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Full text of "Pentagon Papers"

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






V.B Justification of the War (\ 1 Vols.) 

Internal Documents (9 Vols.) 

3. The Eisenhower Administration: (4 Vols.) 

d. Volume IV: 1956 French Withdrawal - 1960 












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UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS 

1945 - 1967 





VIETNAM TASK FORCE 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFE 




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V. B. 3- 



JUSTIFICATIOK OF THE WAR 



- IKTERtvAL C I TS - 

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The Eisenhovfer Administrati on* 3-953 - 19&Q 
BOOK IV: I.956 French Withdrawal - 1S&) 



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V.B.3- (Book IV) 



JUSTIFI CA TION OF TH E WAR — INTERNAL COMMITMENTS 

1 ■ — ■ , -. ■ — ■ 

The Eisenhower Administration, 1953 - i960 



Contents and 



Chronological List of Documents 



1956 French Withdrawal - i960 



1956 (cont'd) 



The State Department informs Defense of the under stand- 
ing that TERM personnel vill perform functions of train- 
ing which arc inseparable from tasks of recovering and 
maintaining MDAP equipment. Only formal approval "by 
the ICC is necessary for the TERM to arrive in Vietnam. - 
State Letter to Secretary of Defense , 1 May 1956 



o ei e • • o ■ 



The Army states its position on the Southeast Asia issue. 
Specifically 5 the U 4 S C should qualify its position with 
neutral nations 5 should allocate the major proportion of 
U.S. re r. our c e s into e conomi cal an d t echn ic a 1 as s 1st ance 5 
should assist indigenous forces to provide internal 
security j should prepare to intervene against aggression, 
and should oppose continuance of colonialism. Army 
Memorandum for NSC Planning; Board, 20 June 1956* * 



Pa 



1057 



:,.*..-i 



1060 



The President approves U.S. military action to encoura, 
Vietnamese military planning for defense against exter- 
nal aggression and to manifest other vays to assist 
Vietnam to defend itself in accordance vith the Manila 
Pact, Secretary of Defense Memorandum for JCS, 
16 July a9 l >5.. . 



pc ..c.c.p. 



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The intelligence estimate m of * the political, economic, 
and military situation in Vietnam through mid-1957 
concludes that: (l) DRV will not attempt an invasion . 
of South Vietnam ; (2) the trend toward stability in 
South Vietnam will continue barring invasion 5 guerrilla 
action, or death of Diem; (3) basic economic progress 
vill be sl6\t j and (If) significant sett resistance has 
been eliminated^ but 8-10,000 armed communists pose a 
serious internal security problem. NIE 63-56* 17 July 
1956 * - .-. 

The President approves NSC 5&12 statement of U.S. policy 
in mainland Southeast Asia, This policy treats the Viet 
Minh as not constituting a legitimate government and 
sets forth actions to prevent the Viet Minh from expand- 
ing their political influence and territorial control 
in Free Vietnam and Southeast Asia. NSC 5^12/lj 
5 September 1956 • * • • • „,.».... 



e • 



1066 



■ c ■ » 



1082 



The JCS recoiranend that the United States make no specific 

force commitments to the SEAT0, but that the Military 

Advisor inform SEAT0 nations of the U.S. forces deployed 

and available to the. Pacific for contingency planning. 

JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, l6 November 1956*,.. IO96 



* , 






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1957 - 1953 ■ " Page 

27 5. Defense urges the State Department to seek international 
concurrence in the abolition of the ceiling on KAAG per- 
sonnel in Vietnam in order to fulfill increased training 
requirements resulting from withdrawal of French train- 
: ing missions* ISA Memorandum to State , 15 April 1957 IO98 

276. Vietnam seems clearly persuaded that its interests lie 
*■' in stronger affiliation with the Free VJorld. The Army ' 
in Vietnam is now capable of insuring internal security. 
321st NSC Meeting* 12 May 1957 # 1100 

* 

277* The prospects for North Vietnam for the next year are 
* * * estimated. Essentially, it is concluded that the DRV 

remains in firm control even though there have been out- 
breaks oi' sporadic violence, that the DRV would attack 
only if Moscow and Peiping were sure that .the U.S. vould 
Eot intervene % and that the DRV will continue its tactics 
of "peaceful competition." HIE 63.2-57, lk May 1937 • 1101 

2?8- President Diem discusses his plans and programs with 
Deputy Secretary Donald Quarles. Among these are the 
resettlement prograa&s, road building, the SEATO glan 3 
and reorganising "the Army structure to include an in- 
crease in strength to 170,000. ISA- Memorandum for 
Record-, 15 May 1957 • *....- c . 1103 

279. Progress is reported in developing a representative 
government in Vietnam. Executive leadership is strong 
but effective counter measures against non -violent 
Communist subversion remains a priority requirement. 

J NSC Planning Board Me at ing, 26 Hovember 1957 '..... 1108 

280, The KSC considers a progress report on U.S. policy on 
"mainland Southeast Asia, (KSC 5612/1) which is essen- 
tially the same as the Planning Board report. 
3147th HSC Meeting, 5 December 1957- ..•■..■-.. I- 1 - 11 

283 . SfSC 5809 reaffirms that the national in sndence o;? 
Southeast Asia is important to the security interests 
of the United States. NSC 5809 contains draft revi- 
sions of ESC 56l2/l s A statement of policy on the 
special situation in Korth Vietnam is included which 
continues to treat the Viet Mirih as not constituting 
a legitimate government. NSC 5809, 2 April 3.958. . * * 1113 

282. In general, the U.S. is achieving its objectives in 
Viet): 21. Major problems which e:cist consist of the 
continued dep lence on foreign aid, political and 
security problems of the Diem (Sovernment. Both mili- 
tary S3 I econosd.c assistai will be reduced in FY 58 
and FY 59 > ccDpared to FY 57.- 0CB Report on Scut st 
Asia, 28 May .3.958. . . . . . . * H3^- 

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* 283- Draft editorial amendments of NSC 5*1-29/5 are forwarded 
to the National Security Council for consideration. 
Substantive change in U.S. policy is noi intended but. 
elimination of ambiguity in use of the term "hot pur- 
suit" where doctrinal meaning in international law 
conflicts with use in NSC 5^29/5. JCS study on "hot 
"* pursuit," 23 October 1958, is included- Memorandum 

for the NSC, 5 January 1959 . . ..„. , Hkg 

28U. Vietnam displays serious concern about developments in 

Laos, Cambodia's recognition of Communist China, and the 
■••'•* U.S* position in the Taiwan straits. Major problems 

facing the U.S- are Diem's internal political position, 
internal security, and economic development. CIA analy- 
. . , sis and financial summaries of assistance. programs to 

Southeast Asia are included. OCB Report on Southeast 

Asia, 7 January 1959 • • ••-••« 1156 

285. Defense (ISA) suggests that it is advisable to withhold 
the replacement of F-8F aircraft in'VHAF with AD-^ type 
aircraft. Defence Memorandum for JCS, 22 January 1959- •••••• 1183 






286* The JCS recommends improvement of Tan Son Nhut Airfield 
and Tourane Airfield be improved for jet aircraft 
"under the guise of commer eial aviation." JCS Memoran- 
dum for Secretary of Defense, 19 March 1959- »..»•••< • 1184 

28 7, Responsibilities within the Defense Department are : 
assigned for the twenty courses of action in the OCB ' I 
"Operation Plan for Vietnam." Among the courses of 
action are: popularize the image of Vietnam among * 
neutralists, probe weaknesses of the Viet Cong, develop 
* i^otimum combat capabilities of RWJU* 1 . and encourage GVII 
to maintain an effective Self -Defense Corps. ISA Memo- 
randum for JCS, 20 May 1959. I1B5 

288. An intelligence analysis of the situation in Vietnem and f 
estimates of probable develoj sxfcs conclude that (l) the 
prospect of reunification of DRV and GVIJ is remote, 
(2) Diem will be # President for many years by repressing 
opposition via the Can Iiao political apparatus, (3) in- 
ternal security forces will not be able to defeat DRV 
supported guerrilla and subversive forces, (h) GVft will 
continue to rely heavily on U.S. aid, (5) and DRV is in m f 
full control of North Vietnam and likely to continue 
harassment of GVfi and Laos. NIE 63-59/ 26 Kay 1959 1190 



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289- 



290. 



291 - 



29 2, 



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The Department of State submits a draft revision of KSC 
5*4 29/5 > U.S. policy in the Far Ea&t, The prin/jiixLe 
objectives of U.S. policy should be: (l) preservation 
of territorial and political integrity of Asian nations 
against coiEmmiist expansion, (2) deterrence of local or 
general war/ (3). bring about desirable ehanges in the 
Communist Bloc, {k) strengthen the economic, political 
and military position of the Free Far East, (5) promote 
Free World unity, and (6) identify the U.S, "with Asian 
aspir at ions* MSC Memorandum for the Planning Board, 
29" June 1959 « • • • * • * < 

The JCS submits their and the Services' vicvs on U.S. 
policy in the Far East. . "The U.S- faces a delicate 
problem in presenting its Far Eastern policy to the 
world. A U.S. policy will not be very sympathetically 
received if it is presented :in the purely negative 
terms of preventing communist expansion or the reduc- 
tion of its power/ 1 JCS Memorandum* f or NSC Staff, 
Ik July 1959 



« . • • • 



A -resurgence of tensions between Vietnam and Cambodia 
threatens to frustrate U.S. objectives in Cambodia* 
In Vietnam the Diem Government continues its strong 
controls which sasfcagonise the Vietnamese elite. 
"Vietnamese ndlitary forces have improved under the 
MAAG training program." OCB. Report on Southeast Asia, 
12 August 1959- » • « t • * • • • 



An intelligence analysis of Communist capabilities and 
intentions in Laos concli that the Communist re sump* 
tion of guerrilla warfare in Laos is a reaction to 
initiatives of U.S. support of Laos. The chances of 
Cor delist success are hj at a low risk. K on -Asian 
forces intervening in Laos increase the likelihood of 
Communist invasion > but preference would be to diplo- 
macy 5 propaganda, and guerrilla act 3.021 to cause the 
West to back dom* SHE 68-2-59 > 18 September 1959 



Pa 



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1195 



1211 



1236 



121*2 



The U.S. seeks to increase the" MAAG ceiling on per- 
sonnel before furnishing the ICC with plans for with- 
drawal or phase-out of TERM. ISA Memorandum for Joint 



Staff, 



20 October 1959 • - « . . . . . 12k8 

/ 



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A9&0 . 

The evolution of political conditions necessitates thai 
policy guidance should be directed at the problem of 
dealing with Sihanouk of Cambodia, ' "by all odds the 
major single factor in Cambodia and the principal .target 
of U.S. policy." Further , the guidance of ISG 5809 is 
not adequate* to *cope with the situation in Laos. 0C3 
Special' Report on Southeast Asia, 10 February i960 



Page 



«.*t.*«OC*. 



12^9 



The Vietnam Country Team prepares a special report on 
the current security situation in Vietnam!, "...the 
rural population is generally apathetic towards the Die 
Government and there are signs of considerable dissatis- 
faction and silent opposition." Without support of the 
rural population, no final solution can be found to the 
internal security problem. Militarily s the GVH organi- 
zation lacks unity of cc and. The situation is summed 
urn "..the government has tended to treat the population 
with suspicion or to coerce it and has been rewarded 
with an attitude of apathy or resentment." Saigon 278 
to State, 7 March i960 



Williams testified that he was working "MAAG out of a 
Job" stnfl this is impressive to Senator Mansfield and 
the Foreign Relations Cc "tiee. Mansfield requests 
information on the situation which 'now requires "the 
addition of 350 men to the MAAG." Mansfield Letter to 
Lt General Williams , 5 May i960 



1276 



VTillisaas replies that the 350 spaces referred to are the 
TERM personnel now in deactivation . The turnover of 
TK-&I spaces to MAAG ends the "subterfuge as actually 
5&SHM has had the undercover mission as logistical advi- 
sers since activation." Williams MA.GCH-CH91 to OSD 
(for Mansfield) , 20 May i960 . . , ,.«...... 



1279 



The President approves changes in ITSC 5309 and directs 
impleine ition as ITSC 6012, "U.S. Policy in Mainland 
Southeast Asia*" Policies toward Vietnam are essen- 
tially unchanged. KSC 6012, 25 July i960 



.•a.**. ...CO. CI 



1281 



Uevelopme in South Vietnam indicate an adverse trend 
and if they re: In unchecked will almost certainly cause 
the collapse of President Diein's regime. SKIE 63 1-cO, 
23 August i960 



« V 



1293 



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300, 



301. 






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The U.S. assesses the possible coup groups in Saigon (e.g. 
peasants j communists, labor , students, Catholic refugees, 
sects, police and Array) and concludes that long term ■ 
effects of any demonstration depends on the attitude of 
the Army.- Saigon 533 to State, 5 September i960 



1302 



lansdalc offers, several proposals to meet the threat to 
security posed by the Viet Cong in Vietnam, Specifically , 
he recommends shifting the MAAG function emphasis to 
assistance on tactical operations, increasing the MAAG 
staff, priority be given to furnishing selective equipment, 
more "emphasis on counter-guerrilla intelligence training, 
and certain actions on activities of the Civil Guard, 
civic action, and MAP requiring interagency coordination • 
Lansdale Memorandum for ISA, 13 September i960. 



C C » • • • 



*•«..• 



1307 



The Dic-i regime is confronted by tv, r o separate, but related 
dangers — a non- communistic coup attempt in Saigon and 
gradual Viet Cong extension of control in the countryside, 
U.S. objectives rest on a strongly ant i- communist but 
popularly supported government ; continued failures by 
Diem is cause to seel: alternative leaders. Saigon 62k to 
State, 16 September i960 . . . . ,, „ « 



1311 



The U.S. suggests numerous political actions to President 
Diem, among them are Cabinet changes, more responsibility 
for Cabi.net members, alteration of the Can Lao Party from 
a secret organisation to a normal political party, in- 
vestigation of Government departments by the National 
Assembly, freer press functions,* and measures to enhance 
the Government's support in rural areas. In addition, it 
is suggested that Ego Dinh Hhu, the President's brother, 
oe given an ambassadorial post outside the country. 
Saigon 157 to State, 15 October i960. • •< 



1317 



30*1- Diem f s responses to the suggestions for political action 
and removal of Khu outwardly show no resentment. Saigon 
802 to State, 15 October I9S0. . < * • . * . . . . ......... . 



1323 



305 



306 



The U.S. urges preparation of an over-all plan, accep- 
table to G#H, for integration ekd. centralized direction 
of maximum resources to combat the insurgency. D0D -State 
653 to Saigon, 19 October I9S0 .....* 



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U.S. urges Diem and the coup leaders to reach a quid 
agreement and avoid further bloodshed* Herter TV) to 
Saigon , 11 November i960 • . . * • 



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qqj. Lansdaie suggests that, in light of the abortive coup 
against Die®.* General McGarr's role should "be expanded. 
to permit freer contact with President Diem. Ambassa- 
dor purbrow has apparently lost "personal stature 11 ' with 
Diem and should be removed. Lansdaie Memorandum for 
Secretary of Defense , 11 November I960. «,.*..* , <> . . * . 1323 

308. Diem may react firmly toward the coup leaders since 

there are similarities to the circumstances of the 195^ 
attempt. Also Diem is probably now very -suspicious of 
Ambassador Durbrow. State Cable 775 invited Durbrow to 
engage in this "demoralising meddling in Vietnam 1 s 
affairs." Lansdaie Memorandum for Douglas , 15 Kovember 

i960....- 



o • * C o 



1330 



30°. The JCS consider that there is a valid requirement to 
increase the helicopter lift capability of the Viet- 
namese armed forces at this time, in view of the 
deteriorating internal security situation in Vietnam. 
JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 1 December 1960* „*«. 1332 

^"10- Him end Diem are rankled by American press stories on 
"autocratic regime*"* There is below the surface talk 
of another coup. The coup has increased chances of 
neutralism and anti-Americanism among GVN critics. 
It is recommended to continue to urge Diem to adopt . 
effective programs even though the situation in -t- 
nam is highly dangerous to U.S. int< s'ts* Saigon 1151 
to State , 5 December i960. ........ „ 133^ 

^11. She U.S. assessment of the Laotian situation is that, 
if present trends continue a it will remain one of 
"confusion, drift, and disintegration. .. .Laos is head- 
ing toward civil war." SE1E 68-6G, 6 December i960 13^0 

~<12. The BonOum Government is in control, but faces criti- 
cal problems in the continuing Laos situation* Immed- 
iate matters of concern are to bolster Phoumi forces, 
forestall Nehru on reconstituting the ICC, and assump- 
tion by the U.S. of primary advisor status, ^70th RSC 
Meeting, 20 December i960 13^6 



i % Diem stresses his need for 20,000 additional troops. 
Diem states also that corvee labor is the only way to 
collect "equivalent tares" from peasants. Durbrow 
urges adoption of liberalizing programs- Saigon 121o 
to State, 2k December i960. . , , , * * * 13 h >8 



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Arabassadox 1 Durbrcw hands a. inemorandum. on liberalization 
to President Diem* Specifically, suggestions are wade 
to: (l) publicize budget heavings, ( 2) _ authorize the. 
Assembly to conduct investigations > (3) vork- out an effec< 
tive press code., (h) and grant broader credit to the pea- 
sants. Saigon 26k to State 3 27 December i960 



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Defense reviews its files to determine the actions taken 
■with State concerning Defense requirements for facilities 
jn Vietnam* Laos, and Thailand. Ho requests for facili- 
ties in Laos or Vietnam have "been made to State except for 
correspondence on improvement of two airfields in Vietnam, 
ISA Memoranda for N3G* k January I961; „ ,...,..,... 



. 



1356 



H&e Counter Insurgency Plan (CIP) for South Vietnam is sub- 
mitted for approval to Washington. MAAG prepared most of 
the CIP which is based on State and DOD guidance. Some of 
the recommendations set forth have already been communi- 
cated to GVN. The Country Team is not unanimous , however , 
on the recommended 20,000-man increase in RVNAF -- Durbrow 
maintains reservations* The CIP* which is an enclosure to 
Tele 276, is not reproduced here, Saigon 2 r [6 to State, 
li January 196I- . ■ *.**«« 

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President Eisenhower meets with President-elect John F» 
Kennedy on the subject of Laos. Attendees are Dean Rusk, 
Robert HeNamara, Douglas Dillon, and Clark M- Clifford, 
Eisenhower gives the impress ion that if Laos applies for 
S^ATO aid, the obligation of the U.S. and other signa- 
tories is binding. Eisenhower says that "Laos is the key 
to the entire area of Southeast Asia" -- if Laos falls, 
then all the area is written off. Kennedy asks "how long 
it would take to put a U.S. division into Laos." Memoran- 
dum of Eisenhower-Kennedy Conference, 19 January I96I. . 



1357 



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SECREI 

DEPARTWEMT OF STATE , v j &J& 

WASHINGTON 






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Dear. Mr. Secretary: 



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_\\ / J refer both to yovj? letter to the Secretary elated December 13* 
y^'1^55^on the subject of dispatching additional military training 
i : personnel to Vaet-SfeBj and to your letter to the Secretary dated 



_ ->? 



personnel to Vaet-SfeBj and to your letter to the Secretary dated 

anu&ry 31 j 1956, bearing xr.ore specifically on the problen of rccov-: 
iiirr md fficintaiMng KDAP-oxdgin equipment in Viet-Nam* 



er« 



As you are aviare, our two Departments have boon stivSying and 
ciiseusBing these related problaras for several months , "On February 25 ^ 
1956, during these discussions* the Department of State initiated ne- 
gotiations with other governments principally concerned with a view to 
obtaining their acquiescence to our joint project of sending a Temporary 
&]uipn3nt Mission to Viet-lJam, These negotiationf* have now boon favor- 
ably completed, leaving only the formal approval of the International 
. Control Co^riission . in Viet-Hais still to be obtain d, t'e are" now* seeking 



13 jl.'.I £j 



K ' 



RM 



this approval vSiich ve hope can be given in tijne for 

elements to arrive in Saigon on May 9j the elate mutually agreed upon for 
initial arrivals, " 

lieanvrhilo- with our concurrence your Deuart&ent has begun isioleaen- 
tail-on of this project* Accordingly^ it nay be appropriate for no to 
elaborate the State Department f s understanding of certain asueets of the 
39S23S operation i/hich are only briefly alluded to in the Joint State/Defend 
message to Saigon numbered State 343P-J datei April 12j 1956., in i-rhioh yon 
cba&u^red. ■ 

I 



i. It is our .unck-r^tancdng that the TJ2K operation has the c ubls . 
piu^pore of (a) supervising the recovery (identification^ inventory and 
accounting control) and oui shipment of e;:cees M)AF equipment; and (b) 



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of ace .stir.£ 



Eie Honorable 

. • Charles y* a \iil~on; 
Secretary o 



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of assisting in the i&prove&ent of Vietnamese logistical capabilities 









jitii other governments coneex-nad the possibility of sending additional 
niliiary personnel .to Vzet-nam to assist in the recovery of our equip- 



She TSPK operation was originally conceived to iftplcnent the 
decision of the Secretary of Stats, dated February 3j 195&j to e::ploro 

vi 

e: 

Eient, It has been understood between our tvo Departments froivi the 

beginning of Siscsassions on that problem that if significant amounts 

of' this equipment are inventoried s much of it inelu&ins equipment 
do: rS.ii ally turned over to the Vietnamese forces, v/ill be shipped out 
of Viet-^aB, It is on the bards of thin understanding that the 
Department of State obtained the acquiescence of other governments 
concerned; the rationale for their acceptance being that the SEE}! opera- 
tion vill not contribute to the growth of the irdlitary potential in the 
zone south of the 17th parallel, 

Khilo ii is understood^ therefore, that T2KK personnel Kill perform 
certain functions of training ^-hich are inseparable frosi their tasks 
of recovering and maintaining United States-origin equipment in Viot-Kan, 
such functions of training should in no case be allowed to become the 
single or even the primary duty of 3SEK (as distinqulshed froSi &**£G) 
personnel* Koreoverj a substantial quantity of the equipment recovered 
in Viet- - -::-3n should be shipped out of the country, so as to implement in 
cood faith the promises :-ade to other govern n.ts whose i'snavoleht 
acquiescence to the operation ve have obtain: a c 



2, In regard to the clothing .of • the military personnel involved, 
" indicated in our joint iaes£&ge of April 1£* 195& 3 to Saigon t' 
question is being left to the discretion of Chief KAAO, Chief T**Kj and 
the American fenbassador at Saigon, However, X vir.h to indicate again our 



and ** 



»»'-*-' 







period of assigs&eni ia the country. 



3. Kith respect to administrative supjort services for ESM, it is 
our understating that the appropriate personnel and funds t;Ill he pro-- 
v'oid by the Department of Defense for the full adnirdstratiVG b&ckstopping 
of the group* In this connection; it h s been our yievi for scae tit^e now 
that steps should be taken to have the XAAG mission administratively svp~ 
port^d by military personnel, 5!he Sbb&ssy at Saigon has had increasing 

* ■ . 

difficulty • 



STICK?,? 



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SECRET 



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difficulty ever the past several years in performing adequate 
sucoort services for the KAAG. V;o feel that since your Depart- 
pent viill now establish a complete adsjinistrative unit for 3332*1, 
it would to appropriate to consider the trc.nr.for of all support 
arnmgeeents for 2&&0 frcii the Qaba&sy f: s jurisdiction as soon a; 
practicable * I understand that the KAAG idLssioh in S&igoh has £iven 
■ considerable thought" to this proposition in the last several months 
and I would like to ttrge that the appropriate administrative units 
of our two Departments bgjgin formulating dcfitiite plans for such a 
transfer . . 



•* 



,s 



1 shall appreciate your views a?: soon as it is convenient and 
hope that you will concur in the points expressed above. A copy 
this letter is being sent to Mr* Allen Tulles, Director, Central 
■ intelligence Agency* frash5.ngto&j and to the American A&ba^sador to 

Saigon* 

* 

Sincerely yours, 



OJ- 






A&ULsfk**Uj~- t 



Robert D-. Murphy i' 
Deputy Under Secretary 



z< 



I 



SEGKfcl. 









1 






\ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 2011 



20 June 1956 



MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DEFENSE M EB OF THE NSC PLANKING BOARD 

THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE JCS FOR NSC AFFAIRS 

SUBJECT: Tentative Army Position on "United States Policy in Southeast 

Asia/" dated 15 June 1956 (u) 



The subject document has been reviewed and the following Department 
of Army comments thereon are submitted, 

a. Add the following course of action: "insofar as possible., 
grant US economic assistance in accordance with a definite plan for 
economic development , avoiding the scattering of economic aid over a large 
number of isolated projects." 



REASO: : To increase the effectiveness of the US economic 



aid program. 



b. Add the following course of action: "Encourage the conditions 
necessary to develop a Western Pacific collective defense arraJ ment 
including the Philippines , Republic of China, Japan, and the Republic of 
Korea, eventually linked with SEATO." 

RE AS OH" : To improve the collective defense arrangements in 
Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific. 



Reproduction of this document 
in whole or in part is pro- 
hibited except with permission 
of the issuing office. 



L. Co SHEA 
for EARLE Go WHEELER 
Major General.GS 
Director of Plans, 0DCS0PS 

Re grading data can- 
not be predetermined 



1060 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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20 June I956 



MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DEFENSE MEMBER OF THE NSC HANDING BOARD 

THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE JCS FOR NSC AFFAIRS 

SUBJECT: Tentative Army Position on "issues in Southeast Asia" (U) 



1, Allied vs Neutral Countries. 

a. Question : To what extent should the degree of alignment 
with the Free World determine the U. S. attitude toward the countries 
of Southeast Asia, particularly as regards economic, technical and 
military assistance* 



? 



b. Answer : 

(1) U. S. attitudes toward the countries of Southeast 
Asia should be governed by IK S. national objectives- U. S- objectives 
must be based upon what is obtainable and therefore will vary from 
country to country* These objectives range from retention of positive 
support for tJ« S. positions to the prevention of any additional Communist 
influence in neutral nations, 

(2) The above notwithstanding., it is generally in U. S. 
interests to give preference to Allied nations who share in the belief 
that regional alliances are the only effective way to deter further 
Communist aggression. This should include special consideration for 

U. S. allies in the granting of economic, military and technical assistance 
However, this should not preclude the granting of a substantial amount of 
aid to a neutral nation in preference to an allied nation, when it has 
been determined to be in the national interest to do so. In granting aid 
to neutral nations the US should declare its respect for the opinions of 
those nations, bu the US should at the same time make clear that it does 
not agree with the logic of their positions. 

2, Relative Weight of Assistance Programs- 

a. Question: What proportion of U- S- resources available for 
assistance to Southeast Asia should be allocated to economic and technical 



ass 



istance as inst military assistance? Should greater emphasis be 
placed on operating an expanding number of technically- competent, pro- 
Western leaders and on "political warfare" activities, at the expense of 
economic assistance, if necessary? 



Reproduction of this document 
in whole or in part is pro- 
hibited except with permission 

of the issuing office. 



Regrading data cannot 
be predetermined - 

C°py 1 of 10 copies 

Page 1 of 3 pages. 



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b. Answer : A major proportion of U.S. resources available 
for assistance to Southeast Asia should be allQcated to economic and 
technical assistance. Greater emphasis should be placed on creating 
an expanding number of technically competent , pro-Western leaders and 
on "political -warfare" activities , at the expense of economic assistance , 
if necessary. ■ Grant military assistance should, in general, be limited 
to those nations which either are threatened by Communist aggression or 
are willing to provide forces for collective defense measures in support 
of common- commitments. Reimburseable military assistance should be 
extended to allied nations capable of bearing the cost and to other 
nations "which are ineligible for grant assistance but are willing to 
develop their own capabilities to resist Communism, 

3. Absolute Level of Assistance 

a * Question : Should the absolute level of U.S. economic, 
technical and military assistance to Southeast Asia be increased, 
decreased, or maintained at present levels in the light of the current 
Soviet campaign of political and economic penetration? 

b. Answer: The absolute level of U.S. economic, technical 
and military assistance should be maintained at present levels in the 
light of the current Soviet campaign of political and economic penetration. 
| * However, in neutralist countries, military assistance should be decreased 

where it is in excess of the needs for maintaining internal security. 

k. Functions of Indigenous Military Forces 

a. Question : Should indigenous military forces in Southeast 
Asia be designed (a) solely to maintain internal security, (b) to main- 
tain internal security and assist local external Communist aggression, 
or (c) in addition to (a) and (b), to contribute to collective defense 
efforts in the area? 

b. Answer : Indigenous military forces in Taiwan, Thailand 
and the Philippines should be designed to maintain internal security, to 
resist lo^ al external Communist aggression and to contribute to collective 
defense efforts in the area. Indigenous military forces in South Vietnam 
should be designed to maintain internal security and resist Viet Ninh 
overt Communist aggression. Military forces of other Southeast Asian 
nations should be designed solely to maintain internal security. 

5. U.S. Response to / ;ression 

a. Question : What political and military action should the 
U.S. be prepared to undertake alone or in cooperation with allies in 
the event of Communist seizure of control within, or overt aggression 
* against, a Southeast Asian country? What would be the role of SEATO 
in these eventualities? 

-2- Page 2 of 3 pages 



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b. Answer : The U.S> should he prepared to intervene, prefer- 
ably with other SEATO nations, in the event of Communist overt aggression 
against Southeast Asia. SEATO military forces should function under a 
Unified Command, perhaps in the name of the United Nations. 

6„ Communist Activities 

a. Question : What can the U.S. do to remedy the existing lack 
of adequate Free World capabilities for cambering Communist subversion 
and penetration? Should the U.S. oppose or attempt to match all Communist 
activities in Southeast Asia or should Communist -bloc trade, technicians, 
and investments be tolerated within certain limits? 

b, Answer : The U.S. should not oppose or attempt to match all 
Communist activities in Southeast Asia, With a careful selection of 
projects, US aid can show the greater advantages of Western methods. 

7. Coloniali sm 

a. Question : Should the U.S. uniformly oppose the continuance 
of colonialism or should it assist its European Allies to retain strategic 
outposts against Communist penetration in Southeast Asia? 

b> Answer: The U.S. should oppose the continuance of colonialism, 
However, an exception should be made when colonies, e.g. Hong Kong, serve 
as strategic outposts against Communist penetration. 



V, P. MOCK 
for EARLE Go WHEELER 
Major General, GS 
Director of Plans, OPCSOPS 



-3- 



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*■ 



* * -^_ t&v^feiRk r l T "* i*^ **?* ."? l < r T 1 * 






TIM C^PP^ 



i 



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

' WASHINGTON 



-- 



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KEMORAHDIM FOR U?HE SECRETARY OF TILE ARMY - 



JUL 1 G 1950 



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■ THE SECRETARY OF Tiffi NAVY. - - • . -. ..- j£c 

-■ 



. - ■. 



THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE. - 
-THE CHAIHMAIJ, J OI171 CHIEFS OF STAFF 
;;* THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY " OF DEFENSE 
i m *~ (international Security Affairs) 



• - ... ■■ *•*•! 



I 



J* 



J : SUBJECT:. \] Capability to Deal vrith Local Aggression In Vietnam . ' 

\ •: - j 

* ' ' "■ REH5RE? ICES : Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: 

, ,\ v "U.S. Policy in the Event of a. Renewal' of Aggression 

\j:':±n Vietnam", dated. l6 September 1955; NSC 5602/I; 

. . . /■ .\ij ' * Memo*' for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: 

■ ; "Basic national Security Policy", dated 13 February ; ■ 

; ; -;u/ **<•• 1956; -NSC Action No. 1522~c . - f. 

"* ■*.■' , - 

% 

■ * • * 

" 1* At its meeting on 7' June 1956, the National Security Council 

1 •-- -"■ 4 toolc the following action with respect to the aboVe subject (NSC Action 

Ho. 1571): S } " ■*■ \ * .. 



a. '] .'Noted and discussed a presentation on U.S. capabilities, 
.''■....'■/• ' preferred to in NSC -5501, to deal with local aggression 

-,.'•'" in Vietnam in accordance vith the provisions of current 
. ■ ' ;i - .\ policy (lISC 5602/1). The presentation was made by the , . 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of S f, for the Department of 
" ' ■ "■ Defense pursuant to NSC Action No. 1522- c. / ■ -- , 

\ - - '-- ' ' X ... • 

■ - /- / b.. Noted the President's viev that it would be desirable 

i ./ ■ for appropriate tf-8.- military authorities: !>•-= 

• . • • .* - ._ - ■- * . 

I " (l) To encourage Vietnomese military planning for - 

■ : "''. - "■ defense against external aggression along 11 11 z ■■ 

consistent with U.S. planning concepts based upon 
\ v : api>roved U.S. policy. 



V 



(2) -To discreetly manifest in other "ways U.S. int rest 
in assisting Free Vietnam, *in accordance with the 
* Manila Pact, to defend itself against external 
aggression. 



; ' 2. The action in paragraph l~b above, as approved by the President, 

has subsequently been transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appro- 
priate implementation. t , . / ./ : .. 



f V - SscDeJ Coot* No TtSr-OS*- 

• ... . X0b« • • • ■ 

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT • .-.,^„ , nr ,'\, , " ' " " "Copy ..../..... of „./ ■ / ... Cop'' 1 
ffviaii: Of; 111 PART IS.PROHIiJITL-D. TO0Ct^lPP^T 

EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE J OF 5£bkt 1 p af/ . / ftf . p 

ISSUING OFflCE. •• . ^age ..../. oi ... ,t._ 






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tion &3 {impropriate. Responsibility within the Dspartment of Defense 
for follov-up of the action in paragraph l~b above is hereby assigned 
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff ; in collaboration a£ appropriate with the 
■ Assistant Secretary of* Defense (international Security -Affairs). 



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HIE 63-56 
17 July 1956 






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NATIONAL IN T E L UG E NG E 



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NUMBER 6 



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ji'/te following intelligence organizations parti ". led in the 
preparation of this estimate; The Central Intelligence Agency 
and ike intelligence organizations of the Departments of 
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff. 

Concurred in by the 
■ • 

■1 

on 17 JvJy 1956. Concurring ioete the Special Assistant, Iniel- 
Ugmce, Department of State; (he Assistant Chief of Siciy, 
Intelligcn-ce, Department of Vie Array; the Director of Naval 
Intelligence; the Director of Iniellijcnce, USAF; end the 
Deputy Director for Intelligziica, The Joint Stag. The Atomic 
Energy Commission Representative to His I AC and the ^issfsi- 
ant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, c^bsU:ir.ed, the 
subject being outside of their jurisdiction. 







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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i 






-i 



• 



SECRET 



* 



PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH. AND SOUTH 

VIETNAM THROUGH MID-1957 



I 



THE PROBLEM 

To analyse the current political, economic, and military situation in North and 
South Vietnam and to estimate probable developments through mid-1957. 



CONCLUSIONS 






1. We believe that the Communist "Dem- 
ocratic Republic of Vietnam" (DRV) will 
not attempt an open invasion of South 
Vietnam or a large scale guerrilla war- 
fare effort during the period of this esti- 
mate because of the clanger of US or pos- 
sibly SEATO counteraction and because 
such action would prejudice Bloc empha- 
sis on peaceful coexistence elsewhere. 
The Communist regime will almost cer- 
tainly remain in firm political control 
throughout the period of this estimate, 
despite some passive resistance and seri- 
ous economic difficulties. It vail require 
continued large scale Bloc aid to make 
even limited progress toward developing 
a self-supporting economy. The DRV 
army will retain the capability of defeat- 
incr the total forces of South Vietnam, 
Laos and Cambodia. (Paras. 7-11, 13- 
16, 18-21, 64-68) 

2. In South Vietnam, the trend toward 
political stability and popular confidence 
in the government will probably continue, 
barring a DRV invasion, larj ale guer- 
rilla action, or the death of Diem. Never- 
theless, such contingent developments :; 
intensified Bloc support for DRV objec- 



tives or reduction in Diem's international 
support could stimulate greater Commu- 
nist subversive pressure, weaken the 
Sou tli Vietnam government's confidence, 
cause some loss of its public support, and 
revive opposition efforts for reeoncilia^ 
tion with the north, (Paras. 35-39, 69-72) 

3. Progress toward resolving basic eco- 
nomic problems will probably continue 
slow, but economic, conditions in South 
Vietnam are not likely to have serious 
adverse political effects during the next 
year, as rice production, rubber expofl 
and large scale US aid provide reasonable 
living standards. (Paras. 40-46) 

4. All significant sect resistance in South 
Vietnam has been eliminated, but some 
8,OQO-10,000_aayned Communists and a | 
Communist political network scattered \ 
through the villages continue to pose a . 
serious internal security problem. The " 
effectiveness of the South Vietnam army j 
will probably improve gradually as more 
units are released from security missions 
for training, but by mid-1957 it will still 
be, unable to contain a DRV attack for a 
prolonged period. (Paras. 47-55) 



SEC M3U 

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J 



DISCUSSION 






I. INTRODUCTION 

5 Under the terms of the 1954 Geneva Ac- 
' corc ] S on Indochina, the area of Vietnam north 

of the 17th parallel was placed under the ad- 
ministration of the Vietnamese Communists. 
The French assumed responsibility for imple- 
mentation of the Armistice provisions in the 
area south of the 17th parallel, but neither 
the French nor the Diem government has 
acknowledged responsibility for implementing 
the political settlement envisaged in the Final 
Declaration of the conference. 

6 The UK and the USSR, as co-chairmen of 
the Geneva conference, met in London in 
April and May 1956 and reaffirmed support 
for the political settlement foreseen at Ge- 
neva but implicitly approved postponement of 
its implementation, including the nationwide 
ejections. The co-chairman called upon all 
parties to* preserve the status quo and re- 
quested the International Supervisory and 
Control Commission (ICC) to continue super- 
vising the Armistice. Thus no steps have been 
taken to bring about unification or a political 
settlement in Vietnam, and the partitioning 
of Vietnam has been tacitly accented by the 
Geneva conference powers for an indefinite 

" pericdV time. In the meantime, the Commu- 
nist regime in the north and the Diem govern- 
ment in the south have been developing their 
own institutions and preparing for an extend- 
ed period of struggle for control of Vietnam. 

II. NORTH VIETNAM -CURRENT SITUATION 
AND TRENDS 

■ 

7, The Communist Party of Vietnam (com- 
monly called the Viet Minh) and its govern- 
mental apparatus, the "Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam" (DftVj continue to exercise firm 
and effective control over the estimated 13 
million inhabitants of North Vietnam. Al- 
though critically lacking in technically 
trained personnel, the Communist regime 
possesses a large number of experienced po- 



litical workers ' and has made considerable 
progress in developing an effective adminis- 
trative machine. It has strengthened its con- 
trol despite severe food shortages, continued 
passive resistance to its internal policies, and 
the gradual reduction of its prospects for early 
domination of all Vietnam. 

8. Ho Chi Minh continues to occupy a pre- 
eminent position among Vietnamese Commu- 
nist leaders, despite some de-emphasis of his 
public role. His prestige as a nationalist lead- 
er is still a significant factor in the attitude 
of many people in South Vietnam and South- 
east Asia toward the Vietnamese Communist 
regime. Power relationships at the level be- 
low Ho are not clear, but party Secretary 
Truong Chinh, Premier and Foreign Minister 
Pham Van Dong, and army corrtmandcr Vo 
Nguyen Giap appear to share top level re- 
sponsibilities. We have no evidence of policy 
or personal differences among these three men 
or of the existence of "pro-Chinese" and "pro- 
Soviet** factions in the party. * 

9. The regime's primary concern in the past 
year has been to develop more effective con- 
trols over the people and the economy and to 
deal with such immediate problems as irehu 
bilitation, malnutrition* widespread disease, 
famine, tightening of the party apj ratus, 
and the development of the armed forces. 
Although violence and iritimida on have been 
employed selectively, the Communists have 
so far refrained from the publicized, wide- 
spread terror employed in Corrmunist China 
during the consolidation perloc in 1951-1952. 
Strenuous efforts are still being made to rally 
popular support behind front groups on the 
basis of nationalist and unification slogans. 
The most important of these is The Father- 
land Front which is designed not only to 
mobilize support in the north for immediate 
reconstruction tasks but also to attract sup- 
port in South Vietnam for Communist efforts 
to unify the country* 



SECR E T 

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SECRET 



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10. The Catholic population of approximately 
759 000 appears to be the main center of 
passive resistance to Communist indoctrina- 
tion and DRV control. The Communists ap- 
pear to have recognised the special nature of 
the Catholic problem and, probably with an 
eye both to reducing opposition and impress- 
in* the evacuees in the south, have moved 
slowly to restrict church activities. At the 
same time, they are attempting to weaken 
the hold of the clergy over the communicants 
by various means including visits of "puppet" 
priests from Eastern Europe. To date the 
Vietnamese Catholic hierarchy appears ' to 
have been fa My successful in maintaining its 
position among file Catholic population, 

11", The substantial ethnic minorities, v.'ho live 
outside the river deltas, have an ingrained 
- (Sslike for all Vietnamese and there have been 
some instances of armed opposition by the 
tribal groi of north and northwest Tonkin. 
To integrate Giese minorities politically and 
to lessen their opposition to Communist lead- 
ership, the DRV has established "autonomous 
administrative areas" nominally controlled by 
tribal dignitaries loyal to the Communists. 
In any event, Communist military and secu- 
rity forces are capable of eliminating any 
active resistance m the north. 

Economic Policies and Courses of Action 

1% The regime is moving gradually to extend 
its contra! over all aspects of the economy," 
but it hr-.s not yet attempted detailed over-all 
panning, the nationalization of small pro- 
ductive units Hid domestic trade, or the col- 
■ Icctivizalion of agriculture. At present, the 
regime is attempting to deal with immediate 
problems on the following priority: (a) in- 
creasing agricultural production; (b) restor- 
ing the transportation network; and (c) re- 
habilitating export industries, e. g., coal, ce- 
ment, phosphates, and textile and other light 
industries. Thus far the regime has not be- 
gun to stress heavy industrial development 
and is concentrating a major portion of its 
industrial production on consumer goods. 

13. The regime's major economic problem is 
io meet the minimum consumption needs of 
the population while developing a self-sup- 



porting economy. Prior to 1954 the annual 
rice deficit of North Vietnam averaged about 
200,000 metric tons. As a result of wartime 
damage to irrigation facilities and an un- 
precedented series of floods, droughts, and 
insect scourges, the rice deficit in each of the 
past two years has amounted to at least 
500,000 metric tons. With shipments from 
South Vietnam cut to a trickle since 1954, 
the DRV appealed to the Eloc for relief. 
However, imports through April 1056, consist- 
ing of token shipments from Communist 
China and some 200,000 tons of Burmese rice 
purchased by the USSR, have fallen far short 
of minimum requirements. In December 1955 
the DRV announced that the per capita food 
consumption in that year had dropped at 
times to as low as 500 calories per day. 

14. There will probably be some improvement 
in the food situation in 1956-1957. The USSR 
has agreed to accept up to 400,000 tons of Bur- 
mese rice each year through 1959. It is likely 
that the Burmese will actually vShip a high 
percentage of this figure and that the D'KV 
will receive a major share of this rice. Al- 
though the spring crop in 195G will probably 
again fall below normal because of continued 
adverse weather, the extensive efforts of the 
regime to mobilize all segments of the popu- 
lation for irrigation repair, reclamation of 
abandoned land, cultivation of new land, and 
planting of subsidiary crops should lead to 
a gradual increase in domestic output, 

15. However, North Vietnam will not achieve 
self-sufficiency in rice in the next few years 
even with optimum weather conditions. 
Planned investment to increase the supply 
of fertilizers, pumps, improved seeds, and ag- 
ricultural implements appears insufficient to 
achieve a substantial increase in output in 
the near future. Moreover, the current pro- 
gram for redistribution of land will probably 
depress production. 

16. Rehabilitation of modern industries has 
gone slowly due to a lack of raw materials, 
technicians, and equipment. Coal production 
in 1955 is estimated to have been about 700,- 
000 tons compared to 900,000 tons under the 
French, in 1953 and the pre- World War II 
peak of 2,600,000 tons. ■ The rate may reach 









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* * 









800,000 to 1,000,000 tons in 1956, permitting 
an 'export of 300,000-500,000 tons. By the 
end of 1956 cement production may reach its 
former annual rate of 300,000 tons. Tfhe large 
textile plant at Nam Dinh returned to limited 
production in December 1955 but even when 
operating at full capacity it will provide only 
about half of North Vietnam's requirements 
and it is dependent on' imported cotton/ 

17. Wife Chinese Communist technical and 
manpower assistance, rapid progress has been 
made in restoring transportation and com- 

. . munication facilities. The rail link from 
Hanoi to the Chinese border at Nam Quan 
has been restored and the Haiphong-Kunming 
line will probably be fully restored this year. 
This construction will link southwest China 
with sc$ transport at Haiphong and the main 

-Chinese rail system at Nam Quan. The line 
from Hanoi to the 17th parallel is also being 
rehabilitated and it is possible that service 
south to Vinh will be established by the end 
of the year. With Chinese assistance, the 
DRV has also made rapid progress in rehabili- 
tating North Vietnam's highway system. A 

• bridge building program for 1955 is aimed at 
eliminating most of the ferries on primary 
roads. Rehabilitation of the Hanoi-Lai Chau 
route and of roads south from Hanoi toward 
the 17th parallel will facilitate the movement 
of troops and supplies to any point along the 
borders of Laos and South Vietnam.* Soviet 
assistance is making possible the improvement 
of port facilities at Haiphong which will fur- 
ther expedite the distribution of Bloc mili- 
tary and economic supplies. 

18. The chronic deficit in the balance of pay- 
ments position of the North Vietnam area has 
been deepened by the failure to restore agri- 
cultural and industrial production and by the 
abnormal requirements for foreign goods and 
.technical aid. The foreign exchange position 
has also been worsened by the break in com- 
plementary trade relations with the south. 
A measure of the deficit and of the critical 
economic situation is suggested by the magni- 
tude of Bloc grants to the DKV. In July 1955, 
Communist China granted the sum of 800,- 
000,000 yuan (about $330,000,000 at official 
rates) and the USSR promised 400,000,000 
rubles ($100,000,003 at official rates) . Smaller 



grants have been extended by several of the 
European Satellites. A substantial portion of 
the aid received has been in the form of con- 
sumer goods. 

19. We believe that during the period of this 
estimate the DRV will continue to concen- 
trate, with moderate success, on efforts to 
increase agricultural, mineral, and light in- 
dustry production. The DRV has the re- 
sources to increase exports and to support 
a modest industrial development. However, 
at least for several years, it will require sub- 
stantial Bloc assistance to support even a 
minimum standard of living and there ap- 
pears little prospect for substantial forced 
saving to support rapid industrialization in 
the near future. 

DRV Military Strength 

20. The "Vietnam People's Army" (VPA) 
now has a total strength of about 268,000 men 
organized in 16 infantry divisions, 2 artil- 
lery divisions, 1 AAA groupment, 10 separate 
infantry regiments, and 5 border and coast- 
al security regiments. As the VPA continues 
its evolution toward a modern force, several 
more divisions may be organized using exist- 
ing separate regiments. Although further 
substantial increases in the numerical 
strength of the army appear unlikely, a ready 
pool of semitn.incd manpower exists among 
the 117,000 men now in regional and popular 
troop units. The recent announcement by 
the DRV of a troop reduction probably re- 
flects the release of unfit personnel since the 
Armistice. 

21. More extensive training was probably 
made possible by reduced commitments to 
internal security missions and reconstruction 
projects, and multidi visional maneuvers were 
reported in late 1955. We believe that about 
half of the major combat units are combat- 
ready and the remainder probably will reach 
that status during 1956. Even at its present 
level of training, the VPA is capable Of de- 
feating the total military forces of South Viet- 
nam, Cambodia, and Laos. " - * 

22. There were no significant changes in the 
dispositions of VPA units during the past 



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year and the largest concentration remains 
in the Delta region, approximately 300 miles 
from the 17th parallel. However, clandestine 
guerrilla operations, foetading infiltration of 
small units, could be conducted against South 
Vietnam and Laos without major troop move- 
ments. - „ . 

23, The Vietnamese* Communists have' no 
combat air capabilities at the present time, 
but some air training probably is underway 
in Communist China. It is possible that the 
DRV will have one or two regiments of piston 
fighters operational in 1957. There are 26 
former French air fields in North Vietnam, 
five of which could be used with little or no 
development to support sustained operations 
by Communist Jet fighters, and one of which 
could probably support sustained jet light 
bomber operations. 1 DRV has no sepa- 
rate naval organization and coastal defense 
depends on small armed craft and ground 



DRV External Relations ana 1 Policies 

• 24. Relations loith the Mac. We believe that 
the DRV is firmly committed to the policies of 
the Sino-Soviet Bloc, even to the extent of 
subordinating or postponing the pursuit of 
its local or regional objectives in the interest 
of over-all Bloc tactics and strategy. The 
attitude of DKV leadership follows from its 
Communist world .outlook and from the fact 
that DRV objectives can only be realized with 
Sino-Sovici Bloc support. 

25. Despite its close ties with and dependence 
on Peiping and Moscow, the DRV on occasion 
acts in less conform!; :y with the. Bloc than 
the European Satellites. A number of consid- 
erations account for tMs special status. The 
Vietnamese Communists fought their own 
fi«ht against French colonialism. The DRV 
possesses an army and security organization 
which was developed >r to 1950 independ- 
ently of Sino-Soviet m rial assistance. The 
appearance of relative independence created 
by some DRV actions may, nevertheless, serve 
to further Bloc interests elsewhere in South- 
east Asia. 

year, Bloc economic and 



expectations. Bloc deliveries of rice have 
been far below levels necessary to prevent 
widespread debility in North Vietnam. Mi- 
koyan's visit to Hanoi in April 1958, the first 
by a major Soviet official, was made a great 
public occasion and DRV propaganda sug- 
gested some expectation that new aid or 
economic agreements might result. No new 
Soviet-DRV arrangements were announced; 
however, and in fact Mikoyan departed with- 
out issuance of the usual joint communique. J 
The USSR also failed to press DRV demands [ 
either for the "strict implementation" of the 
Geneva Agreements with respect to north- 
south consultations and elections, or for re- 
convening the Geneva conference. The So- 
viet position, as it developed at the April-May 
Geneva co-chairmen talks, accepts main 1 , 
nance of the status quo for the time being. 
Although the Chinese Communists have been 
more forthright in supporting the stated DRV 
position, the Soviet Union has shown no dis- 
position to support the DRV's basic objective 
of securing control of all Vietnam Vt the risk 
of jeopardizing Soviet policy objectives in 
other areas or the Bloc's campaign of em- 
phasising "friendship" and reducin 



ig tensions. 



26. Over the p 



iast 



diplomatic support m y not have met DRV 



27. The rather aloof position of the USS 
which increases the dependence of the Viet- 
namese Communists on Communist China, 
may be disappointing to the DRV, ; ne ele- 
ment of the traditional Vietnamese distrust of 
the Chinese probably survives among Viet- 
namese Communist leaders, despite the bond 
of Marxism, and the DRV may well wish that 
it could counter Chinese influer 2 with closer 
Soviet ties. , 

28. Substantial differences over policy toward 
South Vietnam, and possibly 1 ds, may 6 
velop between the DRV and the USSR and 
Communist China if prospects for an early 
extension of Communist control to South Viet- 
nam continue to decline. Even in this .event, 
however, and despite the DRV's potential 
capacity for independent action, we believe 
that other considerations would prevail to 
cause the DRV to continue its loyal adherence 
to the Bloc. 



• 



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29. Policies Toward South Vietnam. Lack- 
in** lull Bloc support for its reunification 
demands and recognizing that the July 1956 
deadline for elections would not 'be met, 
the DRV is now adjusting its policies for the 
longer pull. The regime's public position that 
the Geneva provisions must be fulfilled and 
that nationwide elections must be held re- 
mains unchanged, - However,- the DRV is now 
playing: down the demand for early reconven- 
ing of the Geneva conference and increasing- 
its demands for direct north-south consulta- 
tions. The DRV has accepted the position 
taken by the Soviet Union at the London talks 
that the ICC and Joint Armistice Commission 
should continue their functions despite the 
dissolution of the French High Command. 
The DRV has also enlarged the scope of its 
diplomatic activity to enhance its interna- 
tional prestige and position and to secure the 
broadest possible foreign support for eventual 
implementation of the Geneva Agreements. 

30. At the same time, the DRV has main- 
tained its network of political and paramili- 
tary cadres in the south. It has continued 
"its efforts to penetrate the government of 
South Vietnam and probably is maintaining 
contact with non-Communist but anti-Diem 
Vietnamese, chiefly those now in exile, who 
favor conciliation with the north. Through 
use of nationalist themes and front organiza- 
tions, it is attempting Jo retain popular fol- 
lowing in the south.' Ninety-five thousand 

, men were evacuated from the south in the 
first few months following the Armistice. The* 
DRV probably views this group as a possible 
Instrument for subversive activity in South 
Vielnam and some may have been retrained, 

i reindoctrinated, and perhaps even reinfil- 

j trated."] 

! ~> 

Zh' Policies Toward Laos and Cambodia. The 
Communist rebel movement in Laos, the 
Pathet Lao, is completely dependent on DRV 
support and assistance to maintain its posi- 
tion in the northern provinces. Although 
the DRV continues to support the Pafchet Lao, 
it has begun to soften its line toward the 
Royal Lao government. In place of its earlier 
criticism of the Lao government, the DRV 
now praises the Lao government's professed 






adherence to the "five principles of coexist- 
ence," encourages Laos to adopt a neutral 
foreign policy and to enter into direct consul- 
tations with the Pathet Lao to resolve their 
differences, 

32, DRV policy toward Cambodia encourages 1 
neutralism and the establishment of wider 
contacts between the Cambodian government 
and the Communist world. The Hanoi radio 
has virtually eliminated its previously bitter 
condemnation of the Cambodian government 
and is now extravagant in its praise of Cam- 
bodian foreign policy and its "resistance" to 
alleged US "plots" to undermine Cambodian 
independence. Future DRV policies with re- 
spect to Laos and Cambodia will probably 
reflect the guidance of Moscow and Peiping. 

33. Policies Toioard Other Countries. In its 
relations with other states in Asia, the DRV 
has attempted to increase support for its 
position on unification, to further the gen- 
eral Bloc peace campaign, and to obtain dip- 
lomatic contacts and recognition-. At pres- 
ent, North Vietnam is recognized by all Bloc 
countries, but no non-Bloc country has ex- 
tended full diplomatic recognition. India and 
Indonesia have exchanged consular represent- 
atives with both North and South Vietnam 
and Burma has permitted the DRV to main- 
tain an Information O.Tice in Rangoon. The 
DRV has taken special pains to woo the In- 
dian delegates to the ICC. 

34, The DRV has severely curtailed remain- 
ing French cultural activities in North Viet- 
nam and the much publicized commercial 
arrangements have been too restrictive to 
hold or attract any significant economic ac- 
tivity by the French. However, the DRV has 
won French agreement to the establishment 
of a commercial and cultural mission in Paris. 
Its presence will complicate French relations 
with Diem and facilitate the maintenance of 
DRV influence among Vietnamese resident in 
France. 

III. SOUTH VIETNAM -CURRENT SITUATION 
AND TRENDS 

Political 

35. During the past year President Ngo Dinh 
Dicrn's government has greatly strengthened 



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its internal political position in South Viet- 
nam, a country with an estimated population 
of 12 million. ' The national referendum in 
October 1955 established the legitimacy of the 
Government of Vietnam (GVN), and com- 
pleted the elimination of Bao Dai as Chief 
of State and as a major political factor in 
Smith Vietnam. By the end of March 1956, 
Diem reduced . the 'Cao Dai' and Hoa Kao 
groups to political impotence by a series cf 
moves which culminated to the elimination" 
of the Cao Dai army as an independent mili- 
tary force and the* capture, trial, and execu- 
tion of Ba Cut, the last important active Hoa 
Hao resistance, leader. 

36. On' 4 March 1956, in South Vietnam's first 
national elections, 80 percent of the eligible 
voters participated to electing 123 deputies 
from 405 candidates for the Constituent As- 
sembly. The returns gave pro-Diem forces a 
substantial majority. Although nearly one- 
third of the government-favored candidates 
were defeated, no openly anti-Diem deputy 
was elected. This was due in part to govern- 
mint manipulation of the election campaign 
and in part to a boycott of the elections by 
most of the opposition parties. Despite efforts 
by the Vietnamese Communists and other 
resistance groups to disrupt and sabotage the 
voting, the elections generally were calm and 
orderly. The Constituent Assembly will sit 
for a four-year term as the first National 
Assembly. 



37. The deputies in the Constituent Assembly; 
which convened 15 March, are divided among 
political parties as follows: National Revolu- 
tionary Movement (NRM), 61; Revolutionary 
Workers Party (EWP), 15; Citizens Rally 
(CR), 26; Movement of Struggle for Freedom 
(MSF), 6; and Independents (including one 
■ Dai Viet) , 15. The NRM is the Diem govern- 
ment's primary source of organized political 
power. Although Information Minister Tran 
Chanh Thanh is its titular head, a large part 
of the party is controlled by Diem's brother, 
Ngo Dinh Can, who controls Central Viet- 
nam. The KWP> also a government party, is 
led by Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu. While 
the CR, MSF, and most Independents now 
support Diem, they contain some members 



who have reservations about some of Diem's 
methods and are potential centers of parlia- 
mentary opposition. 

38. Diem will probably maintain his domi- 
nant political position in South Vietnam dur-. 
tog the period of this estimate. The consti- 
tution, which has been drafted under Diem's 
supervision, gives the President wide powers 
including the right to appoint the first Vice 
President and to suspend civil rights during 
the life of the first Assembly. Diem's personal 
prestige will probably be enhanced by im- 
provement in internal security and by con- 
tinued frustration of Vietnamese Communist 
objectives. However, he will continue to face 
serious problems in attracting additional ac- 
tive support for his government, in part be- 
cause of his reliance on a small circle of rela- 
tives and trusted friends. While Diem's con- 
trol of the Assembly during the period of this 
estimate will probably be adequate to insure 
adoption of any important measure he wishes 
enacted, his inclination to hold a tight rein 
on the legislature may accelerate the develop- 
ment of an active opposition. 

■ 

39. The appointment of a Vice President by 
Diem, now 55, will remove much uncertainty 
over presidential successorship. Neverthe- 
less, Diem's death, whether by natural causes 
or assassination, could result to serious fac- 
tional disputes in the government and among 
the major political parties which could strain 
the new governmental institutions. Ngo Dinh 
Nhu and Tran Chanh Thanh, key figures in 
the RWP and NRM, have a great deal of 
political power and would play important 
roles in any redistribution of power, but nei- 
ther of these men- has a wide popular follow- 
ing. To some government critics and govern- 
ment supporters Thanh symbolizes the more 
regressive features of the Diem regime. At 
the moment, Secretary to the President and 
Acting Minister of the Interior Nguyen Him 
Chau appears to enjoy Diem's .favor and has 
grown rapidly to stature a«d power, but he 
has no organized political backing apart from 
his support by Diem and Nhu. Ngo Dinh Can 
would probably play an important behind- 
the-scenes role in any redistribution of power, 
but his lack of national stature and poor 






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health would almost certainly rule him out 
? s"a leading contender for leadership. Tran 
Vfcn lam, leader of the CR, is ambitious and 
enjoys considerable popularity in the -south- 
ern provinces, but his political position is 
weals. Although the army high command 
has been trying to keep the army out of poli- 
tics the prestige and strength of the army 
v.miM.almost certainly j>Iay a major and possi- 
bly decisive role in the redistribution of politi- 
cal power. The numerous anti-Diem national- 
ists in South Vietnam and France would prob- 
ably attempt to re-enter the picture and their 
-maneuvers\vould add to the confusion. How- 
ever, many of these men are discredited be- 
cause of their past relations with Bao Dai, 
the French, or the Communists, and it is 
doubtful that any of them could muster suf- 
ficient backing to gain control. 

Economic 

40. South Vietnam is normally an agricul- 
tural surplus area, exporting rice and rubbei . 
During World War II and the civil war 
periods large portions of cultivated land were 
abandoned and the transportation and irri- 
gation systems deteriorated. Current rice 
production is less than two-thirds the pre- 
Workl War II levels, and exports in 1955 were 
only about 100,000 tons as compared with the 
prewar annual total of more than one million 
tons. Current rubber output of 54,000 tons 
exceeds the prewar level by about 10,000 tons 
and rubber has replaced rice as South Viet- 
nam's leading foreign exchange earner. In 
1955 hi^h" market prices raised the value of 
South Vietnam's rubber exports almost 80 per- 
cent above 1954 and to more than, half the 
v^hie of all exports. 

41. Because of the decline in rice exports and 
the large imports of consumer goods and, to a 
lesser extent, capital goccls for rehabilitation, 
South Vietnam is running a large deficit in 
its balance of payments. In 1954 exports 
covered 17 percent of imports while in 1955, 
even with unusually high rubber prices, ex- 
ports covered only 25 percent of imports. At 
present, US aid is filling the gap and is an 
important factor in the relatively high stand- 
ards of living prevalent in much of South 



Vietnam. For the fiscal years 1955 and 1955 
the planned level of US economic and military 
aid for South Vietnam totaled approximately 
$520 million (not including the value of US 
equipment already in Vietnam and trans- 
ferred* to the GVN), At present the US is 
financing about 90 percent of the GVN mili- 
tary budget, 65 percent of the combined mili- 
tary-civilian budget, and 75 percent of all 
South Vietnam's imports. 

42. The withdrawal of French military forces, 
the termination of France's preferential trade 
status, and the loosening of French -Vietna- 
mese political ties have combined to curtail 
the scale of French industrial and commercial 
activity in South Vietnam. French business 
interests are withdrawing about as rapidly 
as Vietnamese restrictions on currency trans- 
fers permit. South Vietnam's import trade is 
moving away from France toward Japan and 
the US. In 1953 and 1954, France supplied 
about 80 percent of South Vietnam's imports. 
In 1955 the figure dropped to 50 percent and 
the downward trend is continuing. In the 
same two-year period, Japan's share of South 
Vietnam's imports has increased from three 
to 12 percent. 

43. The GVN has not yet effectively come to 
grips with its economic problems. President 
Diem has stated that 195G will be a year of 
economic consolidation, but through the first 
six months of the year, GVN attention con- 
tinued to be focused on security and political 
issues. Only the most pi ing economic 
problems have received serious government at- 
tention and those have generally been dealt 
with by ad hoe methods or authoritarian de- 
crees. For example, the government has at- 
tempted to cope with a serious threat of infla- 
tion by a series of decrees controlling prices 
and inventories for many items and establish- 
ing high fines and even the death penally for 
attempts to corner the market. These n ls- 
urcs have contributed little to preventing in- 
flation and have aroused the, resentment of 
the Important Chinese community. Inflation- 
ary pressures have been held in check pri- 
marily because the government has been able, 
with US aid, to maintain a fairly high level 
of imports of consumer goods. 



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44 progress has been slow in the resettlement 
of refugees and in the implementation of other 
measures to increase agricultural production. 
The limited land reform program inaugurated 
in 1S53 is unattractive to the peasant in com- 
parison with extravagant Communist prom- 
ises. Landlords arc objecting to the low rents 
provided for in the program and their opposi- 
tion plus the general lack of -official determi- 
nation and administrative competence has led 
to the stagnation of land reform, 

+ 

45. Nevertheless, the GVN has made some 
progress in building the organizational struc- 
ture necessary to replace institutions of the 
French colonial period. The GVN has created 
an independent national bank, a foreign ex- 
change office, an investment fund, a govern- 
ment-owned commercial bank, and an inde- 
pendent currency* President Diem has pro- 
posed establishment of a High Economic Coun- 
cil to guide the country's economic develop- 
ment and he has made informal reference to 
the possibility of a four or live year plan for 
economic. rehabilitation and development. In 



addition, government officials now administer 
"a substantial import program and the appli- 
cation of a substantial US foreign aid pro- 
gram. Although these new institutions and 
economic activities provide an essential be- 
ginning for further economic progress, they 
are not yet fully operative or elective. 

4G. Though South Vietnam cannot become 
economically self-supporting to ] g as it 
must maintain armed forces of the present- 
size, its economic position could be substan- 
tially improved by economic and fiscal re- 

" forms. ' However, during the period of this 
estimate there is little prospect for mark* 
development of South Vietnam's economy o 
for a significant reduction in its balance of 
trade and budget deficits. . Inflationary pres- 
sures are almost certain to continue. How- 

' ever, the food supply, a critical political fac- 
tor, is likely to be more than adequate for 
domestic needs. Provided security conditions 
continue to improve, the GVN will probably 
give economic problems increased attention 
during the coming year and will probably be 
able to make some progress toward solution 
of several specific economic pro!;! cms. A pro- 






gram to resettle 100,000 refugees on aban- 
doned land has been developed and some 
40,000 of these have already been relocated. 
This project will probably be followed by fur- 
ther resettlement projects which are likely to 
reduce substantially the refugee problem dur- 
ing the estimate period. Additional land will 
probably be brought under cultivation. Some 
improvement is likely in tax collection and 
in handling the problem of French dlsinvest- 
ment. By mid-1957, economic development 
planning will probably be wall advanced, but 
concrete results are unlikely within the period. 

Military 

47, Current strength of the Vietnamese Na- 
tional Army (VNA) is approximately 145,000 
troops. The VNA is organised into 4 field 
infantry divisions (8,500), 6 light infantry 
divisions (5,225), 1 airborne groupment 
..(4,000), 13 territorial regiments, 5 sepa- 
rate sect regiments, and 3 5 assorted combat 
battalions. Although some progress has been 
made during the past year, the e:; tensive 
plans for training and reorganizing the VNA 
have fallen behind schedule because most ma- 
jor units have been dispersed with many of 
them engaged in security operations. Prin- 
cipal VNA weaknesses are an inadequate logis- 
tical and technical support system, an ineffec- 
tive chain of command, and inexperience at 
the command and staff levels. At least six 
months of uninterrupted training' will be nec- 
essary to bring the VNA to minimum opera- 
tional effectiveness at division level. VNA 
loyalty to President Diem and ( his policies 
seems assured. The army's ssAf-eonfi&eaiee 
and morale are generally good, 

48. When the French High Command was 
inactivated on 23 April 1056, all previous 
French-Vietnamese military agj jments were 
terminated. All French combat units have 
been withdrawn from Vietnam. After 1 July, 
only a few French army personnel remained 
in South Vietnam, in addition to a 1,000-man 
French military support group for the* ICC. 
The Vietnamese and the French are now ne- 
gotiating concerning French support for the 
ICC and the French role in braining the Viet- 
namese forces, particularly air and naval 



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forces. The primary US-directed effort has 
bsen the training of a Vietnamese instructor 
corps and the development of training 'pro- 
grams throughout the Vietnamese army, US 
personnel are detailed to VNA training cen- 
ters, to units at division level, and to major 
territorial commands to supervise progress 
and implementation of the training program. 
The US" military] group In -South Vietnam has 
been held to Its prc-Gcneva size despite, the 
near complete withdrawal of the French mis- 
sion, which totaled about 2,500 personnel 
prior to the Armistice, However, a 350-man 
US Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission 
(TERM)* is being established in South Viet* 
nam. ■ 



e 



* <D. South Vietnam's embryonic air fore 
'(VNAF) has grown only slightly during the 

, past year. Its current strength of 3,338 in- 
cludes 103 trained officer and enlisted pilots 
and 100 pilot trainees. VNAF aircraft inven- 

. tory is 143 planes, mostly trainer/liaison and 
transport types. Although the air force Is 
receiving F8F piston fighter-type planes, it 
is unable to maintain even limited flight oper- 
ations because of a lacl: of qualified mainte- 
nance personnel. The VNAF has a limited 
capability to provide air support to ground 
troops, artillery' observation, air evacuation, 
liaison, and air lift for paratrcop operations. 
No significant increase in VNAF capabilities . 

. appears likely during the next two to three 

. years. 

< 

50. South Vietnam's navy is under operational 
control of the Chief of Staff of the VNA and 
under the admin .strati vc command of a senior 
naval officer." Personnel strength is 142 ofa- 
' cers and 1,755 men, with a Marine Corps of 
44 officers and 1,775 men. The forces afloat, 
which have been an anted over the past year 
by additions from the withdrawing French 
forces, include 3 submarine chasers (PC), 
3 coastal. minesweepers (J£SC (O)), 1C am- 
phfr. -us vessels (2 LSM, 2 LSSL, 5 LSIL, 
5 LCU), and 170. smaller amphibious and 
patrol craft. The Vietnamese navy has lim- 
. ited effectiveness, but it is capable of under- 
taking river patrol and minor coastal and 
amphibious operations. Capabilities should 
improve substantially in the near future be- 



cause of continued US aid and intensive train- 
ing programs which include technical train- 
ing m the US arid France. 

51. We believe South Vietnam's military and 
•security forces are capable of maintaining 

the government in power against any poten- 
tial armed opposition now located^ south of 
the 17th parallel, fin the event of large scale, 
concerted guerrilla'warfare supported by in- 
filtration of men and supplies from the north, 
relatively large areas of rural Vietnam prob- 
ably would be lost to government control/; In 
the event of full scale invasion, the Vietna- 
mese forces at present probably could not de- 
lay for more than 60 days a Vietnamese Com- 
munist advance to the Ban Me Thout-Nha 
Trang line. If the trend toward Improved 
internal security and increased effectiveness 
of the Civil Guard continues, it will be possi- 
ble to step up training and reorganization of 
the VISTA, thereby improving its capabilities 
during the period of this estimate. However, 
by mid- 1.957 Vietnamese forces will still be 
incapable "of delaying for more than SO days 
an advance by DRV forces beyond the Ban Me 
Thoiit-Nha" Trang line. 

Interna! Security 

52. The internal security situation in South 
Vietnam has improved substantially during 
the past year." The sects are no longer a ma- 
jor security problem for the GVN. Host of 

'the important non-Communist sect leaders of 
a year ago have either Sect the country, been 
killed or captured, lost control of their forces, 
or rallied to the government. Remaining sect 
armed bands are scattered and disc d 

and probably total no more than 2,060, Al- 
though various bandit groups will probably 
continue to cause local disturbances, it is like- 
ly that organized non-Conununist resistance 
will virtually disappear during the period of 
this estimate. 

53. With the sect problem basically under con- 
trol, the Communist underground represents 
the only serious threat to internal security 
in South Vietnam. Reports on Communist 
armed strength in the south over the past 
year have ranged from 5^00 to 10,000. Our 
best, estimate of current si h is £,000 to 



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• 



,i 



' ■. 






10,000 with approximately 5^000 organized in 
skeletal company and battalion sized units 
which could be expanded through , # rccruit- 
picnt. Thes6 armed forces are generally scat- 
tered through the mountains paralleling the 
Annam coast and the remote swampy regions 
of Cochin-China. They are capable of harass- 
ing actions against VNA outposts and of widc- 

- spread intimidation, 'assassination, sabotage, 
and terrorism, especially in rural areas. They 
could disrupt north-south traffic throughout 
Central Vietnam and interfere seriously with 
provincial and local administration. Eow- 

! ever, any sustained guerrilla operations would 

I require a flow of reinforcements and supply 

1 from the north. 

54. Tte Communists have an unknown num- 
ber of political cadres fa the south engaged in 

"subversive and propaganda activities. Al- 
though Communist cadres probably exercise 
effective control over some remote communi- 
ties where the GVN has not yet attempted to 
establish its authority, and have some influ- 
ence in villages through much of South Viet- 
nam, over-all Vietnamese Communist political 

* influence in the south appears to have dimin- 
ished during thejast year. However, if the 
'Communists^ecidcUo exercise their capability 
for armed intimidation and terror they could 

S ouickly reassert political control or influence, 

' at least in some rural areas where GVN 
authority is tenuous. £?J . 

55. During the past year the Communists in 
South Vietnam have remained generally qui- 
escent. .They have passed by a number. of 
opportunities .to. embarrass the Diem regime. 
Although some cadres and supplies are being 
infiltrated across the 17th parallel, the DRV 

! probably has not sent any large scale rein- 
"forcement or supply to the south. Commu- 
nist activity in the south appears to concen- 
trate on protecting vital bases and supply 
caches, developing clandestine paramilitary 
organizations, and implementing a broad pro- 
gram of infiltration and subversion. While 

' seeking to maintain intact as much of their 
armed strength as possible, their main activity 
seems to be an effort to weaken the Diem gov-' 
eminent by subversive and political tactics.; 
Communist directives indicate that penetra- 
tion and subversion of the GVN military and 



security forces is a major objective.' Although 
there is little specific evidence, they probably 
have penetrated lower echelons of the VNA, 
especially the integrated sect forces, and prob- 
ably hold positions of influence in some pro- 
vincial governments and village councils. 
Local Communist groups probably gave some 
assistance to the Cao Dai and Hoa Kao forces 
opposing the government. Since the collapse 
of sect armed resistance it is possible that 
the Communists are seeking to take over the 
remnants of the sect forces. 

56; The GVN has organized a Civil Guard to 
relieve the VNA of many static internal secu- 
rity duties. Current strength of the Civil 
Guard is approximately 48,000 men organized 
in lightly-armed mobile companies. Its mis- 
sion is to maintain law and order, collect in- 
telligence, and conduct countersub version 
operations at the provincial level in areas 
pacified by the army. Although considerable 
progress and refinement in its training and 
organization will be necessary before the Civil 
Guard can fully discharge its responsibilities, 
it has shown considerable potential as an in- 
strument for maintaining internal security. 
A 60,000-man village Self-Defense Corps (Dan 
Ve Doan) is being organized to provide secu- 
rity at the local level. 

Foreign Relations 

* 57, GVN foreign policy objectives are to win 
recognition as the legitimate government of 
all Vietnam." to obtain maximum foreign mili- 
tary and economic aid and guarantees of for- 
eign assistance in the event of Communist 
aggression, and to develop foreign support for 
its position with respect to the Geneva Agree- 
ments. Forty-one nations have recognized 
the GVN. In addition, India and Indonesia 
maintain consular relations with the GVN, 

58. President Diem consistently has main- 
tained that South Vietnam is not bound by 
the 1954 Geneva Accords and has no legal 
responsibility for their implementation. He 
has refused to deal directly with the * DRV 
on any issue and has been steadfast in his 
rejection of all-Vietnam elections until "demo- 
cratic processes can be assured in North Viet- 
nam." He believes that any consultations 
or implied recognition of the DRV would have 



s 






SECRET 

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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SECR E T 



12 



■ adverse political effects in the south and 
■could lend to increased internal and inter- 
national pressure for reunification of -Viet- 

■ nam under a coalition government with the 
Communists. 

• 

59. His refusal to permit nationwide elections 
and to assume responsibilities under the Ge- 
neva Accords raised the possibility of a with- 
drawal of the ICC following the deactivation 
of the French High Command in April. To 
deal with this situation, representatives of 
the Geneva co-chairmen (the UK and the 
USSR) met in London during April and May 
1958. The USSR failed to press DRV de- 
mands that the co-chairmen reopen the Ge- 
neva conference. Instead, the co-chairmen 
final*? agreed upon identical letters to the 
DRV "and GVN requesting them to prevent 
any violation of military clauses of the Ge- 
neva Accords, to insure implementation of the 
political terms, to submit at the earliest pos- 
sible time a convenient deadline for direct 
consultations and for holding 'all-Vietnam 
elections, and to give every assistance to the 
ICC. The co-chairmen requested the ICC to 

■ continue supervising the Armistice. They re- 
quested the French government to continue 
its^ood offices in support of the ICC, to reach 
agreement with the GVN to facilitate the task 
of the ICC and the Joint Armistice Commis- 
sion (French-DRV) , and to preserve the status 
quo until such new arrangements could be put 

into effect. 

60. Desolto his past refusals to assume respon- 
sibilities under the Geneva Accords, in his 
response to the co-chairmen's message Diem 
agreed to respect the Armistice and to pro- 
vfde security for ICC members. He recognizes 
the deterrent value inherent in the presence 
of the ICC, and appears willing to take action 
necessary to continue its function but con- 
tinues to avoid the acceptance of any legal 
obligation under the Geneva Accords. 

Gl. Franco-Vietnamese relations continue to 
reflect considerable ill-will and distrust on 
both sides. Recent causes of friction include 
disagreements concerning the future status 
and role of French military training missions, 
residual military base rights in South Viet- 
nam and the equivocal French attitude to- 



ward the Communist regime in the north. 
The French now exercise little influence in 
Vietnamese affairs and there is little prospect 
for any improvement in relations in the near 
future. ' 

62, South Vietnam-US relations have re- 
mained close and friendly during the past 
year. There have bsen few evidences of Viet- 
namese resentment of increasing US influence 
and activity in South Vietnam despite con- 
tinual efforts by the Communists and some 
local French to stir up dissatisfaction on that 
score. The GVN would like the US to rai:: 
the mutually agreed ceiling on VNA force* 
levels and desires greater autonomy in ad- 
ministering the foreign aid program. Diem* 
would also like the US to exercise maximum 
political pressure, especially on the UK, India, 
and France, to enable the GVN to avoid any 
responsibility for the Geneva Accords. 

63. Relations between South Vietnam and 
Cambodia have been strained by activities of 
resistance groups in border areas" by treat- 
ment of minority groups, by boundary dis- 
putes, and most seriously by disagreements 
relating to trade arrangements. A trade stop- 
page early in 1056 was removed through in- 
formal mediation by the US, and by the terms 
of settlement official representatives have 
been exchanged for the first time. The basic 
causes of friction remain, howevc Vietnam 
does not desire full diplomatic relations with 
Cambodia because it fears such action would 
lead to Cambodian recognition of the DRV as 
well. There are no pressing prob is in Lao- 
Vietnamese relations and South Vietnam's re- 

. lations with the Philippines and Thailand are 
generally good. 

IV. THE OUTLOOK IN VIETNAM 

Probable Communist Courses jf Action 
Toward South Vietnam 

164, The DRV probably estimates that its 
lehanc.es for securing control of South Viet- 
nam by, means short of open attack or large 
scale guerrilla action supported from the 
north will gradually diminish with the pas- 
sage of time^J. As indicated by Soviet and 
Chinese Communist performance in the past 



(Z: 






SKCR E T 



1071 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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SECRET 



13 



several months, the DRV probably cannot 
expect strong support from the Bloc for the 
"strict implementation" of the Geneva Agree- 
ments, The lack of strong Bloc pressure 

' strengthens international acceptance of the 
status quo in Vietnam and increases confi- 
dence in the future in- South Vietnam. Al- 
• though the DRV may still believe that it 
could obtain control* of all Vietnam through 
ICC supervised nationwide elections, Viet- 
namese Communist leaders are probably in- 
creasingly doubtful on this point because of 

' - their own internal difficulties and the grow- 
ing nationalist stature of Diem. ["The DRV 
■ probably ate© believes that its covert. .assets 

.. ! in South Vietnam will gradually decline if 

I) the Diem [ rnment is permitted, to concen- 
trate on internal security and economic prob- 
j lems free of external harassment.'? 

C5. Despite the declining prospects for the 
"peaceful" take-over of South Vietnam, we 
believe that the USSR and Communist China 
will almos! " certainly continue unwilling to 
support open DRV military action against 
South, Vietnam during the period of this esti- 
mate, They are probably unwilling to risk 
the chance of US or SEATO intervention 
which would make it difficult to limit the con- 
flict to Vietnam, and probably believe that 
overt DRV military action would seriously un- 
dercut the worldwide effort of the Bloc to. win 
friends and supporters. Although the DRV 
retains the capability to launch an independ- ■ 
ent military action against South Vietnam, 
the chances of such action in the absence of 
assured Bloc ' upport appear to be extremely 

small.- •*...■ 

» • 

/65. The only remaining course of action hold- 
ing out some promise for the early achieve- 
ment of Communist control in South Vietnam 
* ■ appears to be the development of large scale 
guerrilla warfare in the south. In recent 
weeks a number of reports from sources of 
untested reliability have indicated that the 
Communists mAy have started preparations 
in both Smith Vietnam and in the north to 
begin guerrilla action. DRV allegations of 
Vietnamese violations of the demilitarized 
zone along the 17th parallel and Communist 
claims of US-Diem plans to violate the Arsnis- 



■ 

tice could be propaganda cover for the initia- 
tion of guerrilla action against the south. 

■ 

67. However, the possible indications of armed 
action appear inconsistent with the DRV's in- 
sistence on the continued functioning of the 
ICC — which is in a position to make at least 
limited observations of DRV activities. More- . 
over, guerrilla action in South Vietnam, if it 
were to be sustained and not to result simply - 
in the identification and gradual elimination 
of Communist cadres, would., require large 
scale support from the north. - This would in- 
volve some risk of detection by the ICC and 
of intervention Jjy. the US.and possibly SEATO. 
It would also tend to prejudice current Com- 
munist maneuvers elsewhere in Asia. For 
these reasons, we believe that the DRV will 
refrain from instituting large scale guerrilla 
action within South Vietnam during the 
period of this estimate. Communist capabili- 
ties for guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam 
will exist for some time, however, and the 
chances of their being employed jvould prob- 
ably increase in the event of any substantial 
deterioration in the domestic situation in 
South Vietnam — such as might conceivably 
occur on the death of Diem. The chances of 
Communist guerrilla warfare would also be 
increased by deterioration of the international 
aspects of the situation, such as a withdrawal 
of the ICC under circumstances which would 
permit the Communists to place the blame for 
this event on the CVN. 

* 

68. The DRV will continue to seek maximum 
Bloc support for its objectives and will seek, 
within the limits of Bloc strategy, to liar ass 
and undermine the government in South Viet- 
nam. It will continue to seek direct contar 
with South Vietnam, offering economic and 
cultural exchanges while castigating Diem for 



tn 



.t-;. 



blocking 



unification. It will continue ef- 
forts to penetrate the government "of 'South 
Vietnam and to improve its covert organiza- 
tion throughout the area. It may attempt to 
increase pressures for a reconvening of the 
Geneva conference and to unsettle the Diem 
government by fabricating or provoking inci- 
dents along the demarcation line and by dem- 
onstrations of armed strength within South 
Vietnam. 



SECRET 



G7S 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 201 1 






SECRET 



14 






Trends in South Vietnam 

•69 Barring a major Communist effort to dis- 
rupt the Diem regime by renewal, of* large 
i scale guerrilla operations, the over-all pros- 
pects for improved security of South Vietnam 
are good. The VNA, as its training progresses 
and^as more units are released from static 
security duties, probably will be able to pacify 
and extend government authority into., many 
of present Communist influence./ Dicm's 



areas 



> !success in by-passing the July 1956 election 
Wdate without evoking large scale Communist 
military reaction will reassure many Vietna- 
mese and encourage them to cooperate with 
GVN programs to expose and root out Com- 
j munists. Continued improvement in internal 
• security will depend in some measure on the 
government's ability to deal with economic 
'and social. problems and on the effectiveness 
'of the administrative apparatus. ■ 

70. If the Communists were to undertake 
large scale guerrilla action 'in South Vietnam, 
they probably would not toe able to develop 
widespread popular support", especially if the 
VNA were to register some early military suc- 

icess. The GVN is being increasingly accepted 
lias a nationalist alternative to Communist 
i. leadership. Public confidence in the GVN, 
combined with general war-weariness, may 
have already reached the point where any 
effort to upset the government by force \Vpuld 
lead to a strong popular reaction against the 

guerrillas. [ 

. ... * 

71. The trend toward increased political sta- 
bility in South Vietnam will probably continue 
during the period of this estimate and Presi- 
dent Diem Will probably continue to exercise 
effective political control, f" The trend toward 

: authoritarian rule through the political par- 
: ties led by Diem's relatives and small circle of 
trusted associates will probably continue. Iso- 
lation and neutralization of government crit- ' 

ad 



ics and men disliked or distrusted by Diem ; 
will also continue. Diem and his associates ' 
are likely to exert strong pressures against 
any opposition in the Assembly. Thus it is J 
not likely that Diem or his government Willi 

• 

meet any serious opposition in the National 
Assembly during the period of this estimate; 
however, over a longer period the accumula- 
tion of grievances among various groups and 
individuals may lead to development of a 
national opposition movement./ The major 
economic problems will undoubtedly continue 
and over the longer run may handicap South 
Vietnam in competition with the Communist 
north, but economic conditions are unlikely to 
affect political stability during the period of 
this estimate. 

72. Despite the moderately favorable outlook 
projected for South Vietnam, the situation 
contains many elements of instability, and 
progress will continue to depend on firm US 
"support. A number of contingent develop- 
ments could create new tensions* among the 
foreign powers concerned as well as between 
the GVN and the DRV. For example, the 
steps which Diem is willing to take toward 
facilitating the operations of the ICC may not 
be adequate to satisfy India whose representa- 
tive serves as chairman of the Commission. 
Should the Commission withdraw, DRV agi- 
tation might well be intensified and interna- 
tional Communist pressures on the diplomatic 
level would probably increase. The UK might 
become less firm in its support of Diem's posi- 
tion. Weakening of international support for 
Diem, a marked increase in Bloc support for 
the DRV, or a substantial increase in Commu- 
nist activity within South V tnam would 
probably weaken the government's confidence 
in its position, cause some loss of public sup- 
port, and lead to renewed efforts by opponents 
of the regime in the direction oi . ^conciliation 
with the north. 



SECRET 



1080 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16, By: NWD Date: 201 1 















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Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



( 



^Tjte'nfcer 5, 1956 



TOP SECRET 



.?.» Terences: 



A. 

B. 
C. 

D. 

E. 
F» 
G. 



H. 

I. 

J. 
K. 



NOTE BY TKS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 

to the 
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 

on 
U.S. POLICY IK MAINLAND SOUTESAST ASIA 



N3C 5U05 

"NSC Actions Nos. 1^26-b and 1527- c 

NSC C M9/ C j } paragraph 5-d 

NSC 5^29/5 j Annex A 

NSC Action No. IH15-C 

NSC Action No, 1571 

Memo for N3C from Executive Secretary t subject: "U. 

Policy in the Event of a Renewal of Aggression in 

Vietnam"; dated September %6 t 1955 
Progress Report, dated July 11, 1955, "by OCB on NSC 

5*tf)5 and Portions of NSC 5^29/5 
NSC 5^10 
NSC 5612 
NSC Action No* 1599 



c> 



•■"V 



I 

V 



- 




The President has this date approved trie statement of policy in K3C 5ol2, 
as t ided and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith as NSC $612/1$ 
directs its implementation "by all appropriate Executive departments and 
agencies of the U. 3. Government; and designates the Operations Coordinr t- 
ing Board as the coordinating agency. 

■ 

The enclosed statement of policy, as adopted and approved, supersedes 
NSC 5^05 and Annex A of H30 5^9/5* 



.r 












!. 



■ 
I 



cc 



JAMES 3* LAY, JR. 
Executive Secretary 



The Secretary of the Treasury 

She Attorney General 

The Secretary of Commerce - , 

The Special Assistant to the President for Disarnanent 

The Director, Bureau of the Budget 

The Chalncan-> Joint Chiefs of Staff 

The Director of Central Intelligence 



,e 



1082 



r- 



NSC 561?./? 



TO? SECRE 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



i 



STATEMENT OF POLICY 



TOP SECRET 



rn 



on 



U, S, POLICY IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA* 



I 

■ 
> . 



I. -GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 












! 

■ 



i 

■ 



I 

i 
I 
f 



i 






> 



1* General , Since main land Southeast Asia does not 
represent a unified area^ courses of action must generally bo 
determined xn the light of widely varying country situations. 
However, basic objectives and main directions of U. S, policy 
can and should bo established on a regional basis. 

2. Conseque nces of Co mmuni st Domination. The national 
security of the United States would bo endangered by Communist 
domination of mainland Southeast Asia, whether achieved by 
overt aggressions subversion,, or a political and economic 
offensive. 

a. The loss to Communist control of any single free 
country would encourage tendencies toward accommodation by 

the rest, . - - 

* a 

' b . Tie loss of the entire area would have a seriously 
adverse impact on the U, S, position elsewhere In the Par 
East ^ have severe economic consequences for many nations 
of the free world, add significant resources to the 
Communist bloc in rice,, rubber , tin and other minerals , 
and could result in severe economic and" political pros? 
sures on Japan and India for, accommodation to the Communist 
ibloc* Tee loss of Southeast Asia mainland could thus 
have farreachlng consequences seriously adverse to'U. S, 
security interests-. 



3 



The Communist Throat 



a. 



ve r t Aggro s s ion > Although Communist policy now 



emphasizes non-military methods, the danger of overt 
aggression will remain inherent so long as Communist 
China and North Viet Nam continue a basically hostile 
policy supported by substantial military forces. There 
is .only a cease-fire in Viet Nam and sporadic hostilities 
continue in Laos. Tee Viet Mirih have continued to improve 



"Mainland Southeast Asia 1 * consists 



For purposes o± to is paper 
of Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Viet firm, Malaya and 
Singapore. In addition, there is .attached a supplementary 
statement of policy on the special situation in North 
Viet Nam. " 



NSC 5512/1 



1083 



TDP SECRE' 



■ 









- 

I 

■ 

t 



I 

P 



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0' 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



.- * . ■ , TOP SECRET 

- . 

a * ■ " 

their combat capabilities since the* Geneva Conference 
: of 1S5 1 I- 



£• Subversion . In most countries of Southeast Asia 
a threat also arises fron the existence of extensive 
local Communist capabilities for all types .of subversive 
activities , ranging up to armed insurrection. Addition- 
ally, the largo overseas Chinese communities in South- 
oast Asia offer a fertile field for subversion. The 
weal; internal security systems of the Southeast Asian 
states nicilce ,_them highly vulnerable to such activities. 

5L • Communist Political and Economic Of f ensive . 
At present overt aggression and militant subversion art.; 
. less likely than an intensified campaign of Communist 
political, economic Slid cultural penetration in the 
area, The political instability, economic backwardness, 
export problems j and extreme nationalism of these coun- 
tries provide many opportunities for Communist exploita- 
tion by trade and econot&ic assistance, conventional 
political and diplomatic activity, and extensive 
infiltration, This offensive now constitutes a threat 
to U. S. interests mora subtle and more difficult to 
cope with than other threats. 

4. Unit ed States Hole . The. United States is likely to 
remain the only major outside source of power to counteract 
•the Russian -Chinese CoLimunist thrust mtp Southeast Asia. 
Thus j the retention of this area in the free world will 
continue to depend on the extent and effectiveness of U. S. 
support as vie] 1 as on the local efforts of the countries 
themselves. 

* 
a. Political. Tne underlying purpose of U. S. 

assistance in the area is to help the non-Covrimunist 

countries, develop more effective political organizations, 

strengthen their internal administration and enlist 

! greater allegiance in both urban and rural districts. In 

part this purpose will be served by programs for military 
and economic aid dealt with below-. In part it will 
require an intensification of present programs for 
training competent Asian nanagorial and technical 
personnel. And in part nevr approaches, both governmental 
• ■ and private, will be needed. These should not con- 

1 ' contra te exclusively at the national level, but should 

include activities designed to strengthen and vitalize 
indigenous traditions and institutions and to have an 
i.roact on village life, rural socio ty, and educational 
systems. . - • 



.108*1 . . . ' 

NSC 5 J 12/1 ' TOP SECRET 






*'- -- ., _ - — „...-,—. _-,._- , . 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET 



■ 



b. Military. Because those countries do not have 



the capability of creating armed forces which could 
effectively resist largo -scale external aggression:., 
the United States will be required to provide a basic 
shield against Communist aggression. For the foreseeable 
future local will to resist aggression will depend on a 
: conviction in Southeast Asia that the United States will 
"continue its support and v/ill maintain striking forces 
adequate *to 'counter aggression in Southeast Asia with 
the capabilities described in NSC 5e02/l (paragraphs 11, 
15 and lo). The combination of such U. S. forces and 
local will to resist would constitute the best deterrent 
against aggression. Should the deterrent fail, this 
combination would also provide the most effective in- 
surance that, in conjunction with indigenous and allied 
forces, the United States could suppress aggression in 
the area quickly and in a manner and on a 



sea 



e o 



*s 






calculated to avoid the hostilities broadening into 
general war. 



b 



"- 



I 



c. Economic and Technical, The insistence, through- 



out most of the area ^ on <jconCmic development provides 
.the strongest lever for the exertion of influence by the 
free world or by the Cqrmnunist bloc, Without increased 
external help fro a some source, most of the governments 
.of the area will be unable, even with adequate indigenous 
effort, to nanage the political demand for rapid better- 
ment in the cDhditiotis of life and "provide for sound 
econoraic development,' Failure to obtain such assistance 
from the free world will tend 'to drive these countries 
toward economic dependence* on the Coxmnuuist bloc. The 
general preference in" Southeast Asia for Western technical 
and economic assistance gives the United States and the 
free world an opoortunit - to obtain primacy over Communist 
efforts in key economic sectors. The outcome may, 
however, be strongly influenced by the success with which, 
the free world can cope with Communist efforts to 
exploit the existence of Southeast Asian export problems , 
particularly those involving rice. In the period ahead, 
flexibility of U. S, procedure and rapidity of U, S. 
action will be increasingly important, if effective 
advantage is to be taken of unexpected and transient 
opportunities. • ■ # 



s 

i 



5 



r\'r< 



Rio Problem of Regional Association, Over the lon;> 



t. 



j 



run, the snail; vulnerable, and essentially .dependent nations 
of Southeast Asia cannot exist satisfactorily as free nations 
without closer associations than now exist. . * 



6. 



The Preble n of Alignment. To preserve their indepen- 
dence, strengthen their internal stability, and protect them- 
selves against aggression, some countries in Southeast Asia 



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-^efer to join regional security arrangements. Sofiie, however, 
r^cfter t° avoid alignment with other nations. The basic 
Objective of both groups* is to maintain the independence of 
Kieii* countries free of outside .interference or dictation , and 
•*e independence and vitality of both are iniportar 



mt to the 
Waited States and to each other, 

. - . .. ., II. POLICY CONCLUSIONS ' 

7. The national independence of the mainland Southeast 
Asian states is important to the security interests of the 
United States. If such independence is to be preserved, U. S, . 
oolicies must seek to build sufficient strength in the area at 
least to identify aggression, suppress subversion, prevent 
Communist political and economic domination, and assist the 
non- Communist governments to consolidate their domestic posi- 
tions. U. S. policy should not depend primarily on the degree 
and nature of Communist activity at any particular time, but 
should seek to promote these goals within the limits of the 
economic capacities of the countries concerned and U. S. re- 
sources available for the area. 



; '. 8, ' Where a national determination to maintain independ- 
\ . ence and oppose external aggression is sufficiently manifest, 
i t the United States should be prepared to provide military as- 

sistance based upon the missions of the forces as indicated 
in the "Country Courses of Action" (pari: V, below). 



9. In the event of aggression against a Southeast Asian 
| state willing to resist, the provisions* of the UN Charter or 
\ the SEA TO Treaty should be invoked, but the "United" States 

\ • should not forgo necessary action in behalf of such, a state 
\ or states because of the possibility that other allies might 

! "be loath to participate or to furnish more than token military 
forces ■ 



| * . 10'. ■ In the long run, the ability of the non- Communist 

1 governments, to attain political, economic and social objectives 

l will be the dominant factor in defeating the Communist attempts 

I to dominate Southeast Asia. The United States should assist 

i " the non-Communist states of the area to formulate and excute 



I . \ ■ programs designed to promote conditions of sound development, 
I | to demonstrate that they can achieve growth without reliance 

on, Communist methods or dependence on the Communist bloc, and 
to give their .peoples a greater stake in the continued inde- 
! pen-den c.o of their countries. 

f 

j " 11. The United States should continue to make clear its 

; own devotion to the principle of collective security, its be- 
lief that regional security arrangements provide maximum pro- 
V tuetlon at minimum cost for all, and its expectation that a 

> + ■ 

a 

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country's decision to participate in such arrangements is 
based on its own calculation of its best interests and does 
not of itself constitute a claim for increased financial aid. 
Where countries participate, measures to assure adherence 
are desirable , normally including preferential treatment in 
the fields of economic and military assistance as justified 
by U. S. strategic objectives* Where new opportunities for 
affiliation develop they should be encouraged. The United 
States should, however, accept the right of each nation to 
choose its own path to the future, and should not exert 
pressure to make active allies of countries not so inclined. 
The genuine independence of such countries from Communism 
serves U. S. interests even though they are not formally 
aligned with the United States. The United States should 
accordingly support and assist them so long as they remain 
determined to preserve their own independence and are ac- 
tively pursuing policies to this end. 

III. OBJECTIVE 

# 

12. To prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing 
into or becoming economically dependent upon the Communist bloc; 
to persuade them that their best interests lie in greater coop- 
eration and stronger affiliations with the rest of the Free 
World; and to assist them to develop toward stable, free, 
representative governments with the will and ability to resist 
Communism from within and without, and thereby to contribute 
to the strengthening of the Free World. 

IV. REGIONAL C01TRSES OF ACTION * 

13. Support and assist the countries of the area on the 
basis of their will and ability to defend and strengthen their 
independence. 

14. Respect each country's choice of national policy for 
preserving its independence, but make every effort to demon- 
strate the advantages of greater cooperation and closer 
alignment with the Free World, as well as the dangers of 
alignment with the Communist bloc. 

15. Encourage the countries of Southeast Asia to cooperate 
closely with each other on a basis of mutual aid and support, 
and support indigenous efforts to develop regional associations 
so long as they do not weaken SEATO or the spirit of resistance , 
to Communism. 



* The regional courses of action are not applicable to 
Malaya and Singapore. 

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16. Participate actively in SEATO, and seek to develop with its 
military and non-military aspects in a manner that will convincingly 
demonstrate the value of SEATO as a regional association, the usefulness 
of which extends beyond deterrence of Communist expansion. Encourage 
limited participation of non-Communist, non-SEATO Asian nations in certain 
SEATO activities. 

17* Encourage and support the spirit of resistance among the peoples 
of Southeast Asia to Chinese Communist aggression as well as to indigenous 
Communist insurrection, subversion, and propaganda, 

18. Maintain, in the general area of the Far East, U. S. forces 
adequate to exert a deterrent influence against Communist aggression, in 
conformity with IJSC 5602/1. 

19. Should overt Communist aggression occur in the Southeast Asian 
treaty area, invoke the UN Charter or the SEATO Treaty, or both as 
applicable; and subject to local request for assistance take necessary 
military and any other action to assist any Mainland Southeast Asian state 
or dependent territory in the SEATO area willing to resist Communist resort 
to force: Provided, that the taking of military action shall be subject 

to prior submission to and approval by the Congress unless the emergency 
is deemed by the President to be so great that immediate action is nec- 
essary to save a vital interest of the United States- 

■ 

20. In case of an imminent or actual Communist attempt to seize 
control from within, and assuming some manifest local desire for U. S. 
assistance, take all feasible measures to thwart the attempt, including 
even military action after appropriate Congressional action. 

21. As appropriate, assist the police forces in Southeast Asian 
countries to obtain training and equipment to detect and contain Communist 
activities. 

22. In rder to strengthen the non-Communist governments of the 
area and to help forestall their economic dependents on the Communist bloc: 

a- Provide flexible economic and technical assistance as 
necessary to attain U. S. objectives* 

b. Encourage measures to improve the climate for private 
investment, both domestic and foreign, and to mobilize the maximum 
investment of U. S. private capital in the area consistent with the 
prevailing climate - 



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c- Encourage United Nations agencies, other Colombo Plan 
countries , and other friendly countries to contribute available 
resources to promote the economic growth of Southeast Asia. 

d. Encourage the Southeast Asian countries to orient their 
economics in the direction of the free world and to rely primarily 

on non-Communist markets and sources of supply for trade, technicians, 
capital development, and atomic development. 

* 

e. In carrying out programs involving disposal of U. S. 
agricultural surpluses abroad: 

(1) Give particular attentiofi to the economic vulner- 
abilities of the Southeast Asian countries and avoid, to the 
maximum extent practicable, detracting from the ability of 
these countries to market their own exportable produce* 

(2) Give particular emphasis to the use of the resources 
to promote multilateral trade and economic development. 



Promote as appropriate the expansion of trade relation- 
ships between the United States and the countries of Southeast 
Asia. 

g. Take advantage of adverse local reactions to Communist 
barter agreements with countries in the area by demonstrating the 
advantages to these countries of conducting trade on a multilateral 
commercial basis. 

23. Make a special, sustained effort to help educate an expanding 
number of technically competent, pro-Western civilian and military 
leaders, working bilaterally, through the United Nations, with the 
other Colombo Plan countries and with other friendly countries. Stress 
the development of potential and secondary leadership to support the thin 
stratum of elite now administering the central governments and bring to 
their support modern techniques and technology in public information and 
organ! nation. 

2U. Place increased e asis on community development projects, 
educational programs, and other activities aimed to influence the 
welfare and attitudes of the people at the village level. 



25. Strengthen informational, cultural and educational activities, 
as appropriate, to foster increased alignment of the people with the 
free world and to contribute to an understanding of Communist aims and 
techniques. 



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26. Hold or reduce the number of U. S. officials in each country 
to a strict minimum consistent with sound implementation of essential 
programs , in order to head off an adverse political reaction to the 
presence of a large number of Americans in relatively privileged positions. 

27. Promote increasing Asian Buddhist contact -with and knowledge 
of the free world. Explore with friendly religious organizations ways 
of developing Buddhist fraternal associations and identification with 
free world religious leaders and movements, 

28. Continue activities designed to encourage the overseas Chinese 
communities in Southeast Asia (a) to organize and activate ant i -Communist 
groups and activities within their own communities; (b) to resist the effects 
of parallel pro -Communist groups and activities; (c) generally, to increase 
their orientation toward their local governments and toward the free world; 
and (d) consistent with their obligations and primary allegiance to their 
local governments , to extend sympathy and support to the Chinese Rational 
Government . 

29. Discreetly encourage local governments to work toward assimi- 
lation of racial minorities. 

■ 

30. Implement as appropriate covert operations designed to assist 
in the achievement of U. S. objectives in Southeast Asia. 

31. Promote economic cooperation between the countries of the area 
and Japan and with the Government of the Republic of China, to the extent 
feasible without jeopardizing the achievement of U. S. objectives toward 
the individual Southeast Asian countries. , 

32. In order to promote increased cooperation in the area and to 
deny the general area of the Mekong River Basin to Communist influence' 
or domination, assist as feasible in the development of the Mekong Rivei* 
Basin as a nucleus for regional cooperation and mutual aid. 



V. COUNTRY COURSES OF ACTION IN ADDITION TO THE "REGIONAL 
COURSES OF ACTION" ABOVE 



! 



BURMA 

33. In view of the emerging opportunities in Burma and the 
repercussions that developments there will have on the uncommitted 
areas of Asia and Africa, make a special effort to influence an 
increasingly favorable orientation in Burma's policies. 



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3I*. Encourage and support those elements in Burma which do main- 
tain a stable free government that identifies its interest with those of 
the free world and resists Communist inducements , threats, and programs 
to subvert Burma's independence. 

35* Encourage Burmese assumption of regional and international 
responsibilities compatible with our own objectives. 

36. For political purposes, upon Burmese request make available 
military equipment and supplies on a loan or reimbursable basis, as 
consistent with U. S. interests. 

37. Encourage the Burmese Government to establish internal 
security throughout the country, and discourage further foreign 
assistance to Chinese Nationalist irregulars and ethnic rebel groups 
in Burma. 

38. Should overt Communist aggression occur against Burma, Invoke 
the UN Charter and, subject to Burmese request for assistance, take 
necessary military and any other action to assist Burma if Burma is 
willing to resist Communist resort to force and U. S. vital interests are 
involved: provided that the taking of military action shall be subject 
to prior submission to and approval by the Congress. 



CAMBODIA 

39. In order to maintain Cambodia's independence and to reverse 
the drift toward pro-Communist neutrality, encourage individuals and 
groups in Cambodia who oppose dealing with the Communist bloc and who 
would serve to broaden the political power base in Cambodia. 

i*0. Provide modest military aid for indigenous armed forces 
capable of assuring internal security. 

Ul* Terminate economic and military aid if the Cambodian Govern- 
ment ceases to demonstrate a will to resist internal Communist subversion 
and to carry out a policy of maintaining its independence. 

1*2. Assist where possible in solution of Cambodian- Thai border 
problems and in fostering good relations between Cambodia and Viet Nam* 



LAOS 

1*3 # Seek to strengthen the determination of the Royal Government 
to resist subversion and to maintain its independence. 



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44. In order to prevent Lao neutrality from veering toward 
pro-Communism, encourage individuals and groups in Laos who oppose 
dealing with the Communist blow. 

if 5- Develop an attitude of confidence on the part of the leaders 
that the UN Chart er, SEATO, and U. S. support provide a favorable basis 
for Lao resistance to Communist pressure and inducements. 

46. Encourage and support close bonds between Laos and Thailand; 
including such political associations, economic cooperation, and joint 
military planning as feasible. 

il7- Support the expansion and reorganization of police, propaganda, 
and army intelligence services* provided an ti -Communist elements maintain 
effective control of these Services. 

48 • Continue support of the Royal Lao Army to assure internal 
security and provide limited initial resistance to an attack by the 
Viet Minh, 

49. Terminate economic and military aid if the Lao Government 
ceases to demonstrate a will to resist internal Communist subversion 
and to carry out a policy of maintaining its independence. 



THAILAND 

50. Promote the development of Thai leadership which is increasingly 
united, stable and constructive, is supported by the Thai people, and 
willing to continue the alignment of Thailand with the United States and 
the West. ' 

51. Utilize Thailand's central location in Southeast Asia as a point 
from which to create discontent and internal difficulties within nearby 
Communist-dominated areas and thwart Communist subversive efforts in I 
neighboring free countries, to a degree consistent with U. S. polici* and 
programs in neighboring free countries. 1 

52. Provide military assistance to Thailand for support of forces 
sufficient: 

a. To maintain internal security. 



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' 



i 

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> 



external 



To present limited initial resistance to 
aggression. 



£. To .make a modest contribution to collective 
defense of contiguous SEATO areas. 

53. Encourage and support close bonds between Thailand 
and Loos and between Thailand and Cambodia, including' such 
political associations, economic cooperation, and joint 
military planning as feasible «. 



> 



VIET NAM 



54. Assist Free Viet Nam to develop a strong, stable 
and constitutional government to enable Free Viet Nam to 
assert an increasingly attractive contrast to conditions in 
the present Communist zone. 

55. Work toward the weakening of the Communists in 
North and South Viet Nam in order to bring about the eventual 
peaceful reunification of a free and independent Viet Nam 
under anti-Communist leadership. 

- 

•* 
50. Support the position of the Government of Free Viet 
Nam that a 11 -Viet Ram elections may take place only after it 
is satisfied that genuinely free elections can be held 
throughout both zones of Viet Nam, 

57. Assist Free Viet Nam to build up indigenous armed 
forces,, including independent logistical and administrative 
services , which will be capable of assuring internal security 
and of providing limited initial resistance "to attack by the 
Viet Minh. * " 

. 58. Encourage Vietnamese military planning for defense 
against external aggression along line's consistent with 
U. S,. planning concepts based upon approved U. S, policy, 
and discreetly manifest 'in other ways U. S. interest in 
assisting Free Viet Nam, in accordance with the SEATO Treaty, 
to defend itself against external aggression. 

• 

SI NGAPORE A ND THE FEDERATION O F MAL AYA 
"(The following courses of action only, and not the 
regional courses of: action, are applicable to the 
Federation of Malaya and Singapore,) 

59 .' Accept the present primary role of the British in 
Malaya in so far as they arc willing and able to maintain 
it, and collaborate with the British so far as practicable. 

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i 



( 



V 






i 



! ' 



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i 

\ 
\ 



\ 



60. Encourage the British and local authorities to take 
vigorous actions to curb ^ Communist subversion , and be pre- 
pared to assist in such action as requested by British or 
local authorities. . ■ ■ 

■ 

61. Employ all feasible means to prevent Singapore and 
the Federation of Malaya from falling under Communist control . 
In the case of armed attack, place initial reliance on 
Commonwealth, ANZUS, or SEATO resources as appropriate, but 
be prepared to take such additional U. S, action as may be 
required. 

" , 62. Encourage the development of a strong, stable, 
independent Malayan nation within the Commonwealth. 

63. Seek to assure. free world strategic interests- in 
Singapore, favoring, only if consistent with this an&j 
elective institutions in Singapore and Singapore's in- 
corporation with an independent Malaya 'within the Common we a] th 

■ . 

64. After Malaya attains full self-government and in- 
dependence, be prepared, as appropriate and consistent 
With recognition of Commonwealth responsibility, to assist 
Malaya to maintain stability and -independence, and encourage 
it to join SEATO. 

m 

VI . SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF POL ICY 

on ** 

THE SPECIAL SITUATION IN NORTH VIET NAM 



■ 



1 



6* 



r>. Treat the Viet Minh -as not constituting a legitimate 
government,, and discourage other non- Communist states from 
developing or maintaining relations with the Viet Minh 



regime. 



I 



\ 

s 



■■ 

i 



65. Prevent the Viet Minh from expanding their political 
influence and territorial control in Free Viet Nam and South- 
east Asia . * - 

- » 
■ 

67* Deter the Vict Minh from attacking or subverting 
Free Viet Nam or Laos. ■*".'". 

68. Probe weaknesses of the Viet Minh and exploit them 
internally and internationally whenever possible. 

» 

69. Exploit nationalist sentiment within North Viet Nam 
as a means of weakening and disrupting Sino-Soviet domination, 

70. Assist the Government of Viet Nam to undertake 
programs of political, economic and psychological warfare 
against Viet Minh Communists. 



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<'. 


2 

• 


• 


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• • ' * 

ii * 

■* 

71, Apply j as necessary to achieve U. S. objectives, 
restrictions on U, S, exports and shipping and on foreign 
assets similar to those already in effect for Communist 
China and North Korea, 



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16 Nov 1956 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Subject: U.S. Force Commit merits to the SEATO 



1. Reference is made to ADMIN CINCFAC Message 0^f0151Z July 
1956, subject: "Preliminary Summary of SEATO Third Military 
Staff Planners' Conference, Singapore, 11-27 June," which stated, 
inter alia , that CINCPAC would require high level policy guidance 
on the matter of U.S. force commitments to the SEATO. 

2» The permanent SEATO Military Planning Staff is scheduled 
to be established in Bangkok by 15 January 1957- As force 
requirements planning progresses toward detailed plans, there will 
be increasing pressure placed on the United States, particularly 
by the Asian members of SEATO, for information as to availability 
of U.S. forces to support SEATO plans. 

3. The United States should not. duplicate the pattern of NATO 
and its significant standing military forces by earmarking U. S. 
forces for Southeast Asia. Instead, the United States should 
maintain mobile striking power readily available for immediate 
operations and sufficient, in concept with other nations, to 
defeat overt Communist local aggression in the SEATO area. The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that although detailed U.S. stra- 
tegic plans should not be discussed with military representatives 
of the SEATO nations, the United States should discuss her capa- 
bilities and methods of providing support to these nations without 
making a specific commitment of forces. The major effort of the 
United States should be to provide those types of forces which 
are needed in the SEATO area and logistic support to indigenous 
forces, 

U. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the United States 
make no specific force commitments to the SEATO but that the U. S. 
Military Adviser, at the next meeting of the SEATO Military 



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TOP SECRET 

advisors be authorized to reassure the SEATO nations of UoSo support in 
the event of overt Communist aggression The Joint Chiefs of Staff 
further recommend that the U.S. Military Adviser be authorized to inform 
the SEATO nations, in broad terms, of the major U„S. forces deployed to 
the Western Pacific and those forces available to CIBCPAC for contingency 
planning, emphasizing the flexibility and mobility of these forces 

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 



/s/Arthur Radford 
ARTHUR RADFORD, 

Chairman, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff 






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April 15, 1957 



In reply refer to; 1-13^75/7 






Dear Mr- Robertson: 

Recent developments have brought about a new urgency in re- 
solving the problem of the ceiling on U, S. military personnel in 
Viet-Nam. You will remember that by interdepartmental agreement 
early in 1956 there was established a ceiling of 692, which in- 
cludes .31*2 for the MAAG and 35O for TERM, the Temporary Equipment 
Recovery Mission. 

Two facets of the problem now point to the necessity of doing 
away with the MAAG ceiling and permitting the Departments of the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force to augment MAAG Viet-Nam with the 
additional personnel necessary to accomplish the mission there. 

The first aspect is that raised in the telegram from the 
Embassy in Saigon to the Department of State, 2772, of 12 March 
1957 j which points out that the International Control Commission 
is becoming increasingly more restive in respect to 3 I and 
recommends consideration of several courses of action. The Depart- 
ment of Defense concurred in the April 9 Department of State tele- 
gram to Saigon which stated that a solution of the problem along 
the lines of incorporating TERM into an increased MAAG was under 
study and that the Department of State would discuss the problem 
with the Canadians, British, French, and Indians. This telegram 
was the result of a conference c arch 20 of staff representatives 
of the two departments in which Ambassador Durbrow participated - 

The second aspect of the problem is the necessity for taking 
over the training of the Vietnamese Navy and Air Force- It will 
be remembered that TERM was created for a dual purpose, to provide 
a logistical organization to resolve the problems of excess pro- 
perty in Indochina and logistical training in Viet-Nam, and to free 
the MAAG from other duties so that its personnel could concentrate 
on the training of the Vietnamese Army* The withdrawal of the 
French Army training personnel required this increased emphasis 
on training. In the telegram from Chief, MAAG Viet-Nam 56O7 of 
k April, we have been Informed that President Ngo Dinh Diem told 
the Chief, MAAG that agreement had been reached with the French 
Aiak&ssador for the withdrawal of the French Air Force and Navy 
training missions upon the completion of the present courses of 
instruction- The first completion is scheduled for this month, 
and additional U.S. military personnel will be required to p:i ck 



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up the training from the French. CINCPAC has requested in his 
062352Z of 6 April that additional personnel over and above the 
present ceiling reach Viet -Nam in June of this year. 

Other aspects of the problem of the ceiling include a 
request from President Diem for additional Army instructors at 
the Viet-Nam military academy, a proposal by CINCPAC to transfer 
underway training of the Vietnamese Navy from Subic Bay to Viet- 
Nam j and the current difficulty in operating MAAG and TERM 
efficiently within their present ceilings. 

* 

An increase in MAAG strength to achieve a rapid improvement 
in the effectiveness of Vietnamese forces to compensate for the 
withdrawal of French forces is considered a matter of urgency. 
While the French have withdrawn approximately 190,000 regular 
troops from Viet -Nam since the Geneva Agreement was signed the 
Viet Minh have continuously reorganized and re -equipped their 
forces during the same period so as to increase their regular 
combat strength from six to eighteen divisions. These forces 
have a capability of conducting combat operations at Corps level. 
The Vietnamese Army consists of ten divisions which are in the 
early stages of training at regimental and division level* The 
current military situation requires that the Vietnamese armed forces 
expeditiously attain a satisfactory level of combat effectiveness. 

In view of the forthcoming visit of President Diem to 
Washington on Kay 8th, 9th, and 10th and of the impending - 
training crises for the Vietnamese Navy and Air Force I recom- 
mend that steps be taken as a matter of urgency to secure the 
necessary international concurrences in the abolition of the 
ceiling on MAAG Viet -Nam. I feel it might be desirable to have 
this problem resolved, if possible, prior to the arrival of 
President Diem in Washington so that he could be informed at 
that time of our plans to assist him in the training of his 
Navy and Air Force. 

Sincerely yours, 

(Signed) Mansfield D. Sprague 

Mansfield D. Sprague 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) 

Honorable Walter S. Robertson 
Assistant Secretary of State 
Department of State 



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r \ 



*r,r (J "-'':PPT ' ' 321st NSC Meeting 

/ I ■ 3u 

. HEM 6 (For Information)' 

•. EROGKESS REPORT OH Mj UMAH) SOUTHEAST ASIA CNSC5612A) 



BACKGROUSD 






- 
t 



1. The current U.S, policy on SE Asia (NSC 56l2/l) was approved 5 September 
1956. ©lis is the first progress ro]>ort thereon and covers the period through 

13 March 1957. • . .' 



Y 



EECOMMEKDATB 



7. -It- is reccsmonded that you note the report' without exception 






TO? PWi 3-5.Q o 






• 



• : 2. Mo review of 1JS0 policy i« recommended by the OCB* *'"" 

' .-" • 3. Burma appears to be moving closer to the J^ree World* Although her basic 
"policy of neutralism is unlikely to change, Burma has indicated interest in obtaining 
U.S. economic and military assistance. The 1JL.SU has been unable to influence 
. .tombbdia In the direction . of development of a stable government and non-involvement -■ 
' . with the imunist Bloc. The situation in Laos worsened, the government being 
threatened with the possibility of downfall if negotiations with the Pathct Lao 
' should collapse* The F ederati on of _ Malaya made further progress in its transition * : 
" to independence. T hailand- f s slow progress toward free representative government 
continued, and Vietnam seems clearly persuaded that its interests lie in stronger 
.affiliation with, the Eree World. ';...* * O ■ - 

s- ', . 4« A combined SEATO military exercise vas held to improve military cooper a-. 
V_. tion. among the SEATO nations. Prospects that other nations might participate in J 
. SEATO did not improve, with the exception of Vietnam* On the whole , EDAF has begun 
- " to make a contribution. In Vietnam the Army is now capable of insuring internal 
' security, and in Cambodia the KAAG lias made some progress toward achieving a working 
relationship with the Cambodian general staff. In Laos M3AP has made en army pos- 
sible. In Thailand the armed forces ore considered car * Ic of meeting any indigenous 
threat to internal security, retarding external aggression, and making a token con- 
tribution to collective defense. ' " ... 

- • • ! 

5. The economic aid programs in the area have all continued to show slow 
progress* No new U.S. commitments have been entered into during the reporting 
period. Efforts live been made "to lessen demands upon U.S. resources and upon local 
* . economies (NSC Action Ho* 1599-e)* In Cambodia and Lac -;■ the armed forces were re- 
duced, and in Vietnam the U*S» has refused a request for an increase of forces. In 
Burma, for overriding political considerations, it vas found necessary to grant 
• Burma r s request for needed loan assistance. In Thailand no formal consultations 
.have been held with regard to the purposes of HSC Action Ik). 1599-e* 

i 
- ■ * • 

GQMSM ' . • . • 

r « ■ • a. 

- . 6. As you know, the JOS recently recommended that U.S. policy re Cambodia 
be modified to restore the mission for its atoned forces of resisting external aggres- 
sion* Me have recoiiMended that you non-concur in the JCS recommendation* * 



♦ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i 



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NATIONAL iNTE 



GEHCE ESTIMATE 



4 "NUMBER 63.2-57 

(Supersedes relevant portico of NiE 63-56) 






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27/s following intelligence organhaiio?is "participated in the 
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency 
and the intelligence organi tiions of the Departments of 
Slate, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff. 

Concurred, 'in ay the 



™***LS^I32CC:3 



:NT3J 



- - - - • * j — *j *- \j 






on 14 May 1957. Co ^/Ing :jcre the Special Assistant, In- 
telligenee, Dap tent of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff* 
hiielligence, Department of the Army; i7ie Director of Naval 
Intelligence; theMireetor of Intelligence, USAF; and the Dep- 
uty Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic 
Energy Commission Representative to the I AC, and the Assist- 
ant Director, Federal L of Investigation, abstained, th$ 
subject being outside of their ydrisdiciion. 



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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i 



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SECRET 



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TS-F 



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PROSPECTS FOR- NORTH VIETNAM 



THE PROBLEM 



p.*i 



To analyze the current political, economic, and military situations and to esti 
mate the prospects for North Vietnam over the next year or so. 
■ 

.. CONCLUSIONS 



i 
t 



1. Although the Communist regime in 
North Vietnam (DRV) has probably lost 
a considerable measure of its original 
popular support and has been faced with 
sporadic outbursts of violence, it remains 
in firm control largely because of the loy- 
alty and effectiveness of the army. More- 
over, with substantial help from the Bloc, 
it has apparently made significant prog- 
ress toward economic restoration, par- 
ticularly in agriculture. (Paras, 13-16, 
20-21) *. 

2. The DRV has undertaken to "cor- 
rect its mistakes 11 which it admits caused 
popular resentment, and it will probably 
be able to regain some of the popular sup- 
port which it lost. If the party organ- 
isation is sufficiently strengthened and 
if crop prospects are good, steps toward 
further socialization of agriculture may 
come as soon as the fall or winter of 1957, 
Local disturbances may recur but for the 
foreseeable future the DRV will be ca- 
pable of maintaining effective control. 
(Paras. 17, 23-26) 

■ 

3. The DRV is generally isolated from the 
outside world except for close ties with 
the Bloc, on which it depends for aid and 



support. However, the DRV has probably 
been disappointed by the lack of effective 
Bloc support for its objective of unifying 
all Vietnam under DRV rule. The DRV, 
With Bloc logistical support, could easily 
overrun South Vietnam, Camboclia, and 
Laos if opposed only by indigenous forces. 
However, the Bloc would support such an 
attack only if Moscow and Peiping were 
to estimate that such action carried little 
risk of US military intervention. (Paras. 

29-34) ■ . 

* 

4. The DRV will probably continue its 
tactics of "peaceful competition" with 
South Vietnam for the support of the Vi- 
etnamese, although it will continue its of- 
forts to infiltrate and to subvert official 
and nonofficial organizations .aid to ex- 
ploit dissident and dissatisfied groups in 
South Vietnam. In Laos, we believe that 
the DRV will continue to su] t Pathet 
Lao efforts to negotiate a political agree- 
ment with the Royal Lao Government, 
with the ultimate objective of Communist 
control, and may encourage local Pathet 
Lao military action in order to bring pres- 
sure to this end. The DRV will probably 
not, in the immediate future, play a pri- 
mary role in Cambodia. (Paras. 34-36) 



SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order L3526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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OFFICE OF THE ASS'ISTANI SECRETARY Or DEFENSE j£ ,~. Y » 



WASHIKGTON 25, D. C 



MAY 1 5 19S? 



INT£RNATIOKAL SSCUKIVY AFFAIRS 



MEETING dETf/EEN 'VBESIDEHT DIEJ1 AKI) DEPUTY SECRETARY QUAKLKS 
10- Hav 1 957, 104 to 1210 Room 3E924 . The Pentagon, 



Present wer-e: President Ngo Dials Die.:;i 

General Traa Van Don, St 
Str.fi: 

i 

Vietnamese Ambassador Tr 
Kcj u y e n f ! u u G h a u t Sec r e t a 

Interior and to the P 
Kcar Admiral D, L, Mel) on 

Hgo Di nh Di era 
Deputy Secretary Donald 
General K a t !i a i: V , T W i n i n 
Mr, Mansfield D, S'pragu.e 

of Defense (ISA). 
it.. General Alotizo P. Fo 
US Ambassador to Viet-Na 
As s i s t a iit Secret a r y of S 
. Mr* Kenneth i'eung, Dept« 
H-r. Sedge wick (Interpret 
Captain B. A, Robbins t Jr 

■ 

Secretary Quarlcs opene'd the mcetj 
instead of a briefing for President Ngo 
bee n* s c h e d u led, it v/a s felt t h a t this u 
" pres'tmptuoiis In view of the Presidents 
Asia, and therefore the President v;z$ i 
views on he situation. 



aff Chief of the Genera] 



an Van Chuong 

ry of St cite for the 

r es idency 

aid | Aide to Pros id 



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n a t it r a 1 
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d c f e n sos 
This is a 



of invasion along the border area has no 
after the enemy passes tlrrough the Annaui 
soft area for defensive purposes. Either one, or a combina- 
tion of b o t li , of the above routes is possible an 3 feasible. 
Above the 17th parallel the Viet Mi ah have 200,000 regular 
troops and 250,000 -regional troops. Secretary Quarles raised 
the question qs to restriction on those forces by t lie. Geneva 
Accords, "It was --stated that there is no restriction on the 
numbers, The troops, however f have been given modernized 
equipment and training by the Chinese Communists and their 
re-equipment is a violation of the Geneva Accords, President 
Ngo also stated the Russians arc particularly concerned with 
the training of these forces and in accordance with Russian 
practice have emphasized artillery to the point that they 

much as Viet-Mar;i He stated that the 
has been training in Communist China 



a-ve three times as 
friet-llinli air force 
since 1951* 



The Vi c t names e 
the entire border* 
lightly populated. 



do 



not h a v e sufficient forces to g u a r d 
Laos has a weak army, very poor roads and is 
Infiltration through Laos is both easy and 
dangerous to Viet-Nam, It is believed possible . that the Viet 
|,I i n h could infiltrate this interior route with as many as a . 
100,000 troops disguised as coolies which could be very 
dangerous. President Ngo views a strictly defensive plan as 
unsatisfactory if only because of the demoralizing factor* 
lie feels the plan mist be both offensive and defensive. He 
covered this concept as follows: (1) Vietnamese do not know 



the SEATO Plan, 
sive plan which 



(2) The General Staff first conceived a defen- 



was considered demoralize ng. (3). They have 
now conceived an offensive-defensive plan which has been 
referred to General V/illiams, (4) Population of the North 
is against CoamunisEn If free to move it would -move out to 
the South. In the North soldiers are the principals in the 
priviledged class. (5) It is believed necessary in the 
event of aggression to bring airborne troops into the high 
plateau area of Laos-Vi e l~Mam t and also conduct airborne 
operations to pin down the Viet Hinh and make possible an 
offensive to the North. In addition the line of the 17th . 
parallel must be held as this is t h c 
airborne landings must be Vietnamese 
Foreign troops should be limited to use' below the 17th parallel 
as support forces* 



route of refugees, Any 
troops not foreign troops. 



Big question for Vietnamese is wh c n do they get the 
foreign troops, Thai forces "will be otherwise occupied, 
The civil guard is poorly equipped and would not be effective* 
There are no other ground forces available in the Southeast 



s '- 



11 OH 

,i* «.V V » 



■ - 



Declassified per Exec u live Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






V 









v/ 



Asia area* In answer to a question as to whether the troops 
to be used in the pSatcau -q-o-uld be Thai, the President answered 
no. Laos is afraid of the Thais; they are afraid of a Pan- 
Thai movement to swallow Laos. Laos 'hates Cambodia, distrusts 
the Thais but likes the Vietnamese. They would like an outlet 
to the sea at Tourane. They have promised to send officers to 
be trained by^the Vietnamese, President Ngo then consented . 
on' his planned sacond counter move which is to fill up the 
vaciiuu of the high plateau area, the forest border area and the 
Plaine des Jones. This plan will be begun by placing trained 
demobilized men from the Civil Guard in these areas with their 
-families, 3,000 so far. He is no w appeal i ng to the people of 
the central Viet-Ham area to settle on .the high plateau and is 
asking people of South Viet -Nam, the southern areas, to move in- 
to* the Plaine des Jones. \ 

SEATO has always recognized the need of the fight against 
subversion. Planting men in these areas will construct a 
human wall effective against Communist infiltration and sub- 
version. The above goes hand in hand with construction of 
roads in the above areas. Stationing men and building roads 
serve both a strategic and economic purpose. The road build- 
ing projects is really a stage of* the French plan that goes 
.back to 1919 and continues to 1942. 

Secretary Queries asked the status of the road construc- 
tion now. The President answered it had not yet begun but 
Capital Engineering Firm was starting construction studies 
and he thought construction could begin next year. These 
roads in the interior are important because .the roads along, 
the coast is easily disrupted. It has many bridges and that 
is why French, thinking of the possibility of Japanese aggression 
along the coast t thought roads in this area desirable. This 
wa's part of the French Empire Plan to tie together Faet-Haia 
Cambodia and Laos. It is still a good plan for the defense of 
Southeast Asia. It includes a road across the interior to 
Paksc on the Mekong which is near the Thai Railroad terminus at 
Ubon. Konte 9 from Tour a no to Savannakhet is too close to the 
17th parallel, but Laos is interested in an outlet to the sea 
for economic reasons. SEATO principals are CD to pary aggres- 
sion (2) struggle against subversion and (3) economic and 
social aspects required to support the above. The French 
and British are interested mostly in number 3. The military 
strategic a$[2ct of offensive-defensive plan are favored by 
the air force and navy. In case of aggression tactical atonic 
weapons could be used. Vietnamese feel they must emphasize 
ground weapons because the Viet~Han war showed that it was 
difficult to use air effectively in tit is country. Communist 



X J- •*' ^ 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



ocprftrr 



JJ 



troops are very mobile. Tije irregular forces advance ahead 
of regular troops to sabotage and cut coKinniB-i oat ions. They 
also follow the regular troops .to subdue the population* Use 
of atomic weapons against the aggression through" the spsree 
settled territory of Laos would not be effective. Therefore, 
the President believes that the Vietnamese mist reorganize 
their Army to^be prepared for such a struggle* 

Despite the efforts of General T Daniel the present Array 
structure is now not satisfactory. This is due to the French 
policy which insisted on keeping Vietnamese forces, in small 
-units no larger than a battalion, preventing the development 
of a proper Viet-Naia Amy. This is why Diem could not come 
to power sooner.- .French said Vietnamese couldn t t be trained 
and were too weal; physically. They limited them to light 
forces. After the Armistice the French continued to control 
the forces. Following the French phase out t| and the elimination 
of French forces, training was conducted under a mixed French- • 
US training group. The French concept of light battalion, 
light division, heavy division, made no sense at all not even 
for use against the sects,, I therefore felt the Army should 
be completely reorganized and consolidation of training into 
a strictly US mission Bade this possible. The U.S. military 
know that the Vietnamese make good soldiers, I have talked 
over ny idea with General Williams t and it is to reorganise 
lay 6 light and 4 heavy divisions of 5,600 and 8,300 men respec- 
tively, into the sane number of field divisions with 10,000 
each/ with 3 regiments per division. To achieve this the Array 
must increase to 170,000. This would avoid a complete shift 
of the present division. If we stay at the present 150,000 
nen it would be necessary to shift or change the basic struc- 
ture* If our total forces are raised to 170 thousand we 
could increase each division to 10,000. To reduce the impact 
OK the budget I have decreed a draft as a stop gap plan. 
Draftees will be Inducted for 1 year terms in the age group 
20 to 21, Beginning 1 August 150 per day will be inducted. 
This will amount to 40,000 per year. In 3 years this will 
make it possible to replace 2/3 of the Array at the end of 
3, years. The budget will be stabilized. At the present time 
Vict-Hara stray is organised along French colonial lines with. 
the families traveling with the troops* The average pay is a 
thousand piasters a month. The military budget is 170 million 
dollars a year. The use of draftees would reduce the cost by 
half. Draftees would be young people with no families* The . 
US* Eijiitary reconnend that I not replace all my troops with 
draftees but retain 30,000 minimum as a hard core, I believe 
the above is necessary because in lay view to meet aggression in 
my country requires enp.ha.sis on the ground forces. As the 



LluG 



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■% 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 









• 






p res en t 
be sett 

I li i s w o 
reasons 



troop 
led i n 
i: Id be 



s v; i t 

the 
bene 



h their f aciil j us 
high plateau and 
ficial both frota 



are demobilized they would 
the Plaine tics Jones, area, 
economic and strategic 



At this point Secretary Qaarles noted that the President 
was clue at the Press Club shortly and requested tine for a few 
U.S. questions. His first v/as whether the Geneva Accords 
inhibited (US) training personnel. President Diem replied 
that there had been no protests - there had been cmbarras sing 
questions, but the Geneva Accords only prohibited troop rein- 
forcements. 



Hr, 

t r a i n i n CI 
replied t 
-retained 
V res i d c n t 

* 

equipment 
same type 
Accords, , 
air force 
French we 
actually 
which U.S 
French qu 
c o n t r a c t 
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special F 
year for 
met by th 
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k e d a 
ent of 
a u e s t 
n g u n t 
that i 
ad sha 
h e F r e 
ii e d t o 
in h i s 
g t h e i 
p r o v i d 

p e r s o 
xm abo 
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train! 

had t 
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neral vehicles 

These can be r 
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o n 1 y . 6 til o n t h s t 

considered i n a 
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mi ssi on v;i th t 
wo ill d rein 8 i n an 

All other requ 
fore requested 
s c v e r a 1 i n s t r u c 
a demy) .. 



the status of 
orcc, General Don 
r en oh had been 

and then returned, 
and co minimi cations 
e placed with the 
no t!ie Geneva 
h training of the 
oor because the 
at -Nam Air Force 
raining for mechanics 
dequate. VJhen the * 
heir training 
cement to withdraw 
he exception of 
til the end of the * 
3 r ernes ts would be 
the MAAG provide 
tors for the mi 1 i ~ 



. After brief 
session ended e 



closing t remark by Secretary Qaarles the 




y 



B- A. Bo£M&s t Jr.* CSSt. U33 
Sscicn&l Director j Fa? Hast 



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HOT 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



. .• 



. D. ■■■•■■. SEGEi • O 



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' ' yROQRESS HBft) OK U.S. POLICY JN MAINLAND SOUTH EAST ASIA ( NSC 5612 /1.) 

i . » » - . . » 

V - « • 

BACKGROUND *'.•'• • . ' 



W"^U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Ada was approved on 5 September 
1956. This progress rbport. covers the period 13 March through 6 November 1957 • 



SPSTAHX 



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• ■.'*• - . . ■ » 






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1 ■ 






. 



b; - Burma cautiously* developed closer relations with the Free 
■ World while maintaining publicly .its neutral position and 
* '; continuing to receive Communist aid. Awareness of the Co:a~ 

.munist danger increased. The Government recognised and 
r began to cope with its foremost problem, the preservation , 
of law and order, 

c. I^o^* Although the outlook improved with the formation 

" a conservative eabinfet, negotiations for a cabinet including 
■"' Pathet Lao (Coiranmiist-lcd) representatives became more ac- 
-' tive/ The threat posed by Pathet "Lao control of two north- 
-* erri provinces continues, and security conditions in the 
areas under government control deteriorated* 



OEPRET • ■ . 



• * k 



PB Meeting ' j 

r ' . " ■ 26 November 1957 
ITEM A '• \ 



I. 



2, General. Many surface developments seemed to favor the Free World, 
although the Communists, often working underground, may have made gains of 
their own. The coup in Thailand, the repercussions of which are still to be 
felt over-shadowed all other developments. If Thailand orients itself toward 

"neutralism, some of the Free World gains might well.be reduced. The S5AT0 
staff was strengthened, and the September Military Advisers 1 meeting was highly 
successful. There was modest progress in developing SSATO economic and social ■" 
programs. Nevertheless, the generation of public attitudes favorable to col- \ 

■lectlve security pacts and the V. f est in general is becoming increasingly diffi- J 
cult in the area. The adverse effect on U.S. "political objectives of PL 480 » 
rice sale!* temporarily receded because the area nations found ready markets for i 
their produce in 1957. \ * \ 

■ 3* Political items of interest on specific countries are; t 

a. T hailand : The dependability of assurances that Thai* foreign 
: ■" " * r policy will not change re; ins to be seen. A period of con- 
siderable domestic instability* is anticipated. Adjustments 
' ■ to Communist China will probably continue* Owing to the 

f* changed situation, various U.S. programs-, particularly mill- 
; tary and economic assistance programs, are. being reviewed.- 



i 



d. Cambodia: A sharper awareness of the Communist "danger ap- ;• j 

.* *: pearcd to create a more friendly climate toward the U.S., 

. / : '■ and the government showed an increased* will to resist inter- " ! 

( , V ; - nal Communist subversion. Nevertheless } the overall internal 

;y . ' • ■ security situation deteriorated as a result of more vigorous - } 

' . Gouaminist activity. • \ ' • •' t . ■ ..; 



■ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






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...... .0 . ™ . O ■•'.:. 

o. Vietnam maintained its close relationship with the U.S. 
, *" progress was made in developing a representative govern- 

* . • ment, while executive leadership remained strong. Ef- 

fective counts pleasures against non-violent Communist 
,! * subversion remain a priority requirement, 

f , " Mai ay a became an independent member of the British Com- ' * , i 
"* • monwoalth in August, and good will continues to exist " • 
• '-•• * ""toward Great Britain, The new cabinet is conservative 

and pro-Western, but present indications are that Malaya 

'■ " : will not Join SBAtO. Communist terrorists continue to : j 

threaten internal security. The government is opposed ■ .■ - [ 

* to any political fusion with Singapore at this time. ■ . "' ' '"'"'■* " \ 






■- 



g. The Singapor e government, although beset with internal " ■ .\ 
political difficulties, weakened the Communists by ad- I 

ditional arrests of known subversives. 



... 4^ Econom ic. Serious obstacles to regional economic cooperation remain* 
such "as preoccupation with 4 domestic affairs, political antagonisms, and lack 
; . « Of complementary economies. Economic development throughout the area is 

/severely handicapped by lack of trained manpower. The Sino-Soviet Bloc eori- 
• -" ' ." '"tinuGs a high degree of economic activity in the area, with demonstrated ,- 
' . : .flexibility. (Annex B is" a discussion of Bloc-Southeast Asian economic rela- 
tions,) Southeast Asian nations are comparing U.S. and S3 no-Soviet Bloc aid j 
programs as to aid levels, administrative procedures and controls, and speed of * | 
performance. Complaints continue regarding U.S. aid program* delays. Con- . . " J 
. flicting claims on U-S, aid and inefficient use of local resources present "* I 
problems in some countries, The climate for U.S. private investment leaves j 
much to be desired. Planned expenditures for U.S." economic and technical 
assistance for FY 1958 in millions are: Burma - §10.0; Thailand- $35. Oj Cam- 
bodia - $35.0; Laos - $36.6; Vietnam - §209.4; Malaya -'none. These expendi- 
tures total £326 million, compared to estimated expenditures of $379 million for 
FY 1957. ' . 



■I 



5m Hili tary . The U.S. has, or will have, Overseas Internal Security i 
Programs in Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand, U.S. police experts will j 
make a survey in connection \rith a Burmese request for assistance, and the - ... 
■ Burmese have been informed that £10 million U.S. military assistance wil* be 

available • The Vietnamese armed forces improved significantly, and Communist 
..capabilities for resistance in South Vietnam were neutralized". Tl>3 current. 

situation in Vietnam does not permit any reduction in forces, but the U.S. did . 
■. not accede to President Diem's request for increased troop strength. Th ** ; *; 
Malayan Government agreed to the continued stationing of British Commonwealth 
troops in Malaya and to their bearing defense responsibilities for Malaya, . ' . 
; Estimated Military Assistance expenditures for FY 1958 (with FY 1957 estimates 
"in parentheses) are, in millions: Thailand - $20. A ($25*3); Cambodia ,- $6.2 
. ($31.1)3 Laos - §5.7 ($3.8); Vietnam - U3-5 ($105.0); total - $75-8 ($155.2). 

> * 

6,. Recomme ndation Regarding Policy R eview. After the' December elec- ■ 
* tions in Thailand, consideration should bo given to the need for a review of ■ 
( the ' pertinent sections. The section pertaining to Malaya is outdated and should 
be reviewed. • \ ' ♦ 

* * •■ 

X *». L? O 



1 

1 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






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COMKSNTS 



'The sharp drop, in estimated MAP expenditures for Vietnam for FY 1958* 
.„ arcd with FY 1957, reflect a drop in the program ($38.9 million for FY 
1958 compared to $74.2 million for FY 1957) and a levelling off of the pipe- 
line. " * 



as 



7 

comps 



u 



Burmese representatives are expected to arrive 5n Washington on 
approximately 8 December to negotiate the details of the first military assis- 
tance program for Bufma, The U.S. team of police experts is now conducting its 
survey in Burma, . * 

■ 

9 # Since approval of the report, the Pathet Lao symbolically surrendered 
authority over the "two Northern provinces under its control and a coalition 
cabj.net including two Pathet Lao representatives was formed. The actual im- 
position of government control over the northern provinces and the integration 
of 1500 Pathet Lao troops into the army, as agreed, are still uncertain of 
achievement, , . . , .. . ■ , ■-•>"■' 

,10. - The paper is considered to be generally acceptable/ . * '' ." . / 
teOQMMEKDATICy ' 

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: 11 t It is recommended that you note the report without exception* 



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NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



'■ £>- SECRET - . "O 



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347th NSC Meeting 
5 December 1957 



I* 



'••■''' : . " ITEM 5 (For Discussion) 

* 

' PROGRESS REPORT ON U.S. POLICY IN MAINLAND 





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SOUTHEAST ASIA (NSC 5612/ J.) 






BACKGROUND 



1 # U, S» Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia was approved on 5 September * , 

1956. This progress report covers the period 13 March through 6 November 1957. 






SUMMARY 
* " * ' * '■■ ■■ <■■» ■ — *• \ •*-— 

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2;. Po litical: -^ •• . ' ' 

Ui ! a,- Thailand: The coup in Thailand overshadowed all other developments 






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'in the area. The dependability of assurances that Thai foreign policy 
will not change remains to be necn t Owing to the changed situation, | 

various U. S» programs arc being reviewed, - - 



• ■ 

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■b. : " .Burma cautiously developed closer relations with the Free World 



1 






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while maintaining publicly its neutral position and continuing to re- 
ceive Communist aid, . v 



\ - . 



-. -■ 



■ c.' Laos: Negotiations for a cabinet including Pathet Lao (Communist-led} 
* . /~ representatives became more active. The threat posed by Pathet Lao 
control of two northern provinces continues, and security conditions 
: in the areas under government control deteriorated. > 

• 1 

f d, * Cambodia: A sharper awareness of. the Communist danger appeared 

to create a more friendly climate toward the U. S. Nevertheless, the 
■ overall internal security situation deteriorated as a result of more 
. • viporous Communist activity. 

3 

...... 

V " ' ' • * 

\ e» Vietnam maintained its close relationship with the U. S. Progress 



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was made in developing a representative government, and t .ecutive 
" leadership remained strong. . . • 

* 

1 

h i t Malaya became an independent member of the British Commonwealth 

in August, and good will continues to exist toward the U. K. The 

* * 

new cabinet is conservative and pro-T/cstern, but present indications 
are that Malaya will not join SEATO. Communist terrorists continue 
to threaten internal security. 



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* 



• ■ 

tf. Singapore: The government weakened Communist strength by " : 

additional arrests, . . m I 

: ;.. SECSff, nil. " ' " ■; . ; 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 












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7 3 Economic: The Sino -Soviet Bloc continues a high degree of economic 
activity" in the area, with demonstrated flexibility, and Southeast Asian nations 
are 'comparing U. S. and Sino-Soviet Blpc aid programs. Complaints continue 
regarding U. S. aid program delays.- Planned expenditures for U. S. economic 

id-technical assistance for FY 1958 (with FY 1957 estimates in parenthesis) are, 
in millions: Burma ~ $10.0 ($0.0); Thailand ~ $35.0 ($39.8);, Cambodia ~ $35.0 ' ■ 
($4-1.0); Laos - $36.6 ($47.9); Vietnam -.$209.4 ($249.8); total - $326.0 ($378,5). 

4 Military: ' In Vietnam, the armed forces improved significantly, "but the 
current situation does not permit any force reduction. Burn': a has been informed 
that $10 million in U. 5. military assistance will be available. Estimated Military 
Assistance expenditures lor the area for FY 1958 (with FY 1957 estimates in 
parentheses) are, in millions:- Thailand - $20.4 ($25.3); Cambodia - $6,2 ($21.1); 
Laos ~ $5.7 ($3.8}j Vietnam ~ $43,5 ($105.0); total ~ $75,8 ($155.2). ; 



'/: 



# » 



-5 Recommend ation r egarding Policy Review. After the December elections 
-'in Thailand consider ation. should be given to the need for a review of the pertinent 
section&~-" j rfThc section pertaining to Malaya is outdated and should be reviewed. 

* * : 

- 

COMMENTS 

6 Vietnam: The sharp drop in estimated MAP expenditures for Vietnam for 
s v FY I9 r )8 as compared with FY 1957, reflects a drop in the program and a levelling 
>i off of the pipeline. L aos: Since approval of the reporfcj a coalition cabinet including 
two Pathet Lao representatives has been formed, .' 



7 # The report is considered to be generally acceptable 
HE COMMENDATION . ■• .'■ \ ,'.... . ; - ' . 



8, It fes recorom ended that you note the report without exception. 



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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



NSC >309 m: m m -• - TOP SECRET 

Apj/_^ ^ j-jvO 

NOTE BY THE. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 

to the 
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 

on . 

U.S. POLICY IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST_ASIA ■ ' 
References; A* NSC i?6l2/i" ~ ,-.'-*. 
, - • B.- NSC Action No 1826 

C-, Memos f or NSC from Ex- . . \" 
ecutive Secretary, 
same subject , dated 
.. February 20 and March 3, 
1958 
D» NSC Action No. 1885 




stuoxuut; uj. j'.oo ?oi/i/ij prepared oy one w-jsu rj.annj.ng aua.ru 
in accordance with NSC Action No, l826~b and transmitted by 
the reference memorandum of February 20, I$>?8; subject to: 

a* The following comment by the Attorney General: 

■ 

"Agree^ subject to the substitution of the 
phrase 'of the proviso 1 .for the word f indi 
" eated 1 in the last line of paragraph 6hl\ so 
as to make. Identical the references to the 
taking of independent action in -paragraphs -(&A 
and 6 l rD c It is felt that such an amendment 
would .obviate any future implication that 
independent tX c S„ military action in defense 
of Malaya might be undertaken without regard 
to the proviso in paragraph 19." 

b e The following ca&s&ent by the Secretary of Commerce: 

* 

■ . . "The Department of Commerce does ) j*& consider 

' that grant economic assistance to the Fed- 
eration -of Malaya is necessary or desirable 
at this time and understands the revision doc 
* not incorporate such provision,, Also the 
Department does not feel that loans to* the 
. Federation of Malaya for economic developmenl 
purposes cire necessary at this time and shou! 
a proposal for such loans be advanced, would 
desire- participation in the early stages of 
consider at ion*' 1 ■ "* 

NSC 9^) ."' .1113 TOP SEC7 









Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET 



The above revisions to NSC 5612/1, including the 
revision proposed by the Attorney General,, were approved by 

ident on Aprl,l 2,, 1958* The President directs that 



_ .- V." 'fc.-- 



the 

NSC 56-12/1 a &s amended and approved and enclosed herewith 



- - 



as RSC 5b09 5 be implemented by all appropriate Executive 
departments and agencies of the U, S* Government; and 
designates the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordi- 
nating agency. 

A Financial Appendix on the subject 3 which accompanied 
NSC £6.12/1 « has not been reproduced, A new Financial 
Appendix will be prepared when the policy is next reviewed* ■ 

NSC '5809 supersedes NSC 56 12/1, 



JAMES S. LAY, JR. 
Executive Secretary 



• 






cc 



The Secretary 01 the Treasury 

The Attorney General 

The Secretary of Co-snerce 

The Director ,j Bureau of the Budget 

The Chairman^ Joint Chiefs of Staff 

The Director of Central Intelligence 



■ - 









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TO? SUCRE 



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• 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET 



STATEMENT OF POLICY 



on 



U. S B POLICY IN FiAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA* 



1~ GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 



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I c GenevBl^ Since mainland Southeast Asia does nou 
represent a unified area, courses of action must generally be 
determined in the light of* widely .varying country situations. , 
However, basic objectives and main directions of U. S. policy 
can and should be established on a regional basis. 

2 * Con s e Q uen c es o f Cpmmuni st Dom inat ion , Th e national ' 
security of €he United States would Je endangered by Communist 
. domination of mainland Southeast Asia, whether achieved by 
overt aggression, subversion, or a political and economic 
offensive. 






a. 



/ 






_ The loss to Communist control of any single free 
country would encourage tendencies toward accommodation 
by the rest, 

b* The loss of the entire area would have a seriously 
adverse impact on the U. S. position elsewhere in the Far 
East, have severe economic consequences for many nations 
of the Free World, add significant resources to the 
Communist bloc in rice, rubber, tin and other minerals, 
and could result in severe "economic and political pres- 
sures on Japan and India for accommodation to -the Communist 
bloc. The loss of Southeast Asia mainland could thus 
have farreaching consequences seriously adverse to U. S. 
security interests. 



3* The Communi st Threat 

■ 

a. Overt Aggr a s s 1 on . Although Communist policy now 

emphasizes non -military me.thods, the danger of overt ag- 

. . grass! on will remain inherent so long as Communist China 

and North Viet Nam continue a basically hostile policy 

supported by substantial military forces. There is only 



s«* 



•"— *. 



n 



■-■ For purposes or 'cms paper } Mainland Southeast Asia" con- 
sists of Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Viet Nam, Malaya 
and Singapore. In addition, there is attached a supple- 
mentary statement of policy on the special situation in 
North Viet Nam, 



1115 






SSCQ 



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_/ 



TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 




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Revise the first sentence to read as 



• - 



i. O -J- -t o • • *> * 



!, At present overt aggression and ? except in the 



cases of Viet Ham and Laos, militant subversion are less 
likely than an intensified campaign of Communist 






political, economic and cultural penetration in the area/' 

— . — ■ . * . . * . _> 






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NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i 






TOP SECR3 









a cease-fire in Viet Nam and sporadic hostilities con- 
tinue In Laos. The 'Viet Minh have continued to Improve 
their combat capabilities since the Geneva Conference 

ox" 195 1 *. 

* 

■ 

Ps Subyerslon^ In most countries of Southeast Asia 
a threat axso^&i^i&oo from the exi&fcano© of &:;tariDiva 
local Coiftmunist capabilities for all types of subversive 
activities, ranging up to armed insurrection. Addition- 
ally ., the large overseas Chinese communities in- South- 
east Asia offer a fertile field for subversion. The 
Break internal security systems of the Southeast Asian 



j.-^. *- 



states 






them highly vulnerable to such activities. 



c. Communist Political and Economic Offensive. 



A 



*"\"*>£* C & "> 7" 



overt, assies s ion and militant subversion are 



less likely , than -.an itenslfled campaign of Communist 
political ^ economic and cultural penetration in the area. 
The polity! cal instability economic /backwardness, export 
problems, and extreme nationalism of these countries 
provide many opportunities for Communist exploitation by 
trade and economic assistance , conventional political and 
diplomatic activity,, and extensive infiltration. This 
offensive now constitutes a threat to U, S. interests more 
subtle and more difficult to cope with than other threats. 

*. U. S. Role, The United States is likely to remain, the 



only major outside source of power to counteract 
Chinese Co&muhlst thrust into Southeast Asia, 
retention of 



the 



THUS j 



Hus 

the 



S13il 



this 



area in the Free World Will continue to 
depone on the extent and effectiveness of U. S. support as 
well as on the local efforts of the countries themselves. 



•A 



Political « * The underlying purpose of U. S. 



- 



assistance in 'the area Is to help the non-Communist 
countries develop more effective political organizations 3 
strengthen their internal administration and enlist 
greats:? allegiance in both urban and rural districts. 
In part., this purpose will be served by programs for 
military and economic aid dealt with below. In part it 
Hill require an intensification of present programs for 
training competent Asian managerial and technical 
personnel* And, in part, new approaches, both govern- 
mental and private , vrlll be needed. These should not 
concentrate exclusively at the national level, but should 
Include activities designed to strengthen and vitalize 
Indigenous traditions and institutions and to have an 
impact on village life, rural society, and educational 
systems. 



1 X 1 .' 



* J*" 









TOP SECT! 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 









; 






C; 



S 



TOP SECRET 



?w 



k* Mil itary , Be cause these countries do not have 
the capability of creating armed forces which could 
effectively resist large-scale external aggression, the 
United States will be required to provide a basic shield 
against Communist aggression/ For the foreseeable future , 
local will to resist aggression will depend on a con- 
viction in Southeast Asia that the United States will con- 
tinue its support and will- maintain striking forces . 
adequate to counter aggression in Southeast Asia with 
capabilities described in current basic national security 
policy, The combination of such U. S. forces and local 
will to resist would constitute the best deterrent 
against aggression. Should the deterrent fail, this 



the 



combination would also provide the 



most 



effective in 



sur'dnce th^t* in conjunction with indigenous and allied 
forces , the United States could suppress aggression in 









area quickly and in a manner and on a scale best 



calculacec. to avoid the hostilities broadening into 
general war. 

£• Economic and Technical, The insistence, through - 
ut most of the area, on economic development provides 



ie 



o 

the strongest lever for the exertion of influence hy th< 
Free World or by the Communist bloc. Without increased 
external help from some source, most of the governments 
of the area will be unable, even with adequate indigenous 
effort, to manage the political demand for rapid better- 
ment iri the conditions of life and provide for sound . " 
economic development. Failure to obtain such assistance 
from the Free World will tend to drive these countries 
toward economic dependence on the .Communist bloc. The 
general preference in Southeast Asia for Western technical 
end economic assistance gives the United States and the 
Free World an opportunity to obtain primacy over Communist 
efforts in key economic sectors. The outcome may, 
however, be strongly influenced by the success with which 
the Free -World can cope with Communist efforts t) 
exploit the existence of Southeast Asian export problem; 
particularly those involving rice. In the period ahead, 
flexibility of U. S, procedure and rapidity of U, S. 
action will be increasingly important, if effect ve 
advantage is to be taken of unexpected and transient 
opportunities , 



is, 



5. 






Problem of Regional Association, Ovep the long 



run, 



T f ] P 



small , vuln 



iCiC 






and essentially dependent nations 



of Southeast Asia cannot exist 'satisfactorily as free nations 
without closer associations than now exist. - 



NSC 5309 



111* 



TO 












Declassified per Executive Order J 3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 201 



TOP SECRET 



/ 



6. 



Th e Pr ob 1 em of AI i gn me nt . To preserve their indepen- 
:^enathen their internal "stability and protect them- 



de;ice , ; 

selves against aggression, some countries in Southeast Asia 
prefer to join regional security arrangements; Some, however, 
prefer to avoid alignment v;ith other nations. The basic 
objective of both groups Is to maintain the independence of 
their countries free of outside interference or dictation, and 
the independence and vitality of both are important to the 
United States and to each othe 



: *r. 



- # 



i 



i: 



POLICY CONCLUSIONS 



S. 

at 



7 # The national independence of the mainland Southeast 
Asian states is -important to the security interests of the 
United. States. If such independence Is to be preserved, U. 
policies must seek to build sufficient strength in the area 
least toi identify aggression, suppress subversion, prevent 
Communist political and economic domination, and assist the 
non-Communist governments to consolidate their domestic posi- 
tions, U. S. policy should not depend primarily on the degree 
and nature of Communist activity at any particular time, but 
should seek to promote these goals within the limits of the 
economic capacities of the countries concerned and U. S. 
resources available for the area* 

8 C Where a national determination to maintain independ- 
ence and oppose external aggression is sufficiently manifest, 
the United States should bo prepared to provide military 
assistance based upon the missions of the forces as indicated 
in the ,: Country Courses of Action 11 (Part V, tielow). 



9. 



w< of aggression against a Southeast Asian 



>^><^>' 



In the 
state willing to resist, the provisions of the /UN Charter ox 



the 



53 "TO Treaty should be invoked, but the United States 



sh 



ou~c 



not forgo necessary action in behalf of such a state 



or states because of the possibility that other allies migno 



be loath 
forces. 



to participate or to furnish more than token military 






% 10. In the long run, the ability of the non-Communisc 
governments to attain political, economic and social objectives 
will be the dominant factor in defeating the Communist attempts 
to dominate Southeast Asia, The United States should assist 
the non-Communist states of the area to formulate and execute 
urograms designed to promote conditions of sound development, 
to demonstrate that they can achieve growth without reliance • 
on Communist methods or dependence on the Communist bloc, and 
to <"/ive their peoples a greater stake in the continued 
independence of their countries.' 



KSC 5609 



3 



-^ "' 



1. ii.o 



TOP SEC; 



m - 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET 



11. The United States should continue to make clear its 
own devotion. to the principle of collective security, its 
belief that regional sepurity arrangements provide maximum 
protection at minimum- cost for all, and its expectation that a 
country's decision, to participate in such arrangements is 
based on its own calculation of its best interests and does 
not of itself constitute a claim for increased financial aid. 
Where countries participate , measures to assure adherence 
are desirable j normally including preferential treatment in 
the fields' 1 of., economic and military assistance as justified 
by U. S. strategic objectives. Where new opportunities for 
affiliation develop they -should be encouraged. The United 
States should, however, accept the right of each nation to 
choose its own path to the- future, and should not exert 
pressure to make active fillies of countries not so inclined. 



The 



genuine independence 



of 



s 



uch countries from Communism, 
serves U. S. interests even though they are not formally 
.aligned with the United States. The United States should 
accordingly support and assist them so long as they remain 
determined, to preserve their own independence and are 
actively pursuing policies to this end, 



III. OBJECTIVES 



/ 






" 12. To prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from- 
passing into or becoming economically dependent upon the 
Communist bloc; to persuade them that their best interests lie 
in greater cooperation and stronger affiliations with the rest 



of the Free World; and to assist 



j. i 



"cnem 



to develop toward 



stable, free j representative governments with the will and 
ability to resist Communist from within and without, and 
thereby to contribute to the 'strengthening of the 'Free World. 



xv. rkotonatj nounrtrcs of action* 



m ■ * • *■»■ ■**"■ -»*■ "iw V'** •—-*-+* i 



13. Support and assist, the countries of the are n on the 
basis of their will and ability to defend and strengthen their 

independence. I 

14. Respect each country r s choice of national f^licy for 
preserving its independence , but make every effort \o demon- 
strate the advantages of greater cooperation and closer 
alignment with the Free World, as well as the dangers of 
alignment with 



'one 



Communist bloc. 



• • 






vr 



The following courses of action are not applicable to the 
State of Singapore at this time: paragraph 13, lU, 16, 



-a , 



and 32 






5809 



' 11 ?G 

(Revised H/lO/59) 



TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



* . 



TOP SECRET 



15. Entourage the countries of Southeast Asia to cooper- 
ate closely with each other on a basis of mutual aid and 
support,, and support indigenous efforts to develop regional 
associations so long as they do not weaken SEATO or the spirit 
of resistance to Communism. 

16* Participate actively in SEATO 4 and seek to develop 
both its military and non-military aspects in a manner that 
will convincingly demonstrate the value of SEATO as a regional 
association^ the usefulness of which extends beyond deterrence 
of "Ccrsmunist expansion* Encourage limited participation of 
n on- Communist,, non-SEATO Asian nations in certain SEATO 



j-: 



! *- 



acta. v:i G3.es ^ 






C 



17. Encourage and support the spirit of resistance among ■ 

the peoples of Southeast Asia to Chinese Communist aggression 

as wall as to indigenous Communist insurrection, subversion, 

and propaganda. 

■ 

lo. Maintain,, in the general area of the Par East* U. S. 
forces adequate to exert a deterrent influence against 
Communist aggression, in conformity with current basic national 
security policy. 



19. Should overt Communist aggression occur in the 
Southeast Asian treaty are a., invoke the UN Charter or the 
SEATO Treaty, or both as applicable; and subject to local . 
request for assistance take necessary military and. any other 
action to assist any Mainland" Southeast Asian state or 
copendent territory in the SEATO area willing to re-sis t 
Communist resort to force: Provided, that the taking of 
military action shall .be subject to prior submission to and 
approval" by the Congress unless the emergency is deemed by 
the President to be so great that immediate, action is 
necessary to sava a vital interest of the United States. 












20 ^ In case of an imminent or actual Communist attempt 



u--j 



ssiEe control from within, and assuming some manifest 
local desire for U. S* assistance,, take all feasible measures 
to thvrart the attempt, \including even military action after 
appropriate Congressional action"^ 

21* As appropriate,, assist the police forces in Southeast 
Asian countries to obtain training and equipment to detect and 
contain Communist activities. 

22 c In order to strengthen the non -Communist governments 






the 






and to help forestall- their economic dependence 



on trie Communist bio 



si • 



.L •*» £- ■*■ 



fn^T"^ 



IIP %-■ - ' ] 



<%-/-, >■- 



n ^ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






* » 



- 

?p^e'7,\ pary. 2,g-a. Add the following to the end of the 
S3 .In the framing o? U. S c aid programs to Southeast Asian 

■ 

a. 

countries take into account the" economic and- technical 

» 
assistance being provided by other Free World natlpns and 

■ 

, ~oy international institutions^ coordinating with such 
nations and institutions where appropriate. f? 

* * - . - - . • . * - 

* . - V . . - - ' : ". - 

,. • v 

' ■ '*•■• • 

* I *; .---.- • . ■ 

•"%.-.' - * ■••■ . • - '. 

* 

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11 /^ 

# J_l ftfCM M.- fr" 



* » 



t ' 



«• * 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET 



■ 



a Provide flexible economic and technical assistance 
as necessary to attain U. S. objectives. 



Encourage measures to improve the climate for 
private investment , both domes-tic and foreign., and to 
mobilise the maximum investment of U, S. private capital 
in the area consistent with the prevailing climate. 

. cy Encourage United Nations agencies/ other Colombo 
Plan countries, and other friendly countries to contribute 
available resources to promote the economic growth of 
, Southeast Asia. ■ . ' . 



d 



__ Encourage the Southeast Asian countries to orient 
their economies in the direction of the Free World and # to 
rely primarily on n on -Communist markets and sources of 
supply for trade, technicians, capital development,, and 
atomic development « 

£* In carrying out programs involving disposal of 
U. S, agricultural surpluses a.broad: 

+ 

(1) Give particular attention to the economic 
vulnerabilities of the Southeast Asian countries 
and avoids to the maximum extent practicable , 
detracting from the ability of the&e countries to 
market their own exportable produce, 

(2) Give particular emphasis to the use of the 
resources to promote multilateral trade and 



-.i 



- -^ j- 



economiLC development. 



«* 



f 



_ Promote as appropriate the expansion of trade 
relationships between the United States and the countries 
of Southeast Asia, 



Take advantage of adverse local reactions to 
Communist barter agreements with countries in the area' by 
demonstrating the advantages to these countries of con- 
ducting trade on a multilateral commercial basis. 



e 



23,, Tfeke a -special j sustained effort to help educate an 
xpanding number of technically competent, pro-Western civilian 
and military leaders, working bilaterally, through the United 
Rations , with the other Colombo Plan countries and with other 
friendly countries. Stress the development of potential and 
secondary leadership to support the thin stratum of elite now 
administering the central governments and bring to their 
support modern techniques and technology in. public information 
and organization. 






1123 



TOP S :T 



e. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






TOP SECRET 



JT?*P 



/ 



24, Place increased emphasis on community development 
urojeets^. educational prpgramSj arid other activities aimed 
"to influence the welfare anci attitudes of the people at the 
village level. - ■ 




standing of Com-r.o.nist alms and techniques. 



25, Kola or reduce the number of U. S. officials in each 
country to a- strict minimum consistent with sound implement- 
3/bioh of essential programs,, in order to head off an adverse 
political reaction to the presence of a large number of 
Americans in relatively privileged positions. . . * 

27. Promote increasing Asian Buddhist contact v/ith and 
knowledge of the Free World, Explore v/ith friendly religious 
organizations ways of developing Buddhist fraternal asso- 
ciations and identification with Free World religious leaders 
and movements. - . 



28. * Continue activities designed to encourage the 
overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Aftia (a) to organize 
snd activate anti-Communist groups and activities within their 
c?;n communities; (b) to resist the effects of parallel pro- 
Communist groups and activities; (c) generally,, to increase 
their orientation toward their local governments and toward 
the Free World; and (d) consistent v/ith their obligations and 
primary allegiance to their local governments^ to extend 
sympathy and support to the Chinese National Government. 



" 4 



29, Discreetly encourage local governments to work 
toward assimilation of racial minorities. 



zo as 
Asia. 



Implement as appropriate covert operations designed 
rsist in the achievement of U« S. objectives in Southeast 



30 




achievement; of U. S« oajt^v 
east Asian countries. 



.32. 



In order to promote increased cooperation in the * 



w*fl c 



area 



na to deny the general area of the Mekong River Basin 
















K r SC 5S09 



12% 



■ TO? SECRET 



m 



t 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



OFFICE OF JCS PROPOSAL 



Page 8- Add new paragraph after paragraph 32* in Section IV (Regional 

Courses of Action). 

* 

Exercise caution to insure that the United States does not become 
so identified, either in fact or in the eyes of the "world, with 
particular regimes, individuals or political factions in the countries 
of the area as to hinder U. S. accommodation to evolutionary changes 
in the political scene." 

REASON : Initially, this paragraph was intended for insertion 
in the section on Cambodia as guidance for our dealings with Sihanouk. 
' At the suggestion of State it now is proposed as regional guidance so 
as to be applicable to other countries of the area where we may develop 

■ 

similar problems. 









1125 • 













Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET 



t? 



*_• 



•**5t influence or domination , assist 
7].r>C(T^^v: ont f the Mekong River Basin as 



.7?.e c ^ r '"^oo6oeratlon and mutual aid. 



as. feasible in 
a nucleus for 



* o 



as 



Immediately following par, 32, add, the following 



«—s- * • 



oax'agraph j 

? ^ ; Should any country in" the area cease to demonstrate 
a will to resist internal Communist subversion and to * 

ft 

carry out a policy of maintaining its independence, 

* . 

terminate U„ S*- economic and military assistance programs 
to such nation, " 


















Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



CAMBODIA (Revision of pars, 39-^+2 of NSC 5809, ) 

39* Seek to increase Cmabodia's respect for and confidence in the 
United States and the Free World in order to assist in maintaining 
Cambodia's independence and in curbing its tendency to increased 
orientation toward the Sino-Soviet Bloc. To this end demonstrate 
continued friendly U. S. support for Cambodia's independence, understanding 
of its policy of neutrality and concern for its economic and social pro- 
gress. 

1^0. In shaping particular courses of action in Cambodia, take into 
account the fact that Prince Sihanouk enjoys widespread popularity, 
particularly among the rural population and controls all major sources 
of political power. Devote special efforts toward developing Sihanouk's 
understanding of U, S. policies arid of the U. S. position in Southeast 



Asia, bearing in mind his extreme sensitivity to any suggestion of 
pressure or slight. 
I " kl. Since real or fancied threats from neighboring Free World 

countries have been a major factor contributing to Cambodia's sense of 

« 

■ 

insecurity an 1 its consequent readiness to accept Sino-Soviet Bloc 
support^ endeavor persistently and firmly to improve Cambodia's relations 
with these countries, particularly Thailand and Viet Warn. Take every 



appropriate occasion to impress on the governments of neighboring 
countries the importance of repairing their relations with Cambodia 



1127 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



• 



■ 



* 



k 



" ' "^2* Seek means effectively to" promote a sense of re- 
sponsibility on the part of Sihanouk and other Cambodian 
leaders for exerting sustained effort to create conditions 
conducive to better relations with neighboring countries and 
for avoiding contentious and provocative statements € When 
feasible and .consistent v/ith over-all U. S« interests 3 take 
steps to prevent provocative actions by any of the countries 
concerned. 



Jt3« Encourage positive cooperation between Cambodia and 
neighboring countries such as joint participation in the de r 

■ 

velppment of the Lower Mekong River Basin as a nucleus for 



• regional cooperation and mutual aid 



B 



;-\( t*A* Continue to provide modest military aid to enable 



* 

- 

A 



the Cambodian armed forces to maintain internal security 
/agrainst' Cc unist subversion/^ and to discourage Cambodia frc 



v ;' * < ; ■ jKr~* ■ \t?\ 



accepting substantial military aid from the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 



& Treasury --Budget proposal 



■» — »- I. .~w- . s >.*•_. 



k5>* Concentrate' Uc S e economic and technical assistance 



j primarily in those areas in which increased Communist in- 

fluence would entail the greatest threat to Cambodia's 



■ 
• 



neutrality and independeiiGe 



j 

t 

i 



b t 6 u In vicy/ of the relatively strong position still maintained 

* 

bv Sranca in G&afcodla., seek opportunities for greater mutual ur.*er~ 
•» . ., 

standing and cooperation v/ith the French in the furtherance of b&nmon 
Free World objectives • \ •-'. / 



/! hi r 



1 1 / L ! 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



■ 



LAOS (Revision of paras ^3-^9 of NSC 5809) 

lf7o Provide military assistance for the development and support of 
Loa armed forces capable of maintaining internal security /against Com- 
munist subversion/* a ^d providing limited initial resistance to external 
aggression by the Viet Minh /and Communist China/ '.## Encourage Laos to 
formulate and implement a broadly conceived security plan, including both 
internal and external security, which encompasses the services of all 
branches of the Royal Government, civil and military. 

If8c In the provision of UoSo assistance direct our programs to the 
promotion of social and economic progress and unification of Laos, thus 
helping maintain the confidence of the Royal Government in its anti- 
Communist, pro-Free World "neutrality" D 

1*9 # Continue to promote conditions engendering confidence by Lao 
leaders that the UN Charter, SEATO, and Free World support provide a 
favorable basis for Lao resistance to Communist pressure and inducements, 

and at the same time continue to impress upon the Lao the need for a sense 

I 

of responsibility and recognition that too drastic actions may have adverse 

international implications 



# Treasury-Budget Proposal* 

** Treasury and Budget propose deletion* 

lf9A» Encourage the Lao to observe constitutional and legal processes 

as providing the soundest basis for the growth and vitality of democratic 

institutions j discourage resort to force in political affairs „ 



i 



1129 



per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Projecl Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






* * * 






, ■ » . _ 



* ■ 






* ^9B Encourage and' support cooperation between Laos and otner ■ 
Southeast Asian countries,, particularly Thailand, V&et-Najn, the 
Philippines^ Malaya^ and Burma 7 including such joint effort in the 



ar 



rfci- subversion , economic ^ communications, and military fields as is 



feasible 



49G* Develop greater mutual understanding and cooperation wita 



■ «* 



the French in the furtherance of common Free World objectives* 

Iff}* Strongly support an expanded UN presence and technical 
assistance in taos 9 and make a special, intensified effort to ex> 



& 



courage other friendly powers to provide assistance 



::- 



- -* L* ■» k FtMfHi.lMl^ -* 1 — * +.+*-m±w* ivy..*-* ■ 



£ 



-l.h % « 



Treasury reserves on thzs paragraph 






*■ 



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oh. 






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i 



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5 











* 

■1 



i 



i 

,- 

r 



| 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET 



52 o Provide military assistance to Thailand for support 
f forces sufficient; 



a* To maintain internal security 



p 



b* To present limited initial resistance to external 
aggression* 

I 
, .. ; c* To make a modest contribution to collective 

defense of contiguous SEATO areas* 

Continue efforts to persuade Thai officials to eliminate 
non-MAP supported forces which do not contribute to the 
above objectives, 

53* Encourage and support close bonds between Thailand 
and Laos and between Thailand and Cambodia* including such 
political : associations j economic cooperation* and joint 
military planning as will serve to draw Laos and Cambodia 
closer to the Free World without weakening Thailand's posi- 
tion with regard to the Free World* 



■VIET NAM 



$h* Assist Free Viet Kan to develop a strong , stable 
and constitutional government to enable* Free Viet Nam to 
assert an increasingly attractive contrast to conditions in 
the present Communist zone* * • 

55* Work toward the weakening of the Communists in 
North and South Viet Haia in. order to bring about the eventual 
peaceful reunification of a free and independent Viet Nam 
under ant i~ Communist ..leader ship B 



"56* Support the position of the Government of Free Viet 
Nam that all-Vie t Nam elections may take place on3y after it 
is satisfied that genuinely free elections can be held 
throughout both zones of Viet Nam, ' ( 

$? t Assist Free Viet Ham to build up indigenous armed 
, forces* including independent logistical and administrate, a 
services ? which will be capable of assuring internal security 
and of providing limited initial resistance to attack by the 

Viet Minh, 

■ ■ J 
58* Encourage Vietnamese military planning for defense 
against external aggression along lines consistent with 
U* S. planning concepts based upon approved U* s; policy, 
and discreetly manifest in other ways U, S* interest in 



* 



NSC 5S09 



■ 1131 



(Revised V9A r 8) 



TOP SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3 3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



* 
I 



i 



- 



1 



TOP SECRET 



Treaty j 




assisting Free Viet Nam, in accordance with the SEAT 
to defend itself against external aggression. 



VIET i'iAM 

Page 12 , par# j3i. « Add the follov/ing to the end of the paragraph* 

"In this regard encourage and assist public relations and 

public information programs of the government of 

Viet Ram directed both internally to the free Vietnamese 

■ and externally to north Viet Nam, In thxs effort pri- 

oriiy should be given to areas of greatest dissidence. 



y 



particularly in the extreme south."* 
Page 12 par* $7* Add the following to the end of the paragraph • 



.»*•"_ *-"**-- 



i 



*; 



"Also encourage and assist elements of the Army of 

■ 

Viet Nam to establish and utilize specific ant i- sub- 
versive guerrilla formations and operations. In the anti- 
guerrilla campaign encourage the government of Viet Mara 
to use the Vietnamese Array in a way which v/ill help 

l-Ot f% 

ith the favor of the local populace in order to obtain 



its support for their campaigns^ particularly for in- 



n 'in- 



telligence purposes • t, ^;> 



# CIA proposal. 



* 



i 



■ , 









! 



• 



f^- 1 



r *\ 



Pape J.J* 



I r. mediately following par* $$> add the follovdng new 






paragraph- 



11 #U* 

JOT*-* 



Encourage and support an improvement in relations 



■between Viet Kara and Cambodia." 












Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 









| 

v J 

7 
V 

I 



•• 



VI.' SUPPLE HEHTARY STATEMENT OF POLICY 

on 
THE S PECIAL SITUATI ON IN NORT H VIET MAM 

| F I ' — ■ ■ ' ■ ■ - i i . . i-l , __ — . | l „ . , . . . . | ■ ■ - 

73. Treat the Viet Minh as not constituting a legitimate 
* government 3 and discourage other non -Communist states from 
developing or maintaining relations with the Viet Minh regin 

7*L Prevent the Viet Minh from expanding their political 
influence and territorial control in Free Viet Nam and 
Southeast .Asia, " 

75. Deter the Viet Minh from attacking or subverting 
Free Viet Nam or Laos, 

'76. Probe weaknesses of the Viet Minh and exploit them 
internally and internationally whenever possible. 

+ 

■ 77, Exploit nationalist sentiment v;ithin North Viet 
Nam' as a means of weakening and disrupting Sino-Soviet 
.domination, 

78. Assist the Government of Viet Nam to undertake 
programs of political , economic and psychological warfare 
against Viet Minh Communists. 

79. Apply j as necessary to achieve U. S. objectives, 
restrictions on U. S, exports and shipping and on foreign 
assets similar to those already in effect for Communist 
China and North Korea . r 



I 



;.o 



■ 

! 

.1 



NSC 5809 



(Revised 11/10/59) 

1133" 



TOP SECRET 



''•*'-"« 



1 -» . 



" r~ 






. — — .- fc-l 



r 












. 









■I r 



- " 



; ■ > 












Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63310. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



SECRET 



rn 



OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD 
Washington 25, D. Co 



* " , ' May 28, 1958 

REPORT ON SOUTHEAST ASIA (NSC 56.12/1} . ' ":• 

(Aj»p*"Oved by the President September 6, 1956) 
(Pc/.'iod Covered: From November 6, 1957 through May 28, 1950) 




\ 
\ ' ■ 

N^S 5612/1 was revised on April £ 
' and issued as NSC 5809. 





L^ 



A 



L REGIONAL 



\ 



.A; SUMMARY EVALUATION . ■ " .-'•.;. 

y * 1. . General. Burma and Caxnbodia, showed a more friendly atti- 

■ —*■* — » ■ ■ — — ■'■- - — 

tude toward the United States and the Free World, and Cambodian leaders 
made eomc attempt to control communist subversion* Thailand's new 
^regime re-invigorated the pro-SEATO, anti-communist policies of its 
'predecessor g, and Viet«Nam maintained close relationship with the 
■ United States* - "' , • ,.'-.*. 

On the other hand, as the price for . regaining control of the 

i * * 

two provinces previously dominated by the Pathet Lao, the Lao Govern- 
rnent accepted two Pathet Lao loaders in the National Cabinet and as si- 
.milated some Pa the t Lao troops into the Royal Lao Army* The conservative 
governing coalition in ne\vly--independsnt- Malaya suffered some political ) 
setbacks. The communist-supported leftist party did very well in Singa- / 
pore municipal elections in contrast to the poor showing of moderate and 
conservative political par tie s ■ " 



■ ■ , The short- run economic outlook' in "Southeast Asia, is somewhat 

clouded by declining foreign exchange reserves and prospects for lower 
export earnings resulting from poorer rice crops and lower prices for 
ovher export commodities* In the long-run better prospects exist* as<- J 
cuming favorable political developments* because pit (a) the wealth of 
human, agricultural and raw materials resources of the area and (b) 
the developing power, communications , irrigation and other basic facili- 
ties supported by external financial assistance* 



, •* 2, SEATO*. Satisfactory progress continued at the operational 
level in military and civil aspects; however* the Asian members still 
scek'an expansion of economic activities* Atomic -cap able weapons were 



/ 



** 



-'• 






: 



« • 



**. 



SECRET 



- 



\\ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



,,• 



V t 



SECRET 






$ 



■ 



i 



V 






successfully introduced without adverse psychological reaction in the re- ty 

cent "Phiblink" exercise, and a number of military exercises have been 
• scheduled and approved for the coming year* Standardization of equipment 
: is being accomplished between military forces of member nations which 
,' ; ■ will lead to a. reduction of the technical obstEicles to fuller cooperation 

in mutual defense. There were .significant administrative improvements; 

political consultation in meetings of the Council Representatives. improved 
*, in quality and content; ■ and.a successful counter-subversion seminar was held 

in'Baguio; and a cultural round table, attended by seme non-member govern-'. v> . 

merits/. was held in Bangkok* In addition, the United States has committed' 
.'$2 million for skilled labor training and agreed in principle to assist 
. "Thailand in the SEATO context to develop university engineering facilities* 

k V * * : What is generally considered to have been the most successful 

- Council fnpeting to date was held in Manila in March. Among other things, 
the Council at that time authorized the Secretary General to enter into 
limite'd contact with other regional defense organizations and agreed to a 
' proposal that contact with non-member states be continued and expanded in 
the coming year, 

• - . ■■■' .'..*- * . 

3. Mekong River Development The four-power Coordinating Com- 
rnittee established by Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vict-Nam to plan 
the development of the Mekong River basin agreed to set up a system f or . 
the cooperative collection of basic data en the river ba. sin. In line with 
our regional objectives the U, S, offered at the time of the recent ECAFE 
meeting at Kuala .Lumpur to contribute n total of $Z million to establishment j 
of this system* The offer, which was accepted by the four riparian coun- 
tries, produced a favorable impact in the ECAFE area* The U. S„ con- . 
tributionp together with funds offered by the* UN and other friendly govern- 

» * 

ments, is sufficient to finance the costs for approximately the first year of 
the development pIan--$2, 5 million— recommended by the Wheeler survey 

* 

mission. 



Imi -• 






4. No review of policy is recommended* 



B.- MAJOR OPERATING PROBLEMS FACING THE UNITED STATES 



■ 

*■ • 5. Obstacl es to Regional Cooperation . - At present more factors 
obstruct the development of regional cooperation in Asia than facilitate it, 
The most important ones are nationalistic preoccupation with domestic. 



SECRET 



■ " 1135 



-.. 



** 







* • 

- 



y 






.1 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 201 1 



SECRET 



' affaire* political antagonist mo and suspicions* and the general lack of 
.complementary economies* . *" '. ' ; 



.V 
•T • - 



- •* '-' •-"' '■'" "v- . ;, ;" While four riparian states are now agreed on the collection 
of basic data regarding the Lower Mekong River Basin, difficulties will 
probably arise if the time comes to determine means of developing and 
utilising power, irrigation, and navigation facilities « 

.s The Regional Telecommunications Project has fallen fax. 

behind schedule chiefly because of problems with the engineering con- 
tractor* A top-level advisor has completed an evaluation of the funda- 



* mental plan of the contractor in an attempt to expedite the project. 

• * * • 

6. Slow Ec onomic Development. Economic develo23mcnt in the; f 
area is slow because of a shortage of both public arid private capital* and 
1* " "• limited basic facilities such as power, communications, and transporta- . 

* * . tion, as well as the limited number of trained, skilled personnel. The 

resistance of .many Southeast Asia countries to measures which might 
,/' ; ' -encourage or assist overseas Chinese and other minority groups, also 
"- ; ; * ;;■ . retards economic and business development. Thecal! of prices for the 
■ ■ . basic export commodities of the area, with resultant government revenue -• 

losses, may slow economic development. 

» • * ■ * 

... * 

« 

"."■.■• . .It has been difficult to find appropriate means of encouraging 

Free World industrial countries to contribute to the economic development, 
of Southeast Asia. In the case of Japan, at" present Asia's only important 

■ ♦ " industrial country, it is difficult to- determine the extent to which the U*S, 
should encourage Japanese economic development activity in Southeast 
Asia. While Japanese proposals of June 1957 for Asian regional financial 
institutions, to be funded largely by the U.S. and joined by other non- 
regional participants, were not found practicable by the U.S*, the U.S. 
continues to recognise the desirability of close economic ties between 
Japan and Southeast Asia? and has offered to cooperate with Japan and 

* * interested Southeast Asia countries on a case-by-case basis. 



7„ p ublic Attitudes. Efforts to encourage favorable public 
attitudes in the area toward collective security pacts and toward the U» 
and the Free World in general continue to face important obstacles, 
including: (1) demonstrated growth of Sino-Sovict scientific, military, 
and economic power; {?,) Asian fear of involvement in nuclear warfare; 
(3} the appeal of communist coexistence propaganda 3 (4) increasing public 
interest in dome otic f economic, financial and socird problems; (5) doubt 
that participating in collective defense measures offers more benefits and 
less disadvantages than neutrality; and (6) national sensitivity which 



.- 



SECRET 






X X O b 

\ . _„.:___ _ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3*3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 







' .* / . ' ■ ' SECRET 

•'•.. .- . . - 

continues in most Southeast Asia countries regarding the presence of" 
large numbers of U«S, , British and French citisens, 

8* SEATO* SEATO has a continuing problem in p5pularisdng the 
organisation within Asian member countries as well as in. the general 
treaty area. It is essential that this problem be solved if the leaders of 
Asian member countries are to succeed in countering domestic criticism 
of SEATO "mender ship; and if SEATO is to attract new members (notably 
Malaya). From the position taken by representatives of the Asian members 
in various SEATO forums, it is clear that they consider membership in 
SEATO should enable them to obtain preferential treatment in the alloca- 



tion of economic assistance. 



V 



\ 



\ 



e 



9. Sino-Sov iet Bloc Eco n omic and Psychological Inroads . A com- i^ 
bination of fairly widespread acceptance of communist coexistence propa- 
ganda ? a desire to profit from communist "largess" and conviction that - 
communist infiltration is controllable* facilitates communist efforts to 
promote acceptance of their economic aid programs* In addition* 
although bloc aid has "boomeranged psychologically in certain instances, 
notably in Burma and less so in Cambodia* the resistance to bloc aid. is 
reduced by its reputation for "speed 11 , "easy terms' 1 and ihe apparent 
absence of "strings 11 . In some instances, U«S. assistance, because of 
premature commitments or assurances of aid on the one hand and subse- 
quent delays* apparent inflexibility and conspicuous checks and control 
procedures on the other, suffers by comparison in these respects* The 
high political imj xt of communist aid projects emphasises the import- 
ance of continuing efforts to maximize the effectiveness of U*S. aid 

programs, \ .•..">*"' . . 

< While Burma, and Cambodia continue to be the chief bene- l/ . 
ficiaries of bloc aid* a general offer of assistance to .the underdeveloped 
Asian countries was made by the Soviet delegate at recent ECAFE meet- 
ings in Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur* Also- in axldition to credits of up to 
five years for the purchase of machinery and equipment* the USSR ?:\z,cr? m z<j " 
announced it would consider long-term agreements for the purchase of ' ■ 

basic exports. The USSR has offered a trade agreement to Thailand* 

Burma has indicated its intention to use Soviet assistance in 
the priority construction of a technological institute, a hotel and a 
hospital, The number of Soviet technicians in Burma is soon expected to 
increase greatly* 1 Communist China's assistance to Burma was extended 
in the form of an agreement with Burma for a $4« 2 million loan* Burma 
continues to be receptive to bloc assistance but is revising its barter 
agreements with bloc countries to trade on a permissive and cash basis. 



J 



'' 









SECRET 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



SECRET 






* 4 _ 



So far Cambodia has received Approximately one-quarter of a 
programmed $22,4 million grant from Communist China and seems satis** 
fie d -with the program, which has received favorable publicity* New 
buildings for the Cambodian National Parliament will be included in this 
program. The Chinese Communists have also offered one million riels 
($28, 571 » at official rate of 35 to 1) to construct a modern building for a 
20 kilowatt radio transmitter donated by the Chinese/ 

* % ■ ■ 

Thailand has not yet accepted a Soviet offer of a "cobalt 

bomb" for hospital use, 

10, Economic Aid Program Delays, Much political and psychologic 
cal credit as well as operational economy and efficiency continue to be lost 
because of premature commitments and assurances of aid on the one hand 
and the inordinate X4 ime required for formulation and implementation of 
our economic and technical assistance programs on the other. Recipient 
countries continue to complain of delays. This raises serious problems 
with respect not only to "the assistance programs, but to U.S. relations 
in the area. In addition* "particularly in uncommitted countries, it # . 
'also 'materially reduced the attractiveness of U.S. aid as compared wiih 
co mmuni s t b lo c ai d . 



v 



y 



i 












& 



« 



. . • Commitments for physical construction arc frequently made 
.before reconnaisance, engineering and cost estimates are available, 

• "•. .In view of Vae impact of premature commitments and as stir- ■ 
jmces of aid, and aid program delays on U,S, relations in the area and 
on the ability of the U,S, to meet the economic challenge of the communist 
> # bloc-| increased emphasis will be given to a concentrated! coordinated 
attack to eliminate these difficulties. State and ICA are giving urgent 
consideration to these problems with a view to reconciling the limitations 
imposed on our aid programs by statute, by Congressional relations 
factors and by uotfmal administrative requirements on the one hand* with 
the need for obtaining an optimum mixture of economic, political and 
psychological benefits on the other. 

■ 
, 11, Efforts to Lessen Demands Upon U.S. Resources and Upon 

Lccal Economies (NSC Action No, 1599-c), Under this requirement the 
I>opartmeiit of State in consultation with the Department of Defense was to 
explore the possibility of arranging conferences with the nations in the* 
SEA TO area to achieve agreements as to future U.S* aid programs which 
will be more moderate in their demands upon U. S* resources and the 
local economies. Under present circumstances, this objective has not 
been accomplished o 




SECRET 



,K r»- O O 







Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



SECRET 



■ II, BURMA 



• - j 



A. SUMMARY EVALUATION 



Hfcte*^^wy^^-fcr» ■ fc ^^ ^ ■ ■■*■■%-*■ f— 



12 1 There has been a significant, if modest improvement in the 
position of tho U,S» in Burma* and in the attitudes and actions of tho 
Burmese Government as they- bear on U.S, objectives* However, the 
Soviet Union and Commmnct China have been i ble to continue their 
economic activities in Burma, even though, domestically, both com- 
munism and Marxist ideology have received a sharp setback. On 
January 29 Prime Minister TSSu, with unanimous approval of the Anti- 
Fascist Peoples Freedom League (AFPFL) Executive Committee, 
announced the Government Party f s complete disavowal of Marxism as its 
guiding political philosophy, • 

B. MAJOR OPERATING PR OB EEMS FACING THE UNITED STATES 

«■ 1 ... ■ - ■*■ ' fc— T ■ ■' I"- ■ » — ■.■— « * . ,• . ... I . I I ,» —.*. « i_ . ... „ .-..,.. ■ » ■ I , , , .-,,,, _ , ^.11 - P — » 

_ a 

■ 

13* General^ % We necessarily attempt to accommodate our as- 
sistance programs to the political sensitivities and the technical deficien- 
cies of the Burmese Government. However, difficulties in coping \V;.;h 
Burmese attitudes, which often fail to take account of MSP legislation 
and ICA procedures, result in protracted and continual delays. While 
those disagreements thus far have been reconciled amicably > the conse- 
quent delays inevitably tend to vitiate the favorable re suits we hope to 
derive from assistance programs. 



4 
. As a result there may be unfortunate contrast between our 

seeming rigidity and the apparent flexibility of the communist bloc in 

its economic and technical aid programs, < 






■14. PL 480 Sales, The signing of a new PL 480 Sales Agreement 
with Burma has been delayed by Burmese Government requests foi* 
special treatment which though not inconsistent with the law re qui* sd 
repeated exceptions to established policies,.. The fact , that the Burmese 
Government is aware that substantial concessions have been made in the 
PL, 480 agreements with other countries, particularly Poland, ha" com- •'■ 
plicated these negotiations Final agreement appears to be at haiuU; 

f * 

4. 
* I ' 

15, D e ve loprne n t A s s i s tanc e , An approach by the Burmese for a 
new Development Assistance Loan in the amount of $75 million- is antici- 
pated* Difficulties in developing projects on an acceptable basis under 
the present $25 million loan portend inevitable difficulties in the use of the 
DLF for financing future Burmese projects » 



: 



■ 



■ 



- 






SECRET 



• 



*. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 J 






• 





- - 




- ' 




- 






1 




* \ ;■ ' 



• \ 






I* ■ 






•I 



.; •- • / ■ - . ."..-• ••-.■• ', ■ ' SECRET . 

» m « 

■ m ~ m ■ 

16. Mi li tar y A s s is tan c c Program. A tfcl&y which must aj>pcar to 

■ "*flie Burmese as inordinate has taken place in the Washington formulation 
' "of a specific offer, with regard to the magnitude and terms of the military 

assistance which we are committed in principle to make available to the 
' Burmese* Legal difficulties encountered here have now been resolved . 
and Embassy Rangoon 1ms been supplied with negotiating instructions*' ' 

■ 
* 

.• 17, -Police' Assistance Program. Although negotiations on the $10/ 
million police program loan are still going on, the program'has begun, 
A way was found for initiating the program promptly by providing tempore 
ary draw^down against the existing line of credit for the period required 
to -negotiate and conclude an effective agreement* The Burmese appear 
. satisfied that the U»S* is demonstrating a timely interest, A survey of 
requirements hgui been completed and procurement of equipment is under 

- way* * . < 

• ** » • < ■ 

.'.*.. 18* U. Kyaw Nye in Vis it, Plans a?:e being drawn up for a visit 

to the United States by Deputy Prime Minister U. Kyaw Nye in in the late 

"summer or fall of 1958, Our inability to provide official "red carpet" 

-' treatment to U* Kyaw Nyein, who has been lavishly entertained in the 

•USSR and Communist China, is being at least partially overcome by sup- 

* it 

■ elemental assistance from the Asia Foundation* 



-+* 



'.v.- 






' m » CAMBODIA ; m \ • ' ; 

A. SUMMARY EVALUATION • . ' . 

+ ■ 

■ 
i ■ m 

t * 

19. As a result of sustained efforts of the communist bloc to con- 
solidate advantages it gained in Cambodia in 1956, the internal security 
situation has .clearly deteriorated. However, there has been evidence re ; - 
: cently that Prince Sihanouk and other Cambodian leaders arc increasingly 
aware of the potential dangers of communist activities, and some steps 
have been taken to control subversion* In the short run, the situation in 
Cambodia is not alarming, since the population as a whole remains 
strongly Buddhist, loyal to the monarchy and united under the leadership 
of Prince Sihanouk,, and it has* not yet been heavily subjected to communist 
influence* In the long run, there is greater danger that the extension of 
communist influence may overcome such counter measures as the Cam- 
bodians-may be prepared and able to take. 



» 






There has been a reduction in pro-communist sentiment with- 
in the Chinese community in Cambodia- largely because of the Carnbodic 
Government^ action in the internal security field* 






SECRET 



1 1 1! G 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 






'■■ 



?■- 



- : 



•.■•:- - *"•. . . • • - SECRET 

B. MAJOR OPERATING PROBLEMS FACING THE UNITED STATES 



. i,WrJ i ■ ■" l . 'JJ ** +M**r-m^_—, .. -%^,-v—. •»*« >-. 'ItMpJ Ui » >>1 J**,*-.— *. • — - ■ • n mv » ■ ■ ■ ■» 'M i iwn 



20 « Cambodian Neutrality 



« • 



' 



% - 






a* ' Cambodia's neutrality inhibits it from taking a strong 
stand in favor of the Free World, and together with the long-standing 
animosity between Cambodia and its neighbours, prevents close associa 
.tion with 'them in regional organizations. 



• .- 



- 



', ' - V * b* Cambodian neutrality also limits the opportunities for the 

/ . -t . .' United States to work closely with the Cambodian Government. It is 
f • ■ / . difficult to take measures to encourage Cambodia to meet the dangers 
- of internal communist subversion without at the same time seeming to 
\.\ .contravene Cambodian neutrality. We should encourage the Cambodian 
•* ■ .- ' . to orient their policy in a direction more favorable to the West but any 

evidence of undue pressure on our part to change the basic policy of 
• * neutrality could easily cause Cambodia to abandon its .new iirmex posture 
toward communism, . • ■ 



s 






21* Internal Security. In spite of increasing awareness of the 



I 



' ■ - 
-, 



magnitude of the communist effort in Cambodia* Cambodian leaders have 
taken far too' few steps to counteract such influence « Implementation of 
the police training program has progressed satisfactorily* but unification 
of all Cambodian police services has yet to take place and implementation 
of an r.greed action program, is hampered by administrative ineffectiveness 







22. Developme nts Relati ng to Operating Problems. It is possible 
that the Cambodian developments of the past few weeks, which indicate a 
new awareness of the communist threat and a determination to oppose it* 
may require that consideration be given to revision of certain paragraphs 
in £JSC 5u09 relating to Cambodia. In particular, paragraph 39 #. implying 
a continuing drift toward pro- communist neutrality, and paragraph 41 , 

-.implying that Cambodia might cease to demonstrate a will to resist inter" 
nal communist subversion* may need to be replaced by paragraphs calling 
for U*S. action to promote increased awareness of .the danger of subvert - 
sion and to provide means to combat that danger., as well as U.S. econom- 
ic, aid in which continued stress should be put upon specific technical 
assistance. * " 

23. Government Administration Weaknesse s. One of Cambodia 1 - ? 
most urgent needs is for effective civil administration. The ICA program 
is attempting to strengthen the" most important public services: education, 
agriculture, health and transportation. In 1957 the government requested 
U*S* advisory assistance to improve its budget operations, tax adminis- 
tration! and customs collections* One advisor has been recruited; two 
advisors remain to be recruited. 



» 
• 



■ SBCRB1 



* 



. ■* 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



. - 









■ * 



> » * * 



SECRET 






IV'. LAOS 



*» 



> — m» 



A, SUMMARY EVALUATION 



■> ■ " i i ' " 








r 


mp* ... 

. i . 




i . - j . " r . • • 


' ■ : ■ -: ■ 


r ' 








■ 




* ■ 



- 



- • 



tj 



* — 

24* ' Tho formation in November, 1957, of a coalition cabinet 
' with Communist Pathet Lao participation, additional communist gains of 
places in army and civil service, and permission for the Pathot Lao to 
operate ao a legal political party throughout the country were generally 
considered a setback for U.S. objectives* On the positive side the Royal 
Lao Government has gained substantial control of Sam Neua and Phong 
Saly and the Royal Lao Army now occupies the frontier* posts bordering 
on China and north Vie£~Nam. U.S. policy was reevaluated, following the 
Lao Cover nment-Pathet Lao settle ment, talcing into account the Prime 
Minister 1 s declaration in January that the Lao Government was determined 
to tolerate no subversion and his request for U.S. assistance, particular-' 
ly for the purpose of winning the crucial May elections. It was decided to 
continue U.S.. aid as before, but with the clear understanding that pro- 
vision of such aid depended upon future Lao performance. Our effort, 
"has ill -fore shifted from the negative one of attempting to prevent dis- 
astrous concessions to the Pathet Lao to the positive one of helping the 
Lao Government carry out the settle men! already readied, with a mini- 
mum of damage to the Free V/orld position. In this connection, the U.S. 
carried out an impact program of material and administrative assistance. 
Solution of the exchange: rate problem through monetary xeiorm has been 
deferred until after the; recent supplementary elections, new cash trans- 
fers of aid dollars meanwhile being placed in an aecount;>blocked by action 
of the Lao Government until agreement on monetary reform is reached 
with the U.S. Government. ►" . • 



* » 


. 




• . 



■ 






B. MAJOR OPERATING PROBLEMS FACING THE UNITED STATES 

25. Pathet Laq>» Inasmuch as the Pathet Lao have apparently 
chosen to concentrate on political means -to achieve their ends, the : ite« 
gration and demobilization of Pathet Lao forces have taken place relative- 
ly smoothly and the Lao National Army has moved into the two former 
Pathet Lao provinces. The Pathet Lao made an all-out effoi't in the May 4 
nationwide election campaign £qr 21 National Assembly seats, utilising 
well-organized grass-roots cells and demobilized Pathet Lao soldiers 
as propaganda agents. Firm final results have not yet been announced but 
. it may safely be assumed that the communists (Neo Lao Hak Xat) have won 
,-9 seats and the, Neutralists (Santiphab) have won 4- out of 21 seats at issue 
■" in the elections. Since there are 8 leftists in the National Assembly al- 
ready, a leftist coalition could possibly control about one "third of the 
seats in the new enlarged Assembly (us many as 21 out of 59 seats). Al- 
though Lao officials claim that the strong showing of communist candidates 



•- 



*T1 



.- 



SECR&'X 



r < 



*> 












Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i 






SECRET 



does not indicate a choice of conrceaunism by the Lao electorate but six7iply 
a protect vote against war and corruption and in favor of peace, neutrality 
and new faces, it is clear that the Neo Lao Hak Xai'has emerged as a 
well-organized and disciplined legal political party whose aim is to estab- 
lish communist control of Laos, probably by parliamentary means. 



■ The conservative leaders have been badly shaken by the com- 

• * *P A m k 

munists show -of strength which resulted largely from conservative failure 
to agree on a minimum consolidated list of candidates* Available figures 
indicate that conservative candidates received a clear majority of the 
popular vote but that conservatives got only a minority of the seats at 

- stake * It is possible for the conservatives \ if given a little organization 
and discipline^ and reasonably effective leaderships to form an all- 
conservative government* Thrry have a majority of .the enlarged As sern- 

V bly and they possess the psychological advantage of having received a 
popular majority in the elections* We are now considering various pos- 
sibilities relating to a re~appraisal of our effort in Laos* 



- . 






■-\/ 26* .Monetary Refo rm* Negotiations to achieve a single realistic 
. .-•* ■ »f : : rate of exchange, without; trade and exchange restrictions were pursued ! 
\ . ' V 'first in Vientiane and later in Washington during and after the Lao Prime 
%• " '.'' Minister's visit* Because the U.S. could not guarantee that immediate * 

devaluation would not jeopardize conservative chances in the elections* 
."*/ ; as unanimously contended by Lao leaders, the U.S agreed that monetary 
reform should not take place until some time after the recent supplemen- 
tary elections * The U.S.* insisted^ however^ that new releases of aid 
dollars be placed in a segregated escrow account pending devaluation and 
assurances that the ultimate kip value would eventually be deposited into 
the counterpart fund. The U.S. declined to effect further dollar transfer 
(project aid was not suspended) owing to the Lao Government's reluctance 
to accept lenient escrow arrangements offered* Scandalous import 
) icensing was stopped when negotiations led to acceptance by the Lao . 
Government of new procedures proposed by the U*S« There have been 
no abuses since. The Lao Government proposed that U,S, aid dollars 
.' henceforth be placed in a segregated account in the Lao National Bank 
•*! ■■ - ' and, not be used until agreement is reached between the U*S C and Laos 

on such matters. The U.S. agreed that this device would be acceptable - 
until negotiations are reopened in June in the hope that this would accom~ 
* . plish U.S* objectives and also permit the Lao to save face* 

* > 

# 
' "• 27* Lao Nation a l Army T raining. Because the French Military 
Mission is so reduced in strength and quality that it is unable to fulfill' 
its responsibilities* fee Lao National Army is not receiving proper train 
ingi resulting in deterioration of its capabilities and increasing lack of 

' ' " ' "'■... . SECRET • " 

* ■ 

a 

■ 

114 J . ■ ■ i 



** 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



'. 






SECRET 

- 

discipline. Furthermore, French assessment of the nature and magni-* 
tude of the communist threat posed against U.S. objectives through the 
Nco*Lao Hafc Xat.(e:a>Pathet Lao} make it questionable whether or not :V- 
French military advice and training of the Lao National Army will sexvo \ 
our best interests* We are now studying the practicability of a new ap- 
proach to the French Government to bring French policy in Laos into 
agreement with our own and British views on the nature of the communist 
throat and to induce a. more cooperative attitude 021 the part of the French 
representatives in Vientiane, At the same time a U.S. MA AG cannot 
be established because of the present desire of the UoS, to respect the 
Geneva Agreement prohibition against the introduction of foreign military . 
personnel* This means that U.S. financial and material assistance to the 
•Lao Army is not used to maximum advantage for Laos and the U.S. As 
an interim solution* consideration is being given to furnishing Filipino 
civilian trainers to the Lao Army with PEG (Civilian MAAG) assistance. 
Representations to the French concerning their training responsibilities 
appear to be an urgent necessity, • 



; V. FEDERATION OF MALAYA 

^^ ■__■_■ ■ ii m ■ n nTJ 1 ■■ fc I — l _ ■ ■ ■ ■■■■ »" 1 ifc ~ "" * » ~" ■ ' 1 # *~ ■ 1 ' "" -~ * "*" ■ "T* "" * " « 

A. SUMMARY EVALUATION 









p. m 



. ■ : -*: .* 



28, The government has shown continued determination io fight 
> :-eomm\mist terrorism and subversion, and has succeeded in maintaining-* 

: a strong, stable administration and a considerable degree of inter -racial- 
harmony. However, recent local election returns indicate some * weaken- 

• ing of support for this basically pro-Western government as underlying 
racial tensions manifest themselves in a drift toward socialist and ultra- . 
nationalist opposition parties * Tins deterioration of the government's 
political ci vength, particularly among Chinese and Indian voters support- 
ing neutralis' -oriented parties favoring recognition of Communist China - 
and the Malay Communist Party, could neutralise the progress made in ; . 
achieving U,S. objectives in Malaya* 

'"B. MAJOR OPERATING PROBLEMS FACING THE UNITED STATES 

29, Requests for B e ono rnic Assistance. As of April 30 a total of 
$19 million in applications had been received, by the DLF from the Federa- 
tion Government, Of the two projects submitted, one is under serious 
consideration, the deep-water port facilities project for $10.9 million; 
the other, a teaching hospital, has been rejected*" . % .- ;: ' 






SECRET 






1H". 

,. - » - t • 



.■s 



< 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



« 



SECRET 



* 

\ 



« 

support are likely "to result in proposals for new aid projects. The IBRD 
team and ICA advisors arc Assisting the Thai in planning the best utiliza- 
tion of their own resources, v . 

■ * ■ , * . » - * * 

VIII. VIET -NAM 



' • • 



■ . A. SUMMARY EVALUATION 






t 



. 









" < 



■ - 
i 



depend on foreign aid, the largest part of which goes to support the mili- 
tary establishment. U. S. aid still accounts for approximately 85 percent 
of imports and two-thirds of the budgetary revenues. Some improvement 
in the investment climate occurred with the exchange of notes between 
the United States and Viei-Nam effecting an Investment Guaranty Agree- 
ment and with acceptance of the U« S* view that that portion of International 
Development Corporation capital financed by the U. S. would be available 
to aid private enterprise only. Howeycr, economic nationalism and ex- 
cessive government intervention continue to discourage private foreign 
and domestic investment. Moreover, it is likely the Government of Vietr- 
Nam will continue to insist that certain larger industrial projects be 
rovomment-controJlcd, at least in their early years of operations* ' 

•.-•"■ - ■ j 

" - 42. Politicp.l and Security Problems of the Diem Government 

^ f MM .. H M „ J- - , M . _J HI - ~ — - ■ ■ — — ■— — ^ ^- — M ■-— ^— ■ ■ M m ■ I 'I ■ I — *- ■ ■ ■ ' ■ ■ M M ^■■J-^J.fc, ! ^ ■ ^ M ■ ■ ■ 1 ^ ■ _— Ml ■ I -I I. M-M I - M PT - ■ ■■. !! J U " ■ ■ 

President N^o Dinh Diem's policy of strict control in the political and 
economic fields has caused a certain amount of internal dissatisfaction* 
Should the President's exercise of personal authority develop too far t; ire 
may bo danger that the resultant frustration of government 'officials nught' 
weaken the united support for his regime which the situation requires. 
Likewise, the President's stern police measures and his emphasis on 
internal security have led to some criticism of the government. This em- 
phasis on internal security stems from the recent emergence of the country, 
the continuation of communist-inspired violence and subversion, and such 
incidents as the assassination of local officials in rural areas of southern 

Viet-Nam. * # . - * 



* 40. hi general we are achieving U. £. objectives in Viet-Nam. 
Relations between Viet-Nam and the Government of the Republic of China 
Eire improving since the Chinese community in Viet-Nam has accommodated 
itself to Vietnamese legislation concerning citizenship and certain key 

occupations. -- ■ 

- 
• • • t 

■ 
- B. MAJOR O PERATING PROBLEMS FA CIN G THE U N ITED STATES 

• . • • " • 

: 41.. Viet-Nam's Continued Dependence on Foreign Aid. In spite 

»■ ■ ■ ■ ■ - " " ■ ' - - ' ■ "■' - "* -" ■ ■ - ■■ * m " ■» ■■> . m .,i ii. ■ ■ ■ ■ j i • i i ■ 

of some. evidence of greater economic stability, Viet-Nam continues to 



■ < 






%~.- 






- 






■ ' 



j ' . • 



1W5 



SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



- 
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m 






. 






SECRET 



i' 






,4 



.' ■ ' . FINANCIAL ANNEX- TO ..REPORT ON KOU.THEAST..ASIA 

• . , (In millions of dollars over $5 million. Up to 

$5 million shown in nearest tenth million. ) 

EXPENDITURES AND DELIVERIES - CERTAINUL S.TCTJVITIES 

FY W5B- 



Ac bivity 



Military Assistance ("ea. footnotes? '"'a/ and 
— -* — . . »,>.,.» — — — 

/ \ • 



*■ 



*— ' 



? 



Economic Assistance 



.• / 



» i 



Technical Assistance 

■ ii ■ * ■ --- ■*• i i ■ ■ ■ 

w 

Information Services 



Educational Exchange 



<; 



Total 



FY 
1957 



112 



** 




£j .1 j 


!,5 


1. 





2. 


1 


• 


08 


365. 


48 



Est. 



22 



Est. 

Total 



50 



FY 1959 
(Est. as 

of .47.5 8.... 



43 



*Ext. through 3/3T758T" 
MAP Sales of Military Equipment & Services 

^^ — _ . ■ — . — i ii - i — , . —.. .. — ,_ — — — . - . — ,i — . _. _ . _ _ 



M AP Offshor e P rocu r emen t Pay ments (Defense expen- 
ditures entering into int'l balance of payments.) 
Other U.S. Govt. Payments (affecting 5nt l l bal. 
Of- payments - mil. & civ, pay, con '.ruction, pro- 
curement of U.S. mil, supplies & equipment.) 



105,0 



-.^-. T .,_. r -- rrH ,,. 



i.i 



1.2 



* 



130. 1 



19° 






1.6 



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During Period 



to 



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.»•*■#-#■»■■■■•■■•■*■■ 



Repayments 



PUBLIC LAW 480 AGREEMENTS 






■■*.*. .*♦..•.•* 



* 



Mew Loans 
Authorized 



As of 



Undisbursed 
Commitments 



Outstanding 
Debt 



■ iif^nif ikf^kitAi,,***,,,,,,,,., 



a, p | if *)!•»• 



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Date 



Title 



Amount 



Est.%Uols. 



Major 
Commodities 



Use of Local Currency 
or Other Cor 1 " ^mt 



> ■' 



/ll I'otes and Comments relating to the abow figures are sbo^rn on a separate p:.-- 
- . ■ .' 11 Hb :: -.SECRET 






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CRET 












Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 i 



' • ; ' SECRET 

" VIETNAM 
PIPELINE ANALYSIS, MUTUAL, SECURITY PROGRAM 

(in Millions of Dollars) 



. *- '".'■■ 



Military Assistance — *~ 

Prior to FY 1957 

FY 1957 . . 

FY 1958 (est,) • 

FY 1959 (est. ) 

Economic Assistance 



■■* 



Programs 


Deliveries 


Carryover 


■ 
1 1 

r' 

289 


* 

• 174 


• 
+ w 

115 


• . 75 


112, 


78 


57 


50 


85 


• 37 

• 


43 " 


79 


• 

Obligations 

> 


Expenditures 

i 


Carryover 


522. 1 . 
253. 9 


* 

321,2 
249. 5 , 


200.9 
205. 3 


175, 


199.3 ' 


• 181. C 


. 190.0 


191.0. 


180.0 



. . Prior to FY 1957 

FY 1957 
- FY 195C (est. ) 
■ • FY 1959* (est.) 

• * * • • 

♦ ■ * . 

. T e chni c al Co ope gat ion ., 

■ Prior to FY 1957 " 3, 5 . • '0.7 2.*C 

. ; FY 1957 " , ' \ 4,4 ' 1.8 5.4 

" -./FY 1958 (ect.) / . '.->..■ 4,2 " , 2.3 , 7.3, 

. FY 1939 (est.)' , '" . " " 4.5 . " 3. 9 7.9 



ipx 



a/ Includes value of all grant military assistance, whether on a country, 
'•' regional or worldwide basis, with the exception of the value of excess 
stocks,- (In the MAP programming process, country programs include 
• materiel and equipment, training and dollar costs cf consumables and 
construction. Regional or worldwide programs include items such as 
packing, crating, handling and transportation; spare 'parts; cost of re 
habilitating excess stocks; and advanced weapons, as appropriate) 
b/ Excludes $3] million programmed from stocks excess to U. S. Service 
~ -or other MAP requirements for FY 1 950-59* °* which $9 million was ■ 
delivered prior to FY 1957 and $22 million is estimated to be delivered 
"during FY 1957-59. • ' *' * " ' 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 









• ■. 



s- 



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10? i ■ 









DRAFT EDI- , &mDl'm<2S 



-*»m <—**.- 



Revise par*, 5-R (l) Qg HSC *&29/5 aa> follow: 



- J-% 



J*-"*. 



(*i) Issue a directive to its amecL forces tuat^ in %h& even"c 
of tmpravokect Cciaaunist armed attack against U_ S. military or nc:a- 
. ■' military psrsesmel^ air crafty -or vessels outside Ccsxssu&isru 

territory* U* S. forces in the area xd.ll ts&e against the Gonsitmist 

* „ attacking force during the course of the attack £^3&dato-3£<5 

aggressive protective i^easuros^ including if necessary gafl feasible 
hot irane&iate pursuit of the Ccir^uniat attaching force into hostile 

«^^*^ ■** i >■■-* ^. * .i *■ ■■*■ ■■ ■ - 1*- * 

airspace or uaters* . * 

Revise Pars- 1 e&& 2-a of HSC 5€0^ as 'f oiler; -3: " 



--------- 



1. Subject to par, aph£ 2 arid 3 Delc^ in the event of 

1 



Ccir^Lunist territory ^ thos£ U. S_ aircraft attached cr locataa 






£.u u2-C.VJ.il •■*, _-0«C<; Ci.:. .Li r ul-i COi.a_.J O— wiiS CrUuElCiv -: — wviSX»«2 - ( 



a^c;^^ 3£ ~ v - protective neasureSj inclaains if necessary a;5, feasible 



* , :'lj t '-'">vlu , _'\.vUv - — :wJuc>uC' ^u. r , ou:.v vx_ u.-^- w>^ b&m-ou t-vijv-^-'- — 25 _^— ^'^ 



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2. 



• • 



a. 






"* * — — ' ■ __ - _ ■- - _ — — ' ■■ - ■ 



■ncroiO-igaa 



1 V. "a" ,^* T* ^N '"» "." "i ' 



pureuiu aeep muo nosuile air cpaeec 






- 



^cr? sacsES? 



1150 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






#* 



• « 



COPY 



i 



GSSsESSAL C01H££L 07 5SB DSP/^Ss-SS^ OF 33?2i: : 

Washington 25, £. 0. 

Dsesmtci" 2, I95S 



r.s-ioMSDu:-: for ms. warn imzzms 

SUBJECT': "Hoi Pursuit" and Pursuit UnSsr the Doctrine of 

Solf-Preservation 






1 




_JI t .. _-.^i Up s»l^i ^ - - 

Legal ASvisar f s office of th&u agu£icy ana It is in &g?ee&32t vrith tha 
course of action ?$<xxss23g&56& "oy the oth : .; ancl gtf£3£S7i&3C "fasho'v* 



It >&£ a^ra^d th&frj as pointed oat in the JC3 ©tufiy- tmclar'corisidara- 
tics* the terra "Hot Pursuit" has a t:;aaitiana"_ ; fioetriii&l ni: ag in 
interB&tlonal'3£& vhleh is Kora restidetiv^ than the 3 :nin^ oivio\ :ly 
intended in the t\;o I^TSG papers* OSss&s $&g also ag^ggiisnt that the tsrsi 
ruy also bo i\5cd in a non-Xeg&l contont x-jxtli regarfi to activities ana 

S2/CU& tXG;2S 5o£L&? t«£^vA fcSQS'J CLA^OCyXy CiiVJ-ES,geO- oy u,i<J O.g^gTvv:. ' &QCv 3 

Df confusion regarding -ona -cra^ n-sanang ci tna isrja fco« Jrursui^ ^ aaa^ 
Ivt^ofey ^.g It cosc^il/^3 a p^rtic^lar principle of intersatlonal 1 .v 
confusion ao to its relationship to other princinl^s^ esp^cinlly tha 
doctrine of osnf-ciofonna on self-nnesjrvatiun. 



* * 






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NND Project Number: NND63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



* • 









. (2) In addition to the action directed in (l) aoova,. 






constitutionally authorized and specifically approved by ths 
President^ take such additional punitive action as nay ba naeassary 
and appropriate. 



P. 



arasrapns 



•vo 



1 and 2-a of ITSG 560* should ba redrafted 






s follows : ■ 



1. Subject to paragraphs 2 and 3 "belov^ in the event of 
unprovoked Cosmitmist jaWK?3 attack against U a 3. aircraft outside 
Conssunist territory., those U. 3, aircraft attached or locatad in ths 
irinediata area of the attack nay take against the Cc^uiiist 
attacking force during the cour^a of tha attack /Irr^diata ana/ 
asgrfessive protective ^a^L-c^ ; including if n .^ary and feas5Jble 
/'"hot purjuitj' i-^adiata pursuit of tha OcSes^-ist attacking force 
into hostile air spaea. 



2. 



• * 



a. 



/^Rot pursuit; \/ ouch pursuit vill not include prolonged 
rairsuit dee*o into hostile air 3'caca* 



in no vay 







s/ Sober o Uacner v 
Ganeral Counsel 






1 



&. O v^ 



*; 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



Cotober 23; 1! 




;S SivOY 
on 
HO? gOagHEg MP TO asUXS? y] 3 58 ZKXS5GDBS OF 



■ — - 



.- . 1. The tsm "hot pursuit 11 has "been used In various joint and 
service papers j as n;all as "by {kEE&saoS&EB in the field ; in connection vith 
the protective measures United Staves 22ij.ite.ry forces ere authorized to 
take in self-defense * SSie tera has also "bean used vith reference to 
its special s~eanin£ under international lew;* The purpose of this paper 
is to clarify the concepts involved vith a viev to eliminating scaie of 
the confusion which has arisen fre:a the interch^n enable use of the tera. 



2. QSie ter^i "hot pursuit" has a \;ell»establishod and special meaning 
in international lav* It is reeo^jnized as the right of a coastal State 
to pursue CC:-3SRCIAL vessels of a foreign State suspected of violating 
the laws or regulations of the coastal State applicable to its territorial 
sea or conti{^uor.s zone* Basically.;, it is a peacetime concept not con- 
nected vith hostilities or the threat of hostilities by the nilitary 
forces of a State* Parsuit under this doctrine does not include the 
right to pursue varships or military aircraft^ or for that matter any 
tyoe of aircraft* In addition, under -custoM and practice, hot *oursuit 
Kay be undertaken only under certain limited conditions For e:-: le-5 
theVarsued vessel or one of its boats isust "be vithin the territorial sea 

mm 

or contiguous acne of the coastal State "before pursuit can "begin* Once 
the pursued ship enters the territorial craters of its flag state or a 
third state ; the ri^ht of hot pursuit ends* Although hot pursuit sasy "be 
undertaken for a violation of any lav or regulation enacted pursuant to 
the sovereign authority of the teastal State vh-en tke violation occurs 
\rithin internal waters or the territorial sea^ it can be undertaken for 
a violation of only those lavs eovari&g customs ^ fiscal*, an^pa/sicn^ 
or sanitary natters vhen the violation occurs within the contiguous sone« 



3. In marked contrast ^ the right of parsuit under the doctrine of 
self ~ pre serration or self- defense is a avaeh broader concept; not 
dependent on the territorial sea or contiguous ^one*. International law 
recognizes the right of a State to tahe v:hav - ar r'leasires aire necessary 












in tii^e of peace nay repel or resist any hos'cxle acu couriur^a or 
threatened against it 



lorej 



■s *r*\ XT -- 'z* <- z- • ' r\ m '* fi^v^Tii 1 *! 



£he ripit to 



repel and resist includes T, the ri^ht of pursuit 11 wz&gs considered 
feasible and necessary to ensure the safety of threatened forces or 
territory* In this connection , a hostile act has "c^d. defined in varic 
instructions as l e:ay act vhieh involves a clear and present ganger to 
the security o'Z the United States or its forces,- territory, possessions, 



A, 



or territory under the United States administration*" 
vhat nay constitute hostile acts are: 



So:^ exssralea of 






cossjajssaxsz 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



cc:; S6i 



guns; rockets, torp\dc*es, or other irenpsas at any ;caterhorne; air, or 
ground target other thSB reec^ni^ed Papons raftgaa, end 



h* Overt and covert actions "by naval or air forces that place 
in o^opravy cr^ft^ installations* cr personnel of the Uhi\:ed States. 



As to the "right of poateiilt 11 incident to repelling a hostile aetj 
instructions provide that craft or subversive units of a Stkta ccaa.ittins 
hostile acts i:hxch are sporadic^ isolated or snail scale in nature 
should he counterattacked irn^aiately by authorised nsans availrihle to 

craft* This includes purauit as feasible and necessary to ensure tlis 
safety of United States forces or territory* Instructions also provide 
.that United States forces shall not conduct prolonged pursuit deep into ■ 
hostile areas or neutral territory p nor shall thay deliberately and 

As is readily apparent., there exists a clear distinction set een this 
concept and the concept discussion in narearanh 2 e 

k* In vie-7 of the cTcova and in order to Ein&aize confusion, the 
term "not pursuit" should he reserved to express the precise eirev stance 
as visualised under its reeo^i^sd scssatSng in iute:;natisanl lav* the # 
tera "defensive paa*sult u should he used in connection uith the ri^ht of 
pursuit under the doctrine of a^lf-preservaticn. 






^s 



* 



r" ,-* p - *-• 

J. XOo 



t -\ kit 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






■ 






i 



:- 






SECRET 



OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD 



V/a«hittgtpa 25, D f C» 



•January 7„ 1959 



"• • ■ REPORT ON SOUTHEAST ASIA (NSC 5G09) 

(Approved by the President, April ?,, 1950) 
(Period Covered: From May 23, 1958 through Januasry 7„ 






959} 






I. REGIONAL 



A,' SUMMARY EVALUATION 



LI General 



■ * . - aV Progress was irregular in assisting the countries in 

Southeast Asia to develop toward stable, free representative governments 
\yith the will and ability to resist communism. The danger that any of them 
may pass into the communist orbit varies from country to country, 
Thailand, Vict -Nam and the Federation of Malaya maintained an anti- 
communist position* A drift toward political confusion in Burma was * 
interrupted by General Ne Y/in f s accession to the premiership and his 
immediate stand against communism. The Lao Gqvernm it withstood 
neutralist* and .communist efforts to overthrow it, eliminated communists 
from cabinet positions mid took initial steps toward countering communist 
political and subversive progress in the countryside* Its prospects of 
successfully Yarding off communist subversion and achieving stability have 
improved considerably since the low point reached in the May elections, | 
but genuine non-communist unity has riot yet been achieved* -Cambodia, 
while maintaining its neutral position., made a swing to the left in recog** 
nizing Cc lunist China and then Prince Sihanouk tried to balance this 
move to. some extent with a visit to the United State s? In Singapore thu 
moderate governing Labor Front failed to improve its position. In the , 
future it may be seriously threatened by the extreme leftist People 4 9 A tion . 

Party which has shown increased evidence of popular support* * . 

■ 

V - - . b« Slight progress was made ih a second objective of per 
suading the countries that their best interests lie in greater- cooperation 
&nd stronger affiliations with the rest of the,.£rec worlds Under SEATO 
•satisfactory progress continued on both the military and civilian sides of 
the organisation* The Military Planning Office in Bangkok developed a, \ 
comprehensive plan for combined SEATO military exercises in FY 1959* ': ; 
Informal political consultation improved and was characterised by the 
active participation, of all of the member © f Particularly note'v/brthy was 
the improvement in $ho materia! produced by the Public Relations Office^ 



: 



■ 



1. 






- 



«-» 



s 



»■ 



f V 



11KR • 

»'-* •&» \} L* 



SECRET 



' r 



. # 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i 



i ■ 



• ■. 



■- 



: . •■ - . \ . .SECRET 

m • • ■ i 

• « 

The Asian members continued to seek an expansion in economic activities 
under. SEATO, and the U« S 9 accordingly committed $2* 3 million for - 
-.skilled labor training and $425, 000 to assist Thailand in establishing a ' / 
SEATO Graduate School of Engineering,, A moat successful Council meeting 
.was held in Manila in March which authorised the Secretary General to 
•enter into limited contact with other regional defense organisations and 
agreed to a proposal that contact with non^membor states be continued 
and expanded* ■ • . 



T* 



» • 



t * 



Some progress was made in developing regional projects 
Agreements were signed in June with Thailand, Viet-Nam and Laos to 
provide $27 million of U* S* funds toward the cost of a regional tele- 
communications system. Funds were also tentatively earmarked for the 
possible inclusion of Cambodia* A mild expression of interest by Burma 
for participation in the project has been explored, and Burmese participa 
ticm seems unlikely in the near future* ICA has appointed the prime engi 
Steering contractor for the project* A second regional project relating to . 

. .English language teaching has fallen behind schedule because of problems in 
obtaining the participating countries 1 understanding of the project and in 

. drawing up the nece scary documentation, - - ". . / 

There have been two main themes in Southeast Asian 

■ ■ * 

attitudes toward the Taiwan Strait crisis P The initial note of fear that the 
whole area might be involved in war was replaced, to a large extent, by 
satisfaction that the U« S* did not back down on this isc-uz.* 

m " 

c B Progress in preventing Southeast Asian countries from 
becoming economically dependent upon the communist bloc varies from 
country to country* Seemingly generous trade and aid offers from communist 
bloc countries have proved tempting to some Southeast Asian nations*, t 
Burma and Cambodia have been most vulnerable In Singapore and the ' 
Federation of Malaya the Chinese Communists, for instance* -operate through 
banking and trading interests * The Federation is taking steps to reduce 
■the influence of the Communist Bank of China* In Thailand, the volum- of 
imports from Communist China, which is small but increasing, has impor- 
tant propaganda value to tho communists Laos has so far resisted Chinese 
Communist 'trade and aid offers* Even assuming favorable political develop- 
ments,, many uncertainties exist for the economic development of Sont' ea&t 
Asia* Some obvious weaknesses include limited understanding by govern- 
ment and other leaders of the elements essential to economic development 
aijd mobilization of capital, both domestic and foreign, lack of managerial 
and technical experience, lack of diversity in export commodities and 
vulnerability to price fluctuations for these commodities* Some appre- 
hension exists regarding the possibility of obtaining reasonable prices for 
the favorable rice crops now expected ir\ the area, particularly Burma* 



• 



* 

L 



* . 



■ 



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•i 

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■ 

2 f No review of policy is recommended 



\ 



1X0/ 



* 



SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



SECRET 












themselves have not been sufficient to effect a rate of growth satisfactory 
to these underdeveloped countries'whieh tend incrca/singly to compare their 
national economic progress with that claimed by communist controlled Asian 
* countries* The urgency of the problem is emphasized by. the developing 
communist economic offensive* From the U, S* standpoint^ dissettis faction 
'-' " is particularly important in these countries s which have come to expect 

. ,-Athat 'their alignment witli^the free world will bring them the external ; • 

..-• ^"assistance needed for more rapid economic development* ! 






: - . . -. Status of U* S», Actions: Considerable progress has been made . 

during' this period in defining policies and the "broad approaches which the 
•United States will employ in increasing our effectiveness in assisting these 
countries to achieve a satisfactory rate of development* These policies 
and approaches were summarized in the President's recent speech to the 
Colombo Plan Conference in Seattle and are applicable to all underdeveloped 
areas* including Southeast Asia* The President presented a program 
addressed to the following major requirements for economic growth: 






a* 



• 






* 


• 


■ f . * 

■* 


* 


: 




"-' - 


I 



* 

e* 



expanded international trade . ..,.■-, ' 

technical skills 

private investment " m . . 

normal bankable loans , * • . * /.. 

financing to cover other sound projects which will afford 
the borrower flexibility regarding terms of repayment* 









- ■ 

* ■ ■ * 

, * < . Action to meet some of the requirements under each of these 

.points is receiving considerable emphasis in present programs*' Considcra** 
tion is being given to increasing the emphasis on other elements not yet - 
adequately developed* The President has created the Draper Committee to 
consider, among other things, the impact of our military assistance pro- 
grams on those related portions and objectives of the mutual security effort 
which are directed primarily at the economic betterment and growth of the 
free world and to appraise the relative emphasis which should be given to 
military and economic prcgrams s particularly in the less developed areas* 
.Certain other major problems involved in carrying out current programs 
are also under study by such groups as the Straus Study Group and the World 
Economic Practices Committee* " 

The problem of economic development as it relates to South-- 
east Asia reflects the need for clarification of U« S, basic policy in order 
to. determine the objectives? conditional and time period which should 
govern U c S« economic assistance for this area* The attention of the 
NSC io invited to this pressing problem in the context of NSC 5810/1* 



i 



- •- 



SECRET 



*r s> 



1158 



■ 



■ . 






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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



■ * 



SECRET 



• r 



" \ 5** Public Attitudes Toward the U,^S<.- Effects (o encourage . - : \ 

favorable public "attitude s in the area toward collective security pacts and -' 
toward the U* S* and the free world in genera,! continue to face important, " ■• 

obstacles* including; (I) demonstrated growth of Sinb** Soviet scientific ■ " j 
military and economic power; (2) Apian fear of involvement in nuclear 
warfare; (3) the appeal of communist coexistence propaganda; (4) increase 
Sng public interest in domestic economic* financial and social problems; 
(5} doubt that participating in collective defence measures offers more 
benefits and lees disadvantages than neutrality; and (6) national sensitivity 
which continues in moot Southeast Asian countries regarding the presence 
of large numbers of foreign citizens, * \ 



- 
- 



i 



<j+ 



6, Sin fv- Soviet Bloc Economic an d Ps ychological Inroads g A com 



V* 



. bination of fairly widespread acceptance of Communist coexistence propa* 
ganda, a desire to profit from conim^Jnist "largess" and conviction that 
communist infiltration is controllable; facilitates communist efforts to pro- 
mote acceptance of their economic aid programs* Resistance to bloc aid. 
is reduced by its reputation for 1 ' speed /Voasy terms" .and the apparent 
absence of "strings"* In some instances, U© S* assistance suffers by com* 
parinon iu these N rcsp0cts* 

\ 

Burma and- Cambodia continued to be the chief beneficiaries of 
• bloc aid* Howcvcr f the general offer of assistance to the underdeveloped 
Asian countries made by the Soviet delegate at ECAF12 meetings in Bangkok 
and ICuola* Lumpur early this year has not been followed up« Impressive 
progress has been made in implementing Soviet assistance projects in 
Burma, which include, a technological institute* a .hotel* a hospital and, tech-' 
nical assistance iu agricultural projects* Under General He Y/rn^ Burma in 
' likely to be less receptive to bloc assistance* Barter agsreeasoents with bloc 
' countries have already been revised to provide for trade oi:i a, periTJ.Gs5.ve 

and case basis** The USSR is making progress on the SOO^bed hospital it is 
"giving' 1 Cambodiaj la connection with Cambcdia's extension of diplomatic . 
recognition to Comfnunint China in July 1953 p the Jattotf has offered to in**. 
crcac-o It<' p>:o5ir!StiVincd.t:!4 *& $22*4 milK/mby {&& e^atealexft ri about " ' 



£f>* 6 million, 



f ■ * 



if • %»< 



1-irro ' ' ■ ' ' ■ " SECRET 



**** -'? V'" O 



States "of Uo S. Actions: Some of the obstacles outlined 
above involve the U« S» world position in its entirety said require action 
beyond the scope of the information program alone. We expect that these" 
obstacles will continue to be a serious problem in gur efforts to present 
U* S* policies and programs to the leaders of Southeast Asia* Efforts. con- 
tinue to be made* however, to provide information and. public relations 
support for U« S, political^ economic and military policies and programs in 
order to achieve more favorable public attitudes 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



i 






• . 



SECRET 












-. 



Cheap cotton textiles and small manufactures from Commu». 
nist China appeared in greater quantities during the past year in many 
Southeast Asian markets© This sharp competition has mainly affected 
exports from Japan and India* but also* in some instance s* the production 
of local textile mills. ' ■' 

4 

Status of U. S. Actions: With a vie / to offsetting the high 
political impact of communist aid projects* the U. S. continued to pub- 
licise the more dramatic accomplishments of U. S. aid programs, . In this 
connection cuch a program as PL 480 assistance in the form of raw cotton 
. 'for processing in third countries was one means of curbing further Chinese 
Communist inroads into the textile market. A supporting factor in off- 
setting communist aid projects is that remittances from overseas Chinese, 
to relatives on the mainland have decreased markedly since the estab- 
lishment of people's communes,, From August to October* remittances' 
.through the Kong Kong branch of the Bank of China reportedly dropped 
. 40 percent to the lowest volume since 1955* and a similar decrease is 

reported from Singapore. I?art of this reduction is attributed by some to the 
development of communes on the mainland*' . .♦ " 

7. Economic Aid Program Delays. Despite recent improvements* 
the impact of aid program delays on U. S. relations in the area and on the 

-■ ability of the U. S. to meet the economic challenge of the communist bloc 
requires continued attention and emphasis at high levels within State and 

M * ICA on eliminating these difficulties. Specifically* project apptfGvalpro- 
cedtircs* contracting and procurement still need faster handling. Person- 
nel Selection* though greatly improved* require s continuing attention. 






* ■ * * 

Status' of Uc S Actions: Substantially faster program approval 
have occurred this year under new programming procedures. Progress has 
also been made in the initiation of corrective measures to reduce delays 
in implementing econoviic aid activities. Several of these improvements 
stem from action by the special committee recently established under the 
ICA Director. .• .' " . 

* . r . The problem of delays has been made in ore acute in the past 

by premature commitments and assurances of aid. New legislation e *ec« 
tive this year prohibits obligation of any economic assistance funds for 
projects costing over $100,000 and requiring substantive technical or 
financial planning until necessary engineering* financial or other plans are 
completed and a reasonably firm cost estimate made. On the other hand* the 
new legislation will also tend to increase the amount o? time required be- 
tween formulation and initiation of certain projects. 



s 



G Political I n stab ility v Political instability is a potential problem 
in all the countries of the area* owing to the relatively narrow base upon 






r»i 



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SECRET 















Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i 



•i • -. i 



M~» 



S3CEE1 



which their political frameworks rest; and the iinportance of the unpre- 
dictable persona! factor in national politico* Thus the removal of the prin« 
cipal leader, by whatever rc3an3 s or changes in attitude of the leader b can 
have grave repercussions in many of the countries* 



• * 



Statue of U« Sc 



Actions: Indicated, where applicable, under 



individual country headings* 



9* Problem of Overseas Internal Security Program. The Overscan 
Internal Security Program in Southeast Asia, constitutes part of a larger 
operating problem on a world-wide basis on which policy guidance is needed* 
On December 8, 1958, the President approved a National Security Council 
action relating to certain policy issues in connection with the Mutual Security 
Program which: ^ 

Requested the Operations Coordinating Board to review the 
Overseas Internal Security Programs (OIS?) with respect to: (1) The 
" * validity of the policy stated in the following portions of the basic 

national security policy, reporting the results of this review to the 
• _ * Council: to the extent possible without sacrifice of U* S v security, 
- , the United States should seek to reduce requirements for military 
assistance by encouraging selected recipient nations (principally non~ 
European) *♦#"#** (b) to emphasize police and constabulary type 
[■ forces for internal security purposes in lieu of largo indigenous mili*» 
- tary establishments* (2) Certain operational matters raised in the 

Status Report on the Mutual Security Program, - « 



'" Status of Uo Sc Actions: The OCR is currently seized with 
the above problem* 



■ Mi.1J^a-.fc»-StH» T<ci»-* 



*. 



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1161. 



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SECRET 






. - 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



' V- 



III, CAMBODIA 






* ■ 



- - 



A. SUMMARY EVALUATION 






I 



14> Recent developments relate particularly to a U# S course of 
action to reverse the drift toward pro-communist neutrality and to assist 
* • where possible in a solution of the Cambodia- Thailand border problem 

and in fostering go6d relations between Cambodia and Viet- Nam e Cambodia 1 
.neutral position swung to the left with the recognition of Communist China* 
Sihanouk's subsequent visit to the United States may have restored, some- 
what, better balance to Cambodia's neutrality but there has been a net loss 
■ 'to the free world's position in Cambodia* The deterioration of Cambodia's 
.. relations with Viet-Nam and Thailand (the most important international 
■ problems in Cambodian eyes) exacerbated the problem of inducing Cam- 
' ' -bodia to take adequate counter measures against-the communist danger* 

- 

B. * MAJOR OPERATING PROBLEMS FACING THE UNITED STATES 



■ J 



■■»—■■' * •* ■-> 



■ 

15. Cambodian Neutrality* In view of the Cambodian definition 
of neutrality as requiring oscillation to the right and the left in order to 
, balance international pressures and influences, we expect some Carnkodian 
actions to be contrary to our interests, and some to be favorable to us* 
Thus Sihanouk's reaction to his visit in the U* S* may presage at least a 
brief period mora favorable to the U* S* ' 



* 



- 






i 






• • * 

Status of IT* S» Actions* The U. S» is continuing it;! assist- 

ance programs as long as Cambodia demonstrates a will to maintain its 

independence. U* S« influence continues to be discreetly applied in the 

.hope that the Cambodian Government will be more receptive of U e So views* 



♦ 



16* Relations vrVh Viet-Nam and Thailand* Cambodia's dispute 



s 



*• • *-.■ * nHH ' 



■ *--r. 



with its neighbors are a m\ior obstacle to regional cooperation- deter the 
focussing; of Cambodian atceation on communist dangers, and inhibit the 
favorable exercise of U* S« influence in Cambodiabecau.sc of the identi- 
fication of Viet-Nam and Thailand as U S« allies,, 



- 

i 
i 



; ' Status of U ? B 9 A c tion s : We continue to urge settlement. of , 

these disputes through p££.e*ttdl negotiations, but have avoided involvement 
as mediator because of the risk of alienating one side or the other and our 
doubt that any of the parties genuinely desire a settlement other than on 
its own terms. 



17* Subversion* The Cambodian Government is handicapped in 



..*.<-V>4- 



dealing with the problem of subversion by its over-confident belief that 



' 



1182 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13326, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






* « 



i ■ 



.SECRET . 



i- 






I 






it is aware of the existing dangers arid can cope with them* A danger 
exists that by expanding its contacts with Communist China and Communist 
North Viet-Narn it will permit subversion o specially of the Vietnamese and 
Chinese communities to a point beyond its control* 

* 

Stat vis of U« S e Actions: Advantage is taken of whatever 
skepticism Sihanouk may have regarding the assurances he. received from 
Chinee e Communist leaders. Efforts are being continued to try to bring 
about an improvement h\ the preponderantly pro-communist press and to 

implement the police program* ." . 

* ■ 

■ 

18. Reduction, of Informational Outlets. During the five-month 
period preceding Prince. Sihanouk's recent visit to the United States! place- 
ment of USIS preo3 material and other non^USIS originated material which 
supported U. S* interests dropped char ply while press usage of prp-»Commu*» 
hist material increased correspondingly. The decline in the usage of U« S, 
material won Caused by the Ministry of Information's prejudicial treatment 
of the U. S* in its official press service* by government;, 1 closure of 
several newspapers which had' formerly been receptive to USIS approaches 
and by the refusal of others to accept USIS output, hi view of the apparent coin 
munis t influence in the Ministry of Information, USIS activities in other medio 
could be seriously affected by one- sided administration of the government 1 ? 
recently promulgated, communique on propaganda, activities 



■■* 



3« 



Status of II* S. Actions: Special efforts have been made, with 
.come success, to persuade the Cambodian Government, particularly the 
Ministry of Information, to apply restrictions upon ideological propaganda 
equally to pro -communist and free world information activities* Since 
Prince .Sihanouk's visit to the United State b 9 the Ministry of Information has 
taken steps to decrease pro-communist propaganda. VThether or not this 
represents a permanent change in emphasis remains to bo seen* 



4 






* 






.■ \ : . 



• ' 



• 



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*1 

X •£. V C 



. . SECRET' 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



/ 



V * • 



rvrri 






secre/j: 



- 



IV. EAOS 



A. SUMMARY -evaluation ' -'.-.■. 

- 

I 

19, Recent developments related particularly to the U, So course 
of action to strengthen the determination of the Royal Government to resist 
subversion and to maintain i^ s independence. The Phoui Sananikone 
Government, by announcing on October 10 its decision to undertake mone- 
tary reform, faced the first test of its ability to survive with unaccustomed . 
firmness and self- confidence* Subsequently, it foiled an attempt by com- 
munists* neutralists and certain disgruntled. elements of the Rally of the 
Lao People to bring * £ down by a no confidence vote m the National Assembly. 
The government emerged from this first test with increased authority and 
in a stronger position to proceed with the establishment of genuine non*-- . 
communist political unity and the development of a grass roots organization. 
Its prospects of successfully warding off communist subversion and achieve 
ing stability have improved considerably since the low. point reached in 
the May elections, but genuine non-communist unity has not yet been 



achieved 



i 



\ 



*\ 



B. ' MAJOR .OPERATING PROBLEMS FACING THE UNITED STATES 



»■ Mt J . C« 



■»* fci . ■ * m' 



20* Implementation of Monet: Reform Decision* Maintenance 
of monetary stability in Laos will continue to be a problem of major U, So , 
concern, The exchange of notes and protocol of September 30, 1958, con* 
Stituting agreement on monetary reform,provided for periodic discussions 
between U« S* and Lao representatives to review economic developments 
■ and to consider measures which appear to be necessary to maintain a reali 
tic rate of exchange for the Lao currency* This will involve constant TL S 
vigilance and resistance to inflationary policies and proposals* 



s 



■ Status of U 






qtions: U. S* officials Continue to exercise 



vigilance in order to resist any Lao inflationary policies 









* 



* 



■ 









' 






a ,K 



21, Planning for General Elections: The Lao Government is 

expecting to hold general elections for the National Assembly, probably in 

December 1959* The outcome of the elections may be of crucial importance 

in determining the future international alignment of Laos* particularly hi 

its relations Vvdth the. United State So % ■ ■ "■ . ■ 

* » ■ • * » 

Statu s of U % S« A ctions : V7c are discussing" with the Country- 
Team at Vientiane a ■ Country .Team plan for major U; S. . ■ 

effort to bring about a favorable outcome in the forthcoming general elec- 
tions* The planning and execution of this effort will involve at least State, 
ICA, Defense, VSIA and probably other agencies* " The Errbassy has 



• 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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SECRET 



submitted, a preliminary plan of action, parts o£ which are already being 
carried out, . * 






22, Lao National Army Training* French representatives in Laoc 
ha.vc been reluctant to accept U* S, and British views on the nature of the 
cormrmnict threat in Laos and on the need for training of the Lao National 
Army by qualified persons other than the French, , . 

Status of U 'So Actions: Much progress has been made in 



1% ■ »■> mm 



bringing French policy in Laoc iiito agreement with out own and British 
viows on the nature of the communist threat in Laoc, especially since last 
Mayo Furthermore*" the French have agreed to accept Filipino civilian 
traincro for the Lao ax*my # and ntepo aro being taken to strengthen the PEO 
by the ascigmncat of regular- military officers in civilian clothing. 



• 







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s.-. 



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■1165 



•>, 



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SECRET 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 










' 


+ 
















* 


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♦ 






- 




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wVlII," -VIETNAM. 



V 












•■•' .A. .SUMMARY EVALUATION . . • 

"» * * 32* Developments related particularly to a U* S* course o£ action 

■ « ■' to assist Free Viet»Nam to develop- a strong* stable and constitutional 

government which would* work toward the weakening of the communists in 
both North and South Vi.et-Nam. President Diem remained firmly in control 
despite some political dissatisfaction with his government* As a strongly 
committed anti** communist country, Vict-* Nam displayed a serious concern 
about developments in Laos, Garnbodia's recognition of Communist China/ 
" and the U* S* position in the Taiwan Straits* The communists and dissi~ 

dents continued their campaign of assassinations* especially of officials in 
* rural areas and carried out attacks aimed at disrupting Viet-Nam f s eco~ 
nomic progress* Although the government gave increasing attention to 
' : ;j ', .development of the economy, such development continued to be inhibited by 
almost pre-emptive mllita.ry requirements which utilized a substantial 
» . portion of Viet-Nam f s total resources* including U v S* aid« " At the same 
• time, communist North Viet-Natn continued to exploit for political ahd % ... 

'psychological purposes its own reportedly rapid economic development* 






B » MAJ OR O PERATING PROBLEMS FACING THE UNITED S TATES 

B 

33* Diem'c Internal Political Position; Diem increased his travels 

Increas- 



*r- m — i i' ■■!« * ■ ■■■ 



throughout the country for the purpose of popularising .his regime* 
ing accomplishments of the government in the economic and social fields 
should also have beneficial political results. Nevertheless, the .failure of 
the government to fully rally certain elements of the middle class, the 
intellectuals and former officials to its support, the frustration and rest- 
lessnesG of some of the present officials, and some discontent fax the army- 
are source a of political weakness* This dissatisfaction is caused primarily 
by the author ttarian and pervasive political controls of the Ngo family 
and its associate c 









Status of U. S» Actions: The desirability of liberalizing po 



*•■ 



• litical and ftdniinxstrative controls is brought to the attention of the Vi< * 
names e GoVeiwneftl? when considered appropriate by the U« So. Ambassador^ 
Possible Unas of U«. S, action are greatly limited due" to the extreme sensi-* 
.tivity of. Vietnamese loaders on this subject, 



34, Internal Security It has become increasingly clear that" the 
communist/) , 7xo longer expectant that Free Viet»N&m will fall- to their con- 
trol through peaceful methods, are executing a carefully planned can>paign 
of violence aimed at irn^prmiaing the stability of £he Diem Government* 



1188 



SECRET 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






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SECRET 



Their concentration of activities in rural areas where communications and 
terrain make it difficult for the government to cope with thorn recalls the 
tactics used against the French during the Indochina War, . Assassinations, 
particularly of officials in rural areas, continue at an alarming rate of 
about fifteen to thirty-five a month* Attacks on rubber plantations and 
reported communist plann to break up the land development, land reform and 
. agricultural credit programs indicate deliberate efforts to interfere with 
Viot-Nam'a economic programs. 

■ 

Status of Up S« Actions: After a long period of negotiation, 
President Ngo Dinh Diem has now agreed to place the Civil Guard under the . . 
'Minister of Interior. The Embassy and the Government of Viet-Nam have 
reached an understanding on a program to be presented to Washington for 
(raining arid equipping the Civil Guard to enable it to cope with the situation 
described above* The program, if approved, would be for the training and 
equipping of only about 32, 000 of the Civil Guard and not the total current 
force of 48,000* A major question is whether this situation requires an im- 
provement in the Civil Guard, or whether other existing Vietnamese security 
forces, including the Army, can adequately deal with the situation. This 
question is being discussed by the agencies concerned but agreement Han not 
yet been reached* . 

35 % Economic Development, Economic development, though pro- 
grossing, is still at a rate below that which is politically necessary to enable 
Free Viet~Nam to compete successfully with the communist regime in North 
; Viet-Nam. The rate of development is also below what is politically desir- 
able in order to enable Viet-Nam ultimately to reduce- its heavy dependence 
upon external assistance. This problem is further exacerbated at the present 
time because demands on available resources to meet the communist mill* 
tary and subversive threat are rising. It appears doubtful, therefore, 
whether our political objectives can be achieved to the degree desired, 

Status of U. S* Actions: Means of mobilising additional Vict-* \ 

-^ . — .. — - — - — J _- . — - tl , -. — - — . — - — ~ — _ — _ _ _ - v 






• - 



*8 



name cc resources for development are under study by the Vietnamese 
Government. Defense support aid available for economic; development wa 
reduced by $40 million in FY 1958 and further reduced by $ 1 5-20 million in 
FY 1959* Vietnamese access to the Development Loan Fund {which is 
expected as soon as project engineering studies are complete) may offset • 
.the FY, .1959 reduction but will probably not bring total aid available for 
development back. to. the FY 1957 level. 



SECRET 



1161. ' 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 633 16, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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SECRET 



.- ; "■- " The Embassy has been a'oked to reexamine Vietnam's 
military and civilian budgets for CY 1959 to determine what items, if 
aiiy i ' might be postponed for funding until late U 6 S*. FY 1959 when addi- ; 
tional resources might bocomo available!? or, in view of the lag between 
the calendar and fiscal years* until U* *S* FY I960 when they might be 
♦considered t&i- priority financing from FY I960 aid funded .This review 
enabled come reduction isx the 1959 military budget* but itio ctlll $3 million 
highoi 1 than the 1958 budget* \ 



.'. 



NOTE: The following NIEs are applicable to Southeast Asia: 

' NIE 64*58* The Federation of Malaya, Jan. 14, 1958 
NIE 62*58* Tha0and, Aug. 19, 1958, 

NIE 63»56^ Probable Developments in North and South Viet^Nam 
. ..' : Through Mid-1957, July IV, : 1956 4 ^ / 

• '" NIE 63; 2-57 # "' The Prospects for North Vict-Nam, May 14, 1957."^ 
Nil:- 6l*'£>6j, Probable Developments in Burma* Api'il 10, 1956 e 
SNIE 100«*12*58j Probable Developments, in the Taiwan Str'a'it 
• ' \ . Crisis, October 28, 1958 ," . •. " | 

. ' NIE I3t»2*57i Communist China 1 © Role in Non-Coninvdnict ' 

" \ Asia* December 3 f . 1957 e " 

\i . « 

'••■.•■ \. ■ . ■ ■ ■ . . ■ • • • 

, :• \ ' ' ' ■ ■ ■ ■ 

Attachments: 



i 






\ 



Annex A * Additional Major Developments* 

Anne;: B *• CIA Intelligence Annex, dated December JO/ 195& 

Financial Annex &ad Pipeline Analyses* 



* . 



* 



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JL, »••- ■_# *— 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






>:. 






.'*'"'■. ANNEX B 

• '■.-■, ■■'■ ' ' "" * December 18, 1958 

SINO-SQVIET BLOC ACTIVITIES IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA 

Sino-Soviet Bloc Activities in Mainland Southeast Asia* (Prepared by 
CIA without interagency coordination as an Informed. document for use 
- by the OCB Working Group and as background for the information of 

y the^-OCB and the NSC) - 









* * ,* 





. 


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: * 40. General Bloc Policy: The Sino-Soviet bloc is actively working to 
encourage neutx'&Hsm in Southeast Asiai- to destroy the Southeast Asia Treaty- 
Organization/ and to encourage the creation of a group of independent* ' ^ [ 

nationalist anti-Western entities which might ultimately come under close 
;ino- Soviet, influence. • 



SECRET : ! * : 

1 ; i ■ o, . , • ,- i r 



I 



41. Bloc policy has been flexible and opportunistic, adjusting itself to 
the degree of anti- communism evident in each state* Peiping and Moscow 
have avoided pressing too urgently and have sought to influence by example 
the states in which conditions have been most favorable to them* Thus in . \ 

.Cambodia and in. Burma" -at least up to the change in governments who re ! 

bloc activity has been most pronounced, Moscow and Peiping have attempted 
to be circumspect and have tried to fulfill economic aid agreements smoothly 
and satisfactorily. • ■ - ■ , : - 






i 



42. Communist China and the USSR for the most part appear to have _ ' 

reserved a judgment for the present on developments potentially adverse to 
them in Burma ; Laos, and Malaya, The bloc continues to stand on -a pro** . 
jessed plank of noninterference in the irate rnal affairs of other states embodied 
in the "Five Principles" enunciated by Chou En-lai and Nehru in 1954* Chou - ; 

• repeated his^advice" to Cambodia's Chinese to "refrain from taking part ni.- 
'.political activities" during the August visit of Cambodia's Prinze Sihanouk ' \ . I 

to Peiping* « .; m , 



— 

! 



43. -The immediate aim of local Communist parties is two~fold»*>to 
•achieve legality and eventually to turn their governments* policies into neu- 

1 trali st channels* The USSR and Communist China complement that aim by i 

! discreet ancl frequent offers of "disinterested" economic aid and wider . .. 

cultural relations. . . ; 

m # * B 

i , 

44. Diplomatic Acti vity, Repeated bloc initiatives to expand diplomatic 
representation met with success in Cambodia but not in Laos. Cambodia, : . ' 
which already has resident missions from the USSR and Czechoslovakia, " . 
recognised Communist China in July and ambassadors have been exchanged* 
This is a significant diplomatic victory for Peiping in Southeast Asia and \ ill 
considerably raise Communist China's prestige among the Overseas Chinese ' ■ ■ 

- ,.' In the area, Malayan Prime Minister Abdul Rahman continues his policy of* * 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 201 1 






SECRET 



. * 






■ 



Refusing any formal relations with the bloc until the ten year Communist 
rebellion in Malaya is ended, 4 

■ 

■ ' 45. Burma has the broadest bloc representation* having relations with 
the USSR, Communist China* Poland, Chechoslovakia, Rumania, and 

Mongolia* In Thailand only the USSR maintains a mission whiph, with come 
60 officials, is considerably overstaffed in terms of the work at hand. Except 
for some 25 Polish officials on the international Control Commission^ there 

a-eno-bloc officials in South Viet- Nam* 

■ -46r Eco nomic A ctivity: Malaya, with its large Chinese population, has . 
>een a focal point of Communist China's commercial drive in Southeast Asia* . 

Peiping is competing with Japan and Kong Kong and has intensified its trade 

promotion activities in Singapore since April* A wide variety of new Chinese, 

*onim6dities are appearing at prices slashed 10*>20 percent below those of 

normal suppliers. The "effectiveness of this campaign is reflected in a 40 
■ "••••• > 

Percent risp pi the value of Chinese Communist goods imported during the 
irst seve,n' months of 1958 over the comparable period in 1957* Malaya's tot 
.exports to the bloc from December 1957 through May 1958 were about 
$43 million* Compared with the first half of 1957, exports to the bloc as a 
vholc increased during the December -May period by .42 percent and imports 
declined 5 percent*- Communist China was once again the principal bloc 
purchaser, :The marked increase in exports was caused by a doubling of 
-ubber exports to 75, 800 long tons — 15 percent of Malaya's total rubber 

sports in the first half of 1958 c . ' • 

* . ■ 

* 

47* China's drive for economic influence in Malay a, may* however, be | 
jeopardized by recent Peiping threats of trade sanctions against Malaya and 
Singapore in retaliation for anti-Peiping moves by the Federation govern v 
ment. Even if trade is only temporarily affected* Peiping f s actions. have 
caused sharply critical comment in -the Federation and have bolstered the, 
alliance government's determination to curtail Chinese Communist economic 
activities* •.-,.." 



. 48,' Cambodia made its first import allocations in April under trade 
agreements with the USSR;, Czechoslovakia and Communist China. The value 
of export licenses issued was much lower than the level set for imports* 
However, the allocations totaled about $2, 600, 000 and, if actually used, 
would raise imports from the bloc in 1958 to at least 10 percent of Cambodians 
planned imports, exclusive of those under aid programs^ 

- • ■ t 

49» The level of bloc trade with Thailand continues to be less than one 

■ 

percent of total trade because of the relatively satisfactory economic con*» 
ditions in Thailand, its pro-wost alignment* and extensive American aid*, ■ 
Thailand refused Soviet formal trade overtures in March, but did lift its 



■ 



■■ 



i * 






> . 
I' 



! 



3 



i 
*• 



1 • 



i 

i 



■ 

■ 



!f 



* • ..i 



- 

' J. * 

A' 



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- 






■ 



SECRET 



*<■ *•- -i 



\ 11 ?G 



•». 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



1 1 



s 



..■:.'■••" .:. SECRET 

\ 

embargo on rubber exports to Communist China and North Korea on 22 

August* An undetermined amount of illegal trade with Chinese Communist 

is transacted through Hong Kong* Burmese trade with the bloc continues to 

* ' decline, and rice commitments to the bloc in 1958 have been cut back to " ; 

40, 000 tons. Total trade declined in 1957 to $57, 500, 000 or 11 percent of 
. Burma 1 o foreign trade* Bloc trade with Laos and South Viet^Nam remains 
negligible* 



* ♦ 






» . 



50, In the field of economic aid, bloc activities are concentrated on 

• Burma and Cambodia, Cambodia is now in the second phase of a £22, 400,000 
Chinese Communist grant-in-aid program, which appears to be proceeding 
smoothly. Phriom Penh has completed plans for various social and economic 
projects and sites have been selected for the four plywood, cement! paper, 
and textile factories that form the core of the program* At the end of 
Sihanouk's Peiping visit, Cambodia accepted an additional grant of 

. $5, 600,000 and Peiping offered to expand the program to include construction 

• of small iron and steel works and surveys of underground fuel resources. 

In addition, a Cambodian economic delegation headed by the economic planning! 

• counselor sent to the USSR completed preliminary economic and technical aid 
talks in September,, Construction is now underway on the Soviet "gift 11 
hospital in Plmom Penh and Cambodia has included in its 1958 import plan 
$1-, 000, 000 worth of aid«financed goods to raise funds to defray local costs* 

* 

* > 

51. Bloc countries, principally the USSR, have extended an estimated 
$41, 600, 000 in loans to Burma* Implementation of Soviet "gift 11 projects 
appears to be progressing satisfactorily and construction has begun on the 
technological institute in Rangoon, a ploy/ factory, and irrigation projects* 
Two Soviet loans totaling approximately $8, 500, 000 were announced in early 
1958 but have not yet been implemented. Communist China completed ex- 



pansion of a (-oven, acnt -owned textile factory during the first half of 1958 



■; 



52. There we: ^ approximately 140 bloc technicians in Burma in the first, 
half of 1958 and the number of Soviet technicians will undoubtedly increase 
markedly as work on the Rangoon Technological Institute progresses* In 
Cambodia there w.era about 30 bloc technicians, mostly from Communist 
China; additional Soviet Chinese technicians are expected* (Note: There 
are current unconfirmed reports that the Ne Win Government intends to . 
cancel bloc technicians 1 contracts but no action has so far been taken, ) 



i 



■ 

r 

I 



• • ■ 

- 
■ 
r . 



r ;<" 



! ■ 



■ 



- 



-■ 
t,\ 

r 

i 






53* Cultural and Propaganda Activity: The bloc shift to winter schedules 
brought an increase in weekly broadcast output in native languages from 79 
to 93 hours. Bloc cervices in Burmese rose from 10, 5 to 17, 5 hours, and 
Peiping increased its Cambodian service from 7 to 10 a 5 hours weekly. There 
,vac a slight increase in total Vietnamese weekly output. In addition Moscow 
raised its English language broadcasts to South and Southeast Asia from 
17c 5 to 19* 75 hours weekly* . ■ " ■ * . 

: * .■ - 1 1\? -i ■ - ■ - 

SECRET ■ 



i 



•*• 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



.-.-•■- 

* 

« 

54 6 Bloc propaganda activities have been especially marked in Cam*v - 
bodia> where Communist China, the USSR, and North Vict«Nam have all made 
rapid progress in the film field* During the first nine, months of 1958 over 
Soviet films appeared as compared with a total of 15 to ?-0 during all 0:? 
1957, A number of Chinese technicians have arrived in Phnom Penh to 
install the 20 kw radio transmitter presented to Sihanouk last year* The bloc's 
propaganda efforts within Cambodia have been aimed primarily at youth 
through the educational system, and Soviet diplomatic personnel have con- 
tinued to make aggressive efforts along this line. 



& 



rnde r N LK Z- p r e s ur o 



59*. Reaction t o Blo c Activities? Generally speaking, tjie government 
if -the area are preoccupied with and somewhat fearful about resurgent 

a. m 



cs 



-4 * m. - ■ 

■ m ft 1 f fc* ■ * 






V 



55, Subver sive Ac tivity,- Bloc officials' in the area have usually con- 
centrated on developing correct cordial relations with constituted authorities. 

-, Covert contacts, however, are maintained through embassies and through 
Chinese. Cornmunist-contr oiled banks in places such r.s Burma and Singapore, 

' .The banks provide legitimate financial support to pro-Peiping a.dho rents and 
are also a means of psychological and economic pressure on the population, 

^ * - * 

56.* Communist China exploits extensively pro-Peiping elements within 

'Overseas Chinese communities throughout the area- These groups are 

culturally to a large extent resident aliens regardless of formal citizenship ! 

and they are drawn toward the ''homeland 11 regardless of politics, ■ "' " i , 

s 

57-o In. Thailand,' South Vict-Nam, Malaya, and Singapore the Communist 
parties are outlawed and far the most part fragmented* Although ciid may 
^nve.been given from time to time to insurrectionary force s r both the bloc ■ 
. ad local Communists generally would prefer legality to continued illegal ■ r . 

* ' and guerrilla activity* Bloc subversive efforts have been aimed primarily 

it stimulating existing discontent among non-'Communists* ' ['■ 

. . t 

* i. • * f 

5S. The developing political situation-in Laos, where the Communist 
dominated Nco Lao Hak Zat (NLHZ) v/on 13 of the 21 assembly seats up for [V 

election last May* has shown the Communists to be successful in using legal j 

c 

md semi "legal tactics c The victory, was made possible by superior NLHZ 
j;rass roots organization and by lack of unity among hon« communist elements 
who won a majority of the popular vote but dissipated this advantage by 
running too many candidates* . The NLHZ appears to be making strong gain 
In almost every sector of Laotian society including a swell of pro -NLHZ 
sentiment among Laos 1 13, 000 Buddhist monks who have some influence o/er 
- /illage opinion*' The NLHZ alco appears to be making some headway in * \. 

' penetrating the army and eroding government authority in the province G* 
Some locally elected officials in rural areas are reported to be resigning 



1. 

1 






1 , 

i 

. 

i 

i 



1 
t 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 






»\ - 



. * 



SECRET' . 



V 



Communist China 1 s rapid rise from n semicolonial M status to economic and 
military stature as a great power. There is also a great deal of respect for ^ 
China's cconomk achievement* Local opinion tends to separate the Russians 
as outlanders* and except for localised incidents* the pattern of Soviet 
activity does ntil evoke a cencc of thread comparable to that of fcommunist. 

China 9 ■ ' . * - . • 

* 

„-■■ 1 - * " » ■ W 

60. Some resentment against Communist China has been evidenced in 
"Burma over the protradted' Chinese border dispute and in Burma and Malaya 

over bloc efforts oii behalf of opposition parlies or dissidents. Singapore * 
and Malaya both have been irritated by Russian tin dumping on the world 
market and by Chinese Communist textile dumping. On 1 October Singapore 

and- Malaya restricted imports of Chinese textiles. ■ '* 

m * 

■ 

* - » ■ 

61. Outlook: . The Sino»Soviet bloc's fluid and opportunistic approach 

; "\vxtbiri the framework of a policy of developing wider contacts and relations 
on all levels with the nations of the area, will probably continue. The 
development of sentiment that is initially neutralist^ independent, and v 

nationalist v/ill remain the general bloc aim. Communist China and the USSPv 
will probably bend every effort to developing a smooth implementation of the 
economic relationship with Cambodia as a demonstration of what neutrality 
.can brings Normalisation of relations with Communist China should lead 
to an increase in Communist activity in Cambodia. At no time in recent ■■. 
JLao history has the government been more pro-Free World in its foreign 
policy. Nonetheless* Communist influence is still increasing domestically 
although at a somewhat slower rate. The bloc is likely to make little progress 
in South Viet- Nam unless political unrest should! develop. and disturb the 
tenure of President Diem. President Diem is now anticipating a .sharp up- 
surge in- Communist guerrilla, activity and terrorism in South Viet^Nam. 
Thailand and Malaya will probably continue to pursue policies of minimal. * 
relations wita the bloc, although in the former there are a few indications "of 
a softcninn toward the bloc. The trend toward the left in Burma has been 
abruptly terminated by the accession of General Ko Win and for the dura/don 
o£ his premiership^ Communist influence should diminish* Communist 

. China's economic offensive in Malaya and its appeal to" the targe Chinese 
minority thcre«~38 percent of the population—wllX probably result ixi an 
increase of unofficial Chinese Communist influence© 






-- 



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.^CV **'* 



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"i 173 



■-. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i 



■ *> 



FINANCIAL ANNEX TO R&PCKT :.K ~< J.XH.EAST.ASIA 

(In millions of dollars over $5 million. Up to 
&5 million shovm in nearest tenth million.) 

BURMA ' • . . 

8CPEHDITUH2S AND DELIVERIES - CERTAIN It, 'S. ACTIVITIES 

" M WW 



Activity 



■ i--"* 



Militar y Assi stance (c QC . footnotes £,/ andb/) 



a.. 



-. - .- 



-'• 









Economic Assistance 



^ Through ^ s *' # 
1957 l fSm To to: 







* ■ 



! Technical Assistance 



Information Services 



r- 



Educatioiial Bcchange 



-* *■ ■■'—" 



Total 






HAP SalGsofl-Iilitary Equipment & Services 



M AP Offshor e Pro cigeirient Payments (Defense expen- 
ditures entering into int*! balance of payments.) 
Other U.S. Govt. Pa^raents (affecting int ! l bal. 
of payments -.mil, & civ. pay, construction, pro- 
curement of U.S. mil* supplies & equipment.) 



LOANS' 



*«"iy*> k tat**** ****** 



1.1 



..4.6. 

1.5$ 






.,005 



.1 



• •i ........ 



0.3 



Totol 



•* i ■ +• ■ ■ a *«.*** - - ■ * IM| 



;3 



FY 1 9 59 
(Est. as J 

of 11/51 



10.2 



*4 ■«*••■ 



0.8 






0.3 



* - 



A..^?.X... 

i. si 

■ + !•■•■ !*•■*■■ *■ I I ■ - ** 



.001 



« *■* 



id; o 



i«*."j-.» 



0.9 



. .57 



......... . .-« 



Z9.67 



NA 



.2 



1— 


During Period 5/31/58 to 10/31/58 


As of 10/31/50 


LOANS Bt 
I 


Disbursements 


Repayments 


Kew Loans 
Author:! zed 


Undisbursed 
Commitments 


Outstanding 
Debt . ! 


1 

IBRD 


< 

1,0 




* 

| 


12.4 


*9.4 


EX-IM BANK 


•1 


»» 




■ J ■■ ■ J ■ ■ 1 ■ — ■ * * 


. — , — . . . , ..,,. 





PUBLIC LAW 480 AGREEMENTS 



• Date 



_ ■ ■' ii % - »-.»» 



Title 



5/27/ 5i 



I 



Amount 



18. 0'^ 



* 

\ 



Est. 55 Dels. 



100% 



\ 



\ 



— b li i 1 

IT* 



Major 
Commodities 



cotton 






Use of Local Currency 
or Other Comment 



Ur Eco.DeVo 

Uses Loan 



Petals 



3.55 



►- 



14.45 



18.0 






v^lnclucles $i 8 .loan agree*- 



ment av/aitm£ signature 



t/ 



l 



All Notes and Comments relating to the above figures are shovm on a separate page. 



ii7ii 






, a 






i 
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I 



I 



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A 



■ e 

X- 

•r 

i 



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■ 

* 

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 













.- 






* • 




* 


•■ ■ 








. 


■? * 






• 


* 


• 


i 


B * 


* 


. 


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. 








■ 

• 

■ 




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» • 



•; .- 



SECRET 



" ■ : ' BURMA ' •■■- * 

.. PIPELINE ANALYSIS, MUTUAL SKCURITY.:J?ROGRA.M 
. . v - - ' (In Millions of Dollars) 






Military Assistance *— — 
;/ Prior to 1957 
FY. 1957 
■ FY 1950 ' ■'.'*' 

FY 1959 (est*)' V *, 



Programs 



■ 






I 



£ 



2.0 



. .20, 



Deliveries 
2.0 



Carryover 



• 



10.2 



20. 
9.8 






• » 



Economic Assistance 



-.->*. 



t* 



Prior to FY 1957 
• .-FY 1957 

FY 1958 , . . 
FY 1959 (cot.) ■ 



Obligation £ 


- 



24.2 
8.8 



Kxp enclitu re s 



.0 

.3 

18.0 



Carryover 




23.9 
14.7 






■-' ' 



a/ Includes value o£ all grant military assistance, whether programmed 
on a country or non~country basis f with the exception of the value of * 
excess stocks and cost-sharing prog rains, (In the MAP programming 
process^ country programs include such items as materiel and equip- 
mentj training and dollar costs of consumables a?id construction,, Non« 
country programs include items such as packing, crating » handling 
and transportation: spare parts; cost of rehabilitating excess stoclc$j 
and advanced weapons )* * . 



and 



b/ Excludes $1.3 million programmed/ delivered £r ossj stocks excess to 
"~^U* S^S^rvice or other MAP requirements prior to FY &9$7« 



■ • 



f*3 






*- 



*.' 



£ 



•fl 






s 



:■: 



SECRET 



117-5 



€. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



-v. 



■■»'. 






'I 












► ». 



•*" 



« ,-•-* 



'. FINANCIAL ANNEX TO ? SFDS'T ?iT Z Z -JTHEAST A»TIA 

(In millions of dollars over $5 million. Up to 

$5 -million phovrn in nearest tenth million.) 

:" CAMBO.OIA 

■ EXPENDITURES AND DELIVERIES - CEKTAIlTOr^TTCTlVITIES 



■ 



• ---~ 






* 



• 

I 

Activity 

. . » 


1 9 57 


ra 1 9 


(58 


FT 1959 
(Est. as 


Kst. 
Through 

ISbt'M. 


Est. 

Total 


HJMtary Assistance p M fiv^^i*/ *nrl h/) 

■ 
* » ■ 

• * 

Economic Assistance 

■ 

■ ■ 

Technical ' Assistance " 

• 

Information Services 

, ,...., ~ — *— — 

• 
Educational Ex change •" . * / ' 

• . - r ♦ - • • . - -. 
\ .-...• "\ . •■ • ' '• . • ■ ■ .Total 


21,4 


' 


V.6 


6.0 


40.1 

••.■■..■■■•■a n| 

m 

1.0 




37.3 


27.5 

. • ' 

2.0 

■ 0. 8 


1.9 
0.9 

■ 

.25 

4? J *> s 


1.0 
.19 

• 


'0,5 


■ » + 

3 


■ .34 


... 3$.^ 

p 


- 

* ■ 

MP Sales of Military Equipment & Services 


i 

■4 


• 


•# 


* •- 


MAP Offshore Procurement Payments (Defense expen- 


• 


* ■ 

■ > 


* * 
+ 


■ ■ 


ditures entering into. int'l balance of payments.) 


Otl U.S. Govt/ Payments (affecting int'l bal. 
of payments - mil. & civ. pay, con,- tract ion, pro- 
curement of U.S. mil. supplies L equipment, ) ©/ 


■ M/.. 


NA 

* 


KA ■ ; 





LOANS 



LOAtIS BI 



IDRD 



ex-im mm 

DLF 



During Period 



to 



Disbursements 



Repayments 



New Loans 
Authorized 



• •*-< 






As of 



Undisbursed 
Commitment 



s 



Outstandi: 
Debt 



PUBLIC LAW 400 AGREEMENTS 



■ i 



- * 



Date 



F y 59* 



Title 



i ii ^ * ■>■ ■ ■ » 



Amount 



1» 1 eot. 



\ 



\ 



V 



•^4- r/ 



Est. % Dels. 



to be de- 
termined. 



Major 
Co rqniodi tie 

tobacco" 



s 



Use of Local Currency 
or Other CoJflmerit 



In process of negotiation 



All Notes and Comments relating to the above- figures are shoim on a separate page 

I . L '" J t « 

► » . . . \. . 

\ . 11 7 & . . caoast 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



•»».- 



♦ - _ .. 



• * 
1 



*• . 



- •..# 



* . +f *%•* 



• * •*-- .». 



■ 









•M "-. 






• . '-. 



'.*.-: ■ ' : , CAMBODIA 

PIPELINE ANALYSIS, MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM ■ 

(2ii rmlUcnrs of dollars) • . • 



1 _•_ 

4 i ■ 



*.**" . 



*•■■ ' . ; *'/ b/ 

Military Assistance £:' £-' 

Priov to 195V , • 

FY 1957 ' * V 

FY, 1958 

FY 1959 (oet s ) 



Progyctmo 

50. 4 

8.1 

6.2 

12.0 



Doliveric 



s 



*m * ,-^ 



24,9 

21.4 

.7.6 

6.0 



Carryover 

2 r 5.5 

12.2 

10.8 
16,8 






- - 
■ 






' 



Economic Assistance 



■ii», i-<--."~' 



Prior to 1957 

FY 1957 

FY 1953 

FY 1959 (est*) ■ 

Technical Assistance 



; Prior to 1957 

FY 1957 
■FY 1950 

FY X 9 59 (est;) 



• . 



.- •_- * 



Obligation o 
8L t 
32,5 

25,9 

22.5 



1.9 
2.0 
2.1 
2.2 



--„--. 



Expenditure? 
40*0*" ~ 
. 40, 1 
37.3 
27,5 



0.4- 
1.0 

1.9. 
2.0 




1.5 
2.5 
2.7 
2.9 



•-■ 



a/ Includes value of all grant military assistance, whether programmed on a 
country or non-country basis, with the exception of the value of excess 
stocks and cost- charing programs* (In the MAP programming process, 
country programs include such items as materiel and equipment^ training"' 
and dollar costs of consumables and construction? Non- country programs 
inclu/ ■'-■ items such as packing, crating, -handling and transportation; spare? 
.parts; cost of. rehabilitating excess stocks; and advanced weapons}** 



ther MAP 



b/ Excludes $0.o 1 million from stocks excess to U* S« Service or o 

requirements for FY 1950-59; of which $7*4- million is estimated to he 
• delivered by the end of FY 1959* 

c/ Information hot available except for Indochina (Associated States, 
Gambodia* Laos and Viet- Nam) reported as §19* 3 million in. FY 1957, 
* $Z m mfiUott in FY 1953 and' $l Y milUon in FY 1959. ' 






/ 






: 



\ 



RRr.T?F.T 






■. ■ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63310. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



'•6 



FINANCIAL AHMEX TO JB&PORT OK COUTH EAST ASIA 
(In millions of dollars over $5 million. Up to 
$5 million ghovm in nearest tenth million, ) 

LAOS 

EXPENDITURES AMD DELIVERIES - CERTAIN !s.> S* ACTIVITIES 



Activity 



FY 
1957 



Mi litary Assista nce £ M footnote o a/ and b/J 



-' : " ' 



Economic Assistance 



Technical * Assistance . 

■f ■ - I- ~ ■ ■ ■ ■— ■ !■!■ ■ I- . ~ " fc " !■*»■■■■■* 

Information Services 



Educational Exchange 



Total 



M AP Sales o f Military Eq uipment fc Service 



s 



MAP O ffs hore P rocu rement Pa yments (Defense expen- 
ditures entering into intVl balance of payments.) 
Other U.S. Govt . Payments (affecting int'X bal. 
of payments ~ mil. & civ. pay, construction, pro- 
curement of U f S. rail, supplies & equipment, ) $J 



4 3 



47 t r 

* 

0.6 



■ ■■•*■■*»■»■• + ■*■■-•#*•» 



...». ■---** 



♦ 058 



FT 195$ 



Est. 

Through 

i.Q/.5.CL 



•^■••4*ri«»>ii»«tii» 



0.2 



V 
-<** 



Est. 
Total 



4.6 



FX 1 S 59 

(Est. as 
of...ll./i>3 






35,0 



iltill'tii ■,*■«■»■#«< 



1.2 

i » i -• t » i 

0.5 



5/-. 









NA 



it Urn r -' ■■«■■■■■ 



0.2 



...... •.*.-. .4«<>... 



■ .070 
■4i;S7C 



.21, 9 



1.6 



0.7 



■*».#. 'rP--l'l»«l 



NA 



.093 






NA 



v. 



LOAMS 



LOANS El* 


During Period to 


As of 


« Disbursement 


Repayments 


New Loans 
Authorized 


Undisbursed 
Commitments 


Outstanding 
Debt 


IBRD . 

EX-BI BANK 
DLF 


- 


- 


R 


* 

1 

<■■■•+■• n « »>>* • 1 1 ■■•#+ •*»■*'■■* ** P ■##■■■*#» 


* 


• . v 


1 

■ 


■ 









PUBLIC LAW 480 AGREEMENTS 



X 



Date ■ 


Title 


Amount 


Rst.^Dsls. 

m 


Major | 
Commodities 


Use of Local Currency 
or Other Comment 


■ 


■1 

< 


- . v • 
. V 


* 


* 


■ 

• 

* 

* 


• 


• 


* 


• 




* 

■ 


■ » 




« ■ 


- 

* ■ 

\ 


• 


i 
• 

■ 

1 



All Notes and Comments relating to the above figures arc shovm on a separate page, 

.-•■■11 7 R - • 

• ■■•■■ • XJ.IO. _ . SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



■ . ■■ 









• 



SECRET 



v .- • '.'• .. • ;• laos ' ..:-•■-.. - 

• PIPELINE ANALYSIS, MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM 
..... .- ' '•■ • . (In Millions, of. Dollars) 



Military As ci stance^ 
Priett to FY 1957 "~ 
FY 1957 > 
FY 1958 ' ■ 

FY 1959 (cot.) 



a/ b/ 



ProfiTct.mn 
""33." 

7.4 
9.3 

10.3 



Deliveries 



•»**•■■*- 



20,4 
4.3 
4.6 
6.4 



Carryover 
4* 6 
7 # 7 
12.4 
16.3 



\ 



«-■ 



■ 






Economic Assistance 



■ ■■ m . .*—*+• 



ryw < - v ni>'^ v 



Prior to FY 1957 
FY 1957 ■' • 

FY 1958 . • 
FY 1959 (est.) 

Technical As si stance 

PricTr to FY '195? 

FY 1957 

FY 1958 

FY 1959 (est.) 



Obligations 



88.5 

42.9 

29.7 
20.0 



1,0 
1.5 
1,5 
1.7 



EicpcncUtures Carryover 



64. 6 


23. 7 


47. 1 

• * 


19.5 


35. ' 


14.2 


' -21. 9 


12*3 ; 


0,4 


* 

0. 6 


0*8 


i, y - 


1;? 


.- 1*6 


1. 6 


M 



a/ Includes value of all grant military assistance, whether programmed on 
a country or non-country basis, with the exception of the value of excess 
stocks and cost-sharing programs, (hi the MAP programming process, 
country programs include such items as materiel and equipment, training ■ 
and dollar costs of consumables and construction. Non-country programs 
include items such as packing, crating, handling and transportation! spare 
parts; cost of Rehabilitating excess stocks; and advanced weapons* ) 

b/ Excludes $11*8 million programmed from stocks excess to TJ« So 

*~ Service or other MAP requirements for FY 1950-59; of which $11* t million 

is estimated to be delivered by the end of FY 1959*. * j 

* ■ 

* 

c/ Information not available except for Indochina (Associated States, 
Cambodia, Laos and Yiet-Nam) reported as $19- 3 million in FY 1957, 
.$2 A '0 million in FY 1958 and $J, 7 million in FY 1959 f - 






. « 



i 



•■ 



* «# 



SECRET 



■ ■ 



-". s 



\ >'* 7 Q 



i 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



.■ 



■ .-. . 



--.< 



• -■■■'"..' 



* 



seo,:.:-5'j: 



•••-* 



m 



* ' 



' FINANCIAL ANNEX TO REPORT CM r/OUTHEACT^AETA . 

(In millions of dollars over §5 million. Up to * : 

."" " $5 million shown in nearest tenth million;) 
* .. MALAYA AND SINGAPORE ■ 



*. • 



•• i 



?xi:^ 



«**• "»«? ^#i#**«* ■•"-* > -■*■ + 



EXPENDITURES AK r D DELIVERIES - CERTAIN 0. S, ACTIVITIES 



Activity 



»•-* 



FT 
1S57 



M Q i tzxTv Ass is tanco 



1 



Economic Assistance . 



4 



Tech nical Assista nce 

( Malaya 
Informati on Serv ices ( Singapore 

• . "-«*■- ( MaUtya 

Educate ona Excha nge / 

: — ■ ^- ( Singapore 



Total' 



KAP Sales of Mil itary EquJ pment &. Services 



MA P Offshore Procu remen t Pa yments - (Do fens e expen- 
ditures entering into int ! i balance of payments.) 
Ot her" P . S .Govt. Payments (affecting int f l bal. 
of payments - nil. & civ. pay ; construction, pro- 
cur client of U.S. nil. supplies & equipment.) 



# & 



c * 



.22 

Via*** ■■•■ I Jfc ■ * i. i 

0. 02 



FY 



T95F 



Est. 



Est. 

Total 



F2T1959 
(Est. as 

ofli/M 



• Incl 5d i s Eing ap o re. 
LOANS 

■ :- •■ \ . ■ : ; 

1 During Period 5/ 31/ 53 to 10/31/5 









0. 


i 


..A 


i 


* 


* 


■ 




0. 


2 





*f**|. + »..*• ft It. 4* + *fe I I 



0.4 



.17 

:.079 






0.4 
0,2 



.23' 

*-069 

0.899 



i.i^.*!,,,.,, , 



•....<,...• . 



.._■■ r-« ■*#*■ 



. ■ •> i * ri * * ft I - 



LOANS BY 



IBRD 



. 



■EX-IM BANK 
Sj "->..'* (i/ alayb.) 



A 

O 



Disbursement 



s 



\ 






..x 






Repayments 






New Loans 
Authorized 



35. S 






1 o, *** 






As of 10/31/50 



Undisbursed 
Commi tments 



35, 



Outs tana ing 
Debt 



■ : ■ y* 

35. 6 * 



#*#"'0r Jjo, I larr; trait - early July, 
PUBLIC LAW 480 AGREEMENTS 



Dat 



»** 



Title 



Amount 



Est. % Dels, 



rfft.-.^- .«-..-.. * 



I aft «t MflV>B 'f'jU.—lfcr-. 



Major 
Commodities 



■*«♦*— ***»»*K-»^ y ' ■ !' ■ * i 



Use of Local Currency 
or Other Comment 



■ 



%i 1 1 ^1 1 % ji i ji.i ..^ 



■ ^. - ^ ~ ^— .>. 



n*" *^ ' ** 



■*»■*( 



■ 

i 



4 ' - * ' 

^ v For Malaya only* Agreement providing for this loan has been siguedj but the 
loan does not become effective and disbursements thereunder do not Si > until ' 
tho borrower and guarantox* tnkc c^ytaia actions and furnish certain Soeume&t 



s 



to the Bank* 



n 80 ■'. 






1 



Declassified per Executive Order 13326, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



. 



r? C'CU.TKEAST ASIA 



FINANCIAL ANNEX. TO REPORT 
(In millions of dollars over $5 million. Up to 
$5 million shovm in nearest tenth million. ) 

. vist-,nam: 
•-xpenditilres and deliveries - certabtt. 3 .' activities 



■ 



Act 'ity 
\ 



FY 
1957 



FY 1 9 5$ 



Est. 



Est. 
Total 



Mil itary Assistance (Cce footnotes a7 and b/) 



•• 



-*■ 



\ 



■ 
• 



Economic Assistance 



un 



Jochnical Assistance 



Information Services, 



Educational" Jjbcchange 

■ ■■ < — * — * ■■• — 



■ 



Total 



MAP Salc r^ of Military Eq uipment fr. Se rvice 



:: 



MAP Off shore P rocu rement Pa3anonts (Def ens e expo n- 
tfitur&s entering into int'l balance of payments.) 

1 Ot he r U.S. Govt. Payments (affecting int'l bal. 
>f payments « mil, & civ. pay, construction, pro- 

• cureiaent of U.S. nil. supplies & equipment. ) SJ 



112, 5 



.-,.. ■.,. .......... 



249.5 



l|rM*.il*i| f Ht,|p 



1,8 



2,1 

.078 
165, ', 7f> 



.5 



.51.6 



209.5 

2.7 
1.5 



FY iW 

(Est. es 

o'fUL/Sfi 



kfe-kfraff ■■**■-■»* 



* 



NA 



C.5 



i ■* ■ ■ .■ ^ ■j '*-^-- 



. .;ii 

?.65.-a 

«***1.»*. ........ Mf 



•* 



NA 



<-7. 8 

• • 

183,2 

1. 5 
.19 



,tf-|i4<t»'*> *• 



.1 



, N. 



LOANS 






• - 



*& 



• 


During Period to " 


As of 


I .-LOANS BY 


Disbursements 


Repayments 


New ,Loans 
Authorized 

•* 
■ 


UiidisbursejJ 
Coflimitments 


Outstanding 
Debt 


| 

IBRD 


. . 






*•-.*.#•*•*.>> .*-■>•»« i »*-*•**■■■*«*«** 


ex-im bain: 

m • 




* 
* 



/ 



,^ # 



PUBLIC LAW 4.80 AGREEMENTS 



' » 



Date 



.7Y 



58 



iv. 



ritle 



Amount 



I 



j.6, 



Est.#Dels, 



to bo dc" 
tcrrrnxicd . 



Major 
Commodities- 



tobacco 



Use of Local Currency 
or Other- CoBim&iit 



.• 



us 

Uses 

3,0 



Mil. Bad* 

Support . 



i^^ 



Total 



All Botes and Cotfrnpttts relating to the above figures are shovm on a separate page, 

*1 -1 r •? 

.'. .". U ... r» -£*.--•■:> TV 



f 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



7 



4 



! •■. . " ■ • SECRET 

VIET-NAM 
PIPELINE ANALYSIS, MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM 

(La Millions of Dollars) 



Military Assistance j y —' 

Prior to FY"1957 

FY 196? 
FY 1958 

FY 1959 (eat, J 



* 



Economic As pi stance 



Prior to FY 1957 

FY 1957 

FY 1958 

FY 1959 (est,) 

m 

Technical Assistance 



■•■_ »«i*«e»* ■*■-"* >ri»^'W^-'ii«<Jf JWW|I ] +*I0Q 



■• Prior to FY 1957 
FY 1957 \ 

FY 1958 
FY 1959 (est.) 



*>•- - ■•■> "V ■ 



Programs 
294. 1 
73,0 
56.5 
41,0 

Programs 

253.9* 
174,4 

177.0 



3. 5 
4.4 
4.0 
4.3 



Deliveries 



Carryover 

1 20. 3 . 

60* 3 
85.7 

78.9 



Expenditures Carryover 



173. 


8 


113. 


G 


51. 


6 


47. 


8 



321.2 

' 249. 5 

209.5 

' 183.2 



.7 
1,8 

2.7 
3.8 



-?- 



200.9 
205.3 
170.2 
164.0 



2.8 
5.4 
6.7 
7.2 



/ 



I 



s 



■ 

a'/ Includes, value of alt grant military assistance^ whether programmed on 
. a country or non«*country basis^ with the exception of the value of excess . 

stocks and cost-charing programs* (In the MAP programming process, 
■ country pr ogr ams include such items as materiel and equipment, training 
and dollar costs of consumables and construction* Non~ country program 
include items such as packing, crating, handling and transportation; 
spare parte; coots of rehabilitating excess stocks; .and advanced weapons, ) 

b/ Excludes $46, 8 million programmed from stocks excess to U« S* Service 
■*• or other MAP requirement s for FY 195G«f?9 as* well as a pending program 
% increase of approximately $4* C million; $47* 5 million is estimate I to be 
delivered by the end of FY 1959, 

c/ Information not available except for Indochina (Associated States 
; -.. Cambodia* Laos and VietvNam) reported as $19. 3 million in FY *9S?J 
$2, million in FY 1958 and $1, 7 million in'FY 1959, 



■ s 



. ' 



, 



.1 



T\ 



1 1 8 2 

■&. ,-U v.' *.., 



SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 




CO 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 
Washington, D.C. 20301 



JCSM-97-59 
19 Mar 1959 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Subject: Airfields for Vietnam (U) 



1. Reference is made to the memorandum by the Joint Chief 
of Staff, for the Secretary of Defense, dated l8 December 1958, 
subject, "Jet Aircraft for Vietnam (u)." 

2. Subparagraph k b of the referenced memorandum states 
that it is deemed advisable to request the International 
Cooperation Administration to include Cap St Jacques in 
addition to Tan Son Nhut in their program for airfield im- 
provement , under the guise of commercial aviation. 

3. Subsequent review by CINCPAC and the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff indicates that Tourane would be preferable to Cap St 
Jacques. Tourane 1 s advantages outweigh its relative vulnera- 
bility. Its forward position would be operationally useful. 
Its improvement would require less money and time than would 
Cap St Jacques. Tourane 1 s position on the Bangkok-Hong Kong 
air route lends plausibility to its development as a commer- 
cial jet facility. 

If. It is recommended that Tourane be substituted for Cap 
St Jacques in the International Cooperation Administration's 
improvement program as the proposed second jet facility for 
Vietnam. 

5 # It is requested that you advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
of your position and the views of the Department of State on this 
matter ? i order that CINCPAC may, in turn, be informed. 



For the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 



M. F. TWINING, 
Chairman, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff 



118U 



Declassified per Exec u live Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



January 22 , 1959 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 
SUBJECT: Aircraft for Vietnam (U) 



By memorandum dated 30 December 1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
recommended that thirty (30) AD— k type aircraft be substituted for T-28s 
in the Vietnam Military Assistance Program to replace F-8F aircraft now 
used by the Vietnamese Air Force. We are advised by the Air Force that 
the F-8F aircraft are supportable through Fiscal Year i960 and probably 
through Fiscal Year I962 and, although obsolescent by U.S. standards, 
remain capable of performing their mission. While a more advanced 
capability for the Vietnam Air Force is both militarily and politically 
desirable, we question the advisability of introducing AD-4 aircraft at 
this time. 

Although the ASCP rate for the F-8F aircraft is extremely low 
(average less than 2$ for the last 18 months) the utilization rate 
(monthly average 7 hours per assigned aircraft during Fiscal Year 1958) 
is very unsatisfactory. This unsatisfactory utilization rate, which is 
.50$ of the programmed flying hour requirement , is because of high 
unscheduled maintenance rate and substandard logistic practices, aggra- 
vated by a lack of trained supply and maintenance personnel. The result 
has been an in- commission rate of less than 35$ during the past few 
months. This poor maintenance and an inability to operate the logistics 
and supply facilities necessary to support these aircraft are partially 
due to the fact that the Vietnamese are changing over from a French 
operated system to a U.S. recommended system which must be operated 
by the Vietnamese themselves. 

Because of the above and the tightness of the 1959 program and 
in light nf the coming Congressional presentation, we believe it 
advisable, until there is improvement in Vietnamese training and mainte- 
nance, and at least until Fiscal Year I960, to withhold the proposed 
substitution of AD-U aircraft for the F-8F aircraft. 



SIGNED 

1 
John N. Irwin, II 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) 



1183 



♦ . 



i 



; 



* 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Pro j eel Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



*> 



I 



» •> : : 



L 






• 



f 



/ 



E C R E T 



V 



ASSXBXAKD SECHEPARX OF DEFISIS2 
Washington 25 ^ D. Ct ■ 



*- « 



# 



BtfSRifAraoKAi security aefairs 

In reply refer to 1-05,975/9 



20 May 1959 



i' 



MEM0RASD0M FOR ^-SECREEASX OF THE ARM* ■ / ' '. '.. " 

. Effi v SKC5lETARY 0? THE NAVY « ""' ' ' 

' • . THE SECRETARY 0? THE AIR FORCE 

the chairman, JOINT CHIEFS of staff 

• ' , THE ASSISTANT SECKEEARY OF DEFENSE (CGMPXROI£ER) 






'•' 



■ 



f. 



. \ 



a ■ ■ ■ • 

SUBJECT: OC33 Operations Plan for Vietnam' (u) 



•■ 



.■ » 



v. 

■ 

it 



"1* 



- ••' 



On 7 January 1959> the Operations Coordinating Board concurred 
in the "Operations Pirn for Viet-Hem", published under date of ' 
9 January 1959 j and/ agreed^ that tho member agencies 'irouid jtaplemont th< 
actions and programs in tl^PIon,; subject to modification should a • - 
clionge in civovmr/cvxioon ao dictate. * *•.•"•* 






M 



* r Jhe Assistant Secretary pf Defense (3£A).j on behalf of tho S^cretfcry 
of Defense j has approved thie* Plan for Implementation by tho Department 
of Defense, c 

• . ■• * 

Bxo Enclosure assigns responsibilities within the Department of 
Defense for the specific courses of action for which this Department is 
assigned a primary . responsibility in the Operations Plan, 



5 



- ■ 



Components of the Deportment of Defense^ assigned primary responsi- ; 
bilitie* in the Inclocure^ should report on the progress in implementing 
the assigned courses of action to the Assistant Secretary of Defense . (ISA) * 
,*-As a minimim* ouch reports should "be prepared to coincide irlth the timing 
of revisions c? the subject Plan end vlth the propcfration of the 0GB 
Report to the National Security Council on U.S. policy toward Viet-IIr "i. 






♦• 






Enclosure 
Assignment of 
B?$pan o ibiiltiBS 

3" ISA eys; , ■ ,' v " • 

1, HAjfe/KStf (in turn) 

2. Dir, Wa (Action) :■ 
3 • Dir, OP&e 



*j 




ROBERT H. MIGHT 



1^^£^ 





r 

. Acting Assistant Sedretary 



l^Of 



>. 



I • 



: > 



■ ■ 



\ 

\ 

* 



V 



* *. 



C3D Filec <~ ^dCM{/// 

R&C Files 

ISA Reading File 



.!! 



• ♦ 



i n ^ ■ 

SEC RET 



. / 



yV 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 J 



i . 



rr 



SECRET 

ITiCLOSURE 



*.■ 



. .A 



» •, m 



SUBJECT: Department 6? Defense Assignment of Rcsponsibilitico for the 

OCB Operations Plan for Vict-Iiam ' ' 



#■ 



PAGE PARA. COURSES OF ACTION ... ... RESPOA'SraJXX'B: 



. _ ,- ■ I -*•'- — -^rr *~ «*• 



6 ' XJ ■ Popularise, 'particularly in neutralist nationo Assigned to: JC8 

-. . of Asia,,rthe image of a genuinely independent ' "■ Bupp.ort: QKSD/IBA 
.** Viet-ITam Striving by its ovn will and as much * ; 

. , ' , cis possible with its aim resourced to enhance 

" lis ability to- defend and strengthen its * • 
'*/"' " " : : independence. • (OCB Assignment: All agencies; 

Timing -" Continuing) --•"-*' 

- . . .- • % . • ■ ■ ,, ...:■■ ' 

7 .#3 Itetcs 1 the Viet Cons (foxraerly. called Viet Minh). Assigned to: JC3 

from attacking or, subverting J^ree Vlet-Kam '■•—...,. 

' . or -other neighboring states* (OCB Assignment: . * " ** "" " /*■ - ■"■ * . .'*" 
• • ".-" - State, Defense;- Timing - Continuing) * ■ ' 

7 . ■. 2^ Probe vcaknesses o? the Vict Cong and exploit ' * "Ac signed to: ' JCS 

■them internally and internationally whenever • _"_,- . * 
: possible. (OCB Assignment:. ':State, ' Defense, ' • "- ." : : . 
. ■ -' . BSIA; Timing - Continuing) - :--.--> -, -'_ 

■hi » ■ • t 

26 . Continue to support the Vietnamese Government by Assigned to: JCS - 
* .. diplomatic, military, economic, and psychologies!. * Support: QfiS3&/lS& 
. • ,.\ ' nsans. In these efforts the main object should 

be to maximize the attractiveness of Free Viet-ITam . ... 
. ' in contrast with conditions in the communist zone " " 
■ ■ of north Vict-Nam. ( OCB Assignment: , All agencies,; • " / 
* . . ' ' . Timing ~ .Continuing) " % ' - - ' p ,.•"■' 



•v. 






8 27 " Strengthen Vietnamese relations with and ; . Assigned to: JC; 

* - : . representation in Laos, Cambodia, the Philippines, Support: 0/iSD/iSA 

3Siailand, Burasa, Malaya and the Republic of 2 ";*_.• '-.'... " ^ 

-China. Keep the GW as fully informed as * ': .— V 

■ . ■ - ■ possible of developments in Indonesia in order" *TT rv* ",\ 

\ \ that it may guide its relations in the best " \ - " . - -" . ; 

''Interests of the Free T/orld* Support visits by ' ' > . I \, ■] • 

\ , ' - ; .high- ranting officials of Southeast Asian countries " . , \ " * 1 

* " ■ • to Viet-ITam and vice versa, particularly from neutral "*' ; v * 

countries- (OCB Assignment: All agencies; ■. * * ■ 

Timing - Contin^Jii?is) " ■ • * '/■ " / 

11 hi \ " Bicouragc "Viet-iram 'i>6 develop economic relations Acsigned to: OASD/lSA 

iriLth Japan and the Republic of China, and, as 
" " ; . * appropriate, to accord recog^iition to the • . . . 

" .. . \ contributions to the Viet? esc economy non-citizen ■ ♦ 

TsusineGGinen have made and continue to make under . 
proper conditions* (0G3 Assignment: All agencies; ■ : . 

Siming - Continuing) **«,v«*' • • . ■•■ - 

■■,•■.:' ■ ' sficRETV •■■••- ■ ■ . 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



• • m 



«S -•"•"> — ■■% 



I 
i 

- 









I 



• . 



Viet-ila$a Contd 



E C R E T 



i ■ 



t 



\' 



. J AGS 



11 



11 



11 



11 



12 



"- 



PAM_* 
k2 



_ -■ 



h3 



I 



to. 



*5 



h6 



»■ 



COURSES 0? ACTION 



■ -■ ♦ 



RESPOUSIBILI^: 



■ 



On occasion of an Imminent or actual communist 
attempt to seize control from vithlBj take • 
action in accordance tilth U.S. policy* Prepare 
contingency plana to facilitate ouch action. 
(OCB Assignment; Defense, State, tuning - 
Continuing) 



Assigned to: JC 



r* 



- • • 



t * 






Jointly with other SEATO poverSj or separately, 
.vhen appropriate, continue to encourage Viet-llDii 
to send military observers to SEATO military 
exercises, vhen' such ixnrltations have been 
extended* * (0C3 Assignment : • Primary ~ Defense) - v 
Support - Staie; Timing - Continuing) 

Continue to Implement the military assistance 
program for Vict-JTam. (0C3 Assignment: 
Primary - .Defence; Suppose - State; 
Xiwing - Continuing) • 



Seek to influence Vietnamese defense planning 

go that it Trill be consistent vith U.S. and '• , 

SEATO plans/ Promote a fjpirit of cooperation 

• wapng the Vietnamese officials and people in 
order to develop an atmosphere favorable to the 
employment of U*S. forces, if they should be 
required In tliG defense of Vlct-Kam. (0G3 - 
Assignment: Primary - Defense; Support - State; 
Siming - Continuing) ... , " . 

] Develop,' thrc-jgh training, the maximum combat 

* capabilities of the Vietnamese armed forces, 
including logistical support services* Develop 

'adequate reserve forces. The present Vietnamese ■ 
- armed force leve3, of 150,000 should bc # kept under 
' constant revleir, relating such review to the 
\ external menace. Constant efforts should be made 
\to cut the man-year costs of Vietnamese troops. 
(OCB Assignment: Primary ~ Defense; Support : - ... 

' ICA, State; Timing -iContisattlng) \ ' 

■ • • J* 



AssiCTed to: JCfl ' 



i. Assigned 
Support: 


to: 

* • 

* 

* 


OASB/jKj 

JOB 


. < * • 
■ - - i 

- Assigned 


* * * 

■ 

to: 


* 

* - - * 
J03 



.» 









• 



r- h4. 



Assigned to :" JOS 



V 



I 



k 



118-7 



% 



tt 



i * 



TT 3 *Tf ^ 



SECEEl 



Declassified per Executive Order 13326, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



n' 



* 

Viet -Kara Contd. 



j p-:n 



SECREl 



* '. 



s 



■ ' 



I 



r 

i 









- 



I 
t 



PAGE PARA . 



COURSES OF ACTION 



12 



M 



IP. 



ii8. 



12 



13 



I 



She U.S.-sliould continue to provide adequate 
support to the Vietnamese military budget 
as long Its jjEhe threat of aggression so requires. 
Tiie U.S/cKduld exert continuing efforts to effect " 
reductions In over-all ttilltary costs and to induce * 
the Vict&unese Government to increase the total 
amount of Vietnamese resources available for financing 
•the military "budget and economic development o 
Provide equipment to the Vietnamese forces in 
conformity ^riLth U#S« policy in connection vith the 
■Awnlstice Agreement o (OCB Assignment: ICA, 
Defense, State; Sinning - Continuing) 

Encourage ; wltliin the limitations of available 
spaces, attendance of * Vietnamese military . 
personnel -at scliqols of the -U.S. armed forces and 
at 'appropriate foreign school b operated or 
sponsored by the U.S. armed fprccs. Maintain ■ 
U*3t advisors vith aJJ. major units and schools 
of the Vietmiiaese armed forces* (OOB Assignment! 
Primary - Defense; Support - ICA, State; ( ■• 



' RE5P0j:sr;TT.lTX 

Assigned to: OASP/lSA 
Support: ,J03 



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h$) t Encourage Viet-lTam to participate in the Pacific . .'Assigned 'to: JOB 
y ' > Defense College vhon established.' (OCB 

Assignment: Brfaftagy - Defence; Support * ■ 

* State; aiming - Continuing) * ' • * - ■ ' - * 

•51 * Support the Vietnamese Government's psychological 
varfare program against the communist zone vith 
-' a vicv to JTteiting flissatisfafetion and 
encouraging defections* Endeavor to prevent 

-.. ' "ineffective violence or other s elf -de£ eating . 

• -■; " .." actions by dissidents. (OCB Assignment: All* . 

• : \ agencies; TiFiing - Continuint) .- : : ^ ' ' 
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NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 












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PAGK PARA . 

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•Encourage U.So training and orientation visits 
for potential .Vietnamese government and * * , • 
feueiaeso loaders* Continue the granting of ' 
graduate level scholarships, vith extensions to 
permit rAtsiir wait of advanced degrees of % ' 
selcctdd- cases* Permit U.S. financing o:fl p . ■/ 
full unS&rgra&^to scholarships at U.S» ' , 
universities for selected outstanding graduates 
of Vietnamese secondary schools. Encouxago fullest 
assimilation into Vietnamese life (military, economic, 
social, political and cultural) of returned exchangees, 
participants % end trainees* 'Maintain and strengthen 
contact vith these beneficiaries of U.S. exchange 
and training programs* Proyide them vith \ m - 
continuing access to American sources of technical^ 
professional and cultural information., and, help ' " 
them exercise b> pro -Free World influence among . 
fellov Vietnamese. (OCJB Assignment: Defense** ICA, 
USIA. State; EJbning - Continuing) , - 



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■■.'Increase training of Victr go technical, 
professional and administrative personnel in 
Vict-JTan ? U.S. and third country schools* 
(0C5J Assignment: ICA, USIA, State, Defense; 
Timing ~ Continuing) 



Assigned to j 0AS»/l: 



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Assigned to: JCS 



Assignc L to;" JCS 
Support; Q&SD/ISA 



Continue training the Vietnamese armed forces 
f or their internal security role, including " ' " 
. counter-intelligence vithin the arffied forces, 
support of police actions, pacification and , . 
anti-guerrilla operations, et cetera. (OCB 

Assigpme&t: Defense; Timing - Continuing) 

« 

Continue to translate textbooks on leadership, 

anti- subversion, counter- intelligence, 

administration of martial lav, riot control, 

etc, into French and Vietnamese for distribution ,/v? 

to Vietnamese armed forces * (OCB Assign^ontf . ■ : ', * 

Defense, TCA; Timing*- Continuing) ' " ", , - 

The Government of Yict-Nara should be encouraged Assigned to; 
to maintain && effective, well-trained and carefully J 
screened Self -Defense Corps, and to continue other ' 
activities vhich enrphasise self-help and protection m 
against Vict Coug.terrorlr.n. (OCB Assignment: ICA, 
Defense; liming - Continuing) • 



JCS* 



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E € R E T 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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PROSPECTS FOR NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM 



THE PROBLEM 



I 



' To analyze the current situations in North ami South Vietnam and to estimate 
probable developments over the next two or three years. 



CONCLUSIONS 



I 






1. The prospect of reunification of Com- 
munist North Vietnam (DRV) and west- 
ern-oriented South Vietnam (GVN) re- 
mains remote. In the DRV the full range 
of Communist techniques is used to con- 
trol the population, socialize the economy, 
impose austerity and direct investment 
to economic rehabilitation; and develop- 
ment. The DRV maintains large armed 
forces. In South Vietnam, despite the 
authpritari. n nature of the regime, there 
is far more freedom. Local resources and 
US aid are devoted to developing the 
armed forces, maintaining internal se- 
curity, and supporting a relatively high 
standard of living, with lesser emphasis 
on economic development (ParcL 9) 

2. In Soutli Vietnam political stability 
depends heavily upon President Diem and 
his continued control of the instruments 
of power, including the army and police. 
Diem will ajmost certainly be President 
for many years. The regime will con- 
tinue to repress potential opposition ele- 
ments and depend increasingly upon the 
effectiveness of the Can Lao, the regime's 



political apparatus, which is run by 
Diem's brothers Nhu and Can. (Paras. 
11-14, 29-31) 

3. The capabilities of the GVN armid 
forces will improve given continued US 
materiel support and training.* Con- 
tinuance of the present level of train- 
ing is threatened by a recent finding of 
the International Control Commission 
(ICC) that the US Temporary Equipment 
Recovery Mission (TERM) should end its 
activities by mid- 1950. In any event, 
GVN forces will remain incapable of with- 
standing more than temporarily the 
larger DRV foiT.es. ' The internal security - ! 
forces will not be hblc to eradicate DRV 
supported guerrilla or subversive activity 
in the foreseeable future. Army units., 
will probably have to be^ diverted to 
special internal security assignments. 
(Paras. 15-17, 33-34) 

4. The GVN is 'preoccupied with the 
threat to national security and the main- 
tenance of large military and security 



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S E C Ti E T 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



» 



S E C K E T 



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forces. II will probably remain unwill- 
ing to devote a significantly greater share 
of resources and attention to longer range 
economic development. Assuming con- 
tinued US aid at about present levels, 
modest improvement in South Vietnam's 
economic position is likely. However, de- 
velopment will lag behind that in the 
North, and the GVN will continue to rely 
heavily upon US support to close the gap 
between its own resources and its re- 
quirements. (Paras. 19-22, 32) 

5. There is little prospect of a significant 
improvement in relations between South 
Vietnam. and Cambodia so long as the 
present leaders of the two countries re- 
main in power. Relations with Laos will 
probably remain "generally friendly. 
Continued suspicion that the French are 
intriguing in the area to recapture a posi- 
tion of major influence will. probably pre- 



vent an improvement of Franco -GVN re- 
lations. (Paras. 25-27, 35) 

6. Despite widespread popular discontent, 
the Government of the DRV is in full con- 
trol of the country and no significant in- 
ternal threat to the regime is likely. 
With large-scale Bloc aid, considerable 
progress has been made in rehabilitating 
and developing Ohe economy with major 
emphasis on agriculture, raw materials 
and light industry. The regime will 
(probably soon have laid the foundations 
for considerable economic expansion. 
(Paras, 37-38, 42, 44) 



1 



7. The DRV has no diplomatic relations 

with any country outside the Bloc and 

its foreign policy is subservient to the 

Bloc. We believe that itrwill continue its 

harassment of the GVN and of Lexis, 

though a military invasion of cither is 

unlikely. (Parhs. 46, 48-49) 

I 









INTRODUCTION 



i 
i 

* 

■ i 
» 



8. The 1954 "provisional military demarcation 
line" dividing Vietnam at the 17th parallel has 
become a fixed boundary separating two en- 
trenched and hostile governments, the Gov- 
eminent of Vietnam (GVK) in the south and 
the Communist Democratic Republic of Viet- 
nam (DRV) in the north. The all-Vietnam 
elections called for under the Geneva Agree- 
ments of 1954 have not been held, and the 
divergent conditions demanded by both gov- 
ernments preclude the holding of such elec- 
tions. To date the GVN has been preoccupied 
with the threat to internal security posed by 
DRV subversion and guerrilla warfare and 
U'ith the threat that the Communists' numeri- 
cally superior armed forces will one day invade 
the south. However, there are no indications 
that the DRV is willing to assume the risks 
of US intervention and attempt to conquer 
South Vietnam by military invasion. Such a 



decision would probably be made by Peiping 
and Moscow rather than by Hanoi. 

9. Meanwhile life on the two sides of the 
boundary is marked by an increasing dispar- 
ity. The north is organized albng strict Com- 
munist lines. The standard of living is low; 
life is grim and regimented; and the national 
effort is concentrated on building for the fu- 
ture. The DRV claims it has reduced its reli- 
ance on Bloc aid to about one-third of its 
national budget. Its large army is almost 
entirely financed domestically, except for arms 
delivered by the Bloc. Both its foreign aid 
and its Spartanly acquired domestic capital 
are devoted to restoring and increasing pro- 
ductive capacity in agriculture and industry. 
In the south the standard of living is much 
higher and there is far .more freedom and 
gaiety. However, South Vietnam's economic; 
development is still at an early and uncertain 



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stage, 







and basic economic growth has been 
.lower than that of the north. The GVN still 
■depends upon US aid to finance about two- 
thirds of its national budget, including -most 
of the support for the aimed forces. 

L MAJOR TRENDS IN SOUTH VIETNAM 

A. Politico! Treads . ^ 

rlO. President Diem continues to be the undis- 
puted ruler of South Vietnam; all important 
and many minor decisions are referred to him. 
Although he professes to believe in representa- 

j live" government and democracy, Diem is con- 
vinced that the Vietnamese are not ready for 
such a political system and that he must 

: , rule with a firm hand, at least so long as na- 
tional security is threatened. He also believes 

f that the country cannot afford a political 
opposition which could obstruct or dilute the 
government's efforts to. establish r \'rong and 
secure state. Although respect • d for his 
courage, dedication, and integrity, Diem has 
-remained a somewhat austere and remote fig- 
ure to most Vietnamese and has not generated 
widespread popular enthusiasm. 

11. Diem's regime reflects his ideas. A facade 
of representative government is maintained, 
but the government is in fact essentially au- 
thoritarian. The legislative powers of the 
National Assembly are strictly circumscribed; 
the judiciary is undeveloped and subordinate 
to the executive; and the members of the 
executive branch are little more than the per- 
sonal agents of Diem. No organized opposi- 
tion, loyal or otherwise, is tolerated, and critics 
of the regime are often repressed. This 
highly centralized regime has provided reso- 
lute and stable direction to national affairs, 
but it has alienated many of the country's 
educated elite and has inhibited the growth of 
governmental and political institutions which 
could carry on in Diem's absence. The exer- 
else of power and responsibility is limited to 
Diem and a very small circle mainly composed 
of his relatives, the most important being his 
brothers Nhu and Can. J Nhu is particularly 
influential in international affairs and in mat- 
ters relative to the southern half of the coun- 
try. Can is more concerned with internal 
security and the northern half df the country. 



I 



ILL 



12. An increasingly important and effective 
I mechanism employed by the Diem regime to 

maintain control over the affairs of South 
Vietnam is the Can Lao, a semicovcrt polit- 
ical apparatus. Its structure, like that of the 
Kuomintang or a Communist party, is based 
on the cell and cadre system. The Can Lao is 
organized on a regional basis. The southern 
region is run by.Nhu, an articulate, pragmatic 
activist. It is loosely organised and admin- 
istered. The northern region is ruled with 
an iron hand by Can, a withdrawn eccentric 
feared by most Vietnamese, who seldom ven- 
tures from his- headquarters in Hue. Al- 
though there is considerable rivalrj and ten- 
sion between the two brothers, there is no 
evidence that either is less than completely 
loyal to Diem. Diem apparently finds it ad- 
vantageous to continue the division of author- 
ity as a means of controlling the ambitions 
of Nhu and Can, 

* 

13. -Can Lao members are active at virtually 
every level of Vietnamese political life. Mem- 
bership is becoming increasingly important 
for professional advancement. One-third of 
the cabinet members and over one-half of the 
National Assembly deputies are probably Can 
Lao men; the actual figure may- be higher. 
The Can Lao controls the regime's mass polit- 
ical party, the National Revolutionary Move- 
ment. It apparently has it's hand in most im- 
portant business transactions in South Viet- 
nam and is engaged in dubious business prac- 
tices. Recently the Can Lao has stepped up 

• its campaign to recruit key officers in the GVN 
military establishment, probably to establish 
a control mechanism within the only organi- 
zation in South Vietnam strong nough to 
challenge the Diem regime. 



'£»' 



14. Although the popular enthusiasm attend- 
ant on the achieving of independer i and the 
end of colonial rule has subsided and some 
disillusion has arisen, [particularly among the 
I* educated elite, there appears to be little iden- 
' tifiable public unrest. There is some dissat- 
isfaction among military officers largely be- 
cause of increasing Can Lao meddling in mili- 
tary affairs. The growth of dissatisfaction is 
inhibited by South Vietnam's continuing high 
standard of living relative to that of its neigh- 






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bors, the paternalistic attitude of Diem's gov- 
ernment towards the people and the lack of! 
any feasible alternative to the present regime.! j 

* * 

B. Internal Security 

15. The Communist apparatus in South Viet- 
nam is essentially an operating arm of the 
North Vietnamese Communist Party (Lao 
Dong) , but there have been recent indications 
of Chinese Communist participation in its 
operations. It is estimated that there are 
about 2,000 active guerrillas. They are in 
small units scattered along the Cambodian 
border, the south coast," and in the remote 
plateau region of the north. There are prob- 
ably several thousand others, now inactive, 
who have access to arms and would partici- 
pate'in guerrilla activities if so ordered. The 
guerrillas are able to marsh all a force of sev- 
eral hundred men for major hit-and-run raids, 
as they demonstrated twice during 1953. 

[They have recently stepped up their intimida- 
tion campaign, assassinating local officials in 
remote areas, terrorizing local populations and 
disrupting government operations.; The dis- 
sident armed remnants of the religious sects 
are largely broken up. About 2,000. such dis- 
sidents surrendered to the government during 
1958 and the few hundred remaining in the 
jungle are probably now absorbed or domi- 
nated by the Communists. 

16. The government has been able to restrict 
but not eliminate the subversive and espio- 
nage activities of clandestine Communist 
agents. It is probable that Communists have 
penetrated some local army and security units, 
village councils, and local branches of the 
government. There is no evidence, however, 
that such penetration is, sufficient to hamper 
government operations seriously or that it ex- 
tends to the higher echelons of the govern- 

. menl. There. is probably a widespread Com- 
munist underground in the urban areas, es- 
pecially Saigon, and Communist intelligence 
of GVN pjans and activities is probably good. 
Communist agents are also stimulating unrest 
among the tribal minorities in the central 
highlands, a relatively inaccessible and 
sparsely populated area which the government 
is attempting to settle and develop, primarily 
for security reasons. 



4 



17. South Vietnam's 13G ( 000-man army, 1 sup- 
ported by the Civil Guard, the Self-Defense 
Corps- and the police services, is capable of 
maintaining effective internal security except 
in the most remote jungle and mountain 
areas. Until mid- 1,957,' the army had the 
primary responsibility' for internal security, 
and had considerable success. By that time 
major responsibility for internal security had 
been given to the provincial Civil Guard 
(48,000) and the village Self-Defense Corps 
(47,000) . These organizations have proven to 
be inadequately trained and equipped for the 1 
job, and units from the armed forces have 
continued to be called in to meet special situa- 
tions. The size and scattered distribution of 
the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps add 
to the problems of training and equipping 
them and of coordinating their activities. In 
some regions, they are [infiltrated by Commu- 
nists. The police services, which include the 
7,500-man Vietnamese Bureau of Investigation 
and 10 ,5 00- man police force stationed in the 
main cities, have had considerable success in 
tracking down subversives and terrorists and 

are developing into efficient organizations, 

I 

C Economic Trends in South Vietnam 

18. South Vietnam has made only limited 
progress toward basic long-term economic de- 
velopment in the five years since independ- 
ence. US aid during that period, excluding j 
military equipment and training, has totaled 
over one billion dollars. The bulk of this 
aid has been provided to finance imports of ; 
commodities which have been sold domesti- ■ 
cally. Most of the local currency accruing to 
the government has been used to support the 
armed forces and to finance the resettlement 
of over 700,000 refugees from the north. The 
GVN meets, out of its own limited resources, 
about one-third of the total civilian-military 
bildget, including about 15 percent of the 
military budget. The GVN does not have the 
necessary additional financial resources to un- 
dertake a significant economic development 
program. 






1 See Military Annex. 



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19. Basic economic development is also in- 
hibited by the QVN's preoccupation with 

South Vietnam's problems of internal security 
and military preparedness. It continues to 
regard programs for long-range economic 
growth as of lower priority than the building 
of defense strength. Moreover, for political 
reasons, it is reluctant to take any measures 
"which might reduce the country's relatively 
high standard of living. Consequently, the 
GVN devotes only a small part of available 
resources to long-range economic development^ 
Diem is hopeful, however, that resources for 
development will be provided from external 
sources, principally the US and the Japanese 
reparations settlement. There is little pros- 
pect for private foreign investment, primarily 
because *of the unsettled security situation, 
.uncertainty regarding GVN economic policy, 
and other factors creating an unattractive 
economic climate. 

20. Another aspect of the economic situation 
has political as well as economic ramifications, 

i A considerable amount of US aid is in the form 
| of grants of dollars which are used to import 
commodities. This practice has tended to in- 
hibit the development of local consumer goods 
industries, although steps are now being taken 
to encourage domestic industries. It has sup- 
ported a standard of living higher than the 
country could maintain on its own resources. 
A significant cutback in the standard of living 
would probably create serious political prob- 
IlTems for the. government. The present slow 
*Tpace -of economic development holds little 
promise that the gap between the present 
\ living standard and the capacity of the econ- 
1 omy will be closed in the foreseeable future. 

21. Nevertheless, South Vietnam is making 
some economic progress. The heavily dam- 

, .aged transportation network is being repaired. 
After an initial period of frustration and 
delay, considerable progress is being made in 
a modest agrarian reform program. In addi- 
tion, almost 100,000 persons from crowded 

t urban and coastal areas have been relocated 
on land development projects in the Mekong 
delta area and in the sparsely populated cen- 
tral highlands. The economic viability of* 
these last mentioned projects has not yet been 



proved. The resettlement of refugees from 
the north is about completed. Rice produc- 
tion is approaching 1939 levels, but increased 
domestic consumption has kept rice exports 
far below prewar levels. Rubber has sur- 
passed 1939 levels and has replaced rice as 
the nation's major export j 

22. Some constructive long-range measures 
are being taken. The GVN is attempting to 
increase internal revenues by strengthening 
its tax system and is trying to restrict domes- 

* tic consumption and total imports to about 
present amounts. If the main part of the 
defense burden is carried by the US, it is prob- 
able that over the next few years the steps 
taken and planned by the GVN will enable 
domestic production to expand and thus re- 
duce the balance of payments deficit on goods 
and services, which was about $190 million 
in 1958. The planned development of man- 
ufacturing would make possible over the 
next five years the lowering of import require- 
ments by about $25 million a year. In the 
same period the trade g&p should narrow by 
another $30 to $40 million if land development 
and rice productivity programs produce the 

- planned results. Even if these results are 
achieved, hcjwevcr, South Vietnam will still* 
have large foreign trade and internal budget 
deficits and continue to depend upon US aid. 

D. Soujh Vietnam's Foreign Relations 

• * 

23. South Vietnam's foreign policy is based 
upon fear of and rigid .opposition to commu- 
nism, a 3 ! upon a consciou s dependence on. 
the US as its majoFsource of assistance and 
protection and as its principal in ^national * 
sponsor. The GVN leaders desire to maintain 



and to assert their: nation's independence, 
which they believe to be endangered most di- 
rectly by the activities and milita , strength 
of North Vietnam. They are also concerned 
over what they consider the weakness and 
pro-Chinese Communist orientation of Cam- 
bodia, and the machinations of the French,, 

24. DRV: In responding to persistent DKV 
bids to ''regularize" relations, GVN policy is 
to impose conditions it is sure will be un- 
acceptable. By this means the GVN seeks to 
improve Kk propaganda position, while mahi- 



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tabling Intact its opposition to closer contact 
with the DRV. Although the GVN may agree 
to limited discussions with DRV rcpre^iita- 
tives, such as the proposed negotiation 're- 
garding administrative problems of the De- 
militarized Zone, it is not likely to enter into 
any broader discussions (whether or not held 
under the auspices of the International Con- 
trol Commission (ICC) ) ; and even less likely 
to agree to the establishment ofTegidar official 
contacts with the north. 

25. Camhodia: Relations between the GVN 
and Cambodia have become acutely strained. 
Diem is convinced that Cambodia's Prince 
Sihanouk is untrustw.orthy and is tolerating, 
if not supporting, anti-GVN operations on the 
Cambodian border area by both Communists 
and non-Communists. The GVN leaders have 
little confidence in the ability of Cambodia 
to resist Communist pressures and they pure 
convinced that Cambodia's recent recognition 
of Communist China shows that there is little 
will to resist. The GVN is fearful of a Com- 
munist takeover in Cambodia which would 
provide a base for subversive operations or at- 
tack.' GVN leaders were closely involved in 
recent anti-Sihanouk plots, and probably will 
continue activities designed to stir up anti- 
Sihanouk feeling both inside and outside of 
Cambodia and to lead to Sihanouk's downfall. 

26. Laos: South Vietnam's relations with Laos 
are on a generally friendly basis, especially 
since the Lao Government has indicated 
greater awareness of the Communist threat 
and has' become more outspokenly pro-West 
in its foreign policy statements. The GVN 
has undertaken to advise the Lao Government 
on an anti-Communist program, has offered 
to train some Lao troops, and in other ways 
is seeking to stiffen the anti-Communist posi- 
tion of the Lao Government. However, GVN 
worries have been only partially relieved by 
recent Lao Government measures to check 
Lao Communist political activity; the GVN 
continues to feel considerable disquiet because 
of North Vietnamese pressures along the DRV- 
Laos border. 

27. Frcuwe: The GVN leaders continue to sus- 
pect the French of intriguing to overthrow the 
Diem government and to increase their ihflu- 



\ 



encc in South Vietnam. French businessmen 
and officials in South Vietnam are carefully 
watched and the scope of French commercial, 
cultural, and educational activities is re- 
stricted. The GVN leaders also believe that 
the French are at least partially to blame for 
Cambodia's apparent drift towards Commu- 
nist China and for I he failure of recent anti- 
Sihanouk plots. Although many South Viet- 
namese leaders have a cultural affinity for 
France, GVN-Freneh relations are likely to 
remain cool. 

28. US:. Although we do not expect the pres- 
ent close GVNrUS relationship to be under- 
mined, the GVN's sensitivity to its dependence 
on the US is likely to grow and to complicate 



our dealings with it. 



Nhu and some other 



SECH E T 



leaders have expresscc resentment at what 
they consider US attempts to dictate to them 
and to restrict their freedom of action at home 
and abroad. Diem has indicated that South 
Vietnam expects the maintenance of large 
US aid and special consideration from the US 
as a reward for its btea'clfast support. Failure 
to receive such special consideration could 
lead Diem to assume a stance of greater in- 
dependence vis-a-vis the US. However, in 
light of Diem's strong aversion to the French 
and in the absence of any acceptable alterna- 
tive source of supportJhe wilTalmost certainly 
avoid jeopardizing basic US-South Vietnamese 
ties during the period of this estimate, 

E; Outlook for Sou'h Vietnam 

29. The prospects for continued political sta- 
bility in South Vie! m depend heavily upon 
President Diem and bis ability to maintain 
firm control of tti< army and police. The re- 
gime's efforts to assart! internal security and 
its belief that an authoritarian government 
is necessary to handle the country's problems 
will result in a continued repression of poten- 
tial opposition elements. This policy of [re- 
pression will inhibit the growth of popularity 
of the regime, and we believe that dissatisfac- 
tion win grow, particularly among those who 
arc politically conscious. The power and \m- 
scrupulousness of the Can Lao, if unchecked, 
will probably prejudice the prestige of the gov- 

■ I ! 



j 



I 






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JL .-;* V** V. j 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






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_L^.r-^U i : V 






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ff;ce of the president 



:,vT;OXAL SSCURIVY COUNCIL 



V/ASHiNGTOM 

* 



June 29, 1959 . 



» 









lIB^OBANDuK ?0S '2E3 rISC PLANHIHB BOARD 






Current U„ S. Policy in the Far East 



3; Memo for Planning Board, :I U.'S. Policy 

• " Tovrard the Par East/ 3 June 15- 1959 
C* . Seeord of "Meeting of the Planning Board 
"j-us-.w 12, 1959 ' ■ *■ 



■ 



l o 



--.- enclosed graft' revision of 1T3C 5 2 --29/5 , prepared '-"by 






•"the i3s*D&r truant of State j is transmitted herewith for con- 
sideration by the Plesning Board at an early meeting. 



■ • 



KGBSIHTH, JOHNSOH 
Acuisgj Director, Policy 
Coordinating Secretariat - 



..-* 






r i 



/ 






i- 



• 



1196 



SECRET 



^J-79f/9 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



■ 



IS 



SECEST 



•., 



o : . . o ... U .» *^ * rv^j, u .- J. ± * -'. « 1 1» 1? alt J-^ iO I 



■. . ',,^*-^.^ 






» • . . 



« * ■ 



— 5 



'The priis&ry problems cf U, S, policy in the Far East 



- 1 



* • - 



V *.! '^u 1 vv . * Z, V'*- 



the serious threat to U* S, security which 









continent of Asia ergulfii^ mainland China (including 



Sroat) 7 - no^th Korea and north Yiot-Kanu 






r 

Since it seized mainland China in 19^9 5 the regime 












- »*- 



,,-,./ * .*- ,-\' 



.. j- 






has consolidated effective control over 



* that area and has ^eiv.ainea a closely cooperating partner 



o 






Soviet Union* ■ It is -pTixtont to assume in pur planning 



. ths;t for She predictable future the Peiping regime vjill con- 
tinue to e;;eroiss effective control over mainland China, 

» 

that its Eiilifca^y and acoiiordc strength will e©ntiaue to 
inoraass and tha> the Si^o-Scviet alliance will hold firm/ 

■ » 

* ■ 

Cn the othe;? ^c^J., Cc^::unist "China Hill undoubtedly -encounter 

r> ---•'. - ,-■*-••#•* - v f' * ^-*i .*• . --- c *•'• * ftv^e c*vur! sa^" T*\£*/*»Vc; t v\ ^v^r^ v\fr "f" "\ 



* • ■ * 



> 



eduction goals it has set itself • 

if --^ (a) the present ratio of fr -a 
-. r.ilitar7 'oevrer oc that of the Sino-Soviet Bloc is 









V — 



fT^ 



r-- r* 



,....._.. -einec: io; &c.e?t»w3 J* S tf aic ana support is 



forth- 






■v 






«j;^ 






pr»e3oUt orientation of most free Far I 
i-3 not likely to be adversely altered to 



c ' 



- — - -,- — ' *-' 






ahead* In that case the 



SECRET 



1107 



Declassified per Executive Order 13326, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






m 



SECRET 



♦^ »*-• 






1«W \_/ ,1 ■--- 






rive years' — stabilization of the 









der.;a^cation "oeiweesi Ccfisnunisls and aon-Coiamtaiist Asia «- will 



oroocoiy cozrciaue 






On the other hand P the weaknesses en- 



its Incomplete political., social and 

mm ^ / 



economic revolution and "by antagonists between certain free 









are unlikely to be significantly reduced 



' -. ■ clv.rir_-: at least the ne:;t few years and will continue to 



» - ■ - 

- . 



» • » 



* m ' i 

orovlde ovo^rtu.nities for Communist pressures internally, and 

. 

■ ■ 






k ives frcvi Co&s&nist China : s 2*a&e of -economic growth 



vrhich Kill _„rcbably continue to outstrip that of free Asian 

countries with the -Dossible exception of japan. In viev; of 

- 






o- w * 









^ii 



8 major effort of the Soviet Union to 



rraisi influence in the less developed countries v/ith aid and 



•oro:^ise:: of cuioh -orc^re^s unc.er Coaraunisia, increased 



v ■• 



^ 



e^:;>ha. ; .* Bust be 7^1acea u^ou economic growth ox the free 



^\ar 3a >t c 






it the s^icrifice of 









V*- ^.* v* . 






^' V*-. 



Mving i rem security P real econo- 






-.-■ -„ - ■ 



in^; souriS of >tre::r;th for the free viorld 












■ «- - ■— W* _« 



_ .^^ ~ . . v-/ fciWi ^- i t>:t: ^ 



a dominant force 



v. 



. .» * 



f, ** 



■ ) -. ,"L •*« ** 



_ - «. *-"» 



W L» vL*. ^ ^^ '^-v.' 



tov;.^ras the preservation, o 



■ 









SECilS 



rn 






** ** *~ t\ 

x : . b c 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



'• 



■ 

» 



SKCJET 



&ryi"hg to s ubvert- or* abridge imependence. Although there 



„ L »-* 



still considerable lac> of popular understanding in the 






* 

fcha nature of the -Conimunist menace to national independence 

* 

- 

and ways of life and there is increasing determination and 



. *> 






apa'ci% to resist Censausist encroachments. Moreover, the 



anti«o- loiiiAlist- and witi-vresterit attitudes which dominated 



Par East nationalist sentiments in the early post-vrar years 



\ 'are ncv; fading, with Cosu^unlst China emerging as the main 



*•» * 






. ' 



6, 



•Japan occupies a unique position as the only major 



■ 

■ * ■ 

which can play a leading and stabilizing role in' Asia* 



,* «- «* 






-socvering frorn tforOd' I;ar II and fully aware 



of the inpcr::nce of developing. markets for Japanese goods* 









^ wGviv:, ~- ^ ^> v- cinct, kj o u, l>, i i i s _ ■-- 9 u c»p a^ i o iuuu Fe x ii b c met t- x o/. tax 

C- „e..;^cw T i;. : .** — !- w^ ^ uc....;iiivU. J..* i::^jO: Uogi'Sv; Dy luS £101X1 uy 






fl — 









f\ 



*.""■ "■, *i™ ^* '"\ • 1 ^ *i" I**! <ia '' p" 



r",i^^ 



can market. 



?, 



Q-; ■- -■ 



the Con;:. :: st r^^i^-e in China is unlikely to. 






■one 



foreseeable future and since it is un~ 






. . .* 



. . . . -•' _ 4 



' ' 



.-i *N 



-- 7 -! 



w v^ 1 »-" 









s*j U 



inion, the -orinci^al 



*•* — • — * _ ■ — +-* 






vna 



threat it poses is by helping to 









■ileal and econcnic strength and stability 



* 






1199 



- < n f v 






m 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



SECRET 



of Ti'^c 



'X <*. -i a 



* T_ ** 



as rapidly &j3 xe&sxbxe^ 



while maintaining an 



adesgUEifcs over-all free v;orld military posture and while 

> 

exerfciag such pressures as are available to. us to retard the 
~re".;th and "exfcem -:.o:r of Chinese Communist power and influenced 

V 



T T 



• * _ 









8* -he principal objectives of the United States in 



/ 



.-*>< 



T? 



,— ».» 






Lrl^O -. Ci^. ^C^ w i»ii/ V.. -'.'- 



&- 



Prissrva-cion of the territorial and political 






wiuctp«M-v^ w- v..*- — fcp : *3 RVi iu ouU;iorj.g5 ±n une area 

■ t 

■ * 4 

c. < i'£'-;";:'.3t :?v.rtnor Co:..:v.v.nist expansion or subversion, 

■ 

ti Deterrence of general or looal war through 
*-* # - . . 

sainVi-i^i'iiS S feu?032S 5 balanced and determined free 



U- V-^ 



military posting in the Par East as elsewhere. 



W 6 



Development of conditions which in time are 






. * W\> Jaw \-* 






• 









he Asian CeiaEunist Bloc and to per- 



■ 

pitting settle:, ent of issues on terms compatible v/ith 

■ * ! 

U« Sj i;3curity interests* 






I » - 

».■" i -. **» srt **»** * "*i 



ends , strengthening the economic 









. .'-* *.*_»^-.-' 






GO 



V* . - SJ ♦—* 



i'L I/O.'- %• 



'•JO C<- 4» Vj 



a 



ible 



zo ao 



so^ 



li:: -.it In v 






r*>.^ 



tha sro^-'th of the Y)o:/er and prestige of * 

■ * 

..... — ^ ip :v v ;;,.. ( v!o i . c..vpec/j.c,i.iy UOLiUuiilS u OillHct^ 






Uv-J:wl-> »-'- Lev w 



d the Sino-Soviet 



^Ql 



^. •', » ■ ,-. ^-.- .■-. V" •*. '.■ i 






1100 



CT^/-iT>r*rn 






& . 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



* 



Ti 



secket 



• a 



. - e„.. Promotion of political and social forces in .- 
■ ■—••.* ■ , ■ 

the Far East Kfiieh will advance free world unity. - 
«cooparavioii and common purposes, 

f # . Identification of the United States with the 
aspirations and efforts of Asians to maintain inde- 

+ 

perdercel, promote hvss&n values and improve conditions 

of life ; and defining our objectives and programs In 

* - , 

i 

.the Far East in positive terms 9 emphasising our con- 

■ 

i 

structlve relationships. Interests and purposes in that 



■ 

-r 



J. <JL i. u U L 1 U i - - - . O Ui' .- - O JL JL xJi'j 






9/ In order to persarve the territorial integrity of 

- 

■ 1 . „ 

3** «T4 V *. C* C > ;" V , "• 9 

■ 

a*, insure a strong U* S„ military position in 



*— 



ir^r.^ t>. 



^w ucDb Pacific area y including maintaining the 

* 

security of the offshore island chain, capable of 



c 



giving rapid effective expression to all our treaty 
ccrmit^nnj^ in the Par East- and be determined and 

-l.±.\J.* t/*-i— v— .x^u^.^ __i_* c/.', o-± C/U t.l>0 Ixii, -L.L L/C* ^ J Uu^v^ iltlAlu. 1 v 

as may be hacess&ry to protect our allies and friends 

fros CcmniiJ aggression in a manner most responsive 

- I 
to br^a:. w„ 3^ interests* 



Uj -..v;..uv;: c..,.-.. Lj ^; wi -.. uj 16/1 Ol-i GlUi. m3.XSu6i*cIX 

■ 

■• (SISATC, AHZtS') arjS. Tsilat^sl (with Korea, GHC, Js.pnn 



12.01 . SECasy 



• i i 



- 



4 * 



- r^ r\ *i 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 












*! 



r 



SECEST 



pft-clflo and develop' wider understanding of Commoft 

■ • 

"ou'^oosos arnong all our allies and other friends in 



^ 



ne. Far Easts 



c*. QSirovEfrh the Mutual Assistance Program and 



O' 



other measures/ sun'oort the maintenance of free Asian 

* 

. /lita-ry .forces v;hich are (1) capable of maintaining 



internal security and 01 identifying and delaying 

■ 

Cc:^:unist B£&&e&&i<m and vjhich (2) together v/ith 



;k S c and other allied military power and acting in a 

r* c "i '",ti -'• *\\m Q "f~ " "*." 1 <3 --*•-> v. c; 4 \ r p. *r /■% |S v <*» ,o rj C! "1 V* f~ Q \"* /"Ti O f- O O yv£> 

* 

capable of coping v;ith ; and thereby deterring, any 



.r* r\ 



• » 

Provide KAP aid to those free Far Eastern 






'countries vrhere.it is needed to maintain national 

■ 

' independence and v/here it villi be effectively utilized 

a > 

• ■*• ■ * 

* . in consonance v/ith tJ; S, interests, *' , s 






■ i 



•WJ . 



In the event of Co^nunisu overt armed attack 






a'f"Ka 



« ■ 



* v. 4- V 



or i:*:-nsnen^ unreal o: such attacK against; any country 



::i tL'.d 



z.^o. not covered by a security treaty to v/h: 'h 



.*. - ^ 






u* 



Is party ^ the menace to U, S, security _ 



:.nserests would be so grave as to justify the President 



-*_- 






from Congress to 



j- 



take necessary 



action to dec:. v:i\;h the situation, including; the use of. 



*-* 



*-. s i -* * 



7 f * - ,'-■ - j :« -^ 



if a;:ro:>ric.te and feasible Q In 



Uon 



i L--I .- 



f. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3*3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



■•% 



rn 



SJ2CI2ET 



any cv£22it« the United States should consider the 



advisability of talci-:^ the issue before the United K . 



* * 






IT. If requested by a legitimate local government 

> .* ■ 

tJhich rteouireS assistance to defeat local .Communist ' 



. 



■ > 



subversion or rebellion not constituting armed attack, 



■ * 



;;he United States should vie>; such a situation so 



gravely that 3 in addition to giving all possible covert 



and overt support v;ithin the Executive Branch authority 

* 

the President should at once consider requesting 



Congressional authority to take appropriate action 



7 



vrhioh; Sli^it if necessary and feasible 7 include the use 

■ 

o # f 'J, S» military forces either locally or against 

■ 

th/e e::terna^ source of such subversion or rebellion,, 

* ?:» Assist v;kere ne^e^sary and feasible non~ 
CoSimunist Governments, and other elements in the Far 



n „ 



m * 



.-*/» 



,— ' € "J \J 



vO counter oeissusxss su0vers3.cn ana economic 



*.i *-""". - "■" """ * " - «» *«•" 



■ • .he Continue to recognize the Government of the 
Eepublic of China as the only legal government of 
•* China and its right to represent China in the United . 
nations ; Ud agencies and other international orgaiai- 






~ ' ". " f\ *•" r : >* 



lo obtain increasing international 



• • 



» 
• * 



::u\r;ort for the G7:C and otherwise take ste:os to rcain- 



& 






1103 



•s r^ r % ■ % 



SECRET 






Declassified per Executive Order J 3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 



S 


















10 ^ In order to promote the political progress, 
•'•■ vfe. *i"ItY and stability of free Far" East countries and to 
orouiot'e more effective cooperation among those countries and 

* • > > « 

* * 4 

betw&an ther.1 and $fce rest of ths Tree world, the United 
States should; . - • 

: * * * • a„- Without interfering in internal political 

> | « 4 

affairs, promote through economic aid and other means , 



• 



• 4 



the emergence, tenure and standing of friendly govern- 

* 

■ f m 

iseirbs vrhich are striving earnestly for economic and 






• b, I'o the extent possible as consistent with 
cur oontlnuinp: aim of encouraging democratic* rcrov/th 






»*_> 



v 



"!.i J- ri 









- 4- 






type governments which 



are best suited to the 'currant requirements of various 






traditions 









. Ov - Show respect and understanding for the foreign 

■ 

•policy .position of any free Par Eastern country, 

* 

whether allied or neutral^ provided that country is 
striving to maintain its independence from Communist ' 

■ 

domination or snhvcrslon. ' • 



Cs Bncoi-rave the growth of regional and Tree 

•. rorld eooper&tion through such measures as sur>t)ort 

f 






1Z04 



SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



• . 






duo:: as the Mekong Vailey Pr-oject and the Southeast 

, ■ 



*-'.'» . 



$&k to allay animosities between various 

* 

free Far S&sfceiss ccvntries, urging moderation and - 

nutual respect "be t#een parties to the dispute and 

■ * 
takiri^ an active role as channel for communication ; 






rind suo-olyinp; rccbd offices v/here that would serve 



c. 



.-sy „ j 



SJ O 



P m* *> — *> »^, ji, ft 















In order to strengthen the economies of the free 






Eastern countries and theraoy promote U* S« military, 









nonic objectives 5 the U S c should: 



al 



Be Drepared to furnish economic and technical 



assistance on a continuing oasis over an extended 



-.* 



■ supplement the domestic resources of certain countries 
s ~' receiving, military assistance to enable them to carry 



en otherwise iiisiryoortaoie defense burden without 



politically disruptive economic deterioration, and 



; 



(2; to ^roiiote the steady economic development of free 



rUsssA 



.--£:. an countries z+x, a ra^e aaequste i-o give cneir 
■: -.: rsCLes a senae of present v>ro~:recs and future hope 



' 



strengthen their orientation toward the free 






::, Continue to afigisx in the economic develoo 



.-- .- , 



ea on a bilateral basis 7 vrhile encouraging 



1 



l205 



SECBE2 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



b'ECJIE'T 









P- 



regional 



aspects; however, 



if there should develop genuine initiative and support 

■ + 

by most of the countries in the area for a regional 
jLess&ins cjr other eeonomio. development institution and 

concerned are disposed to cooperate 



if the countries 



% 



and to But substantial resources of their own into it 









a should examine such, a proposal sympatheti- 



cally x ? ith a view to cooperation and to contributing 



o 



^ ■ . 


















free nations to contribute 



available resources to procote the economic growth 
of ?s-^ Par Eastern countries* 



ft 



* . .*. 



Micourase ^rxvaoe investment: -so oroviae an.. 

- 
■ * • 

technical !ciow~hcw raouired for economic growth; and 

■ 
- 

- 

encourage less developed countries to improve their 

- V 

I 

► :'Tr ft .5"*i rj.-/: -- *** > "- O V to 'V*^ r "" V 7*^ f 1 ". *i T.C S ^Tiri i PI 



e* . 3neourage free Par Last, countries to orient 

I 

ohcir economies toward the free world and to reply 

v.. .^..1^*^ -!*«■- v O-- - -v--** 1 ^ w...;..U.:^ O t/ i.;Ci^ ilt- L/*> C-I,C4. oUUi OtO Ui 









3 technicians , capital development 









/ . .1.1/,- ! 



■ 

■■a *■ 



c# . , .:. ., ^ w. :: o _ i u j 









;-^. 



uo increase the 



• * -# 









*- 















L «ft 



---» - 



o .»« - .', 



- _ _ "*.* \y,'. -U- v^ 



ea b'cates ana otner iree 



*i*l*> ^ "1" .T & >-n o v*s t O 









120 & 



SECilET 



^ f 



*• ^-* 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 




„- * 






bolitifScl erja Intarnat&onal orientation is likely to 

- 

be shaped by the decree to which she has fair access 






* 



to u 



g . 



• 

Jui. administering P»L* *>00 in the ax>e&, due 



regard should be 3h&:?n to Asian reliance on tradi- 



tional markets for the disposal of commodity exports; 












U"Sill£o Xo 



cal currency proceeds to the "best advantage 



in support of ^ro^eots furthering U 6 S # interests. 

* 

12* In the informational and educational field, the 



V •** v- 



* -— .-I — *-, ^* .— t '•», — . -. - I «-, tf 



• 



: 






\ 






Cc o 



Develop 



C^-s-t 



strengthen informational 3 cultural, 



education and exchange program 



v> & 



c. 






a special 5 sustained effort to promote . 



* * 



ui.~* 



adu^-Vticr. of an expanding number of technically 



, i 



competent pro-free v:orld civilian and military leaders, 
vjorkiES bilaterally or through such multilateral 






UN and Colombo Plan; and stress the 



importance of developing adequate managerial and 
, . , -^ t f r - - . - -i * *. - - ■ » -i \ /^ 









". » < 



a\nro-">riate means, utilizing Asians 



t . 






• • .- - 






extent feasible j to (1) increase t .e . 



urjisr standing and orientation of Asian peoples toward 
the free v/crld and f'2) expose the menace of Chinese 



-* 



Communist imperialism and vrorld Communis 



MJil c 



k 



if 

w» ■ 



In our Cj*tz:?::ii^ci efforts to oppose* Communist 






1?0T 



SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






- 






■ 
-J. 



Asian unats i-re S's&nct for positive constructive actions 

+ 

and objectives end that vie are animated by a desire to 

■ 
further the intex-e3t£ s v;olfare and * freedom of the 






.. Asian pecml 



themselves 



i a 



In order to 'avoid enhancing the prestige and power 






«■■"■ *<■* ^7 






in order to retard., within 



the Units of our capabilities ;, the economic progress of 



*'.-■*.. -, -■ ri ; 



l/«;^Mg i ~~L> J 



■ ■ 

and to exploit weaknesses in their position 



y 






the 

■ 




Q 




j 


• 




■ 

z... Got 



■ 



Continue to refuse recognition of the Chinese 



O 



G^ir^u&ist regime and other Asian Communist regimes and 






avoid actions which night, contribute to their inter- 



mm 






w 









b* Continue to or/oose the seating of any of- 
ftSSe regimes in the United Nations s its agencies, or 



other 






organ! z-ai/ioiis. 



c* The United Stages should continue to apply 

- * 
it6 financial control against } and its embargo on 

■ » • * 

t; le with. Co: cnist China and north "Korea, and its 






* * - ; + 






-::- 



^ : 



£ 3 Urge 'other free world countries to maintain . 
Querent level of export controls on trade with 






In support of this effort^ the 






- - 



'::.'- ::■-:. -co:xtx .:.->;..:. v. ion is identical with* pea?sg»aph ^9-0 



SECRET 



1 



Of; o 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



. 



SECDBT 



Dultilc - 3ral ezsBs&SQQ pi*o?£Fsni« endeavor to handle 



«• * 



Gisastioii^ of routine exceptions in such manner *as to 
preserve em& foster the willingness of other countries 

* • 

e, Continue to determine our policy on travel 
pf Americans to Communist China, /north Korea and north 
Viet-IIa::; 'in a manner most conducive to the furthering" 
of U„. S objectives* "and courses of action as set . 
forth in this naner* . . ' - 



* 






( 



* 



Utilize overt and .covert means consistent 



tilth our broad political and military interests 3 to 

*. 

each of . the Co:v.:::uni3t dominated areas of the Par 
Zast and jo iopair their relations v/ith the Soviet 



i -■ c 



Do not agree to GrEC offensive actions against 

+ 

* 
...ainla- 1 Cofcaunist China, except under circumstances 



E oorcved by the President 



Agree to GHC actions 



* 






against Goftssizsiet China which are pronipt and clear 

» 
■ , 

. c^ w/-.i„ ,',c^.-.^,_ <%£££»*>..&,& s> a. 0;l-L.n^S3 vQIiijn uIIX o t* clbL/dCiC* 

provided such r: diation "is against targets of 

» 

" .....„.,,.. v< — j? wi^-C-; -t,v#G<.ii r «^<5 v. r ii_,OiI [!,coif U 9 *-)> OX J-l/t?jL ±ci aS 

to foaoibiiity ani chance of success and which are 



W ' - ♦ - 



dus coxsicLar-ation for- the un&fesira'bility 



■ * 



12^S 



SECBET • 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 


















O. Sji+jb X 



a 



f prv r clv-.^3 further Chinese Communist reaction 



-■-^--^ Taliban and the Perighus.-* '. - 

^ • * 

ft 

h. If any specific Issues arise in our relation 



•chirr'j v; 



■**v\ 



—■v3co v ":ir.cjd Comayniet regimes where eaiorus 



si he-otiation of these issues would seem to serve a 



W * * '•'** t"* ■£ '- ' i - 



'ore oared to negotiate such issues. 



« 









sgret 



-: rv 



191 a 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 













,— --. *- - — ■•:• 

v. - . ' - - I 

\ - ^ - 1 ' ■ . ... 



- 



THE* ; 20!XT CMIZFS C? S^*~> 
WASHINGTON 23. D. C. 



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2k evly 3£52 






TK. OINT STAFF 






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Subject: 



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Enclosure: 3r$£t ps^^st* U«S* policy i-* • t^o S&r Esst." 

■ 

lo Ehe Joint CliiefD of Staff h^/o recsstly fiipeusceS a cc£? 
ton^ivo ctudy on \£ia par 2nct p^epsred by the Jclut Strategic 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






1 



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GSSScttL cg:~s::lK;Av~;o:;3 


















] the area under consideration ecrpris:^ Jcp^n. the Byukyu Islands, 
. • * 

Oovem^atit of the Republic of Korea, the Gover-v^ent of the Republic cf China,, 

iLtdosiesiaj the Philippines, Thailand; Via* Sa&j I&ftstj Ctes&o&i&j th£ Fader&'sic 

of Malaya j Burr^j Corr^unist China. I-Iorth Korea, and ICorth Vict Ess* Per the 



Cfc*~* « 



■purposes of this psjssr, the area will be referred to as the 'Par S&3v* 

* 

^^ O *• A ** 1 r •« ^» »» — *■ *l -* * ♦*- -^- •« * v**— *»— »— » J 

2. The prin^ry problem of U-*3« policy in the Per g&et Is to cope xrith the 






sr-oh 






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reas 01 "Cii 



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x:a^t, 






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- 

3* the resins in Cor^unist Chi^ 









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W-..w 1-.WVJ-- 



(=5 ** Vil .^r 



p^d. lias ^ri '* '• A t ^ '* r ; .*- 1^ .- ■ ^ r~ &$nfe*t C/CP& c-^c\-'- ••'p - '*V""" r.c* 



* * 



- rel^tioris vith tho -Soviet Unio^. It po3es z: oonst^nt threat to the other 

3j&.^£onS 01 u^e I-i... a<^dv-« »CiA« vi^^_c 2_j Z-OVJ UO irt?2.SG-l u^ cuulCJ;.^^ ^.^ e&i-^j 
*CO2-JLr.*0Ce OS. wiiv rsglui^ i-vJi iU^J :.^_~^ Oi iurSbccj,^ Viii'SIl C^e :,i_.^:_^ OCGUi ^ 



*• 



ir.h are;: tly such regimes hsva elements of 



* _. .■ r> - 



rigi<i^y afid J instability vhich 



sccseti^es produce crises* Sie U^itad States imst be :.\ : :.y to exploit sny 
opportunities which nigbt occur a£- a result of siy i::ter ^hi ,. 







Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



" 



h. tie Cosssunist regjsss in ivorth Korea and Iforth Vict Sssb hnve ©sfcsblishsd 



» ■» » 









4 1 » • ^ 

depend heavily en sunport of ail kinds frosi the Sino-Soviet Bloc* * 









;■* "! •; r. t. '_» *?*v* 1 r~"-~1 



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- 

growth a^d the r^zjor effort of the Soviet Unior: to £^in jLnfluance in vh>i lo^s 

c::vohasis should o a placed troon economic growth of the frea,?er 2l£3t ccuvitri^i:^ 

- 

but this caasaot be at the sacrifice of adocuct^ socurity 2v:e^3urc:s^ for^ v/ith- 

oiit security and the stability and confidence deriving frcn security ; real 



economic -orosnecs will be lansttain&ole * 



WlTFal? S5SS ^JCSLD CC S33S 

., 'L, ."7~-lT'- i _ j_j^~. - — ■ - — — — — -— »■*- 

6. That -oortion of the 5Vir East not under Cc^nnnist ccntro]. dc£;s not 
re*or^£ent a unified a ar.aa« Rather ^ it is ch^ractariasd by inter- £e& intra- 









that el :t dafy ^DjAiticn by orderly pr : 



■• "i- •!? *■* "!•-;* 






**• V> 1^1 fill : "*"r"\ " •*» "* j^ 1 " "• * * 



'■ v rnvated by vTcVXcL War 






J-^* — 









1213 






Declassified per Executive Order L3526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






7. In Ltouthcust Asia tho intcttcu rvM^anulict foclli^j fed hy rooicltial 
resentaonts against European colonialism* coupled *rith a Wlfle-sp3r$a3 fceli: 



ir; 



-9> 4-V 



of weakness and inadequacy in tile iace of the woricL-vi&e porer strurplo, 

/ 
inhibit,/ certain of the countries from coopar&tisg closely with the United 

States* They are vulnerable ssiliterilyj and in varying decrees ,, politically^ 



* ^ 

economically, and psychologically, to Co:auunist e^ansionist efforts 



. At 



I 



• 



the seme tine., deep-seated antagonists and differing assessments of the 
threat divide them and severely hamper efforts to easbliie their collective 
resources for their own defense end \k- re. loot of the nations are on a 
marginal subsistence basis economically and depend heavily on outside aid. 









1 



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technical and administrative personnel ~ and their people are restless and 

have 
impatient "because they / not reali-edtbe dnv ,atic inprovernnts in their ■ 

% .andnrd of living that they azapect » They are politically nnive and have 



fe"^ leaders sufficiently ezaperiencea to provide proper en .stratic-n. 
Governments rise and fall vrith alarming frequency* 



8- Cn the other h^nd^ a possible source of strength for the froe vcrid 

position in the Far Llast is nationellsEi^ a dan-ant force in Asia Shicjh is 

■ 

directed towards the preservation of national independence and a^ain^t thane 



Mho are seen as trying to subvert or abric^a independents * Althcu^n th-re 






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pend.nce ana treys ci 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 









V33EIH 2BB UHI33D S5KSSS 



9» She U»S. feces a celicc.ua procneie m presecrcm;? res Fe,r j5&s"cern policy 
to the tforld. A U.S. policy sill not be very sy>:p-thetic*lly received if it 



is presented in the purely negative terras of preventing Co^unlst eirpav fon 



.or the reduction pf its po^er.. At tha sasis tii£3 5 difficulties of the United 
sHs^tes are multiplied by the way the Sino-SoviMt 31ce reveals the ever -ell 












a. The Sine -Soviet Bloc is a unicenter povier syetee: similar to that of 



'# 



the Chinese Coinnunists to present e, single picture } v:orld~vide > at an# 
given tivr.s £nd to shift rapidly its tvro fece:; ths;t are pre; eat id to the 

- 

■ 
vorlcl,, frozs herd to soft end the reverse, SStis is in the Leninist tr^~ 






aition of presenting to the opponent calculated parieds of te&sicp end 

* 

relaxation, thus tasting the opponent's vill to remain firm in the facs 

■ • 

^ Vii-^':;i/Di c~-C CO!! ^ZRUSUmL'Jt vw U.iSSQvOiliv DQI2~bOL^.;U-23,SijS ZlOv-733 ~o- £. 



peaceful solution to the problems between the tro Bices* 



b . The gorer nizent in 



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into ?ehin3 : s territory, Che United Stetee ie further pen^hized by the 



/viven tir^e sssy enpese ^::\.ve ciser> e^:^i.nt:; e~:onj its i::e;±.ere to the ivo:dd et 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






• 



timing of rf-ajor policy changes toward cither of their countries is dnnr" >:vi 



iroon the death or rctirermnt of tnc rccp^ctive president. Since tha thrca 
men \^e" firstly sponsored by th3*Unit^d<£tnti3 ; policy failure to support 
thc:a in the international arens^ or to allcvr the::- to" he , over thro \ra violently 
by the opposition in their countries ^ ivculd hava undesirable repareussions 
not only in thd nation- itself cut throughout the vorid* United States policy 

■ 

in the future should ^calc tc avoid ouch porsoucuL connitnants and should be 



f 



\ 



of the Far East that can surviva chan^ir^ c&iief o::ecutivoG with little or ^:o 



-> » 






13. The t^sk of the United States in coping V7ith the situation 



in the Par* East is complicates by tha- divergencies on policy vrith 



its .: 



* .*. 



to the poctura of the United St&tos toward China and the cn";nr.t to 
which political, and economic or^gsiires can oa aoplied as&inst the 



Cm - t » • "■ - m »t *| y^ » •% 






riunsn^ j^r-ancn^ an:, is^/ocr. 



.* . . .♦ . 






■»,'.. 






■ 

the two major povxer centar^^ of the Pan 1 ,n ; the Soviet ?kr 3ast 

! 

and Coi-mnv-nist China^ pro j acted into tho areas under- Fras torlfi 



O i . U *-?0 i. ? i i i c u ; I •;. *.• ©C DkraVvS :;*U 3 o ^.c- -L i i &C1G X*o u c^-L .1 o flia 






• n ' 



-. i * 



■ * 

* 

Hast outside the- Soviet Bloc. Certain past actions h:\v3 not on:: 
failed to furthan U,S, interests "but perhaps have hnnda:?wd f yon 









fphAV-rr- 13 



Cj _ i » • i - * • 









baa-**, a A • _, ._ — .' ,/„ 



■? -1 



unoo:nnit:uc:Cl to ezLunar sicia; ana. 



1217 



" 






I , 









Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 J 6. By; NWD Date: 201 1 



b. The tJnii&d States has attempt ad to gain adherence to 



i 

joining the United States/, 

■ 

* 

15, The p&opl-os of Asia concede that Ccna unlet China has 
exhibited a .total hostility tov:ard the United States* They ane 



r 



equally ready to admit that the U 6 S a harbors an intense dislike of 
the Chinese Ccvr^unists* They v;onld probably go further . end say 

-a.*. ■ 

that the United States h&tss Cosiim.inist "China* K6if3ve?j thay a: *e 



-• .:* 



China with U*S« actions aimed at that country* In their vistf, 2,1 



Un.3 f»03GD-J-JLcri? IS uO CJ..:pJ-coc: O^i DO\ril S.tCOi^ UI1*3 Ui.._uc-vi ovSr^Sti 

should be filing and ^efx^/ to ^eize evoay opportunity to ssbs2raa3.fi 



* a -. * *. 



s 



to suoooEtj if not accavaay encase in., any military aetivroii-e-. 

■ 
* ■ 

against Coraranist China to insure the da- eat of that conntny, Yet, 

thev find that the United States hnoka off its action in Xoaea 

nor-J Oj, a GOitipji^v^ cji.cc^ Oj. une — .. v -.: ^ -^ u--a^ — ^. ^ ., _,a. »„w.- ^.. -- — ^^-* 
» - • ■«-* 

its efforts in Indochina to "'force upon an ally a peace that 

the United States actively discouaase^ actions against Ca n:.Bt 
China and against Cc:av.anists els. ^ne in Asia on ths oant of 



- 



I 



■ 



attaclcingj by v/ords only, the Corsauat&t Chinese* As a result ^ 

* 
* 

the Asiatics are inclined to feel that the united States has a 

» 

pov/enfal emotional dislike of the Gainer e CbLS&unists \:aile a*: 



x2J.o 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



the same time it is physically afraid to translate that dislike 
to a trail of strength. They therefore can see no logical end 

« 

result to be achieved through ,0 /B , present policies 9 and no" 
benefits to themselves in actively joining the United. States . 



nations in Asia have been less successful than might be expected* 
due at least in part; to. its attempts to persuade the other 
"nations that they should join the Unit ad States in its holy 
vzar against Co anism^ regardless of the self interest of the 
individual Far Eastern countries. Such an approach has placed 
a needless strain upon the political friendliness of these 
countries for the United States* . Almost without exception these 
nations could 1 be shown that the basic clashes bet -re en the 
Chinese Communists and the United States are due to the I 

* 
i 

championing "oy the unit ad Stat £5 of the Proa .Nations on the ■ 
periphery of Asia, and its support' of their- freedom and national 
! asperations. He must strive to increase these Asians 1 undsr- 

* 
- 

standing that the self interests of the united States and thoise 



. 17. The maintenance or any effective military installation in 
a foreign country requires the acceptance by the government of 



i * 









trie need for such installation and cooperation on the oart o-~" 
that country. Base agreements and security treaties establishing 
these working relationships , to be effective^ must be sensitive 






■ 



1219 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 









18. Tha. United States could ; without fear of locs-of position; allcrcf its 

* • , 

Asiatic policy- to fee guidad *°y "^e ccnscBSUp of tha vital interests of the 



( 



Free World rations of the area, via-a-vis Co--ZSU22ist China and the Asiatic U3S2, " 



^-% 



■ 






-. r— +*?..- ^. 



• * 



■ * 

interast of these frea nations. At this tins, the^e nations have never 

* 

"* a ■ . 

* 
- 

criticise of U U S* policy and U*S- nethcds of handling its ^olicias ara una- 



■ '. 



* 



countries in the 






K1 !T\"V , i\*'f' ••%. j 



J- 



than ae:::ons-Graoan2 -cna"/ 



position of tha U::it^d St teSj rather 
resistance to the Sino-Soviet Bloa 

is in their pwa eallsLtsaea salf intare:i; 



* / 






-" ri 



1220 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



r 









. 



D. U.S. R0I3 33 3SS3 FiB E/.ST 



— t- 









I "53 AY —r-r-r- '.y 



19, Ehe uzsaerlyias purpose of U*3* gssis&g&CQ in the region is to aid ix* tb 
develqocant cf severe ssnts whose chj^etivos do not conflict with the vital 



■:. 



develop luor 






"» -• V- J 






cd^inistraticn; and gsreaotg' 'greater # el'legfaace in both _urbc;.i and rural dis- 






wr,.o: 



— ■ * r 

— **j 






because of atc::^ corruption: ^ or Q*o.asr L^ee£ons 7 th^ United States - shpislo. &C3»: 

■ 

thrcu^rh rc;6riei;tzitio:i to develop it c:: to influcnca tS^ establisbr«isnt of or^e 



•Ti .^» . 






that ao^s orrar sans no^a rcr tine ±\^cv^z« m so <±ol>::iz> tne United 5t:,;c3 

on zae 



should ^ira toward the dovelcni-^nt or? c system eaS institutions that cz 






chr agirig chifei exacutivos vith little or ro disruption 6? orderly ^pv^ys:::^:^ 









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Declassified per Executive Order 13326, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 









22. The tfcilsed ets,tes should continue to r:ahe cleo.r its GVn devotion to 

■ 

the principle of collective security,, its belief that regions! security 



arrangements provide sng^fbnsa protect ion at minir.-ra cost for all 



:■ 






.» .• * 



expectation that a country's aeexsxon *co perxxeiLpsxe in suen ax^ssigeisga&s 
is based op its a;n calculation of its best interests cud does not of itself 



constitute a el&fta for increased financial aido Where countries participate j 

measures to assure adherence ere desirable^ normally including preferential 
treatment in the fields of economic end military assistance as justified cy 
UcS* strategic objectives* Where new opportunities for affiliation develop. 



tuey should "be encouraged * The United States should^ however ; seeeu 






right of ench nation to choose its era ps,th to the future^ and should not 
exert pressure to urlce active elides of countries not so inclined* The 

* - i > 



i> 



even **> 





















— -.«/-.. .-.*?* T 



n\,o 






objectives respecting certain countries 






tendency to lusft the tpio objectives together ^ create a ISA? recvdre-..;nt ^nd ■ 



Dofense SutS&ort r^oui-^ont in the seae of national aocu-ity, sr.e 









this iioues ar-a ^sally political c::-c. r.o i?asl secur-imy i^-s$3*cjs« :.:: 
involved, thus seriously diluting the U.S. military aia swf^3?£a ••-^ 

- 

wide 3 without gd?ovidlng for U.S. military secuirlty, 
doWs tio't v in 'ssiy'wey abrosate'thc sa^i^emeat for^ mutually -^po-tir::- 
Kdlitnw a-^d political tDiolioi^s..' It does ev^^t, bo3fsv*s-, that 
there ce a clearer ftffia&peatioa b*twe$ii political and military 

t>ro-*?£3is ^.re iviore ef f oo'c;.v3 v *n^s i« ^ipo-^-^an v ov^&eas^ <u;a — ^-- 
of -rave iivroortanco dossstically :.n fining support in Cor^rass £.nd 



nwiA'W*(i $*V* *\* te-r- av**i r*^'*"- v>OG*0 ' 3* 



-100^ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NMD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



-p 



24* In Che event cT aggression against a .state^ the previsions Qi 

the- U*N* Chester* or the S3.-IEQ treaty should be Invoked; but ths 

i * 

.-* 

'Unite;?, States should not forego nacossary cation in behalf of such a 

cf the* possibility that other allies ciiffh-t 



■A J - *-v •£* *, r*. --* c *""* £> T* Sb C ! ;"^ C ■-• f 1 ". ■' * '* 



sea 



* 



•- 



be loBth to participate or to furnich more efcsn token military forces 



25* 






Of 









£» j-u _ 



resources or the 



countrie 



q 

-' 2 



it will : 



"i £» 



necessary for the United States to continue to hel*:> them deveioo 









and. of ^ 



I 

i 

leasts limited resistance to external agg2?ession Efforts should 

* 

also be undertaken to encourage the countries to carabine their 



collective resources for tneir oun defense 









/ 



future^ local will to resiot \rlxl expand s5?a£tly on a conviction that 
the United States will continue it^ .report and will maintain a 



military posture in the ?ar Hast that v;ill nariTdt it to s 3iot in 



N 



«. -*, / 






O^l' 1 















cl/JLOiiZi> iw Uii-JTOf.wt^ijSV.*.* ^-i3 UJ^vdU Duv.^'j- l,,UvL1U US >j/c ,.^Cw. ^O 






■V"^ 



*.r 



*^ .^ ^ 



fc&nce 






£:7o In order to preserve the territorial and political lr;tagr*ity 






.•r. 



c. 



»i -. 



-!.OD 



^'o do this, the United State 



Uifcl&b i..-.-.-LtJ u^-v-^ii i.v;d O^ni 



V- 












•*» 



•., 



l_ v : j 



£V - c« i ? '.- « a 



to 









X»*^ .; — -' 



*.» "H 



nav^q;j^ uiit-u ~*/ 






^ -* x*± 



- ' ' "*. **t * ■ 



C*i A", — »♦ - c 



.-^.. -• 



O ^>„.tj-J> 






JL \J J. ^ -^ 



■? \' •-. Cv ,'. c ■ ■ - •". " '.- * 






199H 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






no 



25, There H are n&£»s open to the United Ste^os to reduce Cc./.uun;-: 
China ! s "influence in the Par East and at the seme time under-taks 



force in the sres,* One of t&ese would ha Tor-ovision 









7> *-»' 



, 



ran^e policy for supao.?t of same form of military activities by 



certain nations against Co sunist Chin&j North Korea and hoi 



-th 



V: 



C\ J ~ '*~ •" Vft 






• * 



nuisance raids^ probes^ limited objective attacks and actions to 
rectify boundaries vrould be .carried out without overt U*S* support. 



■t -:- - > 



in sucn sxuua"cion 



it is invorobable 






one uoor^ i.M^ii 



4*>\ a 






calculation on Korea still fre^h in its memory, would overtly 
participate. This fact, plus the lack of ce$3M.llty ef '- hG oppcr.er. 
to destroy one another without big pevrar interference, viould tend to: 



f _ 



c- 



LlP*' 



.11. 






the 



szise oi 



the 



conflicts 1 



h' Put strains u*oon the relations o 






Chinese Com-nunieti 



and the USS?;; 



c* Keet> tiie 



-I 3 r:/"' RE "i",G * 



1 A -*- 



,-^v 



Sc»i/ej.j.lt.i;S ; 



ixorcn. :^orea ana 



£:or'cn 









off 



- 
• * 

dc 3a a sporadic drain upon the resources of Coi-^unist Chin*, 
(and to a lesser degree upon the USSR) to supply these countries, 
Shis would not be a wholly ne^ policy ^ but a return in general to 



* 



the one adopted by the United States tovrard the G3S operation 



/ 






Since 



J. L ,L & 



• • obvibus that neither purely defensive ^:ovas made to ueet actions 









• ' 












-♦-% 















, g 






1 



/ * r^ 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



* » 

29, Tile need throughout mast of the area for economic develop- 
cent provides the greatest possibility for- the exertion of out- 
side influence - either by the Free World or by the Gonsaunlst * 
3icc. Without considerable external help from some source,, most 



* 



of the governments of uhe area vjill be unable to satisfy "cne 



political demand for- rapid improvement in their standards of 

- 

.living and provide for sound economic development, Failure to 
obtain such assistance from the Free World will tend to drive 
these countries toward economic dependence on the ComsminiSu Sloe. 



The out corns ^ay be strongly influenced by the success with y.-hicn 
the Free World can cope with Cer^uunist efforts to exploit the 
Southeast Asian export problems, 5>h£ dramatic economic 
I * improvements realized by Co^vunist China over the past ten yea 



rs 



impress the nations of the region greatly and offer a serious 
I ; challenge to the ?ree World. Flexibility of CJ.3. procedure and 

rabidity of U.S. action is of increasing Importance if 

* • 

- 

i ■ effective advantage is to be taken of unexpected and transient 

opportunities # 



*-.< 



^U • .LlIO Uill,i,»V-U Ov'0.s/n-*j ilji^'LJil^J.^ UUU4.0 1I U.iv- II 1 w'ii~0 , ^;.Ui:L-l.*-.L4Li U DL/£.Vwl) 

of the area to formulate and execute programs designed to 
promote sound development*^ to demonstrate that they can achieve 
growth without reliance on Communist methods or &&>endenc-3 on 



* 



the Communist Bloc,- and to give their peoples a greater st = v ~- 
in the continued independence of their countri.es. 



*i r ■ n 



L226 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






31. The governments and "peoples of the nations niust be made 

to realize that the United States is seeking to develop 

« 

indigenous economies to the point of their being self- 
sustaining with ' a minimum of outside aid, and -chat pros; cts 

i 

for a healthy and viable economy depend upon association vith 
Free World nations rather than with those of the Sino-Soviet 
Bloc. Un:Uved States courses of action must be so de^i-ned ■ 
to' create favorable public toressicns immediately and to • 
maintain oublic support to fruition. To combat the effects 



of 



• » 



Communist aid programs t the United States mus'o nave 
orOKrams of its ovrn 



that are actively and openly 



<*KJ + l + .j'L* w— U-" v *~> . ; -L L' : 1 



jr Y: -s Q t* 



of 



• % -, 



4- r-, '- 



U;I 



ilS 31 






Effective use must be 






10 3 






grant aid to produce 



>i** ^ -•- 



o 



*' -V* ".-1 ,«-i /■"• 



and impassive result 






-i n 



- ■ 

of the peooldj ana loans should be siTmnr-estrictive as feasible 









p take prompt action to exploit any advantage or to ccunitar 



any disadvantage that ni^ht present itself. In ordor to 



strengthen the non~ Communist governments! o 



f the area and to 












a. Provide economic and technical assistance as 









to obtain u\S. ohjectivas. 



i 



±22.7 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



Serve 



to izjprove the climate :'cr driVa 



\m± V* — 



* M 



tiV*Jbi y. . . 



'*^ * * * ' W 



*^J 



.-. ,^ £* 



fl .'_ 



bo tn cio.ri8G"cic . ana xorexgn,, ana so encourage one &ax&iitgn 
investments of United States -jrivate risk capital in the 



area consistent with the 'prevailing climate. 



-» _•_ 



c . Sneourage zna nations zo contribute resources ana zo 



cooperate inuiti late rally to promote the eco rieinic grov;ch on 
an area or sub-area basis, ' 






V» 



■development ^ one of the major probleras which must be solved 






Such delays are the greatest single source of complaint on the 
to the freouently rapid responsiveness of the Soviet Bloc to 



.•r- . 









— ■ ■ • ■• ' 



0~> 






objectives of the United States in the 



Far 






cu. ^ : 



a/ Strengthening of the 






^ i 






i. c 






>-% 



£tl^i ;Ji ci v.. c; -L , : L.ic- Cv^cicu^ 



„..^ . /. rt .o .** 






.o.-._ 



■ "> ^ 



or the iree vroria countries or xne area 



■ 






.?s ' l ^.' l 



/-,**,. 



a.. necaicGion o:: ^nmec,3 uor^iunist pow^r nnc; pre^tis 

p WRVv"v!v : r>p c>~~' "!:^ t " Mnn^vlpf' pill ;* ^^ 






1 O o 






c; 



{ 






I 






/ 



1 * 



-. J 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



F, POLICY GU5IMNC3 

■ ■ * 

! ' I. POLITICAL 



34. With respect to the Free vJoi-ld c.r-ca cf the '*zi< Last, the 
U.S. over-all policy must be the umm?iering s^s>po^t of tjers?i- 

■ 

toxd-al c.nc political integrity against direct aggression, or 



subversion by the Communists and, at the sa^ie time,, support tne 






deveiopinent of ^ mutuality bi interests a&ong the free Asian 
N nations and between the;;: and the United States, 



35. 3?he United States over-all policy toward the Slno-Sovl* 

• > 
Bloc in Asia inust in* turn be an unwavering opposition to tha 

a ■ « 

efforts of the Sino-Sovlet 31oc to e;:pand Its territorial or 
•oolitical hegemony in Asia or the Western Pacific, 



30*. In the event of Communist overt an-i^d attack or Imzctiient 

threat of such attack against any country in the area not 

* < 

Qci± \jj j uns .tisiieics uo u.o* b^oiiiiuv jLti uer*©s t»s ^ouJ.0- oe £o &i&vc 






■ 
1 B 

.c.ci/t!^ »*/<i ■*"'*'- ■ 7-Vi.cv TV ^ •» v*.^,-" Qf,fli*A3 flhA^Trl .'• <"i"" -**T /■ -. "** i-r^va c- ^ r "vV c»^V*^ 1 ~. t"'~' 
O i l- BiO. OS *--a -^ XS S ^^.^ O ^ i. O i. o* o - iS U ^i-^ w/ c: Ci 1 • c. -/— O :'-4. , 



vievr such -a -situation so cravely th^t^ in addition to giving all 

* . ■ possible covert and overt eupport v/ithin the Executive Branch 

■ - •.- ■ 



authority^ the President should con : ler talking addit:-: 
action^ including the u^e of U.S. military forces. 



itv-l. 



1229 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






• 



o 



*. 
\ 



recognize the Governsi^rit c:-: tne. Rz'oxkQ±2 



,.» 



! 



^)0 • ULaiwJ.;.vV- w-o 

China as the only legal gDVQMESnfc of China and its right 



.-■: , iV, -f- 



e oi 



to 



i«w.f»e«.A.*j. p--.---^ ^ the United Nations- j UN agencies and othe: 



■■_ * _■» 



*• .„ A- 






:- 



i 



* 






f&>±* anal <?imnort f&r the GjIC and otherwise take steps to main 

*■■%■• 

tain and advance^! ts international standing. 



i 



* 



39. Continue to. refuse recognition oi the Chinese Communist 









Slight contribute to their international standing and prestige * 



such as 



the seating of any of these regimes in the United 



.'.. i , 



_* .• . 



-n 



Nations* its agencies j or other International organizations 



hO. If any specific Issues arise in our relationships with 



unrecognized Communist regimes where 



► <-o «**- 



enorus at negco 



j— -, ^- - - - 



un of 



these issues v/ould seem to produce a net advantage to She U.S.j 
be prepared to negotiate such issues. 



« 



41. Promote 



•> *• *■» ' £ "'*— «3 - --o y] 



the 



tenure 



iiid standing of friendly governments 



+ 

m ■ 



£J C "*»"^ O 






o. 



3 ."v .-» 



I— — 



-* ,*: -* -- ~ *' r> " " 



42, Consistent with our continuing aim* of encouraging 



0~--w 



democratic growthj especially respect for basic .human rights 



O -^ J 






/- 



governments^ tahing care 



avoid aligning ourselves irrevocah: 



_* j„ » . 



.?• ±.1. 



with one man as head or 






■ • 



4 



1230 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



: 



43. Show respect and understanding for the foreign policy 
position Of any free Par Eastern country^ v;hether allied or 

m 

neutral ., provided that country is striving to maintain its 

* 

independence from Communist domination or subversion. 



» 

+ 

* 

seek adjustments in arrangements governing the stationing of our 

■ 

.forces.. Stress the mutuality of interest and responsibility 
which devolves on local governments . 



215 



Continue 00 seelc appropriate means tc bring about an 



understanding by the Free V/orld nations of the mar-Ea^t of 
nuclear v/arf are , 



V ho. Encourage the growth of regional and ^ree World cooporaticn 

•ir-i *■ * ■" *"** • -i *"i "* - ivt^ d *■■> '■" <& 'y ^i ***, r? c 



^ 



o 



' . k7. Seek to allay animosities between various free Far Eastern cpun*cri«s, 
.urging 1- ration and ritual redact batman parties to the. dispute e eiis 
a2 ^tive role as ehamsl for communication and supplying good offices sfeer 
that would serve cur general interests- 



... - » - 



*m£ 



ivert ir.&aBS to promote ai-scoo^err* 



43. As feasible, utilize ov^rt ana cc^ 

1 

5 ! internal divisions within each of tha Gosununist dc-inated areas of the 7ar 
' £ nd to irnair their relations with the Soviet Union and with *ach 



Slid i~» V* j 



Vw* V**- ■— -V^ ■** 



i-.o Cc>ro--tibie with the security of U.S. cities whUe aoroaa, per...:/.; 

I 

travel of j£.ericar.s to Cossasalst China, north Korea, and Horth Viet ::;;-. 






1231 






. 



\ 



\ - 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Projecl Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



50. As one r&eans of seising the initiative In the Far Sast-^ the United . 
States should, at a propitious ti&isj permit and support certain fcrs&s of * 
military activities by certain nations against Connunist China, I3orih ICoras. 
and Ixorth Viet gfertu Ihese acttions could include reconnaissance In force, 
nuisance raids, probing actions,, limited objective attacks, actions zo 
rectify borders, or any other form that aay be appropriate as conditions </arran^- 



and proper retaliation 



against a 



Chinese CQSSBonist attack 



52- In its Pacific roi.e, tne Unitea States should be less influenced by 

its European allies than in respect to Atlantic affairs. 



II* KILI&ffiY 



53. -Ensure a strong U.S. military position in the West Pacific are&j pro- 

■ 

• viding for the security of the Pacific island chain > (japan Sea, South Korea ^ 

5^ UiHIiOi .DC^cl , J_c.L>. r £ni, O^w. _-—- oil— _.££- u^-Cj i\_- e& 2. t> OliijsU.ii ^ cL.Ijl Cav» -v_r_Lc: t_j__, 



.-> -■ 



eirec'Givej.y x 






Ifiilini 






\ 



5^. promote and strengtban our sbltilatfergi (ih .yO, iUSUS) and 

bilateril (vith Korea , GSC^ Japan and the Philippines) defense 
arrangements in the West Pacific and develop v;ider understanding 



ci e -.luon oitfrposes 



among all ou 






allies and ether Trxer.Cs m zpj 



Far 












r-i-ou^h the iSiitusl Assistance Prosrain and other _.;easur-3, 

the 



in the maintenance of Free Asxan nii-Lxtary icr-ces icr 



•i 

Df (1) ;V-aiiitai-vir-g internal security, (2) identifying 
i.-A c*.c-?.r,yi:-:S Coix^unist aggressicn, and (3) bosether Eifcfc tf.3- 



and other allied sailitaj 



-; *-_»r*v "" _ "37* 

i/ __- v i • w **- _> 






Co 






C_ A, , -s i- t- Ci -^ — \J -i ■ 



122a 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



........ HI.. ZCOIJWlLC . , 

So. Bo prepared to furnish economic and technical assistance % 
on a continuing basis over an extended period of time as can ' 






;>e used effectively (1) to supplement the domestic resources 



of certain countries receiving military assistance to enable 

i 

, m them to carry an otherwise insupportable defense burden without 

<- - 

politically disrOptive economic deterioration/,- and (2) to promo t 






f* ?*r»£»A fi'.o'i am r* n-nr> lTT*i i» « pfc p Wl'fcfi 



• • 



the steady economic development or iree Asian countries at c 
adequate to give their peoples a sfense of present progress and 
future hope and to strengthen their orientation toward the 

■ * 

Free VJorld. 



S. i'a '^~ 



5'/, Continue to assist in .the economic develooment of the 
area on a bilateral basis j while encouraging useful projects 



that have regicriU aspects; however., if there should develop 



genuine initiative and support by most of 



o 






* ■ 

institution^ and if the countries concerned are disposed to 
cooperate and to put substantial resources of their ov;n into 

it,, the U.S. should encourage such a proposal". 

* 

« • 









Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



,o 



<- - ~>kj -*■*■• ~--o 






i t - 



A.1 



J* tf> * * 



reufevrces ko*' pr-cmots- tne economic gzotrcn oz rree <..-..:' 



__--,._• V *** — * 






60* Scsoursge private, investment to provide an increaslilg 
shars of American investment capital and- technical know-how 
recurred for economic growths and encourage less developed 
countries to tlmiprove their 'investment climate for attracting 
U.S. capital. 



61. Encourarxe free Far East countries to orient their 






- / 
i 



economies tov:ard the Free World and to rely primarily on non- 
CcluVjniS't markets and sources of supply for trade,, technicians , 



capital development and atomic development. 



o2. 






-• 1 



f*» £Kt *l '. ■> J ^ Wl C* rs c; 1 ", V*A =1 T i"^ *> "1 «"* V* *"• -' C" f-"S 









%•—-. 






. *' 



of such countries for trade with each other and with the United 






C* 4- *~j J " e\ c? ^ ' *• ^ «**\ 



■e-Sa« 



''- „Tv CS 






World countries ^ bearing in mind 



that the. 



countries r 



long-ran- 






"-- 



is likely to be influenced by the decree to which they have fair 



& it* t* p --ft *t **n TT *s P* rp *•* ^ 



/* 






be shotrn to Asian pel" 



.:■-. ^" -! -*--" — •. --v*t. 






sal of commodity exports; utilise local cur ncy proceed;: 






interests . 



Of- . 1 - . I ; v* ^ *■"/"*■.*"■ *^ '"" *i T" C C C; ! 1 **\ ' ■> "" *"» '^ " 1 ". * ~ -."." i~: \ J *> *** »~* t"% ♦ t / 






• . - >■ , 



lib. 



-* -. *« 



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Declassified per Executive Order J 3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



SECRET 



OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD 



Y/ashington 25, D, C. 



-\ 



August 12, 1959 



REPORT ON SOUTHEAST ASIA (NSC 5809) 
(Approved by the President, April 2, 19-58) 
(Period Covered; From May 28, 1958 through August 12, 1959 ) 






i 



: 



( 



/ 









' A." Adeouacy of U. " 5. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia (NSC 5809) 

m ^ , i-t- ■ .- ii - . I I ■ —..-'' L' . • ' * * " ' ' ' ' .-■ -■ ..-■ ,-. 

m \ " 1 . ■ Review of .policy with respect to Singapore is recommended on an 

ux*gent basis,' in order to provide guidance for the new situation which has 

developed in Singapore with the granting of internal s elf -g overrun ent and 

.". ' the victory of the leftist People's Action Party on May 30, a development 

adverse to U. S, and free world interests. If this revision of policy is made* 

the review of U. S ft Policy Toward the Far East (NSC 5429/5) should be 
• ■ 

kept in mind, 

■ ■■ 

i • 

. B. Summary Evaluations of Progress made in Accomplishing U B St 

» m— — ^ ii -. i ■ ■ ■ i i i . I ■ ^^ ■ I I n. Hil l I ■ ! I -m , m >i ■ I I - . » - , u I m 1 , ■ » . ■ « , , i , , | ,iun. ».n I « a I 11 1 I, , i i i n — — « ■ n nnl 

Objectives 

■ »| "- ■ ■■' — r 

2. There has been substantial progress toward meeting the objectives 
■of NSC 5809 in most of the mainland countries of Southeast Asia* In Singa- 
pore, however, left-wing political elements won an overwhelming electoral 
. victory. Friction between. Cambodia and its pro-tJ. S, neighbors adverse- 
ly affected Cambodia's relations with the U # S« for some months but sub- 
sequently there was noticeable improvement. There has been an increased 
awareness of the communist threat. This increase was given new impetus by 
recent events in Tibet, The resolution of all governments in the area, ex- 



* 



cept those in Singapore and Cambodia, to t?Jke' a firm line in response to 
this threat was reflected in the political developments described below., 
United States political, economic, information and military assistance pro- 
grams have played a significant part in these developments, 

i 

■ .Regional cooperation in Southeast Asia has improved as a result not 
only of our own 1 efforts to promote political and economic cooperation nd to 
reduce specific areas of discord, but also because of increased Asian aware- 
ness of the Sino-Soviet threat and of the material benefits possible from 
•.regional development. This favorable trend has been facilitated by the fact , 
that the Southeast* Asian leaders feel able to work with. one another due to "' 

* ■ * ■ 

similarities in governmental practice and political philosophy. Aggressive 
Chinese Communist policies in Tibet and elsewhere in Asia have given them 
a sense of urgency to draw together; regionally The United States has 



i 






• 









, SECRET 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



SECRET 



' 1 



Unobtrusively encouraged these developments and supported sonie regional 
projects such as malaria eradication, a telecommunications system and the 
construction or improvement of trans-border highway's, taking care to leave 
.the. initiative with the Asian leaders. 



. 



■: 






■-* 



- ' ■ . 

■■■ 

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3, Burma, There has been substantial progress toward the achieve** 

joctives in Burma. The government of Prime 






merit of United States 

m 

Minister, Nc Wis h&s Introduced stability. and vigor into the conduct of Burma f p 
• domestic and international policy. The United States has encouraged the 
■ new Burmese Government to cooperate with the V/est and has made available 
substantial military assistance. The Burmese security forces have effec- 
■. lively .used U. S. equipment against insurgent elements within the country, 
. At the same time, the insurgents 1 relations with communist political organi- 
zations have been impaired by the arrest of communist political leaders 
..engaged "in liaison. Communist influence in labor, among the students, and 
in the press has been substantially reduced,' The government's information 
services have evidenced greater willingness to cooperate with the United 
States Information Agency and other United States services in psychological 
warfare against the insurgents and in general public indoctrination. 

In its international policy, the Nc V/in Government has made it 
clear that, although it may maintain an overt posture of neutrality because 
of its geographical position,, it considers itself, in fact, ideologically aligned 
with the West and looks to the United States for support and leadership in 

■; many fields. The Prime Minister has privately stated that he believes SEATO 
plays an important and useful role, and, while noting continuing Burmese 
sensitivity to open identification with the western powers, he- hopes to move 

" Burma gradually toward a public posture of closer identification with SEATO* 
Relationships between the United States and Burma are trior e cordial r" an 

. they have ever been. At Burmese request, the United States has agreed to v 
contribute substantially to the construction of a highway and university 
facilities as evidence of United States interest. By contrast, Burmese rela- 
tions with the Soviet's have deteriorated sharply, Burma is curtailing its 
trade and aid relationships with tae USSR and the press has been severely 
critical of Soviet Embassy conduct. In its relations with Communist China", 

-BuxTna has moved much more cautious'/ but is stiffening its attitude toward 
the Peiping Government, particularly in the matter of a border settlement. 



•■ 












* 



4. Cambodia o A resurgence of severe tension in relations between 
> — — — _. s ■ 

Cambodia and its neighbors, particularly Viet "Nam, resulting from Cam- 
'bodian conviction of Thai and Vietnamese involvement in two abortive anti 
Sihanouk plots, threatened seriously to frustrate United States objectives 
in Cambodia during the early months of 1939# Primarily because of our 
close association with the anti-comrnunist governments of Thailand and 



-> 



SECRET 



■ 



♦ 4" 



X s. I 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



■*„* 



* 






I 



** 



SECRET 



"Viet- Nam, the Cambodians also harbored strong suspicions of United States 
complicity in the coup plots and anti-American sentiment reached alarming 
proportions in February and March* -The Communists profited from the 
-'situation by actively identifying themselves with the Cambodian side in the 
dispute and by the fact that preoccupation with opposition "movements sup- 
\ ported by Thailand and Vict-Nam further distracted Cambodian attention 
' '-" from the threat of internal communist subversion* Communist influence 

in public information media continued to grow, although there is recent evi- 
dence of official alarm and attempts to right the balance in favor of a more 
strictly "neutral 11 news presentation* Repeated United States disclaimers 
. of support for anti-Sihantyul; activities, sympathetic United States responses 

to two 'messages from Prince Sihanouk, visits to Phnom Penh by high 
American officials and Cambodian fear of alienating the U*S* , have recently 
■improved relations* .At tiie same time, continuation of our economic and 

- military aid programs during the period of stress probably had a favorable 
effect On the Cambodian Government, In this context, relations between 
French and U*S* officials in Cambodia have improved resulting in better 
cooperation m our mutual efforts to further free world objectives. No 
further significant moves v/ere made by Cambodia toward the Sino-Soviet bloc* . • 

- .-Relations with Thailand became more cordial and the deterioration in Cam- 
^-< bodian relations with Viet- Nam was halted* These developments followed 

\ /.by elimination of anti-Western persons from the cabinet, point to a pro-V/est 
oscillation in Cambodia's orientation. 



■ 






-.1 



* 

■ 



■ 

-. 

■ 



.5. Laos, Progress has been made in furthering United States objee- 
lives in Laos, particularly with reference to the strengthening of Lao political 
leadership, the improvement of Lao relations with other Southeast Asian 
countries, and in providing for the training of the Lao National Army, Since 
the grant of special powers in January to a new cabinet, there are indications 

■ that the prestige and morale of the Communist N,eo Lao Hak Xat have de- 
terior cited, while those of the non- communists have improved* Stresses 

■ and strains continue between the older conservative leaders in the Lao Horn 
Lao and the younger elements* in the Committee for the Defense of Nation' L . ■ 
Interests although both groups continued to participate in the government 
and recently have evidenced greater willingness to cooperate in the face of 
the NLHX threat* For the first time since Laos became independent, the 

•- Lao .Government has recently been in a position to consider the long term prob-* 
lem of /Jercloping the rural areas. For instance, through the rural aid 
program, means have been made available to provincial administrators to 
help villagers carry cut email but important development projects, Re« I 
sumption of communist guerrilla activities in July may reVeal communist 
.recognition of their inability to make progress by "soft" tactics in the face 
_ of the improving Lao Government position, However, the military situation 
C remains unclear and there is no conclusive evidence as to the exact compositions 



■ 



SECRET 



«*I /*\ r\. 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i 



" ' . ■ ■ ' ■ "" " \- • " * " ' ■ - * SECRET 

, size and objectives of the attacking forces. Nevertheless, it is reasonable 
to assume that the attache were at least supported by the North Vietnamese 
Communists and that their minimum objective is the reactivation of the 
International Control Commission* Visits by the Foreign Ministers of 
the Republic of Viet-Nam, Cambodia and Thailand have served to improve 
the good relations of Laos with those countries and may pave the way for 
increased cooperation with Thailand and Viet- Nam, Strong British support 
of the Lao Government's opposition to communist efforts to reactivate the 
International Control" Commission was another encouraging development* 









.*■• * Although the Lao Government appears to have handled the insub- 

ordination of the former Pathet Lao battalion at Xieng Khouang in a moderate 
manner, this episode gives cause for concern on two grounds; first, the 
Lao Army displayed a disappointing lack of capacity to control a small 
scale internal security problem when it permitted the battalion to escape; 
second, communist bloc threats relating to this episode raised the possibility 

j ■ "that the blo,r may be planning either an accelerated subversive effort in 
support .of the Neo Lao Kak Xat or a more serious move in Southeast Asia, 
Discussions in Paris at the end of May resulted in a general reconciliation 
of French and American views on means of improving the effectiveness of 
the Lao National Army through American participation in training in a man- 

:• ner. that the French Government can justify in the light of its responsibilities 
sunder the 1954 Geneva Accords, The Lao Government has accepted French** 
American proposals, and a joint training program has been initiated. 



••( 



■ • ■ 

. * \- The generally increased pro-Western posture of Laos has included 
a greater appreciation of SEATO* However, neither the Lao Government 
nor the United States favors Laos joining SEATO at this time. 



-**■ 



at* ' 



- 



' 



. \ Monetary reform, including the adoption of a realistic rate of 

•'exchange and free convertibility of the Lao currency, was undertaken by. 
the Royal Lao Government on October 10, 1958, The reform has been 
• successful in virtually eliminating previously widespread financial and com- 
mercial abuses and in essentially holding the line on inflation* A number of 
'serious financial problems for the United States and for Laos, which existed 
. in varying degrees of importance prior to the institution of monetary reform, 
.remain unresolved; (I) Lao Government revenues remain strikingly low 
while expenditures have increased, thus aggravating the already sizeable 
civil budget deficit; (2) dollar reserves have substantially declined and have 
only been maintained above the "safe" level by periodic injections of cash 
grant dollars; (3) with the exception of POL (petroleum and other lubricants} 
products the use cf Procurement Authorisations for imports has almost 
entirely ceased* 



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SECP.E 









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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



' . SECRET ■ 

■ ■ r w 

' ' ' . ' 

1952 constitution* appointed a Constituent Assembly responsive to hio wishes,- 
and named a email, competent cabinet* The maneuvering of certain o£ hio 
colleagues to improve their chances o* supplanting him should hio health 
fail has waned with the renewal of hio vigor. He has need his power in such 
a way as to win public confidence* He has not cuceeeded in eliminating 
graft and corruption foom government, nor has ho furthered the development 
of democratic concepts and practices 



6^* 






' ' ' Sarlthas stressed hie desire to promote the economic develop- 
ment and the public welfare of Thailand. Efforts to promote foreign private 
investments have been initiated. United States technical and economic aid 
programs, as well as loans from the IBItD, DLF and Export-Import Ban!:, 
continue to provide a major impetus to Thailand's gradual economic progreo 
Although Thailand 1 , s economy is essentially sound its economic development 
continues to be hampered by basic deficiencies such as its dependence on 
fluctuating amounts of foreign exchange, earned through agricultural exports 
which are subject to weather and market variations; its lack of investment and 
management experience; a weakness in public administration including budget- 
ary management; and its inadequate transportation* communications and 
power facilities* . -■ ■ % 



■ 






[ • 

-- 



■ 






c 






1 






*. 



.- "v 



While some communist suspects arrested last October have been 
releasee*, the government has maintained its active anti« communist policy, 
ar4 the communists have been unable to resume public dissemination of 
propaganda* Some important ax*rests have been made recently but the Thai 
counter -sub version effort has not become sufficiently effective to stamp out 
covert communist party activities* , • . ; ■ ; • 

.Sarit.has frequently publicized the threat of communism and has 
declared Thailand's faith in SEATO. The Thai, who fear an expansionist r 
mainland Ghki&j have welcomed such signs of United. States resistance to 
communist pressures as our firm position on the Berlin issue and our 
immediate and effective reaction to aggressive Chinese Communist acts J 
in the Taiwan Straits last year. While for defense purpose Sarit desires 
continued substantial military assistance, he has recently indicated a preference 
for primary emphasis on economic aid. J* 



■ 



■ 
■ 



.9. Viet ~Nam • The Diem Government continued its strong political 
controls' which, while seemingly necessary at the time because of the internal 
security situation, continued to antagonize some of the Vietnamese elite. 
The government has shown par'dc^.r concern over em apparent mtensifica- 
tion of communist terrorism- a,nd sabotage intended to interfere with Viet«Nam ! s 

economic progress and possibly to disrupt the forthcoming national assembly 

- • * » 

' ■ '■' . SECRET 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



n 



SECRET 



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elections* The government has undertaken or planned such counter measures 
as the use of armed force, special military courts for the prompt trial of 
terrorists, the removal of peasants from isolated spots to larger villages, 
and the publicizing of internal security incidents to counteract the "peaceful" 
propaganda of the North Vietnamese communist regime*. Vietnamese mill" 
tary forces have improved under the MA AG training program, but the con- 
tinuance of training at present levels would be inhibited by any action of the 

, International Control Commission arising from its opposition to the indefinite # ^ 
retention in Vict-Nam of certain United States military personnel originally 
cent out for equipment salvage work and now largely used to supplement 
MA AG personnel in training duties* This necessitates efforts to work out 
with the Canadian, British and Indian Governments an acceptable basis in 
consonance with the Geneva Accords for an increase in MAAG personnel 
adequate to replace the special mission personnel referred to above. Imple- 
mentation of the United States aid project for restraining and re-equipping 
the Civil Guard has begun with the signing of the ICA project agreement with 
the Vietnamese Government and the despatch of ICA personnel to administer 
this project in Saigon* la spite of substantial U*S* assistance^ economic 

" -development though progressing, is below. that which is politically desir- 
able* \ .. . w " 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



SECRET 






THE SITUATION IN LAOS 



THE PROiLEM 

9 

. * . t * 

To estimate Communist capabilities and short-run intentions in Laos, and to esti- 
mate the reactions of Communist and non-Communist countries to certain contin- 
gent developments. • 



CONCLUSIONS 



? 1. We believe that the Communist re- 
sumption of guerrilla warfare in Laos was 
primarily a reaction to a stronger anti- 
Communist posture by the Laotian Gov- 
ernment and to recent US initiatives in 
support of Laos. We consider that it was 
undertaken mainly to protect the Com- 
munist apparatus in Laos and to improve 
Communist prospects for gaining control 
of the country. (Paras. 7-8) 

2. The Communists probably believed: 
(a) that guerrilla warfare offered some 
prospects— at: low risk— of promoting 
Communist objectives in Laos even if the 
Laotian C .'eminent received substantial 
moral and material support from the out- 
side, and (b) that military forces which 
the West would be likely to commit inside 
Laos would be indecisive against the 
flexible Communist guerrilla tactics. 
(Para. IS) 

3. Wc estimate that the Communists in- 
tend to keep the risks and the costs of 

m their action on a low level and they are 

*' not likely in the near future to resort to 

large-scale guerrilla activity, at least so 

long as the UN fact-finding mission is in 

Laos. (Pur a. J 9) , 



4. Most uncommitted and anti-Commu- 
nist countries would probably support 
Western intervention in Laos if they were 
convinced that the Laotian Govern- 
ment's position was grave and that there 
was direct Communist Bloc support of 
the Laotian rebels. In that event, they 
would prefer that such action be taken 

under UN auspices. (Paras. 24-25) 

• 1 

5. Hanoi and Peipmg have warned that 

any foreign military intervention in Laos 
would be considered as a direct threat to 
their national security. However, de- 
pending partly on the scale and nature 
of the military move, the Communist mili- 
tary reaction to the Western interven- 
tion, whether under UN, SEATO/or US 
auspices, initially would probably take 
the form ,ox further covert North Viet- 
namese intervention rather than overt in- 
vasion. There probably would be less 
effort than at present jto camouflage this 
intervention. This Communist action 
might, in the first instance, be limited to 
seizing substantial territory in Laos — 
such as Sam Neua and Phong Saly prov- 
inces — which we believe they could do 
under existing conditions with an aiiG> 



SECRET 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



SECRET 












l 



mentation of present guerrilla forces, and 
then using this situation for political 
bargaining purposes. The Com/, /lists 
would probably be prepared to accept a 
prolonged and unresolved struggle, par- 
ticularly if the country were geograph- 
ically divided. If non -Asian forces were 
committed in Laos, the likelihood of an 
overt Communist invasion would in- 
crease, 1 {Para. 21) 

6. If the Communists should come to be- 
lieve that a .Western intervention ap- 
peared capable of resolving the conflict 
and establishing firm anti-Communist 
control over Laos, they would then face 
the difficult decision of whether to raise 
the. ante further, possibly to the point of 
openly committing North Vietnamese or 
Chinese Communist forces to the fighting. 
We estimate that both Communist China 
and the USSR wish to avoid serious risk 
of expanding the hostilities more broadly 
into the Far East or beyond. We believe, 
therefore, that the Communists would 
seek through various uses of diplomacy, 
propaganda, covert action and guerrilla 



'The Director of Intelligence and Research, Dc~ - 
paftment of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff 
for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the 
Assistant G it-f Of Naval Operations for Intelli- 
gence, Department of the Xavy; and the Director 
for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, would delete 
this sentence, believing that it oversimplifies 
the factors which might lead to an overt Com- 
munist invasion: 



warfare to cause the West to back down. 
If, however, the Communists became con- 
vinced during the course of a series of ac- 
tions and counteractions that the US in- 
tended to commit major US combat forces 
into Laos, we believe that the odds would 
be better than even that the Communists 
would directly intervene in strength with 
North Vietnamese and possibly Chinese 
Communist military forces.- 5 (Para. 22) 

•The Assistant Chief a Staff, Intelligence, USAP 
believes that the likelihood of overt interven- 
tion by Chinese Communist or North Vietnamese 
forces would be significantly reduced if the Com- 
munists were convinced that the US would not 
limit its coimtoropcrations in an expanding con- 
flict to the territory of Laos. 

a The Director of Intelligence and Research, De- 
partment of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff 
for Intelligence, Department of the Army; and 
the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for In- 
telligence, Department of the Navy, believe that 
the last sentence of "this paragraph overstates 
somewhat the willingness oi" North Vietnam and 
Communist China to use major military force 
against the US in the Laos situation, and there- 
fore would dctcte the sentence and substitute the 
following: "If these measures failed. North Viet- 
nam, and possibly Communist China, might re- 
sort to at least a show of military force In a last 
effort to make these pressures on the West effec- 
tive, and the risks of overt Communist military 
intervention would thus increase. In the end, 

. however, the Communists would be unlikely to 
press such use of force to a point which in theft 
estimation would approach serious risk of la^ge- 
scale hostilities/ 1 The Assistant Chief of Staff 
for Intelligence, Department of the Army, would 

. add the following clause: "particularly if they 
were convinced that the US would not limit its 
counteroperatious in an expanding conflict to 
the territory of Laos." 



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DISCUSSION 



I. COMMUNIST INTENTIONS IN LAOS 



* ■ 



i 



7. We believe that the initiation of Communist 
guerrilla warfare in Laos in mid-July was pri- 
marily a reaction to a scries of actions by the 
Royal Lao Government which threatened 
drastically to weaken the Communist position 
in. Laos. For a period of about one year after 
the November 1957 political agreements be- 
tween the Laotian Government and the Pathet 
Lao, the Communist "controlled party in 
Laos— the Nco Lao Hak Zat— attempted to 
move by legal political competition toward 
its objective of gaining control of Laos. The 
Laotian Coverm.. , had taken counteraction 
which chec>.jcl this effort Moreover, the US 
had stepped up its activities to strengthen the 
Laotian Government, notably through the de- 
cision to send military training teams, and 
clearly was increasing its presence in Laos. 
The Communist advance in Laos was losing 
impfefrus. To the Communist world, the fu- 
ture probably a] peared to be one of increasing 
political repression, declining assets, and a 
strengthened anti-Communist position in the 
country. . 

8. Hence we believe that the current crisis was 
initiated mainly in order to protect the Com- 
munist apparatus in Laos, to stop the trend 
towards Laotian alignment with the US, and 
to improve Communist prospects for gaining 
control of the country. Judging by Commu- 
nist propaganda and diplomatic representa- 
tions, and by the scale of guerrilla activities 
to date, it does not appear that the Commu- 
nists expected by military action to overthrow 
the Laotian Government and seize control of 
the country. They may have believed that 
the government would be intimidated into 
immediate concessions, restoring at least a 
major part of the legal and political position 
which the Communists had enjoyed after the 
1957 agreements between the Pathet Lao and 

* the government. We think it more likely, 
however, that the Communists expected a re- 
newal of strife in Laos to alarm the world at 
lavjte and to produce a widespread demand for 
restoration of quiet, and that they hoped thus 



to bring about through international action 



o 



a return of the International Control Com- 
mission (ICC; to t*ans. Under the ICC the 
Communists had enjoyed substantial advan- 
tages, and they probably expected to enjoy 
them again if the Commission returned. 

9. Whatever their initial aims, the Commu- 
nists undoubtedly were prepared to adapt 
their tactics and their objectives to the devel- 
oping situation, and even to press on towards 
an overthrow of the government and control 
of the country if the prospects for such ac- 
tions developed favorably. They may als 
have in rnind, as a feasible intermediate aim, 
the re-establishment of Communist control 
over the provinces of Sam Xeua and Phong 
Saly, and possibly the formation of a rival 
government in those areas as a springboard 
for future subversive efforts. 

10. The Chinese Communists probably have 
certain interests in the present crisis in addi- 
tion to those of North Vietnam, It is basic to 
Chinese Communist policy to oppose vigor- 
ously' the strengthening of anti-Communist 
regimes in the area of their interest in Asia 
and to resist the strengthening of the US posi- 
tion anywhere on* China's periphery. The 
Chinese Communists probably also wish to 
demonstrate to Southeast Asian governments, 
particularly the neutralist ones, that they can- 
not turn toward the West without serious 
risks. Although Peiping may well wish to 
emphasize its importance on the world seem 
and may regard the Laos crisis as useful for 
tl: " s purpose, this is probably no more than a 
bonus effect. 

11. Soviet interests in the current crisis in 
Laos are more remote than those of Peiping 
and Hanoi. The USSR probably views* the 
current actions of Hanoi and of the Commu- 
nist guerrillas in Laos as;a reasonable applica- 
tion of basic Communist revolutionary doc- 
trine and in line with worldwide Communist 
interests. It is probably willing to let Pei- 
ping and Hanoi work out the details so long as 
the situation does not appear to risk major 
hostilities with the West. Moscow's propa- 



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ganda has concentrated on charging the Lao- 
tian Government with violations of the 3954 
Geneva Agreements, but on the whole, Moscow 
nas continued to follow a more restrained line 
than Hanoi or Peiping". Soviet restraint on 
this question is likely to continue at least as 
long as the current high-level East- West dis- 
cussions are underway* ; 

IL PROSPECTS FOR GUERRILLA WARFARE 

12. Many conditions in Laos, especially in the 
northern provinces of Phong Saly and Sam 
Neua, are favorable for Communist guerrilla 
warfare. The country is mostly jungle cov- 
ered mountains. It is sparsely populated. 
Most of the people live to small isolated vil- 
lages connected only by foot trails and water- 
ways, The few; roads which do exist, except 
those in the immediate vicinity of the major 
towns, are little more than jeep trails. Fur- 
thermore, the supply routes from Hanoi into 
Sam Neua and Phong Saly provinces and into 
central Laos are considerably better than 
those from Vientiane. Air facilities in Laos 
are limited. The two primary airfields (Seno 
and Vientiane) have a year-round capability 
to support medium transports with limited 
loads. Three secondary airfields (Luang 
Prabang, Pakse and Xieng Khouang) can 
support light transport operations on a year- 
round basis. The remaining airfields are of 
marginal value, particularly during the rainy 
season. Communication- facilities are inade- 
quate even for minimum administrative re- 
quirements in peacetime. Vientiane has ra- 
dio communication with the provincial capi- 
tals and the regional military commands. 
Most villages, army outposts, and self-defense 
units must depend upon runners for commu- 
nication with higher authorities. 

13. Current monsoon rains hamper Laotian 
Government military operations and logistic 
supjcrS rr.cre than they do Communist gucr- 
:".::.%. y>;^:V/-,> T:ji r*;r.y season generally 
:-:■.' r-:^ i:yy:\ ::./>;v';>V';.T.bor to mid-October 
slr.fi U foU&md hy a five-month dry season. 

hi The social and political situation also of- 
fers favorable opportunities for Communist 
guerrilla and psychological warfare* The au- 



thority of the Laotian Government has never 
been thoroughly established throughout the 
nation, due in part to the physical character- 
, istics of the country and in part to a general 
lack of interest by the ethnic Lao governing 
elite, which is concentrated in Vientiane and 
Luang Prabang. People of Lao stock make 
up only half of the population. These con- 
siderations have inhibited [the development of 
a Laotian national spirit, or identification with 
the central government. The common peo- 
ple of Laos, especially those in the villages, are 
superstitious and simple folk highly suscepti- 
ble to rumors, propaganda and intimidation. 
Communist psychological warfare has been at 
least as effective as armed action in the cur- 
rent effort. 

15. Government authority has been especially 
weak in the northern provinces of Sam Neua 
and Phong Saly which were under Pathet Lao 
control until late 1957. During the lull be- 
tween the 1957 Laotian Govcrnmeni-Pathet 
Lao agreements on unification and the re- 
newal of Communist guerrilla activity in mid- 
July of this year, the government had made 
only a beginning in the process of re-educating 
the population of these two provinces away 
from Communist influences, or away from 
their traditional trade ties with northern Viet- 
nam. This is particularly true among the 
Kha, Mco and Black Thai tribal groups, who 
mountainous domain straddles -the Laotian- 
North Vietnamese, border. These tribes, 
which make up about 50 percent of the popu- 
lation of Sam Neua and Phong Saly provinces, 
have traditionally been antagonistic toward 
the Lao people and government. \ 

16. Most of the guerrillas in the northern 
provinces are ex-Pathet Lao soldiers, ant. Mco 
and Black Thai tribal people. Elements of 
the Pathet Lao battalion which refused in- 
tegration and escaped to North Vietnam are 
probably involved. It is almost certain that 
many of the guerrillas now .engaged have re- 
ceived training in North Vietnam, that some 
supplies and equipment for the eurivv.; eleva- 
tions have been provided by North Vict:ia::i, 
and that the guerrillas move into nr.cl out o: 
North Vietnam as necessary.' The total num- 
ber. of guerrillas involved up to the present is 



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relatively small— probably 1,500 to 2,000 at 
most. Although this may represent the ma- 
jor portion of guerrillas recently indoctrinated" 
and trained for operations in Laos, the Com- 
munists probably have considerable additional 
potential strength. Although we have no 
conclusive evidence of participation by North 
Vietnamese, we believe it is almost certain 
some are involved in" the, guerrilla activity, 
particularly in coordination, communication, 
and advisory roles. Lao rebel capabilities are 
directly proportional to the amount of assist- 
ance provided them by North Vietnam. 

17, We believe that if, under existing condi- 
tions, the Communists made a vigorous effort 
through guerrilla warfare to seize San) Neua 
and- Phong Saly provinces, they could succeed 
in doing so with an augmentation of present 
guerrilla forces by additional guerrilla forces 

• and logistic support from outside Laos, and 
without involving the use of regular North 
Vietnamese un-ts. Sam Neua town itself, 
which has special political and psychological 
importance for the Laotian Government, 
might be able to hold out for a considerable 
length of time, particularly if loyal troops 
elsewhere in the province conducted effective 
guerrilla action against the Communist guer- 
rillas. However, problems of logistic support 
and morale, if not corrected, could lead to the 
fall or surrender of Sam Neua town. Al- 
though the loss of the two provinces and par- 
ticularly of Sam Neua town would be a serious 
blow to the Laotian Government, we do not 
believe that it would lead to the collapse of the 
government's will to continue the struggle, 
particularly if it appeared that effective help 
would be forthcoming. 

18. The considerations discussed in the para- 
graphs above probably caused the Communists 

- to believe: (a) that guerrilla warfare offered 
some prospects — at low risk — of promoting 
Communist objectives 1 in Laos even if the Lao 

, Government received substantial moral and 
material support from the outside, and (b) 
that military forces which the West would be 
likely to commit inside Laos would be inde- 
cisive against the flexible Communist guer- 
rilla tactics. 



REACTIONS TO CERTAIN 
DEVELOPMENTS 



l 



CONTINGENT 



39. We do not believe that the Communists 
will resort in the near future to large-scale 
guerrilla activity, 'such as an attempt to lake 
Sam Neua, at least so long as the UN fact-find- 
ing mission is present in Laos. The Commu- 
nists will make special efforts to conceal evi- 
dences of outside participation and will prob- 
ably reaffirm offers to negotiate political 
differences with the Laotian Government. 
Moreover, the US has already set in motion 
certain military preparedness measures in the 
Far East. It is possible that these or similar 
moves might, cause the Communists to keep 
guerrilla activity in Laos at a low level for a 
considerable period. 

20. If, however. Communist armed action in- 
creased in scale and effectiveness, cither in 
the near future or at some later time, and if 
Laotian appeals for outside assistance did not 
result in quick and favorable response, it is 
probable that Laotian morale would rapidly 
decline and the will to resist would wither 
away. Such developments would have wide- 
spread adverse repercussions throughout neu- 
tral and non-Communist elements in. South- 
east Asia. 

21. Hanoi and Peiping have warned that an; 
foreign military intervention in Laos would 

"be considered as a direct "threat to their na- 
tional security. However, depending partly 
on the scale and nature, of the military move, 
the Communist military reaction to the West- 
ern intervention, whether under UN, SEATO, 
or US auspices, initially would probably take 
the form of further covert North Vietnamese 
intervention rather than overt invasion. 
There probably would be less effort than at 
present to camouflage this intervention. This 
Communist action might, in the first instance, 
be limited to seizing substantial territory in 
Laos — such as Sam Neua and Phong Saly 
provinces — which we believe they could do 
under existing conditions with an augmenta- 
tion of present guerrilla forces, and then using 
this situation for political bargaining pur- 
poses. The Communists would probably be 
prepared to accept a prolonged and unresolved 



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struggle, particularly if the country were geo- 
graphically divided. If non-Asian forces were 
committed in Laos, the likelihood of an overt' 
Communist invasion would increase. 1 

22. If the Communists should come to believe 
that a Western intervention appeared capable 
of resolving the conflict and establishing firm 
anti-Communist control oyer Laos, they would 
then face the difficult decision pf whether to 
raise the ante further, possibly to the point 
of openly committing North Vietnamese or 
Chinese Cojnmunist forces to the fighting. 
We estimate that both Communist China and 
the USSR wish to avoid serious risk of ex- 
panding the hostilities more broadly in the 
Far East -or beyond. We believe, therefore, 

' thftt the Communists would seek through 
various uses of diplomacy, propaganda, covert 
action and guerrilla warfare to cause the West 
to back down. If, however, the Communists 
became convinced during the course of a series 
of actions and counteractions that the US in- 
tended to commit major US combat forces into 
Laos, we believe that the odds would be better 
than -even that the Communists would di- 
rectly intervene in strength with North Viet- 

' namese and possibly Chinese Communist mili- 
tary forces, 5 

23. The Communists would probably counter 
the unilateral introduction of "volunteers" or 
regular military units from South Vietnam 
and Thailand with the introduction of North 
Vietnamese "volunteers." 



•See footnote to Concision 5. 
■ See footnotes to Conclusion 6. 



24. The uncommitted and anti-Communist 
countries of the world would view with alarm 
a Communist takeover of Laos, but are fear- 
ful that a Western intervention in Laos might 
lead to the outbreak of a major war. Never- 
theless, most of these ' countries, including 
most members of SEATO, would probably sup- 
port such intervention if they were convince 
of the gravity of the Laotian Governments po- 
sition and of direct Communist Bloc suppc 

of the rebels in Laos. The findings of the UN 
Security Council subcommittee will almost 
certainly have an important influence in this 
respect, 

25. If the uncommitted and anti-Communist 
countries accepted the need for [intervention 
in Laos, they would prefer that such action be 
taken under UN auspices. If dispatch of a 
UN-led force were blocked by Communist dip- 
lomatic opposition, intervention by SEATO 
would probably be supported by most Free 
World countries despite the strong dislike of 
some neutralist nations for the SEATO con- 
cept. On the other hand, SEATO failure to 
move effectively in response to a Lao appeal 
for help would not only endanger the existence 
of SEATO Hscii but would seriously weak 
the confidence of the non-SEATO states of 
Asia in the West's determination and ability 
to defend them from Communist attack. 

2G. US military intervention, such as the dis- 
patch of troops to Laos, in the absence of broad 
acceptance of the need to intervene would' 
probably have little support even among the 
anti-Communist nations. Our SEATO allies, 
hoy/ever, would probably support us although 
most might do so with considerable reluctance. 



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Oct 20 1959 



REFER TO I-l6,OUl/9 






MEMORANDUM FOR THE DI RECTOR P JOINT STAFF 
ATTENTION: DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE 

SUBJECT: North Viet-Namese Military Establishment and 

Capabilities 



The International Control Commission (ICC) has requested 
that the Government of Vietnam furnish them information re- 
garding U.S. plans for reduction and/or phase out of TERM in 
Vietnam. The Department of Defense has requested that the 
Department of State obtain approval from the ICC for an increase 
in the MAAG ceiling before providing the information requested. 
The Departments of State and Defense have agreed that Canadian 
and Indian members of the ICC should be briefed and requested 
to support the U.S. position. In order to bolster the case 
for an expanded U.S. training program, it is requested that 
the Director of Intelligence, Joint Staff, prepare an esti- 
mate of North Viet-Namese capabilities and appraise the un- 
stable political and military conditions in Laos. It is 
recommended that the estimate be prepared with marginal notes 
indicating what Information is releasable respectively to 
Canadian and Indian nationals. 



(Signed) Charles H. Shuff 
Deputy Assistant Secretary 



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OPERAT 1 ONE C OORD IKAT IN G B OA.?J> 



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'. ' • . ■■•••••.-■ February 1 0„ 1960 . • 

* I 

. • - * 

' SPECIAL REPORT ON SOUTHEAST ASIA (NSC 5809) .: ' 
; - * • • ; (Approved by the President, April 2 f 1953) 

{Period Covered: From August 12, 1959, through February 10, "I960} 



.ADEQUACY OF U.S. POLICY IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA (NSC 5G09) 

- 

» 

'1» The validity and implementation of U. So Policy on Southeast A^ia 
has been appraised and evaluated in the light of operating experience. It 
is recommended that the National Security Council review those parts of 
'the policy which pertain to Cambodia and Laos, The basin for this record"; 
mendation is as followo: -. 

.... * 

Cambodia (Paragraphs 39 through 4Z) 



2, The major difficulty 'is encountered in the present wording and con- 
text of paragraph 39» Owing to the evolution of political conditions in 
Cambodia over the past 18 months, this paragraph appears misleading in 
that it docs not provide guidance for dealing with Prince Sihanouk and the 
political strength he representSj but rather implies that we should encourage 
non-communist elements whether or not they are opposed to Sihanouk* The 
latter has emerged with added power and prestige from the abortive coup 
plots and subsequent subversive activities mounted against him in 1959 by 
ostensibly anti-communist elements. In the process many of these elements 
were eliminated and the revelation of their real or fancied association with 
the United States and other free world countries undermined Cambodian 
confidence in U. S. motives and became , an obstacle to the pursuit of our 
objectives* Moreover, Sihanouk has given further evidence of political 
astuteness in the domestic arena, has displayed increased alertness to 
communist subversion* and has shown no inclination to tolerate any challenge 
to. his pre-eminence* Policy guidance, therefore, should be directed con- 
spicuously and specifically at the problem of dealing with Sihanouk, by all 
odds the major single factor in Cambodia and the principal target of U* S« 

policy* .'-..- 

■ 

3« The other courses of action for Cambodia (paragraphs 40 tjrcough 42) 

remain valid, bv,t fail to take into account the particular forms in which 

certain general problems are encountered in Cambodia. In revising the 

NSC paper, consideration chould be given, to the following additional pomes; 



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a. It would seem desirable to acknowledge the acute sensitivity 
of Cambodians to the U. S. attitude tQv/ard Sihanouk's brand of neutrality 
and to reinforce the general guidance on this question given as a regional 
course of action inxparagraph 14 by mnrc specific treatment in the country 
section* 






V 



b# Another problem v/hich probably merits specific attention is 
the presence francaisc iii Cambodia* Guidance on U* S» policy toward ■ . 
the attempt to maintain French influence in Cambodiai and on the use of this 
influence in the furtherance of U* S. objectives, would appear desirable. 






;-' "~" ■' • c. Paragraphs 40 and 41, dealing with U. S. aid, probably could 

Be 'revised to reflect the fact that our military and economic assistance 
programs in sensitive fields are essentially preclusive in nature raid to I 

prrivide clearer guidance on the use of U. S« aid to prevent communist 
penetration*, . ■ 

d. Finally, the guidance on Cambodia's relations with its neigh- 
bors might b.e strengthened to reflect the greater significance this problem 
has assumed in recent months and consequently the more urgent need for 
the U« S. to exert a- moderating influence, • . • 



2 



^ 



Laos (Paragraphs 43 through 49) 

- | _| . ' ■■ ' — ^ -..- I II I ■ !■ ■ I ■ »■ < ■ ■ 



' #4. Both the internal political situation and the country's external ■ rcla- 

v . • t. 1 ' 1 ~ - „ * *.£ -3 « i_ t . _ ^ • _ ^ _ nu-rr* s~* r n r\f\ . _ .1 /a ft *i \ fs r. f 



' • 



.«% 






tions have evolved considerably since NSC 5809 was approved (April 2, 1958). 
' and the guidance contained in paragraphs 43 through 49 is not entirely ade- 
quate -in the light o£ operational experience* "---"'. ■ * 

♦5. More specifically, our problem in the last few months has not been 
il to strengthen the determination of the RLG to resist subversion" (P. 43} 
or f, to prevent La© neutrality from veering toward pro-communism rf (P. 44). ** 
Without minimizing the importance of these objectives, . our immediate- 
operational problem has been to persuade the Lao leadership from taking 
too drastic actions which might provoke a reaction on the part of the North 

- 

Vietnamese and which might alienate free world sympathy for Laos —as for 
' instance, outlawing and eliminating by force the NLHX, or taking a hard anti- 
communist position in international affairs* . 

* 

■ 

6. Again, the events of the past summer have strengthened the belief 
. of the. Lao in the UN "and have satisfied them that SEA TO and, more imp or- 
"tantly, the U> S w would come to their assistance in the evei^t of armed 
conflict with the communist bloc. Therefore, the question now is not to 



a* 



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"develop an attitude of confidence on the part of tlii Xia« leaders" (P» 45) 
in UN, SEATO and U« S^ support, but rather to make these leaders assume 
a greater sense of responsibility and .take into account tho international 
reper erosions which their actions may cause* ^ • < 






■ '*'■ 7 # The entry of the UN into Laos posee new problems but also offers 
new opportunities to satisfy the increasingly felt yearning for progress* It 
creates a new factor in Lao foreign relations which will henceforth have to 
be taken into account/ 



• 8, In summary, it is consaaered that tho language of the policy paper 
no longer applies realistically to existing conditions in Laos and does net 
provide guidance for our position regarding the assumption of now responsi- 
bilities by the United Nations. ' ' 



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Attachment: 



Laos: Political Background 






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LA OS: POEITICAE BACKGROUND 












9 # J" April 1958 an electoral campaign was under way in which the Neo • 
Lao Hale Xat, the communist-front party, was permitted to participate* The 
campaign was being fought for 21 seats to the National Aosex*nbIy in fulfill- 
ment of a provision of the Political Agreement which had been signed be- 
tween the Royal Lao Government and the communist dominated Pathet Lao 

.'the' previous November* This agreement had also provided for the entry of 
"'two Pathet Lao leader 6 into the Cabinet* The Military Agreement, signed at 
the same time, provided for the integration of two Pathet Lao battalions into 
the Lao Army and the demobilization of the balance of the Pathet Lao forces*"; 
In sum, with communist and fellow-traverlcrp permitted to enter the Cabinet, 

■' the administration, the army and the National Assembly, the fate of Laos 
appeared in the spring of 1958 to bo cloudy indeed* The results of the elec- 
tions, which we re, held in May, confirmed our fears* 1 The Neo Lao Hak Xat 

. and a satellite party won 13 of the 21 seats at stake, giving clear evidence 

of the party 1 a strength and or gamzation* " \ " * % \- '*' ■ 

■ « 
- 

* 10. Since then, anti- communist elements have taken a firmer stand 
toward the NLHX and a take-over by peaceful .means, which we may pre- 
sume the PL anticipated and we ourselves feared, does not appear to be an 
immediate possibility* 

^ 11, The election results gave ant i- communist patriotic elements a 

severe shock and in reaction the two major political parties merged into one 
(Rally of the Lao People), while a group of young, relatively better educated 
men in the government, military and business circles organised themselves 
into a so-called Committee for the Defense of the National Interests (CDNI)* 
The GDNl l s stated purpose was to support any Cabinet, political party and 
individual who worked in the national interests* The CDNI was strongly anti» 
communist* 

. 12* In July 1958, the vacillating Souvanna Phouma, who negotiated with 
. the Pathet Lao, resigned as Prime Minister and, in August, Phoui Sanpni- 
kone formed a new Cabinet from which the Pathet Lao were excluded ai. X 
which comprised representatives from both the Redly and the CDNI pre-, 
scnting a solid a nti- communist front* This Cabinet, which was further 
strengthened in January 1959 by the inclusion of three senior army of£i j?e 9 
, tackled one by one some of the major problems which had been left pending 
by previous governments* K carried out monetary reform, & partial admin- 
istrative shakcup, undertook various village aid and psychological warfare 
' programs, and consented to have France and the United. States implement 
a joint training p2 ^gram for its army* • ' • 

. "'■ " . - ■• 

13« In January 1959i the Prime Minister declared unequivocally before 
the Assembly that the government 1 s foreign policy wao pro~we stern and 



« • 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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omcwhat 









SECRET 



n '-i--co.mmunist and, in February, declared that Laos had satisfied all 
the provisions of the Geneva Agreement, While the government has sc 
cone back on this bold stand and resumed an announced foreign policy of 
neutrality (with our encouragement), in fact it has continued to oppose the 
exchange of diplomatic missions with any communist country and at homo 
has taken firm measures to counter and control the Neo Lao Hak Xat, The 
progress which the government was slowly makings its firmness toward this ( . 
pprfcy and the party's consequent lessening prospects of a peaceful take-over, 
have been considered causes for the events of the past summer* By reverting 



.* - 



* + 



to armed subversion, the communists presumably nought to protect their 
apparatus and recover their influence which had been gradually eroded over 

cevex^al months* % . - . . . - .• " . 

■ - 

♦ ■ • 

* 14« The events of this summer brought world- attention to focus on the 
situation in Laos, Domestically, they resulted in strengthening the Sasrfei-* 
communist, anti-Viet Minh convictions of the Lao leadership* Internationally, 
they brought about the decision to establish an enlarged UN presence in the 
country which would permit world opinion to focus rapidly on the situation 
if new fighting were to break out* At the same time, the Lao gained a. sense 
of reassurance that SEATO and, more meaningfully, the ll g S. were pre- 
pared to stand by their country if it came to a showdown* 

15* While it is. not inconceivable that a Cabinet with neutralist ten- 
dencies might be created, such an eventuality is far lees likely than in 
April 1958 Major elements of the Lao leadership are firmly committed to an 
anti-communist stand. Therefore, the major problem is no longer one of 
insuring an anti« communist government but rather one of giving the pro- 
western anti-communist elements cause for maintaining their position 
encouraging greater cohesion among them and reassuring them that their 
policies will permit their country to progress* This evaluation is strengthened 
by the recent political crisis of December. 1959" January I960 which brought 
about the downfall of Phoui and the creation of a new Cabinet under K01 
Abhay* While Kptt has made public declarations of neutrality (in consonance 
with nur recommendations), all the Ministers on whom the Ambassador 
called have made clear that they would continue; to look to close cooperation 
.with the U'o S* The Kou Government is charged with preparing Laos £u? 
new elections in the nea,r future. 






•\ 



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SECRET 



ۥ 















Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NNI> Project Number: NND 63310. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



SECRET-NFORN 



£ 



2137261 



FOREIGN SERVICE DISPATCH 

American Embassy SAIGON 278 

Despatch 



March 7, i960 



This document consists of 22 pages* Copy llf of 25 copies* Series C 



Department's Telegram No* 1339* January 29, 19o0 

D/ARMT 

Special Report on Current Internal Security Situation 

Enclosed is a special report prepared by a Country Team study group 
on the current internal security situation in Viet-Nam* A summary of 
this report and an analysis of the main factors in Viet-Nam 1 s current 
serious internal security problem are given below: 

Situation * Internal security j which improved greatly since the nip 
and tuck period from 195*+- 56 but which nevertheless has been a steady con- 
cern of the GVN over the past few years ^ has again become its No* 1 problem 
as a result of intensification of Viet Cpng guerrilla and terrorist activi- 
ties ^ weaknesses apparent in the GVN security forces and the growth of 
apathy and considerable dissatisfaction among the rural populace* The 
situation has grown progressively more disturbing since shortly after 
the National Assembly elections at the end of August 1959* despite the 
fact that President DIM was claiming 3 up to the end of December , that 
internal security was continuing to improve© The monthly rate of assassi- 
nations rose substantially starting in September > and other signs of 
increasingly aggressive VC tactics such as ambushes of GVN security forces 
began to appear about the same time. The full impact of the seriousness 
of the present situation was brought home by a series of VC incidents in 
late January and February., particularly an attack on an ARVN regimental 
post near Tay Ninh 5 other smaller and less dramatic attacks on security 
posts elsewhere in the southwest and serious VC depredations in Kien Hoa 
Province* \ 

President Diem and other GVN officials are now showing a reassuring 
awareness of the gravity of the situation. They have not permitted them- 
selves to become panic-stricken, and there is no reason to become alarmist 
if prompt steps are taken to correct the situation* 



125U 



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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



Page 2 of k 
End No, 2137261 
I SECRET-KOFORN Desp. Wo 2?8 1 

! From Saigon 

VC Intentions and Potential . Indications are growing that the VC 
are mounting a special campaign aimed at undermining the Diem Government. 
According to CAS sources, VC armed cadre strength has increased to about 
3,000 in the southwest, double the number in September* VC groups now 
operate in larger strength, and their tactics have changed from attacks on 
individuals to rather frequent and daring attacks on GVN security forces 
A recent CAS report has indicated a VC intention to press general guer- 
rilla warfare in South Viet-Nam in 196o 9 and indicates the VC are convinced 
they can mount a coup d'etat this year c President Diem also told me in 
late February about the capture of a VC document indicating their intention 
to step up aggressive attacks all over the country, including Saigon, be- 
ginning in the second quarter 9 

These signs indicate that aggressively worded statements emanating 
from the DRV in 1959 raay accurately reflect DRV intentions . In May 1959 
the central committee of the Lao Dong Party passed a resolution stating that 
the struggle for reunification of Viet-Nam should be carried out by all 
"appropriate means". Subsequently in conversations with Western officials, 
Prime Minister Pham van DONG made statements to the effect that "We will 
be in Saigon tomorrow" and "We will drive the Americans into the sea"o 

It is not completely clear why the DRV has chosen this particular time 
to mount an intensified guerrilla campaign in South Viet-Nam« Several 
hypotheses have been put forward. The campaign may be part of general 
Chi com strategy to increase pressure on non- communist countries all along 
the southern rim of the Asian communist bloc* Several GVN officials, in- 
cluding President Diem, have said that the present DRV tactics may be re- 
lated to the forthcoming East-West summit meeting, but they do not seem to 
be clear as to just what this relationship might be Diem and others have 
also expressed the view that the DRV is aiming at disruption of the GVK 1 s 
economic, social and security programs, many of which have been making 
steady progress while others, like the agroville program, threaten to 
weaken the VC position if carried out success fully© The DRV may also 
have been embittered by its failure to interfere successfully with the 
GVN National Assembly elections last August and resolved, as a result of 
this failure j to intensify activities in the South. 

GVH Security and Political Weaknesses © At the same time that the DRV 
guerrilla potential has increased in the South, weaknesses have become more 
apparent in the GVN security forces GVXJ leaders have in recent weeks 
stressed the need for more anti-guerrilla training of ARVN© The desirability 
of centralized command in insecure areas and a centralized intelligence 
service has also 



SECRET-N0F0RN 



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% 



■ 



-• 



If- - ' '• I - .11. *■ »» .-»»*"<H , «f*-«^** •" » •«« 



1* 



From Saigon 



* * * . 



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4 
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* * ** • 

* • •• 

• • • • • 
• * • * 

• « • • 

* # * . • * *•• 



r-^.-v - - aora evident,. 3?h>a nsscJ Tor a e-3&abi$j a® 11- Quipped j 



fair. tSMSi previously, . ' ; ■■■; 



Civil Guard is even Aicre. keenly 









; " ]&&&*&£•$** ciiJ tHa Ba&?3 tiin&s sl£nc »f /^nor^u. e-p&t&y and 
oonsidorabls ti:Uaat£sf action which the YC cap glay upon have becoras 



• . .•"■_ * *- 



.more evident &aca£ cne p^opi^ ajs rural eres3« 
rWjcass^ts ea<58Rdoa?ed by sustained VO tco^-ori^t 



pr.fi " ' 1 ■; * <•& p ras* ' vj ;-\ t 

t*.v* V*-.. j -•- >,>-**.-•.* i»* ■ ^ -*-* *-* 








irasslo^ are of tan used &y. $&©se orneiaH'ifl carrying out ths 
ft*Nagra&s d:-aldei upon Ip &aigc&« l ? hos*a lis a testfeno*? to disregard 
the rlesix # as and feelings or* the peasantry i\v, for instance, 
[talcing tHsja a^ay frcai tli^ir harvests to parfor-ii co;n: nudity srork* /' 

. % k ** w* f» .- »-, i r-.'» rn * ' I "i 1 r A vs ■■» » o ' ■ * '* r • i • - t- ; •"• n i ' 1 i * "1 vi fr If ; j v» ■ *■• : ^ t* *» ; re fe^T 1 ** Vt r 'Vo'^i **'* ftp F s "t' 1 ' ' 

-lafeorcr^ i>£^ accentuated t*hii5 tr^ncU finpi v opsi* actions by local 
of?lo±a.Xs"'su.ffJi ao tortus©, eztortion sid poa??uptioa> paviy c? 
v/felcSi iiava jboen" reported in fch«i paieas j # bay© also contributed to 
oaa^^^t diss at is faction^ F^¥O^Itis?n a^d fear of officials *as<3 
Wi^mba^s" of the ssra5>-cofreyt Cavi 1^6' Party have liice^i«o eantri)>ated 



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to Wsi& $*vxiL&zioa. 



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pisei cannot &3 eosplet^l^ s.bso3A^©u of blam-s for this imsatls- 
factory situa-tion in th® rv^^l s-s^@« CoafiidsreJblo evidossce' feas 
axls'tsd that he has not ;ln ths os^^t kept HiniC-alf or- overly lBfo:c^e<S 
j of wlisH is going on. Officials havo teB6efi to toll bin: ve-hat :: ; ; 
W^%3 tD/lvsaaV lare;^l3 r fcec^u; -■-;■ fef f^ar of rar^pxa? -if thsy indieai 
thac A^t^;coo havo boon made »:c* ■ •*^ly that projscts Hhich hs ir^ 
ou^hirar;^ £hoa3x2 not bo carri.^l c-v as rApiSly*-&s he fiasires* 



c-a 



y 



;> 



«Tvj4 Cou^tfiractlona. Dsvc3oc4»2?iv3 exuding the last month ov* s-5 ' 
•"'. rts.T-:; hpvrsvepj aualcensd JJissj sac; othar officials to the suavity of 
tr:-.' :c»r-<i'3£sst Intsrnal security vi-.c: p<?A'itical situation," As already 
.': iudlc>:-t-esc- s tHey ars now orriin-i-v.-'.'-.r.^ th-3 nt^eed for. Increassscl ssitl- ;• 
: • ga&eriliz train in g- of this i>.?».T..;ri ":y .foi'c-s^. Diem.also nan iadxcatsS 
: • ti>ftt :"-" : i^ eer&ablislils^g a aj>8o:Ul c^cmando force with "voftsttiftsrsf 
: ' . .f:-:-c,." AR?>S th-3 Civil C:V::.r-d bxkJ r. : '.';3.v-;i^vs who had guerilla 
'■ '^cp$rieAC^ during 'tjia InrXoc^lirva ssbg?«, Dicni has also stated Wiat the 
}\<:Js c<ara*r4as? of tVio L?ifth Kilitery Kvr;lon (tho area of gs^eatest 

••- ■». •-■»-! '> -„- ^ 5>*« «>SiStf> :"-;v" ,r l .''•'••IT -Tiv' i*j OVP'V pll '■"-"■- rx^AitW'C f*V 

t'oroc.^ in' that- swi, .tHus. reoc^nising t!ie noeo for oGjitralisecl ' ' 
f;c:.t : ;-;.y.v;i rather than fra£j«cntatio3 of authority jsttjfong bhs province 



t* J* 



. '• ■ . * ■ 









I 






■.• 



CctOJil has - also indicated that bo is replacing loeal cffiexals 1 



wfeo as^3 •incomoeteat- or^ have abused thoir p:/;^rv He j.« 



■? 



. i *: pi t>ty 



: t 



■ ■ • 






C"* W I*" *' ~* '-* 1 T *" v / '.T,'\-' • 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



Page k of k 
End NOo 2137261 
SEQRET-NOFQHN Desp No. 278 

From Saigon 



renewed emphasis with these officials on the necessity of winning the 
confidence of the people and explaining to them the reasons for the 
government's programs Q He has also indicated that he has ordered a slow- 
down in the construction of agrovilles, apparently in recognition of the 
indications that the people were being driven too hard to carry out this 
new program© 

The Embassy's views on these counterraeasures of the GW as well as 
on certain other actions which should be taken have been expressed in a 
separate despatch* As the situation develops, the Embassy expects to 
make additional recommendations 



/s/Elbridge Burbrow 
Elbridge Durbrow 



Enclosure : 

Special Report on Current 
Internal Security Situation 



COPIES POUCHED TO: CINCPAC POLAT), PHNOM PENH, VIENTIANE, BANGKOK, HUE 



DIST 
AMD 

DCM 
POL- 2 
SECURITY 
CSA 

MAAG 

ELLSWORTH-MAAG 

USOM 

walton-usom/psd 

ARMATT 

HAVAT 

AIRAT 

USIS 

FILES-2 



SECRKT-NOFOKN 



1257 * 



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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



j| Page 1 of l8 pages 

SECRET-NOFORN Encl No* 1 

Desp No. 278 
From Saigon 

,w Special Report On Internal Security Situation In Viet-Nain 

The Viet Cong attack on the Vietnamese Army installation near Tay Ninh 
on January 26 is -a dramatic illustration of the increasingly aggressive 
tactics of the Viet Cong and of the difficulty the GVN is having in con- 
trolling the internal security situation The audacity of the Viet Cong 
in conducting the attack^ the likelihood of VC infiltration into ARVN, the 
indications of secret support of the VC by some of the local populace y the 
successful planning and coordination in carrying out the attack as opposed 
to apparent failure of A3VN which had been told there might be an attack 
to be sufficiently alert for such an attack and effectively counter once 
the attack had been launched^ are indications of many of the problems 
faced by the GVN and discussed in this report* 

Secent Viet Cong Activity 

A* General Situation 

The increase in Viet Cong activity in recent months can be traced 
back as far as the middle of September when the assassination and kidnapping 
rate began to rise. It will be recalled that the Government of Viet-Nam 
intensified its anti-VC measures during the spring of 1959 when it in- 
creased its forces engaged in internal security operations * These operations 
appear to have forced the VC to curtail their activities for a period of 
several months > regroup ,> strengthen and reorganize their cadres and estab- 
lish new bases. The added precautions taken by the GVN during the period 
prior to and immediately following the August 30 National Assembly elec- 
tions further suppressed VC activity. The two important exceptions to this 
relatively static period of VC operations are the acts of sabotage of farm 
machinery in May arid June (which backfired because of peasant resentment) 
and the July attack on U.S* Army personnel at the MAAG detachment in Bien 
Hoa. 

By September 1959 the VC position was somewhat as follows: The VC had 
failed to cs^ry out their plans to disrupt the National Assembly elections 
This failure placed the VC in a position of reasserting themselves in the 
countryside or facing a gradual decrease of their influence as the GVN im- 
proved security and pushed forward its social and economic reforms 

Reports reaching CAS indicated that the VC hy September had become 
quite concerned over the possible effects of various GVN programs which 
were getting underway at that time. The GVN program for regrouping 
isolated peasants into communities was just beginning 5 the various youth 
organi sat ions were be costing active in the villages and the new identity 
card program promised to create difficulties for many VC cadres who had 
been provided with false identity papers The VC propaganda offensive 
against these programs ^ which was already underway during August, was 
intensified in September and VC harassment and violence 






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Encl Noo 1 
Desp Uo Q 2?8 
From Saigon 



directed against GVN youth 
began to rise* 



;roups, project personnel and village officials 



B # Assassinations and Kidnappings 

The figures presently available indicate that assassinations and 
kidnappings perpetrated by the VC and other dissidents got off to a slow 
start in September, '59» The date on which the GVH relaxed its post-election 
security precautions is not available at the present time, but the VC which 
committed only 7* assassinations and h kidnappings in the first 13 days of 
September subsequently intensified their activities and by the end of Sep- 
tember the total for the month amounted to 22 assassinations and 3^ kid- 
nappings, according to evaluated data from various sources <, From this 
point the figures have continued to rise to levels considerably above the 
average for the past two years „ A chart prepared by the Embassy and based 
as nearly as possible on constant criteria, is included as Annex I to this ' 
report o Deaths or persons missing as a result of participation in armed 
combat are not represented on this chart e Since reports are still incomplete 
for November and December, the figures for these months are tentative 

Although a complete analysis of assassinations and kidnappings is not 
available at the present time, it has become fairly apparent that since 
last summer the VC have added the newly formed GVN youth groups to their 
list of prime targets which continue to include village officials and HEM 
cadres The vast majority of incidents has consistently occurred in the 
Fifth Military Region with a small number reported in the First and Capital 
Military Regions. Daring September and October, the months for which final 
figures are available, An Xuyen Province topped the list for both assassi- 
nations and kidnappings, followed by Kien Giang, Kien Phong and Phong Dinho 
Other Provinces in the Fifth Military Region, although far from peaceful, 
vary considerably from month to month* 

Co VC Military Type Operations 

VC activities involving military type operations such as ambushes, 
clashes and attacks on GVN military and civil posts have intensified in 
size and vigor over the past few months although, according to available 
information, the number of such actions increased only slightly through 
December a Statistics from GVE sources on actions and casualties of both 
friendly and enemy forces 



* This figure includes four members of the security forces who may have 
been killed in action since reports simply state that they were "killed" 
by the VC, 



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Desp No, 2?8 

Prom Saigon 
■ 
for the period July-December 1939 a:re shown in aii attachment . The 
accuracy and value of the casualty statistics is, however, open to serious 
question o Comparison of ARVN data with that obtained from the NPS8 and 
the SDC shows frequent discrepancies in casualty figures „ 

The post-election intensification of VC attacks began with the 
completely successful engagement of two ARVN companies on September 26 
The poor performance of ARVN during this operation exposed a number of 
weaknesses which have been commented upon by many CAS and MAAC- sources 
in the Vietnamese .Government • MAAG's evaluation of the factors contributing 
to AEVN's failure include security leaks 3 inadequate planning, lack of 
aggressive leader ship 3 failure to communicate information to other par- 
ticipating units and the failure of supporting units to press forward to 
engage the VC (they were close enough to hear the sound of gunfire at the 
time)* Another factor of importance illustrated in this ambush was the 
confidence of the VC in their ability to successfully conduct such opera- 
tions. This self assurance and aggressiveness appear to be characteristic 
of many actions taken by the VC since September and have probably contrib- 
uted to the low state of morale reported in GVN security units by CAS 
sources o 

Earlier in 1959 ARVN units were ordered to conduct operations in 
Phuoc Thanh Province (VC Resistance Zone "D 11 )* From March 8-19 1959 elements 
of the 7th Division and a paratroop group conducted an indecisive opera- 
tion against the VC in this area, mainly because of difficulty in locating 
the VC« Toward the end of March the elements of the 7th Division were 
replaced by 3 battalions of the Airborne Group, 2 infantry regiments and 
other miscellaneous units 5 to seal off and block in the area. The Viet- 
namese Air Force employed 5 and later 6 F8F fighter planes to conduct air 
strikes. These strikes employed rocket s 3 bombs and strafing, but the only 
known result was the destruction of a number of VC buildings and huts As 
the rainy season approached the emphasis was switched from operations to 
providing security for road construction and other civil works teams. Some 
patrolling in search of VC was continued throughout the rainy season, but 
contacts with the VC were minor and infrequent. By September, Engineer 
construction troops had reportedly been set to work doing road work, clearing 
the forests, planting trees and building houses. The 5th. Division was the 
principal unit engaged in the operation and was still in Phuoc Thanh as of 
late November, searching for VC» The bulk of the VC had apparently moved 
on to continue their operations elsewhere. 

Major incidents in October were the following: According to a CAS 
report an ARVN section (which normally consists of about ^5 men) immediately 
surrendered when attacked by a VC group on October 10 in Kien Phong Province, 
ARVN, however, denies the occurrence of this incident. On October 30 a 



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SECRET-NOFOKN End No, 1 

Desp No. 2?8 
From Saigon 

group of 80 to 100 VC attacked the Kien An District Office, Kien Giang 
Province , killing the district chief, a policeman, six CG members and 
four civilians. Seven civilians "were wounded and the VC after releasing 
about 70 prisoners from the local prison compound carried away 23 weapons 
and other equipment plus the district payroll, which was apparently the 
target of the, raid. Exact VC casualties are not known, hut were estimated 
to be considerable. 

According to a senior GVN intelligence officer whose comments were 
reported by CAS in December, the VC in An Xuyen, Ba Xuyen, Kien Giang, 
Phong Dinh, An Giang, Kien Phong, Kien Tuong, and Long An Province numbered 
2900 about twice the September 1959 figure, divided into groups of kO to 
50 men. This officer expressed the opinion that VC attacks in November on 
isolated Civil Guard posts and AEVN patrol units in Kien Phong Province 
present an important change in VC strategy in the southwest and that the VC 
plan to become increasingly active in early i960 in an effort to prove to 
the people that the GVN is unable to cope with the internal security situa- 
tion. An example of this type of activity is the November ik VC storming 
of Phong My Market in Kien Phong Province during which they reportedly set 
fire to a defense militia post, the information hall, three bridges and a 
motor-boat of the Kien Phong Security Service. Minister of Information 
THANH told British Ambassador PARSES on February 22 that the VC's are 
burning a large number of information halls, and he is very worried by the 
lack of protection and retaliation* 

By November and December it had become apparent that the VC were 
operating in larger groups than those used earlier in the year and that 
their attacks were well planned and vigorously executed. It seems apparent, 
moreover, from such large scale operations as took place in late January in 
the provinces of Kien Hoa, Tay Ninh and Phuoc Long (Dong Xoai incident) that 
the VC have further increased their activities.*" Serious incidents are con- 
tinuing: AEVN intelligence reports indicate that approximately twenty VC 
attacked a boat in Kien Giang Province on February 2 killing 12 Civil Guard 
and 13 civilians and wounding 11 Civil Guard, 2 other security personnel 
and 5 civilians and that as of February 7 VC terrorism was continuing in 
Kien Hoa Province „ 



* See Embassy telegrams 2288 (February l) 2301 (February 2); FVS 4f^l, 
1*222, ^229 and 1*227 j ABMA CX-9. 



3ECRET-N0F0RN 



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-sas&m-BCRcm 



Pa^e 5 of /# 
End No. 1 . 
Desp 5*o« 273 
Fran Saigon 






v 



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Cfch^^ Kooent VO Activities 



A. rocehu 



>n« t-» -j" »«--»»— — .» • «v ■%.■>■! « ■*"■ i 



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CAS report conce^nln^ a li^oup or VC min-boring nearly - 
1000. n-en (probably exa^^ratocl } e;ucriug"G towi 3 or 4 kilometers 
f ro.T. uon Sfr&.oa January 2^ and oporidiri;;; most of the 6&y unnio lasted., 
si^eaainj;; VC propaganda is not tho only si-eh report of VC boldness* 
A~ similar Incident involving about 100 Dvziecl VC occu^cc* in 

-i.-jp ^s» N p-J^i^r* Pv>r3*/'t re rv> fire ^r^ -*i^ r*- r * j> ? v t"^"^ P~ n 1 f,v-.o *Pi>^^" fchsv'f; fcH.** Xtt 9 r*^n 



a^ 



j3^*l^ji>£v^^ ana ^nen 

r^txr:3^L?ji thcn.it ^oetin/y EV M reajisVa nee v? cu lei In cl i ci SO;Eat • -th^VG'"' 

have £T> effective inte lligence s; yst'eiyr» *- J •"' ^.» . 
— * — — — — ■ ■* - — ' — — ■ '• i 



> 



* 
1 *» 



ff- n .t^ 






According to CAS sources j infiltration o 
forces (iiKJludiag AH'©!) baa been s part of $£? .planning throughout 
this period Sg*e 0-VI;i suspected th.it details or the ARVK cpa}?at5cn 
oi) September 23 and 2$ vrad -nade Icriov^bb the VC by persons who had 

JS^Mg^g ^J ; ^ e governs en t un i t s . Snfiltraticns have cot; tributes to 
other VC successes^ poaaiDly iTTolucIing the Tay Kinh incident o;i 
January 26 c The VC,, accord inij to a C/u> report , have also in ado a 
special of fort -to obtain ARVH uniform* 'Seports have been received 
by OAS concerning encounto:7C by £Y;J patrols of what wa^ believed 
to be an Alxv?]' 1 patrol , but v:hich turned out to bo VC* 

■ 

Increased activity was also noted in Contra! Viet-Kam although 






tho probles 'chore ';i2fj Izzd intone than in fch ^r^&uth'^ . According 
to CAS VC ar^ad st^srngth i:i Central Viet-Sfam in Kovemb^r v:as about 
300c According to CAS scuv'coo the VC in the highlands of QuaBg %ai 
carrlecl ocit-cterias attacks ctu.ving- Hover^bor on the head officer of 
co?ifeunal councils 3ncl of the SffiSL !pbt3,y also clootroyoa bri<3g>3S a^« 
seotlona of roacl in an attesnpt to sabotage ecramusloatlons« Having 
j^ipoc^juif lue^c a a^on^ the ^o^t rL^iiiin]^ to the extent of being able 
*,f;n ^^'i^/^irh •^ffffgy fn th^ YJ ? 1 rh 1 ^^^*' - the VC ware repeatedly Dlanning 
in Kove^b^r to ^ctend tlieir ' poXiticai and military activi tf^^to - * 
the coastal regions. 



*.j 



C3' 



&roi*v)d aliSalgJit on Kovceabe^ 5.» 25 to 30 v£ " (50-100 by another 
estin^at^) ar^ed with automatic ivoapor^ attacked a 15 rnan ^quad of 
th<5 2nd 1 Bat tali on ^ Hth _B?g^:j.neoji > Group guarding a temporary "engine a? 
e^tiilpsussst park nea^Di^Vu^^ Kig^assy 5) is ffiaag Kgai P^rovincja^ 
Four 'messds^s of the squao. m^agea to oscape bat tae X'smarlnde^ v^-ire 
iiaeEticKeS and given a propa:>:rida lactxiro for 2 hours* Gne cJuniD 
igiAQit aad 1 gradsi 1 **?©?$ bur-:?.e:' ana 1 tractor was rianiaged. AxiVJa 
oasualti^e were 2 killed and 2 wcun<ae<3« The VC lost 2' dead left 
&?,.' Uxe scene of action. Oh -th« following Dight the timber decking 
osi an Eiffel bridge near G:?.a VUo .was buxoed by an estimated 60 
Kontagnard YC„ c xho damage was repaired but the next night the 
KonfcagBarfi VC r-eturn^.3 and again set fire to the decking this time 
doing sufficient damage to require 3*'-^ days to r-Qpair-. 



I 



.» 



-t n r* n 



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i 



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J Desp NOo 278 1 

From Saigon 

These incidents , plus a relatively minor incident involving a VC 
attack on ARVN patrol on September lU some 35 kilometers south of the 
town of Quang Ngai are significant in that they represent the first such 
reports received from Central Viet-Nam of this type of violence in many 
months , VC activity among the Montagnards, particularly propaganda 
activity, intended to set the Montagnards against the GVN and its programs 
for economic and social development in Central Viet-Nam has "been the subject 
of reports by CAS and our consulate at Hue, There have also been a number 
of reports of VC efforts to establish bases and to recruit Montagnards 
for guerrilla activity. 

During a visit to Kontum in late January our Consul in Hue found 
officials rather worried about the security situation. The Chief of Kontum' s 
northermost district of Dak Sut said that during a three week period in 
January, Communists had forced or persuaded three Montagnard villages to 
withdraw into the mountains , out of reach of GVN administrators. This Dis- 
trict Chief said that he and the Kontum Civil Guard Chief both think that 
the Communists have a major base in the Quang Nam mountains northeast of 
Dak Gle (the northermost point en route 1^), and predicted that communist 
activities in northern Kontinm and southwest Quang Nam provinces would be 
stepped up in I96O0 Our Consul was not permitted to go all the way to Dak 
Gle because on January l8 a Civil Guard force patrolling route ik was fired 
on by a machine gun on a hilltop between Dak Gle and Dak Rot ah, 

A large scale sweep intended to flush out Viet Cong in the mountains 
of Quang Ngai Province has been underway since the end of October 1958, 
According to information obtained by USOM Public Safety Division., eleven 
companies of the Civil Guard and one battalion of AEVBf and two intelligence 
companies were employed in the initial pacification phase * The operation 
was reported by mid- January to have entered a second phase, that of securing 
the support of the local population. The new chief of Quang Ngai Province, 
Nguyen van TAT, told our Consul in January that additional Civil Guard Posts 
are being set up in the Montagnard districts of his province and that the 
Self Defense Corps will be greatly expanded in the Vietnamese sections. 
Asked about the progress of the sweep, he was non-committal, but he admitted 
that the security drive "will not be over for a long time", 

E. DRV Intentions 

In May 1959 > ^he Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party passed a 
resolution or statement stating that the struggle for reunification would 
have to be carried out by all "appropriate measures" British observers 
have taken this to mean measures other than peaceful. 



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Desp No. 278 

From Saigon 



"You must remember we will be in Saigon tomorrow, we will be in 
Saigon tomorrow," these words were spoken by Premier Pham van Dong 
in a conversation with French Consul Georges-Picot on September 12, 

1959. 

In Noyember, Pham van Dong twice told Canadian Commissioner 
Erichsen-Brown that "we will drive the Americans into the Sea." 
DRV General GIAP, however, later saw Erichsen-Brown to "reassure" 
him that DRV intentions are peaceful. (Erichsen-Brown has been 
very active in trying to get the ICC to take cognizance of the VC 
guerrilla activities). 

CAS sources have reported a gradual increase of the infiltra- 
tion of VC cadres and arms from the DRV over the past few months 
which has increased the VC strength to about 3000 in the Southwest. 
(Based on available information CAS estimates that the Viet Cong 
strength in all South Vietnam is presently 3OOO-5OOO men). Many 

I of these new infiltrators, according to a CAS source who is a 

GVN official, are cadres who were regrouped in the North at the 
time of the Geneva Accords and have had a number of years of 

I intensive military and political training. The principal infiltra- 

tion route of VC cadres from the North continues to be through 
Laos to Cambodia although reports are received of infiltration by 
sea. A CAS source with similar access reports that some of the 
cadres arriving in SVN from the North have the mission of establishing 
a VC headquarters to include a general staff, a political section and 
a supply section and to effect a large-scale reorganization of VC 
cadres in the southwestern provinces (Fifth Military Region). 

According to a CAS report from a Western observer based on 
his limited personal observation, the People's Army of Vietnam 
(PAVN) has continued to train its units in guerrilla type warfare 
in addition to training in conventional warfare* In the opinion 
of this Western observer, the PAVN could at any time undertake a 
successful campaign against the GVN utilizing the type of 
guerrilla tactics undertaken so effectively by the Viet Minh 
against the French in the IndoChina War. Another Western observer, 
a missionary who resided over thirty years in Vietnam, has also 
stated that PAVN is in excellent condition to carry on guerrilla 
warfare . 



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Desp Wo. 278 
From Saieon 



A recent CAS report (FVS-ij-2^9)* indicates that the VC are 
presently planning to augment their forces , particularly in 
An Xuyen, Kien Giang, Phong Dirih, Kien Phong and Kien Tuong Province 
and that they will press general guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam 
during i960. This guerrilla warfare would he under the flag of 
the People's Liberation Movement (reports of a number of recent 
incidents mention the flying of a red flag with a blue star) . 
The VC reportedly estimate that 70% of the people in the rural 
areas of South Vietnam are either embittered by or indifferent 
toward the present government. According to this report the VC 
are convinced they can bring about a coup d'etat in i960, and are 
presently considering three ways to do this: (l) to incite the GVH 
military forces to revolt and to penetrate the new government to 
steer it into a neutralist policy; (2) to force the GVN to use harsh 
repressive measures against the people by organizing widespread 
popular uprisings -j thereby laying the foundation for open revolt; 
(3) to set up popular front provisional governments in the Trans- 
Bassac area as the general guerrilla warfare mentioned above pro- 
gresses (the VC estimate that they have sufficient penetrations in 
or control , over village level administration to make this possible). 
The alternative which is selected will, according to the source, 
depend upon VC progress during the first four months of this year. 

President Diem told the Ambassador and General WILLIAMS in 
late February about the capture of a document by GVH security 
forces outlining VC plans to further step up aggressive attacks 
all over the country , including Saigon. These operations are ! 
planned to begin in the second quarter of i960. (CAS has seen j 
the document and believes it to be authentic - see FVS-U292). 

Military Factors Affecting the Internal Security Situa tion 

GVN internal security operations in 1959 employed an average 
of 25 ARTO battalions, W^OOO Civil Guards, ^3,000 SDC, 6,000 Surete, 
as well as the Gendermerie, Self Guard Youth Corps and HEM member r 
for which figures are not presently available. This impressive 
number of personnel has, however, failed to keep VC and dissident 
activities under control. Numerous high-ranking GVN officials 
have very recently stressed the necessity of more ant i- guerrilla 
training for the security forces. From a military point of view 
an outstanding deficiency iri the GVN effort has been the government's 



* See also FVS-^220 and FVS-^263. 



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Desp No. 2?8 
From Saigon 

inability, or lack of desire, to recognize the following factors: 
(l) It is actively engaged in an internal war and, therefore, . 
mist take the measures which this situation entails. (2) There 
is a great need for a strong central military command with wide 
powers for the conduct of internal security operations in the 
unpacified" areas. (3) There is a need for a capable, well- 
equipped, well-trained, centrally- controlled Civil Guard to take 
over from the Military in pacified areas. 

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the apparent lack 
of success in the GVN attempts to reduce the internal threat of the 
VC until now has stemmed from the lack of unity of command in a 
single operational commander who has the means and the authority 
to utilize all of the potential in the area of operations without 
regard to province or regional boundaries and without regard to 
the existing political subdivision of the area. Unity of command 
is the most important basic principle of administration lacking 
here. The Province Chief structure has caused a breakdown of 
coordination and a fragmentation of command structure which has 
blocked an effective attack on the internal security problem. 

The fact that the GVN, though striving to bring its military 
organization to a high state of training, is constantly plagued 
by the diversion of an average of 25 battalions to an internal 
security mission is indicative that a serious internal threat 
exists. The resulting piecemeal commitment of the armed forces 
has obviously been generally unsatisfactory because of the lack 
of a strong central command which could effectively coordinate j 
and control all security functions in the area of operations. ' 
(See subsequent "GVN Reactions" section re recent action taken 
to centralize command in the Fifth Military Region) . ' 

Political Factors Affecting the Internal Security Situation 

It is highly unlikely that any final solution can be found 
to the internal security situation in South Vietnam if the GVN 
does not enjoy the support and cooperation of the rural population. 
At the present time indications are that the rural population is 
generally apathetic towards the Diem Government and there are signs 
of considerable dissatisfaction and silent opposition. In part 
this attitude appears to result from widespread fear of the • , 
Viet Cong and a belief that the GVN is relatively helpless to 
protect the rural population from Viet Cong depredations. 
Unfortunately the longer serious insecurity continues to exist 
in the countryside despite GVN efforts to control- it, the more 
serious is the effect on the GVN's prestige. Another effect is 
a growing belief among the peasants that the Viet Cong -will always 
be here as long as North Vietnam remains under Communist control 
and that they must adjust to live' with them. .(A realization of the 
long-range nature of the problem among officials responsible for 

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I 

i 
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■ 



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From Saigon 
Desp No. 2?8 

dealing with it could be an advantage. In Malaya it has taken 
11 years to reduce the security situation to the minimum, and it 
is even more difficult to deal with it in a divided country with 
long exposed frontiers). 

There appear to be other reasons contributing to the difficulty 
experienced by the GVN in attempting to rally the rural population:* 
(a) Until recently it was becoming more and more apparent that 
Diem was not being given accurate information on the internal 
security and political situation in rural areas. As late as the 
end of December , 1959* be was telling all callers how much better 
the internal security situation had become , despite many doubts 
raised by his listeners. Information was apparently being 
presented to him by local officials in such a manner as to reflect 
well upon the officials giving it. The President's trips to the 
provinces have appeared to be carefully "laid on" by local officials. 
The President himself cannot be absolved entirely from the blame , 
however , since his system of personal rule which permits direct 
appeal from the individual provincial authorities to himself, in 
a sort of intra- executive check and balance system, serves to 
further weaken the administrative apparatus. 

Recently 3 however, as indicated in the subsequent section on 
"GVN" Reactions," the Vice President and others who are not his 
usual informers on security matters have spoken frankly with him 
and he now seems well aware of the situation; (b) Provincial and 
district authorities exercise almost autonomous control in the 
areas under their jurisdiction. Too often the personnel holding 
these positions have been incompetent, having been chosen for 
reason of party loyalty. Moreover, some have tended to view their 
jobs as a means to personal advancement or financial gain** often 

* See also FVS-U220 and FVS-4228. 

** The local press from time to time reports incidents of extortion 
and blackmail by local officials. On December 1 Le Song in an 
editorial cited "numerous cases of abuse of power committed by village 
police officials such as extortion of money and bribery." Examples 
like the following are to be found in various reports in the press 
and from varioxis CAS and USOM sources: 

On February 13 Tu Do reported that a hamlet chief in Binh Tuong 
Province had been arrested for posing as a security agent and 
blackmailing four farmers, A USOM source in July reported that a 
District Chief of Security in Blao had reportedly been removed 
from his position for extorting sums of money from wealthy residents 
who were arrested on charges of being Communist sympathizers and 
had to pay for their release. 



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Desp No, 2?8 
From Saigon 

at the cost of the population under their control. Press 
editorials have attacked local officials for extorting money from 

peasants, using torture to wring false confessions from innocent 

people and conducting themselves in such a manner as to reflect 

adversely on the prestige of the national government. In addition 

rumors continue to circulate among the population concerning the 

alleged nefarious activities of and favoritism shown to members 

of the Can Lao party. While officials have been largely unable 

to identify and put out of commission Viet Cong undercover cadres 

among the population, they have often arrested people on the basis 

of rumors or of denunciations by people who harbor only personal 

grudges. Police powers justified on the basis of the needs of 

internal security have reportedly been misused to extort money 

not only from the peasants but from land owners, merchants and 

professional people in the towns. This misuse of police powers 

and the kind of broad scale arrests on suspicion are weakening 

the support of the population for the regime. On the other hand, 

the application of swift, summary justice (such as the Special 

Military Tribunals were created to hand out) designed to protect 

the population against the Viet Cong threat, if carefully 

administered and "advertised" as such, can do much to restore a 

feeling of security;* (c) While the GVN has made an effort to 

meet the economic and social needs of the rural populations 

through community development, the construction of schools, 

hospitals, roads, etc., these projects appear to have enjoyed only 

a measure of success In creating support, for the government and, 

in fact, In many instances have resulted in resentment. Basically, 

the problem appears to be that such projects have been imposed on 

the people without adequate psychological preparation in terms of 

the benefits to be gained. Since most of these projects call for 

sacrifice on the part of the population (in the form of allegedly 

"volunteer" labor in the case of construction, time away from jobs 

or school in the case of rural youth groups, leaving homes and 

lands in the case of regrouping isolated peasants), they are bound 

to be opposed unless they represent a partnership effort for 

mutual be efit on the part of the population and the government. 

(See subsequent section on "GVN Reactions" for indications of 

Diem 1 s current awareness of this problem). 

The situation may be summed up in the fact that the government 
has tended to treat the population with suspicion or to coerce it 
and has. been rewarded with an attitude of apathy or resentment. 



* Ensuing section on "GVN Reactions" shows Diem now aware of 
incompetence and abuse of power by many officials. 






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From Saigon 

The basic factor which has been lacking is a felling of rapport 
between the government and the population. The people have not 
identified themselves with the government. There has been a 
general lack of "a sense of mission" in the building of the 
country among both the local population and local authorities. 
In the past at least Diem has contributed to this attitude by his 
constant admonition to the villagers he talks to on his trips 
throughout the country that they must work harder , do more for 
themselves, and not complain. He has made little effort to praise 
them for what they have accomplished or explain the reasons for 
the demands he places on the population. He has none of the 
demagogue in him., but is rather still the mandarin. How that he 
realizes the feelings of the people, it is to be hoped that he 
will show more solicitude for their needs and feelings, burt 
this will not be easy for him to do. 

Possibly another factor adversely affecting the current 
attitude of the peasants toward the Government is the decline over 
I . recent months in the price of paddy. Since the population in the 

I Southwestern delta is particularly dependent on paddy for its 

income, it would be a normal political reaction for this development 
to increase dissatisfaction with the government. 



GVN Reactions to Current Internal Security Situation 



President Diem, who had earlier taken the position in 
conversations with Ambassador Durbrow that the GVN's security 
operations had broken up many VC camps and forced them to regroup 
into larger forces, has modified his assessment considerably after 
the Tay Ninh attack and other recent manifestations of expanded 
VC activities. Previously indicating that VC reinforcements had 
come from Cambodia, Diem in his latest conversation with the 
Ambassador on February 12 stated the VC had been reenforced by 
well-trained forces from North Vietnam. In his view the recent 
step-up in VC activities is basically a somewhat desperate attempt 
to disrupt the progress of South Vietnam. He does not appear : 
I to be deeply alarmed, but, on the contrary, feels that with 

I' measures he has in mind the situation should greatly improve in a, 

few months. He believes the security forces need more anti- 
guerrilla training, but also thinks more security forces are needed 
in order to provide better protection for the entire population. 
He has called for volunteers from military reservists who had long 
guerrilla experience dwing the Indochina War as well as from 
ARVN and the Civil Guard, and has indicated that over 1000 have 
already volunteered. 



Diem also now shows awareness of many of the political factors 
which have contributed to the deterioration in internal security. 
By the end of February in conversations with the Ambassador and 



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From Saigon 

other foreign officials Diem has become very frank in admitting 
that many of the civilian administrators have been incompetent 
and have abused their power. He has added he is removing these 
and placing competent men in their jobs whose principal duty 
will be to pay attention to the needs of the population and make 
every effort to win their confidence. The President has become 
quite aware of the adverse reaction of the people to indiscriminate 
use of methods of coercion in carrying out the government's 
programs in rural areas. He explained to the Ambassador at some 
length on February 22 the urgent need for civilian officials to 
explain in detail the reasons for the government's actions in 
these matters in order that the population will fully understand 
how they will benefit in the long run. 

Wgo Dinh NHU, the President's brother and political advisor, 
also told CAS on February 5 that the security forces need more 
anti-guerrilla training. He added, however, that political 
measures are the real key to defense against the VC attacks, and 
mentioned specifically that GVW officials should consider political 
aspects of a situation and not just concentrate on rapid physical 
results to please the President . 

In late January Vice President Nguyen Wgoc THO, according to 
a CAS report > had a discussion with President Diem in which he 
pointed out his belief that the reports which the President had 
been receiving on internal security were incorrect as they 
underestimated the size of the VC network in South Vietnam. 
He reportedly reminded the President that he had told him a year 
and a half ago that the GVW did not have a correct estimate of VC 
strength and, unless this were obtained, the time would come when 
the country would be unable to cope with VC subversion. Privately 
Tho was said to have placed the blame for GVW loss of support among 
the peasantry on province chiefs whose only activity was to apply 
police powers strictly. He also was said to have indicated that 
both Wgo Dinh Hhu and the WRM leaders, through the province chiefs, 
were resj nsible for providing completely erroneous and optimistic 
reports about the security situation. In a conversation with 
Ambassador Durbrow shortly after the Tay Winh attack Tho expressed 
concern over the seriousness of the internal security situation, and 
he also urged more ant i- guerrilla training of the GVW security 
forces. 



Lieutenant General Le van TY, Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese 
Army, has also expressed the view that further ant i- guerrilla 
training is required. In addition, according to MAAG, soon after 
the Tay Winh attack a meeting was held hy the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense with the Chief of Staff and Corps and Field Commanders 
at which it was decided to make certain recommendations to the 
President. These recommendations included adherence to the chain 



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From Saigon 



of command by the Presidency; assignment of commanders to be 
made on recommendations of the General Staff through the 
Department of Defense to the President as contrasted with 
recommendation to the President by civilian and political 
advisers; clarification and definition of the responsibility and 
authority between the province chiefs, military regional commanders 
and local troop commanders; and centralization of control of the 
various intelligence agencies. 

Indications have been received that at least some of the 
ideas which have been expressed by GVN officials are being 
implemented. President Diem has told Ambassador Durbrow that 
Colonel Nguyen KHANH, newly designated commander of the Fifth 
Military Region (the southwestern area where insecurity is the 
worst), has been given fall military powers over the security 
forces of the area regardless of the prerogatives of the province 
chiefs. Diem also said that the GVN is extending an earlier plan 
of appointing military officers as deputy province chiefs responsible 
for security, and has placed them under the control of the military 
regional commander. 

According to a CAS report, the Assistant Secretary of State 
for Defense issued a directive on February 1 ordering concentration 
on ant i- guerrilla training and tactics and enforcement of maximum 
■security at all military posts. 

Another CAS report states that President Diem, as a result 
of recent urgings for improvement in relations between the 
Government and the peasants, has ordered a slowdown in the program 
of building regroupment centers ("agrovilles") . Secretary of State 
for the Presidency TRUAN told Ambassador Durbrow on February 17, 
however, that this program must be continued but perhaps at a 
slower pace, as there is no way to provide protection to isolated 
farm houses other than by regrouping such peasants into larger 
communities. He admitted that the- peasants have the normal human 
reaction jf disliking being forced to work on the regroupment 
centers, but he believes that after the centers have been completed 
they will see the advantages offered. Diem told the Ambassador 
on February 22 that, while he must continue to create "agrovilles," 
he is not planning to push too fast until one or two pilot towns 
are in being so that the peasants can learn for themselves the 
many advantages of this sort of rural organization. 

CAS also reported that the NRM recently dispatched special 
cadres to the provinces to obtain for the President information 
on cases of dissatisfaction with high-handed or dictatorial 
attitudes of local officials. Intelligence committees have also 
been formed in each province which will report to the President 
through the Minister of Interior. Diem told the Ambassador he had 



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From Saigon 



been impressed by the centralized intelligence organization he 
learned about during his visit to Malaya in mid-February. Diem 
inferred he is planning to adopt this system. 












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ex E 

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Desp No. 278 



ANNEX I 



The number of assassinations and kidnappings by months during the past two years are shown in the following 



chart : 



Assassinations 



Kidnappings 



Assassinations 



Kidnappings 



Assassinations 



Kidnappings 



Assassinations 



Kidnappings 



1958 



JAN 



10 



25 

1258 



JULY 



16 



22 



FEB 



36 



AUG 



12 



11 



MARCH 



26 



43 



SEPT 



22 
34 



APRIL 



17 



12 



OCT 



11 


7 


8 


15 


24 


18 


24 


26 


i?5? 








JAN 


FEB 


MARCH 


APRIL 


10 


ii 


31 


13 


17. 


6 


21 


16 


1959 ; 









29 

42 



MAY 



13 



NOV 



8 



19 



MAY 



16 



22 



35 
89 



JUNE 



21 



15 



DEC 



21 



20 



JUNE 

5 
15 



33 
48 



TOTAL 



TOTAL 



70 

131 



TOTAL 



86 



97 



1V7 

246 



TOTAL FOR 
SIX MONTH 
PERIOD 

123 
105 



1958 TOTAL 

193 
236 



233 
343 



H 



NOTE: Figures compiled by MAAG based on ARVN reports show 96 civilians killed and 37 civilians kidnapped 
during January and 122 civilians killed, 72 kidnapped in February, I960* Figures for these months 
for assassinations and kidnappings may be slightly higher (but 'will not greatly differ from these 
Hgures) after investigation based on other sources * T * 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 J 



'+ 



*»-. i«m ».»»■. J- ,»-. *«-vMv(r } v vv .* • •*• 









» 






- From s&igoa 



F Y 



■ 






* j 






, -■ 



■ 

:■ ■■•■ 



3b«& figures contained in the tables in this Apiigk have been, 
['extracted from th-3 following sc^thly reports for July through ';;.-: 



) 



« 



**, 



t - . 



CD 

(2.) 



Intelligence Summary (MM &):.- Source:. AKVK ■ 



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COMr/.ITTKG OU FOREIGN r:SLATIONS 



Hay 5; 19^0 









Lt. General Samuel 3?> ttilliaras 
Chief of MUG 
Saigon, Viet Haar 

4 

■Pear General Williams: 

■ 

During hearings on the Vietnamese Aid-Program before a Senate 
Foreign Relations Subcommittee last summer (July 30 &nd July 31), you were 
most helpful in providing the Members with clear and concise responses to 
questions concerning KAAG-Vieinaa - We found your testimony of great value 
and it was a major source of information for the Subcommittee's report which j 
as you" r:.-},y be aware, drew very favorable conclusions as regards the military • 
aid protean in Viet Ham* 

I do not Kind telling you that 1 was personally very impressed with 
that portion of your testimony which Suggested to tie that you were directing 
the military aid program in a fashion which' was, wisely, aieed at working 
KAAG ,f Out of a job" and that you rind about reached a point where the scaling 
down could begin. Therefore, it carie as something of a surprise to me to learn 
"frcua a U.P.I, dispatch 0/31; May 5, 1960) that we intend to double the training 
staff of MUG in Viet tfam by adding to it 3^0 men. 






Assuming the general accuracy of this dispatch I would very much 
appreciate such responses as you may wish to supply to the following questions: 



(3,) As specifically ?„s possible, what changes have occurred in 
the Vietnamese situation which require the addition of 350 c-en" to the 
K4AG Diss ion? * f 

, (2) If the need is for experts in guerrilla warfare, cannot such 
experts be substituted for those already engaged in other training 
gursuiis in Viet lian rather than siieply addin.3 to them? 1 

(3) Was the need to increase the SSAG determined by you personally 
and did you initiate the request for additional personnel? 

■ . , (h) . If so, did you have the concurrence of the Ambassador ..1 
the request? 



1276 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



Lt. General S&iauel !*• Williams 



- 2 - 



r. 



May 5, I960 



$ 



This letter is transmitted through Department of Defense channels 
but in view of your helpfulness in the past, I loo]; forward to your replies 
vith interest and with thanks. 



With kindest personal regards, I em 




Sincere 



Srtf 



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ours , f 





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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Pfojeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



UPI — (#31, May 5, i960) 



The U.S. is doubling its military training staff in South Vietnam and 
stepping up the training of Vietnamese troops for guerrilla warfare against 
Communist terrorists. 



The decision reflects concern about the mounting strength and boldness of 
Communist bands which are raiding villages and assassinating Vietnamese 
officials. However, U.S. military and diplomatic officials said the 
Communist campaign is not a "crisis" and in itself, is not likely to 
become a major threat to the government of President Ngo Dinh Diem. 



Guerrilla warfare specialists will be included among about 350 additional 
American military training officers and men sent to Vietnam. 



1278 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i 






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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE 
MESSAGE 



CONFIDENTIAL AC PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED 

PRIORITY Except prior to Category B encryption 

Physically remove all internal refs 
by DTG prior to declassification 
No unclass ref if DTG is quoted 

FROM: CHMAAG SAIGON VIET-NAM 

TO: - OSD/lSA WASH DC 

INFO: CINCPAC CP H M SMITH HAWAII, JCS WASH DC 

NR: MAGCH-CH 691 2007HZ MAY 60 

Reference UNCLASS DEF U87183 to CHMAAG Saigon DTG 
182016Z May, 

Attn Asst to Secy for Legislative Affairs. Re- 
quest you pass following to Senator Mansfield soonest. 



Dear Senator Mansfield: Your letter of 5 May 
passed to me by DOD received Saigon 19 May, Full reply 
enroute by airmail. As interim reply UPI dispatch number 
31, May 5? 19^0 to which you refer not entirely factual. 
Specifically US training staff not being doubled as stated 
in UPI dispatch. The 350 US"civilian technicians 11 mentioned 
in news items as sorting and shipping arms left by French 
forces undoubtedly refers to US military personnel of the 
temporary equipment recovery mission, short title TEEM, now 
in process deactivation. Maintenance of total overall 
MAGG-TEHM advisor strength of 385 for time being is at 
urgent request GVN with full concurrence Ambassador, CINCPAC, 
DOD, State Department and myself. Total advisor strength 
to be considerably lower than total 85O US and French MAAG 
at time of Geneva accords and slightly lower than total 
MAAG- TERM strength. Following sentence classified CONFIDENTIAL: 
Change over of TERM excess to MAAG ends subterfuge as 
actually TERM has had undercover mission as logistical 
advisors since activation. Project began before current 
step-up guerrilla activities. Small number US experts in 
guerrilla warfare recently brought in on TDY as substitutes 
for regular MAAG advisors and are within previous overall 
strength. It is my personal opinion MAAG should and can 
work itself "out of job" with possible reduction approximately 
J 15 per cent in June 6l and approximately 20 per cent reduction 

I DA IN 102U6 (20 MAY 60) - 



12 T2, 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



• ■ 



SYA.T COU?.;tfNiCATiO-\*S OfUCE 



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PAGE 2 



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y<jar]y there after dsp^ndrng of coi.rnc on r:^c'inoo 

et subsequent c^los* Very Truly Yours, signed iljlliaas 



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July 25, 19&> 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



#►.-***• 



aferences : 



NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 

to the 
; NATIONAL SBCURIT/ COUNCIL 

on 
U. S. FOLIC? IN MAINIAND SOUTHEAST ASIA 



,.^»-,.^»--»»-V Mf«-, 



A. 

C. 

D. 



SECRET 



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HSC 

OCB Special Report on HSC 5809, 

Sated February 10, i960 
NSC Action No. 2193 
&3IC03 for NSC from Executive Secretary, 

sat/ie subject, flo.tscl July 11 and 18, 

19^0 • 

NSC Action No. 22o? 



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The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the 
Secretary of Conferee, and Mr. Blicer B. Staats for the Director, Bureau 
of the BuSgstj at the k52ncL NSC Meeting on July 21, 19o0, adopted the 
changes to NSC 5809 transmitted by the reference nienorandusi of July 11, 
i960 (KSC Action Ho- 2267). 

The President, as of this date, approved the changes to NSC 5809, 
vhich as e&en&ed is enclosed herewith as NSC 6012; directs the implemen- 
tation of NSC 6012 "by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies 
of the U. S. Government; and designates the Operations Coordinating Board 
tie the coordinating agency. 

A revised Financial Appendix,, in prepaxat ion pursuant to NSC Action 
No- 22o7- d , will be circulated later. 

■ 

By NSC Action No- 2267-5* the Council agreed that, at ouch time as 
policy decisions are required as to vhethe* jet aircraft should be pro- 
vided to Caiaboaia or Viet Nam, these questions should be referred to the 
National Security Council for consideration. 

The enclosed statement of policy, as approved, supersedes NSC 5S09., 



JAMES 8. I AY, JR. 
Executive Secretary 



c 



cc: The Secretary 0? the Treasury 
The Attorney General 
The Secretary of Conferee 
The Director, Bureau of the Budget 
The Chairtnn, Joint Chiefs of Staff 
The Director of Central Intelligence 



. KSC 6012 



1281 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Prnjeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






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SECRET 



STATEMENT OF POLICY 

on 
U. S. POLICY IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA* 



!--»-,• »~- "^S. 



I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 



1« General ♦ Since Mainland Southeast Asia does not 
represent a unified area, courses of action must generally 
be x determined in" the light of widely varying country sltua**. 
felons. However, basic objectives and main directions of 
U, S, policy can and should be established on a regional 
basis* . 

2, Consequences of Communist Domination, The national 



i-»—*-—Sb mm 



security of the United States would be endangered by Communist 
domination of Mainland Southeast Asia, whether achieved by 
overt aggression, subversion, or a political and economic 
offensive . 

a. The loss to Communist control of any single 
free country would encourage tendencies toward accommo- 
dation by the rest, 

b. The loss of the entire area would have a 

* seriously adverse impact on the U* S. position elsewhere 
in the Par East, have severe economic consequences for 
many nations of the Free World," add significant resources 
to the Communist Bloc in rice, rubber, tin end other 
minerals, and could result in severe economic and poli- 
tical pressures on Japsn.and. India for accommodation to 
the Communist Bloc/ The loss of Southeast Asia main- 
land could thus have farreaching consequences seriously 
adverse to U. S. security interests. 



3 • The Ctoianmalgt Threat 

&• P y er t A^gres si on , Although Communist pol cy now 
emphasizes non-military methods, the danger of overt 
aggression will remain inherent so long as Communist 
China and North Viet Nam continue a basically hos J lie 
policy supported by substantial military forces. There 






U 



* 



For purposes of this paper, "Mainland Southeast Asia ,: con- 
sists of Burraa, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Viet Nam, Malaya 
and Singapore. In addition, there is attached a supple- 
mentary statement of policy on the special * situation in 
North Viet Kaa. 



NSC 6012 



1 o o 



SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section .U 
NND I rojecl Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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is only a cease-fire in Viet Nam and sporadic hostilities 
continue in Laos,, The Viet Minh have continued to 
improve their combat capabilities since the Geneva 
" ' Conference of 195*K ' 

J>* S ^ yQ gB/i pn.i In most countries of Southeast Asia 
a threat also "ari¥es from the existence of extensive 
local Communist capabilities for all types of subversive 
activities 5 ranging up to armed insurrection. Addition- 
ally^ the large overseas Chinese communities in South- 
east Asia offer a fertile field for subversion . The 
weak internal security systems of the Southeast Asian 
;■ states make them highly vulnerable to such activities e 

£• Communi s t Pol it i c a_l and Ec onoml c _ Of f en s i v e , At 
j ! present overt aggression and, except in the cases of 

Viet Nam and Laos, militant subversion are less likely 
than en intensified campaign of .Communist political, 
economic and cultural penetration in the area. The- * 
\ ' political instability, economic backwardness, export 

problems, and extreme nationalism of these countries 
provide many opportunities for Communist exploitation 
j ' by trade and economic assistance, conventional political 

; . " and diplomatic activity, and extensive infiltration. 
r _ This offensive now constitutes a threat to U t S. inter- 
^ ests more subtle and more difficult to cope with than 

other threats. 



! * ■ 



^t U. S. Role, The United States is likely to -remain 
the only major outside source of power to counteract the 
Russian-Chinese Communist t'rrust into Southeast Asia* Thus, 
the retention of this area in ttfe Free World will continue 
to depend on the extent and effectiveness of U. S. support as 
well as on the local efforts of the countries themselves; 






£• PoLltAPiQ..* The underlying purpose of U. S. 
I \ assistance in the area is to help the non- Communist 

■ * \ countries develop more effective political organizations, 
strengthen their internal administration and enlist 
greater allegiance in both urban and rural districts. 
In part, this purpose will be served by programs for 
military and economic aid dealt with below* In part it 
• " vail require an intensification of present programs for 

training competent Asian managerial and technical 
personnel. And 5 in part, new approaches, both govern- 
mental and private j will be needed. These should not 
concentrate exclusively at the national level, but should 
include activities designed to strengthen and* vitalize 
' ■ indigenous traditions and institutions and to have an 
impact on village life 3 rural society, and educational 
systems. 



& 



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NSC 6012 . • - " ' SECRET 

• - rC O o 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i 



SECRET 



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b* Military , Because these countr5.es do not have 
the capability of creating armed forces Which could 
effectively resist large-scale external aggression, the 
United States will 'be required to provide a basic shield 
against Communist aggression. For the foreseeable 
future,, local will to resist aggression will depend on a 
conviction in Southeast Asia that the United States will 
continue its support and will maintain striking forces 
adequate to counter aggression in Southeast Asia with . 
the "capabilities described in current basic national 
security policy. The combination of such U. S. forces 
and local will to resist would constitute the best 
deterrent against aggression. Should the deterrent fails 
this combination would also provide the most effective 
insurance that, in conjunction with indigenous and all -led 
forces, the United States could suppress aggression in 
the area quickly and in a manner and on a scale best 
calculated to avoid the hostilities broadening into 
general war. 

e. Economic and Tech nical . The insistence, through- 
out most of the area 5 on economic development provides 
the strongest lever for the exertion of influence by the 
Free World or by the Communist Bloc. Without increased 
external help from some source, most of the governments 
of the area will be unable, even with adequate indigenous 
effort, to manage the political demand for rapid better- 
ment in the conditions of life and provide for sound 
economic development. Failure to obtain such assistance 
from the Free World will tend to drive these countries 
toward economic dependence 'on the Communist" Bloc. The 
general preference in Southeast Asia for Western tech- 
nical and economic assistance gives the United States 
and the Free World an opportunity to obtain primacy over 
Communist efforts in key economic sectors. The outcome 
may, however, be strongly influenced by the success v/ith 
which the Free World can cope with Communist efforts to 
exploit the existence of Southeast Asian export problems, 
particularly those involving rice. In the period ahead, 
flexibility of U. S. procedure and rapidity of U, S. 
action will be increasingly important, if effective 
advantage is to be taken of unexpected and transient 
opportunities. 



■ 

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5* The Problem of Regional Asspciatipn. Over the long 
run, the small, vulnerable* and essentially dependent nations 
of Southeast Asia cannot exist satisfactorily as free nations 
without closer associations than now exist. 



i 



* * 



NSC .6012 



1284 



seck: 



Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



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SECRET 



6. The Problem, of .Alignrnent-, To preserve their inde- 
pendence," strengthen "their internal stability, and protect 
themselves against aggression- some countries in Southeast 
Asia prefer to join regional security arrangements * Some, 
however, prefer to avoid alignment with other nations* The 
basic objective of both groups is to maintain the inde- 
pendence of their countries free of outside interference or 
dictation, and the independence and vitality of both are 
important to .the United States and to each other ♦ 



II » POLICY CONCLUSIONS 

7« The national independence of the mainland South- 
east Asian states is important to the security interests 
of the United States. If such independence is to be pre- 
served, U. S, policies must seek to build sufficient strength 
in the area at least to identify aggression s suppress sub- 
version, prevent Communist political and economic domination, 
and assist the non-Communist governments to consolidate 
their domestic positions • U., S. policy should not depend 
primarily on the degree and nature of Communist activity at 
any particular time, but should seek to promote these goals 
within the limits of the economic capacities of the countries 
concerned and U. S, resources available for the area, 

- 

8,* Where a national determination to maintain inde- 
pendence and oppose external aggression is sufficiently 
maiiifest, the United States should be prepared to provide 
military assistance based upon ths missions of the forces 
as indicated in the f: Country Courses of Action" (Part V, 
below) . • ♦..'-•' .."..,; 

* a 

4 9. In the event of aggression against a Southeast 
Asian state willing to resist, the provisions of the UU 
Charter or the SEATO Treaty should be invoked, but the 
United States should not forgo necessary action in behalf 
of such a state or states because of the possibility that 
other allies might be loath to participate or to furnish 
more than token military forces, 

10. In the long run, the ability of the non-Communist 
governments to attain political, economic and social objec- 
tives will be the dominant factor in defeating the Communist 
attempts to dominate Southeast Asia. The United States 
should assist the non- Communist states of the area to 
formulate and execute programs designed to promote condi- 
tions of sound development, to demonstrate that they can 
achieve growth without reliance on Communist methods or depen- 
dence on the Communist Bloc, and to give their peoples a 
greater stake in the continued independence of their countries 






NSC 6012 






SEC& 






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SECRET 



11. The United States should continue to make clear its 
o\>m devotion to the principle of collective- security 3 its 
belief that regional security arrangements provide maximum 
protection at minimum cost for all, and its expectation that 
a | country f s decision to participate in such arrangements is 
based on its own calculation of its "best interests and does 
not of itself constitute a claim for increased financial 
aid. Where countries participate; measures to assure adher- 
ence are desirable,- normally including preferential treat- 
ment in the fields of economic and military assistance as 
justified by U So strategic objectives* Where new oppor- 
tunities for affiliation develop they should be encouraged* 
The United States should, however, accept the right of each 
'nation to choose its own path to the future, and should not 
exert pressure to make active allies of countries not so 
inclined. * The genuine independence of such countries from 
Communism serves U # S c interests even .though they are not 
formally aligned with the United States. The United States 
should accordingly support and assist them so long as, they 
remain determined to preserve their own independence and 
are actively pursuing policies to this end.' 



/ 



) 



'III. OBJECTIVES 

12. To prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from 
passing into or becoming economically dependent upon the 
Communist Bloc; to persuade them that their best interests 
lie in greater cooperation and stronger affiliations with 
the rest of the Free World; and to assist them to develop 
toward stable, free representative governments with the will 
and ability to- resist Communism from within and without s and 
thereby to contribute to the strengthening of the Free World. 



IV. REGIONAL., COURSES OP ACT ION* 

13# Support and assist the countries of the area on the 
basis of their will and ability to defend and ■ strengthen 
their independence. 

■ 

1^. Respect each country's choice of national policy for 
preserving its independence, but make every effort to demon- 
strate the advantages of greater cooperation and closer 
alignment with the Free World, as well as the dangers of 
alignment with the Communist Bloc. 



i 



• The following courses of action are not applicable to the 
State of Singapore at this time: paragraphs 13, 1^, 3 6, 
22~a, and 32. 






• KSC 6012 . 



7 OO n 
•i £ v 



SECRI 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
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SECRET 



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15 . Encourage the countries of Southeast Asia to cooper- 
ate closely v;ith each other on a basis of mutual aid and 
support 5 and support indigenous efforts to develop regional 
associations so long as they do not weaken SEATO or the 
spirit of resistance to Communism, 



regional 



16. Participate actively in SEATO, and seek to develop 
both its military and non-military aspects in a manner that 
will convincingly ^demonstrate the value of SEATO as a 
association, the usefulness of which extends beyond deter- 
rence of Communist expansion. Encourage limited participa- 
tion of non -Communist , non-SEATQ Asian nations in certain 

.SEATO activities. . 

17, Encourage and support the spirit of resistance 
among the peoples of So.utheast Asia to Chinese Communist 
aggression as well as the indigenous Communist insurrection, 
subversion, and propaganda. 

- 

18* Encourage the Governments of Laos, Thailand, and 
Viet Nam to maintain close relations with the GRC and to 
support its international position as the Government of 
China, Having in mind the desirability, from the U. S. 
point of view, of Halaya and Singapore developing closer 
relations with the GRC, encourage these Governments, as 
appropriate, to take steps that will lead ultimately to this 
objective. Seek to ensure that Malaya does not recognize 
the Chinese Communist regime or support"" its seating -in the 
United Nations as the Government of China, and that Singapore 
does not develop closer economic or cultural relations with 
Communist China, Encourage the. countries of the area to 
eschew relations with the Communist regimes in North Korea 
and North Viet Nam and to support the international position 
•of fcKe Governments of the Republics of Viet Nam and of Korea* 



19 » Maintain- in the general area of the Par East, Uo S 
forces .adequate to exert a deterrent influence against 
Communist aggression, in conformity with current basic 
national security policy. 



i 



20. Should overt Communist aggression occur in the 
Southeast Asian treaty area, invoke ! .he UN Charter or the 
SEATO Treaty, or both as applicable; and subject to local 
request for assistance take necessary military a&& any other 
action to assist any Mainland Southeast Asian state or 
dependent territory in the SEATO area willing to resist 
Communist resort to force: Provided * that the taking of 
military ?~etion shall be subject to prior submission to 
and approval by the Congress unless the emergency is deemed 
by the President to be so great that immediate action is 
necessary to save a vital interest of the United States. 



NSC 6012 



(Revised 8/2 h/GO) ■ 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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* ■ 4 

21* In case of an imminent or actual Communist attempt 
to seize control from within, and assuming some manifest 
local desire for U. S. assistance, take all feasible mea- 
sures to thwart the attempt, including even military action 
after appropriate Congressional action* 

22. As appropriate, assist the police forces in South- 
east Asian countries to obtain training and equipment to 
detect and contain Communist activities, 

23. In order to strengthen the noii- Communist govern- 
ments of the area and to help forestall their economic 
dependence on the Communist Bloc: 

a. ProvJxLe flexible economic and technical assist- 
ance as necessary to attain U. S, objectives , In the 

- framing of U. S. aid programs to Southeast Asian countri 
take into account the economic and technical assistance 
being provided "hy other Free World nations and by inter- 
national institutions s coordinating with such nations 
and institutions where appropriate. 

b. Encourage* measures to imurove the climate for 
privcite investment! both domestic and foreign, and to 
mobilize the maximum investment of U» S. private capital 
in the area consistent with the prevailing climate, 

■ 

i 

c. Encourage United Nations agencies, other Colombo 
Plan countries, and other friendly -countries to contri- 
bute available resources to promote the economic growth 
of Southeast Asia. 






d» Encourage the Southeast Asian countries to. 
orient their economies in the direction of the Free 
World axid to rely primarily on non- Communist markets 
and sources of supply for trade, technicians, capital 
development, and atomic development. . | 

■ 

e» In carrying out programs involving disposal of 
U. S. agricultural surpluses abroad: 

(1) Give particular attention to the eco* jjale 
vulnerabilities of the Southeast Asian countries 
• and avoid, to the maximum extent practicable, 
■ detracting from the ability of these countries to 
market their own exportable produce * ' * 



« ■ 



« 



(2) Give particular emphasis to the use of the 
resources to promote multilateral trade and economic 
development. 



. 









< r\ ^ 



NSC 6012 



■ ■ \- , X2U8 

(Revised 8/2 >-\/6o) 



SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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SECRET 



f. Promote as appropriate the expansion of trade 
relationships between the United. States and the countries 
of Southeast Asia, ^ * 

L g w Take advantage of adverse local reactions to 
I Communist barter agreements with countries in- the area 
Iby demonstrating the advantages to these countries of 
Iconductiftg trade on a multilateral commercial basis. 

24 , Make a special,, sustained effort to help educate 
»0 expanding number of technically competent pro-Western 
civilian and military leaders,, working bilaterally, through 
the United Nations, with the other Colombo Plan countries 
and with other friendly countries, -Stress the development 
of potential and secondary leadership to support the thin 
stratum of felite now administering the central governments 
and bring to their support modern techniques and technology 
in public information and organization." 

* 

25, Place increased emphasis on community development 
projects j educational programs., and other activities aimed 
to influence the welfare and attitudes of the people at the 

village level, . - . 

■ 

26, Strengthen informational., cultural and educational 
activities j as appropriate, to foster increased alignment 
of the people v/ith the Free World and to contribul >; to an 
understanding of Communist aims and techniques. 

27, Hold or reduce the number of U, S. officials in 
each country to a strict minimum consistent with sound 
implementation of erx'ential programs, in order to head off 
an adverse political reaction to the presence of a large 
number of Americans in relatively privileged positions. 

28, Promote increasing Asian Buddhist contact v/ith and 
knowledge of the Free World, .Explore with friendly religious 
organizations ways of developing Buddhist fraternal associa- 
tions and identification with Free World religious leaders * 
and movements, 

/ 29. When not .in conflict v/ith other U. S. political 
objectives, continue activities designed to encourage the 
overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia (a) to integrate fully 
and as rapidly as -practicable into the national life of 
their host countries, becoming loyal citizens and identifying 
themselves with the interests of these countries; (b) to 
support and participate in anti-Communist activities in their 
countries of domicile; (c) to resist Communist efforts to 
infiltrate and gain control of their communities. Seek to . 



NSC 6012 



123S 
(Revised 8/24/60) - 



8ECHE ■ 






■» 






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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



. SECRET 



n siire that elements within these communities that continue 
t °feel and act as Chinese rather than "as citizens of their 
* tost countries look to the' GRC as the custodian of Chinese 
Voclal and cultural values and support it as the representa- 
tive of the interests and aspirations of the Chinese people, 

130* Discreetly encourage the governments of the countrie 
■ f the area to .promote and facilitate the integration of 
racial minorities,- bearing in mind that the extent 'and pace 
f such integration will be affected by the willingness of 
the host countries to permit the overseas Chinese and other 
minorities to participate in the national life without 
discrimination. ' 



s 



31 . Implement as appropriate 
to assist in the achievement of U 

A 



covert operations designed 



o J 



S, objectives in Southeast 



313 



32 # Promote economic cooperation between the countries 
of the area and Japan and with the Government of the Republic 
of China,, to the extent feasible without jeopardizing the 
achievement of U. S. objectives toward the individual South- 
east Asian countries. 

33 • I n order to promote increased cooperation in the 
area and to deny the general area of the Mekong River Basin 
to Communist influence or domination^ assist. as feasible in 
the development of the Mekong River Bas^n as a nucleus for 
regional cooperation and mutual aid. * 1 

3'K Should any country in the* area cease to demon- 
strate a will to resist internal Communist subversion and 
to carry out a policy of maintaining its i. dependence,, 
terminate U, S, economic and military assistance programs 
to such nations, * « 



35- Exercise caution to ensure that the United Stages 
does not become so identified , either in fact or in the 
eyes of the worlds with particular regimes, individuals or 
political factions in the countries of the area as to hinder 
II,. S. accommodation to changes in the political scene . 



V . COUNTRY^ COURSES OF ACTION IN ADDITION TO 
!PHfT^EUIONAL COURSES Oi7 ACTION 7 ^ ABOVE" 






: 



*J 



BURMA 

35. In view of the emerging opportunities* in Burma and 
the repercussions that developments there will have on the 



NSC 6012 



12SID 



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(Revised 8/2 V°0) 



SECRET 









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committed areas of Asia and Africa, make a special effort 
^"influence an increasingly favorable -orientation in 
.^r^ r s policies. . 

37 # Encourage and 



support 



those elements i*i Burma 




ni 
independence. , . •.■•.,, 

38, Encourage Burmese assumption of regional and inter- 
national responsibilities compatible with our own objectives. 

r 39. For political purposes, upon Burmese request make 
/military training available on a grant basis and modest 
amounts of military equipment and supplies on a sales or 
token payment basis, as consistent with U. S, interests. 

m ■* 

V 

HO. Encourage the Burmese Government to establish 
internal security throughout the country, and discourage 
further foreign assistance to Chinese Nationalist irregular 
and ethnic rebel groups in Burma". 



s 



' 41. Should overt Communist aggression occur against 
Burma, invoke the UN Charter and, subject to Burmese re- 



',/. " quest for assistance, take necessary military and any other 



action to assist Burma if Burma is willing to 



resist; 



Com- 



munist resort to force and U. S. vital interests are in- 
volved; Provid ed, that the taking of military action shall 
be subject to prior submission to the approval by the Con- 
gress ■• 



CAMBODIA 



42. 



Seek to increase Cambodia's respect for and confi- 



dence in the United States and the Free World in order to 
assist in maintaining Cambodia's independence and in curbing 
its tendency to increased orientation toward the Sino- Soviet' 
Bloc. To this end demonstrate continued friendly U. S. 
support for Cambodia's independence, understanding of its 
policy of neutrality, and concern for its economic and 
social progress. • 

* 

43. In shaping particular courses of action in Cambodia, 
take into account the fact that Prince Sihanouk enjoys wide- 
spread popularity, particularly among the rural population, 
and controls all major sources of political power. Devote 
special efforts toward developing Sihanouk's understanding 
of U, S. policies and of the U. S. position in Southeast 



NSC 6012 



.* . . *a. r- o JL 

(Revised 8/24/60) 



SECRE1 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Prnjeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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asi£j bearing in mind his extreme sensitivity to any sugges- 
tion of pressure or slight. t 



I 



44* Since real or fancied threats from neighboring 



free World countries have been a major factor contributing 
to Cambodia's sense of insecurity and its consequent readi- 
ness to accept Sino-Soviet Bloc support, endeavor persis- 
tently and firmly, to improve Cambodia's relations with 
these countries, particularly Thailand and Viet Nam. Take 
every appropriate occasion to impress on the governments of 
neighboring countries the importance of repairing their 
relations with Cambodia. 



» 



45. Seek means effectively to promote a sense of 
responsibility on the part of Sihanouk and other Cambodian 
leaders for exerting sustained effort to create conditions 
conducive to better relations xv T ith neighboring countries 
and for avoiding contentious and provocative statements. 
When feasible and consistent with over-all U. S. interests, 
take steps to prevent provocative actions by any of the 
countries concerned, ' - 

» 

46. Encourage positive cooperation between Cambodia 
and neighboring countries such as joint participation in 

the development of the Lov/er Mekong River Basin as a nucleus 
for regional cooperation and mutual. aid, 

47. Continue to provide modest military aid to enable 
the Cambodian armed forces to maintain internal security 
against Communist subversion or other elements hostile to 
U. S. interests and to discourage fcambodia from accepting 
substantial military aid from the Sino-Soviet Bloc. 

• 

43. Concentrate U. S. economic and technical assist- 
ance primarily in those areas in which increased Communist 
influence v:ould entail the greatest threat to Cambodia's 
neutrality and independence, ■ . r 

49* In view of the relatively strong position still 
maintained by France in Cambodia, seek opportunities for 
greater mutual understanding and cooperation with the 
French in the furtherance of common Free World objectives. 



LAOS 



1 



\ 



50, Provide military assistance for the development 
and support of Lao armed forces capable of maintaining 
internal security against Communist subversion or other 
element r hostile to U, S, interests and providing limited 



*f, 



NSC 6012 



f?.QO 
■ (Revised Q/2h/So) 



SSCnc-si 



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*Mtial resistance to Communist aggression. Encourage Laos 
^'x'ormulate and implement a broadly conceived security 

— n -- Jj -~ -u-^ *^„ M ^*i _i _4_ rnal security, which 

=>s of the Royal 




51. In the provision or U.'S. assistance, direct our 
^ograms to the promotion of social and economic progress 
g R d unification of Laos., thus helping maintain the confi- 
dence of the Royal Government in its anti-Communist, pro- 
yree World "neutrality" . . 

m 

52* Continue to promote conditions engendering confi- 
dence by Lao leaders that the UN Charter, SEATO, and Free 
Korld support provide a favorable basis for Lao resistance 
to Communist pressure and inducements, and at the same time 
continue to impress upon the Lao the need for a sense of 
responsibility and recognition that too drastic actions 
may have adverse international implications 

53. Encourage the Lao to observe constitutional and 
legal processes as providing the soundest basis for the. 
grov/th and vitality of democratic institutions; discourage 
resort to force in political affairs* 

t 

- 

54. Encourage the Lao Government to give emphasis to 
programs tending to reox^ient disaffected elements of the 
population. 

55 ♦ Encourage and support cooperation betv;een Laos 
and other Southeast Asian countries particularly Thail-. ncl, 
Viet Nam, the Philippines., Malaya; and Burma, including 
such joint effort in the anti-subversioiv economic, com- 
munications,, and military fields as is feasible. 

*5<5. Develop greater mutual understanding and coopera- 
tion with the French in the furtherance of common Free World 
jectives. 



■ ■ 

57. Strongly support ,l fc he UN presence" and expanded JN 
technical assistance in Laos, and make a special intensified 
effort to encourage other friendly nations to assume a 
larger share of responsibility for the support of the 
country,. * . . . 



( 






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•• 



*. 



S'ilAIMND 



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58. Promote the development of a Thai leadership which 
is increasingly united, stable and constructive, is supported 
by the Thai people 7 and Willing to continue the alignment of 
Thailand vrith the United States and the West, 



1293 

•*'- S- V^ vj 



NSC 6012 



(Revised S/2h/o0) 



SECRET 



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NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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59, Utilize Thailand's central location in Southeast 
,..*a as a point from which to create discontent and internal 
i^riculties within nearby Communist-dominated areas and 
ittart Communist subversive efforts in neighboring free 



•#»?* 



*'A:n tries , to a degree consistent with U, S, policies 
digrams in neighboring free countries. 



and 



SO. Provide military assistance to Thailand for support 
-f forces sufficient: 



a. To maintain internal security. 
* ■ 

b. To present limited initial resistance to 
external aggression. 

£. ' To make a modest. contribution to collective 
defense of contiguous SEATO areas. - 

Continue to urge the Thai Government to improve the organi 
nation of the Thai Armed Forces so as to make a maximum 
contribution to the above objectives. , ' . 

an improvement in relations 






. Encourage and support 
between Thailand and Cambodia # 



ms 



I 



VIET NAM 

62. Assist Free Viet Nam to develcfp a. strong, stable 
and constitutional government to enable Free Viet Mom to 
assert an increasingly attractive 'contrast. to conditions 
in the present Communist zone. In this regard enco : age 
and assist public relations and public information prqgrs 
of the Government of Viet Nam directed both internally to 
thej Free Vietnamese and externally to North Viet Nam, 

63* Work toward the weakening of the Communists in 
North and South Viet Nam in order to bring about the 
eventual peaceful reunification of a free and independent. 
Viet Nam under anti -Communist leadership , 

64. Support the position of the Government of Free' 
Viet Nam that all-Viet Nam elections may take place only 
after it is satisfied that genuinely free elections can 
be held throughout both zones of Viet Nam. 

' I 

65. Assist Free Viet Nam to build up indigenous armed 
forces,, including independent logistical and administra- 
tive services, which Will be capable of assuring internal 
security and of providing limited initial resistance to 
attack by the Viet IHnh. 







/ 



W 



$*' 



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NSC 6012 



(Revised 8/24/60) 



SECRET 






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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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I 66. Encourage Vietnamese military planning for defense 

( a gainst external aggression along lines consistent with ^ 
U? S. planning concepts based v.pon approved U. S. policy, 
arid discreetly manifest in other ways U. S. interest ?.n 
assisting "Free Viet Nam; in accordance with the SEATO 
Treaty, to defend itself against external aggression. 



** 



67. Encourage and support an improvement in relations 
between Viet Mam and Cambodia. 



id 



FEDER ATION OF MALAYA. .> *^^-^-B. f^j^^^J^ kUU?_^ 

68, Encourage the continued development of a strong, 
stable Malaya within the Commonwealth, 

69. Encourage the Commonwealth to exercise primary 
responsibility in Malaya but be prepared to assist, as 
necessary, in the maintenance of Malaya's stability and . 
independence ♦ 



70. In the application to Malaya of the course of 
j action in paragraph 23--£, be prepared to provide needed 
technical assistance to Malaya, and consider the exten- 
sion of loans for economic development if alternate sources 
of financing prove to be inadequate , 

I 71 p Discreetly encourage the present Malayan leader- 
ship to improve its position of strength and responsibility 

unless more favorable alternatives develop, 

■ 

r 

72, Discreetly encourage Malaya's participation and 
membership in SEATO, avoiding any actions which might 
\ } strengthen neutralist sentiment, ' j 

- 

73# Encourage the Malayan Government to take vigorous 
actions to curb Communist subversion and to rely primarily 
on the Commonwealth for any assistance required. ! 



* 

7^, Should overt Communist aggression occur against 
Malaya, place initial reliance on Commonwealth, SEATO or UN 
resources as appropriate, but be prepared, subject to 
Malayan request for assistance, to take independent U. 3, 
action along the lines of . the proviso in paragraph 20, 





1 

1 

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NSC 601 2 

« 


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SINGAPORE . -I 

75 « Bearing in mind Singapore's strategic position 
and its importance to the Free World, encourage development 
toward a politically stable, economically viable Singapore, 

12? 5 

SECRET 

(Revised 8/24/60) 



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.-ting to cooperate with the United States an 
'fating internal and external Communist thro 



and capable 



of 



ats 



-M^ u 






7o # Encourage and support British, Australian, Federa- 
of Malaya and Singapore Government efforts to 
,»«*ngthen moderate political forces in order to counteract 
'♦rich as possible the extreme left's pull on the Govern- 
1^'ti Be prepared, -however, after consultation with the 
r ■••; ■ r^-itishj to take .such independent action as necessary to 

3:*oraplish this end. / - 

» 

77, In case the Communists or extreme leftists move 
• -j gain control of the Government by legal or violent 

' -: : jH3, " consult v/ith the United Kingdom, the Federation, 
ssd if appropriate other interested parties, and as neces- 
zivj support counteraction, being prepared, as necessary } 
, , \o take independent action along the lines of paragraph 21. 

- 

78. Should overt Communist aggression occur against 

, f, • Singapore, place initial reliance on the resources possessed 
by Singapore, the British and the Federation of Malaya, 
■: * but be prepared to take action, if necessary, in accordance 
. . with paragraph 20. 

■ 

t 

79* While recognising the desire of Singapore to 
I / merge v/ith the Federation, do not encourage such a step 
unless and until such action appears to be useful in 
achieving both long-range and short-range U. S. aims as 
: set forth in paragraphs 75 and 76; in the meantime use 
the Singapore Government's desire for closer ties and 
eventual merger with the Federation in an effort to 
counteract the extreme left. 1 s pull on the government ♦ 

80* Encourage efforts by the Government of Singapore 
* to. solve its political and economic problems .in ways con- 
sistent with U. S. objectives. To the extent feasible, 
rely on the United Kingdom to provide external financial 
■ ' . support to Singapore and, to the extent desired by the ■ 
. ' United Kingdom, support the utilization of Free World 

international financial institutions in the promoting of 
economic development and economic reforms in Singapore. 
Be prepared, however, to provide U. S« technical and 
economic development assistance when such assistance would 
be of special significance in achieving U. S, objectives. 

« 

8l § In all U, S. activities in Singapore, keep in mind 
the continuing British responsibility for Singapore's 
defense and foreign affairs, and the British role in internal 
security as well as British knowledge and. experiences in 
governing Singapore, and seek to avoid action likely to 
cause a serious misunderstanding between the United States 
and the United Kingdom, 

locp 



1 



NSC 6012 



(Revised B/?J\/6o) 



SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order .3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NMD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



J- 



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VI . SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OP POLICY 

on . - •■ *~- -. 

THE SPECIAL SITUATION IN NORTH VIET NAM 




Art* 



6-y\ « 



** ••-. 



82 • Treat the Viet Minh as not* constituting a legiti- 
mate government, and discourage other non-Communist states 
from developing or maintaining relations "with the Viet Minh 
regime. 



83* Prevent .the Viet Minh from expanding their polit- 
ical influence and territorial control in Free Viet Nam 
and Southeast Asia. 

■ 

8^. Deter the Viet Minh from attacking or subverting 
Free Viet Nam or Laos. 



8< 



Probe weaknesses of the Viet Minh and exploit 



them internally and internationally whenever "possible 



i/ 



86. Exploit nationalist sentiment within North Viet • y 
Nam as a means of weakening and disrupting Sino-Soviet // 
domination. 

* 

87. Assist the Government of Viet Nam to undertake 
programs of political, economic and psychological warfare//,-^ 
against Viet Minh Communists. // '" 



* 

88.' Apply, as necessary to achieve U. S. objectives, . 
restrictions on U. S. exports and shipping and 021 foreign '/ 
assets similar to those already in effect for Communist 
China and North Korea. * 



- 



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NSC 6012 



1 Q 7 

- 

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(Revised 8/2 V&J) 



SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



SECRET 



SNIE 63.1-60 
23 August i960 



SHORT-TEEM TRENDS IN SOUTH VIETNAM 



The Problem 



To assess political and security problems and probable trends in South Vietnam 
over the next year or so. 



CONCLUSIONS 



1, Developments within South Vietnam 
over the past six months indicate a trend 
adverse to the stability and effectiveness 
of President Diem's government. Criti- 
cism of Diem's leadership within urban 
groups and government circles has been 
mounting. More immediately important, 
the Communist Viet Cong, with support 

and guidance from Hanoi, has markedly 
increased subversive operations, terrorist 
activities , and guerrilla warfare. (Paras 

V13) 

2. Although Diem's personal position and 
that of his government are probably not 



now in danger, the marked deterioration 
since January of this year is disturbing. 
These adverse trends are not irreversible , 
but if they remain unchecked, they will 
almost certainly in time cause the collapse 
of Diem's regime. We do not anticipate 
that this will occur within the period of 
this estimate. However, if Diem is not 
able to alter present trends and the situa- 
tion deteriorates subst ant illy, it is possi- 
ble during the period of this estimate that 
the government will lose control over much 
of the countryside and a political crisis 
will ensue. (Par a, 17) I 



DISCUSSION 



3. Since the beginning of i960, there has 
been a general decline in the political and 
security situations in South Vietnam. The 
Communist Viet Cong 2J has stepped up 
terrorist activities and guerrilla warfare. 



; 






1/ The Viet Cong insurgents represent- the 
paramilitary arm of the North Vietnam 
Communist Party. The Viet Cong esti- 
mated to have in South Vietnam between 
3,000 and 5>000 regular armed cadres 
and about 3j000 irregulars organized as 
underground troops . Main areas of Viet 
Cong activity lie south and west of 
Saigon and along the Cambodian border. 
North Vietnam furnishes guidance, per- 
sonnel reinforcements, and logistical 
support to the insurgents. 



At the same time, grievances against th 
government, which have long b€ n accumu- 
lating, have become increasingly urgent 
and articulate. 

The Political Situation 

U. Discontent with the Diem government has 
been prevalent for some time among intellec' 
tuals and elite circles and, to a lesser 
extent, in labor and urban business groups. 
Criticism by these elements focusses on Ngo 
family rule, especially the roles of the 
President's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and 
Madame Nnu,. the 



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pervasive influence of the Can Lao, 2 the semi- 
clandestine apparatus of the regime; Diem's 
virtual one-man rule; and the growing evi- 
dence of corruption in high places- In* late 
April, 18 prominent Vietnamese publicly peti- 
tioned Diem to "liberalize the regime, expand 
democracy, grant minimum civil rights, (and) 
recognize the opposition in order to let the 
people speak without fear." This unprece- 
dented public attack on Diem by a non-Com- 
munist group may embolden other urban ele- 
ments to become more vocal. 

5. A new and even more important element 
in the political situation is the growing criti- 
cism of Diem's leadership within government 
circles, including the official bureaucracy and 
military; this criticism has become more in- 
tense than at any time since 195G. Since the 
early p*rfc of this year, Vice President Tho, 
other members of the cabinet, and middle 
echelon officials have made known their 
serious concern over Diem's handling of the 
internal security problem and have privately 
criticized the power and influence exerted by 
Nhu and his entourage. In addition, there 
is considerable uneasiness concerning the op- 
erations and activities of the Can Lao organi- 
zation. 



6. Although most of the Vietnamese peasants 
are politically apathetic, they also have their 
grievances against the government. These 
include the ineptitude and arrogance of many 
local and provincial officials, the lack of effec- 
tive protection from Viet Cong demands in 
many parts of the country, the harshness with 
which many peasants have been forced to con- 
tribute* their labor to government programs, 
and the unsettling economic and social effects 
of the agroville (government-sponsored settle- 



*The Can Lao organization is based on the cell 
" and cache system, similar to that of the Kuomin- 
tang or a Communist party. It is controlled by 
Diem's brothers, Nhu and Can. Can Lao mem- 
bers are active at virtually every level of Viet- 
namese political life. One-third of the cabinet 
members and over half of the National Assembly 
( deputies probably belong to the Can Lao. The 
organization also controls the regime's mass 
political part;/, the National Revolutionary Move- 
ment. It is deeply involved In Vietnamese busi- 
ness affairs and has a program to recruit key 
officers in the Vietnamese military establishment. 



• * 






- ,- 1 - - • • - 



ments) program. As a consequence, Diem's 
government is lacking in positive support 
among the people in the countryside, 

7. The members of Diem's immediate entour- 
age have attempted, with_some_ success,- to 
keep him insulated from unpleasant develop- 
ments and trends. However, he has become 
concerned over the deteriorating internal se- 
curity situation, although he still tends to dis- 
count the amount of discontent both in the 
countryside and among urban elements. 
Although he has taken some steps to meet the 
internal security problem, he tends to view 
it almost entirely in military terms. He be- 
lieves that increased military activity against 
the Viet Cong, along with an expansion of 
the agroville program, will greatly improve 
internal security. He has been openly con- 
temptuous of the views of oppositionists in 
Saigon and regards them as uninformed and " 
dupes of the Communists. Diem also has 
failed to take any major steps against corrup- 
tion and arbitrary conduct on the part of the 
Can Lao organization. 

The Security Situation 

8. Aggravating many of the government's 
_ problems is the active campaign of fchq Viet 

Cong to discredit Diem and weaken the gov- 
ernment's authority through political subver- 
• siori as well as paramilitary action. The Viet 
Cong has had some success in exploiting dis- 
contented intellectuals, sowing disaffection 
among the populace, and disrupting the effec- 
tive administration of government. This 
campaign has been well organized and skill- 
fully executed, with the result that Diem has. 
been confronted not merely with the armed 
threat of guerrilla operations but with a com- 
prehensive subversive program. 

• 

9. Between mid-1957 and the end of 1959, the 

Viet Cong conducted a steady but low key 
campaign of propaganda, subversion, and 
terrorism in the South Vietnamese country- 
side. Since January, there has been a sig- 
nificant increase in the number and size of 
Viet Cong attacks in several areas, particu- 
larly in the southwest. Civilian travel on 
public roads more than 15 miles outside Sai- V 
gon has become hazardous. Attacking units 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



SECRET 



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estimated to number at times In the hundreds, 
have operated over wider areas than at any 
time since 1954 and have assaulted Vietnamese 
.Army installations. Since the beginning of 
the rainy season in April and the launching of 
Vietnamese Army counter operations, Viet 
Cong operations have abated somewhat but 
terrorist activity, such as assassination and 
Kidnapping of provincial officials and govern- 
ment sympathizers, "has continued at high 
levels. 3 Support from North Vietnam appears 
to have increased over the past several months. 
In particular, senior cadres and military sup- 
plies such as communications equipment are 
believed to be moving south through Laos and 
Cambodia and by junk along the eastern 
coastline. 

10. TI*-i upsurge in Viet Cong activity, accom- 
panied by a stepped up propaganda campaign 
from Hanoi, probably reflects a recent Com- 
munist decision to increase pressures on the 
South Vietnamese Government. The indica- 
tions of increasing dissatisfaction with the 
Diem government have probably encouraged 
the Hanoi regime, supported and guided by 

.the Chinese Communists, to take stronger 
action at this time. The Chinese Communists 
probably regard South Vietnam as a promis- 
ing area for weakening the US position in 
Southeast Asia at little cost or risk. From 
the Chinese point of view, many favorable ele- 
ments are present: a sizable and effective in- 
digenous guerrilla apparatus responsive to 
Communist control; a government lacking in 
positive support from its people; and the 
widely recognized political commitment the 
US has in Soiuii Vietnam. 

- 

11. In countering the Viet Cong challenge, 
Diem faces many of the same problems which 
confronted the French during the Indo-Chma 
War. Viet Cong guerrilla units have suc- 
ceeded in exploiting their natural advantages 
of surprise, mobility, and initiative. In many 
of their areas of operations, they have ex- 



*.In the first five months of 19G0, 780 government 
officials and sympathizers were assassinated by 
insurgents. The total number of assassinations 
in tS53 was 193 and in 1959, 239. Kidnappings 
this year through May total 232 1 as compared 

- with i in 1958 and 341 in 1959. * 



ploited the tendency of the largely passive 
population to accommodate to their presence 
•and thereby avoid reprisals. In some areas 
of operations, however, they have obtained the 
'active cooperation of the local population. 

12. In contrast to the 'French strategy in the 
Indo-China War, however, the Vietnamese 
Government is attempting not only to control 
the populated areas and main lines of com- 
munications but also to group the peasantry 
into more defensible units through its agro- 
ville program. Special measures in organi- 
zation and training have been implemented 
enabling the army to react more quickly and 
effectively against guerrilla hit-and-run tac- 
tics. The civil guard is forming "commando" 
units and new stress is being placed on the 
building of a youth corps, 10,000 strong, for 
patrol and reconnaissance purposes in the 
villages and towns. 

13. The most effective government measure 
against the Viet Cong, however, remains Che 
active participation of the army, with air 
force support. Until recently, the army's 
commitment to internal security operations 
has been limited by the deployment of major 

. elements in defense against an overt attack 
from North Vietnam and by training ac- 
tivities in support of this mission. Some im- 
provement in the army's effectiveness and 
capabilities can b expected with the increased T 

■ emphasis on antiguerrilla training, improved 
organization, and better combat intelligence. 
We believe it unlikely, however, that the army 
will be able to do more than contain the Viet" 
Cong threat, at least over the short run. 

The Outlook 

14. The Vict Cong will probably maintain its 
pressure on provincial officials and govern- 
ment installations at the present high level, 
and, with the end of the wet season in October, 
return to large-scale guerrilla actions aimed 
at nullifying the government's authority in 
the rural areas. Hanoi, could step up the 
weight and pace of the Viet Cong activities in 
South Vietnam. In the absence of more efTcc- 
live government measures to protect the peas- 
ants and to win their positive cooperation, the 
prospect is for expansion of the areas of Viet, 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



SECRET 



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Con" control in the countryside, particularly 
in the southwestern provinces. 

ft 

15, Dissatisfaction and discontent with the 
government will probably continue to rise un- 
less the security situation improves and unless 
Diem can be brought to reduce the corruption 
and excesses of his regime. Although there 
have been no popular demonstrations so far, 
we believe that the possibilities for antiregime 
disturbances are increasing. The Viet Cong 
will attempt to capture and control major 
demonstrations that occur. Existing police 
and civil guard strength is capable of con-: 
trolling small-scale disorders in major popu- 
lation centers, but army support would be re- 
quired if rioting became widespread. 

1G. Th: position of the army in the Viet- 
namese political scene is not entirely clear. 
The regime has taken pains to insure that 
no one army figure could acquire such per- 
sonal standing or prestige that he could range 
himself and the army against the government. 
However, there is some discontent among ofli- 



%» 






. - 



p. 



cers over Can Lao influence in promotions and 
assignments, and concern over corruption and 
nepotism in the army has increased! If un- 
rest in official circles and urban elements 
became extreme and attempts were made to 
organize an antiregime opposition, the atti- 
tude of the army would become a vital political 
factor. But it is not clear what the army's 
action would be in these circumstances. 

17. Although Diem's personal position and 
that of his government are probably not now 
in danger, the marked deterioration since 
January of this year is disturbing. These ad* 
verse trends are not irreversible, but if they 
remain unchecked, they will almost certainly 
in time cause the collapse of Diem's regime. 
We do not anticipate that this will occur 
within the period of this estimate. However, 
if Diem is not able to alter present trends and 
the situation deteriorates substantially, it is 
possible durhig the" period of this estimate 
that the government will lose control over 
much of the countryside and political crisis 
will ensue. 



%- 



130 1" 






_: 






'.. +, • 



- - -r^zl 



:*• - 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 






. 



f 









Control S&56 
September 5, 190O 

8:37 AM 

' From: SAIGOIT 

To: Secretary of State 

No: 538, September 5, 1 PM (Section 1 of 2) 

Sent Department £38, Repeated Information , CINCPAC POLAD 83, 
BANGKOK, VEIIJTIANE, PjBSCM PENH, LONDON, PARIS UNNUMBERED 

IN VIEW DEVELOPMENTS KOREA, TURKEY, RECENT COUP D'LADS, AND ATTEMPTED 
ANTI-GVN DEMONSTRATION ABOUT HEM AGO (OUR U32) WE BELIEVE IT DESIRABLE 
" , ASSESS POSSIBILITIES FOR DEMONSTRATION AND COUP HERE AND LIKELY OUTCOME. 
POTENTIALITIES OF VARIOUS GROUPS FOR POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF THESE TYPES 

GIVEH BELOW: 

• 1. PEASANTS. VARIOUS FACTORS DISCONTENT EXIST- SUCH AS LACK OF ADEQUATE 
PROTECTION AGAINST COMMUNIST ATTACKS Aim PRESSURES, LOW PRICES PADDY, 
' COMPULSORY LABOR ON AGROVILLES AND OTHER PROJECTS, AND ARBITRARY METHODS 
OF AUTHORITIES. DIEM HAS TAKEN SOME STEPS TO TRY ALLEVIATE SOURCES OF 
DISCONTENT (OUR G-79) BUT IT IS IMPORTANT HE TAKES OTHERS BECAUSE 
PEASANTRY REPRESENT KEY TO SUCCESS OR FAILURE COMMUNIST GUERRILLA WARFARE 
IN COUNTRYSIDE AND THUS TO GRADUAL UNDERMINING OF REGIME, " HOWEVER, ANY 
• SUDDEN DEMONSTRATION OR COUP AGAINST GVN LIKELY TO CENTER IN SAIGON AND 

- SEEMS IMPROBABLE THAT PEASANTRY IN VIEW LACK ORGANIZATION, TRANSPORT 
PROBLEMS, ETC. WOULD PLAY SIGNIFICANT ROLE THEREIN. 

i 

2. COMMUNISTS. WHILE THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT COMMIES HAVE SOME" STRENGTH . 
IN SAIGON. THEY HAVE NOT YET OPEiJLY SHOWN THEIR HAND IN CITY AND ARE MUCH 
MORE LIKELY OPERATE THROUGH INFILTRATED, OSTENSIBLY NON-COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS 
WHICH THEY WILL HELP INSTIGATE TO ACTION. EVEN WITHOUT DEMONSTRATION ATTEMPT 
BY OTitER GROUPS, THEY MAY ENGAGE IN HIT AND RUN TACTICS OF VIOLENCE IN SAIGON 
AND IN CASE OF ANY DEMONSTRATION WOULD STEP UP SUCH TACTICS DURING CONFUSION 
AHD WOULD ATTEMPT BEHIND SCENES TO MANIPULATE ANY DEMONSTRATION WHICH BEGAN, 

■ PARTICULARLY BY TRYING PRO VOICE GVN TO TAKE HARSH MEASURE IN REPRESSIONS 

■ 

3. IABOR. 71ADE UNIONS ARE PROBABLY BEST ORGANIZED NON -MILITARY GROUP IN 
VIET -HAM AND POSSESS MOTIVES FOR POLITICAL ACTION. TRAIT QUOC SUU, HEAD 
CVTC, IS ALLIED WITH MINISTER AGRICULTURE LE VAN DONG AGAINST SsHU-TUySN FACTION 
IN CAN LAO PARTY; EACH GROUP IS ALSO SUPPORTING COMPETING LEADERSHIP IN 
OTHER MAIN LABOR FEDERATION CSTV. DONG HAS TALKED PRIVATELY ABOUT DEMON- 
STRATION. SHOULD HIS FACTION DECIDE UPON ONE, LABOR WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY 
BE ITS CORE. PROBABLE FACTORS RESTRAINING DONG ARE FEAR THAT HE WOULD 
NOT SUCCEED MID THAT COMMUNISTS WOULD EXPLOIT "DEMONSTRATION TO THEIR 
ADVANTAGE. 

ft- 

# 

LABOR ALSO HAS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL GRIEVANCES WHICH PROVIDE FERTILE GROUND * . 
FOR OPPOSITION GROUPS OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT TO CULTIVATE. TAXI AND MOTOR 
POUSSE DRIVERS FOR EXAMPLE WHO LIVE HAND TO MOUTH EXISTENCE WERE ADVERSELY 
AFFS2TED BY INCREASE DI PRICE GASOLINE. UNTIL GVN QUICKLY PERMITTED FARE RISE. 
WHILE NON-GOVERNMENT OPPOSITION GROUPS MIGHT NOT BE ABLE ORGANIZE AS EXTEN- 



1 o 2 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



SIVE SUPPORT AMONG LABOR AS UNION LEADER LIKE BUU, THEY COULD NEVERTHE- 
LESS VJITH COWSUSISS 0RGA3SEZATIONAL ASSISTANCE PROBABLY STIR UP SOME 
■ SUPPORT FOR DEMONSTRATION. 

It. STUDENTS. PREVIOUSLY RELATIVELY INERT, LACKING ORGANIZATION AND 
ANY OPPOSITION PART/ FOCUS SUCH AS EXISTED IN KORE Aim TURKEY, AND 
LIVING IN SCATTERED FASHION RATHER THAN ON CAMPUS, STUDENTS HAVE NEVERTKE- 
LESS WITHIN PAST FEW WEEKS BEGUN SHOW POLITICAL DERMENT. THIS PROBABLY 
BTBOLATSD BY DEVELOPMENTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES AND FERHAPS EVEN, III COUNTER 
PRODUCTIVE SENSE, ■ BY INTERVENING GVN EFFORTS AT POLITICAL STERILIZATION 
OF STUDENTS . WHILE NO REASON AT THIS STAGE BELIEVE STUDENTS WOULD INITIATE 
DEMONSTRATION, PROBABILITY GROWING THAT THEY WOULD JOINT ONE LED BY 
"OPPOSITIONISTS EITHER WITHIN OR OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT. GVN SECURITY OFFICIALS 
ARE CONCERNED OVER GROWING INFLUENCE OF OPPOSITIONIST AND VC PROPAGANDA 
AS WELL AS ESTABLISHMENT OF VC CELLS AMONG LYQEE STUDENTS. 

- 
» 

5. CATHOLIC REFUGEES. DISSATISFACTION WITH REGIME APPARENTLY EXISTS 
AMONG SOME CATHOLICS, WHO REPRESENT GREAT BULK OF THE REFUGEES. PARADOXICALLY, 
SOME OF THIS STEMS FROM WHAT THEY FEEL IS TOO HEAVILY CATHOLIC LEADERSHIP 
OF KEGT-; (WITH POTENTIAL REACTION TO FOLLOW) MID SOME TO REGIME'S FAILURE 
TO BRING CATHOLICS PARTICULAR BENEFITS (E.G. SCHOOLS). SOICE OF HIERARCHY 
< AliSG HAS STRONG FRENCH BACKGROUND. CERTAIN ELEMENTS HAVE SPOKEN OF 

NECESSITY AVOID COM'lUNIST TAKEOVER BY CHANGING REGIME AND THERE IS EVIDENCE ' 
OF CATHOLIC REFUGEES HAVING BEEN " INVOLVED IN ABORTIVE AUG 19 DEMONSTRATION 

' FV3-U9'48). 



* 



6. OPPOSITION GROUPS AND SECTS. WHILE SOI IS STIRRINGS ARE SEEN AMONG 
0PPO3ITI0HGR0UPS, SUCH AS THE DAI VIET3, VNQOD, AND DAN CIIU, THESE GROUPS 
ARE NOT EXPECTED TO DISPLAY SUBSTANTIAL ORGANIZED STRENGTH AND MORE LIKELY 
WILL CONTINUE TO APPEAR ONLY AMONG INTELLECTUAL CLASS. THEY DO, HOWEVER, 
ARTICULATE THE DISSATISFACTION EXISTING IN OTHER CLASSES. SECTS HAVE 
GIVEN .NO SUBSTANTIAL SIGNS OF REVIVAL OF FORCE EITHER II- 7 SAIGON OR ELSE- 
WHERE. ' ■ 

- 
• 

7. POLICE. OF OBVIOUS IMPORTANCE IS STRENGTH AND RELIABILITY LOCAL 
POLICE AND OTiLSR FORCES WHICH COULD BE MUSTERED TO MEET DI .'3TRATI0N. 
METROPOLITAN. POLICE NUMBER APPROXIMATELY 5,l60 BACKED BY APPROXIMATELY 
3,000 MISERS OF NATIONAL POLICE AND SECURITY SERVICE UNDER DIRECT CONTROL ■ 
OF GENERAL NGUYEN VAi: LA. OFFICIAL OF NP3S HAS CONSENTED TO CAS THAT 
POLICE WOULD BE LOYAL TO GOVERN: IENT AND ACT AGAINST ANY TYPE OF DEMONSTRATION. 
OPERATING PRINCIPLES ITT GVN'S ANTI-RIOT TACTIC IS TO SMOTHER DEMONSTRATION 
BEFORE IT CAN GAIN MOMENTUM, AND WHILE INSTIGATORS CAN STILL BE DEIERMHE D 
AND ARRESTED. FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE ARE SEVERAL HUNDRED SURETE PERSONNEL 
MINGLING IN CROWDS AND REPCRTINGP083IBLE TROUBLE. THESE ARE BACKED UP 

BY UNIFORMED POLICE DEPARTMENT RIOT SQUAD, CONSISTING OF 200 PERSONNEL 
PLUS 10-15 MAN COMMAND SECTION. THE 200 PERSONNEL ARE DIVIDED* INTO THREE ■ ■ 
PLATOONS, ONE OF WHICH IS ON DUTY (AND ANOTHER ON S D3Y) AT ANY GIVEN 
TIME. PLATOON (3) ON DUTY SLEEPS i SSED AND IS PREPARED TO ANSWER A 
CALL WITHIN TWO MINUTES, PLUS AN ESTIMATED TEH MINUTES TO ARRIVE AT SCENE 
OF DISTRESS. MEN ARE PRACTICED IN lo FORMATIONS FOR BREAKING UP A MOB. 
THE 200 MAN UNIT IS EQUIPPED VJITH TRANSPORTATION, RADIO COMMUNICATIONS, ' 
VARIOUS SUBMACHINE AND RIOT GUNS, TEAR GAS AND OSIER ANTI-RIOT MATERIAL, 
AND CAN CALL UPON FIRE DEPARTMENT FOR ABOUT 35 WATER TRUCKS WITH HOSES 
(FV3-5007). 



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wranDAi t 















Declassified per Executive Order 13^26, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



SECRET 



2U56 

SEPTEMBER 5, I960 

8:37 AM 



FROM: - SAIGON 

TO: SECRETARY OF STATE 

NR: 538, SEPTEMBER 5, 2 PM (SECTION 2 of 2) 

SENT DEPARTMENT 538, REPEATED INFORMATION CINCPAC POLAD 83, 
BANGKOK, VIENTIANE, PHNOM PENH, LONDON, PARIS UNNUMBERED 

FURTHER ARMED SUPPORT AVAILABLE ARE CIVIL GUARD IN AREA, ABOUT 
7,000, AND REGULAR ARMY FORCES, NUMBERING THREE BATTALIONS 
PARACHUTISTS, ONE BATTALION INFANTRY, PRESIDENTIAL GUARD BRIGADE 
WITH AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF 1,500 BUT WITH CURRENT OVER- 
STRENGTH OF APPROXIMATELY 400, ONE BATTALION MARINES, ONE 
ARMORED COMPANY AND AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF PARTIALLY 
TRAINED RECRUITS FROM QUANG TRUNG TRAINING CENTER ON OUTSKIRTS 
SAIGON. OTHER FORCES TOTAL THREE BATTALIONS OF INFANTRY AND ARE 
AVAILABLE 5 HOWEVER THEY ARE NOW ASSIGNED TO PRIORITY SECURITY 
AREAS AND WHETHER OR NOT THEY COULD BE PULLED FROM THEIR 
PRESENT MISSIONS WOULD DEPEND UPON SITUATION „ 

8. ARMY. /SOME DISCONTENT EXISTS BECAUSE OF POLITICAL PROMOTIONS 
AND FAVORITISM THROUGHOUT ARMED FORCES STRUCTURE. SOME DISTURBING 
INDICATIONS OF POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENT' SPIRIT FRUSTRATION AND 
DEFEATISM IN FIGHT AGAINST VIET CONG ALSO RECEIVED, SUCH AS 
STATEMENT ALLEGEDLY MADE BY GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH THAT FOR • 
EVERY VIET CONG KILLED BY ARMED FORCES GOVERNMENT CREATING TEN 
IN THEIR REARM HOWEVER INDICATIONS ARE THAT GENERALS REMAIN 
IMBUED BY NON-POLITICAL APPROACH AND THAT DISCONTENT IS NOT OF 
SUCH PROPORTIONS THAT ANY GENERAL IS READY TO TAKE INITIATIVE 
IN LEADING COUP. WE CANNOT OF COURSE EXCLUDE EMERGENCIES 01 A 
"KONG LE" FROM RANKS BELOW GENERAL BUT KEY UNITS IN AND ABOUND 
SAIGON ARE COMMANDED BY OFFICERS BELIEVED TO BE CLOSE AND 
LOYAL TO DIEM;7 



SECRET 



130U 









Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



SECRET 



-2- 538, SEPTEMBER 5, 2 FM (SECTION 2 OF 2) FROM SAIGON 



WHILE THERE DOES NOT SEEM TO BE MUCH LIKELIHOOD AT THIS TIME OF 
COUPLED BY ARMY, PICTURE IS NOT SO CLEAR RE REACTION OF ARMY TO 
DEMONSTRATION ON COUP STARTED BY OTHERS. IT COULD BE CLEARLY 
SHOWN THAT SUCH ACTION WAS COMMUNIST-INSPIRED NO PROBLEM RE ARMY 
REACTION WOULD EXIST, BUT AS ALREADY INDICATED COMMUNISTS ARE 
LIKELY TO ACT DISCREETLY BEHIND SCENES. IF ACTION DIRECTED AGAINST 
DIEM, PROBABLY ADEQUATE NUMBER OF POLICE AND ARMED FORCES TO PUT 
IT DOWN WOULD INITIALLY RESPOND TO CALL; IF ACTION DIRECTED AGAINST 
ENTOURAGE OR REPRESENTED APPEAL FOR ACTION BY GOVERNMENT, PROBLEM 
OF PUTTING IT DOWN MIGHT BE MORE DIFFICULT. IN EITHER CASE COURSE 
OF DEVELOPMENTS SUCH AS REPULSION AT ANY EXTENSIVE SHEDDING OF 
BLOOD OF NON- COMMUNISTS MIGHT QUICKLY CHANGE ATTITUDE ARMY UNITS 
INTO ONE UNFAVORABLE TO CONTINUATION REPRESSIVE MEASURES. 

9. GENERAL. AN IMPORTANT ASPECT OF PROBLEM IS UNEASY POLITICAL 
ATMOSPHERE ITSELF, CREATED BY COMBINATION OF CONTINUING VC 
POLITICAL AND MILITARY GAINS, INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF GVN 
COUNTERACTION AND SELF CORRECTION AND PANICKY TENDENCIES BY SOME 
ELEMENTS TO CONSIDER DRASTIC MEASURES, EVEN A COUP. TO FORESTALL 
COMMUNIST TAKEOVER. THIS LATENT EXPLOSIVE FORCE COULD BE TOUCHED 
OFF BY AN ILL-ADVISED MOVE BY SINCERE OR OPPORTUNISTIC 
OPPOSITIONISTS OR BY UNDULY HARSH REPRESSIVE ACTION BY THE GVN. 

CONCLUSION: REAL POSSIBILITY DEMONSTRATIONS IN SAIGON EXISTS. 
COULD BE INSTIGATED BY DONG-BUU FACTION, ESPECIALLY IF IT 
DECIDES RISK OVERLOOKING FEAR OF COMMUNIST EXPLOITATION. COULD 
ALSO BE INSTIGATED BY OPPOSITION ELEMENTS OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT, BUT 
SEEMS UNLIKELY WOULD BE OF ANY SIZEABLE PROPORTIONS UNLESS 
HOOKED UP WITH COMMUNIST- INFILTRATED GROUP ESPECIALLY IN LABOR 
FIELD, ANY DEMONSTRATION MORE LIKELY TO BE INITIALLY LOYAL 
PROTEST CALLING FOR CHANGES IN POLICIES AND PERSONAL AROUND DIEM 
BUT COULD DEVELOP INTO ANTI-DIEM RIOT. WHILE INITIAL DEMONSTRATION 
CAN PROBABLY BE PUT DOWN, LONGER TERM OUTCOME WOULD LIKELY DEPEND 
UPON ARMY ATTITUDE AND DIEM'S METHOD ON HANDLING CRISIS. IN ANY 
EVENT VC EXPLOITATION IS LIKELY. 



SECRET 



1305 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



. 



SECRET 



-3- 538, SEPTEMBER 5, 2 ffl (SECTION 2 OF 2) FROM SAIGON 



WE ARE DEVELOPING RECOMMENDED ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT HEAD OFF 
DEVELOPMENTS OF TYPES ENVISAGED ABOVE AND PRESERVE DIEM AS GVN 
LEADER. SHALL FORWARD THEM SOONEST. 

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES: ABOVE FYI AND NOT REPEAT NOT FOR 
DISCUSSION WITH GOVERNMENTS. 



DURBROW 






SECRET 



1306 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



SEP 13 I960 



MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL E. J. O'DOIMELL, REGIONAL DIRECTOR , FAR EAST, ISA 

FROM: Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, 0S0/0SD 

SUBJECT: Possible Courses of Action in Vietnam 

Reference: Memo for ASD/lSA from Secretary Douglas, dated 29 August i960, 

subject: "Deteriorating Situation in South Vietnam" 

As noted by the Deputy Secretary of Defense , conditions in Vietnam 
are deteriorating. The key element in the situation is the activity of 
the Viet Cong. While criticism of Diem r s government in metropolitan 
areas adds to his problems and interacts with Viet Cong plans, the Viet 
Cong remains the primary threat to security. To the end of meeting this 
threat, several proposals are herewith submitted for consideration 

A* Actions within the authority of DOD 

(1) The emphasis of the MAAG' function should be shifted from 
purely training and organizational advice in preparation for 
defense against external aggression to include on-the-spot ad- 
vice and assistance in the conduct of tactical operations 
against the Viet Cong. 

(2) Concomitantly, the MAAG should be staffed to a greater in- 
tent with officers skilled in the conduct of counter-guerilla 
operations and who are capable of operating in the field. This 
might include Marines for amphibious instruction on Mekong River 
operations. If the immediate threat is recognized as being 
Viet Cong, these proposals logically follow as a deemphasis from 
conventional warfare against a wholesale DRV invasion. While 
the latter possibility is not discounted, it is felt that Viet 
Cong operations offer a more immediate and a very deadly threat 
to Vietnam. ! 

(3) Equipment required to support counter-guerrilla operations, 
including turbo-jet boats for Mekong River patrols, should be 
furnished on a priority basis. Items required by the Vietnamese 
in the psychological warfare area (See Appendix A) shoul be given 
a higher priority within MAP and expeditiously furnished. Advice 
and training In this field specifically directed against the Viet 
Cong should be stepped up. 









SECRET 






1307 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



SECRET 



(k) Small coast patrol craft should be made available to the 
Vietnamese Wavy for purposes, of restricting coastside supply 
shipment from North Vietnam to the Viet Cong. 

* 

(5) In the intelligence area, again the immediate emphasis 
should be shifted from conventional combat intelligence to 
counter -guerrilla intelligence training at the battalion level. 
Further , an attempt should be made through training and material 
support to strengthen the Vietnamese counter-intelligence effort 
in order to frustrate the Viet Cong subversive threat. Finally, 
RF equipment should be furnished so that am effort can be made to 
locate Viet Cong radio transmitters. 

B. Recommendations requiring coordinated inter-agency action 

(1) Strengthen the Civil Guard by making MAAG spaces available 
for trainers and by provision of small arms and other equipment 
through MAP supply channels plus utilization of ARVN supply, 
maintenance, and training facilities. 

(2) During the emergency, the Civil Guard should be temporarily 
put under the Ministry of Defense in order to integrate the ac- 
tivities of the ARVN and the Civil Guard. The Ambassador's 
concern that the Civil Guard will lose all identity as a civil 
police force, if this action is taken, is invalid, providing a 
strong US position to the contrary is announced and maintained. 

(3) Emphasis on civic action type activities by the ARVN should 
be encouraged and advisory and material assistance in this field 
furnished through MAAP and ICA channels. 

(h) The Department of State should reemphasize to the RKG the 
necessity for according the right of "hot pursuit" to the ARVN 
in its campaign against the. Viet Cong. Since it is strongly 
suspected that the Viet Cong maintain their headquarters within 
Cambodia, and since considerable reinforcements to the Viet Cong 
come through Cambodia, the US should tell the RKG that we explore 
jheir inaction in suppressing this activity. The effectiveness 
of the ARVN sweeps will be largely negated until the ROK takes 
steps to deny its territory as a sanctuary to the Viet Cong. 

1 (5) Most importantly for the purpose of strengthening the morale 
of the Vietnamese, President Diem should be informed as soon as 
possible through appropriate channels of the gravity with which 
the US government views the internal security situation, of our 
intent to provide material assistance, and of our unswerving sup- 
port to him in this time of crisis. 



1308 



SECRET 



Declassified per Executive Order 13326, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



(6) If a large scale operation against the Viet Cong is under- 
taken "by the Vietnamese 3 the dispatch of Seventh Fleet vessels 
and Air Force patrols might be useful in deterring sea reinforce- 
ments to the Viet Cong. 



1 Inclosure 

Appendix A 






1309 



a 









: 

1 






Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i 



1 



APPENDIX A 



Minimum Needs for Psychological Warfare equipment. 

a. Leaflet vans: (for publications platoons). 

(1) Operations Van (write and illustrate leaflets to be printed). 

(2) Photo reproductions van (Photograph illustrations to be printed). 

(3) Press van (print 1,000,000 leaflets in 2k hours). 

b. Three Broadcasting Radio Mobile Groups (5KW) without complete 



OUTFIT* 



(l) Emitter and Receiver of 25 KW for Army Broadcasting Station 



c. Three Line Radio Boats. 



d. 20 Line Radio Cars. 



e. ^3 Public Address (high impedance?) 

(10 loudspeaker groups for BSN HAI propaganda 
30 for operations team (long distance) 
3 for Aircraft equipment). 

f . 50 Projectors (16 mm) with screen. 

g. One Secretary Machine (documents copy). 
h. Five (5) teletypes. 

i. 500 Radio (receivers). 

3 . Equipment and finance to set up "Army Movie Studio" . 

fc. 50 taperecorders. 

■ 1. Film (16 mm) for sound recording. 

m. Maintain Annual Budget for psychological warfare activities 
$33,000,000 (piastres). 



1310 



Declassified per Executive Order L3526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






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rv t^ HCH?£ SHflCvS tJA^tM IS E?ADiiAL VICT O,\'0 EKTOlS!0?J C? 
CCnnci OVER COyNTRYSiDS U41CH, IT CC'^niT CCCtUNIST Pn^iRESS 
COffTIK-JES, WOULD MEAN LC3S rRIE VIET-MftM TO CG'-^J^STS. . - 
Wt'SC Ui-0 DANGERS ARE RELATED BECAUSE CC v r*JUM 1ST. SUCCESSES If; 
Rt/RAL ftREAS Ef-'DOLOtU TiiiTM TO EHTEK'D TiJEli^ ACT IV JT 1^3 TO 5AIGC - 
A*C SCCAUSr K-'JM-CC'-^L^IST TC!f>TATIC^ TO EfcSAGE trj DEJ'IKJSTRA- 
T 10**5 OR COUP IG PART LY t'OTIVATED BY SINCERE DESIRE PREVENT 
C.C'-^JNiSr TME-OVER IN VIETNAM. * ■ 

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' 0A^C,!j;5. fOU SAMMWp.ES- ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL AND PSYCHO- 
LOGICAL MEASURES REQUIRED: EG:? COUTltRYSIDE JpANOXlE? SECU'lirY ' 
MfASgRrS AS WELL AS POLITICAL; PSYCHULOG ilCAL AND tCOMXMlC : 
KCAStSES fiKt"D?:L>. HOWEVER DOTH Si:iS MEASURES SHOULD 01 CARRIED 
C'JT SI^LT.ANEOUSLY AND TO SOME. EXUNT INDIVIDUAL STEPS WILL 
I DE AIMED AT BOTH 'DANGERS. 



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k«»> ..-_•• 






1311 















Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



SECRET 



-2- 62k, SEPTEMBER 16, 6 PM (SECTION OWE OF TWO) FROM SAIGON 

CENTRALIZED INTELLIGENCE, ETC. THIS MESSAGE THEREFORE DEALS 
WISH OUR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RECOMMENDATIONS. I REALIZE 
SOME MEASURES I AM RECOMMENDING ARE DRASTIC AND WOULD BE MOST 
IMPOLITIC FOR AN AMBASSADOR TO MAKE UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES. 
BUT CONDITIONS HERE ARE BY NO MEANS NORMAL. DIEM GOVERNMENT 
IS IN QUITE SERIOUS DANGER. THEREFORE, IN MY OPINION PROMPT 
AND EVEN DRASTIC ACTION IS CALLED FOR. " I AM WELL AWARE THAT 
DIEM HAS IN PAST DEMONSTRATED ASTUTE JUDGMENT AND HAS SURVIVED 
OTHER SERIOUS CRISES. POSSIBLY HIS JUDGMENT WILL PROVE SUPERIOR 
TO OURS THIS TIME, BUT I BELIEVE NEVERTHELESS WE HAVE NO AL- 
TERNATIVE BUT TO GIVE HIM OUR BEST JUDGMENT OF WHAT WE BELIEVE 
IS REQUIRED TO PRESERVE HIS GOVERNMENT. WHILE DIEM OBVIOUSLY 
RESENTED MY FRANK TALKS EARLIER THIS YEAR AND WILL PROBABLY 
RESENT EVEN MORE SUGGESTIONS OUTLINED BELOW, HE HAS APPARENTLY 
ACTED ON SOME OF OUR EARLIER SUGGESTIONS AND MIGHT ACT ON AT 
LEAST SOME OF THE FOLLOWING: 

1. I WOULD PROPOSE HAVE FRANK AND FRIENDLY TALK WITH DIEM AND 
EXPLAIN OUR SERIOUS CONCERN ABOUT PRESENT SITUATION AND HIS 
POLITICAL POSITION. I WOULD TELL HIM THAT, WHILE MATTERS I 
AM RAISING DEAL PRIMARILY WITH INTERNAL AFFAIRS , I WOULD LIKE 
TO TALK TO HIM FRANKLY AND TRY TO BE AS HELPFUL AS I CAN BY 
GIVING HIM THE CONSIDERED JUDGMENT OF MYSELF AND SOME OF HIS 
FRIENDS IN WASHINGTON ON APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO ASSIST HIM 

IN PRESENT SERIOUS SITUATION. (BELIEVE IT BEST NOT INDICATE 
TALKING UNDER INSTRUCTIONS.) I WOULD PARTICULARLY STRESS 
DESIRABILITY OF ACTIONS TO BROADEN AND INCREASE HIS POPULAR 
SUPPORT PRIOR TO I96I PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REQUIRED BY 
CONSTITUTION BEFORE END APRIL. I WOULD PROPOSE FOLLOWING AC- 
TIONS TO PRESIDENT: 

2. PSYCHOLOGICAL SHOCK EFFECT IS REQUIRED TO TAKE INITIATIVE 
FROM COMMUNIST PROPAGANDISTS AS WELL AS NON- COMMUNIST OPPO- 
SITIONISTS AND CONVINCE POPULATION GOVERNMENT TAKING EFFECTIVE 
MEASURES TO DEAL WITH PRESENT SITUATION, OTHERWISE WE FEAR 
MATTERS COULD GET OUT OF HAND. TO ACHIEVE THAT EFFECT FOLLOW- 
ING SUGGESTED: 

(A) BECAUSE OF 



SECRET 



1312 



! 






Declassified per Executive Order I3r>26, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



SECRET 



3- 62U, SEPTEMBER 16, 6 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM SAIGON 



(A) BECAUSE OF VICE PRESIDENT THO'S KNOWLEDGE OF SOUTH WHERE 
COMMUNIST GUERRILLA INFILTRATION IS SPREADING SO RAPIDLY I 
WOULD SUGGEST THAT HE BE SHIFTED FROM MINISTRY NATIONAL ECONOMY 
TO MINISTRY INTERIOR. (DIEM HAS ALREADY MADE THIS SUGGESTION 
BUT VICE PRESIDENT MOST RELUCTANT TAKE JOB.) 

(B) IT IS IMPORTANT TO REMOVE ANY FEELING WITHIN ARMED FORCES 
THAT FAVORITISM AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS MOTIVATE PROMO- 
TIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS. ALSO VITAL IN ORDER DEAL EFFECTIVELY 
WITH VIET- CONG THREAT THAT CHANNELS OR COMMAND BE FOLLOWED 
BOTH DOWN AND UP. TO ASSIST IN BRINGING ABOUT THESE CHANGES 
IN ARMED FORCES, I WOULD SUGGEST APPOINTMENT OF FULL-TIME 
MINISTER NATIONAL DEFENSE. (THUAN HAS INDICATED DIEM HAS BEEN 
THINKING OF GIVING THUAN DEFENSE JOB.) 

(C) RUMORS ABOUT MR. AND MRS. NHU ARE CREATING GROWING DISSEN- 
SION WITHIN COUNTRY AND SERIOUSLY DAMAGE POLITICAL POSITION OF 
DIEM GOVERNMENT. WHETHER RUMORS TRUE OR FALSE, POLITICALLY 
IMPORTANT FACT IS THAT MORE AND MORE PEOPLE BELIEVE THEM TO BE 
TRUE. THEREFORE, BECOMING INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT IN INTEREST 
DIEM GOVERNMENT SOME ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN. IN ANALAGOUS 
SITUATIONS IN OTHER COUNTRIES INCLUDING US IMPORTANT, USEFUL 
.GOVERNMENT PERSONALITIES HAVE HAD TO BE SACRIFICED FOR POLITI- 
CAL REASONS. I WOULD SUGGEST THEREFORE THAT PRESIDENT MIGHT 
APPOINT NHU TO AMBASSADORSHIP ABROAD. 

(D) SIMILARLY TRAN KIM TUYEN, NHU'S HENCHMAN AND HEAD OF 
SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, SHOULD BE SENT ABROAD IN DIPLO- 
MATIC CAPACITY BECAUSE OF HIS GROWING IDENTIFICATION IN PUBLIC 
MIND WITH ALLEGED SECRET POLICE METHODS OF REPRESSION AND 



DURBROW 



SECRET 



1313 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






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CJ AF LEAST ITS SL^r.'.C tN% 1/lTH FiAM&S *»»"£> P03ITJC\'3 C? /XL 
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*}. p?k*MiT vArjc—L 4SSBOLy WIDER LCGISLATIVC INtTIATIVC A?3 
AREA OT GrVvil.NT KRXIt AKO DLSTC./ ON IT WTHC^ITV TO CGfflUCT,. 
VJlHi AP?no?rUATE FIL'LICITV, pl«j:UltlNVCSTlGATtC v 4S.C/ A'iY • 
DEPARfMblll r GOVLRl.MLfJT W!T!i RIGHT TO QUEST ION ftNY OfTlCtAL- 
t^ZZ[ : T PRf&iOZHT H!?-T3ELF, HHS STr.P WOULD HAVE TjHRCC-FCLD 

RjnrosE: (a^ n\o.zo::i k?chanjs.m For plsetLUNG thSguoh pu:uc 

UiVLSi tCAT!0 v : CO'JSTA?JTLY GENERATED RU.vCKS ABOUT GOVERNMENT AfCD 
ITS PERSONAL IT US J (B) PROVIDE PEOPLE V/ITM AVENUE RECOURSE 
AGAINST Anon;J/;>\' ACTIONS BY SGtAt GOVERNMEMT OFFICIALS; • 
(C) ASSUAGE 5&-S: Or * INTELLECTUAL OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT, . . 






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REQUIRE t-Ll GOVERNMEN1 OEFIGIALS TO -DECLARE PUSL ICLY TMEIR 
. PROPERTY AND FINANCIAL HOLDINGS AND GIVE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 

AUTHORITY TO MAKE PlCLIC INVtSriGATION O r THESE DECLARAT IC-JS 
i I'i EFFORT DISPEL RUMORS OF CORRUPTION", . • . .' 



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1 






v 13111 









Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i 



-2 62U, SEPTEMBER 16, 6 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM SAIGON 

■ 

6. RELAX EXISTING MINISTRY OF INFORMATION CONTROL OVER COGENT 
OF THE VIETNAMESE PUBLIC MEDIA (PRESS, MAGAZINES, RADIO), 

SO THAT THEY MAY CONTRIBUTE TO WIDER DISSEMINATION OF FACTS 
TO DISPEL RUMORS, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO RECOMMENDATIONS 
k AND 5 ABOVE, AND THUS TO CLOSING THE GAP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT 
AND ITS PEOPLE BY TRANSMITTING IDEAS FROM ONE TO THE OTHER. 
TO INSURE- THAT THE PRESS WOULD REFLECT, AS WELL AS LEAD, 
PUBLIC OPINION WITHOUT BECOMING A MEANS OF UPSETTING THE ENTIRE 
GVN STRUCTURE, IT SHOULD BE HELD RESPONSIBLE TO A SELF- 
IMPOSED CODE OF ETHICS OR "CANON" OF PRESS -CONDUCT. 

7. LAUNCH MAJOR PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN ABOUT NEW 3 -YEAR DEVELOP- 
MENT PLAN IN EFFORT CONVINCE PEOPLE THAT GOVERNMENT GENUINELY 
AIMS AT IMPROVING THEIR WELFARE. (THIS SUGGESTION DEPENDENT 
OF COURSE UPON ASSESSMENT OF SOUNDNESS OF DEVELOPMENT ELAN, 
WHICH HAS JUST REACHED US. 



8. ADOPT FOLLOWING MEASURES FOR IMMEDIATE ENHANCEMENT OF 
PEASANT SUPPORT OF GOVERNMENT: (A) ESTABLISH MECHANISM FOR 
INCREASING PRICE PEASANT WILL RECEIVE FOR PADDY CROP BEGINNING 
TO COME ON MARKET IN DECEMBER, EITHER BY DIRECT SUBSIDIZATION 
OR ESTABLISHMENT STATE PURCHASING MECHANISM; (B) INSTITUTE 
MODEST PAYMENT FOR ALL CORVEE LABOR: (c) SUBSIDIZE AGROVILLE 
FAMILIES ALONG SAME LINES AS LAND RESETTLEMENT FAMILIES UNTIL 
FORMER ON FEET ECONOMICALLY; (D) INCREASE COMPENSATION PAID TO 
YOUTH CORPS. IF DIEM ASKS HOW THESE MEASURES ARE TO BE FINANCED 
I SHALL SUGGEST THROUGH INCREASED TAXES OR INCREASED DEFICIT 
FINANCING, AND SHALL NOTE THAT WIDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES 
REASONABLE DEFICIT FINANCING BECOMES A POLITICALLY NECESSARY 
MEASURE FOR GOVERNMENTS. I SHOULD ADD THAT USING REVENUES FOR 
THESE FUNDAMENTAL AND WORTHY PURPOSES WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE 
THAN SPENDING LARGER AND LARGER SUMS ON SECURITY FORCES, 
WHICH, WHILE THEY ARE ESSENTIAL AND SOME ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR 
EXISTING SECURITY FORCES MAY BE REQUIRED, ARE NOT COMPLETE 
ANSWER TO CURRENT PROBLEMS. 

9. PROPOSE SUGGEST TO DIEM THAT APPROPORIATE STEPS OUTLINED 
ABOVE BE ANNOUNCED DRAMATICALLY IN HIS ANNUAL STATE OF UNION 

MESSAGE TO 



1315 



,r 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NNI> Project Number: NM) 63316, By: NWD Dak- 20! I 



-3- 62k, SEPTEMBER l6, 6 EM (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM SAIGON 

MESSAGE TO NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IN EARLY OCTOBER. SINCE DIEM 
USUALLY DELIVERS MESSAGE IN PERSON THIS WOULD HAVE MAXIMUM 
EFFECT, AND I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT IT BE BROADCAST LIVE TO 
COUNTRY. 

10. AT SOME STAGE, PERHAPS ON OCCASION FIFTH ANNIVERSARY 
ESTABLISHMENT REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ON OCTOBER 26, IT MAY 
BECOME HIGHLY DESIRABLE FOR PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TO ADDRESS 
A LETTER OF CONTINUED US SUPPORT TO DIEM. DIEM HAS UNDOUBTEDLY 
NOTICED THAT EISENHOWER LETTER RECENTLY DELIVERED TO SINANOUK. 
NOT ONLY FOR THIS REASON BUT ALSO BECAUSE IT MAY BECOME VERY 
IMPORTANT FOR US TO GIVE DIEM CONTINUED REASSURANCE OF OUR 
SUPPORT, PRESIDENTIAL LETTER WHICH COULD BE PUBLISHED HERE MAY 
PROVE TO BE VERY VALUABLE. 

REQUEST ANY ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS DEPARTMENT MAY HAVE AND ITS 
APPROVAL FOR APPROACH TO DIEM ALONG LINES PARAS 1 TO 9. 

WE BELIEVE US SHOULD AT THIS TIME SUPPORT DIEM AS BEST AVAILABLE 
VIETNAMESE LEADER, BUT SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT OVERRIDING US 
OBJECTIVE IS STRONGLY ANTI- COMMUNIST VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT 
WHICH CAN COMMAND LOYAL AND ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORT OF WIDEST 
POSSIBLE SEGMENTS OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, AND IS ABLE TO CARRY 
ON EFFECTIVE FIGHT AGAINST COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS. IF DIEM'S 
POSITION IN COUNTRY CONTINUES DETERIORATE AS RESULT FAILURE 
ADOPT PROPER POLITICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC AND SECURITY 
MEASURES, IT MAY BECOME NECESSARY FOR US GOVERNMENT TO BEGIN 
CONSIDERATION ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION AND LEADERS IN 
ORDER ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVE. 



DURBROW 
HC/ 



1316 












Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH 



FROM: Amembassy, SAIGON 137 



Desp. No« 

TO: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE , WASHINGTON October 15, 19^0 

REF: EMBTEL 802, Oct. 15, 19^0 



Subject: Approach to President Diem on Suggested Political Actions 



Attached as enclosure 1 is the English text of a memorandum on 
suggested political actions ^ a French translation of which "was read and 
then handed to President Diem by Ambassador Durbrow on October lk P i960. 
The French translation which was left with President Diem was classified 
"Top Secret" for the purpose of impressing Diem* For United States ' pur- 
poses, however, we consider the classification of both the English and 
French texts to be Secret. 

Attached as enclosure 2 is the English text of notes on the sug- 
gested transfer of Ngo Dinh Nhu and Dr. Tran Kim Tuyen 5 a French translation 
of which was read to President Diem by Ambassador Durbrow at the same time. 

President Diem f s reaction to this approach was described in our 
telegram No. 802, October 15, i960. 

For the Ambassador 

M 

Joseph A. Mendenhall 
Counselor of Embassy for 
Political Affairs 



INF0:SDEF-7 FILE-l(8)JJF/KS 



Enclosures: 



English text of memorandum on 
suggested political actions 

English text of notes on suggested 
transfer of Ngo Dinh Nhu and Dr. 
Tran Kim Tuyen. 



1317 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



SECRET - LIMIT DISTRIBUTION 



Page 1 
Enclosure 1 
Despatch 157 
From Saigon 



ENGLISH TEXT OP MEMORANDUM HANDED TO PRESIDENT DIEM 















Mr, President, in your struggle for survival against the Viet Cong, you 
have taken many wise steps with respect to the security forces of the Goverment, 
and I understand that you are in the process of setting up a national Internal 
Security Council and a centralized intelligence agency as important and necessary 
additional steps toward giving effective guidance to and making maximum use of 
the security forces. We have recognized the increased security threat to your 
Government and the additional needs of your security forces. We have shown this 
recognition by the comprehensive program for training, equipping and arming the 
Civil Guard which I have just explained, by our furnishing special forces personnel 
for the anti-guerrilla training of ARVN and by supplying the special equipment 
needs of ARVN for the war against the guerrillas. 

Our serious concern about the present situation is based, however, not only 
on the security threat posed by the Viet Cong, but also on what to us seems to 
be a decline in the popular political support of your Government brought on in 
part, of course, by Viet Cong intimidation. As your friend and supporter, Mr, 
President, I would like to have a frank and friendly talk with you on what seems 
to be the serious political situation confronting your Government, While I am 
aware that the matters I am raising deal primarily with internal affairs and, 
therefore, in ordinary circumstances would be no concern of mine, I would like 
to be as helpful as I can by giving you the considered judgment of myself and 
some of my friends and your friends in Washington on what we hope would be 
appropriate measures to assist you in this present crucial situation, 

J 

I believe that your speech to the National Assembly on October 3* in which 
you stated that your Government has decided to reorganize certain of its institu- 
tions and to rationalize and simplify its working methods, indicates that we may 
" be thinking to some extent at least along the same lines, 1 

I would like particularly to stress the desirability of actions to broaden 
and increase your popular support prior to the 1961 Presidential elections. It 
would seem to me that some sort of a psychological shock effect would be helpful 
in order to take the initiative from the Communist propagandists as i- 11 as the 
no n- Communist oppositionists, and to convince the population that your Government 
is taking effective political as well as security measures to deal with the 
present situation. It would appear that, unless fully effective steps are taken 
to reverse the present adverse political trend, your Government will face an 
increasingly difficult internal security situation. -It is our carefully consider 
view that small or gradual moves are not adequate. To attain the desired effect, 
moves, major in scope and with extensive popular appeal, should be taken at once. 
Specific actions which, we would suggest are as follows: 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13326, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 






SECRET - LIMIT DISTRIBUTION Page 2 

Enclosure 1 
Despatch 157 
From Saigon 

(1) We suggest that you consider Cabinet changes as a necessary part of 
the effective moves needed to build up popular interest and support. One 
Cabinet change -that we believe would be helpful would be the appointment of a 
full-time Minister of National Defense in order to permit you to devote your 
attention to developing over-all policies. To achieve maximum benefit it is 
suggested that you issue firm directives to assure that there is adherence to 
channels of command both up and down and that firm action be taken to eliminate 
any feeling that favoritism and political considerations enter into the promo- 
tion and assignment of personnel in the armed forces. Removal of this latter 
feeling is of great importance if the morale of the armed forces is not to be 
adversely affected during their mortal struggle against the Viet Cong. 

We suggest that one or two members of the non- Communist opposition be 
given Cabinet posts in order to demonstrate to the people your desire for the 
establishment of national unity in the fight against the Viet Cong, and to 
weaken the criticisms of the opposition which have attracted considerable 
attention both in Saigon and abroad. 

(2) In rationalizing and simplifying the Government's methods of work, 
we suggest you seek to find new methods to encourage your Cabinet Members to 
assume more responsibility rather than frequently submitting relatively minor 
matters to the Presidency for decision, thus allowing you more time to deal 
with basic policy matters; that the new national Internal Security Council be 
so constituted as to be the top level policy-making institution by having it 
meet frequently under your chairmanship for full discussion of all the major 
problems confronting the Government and proposed solutions thereto; and that 
of authority from you in direct line to the department and agency heads 
properly concerned. Under this system Cabinet Ministers and agency heads can 
be held fully responsible for the operation of their departments and agencies , 
because of the full authority you have be stored upon them. If a Cabinet 
Minister cannot fulfill his responsibilities under this system, we would then 
suggest that you replace him, 

(3) We would suggest that you consider altering the nature of the Can lao 
Party from its present secret character to that of a normal political party 
which operates publicly, or even consider disbanding It, If the first alterna- 
tive is adopted, various methods of convincing the population that the action 
has been taken might be used, such as party publication of a list of its members. 
The purpose of this action would be to eliminate the atmosphere of secrecy 

and fear and reduce the public suspicion of favoritism and corruption, which 
the Can lao Party's secret status has fostered according to many reports we 
have heard in and out of the Government. 

» 

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NNI ■> Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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(/>.) We e&gsest that the K^tionn.l^Anq^n}b^'ia authcr3.aed^Aai^7^ct^tct 

any doparti^oiit^cr^arioiicy ®£Jt&\Qj3QV<mmzznt<> Tm Assembly should bo atithc ;, L;od 
icTconcliicV its investigations tlxrocirhQ^ublic, gearings and to publish the 
findings* This iflvesti^tivo authority for t2io Asseinhly tfotttd Lcct© a three- 
fold purpose: (a) to^n^ so£*a rssc&anisrii for &inp&13£ng through public rliive^tiga- 
■Lion the persistent rta&afca about tho Govoriuisnt and its perflonalitibvj; ; (b) to 
provide the people irlth an avenue of 3&c'Gtt?3Q against arbitrary aptiens by 
certain Government cff3.c5.aln; and £c) to assuage soma or tho nonHJosaiu'niat 
opposition to trie Government 



•JQ 



. Ife further suggest that the Kational Assembly ba asked to establish 
requirements for the^ bohaylecc^ of _ public^ Bgr^ftArtW * 



ft t'/liH 



• We also suggest that the Eatiosal Asseinbly be encouraged to taho wider 
Le^sj^tiye initiative ^rough the pXjtef&w^^ 

Deputies or group's of i5epuii"er^ as well as to broaden area of public debate 
on all bills 7 whether Governnont-sponsored cr introduced an a Deputy 7 5 initia- 
tive * 



(5) Vie suggest that you issue c^ t^irpiug that you jgajL £^^^ 
officii to rake a declaration* for possible publication* listing his property 



rana'soureas cf inccs&.« 



(6) tfa suggest that you announce that,* J^tfeg_props yill talco ..a irosgc&siblo 
rolo in policing; itself , the, controls ccsssreioQfl c/ircr_ii,.by_tho X^ovcr;;:: ^wivoiuA ' 

cuposi-iiouj to draft a press coc^e which the press xould police^ within tho 






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ordy-r to reduce ru^ior-^icngeriug a£ai^s*i the Gov^rnnsnts B^JLiCiooa or no^ 



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^1$-^1 \ (?) ^e would like to oiiggost that yon J^ bgya li gQ. nrrrii i^crcants for 

v^C^^v^i^^— an ^ ^or this pui'posc rake xS>re"fr j-ixgn 




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Ui also suggest that you ease restrictions on the entry into ani derr^rs 
./U^) frcc?i Viet*-r^ai;i of Vietnamese nationals^ in crder to encourage Vistnar,ese : 0.1 



• 









Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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fer,p? v tcA 157 



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trained abroad to rotnra and scsticb their eontributica to tho clove l^jn-nt of tho: : 



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eliminating arbitrary actions by local governnuat officials by dOBKJas&cating 

to their, that they will periodically be judged at the polls* 
* 

(9) He suggest pronpt adoption of thes faSPLouJAg Bgnsaeres for tho cnbr.r.cc- 
jnent of the G6voi\^ciit-s support in rural areas 



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. (a) Tnlco action which *;ill reauXt in an A?^roan^ ^.^-t":o.,prico ;;?;d^h 
tieaSa&ts actually will reooivo for pa,d$y beforo th:i now Jxarvest* . 

■ 

■ (b) Liberalise the terms of credit e:;:tondod to th& G^ill^ic^ JPari ?&?$ 



——-•—•••» — — — ■ .»■— » 



(c) Continue tojsxgasacL expcs^*^^ 

diversification., particularly In the j'hlcor.g Delta area* 



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(d) institute a gsffitesa; of _m^s? lt GarorgnsSt ' pa:ffiffi£;t fta? all' cc ;-xLt^ 
dovclopr.^_l^bor^iathor'cn a^rovillor, cr on otacf Go < vbs3&i3zr& :;roj s ;, 

, ' (e) Institute a systoi:\_o£ iinitod jrab^J^i^^ a;ro- 

villus during tho poricd of tho-L^'rHclJucTfee^t., vihilo tho $w6 &it£lTtIcn:f~ 
arc not eonplax^iy cGacarablaj the Diiboxcasr; aolpod to brxags zz& ported ox 
ad(j ust&ifKit for the aottl^rs >n the High PJ&tcau* ' "Thin should holp to desralop 

c^pan^oG incurved in moving to o&icl getting rs^ttled in the asrovilles* 

. / ' 1 * (f ) Give aoprov^rl-xte ar^d adequate co^oa: ie a * ! : -' : c :\ to t&o r^GO -givfega 



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(c) Xacr ease c ot^ongayiogs pal<5 *o the Self G^r.-.r-ci Yci\*h, 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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Enclosure ;> 
3>£6paU;h 157 
Frofc Sai/jon 



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EMG&CSH TEXT 01" HOFES OS NCO ffi'HK ErJU AKD Dit: TRAM IOH 'J.'i.'Y. 



In addition to those positive uiovda^ anoin &n a £H/si>4 iwrt m^*> iVflu&fc&tft&yj 
* ' X fool that X fihcqjldt brin^ to your attention the increasing discontent 3*?;0nj* 

various strata .of Vietn: .■: vi ;se society vith the role ana allowed activities or ypts" 
brother &go dinh Khn and Had&tia Nhti. I repeat^ I bring this matter up sg>st 
reluctantly since I have regpeet for Kr« t and Krs« Hhu and I knot; ho:/ 'much you 
count on his advice and counsel* 1 know pefso#al3y of the r&afcty contributors;; ho 
ban made to the success of your Government and I knoif that he is easily desirocs 
with you to maintain the independence* and integrity of Viet-lfe&j as ;;j11 an to 
advance the fine progress -which has already been made in your country* Ee have 
! disc&ssed this* type o.? rumor before and I ioiov; that you have full coafidene^ in 
year brother* Never theloss 3 the position that tfr. aid Krs„ Hhu hold in Yiet-Mar.: 
ha^ become the basis for a large asiQurrfc of criticism and discontent ggsinst the 
Govarnniojit^Unfortunateiy^ whether based on fact cr not., thin criticise ha/; roaohed 
the point that question is no longer whether, tlsese allegations arc true or x:ot 
The fact that wore and more people are bcli&i&ng them is seriously damaging tho 
prestige of ihe Government. Unfortunately thesa runers are also bsing vfoml 
against your Government' by Viet Cony propagandists in the countryside . Therefore ^ 
sin:e it appears that these allegations are asswniftg a larger and larger Sjapartsncs 
in the public .mini and are causing considerable discontent in t&a country^ it ai£h 
perhaps bo advisable to givs serious consideration to translbr^Uyg Er, $hu to oths: 

It has taaft suggested that ho aright be ;::\ven an Ambassadorial assi^-nt 
A3 you know, 2&% President,, ruany Governments .> including &y 0":;n, faata fro:i 
tin;e found *tt necessary to remove or transfer highly useful officials 
because of the adverse public image they 'have created 



"1 



duties. 

abroad© 

time to 



W4.Q 



In this connection xm have also heard maUx criticism o:^ the role and 
activities of Cr* Tran Xitt Tuyen^ tvho., according to "a gronins arii^er of reports^ 
has cokq to represent a negative force in the ninis of n:a"y^ Thi^ too feoxistitiit 
a basis for serious discontent and resentment agaisst the Go-vern^ent T 
personally Imoyi I)r, Tuyen and knovr of his abilities and contribution t» the ;;erh 
o£ th3 Govern^nt 5 but because of the negative attitude about hir,i T/hic- hae 
developed ^ it nd^bt be uell to collider his appointment to a po?it al^road* 



■ 



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I repeats as unfosirded as these reports and ru^orc m$ be P it has often 
- proven advantageous to other Governments to make transfers of this king* 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE 



INCOMING TELEGRAM 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



CORRECTION ISSUE]'' : 
lo/lT/60 6:30 AM VS 

Control : 8203 

Red'd: October 15, i960 

6:23 AM 



1 



- FROM: SAIGON - CORRECTED PAGE 1 



TO: 



SECRETARY OF STATE 



t 



NO: 602, OCTOBER 15, 6 AM 

SENT DEPARTMENT 802. REPEATED INFORMATION CINCPAC POLAD 122 

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION 






DEPTEL 581 ..." 

DIEM RECEIVED MS ON ikYil FOR HOUR AND FIFTEEN MINUTES WHICH PERMITTED ME 
OUTLINE HEW PROPOSALS TRAIN CIVIL GUARD AND HAVE FRA3CK DISCUSSION RE 
SUGGESTED' STEPS TO AMELIORATE DETERIORATING POLITICAL SITUATION. 



. 






■ 






AFTER OUTLINING NEW PROPOSALS FOR CIVIL GUARD, WHICH PLEASED HIM VERY 
MUCH (REPORTED IN SEPARATE TELEGRAM), IN WHICH THUAN TOOK PART, I 
SUGGESTED TO PRESIDENT THAT I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK 
WITH HTM ALONE. THUAN LEFT. I THEN READ COPY, CONTAINING SUGGESTIONS 
AGREED TO BY DEPARTMENT IN REPTEL (ENGLISH TEXT BY POUCH). /BEFORE 
READING TEXT I STATED THAT ON OCTOBER 13 I HAD BEEN IN VIETNAM FOR 
THREE AND ONE HALF. YEARS, HAD FOUND MX ASSIG-FMEHT EDIFYING, INTERESTS 
AND MOST WORTHWHILE . I MENTIONED SOLID AND WORTHWHILE PROGRESS I HAD 
NOTED IN COUNTRY SINCE 1957 AND CONGRATULATED PRESIDENT ON HIS MANY FI2SB 
ACCOMPLISHMENTS. I THEN STATED THAT SINCE I ADMIRED HIS COURAGE AND 
DETERMINATION I PERSONALLY DESIRED TO 'DO ALL I- COULD TO HELP HIM, 
PARTICULARLY IN THESE TRYING TIMES. I ADDED I PERSONALLY, AND OTHER 
FRIES j OF HIS HERE A3 WELL AS THOSE IN WASHINGTON, HAVE BEEN GIVING 
KUCH THOUGHT ABOUT HOW WE MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO HIM. RESULTS OF OUR • 
THINKING LED TO CONCLUSION THAT WE COULD BE MOST HELPFUL IF WE SHOULD 
MAKE' SEVERAL SUGGESTIONS WHICH I COULD PUT TO KIM IK A FRANK MANNER AS 
A FRIEND. . I THEN READ THE PAPER. J 

• 

DIE-! LISTENED INTENTLY AND MADE NO COMMENTS WHILE I WAS READING EXCEPT . 
TO REMARK AFTER I HAD SUGGESTED HE MIGHT GST RID OF MINISTERS WHO HAD 
NOT CARRIED OUT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES, BY SATING HARDEST THING TO DO 
IS 10 GET QUALIFIED PERSONS WHO WILL TAKE RESPONSIBILITIES. 

WHEN I FINISHED READING PBESIDENT STATED THAT MOST OF SUGGESTIONS I HAD 
BADE CONFORMED TO PUS RASIC IDEAS, BUT ADDED AS I.UCH AS HE WOULD LIKE 
TO PUT THESE IVTO' EFFECT, STEPPED-UP ACTIVITIES OF THE VIET CONG MADS IT 
MOST DIFFICULT. HE ADDED T?IAT MANY PEOPLE HAVE BEEtf INTIMIDATED BY VIET 
CONG AND SOME NAD BEEN WON OVER SO THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO CARRY 
OUT SOME OF STEPS REGARDING COUNTRYSIDE. I REPLIED WHILE I REALIZED 
DIFFICULTIES I WAS FIRtLY CONVINCED AFTER. MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION THAT 
IT ESSENTIAL NOW TO TAKE MANY IF NOT ALL OF THESE SUGGESTED STEPS ON A 



' 



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TOP SECRET - BBHSEETCB 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE 












CALCULATED-RISK BASIS III ORDER TO CREATE THE ' PSYCHOLOGICAL SHOCK WHICH I 
BELIEVED ESSENTIAL AT THIS TIMS. PRESIDENT MADE NO FURTHER COMMEHT 
EXCEPT TO TELL MS THAT HE WOULD CONSIDER THE SUGGESTIONS I HAD GIVEN HIM. 

I THEN AGAIN BEGGED. HIS INDULGENCE AND ASKED IF I COULD BRING UP A MOST 
SENSITIVE Aim DELICATE MATTER WHICH I 'FELT IN HIS INTEREST 'AND IN 
■ INTEREST OF. VIETNAM I SHOULD DISCUSS VERY FRANKLY. FROM NOTES IN 
FRENCH WHICH I READ BUT DID NOT LEAVE WITH HIM, (COPY BY POUCH), I 
DISCUSSED GROWING CRITICISM OF HIS PROTHER AND MADAM KKU, AS WELL AS DR. 
BUYBN AND SUGGESTED THAT THEY SHOULD BE ASSIGNED ABROAD. DIEM DID NOT 
INTERRUPT ME BUT ASSUMED SOMEWHAT GRIM, AND I DETECTED SLIGHTLY HURT 
MANNER. HIS- ONLY COMMENT WAS THAT THESE RUMORS ABOUT THE 17HUS WERE 
SPREAD BY COMMUNISTS. I REPLIED THAT I WAS SURE THAT COMMUNISTS WERE 
DOING ALL THEY COULD TO SPREAD SUCH RUMORS BUT I REPEATED THAT THE 
UNFORTUNATE PART ABOUT IT IS THAT MORE AND MORE PEOPLE ARE BELIEVING 
THESE REPORTS— VIETNAMESE LOYAL TO HIM, THOSE WHO MIGHT BE CONSIDERED 
IN THE OPPOSITION, FOREIGN CIVILIANS AND FOREIGN DIPLOMATS TO SAY 
NOTHING FO THE PRESS. I REPEATED, AS I HAD PREVIOUSLY, THESE REPORTS 
WERE SERIOUSLY DAMAGING PRESTIGE OF HIS REGIME. ' 

■ ■ 

AFTER DISCUSSING THE HHUS, I AGAIN APOLOGIZED, FIRST OF ALL FOR BRINGING 
UP THIS PERSONAL AND SENSITIVE SUBJECT, AS WELL AS THE OTHER SUGGESTIONS 
I HAD MADE. I AGAIN ASKED HIS INDULGENCE AND FORGIVENESS FOR SPEAKING 
SO FRANKLY AND ADDED I HOPED HE WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT I WAS TALKING AS 
A SINCERE- FRIEND. 

OCMIENT: CONSIDERING THE FAIRLY FRANK CRITICISM- I MADS OF HIS REGIME AND 
FAMILY, DIEM OUTWARDLY SHOWED NO REAL RESENTMENT. AFTER I APOLOGIZED 
FOR BRINGING UP THE NHU QUESTION, DIEM REMAINED SILENT FOR A BIT AND THEN 
WE DISCUSSED LAO DEVELOPMENTS IN A MATTER-OF-FACT REALISTIC WAY. I 
SAID "I WAS 'SURE THAT PARSONS WOULD FILL HIM IN REGARDING -LATEST LAO 
BEVELOPKE3TS WHEN PIE IS HERE ON l8TH. I THEN REITERATED MY CLOSING 
APOLOGETIC COMMENTS ON THE NEC QUESTION AND TOOK MY LEAVE, WHICH WAS QUITE 
CORDIAL. 



r. 



EDRBROW 



TOP SECRET . - SENSITIVE 



132ft 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



pfflfit % lEUESRAfift Department oi 









J? ICA1IT: DCOiUCT 
f_, CHARGE lO 



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Classi/ication 



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SENT TO: 



Aiaembassy SAIGON c V 



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Rptd info: CINGPAC 









JOIRT STATE-DOB JSSSAOE 



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1. XpivH^XoXrK^J View continuing communist inspired and directed 

^CppnsidLon , . shquld^bfci developed 

insurgency in YN , :d^safecc^>2b^xdg:g:G^rd: over-all plan/for encouraging 

and supporting G7M in national emergency effort defeat insurgents and 
bring about order and stability in that country. Such action determined 



is 2 

i § 



necessary in order check disruptive influences Which could cause el 






integration of the Government and the possible loss of South Viet-Nara 

* 
* * 

to Communist Eloc» * 

2. Studies of problem indicate plan for QVH should provide for 
integration and centralized direction of iaa:eimum resources in order 
i combat insurgency. Bused on requirements outline plan (see Para h)> US 



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apeuej.es Sjj lgoaj ngy wish develop plan further 3 work out procedures there- O 
. under and determine US personnel, mteriel and budgetary support requisite ■"* 

CD. 

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1 1 successful implementation this OVN emergency effort. 



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3* Before such plan and procedures made known to GVH 3 they w aid be 
reviewed in Washington for consistency with US policy and for funding. 

+ 

When US position established, &VN would be approached to gain acee bance 
such plpn and to work out details of organization, implementation by 









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Tolajraph'C Iiom, minion and 
h:;iliC4t<on approved byt 




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DOD/ISA-CoI. ^.eseh (JAv 1 j 

ICA - Kr. Nestle (/ | A i'-' 
S/3 ' 0r\ \//j *• SECRET 



SSA-- Vx, Clevelai^n -1 A 




1325 






CI^ssmecitioK 



• REPP.ODUCTIO;'! t : ; OB T; 
COPY IS PROHftrfLiS 
UNLESS tt UMCLASSJ,"t5D". 

■---- * 

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i 






Page 



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of telegram to. 



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Saitton rptd CIKGPAO 



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GVN authorities and provision of 113 support* - 

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U. Draft outline plan for GVN national action cabled Chief MAfiG 



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(Defense Mes'sag^ 98299U - 162l£5z Sept 60) should be developed by 

Ambassador and CT in sufficient detail to provide basis approval 

* 

courses of action and US supoort reauirements therefor. Realize 
several important ideas suggested draft outline plan already under 

■ * 

stud/ by GVN. This Kg' might facilitate acceptance by GVN over-all 
plan :;hich appears necessary meet national emergency. 












. 
















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S?£?3T 



1328 



Classification 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



SECRET 



LIMITED DISTRIBUTION 



1 



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SENT TO: AmKnbajssy Saigon 77 5 j 11 November i960 
RPTD INFO: CIHCPAC FOR POLAD 
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION 



If still appropriate you may vish inform Diem and at your discretion 
^ct word to coup leaders that ve consider it overriding importance to 

V 

Vdet Nam and Free Vorld that agreement be reached soonest in order avoid 
continued division > further bloodshed vith resultant fatal weakening 
Viet-Nam f s ability resist Communists. 



HERTER 



Pencilled IJote: 



Parson's pushing the panic button ctgain? 

s/s. 



H/ll/60 F2:SEA: R0 Cleveland 



FH - J. Graham Parsons 



S/S - Mr. Perkins 



COPY 



• " 



LIMITED DISTRIBUTION 



1 Ov^prf 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 J 



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£.}'KIC& OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 







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Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number. NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

WASHINGTON 25. D.'c. 



NOV 1 1 mm 








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MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY GATES 
From; Brig Gen L an s dale, OSO/OSD >^\ 



A 



Subject: Vietnam 



r— — -" 



^ 



With the news that President Diem has put down the revolt in Saigon 
and is rapidly re-establishing his authority, it would be useful to give 
some thought to what comes next. Here are some initial personal 
thoughts which might be of help in considering the situation. 

The revolt undoubtedly has taught a lesson to Diem. lie might well 
read this lesson as teaching him to mistrust large segments of the 
armed forces and, possibly, the utility of the "way MAAG advisors are 
placed with Vietnamese units. After all, officers and men in the revolt 
were quite close to the American military. Thus, it is possible that he 
will tend to take even closer personal command of the armed forces and 
do SQme shaking up by his own personal direction. If so, then this will 
make General McGarr r s role with President Diem of vital importance to 
the United States, It would be useful to get State's agreement to free 
General McGarr to confer with President Diem as closely and as 
continuously as necesseiry, under only broad guidance to attain U.S. 
objectives, without the Ambassador insisting'upon McGarr checking with 
him every five minutes. 






x 



6 



Of course, the lesson we would like him to learn is that he should 
change some of his ways, since some of his people felt strongly enough 
about it to take up arms against him. This is normally a task for the 
Ambassador, when it comes to conveying U.S. views on such delicate 
internal matters to a Chief of State. However, it is most doubtful that 
Ambassador Durbrow lias any personal stature remaining. , Diem must 
feel that Durbrow sided with the re colters emotionally. Perhaps he even 
feels that Durb row's remarks over the months helped incite the revolt. 
Thus, it would be useful to get Durbrow out of Saigon. A graceful way 
would be to have him come home to report. 












■J 



1323 



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— . . . . 









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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



SECRET 



£ 



15 November I960 



MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY DOUGLAS 
From: Brig Gen Lansdale, 0S0/0SD 
Subject: Vietnam 

In determining U.S„ policy towards Vietnam in the immediate 
future , you might find the following personal observations of help: 

President Ngo Diah Diem will have the 195^ coup attempt 
of General Minh in mind as he deals with the leaders of the i960 
coup attempt and receives U P S. advice about punishment. In 195^? 
Diem was persuaded to let Minh and his key officers leave the 
country unpunished. A few weeks later, they were instigating a 
revolt by the sect forces against Diem which led to considerable 
bloodshed in March and April 1955* President Diem always 
felt that a little more firmness with a few individuals would have . 
cooled many of the hot-heads who later listed to Minh. r 

The 195^- &nd i960 events have enough similarities to 
make the 195** lesson fresh in his mind. Both coup attempts were 
in November. The military leader of each claimed inspiration 
from Nasser of Egypt and had rather close ties with former chief 
of state Bao Dai. Both had imprecise programs of political aims, 
stated as generalized ideals which sounded as phoney as a $3-bill 
to the people they hoped would rally to their cause, but which 
coincided with a French analysis of the desires of the U S 
Ambassador and his political staff. Both were certain that Army 
units wouldn't act against them; both woeed the sect organizations 
and the same political parties; both seem to share the same friends 
and acquaintances in France and Cambodia. ! 

The actions of the U.S e Ambassador undoubtedly have ; 
deepened President Diem f s suspicions of his motivations. Diem 
cannot help but wonder at U.S e objectives as voiced by such a 



SECRET 



1330 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



SECRET 



spokesman. At the most critical moment of the coup attempt, the U.S* 
• Ambassador urged Diem to give in to rebel demands to avoid bloodshed. 
Earlier , he had urged others to urge Diem to compromise with the 
1 I rebels. The most charitable view that Diem could take would be that 

*\ our Ambassador is a badly- informed man, but he would also then believe 

that the Ambassador has been far too prone to listen to the wrong people 
in Vietnam, people who are Diem's enemies. 

Actually, Ambassador Durbrow is not entirely to blame for 
these blunders* The invitation to engage in this badly-timed and 
demoralizing meddling in Vietnam's affairs was given the Ambassador 
by the Southeast Asia desk staff in State message 775* This action, on 
top of many others which seem to have weakened both the U.S. position 
and the cause of freedom in Southeast Asia in the immediate past, should 
make us note that advice and actions of this staff carry definite hazards 
to the security of the U.S. Their advice and instructions on the next 
events in Vietnam deserve the most careful scrutiny and evaluation, 
particularly by Defense whose resources are called upon so heavily to 
1 carry out U.S. policy in this area. The long-known strategic value of 

Southeast Asia places a premium upon our military participation. 

Finally, it appears that General McGarr, the MAAG Chief, 
came through this test of U.S. influence very well. Both the rebel 
forces and the loyal forces turned to him for counsel. He seems to 
have handled them with complete honesty and objectivity which will 
increase his potential for influencing the Vietnamese military in the 
future. This is a factor which should carry its proper weight in future 
considerations of our actions in Vietnam. Also, it should be borne in 
mind that this will subject General McGarr to considerable vindictive 
attack by the Vietminh and by those jealous of his increased prestige. 

These observations are prompted by the fact that it is critical 
that U.S* plicy makers have some deeper understanding of people 
and events in Vietnam, if we are to keep Southeast Asia free. It is our key piece 
in the area and must be handled correctly. 

Although this memo deals with a most sensitive subject, you may wish 
to show it to General Lemnitzer and Assistant Secretary Irwin who also 
are concerned with this problem. 



SECRET 



1331 










Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



• * 



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

. WASHINGTON 25. D. C. 



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JCSM«5 J i4«60 



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ISMOPJVKDUI'i FOH THE SECRETARY 07 DKBKHSE 






Subjects Helicopters for Vietnam (u) 

- 

1," Reference is macle to a mefooranctum, da-ted 9 November 
1950 fro:,: the Director of Military Assistance* Office of the 
Assiet&nt Secretary of Defense., International Security Affair*, 
to .ths Chairman* Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning a peoooxenda*- ■ 
tion* to provide E-3'± helicopters to the S&publie of Vieinsra* 

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that thorc is a valid 
requirement to increase the helicopter lift capability of the 
Vietna£tase Armed Forces at this fciia&j in view of tha cleteri^ 
rating internal security gi tuition in Vie^HsSu — — — - — 



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3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur vrith ths reeoaaneneiatiOR 
■of the Director of Military Assistance., GASP (ISA), to provide 
11 H-34 helicopters fro;?, service inventories for deliver? to 
the Republic of Vietnr;,ij subject to iB^nsdiats * reiBburs&riicnt to • • 
the providing department. 

- * 

1*. Xt is the raad-eretatidins oi the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
that emergency funding action will he required to provide the 
required increased helicopter lift capability to the Vietnamese 
ArrJed Forces 9 a&d that the Director of Military Assistance con- 
curs in" the Oogaander in Chiefs Pacific request for such emer- 
gency funding; action,, rather than providing the increased capa- 
bility by deviation from the FY 61 Military Assistance Fregre.** 
for Vietnam* ' " ■ 



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5, The provision of the requested nuabav of H~3*i aircraft 
from active service inventories ^ plus the provision of the 
•ne03ssary ground support equipment and follovr on spares j will 
result in a reduction in the capabilities of the providing 






service until such time as the aircraft.* equipment anci.spr.rcs 
can ho replaces. In View of this* and since shortages of this 
model aircraft already exist .in the service inventories* rapid 




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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



• * . . 



replacement will bo required fl In addition* the anticipated 

in* ' *" " "' 

v 

Progr&ra for yietnaiiu The Joint Qhiefs of Staff strongly recom- 
mend that the _ additional funds required to provide the required 
Increased helicopter lift capability be provided from the 
President'* & Esiergenoy Fund* *•">'■ 

6, It is reeoipjaended that the Department of the Army be. 
designated to provide the 3.1 H-34 aircraft* plus the ground' 
support cqu5.pr.unt and follow on spares, with the • Department 
of the Air Force ImpleViientins deiivsry through normal Military 
Assistance Prograta procedures* ■ • 



For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 



1 



> 



CURTIS B., LeMAY 

General j USX? 
Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force 



I 









* i ■ 


















Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



INCOMING TELEGRAM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

SECRET 

Control: 1953 
Rec f d: December 5, i960 

k:kl a.m. 
FROM: Saigon 

TO: Secretary of State 

NO: 1151, December U, 2 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) 

SENT DEPARTMENT 1151; REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON, PARIS, 
BANGKOK, PHNOM PENH, VIENTENNE, SINGAPORE, KUALA LUMPUR, 
MANILA, CANBERRA UNNUMBERED, CINCPAC POLAD 221. 

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION 

Some three weeks after coup, following are my evaluation and 
recommendations: 

On surface life has returned to normal, Viet Cong activities 
appear to have diminished somewhat, although this could be ' 
lull before storm; Diem has not adopted vengeful attitude 
against rebels, although certain others have sought take 
advantage of situation for "settlement of accounts" and some 
of "people's" actions against rebels 1 families, newspapers, 
et cetera, were unfortunate; Diem has taken some steps recom- 
mended by us in military field, i.e., partially placed Civil 
Guard under defense (this being clarified) ; is reportedly working 
on plan to set up what we hope will be effective operations 
commands, including reorganization and streamlining of field 
headquarters which we hope will be allowed to operate through 
firm chain- of- command, Diem, Nhu and Thuan have told us they i 
working on other reforms, i.e. election youth representatives 1 
to village councils, eventual implementation elective representa- 
tives to National Economic Council, plan for periodic "fireside 
chats," promised reorganization of the cabinet structure, and 1 
other unspecified moves which Thuan promised would be worked 
out by Christmas. It is hoped that these reforms are not just 
reforms on surface with little or no substance. Despite these 
signs, there is basically quite serious under- current malaise 
and skepticism whether effective reforms will be taken soon 
enough. This uneasy feeling not confined to intellectuals or 
opposition groups; but to sizeable number of others, i.e., 

cabinet 



SECRET 






133^ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



r 



SECRET 

-2- 11 51, December h 9 2 p.m., (SECTION 1 OF 2), from Saigon 

cabinet Ministers 5 other loyal officials, deputies and some 
military, Nhu and Thuan have indicated that Diem, who not 
particularly interested fundamental political matters, 
is resisting some suggested basic reforms* 

Nhu and Diem still deeply rankled particularly by critical 
American press stories about autocratic regime and entourage, 
and Diem made the ridiculous statement to Ladejinsky November 
30th that he believes some Americans may have backed coup 
because one of coup leaders 3 Colonel Dong, "told him so during 
negotiations." This may represent rationalization blame others 
not selves. Diem probably drawing on his "miracle theory" 
refuses admit rebels could have captured or killed him if they had 
believed through Initial advantage (General Khanh told me 3rd 
after first rebel attack morning 115th there were only 30 defenders 
in Palace which could have been easily taken) and both Nhu 
and Diem now expressing deep displeasure because "Americans 
equated Diem regime with rebels because both ant I -Communists 
and therefore we urged both sides negotiate. While under 
circumstances their attitude understandable 5 we have made point 
clear to them that we did all in our power to prevent 
bloodshed and urge rebels when they had pov/er to oust Diem 
that he should be given active role in any government 
established. While hothead can Lao party members who organized 
committee against Communists colonialists have been calmed down 
somewhat j this element could regain momentum and cause further 
trouble if unleashed again by CVN. 

Just below surface there is much talk about another coup 
unless Diem relaxes some controls, puts in effective reforms, 
takes more effective action to fight VC and give protection 
to populs ';ion. There is still strong under-current of resentment 
against entourage but because any action he took this score would 
be under pressure and indicate weakness , and particularly his 
resentment of press stories about entourage, coupled with fact 
Diem feels he made Nhu as loyal adviser, prospects Diem will 
transfer Nhu to other work or abroad not in sight, at least 
for some time. Despite this malaise and feeling about entourage, 

moat 



SECRET 



1335 






* 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



SECRET 



-3- 1151, December U, 2, p.m. (SECTION 1 OF 2) ? from Saigon 



most critics* still respect Diem as only leader at moment but 
this feeling could easily change unless he takes fairly drastic 
action to meet criticism and basic desires most strata population 

We believe also that unless Diem takes early effective action 
on political front, coup has increased chances for development 
neutralism and for ant i- Americanism among those critical of GVN. 
Despite our close identification with D'iem and his regime 
critics have not to date bracketed us with government in ex- 
pressing their dissatisfaction. Many have told us however 
that only we can induce Diem adopt changes which will save 
his regime, thus indicating they look to us to help them. If, 
after failure of clearly ant i- Communist coup attempt to bring 
about changes we are not successful in inducing Diem to make 
peaceful changes, critics may well become frustrated, turn 
against U.S., seek other means bring about change and might even 
move toweard neutralist position in middle. If Viet Cong 
guerrilla successes in countryside continue at rate registered 
during past year, this will also increase frustration of armed 
forces and population and could provide soil in which neutalism 
may grow. 



DURBROW 



HMR/3 



Note: Read by Mr- Clark (FE) 11:30 a.m. 12/U/60, (CWO-M) 



SECRET 



1336 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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r-g i SEMI DEPARTKEMT H5U REPEATED I tfOW-ttT I ON LOKDOM, PAR|S 4 

: r «^ fi ^PAmKc;^ .hikom PE»ii vitfUiAre, &ii4fiAPoa£j ku^la luxpur^ w 
h "j!Sr -kam) la; cAficERa\ 'u^jt-^ered, cimcpac poud 22}. . 

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I, VCMUST CONT i NUE "unct EFFECTIVE INTEGRATED PilOGf&t-S SOONEST 

in pol:tical s sccjal, ecg:;cmic. includii;^ keedeo fiscal P;Efc:;;-.3 p 

AKD MlLITAny riCLDS, SIMCE DJEM A!ol OTHERS ASSUME U3 TMSIY . , 
WORKiKQ ON Rt.t0. r "o V.T SHOULD tVjt AT VfXfcNf PRESS "TOO'llUD, 



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2. 1.7 SHOULD COMTIfv"JE UHCE OTHER FcnElGMERS, PART t CULARLV 
ASIANS, TO U;<GE i>|LM TAKE ABOVE STEPS,, • ; 

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3. WE 5K0UL0 CONTINUE URGE DIEM, KHU AKD OTHERS TO CHANCE THEIR 
ATTITUDE REGARDING FOREIGN AS WELL AS LOCAL PRESS AND TAKE 
EFFECTIVE STEPSVOKAVE LETTER PUBLIC RELATION'S INTERNALLY 

AS WELL AS ABROAD AND If-^lfMENT AND F.FFEXTIVE COUNTRY-WIDE 
PSYWAR PROGRAM, • .. 




r ). TAKE APPRGPHAtr. C**P0RTUN1 T 1 1 S U'Uit DIlM AND OTHERS ADOPT 

LEAST r;OST IKP0RTAH1 SLG{XSIJCNS CC:*«T*IKE0 IN MY DEMARCHE TO 

him nft iLiii . • . . 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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■* 



SECRET 



-2- 1151, December k, 2PM, (SECTION WO OF TWO) FROM SAIGON 

6. DO ALL WE CAN GET DIEM TO ACCEPT BASIC PRINCIPLES SUGGESTED IN 
MAAG COUNTER- INSURGENCY PLAN, WHICH WILL BE FORWARDED SONNEST 
(SOME PARTS OF PLAN WHICH WITHIN U.S. AGREED POLICY 

DIRECTIVES HAVE BEEN URGED ON GVN WITH SOKE SUCCESS). 

7. CLARIFY INCONSISTENCIES IN TRANSFER CIVIL GUARD TO DOD IN 
ORDER THAT MAAG MAY START TRAINING ON LARGE SCALE SOONEST 
AND MAKE MAP EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE. 

8. SINCE DIEM BELIEVES WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND SERIOUSNESS OF VC, 
THREAT AND HE SUSPECTS WE MAY HAVE ENCOURAGED REBELS, WE SHOULD MAKE 
ARRANGEMENTS IMMEDIATELY TO SHIP SIX H-3*4 HELICOPTERS WHICH 

ARE NOT ONLY MOST URGENTLY NEEDED FIGHT VC EFFECTIVELY BUT 
WOULD REASSURE DIEM WE TRYING GIVE EFFECTIVE HELP. 

9. SINCE IT FAR FROM CERTAIN DIEM WILL INTRODUCE SUFFICIENTLY 
APPEALING AND EFFECTIVE NEW PROGRAMS AND USE HIS PRESENT 
SECURITY FORCES IN MOST EFFICACIOUS MANNER, WE MUST FIND SUITABLE 
MEANS TO BRING PRESSURE ON HIM. AS I OUTLINED IN EMBTEL 1105 

AS WELL AS IN MEMORANDUM THIS SUBJECT (LETTER TO PARSONS NOV 8) 
I AM CONVINCED, EVEN IF WE EVENTUALLY SHOULD AGREE, THAT WE SHOULD 
NOT NOW ACCORD HIS REQUEST FOR 20,000 ADDITIONAL FORCE OR 
CONCUR IN HIS UNILATERAL ACTION TO RAISE FORCE LEVEL 
(CHIEF MAAG 1537 DEC 1 - COPY JCS). TO DO SO WITHOUT 
HIS HAVING RELAXED CONTROLS, INSTITUTED EFFECTIVE REFORMS AND 
HAVING PERMITTED EFFICIENT USE PRESENT FORCES, WOULD NOT SAVE 
THE DAY FOR DIEM BUT MIGHT EVEN INDUCE HIM FOLLOW HIS INSTINCT 
TO RELY PRIMARILY ON USE OF FORCE BOTH TO CONTROL POPULATION 
AND FIGHT VC. WHILE I AM NOT FULLY CONVINCED NEED FOR EXTRA 
20,000 MEN, I WOULD BE WILLING TO CONCUR IN SUCH ADDITION IF 
CAREFUL STUDY BY ALL CONCERNED CONCURRED IN THIS RECOMMENDATION. 
(MAAG VIEWS ON URGENT NEED FOR 20,000 INCREASE FORWARDED 
PARSONS MY LETTER NOV 30TH) THEREFORE, SUGGESTED THIS MATTER BE 
CAREFULLY STUDIED WASHINGTON AND IF FINAL RECOMMENDATION 
IS FAVORABLE IT BE KEP SECRET AS ACE IN THE HOLE TO GRANT 
DIEM PROVIDED HE HAS TAKEN OTHER NECESSARY STEPS WHICH ARE TO 
ME MUCH MORE FUNDAMENTAL, AND PROVIDED HE NEEDS EXTRA FORCE 
AFTER TAKING MORE ESSENTIAL STEPS. IF, FOR INSTANCE, AT THE 
BEGINNING NEXT YEAR HE HAS TAKEN EFFECTIVE STEPS ALONG LINES 
SUGGESTED ABOVE AND IT IS STILL CONSIDERED HE NEEDS INCREASED 

j SECRET 

1338 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 






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15 HIGHLY DANGEROUS 
D II! LARGE-SCALE' ■ '• 
GUERRILLA EFFORT TO TAKE OVER COUNTRYSIDE AKD OU3T OJEil'S 
GOVCnt^NT, fHElR ACTIVITIES HAVE STCAOILY IHCnCASEO I" 
INTENSITY THHCUSHOtn T»ltSYEAR. J.H .Arr>IUj:;i DIEM. IS FACED 
WITH WIOESPHEAQ toPUtAR DISSATISFACTION WITH II to ggVEm.'MEtJT»s; 

IMAOILITY TO STF ; -' THE COMMUNIST S.IPE-'^?D_ITr.. f' "U ,; . " ^7* "'UX • 
WHi > '005 OF OPTJ tAT I.OJI*. IT i; ; :c:t.:3-CLt-A:i that if he is TO UEMAIH 
nrp^irffrVOsTfeEf THESE Iv^CHAUEKGES BY It^rnOVEi-'EMTS IN 
HIS METHODS OF CONDUCT I KG V/AR AGAINST CCWUMISTS AND IN 
YIGORC't-'S ACTION 10 BUILD GREATER POPULAR SUPPORT. ■ V.Z SHOULD 
HELP AND ENCOURAGE HIM XO. TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION* t SMnu'.n i;r 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



SECRET 



3 -£>*-. *?t .■> 



THE SITUATION AND SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK IN LAOS 



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THE ESTIMATE 



I. THE SITUATION 



1. Laos has never been a national entity gov- 
erned by sure and united authority. Its 
people lack a sense of national loyalty and 
identity and they continue to be- divided by 

" traditional ethnic, regional, and family an- 
tagonisms. A gulf has always existed be- 
tween the central government in Vientiane 
and the people in the countryside, and those 
who have governed Laos have never estab- 
lished effective authority or won the respect 
of all of the various peoples who make up 
the Laotian nation. The non-Communist po- 
litical factions have never achieved unity or 
cohesion and have tended to view one another 
with as much suspicion as they do the Com- 
munist left. As a result, no strong, effective 
non-Communist leadership has emerged since 
Laos achieved independence. These funda- 
mental weaknesses in the political and social . 
fabric of Laos have been brought again' to the 
surface and accentuated since Kong Le seized 
control 6r Vientiane in early August In- 
deed, developments since the coup were made 
possible, almost inevitable, by the incoherent 
nature of the country, its leaders, and its 
people. This chaos has been compounded 
by contradictory and inconsistent Western 
counsel and by the wide attraction of neu- 
tralism, however vaguely understood, among 

, many Laotians. 

2. The principal political elements in Laos, 
aside, from the Communist-dominated Pathet 
Lao — the Souvann^i Phourna government in 
Vientiane, the Revolutionary Committee set 
up by Phourni and Boun Oum at Savanna- 
khet, and King Savang at the royal capital of 
Luang Prabang — have been unwilling to work- 
together. Alone none of them has the fol- 



.- 



lowing, the national status, and the military 
strength to contain the Pathet Lao. The 
Laotian Army, spread thin in small often iso- 
lated units, has been uncertain in its loyal- 
ties. A majority of the commanders lean to 
Piioumi and the Revolutionary Committee 
although some still support Souvanna's gov- 
ernment. Others seek to maintain a neutral 
position in the struggle among the non-Com- 
munist factions. r]e\v of them, however, ap- 
pear willing to fight' one another. Some com- 
manders are anti-Pathct Lao and ready to do 
battle with that enemy. 

3. Under cover of the confusion, and taking 
advantage of both the stalemate .among the 
non-Communist elements and the desire of 
Souvanna and Kong Le for a negotiated end 
to the civil conflict, the Pathet Lao have 
steadily improved their political and military 
positions. Thus, Kong Le's act of mutiny 
set in motion a chain of events in Laos which 
could lead to the country's departure from its 
western orientation and its entry into the 
Communist orbit. 



4. Kong Le*s mutiny and its aftermath have 
also had deep repercussions in Soi heast Asia, 
particularly in Thailand and South Vietnam. 
Thailand's Prime Minister, Sarit, is con- 
vinced that either a Communist takeover or 
the establishment of a neutrali „, coalition 
government in Laos would seriously threaten 
Thai security. Either development, he feels, 
would dangerously expose his country to Com- 
munist infiltration, subversion, and attack, 
and would generate strong pressures inside 
Thailand for a more neutralist policy. More- 
over, he believes it would undermine his own 
personal position. He almost certainly views 
US policy in the Laotian crisis as providing a 



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, demonstration of what support he could ex- 
pect from the US if a Communist coup 
against his government were to occur. .Thus 
far, he has been most disillusioned by US policy 
in the Laotian crisis, feeling it to be inde- 
cisive and ambiguous. . 



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5. As a result of the developments in Laos 
'and the 11 November cojip attempt in Saigon, 
President Diem of South Vietnam probably has 
lost some of his confidence in US willingness 
to support fully his anti-Communist position. 
He may believe that the Saigon coup effort 
was at least partly stimulated by Kong Le's 
coup and the failure of the US to extend 
General Phoumi full and immediate support. 
Moreover, these events, coming on. the heels 
of US efforts to convince him to hold less 
tightly the reigns of power in his own gov- 
ernment, have probably further undermined 
his confidence in US judgment. From Diem's 
point of view, an anti-Communist Laos pro- 
vides some shield against a North Vietnamese 
attack, and southern Laos, at least, must be 
kept in an ti -Communist hands to avoid criti- 
cally exposing his own borders to infiltration 
and attack. 

6. The outcome of the immediate crisis, inso- 
far as internal considerations apply, rests pri- 
marily with the interplay of the intentions and 
capabilities of the major Laotian elements: 

. Souvanna, Phoumi, the King, Kong Le, and- 
the Pathet Lao. 

7. Soiivaiwt. Compared with other Laotian 
politicians, Souvanna has considerable per- 

' sonal prestige and appeal among the peoples 
of Laos. He is stul Prime Minister, but he 
controls no organized political apparatus, he 

lacks administrative control of 1 the country- 
side and command of the Laotian military, 
. and he is not trusted by the King. A quorum 
of the National Assembly, chosen in highly 
corrupt elections in May of 1960, remains in 
Vientiane, but almost certainly a number 
of its members, if free of duress, would oppose 
Souvanna or defect to the Phoumi group. 

8.. Souvanna is neutralist and leftist, but we 
do not believe that he is a Communist. Sou- 
vanna's leadership qualities are weakened by 
his impulsiveness, willful disregard of un- 



pleasant facts, and over-weaning self-confi- 
dence, particularly with regard to his ability 
to deal with and control the Pathet Lao. He 
believes most of the Pathet Lao to be patriots 
who, once reintegrated into Laotian political 
and social life, would lose their Communist 
coloration. Those few hardcore types who 
would remain Communists, he states, could 
be kept in check. Accordingly, the only fea- 
sible solution for Labs, in Souvanna's mind, 
is a negotiated settlement with the Pathet 
Lao along the lines of the 1957 agreement, 
and a neutral foreign policy. Souvanna is 
moving Laos in the direction thai he has 
maintained for several years it should move. 
However, we believe that it is moving at a 
faster pace than Souvanna would counte- 
nance if he were master of his government 
and free from the pressures Kong Le and the 
Pathet Lao exert on him in Vientiane, 

9. Early in the crisis, Souvanna apparently 
had hoped to strengthen his negotiating posi- 
tion vis-a-vis the Pathet Lao. He was unable 
to use Kong Lc to this end because Kong Le 
tended to be more amenable to the Pathet 
Lao than to Souvanna. At one time Souvanna 
probably believed that a combination of Kong 
Le and Pathet Lao military pressure on the 
one hand, and US political pressure on Phoumi 
on the other, would force the latter to capitu- 
.late, thus restoring his government's au- 
thority over the troops and areas controlled by 
t'the Revolutionary Committee. Although he 
has attempted to open negotiations with the 
Boun Oum-Phoumi group, his conditions have 
been unattractive to Phoumi, and, at times, 
seemed to be calculated insults. Recently 
Souvanna has attempted to strengthen his 
position by recruiting several new battalions 
of troops in Vientiane. However, these units 
are probably infiltrated by the Pathet Lao. 



a 



10. Souvanna also hoped to win over the 
troops in the Luang Prabang area which had 



tempted to maintain a neutral position. 
However, this hope was clashed by the pro- 
Savannakhct coup of 10 November and the 
subsequent defection of General Ouan to Sa- 
yannakhet. This was a serious blow to Sou- 
vanna, and he attempted to compensate for 
it .by drawing closer to the Communists in 



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both the domestic and international spheres. 
On 17 November, his govemmqnt and the 
Communist Neo Lao Hak Xat announced an 
agreement to establish a national coalition 
government including representatives of the 
NLHX. The agreement also provided that 
the government would soon accept aid from 
Communist China and North Vietnam and 
would send a delegation to. those countries 
to negotiate for exchange of economic and 
cultural relations, for the re-establishment of 
telecommunications with North Vietnam, and 
for the immediate opening of the Laos-China 
border. On 29 November, Souvanna's cabinet 
named a 10-man friendship mission, headed 
by the Prime Minister, for a visit to Peiping 
and Hanoi beginning 10 December, Deliveries 
of Soviet food and POL to Vientiane have be- 
gun and a 3-man Soviet Embassy staff has 
taken up residence in Vientiane. 

11, Thus, Souvanna now relies very heavily 
upon the support of pro-Communist and Kong 
Le elements. It appears that this will con- 
tinue, and that as opposition to him mounts 
he will keep on seeking broader and more 
specific support from the Communist Bloc, 
Souvanna probably still hopes to keep Com- 
munist influence In check, but some of his 
measures to protect his position by moving 
closer to the Communists are irrevocable, and 
most, if not all, of them have been highly 
favorable to future Communist domination of 
the Vientiane Government. 

12. Phoximt The position of Phoumi, and 
of the Revolutionary Committee he has set 
up with Boun Oum, has a number of serious 
weaknesses. In southern Laos, there are 
about 7,500 combat troops, most of whom are 
under commanders probably loyal to Phoumi. 
Most of these troops are scattered widely 
through the area, and have their hands full 
attempting to cope with local Pathet Lao 
activities. In the Thakhet-Savannakhet area, 
Phoumi has about 1,500 troops. He is in 
the process of recruiting and organizing an 
additional battalion. It is unlikely that 
Phoumi 's troops without continued US assist- 
ance could or would offer very strong or effec- 
tive resistance to a determined attack on their 
positions by Vientiane and Pathet Lao forces. 



? 



13, Phoumi's military capabilities have mark- 
edly increased since he received additional 
US aid and moral support. Moreover, the pro- 
Savannakhct coup of 10 November in Luang 
Prabang greatly improved PhoumPs military 
and political positions. Nearly all the com- 
manders in the Luang Prabang region have 
pledged their support to him. Several small 
units operating against the Pathet Lao in 
Sam Ncu a arc being supplied by Phoumi and 
are probably responsive to his guidance. 
Phoumi is handicapped, however, by poor 
communications with these units. In Xieng 
Khouang, the militant Mco tribesmen are 
being' supplied with arms by Phoumi and are 
currently conducting effective anti-Pathet Lao 
operations. 



14. The Revolutionary Committee probably 
has some political appeal in southern Laos. 
Boun Oum is a member of the Royal Family 
of Champassak which ruled southern Laos 
until Laos was united by the French follow- 
ing the Second World War. However, we 
believe that Boun Cum and Phoumi lack 
broad political appeal outside the south. 
Phoumi's loss of prestige among both political 
and military leaders in Laos as a result of the 
Kong Le .coup has been only partially made 
up by the Luang Prabang coup and General 
Ouan's defection. Moreover, Phoumi has in 
the past proved to be an undependable and, 
at times, careless military leader, highly am- 
bitious and opinionated. 

15. Phoumi's. motivations in the present sit- 
uation are probably a combination of per- 
sonal pride and anti-Communist convictions. 
He is frustrated by what he believes to be 
inadequate US support and an ambiguous 
US policy. However, he probably has never 
intended to come to terms with Souvanna, 
and probably has felt that the US would, 
in the final analysis, support him. He would 
like to retake Vientiane by force and almost 
certainly has plans for such an operation, 

16. King Savang. The King appears to, have 
no personal courage. He has been extremely 
careful to stay within constitutional limits 
and he has never asserted; openly and clearly, 
his potential authority and influence. Al- 
though it is quite clear that he distrusts 



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Souvanna and desires Souvanna's resignation, 
thus far he has been unwilling to take any 
overt. steps to this end. The Revolutionary 
Committee at Savannakhet received the 
King's private approval, and the 10 November 
coup in Luang Prabang probably had his 
blessing, although thus far "he has been care- 
ful to avoid associating himself with either. 
It is possible that the King has played a sig- 
nificant behind-the-scenes role in the anti- 
Souvanna plotting and maneuvering. It is 
unlikely, however, that he will openly take 
a strong personal stand ,- or one which he 
believes would endanger the position of the 
monarchy* 

17. Kong Le. There is some circumstantial 
evidence that Kong Le may have plotted his 
coup with Souvanna. However, Kong Le's 
August revolt apparently was conceived and 
executed on very short notice, and it may 
have been a decision made primarily by Kong 
Le himself. Ke probably was motivated 
largely by personal grievances arising from 
the way in which his 2nd Paratroop Battal- 
ion — the best combat unit in the Laotian 
armed forces — had been treated. However, 
the revolt has assumed proportions and 
opened up ramifications which Kong Le prob- 
ably did not anticipate and which have been 
beyond his ability to cope with. He has now 
become so implicated with Souvanna and the 
Pathet Lao that he probably cannot turn back. 
Although there have been some indications 
that his control over his troops has been weak- 
ened, Kong'Le is still an important element 
in the situation and could still rally a consid- 
erable number of troops to his personal com- 
mand. - - ■ 

18. The role of Kong Le v/ith respect to the 
activities of the Souvanna government is not 
clear. Until recently, it appeared that he ex- 
ercised a veto power over those political and 
military decisions of the Souvanna govern- 
ment which he considered important to him. 
Now, however, it appears that his direct influ- 
ence on the government is being usurped by 
the Pathet Lao, Although Kong Le has lim- 
ited Souvanna's freedom of action, it is also 
clear that Souvanna has used Konpf Le. 



19. Shortly after the coup, Kong Le critically 
compromised his position with respect to the 
Pathet Lao when he distributed' the arms 
stored in Vientiane to villagers, including 
many Pathet Lao, in the' surrounding area. 
Although he probably did this to build 
strength against a possible attack from Luang 
Prabang and Savannakhet, once the arms 
were distributed his favorable balance of mili- 
tary power in the Vientiane area vis-a-vis the 
Pathet Lao was lost. Whatever his own wishes 
may have been, Kong Le has become increas- 
ingly a captive of the Pathet Lao. If Sou- 
vanna were to lose out and an anti-Pathet 
Lao government take over, Kong Le would 
probably join the Pathet Lao. 

20. The Pathet' Lao. The hand of the Pathet 
Lao has been strengthened greatly by events 
since the Kong Le coup. Any figures concern- 
ing the strength of their armed guerrillas are 
highly speculative. It is almost certain, that 
their number is higher than at any time in 
the past. We estimate their present strength 
to be between 4,000 and 8,000. They have 
obtained considerable arms and ammunition 
from Kong Le and as a result of capturing 
equipment during the rout of Pnoumi's- forces 
at Paksane and their defeat and disarming 
of the Sam Neua garrison. They probably 
have been reinforced by cadres recently 
trained in North .Vietnam, and they probably 
have concentrated increasing numbers of 
troops in the areas around Vientiane, Thakhct- 
Savannakhct, Phong Saly, and Luang Pra- 
bang. The Pathet Lao and Vientiane forces 
in the Vientiane area are deployed in such 
a manner as to either defend or attack the 
city, and the forces facing Phoumi along the 
Nam Ca Dinh line are of both Pathet Lao 
and Vientiane units. At present, anti-Pathet, 
Lao operations are going on only in Phong 
Saly and Xieng Khouang. 

21. The Pathet Lao probably view the devel- 
oping situation as a golden opportunity cither 
to force acceptance of their participation in 
the government and their foreign policy de- 
mands, or to seize control of Laos by armed 
action if they conclude that they can do so 
quickly and without risking outside int. rven- 
tioiV. We do not believe that the Pathet Lao — 



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or Feiping and Hanoi — are likely to let this 
opportunity pass. The longer the present cri- 
sis* continues, the better the Pathet Lao will 
.be able to consolidate their political and mili- 
tary positions. 

22. They would prefer to -gain their objectives 
through negotiations and political action be- 
cause this would reduce- the chances of out- 
side intervention. Events since the Kong Le 
coup have moved along lines favorable to such 
tactics. They have profited, greatly from dis- 
unity among the non-Communist political and 
.military leaders. Moreover, they hold Vien- 
tiane virtually a hostage and have been able 
to exert considerable* leverage on Souvanna 
and Kong Le, and Quinim, the most influen- 
tial member of the government after Sou- 
vanna himself, has apparently become their 
tool. 

23. Although Pathet Lao tactics have empha- 
sized negotiations, psychological pressures, 
and political action, they have maintained a 
fairly high level of military pressure on the 
Laotian armed forces and have built up their 
guerrilla strength in key areas. This puts 
them in a favorable position to seize by force 

* large parts of the country, including such key 
points as Luang Prabang, Savannakhet, the 
Phong Saly. If the Pathet Lao were to exert 
their full guerrilla warfare capabilities, the 
Laotian armed forces, in their present disor- 
ganized condition, probably could not prevent 
the loss of large parts of the countryside and 
a number of key towns. 

IL POSSI3LE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 

24. If present trends continue, the situation 
in Laos will remain one of confusion, drift, 
and- disintegration. Ultimately this would 

probably result in the fragmentation of the 
country, with the Communists, supported by 
the Bloc, assuming control over most of the 
north and the Revolutionary Committee at- 
„ tempting to set up a separate state in the 
south. Without large amounts of outside as- 
sistance, a separate southern Laos probably 
would not survive for long. 

25. We believe it more likely, however, that 
the pace of events will quicken over the next 



few weeks and, barring a quick victory by the 
Phoumi forces,, that the situation cither will 
move toward some form of political settlement 
or will degenerate into widespread civil war. 
Although -a political settlement based on a 
compromise agreement between the Vientiane 
and Savannakhet groups may still be possible, 
we believe that odds are against it. Souvanna 
and Phoumi arc not likely to find mutually 
acceptable terms for cooperation at this late 
point in their conflict. Any negotiations held 
between them arc not likely to be con- 
ducted in good faith. Although it is con- 
ceivable that the King might be induced to 
exert more influence than he has in the past, 
we do not believe he can be induced to take 
personal charge of the situation. Moreover, 
we do not believe that Souvanna is likely to 
resign voluntarily. If an effort is made to 
upset his government by calling a special 
meeting of the National Assembly in Luang 
Prabang to pass a no-con fid en ce motion, Sou- 
vanna could maintain that the deputies and 
the King, as prisoners of rebel forces, were 
acting under duress. He could declare their 
act illegal and invalid, and maintain that he 
wis the legal head of the government. If, on 
the other hand, Souvanna were forced out by 
political pressures, the Pathet Lao would prob- 
ably step up sharply their military activity. 
Consequently, it is probable that any politi- 
cal measures to oust Souvanna will be inef- 
fectual unless enforced by military means. 



26. Thus, we believe that Laos is heading to- 
ward civil war, with supporters of the Sou- 
vanna government — primarily the Pathet Lao 
and the followers of Kong Le — on one side 
and anti-Pathet Lao elements and supporters 
of the Savannakhet group on the other. The 
conflict could be triggered by a Phoumi at- 
tack on Vientiane or by a Souvanna or a 
Kong Le-Pathet Lao attack on Luang Prabang. 
Both sides have major problems of logistics, 
communications, and transport. The strug- 
gle would probably be one of widely-scattered, 
small-unit operations in which the staying 
power, the training, and the relatively shorter 
supply lines from North Vietnam would give 
the Pathet Lao guerrillas an advantage. 
Without extensive outside assistance, the 
Phoumi forces would probably soon collapse, 



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leaving the country open to early domination 
by the Communists. ' 

27. If no political settlement is reached be ; 
tween Phoumi and Souvanna, the US may 
soon be faced with the following situations: 
(a) A Souvanna solution, which woulci gravely 
risk ultimate Communist 'supremacy. This 
would .involve serious adverse consequences 
for the US position in Southeast Asia, and 
over the longer run, would greathf facilitate 
Communist subversion, infiltration, and ex- 
pansion to Southeast Asia, (b) A widespread 
civil war in which the Phoumi forces almost 
certainly could not prevail or even survive 
without extensive outside assistance. Such 
assistance to Phoumi in a civil war situation 
would probably prompt a Souvanna appeal 
to the UN and, would risk the introduction of 
North Vietnamese or even Chinese Commu- 
nist "volunteers." While at least initially, 
extensive assistance to Phoumi in a civil \yar 
would not have the support of the Western 
members of SSATO or possibly of most 
Free World opinion, if successful it would 
strengthen the SEATO area against further 
Communist aggression. 

28, Even if the various non-Communist fac- 
tions surmount the immediate crisis by a 
political settlement, the fundamental politi- 



cal and social problems of Laos will remain 
and, as a result of recent events, will prob- 
ably be more acute than before, Pathet Lao 
armed strength will be greater and more 
Communist footholds established in villages 
throughout the country. Solutions to the 
fundamental problems/ if indeed there are 
solutions, can be worked out only over a 
long period of time. Meanwhile, the urgent 
threats of the Pathet Lao on one hand and 
the centrifugal force of non-Communist dis- 
unity on the other, will operate against the 
solution of long-term problems. 

29. Consequently, we believe that any non- 
Communist government assuming power in 
the wake of the present crisis would, in time, 
face very heavy pressure to move toward a 
neutralist position and Pathet Lao integra- 
tion into the political life of the country, or 
face the likelihood of the situation gravitating 
again toward civil war. It will be extremely 
difficult for the non-Communist leaders of 
Laos to resist this pressure and to contain 
the Pathet Lao unless they develop a much 
greater degree of unity, determination, and 
nationalism than they have in the past, take 
effective measures to win the loyalty of the 
peoples of Laos, and receive extensive outside 
assistance to this end. 



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470th KSC Mseting 
• 20 Docoiaboi* i960 



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ITEM 3 (For Discussion) 



THE SITUATION IS LAOS 



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1# -This ltcai v/ill involve a discussion of tho latest 



■■■ -v .- , ■ ;„"■• * •»•* -jui.i-v.fcj j.wvw «j.aj. JJi*u^»y t* uiu'^uof xvu vx vuv «*.** >/v»u v 

^/2Mi&"*V^ in Laos based on a presentation by Allen Dulles* 

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[*""• • . 2. For your convenience vo have placed at Tab Laos a 
: summary of the most significant developments in Laos during 
• tho past vaok# .lb shall bo prepared to Give you. orally any 
^ * oignlCioant later developments* 






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LAOS SITUATION 



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1. Tho Bon Oum Government is in control in Vientiane but faces 
critical problems; „ •■ - • 

■ 

cu Militarily its forces are subject to Corriraunist-hupported 
. '' * "* guerrilla warfare throughout tho Kingdom and to tho throat 
•■ , of overt Intervention by tho DRVK (North VI ot Nam)* 

]j. Politically tho government doos not control the entire 

country and is considered by tho Department of State to bo 

too narrowly baaed to be popular* 

- 

* 

__ Economically the government faces tho necessity for 
■ m \l) emergency relief for civilioais, (2) payment of mili*- 

tkry forces and civilian officials throughout the Kingdom . 
f ol a three-months period (less the amounts paid Phoumi 
forces by CIS), and (3) reconstxtiction in Vientiane* 

•• £• Internationally only the U.S. and the Thais are fully 

supporting the government although there are indications 
■ that the British* Philippines and others will give do facto 
recognition • Souvanna Phouma claims to be the legal Prime 
Minister and is supported by Communist Bloc countries* 

* 

2. The United States is faced with tho problem of giving tho new 



•• 



^_/ ; government immediate and substantial aid in each of tho "abovc-listod 
problcjii areas*. Action is being taken in each field. 



■ * 

3» * Immediate matters of concern to the U.S. include: 






a* The necessity to bolster Phouihi forces against Communist- 
/■ - supplied Pathet Lao attacks, and to be ready for military . 
- • and political action in the event of overt intervention by 
DRVN forces . (CJJICPAC has cautioned Chief, FED, to assure 
that Phoumi does not become over- optimistic - a major effort 
.v * lies ahead). , ' ' . ' ■ 

• . * 

b* The desirability of forestalling efforts by Jleliru and others 
to reconstitute the ICG* 



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c* Tho desirability of gaining wider acceptance for the Bon 
Oum government in the Fro© World* . . " 

^* Funding of U*S. support activities* * / ] 

e*. Assumption by the U.S. of primary adviser status with re- 
* * lation to tho provision of training end operational, advice 
to Lao forces. ••. 






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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 11 



INCOMING TELEGRAM 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



SECRET 



FROM: SAIGON 



Control: 13650 
Rec'd: DECEMBER 24, i960 

12:26 PM 



TO: 



Secretary of State 



NO: 1216, DECEMBER 2k, 6 PM 



SENT DEPARTMENT 1216, REPEATED INFORMATION CINCPAC 
POLAD 252. 

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION 

RE DEPTEL 898 

DIEM DIDN'T RECEIVE ME UNTIL 23RD. 

I WROTE OUT INSTRUCTIONS AND TRANSLATED THEM IN FRENCH AND 
LEFT ENGLISH AND FRENCH COPIES (TEXTS BY POUCH) . MY REMARKS 
COVERED MOST POIHTS DEPT'S SUGGESTIONS ALTHOUGH IN VIEW 
CURRENT INDICATIONS LIBERALIZATION PROGRAMS MAY NOT BE TOO 
PROFOUND, ONLY HINTED DEFT WOULD BE PREPARED PUBLICIZE ANNOUNCE- 
MENT SUCH PROGRAMS. SINCE MY OCTOBER l^TH REMARKS INCLUDED 
SUGGESTION TRANSFER NHU, I DID NOT SPECIFICALLY REFER TO THAT 
DATE ALTHOUGH REFERRED TO PREVIOUS SUGGESTIONS WE HAD MADE. 
SINCE GVN HAS ALREADY INSTITUTED PLAN TO INCREASE AND 
STABILIZE PADDY PRICES, I MERELY STATED WE PLEASED LEARN 
THIS AND THEN URGED GRANTING BROADER CREDIT FACILITIES PEASANTS 
BEFORE GOING INTO DETAILS, I REMINDED DIEM OF STEPS WE HAVE 
TAKEN TO STRENGTHEN GVN AGAINST VIET CONG SUCH AS DELIVERY OF 
AD-6 PLANES, STEPPED-UP DELIVERIES OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT, 
AND TOLD HTM I INSTRUCTED GARDINER TO RE-EXAMINE WITH VICE 
PRESIDENT AND THUAN WAYS AND MEANS TO OVERCOME PLASTER 
SHORTAGE. SINCE I DID NOT RECEIVE DEPTEL 917 UNTIL AFTER 
TRANSLATION TYPED, I TOLD HIM ORALLY OF APPROVAL TO GIVE HIM 
ELEVEN H-34'S SOONEST. (HE MADE NO COMMENT.) 



WHILE DIEM WAS PLEASANT DURING HOUR AND THREE QUARTERS OF 



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-2- 1216, DECEMBER 2k, 6 PM FROM SAIGON 

DISCUSSION, HE WAS BASICALLY NEGATIVE. DIEM DID NOT REPLY 
TO MY" REMARKS ■ IMMEDIATELY BUT INSISTED ESSENTIAL HAVE ADDI- 
TIONAL 20,000 TROOPS SINCE WOULD DO NO GOOD TO TRY TO PUT IN 
REFORMS, BUILD FACTORIES, ROADS AND BRIDGES, ETC., UNLESS 
THESE THINGS AND PEOPLE COULD BE PROTECTED. HE REFERRED 
SEVERAL TIMES TO THE NEED FOR 20,000 MEN STRESSING NEED 
BECAUSE OF DETERIORATING LAO SITUATION. I THEN REMARKED WE 
HAD JUST LEARNED THAT HE HAD INCREASED FORCE LEVEL OF CIVIL 
GUARD TO 6U;000 AND ASKED IF THIS INCREASE WOULD NOT FILL 
SECURITY FORCE NEEDS. DIEM REPLIED CIVIL GUARD NOT TRAINED 
SO NEEDS BRING BACK 20,000 RESERVISTS.. HE ASKED THAT I URGE 
DEFT TO GIVE FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION FORCE LEVEL REQUEST AND 
I REITERATED MATTER UNDER CAREFUL STUDY IN WASHINGTON. 

REFERRING TO MY REMARKS HE AGAIN ATTACKED THE VICIOUSNESS OF 
FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS, PARTICULARLY THE FRENCH, WHO ONLY SEEK 
SENSATIONAL NEWS. HE THEN REVIEWED IN SOME DETAIL ECONOMIC 
AND SOCIAL PROGRESS MADE IN VIET -NAM IN THE PAST SIX YEARS 
WHICH HAVE RAISED STANDARD OF LIVING HERE ABOVE MOST SEA COUN- 
TRIES AND ASKED WHY CORRESPONDENTS DIDN'T REPORT THIS INSTEAD 
OF PICKING UP RADIO HANOI REPORTS SPREAD BY DISGRUNTLED 
VIETNAMESE INTELLECTUALS. AS I HAD DONE IN MY REMARKS, I 
REITERATED IF HE AND OTHER MINISTERS HAD PERIODIC PRESS 
CONFERENCES AND IF MINISTERS WOULD HAVE FRANK TALKS WITH 
CORRESPONDENTS THEY WOULD WRITE MORE OBJECTIVE STORIES. 

REFERRING OUR SUGGESTION ALLOW ASSEMBLY TO CARRY ON INVESTI- 
GATIONS, DIEM POINTEDLY STATED THAT SINCE UNDER THE CONSTITU- 
TION THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATURE ARE COMPLETELY SEPARATE, 
AND IT WOULD NOT BE RIGHT FOR THE ASSEMBLY TO INVESTIGATE 
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS. I REPLIED WE HAD THE SAME SYSTEM AND, 
AS HE KNEW, CONGRESS DOES INVESTIGATE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS 
AND MAKES FINDINGS PUBLIC AND POINTED OUT THIS WOULD BE VERY 
HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT HERE IN ORDER TO QUELL UNFOUNDED RUMORS. 
DIEM OBVIOUSLY DIDN'T AGREE. DIEM SPENT SOME TIME DENOUNCING 
RICH INTELLECTUALS AND BUSINESSMEN WHO DO NOT PAY THEIR TAXES 
AND THEN BLAME THE GOVERNMENT FOR NOT DOING ENOUGH FOR THE 



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PEOPLE. ALTHOUGH I HAD WOT MENTIONED CORVEE LABOR THIS TIME, 
DIEM STATED THIS ONLY WAY COLLECT EQUIVALENT OF TAXES FROM 
FEASANTS AND THAT THIS SYSTEM IS IN VIETNAMESE TRADITION, 
BUT FEASANTS IN COCHIN-CHINA UNDER FRENCH HAD NOT BEEN ASKED 
TO CONTRIBUTE LABOR. THEREFORE THEY NOW RESENT CORVEE LABOR 
AND OF COURSE WOULD NOT THINK OF PAYING ANY MONETARY TAXES. 
HE POINTED OUT FEASANTS IN CENTRAL VIET-NAM WILLINGLY CONTRI- 
BUTE FREE LABOR INSTEAD OF TAXES. I REMARKED ONE REASON FOR 
DISCONTENT IN SOUTH IS ARBITRARY ACTION OF OFFICIALS AND THE 
FAILURE TO EXPLAIN NEEDS TO PEASANTS BEFORE FORCING THEM 
TO WORK. DIEM INSISTED PEASANTS HAD BEEN TOLD OF NEEDS BUT 
THEY JUST LAZY. 

DIEM THEN STATED WHILE IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO FIND WAYS AND 
MEANS TO RAISE TAXES IN GENERAL, THIS HAD TO BE DONE VERY 
CAREFULLY IN ORDER TO AVOID A TOO-HIGH RISE IN PRICES 
WHICH WOULD CAUSE FURTHER DISGPJJNTLEMENT. HE ADDED DEVALUA- 
TION WOULD HAVE SAME EFFECT AND THEREFORE THIS COULD NOT BE 
DONE IN HURRY. IN THIS CONNECTION HE AGAIN STATED THAT LAO 
DEVALUATION BEEN A FAILURE AND WAS ONE OF THE CAUSES 
FOR THE CURRENT TROUBLES THERE. I REPEATED, AS I HAD SEVERAL 
TIMES, THAT WE CONSIDERED LAO DEVALUATION AS BENEFICIAL AND 
SUCCESSFUL. 



TOWARD END OF CONVERSATION DIEM REVERTED AGAIN TO USELESS 
INTELLECTUALS WHO NOW SPREADING REPORTS OF ANOTHER COUP ON 
CHRISTMAS OR ON JANUARY 20th. 

ON FEW OCCASIONS HE LET ME TALK, I URGED HE ADOPT REFORMS 
SOONEST SINCE IT ESSENTIAL TO WIN FURTHER SUPPORT OF THE 
PEOPLE IF VIET CONG MENACE IS TO BE OVERCOME, BUT HE GAVE ME 
NO INDICATION OF REFORMS HE MAY ADOPT. BEFORE LEAVING I 
AGAIN EXPRESSED HOPE THAT HE WOULD ACCEPT OUR SUGGESTION THAT 
HE ANNOUNCE ALL LIBERALIZING PROGRAMS AT ONE TIME IN ORDER 
TO MAKE BEST IMPACT. DIEM REPLIED HE WOULD THING ABOUT THIS 
BUT MADE NO COMMITMENT. 



COMMENTS. WE HAVE HEARD THAT NHU, THUAN AND OTHERS HAVE BEEN 
RUNNING INTO RESISTANCE WHEN URGING DIEM TO ADOPT WORTHWHILE 



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REFORMS. I ALSO RECEIVED INPRESSION HE VERY RELUCTANT TO 
, ADOPT REFORMS. AND IS STILL BASICALLY THINKING IN TERMS OF 
' FORCE TO SAVE THE DAY, HENCE HIS INSISTENCE SEVERAL TIMES 

' THAT WE APPROVE FORCE LEVEL INCREASE AND HIS ACTION RAISING 
CIVIL GUARD CEILING BY 10,000. WHILE I STILL BELIEVE IT 
ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL HE ADOPT MORE LIBERAL FROGRAMS, IT IS 
NOT CERTAIN FROM HIS ATTITUDE AND REMARKS THAT HE WILL TAKE 
EFFECTIVE ACTION IN THESE MATTERS, ALTHOUGH I LEARNED LATER 
HE HAS AGREED TO ENGAGE THE SERVICES OF -A PUBLIC RELATIONS 
EXPERT SUGGESTED BY CAS TO MAKE A SURVEY OF GVN FOREIGN PUBLIC 
RELATIONS NEEDS. 



DURBRCW 
SGC 






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FOREIGN SERVICE DISPATCH 



FROM: Amembassy SAIGON 



TO : THE DSPAR1VENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON 

REF: Saigon's Telegrom 12lS, Dec- 2k, I960 

SUBJECT: Memorandum Handed to President Diem on Liberalization 









f 



Enclosed is the English text of the memorandum on liberalization 
which Ambassador Durbrow handed to President Diem on December 23, 19^0, 
as indicated in Saigon's Telegram 12l6. The French text of the memorandum 
is being forwarded under transmittal slip to Mr, Wood in SEA, 

As indicated in Telegram 1216, the Ambassador supplemented the memoran- 
dum with the following oral remarks about the ' supplying of the H-3^ heli- 
. .copter to Viet-I-am: "I have just learned today that my Government has 
approved the request to give H»3lt helicopters to Viet -Nam, The total will 
be 11 units- I have been told that the first ones will be delivered shortly 
. and that we shall be furnished soon with the delivery dates for all of 
them," * 

■ 

President Diem's reaction to this approach on liberalization was de- 
scribed in Telegram 12l6. 






For the Ambassador 



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Page 1 
Enclosure i 
Despatch 261+ 
From Saigon 

Memorandum Handed to President Diem by Ambassador Durbrow on December 23, i960 

I have reported to the Department of State your serious concern and that 
of other high-ranking Vietnamese officials about the critical articles about 
Viet -Nam "which have appeared in American as well as other foreign papers, I 
have also reported on the progress being made in working out new policies , and 
organizational and liberalization changes in the governmental and military 
structure which you and other officials have informed us you are planning to 
implement in the near future ♦ 

As you know, my Government has taken certain steps to assist you In 
strengthening the GVN against the Communist attacks being made against it. 
The new AD-6 planes whose delivery was speeded up I understand are proving 
effective and helpful , and you are aware of the large quantity of electronic 
communications equipment MAAG and USOM secured on an expedited basis. 
Lastly, I have instructed Mr. Gardiner to seek an appointment with the Vice 
President and Secretary of State Thuan to re-examine carefully the entire 
problem of your piastre shortage to see whether there may be some new technique 
or action to meet your critical need in this area. Your comparatively satis- 
factory foreign exchange and balance of payments position has of course created 
special problems which we hope we can jointly solve. 

On the basis of these reports I have received instructions to discuss 
these matters with you, particularly certain liberalizing projects which would 
have a favorable effect on world public opinion. As you no doubt know, Mr. 
President, since the press conference held by Mr. Thuan on November 17 at 
which he stated that the Government had for some time been working out details 
for new organizational and liberalization schemes , many elements here in 
Viet-Nam and in the world press have questioned whether these projected 
schemes would be adequate and sufficiently profound to increase the public 
support for your Government and make it clear to world opinion that tl criti- 
cisms of your Government in the world press were unfounded. , 

In an effort to be as helpful as we can to assist you in your efforts to 
broaden the base of your Government, the Department of State has instr .cted 
me to discuss with you some of the suggestions which we have already made and 



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Despatch: 26 h 
From Saigon 

which the Department of State believes would have beneficial affects if 
adopted now in connection with the other measures you are planning. Apart 
from the organizational changes proposed in the governmental and military 
structure and those liberalizing schemes you have told me about -- such as 
elections of youths to village councils and other progressive matters of this 
nature — we believe it would be helpful if you could also adopt the measures 
outlined below. We, of course, recognize that security considerations impose 
certain limitations on liberalization, but we believe that the political 
situation requires certain calculated risks in order that the public and 
world opinion will become convinced of the sincerity of the steps you are 
takeing to evoke broad participation in your efforts to improve security and 
develop the economy and institutions of Viet-Nam. It is our belief that the 
liberalization schemes should be clear-out, effective, and of a broad nature 
so that the impact of their announcement will have the desired beneficial effect 
on the public here and abroad and will enhance the public support for your 
regime. With this thought in mind, it is suggested that: 

1. In connection with the excellent ,new method of having Ministers 
defend their budgets before Assembly Committees, it would be advantageous 
from a political and press point of view either to publicize these hearings 
in full or at least to give fairly full minutes of these meetings to the 
press. 

2. As has already been suggested, it would be politically worthwhile 
to authorize the Assembly to conduct investigations of any Department or 
Agency, of the Government. While public hearings would be politically more 
useful, closed hearings could be held providing the results of the investiga- 
tions are made public in considerable detail. ' 

3- While it is realized that it is not a simple matter to work out an 
effective domestic press code, we believe it would be most beneficial to a 
better understanding of the fruitful efforts being made by your Government 
on behalf of the people and a better appreciation of the many problem? you 
and your colleagues have to face, if the Assembly could adopt in the near 
future a fairly liberal press code. If this cannot be accomplished i lortly, 
the press should be encouraged to set up machinery to police itself. Under 
such a system the Government should only intervene if articles are flagrantly 
dishonest, inaccurate, or favorable to the Communists. In case of a s reach 
of the press code it might be better to require the paper to publish si full 
retraction rather than confiscate the particular edition or suspend the 
newspaper . 



h. I have already discussed with you our suggestions on ways and means 
to have more favorable foreign press coverage. In this connection, the Depart 
ment of State believes that it is almost as important for your Government to 
have favorable foreign press relations as it is to have diplomatic recognition 
from friendly countries. The Department suggests that you continue to have 
periodic press conferences such as those recently conducted by Mr. Thuan, that 

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rage 3 
Enclosure 1 
Dispatch 
From Saigon 



effective use be made of the weekly press conferences .of the Directorate 
General of Inf orinat ion 'by channelling items of substantive information 
through that agency for release *that foreign correspondents "be permitted 
to make trips in the country to learn for themselves the nature of the 
Viet Cong threat, and that Ministers of. the Government "be available to 
have open and frank talks with correspondents about the accomplishments 
and problems of the various Ministries. It is believed that this might 
be helpful in improving the tone of foreign press articles, 
-•■"•*-*• 

5. We are pleased to learn that steps are being taken to increase 
and stabilize the price of paddy to the peasants. We also suggest that 
further efforts be ma.de to grant broader credit facilities to the 
peasants. 

It is the belief of the Department of State that if measures such 
as those suggested above, in addition to the other liberalising steps * 
regarding elections of youth representatives to village councils, 
sending better administrators into the countryside, periodic 
"fireside chats", etc., are adopted in the near future, it would be 
worthwhile to withhold the announcement of individual measures, so 
that a meaningful official announcement could be made," preferably by you, 
of all of the liberalizing measures you are putting into in-mediate 
effect. If the individual measures were not disclosed in advance, such 
an across-the-board announcement of genuine liberalizing measures would, 
we believe, have a most beneficial effect on the people of Viet -Ham and 
on world opinion. It is certain that such an announcement would do 
a great deal to correct any erroneous impressions that have been given to 
world opinion in recent months and encourage the world press and govern- 
ment spokesmen to support you in yo;rr tireless efforts to eliicdnate the 
Viet Cong threat and continue the fine progress attained in Viet -Sam 
in su.ch a short period of time. 



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■\ OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

... * WA5HINC4TON 25, D. C. 



lNTEF<NATfpttAL SECURITY AFFAIRS 



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MEHQB/UflDOli.lfOR 22B &IHEG350R, SSC ASFiM 

■ 

5UB-JTJCT: Defence EequireLicntd in Victuc-% Laos end ffhallaud 

. . A review "of our files concerning vhat action, if cxiy, had 
been tolien \rith the Department of State concerning defence ro~ 
^ulreiuentG for facilities in Vietna-n, Le.oo end 2hailr.n& revealed 
the jtoUouiityg - 



1« Ito request for any facilities iu Laoo have 
beqn made to the Deportment of State * 

■ 

2* Ko request has been iaade to the Department of 
State for obtaining zxx agreement to vlzq facilities in 
Vietnam. Eovrever, there has been an exchange of corres- 
pondence (vhlch ba& been h:\ndlcd by the Far EtiGt Region) 
in vhich BefcnoQ Bepc%rtr A ont tried to .utilize ICA fundc ■ 
to develop tvo airfields in Vietnam With" a capability 
of hcuidlins Jet aircraft . 



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3« Xn January of 195 6> the Defense Department twtoto 
to Stato asking for the negotiation of an r^rectnent vhich 
vould Give general overflight rights to U.5*,foreec and 
yould pettolf the utilization' by the Air Force of Ton £$kai& 
airfield at Bangkok. Anny eo^airaicaticns rind Air Force 
4 Intelligence roquirementfl \rere aloo included* ITo formal 
reply vas received from the State Department, although i?q 
vara tidviced inforaeXly that the political situation, in 
53i3il:.jid procludod our obtrdnin^ the necessary right a • 



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Director, 0:C£icc of 
, Forciea miliary Slghto Affairs 



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SECRET 



FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH 

American Embassy Saigon 276 

Desp No« 

The Department of State, Washington January 4, 1961 

Department Telegram 658, October 20, i960 



Subject: Counter Insurgency Plan for South Viet -Ham 



Reference is made to joint State DOD message, Department's 
658 of October 20, i960, and Defense message DEF 98299^ of 
September l6, i960, both of which set forth the requirements 
for the development of an over-all United States plan for en- 
couraging and supporting the Government of Viet -Mm in the pre- 
sent National emergency. Such a plan has been developed by the 
Country Team and is attached as an enclosure to this despatch 
for review by interested Washington agencies « 

The plan was drafted by a Country Team staff committee com- 
posed of the following members: MAAG - Colo F. W. Boye, Jr., 
Major Kurtz J. Miller, Jr., and Captain Boyd Bashore; Embassy - 
Joseph A. Mendenhall (Chairman) and Andrew J Fink; USOM - James 
W. Howe and William R. Trigg; USES - John Mo Anspacher; and DSA - 
William E. Colby and Clarence E e Barbier. Because of the impor- 
tance of military factors in the development of the plan, MAAG 
assumed the major burden in its preparation, and is to be con- 
gratulated on the excellent job it has done. ' 

The plan,based on tasks and concepts outlined in the CINCPAC 1 
and OASD/lSA plan for counter-insurgency operations, not only sets 
forth recommended action in the military field, but also establishes 
requirements for coordinated and supporting action in the political, 
economic and psychological fields. In developing the tasks to be ! 
undertaken the plan also presents recommendations and justif icati n 
concerning requirements for United States personnel, materiel, funds 
and organizational and operational concepts. The Country Team 
Plan consists of a summary and three Annexes, which discuss Task 
Organization, Concept of Operations and Logistics. Each Annex a] o 
has appropriate appendices which spell out in detail the tasks, 
the present situation with regard thereto and recommended action. 
The plan is complete except for appendices relating to a study of 
the non-military communications system and to economics and finance. 
These will be forwarded upon completion as supplements to the plan 
enclosed herewith* 



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Despatch No. 276 
From SAIGON 



Certain recommendations have already been discussed with 
the Government of Viet-Nam (GVN). Some of these actions have 
already been agreed to by the GTO (e.g a , transfer of the Civil 
Guard to the GW Department of Defense and creation of a na- 
tional Internal Security Council) , and others are under study 
by the GVN (e.g., establishment of a military operational com- 
f mand for counter-insurgency operations, reorganization of military 
1 regions, and implementation of a firm military chain of command). 

In addition there are other actions which will shortly be taken up 
with the GVN such as establishment of internal security councils 
at every governmental level, implementation of proposals for the 
establishment of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency 
(previously discussed several times with the GVN, but to be pushed 
again) and creation of a village level communications system, 

* 

There are, however, certain actions which involve major 
expenditures and will not be discussed with the GVN prior to 
Washington approval. The most important of these latter actions 
is the proposed 20,000 man increase in the size of the RVNAF 
which was presented for Washington consideration in Embassy tele- 
gram 1151, December k* I maintain reservations concerning the 
proposal to increase the force level up to 20,000 additional 
RVNAF troops, purely to meet the threat in Viet -Nam and still 
believe more calculated risks should be taken by using more of 
the forces in being to meet the immediate and serious guerrilla 
terrorist threat, I recognize, however, that additional well- 
trained forces in being in this area are probably now justified 
from purely US interest point of view in order to meet growing 
bloc threat SEA represented by the Soviet airlift in Laos, (See 
ibassy Telegram 1231^ December 29.)* 



*MAAG Comments : 

The MAAG position on the need for a 20,000 force increase 
continues as reported in MAAG telegrams to CINCPAC (CHMAAG 1579 5 
27 Dec 60 and CHMAAG 1620, 29 Dec 60) which were also forwarded 
to Washington. 

a. The military requirement for this force increase 
to accomplish the current mission had been demonstrated in MAAG 
considered opinion as early as August i960. This force increase 
was badly needed before the beginning of the Soviet airlift in 
Laos. The recent Viet Minh overt aggression against Laos merely 
reinforces this requirement. 

b. The four divisions in the North in I and II Corps 
areas are committed in anti-guerrilla and static guard duty to 
an extent which not only cuts down their capability to resist 
overt attack and thus magnifies the risk to a militarily unaccep- 
table degree, but also prohibits required training to adequately 

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Despatch No. 2?6 
From SAIGON 

counter either external or internal aggression. 

* 

c» Additionally, the force increase will provide the 
long needed balance between combat and logistic support. 



A number of recommendations in the plan, considered by the 
Country Team to be indispensable and in the GWs own best in- 
terests , will probably not be particularly palatable to the GVN. 
This situation pertains particularly to certain political actions 
and concepts of the military-civilian relationship e However, 
these questions are an integral part of the overall plan and are 
essential to its successful accomplishment. Consideration should , 
therefore , be given to what actions we are prepared to take to 
encourage , or if necessary to force, acceptance of all essential 
elements of the plan. (See Embassy messages cited on page lU of Enclosure.) 



Elbridge Durbrow 



1 ENCLOSURE: Counter insurgency Plan for South Viet -Nam 



COPIES PC rCHED TO : CINCPAC POLAD (2 copies), 

DEPARTMENT please pouch 8 additional copies to CINCPAC POLAD 



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* 



THE PRESIDENT 



September 29, 1967 



FROM: CLARK CLIFFORD 



Memorandum of Conference on Tanne r y 19, 1951 
betwe en President Eisenhower a nd President-elect Kennedy 

on the Subject of Laos 



'/ 






■ ' ■ ' * ' / 

*The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room with the following 
men present: President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Christian Herter, \ 
Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates, Secretary of Treasury Robert Andersorf, - 

* ■ ■ * ■ 

and General Wilton B. Persons* ■ * . 



'i 



With President-elect Kennedy were the new Secretary of State 






A 



Dean Rusk, tne new Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the new 

- 

* Secretary of Treasury Douglas Dillon, and Clark M. Clifford. 



• *■ 



An agenda for the meeting had been prepared by Persons anci 



Clifford. The subjects on the agenda had been recommended by the 



•i! 



parties present at the conference and were arranged under the headings of 

- ' ■ " - ' ■ - " ' ii 

"State", "Defense", and "Treasury.". The first subject under the headier- 
of "State 1 * was Laos. ■ - 



«• 



_. ,..— -- ■- " President Eisenhower ooened the discussion on Laos by stafcir 

- 

that the United Stages was determined to oreserve the indeoenden.ee o: 

* ■ ' " - if 

* .Laos. It was his ooinion that if Laos should rail to il\e Communists, then 



f «* 



it would be "just a cuesUon of time until South Vietnam, Cambodia, 



l 



Thailand and Burma would collaoss. He felt that ih 



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designs on all of Southeast Asia, end that it would be. a tragedy to pen-pit j 

_ * 



Laos to fall. 



I 



, President Eisenhower gave a brief review of the various moves 
-.. . • - • 

- 

* 

and coups that had taken place in Laos involving the Pathet Lao, 



* 



Souvanna Phouma, Boun Oum, and Kong te. He said that the evidence , 
t 

was clear that Communist China and North Vietnam were determined to I 
. I J 

• I 
destroy the independence of Laos. He also added that the Russians 

■ *- * 

p" ■• . . 

were sending in' substantial supplies in support of the Pathet Lao in an 



effort to overturn the government. 



■ . 



President Eisenhower said it would be fatal for us to permit 



• 'i, • 






Communists to insert themselves in the Laotian government. He recalled 

{ 

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that our experience had clearly demonstrated that under such circum-; 

stances the Communists always ended up in control. He cited China 

\ ■ • ■ • "" - " • ■ * 

\ m «• — 

as anillustratlon, • ■ * 

r 

\ At this point, Secretary of State rlerter intervened to state that 

■ 

if the present government of Laos were to apply to SEATO for aid under 



* 
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the Pact, Herter was of the positive opinion that the signatories to the 



SEATO Pact were bound. President Eisenhower agreed with this and in 
his statement gave the impression that the request for aid had already 

-_ » * * 

come from the government of Laos, He corroborated the binding nature 



VM 



oi tae obligation of the United States under the SEATO Pact. 



President Eisenhower stated that the British and the French did 



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not want SEATO to intervene in Laos, and he indicated that they 

• i i ■ ■ ■ . •■ 

j would .probably continue to maintain that attitude. President 
Eisenhower said that if it were not appropriate for SEATO to intervene j 



IP- 

x in Laos, that his next ©reference would be the International Control 

- i 

\ Commission, He was sure, however, that the Soviet Union did not 

'■•■ • j - - • 

want, the ICC to go into Laos. President Eisenhower stated that if- 

■ I . : • 

this country had a choice as to whether the task should be assumed by 



* • 



SEATO or the ICC, that he personally v/ould prefer SEATO. 

... .- 

■ * 

Secretary Herter stated that we possibly could work out some* 

agreement with the British, if they could be persuaded to recognize 

■■■ 

the present government in Laos, The chances of accomplishing this, 
however, appeared to be remote. 

• * \ 

^ 1 
- . t 

\ Secretary Herter stated, with President Eisenhower's approval, 

1 * 
that we should continue every effort to make a political settlement in 



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Laos, He added, however, that if such efforts were fruitless,- then 

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the United States must intervene in concert with our allies. If we were 

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unable to persuade our allies, then we must go it alone* 

•■« 

this point, President Eisenhower said with considerable 

■ 

emotion that Laos was the key to the entire area of Southeast Asia. Ke 



. * 



said that if we permitted Laos to fall, then we would have to write off 



* *i 



all the area. Ke stated that we must not permit a Communist take-over. 

* 

He reiterated that we should make every effort to oersuade member j 
nations of SEATO or the ICC to accept the burden with us to defend the 

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.freedom of Laos. -. • 

As he concluded these remarks, President Eisenhower 

■ 

■ 
stated it was imperative that Laos be defended. He said- that the 

> 

United States should accept this task with our allies, if we could 
' persuade them, and alone if v/e could not. He added that "our 
unilateral intervention would he our last desperate hope" in the 



/ 



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event we were unable to prevail upon the other signatories to join us. 



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At one time it was hoped that perhaps some type of arrange- 

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merit could be made with Kong Le. This had proved fruitless, however, [ 



i 



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r 

and President Eisenhower said "he was a lost soul end wholly 

« 

irretrievable, " 



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Commenting upon President Eisenhower's statement that we' \ 



\ 



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would 'have to go to the support of Laos alone if we could not persuade 



* - - 



others to proceed with us, President-elect Kennedy asked the question r 



as to how long it would take to put an American division into Laos. 






•t 



Secretary Gates replied that it would take from twelve to seventeen |l 



* 



- 



days but that some of that time could be saved if American forces, 

■ » ■ 

m * 

then in the Pacific, could be utilized. Secretary Gates added that the 

N 

American forces were in excellent shape and that modernization of the 



Array was making good progress. 



. 



President-elect Kennedy commented upon the seriousness of 



* ^ . "the situation In Laos and in Southeast Asia ard asked if the situation 



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seemed to be approaching a climax. General Eisenhower stated j 1 



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that the entire proceeding v;as extremely confused but that it was 



1 



1 # clear that this country was obligated to support the existing govern- 
ment in Laos. 

„ - . The discussion of Laos led to sorne^concluding general 



statemerks regarding Southeast Asia. It was agreed that Thailand- 



"was a valuable ally of the United States, and that one of the dangers 



. - - 



1 



of a Communist take-over in Laos would be to expose Thailand s borders. 



. • 



ii 



i \ In this regard, it was suggested that the military training under French.. 

i 

* m 

Supervision in Tnailand was very poor and that it would be a good idea 

■ 

to get American military instructors there as soon as possible so the 



level of military capability could be raised. 



* =» 



\ • 



President Eisenhower said there was some indication that 



Russia was concerned over Communist pressures in Laos and in 









Southeast Asia emanating from China and North Vietnam. It was felt 

■* ■ 

that this attitude could oossibiy lead to some difficulty between 

\ 

Russia and China. 



* 



\ This phase of the discussion was concluded by President 

m 

Eisenhower in commenting philosophically upon the fact that the 

* 

morale existing in the democratic forces in Laos aooeared to be dis- 



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appointing. He wondered aloud why, in interventions of this kind, 

!..'■• '■'■■■- 

we always seem to find that the morale of the Communist forces was 
* - ■ i * • 

better than that of the democratic forces. His explanation was that 

• ■ 

* 

i 

the Communist philosophy appeared to produce a sens6 of dedication 
» * 

on the part of its adherents, while there was not the same sens^ of 

■ 
dedication on the part of those supporting the /ree forces. He stated 






-» 



that the entire problem of morale was a serious one errtfl would have to 

m 

be' taken into consideration as we became more deeply involved. 



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