive self- 
obstruction be offered to yietna2iLese Governijaent and armed forces. 

(b) Specifically^ General Ely should be directed take active steps, to 
persuade Binh Xuyen to withdraw their forces froin three police posts ■ - 
remaining i\^ithin French security zone in Saigon^ or if Binh Xuj'-en refuse^ 
then to perroit Vietnam aircned forces to reduce these posts \-rXth minimum ot 
casualties, 

(C) All echelons of French bureaucracy, including arned force s^ should be 
instructed to desist fz^om agitating against Diem government, 

■ 

(d) Official pressure^ both in Paris and Saigon ^ shoxild be brouglit upon 
Radio France "Asia^ a seiai- governmental institution ^ to cease its attacks 
on Diem government. 

(e) Such steps as may be possible should be talien to persuade French 
pressmen to cease their attacks^ particularly in Saigoril 

(F) French garrison in Saigon-Cholon should be reduced without delay, 

(g) There sho^old be a public announceiaent by appropriate French authorities 
of their full support of Diem government in present coirTlict with Binh^Xnyen, 
possible to assist organisation and training of essential logistical ser- 
vicer of Vietna2!]'ese ^rined forces so as to Jnake them as independent as possible 
of FECp This is under vay in accordance vith r<y^ instructions to J-^lAG, . 



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(2) As soon as ciirrent crisis is over^ decisive effort must "be made to 
persuade or other'v;ise" force Diem to reorganize his goverijirLGnt artd to 
establish a cabinet competent to Implement broad programs of refozm 
covered by the Gollins-Ely seven-point progra:^^ plus a program, for inte- 
gration of sects into normal life of Vietnam. 

m 

(3} If^ after res.sorable further period of trial^ Diem is nnable to con- 
stitute a government capable of linplementing these ^jrograms^ US should Join 
vith France and Bao Dai in assisting liberal Vietnajmese nationalists to 
establish a competent goverriinent. 



o 



B. I recognize that General Ely may irrevocably be opposed to supporting 
any Dien governtnent. If this should prove to be true*, I vould sugr^est v:e 
UT'^e Faure government to replace hm^ preferably vith roan of caliber of 
D' finat^ or perhaps Georges-lfiact. At same time^ it vould probably be 
nt^cessary to replace General Jacquat (vho has inciorred violent anijuosity 
of Vietnamese during Binh Xuyen affairs) vith man liJce General Cogny* 

■m 
1 

C. Reference step (3) above j I recognize also that it may be politically 
difficult to withdraw US support from Diem even if trial proves is capable 
of establishing an effective government. I still feel that even if Dien 
manages suppress Binh Xuyen ^ this vill not change his o^'n basic incapacity 
to manage the affairs of government. His present successes may even msike 
it harder for us to persuade Diem to take competent men into goverronent^ 
to decentralise authority to his ministers , and to establish sound pro- 
cedures for the implementation of reform programs, I am still convinced 
Dit^i does not have knack of handling men nor the executive capacity truly 
to unify the country and establish an effective government. If this should 
become evident > ve should either withdraw from Vietnam because our money- 
vill be wasted, or \'Jq should take such steps as can legitimately be taken 
to secure an effective nevr Premier, 

D- T/iroughout all this I feel we must keep our eyes clearly on our main 
objective in Vietnam^ i-e,j to assist in saving this country from Cornnunism. 
Ho matter who heads the government here^ free Vietnsm will not be saved 
unless sound political, economic and military programs are promptly and 
effectively put into action. This will require wholehearted agreement 
and coordination between Vietnamese^ Americans and Krench. Difficult as 
this may be to achieve, it is possible^ in my judgment. If this tripartite 
approach is not secure, we should withdraw from Vietnam, ^ 



KIDDER 



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THE JOINT Cf-IIEPS nF STAFF 

V/ASHItsJGTON 25, D. C, 



i. fi *: ? ^^ 






9 May 1955 




lAEMOUAiroUM .FOR THE Sj^CRETARY OF DlilFEHSE 



Subject: Indochina (Vietnam) 



1, The Joint Chiefs of Staff sutmlt herGv?l\h their vlevjs 
rei :rciins the military aspects of the p,roblein presented in 
the attaclicd excerpt from a telegram from Ilr. Dulles to the , 
Department of State, 

2. The situation as depicted in the telGgran from Mr. 
Dulles appears to present the United States v;lth a choice 
between: 

: a. Continuing to support the- Diem Governnient in Vietnam 
^ hliich v/ould result In the withdrawal of French forces from 
that cou-ntrj?; or 

b* V/ithdrawlng United States supjport from Vietnam --. 
al3cwln2 the French to deal with the situation as thoy 
deem fit. 




military implications. 



^. It is considered doubtful that the Viptnam National Army 
(VjfA)j in its present state of development and unassisted by 
other forces J can continue to maintain internal security ujvler 
ti}e conditions of near-^ civil war nov; prevailing in Vietnam, 
TJ'jere is even less likelihood that the VITA could offer more 
than a token resistance to external aggreiE^slon. Further, it 
is open to question whether the VMA v;ou.ld be loyal to tlie Dlcm 
Government under all circui^stances . The presentee and coopera- 
tion of an outside milltar^^ force is therefore essential at- 
this tJme if Victnan^-se security and integrity are to bo assure 
'fho United States ^Is debarred by the jjrovicicns of the Oenova 
Tlgi^eement from providing tiuch forces ^ and could tJiorofoi^e give 
ho assurances rcjiarding t)\e protection of lives and property 
of French or any other foreign nationals, VHiile the vflthdravml 



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of I'Jie French JJxpcd 1. tionary CorpG is ultimately to bo desirGdj - 
it Is considered that a precipitate v/itiidrav;al ncjv: v/ould be 
l.lkely to result in an Incroa^ringly unc tabic and precariouo 
Eituation, This situation v;oald undoubtedly be exploited to 
ConimuniGt aclvantat^Cj v/lth the probable eventuality that South 
Vietnam v/ould be lost to conununisnr. ^ ' ' 

5, Tn the face of the strong an ti ^French sentiment v/hich 
has developed In Vietnam^ tliere novf seems little prospect 
tjiat France alone can provide either the leadership or tae 
resources required to establish a stable Vietnamese government. 
V/ithout United States moral and materiel supn^ort it cannot be 
expected tha.t the Yil^ vjould develop into a cohesive military 
force or maintain even its present limited effectiveness, 
Vlithout effective indigenous forces and vilthout a Vietnam 
goveriiment VJhich caji conunand tlis loyalty and support of its 
people^ the French lixpeditionary Corps (FEC)j judt;ed by past 
performances J vfould be incapable of pre serving the secxirity 
and integrity of Vietnam. It can therefore be expected tliatj 
folloKing the pattern v;hich led to the loss in the Worthy 
South Vietnam v;ould^ in due course, fall to the Communists, 

6. For the forecoing reasons, the 'Joint Chiefs of Staff 
consider that neither of Uie altei'^nativcs suggested represent 
acceptable solutions to the problem of Vietnaui at this time. 
They feel it to be in the best interest of France as v.^ell as 

of the United States that every reasonable effort be exerted to 
preserve South Vietnam from communism. It is their opinion - 
that the present situation, involving armed resistance against 
the established govei^nmcntal authority and the dangers inlierent 
in the role assumed by the Revolutionary Committee, requires the 
utmost in coopex^ation and energetic action by the Vietnamese, 
United States, and French Crovernments tov/ard tlie restoration 
of internal order and governmental control in Vietnam. It is 
considered tliat this should constitute the im^s^tediate joint 
objective. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that Mr. Dulles 
be advised that from the military point of view; 

a. The government of Prime Minister Hgo Dinli D:i em shov/s 
the"~greatest promise of aciiieving the internal stability 
essential for the future security of Vietnam, 

b* The United States could not guarantee the security of the 
French nationals should the French Fxpcditionary Corps be ^_ 

vjitlidrawn, j . 'I 

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c_. FoL^^iible Unlt3cl Stateii actioi-^G under the Southeast 
Aisla- Collective Dcrense Treaty could ultlinntsly af ford - 
security to Sout)^ Vict nam equal to that provided by the 
continued presence of the French Expeditionary Corps* 

7. The above coir:!T:3ntn ovc submitted v/lthout benefit of the 
peel fie viev;s of Ambassador Colllnri, v/hlch have been requested 
by the Gecretary of State, They L>hculdj therefore, be con- 
sideref] an tentative and subject to poasible revision in the 
light of his reply. 



For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 



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/UHTiim^v rai:jford, 

Chaix^inan, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. 



Knclosure 



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EX03RPT FKOli ^JELEaRAM FROM SSCiiST/iRY DULL33: 



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\Je n;et alone vlth the Fi^enohj- teing joined after a time 
by the British for discussion of Indochina. Faure proposed 
that in vleu of the sharp differences of opinion" vhich exl*sted 
betv:een our tvo Governments vith reference to policy in Vietnain 
and in viev of his ^overnr^ent 's total inability to support 
Die in, vho had now become violently ant i- French, he proposed 
that the French should withdraw their, forces irorj Vietnam. Ke 

n 

raised the question as to whether in this event v^e vould be 

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^ able to give any assurances rd^^arding protection of lives 
and property of remaining nationals • 



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I replied that this was too serious a matter to 



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ettle vithout deliberation^ and that \ agreed that Viet nans 



vms not worth a quarrel betveen France and the United States, 
If ve could not agree, then one or the other should withdraw 

i 

ivoxTi the scene, as \:e could not afford to oppose each other 
In this area end adopt rival and conipetitive policies, I aaid 
that the United States vould be vllling to vithdrav, and indeed 
I could not have 'any good hope that Congress vould appropriate 
the necessary funds for us to support the situation if ve with- 
drev support fron Dien] and saaght an alternative vhich Faure 
hiiiiself said he could not now define- My guess is that the 

■^ - * n * 

French are not bluffing and that his proposal may be the 



agreed solution . 



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Dccbssined per Executive Order 13526» Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20il 



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SUr>yZd: FooSiTjle I'rench V/ithdrav/al fro::! Yieteaia 







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If "tlie U, S. can aiid vili nake a cleal ultn Dicnj in i?liich he 
pledges to protect French civilians rei^ainin^'axter French troops 
leave ^ in retui'^n for our r-ssurances oJT increr,sea £iid and the rapid 
and effective training of his army^ v& shouJLd he happy to see the , 
Trench leave. 

A novc^ of this sorb ^7ould clearly disengage ud f ro?^. the taint 
Ox' Colon ip-li3'm derivijjd f roin our support of the French and Eao I)?*i 
i^hich has plrigiied us throu;^ho;it AGia. It vou-ld i:>ut us clep.rly in 
oi:r traditional role of su.25portin3 the "independence and legit ipiate 
national aspirations'* of peoples. The rcpercuGcions of this throu^-h- 
out Asia and the I^oslan iForla i:ill he great and he:;eficial. A cD.ear 
stand against French colonial icn^ may greatly Tree our hands at sous 
later d.ate vith reg^-rd to French Ilorth Africa \?here a.n explo:>ion like 
Indo Cliina seo-ns inevitable. 

Fi^ench \;ith'lrai;al i7ill also effectively stop the potential 
douhle -dealing \;e have suspected of th.e Saintenay mission in Viet Minhj 
vhex^e it appears the French have hcen insuring against the loss of 
Free Vietna'^ to the Vict llinh hy corprorxising -with the Corrimunists so 
a,s to retain conunercial and other advantages after a takeover. At 
one tnne it vb.s ruiiiored the French nilght even accept a Co:3L-niinist 
Indo China in the French Union, 

* * 

A. tacit ass>a:7iption hy the U* S, of the support of Free Viet ITaia 
night J of coarse, eventually involve us in e. suhstantial ccn-.-nitTT.ent . 
Eovever^ this is "by no Fxans certain ^ and there is a real likelihood 
training; technical r^ssi stance and noderate aid v;ill "be all that is 
recuired. lie should not forget that ve are already coiunitted under 
SFATO to defend Viet ITam against overt attack* The nd/ situation 
vou3,d permit J in psychological tennsj the all-out use of "Militant 
Lioerty'' to help "build Free Viet H^ca resolve, 

m 

As a final point to reneziocTj the French declared at Geneva 
that they -wouid vithdraw th.eir forces at a-ny tina if re^iue^ted by tjie 
Free Viet llain Governi^^ent. 



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NND Project Number: NND 6?316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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THE JOINT CMIEF3 OF STAFF 

WASHINGTON 25, D. C, 



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2 June 1955 



IIEMOIL'VI.'DUn FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ■ 



Subject: 



Repoi-t of Military' Staff Planners 
Conferonce, Southeast Asia Collective 
Defenoc Treatj', Ba^^ulo, Philippines, 
April-May 1955. 



1. The Staff FlaruierG to the Mllifcrii-y AdviGcra of the 
SoutheP.f:^t Ania Collnotlve Dcfonoe Treaty (3EACPT) Council 
held their first conference in Basuio, rhlllpplnes clu't^ng 
the period 25 April to 5 nay 1955. The report of that con- 
ference, attached ari Appendix "C" hei^etO;, vrlll ho conolderecl 
by the Military Advipern at their next rAeetins in Banglrolc. 

A cuin.-nai.'-y of the i-ecorumcndatlouG nadc in that report, the 
propocod actlona of CIFGi'AC and the rccoipjasnded actlonc of 
the Joiiit Chief t5 of Staff thereon are outlined in Appendix "A." 
hereto. 

2. The Joint Chiefc of Staff have reviewod the report of 
the Staff FlannerG, and, cnbjcofc to the corr^nent and/or in- 
ntr-uctiono outlined in pax^ograph 2 of Append i:< ''B" hereto, 
con cider the report gone anally Gatitsfo.ctory as- a baclo for 
further plonning actlvitlca of the military machinery under 
the SEACDT orgnniKation. 



3. The Joint Chj.cfc of Staff recoripond that the Secretary 
of Defence concur in the content of the proponed ncfjnase to 
the Gor-:iander in Chief, Pacific, in Appendix "B" hereto, and 
authorise its t ran emi colon by -the Joint Chiefo of Staff, 



For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 



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ChailiTa^n, 
Joint ChiofB of Staff. 




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NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 



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FIJ.NTCR h, CI NCP;,C'S _ P I xOP OS_;',p_ A CTIO lI-i T lffiVvEOH 

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[i^efeVcnce: Reoort of Military Staff Planners Conference^ 
'• ^ SLACm^ Dasuio^ rivilipplnes^ Aprll-Moy 195!3)^ 

■I- 

1, EncloGures 1, 2, and A - No action required by the Joint 



"^ Cnlefs of btaff* 



[ '2, Enclosure 3 -^ (Military pcrticioation in ccnibattin:< Coininunlst 



i- 



[ 



subversion ) 



^' , S t a f f r 1 r. nn c r s recomnv^ nd a 1 1 on : Hone , 



b. CTircP/C*s '^rooosed action;^* Subject to the results of 






the Subversion Subcoiiiinlttee meeting held In Bangkok 3 H^y^ 



r and guidance of higher authoi-'ity, to participate fully in 

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giving the necessary direction to tbe Staff Planners uhile 
insuring the proper division of reisporisibilities betiveen 

4 

military and non-militrxry aspects," 

S.' ^iL^i^"J}£l£J:^'^-Q^-^''''A!^ ^ ^ ■ ° ^" 3 1 a f x' " a c t i n : Concur in the 
action pz^oposed by CIWCP.AC, ' ' 




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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Dale: 201 1 




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3. Enclosure 5 - {Terns of Reference arid Rules of Proced ure ) 

f 

a . Staff rinnners reconjncndation: ;Voorove. 
■ b* C I J TO J" A C ^ fj or o o o s e d _ ^ c 1 1 on _ : ^- To approve or concur. 
N c. Becorninend.^d Joint C'liefs of Staff notion: Concur v;itli 



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the addition that CIHCPAC v/ill not make any coranitnent of U.S. 
fprces and vjill support or furnish to the Council t;:iose 
recoirunendations v;hich have received approval of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. 



k. Enclosure 6 - (Measure:^ to IncroaGe Securltv of Classified 

Infor mation) . 

■ ^ 

a. Staff Planners reco™ionf3ation: Approve* 

I I . ^ ■■ I ■ r i I I 11 till !■! II I ■• 1 ■ I ' l — --- - - r --• '. .. . - . k JL 

■■ -/b* CINCPAC_\s_ proposed^ action: ^^ Approve or concur, 

M 

c. ncconiniendGd Joint Chiefrj of Staff Action: Concur "but 



F 

inforn CINCPAC that subparagraph 3 d should be changed to read: 
1* ' . * ''All placesj buildings^ industrial and military instal- 
^ la t ions J chips and aircraft^ v;here classified matter of any 



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sort is located, shouldj through appropriate procedures be 
inade secure against access by unauthorized persons." 

5. Enclosure 7 - (Intelligence Survey of Selected Areas), 

- - _ — . ■ * ■ I- m • • m-^ — ■*- 11 I . r m— ' ijJit^ 11 il M ■ I > ^ 1 I I I I I] '-J 

a^ Staff Plannei"*B reconiniend^tion: Aoprove as a basis for 
further planning. 

* 

b. CINCFAC ' 5 pronon ed action ; Approve or concur. 

^ • n ecoi urn ended Joint Chiefs of Sta ff action ; C on c ur , except 

4 

Inform CII.'CPAC that t^e last sentence of subparagraph 3 a should 
be deleted. 



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C1MCP;^.G W3G to Clio, DTG 150OOIZ May 1955, 



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Declassified per Execiitive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Pn^ject Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i 




6, Enclosure 8 - (Prlox"^ity Listing; of Courses of Action or 

» ■ ■ ^ I " — . -^ - ;^-t- i> 1 M J . ■ m |- -- -. . .. ^ - - - ^ . . - ^ - 1^ ■ I I ■ Mil , ! 1 — I r - - L ■ — - 



, ' r Measur es) * 

L * " ' * 

* a^ Staff Planners recomrnendntlon: Approve as a nuide to the 

- -■ J ^ J^ailJ ^ 1 t i l l U ^" !■ I '^l ll ■ ■ ! — ■ ■ IJ -I .1 > I M * ^ ^- 

jjf order in vjhlch further coordinated planning studies should be 

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prepared , .' ■ \ 

b* CINCPAC's prO!"^^osed action:'^ j^pnrove or concur, 
"-- c. ■^ecominendod Joint Chiefs of Staff action: Concur, but 

■ ' ^' ■■ ■ ■ ■ ' ■ -■ ^ '- ^ -■i II p I II b ■ » ■ ■ > ■ ■ I - h ■ fcJ l | J _fc ■! l . fcB l - 1 H I ^,^1 - <• ^ ■ II I ■ ""^ 

inf oriji CinCPAC tliat it vjould be more acceptable \o delete the 
excepl ion stated in subparagraph 9 b In the case of West Pakistan 



7. Enclosure 9 ^ (Methods for imnrovinn; defensive effectivenevS 

- ' I ^ II ■■" ■ ■ 1 ^ 1 II I til ' I II ♦^s^i I " II ^1 - ■ ■ .- r-T* ._-n i ' 11 ■ — in ' n .■ ■ r i ■ i i ■ ■ i- » ■ m ■ ■ ■ i w l i 



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in the treaty area)* 

a* Staff Planners recommendations: 



■*" ■ ■ ^ff. — ^- m I m ^^s rf^.-^M ^ - 1 1. 1 I |.» i « r w, i n ■ ■- ^i i 



' (l) Adopt the recoiiHTiendationG concerning the approach to 
the Coimcil, 



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i-t ^ "'- (2) Approve as a banis for further planning studieti and 

pr e p a r a t cry ine a s ur e s * 

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b. CIIICFAC^s' or^oposcd^ ac tion :^^ To approve or concur. 

1 

c, Rs£0n^mend£^„.Io1.nt_C^ Concur, tut 
inform CIMCPAC that in cubpar'-si'f'plT 2^1 6, the word "common" 

" ' a. 

...should be substituted for "combined"'. 

8 Hnc Ids lire 10 - (Study of 3l p;nnl com nTunlcaJ^lon_G ;>-'S terns v .'ithin 

t jie treaty area) , ^ 

a. Staff PI:'' nr^ e r s r e c o rii ne nd a t i on : Approve az a' basis for ^ 
further planning studies and preparatory measures. 




I 

L b CINCF.AC's ri^O!20J^^d Pc_tian:* To approve or coneur. 

r c. Re comi- ended Joint Jy:^J,eUl^cni^sXfjiJ^ctl on ^ Concur. 

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Dedassitied per Executive Order 13526, Secdon 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633] 6* By: NWD Dale: 201 1 



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9* **Enclor?v\re 11 - (Exanlnation into methodn of creatlnn; a 

^ - . - - L I • ' ' I 11 111 1 — - - - - . . ■■_ r^ 

5Sible future org^^nizational structure ) , " [ 

a, staff Planners recorrrmenciaticn: itpprove the findings as, 
- an interim meaaure pending further experience, 

' b . C INCPAG ' s pr o pos e d a ction : - To approve or ccncur. 
However J CINCPAC has coirjiiented thatj "An item of major 
interest lies In. the proposed creation of a small permanent 
sccx^etariat , From the U,.S, delegation vievjpoiht, as v:ell 
as that of certain other delegations^ thiG was recogni:sed 
as not lra'!iediately a valid requirement and it wao further 
realized that the necessary coordination and continuity of 



I- 



effort could be maintained by correspondence and through che 
military liaison group In Bangkolc, It becarne apparent however, 
that it wa3 vitally nececsary to lend substance to the Fuilitary 
/advisers endeavours try (by) a form of some type permanent 
I f" group. VJithout this recognition it was evident. from the 
*' start that a serious split v;ould have developed ^ thereby 
f militating agciinct the desired development of the military 
aspects of oEACDT. This step^ i^e.j the recognition of the 
^|,V, ' requirement for' a small pcr:manont secretariat has definitely 
r forestalled for the forsecable future any determined insistence 

,1 "■' for either a permanent Staff Planners organizationj a standing 
'-"'■ group J or a combined staff," 



■ ■ ■ <^ cBcPACT'I^i^'TB' C J^ior DVG 1500013 May 19!35 
' TOP SECRET 



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c. Recomriended Joint Chiefs of Staff action: To inform.' 

^^^ ^■-^^^i— i^^^^r^^^— ^^^™^»^— ^ ■!.■>• h-^ ■ I . IM m ■ ^ ■ J. ^^»-^»^^ B_a -j - 

CINCrAC that, subject to the results of the study indiccted In 
Dubpnracraph 11 b^ the Joint Chlnfs of Stcff hove nonobjection 
to the establishment of a am 11 porit^anent secretariat, which 
would be an instrument of the Military AdvicOrs and sub- 
ordinate plnnning connnittees. However, the Joint Chiefs of - 

* ■ 

Staff would not aerec to the' possible evolution of such a 
secretariat into an organisation of o otanding nature as 
indicated in Gubparaf^raph 11 c_. 



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10, Enclosure 12 - (Future anenda). 
9.- Staff Planners ru cc r:;r:rend n ti ons : 

(1) Appro^^e Port II - Agenda for Hilltary Advlsera 

nieetlng (6 June 1955} i ' 

(2) Approve part III -- Prograrrinie of studios to te 
coiT^plcted at the next Tncetins of the Staff Planners, 

(3) Approve Part IV -- Preparation of position papers. * 
{^) Approve Part V - TlmcG and places' of meetings, 

(5) Approve Part VI ^ Initiation of additional studies, 

b. CI NCPAC'g pr o posed acti on:-^ To approve Staff Planners 
RecoiT/mendations* 

c, necornr.iondcd- Joint Chiefs of Staff action: Concur in 



^~"»"^-^ 



action proposed by CI?ICrAC^ 



•> 



ClFcTlUTlIiFirt^^ DTG 15OOOIZ May 1955 



. ♦ -J ':■. - * ''-=*- 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



t»-nff 



APPEWDIX "B 



TOP SECRET 0!rf\10ET!\/L" DRAFT 



'■ SENSITIVE 



MESSAGE FOR COMWmER IN CHIEF, PACIFIC 

Ic The Report of the Military Staff Planners Conference^ 

t 
I 

SEAGDTj April-May 1955? has been reviewed* 'JCS consider the 
report generally satisfactory as a basis for further planning 
acti\ ties of the military machinery under SEACDT* 

;2, The actions on that report proposed in Part III \}f CIDICPAC i 

1500C^Z May are concurred in subject to the following cojnment 



and/or instructions in reference to the Staff Planners report: 

a. Enclosure 5 " Conciu* in terms of references and 
activities of the Military Advisers Group vith the addition 



> '* 



' that CINCPAC will not make any commitment' of U.S. forces and 
will support or furnish to the Council those recommendations 
which have received approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
' b. Enclosure 6 - Subparagraph 3 ^ should be changed to 
read: 

"All places J buildings ^ industrial and military 
installations J ships and air crafty where classified matter 

b- 

of any sort is located ^ should through appropriate 
procedures be made secure against access by unauthorized 
persons," 

£. Enclosure 7 - In subparagraph 3 ^ the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff consider that the last sentence should be deleted. 

4 

d. Enclosure 8 - The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider this 



if\ . _ 



Enclosure suitable as a guide for the preparation of further 
planning studies. However ^ it would be more acceptable to 
delete the exception in subparagraph 9 h in the case 



of West Pakistan. 



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NND Pioject Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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e_. Enclosure 9 - In subparagraph 2'\ d^ Gubstltute *'conitiion" 

ST 

for "comblnuHl^', ^ " . . 

f, Encloourc 1] - Subject to tliu rccults of the Dtudy 
incl.lCDtcd in subparai^rnph 11 b^^ the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
have no objection to the CfCtablishnont of a sinall por:nan*int 
scc^^?t^^''iat vjhlch v:oulri be r.n li^st rumen t of tlj^; Military 
Advisers and subordinate planning conimifctecs% Hovvovor^ the? 

w 

Joint Ch:l'-:?fn of Staff v:ould not apree to thu possible 
ovolutioi; of Guch a oecroitavint into an organi^^a tion of a 
stand inc naturo as Indicp-tod in cubporo graph XI c^. 



3 . Do f o n rj c CD nc urs * 



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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDE 

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 

WASHINGTON 



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COPY NO. 






June 13 J 1955 



M5M0RA?IDUf-i FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 



SUBJECT: 
REFEREMCS3; 



U.S. Policy on All-Vietnam Elections 



A. 
B. 
C. 
D, 



NSC 51-J-29/? 

NSC 5519 

NSC Actions T.ios. 13l6-d and lM-15 

Henio for NSC froir. Executive Secretary, 

s?.ffie subject 5 dated June 2, 1955 



The National Security Councilj the Secretary of the Treasiiryj 
and the Director, Bureau of the Budget^ at tho 25lst Council 



mee 



ting on June 9, 1955 (^^'SC Action No. 1^-15) 



a. 



Noted the draft statement of policy contain-ed. 
in the reference report (NSC 5519) and the 
views of the Joint Chisf s of Staff trans- . ! 
jnitted by the referenc3 memorandum of June 2,. 

b. Agreed that Council racommanclations as to : 
U*S, policy on all-Vi^tnam slections ara not :' 
required at this, time. 

4 

■ 

c, Notad that U,^S* policy in tha event of a 

^ renewal of hostilities by the C orfLT;iin i s t s in 
Vietnam would be g over nod by the provisions -• 
of paragraph 5-d of T'lSC 5^f29/5j pending a : 

review of thrit paragraph by the MSC Planning 
Board, 

Accordingly the actions in b and c above ^ as approved this 
date by the President ^^ are transmitted herev.ath for infor^ 
jnation. 






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'i>C-iXi./2^C 





JAliES S.^LAY^ JR. 
Executive Secretayy 




1- • 



cc: 



The 
The 
The 



Secretary of the Treasury 
Director J Bux-iau of the Budget 
Chairman 5 Joint Chiefs of Staff 
The Director of Central Intelligence 



* 



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/!/S M6/ 



Decl^ffsined per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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THE JOINT CHIF-:FS OF STAFF 

VVASinrJGTOH 25,D.C, 



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CM-171-55 
1 July 1955 



MEMORAl^mUlA FOR TilE SECHETAP.Y OF DEFEIiSE 



Subject: 



Sun-iray of T^eport of Military Staff Planners 
ConferencCj Southeast Asia Collective Defense 
Treaty, BaguiOj Philippines ^ April - Hay 1955 i 
for Infoniiation of Secretary of State. 



i 



1. Reference is niade to a FiOmarendum by the, Joint Chiefs of 
Staffs deted 2 June 1955; subject: ''Report of Military Staff 
Plnnn2rG Coriferencej Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treatyj 
Baj^io, PhilippinoGj April - Hay 1955 •" 

2. Attached hereto is a- GUnimo.i-'y of those portions of the 
Report of t}:iG BtoSf Planners Conference vhicb may have 
political eigJiif icance. I reconi'ieiid thot you inform the 
SccretRry of State of this conference^ ciyl i^rovide him irith 
copies of the attached summary. 

3. It is further rccoiranencled that the Secretary of State 

"be informed that the studies prcpoa-ed by the Staff Planners are . 
not final until approved by the Military Advisers. 



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ASTHOR MDFORD 
ChiairrTLan • 
Joint Chiefs of Staff 



ISA i- [S'l^'^/S'^^/i.C. Df^iK^ 



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BU:j^mRY_ OF THOSE^rORT J or 3 _0£;j^ J-i'lORT^O? J'-2J.tT/'>RY 



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^^^^---* - ^-— Jfc'-«*^±*— •^»*.-^I*»fc^*<J- 



PART^I 

* 

Terms of Bofercnce and Rules of Frocndijire of tbe Military 



M^ T'T-^^ iW I I' ri- ^r^ 



■ Hi f — f - ■ -"-Mi-^i I -r i I 



Advisers Grf^nnlzr\tlon to the So^jthenct AGin Colloctive DefcnGc 



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Trenty Cov.acll, 



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■ Tentis of RcfGrcn'ce 



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1. Military Advisers Gi^oup, In the furtherance of peace 



ill J. l-M I * w 



and collective security vltbin the Treaty area^ it Ic the 
reGponjjil:»ility of the Militfiry Advisors Group to provide 
general policy f^uidonce to such subordinate groups cs nny be 
established under the aegis of the Council and to nake appropriate 
nilitary rccoirtnendations to the council for its decision* 



2. Actlvitien of the Military Advisors Group, 



n. The Military Advisers Group should: 

(1) Conctantly revlev' the r^llitary necsurcs by vbich 
CoDj^unlst subversion airl aggression directly affecting 
the Treaty area cau best be countered* 

(2) Meet as required after consultation air.ong then- 

■it 

selves or as -directed by the Council. In addition^ they 

•a 

vill be prepared to attend iieetlngs of the Council. 

(3) Designate such planning assistants as night bq 

■I.'-- } \ .■'a j: . , . it 

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required. 






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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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{h) Ensure that railitary planning actlvitios tal^e into 

* 
.Gceount vf.rioT:n contingencloG that r^ight arlce In connection 

with the tr:ipleiicntation of the Treaty throush close 

coordination of planning and appropriate GXchcLngt? of 

r 

InfoiTiation bctvcen the Military Advicers, their plcnaing 

i 

QDGlGtnnts and other reproseatativcG which !.:ay r:cet under 
the aegis of the Council* 

{5} "DeslGn^te ullltrkry liaison officerG in Dangkok 
vhose functions arc as stated in paragraph 6^ beljir* 
b. The activities of thu Military Adviscrf^ Group sliould 
Include aiionG other thinsc:" ', 

(l) Consideration of nensurec to be taken in each 



J * 



country to increase the security of class if led inforriation 
with n viev to au£?r.ientlng the effectiveness of nn exchange 
of intelligence data. 

(2) Initiation of and naintenance of an Intelligence 

■ 

sui"^ey of Southeast Asia. 

(3) Continued exchange of planning infor:.iation. 

■ 

(U) Detei::::ination of posGible courses of action to 
meet the current CoiX";unist threat in Southeast Asia and 

F ■ 

in the event of further CoriDunist aggression directly 



a 



ffecting the Treaty nrea, 

(5) Prciparation of planninf^ studies on likely Allied 
courses cf action developed in subparagraph {h) ^ above, 
to be used as a basis for further planning. 

(6) Maintenance of a strategic estinate for Southeast 



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Asia, 



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(7) Consideration of ways and Dcans for incroaGing tha 
effectiveness in the Trenty area of the collective defense' 
effort of the uenher nations* 



3. Military Liaison Group. 

a. A >5ilitGry Liaison Group conslGtinfj of one officer 

fron each of the rienbcr countries will te eotcililiGhed in 

BnnG'^.ok, These officers nay he neuhers of the staffs of 

Council Pcpreseiitatives in Bangkok. 
I b\ The JUlitary Liaison Officers viH provide nor:.;Ql 

points of contact hetveon Military Advisers j nc veil as 
■ vlth other interested individunlG nnd ac^nciGs as approx^rlate* 

I c. Forr-ial neetings of the MllitrTrry- Liaison Group vill be 
convened^ vhen so requested by any of itn ncnberSj by nn 
officer to be nonlnatcd by the Chief of the Defense General 
Staff of Thailand. 






■ 

h. Frequency of Meetings* 



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The Military Advisers Group will neet not less than 



twice a year. 



5* Flace of Mcetinj^r^. Meetings will usually be held in the 
Treaty area at places to be agreed upon by the Military Advisers 
Konially the place of nee ting for both the Military Advisers 
Group and the Staff Planners will be r .stated a:nong the neriber 
nations. The sites' for ::icetinf:5 of the Staff Flanners will be 



recoixiended by tlien. 



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6. participants at Meetings of tho Military Adviser g Grcup. 



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The accredited Military Adviocrs or properly designated alternat gc 

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* will attend neetings of the Military Advisers Group* Staff 
Officers and technical advisers iiiay attend v.iGctings of the 

Military Advisers as tho latter nay individually require* These 

t. 
- ' 

officers nay fon-.i working corinlttc:cs as required by the Military 

Advisers Group. 



7, Observers. Frovirled a record is kept of their nojT^es and 
^^appropriate security ueasures are taken, properly accredited 

-I 

Military observers nay be allowed to attend i:;aetii:i2;s of thtj 
Staff Planners. As a r^eneral rule tho nuuber of observers will 



be kept to a ninlrjun 



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a. Cor.iTiuni cat ions between Military Advisers w^ill be 
prefixed by the work '^SEAMXL". 

b. W^cn a Mi].itary Liaison Officer is on lnfon::ation 
addressee of a coT.ijtunication exchanged botwocn any two (2) 
or n;orc Military A'lviGtrs, he v:ill provirle copies to tlic 

m 

Military Liaison Officers of the countries t;hose Military 
Advisers are inf orient ion or action addressees of tl^e basic 

* 

comunication . 



9* Cor T'^unique . Cor.r.iunlques should be prepared under the 
direction of the Chain.ian and issued upon the ngrecLient of all 
the Chiefs of DeleGations, normally one at the be^^inning and 



end of each ueetin^. 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By; NWD Dale: 201 



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Sup.fsGstGd Mencures for Ii::provinf^ Deli^nsivt EffcctivEnGGS in 

■ Mill «. ^ ^ - ■ ■ L I ■ J . I -.F I I B ■ J l ■ 1 ^ « - f -^ i ' . l - _ . - M I I !■ 

II 

Treaty Area throu^?^ So].r-Help nnd Mutual- Aid, 



1* Each nation individually should noy strive to inprove its 

■a 

defensive effectiveness by the following nGa"ns: 

a. Inprovlng its intelligence organization, 

h. Improving tho quality and training of its anifed forces 



■^ f 



c. Maintaining and developing the logistic facilities to 

■■ 

support Its ar:.icd forces. 



2. Mcnbcr nations should act collectively to augr-:cnt their 
individual effort3, by tho following cooperative iieasuros: 



■f * 



a. The initiation and maintenance of intelligence nnd 
operational appreciations. 

b. The exchange of obGorvers, students ^ advisers ^ training 
experts and training facilities, 

4 

c. standardization of techniques and equipnent, as 
nececscxy and practicahla. 

d. Provision for the coi:ibined use of military facilities 
and cervices > 



e. The planning and dovtlopi'^ent cf logistic facilities in 

the area* 

f , The holding of conblned naval and air exercises. 

r 

^. The holding of exercises vithout forces nt a later 



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3* In addition the Staff FlnnnGrs^^/in- this Gtudy^ recofx.icndud 
thrit the SEiiCDT Cc-uncil take note- of tlie ntlit^^ry neud to n^-ke 
ir:.icd lately availa'ble^ for cpc-ratioTiQl uGt^ in cace of ci.iL-ryoncy; 
tho combined use of tli-:^ :::llitr,ry faciliticG and cervices of the 
nenbar nations. 

ft 

NOTE: The position of the Joint Chiefs of Stcff is that ^^cori^on" 
should be substituted for ''co::bin-jd" Ip par agl^aph 3 above.-* 



RART III 
Study of S J^n-l Go:;; iinications SyGt-r:s V'ithln the Treaty Area, 



The Military Staff Planners concluded that the present 
international systems of co:in\inl cation such as Port^ Ship -Shore ^ 
Ground -Air J Radio aids to navigationj and Gyster.is of seoi-ch and 
rescue operations are available and adequate' for uce by pai^ticl- 



^ i 



patlng nations* They notQ<i^ howeverj that sorjte r^cthod should be 
established by which area G£ree:.ient can be readied for tlie 
conbined use of frc'iucncies. 



P/lRT IV 

[Ml I ■ — ■■■^rk 

Conclusions and RccoTTX-ndations of the Staff Planners in their 

^-11^ ■ . !• - I h J - I ■ -I [» I 111 1| [W ■ I 1 i >■ » Ml ■ ^ T II' I u -. I ■ I ■ ■ 

study on the sub.ioct; ^'Exr^::i nation into Methods of Creatin,^ a 
Possible Future Or r^an Irrational Structure". 



■^ 1 I I I ^ 



1, It vos concluded that: 

a. To carry out the requirenents of tl:e i:3.*ediate tasks 
to be undertahvcn by the military nacliinery of SEACDT, .staff 



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/ planners nnd tl^eir Gub-con:.iittccs.^x;ecting on an ad lice Tp^sIg 

j and supTJortcd by n criall'x^cn.anent^Gucrctcri^t is the be&t 



Dcano of cnouring ii~Lnediote action; 



* b. A Gtudy should be; uario of the conposltloUj functionj 

r* , nnd location of the pcir/ianent Secret r.ri at; ^ 



c* The er^tabliGlii.ient of cuch an r4 hoc c-rrangeuent Ghould 

■■ 

not prejudice the cventuril creation or evolution of a 
stonding group, or certrLin sections of a etandin^; nature to 
au(5"ient the cd hoc systcnij should the need bo cone necessary 
because of inat.\cnuacics revenXed by cxpt^rricnce. 



2, It was recoij.icnded tliat the Militcry Advisers Group 

* 

approve the conclusions of this paper and nake arrangcricnts 
accordj.nEly. 



^ m 



3- The French delegation did not accept the recor.r-endatlon 

- Dade in this report. It questioned the usefulness at the 

prcesont tine of tlie creation of a peiTian^i^nt secretariat and 

held the view that coor:Unatian of studies can be G:itiofactorily 

carried out by the Staff Planners at their r.eetings. If it 

vas agreed in the future that closeir epprdination vas required 

it could best be achieved through the nilit?.ry liaison GX^oup 

without setting up a nev; body hovrever snail. It also su^^r^^osted 

that as a rule ad hoc cor.i:iittces r.:eet in a fev places, centrally 

located in the- Treaty Area. 

HOTE; The Joint ChAefs of Staff have no objection to the 

establiskient :of a s^iall pornanent secretariatj which 
would be an^ inst.rur,cnt of tl-je Military Advisers and 
suJ)ordinatv plarniing corj.jittces. Hcvever^ the Joint 
. Chiefs of Staff would not a[i:ree to tho possible evolution 
of sucli a secretariat into an orn;r;nlzatlon of a standin;^ 
/ ' _nc^ture as indicated in subparar^raph 1 c above.* 

J.CS, 1992/h6h 

■ 392 • 

TOP SECRET 




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(Sup3rcec!os Portio:':^ o? NiZ c3-:7— 54 on Nor^h Vievncm) 




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^r^oarc'ic^n cf tJiis ^stivicta: -iVij Centrcl Inhrd^cncz Ag&ncy 
Olid the ivJe-Uz^3nce or[fa7iizcitio7is of ilie D^pr^rttnents oj 
Stat-3, the Army, th^ lU"t>y^ the /Jr Poro-^, and Th$ Joint Stcjf. 

on 19 Jul'j toss. Co:ic%trrinj wsr^ tii3 S:^^a;al Assiss^.ni, fyitsl- 
Unenc^, mpttrtnLCrA oJ SirJo; ihz Assistant CrJaf Oj Staff, 
C-2, Dcparl-^naytt oj t/iB ^trrav: Ih-^ Director of Ilci^al Intelli- 
neiic^; the Director of l7iteUi:,'aiice, UiSAF; a^id t7ie Deputy 
Director for l7it^lli^c:iDe, The Joint Staff, The Ato^rJo Er.troy 
ComTiiis'^ion }lepi-evjiita.iixa to the JAC^ ar:d the /.isistant to 
thQ Director, Federal Bureau of Inv3$ti:^at:oii, c-hstcdnad, the 
subject bcir^j o:tlsiCc of their j^rr:sdict:on. 



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SSCIiJST 



PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN NO:<T>^ VIETNAM 

• ' TO JULY- 1956- 



(Supersedes Porfions of Nlir 63-7-54 on K^rih Vieinam) 



THE PROBLEM 

To analyze the present strengths and weaknesses of North Vietnam and to estL 
mate probable future developments and trends to July 1956, 



CONCLUSIONS 



1. The immediate concern of the "Demo-- 
cratic Ropublic of Vietnam" (DRV) is to 
consolidate its control in the area north 
of the 17th Parallel and to gain control 
of South Vietnam. (Para. 14) 

2. We believe that the DRV will experi- 
ence no great difficulty in maintaining 
eiicctive control of North Vietnam during 
the period of this estimate and will prob- 
ably retain a considerable measure of 
prestige and general acceptance. Hov^^- 
ever, passive resistance and discontent 
resultinfi- from harsh control measures 
and poor economic conditions may in- 
crease toward the end of the peilod. If 
the situa^tion in the Soutli does not de- 
teriorate, the na^tionalist appeal of Ho Chi 
Minh and the DRV wii: probably be re- 
duced throughout Vietnam. (Para. 23) 

3. The DRV is confronted by serious eco- 
nomic problems of which the current rice 
shortage i.s the most criticaL Its present 
export potential falls far short of pro- 
viding sufiicient funds to pay for neces- 



sary, imports. Hov/ever, the Sino-Soviet 
Bloc ^will almost certainly provide sufin- 
cient economic and technica.1 assistance- 
to meet minirriiun requirements for sta- 
bility and control With such assistance 
the DRV v/il3 probably make gradual 
progress in g-aining control of the econ-- 
orny and in rehabilitating transporta- 
tion, irrigation/ and industrial facilities, 
(Paras. 24-30) : 

4. Since the Geneva Conierence, the 
strength of the DRV regular army has 
been increased substantiaJly by drawing 
on regional forces to form nev/ units and 
by the receipt of new and heavier mili- 
tary equlprneiit from Communist China, - 
DRV forces are capable of defeating all - 
military forces, including the French, j 
nov/ located in South Vietnam, Laos, and I 
Cambodia, (Paras- 31-35) 

5. The present DRV tactic with respect 
to South Vietnam is to pose as the 
cliampion of Vietnamese hidependence 
and unification, and as the defender- of 



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^ -the provisions of the Geneva Agreenjent,^ 
The DRV probably still believes that it 

* could emerge from Iree nationwide elec- 
tions v/ith control of rJl Vietnam. It v/ill 
attempt to appear reasoiiable in any ne- 
gotip^tions concerning procedures for elec- 
tions. While the Communists almost 
certainly v/ould not agree to complex and 
, elaborate safeguards a.nd gua^rantees, 
they probably would agree to some form 

- of ''neutral" (but not UN) supervision. 
They would probably estimate that such 
election controls would work to their ad- 
vantage in the Soui^h and, as manipu- 
lated, would not adversely a:^sct their 
position in the North. (Paras. 4^45) 

6. In the meantime, the DRV will con- 
tiinie its efforts^ through subversion, in- 
timidation, and propaganda, to weaken 
the Diem government, and to bring to 
pov/er in the South men prepared to ac- 

" cci:>t a coalition v/ith the DRV, (Para, 
46) 

7. The Communists in their propaganda 
have revepJcd sensitivity to the implica- 
tion of the Manila Paxt v/hich incorpo- 
rated Vietnam, Cambodia, and Lacs :n its 
area of protection. We believe that con- 
cern for Vv^estern, and particularly US re- 
actions, together v/ith general considera- j 

tions arising from over-a,ll Bloc policy,! 
will prevent the DRV from openly in-} 
vading the South during the period of 
this estimate- Similarly; 'the resumption 
of v/idespread guerriJIa activities appears , 
unlikely prior to the election deadline, 
unless the DRV should come to the con- \ 
elusion that South Vietnam can be wen ] 



:■ ^A 



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V . , 



'For. an cstimatf* of probable clcvelopmcnts in 
Sov.th Vietnam, see NIE^ 63.1-3-55, "Probable 
Developments in South Vietnam Through July 
1955," to be published in Aii^ust 1055. 



only' by force- Such a conclusion v/ould 
become more likely should the Diem gov- 
ernment persist in refusing to enter tiie^ 
election discussions, should election dis- , 



I 



cussions not proceed favorably -for the 
. DRV, or should the Diem government 
succeed,- with US assistance, in consoli- 
dating its strength to the point of be- 
coming' a nationalist altc-rnatlve to the ^ 
lio regime. Moreover, if during the / 
period of this estimate little progress is ' 
made tov^ards l^elaxing tensions, Peiping 
a.nd Moscow might pemiit the DRV 
greater freedom of action. Should the : 
TypC^ decide to uss fores short of open : 
invasion, it v/ou!d probably attempt to ^' 
undermine the Saigon government by ,' 
initiating a. campaign of sabotage a,nd ' 
terror, seeking to formation of a new gov- ' 
ernnient more amenable to demands for 
a national coalition. These tactics are 
likely to include the activat ion of DRV ' 
gi:errilla units now in South Vietnam and ! 
their reinforcement by the infiltration in 1 
sm^Jl units of regulars from the North, 
(Para, 47) , - - ■ ' ^_ 

3, The DRV v/iil probably refrain from 
launching an attack with its ov;n forces 
to seize Laos during the period of this ' 
estimate," It v/iIl probably continue ef- 
forts to convince the Royal Laotian gov- 
ernment of the propriety of the DRV 
attitude toward" Laos, while covertly 
strengthening the rebel Pathet Lao move- 
ment. The DRV Vvould probaljly infil- 
trate armed units mto Laos to assist the 
Pathet L?.o ii Royal goverirment -military 
a,ction should seriously threaten the 

■^ . ^H « 

-For an estimate of probr^bl^ ^?ve]opir*enrs in 
Laos, see XIK 63^^55, ''I^obr.b!5 Dovelopinents 
in L:i03 Through Jul^ 1S5G/' to be pubJishecl* in 
July 1D55, 



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Patliet Lao position in the northern prov- 
inces. (Paras. 4S-49) 

9. The Communists now have fev/ assets 

m 

in Cambodia and will probably be unable 
to develop a significant -interna-l threat in 
that country until their position is great- 
ly strengthened in La.os or South Viet- 
nana,'* In the meantime, the DRV will 
prob. Ay continue its efxorts to i:}romote 



friendly relations and to secure Cambodia^; 
neutrality. (Para. 50) 

10. We beheve the DRV v/ill be v^illing to 
continue political and economic contacts 
v/ith the French. Ilov/ever, it almost 
certainly will be umwilling to make ?*ny 
agreement v/hicli in fact v/ould permit 
the French to retain an economic and cul- 
tural position in North Vietnam. (Paras. 
51-56) . ^ ^ . 



DISCUSSION 



I. INTRODUCTION 



Ih Under the terms of the Geneva Accords, 
and with tlie Hnal v/ithdrawal of French forces 
from. the Haiphong area on IS May 1955, a 
Communist regime known as the "Demo- 
ci'atic Republic of Vietnam*' (DRV) "has as- 
sumed full respoiisibility for the administra- 
tion of the territory of Vietnam north cf the 
17th Parallel, pending a political settlement 
and the unification of the country. 

12. The DRV, known also as the Viet Minh, 
.vas established at the end of the Second World 
War when a coalition of Vietnamese of ail 
political leanings drew together under the 
leadership of the veteran Communist, Ho Chi 
Minhj and proclaimed Vietnamese independ- 
ence. The DRV openly and frequently pro- 
fessed its solidarity v/ith the Sino-Soviet Bloc 
after 1949. Since then any loss by the DRV of 
its Vietnamese support has been offset by a 
considerable increase in organizational and 
material sti^ength and by the prestige of vic- 
tories over French forces. 

13, Although the recent assumption of re- 
sponsibility over 13 million people and several 
large cities has confronted the DRV with 
major problems, these problems a.re not en- 
tirely new or unrelated to previous DRV ex- 
perience. During its years of resistance, 
ivhich was conducted until 1950 with little or 
■ - ^■ - -. ^ ^..., 

*For an csUmate of probable devclopnients in 
Cambodia, see NIE G3.2-55, "Probable DQvclop- 
nients in Cambodia Through July 1956/' to be 
published in August 1955. 



no external assistance and under conditions 
of severe physical hardship and austerity, the 
DRV leadership was able to weed out the v/eak 
and timid, build an effective arrny, train a sub- 
stantial number of experienced cadres and 
local administators, and" obtain considerable 
experience in the techniques of political con- 
trol. \Thus, when the DRV assumed ''control 
of all North Vietnam in 1954, it possessed con- 
siderable advantages over the Diem govern- 
ment jn terms of military strength and ex- 
perience, organization and sense of unity and 
purpose, . 

14- While the immediate concern of the DRV 
is to consolidate its control in the North and to 
gain control of South Vietnam, its longer run 
objectives almost certainly are to build a 
strong Communist state in all Vietnam and to. 
assist in the extension of Communist control 
throughout Southeast Asia/ 

II- INTERNAL SiTUATlOM AMD TRENDS' 



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Svabiiliy and Euec;']vene35 oT me Kegime 

15, The DRV is organized on the normal pat- 
tern of all Communist ^'peoples democracies," 
Although the government of the DRV ostensi- 
bly represents all elements in a * 'united front" 
grouping (the Lien Viet) , actual power resides 
in the Com^munist party (the Lao Dong or 
V/orkers Party) , Out of a total population in 
North Vietnam of some 13 million, the Lien 
Viet is estimated to have approximately 3 mil- 
lion members, including the Lao Dong, which 



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NAT^OHAL IHl^lllGEKC^ ESW^'^hm^ 



NUMBER 63.r~4~55 



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i^^-c joUowino hitcUigence or[jani»atwv.s participated i7i the 
prcparcMo7i of this esilinrite: The Ceiiiral hitclligence Agency 
and the i7iielHjenc& org cmhat ions oj the DGpariments of 
State, the Amiy, iha Nuvp, trie ^ir Force, and Tha Joint Staff. 

Concurred ti oy ths 



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on 13 Sc2Jt^yribcr 13oS* Conciirrlii-j loere the Specicl Assistant, 
InielUo^'noa, Department of Slate; the Assistant Chief of 
Staffs C-2, Department of tJis A.rmy; the Director of Naval 
Intellvjenoe; the Director oj Jnlelliuenee, USAF; and the 
Deputy Direetor for Irdelligeiice, The Joint Stajj\ The A^tomic 
KnertjV Co7nrnissi07i Representative to t7ie J AC, and the Assist- 
ant Direclo", Federal Bureau of Investigation, a'bstazned, the 
stfoject oeing outside of their jiirisdiciion. 



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NND Project Number: NND 633 16, By: NWD Dale: 201 1 



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CONSEQUENCES OF POSSIBLE US COUl^SES OF ACTION 
.. ' ■ . WITH RESPECT TO V1ETNAA4' - 



•: ■ . ■ TF;E Pi^iOBLEM 

To estimate the deterrent ef/ect on the Viet Minh of certain US courses of ac- 
tion; to assess the consequences of a US failure to counter overt Viet Minh aggres- 
sion' and to assess the political repercussions of US armeh intervention against Viet 
Mizih aggression. ■- ' - 

* < 



I INTRODUCTOP.Y NOTE 

1. We continue to regard as valid the estimate 
made in NIE 63.1-55, namely that during the 
period of the estimate (to July 1953) "concern 
for Western and particularly US reactions, 
together with general considerations arising 
from over-all Bloc policy, v/iU prevent the DRV 

' from openly invading the South/' We also 
believe that the px^esent Communist policy of 
reducing international tension malces nnlikely 
the resort to overt aggression. 

11, DETI^RRENT EFFECTS OM TME VIET MINH OF 
TH5 US UKDErrrAXING SUFFICIENT MILI- 
TARY, POLiTlCAl, AND ECONOMIC STEPS 
TO CLEARLY CONVINCE THE COM/'AU- 
NiSTS THAT OVERT AGGRESSION 3Y TnE 
VIET M!NH AGAINST SOUTH ViETNA/A 
WiLL BE MET BY SWIFT AND DETERMINED 
US ARMED INTERVENTION 

2. This assumed US course of action vmuld 
render even less lil^ely than at present any 
overt aggression by the Viet Minh against 
South Vietnam, The Communists v^/ould prob* 



^The possible US coiirses ot action considered 
herein v.'cre furnLshcd the intclliscnce commum- 
ty for the purpo.TOS of this estimate, 
'"Aggression" in this paper' is ceSncd as a Viet 
Minh attack by overt amcd forces across the 
anni,^tice line, of such a character that it can 
clearly be labeled as a^grc^ssion and is generally 
regarded as such by free v/orld opinidn. 



ably estimate that: (a) Viet Minh forces alone 
would not be able to capture South Vietnam 
in the face of swift and determined US armed 
intervention; (b) Chinese Communist assist- 
ance v/ould have to be on such a Scale as to 
seriously risk spreading the war beyond Viet- 
nam; and (c) acquisition of South Vietnam 
would not be v.^orth such a risk. These con- 
siderations v;ould ler^d the Communists to re- 
frain from overt aggression even if they could . 
see iio prospect of winning South Vietnam by 
other means and believed they enjoyed a 
marked superiority in forces locally available, 

3. The assumed US course of action would not' 
in itself preclude either a Communist decision 
to initiate large-scale guerrilla action in South 
Vietnam or the clandestine support oi such 
actions by the Viet Minh. 

4- The dcten^ent ellect on the Communists of 
the assumed coiuse of action v/ould be in- 
increased if the US made it clear that nucles^r 
weapons w^ould be used. If the US made it 
clear th?vt nuclear v;eapons would not be used 
the deten^ent ellect would be reduced. How- 
ever, the Commmiists ^vould probably esti- 
mPvte thp.t the US w^ould not maintain such a 
position if faced vnth a deteriorating militaiT 
situation- In the absence of any clear indica- 
tion, the Communists w^ould ahnost certainly 
base their plans on the possibility that nuclear 
weapons V'ould be used. 



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in. CONSEQUENCES Or A US FAILURS TO 
INTEi^VENE AGAINST AN OPEN VIET 
MINH ATTACIC AFTER HAVING TAKEN 
THE p;^ERARATORY STEPS ASSUAGED IN 
II ABOVE , 

5. The Communists v/oulci vigorously exploit 
the opportunities in Asia created by the fail- 
ure of the US to intervene in Vietnam. Al- 
though Coinmunist China and the Viet Minh 
would probably not launch early overt aggres- 
sion agahist other countries, Chinese Commu- 
aiist diplomacy would probably become openly 
threatening, possibly supplemented by intim- 
Jdatory troop movements near the Chinese 
Commimist border with Burma and Laos or 
v;ithin Communist-held Vietnam. Commu- 
nist policy would also be furthered by greatly 
increased support from overseas Chinese com- 
munities. 



6 



The Chinese Communists would probably 
apply strong press ui^e against those countries 
whose determination to resist Communist in- 
roads had been most weakened. They v/ould 
demand an accommodation to the Bloc going 
beyond the benevolent neutralism that is the 
current goal of Communist strategy .in much 
of the area. V/here more forceful action ap- 
peared necessary, Pciping would almost cer- 
tainly encourage local Communist groups to 
resume and enlarge guerrilla operations and 
vrould support those operations more directly 
than in the recent past. In some cases units 
of Chinese Communist troops^ possibly of mi- 
nority origin, might be assigned to reinforce 
local guerrilla units. Communist operations 
against the ofTshore islands might be stepped 
up, but a full-scale attack against Taiwan 
v;ould probably not be initiated. 

7- The consequences of a US failure to Inter- 
vene to save South Vietnam v/ould be most 
serious in Asia. US prestige and iniiuence 
would be drastically lowered, and the Manila 
Pact as an effective instrument against Com- 
munist aggression Vr'ould ahi:tost certainly be 
destroyed. Even immediate and forceful sub- 
sequent US action elsewhere in Southeast Asia 
might not persuade any state in the ax^ea that 
further Communist pressure could be resisted. 
These countries would be reluctant to accept 



US offers of assistance from fear that closer 
alignment with the US v/ould merely invite 
the Communists to further acts of aggression 
^nd that in such an event US assistance v/ould 
not be forthcoming. They v/ould become in- 
creasingly Inclined to attempt to maintain 
.their independence through negotiated under- 
standings with Peiping. 

8. Both Lacs and Cambodia v/ould probably 
initially proclaim a neutralist position but 
v/ould shortly enter into cultural and eco- 
nomic agreements with Communist China as 
the first steps T:oward political accommoda- 
tion. Thai apprehensions for their own se- 
curity would greatly increase. Succcijsive 
govcrninent changes might bring to power 
a leadership amenable to an accommodation 
with Communist China. Burma would prob- 
ably not consider such Comnnmlst action as 
a direct threat and v;ould seek to rear.atn neu- 
tral. Should the Thai government reach an 
-accommodation v;ith the Communists, Burma 
would become concerned and v/oufd probably 
seek a closer alignment with India, The 
British would be gravely concerned over the 
security of Malaya and would almost certainly 
press for the conimitment of US forces to the 
defense of Malaya. Although the Philippines, 
South Korea, and Nationalist China ^ w-ould 
rem.ain allied v/ith the US» tliey v/ould have 
grave doubts concerning the lutm-e. They 
V\^ould almost certainly press the US for a 
more concrete demonstration of its determina- 
tion to defend them. In Japan, neutralist 
sentiment would increase. Indonesia would 
attempt to maintain a neutral orientatloii but 
would be drawn toward an accommodation 
v/ith the Communist Bloc as Communist in- 
fluence spread thi'ough mainland Southeast 
Asia. 

9. The reactions of the Western Euroi:)ean 
allies of the US v/ould be mixed. Oa the 
one hand, they v;ould be concerned about the 
implications of US withdrav/al in the face of 
an open Communist attack, and there would 
probably be an increase in defeatist and neu- 
tralist sentiment. On the other hand, we be- 
lieve that these concerns would tend to be 
offset by their relief that a crisis in the Frr 
East had not led to a renewal of ai^med con- 



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flict which might embroil them in general war. 
In any event, the Europeans would not neces- 
sarily conclude that the US would fail toresist 
Coinniunist aggression in Western Europe, 
Middle East defense arrangements might be- 
come more difncult because of a loss of con- 
fidence hi US commitments, 

IV. CONSEQUENCES OP A FAILURE OF THE US 

TO INTERVENE AGAINST AN OPEN ViET 

MINH ATTACK V/lThOUT HAVING PRE- 

' " VIOUSLY MADE INTENTIONS CLEARER 

THAN THEY ARE AT PRESENT 



10, The local reactions to the US failure to 
intervene under these conditions would be 
virtually the same in Southeast j\sia as they 
would be under the conditions discussed in 
Section III above* It is widely believed In 
Southeast Asia that the US is already com- 
mitted through the Manila Pact to the defense 
of South Vietnam and that it has strong moral 
obligations to the Diem government. How- 
ever, if the US had made its intentions no 
clearer than at present, the Communists 
would be less inclined to believe that the US 
failure to intervene indicated that the US 
would not resist Communist aggression else- 
where. The Communists might therefore pro- 
ceed more cautiously in their eflorts to exploit 
the situation created by the fall of South Viet- 
nam, Outside Southeast Asia, the damage to 
US prestige and the decline in the will to re- 
sist Communist pressure would be less than 
under the conditions discussed in Section III 
above. 



v.. 



V. CONSEQUENCES OF US ARA-VED INTERVEN- 
TION IF THE US (q) STATED ITS OBJEC- 



TIVE V/AS LIMITED TO RESTORING THE 
STATUS^QUO AT THE 17fh PARALLEL, OR 
(b) STATED ITS OSJECTiVE V/AS TO DE- 
STROY THE ViET MINH REGIME AND EX- 
, TEND iNON-COM^AUNIST CONTROL TO 
ALL VIETNAM 

11, Asian and European approval of US armed 
intervention against clearly recognls^able Com- 
munist aggression v/ould be tempered in vary- 
ing degrees by the fear that the fighting could 
not be limited to Vietnam. Our NATO allies 
and Japan Vvould exert pressure on the US 
to limit its objective to restoring the status- 
quo and to Iceep its military actions clearly 
consonant with that objective. They w^ouldf 
be deeply concerned if the US declared its ob-( 
jective to be the destruction of the Viet MinhX 
regime, or carried the fighting beyond Viet- 
nam. India and other neutrals v/ould exert 

> every Cilort to bring the figliting to an end. 

12, The other nations of mainland Southeast 
Asia would be encouraged in their efforts 
to resist Communist pressure by US inter- 
vention. They too, however, would fear that 
the fighting could not be limited to Vietnam, 
and that they would become embroiled in gen- 
eral war in the Far East, Only Nationalist 
Ciiina, the ROK, and possibly Thailand and 
the Philippines, v;ould give unqualified sup- 
port to a US declaration that its objective was 
to destroy the Viet Minh regime and extend 
non-Comrnunist control to all Vietnam, 

13, The Communist reactioiis to US interven- 
tion would probably depend on the course of 
US military actions rather than on any state- 
ment of US objectives. 



TOP SECRET 

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i'exora:7DuK ?oh TK3 Ec-:Ecx7r::yE 3!:s?:irAHY ' 

^ • NATI0?i7iL SECU^ITV COUKCII 



SUBJECT: 



U*S« Policy in ths Svant-cf a Henev;al 






1 ^ 

1- xrari3:r.it her-e-„n\;h fci' the in:rcr.r.atiGn. cf 

National Sec^K-ity Council a rnsho^i^anauri by the Joint Chiefs 

or Staff on the above aubcect. -..•hich vas pr£t>arsd in 

response to a request t^^ixc^ t-^Q'i:-. nTSC Action Ko. I^>i5-il« 

I believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff analysis to be i&nerally 



,1'. 



cut i.: or del'' to expedite ?rsc cor,s-id£::'ation of uiia -Di^orjici:!, 

this tJr:;s. ^^ilth the -ondc^ij^stnncling th^t ^^o tvill be p}/e;^avedj 
if necssscry^ to discuss :co 1:^ nL^3ate:c^ d3tr,i?v in tho ??i£:n- 



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ning Boards I trust that this mato^'^ial Xvij.l iicovo o 

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cuestioi'i under consider atic-ii 



:3 policy 



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r;eir:oranda (dented 11 F-3toxii:^y__ and 15 Aiigust' 1S>5) *^o which 
reference i:-: r;.ad3 iii ths >?.sic J'CS j::o:ncrandu:r/,. j?ri;3::'3 e>e 
also fu-x-nished co;3i£c^ of the t'i-/o cables :a is cr^s^ed in t he- 
latter of these me^Lorande 







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Beoa'ase of the- sensitivity of the docTanents 



attached it is rociuested that they.be distributed on a 
strictly liifiited^ neod-tc-kno^; biisis* Extra copiej of the 
cables are firmished so that tliey rr^ay be appended to the . 
papers you distribute -r.cithout the need for wox.-2 office to 
re'Lij-oduce theiiic. . ■ 









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NND Pn^jeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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1^ This nanicrandriia Is In ^-aspoi^se to^a m^nor^c^iidurvi \ 
by the Assistant Sscret-ary oiT Defense (ISA). d?.t£d 

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and recu:l:c5:T.Gnts cf L%S^ n'diitary c3:j£::-ations^ with e.;vi 
V7ithGut ator/iio voapons^ (1) tc rapnlsc and punish ove:::* 
V:-etr:lnh as gross! on., or (2) to d^istir^oy Vistmirh: forces 
and taho control ot l^orth Vietnc^::!. - *' . 






2. The Jo5.ni;Chiaf5 of Staz":: consxcc- "i'-atfor 
near luc-are^ \i;iass:'.s'C3:i Soccn V:=:3'';:^av^cse icij^jo;^; ^:i,i,-L oa 
ca*Dab?_e of only il:::ltGd ras:Lstan:::e against d&t:^^^!ii:Lnod^ 

poi-tion cf South Vlafean would pi^-o^ably be o7£::?*?\i2-, 
the in-05gi-i-cy of clerisnts of tl^i cofevidin^ foi-ces "ould 

4 It 4 V ^4 ■. 






,'j..\C1c:l vilvj ^ 0„ ^^i, sj.L^.t ' 0:l Q t-"c.^*.:.L: CC_i'.:.JU v-.vl.:^ - 



fj_::^st tasl-: Cusratlons to i^e'julse and "vonlsh gvg 



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a K K r e s 3 1 on \Jo\ixc. xnc Inda : 



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^ a. xniniedlate U'.S. naval and ai:^ at^ao!: a^a^^i^s 
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to oppose the- aggression 



c, ^Early r.ovGrnsnt fo:r,vard o:C mobile tuS^ Tore 
for the i^JirposG of cond-aotin^ jolnt^operations loj 
tasks beyond the capabilitiGs oi". South VletnciTiase 



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o2" creating cona^tions wider ^rhicli vlie I'orcas oi" Soiith 

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nlargad :nlssion. Such a campaign ^ould ba :Lnlti.avCd by 



joinG ana corabined q-og rations 

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supply lines from CoriiHirjiist Chr.-;.a\. 



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vr.e Tcnjiir: jj3J-^c 



to seize bases a:cd othe:? i::i^Oj:':;cnt ^./j^^^ --v^^:. c^.^u 









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sv/ijit and docisive action is believed d-2j/GridGx.f en th3 
military ener-gy and £o.\idai\ity o:t thG Vlrtnanase. ths 






extent of^ warning and pr* 3 palpations r:adG boiTor^ :?.n a 
t h e r ^ s t r i 1 i on impo sea. on U.S. ni li t a i^;^ c;>3 r a t i on s ^ . ' 
and tha season of th3 yar^r* It is cstiniated that opa::--:.-' 
tions to carry out the fi::^£t tas": corld be l:frhinatc-d in 

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une vi^Gtniinh 






a I'GW inonvhs 'co ona year zo on-3:;;: ar^res^iLon. 






tins night bG rGCfuirefi to cj.oar oir: all the Vi 

back to thG 17th parallel. The ti:-:3 nGeded for carrying. 



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out the second tash cannot be accYirataly estinat^d* Shoui 
Gmplcyrient of atonic '^.csapcns not be authoi/ii^cd a longer ■ 

employment of U.S. arned forces and conseo;:ently rriight 
require .^^reatar forces than the u"*S, y'^OLild bo jiistified 



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in providing from the over-^ali point ox 

With reference to U.S. 



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naf^nitude. of tvo ^o :?cur U.S. divisions rhould be 



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ba r(^cuir'3d. BGOiirV^Gnients -or u.S* z'^ovuic. forc-35 
i;OLild ba subject to 'sec-\\oti.ori to thG extent thrat 
off ectix'^c- forces ^;£^s provi'.ded by otl'ler Mciiila ?^c': 
countries or* by other AlIiGS, 



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7. The Gffects upoii other U.S. i::ilitar-y ooi::n:it^Gnt5 
as a result of thc;se' cpGTcitions by U*S, arnicd forces in 
South 2ast j^sia v:o\;ld bo significant aiiu in proportion to 
tho amount of diversion of forces to this area and the 
spsed vith V;hich these diverted forces s arc ret-arned or 
replaced, Kov/ever^ the ^leet Karina Forces and certain 
Avny forces in the Pacific could ba cepioyed to the area 
te^iporarily without serious . effects en other x-iilitary 
corn^itnents and without necessitating partial i::obili^;ation 

or substantial "increases in fores levels 
support^ 






*■* ^ ^ '^ *^" 



S. The strongest ^deterrent to Yietmirili aggression. 






\^-\) 



and.^ at the sane tinej the nost effective pre^^Lir^^vUi^ 
military step vould be the stationing of u'.S, forces in 
South VietnaiTi. Hov;ever^ this course of action is pro- 



the Geneva aj^reerrients 



•^ ."' 






vo\a-i,c oe to aca co 









c'cLve aexerront 



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r>rGsently deployed in the ?ar East by deploying inobilo 



^ro^md 'forces oH approxi^nately corps strength toge'cher 



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v/ith naval and air forces into ^zriZ Sout:icast .-^^sia ci^^^ 
prepared for rap5.d corj^vitnent to South Vietnan,- I^evertha- 

at th 1 s t ir^e t h e na j r "chr eat to- Sou t h Vie t nara c on 1 i nu e s * 
to be that o^ subversion ^ and vaitil there are :;,ore con- 
clusive indications of overt co!;res5ion, it is not .ccn:^id4: 
GO that additional force ^^ should be do ployed to\tha , 
Southeasi: Asia ar-^a^ 



'i 



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TO? SSC?:ET* 



1 

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Declassified per Execmive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



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are :' 



Pt' r- X 






li^t^ry stsps vliich 






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' a. Gonti::.ued a:rforts-tS irLCs^oase th<^ GfrG^tivc- 
na ss of the So*ath V:lGtn.^r-GS'3 rir'"-^d forces for coi:ntGr 
ing GXtGrnal as^^or?slo:"i as \rz7J, as m^ini^.iinin;? iri- 
tGrnal sGeurity 



.-r*-.. 



* 



iii 






,^> 



is riiado to merriorrir^clvin for tr-e Saoretar;^ of j^cXgiisg 



> 



for Vietn-^r;'-. 



'.-\. 



_ "^ ^ <^i^« *wi Sir 



•^ 
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.b* CcntinuGd inprovGD^rit of basas in Thailnni 
■ and Car.bodia for use in support of Vlc^.aiTiGsa forces 



■-* 



c, Speci?.l training for y^ilcct^d Vletii^n^s^ 
persorjiGl, exits ids of Vietn^rr: if necessary ^ in U.S, 
rasthods of exploiting air and n:ival su^'':'Or.t in grovind 



ODGrations 



T-.- 



insui^'UCoion mgn- ^^;:,u ^ 



r,T =1' 



s.— 



* J* 



G vii^^OVAUi^C m 



the special tactics and tschr>.icues of cnploying atc^^i:; 
weapons su^^ort, - ' -- ^ " . 

m 

r^ , A f' f* L^ "i ."i^f* '.11 "'; p fl . *")':'*;"> r^ "i"* i'x .■" c: -^ r "-'*''i .-ii rrr"' "i * '" '^ V'^ ' '> ^ "* "^ r-'h^ 

of the KrLiiila Fact incXudinj co:::binod ti^aining/ 
Exorcises could b^ tinned to at'tain optiriuni psycho-- 
logical and political irripacitj J^or arcaiapla-. ."joint and 
combined nancuvar ' type G:x:arc{sGs in tha Hlillppines 
Oi* Thailand co^^ld "dg schednlui^d iiriinediatoly pi-ior .to 
thG Vietnain elections to indicatG pro2^ess.i::ade hy 
ncn-GpLii^r:nist nations toyard collective s^curity^ 






e_, .^side from the fo::'Ggoin^*. prepar^atior.s can 



DG r4^cC3 ior Tsne rapia novcniozrG p 
partiGs and sc^e g:i::o\:nd liaison^ logistic and coi:;- 
mimications pcz-sonnol to "Viatnau.^ in advance of rja;Jo: 
U.S* fox'inaticnsj-^cq insiire an 'eax'lj^' C'lpability for 
U ,S , supporting operations ^ Siuilar7,y ^ prcpai-^ations 
can be nade for early da ployrnGnt of special U,S, 
forces to provide a capability for grotind delivery 
of atonic wea'oons. 



— * 



10. In the early' stages^ Vic^tminh aggression would ■ 
probably be characterised ^by a f luid- sitvta'^icn v,"it> dispars- 
ed clashes between opposing- forces. 



v-,^ 



ch G o '0 00 r z u n \ c i g s i o r 









During later stages^ however^ suitable tar^exs could be, 
expccxed to dGVG?L0p as a res^ilt of friendly efforts to 

uon;i:iun,,s ijS ^ri's^ji.u j.iZuo± \vi*ic; Uvc^ v-uy • usc i^^ aijvJij—!^ 



ICCo 









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1 



Declassified per Execiilive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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vjcapons should result- in 'a ccr::>?.dL^rchl<= reduction in 
fri^Xi<ily casuaitf!Gs and in niorc- ^rapid ccss?::t:'.ors of ho;-ti\:".-- 



¥-► 









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ties* 

the v.s^ of atomic weapons ^ or on ot-i-3r r.:.lir:irv^orj3r£:-- 



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rc^iciion as x:iq situaxxoAi CL5valo':)s. 



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Staxx consiaer cnc^u xx- ar^crac ■.:::'ji^:on.v \:c^irs not 'ds^c. 



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^It:;i^w:,I ^ OJL O i; :> ^Jii^XXl i-- _ "i. w * hD , 

■ 11 » The Joint ChiGfs of Stafz" rvitcrctc the vlcv/ 
exp-jTcssed in their ricinoraridurii,^ cat-ad 11 7^bv*u.:iry If 5?: • 
suhjecu: ^'Gonc£pt and Plr^ns for the IinploL;r3nta'^iori,^ if 

T^V c.-v q S o ',-• V n -^ ^^ -^ t "^ o ""■"'" ¥ ^ p ^ ■;-'--* -^ Vr*n ^ 1 '■' ^'- G u ■ ■ t>* ^' u 

the United States cannot ^^usi^antea tho terr5-tov'ir.l in- 
tegrity of any merroer nation (of the Manila Pac^t), but 
at most can help secure the inc-=p'indenca of those coun'cri^s 
^,vhose pGoplt?s desii'3 it and' vrhc are v;illiiig to under talca ■ 
th^ responsibilities of self £o\-ern::;ient, - This appears' to 
be particularly applicable tc protGCted^ 'non-r;;£nbei 









x<rz,, j,iJo J. oj/ti^o,,ii^ _^s ci ±o.s^ij. e ::; L^-L^i-ia ^vS O- i^.i^ xx^l^u.v* la- 
ment s » A rr,or e do f in i t ive an s ve r c ann o t be n:a cg I'tn t i 1 the 
Commander in Chief, Pacific, orovides a olan vhich he is 
presently developing „ . , 



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13 






par*cic.\pa'ce iin the ac^iiion oi 
outlined in this ::ier:orandun. 






.3uai-L .. Clu :,_Om 



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(5IG:^H3) 



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Chief of Staff. United: States I: 









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TOP SECRET 



Dccliissincd per ENecutive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND G3316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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APHiI;?;DIX "A- ' 



;iVAILA3ILI?Y 0? U.S. ^.R;XD FCTvOZS 



F^U. -»■ \ I 1 



An 



nnex '*A"* 






■i^ -^^ =; ^ 



Annex *'3''^ - Naval Fo.'r-ces 
Annex ^^C^' - Air ?crce Forces 



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Dedassitied per Executive Order 13526, Secdon 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Dale: 201 1 



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Co;o:^nn 1 Co?.v.rrn 2' CoV3::^n ^ 



»*_™ ■ '^^i 



1 Co-^"03 I-Isadcucirters V ^/ 
i Abn'Div 2/^6/ 
1 Inf Div 2/ 6/ 
1 'Abn Div 1/ "6/ 
1 Tnf Div 3/ 

1 Inf Div 'V. ' ■ 

1 Inf Div ^y 

1 Abii RCT 3/ 6/ 

1 AriKCi Cav Hegt 3/ 6/ 

1 Arrr;d Cav Kegt '^'/ 0/ 

1 Inf Div V 

1 Abn BG? V/ *■ ; . 

1 Inf Div 2/ V 



D~Day 

D-Oay 
D-Dsiy 

DA 30 
D/210 ^ 
D>^2^^0 " 

D-D ay - 



t:c ■ 



D>a20-. 

D/225 

■1j;^23J 
D>^90 

D;-90 

s>a2o 

■D/25 
Dj^50 



B>''205- 



D>^S'- 



^ 



^ ** 

_.-**-■■- " 



2/ Coirjaittec "to NA'IlO _._... 

,1/ General riasorve . ^_ . . . . . , 

V/ Located in Ai'ea o? CISCFE "* ^, .: 

5/ Located in Area, of CiaCPAC ' .- " - 

6/ Designated ?.s A-dg3ontation Forces for Contingency Planning 
of CII^C?:: and CINCPAC — ■ '^ 






Col'urJi 1 is based on readiness oi^ avciilability of units-- 
Coluinn 2 indicated' t;}>e tins unii^^ ooliIc bs t^vailable in 
the area based on surface shipping- 
Colu,7;n 3 incticatc-s the tirie the assault schelcns of 
specifiod units could ba available in the araa based 
on air raovernent,^ and provided cc^ibat and service 
suoport can be i^roviced by the force ccrrL^andar until' 
the non*-air transportable portion cf the iinits have 
arrived by surface shippings 



J -^ 



The above schedule does not talca into consiccrawion 
the availability of lift^ nor. other requireinents for 
lift J ineluding possible deployr-ients of other Services ^ 



c 
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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Piojeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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ANNEX ''3" -TO A???^"DT>: ''A" 



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^IM^h^ }J £A5ISlJ^ y 



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Attach: Carriers 

ASVf Support Carriers 
. Escort Carriers 

Battleships 
■ Cruisers 

Destroyers 
. Submarinos 

Am'ohibious ^-^ 



9 
3 



jy — 



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(Div) ■ 

, Pa-cro.L Scrat-.di'-ons (V?) 
Airship Sqitad^'ons (Z?) 

■ dll~^MT^ M^ ■! ~IW 1 ~ ■ II l"* ■ I I I ~ ■ ri" III M l,,^.^ > 

i 

Division 

Air V/ings 
FOOTNOTES: 



1. 

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2 



S 
93 

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(2/3) 2/ 
(2/3) 2/ 



2-2/ 
1-2/3 2/ 



.!_ ■» * 



a/ C^EC?AC?Lr Hi^intains unaer a flest corr-^ncor in t^e 

VJo s t aril Pacific^ us in g b^, s e s i n oEjo^Tx ^ Kcr o c. ., the Hyi;^:y us 
Philippines and Marianas a fleet cciTi^jCsed ci' 



s^ 



-0 






*V4- o.-^-^r 



a* A ccrr:Dac-rea::y 'cas^-: ^roup ccricrzswing c:: cXXac^z car- 



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riors wi'cn supporting ooiiibat ships* ^Ciu?rantjLy 
appro:'rir::at8ly 3-%- attach carriers j 1 ASV/ support 
'carrier^ 2 cruisers. 32 destroyers.) ^ ^ 



/mti^-subraarine v/ar^are units inducing escorts 






oatrol aircraft 



Appropriate subraarine and mine warfare 'onitst 



■*■ -.- 



d. 



Requisite nurnbar of auxiliaries including an under- 
way repleni snnieni^ group c TIiis fxeeu is m acc.iticn 
to thos^ forces sho-jn locatod under *^?ar Sast*^ 
Additional ?AC?L? forces :v:ay be considered available 
f or op er a t'i ons s h or t of g aner a 1 var ^ s 'ab J e c t to 
specific determination in the licht of conditions 



prevailing at the tir;e^ as follcv;3 



t 









■ 1002 



I 



Decl^ffsined per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dute: 201 1 



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1 Attacl^ Carrier and 1 Sscc::t Carrier \rit^i 
' s upp or t i n 2 c o ■ 'ib a t ships 'and 3 Pa t r ol S qi:ad2"' ons 
^■1-1/3 KarDivs . 1 MarAlrV/lng. a::id Ari:-:^hibiGUS 

Troop HdGtrs^cnd- 2/3 ^-phibious Lift (Div) , 

B- _ ■ 

Both CIrlCPAC (and CIHCFi;) should plan for' use oi* 
the forces available in the F?.r East-V/c stern Paoif 
area plus the augmentation shovrn above for contih^ 
planning, * \ ' ' - 






4Jt 



2/3 Marine Divisions and 2/3 Karine ii3 
under forces loc^atod in the ^ Pacific are 
East and tonporarily assigned CliiCFS^ 



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♦ - - - - vJ-L, il 



From suor-iarines maintained 'oy Cl?yCPAC?Lv ±n >c^'^ 
Pacific. 



*in ::IiOpiiZDj.OuS ^^c\Sii ^^ Qu J ;*i W;.. - .^O-^-jI i:^ VCi.:0'-^- t,_ — -/ 

assigned to the operational ocntrol of C0>2;1y?2 in cor^- 
nection vith the current situation in the Far Saat Con- 
mand ^ 



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OP S2CRET 



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Declas^incd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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ANNKX "C" TO X^?Wr)7X "A" 



ATH FGKC"^ VCfRCrm 



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Unit ■ 

■ri B. 

1 ,Ftr 3o;v:b Wing 

1 Ftr Bom'D V.'lng 

3 Ftr Int Sqs . 

1 Kvy Ti'oop "Cai-rier Wg 

1 Med Troo'j Carr Wa 






Or^xm^o' 2 



Q-Day 
D-Day 



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"> 



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D/7 



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SAC snppoiH and such' sup^^ort fi^oin CIMC/S as is dire c ted 
by the Joint Chiefs of Stafv*, ■ ^ '' 






u 



Col-urnn 1 abova indicates the d^y on rhich v^nits ^vi":. 
be ready fo:^ deployment firc-rr: their cvjn baas^ * 
Co?janin 2 indicatas ths t:c.:a tha units ccald ba av^.:ll- 
able in the theatar basse; i^pcri surface shippings 
Col'arrzH 3 indicates tha tir.e" the luiits v;ould ba 

p*W"l l"^ '1 ^^ t }l i^ •!■ Vi G c '^" O'v* ^ "F* ^ ^"i o ^ *; *"^ t!- v* r:'r'^, cr> ^v»''" '^ *^*' ra 
& EJ — ^ JLxi Uii*^ U« ^o«^ ^<^^ J,« ^^- to CIh '- (J— *^-.*Jt hJjU ^>™ ^/^.^ *y — *— 

Ox the units i^erG^ airlifted. 

The above Dchaduls does not ta'ce 5-nto cor^^icaration 
tha availability of lift; nor pther r3C:uir3::icnta for 
lixtj including possible d'3ployi::an'ts of othar Sarvica 






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Declassified per Execmive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



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bac!cup £ti the field Ar-rn^r laval. 










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» V ^ T ■« ■■ ■ -w-w-m- ^f— q _ _ _ -IB^ ^ _- ^-^ ^_^ -^,_- 



^. V/ate:? tr-^-nacor^ "or^ xvo to four divisions fo: 
the rirst task^ and u'O to -i^rlr^ht divisions for- tho 






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e. 






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Pbiii^^in^s v;ouid ca 'needed. 









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incr<5as£ capaoility up to 
v:ould '03 rcaui/r^ad. 






additional S^^^ tons/^^onth 



fi;. Unless Jet aii'* bases ar-o mad3 available in " 
Vic;tnam prior to tho Gutbi*3a:i of hos:tiliti38j an 
aviation anginas:^ sffcr-t of up to 25 aviation angin^^ev^ 
battalion jnonths pa^ air fiajld may ba- raqviirad to 
provida air basas for- tho^^ j'ot air unit^ to ba daplcyad 
to Vietnam, - : 






\ 



2. Log! >■ tic For-o 












• * — * 






1 



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"T ?1 "^ ^ C" iT. -r^*t r" 



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■ ■ ■ a ■ • ** 



ara avaaiaDie oiiiy xn y.a server ocinponan'^s o:? 

Aivny of the United Statas. Sd:v:3 daficianciaa vrould 



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^0? SECHS? 



Declassiried per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 1 6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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divisions are deployed. Of the reouirad I^ar^ina Cor;p^ 
logistic support ' forces J an adequata r.uoleus is 
available to support up to tv:o M?.i*ine Al'^:* Gr-ovn^i 
Ci?ask Porces, Prolon^cea incobaiidoiit o'j^^?ations 






.- ^* .- ^ .^ ^ *. 



^^ 






to sustccin 5ueh op5r'ation,5. 



D. 



Uhiti; to coi::Sti-"-^ '-- 



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■ ^ t.*-^ ^ ^h. ,,:> 






^- o ^ -; *-^, ■,** p *AV1 






var 



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forces ar-o availabl3 in the activa fleet- 
in the' event of a pz-'olon^acl cr.ar'gency^ additional 
logistic suppoz't units vjould ba reqviirad to suppor-t 
sustained ooe rat ions. 



( 



c. VJater trans'oort for uo to four division; 



■% I 



, -* J-. 



equipj:::ent and supplies v/i'c^hin a period of cO days^ 
and for up to four additional divisions during the 



** -r- J; 



pr\ 



f^ \~ 'i r" ^ -"^ .^\ ► 



t^iJ 









xniGia 

In connection v;ith the abova"; the follOTCin^ shipping 

capability is estir^atei to be available: , - 

Notional 0>ren3^o:?t Ca^ab-.I5.ty - ?5.cif?.c 






MSTS (active & ROS} 
C Gi'/r-ia r c i fel ( a c t i ve .; 
Reserve fby D/^O days} 
Reserve (by Jj/%0 days) 






•r'r 'k > ^ ' 






3-5 



o^ -'- ^ - 



■ TOt;: 



by D/lyO 



^^ 



bo.O 



N otional Car;;o CcLoability - Facific 

F 

MSTS (active) ■ ■ . 

kS?S Active Heavy lift C^s 
Coirinc r-cial (activa) 
Rese3?v£ (VC2 = a} (byEK^J^O days) 

. . 'Total by 3/^0 



17 
2 

13: 







224 



The reserve ves.^;els can be activated as indicated 
on an erriersency basis if highsst priority is givea 
for men, r-iaterials^ and facilities, -In vie?; of the . 
above capability existing shipping capacity can i-eet 
a recuirei^ient of appro:^inately three divisions and 
supporting enuip:?.ent after positioning of shi^/pin^ 
is effected (approxiriately 15/20 days). By S/SO days 



• ■ 1013 



TO?'SEc?ae 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3-3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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TOP SZC3ZT 



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a iovj?'oa. cavxsicn can ce cr£nspo:rGca 03^ reserve 



3 ac^^ivated. Capacity noeis the voIu:-:3 



T -1 ^"J ■ 



Tourth 



divJvSlon caraiot bo 'tra-n£3:'crtoo- to be £iva:L\able v7itri:ln 
the ?-raa by D;-^55 '^"^-t can rGc^oh the axe a by J^^^oO C?^ys. 



J-.* 



H,>:?- G V 1- n^ . ccirr^ s n :-, 'cs can J:ie e 'o car;<o re a vii'-reni^ nx; s . 



o 




V f , Thero ^-:?e 7 aviation engineor battalions in 
the *!?ar Saat and li in the United. States. 



*'-! 






^■•^^"# '^^■^^■-irf-wl-^^ 



a^; 'Js3 of existing fcrces and natoi-^iels for 
this operat^lcn vrould ganercally 00 at 'the direct expense 
of ctho:? cq:-:i\iit:-ri^nts and v;ould constitute a serious 
iv:ald:;pIoyi-ent of logictic forcef> and ;;:aterieX if a 

!^C^e"^*a - ''.*P'-^^ FlhoV*^ ^. fyri^^^-i-r* pi^r*<^ort""sj^"i pn'^ fn^tp^T ^T. 

■'-"j^ n V" •'! r^pr/io ^'i -> p- *!- <^ ;^ i t .,'% *^ ^^ •^''- ^-T--* o n r^ ^ r'p h '* r^n l*o n '^ ''I n p r -^ s R 'i "b ^ "'t'^ 

ryp '■■*!--* -^ "i v^i^^il^*: 1 -: *;'o ^'*- r^-n 



- 



I 



■£- Suppo/.-^t of^ this Operation v;ould probabiy cv^rtaii 
MDA? deliveries to the 'Title- X. IX and IV countries. 



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rersonnel ceilin^^s for Services raust be raised 
.t 100 per cent iTianning of ships^ units and 
installations racuired in support of both t?,^^;:s. 






X 






-:- >-t •' t?. '**% r^-^-* -T^ ^ 't ^- f*. n r '^^: ' ■"» ^ r V "i '•■; ■■ n "^^ 2. 1 b P n '^ *^*' ' '"'' t S '"av be 



b^, Hcitensive construction t:ill- be required in 
^/ietne^Vi^, to include, bvit not lir.iited t;o; ^.ir bas< 









** .* ,*. 



j: 1 



AcvCTvJ.i*;ieSj S';orC'/v3 rac:;.j-iticSj roads and port facili-'i^ietr-. 



WlH 



TO? S3CKET 



I 



I 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND Cj3316. By: NWD Diite: 2011 



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■ ■ ' i l l It,...* 1. ' I I > M ■ .Jl .1 ■ U ■■ ir^ ■ '* * 

production j?acilities expr-n clad ir, crcl^'j* to 'oorrilt in- 
creased production. 



^ 



jj . 



unuil production is e:ypnnd£:dj mo"bilis?:tion 



ro serve stocks rau^it 'be utilised. £oi:^ itaivis of 
rasarve stook=s require a lead tine of on:^ to tv;o year-, 
Even soj shorta^Ds i?iil e::ist bocauss of non- 
availability of critical itei;i3. 

■° - * ' 

£. Navy and Air Force stocks in Philippines nuet 

be built up* - ■ ' ' ' ^ ' 



J- ** 



In ligbt of the Khorta^a of adequate port 
raciiioies^ extensive ovor-the-beech cffloadins 
of personnel and materiel vrill b3 required* Such 
offloadinp; v/ill be ^li^iited durin-. th:; first year 



Si 



,-r* 



^ -£* 



v.-.- ^z- 






terrain and due to short e^;5 of ovsr-^the-bsaQb 
equiprt^ent and ships capable of offloading heavy 
eouipinent. 



.1 '_ • 









until current facilitie;H 

constructed* 















^ '- ■? 






restricted by lack of adequate inland. transportation ^ 
and by the difficult terrain, 

r 

■ g^, Losiijtic support for up to IpOjOCO Vietnar.iese 
troobs will be reouired* 



. Action Covered by ir'arac^raoh o c:V 2:";ncloc-,ure 



h'' 



The employp-ant of ground forces as a deterrent v/ill 
have con si de rable lo v;i sties iinpli cati ens ^ the de t err-iina t ion 
of vjhion is largely dependent upon' the ezctent and nature of 
t h a ' de p loynia n t s re ou i r e d , ' -' , " 



1015 . 



TO? SBCHSO; 



t. 



Declus^jficd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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STATr; B3AFT STUI5Y 



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jbtf 



TO? SSCRS!!: 



Octbusr 6, 1955 



OF A Ri^SlE'ilL K-^ jG-C^:Cii 



."-.• I . I .. .-*. - 






■ *^"*^^™l-»J 



Tha follcving study is suiiaittad in response to the 
Planning Boar-d Mer/.orendvjn of August l6 which celled for a 
State Depai^t::ient '-study of political and s^oncrfiic measures, 
which would be required in support of ths opsrations" vjhich 
are described in thf^ JC3 !'lenorendum for the Secretary of 
Defense dated 9 oeDtG-'no^i'^"' ^^including nre'^aratory steps 



.1^ J 



^'j-nich inisht have a deterrent eiTect, 



---r ^x-^'^^^.".-!- n 



A. POLITICAL: 



Deterri=nt 



1^ * 



1 






nost irri^ortant 'political c.ction which the 



US could take to deter overt Viet Hinh aggression would be' 
a clear reaff lrr::[ation in official public state^.ents of US 
intention to tahe vigorous action under the protocol zo 
the >uanila Pact in the event of such aggression. 

2^ Similar stater.ents frc-n other nieriibers of the 
Kanila Pact vrould also provide a useful dete,;:rent^ 



3^ Possioiliiiies of securing such statements would 



be affected by the 
?:ani could nake. it 



de^^ree to vrhich the Go 









o^- 



■-+ ■"'*^-^^ 



v^.^^ ^■^►^nrs^ to "^erno for KSC^ 



UT 



iCAUbure ou ; i^^iriu ^or :.o^^ "Uv^S., ?o.licy in the Event' cf 
Renewal of Aggression^ in Vietna^^' j Septenber 16.^ 1955* 



lOIG 






Dccbssined per Executive Order ]3526» Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



* * 



[ 



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uo-uld lie with ths Viet 'Cinh 



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Siniilt.r'ly j dsn^ons t::'c:tion 



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"by the OoverniLent of Viat Ivan of its 6.5ter:nination c.r-d 

4. ' 

■1 v^ " ,f^ la "T^ ^" r\ ^ '' '^ "^ "n V "^ ~t >i *i ^ c /^^ v* r- o -^ *a "T ?^ ^ o "^iG"^ i^* .^■^'5' C >". ^ "^ -^/^ -".■"'■ "^n*^"^ '^ i" 



country v/111 as sis 



it 



'* 









and will s^rvt; as a detor-rent *5o Viet Kinh aK^xesslon, 



\^*-j 



Accordingly^ the US should continiia to prevail upon tne 
Govern^Tient * of Free Viet jf?ar:'i to follow courses of i:ction' 



i v;hicii ^rill 



a=:c'c.- 



tT ri *] >-. '.'^ . 






i-y 



^ J- ' 



should £tter;:pt to p^^rsuade tha Govormcant of l^rca Viat I\an 
^ to establish a National Assembly as soon as ^^0£;siblG which 
V;Ould be aiidov/ed with authority i^o draw up a constitution 
to detsr;iiine the relationsni-D of Viet Kan i;ith FTan:^3 anc 



^^ 



other countrreSp and dec x are the officis^l position oi Free 
Viet Nam v/ith respect to the pre-^election consultations 
v/ith the Viet Minh and the eD^ections called for rmder the 

* 

Geneva agreement.* 



'-V 






US could also undertal:e political action to 



assist in establishing military deterrents to aggression such 
as arran^in^ facilities for introduction of US mobile ground 



forces into the Southeast Asian area should such co:;jr.i 



(^;.;en it 



of forces be decided upon. US political action T::ould also 



be he 



lT)ful if irnnr overrent of bases in Thailand cr other 






m i^uuonec",s L ^--ii-^a v/eie j^icj^ulj-iv^cl^ 

* 

?. In the evsnt of Viet Minh ove-^t asg^assicnj the 
US should sti::^\xlc/Qe an officisl Viet-Hanesa r^cuast to tha 



^' 



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I 









sx^n^ H^o^ xt 






for assistance vnider tne pro\.oco± 

il V ^* ; 



fprD c:T:p-;5"'l 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Dale: 201 1 



I (■ 



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fT^ 



10? BSS:X-x!i 



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Article IV or tho tii^eaty* ^he Ud shoi^ic! 



strongly support the Viet 2;an;c3e r 






pi^rl vo^ ^u^ 






fluence to secu^L^a action cy'tha r::onib3i"s cx the Pact iinc^i'* 



<^ -'^* 



II »- » 









^iet Kciia 



• • .*. 



initiative to briri^ the issue to the Security Council of 



^-l'l^/^^ v^^-; 



i- « 



u.ne uni'coa .\abions m an eiioro xo seoui^5 coi'iaaniia'cion oi 
the Viot Minh and a U^I reservation calling to^: ^ cessation 



OI ^■'' 






agression, ihe US should ccnqicsr in 'cno -^ign^ oz one 

■ 

circumstcncGs at the tine vJh^thar or net it should sael: 
designation as United Nations CQi:':ia£:nG3r' in an organized UN 



action. 



7^ 






US uould undoubtedly have 1:0 insist tha 



.u- V 



supra;:::ie conii^ianc o:: any I'ci^ces contributoc aithor under tha 
Manila Pact ci' -u^ider ths United ?Tations should be vested 



in the US, ine Jd uouj^d 



'1 ^~7^~H ^ n 1 






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in a wav 'co avoici CG^o^a'cion oi 



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Viet Name. It should a^aphasize that r'raa Viet Na^ h^o. 
foriTierly called upon its ^^lanila Pact pi"otecto:^s to deploy 
troops within its ter^^^itoi^y to i^epal Viet.I-Tinh -^ggr^sslon 



It should eru'ohasize \"ne fact that US exarclse of 






co^iiv^and and tb^ u^essnce of fo-^ai^m ^foi^ces in Viet ^la:^ vone 
that the US intended to establish a colonial ]:^a^ii:;o* 






1018 



Declassilicd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



t 
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5, Viet Hiziii aggi^essio:! and consacuont introoL^ction 
of iO'i?eign troops into Fres Viet K srrr avoixlo s&riously npsst 



tha Viot I^rarnese economic pEtt5:?n.^ "The proouotion of p^xxV 
and rubber v;onld be fvirthei" reduced, Sivo^oo:;?t of forcGs 
V. uld nscGssariXy cor.a froi^: abrcr.d. Viot 2van voulci bsccv.'ie 

a. 

even more fiepandent upon foreign aid.o lHXlt€.Ty necessity 
v.uuXcl reouire Viet ICain to accent increasea foreign, control 



j> ."> 



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r 

■I 

nnd internationcil trade would hava to be dolas^tsd to "cho 



* . 



9uprei;-e Military Goini^iand. Tiie US vould have to oa t^reparea 
to extend subsT^antial econonuo assistance to Viet I^Iani and 
to exorcise a considerable cegroa of econordc authoritj'^* 



[ 



p' 



\s 



lOlD 



-Ti o -3 QTP PV5T''' ^ 



m 



Declassiried per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Pmject Number: NND 633 1 6. By: NWD Date; 201 1 






V 






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T 



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TO? SllCRIir 



(K!~95) 



To: 



Ths Staff Plannoro ' 



& 



ubj': 
Ref: 



(a) l;anii:£o!c RcpDi-t of (>-S July 195i> (TO? SrORliT) 







I^ GI^TFRWj; In accordance v/ith tho provl^DfLon^i of refdronco (ei), tho 
Staff P'La^ins^r^i held thoir second co'^ercnco £iv ?craO- Hrortor, T.H* durlr.^ 
the period .VI6 novc::^.ber 1955* I^^ ndditilon to e:;a\niii5ji^ their figcridaj, 
thcj attcndad to other jaatto^^a raicod at the jiicatlBg and alf-o pr67:):^ccd 
a cQriprchGu:3ivo pz'0^;iVsao of future vrork of the Military Advir^era 
0.vi:aDl£:ation. , ' I 



?-. ■ JtoM^Ar^cafllJjJ:'!.^: ^iio Ad Hoc GotEiittGG on TnUOJA'jc^oe re^- 
vicij:^:! tJr:, a-i2nc!.:::1. t/is intcIHgcace ansG^^s-seats i.-j.ds in July 1955 » Thosa 
Kiie.n:l-.:cnt:J h^vo been circulated- by the- vScorotrxiat and have been incoi*" I 

poratocl .ill tho inLolllgoncc report '..Oil oh th-3 Militaj^y .'dvisGrs cro ., • 
ix-co:=-^3Kdcd to e^provo lu-der Asend?. Item I. •. - . . ' ' ) 

B. A'^:^:\J^7]XZ-^Jl.:^I^±]li OiOTS;' Theirs Agenda 'itoo vore 
conrjoli-dntod foi* tno pm-poaoa of thlo riayzu^g Study) 

.V 

3- feq/ll-.^.lJ To dotcr/oiue tho e:ctotit of id-lixDj-y cupport for tho 
dofcncjo of EDut'a ViGtnrn^ l-zos^ and Cambodia in tho event of ovoi*t 
Co^;DiT.mi£;t r.^gi'ossion, 

■ - * w 

I^* ' i^ir^G]^^;^?^;:^^: Tho concept of oporatioiia requiroa that tho 
ijidi^onoup forcc3 of t'lree ctatoz; resist Co:^ami;3t r,:i^^-ro3idon to tho fiOJ. 
crctco.t of their capzibllitlon prior to and aftor tho Liti-o duct ion of SEATO 
forcoDs Tho initial op:^r.Ttion3 vDJ. ba to deliiiy tho advauo:* of the 
ConvJiilijt jU-nioD into fi^icndly ra'c:,D. S£:VrO forces i^vut be dm3.oyc:d to 
the tho?*tor of opDr^ntiona a3 G^^i^.y TvH pr^/jtic^rolo nf tc^r tli-^ Dt^^t of ;. 

n:',rp:r-jioii end not later th.r:a 90 (i:\j3 Jja* order to cr-.^iire holdlr;;;^ a^- cxi ' 
ab::Dlu^3 ]iinJr:io^ the.SzJ..:io.^i rj^oa^ A.t a Ir.t^r r/i^-^-S^^ ^ coiurtor offc^iisive ■ 
\rill fc5 Liouutcd to clvivo the enc^iy froi^i the three ^tr-tep. 



■ a 



"3*. Forcn P.'^.nvir-^Krntf^: ^ 

■ 

cu Tho forci rcq^aircasntr; for thxa action i7iil ba on tli- crd-v 
JO? SSHST . . ' ■ =7- • * ' ^ ■ 






'i n ■? ri C'i'y 



Z-- 



oi' ^ /- — 



^^jpies. 



Declassined per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dute: 201 1 



r 
c 



TOP SSCirST 



E^"95) 



(},} UavcJ, •" Cax*ripi' Striking Torco^ including it;; ^upporV 
ing tnA Lo£-5_str5-C clcF.eiits, /^SiJ llun tor-Kill or Crovip^ Hiiaesw.^spiiig force end. 
necescp.vy /u^iphibioup lif tp 



(2) Gi^ovjid - Up to S Divisions plus £iupporting Tores J 






(3) Aiv^ " 2 to 3 Tactical VJingfJ, 1 Tr.cticEl Eeconnr.iGseJioo 
VinSy ^ S'roop CcLrrier V/i:!i:^p Eci^boi' forco or long-r^j^gc Tightsr l>Dn^.bers as 
Gvaiiab^le fronvbasos outsido the thsat^:^^ of operation. 

, % - 

bo It chou.lci he noted that thscc forces are those required 
v/hcn tho d0fcnr:3 of tho t^u^oa stats 2 is conzddered collectively and on 
the as£ra:rption th-j/t nnclcar uaapons vdLl not be usad^ 

* ♦ 

Co Tho forces depict sd aboYO, o:ro in addition to Incigcnous 
forces evailablGc * 



[ 



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L 



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/■s Gonel\ir>iQn3: 



d^r- r- .>^ a- . %^>^ ^& ..f^^. ■_ 



a 



iTT* 



The aiooossfiOL defenno of South Vietnanip Laos and Gariibodia 



3 



±n vholly dopend::r.t on the tinaly deplo^^T'ient of SBiTO forces into th 
Theater^ in addition to operations by the indigenous forces, 

bs On tho a:;5U!T>ption that nucj^eav veapons are not tised^ the 
forces roquired for the r.ueccpsfiLl cljfGn:^^ of Pcuth Victnci^^ L?.as txiA 
Ca^abodia are ujilrU^oly to b:i f.vailablej,- for the time beinf^^, iii ths muabers 
indicated and \;ith:in tho tib^^a hy \:hich they must bs deployed* 




5o ]RonoT:>TiCncT'^.ticnn5 Jt io recoiis:aended that the ILllit^i^ Aclvlesrs 
a a lloto tho conclusions in i^ava^^raph 4 above, 
bp 'Approve thlp Dtudy* 

.1/ Prqblens^ To cletcj-n^i'io the crtent of tho Hilitary ^Support 
nceoBssLvy for t}io"d3fenae of Th^llond In the event of overt Co.-iuiHiist 



i I 



c^grep^j-on^ 



*» 



2 J5 i '^ -H 3 T^lon ; ^ The on c en t. f op or at! on 3 for the d of en £: e of 




^ 



TOP SSXjKSX 






I 



U 



I 



Declassiried per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Pmject Number: NND 633 1 6. By: NWD Dute: 201 1 



# 






1 



k 



t 

* 

'[ 



i 



TO? esozss 






J- 



n flnf-O. cTare.-ii^J.vO! pori-'c.:lc:i on t'lo Hud Lrfj;-:! rirsai (!j;-I-.-:i::-a) " D:;ac^ai - ' 



3« X'orcio r.rcilr-.t.r'.-iri.'iiss 



(?.) Air ™ 650 culre:L-af t " * 



/ 



r - (3) ilc.val <* A OGi^iTier tar': roi^^so^ r.-i /iS:T Ibvrj'"c.D:o->;':::Ulo:>* 

i[_ , tr^oup lo^dDtic iia\p2Do:.^t Sdi^ooz^ s^vcor'naiG^anoo n:^cl pah'ol forces raid irln:* 

M . . ; . . bo - )-t fjhould ba not':;d. th-?/% t]ism Sqtoo at:sosrv:o:itn rcps:'C^»- 



4 



lirA^o to to n^ao up f?.xd outside couvcor-]^ cj/O thQ=:<"oforOp lar^o, _ * 1 ' 

' -5* C£::3/j^:li:^iSlQ- 3;t io cono;2;C:d3d.th:tts * . ' - ■ • 



-♦ri 



. ' A* Choiild tho fo:.^oDG c^aoi^szd in tii5.G otiidy tD pro^/idod V/f 

be !Ph^ ^orcoa d^filcicncion ro:-; tho tlccrca^D of Tho:5J-€nd^ 

' — ' c* ThacD *cVj:?:Volcna:loG cvo likoly to br-Doro i:.ovd r.'^asoae.bXo -. 
^: ' \:hzn tho dofonco of Thri3.ond X3 conc^idj^cd 3ji 5,-^o?.at:loa to ot'jiji' i:oz;:?i'i)la " - 
eovs^cisp of r,c^t:lc:a p^r/to-'j^in^ to Soi^-thoaat ADila,. 
. , ■ . .' . < ^ - 

j '■' tliQ dol'cnn^ of Si^o-lirivd to stiu^lcd 3 11 corro.\citic':i vi%\i tl^D jK-^ovicic:! of 

- '/' / uUit:v;-y :A\ppo:/i <rcv* ±ho CoSC:.zzo'cyx h?.oz^ Qzr*:zC\5-':i cridf^^iitb Viotii::^ tv::^i 

I \/it-h othor ia\p7:o:;'t5/i:^.:; coi\vi^:id 0:? action 5.i^clud5^i:j c/ttc.'ri!; ca G^loofed, 

I*- . tx'SotD on tin C:vlivo:]:i iiia:]xlr:nd u::d^::3 bo't-a nMOlojr 't:?.d <:^^^c:a1vicn:x>. 

s' ' - ^ . , - 

1 . ivy*, w *- vf^*r^JA 



Declas^jficd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



[• 

I 

[ 
[ 
[ 
[ 



Xr 



[ 

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» ' 



^0? S3CRET 



% 



(i^^>-93) 



that ?t^JcL^sti:^;ii jToxc-33, au£'ir.3nti:cl hy falcVLtio.^:!-! C3.\T0 j?o:;c5s/ r^3:ler>* r.i 

studies f^o fr-Tc' consid!jr3cl by Vne S'ccfx plrAin^i-zs , t/^is sU^uy br-o b-i^a ir.:\cJo 
in tb3 ccTt-3xt of Globnl Urjt^. Providod ti:^t t-h^ Dc^senW,al r^adfi-tlo^ica 

d-dstroy^d by liolclini; either of tbs fo-llo:;5„ng thr^-G -lin:;S: 

a, Th^ hir.dvlaish line: (Pcdgha t.ikT SM.bar Passes I?orth of. 
Kelral " Herat - Kschecl.) 

b, !Ili3 Kabul - F^rJiiUav - ^-oMd-nn lin?, 

c, 'The Khj^bor Pass - JO^ojak Pass -- Zaiiidan lira. 

3* Fpi^l££. Kp^?sll^?jl^x'|^^ ^ii addition to t-hs Tore 3 3 ^^Jr^^ccTy avail- 
Gblo in P^lcLstruij tba foiloirin^ iiilitfj,iy Gupjx>:vt ijill b5 reqiiirad: 

, Alrcvaft cariTi^lor 

Crii-isDr (CL) 
IDDstroyGr:^ (DD) 
Aa/A&"i:3Co:.:t Ve£:^Dl8 
Sulm^irinpn (S3) 
Ocoi^:*i ,lLai9STrDap3X"*3 (All) 
Coastal ImiasirespDrs (AviS) 
Insliors Min3Si/a8per3 
MTi5 and II?.:t-bor D^fenso Boa't 
lVa3j;er 

Iforitir^a shoi*^ basod ^^i^crci^b 
Easo cjid rcpcdr ship 



Fonr 
Si>: ■ 



.i/kj 



(SDSs) 



Tvslva 
'Aralva 

Oni! sqiicxTron 



C-^) N':S^y}^* O-"^^ Arnioiircd cliv^-fjion oxtd ona AK^^urod 



iv>conn?Lissarx3 re 2^' 






(S) j2:f£ll^XXi K-ve iioro iii^DxAry di\"inions c-tid 
non^-di\dsional supporting uioits for elovon di%dsions* 

* (3) Aix-bo?7r>.o : 0n3 Pi.ira/Bi"^is-da Group 



c. Air S^^ADport: 



■Fig'nt-ijr Eoii-cr cquEOccons (jots) 






I 



TO? SECHai' 



1023 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND Cj3316. By: NWD Diite: 2011 



■ 



I 



[ 
[ 

c 

[ 
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[ 



•■~ *' 






CD 



c 

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TOP SIXKST 



{B?»95) 



Light, bo: ::b:tr SquccVroni: (jct^X 
*(inolvxUDS one Squadron for 
■ Photo Rccco) 



Ono 

ISino 



■ . I * . The fLbov'3. rx:i \:or::od out o,t ihi? ccc?lc; cf ^ii rirorr^t in g ^ 

squnrJron# 

^^ \t^Kl'.^J&S3.- I^ogictic fr,ollitioG Gi;ch r^s cc:Tuunicatio?ip n^cli- 
cal^ trraisportatiOH; dccky^rd riid cix* bases \:onld hovo to ba ccnejidiirably 
5.r:pr ov;jd cori^Qnsvu'iito \:itb Oj-y iTiCroas^ that \_z?j bo effected in SJi:7fO force n 
in Pt^^iij^troi. 



I 






, a* On th3 r.s3uri;ition such ni\ att^^clc uould b-D jointly undcrt^^Uou 
\;:rth /^FGH-^IIISTLN r.nd Cor^-amist Chino.^ opf-rr.tii^^ fi*on bazioo in Cav^tx-ol /cia 
Olid SIiuQ/ii;G^ nnd thr^t in 5uc}i £^rj ovcntu^lity IKDIA night .roaain n3iVbr*?J- or 
ccii:idt cci ret of f^.gsres?)ion F.gaiiist P/KI3T^'i:3^ in the carXy .^ita^^^tn of c<\obol 
^^-^x KUSSIIjI moxClA attao]c Pi':CTai/:i-t:6p?rriteiy or £jlHiO-tr-'i30u.'3l;f"a'3 pTo;t of thTiix* 
objcotivo of EOctLvins tho Middlo Ea£;t mad godiilrig fiecoso to v;?^*F.3r v;atoA*s. 



Tno in-iti.-l Riuislrjii attrnk r.grdi?.st P/^jaST/:-l v:av.ld bo of oiQlrt 
divicions inoludin.'j ona - t\ro rrnoiu^t'd/j:::^chaxals:Kl divisiojan^ ono rlr-boi'nj di-- 
vlDiOHj ritli tr.otiaca r.nd ti-o^^cport rdr cxi-pport„ Tliis Ruscio-i] offon.^ivD ^.:oa^d 
dovoico in thyoo GDp:^/i'ato colri:n3 e^lcng tho hii;toric:^l koH l:no:^^i.-i ro;vt:j3 lor.d-* 
ins ^i^'^:^ Control /.^ia r.orooa /^?GH/iI;ISM:J r^id K:^..'stoi'n IK/:'! into P.^XISV£I. A 
ra^b^idirxy offonslvo of ono division sti-'onsth voiiXd t:^ Ir.ijnohod by Go::2iuM.jt 
Chino::o q:i Pi^CISVAII'a llorthorn i-a-oao* '/fchr^ Mtion r.^rLinat \SST P/JvIST/t^i 
voiild tt-ko tliD f orn of r.ttrjokg on po^tsp cutting of linoo of coi:Z2r»vticr-:tionj 



yould bo proparntory to th:) nain Cox'irojiist invasions 

■ h 

Co With tho Gxc option of ra-^om*- S:horc3 noc:^* p^i^'ity Liay bo clair:3d 
in tho cponing phr^nos of tho c r::p aign^ tho CoLratnisto havo rn 0'7ar;;h'jl:in2 
supoidority in tho ^A."}^ i^xA on Inndo I'ho procDnt ctron^th r^id logititic b"C;:in<7 
of' tho P/:XIST/:i Arr-:^d Torccs it; inrdcq\\r\to for tho dofcnno of P/aX&m a-o.;ai:;t 
tho Coirjimiot thro at * 



d. 
nrxlo ^[r^ailnblo 
doBtroyod by h 



K/3UL ^ Hsa.wr 



Providing thrd tho es^ont.lrA- cddltional j3ilit"i^'y t^UDiyo^t Jq' 
tho Coznuaiii-^t invasion of WEST ?j':iIST/:i couj-d bo ehcc^^od crid 
/dng oithoL^ of tho fo^Jlo-jing throo 3,iD0p. 

(1) Tho HIliDUKUSH li)i.i- (P.^lGIt\ o^ivJ SEID/:a Par, so 3 >lo:^Lh of '■ 
. ISSHED). 

.(2) Tho KABUL « K/UiDiUR -^ ZtCSUiU \±\Yi, 

■I 

(3) Th3 KHVBjH pass ^ KIIOj/a PJ^S - ZAHID^^ liv::!. .* 






102^4 



Declassincd per Executive Order 1352&, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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(r'?i..95) 






th3 Tore;; roq ^irc^::::'nt3 s^^t ou'b ;'>■■ iM 3 . p^^i: :,r^ rd^/i'b b?-VD T3.-::n oV;:,V"C;;tiv:i'!;ci, 
Thry propose "to a":r-J:d.r^,o tIi^^i iy\ }^i*3 dotail bjioi^'-o tla-:) urt;:/ca?.^5^ /^7:Ig:"1"3 . . 

■ * - ■» 

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1^ ^Jl^W,;:3s To co^luot a plojordvig :jtr5j^ 0-5 tho aca-lal a'ttr.c-: o:v 
ca?.-Gelcd tavgG'bs o:^ 'ti:o Gbi-cs^o ii'ainlond am l]o'^-±yi Victnan as th3 rajci- 
liiiifeiV ooi:G7ca of GCX-ion Ij^ i^-^pport of xilifer-y opM';it:lo:as iln tho CYCji't 

1 

a, E:^scd upon r.cc^pt-d SEMO x-^-t^liJ-sa-cca ttr^X'j^'B^ 'tlio 
S3/:.T-0 jir-.tiC'ixs oro faced \r.lth a potaa-tdal cnoa^r of conaidoi'eblo raJ-ita-oy 

r.c;.Q:rcoa proT.UIon tho ti;o rcos't potaat Jcv-aes cona-tci-iiru-li^^g a t.h:.-c:i-b -co 
tho ibS-'uiO ii-ationSe , . , , ■-.-..-.■-.■ -• • • ■ - • - '- 



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roduoo th:; 5j:jn:xliatD tiirciit -^ -^lo S3V[0 nation (s) mdor attack ard to 
provide th3 opportunity qC oiffcctivcly cL;i:>loyins S!1\T0 fox^cos. Control 
of thcj nil- PA\3t ba lield or £rdncd by tho SK\TO nation's if they aro to 
suTvlYO f.fl crfcctivo fightin,^ vjiitso In addition, friondJy air yiUL-.t ba 
cap- bio or noutralizins or reducing th3 taxoat pos^d by c-iaijy ground rcroas 
It hTis b^on forad that in vicu of tho Ei-i^nitudc of tho. tas\ and the iii-ocnfiy 
of reducing thcs thi'tatj atonic an v;oll as non-atoi^^Jx lavnitions vill ba 
required. If non--ato::dc vroapons oi\].y' arc employ ad j ths fo:oco re qu iron ant 3 
to inpl.2zu:;nt this coujss of action v;ill ba prohibitive , 

c, Bocausc of tho iii^portancG of targst solcct5-on. in ^tho^ 
adopted concept of opi^rationsp a tai'goting atax^y hnn h^cn cari*-icd out. 
U.^ing tMs inforjiation as a bacisj an estiiiato of force i-cquiroKanta 
has bean made and included in this papir. . ■' 

3* i>^;9jl?.?.^'^^^?3i It i^ concluded that in tho ovcnt of overt 
aggro 3 Dion by CorinuiLlst China* 

■. " a, Tho course of action vhich i/iU ^^odI cffcctivaly, aJid 
vith the IsaPt Aoli^, in tini=, rcduco tho thr.3at to tho Tra^ty Ai'v^j; 
ic att..c:c by the SEL'TO air forcos upon aclootcd targets on ;.n. Cnxi ..a 
M^iDlrnd and North \xoU^. Ihia reduction voiad probably be sm.icicn. . 
to ensure that the dofcn«o of tho Treaty Area veuld bo practicable. ^ 



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TOP ss(;pLii;T 



1025 



Declassincd per Executive Order 1352&, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20il 



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(Pi;-95) 



b'. Kio SMTO liations s}2otuld ^^dopt a co;ic^pt of air or^rafJono 

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■fe 

a. The l^ii^-itary k&yls^T3 approve the* ecnclu^jions in p^'^j^'^a- 



^ 
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graph 3 abov<3 

■ 

b. Th3 Stsff Plr^miars conduct r stiiiy ^±or tho Militaiv AdvJ.fjars 
to ' ^itQi^lno the exiict dim^-nsionv^^ of the reduced threat. 



^ F- Ar<cp.da Iton H 






^-o ^?£piL^£i'U To develop n^asm'Gs for 
of coiiibatting ruibvortjlon » 

2, Dir^ciission: 



iDP 



J.* 



inT^rovaBS XJio 



ziilitsr'/ cspacts 






^ Q. I'ho reports of thj Conbii-^ad K-^otin^ h2:vo boon CGiicldorod 

uador Asenda Itcn I (f) (End (f) to App 9). 'i>.a Coabif^ed K:^utin2 
agi'OGd;; as to th'j Militaiy Staff ?lm>r.'jrB^ that a tnifiod Civil rjid". 
'irllitary effort against Co:^^unist fmbvarsio:i is csssntinlj ai:id_thcLt_ .. ^ , 
the. Catui.it 'itt CO. 'to Ccqzbat: Coi^iniiiiiist Subverrslcir shoiO-d be the" agehcy to 
na!:o tho \m5Sxcd effort* Tliorefora^ the paper prepared by Thailend 
,ehoiild bo T^ado available to' th-e Corijittee to Cojabat Coi^TiiUAiist Snbvar^iicn, 
for their ixifona^ition. , ' 

i 

' h^ Tiier-o ^;ill bo a coiitinulDf];- ro(j;ilrGr:ezit for tha Milita^.^ 

Staff Planjaere to con:^ilder ewtinatoa and etudies pic^pi^rcd by tha Co)::^ 
iilttoo to CoTfoat Coim^unist Sv.bver:^lon as tliose estiriatcs vs^A stv.d5.oo 
havo a bearing on lailitarj'^ plana aiid pro^i'^aii^s . i'iierefore, the p.attor 
^of ii.ip::ovj_n2 rAlitaiy effectivena^s in co::ibattiD2 subTeroion should bo 
hopt continuoii.nly before the l'Ii3,ita^;^ Advisers* 

«- ' -. 

w 

3. Recovrei-^d^.tio^mj It la rcconitnended that: Th-e Military 
Advi^era noto the 'x'halland paper on '^L^arsures of Inproving Mlitary Aspect o 
of Coribattin^ Coi-'i^mnist Subversion" and cor:iiend it to the Cori'id.ttao to 
Co'nbat Goii::2\u:i3-::t SiibvorBion that it E^hocLld Ve hcpt rcr.tiriX"ousIy before thxr 

W 

G. Agenda Iton Is 



N 



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'■7 



1* Probloru 'i'o roviei; the Ad Iloo SuVGcnmtteo reports lij^tod 



b::lov;; 






Q. Intolliscnoo -- Singapore - Jtdy 1955 
b^ lo.^lrjticri " Helboiirne - Au:5U3t 1955 



c. Co::.v^iuni cations - Aixclcland - Septe; 



!ber 1955 






i-G? SEGKliT 



x02S 



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Declassined per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 20 1 1 



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(KJ-95) 



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o^ Un convent ion -JL \!c^'£vro - McniJ.a - GopoO-ibor 1955 



f. 



Trainins - KpjrcLchi - S-r^ptembsr 1955 
Standardization - Briigko!: - Octobsr 1955 



2. Pi sown <:; ion 



Ik "■ 



»-■ •■^.-^ -•---■ ^ ■■— ^ 



Qc The St^Xf PlEtnners hav3 rDviclJ:^.d^ and iji sor.^D oas3& 
ej'T.cnclGCi, tl:e reports of those Ad Hoc Suc^^Coi^^iiiittoos* Thosa rovlov/s, 
v/hich are cnclosGd at /.ppcndix (9) j, t^b-0\j that tho reports foil iirto 



throo catOi^orioGs 



( ' (1) VJorklnr docimonts for tbo i\£!3 of Staff Plrnnors. 

+ 

I - % ■ - 

.^ .. . (2) IntDllirjeno^ as£;eGE]^Qnts wM.ch form tho basiti for 

th.6 dovelopmc^nt of pn^anuin^ utudiDs, * ,..-.. .. -.^-rv^-- 



-.•'-.. '1 



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(3) Reports on 3.i,ilit.^j:y activities iMch require coordlna- 
tion \rith civil aotivitiGs undortc'cen \uidor fcho iior:U> of the Coi^zioilo 



I 



Thosa reports \rK:;.ch fa.Tl under ths category in (l) 
abovo haVG bccm appro%-c!cl by tho StvSf P3.annerSj ^;ho have directed tha 
Conforcnco Socrotsxy to refer tha ri-r.^snfc-.-nty to tho Cha3.r?iou of tha 
Mil.ltai'y SGcrataj;lat for diptribution to dl holders of tli3 opproprJ.ats 
roports. (Vo?AiiurD2) _ ■ • 

# 

(lX0;7^iS Tho Au-sti^alirai r^eprocontativo pointed out that h3 had not Ir^on 
doic;;;atad tho authority by tho AustraD.ian H5.1it!?j:y Advisor to approve ray 
dociu<\ent for futi.tr o action o H-^ advisad^ hov;overp ho \:ouJ-d o-vrrn^o for . 
such en approval to be signalled from AuBtra.lia as soon as posaiblo* The 
lion 7iOol€Jid Roprocintativo oiproos^d a slrxiiar vicupoint;,) 

3* Action bv H:mtary .Vdvif^ors^ As a result of their roviov/s 
the Staff Plarmors invite tha Hilitai-y Adviser a to ti'ko note? of the 
points^ and vjhero appropriate approve the reo::i.;ni3ndation3 arioins out 
of each raport as set out in tho fo3-lo\jin2 Dubp^ra^raphss, 

a^ . Intollinenco; 



r 



(1) Tho'^Intolliseaco Ad Hoc Sub-0oitmitt-3e diwi up t^*o 



docujii3ntD; 



■ ' (a) A report jj dated July 1955^ contpdninj an 
as^est^LBnt of the threat to Laos, Gciabodia^ South Viotnai, Thoilcjid and 
\Jout ?>rJ':iuton, 



TO? SliiGHET 



(b) A paT)or entitled Sifourity Policy r^nd Procedures 

* * »-^ ^-^ !■_* ■ ^ 



s* 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number NND Cj3310. By: NWD Diite: 2011 



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Ad Hoc- SxCi>-Oo:zjl-bloo iiDotii)^ iii KoVerr.bor 195^ corrtrA-a ^Dn^c^ctilvoly: 



viDxcnoOly approved by tha klH-tcry /idvAiJDi'G„ 



(3) Th'j Sto-ff pi.ann:a'a cciarjiclai' tlrr/bp in crd:i' to 
pro\':;.do fc c.d:;q-(.utD coordlaat.lcn in t'5,0 l'.:plp:.L.!intc.tJ^n of tho r-?r.7'J?po 
pi-CT^oj-a in tli3 f;ocii^it7 Policy D;::d Prcec^J'Vay dcjvirjatj, n £3cvrjx^" 
Ccd: y'a-irAc:c is A'cqi'.lj^citU Px'CiJC3od tc'i=i.io of rofcrcnco fci" tljio co:i2'vlii:.?.tc:f 
£LVO:at ApjjciuVb: (9) i;uc?.o.To?a' (a) Tab (^). • . . - 

\Ath to'^'12'3 of rofo::*orico a^ cot out at^A-^jponcU:: (9) ,&^^ (a) 'rr.b (1)* 

I (b) As-t'oo tb:vt t'np pcot .s'iwH l;*vf:Ul':.ulv r^^i.of-Tiqor^ 



(o) /^r-'provo tiici SDGi-rlt/ Policy r,ri Preocc^.m-^^^ i:r.;:oi' 



V 



cbovo;, in:jt:rr.3t tho C.-^orot?rlat to iiic6:'=porato into i^oSo cioon-z-jiri 'ch-o 
toiT2D oa roforonoo of tho S30"n:<^5/cy Coc-^O^rbn-Lrtc^ra 

(cl) An-pi^oTO t>.3 oxondocl ropc-:.-^t c? tbo Jv^^ 191^5 Acl 
IIcG Siib-Co:"J;ctoa en IntollLl^.TiiicD cp a b.'^.nils fcr tho cbvolopi^^nt of 



l^o i^iSJ^irU3i 



t „ 



(1) Tiio ropoort of tho Lc^iuticj J/I Uoo CuVCcir.'dttcj li?.a 
boon approved b/ tiio Staff V3j::xaiOTi^ t\3 a i:orl:iT:3 docvr-iont fci^ uco fit 
DtrJT Io-'TdIc It conta:lrj3 a U'Oad r-ovloi; of c:c:lctiD2 ^-OjrLotilc far;:UJ/G:lc3 
of ?r?nt:r ratlona In tho Ti^oaty .^ava ^ir^d prcv:U!':)P fcr tho G::ch:in:;o of 
i3C^"G clotrdlQcl lo^iyjyllc data n3 rar cd rcqirlrcd fo:.^ tho friT'th^i' d^volc^?" 
i-::oBt of cpori^.tlcnrul pIci:j2lD2 Gtuciiop, ,, ' , 

(2) Tho i^^pcrt oAoo dj.^'U'^.r^ attontilco to tho fact that in. 
v:bo;:r of tho financla),:ar:i:T occnc3-G ij:>c3.cat:lcno it vXH^ at oo:io fut;r.'o 
datOjj nr'0b.ib7.y t:i r:';co::i:-:aT-7 fCj.^ iXTX^o::.:^ntativo3 cf th:j l^J^lt.-,^/ iclv:lcci-3 
to r::ot HltJi tho Bocnd^o GcrriLttop cf tho 5S.W0 CGi:no5i mth a v:lc:f to 
i?c:iv.:'al:vi:b:*2 "^'^ ovo:^:ul ixlou fcj^ tho .do%"olcp:::orj; cf icjzlotdco faei.VLtloa 
'ui tho T^^caty ;\voa, ' " . , ' 






iC2B 



!l 



I 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND Cj3310. By: NWD Diite: 2011 



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CPII~95) 



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(1) Tho ropor-'o o£ the Con:au::iicitions Acl }Ioo Sui>-Co::C^i5,ttoQ has 
b.-^GB an^^i^tacd and approved by th3 Staff PlGm^ors ar> a bnois foi' future cI:^Sj: ^ 
octfi.on. ^ 

(2) Tiio report Qirp)iD.?Ay,rs t}^:it V,bu:;nca of a clofinxto cc:r:^aiid 
stru-oturc s}ii3. oporatio:aal pi on 3 Ii:\s pr^ocliidod cloTolopr^^nt oS a coroiUiiion- 
ixons plan. This x'-opor'tj as ojii^nclcdj pro"/id3& a b^r^n foi- cstablishii^s 
t:\Ldc cor-amlcr/caons tc;cloi:lquoa^ anl proccdiUL^oy foi* RXVTO naticQ:^. It 
fiirthoi^ provides for cr^tublishins rdD:lm\B e6r;a?i^icatioii0 facUitlon in 
aroa3 i-*hora doflcicaaiCD no:; cxist^^ cXitX establi^bin^' banic actions and 
or^ofconso oi^ data n^ioozs^xy to future prapar^ition of a coriroiii or/lions pi cm. 
It e-hould b3 notcd^ th:vt even \1h2n nil rolevant action? requArod in tbo 
report )y:kV3 baon tfiVcn^ tho cor-V.nuii cations; proooduros end tcciniiqxias i:a 

tlio E}1.\'':0 crca vjill b;-fVO only reached a prinary ntago and that prosrci^'* 
fiivo dc=vclop::ont ijill bo n3ceG?>rLry, 



^~^-^M JJ 1 II — - — - - ■- • ■ — ■ — ■ ^ ^ , — , T in fm ir^-L^^^M 



A. 



-••'* ' ^'^ ' ■ ""' ■" (1) TKo raport'of tho rsycliolosical b'arf^ro Ad Koc Sub- 
Cc>:r;:-dtt CO has b3c;'i aiii2ndcd and approved by tha Staff PlasiDortS. as a 
' v;or!ciu2 doouiiont for ud3 at staff level. (Eo^jjvcrj tho Aujtralia:i dcD.os-'ticB 
uifjhcs it to bo record f:d that^ iJi thx^-* viau^ thD authenticity of tho doou'^^nt^; . 
a tt 3. chad to tho Ad Hoc Sul>GoiJiiittGo rcpor^t a?? Arnc.^ 1 oxid /i^i^ic:-: 2 hiiB not ' 
yet bion c;'jt:;bli£;h:d aud nhoiO^d na^^oly b3 ivsod as an ox^aplc of th::j typ;; of 
policy vhich tho Ru^isian vx\A Chin'j33 Co?inux^ist3 rdght ,b3 c:<p3Ctcd to adopt.) 

at 

(2) It provides the iV2C03^ax-y teras of reforoB03 for futura 
plcojuins studios to support idlit:'!^' coiiroos of rction a3 iray b3 dovolopsd 
und3r tho no£;is of tho Mllj.tary Advisors. Consideration has b:c.:a [^Ivoa in 
tho ropo-'o to pro'vddin^ nooofjsai^' o^:chxmgo of training G:^3ricnc-3* . ; 

(3) Tho Continuij\3 action by tho nilltrvry AdviDsrs orc^rol^.a- 
tio;a in providiBg basic data ancl oxchtiDs^ of training c:;i::rric3^C3 in Jj/sportrait 
to ovontiul fori' ail a ti on of P^ych.olocical VJarfara cupportlD^ plana to tho 
ra].ita.'/y coursi^sj of action, ' ' ■ 

* 
(a) In order to clarify tha reoponsibilitor of tho l-alit?;:fy 
Adviporn in tho fiold of Pi:ycholo£;icar Unrfa:i-'0; the rei^ori ooto out tho . 
follo^.dns dofinitions: . 

" (s) X^>y.^PlS'2'i-SCl-^-?-PM^' '^'^i^ i^ *^- planned uso in 
co:^;diticn3 chort c^ var, "of' pT/ohliioG'lc'^orui'asur J3 .vo.clviiin^ propaaor.aa, 
- inror^-ation e-ad cthor ralntsd ticUons oiroctccl at -i-ii*i'icndayj neutral 
■ and nrri-ndly £roup3 for .th^ p^r?P:;30 of £i>ppcrt5.n:j tho ccco-raHDhncnt of 
nat;l.cn,al r..ir:G fLiyJ objectives. 



TOP. SSCRilV 



1028 



! I 



Decl^ffsiHed per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dute: 201 1 






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"(Pi:"95) 



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(b) ,P?X*Z^?l-5,?^'J^>!c^.Jji^^^^^^^ TMg 5.3 the plerjisd use 

in time of vrar or declei^ecl eyrL^rgcrjcj-^ of p^'yuholo^^-cr-J, incaBVxez iuc3-uc>- 
ing propa^a^-^-?-, 5.nfori*nation^ aucl other relatccl r.eoions clirir-otod F,t 
oiic-nyj neutral^ friendll_y foreign ^ronp3 for t}>o pvitjco^iso of 3iipp-:>roin3 
the^ acco3::plisl:iiiienl of national aij^is'and objcicti-^jc^y* 
! 1 . ^ . 

I (5) Activities unclor tha aogib of t>i3 Kilitsr-y Acivisei- 

should b8 confined to the field of P&yoholo^'ical lJa.vfr-VG as dsfjU^^d 
aboYOo Pnli^.^xy responsibility in the field of PDycholo;sic?'-l Action ig 
O' ^cido thG £iphcre of the llilitary AdviserSi, In order to cr?.3iirG con- 
tinuity of x^l^^i^'i-^^S ^'-nd coordination of effort there shoiO.d b3 co- 
T:)rdlnation b^stueen the co:':i::itteoD cet \vp \-r the Kilitary Advinorj^ rnd 
thor;e eet np by: the Coiincil Rcprosontatives„ ThJ.s f>hould.i3iclado tba 
ec .hange of obnerYers on an j.nvitationsl basiSo 

a 

(6) Renan-r.en4at.ion5 ; It is rceoi^endcd that the Mili- 
tary Advisors: 

i 

^ (a) Aj;ree that act5.vities UTider their aegis ' nho;0.d 

bo' confined to psychological vjarfai^e as defined xn paragraph f^^h, above 



^ (b) Insirdct the Secretai'iat to adviee tho Coimcil 
Rbpre£>entative3 of the field in i/nich the 'Military* Advi fields '£>tS eon- '■' 
fiji)ir«g their activities \rith respect to Pr.ycho logical V!ai"^farOj and to 
invite their attextiou to the need for coordination botveen the Mili- 
tary Advisers or2^ni£:at5.on and the Council Representativos 0T^c-'-)3.zt'-' 
ion to cni^ure cont^Vnuity of plannln,^ aucl effort in this field* 



tio; 



.y oi" pi 
.Oe Unconvent5_on^l Vr^rfare; 



(1) The report has been approved by the St?ff Pleroisra 
as a ^JorVlns dobr-nsnt for ugo at stcuff levels, 

(2) It essentially provides baf;i3 for development of 
S7i^iT0 Unco nveJrta oral Vfarfare planf3 to support planning studies of the 
MiDJLtary Advisers oi^rianisation in th'it: . 



stated; 



Wsrf^o^oj 



cnsi'ired; and 



(a) Pertinent arpectc of Uli conventional ir^vfaro aro 



(b) There is an a^a-eed definition of Unconventional 



(c) Keans of coraoilin^ b:\?iic teebnAeiUOs ar.d data aro 



(d) Ecchr-Dg^ of troam-T^;; c-:rpca\ienoe is provid:rd foi\ 



-'a 



(3) Tha Gharccterirrtxcr. of tho SE^TO crc-^i h±i^tili.zs^ -the 
iinportauce o£ U;-:convt;n-tior,.rJ. V!oi-rr..r,o- pl'Lti.ii and tha iujt.>r'o.^ncc of h-;? cpJj:!^ 
th3 nattci- of 'Jictv v-t' Unoonventlon^J, Ucxfare ctti^lies co.Titiau0U3ly bcfoi-o 



L 



TO? SECRET 



J..U O G 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND C)3316. By: NWD Diite: 2011 



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^* Pi2}S}i-SK'::§B)S'.'!S'''-lflism 



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■ . (a) Tho vr^ort of tho Kilitc-ry 7inti^-SiO?v^rc;ion Ad F:o3 

Coir^mttoe^ toge^thor vlth the rc:v:ort c^f th^ CoLirattoa to Cccibat C'jLU^:\*rz5.?jt ■ 
Svh'r^Tzlon^ is n pDllc/ dociv.'ionu i;M.ch e3tr.W.j.£ih3^ ths b--'.cin Tor fivbiivo 
^:orlc in the field of coivater^oubTorsion vitbin SSATO^ ^ 

(2) Thcae c1ocrjnc:aoj: reflect. tho results of the Goi\bin-d 
Civil oxxd Military Meeting on Coimter-S'ab^^orziion, Both reyjrts f^gi'^^^ 
as cb the Kilitaiy Staff Plan-norc^ tlixt a unified civil md nilit?.ry 
effort against Ccrrjumi^t tiubveri^iion is essential., an 3. tiiat the Ccrjiiittes 
to Co-nbnt CoHisunict EifovGrsionj d.s sot iip by the Council, f^hould b3 tho 
cgency to Kio^^g ,th.3 unified efforts, ^ . 

(3) Proper covorage of ?J1 ti^pGcts of coimt^r^-Giib version, 
ip to bs achieved by each ]n ember coiratry scndSj^g its approprie^/to ^pcieialz- 
ists, whether civil^ luilitexy or both, to n-33tii3g3 of tho CoLTilttco to 
Cohibat Ccc^mimitSt Subversion* 

C^) BsSQ^!H3£i^f ;?:ift9.s : It is recoirnsnded that: 

*. * . . (a) l*]ie VSJ.yA?j.-y Mvisers accept th^ report^ of th^' - 

liiijLtr_ry A'ati^-Subversion Ad Hoc Co^iiioittoe' and appro yo. tho,. x?=ooxntac^ndn.tion3 
tne:i*oxno 

(b) Tho Military AdviBsra note the i-oport of tho 
Co:3itt'::3 to Goi^tat CoriiiuM at. Subversion cud cndoras tho Co::LMittoo^a 
recoiiu^ sedation re^-'^r dlv;.;^ rosponsibilitiOD dtA coox-^dination of civilian, 
and id-lit ary authorities in coiuiter Lni.bvorsion motI: in tha r.oT)so t}ioro 
ehould bo one unified copjiiitteD to eouitor Coinraurd.bt rAibyor^-^ion roporti?:3 
to the Council Reprerj^ntativeSj and in tho sonfjc con^dstsnt i;ith th3 
intent of the rnilit^iry report p.b it rolateo to tha recoixncndatio;::; coi:- 
cerimi^ racrgcr of tha t::o con^Aittee^, that tho or£;*?;aic^.tion of such a 
uriified oon^aittee Yl^jj tlao effoot of leaving to e:idh i^c-::ab:r nation tho 
rifdit to deterraine its civilian end/or Liilit?ry roproacntLVGion, 



(c) Estimates related to tho do vtoz^ iihrro rA^bvorDlva 
aotivitic3 m^.j directly affect 3?.ilit;?j:y plaunit^g should be prepared by 
tho Goriuitteo to Coribat Cor^vurist Subversion cud the KiLitavy AdviDora 
s}iDuld instruct the Sscretrn'^iat. to invito tho Couacil Eepro:?entativo3 

to initiate t^uch studios as soon as poosiblo, 

(d) Tno r.iUtt-xy AdvlnorD instruct the Scorotavir/c to 
laaUo kno^.rn to the Council Roprcrente-tives the re::u.lts of the:i.r considor- , 
aticn of tho reports of tho Co:.foined i^oet^T-g a:-: indicated in p?j\^.<^r;-;r>h3 ,- 
^a^ b^ a-nd c above* 



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(e) Th?.t t}i3 MJJ.3.t?x-y A{3v:ls£r3 note tbo ros^x-Y-i-bioa 
■ nvJo by tha French D Dictation in rci^ccJ.i\±n2 -fro-.T B'ateittiii:! f;pool:C.io 
c-it^j^iatos on-tiv3 5ubver£^.vo thri?a-b in IA03, VXBnij:-! and C^itODXA. 



TO? SECRET 



1031 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



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(X) TbiG report has bcs^n approved by the StoXf PlLVJTier.^ . 
as a iror1:i»:s dociruiont for use at staff lovol, 

' . ' (2) Th3 report noteD £ons action alro?,cly in pro^fraos on ' ■ 

SJiI/lTO trairdns ^^^^ rcsr.lt of thils report. It point u out the t::cistixi3 
deficiencios iii this fiold cg pertain to the req"uire;aent for the ciil>* 
liission of traiy±n-s reports, ti-alnin^ sc3:c3uld^ ancl need for lonj ran^o: 
forecast of bilateral or niu?-tilatc-:ral exerci^jOSc Th^ report utre3G0G 
the UGGcl^ on a priority baf^is^ for sts^nciordisation of doctrinas, proeecl- 
v±o-^y techniques and pub?cLcatioii3 which are con::;idercd in the re;:art of 
the Staiida.vdiZ':;-tion Ad Hoc oub-Co7-:^tteo<, 5?h3 report providG3 fc^r t:^C:3l>-' 
ins th3 cinficicncife3 noted tlirough pro^-r^ri of fiitiirc vrorf: and cccohango 
of schedulo of training facilities a\^ailablc \dthin tho SJtL^.TO £irea. 

(1) This rcpprt has besn aL-ie-iiclecl and approved by the Staff 
Pa^ainers r.s a v;orkin3 docur^icnt for usg at ctaff lovol. , ' • 



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(2) The report points out major eate^jories and areas 
V7here Bsr.s'J^i-es to effect practicable ancl. tiecensary staiidai-di sation 
procedUTCfs shovJA be ivadertaVen ap goon as p^Ksible. It providas for 
Taa-ftbnr nrLtioiis to under taj.:e .puch practicable and nscessary ota'adi?vdi-,atlcn 
of tech;.^iqu£s ojid cquipnent to enable S&\TO forcer. \;hich may particroato " 
in conbiiv:.d trajuiii-' or operations to operate collectively in an efficient 
and crfect?,ve nanner. The report cstab.Ushs^ methods and procedurerj for 
collective and caohr.nge of data. 



(3) ArrtOigGrac-ntG are provided for the U:iitcd States to 
asrAHie responsibiUty fc-r initiating actions relative to coordinat5-n;^ 




traiains, and logistics have been a^si^n^d to the Ph;lii;yo:iJ2cs^ United 
States, and United Kinsdom respsotivcly. ■ ■" 

III*' OTHER. BUSWgS: (AlCISC^ E) ' ... ' . - ' 

^* ^J^^^jMSiP' of DofensivG and Suo-o^i:J:in^_C<^^^315^o^|LAc^^^ 



1. 



Str;tjrnsnt_or_Prqblc:at To correlate tlie provision of nilitr-a-y 
support fcr th^li^.^foilsVoT^he-TVca^^^^ A.rea la-Lti other - OTpportir. 
of action including attrxk on selected ens-xy tr^rgetD v.cin^ totb 
t5.oria3. and nuclear. Areapons. 



^v.^ couroes 
:h conven- 



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2ft ConnliKiionn 



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Of Th 
in th 
acccp' 

TOP SDIRET . 



1032 




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Declassifi^ per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TO? SECRET 



(Pr:-95 



* ' btf That the proviniuon of military support for repollijQS 
Coii"^iii^^^i5/jt c^r^reiision ^i^aiast the Tra^.t;r Ai-en through &.ii'b?. "bo £cco;i:'tcd 
an a bsu coui-^^e of action and plerc-iing stucVios propi^Tcd, 

: (1) The net capability of the Chinese Cox^artiiritG end 

Viet MirJl follo-j:Uig attao!-: on fjoleetsd targets of the Chinese nia3.:>- 



' ■ ^ - (2) The net cp.pability of the Yiet l-Ji^ih follc^dn^ c.ttiic?: 

on £if.locte:l targets of JTorth Vietn^in, and , ^ 

(3) That the pro"vrifjion of xiilitai-y fii^^pport for the 
defence of 3?rf:it:tr;a h^ Au'ther developed to include the rittac^c of 
Bolccted encijytargjts us^ing both conventionrJ. and imclerj^ x.^eapens. 

J ■ c* That other supporting coi*^:^^sc3 of act5_onj Inoludins 

jblxjolcftde of Coi^-mniet consts, deffenne of essential cca Jlnes of coii-^m- 

Cication tjid defense of essential air linos of coTumuiication, b3 doyelop::;d 
lu c or :o elation u^th tha provi::ion of lailit^^iy support for tho defends 
' ' of Thailar.a, Ic,03^ CaTEihodiaj" Sov.th Vietn.^jQ end Pakitit.^^! and ;rf-th attack 

'. * - ■' on selected tai'g^tt^ of the Chinese. 3nDJ.nD-and and elDe::her0 as rccuir^d,- 

r' ; ■ ' ^ - 

V. . 3* Rcco^^-ri^ndation J That the IIilita^*y Advinera r/tyorove the 

coneluf:jion3 ateve and direct the Kilitfay Staff Plavmor.r? to trfcc the 
fj ■ * n^Q033c:cy action* 



1, DicGiv'^^nion! 



i* 



a, /^euda.o for Mllitai^^ /.dvisers and Sts^ff Planners Meotli}^^ 
h^ivo b::au fir;ily JjoA-oii^ have bsen cl-^^rr-cut and have.bijen follo".;cd in ^ 
ConoraJle llo auch fiia-i .^/stc^ pi-evailcd for the Ad Uoo Si'b-Ceirioltt cd, 

b- Th9 foLlo-'.Jing additioDpJL slgnificrat x:ointD c.re l?roii;:;ht. 
t-o the attention of the i:ilit::.ry Advisers. 



9 

(1) Agendas frequently do not darjioiiatop irhen thou^-h 
appropriate^ rcinon^ibility for t}ie prcp:a*ation of po^jition p>;per, 



e. 



-? n ^ -% ^ . 




. 






Ec ForM.^rdl^:!'^' Co?rrcr;nondonne B'-^tiraen Militai^y Advi^jGrs; ' . 

!• Ji4r'£?A§J^i;Sn - 3x1 the case of signals addressed to tho French 
Military Advif^cr^ there has been certain difficulties of routin^^^ due 
to tho use of various cliaunels, - ... 

2* E.^^'l^i^i^^^i^-® • I't is recoHLisndcd that t}ic MiDAtary A.clvlaoro ^| 

ta.ke note of the irich of the French Delc'^ato to ha\'-o the corre:>pondGnoG , ' 

adtlre33ed to the French iiiDAt^A'y Advitiarn routed as faa' as poni":jiblo. 
throv-Sb the Military Liaison Group in Banghok- ' ■ ,■ ' '; 

G* Thn ProcVidures for Develouino' A^endan for Co?™'}lttc3 and Snb-* ' . 

Ceii^a5_ttee Knat^jif^.i: ^ ■ 



frv. ^^"^v^ ^-- 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
^fND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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-(PK-95). 



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, (2) Position papers ortc^a ai^e r.ot circiilD/ocd in 
.surn-cicnt tiuo to p^^r^pJlt" study bsforo tho com'^enj^ig of neet^aigs, 

■ ■ ^ ' ' * 

a* IJhsn the Stnff Ple;::!nars rccoia-uCJid or ^the l^'ilitrx^^ Advisers 
axrprovo or i:ichedulo Ad Hoc Sub-CcrivJ-ttBO ir-eotan^^ that 5.n acVln.tion to 
spsoifyiiis t^-Q 'iV/nnD of RororGn;;;^ tvnd t^j^ie rncl place of i-isi^tir^ga that 
os^-^3^cl?.s bo ciGvaLopcd cxid irhero rppropriate rc3ponsib:llity for the prepnra-^ 
tion of pO'^itilon pap3x-B bo da^igiiiVLritle • , • ^ 

i 

b. Once r/^^ei^claa exo r.pproved by tho Mi.lAtary AC\Y5,seT0 they ' ' 
irlll not b3 icodiricd except r.G tho flvst itc^.i or bihvxnc^Ds at a prrtioiilsr ■ 
laG&tii:^, , . "... ' 

' ' ' * ' ' " ^ ■ ' . ■ 

Ct irneii x^^^^^"'^-^-^^ 'P^'P-^^ ^-'-^ bc^ilri^ propavcd tho coi^ntry * 

respDnsiblo should in3u::c th:it rATch pcpsrs reach other lacrab^r countx-ie^ 

in rsi^ffioient tiiao for study prior to a liieotinso - 



CJ 



3. 



R^j^-Qr':^gj:^^':^ici3:Tq : It is reco:i:i eroded that the Milit:?2^y Advisors 
^ tpxxcore tho abo\-o proocdiire for dcYGlopi^i3 future agendas for SE/iTO Ad 

Hoc Sub-Gorjimttees, ■ ^ . , . ' , ^ 

* ■ '' . ■ ' ' ' 

■ 
iSKATO Coiv;\oll. ProTfrens Ro-.-^nrt: ■ -^ ■. . ^ 

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■ * • • 



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a* The Sta,ff Plejancrs consfdorsd the x^'03t^5.Mlity that thc^ro 
iLi;jlit bo required a co::;prehensive SSATO Council Prosross Roport v;hich 
\rjj.l contain a ni3.itary chapter » Such report sight bo required for US3 
by tho SEATO Council at tlieir 33:p8ncy,U2 raeetiii-; to bs held in late 
^'obruary or early Maixh, ■ '-. ,, 



■"o 



bfl Althoi'gh it>v:a3 goner ally agi*eod that tho Military 
SocrotaricVt \;ould be the proper' organ for coaipilixig such a report for 
ar^>roval by tho llilitary Advisers at their ncKct noetir.g in Melbouvao 
dxxrln^ Jaauaiv^ i"*^ vao rccogniiied that the shortnef^s of time ajid present 
embryo statuD of tho. Secretariat XDlght not perz-rittho coiipil5.ng of th^ 
coi::OTchcn3ivo aad accurate report de^jired. 



G 




in the Sli/iIO Go\moil report c The United States a^freed to prepare dxai^t 
reports aud 'to diascjiinate scjae to tho other llilitar-y Advisers during 
.early Bccoiiber, ^ 



■w .- 



d, Th3 rc3p-:?otive Military Advlpcrrj^ co~aieiits vxul roco-iierLi 
ation.s on thoDO rc^pcrts i:ould thoa bo for:^-ai'ded to tho Mi3.it?ry 
S'^^^cretariat \:hich vouAd^thcu h'ajv^ "the tojss: of coneolidatir-^ theDO 
c.o:^:i?ntG and rcconiaendationa r.rid coiopili:a3 those reports for subrdeLvVo::i 
- to the Hil3/to:cy Advisers at their ne::b neetin^. 



TO? SEGRET 



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Declassified per Execulive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TO? SI^RST 



(p;%95} 






2, Rrr^^o^^vr-DOTl/i.on; It in rcoo:-TaoJi?.cd 1;lia"t the lliIli.t::'Xy 
Scnx'ot print: ' ^ ' ' . 



•t ■< 



1* Dif^ovr.^ijion: 












' Gc " On 30 Sc-ptc.^'oGr 1955, the PrrccutiYo ScorootDi^ o.f tlK 

SKiiITO Coiixicil Roprcserttav-ivo'j Sc^rotrriat lulviscS tho CI:a:U'ncm of tii3 
SEATO M5-litary £ra>?OwCJ'5:at th:it tlio Ccin^Gil Rc;pi-e:^ont:^o:tvcQ kci'G pro- 
rrciai^ to o^Tfm^o for eoplotj of all a^rirovcd roorcls of tholr p:-;oo:>itlar'iii 
,j ba Hado available for the una of tho Hilit^a^y jicTviGoi^s aa \/ol3. as 
'copicp of othor docvTov^^rtD l:lk3?.y to b^ of. iiit^^rcijt^to thc::!^ It \:-^.:3 
rJlcQ iiirorr^ially conveyed th:it tbo Co-ancil nc;jro3i;ntativc3 Socrotr/i*iat 
\ aild like to he in porr^cri^slon of n copy of omfiioJ. records of pAI , ; " 
LjSAffO r^ootinga to ijicluclG the fin^jaisM^rt^^ of a eapy of all riilit:?.!'/ r0;Tort3 
for ro tent ion oy tho Couiicil PtcproDe^t:Lti\'03 SDcratsi^iat,. 

; b* TIdrs Hatter vic.o c-ifx-ucaod b^ the Et:Lff Flr.nncrs at t>io 

inj^tisiation of tlio 11=8, dolG^^ation aud it t-ao gonoi'alAy a^roccl" that a^i 
^cccchcj^so of aporopx-iat 3 tlocAv:iont:3 v^oiilcl bo cTcoirablOa 3't vwz rc£^oj^.vU;cc% 

^ far 

Sscrotariiit* 



^o:;ovv?r, that thcro i^ay ba j-iilitr^a^y qccm^lty and- other rv?:rtrictionD o.2:d\::3t 
^urxiliDhijiz ^^^^ iii-'i-itojrj rGoordri ciid ropoiyos to tbo Ccr^ricil Rcpros&ntativc3 



2 r Rccot^-nendnt.ion : 

a« It is rccori^:iio:adcd that tho MJjA-trx-y ;:d^lr;erD a0.opt tho 
folio i.-in^ &tate--2C2at of poriition a:} £uid:i:2oo for tho Chajx-f^:ai of tho 
miltary Sccrotarc-lat: 



"Ad a f;onDr;:il. nilo^ thoro i^ no objection to lial-cin^ coplc3 
of i^eportD of pa3t rrtooti:i:?;;n avaalablo to tho Gou>iDil Sacrotarlatj ho7> ■ 
'ovGr/thJ.n choi^ld not noan tho automatic diatribatioii of cU official . \ ' 
records of tho I-Jilita^vy Advincrj o:?2a.i>i^':-atiori lol^pas the CoTiiioil 
nopreacntativon t3^ci-^ot:ij:-iat is cpaoifica.Uy dosiijnatcd in distribution." 

b.. It la fiurthor rccor^aonded that the Milit^j.*}'^ Advicciro . 
5.ndicatu their acceptance of thla position by ei^jaal to tbo lliHtaiy " 

Sccrotaxiat as c:?^'ly as practicablo ap intorliv gtiif^Taco psndi?::^ cJiy 
furthc-i^ oicaTniiiation of thin cubjec^t as nay bo n^^GGP2ary.r 

■I- 

F* Rnl ^tioP^wulrja B^tu^on ryj^ct-iTcv Advinor-i rvs\ Cminriil Rc■'^rn'l:'r^t.'xt.^val• 
lo Dirjcvvinioii; , ' ' 

a» In con::idcy:bJ3 a proposed a 2-^-^- ^or tho M3.1it:?xy Advicora 
at thoir forthcoiiin^^'n-^iotiiij in Molcwv-no^ the nattm* of tho corporate 
Dtatii.T rolatioi:i:;bip3 botira::!! Kilitr^v Ad'^i^jJ crs r.^d tho Council Roprcsenta-* 
tiva3 vraD raiccd* Thin !:attor had bcr^a dicout^r*::^ bilofly at tha la3t 
Kllit:?.ry AdYiD3rB' :T.oot 5^:13 in Bai^.^IioV:^ bi:t raD dsi'e^^rc-d at that tii^a 
D.Q eJl i;ilit.?j:'V Advi.T:or3 uoi^a ^oo then in reooipt of natiorsal £;uidarice. 



TO? SUGRS-r 



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Declassiried per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 2011 



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be. It \V2.3 i^enor^"'Jy rcco^';:i.'>:cd that the ^jo.fdvicluil I'clc/cio::;- 
thipti "bstuecn tb?j roDpoDtivo KiJatar/ kCcn.^^'iTu^ Cdv^jjaoII Represent rttivCii^ 
Connc.il J^i briber 3 a'ad oira dsren?i;& c3t£i"b3J.£bxioiit:i d:*.?x'*ca' xa the \i\riD'i'^.r*-^ 
eoi\ntr:le3 c/acl uro a patter for nation^il dirtcriTor^roicn, it ij2;;i r.*;;r-::z5, 
hoiroverj th^vt there sIiQUlld bs a dster-aination r.3 to th=3 cc:?.ot iV3A:it:lo;>' ' 
cM.T);j b;^tvb3it liilrltra-i^ Adviccrs r,ncl ths'Coi^oil R-:yz*osont::itiv:;3* Tli3 
U*S. Dele{^ation ^ub^rlttc:! a di-?.;3r^S':r'!r,tio chart r-3f.lcatii"^^ the;.- if roletlo:!'* 
slxlp^j fro::^ tho vilei^pDi'at of the U.S* Ml^ltai^^ Advi.^^r, I'his ir* av:;; Glided 
h^vo'to as App3ii5i:^ 10 t.:> AnBex A,, , : 



K 



2p Reco^Tnende.tion; It is therefore rcoor:r;]enclcvl thattho ' 
liilltary AclviDerc; co-asidsr this rolatio^iDbii:' at tiiD^r foj/licorjij:-! 



Go 



Pnnnrlhle Thrp::it to Tro-itv Avt?a by Ovoi't 3^i=:-y'V ,*.'v^^*Gn':^:lr3n TV^rcir^h 



1. 



J)if?cnr;jn:'.on 






1 

a. Tho PcOdDtL^n Dclc;:at^.Q3i ra;l:5e:l tlio }:}attcr of tlio H^rioi^.a 



i H — 



throat to the cutiro Treaty arc?! of overt Coi=cz>ani£st a2gx*G=js:lon ti'i:oo\?:;;h ■ 



2# Rnoo'^7ij!v.lr'.t:^.n:a: It is recoii-iiondsd th?-t the MlLttc^ry A0.v:l:jcr3 
t-?]ce ijoto of t}iE3 forego :'.n^ propoaod i\\\\C^:j 5.n ito relittloiaDlrlp T^dth oth-:!^ 
clofcnL^ivc .nnd eupportAr^j coin^as^ of actions 

H* SPTin-TAT Rer^ort on Go:-nuii:Uiiu^:^ md }^ifolic Rr^lr^.tion^: ' 

■ 

1^ St'^-tf-rjnt of Frol?T.::-n : To r/a^r.'ciariivO t}i2 leacons learned ;'_:=a 
tri3 public rali-vt 3.01)3 field diirir.^ tho second confer snco of tho Et^^f:^ 
F,lr.';ino:Ci'^j end to rcccc;:aavid tho i[ian:aer in \;hlch !i;r:eh rolatio:ii3 phoiuld 
fimcticn r.t fiitaro SEATO nllrltsu-y confcrcviices, 

"p. Tn.tmduotir-n: Tiic e0a£:rtial p^^rpriz^o of this rc'.:?ort in to 
cer/e ao a b?.6'io for di'jcuasion by r.^Tprcbriate rAithoidtie^ in orich ;.v:3ber 
niition prior to tho Jicrit HiJat^:.-^^ Advir^er^i mE^otin^ v^ rath-ir 'the-n thrt it 
choiild bo regard od co "A cc:iclu;iivo cc:prDJn^.o:;a of runtr-J^T- q:>:a-don cii/chiD 



3 






TO? SiCH;:^r 



103 






b* The Staff Plariners n2"recd that a detrdltd atudy of tho 
pb:^;Diblo thrc:it of Coi:ii^unir;t A£_^2^c:7sion t'l^jairist th'i Treuty ai-ca gcnora^J.y^ . 
Olid Tha^.lcr-d and Earjt Pahi^tr^i in pai^ticiLlar, tlii^or^'h }h^rjr.a nhoirld ba 
prcpniccdj tos^thsr ulth a dotsrvxlaatior. of tha military support i:ocjo.^,3a^y ^ 
to reool i>rch a thrcr,t imdcr co2:dit5,on3 of 2iucle2r v,zzQZi}:ca^ ' ■ > 



i 



^ * 






Declassiried per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 1 6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



c 

r 

r 

m 

[ 



r 






E 



E 



TOP SKFvET 



(Pi:-95) 



.J^' JiecpH ^]ena?^XDiji3 : The St?-fr Plpj]r.ers recoi^-enfl; 



« '■ 



OX o 



a. That, at futm-e SEATO laHtai*^ Aciviscrs and Staff Plaim 
conferences, a Public Relations CoL-:Laittee ba eritabliehc-d A.dth tho cole 
responsibility of supplying material for al.1 nass cojc^im^lcations lacctia. 

b, Tliat the Military Advisors in5:truct their reprcsontativeD 
on the Pi^bllc RelrAions CoiraitteCj prior to the meotiiig-p on the theriGS ■ 
cnct'policies uhich thoy consiclGr should h3 emphasised in wblic rolatior 
EiaterieJ.* 



piv 



0113 



c^ That the Public Relation^ Cori^^ittee chouJ-d convene prior 
to SEATO Kilita.ry Advif;er£; aiid Staff Pla:mers conferonc^a to analyse past 
pcrfoMDUices vjnd foririulate a public relations poller for guidance during 
tho confer cno 3, (Note: The effectiveness of SE.'.TO* public rclcations 
cannot be i/ieasured until post-conference reports concerning public 
relatione are available in all countries «)■ 



4' 

i 



* ^ d* , That the members of the Public Relations Corumltteo r.hould 
h^^o no other duties. " \ '\ - ' 

Go That the ropresentativ.e of the ho^st nation on tho Public 
Relation:? should be the channel t}rrou:ih \:'hioh all puW.icity pertninin^ 
to the confer anoe is reloaded locally, -^ ■ . . ^ 

f. That aJJl l^ilitary Advisers should ^ as soon as poaDibley 
individua-lly notify the Secretariat of their agreeTnent that the Public- 
Relations CoiLjnittfiC should laeat in Melbourne on 11 January ^ I956 to 
agree to a comiunique for issue pilor to th3 Military Advisors* r^otins 
on 16th JaiiUaiY/ ^-956* ' 

IV. R?:/^U3:RFM£I?rSJ'0R_FU-''IIHE VJORK: ' " i 

+ ■ 

A, Vi^ litarv Advil a em ' Group : 



1. Tlio Military Advisers^ Group is due to laeet 5ji KolbouA^no on 
16 Januai^y 195^* The Staff Plauiacra suggest that they should conaider th 
foU.oi7.iD2 agenda: ■■ ' 

ao AgcndaXtc^- A: Approval of tho Dv:^jnejx-y report of tho 
ysiitsry Staff Plannors Coufercnce at Pc?j:*1 Ka^rbor in Noverober 1955 • 

b* A!:^anda Itf::^^! B; Con£dd:^ration of the- United States paT^er 
on tho rolationship bstveen the Military Advisors' Group and tlia Council 
Representatives* . ■ . , 



r^ 



B 



c, A^^erda Itcn C;/ AgTeemeat t-o tho rillitary prc^rea, 
reports, to be sircniitted by the S.3creta.viatj for subcaisiiion to the SS/.YO 
Coiacil Rooresentatives* 

dfr A'cpnda Itc-^ D: Other businoi^s* 

J < ^ X L' O J 



I 










£■ 



Decl^ffsiHed per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dute: 201 1 



■/- 



--> ^ 



TO? SSGRLT 



■ ■.C?;^-9:5) 



1 4 

y ^ Hilita'f^ Advxcora shonin^ as soon e,3 poj^^iblo, jj^.^ulvic>acJ^l7 r.oliSy tbs 

J , ■ *. Secretr.rir;!: of thsiir r"rcc:'ient to Viio d'cove Q2cr4^# 






ItutJ-^ .-1^ . ■ - a .^ ..^i»C,.b __^'.^.r^ .^.i^. ^ ....^.-fr..^-^ I* ■ -J!,. J 



.^-^ 



; . 1. TiiD St?.ff Plimiiors prof:3D3 th^t orii Ad Hoc S;^l>-Gffi::Mitt 
ehoii^-d n^cit to consider tha c.i^cncl^ as i^ tat so b^loi? vJ2^i that pacitic^a 
pH^:?a\^£i rhoiild bo pr-cp.rrccl C3 iixUcatsd: 



* ~-' - ■' -' — - - ' —■..-. — -^ ^ ^ 

,. ' ^ . ■ (1) X^^"'i: /m crvrJiiation of tho not Conmui^^rrt tL'j'Cj:-: to 

Cf ,nithcarrt Anir;> ir>- dueling S'.a-t Ptilcif:t?.n^ in con r^icl oration of <ho i'oxvat 
,th:cou:th BiUTi?C^ aftf^r- t:C.:ir!g Into con ciidci^it ion ths offc^ct of /-Xlicd aerioA 
attack, ^7ith c, ccrro:ln ration of convent.ior.al ciii nnclz3:c voyoo^D^ on KoiitOa 
Chiuct TAicl !!ort5i Vlotniixi. (The ccopo of tho ailica r.ttao!^ to b3 ta'ccn int-o 
con ^^icl oration ir. arj detailed in the t/onOy 6t Anne^: A^ /^ppcadiUc 7 of tlvio 



I rcpDi^t.) 



■♦' % 



/■*^ \ ' / C^) P^nit ion.. r)nr>r;r; To bo ixccpDi^cd by tiio U::iitc:l Stcto:^^ 

(1) 7,^^325: ^^>^ ova^lnation of tho not Viot V^:^::k thrcnt to 
tho G0untrf.e:3 of fi'^vvtli^a^t Asia af't^or tp]:!!-'^ into a^coimt tho effect of 
A^^licd aciripl *"ttr.ckj' v^ith a coi3M.nation of conventio;aal and nnolcrj* 
.ue^iponsj on 7brth Viotnr].^t . ' " 

■ 

^ ■ (2) ?on5,t5.on T>Toari To' bo propore-5 bv tho bnitad StatoD* 

' - ■ ■' ' p ■ ' ' ^ 

I - . ■ ■* ' ■ " ' ~. 

r ' ' ^ " ■ ' . (l) Ta5";,:: An ov^Jv.ation of tho i\^% Ccr„*:;iird8t tjr^^c?,t to 

C[^ ' ' IJoDt P<?;iiotan aftor tr-Vin^ into ficootint tho effect of AJ:i:v::d nuolcr^r 

i - ■ motion (!::irJji^3t the Co^7aroist v,zz^oz:ilon^ 



b. Tt>; tho n3e:yi:v'prcpDoi;d abovo^^ • - ' ■ ' 

Q.. Tn^X poaition 7:?n^>or3 ohor^d bo r^c'r^:}:^^ og pro'::opcd o;:ovc, 



J 'S . . " • 

ij .' — 

^ Co Str.ff P:t9nv,r:ro^,; 

if . -■ ■ 3,, Th3 StAff ?aa"::c:r.:3 iTro::oro that nt thnix* ri:^:t. nootli'is thoj 

^- - EhoiLld coxi::idc^ the fo2J/:^::i:i5 0.3---^^ ^--^ "^--^ po:jition p;\p:T should bo 

]; ^, - produo^::d tip. indicated: 



1. 



70? SEGHIff 



- C^) Vj^J^JijSlV^JOjni^i To b3 prcpoTcd by tho Unrltcd States e ' 

* 

2^ Rocor=^o::r'i!.-^tion; Tho St?S£ ri^nncrn recCwierad th:it tho *\ I 

'"'** ^ ''/ '' ,.\ G. To tho irjotin3 of tho Ad Hog C:fc-Gc::::od.ttco jjroprjrod abovoi*'^ 



1 



[ 

c 

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I 






c 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 









XOP saiRET ■ 



CpH-95) 



a. Apxincla Itsyi A: 



b, Ar<.enc!a Iter^i B; 



. aw^^ v'fc- .rfi,-^.^^*^ •m Ln--^ _ ■• 



(l) X^i^'i* A stiicly of thD Wocl:ade of the South Ghinii and 
North Vietnrjn cor.,sts in support of the rdlxtniy o^j orations in dofcnr.o of 

So- theanit Asia,.agrdnst aii attacic by ClL^aeso Coii^u^xst vxid Vict Mitili forcoco 

/ 

C^) r£/^i^3UJiSSJSI ! To b'^ prepcjj^ed by the UrdtccT Stater^ 

■ 



(2) Position iD-pj^er; To bo preuDred by thG Urrltcd KingdQrn* 




(7^ Por.iti^n prroex^: To be produced \rr Paidst^Ji, 



I (l) 7(1^^}:: To C::coi::ino e:^d,r>ti^2 iiov.-mxc^z saA to d8te:c:ai?:^,3 

^SHL^TO rcquir Clients for th3 all.oc?.tior*, coiitvol riud protection of -QHed 

L ■ :fo? sECRRr 







. " I 

(-1-) .^^-.S's: A revievr of the report bj tho Ad -Ibc Sub-. ' 
CoinaittoG on Tiireat EVrJ.ua tlon end tho ch^a'.-dri'? iro of f •.•o^jropriat 2 cl■>scA^-• 

vations and r&cor:3nezLdations to the Kilitc^a^" Adviccre concornins it, - ' ; 

M ^. ' ^ , ■ ' 
1 (2) Position iy".^or; Ken 3 renuired. 



! 

) 



) 
1 



(i) X?,5l?5 The dDve.lop:aent of the SEATO f^ti^ategic concept 
^ for tlic dofen£.^G of Southeast Ania, including the defeui^c of Fact PiO:ir/J",£'Ji I 

\ ~ ^ and of essential sea and air lino:] *of coiT.V^uziicatioB, against eXi attack - ^ P 

by Chin 83 G Coirj.maint a^id Viet "Kinh forces on tl33 aanUT:ption that tho 
SEATO nations uoiLld uso nuclcax frc^t\pony us required^. (To bs bapcd on the 
^ findingcj under Agenda Iteia A of tlio A.d Hoc Sub-Coiuiaittes on Tiir cat 

' Eval'.uatlon,) 



) 



d* i.^Mo-^lfe'iJl.: ' ' \ 



* 






(2) Pofsition BrvDor: To bo prcb:a^ed by Prince. 

\ 

c. ^ Agenda Itrri E: * , - J 

I (1) Ta:^-l5' The dsvolopment of a SEATO ctrategic concept ^ I 

for the dofcn-^b of V/est Pakistan against an att!ic!< by CorrfiTiuiiDt forcr.o ) 
on tho ai53n^i:ption that SEATO nations i;juld u^a i.^u clear v; canons as required ^ 

L{To b3 bailed on the findings under Agenda Itc3 C of tho Ad Hoc Sub- ' 

' Commttee on Thj^eat'Eva^luationo) ; » ' ^ / 



J 

' t 



4 



i 



I 

\ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND Cj3316. By: NWD Diite: 2011 



1 

m* 



I 



I 



'■- /T 



TOP SzCRST 



(JlT-OS) 



jaerccjiant tihilppiL^g 3Ji the South cud £outhe'iirt'i:ii'5.a r-ra23 in tlis OTCii'i ox 
overt CD:-amiviifit r.sijL'esjsilonc 



.A 




^T" 




I 



StD.-oo3^ TJ?xltcc!. Kir^^c'ci:.^ }^rr.^c^3 rxcl Av.:^traT-i^ (tl^is cv.bjcot to cor):?3^ir.- 
at:lQn by each n^^tion coriocx^ntci) ^ 'xli:; Xi;Kltc:l Stato^ Vil'D, r:?n:ltor tM.s - 
nubJG:;t ^^icVirfJJ- avr^Y\^;o for v. jo:avt nootir.3 to lo l^sld svJTicicritly -In 
ec""/r;iico or tli3 ^Str^Tf PJ.rJiUor;^^ iicotiL^^ to cnablo tho prcpa-ration of" a 
jo5Jxt pDcitioa pw.po:r« ■ , - ■ ■ -■ . .^ ^. .: : — 

i * r . , + 

(1) lJ^^:iS* ^^^<^ coazJicioratioM of iiatci-iDJ r>tand^i'ai^i;aio:d 
' by properly o\\v^S£xz^O, t3ohn:lc^2 ropr;DDontat5.YOD* i!l3e.^lc■a to b6 dralm up 
■ tiUvf circiilatcd by the U:2itod States* 

• ■' ' (2).2i>5^,mJ?:v:s;: Yo ba prcpc^Tcd l:>y t!io Unxtca St:itc:3. 



hft Af;e"o.a .Ctc':a 11: 



L 



iT - 



(-'^-) -T/i^ji! To'diwj lip 4ot?.ilccl GD:}G32.^eata of r_rc?.3 of 
pb^cntxnl re:^:lf;trji,co, facivvticj foi-^ e^capa cna evasion c^fi (j-accri^aa 
varfcvo cr;?ab:llit5,es ft ■ ' * ^ 






t 






t 



.• . ■ (2) fe;i^V:'a^.:jl^3£S! 1:^3 rcqu3j:'cdo Each nv:'aou iti 

Uixltccl fib atop \f:5JJ. coaslcbr ths Chinese zji^lrLlriKL Irx»n. Csp/cadia oa^ ■ 
Scjuth V:lotn;£3. ; . ,. . . ,. ... 

w 

"■■■-' i» ^''^i^■f'''^ 'J-'^r^ J: -.•...; ■ . . 




; out iLi piu^^5v.^^:i i,(T^) f^T:ova 



• i 



. » 



I 



* I 



■ (1) Trt'cj' 2VeDontntlc):a of r^ ov^i.^:; r.tic:3 b-f" tbs overt 



J 



r:=o:d: ji-t^ .of loi^DDa'to tho PMH^ilr-^:), 



I 



;! 






to 1)3 



i.i 



TO? SIOIIHT 



L 



•■ 4.01:0 



.1". 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 201 1 



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TO? SIS^RET 



(PIN-95) 



k, A^^e^^cip. Itr-Tj K; 



Li^.^^dk'k^v'^k.^'t-k h:^ -a — ^rJt^,^^ 



%' 



JLtig the preparation of agicidad for: 



2. 



(a) Too third laa^tli:^ of the ra3ifcm*Y Advlssra. 

(b) Ad Hoc Sub-Coni:ii,tte3 as rcciu:brcdfl 

(c) Ths foLirth nc'itit)^ of tho St^IT Planners. 

Rf^£J2fr2S:::i3ni:£n : TI13 St-rr Planners recoroiGnd that "tho lliHtiri' 



7 



Pl!?jiue:cs . 



a. Approve the above rgenda for tho thli^a Kcotin" of the Staff 



b. Asi-es th-t po3;ltlou papers £;bmad bo prepared as indlca" 



tecle 



i>» TiB03„enrl_Pn ;-iNj3_j)_f^r)_^^^^^^ . • 




Ssr;lal 



• 1, 



Coirc^ittca 



-^iii ^i i- ^-i 



>?XaQ 



a 



Dats 



ft 



2. 
"3. 



Ad lloQ Suc"Con:nittcG on !rhrD.-i 
&/aluatio;i 



t VoDxJ, HarraT 5 Fcbruory 1956 






■j.",i' 



23 15^7 195S 
16 July 19 5 S 



1 



, ^" ^^iS^^rESE^Jvy^on: The Staff Plamerc rcoo:3jsnd- that tlio* 

^j.xxw:l-/ Auva.oerD f>pprovi the n'cove echedulG of future Ksctin^^D, " 

,,,. -'- .5fiQ.'':n32:'S-i?;PI!: The Stsiff Pl^riiora rccor-se-r'.S that tho 

i'^-.-ttarj Arlv;lscra g^-gs th?.t nations reD-conail^Xo for t-lio prcpr.ratioa 
01 pOEXxicn p^psrs should circu3.atc tho so thr-oti-th the Szcr ctxcxo^t at 






lea; 



'^^i' o:i-3 nonth before tha r.ppropriato nooti-^s* 






'^ .^ 



A. Tha Str-ff Planners .1 



'^cc~: 



.z-.nCi that tho i-'ilitar-y /idvijsora 



ro;:t>rt. 



1. Tekc Koto of cXL tho ixjint:; rained la tho ebovo cui^iaary 






^•r^'iTT:i^i* 



TO? SIXiHEl 



' 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 20 1 1 



F ■ 



I 

L 

[ 



pi 



r 



TO? SECltET 



(r-M .-^95) 



* - 



C 



2o Appx'ovc th'j rcooriiiibnda'oicns naclo in thn vcr5xai3 c action 3 of 



^* *■ 



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L 






« F.^-'^l l-"*.^ 



Tho list of clDlonat33 ia coatrliu'd at J^^nox S, 






Aufitrclia 



Sonior Kcilc^ato, 



FrcrtOQ 






ilVO/n:^"' 



-'— 'i-'i^ 



Lv^ 



1' 



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\ 






11 Gi; 2oa3.r-acl 






Senior Polecats, 



r 



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Senior Dc3,03at3j 



TO? SEOJlBr 



r- 



Kcnior D:)l03at3, 
Unit^cl States 



»■* 



1GU2 



Declassiried per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 1 6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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S'cCRE! 



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In reply refer to 1-16501/5 



MEMOIWniM TOR TEE SECRETAEY OF THE WAVY 



l6 December 1955 



SUBJECT: Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO) Staff 

Organization 



Reference is made to the forthcoming meeting of the SEATO Council 
to be held at Kai'achij Pakistanj coiimiencing 6 Marcli 195^- 

The Department of State has informed this office that pressure is 
increasing J particularly from the Asian members of SEATO ^ for a permanent 
I SEATO Council and Mlitary Staff, organ iza-t ion. At a recent meeting of 
'the Military Staff Planners held at Pearl Harbor j TH (1-15 November) ^ 
it was the conclusion of the U.S. representatives that the position of 
the U.S. relative to avoiding a commitment to the concept of a permanent 
SEATO militaiy staff organization vas fast becoming untenable. CIIICFAC 
reported this in his message to CNG^ 230211Z November j vhen he stated 
*'It has been U.S. policy to oppose formation of a permanent SEATO staff 
orgeuiisation. In this connection^ foimatioa of some sort of perrnanent 
SEATO staff organi?,ation may be Inevitable and U.S< eventually may find 
it necessaxy to yield on this point or find itself in no position to 
refute 'paper tiger' charges. It may be more realistic to take the 
initiative in this matter so as to be in a better posJ_tion to influence 
the size and shape of the end product." * ' , 

She attitude of the Asian countries signatoz^j" to the Treaty indi- 
cates that they are losing faith in SEATO as a means for deterring Com- 
mm:tist expansion in Southeast Asia. In this connection^ the Asian States 
consider that the U.S. is not leading sufficient support to SEATO. 
Further J the recent Russian visits to Southeast Asia and continuing 
CMnese Coimnunist activities in the area could result in the Asian 
members of the Treaty leaning more to a neutralist position. 

The Department of State is currently re-exaiaining the U.S. position 
as pertains to a permanent staff organization for the SEA.TO Comicil and 
has indicated that^ due to the need for adding "substance** to SEATO ^ 
consideration is being given to the desirability of a U.S. proposal 
at the 6 March Council meeting^ for the establishment of a pemianent 
SKA.TO Council staff. 



a* 



V ,, 






SecDef Cont. l^Io. S-578 



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t. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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It is requested that the Department of the Ilavy obtain CIKCPAC's 
detailed vlevs on tliis matter. Upon receipt of CIKCPAC's views they 
vill be presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration in 
conjunction vith other policy factors as a basis for the development 
of a Department of Defense position regarding a permanent military 
staff orgai:iization. ^ 



2 cys SeclMavy 
1 cy SecAirmy 
1 cy SecAF 
1 cy CH, JCS 
1 cy OSD 
1 cy E&C 

1 cy Reading file 

2 cys SKB'E 



(Signed) 



E. Perkins McGuire 
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) 



Lit^Col.Queenin/j/s/oiiia safe 
2E83r T9258 15 Dec 55 
1^16501/5 



r 

c 






Declassiried per Executive Order 13526, Section 3, 3 
NND Pmject Number: NND 633 1 6. By: NWD Dute: 201 1 




Dedassitied per Executive Order 13526, Secdon 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16, By: NWD Dale: 201 1 



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■-^i r^^'\s\*y^ 









. sf c/?£r .- 



*«• 



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/vSSiS^rANT SECRETfARy OF DEFENSS 
VVASHINGTOH £5, D, C 



Tl>' 












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*- 



.* - 



-'J*'**? 



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f. 



In reply xe^cr %o I -32377/6 , ' 



25 JcjaUGiV 1955 



* * * 



r 






- . ■ • - -*», " 



v-V' 



■ ( 




t -., Ht 



To: The Scoretaty of DefenoG ■ ': 

^'rpm: Tho Assictant Secretary of Defense. (ISA) 

* ' . * ' . '* . ♦ / ' 

P roMciii : /oa Intcjragency Military Coatine Team recently returned frora a five 
vccks iDiGsion'to Free Viet -Nam, The proposed letter to the Secretary of 
State Gimimarizes tlie Team's findings and re^iuesta hio aGsiotance in cor- 
rectln^^the eerlouo logistic situation. - "./ ' ; 

.■ ■> ■ < M ' ii ^* ' < • : _ . ^ . 

DiscuGGlon: 1* Financ ei Partially as a^ resiO^t of the Coating Teajn^s efforts^ < 
estlrfiates Oj? aiinuaD. Defense Svipx"?ox*t and Direct Forces Suj^port do3Jar require* 
mentG have been reduced by $70 million to $90 ni3.1ion a year. ' _;■' 

' ■^" ■ . ^r ■ ■ ■ ' ■ ■ "• 1- 

2. . Lo:';istics; Tens of'mllliorjs' of dollax's of U.S, cqulp:.ient' e.nd cumly" 
are no'./ being loat* Only proiriT^t State -D-^fense action can correct the i^ 

deficiencies* Tlie TeaiQ' reported; (a) "Tuo \;arehoueeG vere recently ' '>^/ j 
found to contain' 120 tons of Diedico,! oupplies of vjhich no_ one had prior 
knowledge*"- (b) 1^000 vehicles and l^jOOO njajor assemblies are sittings ;^ 
in the rain and mud deteriorating rapidly* (c) ***.*the capabl3.ity of ;' 

fjupply of foixeo in the field in the event hostilities BhoiO,d be recUL^ed -, ; 
in mld-1955 vrould be virtua3_ly non-existent*" (d) "#i*the HAAG personne]/* " 



I 



have done tlieir utiiiost to protect II*S. Interests; there are juet not 
enough lndi\idua],c to go around*", > ' ,*'■'. - 



■>i'!"-' 



*■ *. 



n- 
-»'■■ 



' ■ ] 3* Person nel Recul remen ts : ' I50 to 200 Air.erlca.no ckillcd in nd.litax'y " 
.supply and logistics are iirgent.ly needed in Vict-Ilatii. Authority, to add th.lo ' 
nuraber requires State D^parti^e^t concurrence* • ." - 



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; ^* Co p lins-Kly Agreeiiient ; Tlie Collins Ely Agreement of 1 I>3c X^^h, ' 

/■/ provides that U*S# equipment in the hands *of the French in Free Vlot-lT.:;i3 "■ 
/\ is to be returned to U*S. or Vietnaii^cGO control vrhcn dctcnoin'i^d by joint ■ 
U*S. -French revicif to be no longer needed for the purposes for which 
': ; \ originally tiade available* 'This Ag^recrient is not' being lr.jplei):3ntcd by the 
' French, with loss pf assets to U*S. end loss'of Vietnaujco'e ■logistic capablli- 

* ■■ - ■ , * ■ * 

\ ' • " .- ' * ■ - * 

.' Im plcTiiGntation : If Mr* I>alles can (a) mol^e it possible to bring in the adOltiona' 
T Aniericans .(as. you requested in your letter to Mni dated 13 I)oc 3.955 -* cec ta* 
A) iincl (h) arrange with the Froncli for lFrplei^:-ntation of the CoHlns-E?^- /^fjT^^ 



Tucntj VqD C€1\ proceed 'ifith Its plans to rolve the-px^oblcLi*" ; ^^y 
Recoijui^nO^^c-ion: ^^^'^ '^^'^ ^^^ ^^^^ attached letter 4 *']; -'"f -'.'//^'"-'^-v ^^ 

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Concurrences: 



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Di^classified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By; NWD Dale: 201 1 



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SENSITIVE 



Ltr SecDef to SecState 



JM 31. 1956 



Dear ltr. Secretary: 

Since my letter to you of the 13th of December regarding 
the Viet-JN'am situationj the Interagency Costing Team^ sent to 
Saigon to study military finance and related matters^ has 
returned and submitted its report. The recommendations of 
the Team vill lead to substantial improvements in budgeting, 
including savings of millions of dollars during tlie calendar 
year 1956. Steps have already been initiated to realize 
these savings. 

The Team also studied the logistic situation in Free 
Viet -Nam and has reported deficiencies which are of greatest 
concern to me* Only by prompt action at highest departmental 
levels vill it be possible. ito correct the problems. 

Since the recent heavy phasedowr^ ±]i French forces^ or 
adequate logistic capability in Free Viet-Uam no longer 
exists- The Team reported that "..,the capability of supply 
of forces in the field in the event hostilities should be 
resumed in mid«1956 vould be virtually non-existent." From 
the standpoint of preservation of U,S.^ assets ^ the situation 
is also most unsatisfactory. Adequate control of MOAP 
spares and supplies has^ in large part, been lost. 

We have concluded that not less than ^lOO^OO&jOOO worth of 
MOAP materiel can be saved if prompt corrective act,ion can be 
taken. Such action includes the availability in Viet-Nam 
in the immediate future of I50 to 200 Americans skilled in 
supply management and logistics. 

A further essential factor in achieving effective supply 
control is the implementation of the Collins -Ely Minute of 
Understanding of 1 December 195^. This Agreement provides for 
the return by the French of U.S. equipment no longer required 
for the purposes for i^hich originally made available. The 
Agreement further states that decisions on >rhat is to be 
returned should be made Jointly by French and U,S, repre- 
sentatives. Nevertheless^ the French are making these 
decisions unilaterally; it appears that they are carefully 
sorting out the useful^ serviceable items for their own use, 
and returning the excess and salvage. We know of no valid 
reason why U.S. personnel shoiild not be allowed to enter 
French military storage areas to participate in these 
determinations. 



10^6 



SecDef Cont. No. S-O86 ' 



SENSlIiVE 



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Declas^jficd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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Your assistance in (a) making it somehow possible to 
bring in additional personnel^ and (b) arranging T^ith the 
French for effective implementation of the Collins-Ely 
Minute of Understanding is requested -on an urgent basis* 
I recognize that in reaching your conclusions, you must also 
weight other factors not discussed in this letter* To enable 
the Department of Defense to carry out its responsibilities 
in Free Viet-Wamj however ^ a solution along the lines 
discussed above is essential, j 

Sincerely yours , 

SIGHED 



C.E. WILSOIT 



The Honorable 



The Secretary of State 



2 cys State 
1 cy OSD 
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1 reading file cy 
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Prepared by JEWestcott/^s/2E837 

5U175 - 12377/6 
Re^^itten by Gordon Gray/jcp 



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Di^cl^ssined per Executive Order 13526» Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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■ 'THE GENERAL SITUATION] If J SOUTH VIEEMAl'I 






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. ' Tho position of the government of South Vletnsm ' 
is appreciably stronger than it vas a yoar^ or . en 
six jnonths^, ago^ VJithin- the past several ueeks, hOi-;'- :, ^{^^*^S ,"; ■ -. J 
ever J si;;jn3 of new political stresses have appeared^ /^^j'''■^-^^^'Xl:V^''^* ^ - - 



LHd the Coiumimists are, apparently steppiiig up their 
campaign against the South Vietnamese Goverimont^ - 



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pect that the nation-vrldo election^ stiptilated 5^1 

Final Declaration of the 195U Geneva Conference, tail -^^^'Sr:^'^:^^l ^' /' 
be held by July; aaid 3) the reported rmcrease in op^ \i)^^'^^^i-^^^' ■.. /^ 
position to President Ngo Dinh Diem er^d the Corrijnunist .'^^;v:t/:-'*-\--J'v'*V'/. .: -<- 
attack on programs strengthening the Diem governmentj-V' --,?'/ ./;^f:^'.r.'.'>.! -'■ 
spec^i'ioally,' the March U/ election for a national- con** '^; ;'■ *V '*:; /'■-": -\y; 
stituent asseiTiblyo ..*..■■ * ^ i':'-:u ---.,>/,<':■='-."■ 



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-Tv^^ernal tSecurioy 

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Since the vii'bua], Gl5jriination of the Bliih Xuyen as a 7ni3-5.tary foroo " ■ 
iiiki the neutralisation of .a major portion of the Cao Dai vjiitCj the principal 
tlTToats to internal seciirity in South Vietnam come from the claiidestino ■ 

Co:r;:TiUnist apparatus and from the remnants of the HoaKao'sectg The CorLTiunists^ 
have ^.n' est^jnated 10^000 guei-rillas in South Vietnam^ scattered in small 
g'^-^Q^-^-QS ±^1 rural areas but presumably still responsive -to control from Haiioio 
?ae principal infested areas ai^^e the plateau region of northern Soxith 
Vietnam the southern peninsula (Camau), ajid the canal-i-oyen area southuest ^ 
of s'aicron where the Vietnainese National Army (VNA) io cm^rently engaged in ' 
operations a^^a^nst the Hoa Kaoo COir.munist agents reporl^edJ-y have boen ' . 



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NND Project Number: NND 633 1 6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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SECRET,^! :^ I rrMO!Tl\^ 



successful In infiltrating remaining Hoa Hao groups chiefly Ba Cut's 

organization. The latter' s increasingly effective defensive tactics have 
made recent TOA operations relatively costly. 

I 

In addition to the continuing presence of these guerrilla elements ^ 
the Communists have presumably tried to penetrate all branches of the 
goverjunent. The most frequent reports suggest heavy penetration of the 
Inf rmation Ministry. The absence of reliable information does not disprove 
somt; probable penetration of police and military services ^ particularly at 
lover levels. The Communists have a surviving capability to disrupt govern- 
mental operations J and perhaps to immobilize the regime ^ through a co- 
ord nated campaign of terror and assassination -- a capability they have 

thus far chosen not to exercise, 

I 

Political Problems 

The March ^4 election vill^ in all probability^ produce a national 
assembly that will overwhelmingly support Diem and approve the constitution 
that a pro-Diem commission has prepared. The constitution will establish 
a presidential system vith separation of povers. Balloting vill not in- 
dicate accurately the extent of ant i -Diem sentiment ^ for a nimtber of 
nationalist leaders, particularly refugees from the norths appear disinclined 
to risk censure or repression by contesting the election as opposition 
candidates. 

It will be essential J in the iromediate future^ that Diem have effective 
control over the administration and the national assembly- He has the sup- 
port of the National Revolutionary Movement (MM) ^ which has become^ in 
effect his political party. There is some question^ nevertheless^ whether 
at present Diem is unnecessarily antagonizing elements which might add 
strength to the future government. He remains almost pathologically 
sensitive to criticism and potential opposition^ with the result that the 
regime is becoming increasingly autocratic despite his democratic principles. 
In view of Diem* s skill in dealing with dissident elements over the past 
year J it will, perhaps be wise to give him the benefit of the doubt during 
the pre-election period. 

Economic Conditions 

There has been little recent change in the economic picture in South 
Vietnam. Rice prices^ which rose precipitously during the summer and fall 
due largely to poor distribution, have now returned to normal. A major 
program for resettlement in southwest Vietnam of up to 100^000 of the 
refugees from the north is now developing^ with US and other foreign support. 
If successful, it would simultaneously reduce the problems of 1} the 
refugees J 2) increased agricultural production, and 3) internal security in 
rural areas * 



10^9 



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Deciassified per Executive Order 13526, Sectit^n 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 1 6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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Xr.ternr,tioncl Asoecfcs 



The Chines© CojYanunist request for a reconvcnajig of the Geneva* Conference 
broadened to ii^iclude 'the International Control CormrtiGv'jion rfierrbers^ probably 
indicates that tho CorrjTAmisto vdll continuo to drive for "ro\:nlflcation^* of • 
Vietnsn by political and diplonatic Tno^is rather than by a x'^esort to large** • 
E;cal3 \dLolence z-*^ at least until their proposal is definitively rojectedo ' 
''" ;q Indians, as i:ell as the Coinjiiunist countries^ uUA probably approve tlia 
call for a new conference^ . They apparently lash -to see "the ICC continue ia 
operation^ ivhich T:ould require the Vietnamese to assuirio some of the functions 
GElsignod to the French by the 1?5U agreements (, ^ '■■-.. 



The French are likely to continue the Trlthdraw?^.! of their forces (now 
reduced to about l^^OOO) in South Vietnam^ to avoid formal terinlnation of 
its informal mission to the DRV headed by \U Saintenyj and — despite current 
opposition — nay come to favor a neu conference as a means of relief from 
their obligations undor the 195U agreements o The British have become in- 
creasingly reconcHGd to aji extended partition of Vietnam^ novr have greater 
confidence in Hiem*s strength, and TXfuD.d prefer to avoid or at least postpone 
a ncvj Geneva Conference 9 'Jho Bi^itinh;, hotrever;^ still hope that Diom can be - 
brought to accept some form of nort-h^-eouth consultation^ ovon without proc^'» 
poet of success ■/■ ^-^ ' 1. , " 



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NSC 5602/1 
March 15, 1956 



TOP SECRET 



Ref erencess 






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ITOTE BY THiS EXECliTIVE SECRSTARY 

to the 

HATIONAL SECURITY CCUNCIL 

on 

BASIC NATIOj:IAL_ST';GyRITY_FgLTCY_„ _ 

A. Ka; 5501'"" ■""" '"'"' " 

B. NIE ii-a- 55; MIS 11-7-55; - 
NIE li--i3-55i NIE' 11-13/1-55 

NIE 100-7- 55;' SNIE .TOO- 8.-55 
NSC 5602 

Memos for NSC from Acting Execu- 
tive Secrotarv, sane sulfject, 
elated February 13 and 2^, 1956 

E, Memo for NSC frorij Executive Secretary, 
subject: -"U. S. Policy in the 
Event of a Reneval of Aggression 
in Vietnain". dated September l6- 

1955 

F. NSC Action No, 1522 



The National Secuirty Council; the Secretary of the 

to 

mergy 
■f onse 

Administrator J and the Director , -Bureau of the Budget j at . 
the 277th and 27Sth rafeotings of the Council on February 27 
and March 1, 1956, discussed the subject on the basis of 
the reference report (N£C 5602) in the light of the recorjiiiien 
dations of. the NSC Planning Board, transmitted by the 
reference memorandum of Pbbruary 13, and the views of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff ^ tranismitted by the reference m.er.10- 
randma of February 2U; 1956. The Council -adopted the state- 
ment of policy contained in McG 5602, subj^^ct to the changes 
set forth in NEC Action No. 1522~b. ■ . 



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The President has this date approved the stateraent of 
policy in NSC 5602 ^ as amended and adopted hy the Council 
and enclosed hez^'ev/ith as IvSC 5602/1 5 and directs its 
implementation by all appropriate executive departments 
and agencies of the U. S. Governir.ent^ vrith the understanding 
that final determination on hud^^t reqvxests hased thereon 
v;ill be made by the Presid-^^nt aft^^r normal budgetary revien-j, 

'nSC 5602/1 is a Eubstitut'd for ^82 5501 and is the 
basic guide in I'ho implementation of all other naticjial 
security policies J supc^rsfding ziny provisions in such other 
policies as may be in, conflict v/ith it, Progress rt^ports to 
the National Secuirty Council on other policies should include 
specific reference, to policies which have been modified by 
NSC 5602/1. 

105 'I ■ ' 

NSC 5602/1 ■ ". " " TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Pmjeci Niiniber: NND 63316. Bv: NWD Diite: 201 1 



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■At the time that th^ Council adopted the enclosed 
policy it a] so took the follo-iv'ing actions (KvX Actions 1522-c 
thi^ough -h): " . • " 



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Requesjted the Dt^parteen.t of Defense to make a 
presentation on the capabilities^ vith or v;ithout 
nuclear vjeaponSj of the U, 5. military forces 
37 ef erred to in paragraph 32 and ether appropriate 

ocal aggres-i 
late the 
study transmit te^d by the reference, memorandum of 
September l6 1955. 



J. V'J. ^-v J. vr^_t vv^ -Lij ya^x d£^*c CLjJii _j£L CI i J-VJ- ^^M-:l^-J. n 

paragraphs of ?ISC 5501 j to deal v:ith lo 
si on in Vietnam^ utilizing as appropria 



Agreed that the Councilj after submission to the 
President of the report on the subject noi/ In 
preparation by the Chairr^anj Council on Foreign 
Economic Policy, should give further consideration 
to basic U. S. policies v;ith respect to the less 
developed and uncommitted areas* 

Requested that a presentation to "the Council on 
the problem of technological superiority be raade 
by the Department of Defense, the Office of 
Defense Mobilization j and the Ifetional Science 
Foundation; v;ith the collaboration of the Department 
of Health, Education and V/elfare on those aspects 
of the presentation respecting the educational 
objectivtjs in the United States, ■ : 

■I- 

Agreed that intensive? efforts should be continued 
on all aspects of the probleiri of devising a safe- 
guard^jrd systeir^ of disarmament* 

Requested the Operations Coordinating Board^ vdth 
the participation of the Department of Justice, to , 
prepare a study of the factors involved in implement- 
ing' paragraph 35 of NSC 5602, dealing with free 
Vcrld-Comjnjinist bloc contacts; and directed the 
KX Planning Board to review pertinent policies 
(particularly NSC 5508/l and NS'J 5^2?) based upon 
such an OCB study. 



V , . 



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TOP S£CRIi,T 



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Noted tUe President's request th-nt the Department 
of Defense and the Office cf Defense Mobilization, 
in consultation vith the- Bureau of the Budget pre- 
pare for Counci:. consideration a definition of " 
the terra "mobiliaation base". 



JAITSS S. LAY, JR. 
Executive Secretary 



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The Secretary of the Treasury 

The Attorney General 

The Special .Assistant to the Prosidont for 

Disarm^nent 
The Director J Bureau of the Budget' 
The Chairnan^ AtcLiic Energy CoiruTAssion 
The Federal Civil Defense Adninistrator 



1 A^ 



The Chairniahj- Council of Sccnoniic Advisers 
The Ch^iirivianj Council on ForejgiiL Econorac Policy 
The Chairmanj Joint Chiej?s of Staff 
The Director of Central intelligence 



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Decliis!>jncd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POIJCY 



Mr— w'^r^-' VV^ * ■ 



PREAMBLE 



^#-tl= W P q T-^"**"" 



li, 0?he spiritual J nioral and material postiu'^e of the 
United States of America rents upon establishsd principles 
which have been asserted and defended throughout the history 
of the Republic « The genius ^ strength caid promise of America 
are fourided^in the dedication of its people and government 
to the dignity 5 equality and freedom of the human being under 
Godt ThGse concepts and our ins tituti 021s v/hich nourish and 
maintain them v.ath o^stice? are the bulv/ark of our free society 
and are the basis of the respect and leadership v/hich have ] 
been accorded cur nation by the peoples of the world,. When 
they are challenged j cur ^ response rr-ust be resolirte and worthy 
of oui' heritage p From this premise raust derive our national- 
v;ill and the policies which express it. The continuing full 
exercise of our individual and collective responsibilities 
is required to realize the t-asic objective of our national 
security policies: i2>aintaining the secuirty of the United 
States and the vitality of its fundamental values and insti- 
tutions* 



NEC 5602/1 



TOP SECRET 



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Declassified per Execiitive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Pn^ject Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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SECTIOi-: A- 
0UTLI1\H. (F. U. S . h^ATIOK^L STRATEGY 



2- Ih^^^^^iil_p]?.i active of Ut S, national security policy^ 
is to preserve the seoufity of the United States^ and its 
fundamsntal values and institutions, -^ ^ ■ 




an^ernatlonal apparatus. 



^^ .The basic problein confronting the United States is 
how, v;lthout undsrinining fujidaKiental U, S^ values and in-- * 
stitutions or seriously v/eakening the U, S, economy j to meet 
and ultimately to reduce to acceptable proportions this threat 
to U,. S* security. ► - , - 

\' • . ■ ' '^ 

\ 5. The United States and its allies have no foreseeable 

^ -prospect of stopping the growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities- 

and of reducing Soviet armed strength — the core of CoiniJiunist " 

'pov;er— or of significantly reducing other basic Cojomunist 

military strength^ except by riiutually acceptable agreements 

v;ith thG Soviets or by large--scale military action* The . t 

initiation by the United States oX such military action for 

this purpose is not an acceptable course either to the United 

States or its major allies, 

6, Hence J U. S, policies must be designed (1) to affect 
the conduct and policies of the Comrriunist regimes 5 especially i 
those of the USSR, in v;ays that further U, S. security . ; 
interests (including safeguarded disarriament) j and (2) to 
foster tendencies that lead thein to abandon expansionist > 
policies. In pursuing this general strategy, our effort 
should be directed to: * 






^ 



s used in this paper , the term ^'nuclear'^ refers to any 
military device of any sise or purpose which utilizes 
energy released in the course of nuclear fission or fusion. 



KSC 5^02/1 



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a. Deterring further Cor-irnvmist aggressiorij and - 
prevsnting the ocourrerioG of tj;^al_j:/ar so far as 

compatible with U, S, security, . ^ 

» - 

* 

b. Madntaining and developing in the free vorld 
the mutuality of intGrcst and coiiiiBon purpose, the 
confidence in the United States, and the will, strength 
and stability 5 necessary to face the Soviet-^Cczimiunist 
threat and to provide constructive and attractive altern- 
atives to CoirmunisM, v/hich sustain the hope and confidence 
of the free peoples* * .'.... ^ 

c. 'In addition to a and b above, talcing other 
GLCtions designed to foster changes in the character and 
policies of the Soviet-Coiiirrranist bloc regimes: 

(1) By influencing thera a2id their peoplfis to- , 
\;ard the choice of those alternative lines of action 
vhich^ while in their national inters sts^ do not : 
conflict vjith the security interests of the United 
Gtates, ... 



i 



(2) By exploiting differences betv;een such 
regimas to disrupt the structure of the Soviet- 
Corjirnunist bloc. 






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(3) Sy exploiting vulnerabilities \7ithin the 
bloc countries in v/ays consistent vath this general I 
strategy, ■ ^ , ' 

dl 

d. Destroying or neutralizing the international 
Communist apparatus in the free vi^orld, 

■ 

7. To carry out effectively this general strategy v;ill 
reouire a flexible combination of military, political, 
economic, psychological, and covert actions i;hich enables the 
full exercise of U* S. initiative. These* actions must be so 
coordinated as to reinforce one another* Programs for carry- 
ing out this general strategy should be developed and con- 
ducted as a natter of urgency j vith special enphasls in the 
period before the Soviets achieve nuclear parity* 

8, Provided that it is resolutely pursued , this general 
strategy offers the "oeht hope of bringing about at least a 
prolonged period of arraed truce, and ultimately a peaceful re- 
solution of the -Soviet bloc-free v;orld conflict and a peaceful 
and orderly v;orld environment. Failiu'e rcso3-Utcly to pursue 
this general strategy could j v;ithin a relatively short span of 
years, place the United States in great jeopardy. 



LSC 5502/1 



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