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Full text of "Pentagon Papers"

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



VLB Settlement of the Conflict (6 Vols.) 
Negotiations. 1965-67: Announce Position Statements 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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Itop secret - sensitive ! 



UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS 



VIETNAM 



OF THE S 



ETARY OF DEFENSE 



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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE] 



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17 



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Part VLB 



s 1965 - 1967: 

tmaw J POSITION S'i TS 



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VI. B. FdGQTIA'j 3 I965 - 19 67: 

* 

AHNOUTJCED ST, .SlfTS 



TABI-'J OF COKTEI'iTS 



Page 



1. U.S. POSITION S'j ENTS 1 



I963 

19S5 3 



1966 



• • 30 

1967 • 35 

2 . NVK K' SITION ST ATiiMflHTS ' ." '. . 98 

- 

Extracts from NVW Statements 1962-1965.- 100 

April-October 1965 133 

1967 177 

3. KFLSV P OSITION STAflBM EHTS 188 

"«-' ,U» ■! M ■■ ■■ — Ill III! ■ ■' ■^■■■ ■ ■■■" M 

■ 

I96I 189 

I965 ,193 

1966 208 

I967. . 222 

k. AWM 235 

Hanoi Attitude en Bombing 10 SepL er I967 • • • • 236 

I onology cf Viet Feace Effc c 1966-Feb I967.. . 237 

The Asl : Letter to Ko Ch' Minh 5 Fc/h -7 238 

Publication of ' ore Peace Feeler / pis: 

Sew York 5'.* 3 . . f 239 

V For , . 2k! 



Cc risen of LBJ 1 s 



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at of S e Di ] H it 3D ■ ' 1 of 
;es ....... 2^5 

S ; ' i Ct 1 ' on ■'. ( ty). , 2^6 

* 

Si Press C r Held by Wm. P. 

Bun on / pis 2V 



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1. US FQSITIC TA ! J 

1 

ft 

. (u • TIED) 

- 

' • ' . I L ...... 

- 

Sub j oct • F&ge 

Statement "by McGeorge Bundy, September 30, 1963 1 

Whits House Policy Stat nt, October 2, 1963 * 2 

Rli's^s' s Conference, February 25^ I965, . . ,' 3 

Pattern for Peace Address by Presideivt Johnson, April 7, 1965 12 

Speech, "Day for Intern I i 1 Aid/ 1 June 22, I965* 16 

White House Pre^s Conft? ce 17 

Letter from -id Jolmson to U Kia&t* July 28, 1965 20 

I liter from A ador Goldb 5 to Sect y Council, 

July 30> 1965 • . • 20 

Corre spondence with Foreign Minister PUnfani, I 6^ 22 

Statement Concern : ] $&k Peace Overtures 2k 

Secretary 1 h r s hevs Conference, Eov ber 26, 1965 . 27 

Letter from Aiifc r Goldberg to U Thant, Jar y 5, I966. 30 

State D rtment Re s Release (l'j Points), J* y 7> 1966 31 

Extract from S e of Union Kes -, Jan- ,/ 12, 1966 32 

Ad,. 1 b -" Goldbei . to I ..'":, 

Feb ry 10, I967 * 1 35 

Frr Johnson r r> I r to Ho Chi Minh, February 8, 1967. - % 

o Chi Mtrih * a fisply to Jc son's Letter, ry 10, j /'f . . , t fyf 

k*s ! i C nfen ■:, : ■ 28, 1\. ,... .;.......... k9 

"The Bath to VietE .." / 1st I5, 1967 72 

•■■ 

A' G rg -, s S| ih bo the Lfnitc , 

S 21, I967. ; - ■ 7^ 



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Subject 



Pace 



San Ante do Fc ■ y Sept : 29 j 1957 



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Arab tador Goldberg at T tai-e- Foreign gelations C .iittce, 
STovezrib c-2, J 967. • ■ • 



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THE NEXT STEPS TOY'AKD PEACE: Statement by Me- 
Georgc ] dy, Special Assistant to the President, September 
30, 1963 (JBxeerpJs) 1 ■ . 

******* 

The difficult situation in Hie troubled country of South Yict-Xam 
is one- :h I have even less desire to discuss, in stantive terms, 
than the other questions I have raker, as cxa: 3. The important 
mission of Secretary [of Del Rol ert S.j MeNamara and General 

[Maxwell I).] Taylor is only just ending, and it would be wholly in- 
appropriate for me to continent on the course of acl hich may bo 
chosen in the light of this mission and of tl ontinujng consideration 
which is going forward in Saigon under the leadership of Anil sudor 
[Henry Cabot] Lodge, and also in Washington. 

Yet It i not wrong, I think, to s t that in this case again there 

are two proposition-, b >th of them true, and two kinds of error wh ; 
can result from an unwillingness to accept them botli. And again both 
propositions have been stated clearly by the President. The first is 
that Lite object of American policy in this pai I of the world is to assist 
in a most difficult and important struggle against Communist subver- 
sion—military, paramilitary, and political. The* commitment of tho 
United States to the independence of South Yiet-Xam goes back many 
years. This commitment was intensified and reinforced 2 yearn ago, 
and since then a major cooperative effort has been carric I forwa 
with increasing energy — and at least until recently with increasing su 
cess — by Americans working closely with the people and Government 
of South Yiet-Nam. It is the policy of the United States to sustain 
that effort* 

Yet it won 1 - folly for the United States to neglect, or to regard 
with indifference, political develop ..ts of recent months winch fcti 
questions about the ability of the Government and people of South 
Yiet-Kam to support each other effectively in their contest with corn- 
n, The President has made it clear that the United States 
is not indifferent to these events and regs rds them with great con era. 
It is and must be the nolicy of the United States Government to rm 
clear its interest in whatever improve ts it judges to be neeessar 
always of course with a proper re, ! for resf risibilities which rest 
in the first instance upon the pepj h of South. YkSXam. 

It is no secret that observers of the scene in South Yiet-Xam have 
often differed sharply in their interpretation of events. From these 
differences there have come divergent recommendations for [hey. 
There is nothing discreditable in the -existence of such differences. 
In a situation in which easy solutions do not exist and in which com- 
mitments of purpose and hope are high, it is only natural that there 
should be a tendency in each observer to emphasize the part of the 
truth to which he is nearest. If a particular antisubversive e;T 
is goim >11, the man who is working o:; that effort is bo I to s 
that part of real:: 5 very large, If in the cities there is repression 
and alienation of ] blic sup] orr. men living in those cities, with 
responsibilities more civil than military, will feel a special and intense 



* Itep&rtaeat oi Si ilz BltTMin^ 0& 21, 1953. pp. 633-323. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



U.S. POLICY ON VXET-NAM: WHITE ROUSE 
STATEMENT, OCTOBER 2, 1963 * 

Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McSamara and General plhxwell 
D.] Taylor rep 1 to the President tins morning and to the Nation 
Security Council this afternoon. Their r id a number of 

classified findings and recomr which will be the sub] of 

further review and action. Their basic presentation was endorsed by 
all members of the Security Council and the following statement of 
United States policy was approved by the President on the basis of 

lomniendations received from them and from Ambassador [Her 
Cabot] Lodge. ^ 

1, The security of South Vi: t-Xam is a major interest of the United 
Stales as other free nations. We will adhere to our pel' g of work- 
ing with the people and Government of South Yki-Xam to deny this 




penorniance in mis unaeriajang is me qenirai obj 
policy in South Yiet-Nam. 

2. The military f ram in South Viet -Nam 1ms made progress and 
is sound in principle, (hough improvements are being energetically 

Bought. ( ' 

3. Major U.S. assistance in support of this military effort 5s needed 
only until the insurgency has been suppressed or until the notional 
security forces of the Government t >uth Yiet-Nam are capable of 
suppressing it. 

Seer ti ry SIcXamara and General Taylor reported their judgnv 
that the major part of the U.S. military task can be compl by the 
end of IOCS, although there may he a continuing requirement for a 
limited number of U.S. training personnel. They reported that by 
the end of this year, the U.S. program for training Vietnamese should 
have progressed to the point re 1.000 U.S. military personnel as- 
signed to South Viet -Nam can be "withd ■ n. 

4. The political sit nation in South Yiet-2\ am remains deeply serious. 
The United States has made clear its continuing opposition to any 
repressive actions in South Yiet-Nam. While such notions have not 
yet significantly affected the military effort, they could do so in the 

future. 

5. It remains the policy of the United States, in South Yiet-Xam 
as in other parts of the world, to support the efforts of the p pie of 
that country to defeat aggression and to build a peaceful ana free 
society. 



* Department cH Stcte Bufttitn, Oct 21, 1963, p. 



623. 



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SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: Secretary Rusk's News 

Conference of February 25, 1P65 2 

Good afteniooa, ladies and gentlemen, I should life e to take a few 

moments of your time to fry to draw flier ii simples tost 

fundamental way our attitude toward the situatic South [ a . 

Some of the things which I shall say will repeat what lias been said 
before, but mci ies here and abroad seem to be sometime 
And it is important to repeat and draw together those matters which 
are at the center of the problem, bee there is a great deal el$e 
which is peripheral and transitory. 

1. The nations of Southeast Asia have a right to live in peace, free 
from aggression directed against them from outside their borders, 
Now, tins is not an empty theory; it is a point of vital importance to 
the safety and, indeed, the very* existence of more than a hundred 
smaller nations all over the world. 

2. North Vietnam, in callous disregard of the agreements of 195 
and 1902j and of inter] >nal law, lias directed and supplied the 
essential military personnel and arms for a systematic campaign of 
terror and guerrilla action aimed at the overthrow of the Government 
of South Yiot-Xam and at the imposition by force of a Communi 
regime. The evidence of North Ylot-Nanrs direct responsibility for 
this aggression has been repeatedly presented by the Government of 
Vietnam, the United States Government, and the International 
Control Commission; A full a nd up-to-date summary of the evidence 
establishing this responsibility will be available to you within a rei 
few days. It is now bei ng processed for pu bl i .n. " 

3. The attitude of the United Stajtes toward threats to the peace 
in Southeast Asia has been made clear many tunes and in the most 
serious and formal ways: 

(a) by the ratification of the Manila Pact in February 1955, which 
includes South Yiet-Nam as a protocol state; (This treaty was ap- 
proved by the Senate by a vol 32 to 1 .) 

(b) bv a decision of President Eisenhower in 195i to extend aid to 
South Vietnam, who said in a letter to the President of South Viet- 
Kara : 

The implications of the c ment concerning Yiet-Xani bare caused grave 
concern regarding the future of a country temporarily divided by an artificial 
military grouping weakened by a long and cxh.-v, ar and faced v. Kb 

enemies without and by their subversive co! lab orator* within. 

and he went on to say that 

The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Viet-Xam in devel g 
and nialniaicins a strong, riable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion 
or aggression through military means. 

and then again (c) by the joint resolution of the Congress of the 
United States, passed in August 1984 by a combined vote of 502 to 
2, which stated, among other things ; 

That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the Prescient, 
as Commander in Chief, to take ail necessary measures Co repel any armed attack 
against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression. 

and that 

3 United States regards as vital to Its national interest and to world reace 
laintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. 

and that 



The 
the ma 



• * * the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, 
to take all necessary step Lag the use c* ed force, to assist any 

member or pi I :o1 state of the Southeast Asia Collective T)c Treaty re- 

questing assistance in defense of its fr< 3 m. 



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(d) and Iheii you should remind yourselves of the statement made 
by Presid it Johnson on the occasion of signing that joint resolution : 

To any armed ' tees, we shall reply. 

To any in S who ask our hel uding their freedom, we shall 

give it. 

l'u that region, there is nothing we covet, nothing we seel;— no territory, do 
military] ion, r feat&nib . Our one desire — our one determination — 

is that the peo :" South be left in peace to work out their own d-: ies 

in their own way. 

4. Now, it 1ms Leon stated over and ever again that the key to peace 
in Southeast Asia U the readiness of all those in that area'to live at 
peace and to leave their neighbors alone. Xow a there is no mystery 
about that formulation ; those who areV.ot leaving their n djors alone 
know* exactly what it means. It is an obligation i r the 1934 agree- 
ments, under the 1962 accords on Laos* and under general international 
law. The illegal infiltration of military personnel and arms cannot b 
described as "leaving your neighbor alone." 

5. There have been negotiated settlements in South la, tl 
most, recent one as late as 19G2. Those several agreements were in- 
tended to establish peace in that area; compliant with them by all 
concerned can achieve that result 

6. Now, since the Geneva conference of 10C3, the United States h 
been in ive and continuous consultation with other governments 
about the clanger en • by i ion in Southeast Asia, It has bee 
discussed hi the United Nations, in the SEA TO and XATO Councils, 
and on innumerable occasions directly with ot! governments thtong 
diplomatic channels. We have had direct discussions with aln 

\ every signatory of the agreements of 1954 and 1902, "What is still 
; mi i[>g is any indication that Hanoi is prepar o stop doing what 

it is doing and what it knows it. is doing against its neighbors. The 
! ; al ce ol this crucial element affects the current discussion of i; nei>o- 

'tiation " Palitical channels have been and are open, and a considerable 
■number of govermnr ittsare actively interested in 1 g them open 

to explore Hie possibilities of a peaceful solution. But a negotiation 

aimed at (V acceptance or the confirmation of aggression is not j 

sible. And a negotiation which simply ends in bitterness and hostility 

merely adds to the danger. 

"-—7. Let me remind you that on February 17 the President said, and 

I am quoting: 

As I have said so many, many til and other Presidents ahead of me have 
safel, our purpose, our objective there i r, That purpose and that objective is 

to join in the defense and protection of freedom of a brave people who are under 
attack that is controlled and that is directed from on! their country. 

We have no ambition there for ourselves. We seek no dominion, v,"e seefe no 
conquest We seek no wider war. But we must ail um> : uind that we will per- 
sist in the defense of fr i and our continuing actions will be those which are 
justified and those that are made necessary by the continuing aggression o ers. 

These actions [be added] will he measured and fitting and adequate. Our 
stamiaa &nfl the stamina of the American people is equal to the tasli 

Let me conclude by reaffirming, still once more, that the central ob- 
ject of American policy and action in peace hi Southeast A and the 
safety of the independent states in that region. Many of the peoples 
of that area hare been subjected to 25 years of turmoil and violence; 
they are entitled to peace. We ourselves much j use our re- 

sources as a pari of an international effort to assist the economic and 

social development of the ] les of that' area than to have them 
diverted into theharsh necessities of resisting aggression. 
I am ready for your collections, gentlemen/ 



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Q. Mr. Secretary, what & the association of the United States Gov- 
ernment with the activities of these nations you referred to which are 
trying to keep open the channels of diplomacy? > " 

A- Well, we are ourselves in regular contact with many govern* 
ments in all pails of the world, through diplomatic means. * We have ' > 

, not seen any basis on which we can ask anyone else to speak for us, and 

we do not know of anvone else who is purporting to speak for us. 

But let rne come back again with great emphasis — because I do think 
that it is central to this question of negotiation. And that is that the 
missing piece — the missing piece is any indication that Hanoi is pre- 
pared to stop doing what it is doing against its neighbors. 

Sow, in many of these postwar negotiations in the last 20 years, as 
you know, the negotiations have been frequently and most often pre- 
ceded by some indication that those negotiations might have some 
chance of success. Xow, that is the missing piece here — that is the 
missing piece. 

The object is th& safety and security of these smaller countries of 
Southeast Asia. In that issue all of the smaller countries of the world 
have a vital stake. It is atthe heart of 'the very structure of inter- 
national life, of the international state system. And it is the missing 
element, the unreadiness of Hanoi to stop doing what it is doing- — 
that is the problem in this thing called negotiation. 

Q, Mr. Secretary, did you give thai message to Hanoi by -way of the 
Chinese Communists in the Warsaw meeting the other day? 

A. We had a talk — I think it was yesterday. That talk revealed 
nothing new in the known positions oi the two sides. That talk did 
not supply the missing piece that I am talking about. There was no 
indication in that talk that Hanoi is prepared to stop doing what they 
are doing. ^ 
■ Q. Welt, did you use that channel to get this word directly to them? 

JL Our policy, along the lines that I have summarized here, was 
made clear there; it is made clear repetitively with governments all 
" over tho world, time and time again, and this was done yesterday. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is speculation here that the United States 
it now in the process of expanding its military role in Viet-Nam in 
hopes that this might convince the Hanoi government to provide this 
missing link, 

A. I wouldnt speculate on that from that point of view. I would 
urge you to look at what I have said in my opening statement. Look 
at alfof it — look at all of it taken together. That is the policy — that 
is the policy. How you feel you must act at a particular time and 
under particular circumstances under that policy and within that 
policy — for example, within the joint resolution of the Congress — 
depends upon circumstances from time to time. But the policy is to 
act to support the independence and safety of these countries of South-, 
east Asia. That is the policy. 

And I would unre vou to eive serious consideration to all of the 
eler ents that I have indicated m my opening statement. 

Q* Mr. Secretary, Secretary-General U Thant* in New York yester- 
day , in urging the beginning of some hind of informal discussions to 

restore peace in Viet-Ntim^ said, "/ am sure that the great American 
people, if they only know the true facts and the background to the de- 
velopments in South T-iet-Nam, will agree with me that further blood- 

i ■ shed is unnecessary" Now, are you hiding any true facts from the 

lj t American people? 

I * A. Well, I don't want to comment on that particular statement in 

any personal sense.^ I believe that there has been some clarification 
of that statement since then. But, as I have said to you gentlemen 
before, I don't know of any situation anywhere in the world on which 
the American people have been better informed, in more detail, on a 
current basis, both by officials and by the intensive effort of a vigorous 
and free press, that is the ca^e with respect to South Viet-Xam. 



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Q. Mr, Secretary perhaps^ sir } then you could clarify this poh 
There Tuis leen a notic ote* const 'erable dif ce of emphasis in 
the statements of the c- al objectives of United States policy in 
these terms. There have been times when the United Sic policy 
has been said to he to defend the freedom of the people of Yiet- 
Ncm. There have been other times w) the policy of the United 
States has been i id to le to resist tl sponsion of Chinese Commu- 
nist aggression. Could 'you clarify that? 

A. 1 think those two mean exactly the same thing. The expansion 
of Communis- ion involves the al i empt to t I fee over South Viet- 

Nam. I think that is looking at the same coin from both its sides. 

Q t Mr. Secretary, the Secretary-General said he had made a pro- 
posal to the United States. The White House sai no suoh proposal 
has been presented to the President. Do you know of any such pro- 
posal? 

A. "Well, we have talked over the past 2 years informally and on 

1 a number of occasions with the Secretarv-General^ who carries a very 
! heavy responsibility in his role at the United Nations, as well as with 
many governments in various parts of the world. Now, during that 
2-year period, various suggestions have been discussed—sometimes 1 
us, sometimes by o; $* But the proposals that I know aboutthus 
fax 1 n procedural in nati The missing piece continues 

to be the absence of any indication V Hanoi is prepared to stox) 
doing what it is doing aga tnst its neighbors, t - 

Now, these suggestions and pr dural questions have been dis- 
cussed, many of them publicly. This question of calling a conference, 
under what circumstances— these are procedural matters. What we 
are int< ted in, what is needed to restore peace to Southeast Asli : 
is substance, content, an i lication that peace is possible in terms of 
theappet and the attitudes of the other side, 

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you evaluate the situation, the political 
situation in South- Viet-Nam % in the light of the recent changes of 
government amd whether or not you feci that an ef fit 

is now possible th ere y and is iha i one of the missing pieces? 

A. "Well, we have been very deeply concerned, as you know, for 
some time about the question of the essential unity and solidarity of 
the Govern in • nt in Saigon. Confusion on that matter — or the absence 
of unity — ramifies in a variety of directions and, of course, makes it 
that much more difficult for them and for us to act effectively to 
insure the independ a and the safety of South Yiet-Narn. And 
undoubtedly disunity and confusion in Saigon increases the especta- 






•!en of the other side that, if they persist, they have a chance of 
access. 

So vre attach the highest possible priority to unity and solidarity 
3 mong the South Vietnamese leaders arid its Government. 

I can express my belief, as well as my hope, that at least some of 
these problems of disunity have been resolved. 

The recent so-called coup that involved— what— some tiling like three 
battalions again^ similar to the one. of last September, did not i re 

with the operation of the civilian government, or did not ci a 
situation of bio: ?d within the country. 

But we are moving with hop? and expectation and in the closest 
working relationship with the present Governi in that country. 

Q, Mr. Secretory, your stt s to suggest that only Hcnovs 

aggression gives any body an$ major danger to tohai some have also 
described as the coi in South Viet-Nam* Did y\ 

mean to suggest, sir, that if yo u ohta In c vidence that Hanoi stops doing 
what it is cioirg^ the United St ies aid and assistance to the South 
Vietnamese Government <wc no longer be necessary to handle the 
local problem? 

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A. Well, let's be a little careful about this word "Indigenous ele- 
ment? 1 There are those who use ' term, particularly in the Com- 
munist world, because the North Vietnamese are "\ se and I 
South Vietnamese are Vietnamese and they would like to hare every- 
one believe that that is what is meant by letting the Vietnamese settle 
their own problems. But an attack by North YUl-Xum on South 
Yiet-Nam by military personnel and arms is aggression contrary to 
established a greements. "Without the control of these o i ons frc 
the North, without the manpower, the trained manpower sent from 
the North into the. South, without the supply of anus and other key 
items of equipment from North to Sontn, the indigenous aspect of 
this problem, the genuinely indi. : ict of this problem, would 
be quite a different matter* It was this external a ~ of the : 
which explains the presence of the American military personnel in 
that area, the rapid increase in American personnel since 1901. It 
was the escalation of that infiltration. So I think we need to separate 
Very carefully that part which is local,, that part ich is external; 
and the external part of it is the crucial aspect in terms of the pacifica- 
tion of the country and in terms of the establishment of peace in 
Southeast Asia. 

Q. You mean tJien, also, sir, the withdrawal of such man-power as 
may have infiltrated as Icing part of staffing^ doing 

A. Well, that is what they are doing; that is what they must stop. 

Q. Mr. Secretary \ do you expect more active and perhaps collect ' 
mpport from other parties than Asians to the Amerii n effort in 
South Viet-Nam, and could you describe whether they have given 
any fo rn ui I p 1 c dg c s ? 

A. Well, Tre have been discussing with of governments, as you 
know, for some time now, increased assistance to South Yiet-Nam, 
political , through personnel, ecoi tc, in other ways. We have been 
encouraged in some cases to see that that increased assistance is forth- 
We know that there are other governments that are con- 



con mg. 



sidering now whether they might not be able to do more than they 
have been doing, not just those in Asia, We would welcome additional 

support, and we think it is very important, both as an encouragement 
and practical support for South "Viet-Nani and also as an indication 
to the oilier side of the international objection as to what the other 
side is trying to do here. 

Q. Mr. Secretary* in order to inter. your statement correctly, 
could you tell iis whether or not you mmti to suggest thai it would be 
a preconditio?i of any negotiation or conference that there must he 
anociuol t xti&n of this penetration* or merely an indication of thai? 

A. No. I think that it is well for us and for everyone to concen- 
trate on the meat of the matter. The meat of the matter is that Hanoi 
is sending these- people and these arms into South Yiet-Nam contrary 
to every agree t and contrary to international law. Now, if that 
problem is grappled with, then we can get into details. We can con- 
sider whether the meat involves a little salt and pepper and a dash of 
garlic } but here is the meat of the matter, and I, think we ought to 
Keep our eyes on that. That is the central, all-important element in 
this situation. 

Q m Mr. Secretary, v:ha! kind of legal hash did the United Stat< 
hare to homh the targets of North Vict -Nam? 

A. Self-defense of South Yiet-Nam and the commitments of the 
Unite es wiih respect to the security and the -defense of 

South Y Nam, 

Q, Mr, Secretary^ if we could turn from Vict-Xam- Iriefy. I won- 
der if we a go to the Middle East. I wonder, sir, v:hal was th# 
reason for our approval of the shipments of tanks to Israel? And, 
secondly, now that the Gerr shij mis have r /. what plans 
does the United States ka$$ fo see that Israel gets the remaining pa 
of the arm ikipmentP 

A. On the first part of your question, we have been interested in 
some sort of reasonable balance in the armed forces in that area. As 
you know, "Western Europe has been the primai iplter of arms to 

Israel. We ourselves have tried not to be active in the Near East in 
the arms field, although we have taken sc steps in that regard be- 
cause for some rears we h en trying to find some way in which 
to put some ceilings on this m ighborhood arms race in the Near East, 

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Wc have been working with the governments concerned lo find out 
whether it Is possible that this arms race might someliow be turned 
downward. 

The ond part of your question I am not able to get into— about 
the future. 

Q. M}\ Secretary^ in response to an easier question you equated 
Chinese C 'ommuniit < nsio\ ritktlieguerrd in South 1'iei- 

Nam. but I don't belli ve you mentioned Peiping or Communist China 
in you?' opening statement. I wonder ichether you ecu/ U tis xehai 
you believe the role of Red China and its guilt in this particular opera- 
tion is? 

A. tVeUj I think in my earlier statement I intended to comment 
on 

Q. You emphasized Hanoi. 

A. I intended to comment in answer to an earlier que i on Com- 
munist- aggression and not specifically* necessarily Peiping or the 
Chinese Communist aggression at the same time. However, I think 
the role of Peiping here is prettj clear. They hare gone to consider- 
able lengths to make it public themselves. They have announced the 
doctrine of a militant world revolution, which they not only have 
adhered to in theory but have backed up in practice cm more than one 
occasion. They have supported I doctrine with a harshness which 
has created very serious prohlei even within the Communist world, 
quite apart from problems with the free world. 

Now -we know that they have been giving encouragement, that they 
have been sending arms to Xorth Yiet-Kam, that many of these arms 
that we capture in South Viet-Xam are of Chinese origin, Chii 
manufacture, and they have thrown their military and undoubtedly 
their economic weight behind what, Hanoi is doing, and I would sus- 
pect that they have a very strong Influence indeed in Hanoi's attitude 
in this present situation. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned Hanoi and Peiping — what abou 
.the shipment of Russian i . *plies to North Yiet-Nam? 

A. We haven't precise information on that, but I think in the case 
of the Soviet Union, judging from their public as well as private 
statements over the last 2 years or so, I think they have all along 
taken about the same view of South Viet-Xam as have other members 
of the Communist world. They have had a somewhat different vie v 
on Laos where, they had a very specific and clear commitment on Laos, 
but I think they have been less active in this pre.- situation than 
these other two capitals by a very considerable- — — 

Q* Mr. Secretary, could ice return^ sir, to what you restated several 
times as a, critical point? Could -you clarify for us in a diplomatic 
sense tchat it is that the United States would regard as evidence that 
Hanoi is stopping doing what it is doing? Bow could this he con* 
verted into a diplomatic, negotiable situation? 

A. I don't think that it requires me at this time to try to spell that 
out in detail. "We would find out very shortlv on the ground, as well 
as through any diplomatic channel, whether there lias been any change 
in the posit ion in that respect. But I don't think it is app "iate for 
me to tall:- about complex sets of preconditions on their side or on our 
side or problems of that tout, because we still have this missing piece, 
which is the dominant element in the problem. ^ - 




fro: 

to solve the inaige. 

wider' r-naiional super i ton InSouth Yiet-Nam? 

A. Well, let's get to the first step first, and then if we get to that 
step, then we will have the luxury of indulging in the consideration 

of tile second step, \ 

Q, What are our policies i nt% regard to the indigenous aspects of 

a civil war? Could you enligh ten vs on this? 

A. Well, J think that the indigenous aspects of it could be brom 
to a conclusion very quickly and that the South Vietnamese people 
could turn back to the problem of building their country and improv- 
ing their constitutional sv m, elevating the econo standards^ of 
the country and get on with the modernization of the country which 
has been their purpose iron: the begi ■;. 

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■ 



: 



i- MM ■ f8S& puiWk- •< ,„e 

w |4: «jld be «*, if * ? -.^rSK, 

war 

snake. tt tns armea - uut> u*«w «y»v •*/ 

J* , / u icr, sir if this ' fnce, change the cento 
/if our understanding of the 1 t» Ktew>«»w , 

T Xo T k all a tore put the finger on this question of 

fl - infilt'r i i of th cwnnd and of the arms from outside as the 
kavtothe Waiiiftb *re aggressfre acts that is p^son 
f om t S Ko'ti and that is the thuTg which is a the heart of the 
problem, I wouldn't characterize it as a different thing. 
Q. Mr. Secretary? 

O' fdidvani to char up two things here. Ton said you had looked- 
^nthStmttr and I v ered. did you hnow there wen author- 
£52 ^anddidyc las untruthful testimony under 

«¥ ^r^^o^^lSiSLs involving both th« 
potts, bill Wt make a characterization of either one of them at 

V Doyou think it's all right? Did you approve it? 
X Ko J am not making any comment about what I did or did n< 
aunrove of about either one of those point ■ 

P S Mr Secretary, ™ P° si P ress con >? es I Uh f v& K^nl 
iterated }he San/ iha/ the Lar-and so has Se, . [of Defense 

Robert 8\ M r-.Yamara-that the war has to *&&"?{• 

WhvLwUtn this talk about Hanoi and injIUr.fhn from tU NoriM 
TMsUa relatively new theme, at least as far as the ham u cm- 
cemel Areyou still of the m ind that the war has to he icon on the 

'TwdL &*$* of it, of course, is c ely important and h 

crucial to the ent re. effort." But again let me go back to my opening 
Xement taken altogether. Beca the aggression, these aggr^e 
nets from the Nortlfhare been-as we have made clear }***$£- 
W been increased both with v | ct to manpower and with respect 

to arms. The problem has increased in size and scale. And the neces- 
sary steps, therefore, change. 



4 



C 



* 



0, Mr. Secretary? 

A. Yes, sir? 

Q. When we z involved in the Korean tgor, Ghi Kai-$hel r 8 
offer of troops to participate was rejected. Now, as I understand 
it^ South Koreans are being introduced into Viet-Nam. Can you 
tell ms wherein the situations differ? 

A, Well, the South Korean personnel that are going into South 
Vict-Kam are not going there for combat purposes. They will be 

imarily engaged, I understand, on meerm<ri here and t 1 
They will have with them cert ran local guards in connection with 
those particular tasks. They were requested by the South Vietnamese 
Government. They have a limited mission. I think that explains 
that particular point 

The other question 13 years ago had many more eomj>lications in it. 

Q, Are the South Koreans able to defend themselves if attacked? 

A. The South Koreans and the United States are able to defend 
South Korea if attacked, yes. * 

Q> Mr. Secretary , toithout eom ding on specific f re opera- 

' the conce\ ' 
is would) in 




A. I think t)\Q question was the legal basis for the action that 
had been taken in that regard, 

Q. Welly that implied the broad concept of self-defense would 
permit 

A. That's correct. 

Q. ■ would permit further a is without necessarily 

A I was commenting on the. I :; . J : s, jcs. 



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Q* Under that concept, Mr, Secretary? has the United States A by 
■' allowing American comb South Viet-Nam^ modi fed its 

previous on on the rols of U.S. forces in South Yiet^Naz&f 

A. Well, again, the policy remains the same. Look at the con- 
gressional resolution passed by a margin of 502 to 2. Now, the use 



of a particular weapon may change from time to time, or a type 
aircraft, but the policy is the same- When the circumstances or 
changed circufl stances require changed actions, those actions will be 
taken. But that does noi ! teas an underlying change* of policy. I 
have tried to put together in my op " g statement tii elementary 
and basic policy within which we arc operating. 

Q t Mr. Seer /, to go bach to t? lonSj is it a fair sum- 

mary of what you have been saying l y that the Untied States 
is not prepared for any hind of nege ' Ion op, the war in South 
Viet-Nam with the governments of Hanoi and Peiping unless c 
until what you call th ' . mg piece is ; ' ? 

A. Well, I would think that that would-be the essential point in dis- 
covering whether what is broadly called the political process— 
whether it's diplomatic contacts or whatever — can help bring this 
question to a peaceful solution. I think that is crucial to IL 'J a 
is no political gimmick by which you can bar the other side from 

continuing arri . ion if they are del-:: 1 to do so. That has to 

be met on the ground, factually, directly. There is no political 
wjzardy which will ch. that until that will is changed^ until the 
decision is changed on e ether side. 
(?. A related question} Mr. Secretary 




man for. the German people on international affairs. We have not 
looked with favor upon any treatment of East Germany or it? officials 
; that, would seem to undergird or underpin the division of the German 

] people or enhance the position of the regime in East Germany. 

Q, Mr. Sec, ry, Laos is also a pa) t of this aggression from North 

Yici-Nam. The policy statements that you hare been pie/king today 

. apply equally to L* do they\ or just for ) 'iel-Xam? *. 

j A. Yes, For brevity's sake I did not include Laos in detail, but the 

1 m the same situation obtains there* 3n the case of Laos, we ha an 

agreement as recent as 1962. I don't know of any single day since, 
the signing of those ag its in which North Yjet->am has been 

in compliance with them. p Xow, compliance with those, agreements 
would make, a big contribution to th e of Southeast Asia. That 

is what they were for. Their entire purpose was to decide, that every- 
one would leave ths Laotians alone and them run their own affairs. 
That is what it was all about 

Q. Mi\ Seen ry.it seems that the congressional opi ton that has 
been expressed over the last couple of wee%s has not focused so much 
on goals of policy, which you have outlined, but the ability of the 
United States to realize them in Southeast Asia, Can you, say why 
you think theneto^ level of action which the UJ3. has moved v.p to in 
Southeast Asia vjill realise these goals any more than the policy of 
simply fighting the v:ar out in the South that we wer& following 
before? 

A. Well,J[ think I would go back to the President's statement on 
February 17th and tothc underlying policy of the congressional reso- 

What is required is required. 



lution itself. What is required is required. The commitment there 
is very clea 
the security 



is \(:iy clear with respect to this aggression and our commiti t to 
e security of these coin.' i s of Southeast Asia. 




an 

oil: 

the policy and the determination and the attiti d< are clear. 



10 



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t 



Q. Mr. Secretory if the I \sh end the liu^srian Gov nis y as 

cock-airmen -of the Geneva co. . d'eci 7 to convene it, in ti 

absence of the missing piec€ % tcoxtld the United Sta ? pn to 

attend tlii? conference? 

A. Well, I think they would be in consultation with the- members of 
the* conference before they convened it. 

<?. Sir. Secretary) ii is implied on the subject of ncr/ot'ations thai 
what yoxdre saying is thci the minimum on our side icovld be o status 
quo ante. That u t at the beginning of the guerrilla wa>\ that South 
Yiet-Natn v;oidd rem* with its ferritorifd integrity end inde- 
pendent 



rx. 



A. "Well, the hfrart of the problem is an assaitTt upon tha safety and 
(lie territorial integrity ana independence of South Yiec-Xauu If 
that is relieved and removed. then things can begin to move That is 
tlie heart of the problem, Thai is why we havo force? out there. 
They could come horn;" tomorrow if thai problem had not been 
i ated by ag£ siom They never would have hwn there in the first 
place. That is the central hoaii, the essence of the situation, and that 
is the problem that has to be dealt with. 

<?. Thanh you, dr. 



-*«-—♦ 



»*-» . — 



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PATTERS FOR PEACE IN SOUTHEAS P ASIA: Address 
by President Johnson, Johns Hopkins 1 Diversity, April 17, 



19 G5 l 



e 



3 



Last week IT nations sent their views to some two dozen eo ie 
having an inti in Southeast Asia- We are joining those 17 coun- 
tries and sfc ing our American policy toniglit, * Leh we believe will 
contribute toward peace in this area of the world. 

I havo come here to review once again with my own people the views 
of the American Go nent.^ 

Toniglit America! nd Asians are dying for a world where each 
people may choose its own path to change. This is the principle for 
which our ancestors fought in the valleys of Peru rania. It is a 
principle for which our sons fight tonight in the ju of Yiet-Xarn. 

Viet-Xam i r away from this qmet campus. We have no terri- 
tory there, nor do we seek any. The war is drrtv and brutal and diffi- 
cult. And some 400 young men, born into an America that is burst- 
ing with opportunity and pronu , have ended their lr s on Viet- 
Xanrs steaming soil, 

Why must we take this painful road? "Why must this nation 
hazard its ease, its interest* and its power for the sake of a people so 

faraway! 

We fight because we must fight if we are to live m a world wh> 
every country c Iiapc its own destiny, and only in h a world will 
our own freedom 1 »e finally s re* 

This kind of world will never be built by bombs or bullets. Yet 
the infirmities of man are such thai force must often piv edc reason 
and the waste of war, the works of pence. We wish that this were not 
so. But we must deal with the world as it is, if it is ever to be as v 

wish. 

The world as it is in Asia is not a serene or peaceful place. 

The first reality is that .North Vietnam ] 1 the independ- 

ent nation of South Yiet-Xam, Xtsobj is total conquest, Ofeourse s 
some of the people of South Yiet-Xam are pan icipal in attack on 
their own govern L But trained men and supplies, orders and 
arms, w in a constant stream from Xorth to South. 

This support is the heartbeat of the war. 

And it is a war of u | aBeled brutality. Simple fanners are* the 
targets of assassination and kidnaping. Women and children are 
strangled in the night because their m a 'are loyal to their government. 
And lielpless villages are ravaged by sneak attacks. Large-scale 
raids are conducted on towns, and terror strikes in the heart of cities. 

The confused nature of this conflict cannot mask the fact that it is 
the new face of an old enemy. 

Over this war— and all Asia — is another reality: the deepening 
shadow of ( China. The rulers in Hanoi are urged on by 

Peiping. This is a regime which has destroved freedom in Tibet 
which has attacked India, and has been condemned by the United 
Nations for aggression in Korea. It is a nation which is hclphv e 
forces of vio e in almost every continent. The contest in Vict -Nam 
is part of a wider pa i of ag« sive purposes. 

Why are these realities our concern? Why tire we in South Viet- 
nam? 

We are there bee. we have a promise to keep. Since. 1954 every 
American Pre. nt h I support to the people of South Yiet- 

Xam. We have hel | I mild, and we have he! to defend. Thus, 

over many years, we have made a nati .1 pledge to help South Viet- 
Xam de incL pendence. 

And I i I to keep that promise. 

To dishonor that pie • \ to* al tan this small and brave nation 
to its enemies, and to the terror thii must follow, would be an tm- 
fon le wrong. 

We are also world order. Around the * I e, 

from Berlin to Ti : ' nd, are pe pl( whose woll : " ; s in part 
on die belief th are at1 iclred. To leave 

Yiet-Xam to its fat< sh be the confident Eallthes , pie in 

tl. e of an An 'can-- nil Eindinthev* of America's 

word. The 3 Itwoul i iikj . i and instai I y, and even 

wider war. 



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\vc are also there iiisc there Eire great stakes in the balanc 
Let no one think for a moment that t fron Yiet-Nam would 

bring an end to conflict The battle would be renewed in one conn try 
and then another. The central 1 :i of our time is Unit the a; ite 
of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from on? batl !d 
means only to prepare for the next. "We must star in Southeast. 
Asia — as we did in Europe — in the word.-? of the Bible: "Hitherto 
Shalt tliou come, but no further/ 3 

There are those who say that all our effort there will be futile — 
that China's po is such that it is bound to dominate all Southeast 
Asia. But there is no end to that argument until all of the nations of 
Asia are swallowed up. 

There are those who wonder why we have a responsibility there. 
Well, we have it there for the same reason that we 1 b a responsibility 
for the defense of Europe. World War II was fought in 1 Europe 
and Asia, and •;>. it ended we found ourselves with continued re- 
sponsibility for the defense of freedom. 

Our objective is the in Lepei of South Vietnam and its free- 

dom fr ittaclc We want nothing for ourselves — only that the peo- 
ple of South Yiet-jXam be allowed to guide their own country in their 
own way. We will do everything necessary to reach that objective, 
and we will do only what is absolutely necessary. 

In recentmonthsattacks on South Yiet-Xam were stepped up. es, 
it became necessary for us to increase our re [ and to make attacks 

by air. This is not a change of purpose. It is a change in what we* 
believe that purpose requires. 
We do this in order to slow down ag on. 

We do this to in ase the confidence, of the brave people of Sou 
Viet-2\am who hare bravely borne this brutal battle for , so many years 
with so many casualties. 

And we do this to convince the leaders of Xorih Yiet-Xam — and all 
who seek to share their conquest — of a simple fad : 
We will not be defeated. . 
We will no' grow tired. 
• We will not withdraw 1 ) either openly or under the cloak of a mean- 
ingless u. 

We know that air attacks alone will not accomplish all of these 
purposes. But it is our best and prayerful judgment that they are a 
necessary part of the surest road to peace. 

Wo hope that peace -will come swiftly. But that is in the hands of 
others besides ourselves. And we must be prepared for a long con- 
tinued conflict. It will require patience as well as bravery— tie will 
to endure as well as the will to resist. 

I wish it were possible to convince others with words of what we 
now find it necessary to say with guns and planes: armed hostility is 
futile — our resources are equal to any challenge — because we Sght for 
values and we fight for principle, rather than territory or colonies, 
our p: ice and our determination are unending. 

Once this is clear, then it should also be clear chat the only path for 
'reasonable men is thejpath of peaceful settlement. Such peace de- 
mands an independent bouth Ytet-Xam — securely guaranteed and able 
to shape its own relationships to all others- f: :? from outside inter- 
ference—tied to no alliance— a military base for no other country. 

These are the essentials of any final settlement. 

We will never be second hi the search for such a peaceful settlement 
in Yiet-Xam. 

There may be many ways to this kind of peace: in d ission or 
negotiation with the governments concerned: in large gro or in 
small o in the reaitinnarion of old agreements or their streng i- 
mg with new ones. 

We have stared tins position over and over . tin 50 tin and more 
to friend foe alii - And we i i ready with (his purpose for 

unc->i d i t iona 1 d iscussi ons. 

And until that bright j - lt day of peace we will try to keep 

conflict iron: . hi ,:. We have no d ire to see thousands die m 
battle— A s or Ameri ?. We have no desire ,to d»-. tate that 
which the people of North Yiet-Xam h '■-. built with toil and sacrifice. 
We will • ■.•ur p ^vith restraint and with all the lorn that wa 

can command. 

Fyat we will Use it, 

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This war, like most wars, is filled with terril irony. For what do 
the prop]'? of North Yiet-Xam want ? They want v. their neighbors 
also desire — food for their hunger, health for their bodies, a chance to 

in, progress for their country, and an end to the bondage erial 

•tv. And they would find all these things far more readily in 

peaceful i iciation with others than in the endless course of battle: 

These countries of Southeast Asia are homes for millions of im- 
poverish <• pie. Each day these people ris dawn and stru 
tli h until the night to w existence from the soil. They are 
often Vracked by diseases, plagued by hur. . and CiQu.Cn c'o at the 

rly ago of 40. 

Stability and peace do not cor asilv in such a land, Neither inde- 
endenee nor human dignity will i von, though, by arms atone, 

t also requires the wi of peace. The American people hi ve helped 
generously in times past in these works, and now there must be a much 
more massive effort to improve the life of man in that conflict-torn 
corner of our w< ; . 

The first step is for the countries of Southeast Asia to stssocii 
themselves in a greatly expanded cooperative effort for develop] 
We would hope that Xorth Yiet-Xam would take its place in the com- 
mon effort just assoon as peaceful cooperation is possible, 

The United Nations i already actively engs 1 m develop*! in 
this area, and as far back in 10G1 I conferred with our authorities in 
Yiet-Xam in connection with their work there* And I would hope 
tonight that the SeereUuy-G ral of the. United Nations could use 
the prestige of his great office and his deep knowledge of Asia to 
initiate, as soon as possible, with the countries of that area, a plan 
-for cooperation in increased aerelc t. 

For our part I will ask the Congress to join in a Lillion-dollnr 
American investment in this effort as soon as it is underway. And 1 
would hope that all other industrialized countries, including the 
Soviet Union, will joint in this effort w r ce d ii with hope 
and terror with progress. 

The task is nothing less than to enrich the hopes and fcxisi e of 
more than a hundred million people. And there is much to be done. 

The vast Mekong River can provide food and water and power on 
a scale to dwari even our own TVA. The wonders of modern medicine 
can be spread through villages where thousands die every year from 
lack of care. Schools can be established to train people ir ills 

needed to manage the process of development. And these fcs, 

and more, are within the reach of a cooperative and d mined effort. 

I also intend to expand and speed up a program to make available 
our farm surpl s to assist in feeding and clothing the needy in Asia. 
We should n ot allow people to go hungry and wear rags whi 1 wn 

wa relic overflow with an abundance of wheat and corn and ri 

and cotton. . « -v 

So I will very shortly name a special team of outstanding patriotic, 
«..d distinguished America] to inaugurate our participation in these 
programs. This team will be headed by Mr. Eugene Black, the very 
ableformcr President of the World Bant. 

This will be a disorderly planet for a long time. In Asia, ana 
elsewl - the forces of the oclern world are shaking old w and 
uprooting anei ivilizations, There will be turbulence and strug- 
gle and even violence. Great social change — as we see in our own 
country— does not alway come without conflict, 

We must also ex; that nations will on occasion be in di te 
with us. It may be because we are rich, or powerful, or because we 
have made semel s, or b iusq they honestly fear our intentions. 

However, no nation need ever fear that we desire their land, or to 
impose our will, or to dictate their in ■ nations. 

But we will always oppose the effort of one nation to conquer an- 

'other lutt ion. 

We will do this because our own security is at stake. 

But there is more to it than that For our ration has a dream. 
It is a very ol 1 dream. But w a the power, and now we have the 

opportunity to E hat dream c 

For cento re struggled among each other. Bur v 

dzeam of a world where disputes are settled by law and reason. And 
we will t ry to make it so. 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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For most of history men have hated and killed one another in 
battle. But we d " of an end to war. And we will try to make 

it so. 

For all existence most men hare lived in poverty, threatened by 
hunger, But we dream of a world where all are fed and charg 
with h - a. And we will help to mal so. 

The ordinary men and women of Xorth Vietnam and South Yiet- 
Xam, of China and India, of Russia^and Americ re brave peo] 
They are filled with the i porti »ns of h ue and fear, of love and 

hope, Most of them want the s; thii for themselves and thrir 
families Host of them do not wane their sons to ever die in battl 
or to see fcl homes, or the homes of others, destroyed. 

Well, tliis can be their world yeL Man now lias the knowledge — 
always before denied — to make this planet serve the real needs of the 
people who live on it. 

I know this will not be easy. I know how difficult ir is for reason 
to guide ] ion, and love to master hate. The compl tes of this 
world do not bow easily to pui^ and consistent answers. 

But the simple truths are there just the same. We must all try* 
to follow them as best we eon. 

We often say how impressive power is. But I do not find it im- 
pressive at all. The guns and the bombs, the rockets and the war- 
ships, are all symbols of human failure. They are necessary symbols. 
They protect what Ave cherish. But they are witness to hitman folly. 

Adam built across a great river is impressive. 

In the countryside where I was born, and where I live, I have seen 
the night iMumhialed, and the kil n warmed, and the home heated, 
where once the cheerless night and the ce ' cold held sway. 
And all this happened because electricity came to our area along 
the humming wires of the RE A. 1 ation of the countryside- 

yes, that, too, is impressive. 

A rich harvest in a hungry land h impressive. 

The sight of healthy children in a classroom is impressive. 

These — not mighty arms — arc the achievements which the Amer- 
ican nation b to be impressive. And if we are steadfast, the 
time may come when all other nations will also find itso. 

Every night before I turn out the lights to sli ' I ask myself this 
question: Have f done even tiling that I can do to unite tills country? 
Have I done everything I can to help unite the world, to try to bring 
peace and hope to all the peoples of the world ? Have I done enough I 

Ask Yourselves that question in your homes — and in this hall to- 
night. Have we, each of us, all done all we can do? Have we done 
enough? 

We may well be living in the time foretold many years ago when 
it was said: c; I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, 
that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing: there- 
fore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live/ 5 

This generation of the world must choose: destroy or build, kill, 
or aid, hate or understand. We can do all these things on a scale 
thai has never been dreamed of before. 

Well, we will choose life. And so doing, Ave will prevail over the 
enemies within man, and over the natural enemies of all mankind. 



15 



■-ifepareaeat of Stat* BvTUtln, Apr. 23, LSS5, p< --A0, 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



EXTRACT OF SPEECH BY SOUTH VIETNAMESE FOREIGN 

MINISTER TKAN VAX DO ON THE OCCASION OF THE 
"DAY FOR INTERNATIONAL AID," June 22, 1965 

For many Years, South Vietnam has been plunged into a war 
imposed on it by the Communists- It has been abk to preserve the 
integrity of its territory and dom only because of the courage of 
its son/ and the friendly countries of the free world, which have not 
spared either their friendship or their generous assistance. 

To the representatives of those countries present at this ceremony, 
I express, in the ie of the Republic and people of South Vietnam, 
our profound gratitude, which I ask them to convey to their Govern- 
ment, 

It is also my duty to tell them what we are doing with their assist- 
ance. Some is usee! to relieve the misery and suffering of our people 
as a result of the war, to rebuild on our ruins, and to reconstruct our 
nation; some to help us defend ourselves against the Communist 
aggression. 1 say "defend ourselves" advisedly, for our primary 
objective continues to be the search for peace and not the spread or 
prolongation of the war. We do. certainly, want peace, but not 
peace at any price. If it is to be a just and enduring peace, the 
following conditions must be met: 

1* Since- the war now in pro] ress in Vietnam was provoked by 
Communis' aggression and subversion, it is essentia!, first of all, that 
these subversive and military activities undei ken, directed,' and 
supported from abroad again J ■ independence and freedom of tlv 
people of South Vie) i cease, and that the principle of noninter- 
ference in the internal affairs of the two zones, ji principle that was 
laid down in the 1951 Geneva eemer id in international law, be 
respected. Consequently, the Communist regime of Hanoi must 
dissolve all these front organizations and age it has created in 

South Vietnam under the title the "Front for the Liberation of the 
South/' "Liberation Radio Station," and "People's Revolutionary 
Party/' and, it must remove from South Vietnam the troops and 
the political and mili li d rsithas ) illegally. 

2. The internal affairs of the South Vietnamese people must be 
left to the disc ton of those people in conformity with democratic 
principles and without any foreign interference from w' ever source. 
That will be feasible, obviously, only when ti aggression by the 
Communist regime of K i and its campaign of intimidation to 
which the people of South Vietnam have been subjected have been 
terminated. 

3. As soon as aggression has ceased, the Government of the Republic 
of Vietnam and the nations that come to its aid will be able to suspend 
the military measures in the territory of South Vietnam and bey T ond 
its boundaries that are now n sary to defend that territory against 
Communist aggression. Moreover, the Government of the Republic 
of Vietnam is prepared to ask friendly nations then to remove their 
military forces from South Vietnam, It reserves the ri^ht, however, 
to take whatever measures are necessary to see that law and order 
are respected throughout the territory of South Vietnam and to 
insure the safety of the South Vietnamese people, as well as the right 
to appeal again for foreign assis : the case of further aggression 
or thre or ag . 

•i. Lastly, the independence and freedom of. the people of South 
Vietnam must he i tiveiy guaranteed. 

If th" Gonur I v ?inte in Hanoi sn eerely wants peace, if it puts 
t } l( , interests t £ the nation above those of an hi y or a party, 
wants the Vi< ti : people and the other peoples 01 southeast Asia 

to Hve hi peace i of w. / instead of poverty, treedom 

instead of slavery, it has only to put an end to aggression^ 

ThU is the onfv pal we believe can lead to peace it the south 

Vietnamese people to be able to enjoy the full b .its ol tne 
aid that the friendly nations have so ge usly lavished upon it. 



!' 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



t 



» 



77.-78. V l -GS ACTA ON VIE NAM BY PRESI- 

DE] iSTSON AT RIO PRESS CONF3 DE OF 

JULY : , i 

We Will Stand j:; Vietnam 



My fellow At: : :\n< t not loi g ago 1 received a letter ' a a worn n 
in the Mid .vi t. She wrote. 

Dear Mk. President: In my hu ay I am writing to yoi " i the orh 

in Vietnam. 1 have i who : i ■•■ h\ Yi ftuam* My husband served in World 
War II. Our country was at war, but now, this time, it is just i Ling that I 

don't undei ad. Why? , 

Wellj ] have tried to answer that question dozens of times and 
more in practically cvay State in this Union. I have discussed it 
fully in Baltimore in April, in VFashii ton in May, in San Francisco 
in Juno. Lel'ine again, now, discuss it here in the east room of the 
White j Louse. 

Why must young Americans, bom into a land exultant with hope 
find with golden promise, toil and suffer and sometimes die in such a 
remote and distant place? 

THE LESSON OF HISTORY 

The answer, like the wt r itself, is not an easy one, but it echo 
clearly from the p os of half a century, Three times in my 

lifetime, in two World Wars and in Korea, Americans have gone to 
far lands to fight for freedom. We have learned at a terrible a 
brutal cost that retreat does nut bring safety and weakness dues tiof 
bring pgace* 

It is this lesson that ha b tght us to Vietnam. Tins is a different 
kind of war. There are no marching armies or solemn declaration 
Some citizens of South Vietnam, at times with understandable griev- 
ances, have joined in the attack on their own government. 

Bni we must not let this mask the central fact that this is really war. 
It is guided by North Vii m, and it is spurred by Communist China. 
Jls goal is to conquer the South, to defeat American power, and to 
extend the Asiatic dominion of communism; 

There are great si tikes in the balance. 

Most of the non-Communist n tiona of Asia cannot, by themselves 
. and alone, resist growing might and the grasping ambition of Asi 
communism. 

Our power, therefore, is a very vital shield. If we arc driven from 
the, field in Vietnam, then no nation can ever again hare the sail 
confidence in .American promise or in American protection. 

In each land the fee of independence would be considerably 
weakened and an Asmso threatened Communist domin n would 
certainly imperil the security of the United States itself, 
■ We did not choose to be the guardians at the gate, but there is no 
one else. 

Nor would surrender in Vietnam bring peace, because we learned 
• from Hitler at Munich t success only Feeds the appetite of aggre 
sion. The battle would be renewed in one country and tl anothi 
country, bringing with it perhaps even larger and cruder conflict, as 
we have learned from the lessons of history. 

Moreover, we are in Vietnam to fulfill one of the most sy mi 

5>ledges of the American Nation. Three Presidents— President 
Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and your present President — over 13 
y L have committed themselves and have promised to help defend 
- this small and valiant nation. 

Strengthened by that promise, the people of Soul: Vietnam have 
fought For many long ye . . Thousands of them 1 .■'. e died. Thou- 
sand hs ve 1 crij ! I fxnd scarred by vyar. We just c ot 
bow dishonor our word, or Ion our tmitment, or leave those 
who believed I who ' to the terror and repression and 
murder that- would fellow. ^ 
This, then, my ( v Americans, is why we are in Vietnam* 

' ' DcpArti iteii t oCSc*.:? Publication 7937, Rd&ued August I "53. 



n 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 






■ * 



- 

» 



JXCi . IN U.S. 1 OKCES 

What are our goals in thai v : 1 ;■ nd? 

First, we intend to convince Cbmnumists that wo c ot 1 
defeated bj - ; j nis or b-j si ior ] ower. 5 hey an ! •: i ily 

convinced* In re n d mo ■ the} ' atly ii creased their fight- 

ing forces and their tcks and the number of im nts. 1 have asked 
the ter-fil, ( 1 [\i C] Westmoreland, what 

more he r to meet this Mounting He has told me., 

We will meet his m eds, 

I have today o: > Vietnam tl \LM<: iDlvi nd ceriai 

other forces w : will rais< [febthi* strength from 00 to 

125,090 men almost immediately. Additional foici i will be : I 1 
later, and they will be qn J* This will i ike it n ssary 

to Increase our active fighting fore by raisin* cmthly draft call 

from 17,000 over a period of time to 35,000 per i h, and for us to 
step up our campaign for voluntar enlistments, 

After this past week of deli 1 -., I hare eonclud that it is 

not essential to order Reserve units into serviccnow. If that n ity 
should later he indicated, I will give the n . Ȥ{ careful considera- 

tion and 1 v, 331 give the country clue and adequate notice before takiu< 
such action, but only i fter full preparations, 

Wc have also disc d with the Government of South Vietnam 
lately the steps that we will Like to substantially increase their own 
effort, both on the battl Id and toward refc and \ s^ in 
the villages. Amh dor Lodge is now formuiatiifg a new p: ogram, 
to ho tested upon his return to that area, 



CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW 

I have directed Secretary Rust and Secretary McNamara to be 
available immediately to the Congress to review with these co 
mittees, the appropriate congression '1 committees, what we plan to 
to in these areas. . 1 have asked them to be iible to answer the 
questions of any Member of Co; >s. 

Secretary McNamara, in addition, will ask the Senate Appropria- 
tions Committee to add a limited nount to present legislation to h 
meet part of this new cost until 8 supplemental measure is ready, 
and hearings can be held when the Congress asses ! 3 in January, 

In the meantime, we will use the authority contained in the \ sent 
defense appropriations bill under consider ^n, to transfer funds in 
addition to the additional money that we will ask. 

These steps, like our actions in the past, are carefully meas d to 
do what must be done to bring an end to aggression and a peaceful 
settlement. 

We do not want an expanding struggle with conscque • that no 
one can perceive, nor will we bluster or hull}* or flaunt our power, but 
we will not surrender and we will not retreat, for behind our Ameri 
pledge ties the determination and resources, I believe, of all of the 
"American Nation. 



U.S. WELCOMES UNCONDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS 

Second, once the Communists know, as we know, thai a violent 
solution is impossible, then a peacefid solution is inevitable. 

We are ready now, as we have always been, to move from the 
battlefield to the conference table. I have stated puhlicly and^m 
times, fi and again, America's willingness to begi unconditiom ] 

discussions with any gove nent at any place at any time. Fj fi ta 
efforts have been made to start these disci) - : i with the help of 4 
nation:, throughout the world, but there has been no answer. 

But we to continue to pr 3 if p \ must, until 

death and desol ti n have led to the rue c i t ble where 

others could now join us at a much si tier cost 



18 



* 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



] have spok m m my times i f our objectives in Vietnam, So 1'.-- the 
Government of South Vi< tn. Hanoi has set forth it- own prop> ds. 
"We are ready to discuss their proj b and our proposals and ai 
proposals of any govefmi ml whose p oplc may be affected, for we 
fear the meeting room no mora tin n we fear the battl Id. 

In this pursuit we welcome and we ask for the c :ra and the 
assistance of any nation ai 11 nations. Jf the United Nations and 
its officii or any one of its 1 14 members can by deed or word, private 
initiative or public action, bring us r an honorable peace, tin 



they will have the support and flu gratitude of the United States of 
America- 

I have directed Aroba lor Goldb to New York today and 

to present immediately to Secret ry Gel 1 U Thant a letter from mo 
requesting that all of tit ^sources, energy, and immense prestige of 
the United Nation: be employed to find ways tu halt aggr >n and to 
bring peace in Y am. 



ruitPosB or "U.&. action 

I made a similar request at San Francisco a few weeks ago, because 
we do not seek the destruction of any government, nor doVe covet a 
foot of any ten story, but we insist and we will always Insist the 

people of South Vietnam shall have the righl of choice, the. right to 
shape their own destiny in free elections in the south, or through 01 
all Vietnam un •!■ international supervision, and they shall not have 
any gov lent imposed upon them by force and terror so long as we 
can prevent it. 

This was the purpose of the 1951 agreements which the Commu- 
nists have now cruelly shattered. If the machinery of those agr 
ments was tragically weak, its purposes still guide our action. As 
battle n » we will continue as best we can to help the good people 
of South Vietnam enrich the condition of their life, to feed the hungry, 
and to tend the sick, and teach the young, and shelter the homck , 
and help the farmer to increase props, and the worker to find o job. 

It is an ancient but still terrible irony that while many leaders of 
men create division in pursuit of grand ambitions, the children of man 
arc really united in the simple, elusive desire for a life of fruitful and 
rewarding toil. 

As J said at Johns Hopkins in Baltimore, I hope that one day we 
cau help all the people of Asia toward that desire, Eugene Black has 
made great progress since ray appearance in Baltimore in that direc- 
tion — not as the price of peace, for we are ready always to bear a more 
painful cost, but rather as a part of our obligations of justice toward 
our fellow man. 






- - A PERSONAL NOTE 

Let me also add now a personal note. I do not find it easy to send 
the flower of our youth, our .finest yoi men, into battle. I have 
spoken to you today of the divisions and the forces and the battalions 
and the units. But I know them all, every one. J have seen them in 
a tin ! streets, of a hundred towns, in every State in this Union — 

workh ! lair ing and building, and filled with hope and life. I 

think that I know, too, how their mothers weep and how their families 
sorrow. This is the most agonizing and the most painful duty of your 
President. * 



19 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO U TIIANT, 
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 
JULY 2S, 1965 [ 

His Excellency U Tkaxt, 

Secretary General oj ike United Nations, 

United Nations, X.Y. 

Deaf. Mr. Secretary General: I want you to know from me 
di Ij of the \ great persona! confidence which I place in Am- 
bassador G . IIi> a] intraent as permanent representative of 
the United States to the United Nations— and his &c< *i e of this 




jupport 
I have instructed Ambassador Goldberg especially to maintain close 
contact with you on the situation in Vietnam. Your efforts in the 
past to find some way to remove that dispute from the battlefield to 
the negoti tg table are much appreciated tghly valued by 

my Gu ;t. J trust they will be continued. 

Meanwhile, as I stated pufilicly last April, the Government of the 
United States is prepared to enter i to negotiations for peaceful 
settlement without conditions^ That remains our policy. 

And as I si J in San Francisco last month, we hope that the mem- 
bers of the United Nations, individually and cotlectirelv, will u 
their influence to bring to the negotiating table all go; ments 
involved in an attempt to halt all ; ion and evolve a pe ;tl 

solution, ^continue to hope that the United Nations can, in fact, 
be effective in this regard* 

I hope that you will cor inicate to us, through Ambassador 
Goldberg, any helpful suggestions that may occur to you that can 
strengthen our common search for the road to peace in southeast 
Asia. 

Sincerely, 

Lyxdox B. Jorxsox. 



LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG TO 
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, JULY 
SO, 1265 ■ 

Dear Mr. President: The President of the United States an- 
nounced on July 2S, 1905, certain steps being taken by my Govern- 
ment to lend farther assistance totheEe] £ Vietnam in resisting 
armed aggression. 

At the ie time the Prescient reaffirmed to the Secretary General 
of the United Nations the Willi ess of the United States to enter 
into negotiations for peaceful settlement without conditions, and again 
invited all members of the United Nations, individually and collec- 
tively, to asc their influence to bring about d~ tons in a negotiating 
forum. On Jury 29 the Secretary General Immedi ly sent a most 
welcome and appreciated reply, stating his d ruination to pursue 
his efi is to remove the dispute over Vie:.. . : . the battlefield 
to the negotiating table, 

The Security Council, which has a legitimate interest in the peace 
of south: ; Asia, 1 een kept informed of the policy of niy Govern- 
ment with respect to the dangerous co: of Events in that part of 



e world. For e I ?, my late predecessor, Ambassador Adlai 'E. 

Stevenson, told the Council more than year ago on May 21 1964: 

* * * the "United r ?r.o, rep \ aal military objective anywhere 

in 5 ist Asia. U. ; !icy for southeast Asi It i< the r na- 

tion of peace so that the i Ft! ■■ ;i c:;:i go ;: ; out their own independent 

bushv i .■ iv] ver n y freely cl - for themselves with 

interference frons the o We, 

Members of the Council also are aware of the pi ] zed and ited 
efi U.S. Governi:: ' a path to peaceful soli of 

the dispute? of southeast Asia, begun with our acceptai ce of the 
terms of the C va Accords of 1954, . These efforts have included— 20 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



Various approaches to Ha: mi, Pdping, and Moscow, 

Support of pe*c< fill overtures by the United K: : rn, Canada, 

,d the British Common Ith of Nations. 

Favorable reactions to pro] U made by 17 nonaliitcd nations, 
and later by the Go^ eminent of India. 

Approval of efforts by the Secretary Genera] of the United 
Nations to rail e peace talks, 

Endorsement of a larger role for the United Nations ia south- 
east Asia, including a U.N. mission of observers along the frontier 
between Vietnam and Cambodia, a L.N. mission to investigate 
alleged suppression of minority rights in Vietnam, and a U.X- 
invitation to Hanoi to participate in Security Council discussions 
of the incident in the Gulf of Tonkin. 

Major participation, directly and through the United Nations, 
in economic and social development projects in sout! ' Asi 

A direct appeal by the President of the United States to the 
members of the United Nations to use their influence in bringing 
all parties to the peace table. 

Repeated 8 lions on the highest authority that the United 
States is prepared to -engage in negotiations or discussions of any 
character with no prior conditions whatever. 

On at least 15 occasions in the past four and a half years, the United 
States has initiated or supported efforts to resolve the issues in south- 
east Asia by peaceful negotiati . 

lam sure that the other members of the Security Council share the 
deep regrets of my Government in die fact that none of these initiatives 
has met with any favorable response whatever. It is especially un- 
fortunate that iie regime in Hanoi, which, along with' the Republic of 
Vietnam, is most di tly involved in the conflict, has dented th 
competence of the United Nations to concern itself with this dispute 
in any manner and has even refused to participate m the dis> ions 
in the Council. 

Nonetheless, our commitments under the Charter of the United 
Nat' require u^ to persist in the search for a negotiated end to the 
cruel and futile violence that ravages the Republic of Vietnam, This 
responsibility — to persist in the search for peace — weighs especially 
upon the members of the Security Council, the primary organ of the 
United Nations for peace and irity affairs. 

The purpose of this communi Eon therefore is to reemphasize 1 
the members of the Council the following points: 

First, that the United States will continue to provide, in whatever 
measure and for what r period U necessary, assistance to the people 
of the Republic of Vietnam in defending their independence, their 
soverehmtv. and their right to choose their own government and make 
their own decisions. 

Second, the United States will continue to assist in the economic 
and social advancer of southeast Asia, under the leadership of 
Asian countries and the United Nations, and will continue to explore 
all additional possibi , especially in connection with the great 
projects taking shape in the Lower Mekong Basin, 

Third, the United States will continue to explore, independently 
and in conjunction with oth all possible routes to an honorable 
and durable peace in southeast Asia, 

Fourth, the U ■! States stands ready, as it has in the p-\<i> to col- 
laborate u tditionally with members of the Security" Council in the 
search for an acceptable formula to restore peace and security to that 
area- of the vorld. 

It is the hope of my rernment that the i :\)tvs of the Security 
Council will sos ' w find the means to respond effectively to the 
challenge raided by die r " 'e of affairs in southeast Asia. 

I respectfully : ; this comnmnk n be circulated to the 

members of the United Nation.-? a< a irity Council document 

Accept, E:-. ^y. cue asauran : of my I I consideration, 

Arthur J. Goldberg. 



'U.S.: :-;<a to the l": '> 1 N .t!oi\sp«.3S :'..: r:*\ r -^ 

21 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



CORRESPOXDKXCK WITH FOREIGN MINISTER FAXFAXI 
OF ITALY, NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1985 1 ' 

Foreign Minister Faxkaxi's Le r to President Johxsqx, 

November 20, 19G5 

■ 

Hon. Lyndon* B. Johnson, 
President of the United S' 

Mr. President: In the interview which you graciously accorded n 
at the end of May you repeated anew your firm intention to seek 
assiduously a negotiated solution for the conflict in Vietnam. 

In the hope of being able to assist in the realization of thi- noble 
purpose, I brfog to your attention the following;: 
" On Thursday, X'ov er 11, in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh, and the 
President of the Council, Van Dong, expressed to two person? (known 
to me) tl; strong desire to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in 
Vietnam and, in summary, stated — accounting to what they wrote 
me — that — 

in order for the peace totiations to come about, there will be accessary (a) a 
cease-fire (by air, by sea, by tend) in the entire territory of Yl m (north and 
south); the cessation — that is, of all beltgerent operations (including therefore 
also tfc ssation of debarkation of further American troops); (b) a declaration 
according to which the Geneva agreements of 1954 will be taken as basis for 

the negotiations — a declaration made up of the four points formulated by Hanoi! 
points that are i. ility the explanation of the Geneva text and which, ther - 
fore, can be reduced to a single point; application, In other words, of the Geneva 
accord. 

The text of the commimieation which I have received adds that 
"the government in Hanoi is prepared to initiate negotiations without 
first requiring actual with ! awal of the Ameri an troops," 

To the same interlocutors Ho Chi Minh said: "I am prepared to go 
any where; to meet anyone." m 

These are the e tial points that one of the two interlocutors of 
Ho Chi Minh an an Dong sent me in writing last night and which, 
in this letter of mine — c I ed to Mr. A. Gofdb the U.S. repre- 
sentative to the U.X., so, that he can deliver it promptly and 
conSd tally — I bring word for word to Your attention. 

You surely have "her elements by which to judge the important 
of the above. As President of the 20th Assembly, as a high official 
of Italy, as a sincere friend of the United States and of yourself, I 
hope that this contribution to the sought-for peaceful solution, always 
more necessary and more urgent, may be a useful one. And I ai at 
your disposition for any step thai you consider opportune in the matter. 

With sincere pleasure at your recovery nnd with best wishes for 
your high mission, I send my respectful greetings. 
Yours, 

Amtxtore Faxfaxi. 



t - 



Secretary Rusk's Reply to Foreigx Minister Faxfaxi, 

December 4, 1965 

His Excellency Auixxoins Faxfaxi, 

Foreign Minuter of Italy. 

Dear Mr. Faxfaxi: My Government k most grateful to you for 
your -help and cooperation in transmit tin <r views" attributed" to the 
North Vietnamese G rnraent on :• rations to denl v.ith the prob- 
lem of Vietnam. We have c: illy examh the suggestions you 
have conveyed, and I wish to make the foUowinsr co rents: 

1. A? it has repeatedly suited, the United States is prepared to 
enter into discussions or negotiations with any govcr; m nt at anv 
time without any preconditions whatsoever- We reaffirm this will- 
ingness. 

2. Although there is so: Lhiguity in tbe statement of Hanoi's 
position, your source seems to h ' ate that Hanoi would a e that 
negc tions mighl be ui d taken on the bj is-of tl .. -va , i :- 
meats of 1954 withoul any qualifications or condi . We for ou 
part would be willing to engage in negotiations on this bads without 
any qualifications or conditions. ^o 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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3- The United States docs not, hi rer, agree with the contention 
that the four points advaj i by Hanoi constitute an authentic in- 
terpretation of the Geneva ngrc s of 1954. 1 U >nts in the 
four points, i blr the political pi n of the so-called National 
Liberation Front, have no b in the Geneva agreements, and 
Hanoi's apparent in on a prior dec] accepting the four 
points thus appears both to be ina nsistcnt with the agreements 
to require a substantive condition to negotiations. Nevertheless, we 
are prepared to include these four points fur consideration in m ' 
peace talks al< with any prop >a!s wMch the United States, South 
Vietnam, and other governments may wish to advance. 

4, Your soiu also n ti on another ^app; it Hanoi condition 
calling for a cease-fire and other ml res prior to negotiations. be 
United States would be prepared for negotiations without the im- 
position of any conditions of this nature. However, if a reduction 
cessation of hostilities were to be arranged prior to negotiations, it 
seems self-evident that it would have to be on an equitable and re- 
ciprocal basis. If tli were a cessati< of certain military activities 
on the one side, there would have to be an equivalent cc :i of 
military activities on the other. The formulation prop* by 
Hanoi's leaders does not a] r to meet this test, for example, in 
that it inipe no restraint on the continued infiltration of forces and 
equipment from North to South Vietnam. 

5. The U.S. Government notes the message conveyed that North 
Vietnam wuiild not insist on the actual withdrawal of American for 
prior to the initi ton of negotiations. However, the clarification of 

* this point, though not without significance in the light of conflicting 
public statements by Hanoi on the subject, still leaves the questions 
discussed in 2 and 3 above, 

We are thus far from persuaded that statements by Ho Chi Mb 
and Fham Van Dong quoted by your Italian sources indicate a real 
willingness for unconditional negotiations. We woidd be pleased, for 
our part, however, on the basis of the considerations set forth above 
and perhaps in lighl of any further soundings your sources may make 
with Hanoi to discuss this matter further with you. 1 have asked 
Ambassador Goldberg, who bears this letter, to make himself available 
to you at any time for this purpose. 

Further, if it develops foil' tg such discussions, or further contact 
by you with your sources, that a direct discussion with your Italian 
sources is deemed fruitful, a representative of the United States ivould 
be authorized to meet with them priva.b ly. 

Finally, let me make it clear that you are free to draw on the con- 
tents of this letter, in any way you may desire, in communicating with 
vour sources. We would welcome your continuing assistance on this 
important matter. 

With tin assurance of my highest consideration, 
Sincerely yours, 

Deax Rusk. 

Foreign Minister Fastfaxi's Reply to Secretary Rusk, 

December 13, 1965 

Dear Mr. Secretary: I received on December 6 your letter which 
Ambassador Goldberg had previously announced to me on Novem- 
ber 29. 

The same day I summarized in a document of mine essential 
observations i; by you on various points and I have jus: received 
word that on Wednesday last, Decern! S % si has been 

confidentially delivered into the hands of a qualified rep esentativei 
order to be forwarded to Hanoi I think, i of today, said document 
has already reached its final destination. 

* I would like to add I desire, Mr, Secretary, to thank you very much 
for the confidence .1 trust in my person you and the American 
Government have confirmed in your let: --. *f c rre yon tl 

as soon as I receive any reaction on the points contab. the le* 

I will inform you i iy. 

Anticipating the pleasure of meeting you next week in Washington, 
I remain, Mr. Secretary, 

AmixTore Fanta.vi. 



' £>■:; ; af Stsfc* Egft&s, Jan. 3, r-v, pp. 11-13. 



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* t 






< 



! 



STATEMENT CONC ENG 1964 PEACE OVERTURES 



• — i 




The North Vietnamese regime has made it clear again and again that 
it will not enter into any discussions unless the conditions it has 
set down for sett] nt are accepted as the basis of negotiation. 
These conditions, amounting to a surrender of South Viet-Nara to Com- 
munist domination s and formulated most forcefully on April 8, 1965 
by Premier Pham Van Dong in his "four points/ 1 include the with- 
drawal of United States Military Forces and acceptance of the pro- 
gram of the Viet Cong. Not only have the North Vietnamese reiter- 
ated these conditions on numerous occasions, but they have peremp- 
torily rejected the repeated attempts of the United States to find 
an avenue to peaceful settlement, including notably the President's 
declaration of April 7, 1965, that we stand ready to engage in un- 
conditional discussions. 

> 

In this regard, the Secretary made »the following statement in his 
, press conference of November 26, 1965: 

- f, »..It is true that last autumn Ambassador 'Stevenson was 
informed by the Secretary General that he had been in- 
formed indirectly that Hanoi would be willing to have a 
contact with the United States and that the Secretary Gen- 
eral had suggested Rangoon as a suitable site. 

- « 

"When this matter arose, it was considered in the light of 
a great deal of information available at the time about 
the attitude of the authorities in Hanoi and, indeed, of 
other governments in the Communist world. I am not at 
liberty to cite all of these ccmi its, which were numer- 
ous, &ut you Will recall that the Canadian Minister of 
External Affairs reported to his House of Commons in June 
of this year that the Canadian Commissioner on the ICC had 
made several trips to Hanoi over the eight months prior to 
the end of May. There were other public indications such 
as the failure of the Polish proposals on Laos and the 
refusal of Hanoi to attend the UN Security Council in 
August. I myself had a number of discussiops with the 
representatives of other governments, including Communist 
governments. It seesn© cleg? beyond a peradventure of 
doubt chat Hsnai v/ss no: prepared to discuss peace in 
Southeast Asia b&5 upon the agreements of 1954 and 1962 
and looking t.&w&rd ^he lifting of aggression against South 
Viet-Nam. Indeed-, in the latter part of 1964 Hanoi in- 
creased its infiltration, including units of its regular 
army* They undoubtedly felt they were on the threshold 
of victory. Just yesterday Hanoi denied that they had 
made any proposals for negotiations. 






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. •* 



* ■ 






— --■. — ' 






"■ *H 












"Throughout all of last year, the general attitude of the 
Communist world was that they might consider soma device 
to save the face of the United States while they them- 
selves imposed their will upon South Viet-Nam. Our at- 
titude was and is that we are not interested in saving 
face but in saving South Viet-Nam. * 

* ■ 

"It is worth recalling that President Kennedy and his 
principal advisers made a far-reaching review of the 
situation in Southeast Asia early in 1961, and deter- 
mined to do everything possible to find a peaceful settle- 
ment based upon the integrity and the safety of the smaller 
nations of Southeast Asia. President Kennedy's talks with 
Chairman Khrushchev in June 1961 led tp_ agreement__in prin- 
ciple on Laos but not on Vief-Nam. - The Laotian Confer- 
ence succeeded in concluding the agreement of 1962, an 
agreement which failed because Hanoi refused to comply 
with it in any way, shape or form. Nevertheless, during 
and after thaL conference the United States' has had re- 
peated discussions about the possibilities of a peaceful 
settlement in Southeast Asia. * ~T 

"Hanoi, in their well known four points, has indicated its 
basic position on Viet-Nam. They have refused to accept 
the suggestion that their points can be discussed along 
with all other points presented by other Governments,- 
They, therefore, exclude in advance the position which 
they know the United States will take, namely, that North 
Viet-Nam must stop its aggression against South Viet-Nam 
and discontinue its effort to impose the program of the 
National Liberation Front on South Viet-Nam by force. 

"There have been many efforts by the United States and by 
other governments throughout the past five years to 
achieve peace for the nations of Southeast Asia, Leaving 
aside all questions of diplomatic procedure there has not 
been and there is not now any indication from Hanoi that 
they are prepared to accept the self-determination and in- 
dependent existence of their neighbors as free countries 
rather than what the economist countries have come to call 
their wars of national liberation. 



>.. \ 



i 



t 



• 



^ 



y 



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'(' 



* 






1 . 



y 



■ — 

"You are familiar with many initiatives which have been 
taken during the past year to bring this matter from the 
•battlefield to the conference table but you are also famil- 
iar with the increased infiltration by North Viet -Nam to 

impose their will by force* * 

• - • • « 

. - 

- 

"Our task remains, therefore, that which President Johnson 
has often stated, namely, to assist our friends in South 
Viet -Nam to repel the aggression against them and, at the 
same time, to keep open every possibility of a peaceful 
settlement. For this purpose, as President Johnson has 
repeatedly declared, we are prepared for unconditional dis- 
cussions with the governments concerned, or, as the 17 non- 
aligned nations phrased it, negotiations without precon- 
ditions/ 1 * 



'■ 






w n 



X. 



4/17d - 1266BT 



Office of Public Services 
Bureau of Public Affairs 
Department of State 
Washington, D.C. 20520 



_ 



. - 



c 



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SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER. 26, 

19G5 (Excerpts) l 

Since my return from the Inter-American Conference I have read 
wh&thasl i said during my absence about the so-called peac< fe 
of last autumn, I hare ako seen the fragment on this subject which 
app d recently in a national magazine. It is true that last autumn 
Ambassador Stevenson vvas informed by S --vy General U Tbant 
that he had been informed indirectly that Hanoi tvould be willing to 
have a em .t with the United States and that the Sec :y General 
had susr^ested Rangoon as & suitable site. 

Vfhen this matter arose, it- was considered in the light of a great 
deal of information^ available at the time about the attitude of the 
authorities in Hanoi find, indeed, of other governments in the Com- 
munist worlds I am not at liberty to cite all of these contacts, which 
were numerous, but you will recall that the ( clian Minister of 
External Affairs reported to his House of Commons in June of this 
year that the Canadian Commissioner on the ICC had made several 
trips to Hanoi over the S months prior to the end of May, There 
were other public i: ations such as the failure of the Polish proposals 
on Lao? and the refusal of Hanoi to attend the U.N. Security Council 
in August. I myself had a number of discussions with the represen- 
tatives of other government--, including Communist governments. It 
seems clear be}"ond a perad venture of doubt that I- o? was not 
prepared to discuss peace in southeast Asia based upon the agreements 
of 1954 and 1962 and looking toward the lifting of ajsgn : : g jainst 
South Vietnam. Indeed, in the lattt art of 1964 Hanoi incre I 
its infiltration, including units of its regular armjr. They undoubtedly 
felt that they were on the threshold of victory. Just yesterday 
Hanoi denied that they had made any proposals for negotiations. 

Throughout all of last year, the general attitude of the Communist 
world was that they might consider some device to save the face of 
the United States while they themselves imposed their will upon 
South Vietnam. Our attitude was and is that we are not interested 
in saving face but in saving South Vietnam. 

It is worth recalling that President Kennedy and his principal 
advisers made a far-reaching review of the situation in southeast 
Asia early in 1961, and determined to do even-thing possible to find 
a peaceful settlement based upon the integrity and the safety of the 
smaller nations of southeast Asia. President Kennedy's talks wi 



Chairman Khrushchev in June 1961 led to agreement in principle on 
Laos but not on Vietnam. The Laotian Conference succeeded in 
concluding the agreement of 19&2, an agreement which f d becau 
Hanoi refused to comply with it in any way, shape, or form. Never- 
theless, during and after that conference the United State:; has had 
repeated discussions about the possibilities of a peaceful settlement 
in southeast Asia. 

Hanoi, in their well-known four points, has indicated its basic 
position on Vietnam. They have refused to accept the suggestion 
that their points can be discussed along with all other points present 
by other governments. They, therefore, exclude in advance the 
position which they know the United States and others will take; 
namely, that North Vietnam must stop its aggression t fast South 
Vietnam and discontinue its efiori to impose the program of the 
National Liberation Front on South Vietnam by force. 

There have been many efforts by the United States and by other 
governments throng] out the past 5 years to achieve peace for the 
nations of southeast Asia. Leaving aside all questions of diplomatic 
procedure, there has not been and there 3s not now any indie n from 
Hanoi that they are prepared to accept the self-determination and 
the independent existence of their neighbors as free countries rati 
than wbnt the Communist countries have come to call their wars of 
national liberation. 

. You arc familiar with many initiatives which have been taken dur- 
ing the past year to bring this matter from the 1 -Id to the con- 



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fercnce table and you are also familiar with the increased infiltration 
by North Vietnam to impose* their will by fores 

Our task remains, therefore, that which President Johnson has often 
stated; namely, to assist our friends in South Vietnam to repel the 
aggression against i and, at the same time, io keep open every 

Josstbilky of a peaceful settlement. For this purpose, as Pre 
ohnson has repeatedly declared, we are prepared for unconditional 
discussions with the govern rtts concerned, or, as the 17 nonalined 
nations phrased it, negotiations without preconditions. 

Question. Mr. Secretary, in the Unfit of your statement about the 
Vietnamese situation, ij today we had such an indication through Mr, 
Thant or any other channel that they were prepared to contact, apparently 
without specific conditii ' we aa 

Answer. Well, the President has said, on more than one occasion, 
and so have I, that we are prepared for unconditional discussions or, 
as the 17 nations put it, negotiations without precondition. 

In view of the statement made by Hanoi in the last 24 hours, 1 
would not predict that this is likely to occur in the next week or 

Question. Well, icould you say, then, that we ha softened 

our position; that Is rem last year we sensed — we ati I some 
conditions to our position, that this time 

Answer. No, I think this is a problem of nuance here. 

President Johnson said in April of this year, publicly and clearly, 
without any doubt whatever, that we are prepared for uaconditidn 
discussions. 

Prior to that time the discussions had been private; that is, our 
attitude on this had been private. 

I have myself spent hours and hours and hours since 1061 with 
representatives of the other side talking about peace in southeast 
Asia. There was never any period when we were unwilling to talk 
about peace in southeast Asia. 

Now, at the time last autumn, I want to c ient, and I cannot 
pursue it, that this was not the only contact by* any means. Then? 

re many contacts with the other side, including fianoi. This was 
not the only contact. ^ 

This particular incident had to be lot at in — against the back- 
ground of a very considerable activity that was going on among the 
foreign offices of the world, to d termiue whether or not this particular 

"ng made a significant difference. 

Question. Mr, Secretary, are you saying thai there was no change in 
American policy in so Jar as negotiations are concerned dating from last 
April 71 

Answer. Well, in April the President said at Baltimore that we are 
prepared for unconditional di ssions. I think that perhaps that 
was the first time that it had been said in just those words publicly. 
But this was not a major change in tL- souse that for the past 5 
years we have been in continuous contact with representatives of 
the Communist world^ about peace in southeast Asia, There has 
never been any cessation of discussion on this subject. There has 
has never been any lack of c rtunitv to bring this matter of peace 
to the conference table, if the other side is prepared to stop trying 
to impose their will be force on South Vietnam. 

So that if there was a difference in the public way in which this 
matter was stated, e vv as no difference in the basic objective of 



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the United States, and no difference on the point that we were in 
regular con tad with the Communist world. 

Question. V/hcn you say without precondition^ liQWi r, you are 
talking only about without preconditi is of getting in the m to 

open discussions, are ; i not, I- ■ tst you li f ! - numl r of conditions 
which the U I Stati ^ould have in U rms of the settlement to be reached 
at an\ \ch discussions. 

Answer. Well, I do not suppose that anyone would expect the 
United States, in agreeing to discussions without preconditions, to 
imply thereby that we are going to accept the program of the oth 
side in such cV -ions. 

Question. Therefore you concede that the other side irtll also com 
with its preconditions. 

Answer. Well, we have already said to the other side — we have 
already said publicly to the other side thai we are prepared to talk 
about "their proposals along with the proposals of all the other gov- 
ernments concerned, and they have tun that down. 

Question. Your point is thai as of today, aside from the technical 
problem which you cj Jt <: tth v a ling started, tfte situation is that v:c 
are willing to listen to their preconditions for settlement as 3 as our 
own, that they ere not willing to listen to our preconditions as well as 
theirs. 

Answer. Well, the question of whether, for example, their four 
points, Mr. Roberts, are preconditioned to any discussion, or any 
conference, lias varied a little oyer time. 

There have been moments, quite frankly, when it has appeared ths i 
they were rigid preconditions, that these four points would have to 1 
accepted 1 lore there can he any serious discussions. 

There have been other t' when we had the impression that there 
were not necessarily preconditions to discussions, but that they would 
be the points on which the other side would sist as necessary fc 

peace. 

I would — one has (he impression that in recent w their attitude 
has been moving toward these four points as preconditions somewhat 
more than might have been our impression for a time. We don't 
know. We don't know,. 

But what we are saying is that if they want to come to the con- 
ference table, if they want to have discussions, we will d ss, and in 
those discussions iher can say anything that they want to. But we 
must be free to say anything that we want to. And then we will try 
to find our whether there is a basis for peace. 

But we are not going to limit discussions to their four points. 

Now, these have got to be discussions in which governments can 
talk like governments, discuss their problems, their interests, their 
demands, to see whether in that kind of mutual discussion there is 
any basis for peace. 

Now, we did that in 1961, on Laos, and it seemed, in the Vienna 
conversations between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy, 
that there was a basis for a settlement of the Laotian question. 

No such basis appeared in discussing Vietnam. 

We got tl inference and the agreement on Laos. 

And as I pointed out in my statement, the problem with that is 
that Hanoi never complied with it. 

But I don't want to leave the impression that we are — I think it is 
import to be clear on two things; that we are prepared for discus- 
sions, without. conditions, without preconditions. But we are not 
going to promise in advance or at an}' time that we are going to give 
away the basic interests of the South Vietnamese people and South 
Vietnam, and theint of the United States w] we go into such 

discussions. The other side h not going to do that 

So the problem is to find out whether, given the attitudes, the 
interests, the commit of the two s" , if peace is [ ible. 



29 



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r 






LETTER PROM AMBASSADOR ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, 
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, TO 
SECRETARY GENERAL U TIfANT, JANUARY 5, 19G6 ' 

• 

His Excellency U Tnaxt, 
Secretary General, U: I Nations. 

Dear Mr, Secretary General: My Government has during the 
past 2 weeks been taking a number of steps in pursuit of peace which 
How in part from our oSligations under the United Nations Charter, 
of ^> a we arc most mindful, and in part from the appeals which 
His Holiness the Pope and you add sed just before Christmas to us 
and to others, I beli ve it would be of interest to you, in addition to 
what we have already communicated to you privately, all 

States members of the United Nations to know more precisely what 
we have done, and what we have i ind. 

You will observe that we have already responded in terms which 
go somewhat beyond the appeals earlier addressed to us. President 
Johnson dispatched messages, and in several cases personal repre- 
sentatives, to His Holiness the Pope, to the Secretary General of the 
United Nations and to a considerable number of chiefs of state or 
heads of gov*, meiit, reaffirming our desire promptly to achieve a 
peaceful settlement of the conflict in Vietnam and to do all in our 
power to move that conflict from the battlefield to the co nee 
table, In this connection, our bombing of Xorlh Vietnam has not 
been resumed since the Christmas truce. 

Among the points made in our me :es conveyed to a number of 
governments are the following: That the UniUd States is prepared 
for discussions or ne^otia 5 without any prior conditions what- 
soever or on the basis of the Geneva Accords of 1054 and 1962, 
that a reciprocal reduction of hostilities could be envisaged and 
that a cease-fire might be the first order of business in any discussion 
or negotiations, that the United States remi prepared to withdraw 
its forces from South Vietnam as soon as South Vietnam is in a position 
to determine its own future without external interference, that the 
United States desires no continuing military presence or bases in 
Vietnam, that the future political struc in South Vietnam should 
be determined by the South Vietnamese people themselves through 
democratic processes, and that the que of the reunification of 

the two Vietnams ild be decided by the free decision of their two 
peoples, 

I should appreciate it if this letter could be communicated to all 
members of the United Nations as a Security Council document. 

I should urge them in exami to recall President - ason's 

letter of July 2S. 1965, to the Secretary G al in which the President 
invited all members of the United Nations, individually and collec- 
tively, to use their influence to bring about unconditional discussions, 
and tax letter of July 31, 1865 (document S/6575) to the President 
of the Security Council in which I said, inter . that the United 
States stands ready, as it lias In the past, to collaborate unconditionally 
with members of the Security Council in the search for an ace 
formula to restore peace and security to that area of the world. I 
should hope that on the present occasion also organs of the United 
Nations and all States would give even more earnest thought to what 
they might do to help to achieve these ends. 
Sincerely yours, 

Arthur J. Goldberg, 



i U.S. iz&ifoa to Vzi VslU ! Kitfdna press reteise >ro, i*3l, : ' fis. 5. iSsd, 



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U.S. OFFICIAL POSITION ON VIETNAM: Slate Department 

Press Release* January 7, IS66 l 

The following statements are on the public record about elements 
which the United States believes can go into peace in southeast Asia: 

1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate 
basis for peace in south I Asia; 

2. We would welcome a conference on southeast Asia or on 
any part thereof; 

3. We would welcome ''negotiations without preconditions" 
as the 17 nations put it; 

4. We would welcome unconditional discussions as President 
Johnson put it; 

5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of busin 
at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussion 

6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with other 
points which others might wish to propose; 

7. We want no U.S. bases in south Asia; 

S. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Vietnam 
after peace is assured; 

9. We support free elections in South Vietnam to give the 
South Vietnamese a government of their own choice; 

10. The question of reunification of Vietnam should be deter- 
mined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision; 

lh The countries of souti la can be non alined or neutral 

if that be their option; 

12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic 
reconstruction of southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, 
North Vietnam could participate in a regional effort to which we 
would be prepared to contribute at least SI billion; 

13. The President has said: 

The Victeong would not have difficulty being represented and having 
their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease 
'aggression* 1 don't think that would be an insurmountable problem. 

14. We have said publicly and privately that we could stop 
the bombing of North Vii m as a step toward peace although 
there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from t lie other 
side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped. 

i Depsrtmg&t of State pn sa release Xo. 4 thtvi Jzn. 7, 1965. 



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EXTRACT FROM THE PRESIDENT'S STATE OF THE 

UNION M 1SAGE. JANUARY 12, 19G6 > 
******* 

* 

Not too tii any years ago Vietnam was a peaceful, if troubled, land. 
In the north was an mdepend Communist government. In the 
south a people struggled to build a i ;on, with the friendly help of 
the United States. m _ . ■ 

There were some in South Vietnam \yho wished to force Conimuni: 
rule on their own people. But their progress was slight. Th 
hope of success was dim. Then, little m than 6 years ago, North 
Vietnam decided on conquest. From that day to this, soldiers and 
supplies have moved from north to south in a swelling stream — 
swallowing the remnants of revolution in aggression. 

As the assault mounted, our clu gradually became clear. We 
could leave, abandoning South Vietnam to its attackers and to certain 
conquest, or we could stay and fight beside the people of South 
Vietnam, 

We stayed. 

And we will stay until aggression has stopped. 

We will stay because a jus nation cannot leave to the crueltii 
of its enemies a people who have staked their lives and independence 
Oil America's solemn pledge — a pledge which has grown through the 
commitments of three American Presidents. 

Wo will shay because in Asia — and around the world — are countries 
whose indepe I >ee rests, in large measure, on confidence in America's 
word and in America's protection. . To yield to force in Vietnam 
would weaken that confide would undermine the independence 
of many lands, and would whet the appetite of the aggr< or. We 
would have to fight in one! 1, and we would have to fight in another— 
or abandon much of Asia to the d of Communists, 

And we do not intend to abandon Asia to conquest. 

Last year the nature of the war in Vietnam changed again. Swiftly 
inc " .; numbers of armed men from the north crossed the ] ler 
to join forces that were already in the south. Attack and ten in- 
creased, spurred and encour 1 by the belief that the United Star 
lacked the will to continue and that their victory was near. 

Despite our desire to limit conflict, it was i to act: to hoi! 

back the mounting aggression, to give courage to the people of the 
south, and to make our firmness clear to the north.. Thus we began 
limited air action against military targets in North Vietnam. We 
increased our fighting force to its present strength tonight of 190,000 
rmiu 

These moves have not ended the aggression but they have prevented 
its succe The aims of the enemy have been put out of reach by 
the skill and the bravery of Americans and their allies — and by the 
enduring courage of the South Vietnamese who, I can tell you, have 
lost eight men last year for every one of ours. 

The enemy is no longer close to victory. Time is no longer on his 
side. There is no cause to doubt the American commitment. 

Our decision to stand firm has been matched by our desire for peace. 

In 1963 alone we had 300 private talks for pe in Vietnam with 
friends and adversaries, throughout the world. 

Since Christmas your Gov ; meat has labored again — regul- 

ation and endurance — to remove any barrier to peaceful settlement 



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For 20 davs now we and our Vietnamese allies have dropped no bombs 
in North Vieti . 

Able and experienced spokesmen have visited, in behalf of America, 
more than 40 countries. We have talked to more than a hundred 
governments — all 113 that we have relations with, and some that we 
don't. We talked to the United Nations and we have culled upon all 
of its members to make any contribution that they can toward helping 
obtain peace. 

In public s ements and in private communications- — to adver- 
saries and to friends, in Borne and Warsaw, in Paris and Tokyo, in 
Africa and throughout this hemisphere — America has made her 
position abundantly clear. 

We seek neither territory nor bases, economic domination or military 
alliance in Vietnam. We fi for the principle of self-determination — 
that the people of South Vietnam should be able to choose then* own 
Course, choose it in free elections without vj ce, without terror, and 
without fear. The people of^ all Vj nam should make a free decision 
on the great quo tiou of reunification. 

This Is ell we want for South Vietnam. It is all the people of South 
Vietnam want. And if there is a single nation on this earth that 
desires less than this for its own people, then let its voice be heard. 

We have also made it clear — from oi to New York — that there 

are no arbitrary limits to our search for peace. We stand by the 
Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962. We will meet at &ny confer- 
ence table, we will discuss any prop —4 points or 14 or 40— and 
we will consider the views of any group, We will work for a cease-fire 
now or once discussions have begun. We will n ; -id if others reduce 
their of force, and we will withdraw our soldiers once South 

Vietnam is securely guaranteed the right to shape its own future. 

We have said all this, and we have d — and hoped — and we have 
waited for a response. 

So far we have received no response to prove cither success or 
failure. 

We have carried our quest for peace to many nations and peoples 
because we share this planet with others whose fut lire, in large measure, 
is tied to our own action, and whose counsel is nee ty to our own 
hopes. 

We have found understanding and support. And we know they 
wait with us tonfeht for some response that could lead to peace. 

I wish tonight that I could give you a blueprint for the course of this 
conflict over the coming month *, but we just cannot know what the 
future may require. We may have to face long, hard combat or a long, 
hard conference, or even Loth at once. 

Until peace comes, or if it does not come, our course is clear. We 
will act as we must to help protect the independence of the vali 
people of South Vietnam. We will strive to limit the conflict, for we 
wish neither increased destruction nor do we want to invite increased 

danger. 

But we will give our fight: 1 g men what they must have: every gun, 
every dollar, and every decision — whatever the cost or whatever the 
challenge. 

And we will continue to help the people of South Vietnam care for 
those that are ravaged by battle, create progress in the villages, and 
carry forward the i ting hopes of peace as best the}" can amidst the 
uncertain terrors of war. 



33 



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And let me be absolutely clear: the days may become months, and 
the months may become y* ars, but we will stay as long as on 

commands us to battle. 

There may be some who do not want peace— whose ambitions 
stretch so far that war in Vietnam is but a welcome and convenient 
episode in an immense desfen to subdue history to their will. But 
for others it must now be clear the choice is not between peace and 
victory. It lies between peace and the ravages of a conflict fro 
which they can only lose. 

The people of Vietnam, Xorth and South, seek the same things; 
the shared needs of man, the needs for food and shelter and cd ucation — 
the chance to build and work and till the soil, free from the arbitrary 
horrors of battle — the desire to walk in the dignity of those who master 
their own destiny. For many painful years, in war and revolution 
and infrequent peace :y have struggled to fulfill those needs. 

It is a crime against mankind that so much courage, and so much 
will, and so many dreams, must be flung on the fires of war and death. 

To all of those caught up in this conflict, we therefore say again 
tonight: Let us choose ; eace, and li it the wondrous works of peace, 
and beyond that, the time when hope reaches toward consummation, 
and life is the servant of life* 

In this work, we plan to discharge our duty to the people whom we 

serve. 

This is the state of the Union. 

But over it all — wealth, promise, and expectation — lies our troubling 
awareness of American men at war tonight. 

How i i tea who listen to me tonight have served their Nation 

in other wars? How very many are not here to listen? 

The war in Vietnam is not like these other wars. Yet, finally, war 
is always the same. It is young men dying En the fullness of th 
promise. It is trying to kill a man that you do not even know well 
enough to hate. 

Therefore, to know war is to know that there is still madness in thi 



woi 



Many of you share the burden of this knowledge tonight with me. 
But there is a di6 ence. For finally I must be the one to order our 

funs to fire, against all the most inward pulls of my desire. For we 
ave children to teach, and we have sick to be cured, and we have men 
,to be freed There are poor to be lifted up, and there are cities to be 
built, and there is a world to be helped. 

Yet we do what we must, 

I am hopeful, and I will try as best I can, with everything I have 
got, to end this battle and to return our sons to their desires. 

Yet as long as others will challenge America's security and test the 
dearness of our beliefs with fire and steel, then we must stand or see 
the promise of two centuries tremble. I believe tonight that you do 
not want me to try that risk. And from that belief your Pre it 
summons his strength for the trials that lay ahead in the days to 

come. 

The work must be our work now. Scarred by the weaknesses of 
man, with whatever guidance God may offer us, we must nevertheless 
and alone with our mortality, strive to ennoble the life of man on 
earth. 



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ADDRESS BY AMBASSADOR ARTHUR J, GOLDBERG, 
US. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, 
AT HOWARD UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

February io, ig6j 

I appreciate very deeply the honor which Howard University has paid 
me today. The ideals Howard has stood for, and the pioneering things it 
has achieved, in its first century are not merely of local but of national and 
indeed international significance. For the future of our democracy depends 
on the opportunity— such as Howard has always sought to provide — for 
eve y American to develop to the fullest his inborn potential of character and 
intellect. In pursuit of this ideal I feel certain chat Howard will provide 
its second century a leadership no less important than in the century you have 
just completed. 

You may be sure that when I use the word "leadership" in connect:* 
with Howard University I am not thinking in the abstract; I am thinking 
with great admiration and gratltu d< ' one particular leader, your eminent 
President and my dear friend and colleague, Dr. James M. Nabrit, Jr. 

As you know, when the President asked me to assume the post of United 
States Representative to the United Nations and I had to find a Deputy Rep- 
resentative who could share the immense difficulties of that vital work : 
peace, I sought out Jim Nabrit; and by dint of hard negotiating I manag 
to get him for one year. During that year I had countless occasions to be 
grateful for his clear and vigorous mind, his ability to see to the heart of a 
complex problem, his force of character, his charm and persuasiveness — all 
of which made him a most effective and memorable advocate of the United 
States in the ecu ncils of the world. 

I know you are as proud as I am of the services Dr. Xabrlt has rendered 
his country. And much though we at the US miss him, we must acknowl- 
edge that here at Howard University he is still rendering an outstanding 
service to his country. 

h seems to me fitting that, in the presence of Dr. Nabrit who shared with 
me for more than a year in the search for peace. I should report from my 



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United Nations vantage [ • or. where we now stand in the uneeasin; 
effort to achieve a just and honorable negotiated settlement of the conflict in 
Vietnam. It is equally fitting that this report should he made 'vers ley 

campus, for no issue of our day has brought forth a greater involvement on 
the part of our universities than I nc question. 

Our effort to open the door t< In 

recent wee! public aa ' been foebssed o n this effort by an i iJL 

r, -r I ; .;> a nd -events: p ronoun : . :its_by_the_£ 

meats involved, appeals b\ rid leaders including Po] 
General U_TJ • Sadcs 3J I uueh^arien:-. | $ ' - 

and the perplexing events in Mainland China, Right now we are in the 
midst of another pause in the fighting, the Lunar New Year truce. Thus 
this may be a good moment to assess the present status of our efforts for 
peace. 

In such an assessment, a responsible official must, in all that he says in 
public, avoid damaging the hopes for progress through private diplomacy. 
But in a free society he must also accept the inescapable responsibility to 
keep the public adequately informed. h is difficult to deal on both levels at 
once but it is essentia! to do so as well as we can. 

Let mc begin, then, by recalling the basi aims i n Viet- 

nam._ These aims have been stated man) times by President Johnson and 
other responsible spokesmen of the United St They have been stated 

over a span of two years, but t bb a ad Row of the military situation during 
that time has not made them any less valid as guidelines for peace negotia- 
tions. We do not subscribe to the false notion that a strong military 
position obviates the desirability seeking peace through negotiations, 
Today, therefore, I wish to re the essence of these American aims. 

The United States se eks a ' solution ld YJeJ - V* & 

the of our adversaries. W e seek a .< ttlement whose 

terms will result no t from dictation, but ' negotiations — a 

settlemen t who se .terr. will not s: ifice the vital interest of any p arty. In 

the words of the- N rirnjJ •: : "The scrr' r in Yiet- 

nam de pends on the readings ajad ft'llli j ' pa rties concerned to 

exp lore a nd work i ' &j jmj ;md reasonable soluthv,." As President 

Johnson said a week ago here in Washington: Such a solution "will in- 



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We are not eng aged in a "holv war" against comr ism. We do r. 
seek an Am >. &pi ; JKfcJuO A;n; nor_.a .permanent American 

"presence" of any kind— military or otherwise — in Vieir. ■ ; nor the 
impositi on of a milita allianceon South Vi \ si. 

We do not s • '. i i do any injury to Mainland China nor to threat any 
.of its legitimate interests- 



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Wc seek to assure to tl c of South Vietnan rtl 3 ffi n ft live c 

of the rig ht of s elf-determi nation— : hc right to decide th n pol iti 

destiny free of. external jiKcr:'-r-n-r \ . and through d tic 

processes In kcej ._ j h the ann .... | 5 ' Vietnamese Gove icnt i 
policy of na ■ncilinci ;^. '■• : ■ not seek to i ny ;j 

South Vietnamese people fi peaceful garticij n in thei r c ount ry s 
future, Wc are t .. red to ; Its of that dec] wha tevci it 

may_bc. Wc support the early c'onsum :,ofa-" .era":: cons:; rial 

system in S tl Vietnam, and frclcome the gi .• ; being ; to this en 

As regards North Vj t, we have no i • on its ten 

do not seek to i row its go] i ' itevej its i deolo gy. Wc are 

prepared fully to r :t its sovereignty and ten integrity and to ent 

into specific undertakings to that end. 

We " vc the reunification of Vietnam should be deci de 1 uj i th igh 
a free choice by the peoples o f both the North and the South without any 
outside interference; an J the results of that choice also will have our full 
support. 
Finally* -.when peac tgred v., are wilting ke a major cornrnj 

p n mt of money, talent and resources to a multilateral coo per 
b ring to all of S outheas t A including N . ., the benefit! 

.economic and social jrj tjort and devdopn rrt whicj tl ; eajo 

^sorely needs,. 

These, then, are the peace aims of the United States. They parallel the 
objectives stated by the South Vietnamese Government at Manila. Our 
aims are strictly limited and we sincerely belie contain nothing in- 

consistent with the interests of any party. Our public pronouncement? of 
them — both in Washington and a: the United Nations — are solemn com- 
mitments by the United States. 

Our adversaries have also placed their aims and objectives on the public 
record over the past two years. The n ; aims is thj 

well-known "Four ; Poii ' " >], which I wtU summarize witho ut 

trtfag too much from their owi trratnol 

The n.-.-: ;'-';:; c.ois to: pjco c ;.: : A : ;l of th. basic national rights of the 
Vi etnamese peop l e: pe . s overeig n:;., unit ricori ! 

inte grity. It als o calls for the ces all_a.; £ war ag >t thcNortl 

thcjmdin g of Unite d Stat es intervents - in the S h; the withdi i_alj 

U nited States tr oops, mili: : ;■ pe rsonnel and w is of all kin 
mantling of A merican bases and the c •■■-..! : of what i. tejrju t! 
United States "milit ar y alliance' 1 with So uth Vietnam. 

The United States would not find any essentia! difficulty with a reasonable 
interpretation or any of the terms included in this point. Our chief concern 
is what It does not in : namely, that North Vietnam also ce its inter- 



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vendon in the South, end all jjf its acts of w j unst the S >uth, and vvith-^ 
draw its forces from the South* Such a requirement is obviously essentia! 
to the 'pence" to which this first point refers. 

The sec ond p oint relates to the military' clauses. of Scneya agreements^ 
It provides that, y: . b lj the peaceful reunil J^jjL^em3jii,«UQSiJLJ^ 
North and t he South must refrain from joining any milita ry and, 

that there should be no foreign bases, tr ; - or military personnel in the*£ 
jcsy<cciiyc_lt rritQric .?*_ 

Here again, the only real difficulty is the omission of any obligation on the 
North to withdraw its military forces from the South— altru the Geneva 
Accords which established the demarc n line in Vietnam forbid military 
interference of any sort by one side in the affairs of the other, and even go 
so far as to forbid civilians to cross the demilitarized zone. 

The third point calls for th e settlement of the Sou t h ' . ! affairs "in __ 

accordai with the . . : the National Liberation Front for South 

Vietnam". /This point, of rje, was not a ggn oj the Geneva Accg r.ds 
at all. [t introduces a new clement which I shall d iscuss late i irj thi s anal ysis*/ 

The fourth p oint calls for the p eacef ul ion of Vi . to bo. 

settled by the people of both zpnes without any foreign interference . We 
have no difficulty with this point as was indicated in my speech to the Gen- 
eral Assembly on September 22. 

There has apparently been added a . fifth .point—put forward and re- 
peatedly endorsed by both H .1 and the Nations! Lib.:. :" \ ront since 
th eenui : ion of i in April, 1905. This fifth point was stated 



by Ho Chi Minhjn January, 1966, when he said that if the United Stafc 
really wants peace, it must rc o;^:.:?- the X a] Liberation Front as the 
"sole genuine represent, ti ve" of the people of Soul "■. j . 1, and engage 
in negot iation w ith it^/This, like the third of the "Fpug Poin ts", introduces 
a new element which was not part of the Geneva Accords. / 

Now, from this brief summation of our aims and those declared by 
Hanoi, it is clear that there are areas of agreement and areas of disagreement. 
Recent public statements by Hanoi have been helpful in certain aspects, but 
how great the disagreements are is still uncertain because the stated aims of 
Hanoi still contain a number of ambiguities. I would like to discuss some 
of these ambiguities because they relate to very consequential matters- 
There is ambiguity, for example, on the ro' e of the National Ltl 
Front in peace ne gotiati I have already noted the statement of Ho 

Chi Minh and other spokesmen for our adversaries who have said that we 
must recognize the Front as "the sole genuine representative of the South 
Vie t na mese pe op!e f and n ego t \ a te wi di it**. If thi s m e 3 n s th 3 1 we a - asked 
to cease our rec of the Government in Saigon and ' ' dy with the 

Front, insistence on this polnC would imperil the search for peace. For the 






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Front has not been chosen by any democratic process to represent the j 
of South Vietnam. Nor has the Front been recognized by the world com- 
munity, h h pertinent to recall that more than 69 nations recognize the 
Government of the Republic of Vietnam in Saigon, whet is none recog- 
nizes the National Liberation Front as a government. 

On the other h \ - ;ue pvK' ■ tc?_call ff ; r the N \ sal 

Liberation Ft-.:.: to be g iven a place or voice at the nej gating table. 
t his were the p n of our j I versa ^t! ts would, be brigh t :: I 

President Johnj ::, as I . > as July, Lpf^jgajd shaj "the Viet CpngWj 

not h ave difficulty i n being rep ated and in 1 ta V i | tg th eir view s presented 
if Hanoi for a moment decides that it wants to cease ession". He added 



:-" "oct 



.th at this did not see: e "an insurm ible problem / 1 and that 

"I think that could be vvoi ked ou t M . 

•~ — — ~ — 

A f r am biguity re] ' to the roj - J Liberatio n From 

in the future political li fe of . Vietnam , Hanoi asks that the affairs of 

South Vietnam be settled "in accordance with the program of the National 
Liberation Front". Our adversaries, in their various comments on this 
point, take no notice of the internationally recognized Government of 
So uh Vietnam or of the steps which the South Vietnamese leaders have 
taken, and have currently under way, and the institutions they are now cre- 
ating, for the purpose of providing their country with a constitutional and 
representative | mmeru. 

Nor would their statements seem to leave any place for the South Vieti 
mese who have participated in and promoted such steps. Such an interpret 

■ 

tation would pose serious obstacles to a settlement. 

However, some claim that what the National Liberation Front real!) 
seeks is no more thin the opportunity to advance its program peacefully 
along with other elements and grc gs in the South in a free political 
environment 

Wc have already made It clear that we do not wish to exclude any seg- 
ment of the South Vietnamese people from peaceful participation in their 
country's future, and that we support a policy of national reconciliation en- 
dorsed by the South Vietnamese Government in the Manila Communique, 
Indeed, as See:.:, ry Rusk sai \ In an interview I week, if the Viet Cong 
were to lay down they -. vvays cpul ' ; found to permit them to take 

part in the normal ;■■ Itti i\ proces ses in South Vietna m. 

Furthe r frmfoi j e>_anse q . rjpung d : : foreign _troops_in. 

South Vie tnam, What dees Hanoi mean by "foreign troops*'? Tl 

clearly include In this term the forces of the United States and other coun- 
tries aiding [he South, but they have never admitted the presence of their 
own forces in the South. Ot course, a one-sided withdrawal by our side 



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would not lead to an acceptable peace. All external forces must withdraw, 
those of Hanoi as well as ours, i: peace is to be achieved. 

T here is ambiguity al so in Han *: osttion on the timin g of the with - 
drawal of external forces. Do oar adversaries consider withdrawal of forces 
as a precondition to negotiations, as some of their statements tmpij ? It s< 
this again would raise a serious obstacle to progress. But S£ they look on 
withdrawal of forces as a provision to be incorporated in a settlement, this 
clearly could be worked out. The United States and its allies are already on 
record m the Manila Communique that their > "will be withdrawn , .- . 

as the other side withdraws its forces to the Nbrchj ceases infiltration, and 
the level of violence thus subsides. Those forces v. ill be withdrawn as sooi 
as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have 
been fulfilled". Further, we have indicated our willingness to join in a 
phased and supervised withdrawal of forces by both sid •■. 

Next, there is ambiguity hi Hanoi's positio n on the ce; 
of North Vietnam. At times their pujblj re dej ' xl.that 

thc_bombing he ended uncc ' ' ally, ■• j ' ny reference v . | : '' | 

re spon se from tl te ! r side. O n the oj h r hand, qui*.- re cc a -spokes man [ 

Hanoi said that "if, after the definitive and unconditional cessation of the 

— -— — ■ ■ ~ —* 

bon " American Government pr £0 enter into contact 

with the [..'■ h Vietnamese! Govs nent, . . , this pro] • \ will he ej 
a mine d and studied *'. And just this week we have seen a further statement, 
in an interview by the North Vietnamese foreig n Minister, t 1 atces 
the "could i : between North Vic acJL/.S.'i 

Many of their stater: that the bombing cease have also con- 

tained other expressions, such as that the American military presence in 
South Vi an be completely withdrawn, and that the "Four Points' 1 of 
Hanoi must be recognized and accepted as "the" basis — or possibly as "a" 
basis — for settlement of the conflict. This c 5 an additional ambigui" 
as to whether Hanoi means to add still other prenegottadng conditions. 

The position of the United States on this bombing question has been 
Stated by a number of Administration spokesmen, including me at the 
United Nations. The United States re: :d to take the first step 

and order a cessation of all I a ' ing of_ North Vietnam the m :e 

.a ssured, | l y or ot h rwhe, that this step will ,•_; .-.J prompdy \ 

a ta v ^Gi\^ toward per-. N :*h Viet nam, In his letter of 

February S to His I ess, Pop-e Paul, President Johnson said: "... I know 
you would not expect us to reduce military action unless the other side is 
willing to do likewise. We are prepared to discuss the b ed reduction 

in military activity, the cessation of hostilities or any practical arrangements 



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which could lead to these results. We shall continue our efforts for a 
peaceful and honorable sc tent until they are crowned with success.* 1 

Some analysis contend that our terms of self ei it should be more p; 
eiseJy defined. But it is very dil uh to be more precise in advance of nego- 
tiation and particularly in light of the substantive n tries on the other 
side. But whatever questions may be raised, they should and can best I 
resolved in discussions between the parties who have the power to resolve 
then). For our part, we stand ready to v. tate in good faith uncondi- 
tionally to resolve all outstanding questi 

Th e. Unit ■: J State s_ a gp ro . : ! i t o n e g otiatio ns is flexible . We and ou r allies 
do nptask our ad; J esjo a ; | - LJ . j ■ di c usslon j ■> 

JEtatipjis, any | pf_gtfi5JQ_! ' is. Nor do we 

rule out the discussion of any | > of theirs, ho *. vc ■ r difficult they might 
appear to us. We are willing to discuss and negotiate not only our ov 
points but Hanoi's "Four Points" and points emanating from any other 
source, including the Secretary General of the United Nations. 

I t remains to be seen vv j < u r advers aries share this concep t of ncgo- 

;_tjatjo ns. As I have already pointed out, their various public declarations of 
peace aims have often been coupled with statements that the goals they put 
forward must, for example, be "accepted 11 or "recognize as the "sole 
basis" or "the most correct basis" or "the only sound basis" or "the basis for 
the most correct political solution". 

Such statements contain still further ambiguity — in one sense the most 
fundamental of all, since it relates to the concept of negotiation Itself. Do 
these statements mean that Hanoi is willing to enter negotiations onlv if 
there is ah assurance i t the l outcome will be on ■: tr terms 

will, in effect, simply ratif y the goals they have already s:a:cd? Such an 
attitude would not be conducive to peace and would make the outlook for 
a settlement bleak indeed. 

If, on th othei ! tnd, Nbfth. Vie! were.to t! t! ir_ points ire 

no: pre.co;:d:*:ons_to ill $ g '' - : s,_thcn the prospects^ 

be more promising. 



Our negotiating approach would permit each side to seek clarification of 
the other side's position. It dees not require the acceptance in advance of 
any points least of all chose whose meaning may be in need of clarification. 
We do not ask that of Hanoi — and progress toward a settlement will be 
faciltt ;ited if Hanoi does not ask it of us. 

In this situation, how can we best move toward a settlement: 

One essentia! early step is to analyze the positions of all parties in order 
to ascertain whether there is some element or some kernel common to all. 
Many students of the subject have pointed to one fact which may prove to 
be such a kerne! — namely, the fact that both sides have pointed to the 






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Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1^62 as an acceptable basis for a peaceful 
Settlement, 

But I must add quickly that this di not necessarily indicate a real meet- 
ing of the minds, because of doubts chat all sides interpret the Geneva 
Agreements in the same light. I lanoi has said that the essence of the Geneva 
Agreements is contained In its "Four Points". But the four points would not 
put Hanoi under any restrain:, or obligations in its hostile activi against 
the South, which the Geneva Accords explicitly prohibit. Besides, as I 
already pointed out, these points insist that the South's future be regulated in 
accordance with the program of a group which was not referred to in the 
Geneva Accords and did not even exist when they were written. And in any 
case, if the Geneva Accords were to serve a? a basis for settlement, it would 
obviously be necessary to revitalize the international machinery which they 
provided for supervision — which is presently operating under severe limita- 
tions; to incorporate effective international guarantees; ^nd to update other 
provisions of the Accords which on their face are clearly out of date. 

Despite these problems of interpretation, it can he said that if the mean- 
ing of the Geneva Agreements were accepted as a matter for genuine nego- 
tiation, then the constant reference to these agreements by both sides would 
be more than a verbal similarity; it would be a significant and hopeful sign 
of the prospects for settlement. 

From all this analysis, there emerges one basic and practical question, and 
it is this: How are all these apparent obstacles to a settlement to be over- 
come? 

The first and essentia! "pre-requisiie is the will to resolve them — not by 
unconditional surrender or by the dictation of terms, but through a process 
of mutual accommodation whereby nobody's vital interests are injured, 
which would be a political solution. Speaking for the United States Govern- 
ment, I affirm without reservation the willingness of the United States to seek 
and find a political solution, 

The next question, then, is by what procedure such a political settlement 
can "be reached. One well-tested and time-proven way is the conference 
table. President Johnson has repeatedly stared our readiness to join in a 
conference in Geneva, in Asia, or In any other suitable place. We remain 
prepared today to go to the conference table as soon as, and wherever, our 
" adversaries are prepared to join us. 

There is also a second procedure by which to pursue a political settlement: 
namely, private negotiations — either by direct contact or through an inter- 
mediary. There is much to be said for this private method, for in a situa- 
tion as grave as this, with its complex historical background and its pres- 
ent political cross currents, i: would be excec ly difScult to negotiate 
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I therefore affirm that the United States Government stand tdy to take 

its route also toward a political mem. And . ive our ;;e 

that the secrecy and security of such private explorations would be safe- 
guarded on our sid^:. Of course we do not and should not ask th.it free- 
dom of expression be curtailed in the slightest degree, Nevertheless- 
that conspicuous champion of free expression, Dr. Enrin D. . Canham, re- 
cently reminded us — no one's credibility ought to suffer because of what is 
better left unsaid under such circumstances. 

Let me quickly add that at this juncture I do not want to raise any false 
hopes by this remark. I amply stating a principle which is inherent in 
the concept of the secrecy and security of private explorations. 

Such then is my analysis of the problems involved and the methods to be 
employed m seeking a negotiated sol of the Vietnamese conflict Nor 

should we overlook the possibility that neg< ti ions, private or public, might 
be preceded or facilitated by the process of mutual de-escalation or a scaling 
down of the conflict without a formally negotiated ceasefire. This, of course, 
would be welcome on ourpart. 

It is altogether possible, too, that there will be no negotiations culminating 
in a formal agreement; that our adversaries will sooner or brer find the 
burden of the war too exhausting and that the conflict will gradually come 
to an end. 

Perhaps this will indeed prove to be the outcome* But our most re* 
spected military authorities have cautioned us not to expect that this will 
happen quickly, and that w c must face the possibility of a long scruple, 
burely, it tncre is any contribution that diplomacy can make to hastening a 
just and honorable end of this struggle/ we cannot in all conscience spare 
any effort or any labor, day or night, to make chat contribution—no matter 
how difficult and frustrating the effort may be, or how many false starts and 
failures and new beginnings it may entail. 

As students of history know, one obstacle to a negotiated end of any war 
can be psychological. The frame of mind appropriate to fighting and the 
frame of mind appropriate to peacemaking are by nature very different. 
And yet a stage inevitably comes when both these seemingly contradictory 
efforts must go on side by side. 

^ Many citizens, viewing this complex dual process, are likely to be con- 
fused and distressed by what seems like an inconsistency in their leaders' 
policies. Some complain that the talk of peace suggests a ! ;!ng of our 
resolve and of our will to win. Simultaneously others complain that the com 
tinned military effort suggests an attempt to bring the adven : ; to hi 
knees, to break his will—and thus casts doubt on the sincerity of our will 
to peace. 

The great difficulty of achieving peace should serve to remind us that 
there are r^by -1 conflicting interests at stake which stubbornly resist 



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solution; that peace cannot be bought at any nor can real conflicts of 

purpose be wave J away with a magic wand. By the same * ken, the 
ferocity of war shi did not be an incitement to hatred but rather a stern dis- 
cipline— a i Jer of the imperative duty to define responsibly the ! :d 
interests for which our soldiers fig] and which a peace settlement must 
protect. 

The effort to make such a res; ible definition, and to carry it through 
the process of peace negotiations! is "piled high with diSculty'*. A genuine 
meeting of the minds may never be wholly achieved. It is unlikely that 
terras of settlement f this stubborn conflict can be found which would be 
wholly pleasing to either side. But it is in our highest national interest that 
an acceptable, livable solution should be found. 

Let no one suppose that patriotism, which is so inspiringly displayed on 
the battlefield, is not also present at the negotiating table* All our recent 
Presidents have testified to our country's dedication to negotiation as a 
means of peacefully bridging differences. 

President Eisenhower said in 1955, on the eve of the first Summit Con- 
ference with the Soviet leadership: "We shall work with all others so that 
peaceful and reasonable negotiations may replace the clash of the battle* 
field." 

President Kennedy, in his Inaugural Address, said: "Let us never negotiate 
out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate " 

And President Johnson has summed up the true value of negotiation as 
follows: 

"To negotiate is not to admit failure. It is to show n od sense. We 
believe chat collective bargaining is working as long as parties stay in 
negotiation. Only when bargaining breaks off do we speak ol Failure. 
And so also in foreign policy. There, too, the rule of law and the resort 
to the bargaining table are the hallmarks ot success." 
And to these words the President added sp-:cir" catly: 

"This rule applies without qualification to Vietnam. We shall 
count it a mark of success when all the parties to that dispute are arotu 
a conference table. We Americans are experienced in bargaining; 
wc have nothing to fear from negotiation. And we Americans kn 
the nature of a fair bargain: none need fear negotiating: with us." 
I am sure all three of these Presidents would agree today that the effort 
to discover through negotiation, the common ground on which to build a 
just and honorable peace, is worthy of our most sincere and d d 

efforts. 



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( 



r 



-His Excellency • ' . ... ' 

Ho Chi Minn " . ' 

President 

Democratic Republic of Vietnam ' . '" 

■ 

I a. 

Dear Mr. President: . ."" . • 

4 

I am writing to you in the hope that the conflict in Viet 
nam can be brought to an end. That conflict has already taken 
a heavy toll — in lives lost, in wounds inflicted, in property 
destroyed, and in simple human misery. If we fail to find a 
just and peaceful solution, history will judge us harshly. 



Therefore, I believe that we both have a heavy obliga 
to seek earnestly the path to peace. It is in response to 
obligation that I arn writing directly to you. 



ion 
that 



We have tried over the, past several years, in a variety 
of ways and through a number of channels," to convey to you cmd 
colleagues our desire to achieve a .peaceful sett! 



your w * 

For whatever rraso 

suits , 



tlciuent. 



these efforts have not achieved any re- 



, It may be that our thoughts and yours, our attitudes and 

yours, have been distorted or misinterpreted as they passed 

through these various channels, Certainly that is always a 
danger in indirect communication, • • * -- . 

F 

There is one good way to overcome this problem and to 
move forward in the search for a peaceful settlement. That 
is for us to arrange for direct talks between trusted repre- 
sent ts in & secure setting: and away from the glare of 
publicity. Such talks should not be used as a propaganda exer- 
cise* but should be a serious effort to find a workable and 
mutually acceptable solution. 

In the past two weeks, I have noted public statements by 
representatives of your government suggesting that you would be 
prepared to enter into direct bilateral talks with representa- 
tives of the US Government : provided that we ceased "uncon- 
aition«ily ?l snd pe*? : tly our bombing operations against 
your* country and alL -military actions against it. In the last 
dav serious and responsible parties have a 



that this is in fact your proposal, 



assured us indirectly 



Let tne frankly state that I see two great difficulties 
with this proposal, In view of your public position, such . 
action on our part would inevitably produce worldwide specula 
tion that discussions were under way and would impair the 






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privacy and secrecy of those discussions. Secondly, there would 
inevitably be grave concern on our .part .whether your government 
would make use of such action by us to improve 5.ts military 
position, .. . 

With these problems in mind, I am prepared to move even 
further towards an ending of hostilities than your Government 
has proposed in either public statements or through private. 
diplomatic channels. I am prepared to order a cessation of 
bombing against your country and the stopping of further 
augmentation of US forces in South Viet-Nam as soon as I am 
assured that infiltration into' South Viet -Nam by land and by 
sea has stopped. These acts of restraint on both sides v/ould i 
1 believe, make it possible for us to conduct serious and 
private discussions leading -toward an early peace. 

■' I make* this proposal to you now with a specific sense of 
urgency arising from the imminent New Year holidays in Viet- 
Nam. If you are able to accept this proposal I see no reason 
why it could not take effect at the end of the New Year, or 
Teti holidays. The proposal I have made would be greatly 
strengthened if your military authorities and those of the 
Government of South Viet-Nam could promptly negotiate an 
extension of the Tet truce, , ^ \ 

As to the site of the bilateral discussions I propose, 
there are several possibilities. We could, for example, have 
our representatives meet in Moscow where contacts have already 
occurred. They could meet in some other country such as Burma. 
You may have other arrangements or sites in mind, and I would 

try to meet your suggestions . * • 

< 

The important thing is to end a conflict that has brought 
burdens to both our peoples, and above all to the people of 
South Viet -Nam. If you have any thoughts about the actions I 
propose, it would be most important that I receive them as soon 
as possible. , * 

Sincerely, 



Lyndon B. Johnson 



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To His Excellency Mr. Lyndon B# Johnson, 

President, 

United States of America, 



Your Excellency; . - ; 

On February 10, l$"67j 1 received your message. This is my reply. 

Vietnam is thousands of miles -away from the United States. The Vietnamese 
people have never done any harm to the United States. But contrary to the 
pledges made by its representative tit the 19fj'i Geneva conference, the U.S. 
Government has ceaselessly intervened in Vietnam, it has unleashed and 
intensified the war of aggression in South Vietnam with a view to prolonging 
the partition of Vietnam and turning South Vietnam into a neo-colony and a 
military base of the United States, For over two years now, the U.S. 
Government has, with its air and naval froces, carried the war to the 
Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam, an independent and sovereign country 

The U.S. Government has committed ww crimes, crimes against peace and 
Against mankind. In South Vietnam, half a million U.S. and satellite troops 
have resorted to the most inhuman weapons and the most barbarous methods 
of warfare j such as napalm, toxic chemicals and gases, to massacre our 
compatriots, destroy crops, and raze villages to the ground. In North 
Vietnam, thousands of U.S. aircraft have dropped hundreds of thousands of 
tons of bombs, destroying towns, villages, factories, schools. In your 
message, you apparently deplore the sufferings end destruction in Vietnam, 
May I ask you: Who lias pei'petrated these monstrous crimes? It is the B 
United States and satellite troops. The U.S. Gov tment is entirely 
responsible for the extremely serious situation in Vietnam, 



The U.S. war of aggression against the Vietnamese people constitutes a 
challenge to the countries of the socialist camp, a threat to the national 
independence : } and a serious danger to peace in Asia and the world. 

The Vietnamese people deeply love independence, freedom and peace. But 
in the face of the U. S. aggression, they have risen up, united as one man, 
fearless of sacrifices end hardships. They are determined to carry on 
their resistance until they have won genuine independence and freedom 
and true peace. Our just cause enjoys strong sympathy and support from 
the peoples of the whole world, including broad sections of the American 
"people « 



The U.S. Government has unleashed the war of aggression in Vietnam. It 

must cease this aggression* That is the only way to the restoration of 

peace, The U.S. Government must stop definitively and unconditionally 

its bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic 

of Vietnam, withdraw from South Vietnam all U.S. and satellite troops, 

recognize the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, and let the 

Vietnamese people settle themselves their own affairs* Such is the 

basis (sic) content of the fi ve-point s J 1 of the government of the 

Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which embodies the essential principles 

and provisions of the 195U Geneva agreements on Vietnam, it is the basic (sic) 

of a correct political solution to the Vietnam problem. 



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•* - 



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In your message 3 you suggested direct talks between the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam and the United States, If the U« S. Gove^nment^eally^ 
vants_ these talks, it must fir; L of aX] stop, unconditionally its bombing 
falds and all othei :ts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. 
It is only after the unconditional cessation of the U.S. bombing raids and 
all other acts of war against the Ecriocratic Republic of Vietnam 1 the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States ^corJxl enter into talks 
cud discuss questions concerning the two sides. • _ .- 



The Vietnamese people will never subrait to force, 
talks under the threat of bombs. 



ey vill never accept 



I 




Our cause is absoultely just. It is to be hoped that the U , S ." Government 
vill act in accordance -with reason. 

Sincerely, 



ti - 



Ho Chi Kinh 



• 



* • 



V 



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• MARCH 28 , 19^7 






- - 



■- 




TIT 




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* . 1 - 



• 



NO. 70 



t - r ■ - 



SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF MARCH 28, 19 67 



>• 



f 



"The following is the State Department's release 




of Secretary of State Dean Rusk's news conference, which 
is authorized for direct quotation: 



•» . 



SECRETARY RUSK: Earlier today, the Secretary 






General of the United Nations ,, U Thant, made public 

. . # . . .. . . 

some proposals which he had offered to a number of govern 

i 

■ 

ments involved in the problem in Viet -N am on March 14. 



The following day, we gave the Secretary General our 



* 



;■ 

-. 
i 
i 






interim reply, stating that we welcomed his initiative/ 
and, . after consultation with the Government of Viet-Nam 
aid other allies, we would give him a more considered 



reply. 



On March 18, we delivered that reply to th* 



Secretary General; and you now have that in front of you. 

In essence, the Secretary General proposed 
that there be a general standstill truce in Viet-Nam, 
that there then be preliminary talks leading to a 



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PR 70 



- 

^reconvening of t\\e Geneva Conference. 



In our reply ( we "(stated tha,t we accepted the 

* 

* V 

outline of his proposals, that we would fce glad to 

, - •- - . * '-• 

' negotiate .the standstill truce f and .take part in pre- 

■ * 

liminary discussions leading to a reconvening of that 

■ 

conference, . 4 v ., 

■■ . . r . ... - - 

We do not yet have in front of us the full text 



of whatever reply Hanoi may have delivered to the Secretary 
General. Whether Hanoi will make that public I do not now 
Know* We do have a public statement from Hanoi which seems 

to indicate their attitude. That public statement of 

. _ -**•■* 

yesterday said that: 

"To call on both sides to cease fire and bold 

> 

unconditional negotiations, while the United States 
is committing aggression against Viet-Nam, and taking 
" serious steps in its military escalation in both zones 
of Viet-Nam, is to make no distinction between the 
aggressor and the victim of aggression, to depart 
from reality, and to demand that the Vietnamese people 

'accept the conditions of the aggressors," 

And then it adds: 



* 

"And, by the way, it is necessary to underline 



\ 






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PR TO 



once again the views of the Government of Hanoi, which 

* ■ 

ha$ pointed out that* the Viet-Nain problem has no concern 
V/ith the United Nations , and the United Nations has • 

» 

absolutely no right to interfere in any way in the 
Viet-Najn question," ' ". * *- >*?.._... * 

The indications are, therefore , that Hanoi 
has once again taken a negative vlev; toward an 
initiative taken by someone else to move this matter 



toward peace. 



■ ■ :.'.-.. '_ - -\ -*■•*'. V : '- r 



;> . 



I might say that the recent publication of 



the exchange between President Johnson and Ho Chi Minhj 

a*£ todeiy's publication of the proposals of the Secretary 

General, and the responses to it, illustrate the problem 

that" we have had from the beginning in bringing the 
« ■ 

* Viet-Nam problem to a peaceful conclusion. 



Many governments, many groups of governments, 

9 

many world personalities, have tried to take an initia~ 

* 

tive to move this conflict toward a peaceful settlement. 

■ 

Thejre has invariably been a positive and a constructive 
response from the United States; and there has invariably 
been a, negative and hostile and, at times f vituperative 



•■--. — t 

m • • - 



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* < PR 70 

response from the authorities in Hanoi, When* one looks 
"b^ck oyer the long record of initiatives taken by many 
personalities and governments, and groups of governments, 
one sees the record of Hanoi's injiransigeance, vzit h 
such phrases as "swindle," and "farce, !t and words of 




tf 






that sort 



= ...^ . . . ♦ . . .', 

Now, we do not ourselves believe that peace is 



not the business of the United Nations,, We believe- that 
no nation can say that a world organization representing 
122 nations ' cannot properly take up the 'question of 



- _ • « 



i . _ 



"maintaining -the" peaceV " The 
Charter provides for it? the obligations of the nations 
of the wo,rld are involved; and the issue of peace is at 



• -M. ' 



""•*. 



stake, 

Nevertheless, we have never insisted that the 

United Nations is the sole mechanism for dealing with 

* 

this question. 

There is now pending before the Security 
Council a resolution offered by the United States 
-calling for a peaceful settlement of this problem. 



\ 



That has been resisted in the United Nations because of 

- 

the attitude of Hanoi and Peking toward the involvement 







52 



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PR 70 

■I 

...,"' ■ • .-...-.. • . ■• . 

"of the United Nations. V.hen the Soviet Ambassador 

...... 

* - ' 

said at the Security Council that ,f This is not the 

* . 

: . < .. 

business of the U, N., it is a matter for the Geneva 



t 



- machinery/' Ambassador Goldberg said, "All right. If 



* * 



that is your view, we will agree with that; "then let 



._ * . _ 



us use the Geneva machinery." 



But the Geneva machinery has been paralyzed 



- --- ■ --> — - 

. Py the ^tt^tude of H^noi and Peking. For example, 






;"•■*. 'th.evt, jn^chinery has jiot been available to respond favor- 

"-_*-- * *. * - 

'-"' &£>Xy to Prince Sihanouk's request that the Inter- 
national Control Commission step up its activities to 

,^iisure the neutrality and the territorial integrity 

of Cambodia- That machinery was not available to ensure 
. the demilitarization of the Demilitarized Zone between 



North and South Viet-Nam. 



So we would say to the authorities in Hanoi 

F 

that, surely f there must be some machinery somewhere 
which can open the possibilities of peace. If not 
the United Nations, then the Geneva machinery; if 
not the Geneva machinery, then the resources of quiet 



diplomacy 



* 






I can tell you* now that the exchange between 



■53 



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President Johnson and Ho Chi Minh has been made public, 
and U Thant's proposals and our reply have been made 

V 

public, that there is nothing in the private record 

... . 

which throws any different light on this situation than 

m a - 

i 

you now have in the public record. Despite all of the 

m 

m 

efforts made privately by many people in many places, 
the private record and the public record are now in 

m 

agreement. ... ... :/ 



m ■» . * ■ 

: - • . > .. - 



I do hope that the authorities in Hanoi would 
give serious thought to the present situation, a If they 
have supposed that they would be able to obtain a miii- 

. tary victory in the South, they must, surely, now put 
that hope aside* If they have had any hope that there 
would be a political collapse in South Viet-Nam, surely, 

, they must now know that all of the groups in South 
Viet-Nam, who have some differences among themselves, 
are resolved to bring into being a Constitutional 
Government in which those various groups can work to- 

i 

gether on a basis of the free choice of the South 
Vietnamese people with respect to their future; and 
that one point, on vhicfr they are generally agreed 



PR 70 ' 1J 



£ 



■ 

— — .» - 



in South Viet-Nam, is that they do not wish the program •?% 

* 
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; • **■< ' ■ ■- PR 70 

■ ■ . 4 « 

* 

of Hanoi or the Liberation Front • 

* 

If Hanoi supposes that somehow international 

* > • 

* 

opinion will come to their rescue, surely . they must 
know that when they rebuff the United Nations Organi&a~ 

■mm a ■< 

tion, an organization of 122 members, that this will 
not bring them support in other parts of the world. 
"And, surely , they must understand that all small nation 
Who are within the reach* of some greater power have a 



> 



r ~ stake in the ability of South Viet-Nam to determine its 



c,«. 



own future for itself. And, surely, Hanoi must not be 



• 



- .tinder continuing misapprehension .that, somehow, some 



■> * *•* 



'fl.AYisi.ons within the United States might cause us to 
c h^nge our attitude toward our commitments to So\ith 
Viet"Nam. Because although there may be some differences 
among us, those differences are trivial compared to the 

- 

differences between all of us, on the one side* and Hanoi 

on the other. . 

» 

So we would hope that in some fashion; in 



sows way* at sone tune, the authorities in Hanoi will 



make use of some machinery in which to be responsive 



to the many efforts which we and others have been making 
toward peace over the Mast 'several years. 



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' /; v \ * ' ? PR 70 

- . • * -' . - - ■ 

_ 

. It is no good to brush aside the 17 nonaligned 

f . v 

r * v 

. pationp, and the British Commonwealth of Prime Ministers, 

and His Holinesp the Pope, the Secretary General,- and 
. the President of India, and all the others who have 

- 

been trying to find some basis on which this matter 
could be moved toward a peaceful conclusion, and suppose 



that, somehow, world opinion is supporting them in 

* 

- 

. their efforts to se£z@ gouth Viet-Nam by force, 

■ 

{3o we would advice them to believe that, as 



■ 



: fa,r .as we are concerned, we are not calling the search 

- * 

for a peaceful settlement to an end because of Ko Chi 
Minh's reply to President Johnson, or because of the 
.altitude which they seem to be taking toward U Thant's 



most recent proposals 



* i 



We ^r:a 



continue that effo: 







\ 



j>y private and public means, aid we would hope that we 

* 

■ 

would get some response through some channel that would 
begin to bring this thing within the range of discussion 

* 

and ni&ke it possible to move toward a peaceful settlement, 

Nov/, I "am ready for your questions. 



QUESTIONS £HD ANSWERS; 



Q 



Mr. Secretary, you have outlined all of 



. the reasons why they/ surely, must not believe these 









various elements. What is it then you think that makes 



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PH ?o 

them keep on fighting and refusing to negotiate in the 

face of v^hat must be a loss of international support, 

* 

- 

and these other adverse factors? 



A 



Well, it is very hard to say, I can't 



enter into the minds of the leaders in Hanoi on a matter 

- 

of 1 that sort* I would suppose, really, that they are 
under pome misapprehension. They are making some mis- 
judgments and miscalculations on some point; either 
the state of international opinion, or the state of 

■ : 

■ 

Opinion within the Uji^ted States, It's possible even 

that they still have some slender hopes of some military 

. * ■ 

success in the South, 



puf 



Y':; 



I just don't know what is in their minds. P.u 
Vat I am saying is that, so far as we understand their 



poi,nt of view, the principal pillars of their hopes are 
eroding from under them, and they should become interested 
in peace , and at an early date and not at some long 
delayed future date. 



Q 



Mr, Secretary; your statement today in 



* 



9 

reply to U Thant has said that there would be "an appropriate 
involvement for the Government of South Viet -Nam throughout 



57 



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PR 70 



j tfte entire procesp of* arranging a peace* 1 ' 



':'_ .Would, you ppell that out a little more, sir? 
--.Premier Ky has been indicating that we haven't 



j> 




A 






called him in. . St . . 

+ m 

,_A ."Well/ obviously, any discussion with 

■ a- ■ 

1 

:- North Viet~Nam about. peace in Viet-Nam must directly 



involve the Government of South Viet-Nam, Indeed , as 






i . 



. 






-vyo.u.know,. the Government; of South, Viet~Nam has on 

p ■ 

,-r.fliore. than one .'occasion, suggested direct talks between 



"South Viet -Nam and North Viet-Nanu They have proposed , . 






"^fox"- example ,_ that the two .governments there get together 
- on the question of possibly extending the Tet standdown, 






the Tet Cease-Firs, 



We would support that as a means for coming 



i 



to grips with this problem, We would think that it 

* 3 

* 

would be a very good idea if Hanoi v/ere to accept the 



proposals of' South Viet-Nam for direct talks to move 
this toward a peaceful solution. 

Thex'e are many opportunities available/ you 






■ 



r, see , 



; There would, be direct talks between Saigon and 



Hanoi* There would be talks between ourselves and 



* 




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PK 70 



y 



Hanoi* There would be talks under the auspices of the two 



- 



Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conferences, or under the 

■ ■ 

auspices of the three members of the International 
Control Commission* Or there could be intermediaries, 






such as the Secretary General of the United Nations, 



V 



or, some other distinguished governmental or noji- 

i 
governmental leader, Any of these methods are 

appropriate and useful, as far as we are concerned. 

* 

5?he problem is that no one 'has been able to 

; . 

find a procedure or a method v/hich, apparently, is 

- 

* 

agreeable to Hanoi. ' . . 







A 



Mr* Secretary? 



Yes, 



Q 



If Hanoi persists for months and ev©n 



years in its attitude r what vn.ll our response then be? 

* 

m 

What will mir course be? 



A 



We shall meet our commitments in South 



, iet-'tfax. We shall do our duty there 



* 



3 



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PR 70 



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«v . 



- 



as 



Q Mr. Secretary, at the end of the Korean 
2 recall, we entered into talks without a truce 



and the fighting continued for two .years. V/ould you 




explain, would this formula to which you have responded 

* 

today, could it be a lead to that same sort of thing, 



• peace talks without any change "in the fighting? 

m 

A Well, let me remind you, Mr. Harsch, of 



v_ 



, 






i 



our most elementary position on this matter of talks. 



We will talk this afternoon or tomorrow morning without 

* 

~any conditions of any sort on either side. We are pre- •■ 
pared to talk while the shooting is going on. If the 

* 

other side wishes to raise major conditions, as they have 

+ ■ 

with their demand that there be an unconditional permanent 
cessation of the bombing, we are prepared to talk about 
conditions. We will discuss the conditions which must 
precede the initiation of formal negotiations. 

Or if they do not wish to start at that end-- 

* ■ 

that is, what do you do about the shooting— we are 



orojjaroo 






c i»zi 






he 



r\ f f* .*— * 






what do you do about 



a final settlement cf the problem? And work back froir: 

■ 

■ 

that to the practical means by which you reach the final 



settlement. 



So we are prepared to talk without any 



conditions of any sort, or about conditions. 



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PR 70 



Now, let me say that we don't ourselves fully 

* ■ 

* 

understand why there cannot be discreet talks even 

* 

* 

though the shootihg is going on. Now, we are aware of 



% 



the element of so-called face, but face is not a substi- 
•tute for very serious practical problems that we face- 

* * 

on the military side, * 

■ 

Now, I remind you that we discussed Berlin 
while the blockade was s^ill i'n effect. We discussed 

Korea while the hostilities were still in effect. In- 

■ 

deed, we took more casualties in Korea after the negotia- 

i 

tions started than had occurred before the negotiations 
started. We talked about the Cuban missiles while the 
Cuban missile sites were being built by the hour in Cuba. 

■ 

So we are prepared to talk without any change in the 

■ 

military situation whatever. 

But we are also prepared to talk about .changes 
in the military situation. What we cannot do is to 
commit ourselves to a permanent and unconditional stop- 
page of the bombing without knowing what the practical 
results of that will be on the military side. 

No one has been able to tell us, for example, 



just as one example, that i'f we stop the bombing those 



three divisions or more of North Vietnamese troops that 



>• 



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PR 70 



if 



are now in and on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone 

* m • . * 

* 

will not advance to attack our Marines who are six miles 



away 



Now, obviously, these are important practical 



. questions. So we will talk at this moment, or we will 
talk about any other circumstances in which the other 
side might think that they might wish to talk. But what 
we cannot do is to stop half the war and let the other 
half of the war go on unimpeded. 



* 



> 



*:H 




V. 



Q Mr. Secretary, when you refer, when we re- 
ferred in our reply to the Secretary General to a general 

* ■ • " > 

stand-still truce, are we talking at that pointy of a 

■ 

cessation of the bombing, and cessation of infiltration 

from the North? 

A I would suppose that a general stand-still 
truce would involve an elimination of all military action 
of all sorts on both sides. Mow, one reason why there 
has to be some discussion of that is that it is necessary 
for both sides to understand what in fact will. happen, 
particularly in a guerrilla situation where the situation 
on the ground is somewhat complicated. And so there needs 

— 

to be some discussion of that point if it is to be a pro- 



tracted stand-still. . ' ' . • ^ 




■ 
* 



62 • 



i 



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* 



i 

Q Mr. Secretary, just how does this formula 
today differ from Mr. Thant's previous formula? 



A Well, I think that he would perhaps be 
■the better one to comment on that. If there is a major 
difference, I think that this does place emphasis upon 

* 

a mutual stop of the military action on both sides as 

- 

an important first step. 

As far as his earlier proposals were concerned, 

■ 

the three-point proposals, you recall that they envisage 
that we would stop the bombing as the first point. The 
second point, that there would be a mutual de -escalation 
of the military action; and, third, there would be dis- 
cussions among all those involved in the conflict. 

. . We said, "Your point one, stopping the bombing, 
gives us no particular problem, but what do you have from 



But- if that can be achieved, then we can move ^ _ 

■ 
into the preliminary political discussions which might 

open the way for a reconvening of the Geneva Conference 

or some other appropriate foriim. But a military stand- 

- 

still would involve the concept of stopping the military 
action on both sides, and that .certainly would include 
stopping the bombing. 



the other side about point two?" Well, what he had from 



63 






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the other side about point two was a complete rejection 

- 

. that there will be no mutual de-escalation of military 

f 

m 

action. • - / . . 



/ 






And on point three, the question of discussions 

■ 

■ 

with all the parties involved in the fighting, the other 

*-* 
side has consistently said in and out- -from time to time f 

rather — that the Liberation Front must be accepted as 

the sole spokesman for the South Vietnamese people, 

* 

« m 

We find disturbing the refusal of Hanoi to en- 
gage in discussions with' the Government in Saigon. We 

■ 

' think that would be an appropriate way to begin such dis~ 

- 

■ 

cussions, and the possibilities of peace might be opened 
up if that channel were to become active. But thus far 
Hanoi has refused to asrcise it. 

■ 

Q Mr, Secretary, how would you distinguish 
between this proposal and the Presidents proposal to Ho 



Chi Minh? 



A Well, I think that perHaps the Secretary 



General's proposal is somewhat broader, in that it would 
presumably apply to a cease-fire throughout all of Viet- 
Nam, South Viet-Nam as well as. the disengagement mili- 

* 

tarily between North \Uet-Nam and South Viet-Nam. So to 
that extent, it is somewhat broader. But, nevertheless, 



>•• 



U 




) 




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FK /U 






r ■ '•' - . ! ■ --■■. 

t that is sorae thing which we are perfectly prepared to 



* 



discuss with representatives from the other side, or 
are perfectly prepared to have the Government of Saigon 

- 

discuss with the representatives from Hanoi. 

Q Mr. Secretary, what is your answer to 
those critics who say that the President's letter in 

9 

■ 

, effect raised the American price? . " . . 



A Well, I don't understand what they are talk- 



ing about . 



- 



- „ Q Well, they say that in this letter the 

- . . 

United States is demanding proof in advance that infil- 

^ : 

f- tration would have stopped. 

1 



, ' A We didn't talk about proof in advance. 
The words used were "assurances that infiltration had 
stopped. 11 

> 

Q Well, it is your contention that the price 

I . ' 

v&s not raised, that you're on the status quo ante as 

far as that is concerned? 

■ 

A The principal point here is that 
Hanoi has increasingly emphasized during this past year 
its inflexible demand that a stop in the bombing be 
permanent and unconditional, and that in exchange for 



65 



' 



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-that, there would be no indication from Hanoi as to ^ 

4 

What comparable or corresponding military action they 




* - 



would take on their side, 

. Now, just recall, for example, during the 37- 
day pause at the beginning of last year, Ho Chi Minh 
sent a letter to the Heads of Communist States, and in 
that letter he demanded that the United States must end 



unconditionally and for good all bombing raids and other 

. - 

- 
acts, war acts against the Democratic Republic of Viet- 



^ ... * 



Nam. Only in this way can a political solution of the 
Viet-Nam problem be envisaged.^ 

* Nov;, that insistence upon the stoppage of the 

— — - 

1 

bombing, which would be permanent and unconditional, has 
been a major increase in the public demands of Hanoi 
during this past year. And that makes it necessary for 
us to know what would happen if we committed ourselves 

to any such cessation, 

* 
The North Vietnamese representative in Paris 

on February 2 2nd said that we must state in advance at 
the time of any cessation of bombing that it would be 



*- 



J 



permanent and unconditional. Well, that means that we 



must know what the eff&cts would be. Will the infiltra- 



tion continue? Will those three divisions move against 



.r*. 




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;: 



i i 



- 



our Marines? Are they going to continue their half of 

* 

the war?' No one has been able to whisper to us that 



that would not be the result. No one, private citizens; 

: 

governments, Hanoi's own representatives, governments 



\ 
\ 



- 



friendly to Hanoi. No one has been able to whisper to ' 

a 

us that there v/ould be any change "in the present military 

tactics and strategy of Hanoi with respect to seizing " 

South Viet~Nam by force, 

* 

' r . . . „ If any of you gentlemen have any information 



— - 



to the contrary, I would be glad to hear it. 

Q Mr. Secretary — 



A 



Yes? 



' t ' Q May I ask you if the channels directly to 

Hanoi remain open after this exchange of letters, and if 









so, are we putting these propositions that you have just 

■ ■ 

stated directly to them? 

* 

A As far as we are concerned, the channels 
remain open. They have been open all along, I have 
referred to the fact that nothinq we have had privately 
throws any different light on what you now know publicly _ 
about tha^ attitude of the two sides. But I shouldn't 
exaggerate the point that channels remain open. V7hen..you 



-t 



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n - 



pick up the telephone and nobody answers on the other 



*>. 




r* 



, end, is that a channel or not? Or if you find yourself 

- 

. in. ci telephone conversation and the other end hangs up, 
I will leave it to you as to whether that is a channel. 
:■ I can ^ say at the moment that our channels are not very 

— — — — ■ ^ ■* ■ 

efficient, to say the least. „ - • . 

m _ 

. . . » 

Q Mr. Secretary, is the amount of reciprocity. 

- * 

that we would require for stopping the bombing a negoti- 

* 

able commodity, or is there a decisive--iausfc there be a ' 



complete stoppage xn infiltration , "or is 

- * 

it negotiable? . •■'- — ■' 



- -' »_ t • ■■ - — ■ 



A 



I don't want to give a categorical response. 



%, , — . 



■ 



to that because President Johnson in a recent press con- 

■* 

» m 

fer'ence said that we would be glad to hear of almost any- 
thing from the other side. But that doesn't mean that we 

- 

can live on just nothing from the other side, just nothing, 

* 

I point out to you that during the Tet pause, 
at the end of which Ho Chi Minh gave his reply to the 
letter which President Johnson had sent to him at the be- 
ginning of the Tet pause, he had some other alternatives 
open to him. p If there was a problem of time, he could 

* 

. have said, "Mr. President, time is rather short here, Vie 



«* 



\ 




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' : . v : ;; .: ■ PR 70 






need a little more time on this." He didn't say that. 

* 

r 

Or he could have said, "I don't particularly like your 
proposal, but here are my counterproposals." He didn't 



* 



say that. In effect, he called for the capitulation of 
South Viet-Nam and capitulation of the American forces 
in South Viet-Nam, and a permanent and unconditional 
stoppage of the bombing. That we can't take. ■ L 

* 

Yes, sir? « ', 

* ■ 

■ 
Q Mr. Secretary, when you talk about the 



. 



— . r 



public and private record, being the same, what exactly 

- 
" do you mean? Do you mean there is nothing outstanding 

-now privately in the way of negotiation? 

- A No, What I f m saying is there is nothing 

in the private record that reflects any different view 

* 

on the part of the authorities in Hanoi than you now have 
on the public record. 

- 

Q Mr, Secretary , could you explain why you 

9 

haven't published the text of four other letters that 
you recently sent to Hanoi? . .. 

" A Because we do not wish" ourselves to 

- 

establish the point that a private communication with 
us is impossible. Xf Hanoi wishes to make public a 



69 






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* 






ti< /u 



communication from us> as they did in connection with 
the exchange between President Johnson and Ho Chi Minh, 

I - m 

m 

that is a choice which they can make. But I think it 
could be very important in the future that Hanoi at 

* 

-...* least know that it is possible for" them to communicate 

privately with us without its becoming public, to the 

- 

i* 

extent that you gentlemen would let us get away with 



>> 




! :•. 



.- -»« » — • « 



that. 



■ Mr/ Secretary , Point (b) of the United 



. - - 



States answer talks about preliminary talks. What's 



< ■ * 



your understanding of who would take part-in those 
talks— just Hanoi and Washington, or would it be Saigon 



or the NLF? 






A Well, we haven't formulated that in 



great detail because we need to know what the attitude 
of Hanoi would be and what the general situation would 
be. In our reply we did say that of course the Govern- 
jnent cf South Vic-t-Nam will have to be appropriately in- 
volved throughout this entire process j and that the 
interests and views of our allies would also have to be 

r 

taken fully into account. So we did not try to make that 

* 

* - - 

precise in detail because we would be interested in 




70. 



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. PR 70 



knowing what Hanoi's response to the Secretary General's 
initiative would be. • •"• 

Q Mr. 'Secretary, you referred to the fact 
that there was no contradiction between the public and 
private record as far as peace talks are concerne 
I wonder if you would be prepared to comment now on 
reports concerning the possibility of negotiations in 
Warsaw. f 



3'.f your question is would I be willing to, 




the answer is no. I think the attitude of Hanoi on 

* 

these matters is fairly clear at the present time, but 

I do not want to point the finger to, or close the door on, 

any contacts that might occur anywhere in any capital 

■ 

as far as the future is concerned. 

i 

Q Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. 



* 



* 



\ 



- 



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5" 



HE P. 'fO V 3 .':■■. '-HAM : - 3 



ji; INVQLVEMEKf by Willi na P. 
Bu.n->/ , A v s i s t - jat S©cr t . / for 
1 st Asian and Pacific: Affairs. 



* * * * 



Cornerstones of U.S. Policy 

* 

In essence : 

(a) Our objective remained solely that of 
protecting the independence.^ South Viet- 
Nam from external interference and force. We 
deetiiu h and still decline, to threaten the re- 
gime in North Yiet-Xam itself or the territory 
and regime of Communist China. 

(b) Ve indicated in April of 1965 that vre 
were prepared for discussions or negotiation-, 
without condition, and we have relentlessly 
pursued our own efforts to enter into meaning- 
ful discussions as veil as following up on a 
host of peace initiatives by others. Unfortu- 
nately, Hanoi has clung firmly to the objective 
of insuring a Communist takeover of booth 
Viet-Nam "and has refused to enter into any 
fruitful discussions. Indeed, Hanoi has rejected 
any discussions whatever— initially unless its 
basic objective was accepted in advance through 
the so-called "third point," more recently un- 
less we agreed to a complete cessation of the 
bombing without any responsive action on their 
part. Hanoi's philosophy toward negotiation 
hasnmv become authoritatively available, par- 
ticularly in the section on "fighting while nego- 
tiating'' in the captured remarks of one of the 
North* Vietnamese leaders, Comrade Vinh. 

(c) We continued to place every possible em- 
phasis on the crucial nonmilitary aspects of the 
conflict, greatly strengthening our own con- 
tribution to the essentially South Vietnamese 
task of restoring stability and control in the 
countryside and working for the welfare of the 

people* . , 

(d) Militarily, our actions were d ted to 
proving to North Viet-Nam that its effort to 
take over the S th by military force mui I ail 
and to extending and enlaj g the areas in 
which the vital business of bringing real se- 



curity and peace to the c tryside could go 
forward with all th stn | h we could hope 
to give it. The total effort in I .itli remained 

primary, even n- bombing of military tar- 
gets in the North was carried on— i. tally to 
demonstrate resolve but alwnvs and basically to 
make Hanoi's irrfilt ton far more difficult and 
cosily and to prevent levels of new men and 
equipment that, could only, in the arithmetic of 
guerrilla warfare, multiply many times over, 
for each addition from North Viet-Nam, the 
requirement for forces in the South. 

(e) Wo encouraged the South Vietnamese in 
their own resolve to move to a constitutional 
basis of government j a process sc1 underway 
formally by Prime AIini= t Ky in January 
of 1?G6 and followed since that tune in the face 
of all the difficulties and dan: of attempting 
to create such a basis in a country without politi- 
cal i ; ' ce a [id ravaged by terrorism and by 
guerrilla and conventional military act inn. 

(f ) We encouraged the South Vietnamese at 
the same time to proceed on the track that has 
now become reconciliation, the holding out to 
members of the Viet Cong of the possibility of 
reentering the political life of their country 
under peaceful conditions. In ace, we 

and would accept a fair determination of the . 
will of the people of South Viet-Nam along the 
lines well summarized by Ambassador Gold- 
berirs Chicago s\ of May 12, iS)67. w 

These were the South Vietnamese aspects of 
our policy. But then, as previously, the policy 
was seen in the wider context of the future of 
Southeast Asia. So it was that President John- 
sou lent our strong support in April of 1985 
to the development of regional cooperation and 
of econoinic projects created through Asian 
initiative! By this vital element in our policy, 
we made Hear again that our underlying objec- 
tive was [to do what we could to assist in the 
constructive task of bringing about a South- . 
east A : i of cooperative and independent na- 
tions, whatever their international postures 

might be. 

We bad a security job to do in Viet-Nam and 
were joined over tii by five other area nations 
in supplying military forces to do that job. And 
we are assisting Thailand against a concerted 
Chinese Communist and North Vietnamese ef- 
fort at external subversion, an effort begun— to 
keep the record straight— as early as 1082 and 
clearly and definitively by December 19G1, be- 
fore our major decisions* in Viet-Nam. Our 
SKATO and ANZUS undertakings remain 
firm. 



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But we looked b 3 cl tb ■■ . and * ■ rcra 
•still loo!: !>:/ '1 these, to tlie who] qi 
of the future of South •. and fcn the role 

that we can play in assi lienatii \* oft; 

area to cons tte their national mdopend* 
and to improve the welfare of their people. 

This, then, is a barebones a e< imi of 'The 
Path to YietN; m." J Itch within its own tei •■■■•■: \ 
it may omit what others would include. And, 
long as it may seem, if is still incomplete in two 
respects that it would take far too much time 
to cover. 

First, it is plainly inadequate to fccti solely 
on dor policies toward Yiet-Kain or evftii toward 
Southeast Asia as a whole. Those policies are 
intiinal ely r* :1 to the res( of Asia ; to the im- 
plications of A developments for o' 1 
areas and, in the last analysis, for our own na- 
tion."] security; and to our central world pur- 
; —the creation of an international order of 
independent states. 

Secondly, I have tried to i re what I con- 
sidcr to have been the major policy decision 
Obviously, policy is hot fnsf a matter of single 
decisions, however fully considered. A vast num- 
ber of lesser policy d- ions have accompanied 
these basic ones, and the way in which a basic 
policy is carried out in the end affects its sub- 
stance. I have not tried to cover, for example, 
decisions 01 the balance of effort within South 

VicNNam, decisions on particular negotiating 
proposals, decisions on the pace and nature of 
the i bing of North Mel-Nam, or the subtle 
and difficult problem, over the years, of United 
States influence toward political progress in the 
South. I know full well that these are areas in 
which many of yon undoubtedly hold strong 
views. I welcome discussion of therm 

"The Lesson in Involvement 

What, then, is "the lesson in involvement"? 

— Is it that we have been trapped into a diffi- 
cult situation by a series of lesser decisions taken 
with no clear view of their implications? 

—Is it that we should never have become en- 
gaged in Southeast Asia ? 

—Is it that we should never have attempted to 
support South Yiet-Narn ? 

—Is it that, having supported South Viet- 
JNVirn in certain respects (including a treaty) 
and having become deeply engaged in South- 
east Asia, we should nonetheless have decided— 
or should now decide— to limit the actions we 
take or even to withdraw entirely? 



The first que?'" seems to me both? te 

and d^ It. At so point in tl ve 

recited we became < liimitted, delll id 

by formal constitute al proc to the support 
of the freed of South Yiet-Nam from ex- 
ternal interference. That commitment included 
a strong t y obligation, and that is a clear 
part of the story. But what is perhaj 1 ore to 
the ] int is that greaf powers must free two 
central points: 

(a) As Irving Kristol has pointed out in his 
. recent article in 1 ign Affairs, the very defini- 
tion of a great power is that not only its ac- 
tions but the c in which it declines to act 
have major consequences. At every e in the 
Viet-Nam story, it has : med clear to the lead- 
ers of this country that not to act would have 
the gravest effects. This is the way that succes- 
sive choices have appeared to four . essive 
Presidents. 

(b) The second point that u great pi 1- 
not c ; is that its actions in themselves affect 
the stakes. When great powers commit them- 
selves, by treaty and by a total course of eon- 
duct extending over many years, an element of 
reliance comes into being, both within the area 
and within other areas in which commitments 
have also been undertaken. 

Yet, all this being said, I do not think one 
can conclude that b we said or did a, we 

must necessarily say or do b — in a e 

of Bismarck's. So I, for one, do n believe that 
the Wesson in involvement" is that we are the 
prisoners of history. 

Rather, I think we should be focusing on the 
second, third, and fourth questions I have listed 
above. 

These are big questions, and if I have tried 
to do liny thing today it is to stress that the. 
matter has really been looked at for at least 
the last 13 years in this kind of larger frame- 
work. The policies followed today are, as th$y 
must be, the policies of this administration. Xo 
one can say whether another administration 
would have done the same. YThat can be said 
is that the underlying viewpoint and analysis 
of factors have b en largely similar throughout 
the last. 13 years, if not longer. 

This does not prove, of course, that this 
analysis has been correct. The United States 
has no divine dispensation from error, and the 
most that your leaders at any time can do is 
to exerl the best human jucl mi and m 1 
sense of which they are cap? 1 ! . 1, for one, am 
convinced that this has been done, at all stn£« 



73 



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tjt*i& y if^c^/L^f^^i^p jt* 



VmTBD NATIONS, K Jf„ Sept. 21 
—*otfowitig is th text of a speech to 
Zmerol Assembly delivered tod 
Arthur J, Goldberg, United States 
chief representative: 



•*?. 



loday, as every year at this time. 
We open a new chapter in the history 
■ of the United Nations. We open on a 
Uopciul note with your [Corneliu Mao- 
5 SCU of }: tion as President, 

for you are noL only known a p. J re- 
spected by your colleagues thrc 
tfce World £5 an able and cfistfagal 
WPK isl; you also have the d 
tson of being the first representative of 
a country of Eastern Europe to be e 
^ i- high office. We of the United 

States welcome this development as 
furthei sign of the evolution which h 
been taking place in the relations among 
the states or Has Europe and of oth- 
er^ parts of the world May all members 
tane this new stcj s a reminder of i" 
truth which a modern -Danish saga h 
compressed Into jhes m - Is: "Coexist- 
ence — or no e nce. ?l 

■ We congratulate you, Mr. President, 
and pledge to von our cooperation in 
the discharge of your difficult and im- 
portant of f ice, 

I take this occasion aiso to pay trib- 
ute to your distinguished predecessor, 
the President of the Twenty-First Ses- 
r "X Ambassador Pazfa 

■ We share the admiration of all 
atfons for the resourcefulness znd 
patience with which he guided us 
tnrough more meetings of the General 
Assembly than have been presided over 
by any other man in the history of this 
organization. 

This annual genera! debate serves the . 
Important purpose of allowing e?.ch ' 
member to lay before the entire As- 
sembly, at the outset of our session, its 
major concerns in the international 
sphere. I shall not attempt to touch on 
all the issues on the agenda to which 
my country attaches importance. This 
statement will concentrate on certain is- 
sues which, in our view, are of trans- 
• cendent significance to world peace. 

The Conflict in Vietnam 

First among these is the continued 
tragic com! | im. For the en- 
tire community of nations, the search 
for peace in Vietnam remains a matt— 
of the firs! r v. for peace in Viet- 
nam must and should hi our major con- 
cern. Indeed, pvr, to its Charter, 
the United Naii . has the most explici 
right and duty to concern itself wfch 
tnis.quest:. n. as it toes with any breach 
of or threat to the peace anywhere in 
e world. _ __ 

KoMfng this convL 

it continues to seek ti 
part' '_ Eion of the V - : Nations 
in the quest for \ in Vietnam. Every 
member and every organ of the Unite." 
Nations, this Assembly include \ shares 
the Charter obli of lej . its 



weight and influence to help resolve dis- 
putes and conflicts between nations fry 
peaceful means. Today, c irjs past dis- 
appointments, I reiterate our appeal to 
all members of United Nations, • 
dividuaHy and collectively, to accept 
that obligation — to use their Influence 
to help bring the Vietnam conflict to an 
end by peaceful means. 

The distinguished delegates who par- 
ticipate in this debase will undoubtedly 
make observations and offer su« gesti ns 
as to how this can be brought about 
My delegation wilt listen to them with 
close attention and rasps 

As our contribution to the Assembly's 
discussion of this issue, let me state as 
precisely as possible the views and ides 

of my Government, 

Our basic view is one which, I am 
sure, is shared by the great majority of 
this Assembly: that this conflict can an " 
should be ended by a political solution 
at the earliest possible fee. A military 
solution is not the answer. For our part, 
we do not seek to impose a, military 
solution on' North Vietnam oTc . i ad- 
} , By the same token, in fidelity 

to a political so 1 ^SLe^Uj^OUIJ 

^orth^yietnanj^andjts i qntsjtojnv 
pose a military solution uob'n South 
Vietnam. 

4 » 

Procedures for a Solution 

The question then naturally arises: By 
what procedure can a political solution 
be reached? Qne well-tested way is the 
conference table. We are prepared to 
follow this path at any time— to go 
the conference table in Geneva or any 
other suitable place. 

There is a second way to pursue a 
political settlement: through private ne- 
gotiations or discussions. The United 
States stands ready to take this route 
also — and, in so doing, to give assur- 
ances that the confi :: 1 privacy 
of such negotiations or discussions 
would be fully respected by our Govern- 
ment 

It may be that negotiations or discus- 
sions might be preceded or facilitated 
by mutual military restraint, by the scal- 
ing down of the conflict, bye 5- escalation 
either with or w:: t a formal cease- 
fire. This route, too, we are prepared 
to follow. 

There is, on the other hand, the dan- 
ger that the Cj^nfl let nry continue until 

one side finds t [ :r6Qn of war too 
exhausting or too cosily, and that the 
fighting will only gradually end, with* 
ou: negotiations and without an agreed 
settlement Certainly this is a grin 
prospect, for it would mean prolonged 
conflict and tragedy. It is in essence a 

•rmhtary solution, and ii is not one we 
seek. We earnestly hope that it is not 
th :rse in which our adversaries will 
persist In any event, there will be no 
stack g in our resolve to help South 
Vietnam defer.d its right to deti . ;e 
its own future by peaceful means and 

•free from external force, 

7k 



most 
third party 



/ /-— - j 

Committed as we are to a political 
solution through di ssions or ne^o- 
tiati /;', we regret that, many 

efforts, North Vietnam and its adh: - 
ents Have not yet :-. ■ ' to this obj: - 
live. But we shall continue in our ef- 
forts; and we hone what we say 
today may help to bring the 
time when the two sides will sit down 

together. 
# 

The Attitude of Hanoi 

It is said by some that Hanoi will 
agree to I \ egotiations if the United 
States c-: ' . ti ; nj of North 

Vietnam— that this b bing is the sole 
obstacle to negc tons. I would note 
that in its public stater mts Eianoi has 
merely indicated that there "could" be 
negotiations if i bombing stopped. 
True, some governments-— as we'd as our 
distlnguts- ed Secretary - General and 
other individuals — - have expressed 
their belief or a thai nego- 

tiations "would" begin, perhaps soon, 
if the bombings were stopped. We have 
given these expressions of belief our 
careful attention. But no^si 

-Jr. j ji the U >vern : 

men '-.l^zJ.-l I }_L 

fri I s" '— _ ha&_ com 3 to j arty 

f sra Hanoi that 

there' would in JStcCI Qf 

the bombing J&pre >■ oped. We have 

sought such a message 'directly from 
Hanoi without success. 

On its part, the United States would 
be glad to Cv ": and discuss any 
proposal that would lead promptly to 
productive discussions that might bring 

about peace to the area. 

We do not, however, conceive it to 
be unreasonable for us to seek entight- 
tenment on this important question: 

Does North Vietnam conceive that 
the cessation of bombing would oi 
should lead to any other results than 
meaningful negotiations or discussions 
under circumstances which would not 
disadvantage either side? 

Moreover, we believe we also have A 
a right to address ourselves to those 
tents which support Hanoi's 
cause and which have stated their^ 

beliefs about Hanofs intentions and to- 

Dut this cuestion to them: 

If the I IS* tes were to ' 
first sien and order a prior cessation 
of the bombing, what would they men 
do or refrain from doing, and how 
would they then uses their influent 
and power, in order to move the Viet- 
nam conflict pre:, ptiy toward a peace- 
ful re5 m? 

Constructive answers to these ques- 
tions v : r aid in the search for peae 

A Further Necessity 

In U-ie minds c " s : mo, there is a fur- 
ther necessity; r. ly, to art ate 




l 



/ 3 /.-.■". -'Z^ by my Gov- 



ernment in as precise a manner as is 
poss:: : prior to negotiz 5 -7 and 
without in any way pre-conditioning or 
prejudicing such 1 niatkms. 



Declassified per E.xccui i \ e Order 1 3526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



It is widely accepted that the Geneva 
Agr of 1954 and 1952 si outd 

constitute the basis for settlement We 
agree. In our view, this entails: 

1. A complete cease:":- and disen - 
_jemcnt by all ?:r^d personneTln 

sped [, Such ac$bn was called 

fdnpTEe Geneva Agreemen Es.* 

2, Ko mill tar v forces, armed persqn- 
net o r b aseV to fie * main! TcfKorth 
oT~S6uth Vietnam except these under 
the control of the respective govern- 
ments. This would mean wtthdcawu 
or demobilizing all other troops, with* 
drawing external i / and related 
personnel introduced from outside South 
Vietnam, and the evacuation of mili- 
tary bases, as soon as possible under 
an agreed time sche dule* This too was 
con te m . r i J u n rfeF'f fie" G e nc va A g re 
merits. 

3. Full respect for the international ' 
frontiers of the states bordering on 
North and South Vietnam, as well as 
for the demarcation line and demilitar- 
ized zone between North and South 
Vietnam. This too was called for by 
the Geneva Agreements. 

4 t Peaceful settlement by the people 
in both North and South Vietnam of 
the question r of reunification, without 
foreign interference. This too was called 
for by the Geneva Ag its. 

5- Finally, gupervi sion of all the fore- 
going by agreed uoprj ir. x^tip^alnia- 
.<&&£&. this too was calted i^r by the 
Geneva Agreement 

thus summarizing the central e! 
ments of the Geneva Agreements, I 
tnat, as_cvidcnced H the communique 
issued at Manila last October 25, the 
Government of South Vietnam holds sm> 
ilar views. 

We make this authoritative statement, 
Mr. President, in the hope that a settle- 
ment can be reached by reaffirming the 
principals of the Geneva Agreement and 
by making use of the machinery created 
by those agreements — including m par- 
ticular a reconvened Geneva Conference 
in which all concerned parties can ap- 
propriately participate. 

An Additional Question 

* And we suggest that a further ques- 
tion is in order: 

Does North Vietnam agree that the . 
foregoing points are a correct interpre- 
tation of the Geneva Agreements to 
which it professedly subscribes? t 

To this question hi me appeal this 
plain statement about the alms 01 tne 
United States toward North Vietnam. 
The United States has no designs on 
the territory of North Vietnam: we co 
not seek to overthrow its gaveramej 
whatever its ideology; and we are fuliy 
prepared to respect its sovereignty arid 
territorial integrity and to enter mto 
specific undertakings to that end. 

By the same token, it rem our 
view that the people of South Vietnam 
should have the right to work out their 
own. political future by peaceful m« 
in accordance with the principle cf seir- 
determmatlon, and without external h- 
terfcrence; and that this ri^ht too should 
, be respected by sit. 



And it is our further view that s 
Sou tii Vietnamese who are willing to 
pari v m i Kfe 

Cf"Sottt*TVI . - - • -." . 



**■-■- 



cif^hce" as first-class • ms wtth'fuTl 



rtgfitSTn i y^scnseTWc 



qo no: co 



.-(P. 



te:ee T that" a; v segment cf the South 
.Vietnamese people should be excli 
from such peaceful participation. We 
wouJcLco::sx ! er . it altogether wise arid 
proper,, if vvoujdLji • YfCeb; 

stacle tojseacSi § — assur- 

ances oh this matter be consfde 'in 
connection \ fth a IE 

It should be on 

that the Government cf So^ih Vietnam 
has stated th*t it has "no desire to 
threaten or harm the people of V 
North;" that it seeks only to 'resolve its 
political problems without externa! in- 
terference; and that it is prepared for 
"reconciliation of a' I elements in the so- 
ciety/ 1 It is also noteworthy that the 
people of S Vietnam have Just con- 
cluded a peaceful election under a new 
constitution, and have made progress in 
trie democratic process. 

Let me add that my Government re- 
mains willing, and indeed has already 
begun, to make a major commitment of 
resources m a multilateral cooperative 
effort to accelerate in all of Souther 
Asia the benefits of economic develop- 
ment so sorely needed there. When the 
conflict is ended and peace is restored, 
we would hope to see North Vietnam 
included in that effort. 

' Constructive Replies Urged 

■ 

In the interest of progress along tl 
road to peace, we earnestly hope that 
constructive answers to the questions we 
have raised will soon be forthcoming. 
We are all too conscious that the pres- 
ent reality is one of grim and harsh con- 
flict — already tragically and unduly 
prolonged. Surely if iV re is any contri- 
bution that diplomacy, whether bilateral 
or multilateral, can make to hasten the 
end of this conflict, none in this Assem- 
bly can in good conscience spare &ny 
effort* or any labor to make that con- 
tribution — no matter how frustrating 
past efforts may have been, or how 
many new beginnings may be required. 

We of the United States, for our part, 
stand ready to make that effort and to 
persist in trying to overcome all ob- 
stacles to a settlement 

The President of the United States, 
speaking specifically of Vietnam, has 
said: '" V/e Americans know the nature of 



a fair bargain; none need fear negotiat- 
ing with us." In the flexible spirit 
that statement, and speaking for the 
United States Government, I affirm with- 
out reservation the willingness of the 
United States to seek and find a politi- 
cal solution cf the conflict in V: n. 

I turn now to the Middle East, a sec- 
ond area of go t which is both tragic 
in itself and dan : . us to the peace of 
world. 



The views of the United States on 
the requirements of peace in the Middle 
East have been se I rth by President 
Johnson, notably in his statement of 
June 19 which remains bur policy. In 
that state t my Gove: . . ' appealed 
to all the parties to ado; no rie."d view 
on the method cf bringing peace to the 
area. Rather, we have emphasized 
throughout that there is something more 
basic than methods: the simple will to 
peace. There must be present on both 

des an affirmative will to resolve t : 
issues, not V gh the dictation of 
terms by either side, but through z. 
process of mutual accommodation in 
which nobody's vital interests are in- 
jured; I hortj both sides must have the" 
will to work out a political sol a; 
both must be committed to the peace; 
and no appropriate method - h as good 
Offices or mediation, si excluded. 



Emergency 



*Tftirfrtn«* 



Ion's Work 



In candor it must be said that such a 
will to peace was not mani in the 
recent emergency s ion of the Assem- 
bly. It is greatly to be hoped that, af 
sihz? reflection by all concerned, a 
and better mood wilt emerge — a mood 
of reconciliation znd n ntmlty. 

Surely the purposes of peace cannot 
be served if the right of a n :r state 
to its national life h not accepted end 
respected by its f s; nor if mili- 

tary success blinds a member state to 
the fact thai its neighbors have rights 
and interests cf their own. 

In realism, it is perhaps not to be ex- 
pected that reconciliation and magna- 
nimity will appear ov« but surely 
enmity must at least give way to toler- 
ance and to the will to live togeil in 
peace. Once that v. ill is manifest, the 
terms of settlement can be evolved. 

The principles which my Government 
believes can bring peace to the region 
are these: 

SEach nation in the area must accc 
the right of others to live. The least that 
this requires is that ail should renounce 
any state or claim of belligerency, 
which as Ions ago as 1931 was found 



75 



by the Security Council to be incon- 
sistent with peace. 

ciroops must be withdrawn — and 
withdrawn in a context of peace. For 
some parties cannot be left free to as- 
sert the rights of war while oLhers are 
called upon to abide by the rules of 
peace, 

SThcre must be justice for the re' 
gees. The nations of the area must ad- 
dress themselves at last, with new en- 
ergy and new determi m to succeed, 
to the plight of those who have been 
rendered homeless or displaced by wars 
and ct is of the past, both distant 
and recent. 

*iFree and innocent passage throu 
international waterways must be as- 
sured for all n at; One of tli 
of tire recent conflict is that mari 
rights must be respected. 

CThe wasteful and destructive arms* 
race in the region must be cur 'ted, tl 
by making i ;es available for 

economic development, - . 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



tfThe states of Jerusalem must notbe 

decided unilaterally but in consultation 

v-th at! concerned, and in recognition 

e historic interest of the tnree great 

Lotensin the Holy Places. 

qThe political independence arid ter 
utonalir: ity of t all states in the ares 
must be respected. 

<» Boundaries must be accepted ana 
other arrangements made, superseding 
temporary and often violated armistice 



a 



lines, so as to afford security to 2II 
parties against terror, destruction and 
war. 

These are important general princi- 
ples on which* we believe, rests the 
peace of the area. White the- main re- 
sponsibility lies with the parties, the 
Urn-id Nations and every member state, 
including my own country, must help m 
the search for peace. For it is in i 
highest international int-;->t, as well as 
in the national interests of the parties, 
that peace should be achieved as soon 
as possible. 

, As for my own country, bur most 
cherished wish for the Middle East has 
long been an age of peace in wmch we 
could enjoy good relations with every 
.nation of that region. In such a climate 
of peace there is much that we could 
do, and would bs glad to do, in coopera- 
tion with other members and with the 
gifted people of the region itself. Re- 
gional economic development; the full 
habitation -of the refugees; the de- 
Iting of water and the restoration or 
-iie desert to human u=e — the 
not war or armaments, are the 



works to 



which my country, and I am sure many 
both "in end outside the Middle E; 






would prefer to devote our energies. 

I turn now to a third momentous 
problem: the search for reliable pro- 
grams of International disarmament ai 
arms control, particularly in the field 
Of nuclear weapons. 

Step-by-step progress in this field, 
which seemed out of reach for so many 
years, has more recently become a real- 
ity. Significant limitations regarding nu- 
clear weapons have been accepted by 
the nuclear powers in the Antarctic 
Treaty of 1959; in the Partial Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty cf 1963; and only last 
year in the Outer Space Treaty. 

These successive steps have encour- 
aged us to continue to tackle one of 
the most basic aspects of the nuclear 
dilemma: the threat of the spread of 
nuclear weapons to more and. more na- 
tions. This 'poses one of the gravest 
dangers to peace and, indeed, to the 
survival of mankind. The longer this 
problem remains, the graver the danger 
becomes. 

My Government has long been very 
much alive to this danger. In response 
■* it we have given th: highest priority 
the IS-Xatlon Disarmament Commit- 
tee to the objective of a non-prolifera- 
tion treat} - . 

Last month tin's long effort culminated 
in the simultaneous tabling by the Unit- 
ed States and the Soviet Union of iden- . 
tical drafts of a non-proliferation trea- 



ty -a- complete 13 ail exC cpt its safe- 
guard provisions. The texts of these 
drafts will re available in document 
form to all members of the General As- 
sembly. 



a 



comply Problems Remain 

Complex problems still remain. But 
we arc: hopeful that a. complete treaty 
draft, including a generally accept; 
safeguard provision,- wit! be presented to 
this session in time to allow for c 
sideration and action by the Assembly, 
under whose general direction and guid- 
ance this treaty Is being iiegotia 

The presentation of such a^cdmpleted 
draft will, of course, not be the cad of 
the process. There wilt remain the un- 
derstandable d of certain non-nu- 
clear countries for assurances against 
nuclear blackmail. In? Assembly , in ad* 
dition to endorsing the treaty as we hope 
it will, can make a significant contribu- 
tion to the treaty's objective of r: 
.proliferation by helping to "develop t 
solution to this related problem. 

' We fully understand that the drafts 
which have been tabled in Geneva are 
far too important to admit of hurried 
consideration by prospective signatories. 
But neither does this urgent matter ad- 
mit of procrastination. All concerned 
powers, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, 
should press forward with all practical 
speed to the conclusion of a final treaty. 
Indeed, the General Assembly itself 
spoke to all of us last year when it 
unanimously declared in Resolution 2149 
(XXI): ^ 

First, that states taf:e all necessary 
steps to facilitate and achieve at the 
earliest possible time the conclusion of 
a non-proliferation treaty; and 

Second, that all states refrain from 
any actions conducive to proliferation 
or which might hamper the conclusion 
of an agreement. 

' Mr, President, our preoccupation with 
the non-proliferation treaty lias not di- 
minished my Government's concern over 
other major problems in the arms con- 
trol field. High on the list of thmt 
problems Is the growing arsenal of stra- 
tegic offensive and defensive missiles. 
Some time ago we expressed to the So- 
viet Union .our irt: rest in an under- 
standing which would limit the deploy- 
ment of such missiles. 

In the interim, we in the United States 
have been obliged to review carefully 
our strategic position. Our conclusi 
from this review was that our security, 
including particularly security against 
the threat of a missile attack by Wain- 
land China, required us to embark upon 
the construction of a limited ant'-ballis- 
tic missile system — and 1 emphasize 
the word 'limited." 
No nation, nuclear or non-nuclear, 
^ should feel that its security is endan- 



76 



gered by this decision. On the contrary, 
to the extent that the United States will 
be better able to meet its international 
defensive resoonsf] s, and to re- 
spond to appeals from states threatened 
by nuclear blackmail, the present safety 
of many other countries may in fact be 
enhanced. 

a 

t ' No Illusions on Missiles 

However, we have no illusions that 

the construction and deployment of mis- 
sile 5 of any kind is t referred ro: ! 
to security. It is not. The events which 
Jed to our decision simply underscore 
the urgeni importance of pursuing nego- 
tiations on a limitation of s gic of; 
fensive and defensive missiles. Despi 
our lack of success thus far, the United 
States remains ready to open talks on 
this subject at any time. . , 

Mr, President, these developments 
once again demonstrate the urgenj need 
not only for a non-proliferation treaty, 
but for all the necessary steps toward 
■aeral and complete disarmament. Let 
no one imagine that the building or ac- 
quisition of a nuclear bomb buys cheap 
security. True security for all powers, 
nuclear and non-nuclear alike, lies in 
progress on the entire range of an 
control and disarmament measures — - 
including control of the strategic arms 
race, a verifiable comprehensive test 
.ban, and a cut-off of production of fis- 
sionable materials for weapons purposes. 
The sum of such acts will help to build 
a more secure world for all. 

Mr. President, the fourth great prob- 
lem which I wish to discuss is that of 
assuring self-determination and full n 
tionhood to all peoples who still live in 
colonial subjection. 

Our Assembly agenda reminds us that 
the work of ending the colonial age is 
far from finished. In fact, the hardest 
problems have remained until the last. 
This is true above alt in the southern 

■ portion cf the African continent, where 
white minorities have become deeply en- 
trenched in their dominion over black 

* majorities. In much of this area we see 
not one evil but two evils which, under 
one guise or another, go hand in hand: 
colonialism and that particularly cruel 
offense against human rights, racial dis- 
crimination. 

The opposition of the United States 
to these twin evils draws strength from 
two of the deepest elements in our own 
national life: our historic stand as an 
anticolonial power and our continuing 
struggle against racial injustice among 
our own people. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 









_ My country, founded on the proposl- 
lion that all men are created equal* and 
have equal rights before the law — and 
currently engaged in a vigorous nation- 
wide program to make that equality real 
Jot all its citizens — cannot and will 
pot adopt a double s of what is 

happening in tfte southern pan or rtifit«t. 

To those who arc impatient for re- 
dress of grievances we shall show that 
we sympathize with them and support 
their objectives, even though we may 
not alwavs aqreo on the specifics steps 
to be taken "by the international com- 
munity. 

To those who, on the other hand, re- 
sist all change, we shall continue to in- 
sist that the way to preserve peace is 
not the subme :e of legitimate grtev- 
• ances, but their timely redress. And we 
shall unceasingly bring home to them 
America's profound conviction that 
apartheid — like every other form of 
white supremacy — is, as my predecessor 
Adtai Stevenson said, 'Vac 1st in its 
origins, arrogant in its implementation", 
and, in its consequences, potentially 
dangerous for all" 

Mr. President, during th^ coming' three 
months the General Assembly will ad- 
dress itself not only to the questions we 
have discussed in. this sta> at but to a 
vast range of i i > ajffeciing the peace 
"and welfare of mankind, both now and 
in the long future. My delegation will 
seek to participate constructively in the 
Assembly's many concerns: and on a 
number of topics of particular interest 
we shall present proposals of our own. 

The United States turns to these tasks 
in a mood of sober determination. Our 
disting'i' d Secretary General, in the 
introduction to his annual report, has 
made clear his view that this has not 
been a good year for the United Na- 
tions; and we agree with that assess- 
ment. The fault lies not in the organiza- 
tion itself but in ourselves, its members; 
and it is to our own policies that we 
must all look if \ sire a better fu- 
ture. 

In serving the cause of a just ai 
peaceful world, we are not permitted 
the luxury of being easily discouraged. 
Indeed, the most forbidding obstacles are 
precisely those which should call forth 
our most persistent efforts. Nor should 
we look for any alternative to the Unit- 
ed Nations, for there is none. Year in 
and year out, through all the 'difficulties 
that may arise, we must strive to be true, 
both in word and dQQd } to the perma- 
nent pledge of peace and justice which 
we, as members, have made to the Unit- 
ed ftpJ.ions and to one another. 

As this Twenty-second General As- 
sembly opens, the United States once 
again solemnly reaffirms its devotion 
that pledge, 



.-; 



77 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NVVD Date: 201 1 




Clfi <n i >h f 1/7 fin fi n f 



Fllilv&IUli/lM i 1 





1 ) U f O ,! 



r 



<*, 




/i j.6i\! 1 a 



Week Ending Friday > October 6> 1967 



1372 



VIETNAM " ' 

The President's Remarks in San A nlonio Jiefare the National Legislative 

Confirmee* September 29, 19G7 

• 

Speaker Barnes, Governor Hughes, Governor Smith, Congressman Kazen, 
Representative Graham, most distinguished legislators, ladies and gentle- 
men: 

I deeply appreciate this opportunity to appear before an organiza- 
tion whose members contribute every day such important work to the 
public affairs of our State and of our country. 

This evening I came here to speak to you about Vietnam, 

I do not have to tell you that our people are profoundly concerned 
about that struggle. 

There are passionate convictions about the wisest course for our Na- 
tion to follow. There are many sincere and patriotic Americans who 
harbor doubts about sustaining the commitment that three Presidents 
and a half a million of our young men have made. 

Doubt and debate are enlarged because the problems of Vietnam 
are quite complex. They are a mixture of political turmoil — of poverty— 
of religious and factional strife— -of ancient servitude and modem lonnm 
for freedom. Vietnam is all of these things. 

Vietnam is also the scene of a powerful aggression that is spurred 
by an appetite for conquest. 

It is the arena' where Communist expansionism is most aggressively 
at work in the world today — -where it is crossing international frontiers 
in violation of international agreements; where it is killing and kid- 
naping; where it is ruthlessly attempting to bend free people to its will. 

Into this mixture of subversion and war, of terror and hope, America 
has entered—with its material power and with its moral commitment. 

Why? 

Why should three Presidents and the elected representatives of our 
people have chosen to defend this Asian nation more than 10,000 miles 
from American shores? 

We cherish freedom — yes. We cherish self-determination for all 
people — yes. We abhor the political murder of state by another, a : 
the bodily murder of any people by gangsters of whatever ideology. And 
for 27 years — since the days of lend-lease — we have sought to strengthen 
free people against domination by aggressive foreign powers. 



rr 



Declassified per Execw i \ e Order 1 3526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 201 1 



MONDAY, OCTDDE2 9, 1967 



it 



V 



■ 






I 

* 



^ 



+ 






r 






/ 



But the key to all we have done Is really our own security. At tin 
of crisis — before asking Americans to fight and die to resist aggression 
in a foreign land—every American President has finally had to answer 
this question: 

" Is the aggression a threat — not only to the immediate victim — but 
to the United States of America and to the peace and security of the 
entire world of which we in America are a very vital part? ■ 

That is the question which Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy 
and Lyndon Johnson had to answer in facing the issue in Vietnam. 

That is the question that the Senate of the United States answered 
by a vote of 82 to 1 when it ratified and approved the SEATO treaty 
in 1955, and to which the Members of the United States Congrc 
responded in a resolution that it passed in 1964 by a vote of 504 to 2, 
"the United States is. therefore, prepared, as the President determines, 
to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist 
any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense 
Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom." 

■ Those who tell us now that we should abandon our commitment — ■ 
that securing South Vietnam from armed domination is not worth the 
price we are paying — must also answer this question. And the test they 
must meet is this: What would be the consequence of letting armed 
agression against South Vietnam succeed? What would follow in the 
time ahead? What kind of world are they prepared to live in 5 months or 
5 years from tonight? 

For those who have borne the responsibility for decision during these 
past 10 years, the stakes to us have seemed clear — and have seemed high. 

President Dwight Eisenhower said in 1959; 

"Strategically, South Vietnam's capture by the Communists would 
bring their power several hundred miles into a hitherto free region. The 
remaining countries in Southeast Asia would be menaced bv a ereat flank- 
ing movement, The freedom of 12 million people would be lost immedi- 
ately, and that of 150 million in adjacent lands would be seriously endan- 
gered. The loss of South Vietnam would set in motion a crumbling process 
that could, as it progressed, have grave consequences for us and for 
freedom, .,...* ' 

And President John-F. Kennedy said in 1962: 

* c . . . Withdrawal in the case of Vietnam and the case of Thailand 
might mean a collapse of the entire area." 

A year later, he reaffirmed that : " : 

"We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for 
us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South 
Vietnam; but Southeast Asia, So we are going to stay there," said President 
Kennedy. 

This is not simply an American viewpoint, I would have you legisla- 
tive leaders know. T am going to call the roll now of Owbc who live irf that 
part of the world— in the great arc of Asian and Pacific nations— and 
who bear the responsibility for leading their people, and the responsibility 
for the fate of their people. 



13; 



79 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i 



1374 



V/SE'UY CO.MNLAT10N OF PRESIDENTIAL PCCUAti: 



,Thc President of the Philippines had this to say: 

"Vietnam is the focus of attention now. ... It may happen io 
Thailand or the Philippines, or anj^wherc, wherever there is misery, dis- 
ease, ignorance, . . , For you to renounce your position of leadership in 
Asia is to allow the Pvcd Chinese to gobble up all of Asia." 

The Foreign Minister of Thailand said : 

"(The American) decision will go down in history as the move that 
prevented the world from having to face another major conflagration." 

The Prime Minister of Australia said : : * 

"\Ve .are there because while Communist aggression persists the 
whole of Southeast Asia is threatened." 

President Park of Korea said : 

"For the first time in our history, we decided to dispatch our combat 
.troops overseas . . . because in our belief any aggression against the 
Republic of Vietnam represented a direct and grave menace against the 
security and peace of free Asia, and therefore directly jeopardized the 
very security and freedom of our own people," 

The Prime Minister of Malaysia warned his people that if the 
United States pulled out of South Vietnam, it would go to the Commu- 
nists, and after that, it would be only a matter of. time until they moved ^ 
against neighboring states. 

The Prime Minister of New Zealand said: 

"We can thank God that America at least regards aggression in Asia 
with the same concern as it regards aggression in Europe — and is pre- 
pared to back up its concern with action." 

The Prime Minister of Singapore said : 

"I feel the fate of Asia— South and Southeast Asia— will be decided 
in the next few years by what happens out in Vietnam." 

I cannot tell you tonight as your President — with certainty— that 
a Communist conquest of South Vietnam would be followed by a Com- 
munist conquest of Southeast Asia. But I do know there are North 
Vietnamese troops in Laos. I do. know that there arc North Vietnamese 
trained guerrillas tonight in northeast Thailand. I do know that there 
are Communist-supported guerrilla forces operating in Burma. And a 
Communist coup was barely averted in Indonesia, the fifth largest nation 
in the world. 

So your American President cannot tell you — with certainty — that a 
Southeast Asia dominated by Communist power would bring a third 
world war much closer to terrible reality. One could hope that this would 
not be so. . - 

But all that we have learned in this tragic century strongly suggests 
to me that it would be so. As President of the United States, I am not 
prepared to gamble on the chance that it is not so. I am not prepared to 
risk the security — indeed, the survival — of this American Nation on mere 
.hope and wishful thinking, I am convinced that by seeing this struggle 
through now, we are greatly reducing the char of a much larger war — 
perhaps a nuclear war, I would rather stand in Vietnam, in our time, and 



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by meeting this danger now, and facing up to it, thereby reduce the dang 
for our children and for our grandchildren. 

I want to turn now to the struggle in Vietnam Itself. 

* 

There are questions about this difficult war that must trouble every 
really thoughtful person-. I am going to put some of these questions. And 
I am going to give you the very best answers that I can give you. 

First, are the Vietnamese — with our help, and that of their other 
allies— really making any. progress? Is there a forward movement? The 
reports I sec make it clear that there is. Certainly there is a positive mover 
ment toward constitutional government. Thus far the Vietnamese have 

met the political schedule that they laid down in January 1966. 

The people wanted an elected, responsive government. The}- wanted 
it strongly enough to brave a vicious campaign of Communist terror and 
assassination to vote for it. It has been said that they killed more civilians 
in 4 weeks trying to keep t! from voting before the election than our 
American bombers -have killed in the big cities of North Vietnam in bomb- 
ing military targets. 

On November 1, subject to the action, of course, of the Constituent 
Assembly, an elected government will be inaugurated and an elected 
Senate and Legislature will be installed. Their responsibility is clear: To 
answer the desires of the South Vietnamese people for self-determination 
and for peace, for an attack on corruption, for economic development, 
and for social justice. 

There is progress in the Avar itself, steady progress considering the 
war that we arc fighting ; rather drama I >rogress considering the situa- 
tion that actually prevailed when we sent our troops there in 1965; when 
we intervened to present the dismemberment of the country by the Viet- 
cong and the Nor tli Vietnamese. 

The campaigns of the last year drove the enemy from many of their 
major interior bases. The military victory almost within Hanoi's grasp 
in 1965 has now been denied them. The grip of the Vietcong on the peo- 
ple is being broken. 

Since our commitment of major forces in July 1965 the proportion 

of the population living under Communist control has been reduced to 

"well under 20 percent. Tonight the secure proportion of the population 

has grown from about 45 percent to 65 percent — and in the contested 

areas, the tide continues to run with us. 

But the struggle remains hard. The South Vietnamese have suffered 
severely, as have we — particularly in the First Corps area in the north, 
where the enemy has mounted his heaviest attacks, and where his lines 
of communication to North Vietnam are shortest. Our casualties in the 
war have reached about 13,500 killed in action, and about 85,000 
wounded. Of those 85,000 wounded, we thank God that 79,000 of the 
85,000 have been returned, or will return to dutv shortly. Thanks to our 
great American medical science and the helicopter. 

I know there are other questions on your minds, and on the minds 



of many sincere, troubled Americans: ,c Why not negotiate now? so 
many ask me. The answer is that ^ve and our South Vietnamese allies 
are wholly prepared to negotiate tonight. 

- •* . 

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WEEKLY COMPILATION Or PRESIDENTIAL DOOj; t \^uZ 



I am ready to talk with IIo Chi Miiih, and other chiefs of state 
concerned, tomorrow, 

J am ready to have Secretary Rusk meet with their foreign minister 
tomorrow. 

I am ready to send a trusted representative of America to any spot 
on this earth to talk in public or private with a spokesman of Hanoi. 

We have twice sought to have the issue of Vietnam dealt with by the 
United Nations — and twice Hanoi lias refused. 

Our desire to negotiate peace — through the United Nations or 
out — lias been made very, very clear to Hanoi — directly and many times 
through third parties. 

. : As we have told Hanoi time and time and time again, the heart of 
the matter really is this: The United States is willing to stop all aerial 
* and naval bombardment of North Vietnam when this will lead promptly 
to productive discussions. We, of course, assume that while discussions 
proceed, North Vietnam would not take advantage of the bombing 
cessation or limitation. 

But Hanoi has not accepted any of these proposals. 

So it is by Hanoi's choice— and not ours, and not the rest of the 
world's— that the war continues. * „ 

Why, in the face of military and political progress in the South, and 
the burden of our bombing in the North, do they insist and persist with 
the war? 

- From many sources the answer is the same. They still hope that the 
people of the United States will not see this struggle through to the vci y 
end. As one Western diplomat reported to me only this week — he had 
just been in Hanoi — "They believe their staying power is greater than 
ours and that they can't lose." A visitor from a Communist capital had 
this to say: 'They expect the war to be long, and that the Americans in 
the end will be defeated by a breakdown in morale, fatigue, and psycho- 
logical factors." The Premier of North Vietnam said as far back as 1962 : 
'Americans do not like long, -inconclusive war. , . . Thus we are sure 
to win in the end." . 

Are the North Vietnamese right about us? 

* 

- I think not. No. I think they are wrong. I think it is the common 
failing of totalitarian regimes, that they cannot really understand the 
nature of our democracy: \ 

m 

■ - - * " 

—They mistake dissent for disloyalty; 

- — They mistake restlessness for a rejection of policy; 

■ — They mistake a few committees for a country; 

— They misjudge individual speeches for public policy. 

They are no better suited to judge the strength and perseverance of 
America than the Nazi and the Stalinist propagandists were able to judge 
it. It is a tragedy that they must discover these qualities in the American 
people, and discover them through a bloody war. " , ■ 



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And, soon or late, they will discover tlxem. 

In the meantime, it shall be our policy to continue to seek negotia- 
tions — confident that reason will some day prevail; that Hanoi will 
realize that it just can never win ; that it will turn away from fighting and 
start building for its own people. 

Since 'World War II, this Nation has met and lias mastered many 
challenges — challenges in Greece and Turkey, in Berlin, in Korea, in 
Cuba. -- 

Wc met them because brave men were witling to risk their lives for 
their nation's security. And braver men have never lived than those who 
carry our colors in Vietnam at this very hour. 

The price of these efforts, of course, has been heavy. But the price of 
not having made them at all, not having seen them through, in my 
judgment would have been vastly greater. 

Our goal has been the same — in Etifope 3 in Asia, in our own hemi- 
sphere. It has been — -and it is now — peace, 

And peace cannot be secured by wishes; peace cannot be preserved 
by noble words and pure intentions. "Enduring peace/ 5 Franklin D. 
Roosevelt said, "cannot be bought at the cost of other people's freedom." 

The late President Kennedy put it precisely in November 1951, 
when he said: "We are neither warmongers nor appcasers, neither hard 
nor soft. Wc are Americans determined to defend the frontiers of frecdoi n 
by an honorable peace if peace is possible but by arms if arms are used 
against us." 

. The true peace-keepers in the world tonight are not those who urge 
us to retire from the field in Vietnam — who tell us to try to find the 
quickest, cheapest exit from that tormented land, no matter what the 
consequences to us may be. 

The true peace-keepers are those men who stand out there on the 
DMZ at this very hour, taking the worst that the enemy can give. The 
true peace-keepers are the soldiers who are breaking the terrorist's grip 
around the villages of Vietnam — the civilians who are bringing medic 
care and food and education to people who have already suffered a 
generation of war. - ■• 

And so I report to you that we are going to continue to press forward. 
Two things wc must do. Two tilings we shall do. 

First, we must not mislead our enemy. Let him not think that debate 
and dissent will produce wavering and withdrawal. For I can assure you 
they won't. Let him not think that protests will produce surrender. Be- 
cause they won't. Let him not think that he will wait us out. For he won't. 

Second, wc will provide all that our brave men require to do the job 
that must be done. And that job is going to be done. 

These gallant men have our prayers — have our thanks— have our 
heart-felt praise — and our deepest gratitude. 

Let the world know that the keepers of peace will endure through 

every trial — and that with the full backing of their countrymen, they are 

going to prevail. * ■ 

• * 
note: The President spoke at 8:34 pin., c.d.t., at the Yilltta Assembly Hal! in San 
Antonio, Texas. The speech was broadcast nationally. 

The National Legislative Conference is an operation of the Council of St; 
Governments with headquarters in Atlanta, Ga. The group included approximately 
.2,000 delegates to the Conference. 



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SUBMISSION OF THE VIETXA3I COXPJLICT TO THE 

■ UNITED XATIOXS 



thursday, nov3ssibek 2, 1937 

United States Senate, 

.COMMITTEE OX FoilEIGX RelaTIQXS, 

Washington-, U,C\ 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 
4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) 
presiding. 

Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Gore, 
Laiiscbc, Symin gtOn, Pell, McCarthy, and Aiken. 

The Chairman. The committee \ral come to order. 

Wo meet this morning to continue a series of heatings on the role 
that the United Nations should play in settlement of the Vietnam 
conflict. The committee is considering two resolutions covering the 

§u est ion of submitting the Vietnam war to the United Nations 
ecurity Council. Both Senate Concurrent Resolution 44, introduced 
by the distinguished Senator from Oregon, Senator Morse, and Senate 
Resolution ISO, introduced by the senior Senator from Montana, 
Mr. Mansfield, with 57 cosponsors, are being considered by the com- 4 
mi I tec. ^ ^ 

We are very happy indeed this morning to welcome the Representa- 
tive of the United States to the United Nations, Ambassador Arthur 
Goldberg. Mr. Ambassador, will you proceed? 

STATELIEST OF HON, ARTHUR I. GOLDBERG, "U.S. REPRESENTATIVE 

TO THE UNITED NATIONS, ACCOMPANIED BY JOSEPH J. SISCO, 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OP STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL 

- ORGANISATION AFFAIRS - 

. "** 

Ambassador Goldberg. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman 
and members of this committee. I should like to say I am accompanied 
here today by Mr. Joseph Sisco, the able and dedicated Assistant 
Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. 

Mr, Chairman and gentlemen, I appreciate very much your 
invitation to appear before this committee and to give testimony in 
public session on the important subject of the responsibility of the 
United Nations in the search for peace in Vietnam, This is the grara- 
men of Senate Concurrent Resolution 44 introduced by Senator Morse, 
and of Senate Resolution ISO introduced by Senator Mansfield and 
many other Senators. 

I should like also, Mr. Chairman, to express my appreciation to the 
committee which had scheduled me to appear last week to defer my 
appearance which was impos 1! k ; i thai time because of a meeting 



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SUBMIT VIETNAM CONFLICT TO UNITED NATIONS 

of Jie Security Council and other consultations on the Middle Eastern 
£'YJ3is ftt the U.X. I. should like aba to thank Dr. Ma rev who was 
Vind as to arrange fur this day which was mure coin en rent. 

At the very outset let me say that I a ly with the 

concept of the responsibility of the United Nations which tttulerTu 
both resolutions* 

In preparing my testimony I have taken note of Senator Morse's 
comment in the hearings before this committee on October 20, 
referring to Senator Mansfield's resolution and 1 quote Senator 
Morse, who said in part: "I think it probably would be the most 
appropriate type of resolution to send to the President, for, after all, 
this ought to be a teamwork play." 

I need scarcely add at this time that the Senator made it very clear 
this was without prejudice to his own views in the matter. 

It is my considered view as the U.S. Representative to the United 
Nations that the adoption of Senator Mansfield's resolution at this 
time will sttpjx efforts I have been making at the United Nations 

at the direction of the President to enlist the Security Council in the 
search for peace in Vietnam. 

U.X. RESFOXSiiilU'l V UNDEI; THE CHARTER 

Any analysis of the problem of .U.X. involvement in Vietnam nuisi 
start with the United Nations charter. Under the charter, the United 
Nations and its members have a specific obligation to cooperate in 
the maintenance of international peace and security. This obligation 
is clearly set forth in the provisions of the charter, including specifically 
the following: 

Article 1, paragraph I, which states the first purpose of the United 
Nations as: 

To maintain international peace and scanty, and to that end: to take effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for 
the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and ro bring 
about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of jir- and 
international Luv, adjustment or settlement of iuternufional disputes or situations 
which lui^ht lead to a breach of the peace. 

Article 2, paragraph 3, which includes among the principles binding 
upon all members the following: * " 

All members shall settle their international disputes by .peaceful means in such 
a manner that international peace and security, and justice are not endangered. 

Article 24, paragraph 1: - 

In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nation?, its Mem- 
bers confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under 
this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf. 

■ : Article 25: 

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions 
of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter* 

And to these provisions should be added all of chapters VI and VII 
of the charter which confer broad powers on the Security Council for 
the maintenance of international peace and security. 
• Moreover, it is obvious that these powers and obligations of the 
United Nations pply to the situation in Southeast Asia in general 
and Vietnam in particular. * 



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SUBMIT VIETNAM CONFLICT TO UNITED NATIONS 



In saying this I ant mindful of the argument that is sometimes made, 
both tn and out of the United Nations, that several of the principal 
parties—the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, theRcpublic of Viet- 
nam, and the People's Republic of China— are not in the United Na- 
tions and that it i>, therefore, not a suitable place to deal with the 
Vietnam qw -'; >n. The premise is, of course, a fact, but the conclusion 
is incorrect. The charter explicitly provides for the responsibility and 
participation of no tmi embers; for example: 

Article 2, paragraph 6, provides— 

The Organization shall ensure that states which arc not Memberi of the raited 
Nations n accordance with thfso principles so fur as may 1 cessary for the 
niaintcnaro ' rnatloual peace and security. 

Arid article 32 provides in part, and I again quote, that— 

Any state which ta not a member of the United Nation?, if it U a party to a di<- 
ptfte InuI'T consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, 
without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. 

—It Is clear, .therefore, Mr. Chairman, that the United Nat inns has 
a dutv to act for peace in Vietnam, and that the involvement of 
nonmembers is no obstacle to such action. The question therefore 
arises: Why has such action not taken place? 

I believe it would be useful to tlm committee if I review briefly the 
record of our endeavors in the Security Council to obtain such action. 

• ■ 

ATTITUDE OP COUNCIL MEMBERS TOWARD DEBATE 

Ambassador Goldberg. It is important to note also, Mr, Chairman 
and gentlemen, that the Soviet Union and Bui la refused throughout 
to even join in the consultations which Ambassador Matsui held among 
the Council members. The Soviet representative. Ambassador Fcdc 
enkOj sent a letter to the President of the Council stating his "stro: 
objections" to the procedure followed by Ambassador Matsui, and 
charging him with "steps that go beyond the limit of his confidence and 
violate the Security Council's rules of procedure and established prac- 
tice-" A si? t letter Was also sent by the Bulg a representative, I 
need scarcely add, Mr. Chairman, that in our view and I think in the 
view* of many members of the Council Ambassador Matsui acted 
uitc properly in doing what he did and quite within his authority as 
Resident of the Council in reporting to the members of the Council 
the results of his consultations. 

My own canvass taken independently of that of Ambassador Matsui 
confirmed his assessment that the members of the Council were gen- 
erally unwilling to proceed with a substantive discussion despite the 
strong and express preference of the United States that we get on 



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SUBMIT VIETNAM CONFLICT TO UNITED NATIONS 

-with the debate. I should also like to add we did have somewhat of a 
•substantive debate as happens in the U.X. even i:i the process o 
inscribing an item. I made a statement of a substantive character in 
support of Inscription because I could hardly avoid it, and other mem- 
bers spoke to the substance in dealing with the inscription matter as is 
apparent from the record you have kindly allowed me to file with t 
■committee. 

Indeed my canvass showed that this unwillingness to get on villi 
the debate was found even among those members who had voted 
affirmatively on i riptioii in the hope that such a vote might- sway 
the negative attitude of the Soviet 1 ti and France in particular, 

# # 4 # 

EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF THE ADMIXlSTilATlOX 

Now, Mr. Chairman, this is the record of my efforts on behalf of 
the Administration and the President to enlist the United Nations 
and specifically the Security Council in the search for peace in Vietnam, 

I must confess that the failure of these efforts has been my keenest 
disappointment and my^ greatest frustration during my service for our 
Government at the United Nations, I frankly had hoped for a much 
more constructive and positive role of the United Nations when I took 
on this ! ssignment for our country. But, Mr. Chairman, in spite of 
these rebuffs, I do not intend, as long as I occupy my present post, to 
diminish my efforts hi this cause. - - . . 

I repeat my co&victioo that Senator Mansfield's resolution, if it is 
. adopted by the Senate, as I hop and trust it will be, will support the 
efforts I am makim at the United Nations at the President's direction. 
-The resolution, as I understand it, is intended to express the sense of 
the Senate and appropriately leaves the timing and circumstances of . 
action in the Security Council for Presidential determination. 

For my part, I promise this committee and the American people, in 
keeping with the spirit of the resolutions that you are considering, to 
persevere with all the resources at my command to the end that the 
Security Council may cany out its clear responsibilities under the 
charter with respect to Vietnam. I shall do so in the conviction that if 
there is any contribution that diplomacy— in or out of the United 
Nations — can make to hasten the end of this conflict, none of us can in 
good conscience spare any effort or any labor to make that contribu- 
tion — no matter how frustrating past efforts may have been, or how • 
many new beginnings may be required. The admirable courage and 
perseverance of our men on the "battlefield must be fully matched by 
our perseverance in seeking, through diplomacy, to find the common 
ground on which a fair and honorable political settlement can be 

built. 

I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. . . 

The Chairman, Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, 

I third: that is an extraordinarily clear and very fine statement, and 
I think it does great credit to your representation of this country in 
the United Nations. _ i . * 

There are a few questions I want to go into quickly, much quicker 
than I would like, m order that other members may have an oppor- 
tunity to put questions. 

INTENTION TO RECONVENE GENEVA CONFERENCE 

May I ask regarding the current prop 1 that you have or expect to 
submit, which— 

Calls for the convening of an international conference for the purpose of estab- 
lishing a permanent peace in Southeast Asia based upon the principles of the 
Geneva Agi- ■ -'s. 



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■ . SI'BMJT VIETNAM CONFLICT TO UNITED NATIONS 

Is it proper to Interpret that as meaning the ssmc as the reconvene 
of the Geneva conference under the cocbairniaiiship of the United 
Kingdom and the U.S.S.K., with the same membership parti* ting? 

Amb^ 1 >r Goldberg. Yes, Mr. Chairman, 

It is intended to reaffirm our Mfillin to have that done. It is 

also intended to .add a little more flexibility because there bare been 
some indications from the other side that perhaps some other con- 
ference might b i .Me. But we would bo entirely will and we 
would be interpreting this clause to menu that the Geneva coi Mice, 
With tho same membership should be reconvened. 

The Chairman. On several occasions, the other side, the North 
Vietnamese and, I thinly as one of your citations of the Chinese said, 
■that that is the competent forum in which this matter should be 
settled; is that not correct? 

Ambassador Golmerg, There have been some recent statements 
particularly from China further quaKfiying their former position, and 
pur formulation was intended to be more encompassing so as not to 
exclude-any type of international conference, but we believe the most 
•appropriate would be the reconvening of the Geneva Conference as 
yon have said, ' ^ ' j " . . 

The Chairman. And from time to time, the Soviet Union has also 
stated that the conference was a proper forum; is that not correct? 

Ambassador Goi/dkkiig. That is correct, but the Soviet Union has 
not responded to our repeated invitation to them to join with the 
British in reconvening the conference. 

The Chaikman. I realize that, "" '" : : 



RECONVENING OF GENEVA CONFERENCE 

Let me say, I certainly am sympathetic with your view that Hanoi 
lias been very unresponsive to these offers and it is cmitc beyond my 
comprehension as to why. I don't understand their reluctance or their 
refusal to do it except possibly they may interpret this move to mean 
the United Nations is going itself to undertake to deal with the sub- 
stantive question. Nov.', this may be a point, I am not clear, I don't 
faiow, of course, whether or not mat is their reason, but if that should 
be so that they interpreted this as "a move on our part to use the U.N- 
to solve the problem then they, not being a member have some reason 
for it Even so, I would not agree with their position at all. I think that 
it would be perfectly proper if they would agree to come and submit 
the matter to the United Nations. ^ ^ . 

But in any case, seeking to find some basis upon which we might get 
a reconvening of the Geneva conference, it has seemed to me that this 
point is very important. I confess that if this is the purpose, to re- 
convene the Geneva conference, I cannot possibly understand the 
attitude of the French Government or of the Soviet Government in 
refusing to take the position in the Security Council that this would be 
a proper mode of procedure because you do not deal with it 

substantively, 

I think some of the statements of the Soviets and of the French 
that I have seen and some which you cite seem to indicate that ther 
believe, too, that we are attempting to use the Security Council 
itself to deal with the substantive question; is that correct? 



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; SUBMIT VIETNAM CONFLICT TO UNITED NATIONS 

"Ambassador Gold};:. I shared your apprehensions about this,, 
Mr. Chairman, and in the inscription debate in 1686 after listening 
to the comments made by the Soviet Union and by France and having 
read sonic- of these editorials which appeared at the time, 1 specifically 
addressed myself to that problem in the same light as you have hist 
done, trying to make clear that while we believe, and had to believe 
under the charter, that the Security Council had competence, never- 
theless, in Ikjit of v.hat they are saying about it, it was not our 
proposal that the U.K. itself settle the matter, but rather, we were 
trying to get the great influence and prestige of the Security Council 
behind the reconvening of the Geneva conference, and I think the 
statement you made today is a helpful statement. I endorse it com- 
pletely, and I also am puzzled why, in light of their contention on 
the basis that the Geneva conference is the forum, why they can pos- 
sibly object to a Security* Council resolution which supports the recon- 
vening of the forum which it is asserted by them is the appropriate 

forum. 

The Chaikman, That is right. This really raises a question of their 
good faith, in toy mind. If they really are interested in being of assist- 
ance in stopping this serious conflict, I am at a loss to understand why 
they would refuse to reconvene the conference if the members of the 
Security Council so recommend; That would particularly apply to 
France and the Soviet Union who have both on numerous occasions 
stated publicly that this was the way to proceed. 

ATTITUDE OF NONPBR11ANBNT MK.MBEK5 OF COUNCIL 

Now, I am not aware of the previous statements of some of the 
nonpermauent members of the Security Council. You don't have 
time, of course, to outline them, but in your consultations, I can't 
understand why they would not, at least nine of them, agree to this. 
00 you think they understand this point? 

Ambassador GoitDBEHG, I think they must understand it, Mr. 
Chairman, and gentlemen, I have before me the statement I made, 
which is in your record, after the debate that we had in February 
of 1966, and I said this — I should like to read, if I may, just a para- 
graph or two, - : * 

Now I shall turn to some of the questions raised by members in the course of 
our discussion. I should like to deal with what was first pointed out by my friend, 
our former President, the Representative of France, whose vrisdom I have learned 
to appreciate very much and whose friendship I deeply value. The question he 
raised is an important and lias been raised by others, the representative of 
Mali, the representative of Uganda, and it has been adverted to by the repre- 
sentative of Bulgaria and I think was mentioned also by our esteemed colleague, 
Mr. Fcdorenko of the Soviet Union. Their point is this: It has been pointed out 
by them that the Geneva conference at which all parties to the conflict are repre- 
sented, has been the international body which has In the past dealt with the 
Eroblems of Vietnam, it lias been claimed that it still remains t ■ ■.- appropriate 

ody to do so. The United States has no quarrel with this contention. We have 
repeatedly stated that we would welcome the reconvening of the Geneva con- 
ference for this purpose. It has been correctly pointed out that the purpose of our 
draft resolution is to assist in what thus far it has not been possible to realize, 
the reconvening of the Geneva Conference. That has not been possible to realize 
not because of any opposition on the part of the Unite tes.* Quite the con 




at least for the time being closed and the question we have to decide is a plain 



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SUBMIT VIETNAM CONFLICT TO UNITED NATIONS 

find simple one: Do we wish also to close the door to the V fJ ! Nations? What 
wilt the people of the world say if we do? 

The Chairman. You have made that very clear this morning 
much clearer than it Las ever beetk made before, although I think 
your speech in August went very far in this direction. I must say I 
thought it was an excellent speech and I am at a loss to understand 
why so many members of the Ass My haver tly made spec- 
critical of our country, and of the bombing in view of your speech. 
I can't believe they understand what we really mean. So I am par- 
ticularly pleased that you support this resolution of Senator Mam f: kh 
I predict that if this is property handled, and I have every confidence 
it will be by you, that this will make a great impression upon a number 
of those people' who have been critical. J don't see how they could 
object to this procedure. 

Senator Spark man? 

Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, let me say that I certainly 
endorse everything the Chan-man has said. I have been very much 
impressed with your statement, Ambassador Goldberg. It seems to 
me that you have gone into the matter most carefully and pointedly, 
and 1 don't see much left to question you about. 

I am puzzled as is the Chairman, about the attitude of many of 
these countries, as to why they could not accept what seem- to be 
the clear responsibility of the Security Council under the charter 
of the United Nations to take some kind of action. It seems to me 
that you have probed in just about every direction that you can to 
find some action that they could agree to take. 






AGREEMENT OX RECONVENING GENEVA CONFERENCE 



Does the Geneva Conference have the power to reconvene itself? 

Ambassador Golti Under the rules of the conference, the two 

cochairmen, the Soviet Union and Great Britain, may reconvene the* 
conference. 

Senator Sparkman. But it cannot be reconvened unless bot 
chairmen agree to it? ^ 

Ambassador Goldberg. That is correct. 

Senator Sparkman. And so far the chairmen have not agreed 

to do so? 

Ambassador Goldberg. The British have repeatedly indicated 
their wi!lingn to do so by public statements and bv private letters 
to the other coch airman as recently as in the Assembly of the United 
Nations last month. ..* - 

Senator Sparkman. Does the Soviet representative give reasons 
for his unwillingness to reconvene the conference? 

Ambassador Goldberg. Basically, if I were to interpret his reasons, 
his reasons are that Hanoi does not want the conference reconvened. 
He always says that the Soviet Union docs not want to, but lie always 
reads the statements made either by Hanoi or the NLF, and my 
interpretation is that that is the basis for the ck m taken by the 
Soviet Union. That is my interpretation, Mr. Chairman. He also 
asserts that they are unwilling, but that is my inter! rotation. 

Senator Sparkman. How many countries constitute the Geneva 
Conference? ■- 



1/ 



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SUBMIT VIETNAM CONFLICT TO UNITED NATIONS 

Ambassador Goldbkrg, The Geneva Conference, there are quite a 
number, 

•' The Chahlmax. Are you^ talking about the 1951 one or tlie 19G2. 

one? There arc nine in the first; M in the second. 

. Ambassador Goli^i. it a. There are a 1 :: er Dumber. 

: Senator Spaekmax. Fourteen hi the one that prevails at the present 

time. I believe, you have put to them that we would be willing to 

proceed under either the 1951 or the 1902 arrangement; is that right? 

Ambassador Ggldekkg, That is correct. Although we do feel that 
if a conference were to be held it would be highly desirable to deal 
•with both issues because it would be necessary to deal with peace iu 
that part of the world, and would be highly desirable to deal with the 
problems in Laos, Cambodia! because they are related problems, as 
well as Vietnam, • 

Senator Spark-max. But the membership is powerless to act in the 
absence of the. agreement of the two chairmen. 

Ambassador Goldbjuig. That is correct, Senator Sparkman. 

Senator Spakkmax. Mr. Ambassador, 1 want to commend you for 
what 1 consider the excellent job that you have been doing for us in 
the United Nations and for your presentation here today. 

Ambassador Goldberg. Thank you. 

Senator SrAUKMAX. That is all, Mr. Chairman, : 



. 



'». 



*i 



MEMBEK5HTP OF GENEVA CONFERENCES 



» *\ 



The Chairman. For the record, Mr. Ambassador, unless it is already 
in would you insert the membership of both Geneva conferences and 
also the present membership of the Security Council? 
Ambassador Goldberg Yes; J shall be very glad to do so, , 
(The material referred to follows:) ■ : ■• 

■- ■ Membership of Geneva Conferences 



195-1 



1962 



I. PARTICIPANTS 



Cambodia 
Chit i a (Communist) 
France 
Laos 

United Kingdom 
United States . 

U.S.S-) : 

Vietnam, State of (South) 
Vietnam, Democratic Republic of 
■ (North) » 



Burma 
Cambodia 
Canada 

China (Communis?) 
France 
India 
Laos : 
Poland 
Thailand 
United Kingdom 
United States 
U.S.S.R". 

Vietnam, Republic of (South) 
Vietnam, Democratic Republic of 
(North) 



* Fopuhrlv Known as Viet Mlnh, 

» During me conference, there m ea Lrsot??.n representatives Invited to sit nt the table v.ith eq'.:it 

status: one representing the neutral fcclion, one renro renting the leftist taction, and one representing the- 
rightist fiction. 

The U .5.3.1:. looked upon the neutral (action ss represent! _- Bie Royal Lio Government; the United 
States looked upon the t m 25 representins the Royal Lio Go-. rem . t. 1 he conference &tt* 

Jourced for sever*] 1 His to permit the three (actions to untangle their conflte;ln; cl-'.ims. They firm'iy 
reached an agreement (In June of 1562) to establish a government of notional •■, end it svas this 

governniei-t nhlchaccej :■ I \hi I - Bleats read I it the con&rgnee. » 



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i 




SUBMIT VIETNAM CONFLICT TO UNITED NATIONS 



PARTICIPATION IK FO&XULATIQN OF T7.S* VIETNAM WAR POLICY 



.1 have another question. You may answer it or not, just as you liKc. 
Did you or Mr. Sisco participate in formulating our government's 
Vietnamese policy in carrying out of the war? 

Ambassador Goj lg, J would )< say this: I am often talked 

to about these matters, but T do operal e under the restrictions that are 
imposed by the United Nations Participation Act by Congress, which 
I tluuk are appropri restrictions. At the U.N. 3 slate the viev at 
of the U.S. Government as determined by the President, and I have 
participated in many meetings, however, on the subject of Vietnam. 

Senator J\u\v.x. 1 notice in the last paragraph of your statement 
you say that you promise to persevere with all trie resources at your 
core d to the end that the the Security Council mar carry out its 
clear responsibilities under the charter with respect to Vietnam. 

Now, the resources at your command would be whatever the Presi- 
dent decides you should have? 

Ambassador Goldberg* That is correct, and I am confident that 
those resources will be available if the Senate sees fit to pass this reso- 
lution. 

Senator Aiken. Of course, I will say this. It is entirely possible that 
the President and the Secretary of State might not see eye to eye on 
the degree of resources which you should have. 

Ambassador Goldberg. Well, I know only one way to use my 
resources and that is to use them full}-. I don't know any other way to 
use them. 

Senator Aiken. Yes, I am saying that. That is all, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chaibman. Senator Mansfield? 

LIMITATIONS APPLICABLE TO THE UNITED NATIONS 

Senator Mansfikld. Mr. Ambassador, I want to congratulate you 
on an excellent statement. 1 think you have put the question in proper 

Eerspective before tbis committee. I very much appreciate the colloquy 
otween you and the Chairman of this committee relative to the limita- 
tions which apply to the U.N., and a recognition of tl ict that it is 
not the UN, which will make the final decision but, let us hope, some- 
thing like a reconvened Geneva conference. 

This resolution docs not hand you any blank check, and I think that 
ought to be kept in mind. Nor docs it allow, if it is passed, any authority 
to the U.N. to dictate a peace in Southeast Asia. 

MANSFIELD RESOLUTION IS AD VIS OK Y 



by 5S Senators. It places the President in no straitjacket, 
> conduct of foreign policy on Vietnam where, in the end. 



The pending resolution is entirely advisory, at least the resolution 
-cosponsored 1 
It leaves the 
only it can be, in the hands of the President. 

In my view the adoption of this resolution would say to the Pres- 
ident most respectfully, that the Senate hopes that he would see the 
desirability of trying again to open the question of Vietnam to formal 
consideration by the U.N. Security Council. Furthermore, we would 
say to him that we thin!; it is desirable to take timely nofce of the 
deep concern over Vietnam winch has been expressed by more than 



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' 



jm V. 



'/ 



rr 



slto.iit Vietnam conflict to united nations 

100 nations during the current session of the General s erably and 
try to convert these wards of concern into a U.N. action for peace. 

Vie would say further by the passage of this resolution, in effe 
thnt if a U.N. contribution to peace i$ not forthcoming it ought not 
to be because this Nation has been unwilling to act positively under 
the charter. - * \ 

On the contrary, we would ask the President to consider making, 
clear to the world that this Nation will submit the issues of Viet- 
nam to the formal procedures of the Security Council in an effort to 
move the search for solutions from the battlefield to the negotiating 

table. 

In sum, the Senate resolution would suggest to the President that 
he consider acting on the premise that the U.N. could be a point of 
entry to the road to peace even if it is not the place where peace is 
negotiated in the end. 

The U.N. may not prove useful in this connection, but no one can 
blame the IV i ] ''nl or this Nation of not acting in good faith to t 
to find out by an initiative involving votes who is willing to try for 
a just peace % this route and who is not willing. 

In my judgment, win, lose, or draw*, this Nation has everything to 
gain and nothing to lose by taking that initiative. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. t - - ■ 

. The Chairman. Senator Morse. ■' - 

* 

COOPERATION IN" SETTLEMENT OF VIETNAM ISSUE 

Senator Mokse, Mr. Ambassador, I think you have made a power- 
ful statement this morning. My prediction is, in light of future develop- 
ments in Asia, it is going to be a historic one. I have in mind your views 
in regard to United Nations participation and settlement pf tins war 
from the very beginning. I think I violate no confidence by saying, at 
your invitation, I went to your Supreme Court office three days after 
your nomination and prior to your confirmation and we talked about 
my views in regard to United Stations responsibilities. You will recall 
at the time of the steel case we were down at the White House to- 
gether and the President asked us to talk about it further. 
G I mention that only because I think many people do not know 
what the President's position was from the very beginning. There is 
no doubt that he has always welcomed appropriate United Nations 
participation and intervention in trying to seek a peace in Southeast 
Asia. And, as you point out this morning, as his Ambassador you have 
sought to serve that purpose on the part of the President- 
It is true, as you point out in your statement, that I quickly endorsed 
the Mansfield resolution. In that record which you accurately quoted 
from, I pointed out I thought it was important that we build a bridge 
between the Congress and this Administration in trying to resolve some 
of these foreign policy differences. 1^ think it is a great mistake when 
people don't want to cross those bridges. You have crossed one this 
moraine by appearing before this committee in a public hearing, as I 
think you should have done, as you were always trilling to do, and 
which I think ism keeping with our whole S3 T stem of representative 



government. 



* 



* 



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ADMINISTRATION ATTITUDE 



TOWARD NEUTRALIZATION OF SOUTH 
VIETNAM 



Now, as far as neutralization, we have said that we clo not as a 
matter of principle, ami 1 repeat here, do not, in ony way oppose 
neutralisation ot South Vietnam if South Vietnam wants to be 
neutral Why do I not extend it to North Vietnam? We would welcoE 
the neutralization of Nor tli Vietnam, but I am being realistic. North 
Vietnam is^a Communist regime, professedly so, and I don't want to 
put a barrier in the way of settlement by adding a new term since 
my idea is to have a settlement. If we, the United States, were to 
put forward a position today that the price of a settlement in Vietnam 
is "u neutralization of North Vietnam" we would be putting a barrier 
in the way of a settlement in light of the nature of their regime. 
So we hare gone as far as we can reasonably go in saying that so far 
as U.S. policy is concerned, if the people of South Vietnam want to 
be neutral, nonalined that is then- decision, that is acceptable to the 
United States. # . . 

The Chairman. I think Senator Gore has raised a very valid point 
that has bothered me, but it seems to me this is the hind of question 
that the conference at Geneva should decide. We don't have to decide 
that in advance. It is a problem that has always bothered me. 

Ambassador Gqm>beuo. Yes, I would agree that is a proper subject 
within the competence of the conference. I gave an interpretation. 

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, the contradictions has not been re- 
solved at all. The resolution provj I the Geneva accord would 1 
adequate basis for peaceful settlement. The Geneva accord does not 
make reference to two separate political entities; in fact, it definitely 
rules them out. 

The Chairman. The Senator is correct, but there is a proposal for 
discussion before the Security Council to seek a reference. They don't 
have to accept this interpretation. 

U.S. POSITION TOWAKD NEUTRALITY AS BASIS FOB PEACE 

Senator Gore. I know, but what is the position of the U.S. Govern- 
ment? This is the point at which I am aiming. 

Ambassador Goldberg. May I answer it. t . 

Senator Gore, Will we accept the neutrality of Indochina as a 
basis of peace? Will we, in fact, accept reunification, self-determination 
of one country? Will we, in fact, be satisfied with the Geneva accord as 
a bnsis for peace? It appears now that we will not. 

The Chairman. I am not sure about that. • # • 

Ambassador GoIiDBEug. I want to make it explicitly clear and it 
does not appear to be now. With due respect, I want to make it ex- 
plicitly char we accept the Geneva accord as a b:isis for peace, I also 
want to no ke it explicitly clear when we offer a resolution that is the 
offer. We are ready to heat other views, including the vi s of this 
committee. When I put a piece of paper for informal discussion, it is 
quite agreeable to me to put a piece of pager before the Security 
Council without going hi to controversial detail, saying we accept the 
Geneva accord as a basis fur peace. We ask for the reconvening of the 
conference and we recognue the competence of the conference to 
settle, adjudicate it or related problems. I am perfectly willing to put 
that in the resolution and 1 think that meets your point of view, 
Senator. 

The Chairman. The Senator from Ohio. 



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praise for documentation of u.s.-kffokts i.\ u.x. 

'Senator Lausche. Ambassador Gold: , I am grateful to you 
for your very lucid presentation and documentation of tlte efforts of 
the i united States to have the United Nation be ji n of the 

Vietnam dispute, 

•Unfortunately t!i ;h the propaganda of the Communists and 
in many instances through statements of uninformed individuals 
within our own country, the imprc n has been gained that we 
sought to escape the rights and the powers of the- United Nation; 
to intervene for the establishment of peace in arc f the world 
■where violence existed. ^ . 

/ Your pre. tation regrettably vv31 not be heard fully by the people 
of the Nation. But the documentation which you have gi i refutes 
completely every argument that has been made that our Govern- 
ment lias not extended its efforts to have the United Nations take 
jurisdiction. 

I vauit to chronologically follow your presentation of what has 
been done. You cite the efforts of the Cambodian Government to have 
the United Nations check to ascertain whether or not there were 
unlawful transgressions on their border by the Communists. And the 
United Nations did take jurisdiction, but Cambodia finally dropped 
its petition. Is that correct? ^ . -, 

Ambassador Goldberg. That is correct, Senator. 



# * 



*. *- 



IS CESSATION OF I50MBIXG PREREQUISITE TO SETTLEMENT? 

» - 

I have been struck by the unanimous recommendation of all the 
witnesses who have come up on the Mansfield and Morse resolutions 
heretofore to the effect that we didn't have a chance of securing action 
in the Security Council unless there was a cessation of the bombing 
first- Each witness ated this in the record. . 

I was wondering what your own views were with regard to this point. 

Ambassador Golm;vkg. Well, my own < tew about that is that at the 
moment that is probably not the d mining factor. It may affect, as 
I said, other countries, but the determining factor from the standpoint 
of countries that could obstruct Security Council action has been this 
concept of no competence, because Hanoi says no competence. But, 
as I have said, I don 1 ! think it serves their interest to pursue that, and 
I am going to make another effort. 

Senator Tell. But would it not be correct, to put it in a more 
affirmative way, that the chances of, success of some positive action 
involving cither resolution would be better if there were a cessation 
of the bombing? 

Ambassador Goldheuo. I don't, frankly, know the answer to that 
question because of the experience that we had during the bombing 

pause. 

Senator Pell. Excuse me for interrupting, I do not mean a bomb- 
in * pause. I am among those who are rather concerned at the idea of a 
pause because I can see the thing blowing up further at the end of it. 
I mean cessation. 

Ambassador Goldberg. Even with respect to that. You will re- 
member I said that at that time when we were engaged in an indefinite 
pause, I consulted. Now, the viewpoint then on the part of many 
countries was that if this was the situation we ought to develop private 
diplomacy. If we brought it to the Security Council, there would be a 
public exposition, people would have to take a position, and it would 
be far better, therefore, to explore by private diplomacy the prospect 
of another forum, the Geneva conference, and so on. ■ - 

So I really cannot honestly say. 
• I will say in cand« in answer to your remark, that I have no doubt 
that that would affect the judgment of some. But with respect to 
those countries that can obstruct the action, those with the veto 
power, at the moi i I don't think it would affect their judgment. 



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Senator Pell. Right, .1 appreciate your position, and your offid 
position, too. But 1 think the record mid very clearly show that 
every witness who has come here on this resolution has specifically 
stated that the resolution did not have a chance unless there was a 
cessation of the bombing. 

Ambassador Goldbeeg. Senator, I might say this is a subject I 
am quite prepared to talk about; we talk about everything in nego- 
tiating & resolution, but I am quite clear in mv own mind that < 
the .basis of everv talk I have had this is not the' determining factor 
for the Soviet Union and perhaps France, but that does not mean 
that we ought not to try* 

Senator Pxll. Thank you. 

VIETCOXG MILITARY BASES AXD FOECES 

Finally, I have one specific question on your testimony in connec- 
tion with the draft resolut section (b), the same one that Senator 
Symington drew our attention to. It says — 

That there should be no military forces or bases maintained or supported in 
North or South Vietnam other than those under the control of the respective 
governments, and all other troops and si mod per I should be withdrawn or 

demobilized * * *. 

Docs this apply to the Vietcong;? 

Ambassador Gori r::uc. Yes. 

By the way, this is not intended to be a formulation of ours. This 
is intended t> be our interpretation of what the Geneva accords would 
require, and again this was put, and specifically put by me in the 
form of a question to the other side, is there disagreement that tL 
is what the Geneva accords require? 

Senator Fell. But would this not, in fact, be almost a preventive 
factor in anything coming out? In other words, would it be conceiv- 
able, in your view, that that portion of South Vietnam which is 
under Communist discipline or Vietcong discipline would willingly 
drop its weapons and demobilize while those portions which are under 
the Ky government's regime maintained then* weapons? 

Ambassador Goldberg. Again, I would answer in terms that the 
Chairman put it. This is what the Geneva accords, in our view, pro- 
vide; and there is a matter which ought to be discussed in the Geneva 
conference as it was discussed in 1954 and in 1962. There were deci- 
sions made in both 1954 unci 1962 about the disarming oj irregular 
forces, and this obviously would be a subject appropriate for dis- 
cussion in the Geneva conferences. This is not put forward to be 
any barrier. " • . -- 

Senator Pell. I understand. 

Ambassador Goldberg. As I said, the language of the resolution 
is subject to discussion. This is intended to be a statement in response 
to the statement very often made that we don't state what we think 
about the Geneva accords. This is what we think. We are ready to 
talk about what other people think about the Geneva accords. 

Senator Pell. Right I think we have made a great step forward 
here today in the assertion of our willingness, if necessary, to negotiate 
with the representatives of the XLF because that has been am in- 
hibiting factor. 

Ambassador Goldberg. Well, I think the President has frequently 
said that is not an insurmountable problem, and I was repeating it 
in that context. 

Senator Pell, I understand and I thank you very much *and I 
think we are very lucky indeed to have you as our Ambassador to 
the United Nations, and I wish you the best in your efforts along 
this line. 

Ambassador GolbbErg, Thank you. 

The Chairman, Senator McCarthv? 



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SUKMIT VIETNAM CONFLICT TO UN1TKD NATIONS 



U.S. WITHUKAWAL OF TKQOPS FROM VIETNAM 

- 

Senator McCarthy. Mr, Ambassador, I have a few questions, one 
which moves on from the reference Senator Pell has made to your 
discussion °f the Geneva accords. Do I understand that this is the 
Administration's position in the United Nations, should these other 
conditions prevail: that you would withdraw troops? 
-Ambassador Goldberg. This is what the Geneva accords >rovide 
And we said we would be willing to use them as a basis for sett emenl. 

Senator McCarthy, Is this limited to what happens in Vietnam? 

Ambassador Goldberg. I am sorry I am not following you. 

Senator McCarthy, The consideration of whether you would 
-withdraw is limited to what might happen in Vietnam. Does this have 
reference to other parts of Southeast- Asia or not? 

Ambassador GoldbSjicG We are ; very interested in observance 
... of the 1902 accords in Laos, very much so. We would like the Laos 
accord to be complied with. 

Senator McCarthy* Where would this leave us in the light of what 
the Secretary of State said in his rather well publicized press confer- 
ence of ( r 12 when he talked about the threat of a billion Chinese 
with nuclear weapons to all Southeast Asia and beyond that to the 
United States itself? 

Are we going to leave this critical area open to a billion Chinese if 
the Question of South Vietnam should be settled within the limits you 
have defined or not? 

Ambassador Goldberg. I think that question ought to be addressed 
to the Secretary of State. 

Senator McCarthy. All rights I will ask the Secretary. 

Senator Fell. When? 

■ Senator Mouse. Where? [Laughter.] 

IS PROCEEDING THROUGH THE U.N. AX EXERCISE OF FUTILITY? 

m 
* 

-Senator McCarthy, One other question relating to that press 
conference* You seem to think that proceeding this way through the 
United Nations is worthwhile, at least the efforts you are talking 
about, even though it mav not come to very much. 

Now, the Secretary, when he held a press conference, said about 
what you have said in terms of process but then said, "On the other 
hand, there are some problems about going through an exercise of 
futility, if this is what it appears to be, to satisfy some critics among 
our own people/' 

This is not particular to the process he was thinking about. But, 
on the record, you don't think this is necessarily an exercise of futility?' 
Ambassador Goldukkg. If I thought it was an exercise of futility, 
I would not engage in it^ 
-Senator McCarthy. Very good. Thank you very much. t 



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2. bvh position sia5eemekts 
(unclassified) 



INDEX 



SUBJECT 



n 1 1 



PAGE 



Extracts from North Vietnamese Statements on The Four Points . . . 100 

Extracts from North Vietnamese Statements on the Front's Position. 10 5 

Extracts from North Vietnamese Statements on r 33he Geneva Agreements. Ill 

Extracts from North Vietnamese Statements on the U»H 115 

- 

Extracts from North Vietnamese Statements on Mediation Efforts 

by other Countries • . . 117 

m 

Extracts from North Vietnamese Statements on the Bombing Pause . . 119 

Extracts from North Vietnamese Statements on U.S. Moves 121 

Excerpts frcm South Vietnamese National Liberation Front — North 

Vietnamese Fatherland Front* Joint Stat at of October 30A9& 2 ' 129 

Ho Chi Minh's Interview with Akahata, April 5, 1965. ....... 133 

Report of the DRV Government Submitted by Pham Van Dong to the 

DRV National Assembly on April 8, 1965 13 6 

VKA "Authorized" Statement Rejecting the 17 Nqn- Aligned Nation 

Appeal 1^2 

Khan Dan editorial, April 21, 1965 on the NFLSV as the Only 

Genuine Representative of the South Vietnamese People. ..... lkk m 

DRV "White Paper" on "U*S, Aggression and Intervention in 

Vietnam" « 2h6 

DRV Government Statement on President Johnson's July 28, 19^5 

Press Conference Statement 152 

Le Monde Interview with Ho Chi Minh, August 15, 1965 15^ 

Quan Doi Nhan Dan Editorial of August 20, 1965 Criticizing 
Attempts at Mediation in Vietnam 15 6 



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SUBJECT PAGE 

DRV Embassy in Moscow Issues "Correction* 1 of Lord Brockway 

Press Interview 159 

DRV Foreign Ministry Memorandum of September 23, 1965 l60 

Vietnam Courier Article on "How Should the Most Correct Solution 

to the Vietnam Problem be Understood" l£h 

Joint Asahi-Mainichi Interview with Phain Van Dong in Hanoi on 

October h, 19&5 . • • • » • • 166 

Mai Van Bo Statement, January 5, 1967 177 

Trinh Interview with Burchett 179 

Mai Van Bo Statement, February 22, 1967 l8l 

* 
Pham Van Dong Speech, 1 Sept 19&7, on 22nd Anniversary of the 

Founding of the DRV ...,♦.. 183 



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EXTRACTS ERgl KORTII VISTIIAMaSE STATS^ffflS ON 

T r KK FOUR POINTS 



(Report of ?har.i Van Done to National Assembly April 8, 1965 - 
Tab^H, pp. 1-2) 



11 . . .The unswerving policy of the DRV Government is to respect strictly 
the 195U Geneva agreements on Vietnam and to implement correctly their "basic 
provisions as embodied in the following points 



it 



* * * 



"The government of the DRV is of the view that the stand expounded here 
is the* basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem." 



"If this basis is recognized, favorable conditions will be created for 
the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam people, and it vill be possible to 
consider the reconvening of an international conference along the pattern 
of the 195^ Geneva conference on Vietnam*" 

"The DRV .Government declares that any approach contrary to the afore- 
mentioned stand is inappropriate; any approach tending to secure U.K. inter- 
vention in the Vietnam situation is also inappropriate. Such approaches are 
basically at variance with the 195^- Geneva agreements on Vietnam. . 



ii 



ii ■«■■ aiiLi 



(VKA statement rejecting 17 non-aligned nation appeal - 

Tab J, pp. 1-2) 



"To settle the Vietnam problem at present, the only correct way is to 
carry out the points laid down by DRV Premier Fhara Van Dong on 8 April I965." 

- 

■ 

"The DRV Government is of the view that the above -expounded stand is 
the basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem.-. If 
this basis is recognised, favorable conditions will be created for the peace- 
ful settlement of the Vietnam problem and it will be possible to consider the 
reconvening of an international conference in the pattern of the 195** Geneva 
conference on Vietnam." 



"The DRV Cover nraent declares that any approach contrary to the above 
stand is inappropriate; any approach tending to secure a U.TT. intervention 
in the Vietnam situation is also inappropriate, because such approaches are 
basically at variance with the 195'+ Geneva agreements on Vietnam." 



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(Attack on President Johnson's May 13 , 1965 speech - Tab IA, p. 2) 



"Trie DRV Government has shown them a most correct way out in the four- 
point stand prgsented "by Premier EhSrn Van Dong at the second session of the 
DRV Rational Assembly — that is> to withdraw from South Vietnam, stop its 
acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and let the Viet- 
namese -DcoaLe settle themselves their own affairs, • * ." 



(DRY Foreign Ministry statement on suspension of U.S. Attacks, May 18, 19^5 
Tab Kj p. 2) 



"The DKV Government affirms once again that the four -point stand made 
public on 8 April I965 is the only sound basis for a political settlement 
of the Vietnam problem*" 



(No DRV reaction to Canadian disclosure of mission to Hanoi - Tab 0, p. l) 

■ 

"The Foreign Minister stated repeatedly that the four conditions which 
had previously been outlined by the Prime Minister of North Vietnam on 
April 0, taken as a whole, represented the Hanoi government's approach to 
a settlement 



,4- « 



(Mhan Dan protests U.K. Government's connivance with U*S 
7 June 1965 - Tab P, : p. k) 



"Once agaliij we stress that the Vietnam problem can be solved only 
in accordance with the four points mentioned in the statement and resolution 
of the DRV Government and Hational Assembly and the five points of the 22 
March 19 65 statement of the 3I?ISV and on the condition that the U.S. im- 
perialists stop their aggression, withdraw from South Vietnam, stop their 
attacks against the DRV, respect and implement the 195U Geneva agreements 
on Vietnam, and let the Vietnamese people solve their own problems without 
any foreign intervention." 



("White Paper" on "US aggression £^d intervention in Vietnam - Tab Q, p. 6) 



"The unswerving policy of the DRV Government- is to strictly respect the 
195*r Geneva agreements on Vietnam and to correctly implement their basic 
Drovisions as embodied in the following Joints." 



101 



1 



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"The DRV Government holds that the above -mentioned stand is the 
oasis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem. If 
this oasis is accented, favorable conditions vill be created for the 
peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem and it will be possible to 
consider the reconvening of an international conference of the type of 
the 195^ Geneva conference on Vietnam." 



"The Government of the Damoeratic Republic of Vietnam declares that 
any approach contrary to the above stand is irrelevant , any approach leading 
to a U.I7. intervention in the Vietnam situation is also irrelevant, because 
such approaches arc basically at variance "with the 195^ Geneva agreements 
on Vietnam/ 1 



(Thong Eat (Reunification) Article by Nguyen Van Vinh 
July I965 - Tab R, pp. k-6) 



"The DRV Government is of the opinion that the above -mentioned stand 
is the b as is for a correct political solution to the Vietnamese problem. 
Only through recognizing this basis will the peaceful settlement of the 
Vietnamese problem be afforded the conditions in which it can be conducted 
favorably and will it be possible to think of convening an international 
conference of the type of the 195 h Geneva conference on Vietnam," 



"The four -point program as set forth by Premier Pham Van Dong and 
the views as set forth by the WISV in its 22 March statement are truly 
constructive and practical*" 



"If the U.S. imperialists agree to accept the above-mentioned conditions 
of the people in both North and South Vietnam, we will readilv negotiate 



o 



i. 1: 



with them anywhere at any moment. 



(DRV Eeport on Ghanaian mission to Eanoi - Tab S) 



"Presented the four -point stand of the DRV Government , the basis for 
the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem." 



(DRV statement on President Johnson's July 23, 1965 Dress conference - 
Tab T, p. 2) 



"For the U.S. Gove;; ent there is only one way to an honorable peace; 



102 



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"that is , to correctly iupiejaent the 195^ Geneva agreements on Vietnam and 
accent l:he four-"ooint stand of the DRY Government," 



"IJore recently, on 8 April 1965 , it made clear its four-point stand as 
a oasis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem." 



(Le Monde interview with Ho Chi Minh - Tab U) 



"The U.S. Government must give tangible proofs that it accepts the 
four -point stand of the Government of the DRY which conforms to the 
essential political and military clauses of the 195 *>■ Geneva agreement on 
Vietnam; it must immediately stop the air attacks against DRV territory, 
stop forthwith the aggressive war against the south of our country, and 
withdraw fr on there all U.S. troops and weapons. That is peace in honor; 
there is no other way out." 



(Duan Doi loan Dan Editorial of August 20, 1965 -'Tab V, p. l) 



"Only when the U.S. Government shows concrete manifestations of its 
recognition of the four -point stand of the DRV Cover: nt and the five- 
point stand of the KFISV can there be a basis for the peaceful settlement 
of the war in Vietnam." 



. 1 >~ — ,.**. ««>. ■ I ' ll 



(DRV Embassy in Moscow issues "correction" of Press Interview - Tab W ) 

, "The four-point stand of the DRV Government as ocpounded by Premier Hiam 
Van Dong on 8 April 1965 is the basis for all soundest political solutions 
to the Vietnam question. If this basis is recognized, favorable conditions 
will be created for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem and it 
will be possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference 
of the type of the 195U Geneva conference on Vietnam." 



(pham Van Dong's national Day report August 31, 1965 - Tab X, p. 6) 

"This four-point stand fully conforms to the most important political 
and military provisions of the ISoh Geneve agree its on Vietnam, and the 
whole world is now of the view that these agreements must be correctly im- 
plemented. This four -point stand must be solemnly accepted by the U.S. 
Government before a political settlement of the Vietnam "problem can be 
contemplated." 



■ 
* 



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(lEV Foreign Ministry memorandum of September 23, 1965 - Tab Z, p. U) 

- 

"The four-point stand of the DRV Government . • t is the sole 
correct "basis for a settlement of the Vietnam problem. Any solution 
at variance with it are inappropriate and so are any soultions which 
seek U. K- intervention in the Vietnam situation,, because such solu- 
tions are fundamentally contrary to the 195^ Geneva agreements on 
Vietnam." 

"The U.S. Government must solemnly declare its acceptance of this 
four -point stand before a political settlement of the Vietnam problem 
can be considered. , 



it 
* ■ 



(Joint Asahi-I-lainichi interview with Fnam Van Dorgin Hanoi in October 
U, 1965 - Tab CC, pp. 1-2-H-9-10-11) 

"Premier Fnam Van Done of the DRV stated in a YeT'j strong tone on 
k October that 'The present Vietnam war can never be settled unless the 
United States accepts the four conditions presented by our side. And 
without that, there also can be no discussion. 1 " 

"We proposed four conditions for the settlement of the present war 
Boise time ago. They asked for respect of the Geneva agreement of 195^ 
concerning the Vietnam question and sought the correct observance of 
the basic clauses of this agreement. We proposed at the time that if 
the United States were to issue a statement to the effect that it accepts 
the four conditions, we will agree to negotiate at any time." 

"If the United States wants negotiations, it must accept the four 
conditions and recognize the TCETSV." 

"We have announced that if the United States issues a statement 
to the effect that it will recognise the four conditions, we will 
respond to talks. The United States, however, has no such intention." 

"The only just way to settle the Vietnam issue is to accept; in 
line with the 195^ Geneva agreement, the four conditions proposed by 
the Ilorth Vietnamese Government and the stand explained in the KFLSV's 
March statement." . 

"Ilorth Vietnam's four conditions are in complete accord with every 
one of the essential, political, and military provisions in the Geneva 
accords of 195^- ^ ne feur conditions alone can be the basis to bring 
a correct solution to the Vietnam issue* The U.S. Government must declare 
clearly that it accepts the four conditions. A political solution can be 
considered after that." 



lOh 



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•« 



EXTRACTS FROM K07FH VX3TNA3SS3 STATEMENTS ON THE FRONT'S POSITION 



* 

(Excerpts from Joint Statement of October 30, I962 - Tab A, pp. 2, 4) 

11 ••.The Vietnam Fatherland Front holds that the NFLSV, which cane 
into being owing to the growth of fchj South Vietnamese people's struggle 
and which rallies broadly the patriotic and anti-U.S.-Diem forces in 
South Vietnam, is the genuine representative of the people there, and 
is one of the decisive factors for their certain victory . " The Vietnam 
Fatherland Front fully supports the program and the urgent steps ad- 
vocated by the NFLSV to realise independence, democracy, improvement 
of the people's living conditions, and peace and neutrality in South 
Vietnam, in an advance tov;ard the peaceful reunification of the father- 
land. The program and urgent steps of the KFLSV meet the interests and 
aspirations of the South Vietnamese people and conform to the practical 
situation in South Vietnam at present.. 



n 



• m 



"..•The 1^ million South Vietnamese compstriots vri.ll develop more 
and more their valiant and indomitable tradition and unite more and 
more vridely and closely within the KFLSV to directly oppose the U.S.- 
Diem clique.) 



(Sxcerpts from National Assembly Statement Published July 5, 196^ 
Tab B, pp. 1 and 2) 



1 



if 



• * • 



The U.S. Government must put an end to its aggressive wa 



r* *,*"3 "r* ** 



n 

South Vietnam, withdraw all its troops and weapons from there, and let 
the South Vietnamese people settle their own internal affairs by them- 
selves in accordance vrith the program of the National Front for the 
Liberation of South Vietnam. . •" 

"...The National Assembly of the DRV vrholeheartedly supports the 
National Front for the Liberation 01 South Vietnam and firmly bel eves 
that the South Vietnamese people, who are closely united under the 
front *s banner and are heightening their determination to fight and 
to van, . ." 



(Excerpt from Text of DEV-USSK Delegations 1 Joint Statement, February 10, 
loi- - Tab F, p. 2) 



"...The Soviet Union fully supports the just and heroic straggle 
for independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality which tfc^s South 
Vietnamese people are waging under" the leadership of the National 

Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam* v* fl 

m 

105 









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(Report by Phaxn Van Dong to the National Assembly April 8, 19&5 - 
Tab H, ?. 5) 

"...In response to the appeal of the NFLSV, the South Vietnamese 
cadres j arstymen, and ordinary citizens rogrowp©d to the north have 
enthusiastically voiced their readiness to return to their, native 
land and to fight, anr*s in hand, or to do any work to contribute to 
the annihilation of the enesiy and to national salvation..." 



(DRV-SOVIET Communique issued April 1?, 19&5 - Tab I, p. 1) 

• 
"...the National Front of Liberation is the genuine exponent of 
the will and aspirations of the people of South Vietnam, its only 
legitimate representative. The program of the front enjoys (the 
broad?) support of the mass of the. people because it proclaims in- 
dependence, democracy, peace, an end to (imperialist?) intervention 
and the formation in South Vietnam of a national, democratic coalition 
government carrying through a policy of independence and neutrality in 
full conformity with the Geneva agreements of 195^««» u 



(VNA on l?~Non~ aligned Nation Appeal, April 19, I965 - Tab J, p. 1) 

"...The NFLSV is now controlling three-fourths of South Vietnam's 
territory and two-thirds of its population. It is clear that at the 
present time any solution to the South Vietnam issue without the de- 
cisive voice of the NFLSV is impractical..." 



("Shan. Dan 1 ' Editorial April 21, 1965 on the NFLSV - Tab K, pp. 1,2) 

"...In the world, the voice of the NFLSV is the decisive one in 
the settlement of the South Vietnam question..." 

"... A. >!• Xosygin declared: Today everybody must see that the 
NFLSV, which is leading the South Vietnamese people's struggle, is a 
real force which decides the present as well as the future of South 
Vietnam. Premier Chou En-lax has on many occasions asserted that 
the NFLSV is the only legal representative of the South Vietnam 

population ..." " . 

■ 

106 



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"...Just as the NFLSV Central G&K&ittee declared in its communique 
of 15 Aprilj any settlement of the South Vietnam question will lose its 
practical and positive meaning if it is undertaken without the partici- 
pation of the NFLSV in a decisive role..." 

f » , #% and all negotiations with the U.S. imperialists at this moment 
are entirely useless if they still refuse to withdraw from South Vietnam 
all their troops and all kinds of war materiel and means — and those of 
the satellites — if they still do not dismantle all their military bases 
in South Vietnam, if the traitors still surrender the South Vietnamese 
dsodIc's sacred rights to independence and democracy to the U«S* in- 

4b * *"* * V 

perialists-, and if the NFLSV — -the only genuine representative of the 
14 million South Vietnamese people — does not have its decisive voice* " 



(DRV White Paper on "United States Aggression and Intervention in Vietnam" 
Tab Q, pp. 1 3 2, k and 6) 

".♦•The NFLSV j founded on 20 December 19 60, more and more clearly 
proves to be the sole genuine representative of the people, the mobiliser 
and organizer of all patriotic forces in South Vietnam..." 




"...To date, the NFLSV has gained control of four-fifths of the 
territory and 10 million people; that is 5 two-thirds of the population 
in South Vietnam. It has become a powerful force which has a decisive 
voice in the South Vietnam problem. 



f* 



* * 



"...The United States talks about its desire to hold discussion 
with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the South Vietnam question, 
but it refuses to recognise the 1IFL5V as the sole genuine representative 
of the South Vietnam people. It is obvious that the United States wants 
neither peace nor negotiation... " 



"...All negotiations at this moment are entirely useless if the 
U.S. imperialists still persist in refusing to withdraw from South 
Vietnam all their troops and war materials of all kinds and those of 
their satellitiesj and to dismantle all their .nilitary bases in South 
Vietnam, if the Vietnamese traitors continue to surrender to the U.S. 

imperialists the South Vietnamese people *s sacred rights to independence, 



107 



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and if the NFLSV—the only genuine representative of the 3A million 
South Vietnamese people — is not asked to say its decisive say.,." 



(Excerpts from Nguyen Van Vinh's Jfr-part article issued in "Reunification", 
a Vietnamese language newspaper on July 2, o» 9 and 13 - Tab R, pp. 2,3 ) 

" # ..?he United States still carries on viar in the south and still 
refuses to recognize the presence of the NFLSV — which controls most of 
the territory and population of the south and which leads the sacred 
resistance of 1^ million people in South Vietnam. Therefore, the 
United States continues to be fought against by the South Vietnamese 
people, and there can be no peace..." 

- 

n .. .Moreover, they have brazenly stated that they are determined 
to eliminate the KFLSV from all International conferences, and, at 
worst, they can regard the SFLSV only as the tail of North Vietnam,. •" 

"...In the past the Americans did not want to negotiate with the 
CPR or to recognize the Pathst Lao. The French did not want to re- 
cognise the Viet Minh and the Algerian FLH. But finally they were 
defeated and forced to negotiate with them. Concerning this point, in 
"its famous 22 March statement the MFL3V declared: 'Any negotiation 
with the U.S. imperialists about the South Vietnamese. problem will be 
useless if the U.S. imperialists refuse to respact and strictly implement 
the Geneva accords, abolish the U.S. military bases, and withdraw from 
South Vietnam all the soldiers 5 weapons, and other war materiel of the 
United States and its satellites, if the sacred rights of the Vietnamese 
people — independence and democracy — continue to be offered to the U.S. 
imperialists by the kneeling traitors, and if the NFLSV — the only 
- legitimate representative of 1^ million southern people — does not have a 
decisive voice..." 



(DRV on President Johnson's July 28, 19^5 Press Conference Statement 
Tab T, p. 2) 



11 ♦*, The U.S. Government must stop at once its air war against the 
DRV and completely cease all encroachments on the sovereignty and 
security of the DRV. It must put an Immediate end to the aggressive 
war in South Vietnam, withdraw all U.S. troops and weapons therefrom, 
and let the South Vietnamese people settle their own affairs in accord* 
ance with the program of the liFLSV — the only genuine representative of 
the South Vietnamese people..." 

108 



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(L 
Au 



E H0KD3 interview with Ko Chi Kinh— Hanoi Broadcast in English , 
ztgast 15. 1965 - Tab U, p. 1) 



"•••(Q)...the South Vietnamese people must be left to solve their 
own affairs themselves without foreign interference and on democratic 
bases? 

■ 

(A) "•••on the basis of the program of the NFLSV, the sole 
authentic representative of the South Vietnam people, •♦" 



(Phasi Van Dong's National Day Report, August 31 ? 1965 - Tab X, p. 1) 

"•••In response to the pressing requirements of the patriotic 
struggle, in i960 the IFISV ca into being, closely uniting all 
strata of the people holding high the banner of patriotism, and 
starting the resistance war against U.S. imperialist aggression..." 

".••The KFLSV, now controlling .-ore than four-fifths of South 
Vietnam's territory and over two-thirds of its population, is the 
only genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam. The 
Front's international prestige and influence increase with every 
passing day. The Front is now the real master 01 the situation in 
South Vietnam. It must have a decisive say in the settlement of the 
South Vietnam question..." 



(DRV .Foreign Ministry Memorandum of September 23, 19°5 - Tab Z, pp. 1,2,3) 

"...U.S. troops will not withdraw, but will cling on to South Vietnam; 
the United States always regards South Vietnam as a separate nation, that 
is to say, it wants the partition of Vietnam to be prolonged indefinitely; 
it does not recognize the KFLSV, the sole genuine representative of the 
people of South Vietnam. As a matter of fact, its scheme is to try to 
achieve at the conference table tihat it has been unable to gain on the 
battlefield..." 

"...The NFL3V 5 the organizer and leader of the South Vietnamese 
people's fight against the U.S. aggressors, has gained sympathy 3 support, 
and recognition from ever broader sections of the world's peoples. Yet 
the U.S. Government refuses to recognise it as the sole genuine repre- 
sentative of the people of South Vietnam. It has declared that it does 
not regard the front as an independent 'party in negotiations. This 

109 ■ 



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* 



This further exposes its talks about negotiations as a mere swindle* 
There cannot be any negotiations en the South Vietnam problem without 
the VSLSV having its decisive say.,/ 1 

"..•This stand also proceeds fror* tKe legitimate aspirations of the 
Vietnamese people in both -zoness, as embodied in the pragraia of ths 

Vietnam Fatherland Front and that of the NFLSV; namely , peace, independ- 
ence, unity, and democracy..." 



Message to the Austrian Red Cross Society, September 25, 19^5 - 
Tab kk) 

"•.•The only genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people 
is the KFLSV. The Red Cross organization sat up by the front is the 
only organ serving the interests of the South Vietnamese people* ••" 



(Joint Asahi-Kainichi Interview with Pham Van Dong in Hanoi, October k 9 19°5 
Tab CC_, w 3> ^ 8 - nd 9) 

"...It is very foolish of the United States not to recognize this 
Liberation Front which is the only force which has the ability to settle 
the Vietnan problem..." 

"...The best way is for the United States to negotiate first with 
the Liberation Front. That is only natural, considering that the United 
States is actually fighting the Liberation Front.., . The United States 
should negotiate with the Liberation Front of the South first of all. 
However, it will be out of the question if it were to take the attitude 
of negotiating with the Liberation Front as if it vie re conveying a favor. 
The primary and decisive party for the United States to deal with is the 
Liberation Front . . . " 

"...as long as the United States does not recognize the People's 
Liberation Front of the south, there cannot be any negotiations..." 

"...Who is fighting the United States in the south? It is the 
liberation array. And yet, the U.S. side is escalating the war against 
the north. Does it think that it can negotiate with the north alone and 
settle the problem?..." 



110 



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EXTRACTS FRO! EteTH VI" I STAT \ TS C 






r 



(Joint Statement October 30, 19o2 - Tab A, pp. 1-2) 

« ## .the Vietr. se people and the Government of the DRV constantly implement 
correctly the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam, . . rr 

"...This is a just struggle , which conforms to the 1954 Geneva agreements 
on Vietnam, . . ,! 

(DRV National Assembly Statement July 5> 19 64 - Tab B, pp 1-2) 

"...The U.S. Government as well as the governments of the countries which 
took part in the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina must live up to their 

I * _ • » _ • 1 * _ ■ _L __ S A _ _i*J J. — ,--? ~*i 



commitments : respect and sovereignty , index ience, unit;/, and 1 
integrity of Viet-Kam, and refrain from interfering in its inter: 



territorial 
ernal affairs . . , . ' 



t! ...we demand that the 195'* Geneva agreements on Indochina be strictly 
imolemented . . * . 1f 



(DRV Foreign Ministry Letter September 4, 1964 - Tab C, pp 1-2) 

» ...The DRV Government has more than once stated its eagerness for 
peace and its constant desire of respecting and correctly implementing the 
1954 Geneva agreements on Viet-nanu • * n 

■ 

l! ...The DRV Government .•• earnestly requests the eochaimen and the par- 
ticipants of the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina, in accordance with point 
13 of the final declaration of the conference , jointly to study such measures 
as might prove to be necessary to secure from the U.S. Government an immediate 
end to all acts of provocation and sabotage against the DRV and to the 
aggressive war in South Vietnam, as well as the withdrawal of all U»S. troops, 
military personnel, and arms from South Vietnam, thereby i iring respect for 
and correct implementation of the 1954 G va agreements on Vietnam with a 
view to maintaining and consolidating peace in Indochina and southeast Asia... 



(DRV Note of Protest Issued February 9 5 1965 - Tab S, pg 2) 

"...The Vietnamese people and the DRV Government, who have always re- 
spected and correctly implemented the 1954 Geneva agreements en Indochina, 
will certainly r *°^ be cowed by the U.S. attempts at intimidation.... 11 

,T ...It resolutely demands that the U.S. Government correctly implement 
the 1954 Geneva agreements en Vietnam, and stop at once the aggressive war 
in South Vietnam and all acts of war against the DRV.... 11 



"Th 



e 



111 



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"The D?-V Cover:: \z earnestly requests the cochairnan and the govern- * 
ment of .the participating countries of the 1954 Gen conference on 
Indochina and all ce-Ieeving countries cf the world to take timely and 

C.lGCulV Colons tt — t/.- d. v-L^;, uO CneC-xl-.^ ^~.^ .ncuiU" o_ Uii.e . __>^ c-.,^ 

aggressive U.S. imperialists, Insuring ^ correct implementation of the 1954 
Geneva agreements on Vietnam, and defending peace in Indochina and Southeast 

Asia," 



(Joint Statement February 10, 19o5 - Tab ?, pp. 2-3) 

, .."The two govern its... regard these acts as completely inconsistent v/ith 
international law and the 1954 Geneva Agreements . . . . n 

, .."The two sides unanimously note that, for the past 10 years and more 
the U,S. Government has sabot 4 the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam, 
sought to hinder the reunification of Vietnam, and turned South Vietnam into 
a nc/.-tyce colony and a military base of the United States..,." 



... "The two governments f :'...". y stand for the defense and implementation 
of the 1954 Geneva agreements en Indochina, resolutely oppose the U.S. 
violations of the said agreements ., and demand that all participants of the 
1954 Geneva conference respect and correctly implex them.- As a. coehairman 
of the Geneva conference on Indochina, the Soviet Union v;ill do its best to 
ensure international support for the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indochina,..; 1 



(Ho Chi Kinh's Interview with Akahata April 5> 19&5 - lab G, pp. 2-3) 

"...The U.S. imperialists 1 acts of agression and war in Vietnam are of 
the utmost gravity; they grossly trample upon the 1954 Geneva agreements on 
Vietnam and constitute violations of international law and manifestations of 
disregard for world public opinion..,," 



"...To settle the South Vietnam question, first of all the United 
States must miihdrav; from South Vietnam, let the South Vietnamese people 
themselves decide their own affairs, and stop its provocative attacks against the 
DRV. The carrying out of these basic points will bring about favorable condition 
for a conference along the pattern of the 1954 Geneva conference. Such is a 
reasonable and sensible approach which is beneficial to peace and to the U.S. 



■oeoole. . . . !1 



(?ham Van Dong's Report to DR7 hational Assembly April 8, 19op - Tab H, pp 1,2,4)* 

"...If this basis is recognised, favorable conditions will be created 
for the peaceful sei,"_3merm ci tne vne:n::. people, ana ro wall oe possnojue 
to consider the reconvening of an international conference along the pattern 
of the 1954 Geneva conference on Vietnam...." 



» ■ v> 



112 



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"...V/e believe the world's people were awakened on hearing President - 
Johnson speak of a return to the 1954 Geneva agreements en Vietnam. This 
was a lau~h. Everyone knows the U.S. imperialists are the energy of the 
Geneva agreements . . « « l( 

"...By attacking the DRV they have completely scrapped the Geneva 
agreements* and grossly violated international lav; and all human lavs. They 
must r>ay for their crimes . . . . » 



*■ ** 



(DRV Stat.osr.ont on 17 Katiom Appeal - Tab J, pg, l) 

«...,It is the unswerving policy or the DRV Cover.: stent to strictly respect 
the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and to correctly implement their 
basic provisions as embodied in the following points:.,." 



* > ■ 

(DRV Statement on Suspension of U.S. Attacks Hay 18, 19o5 - Tab N* pg* 2) 

"...The peace-loving peoples and governments in the world are firmly demand! 
that the United States end its aggressive war in South Vietnam* stop for 
good the savage bombing and strafing raids ■ inst the DHV* and scrupulously 
observe and correctly implement the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam..." 



(DRV "White Paper - Tab Q* pp. 1, 6) I 

"...But the heroic South Vietnam people have risen up in arms against 
the aggressors for national salvation and self -liberation. Theirs is a 
thoroughly just struggle which fully conforms to the 1952- Geneva agreements 

and to international lav;. ..." 

"The DHV Government has always held that the correct implementation 
of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam is the correct way of settling the 
South Vietnam problem. ..." 



(Thong Hat Article July I965 - Tab R* v>g. 2) 

"...If the U.S. imperialists really respect the 1954 Geneva agreements 
on Vietnam* they must first of all recognize the fundamental provisions cf 
the Geneva agr^ -nts on the sovereignty^ unity* independence* and terri- 
torial integrity of Vietnam and the subsequent provisions insuring the 
implementation of the Geneva agreements; also* the United States must immedi- 
ate!;/ abolish all U.S. military bases* withdraw, all troops* weapons* and van 
equipment of the United States and its satellites from South Vietnam* and 
stop all forms of aggression in South Vietnam and all war activities against 

the DRV. ..." 



113 



Declassified per Executive Order 13326, Section 3.3 
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(Q&an Boi Khan Dan Editorial August 20, 19o5 - Tab V, pg. 1) 

H »..Eo» the Vietnamese people only deaand that the U.S. Imperialists 
return to the 1954 Geneva agreements: they nust stop their aggression, 
withdraw U.S. troops from South Vietnam, stop air raids on North Vietnam 
and let the Vietnamese people settle their internal affairs themselves., »* 



(Joint communique September 16, 19&5 - Tab Y, pg l) 

"...The fundamental rights of the Vietnajaese people to independence, 
sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of their country were solemn? 
recognised by the 1954 Geneva agreements and must be respected..., 1 ' 



(DRV Foreign Ministry Memorandum September 23, 19&5 - Tab Z, pp. 2-3) 

"...The DRV Government has on repeated occasions declared that inter- 
nationally spec ing the consideration of the -U.S. Governments war acts 
against the DRY and the U.S. war of aggression in South Vietnam falls within 
the competence of the participants in the 1954 Geneva, conference on Indochina, 
and not of the United Nations. Any U.K. resolution in furtherance of the 
above U.S. scheme will be null and void and will completely discredit the 
United Hat ions. . . . ,: 



- 



"This stand proceeds from the fund: tal principles of the 1954 
Geneva agreements, which recognize the national rights of the Vietnamese 
people — independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial, integrity — 
and* from the essential military clauses of the said agreements. !: 

"The 1954 Geneva agreements are an international legal document which 
all participants must respect and correctly Implement. At the 1954 Geneva 
conference the U.S. Government, through its delegate, recognized and pledged 
respect for them. Yet throughout the past 11 years it has systematically 
violated them and had thus brought about a serious situation in Vietnam. • .." 



(Vietnam Courier Article - Tab E3, ?■?, 1-2) 

"...The only way out for the U.S. imperialists is to put an end to thei 
aggressive war, to withdraw all their troops and weapons as well as those o 
their satellites, to respect the independence, sovereignty, unity, and 
territorial integrity of cur country as stipulated in the 1954 Geneva 
Agreements...." 






llU 



. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



■ ■ ■ ■ I ■ ■ ■»» » ■ ■ ■ M ■ II ■ ■ » ■ Ml ■' I I— ^ ^ ^M^fc. ■ | ■ M — — i^^^-^— 

irl:- -J. :.. 



(Phea Van Dora's Report to DRV National ALjembly - Tab H, pg. 2) 

,: ,..any approach tending to secure V. ":. intervention ir. the Vietnam 
situation is also inappropriate. Such approaches are basically at variance 
with the 1954 Geneva agreements en Vietnam ll 



(DRV Statement Rejecting 1? ration Appeal - Tab J, pg* 2) 

"...The DRV Goverment declares that any approach contrary to the above 
stand is inappropriate: any approach tenaing to secure a U,N« intervention 
in the Vietnam situation is also inappropriate, because such e roaches are 
basicallv at variar.ee with the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam, - . " 



■(DRV ^vhite Paper" - Tab Q, Pg. 6) 

", ## The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam declares that 
any approach contrary to the above stand is irrelevant, any approach leaci: 
to a Ujl. intervention in the Vietnam situation is also irrelevant, because 
such approaches are basically at variance with the 1954 Geneva agreements 
on Vietnam. - • . " 



(Statement on President Johnson ! s July 28, 19&5 Press Conference Statement 
Tab T - pg- 2) 

■ 

"... There is no other way^ not even the resorting to U.M. intervention 
in Vietnam, . . . !r 



■ 
(DRV Foreign .ministry Meadrandian September 23, 19 op - Tab Z, pp. 2-4) 

"...The UJS. authorities are also feverishly trying by every means to 
secure a UAL intervention in Vietnam, ^heir have Requested help fron the 
Uniued Nations membership at larje in getting peace talks started, ! This is 
a maneuver to use the United Nations to impose on the Vietnamese people 
negotiations under U.S. terms...," 

''.♦.Any U.N. resolution in furtherance of the above U.S. scheme will 
be null and void and will completely discredit the United Nations.,.. " 

STHp 



ii $ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16, By: NWD Date: 201 1 









ezijoyins £H ever*- 



*■ "I 1 j*v*. -"-.■•■» " V. .',. t "" >^'l .^ 'JT. ", C ~~ '-i A Q -s ' ^ j^ ---■.■ * -. -•-* V*5«-|c ***>•** £ cr -.*- 4" "1 ""^ r^ ""*"■" -^ 



1.16 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



fvn-) ♦, rirfiQ —17; -v * r-*-- n-j if TV* ■ • -- ^~i qo ■ .-1 r-»- r?-V* 






*'_I,L)±^. v.., _J_'L...l^ . , U "-• v. j ... .O 



(aaV Rejection of Hadhakrishnan Proposal - Tab L) 

nient of ' as Asian-African force to (^supervise) the demarcation line between 
::crth and South Vietnam and (?ccnsidered) it a necessary measure for the 
( .'^restoration of) peace in this area T: 



(Khan Dan Protests U.K. *s Connivance with U.S. June 7, 19o5 - Tab P^ pg> 3) 

«..,To £z~sxx a pease-fire as mentioned in the British Government vlnn^ 
or the Indian Gov* ascitis proposal sc:;,e time ago., is deliberately to ignor 
the nature and the origin of the v:ar in Vietnam.*." 



(Quan Doi :-:han Dan Editorial August 20 > 19o5 - Tab V^ pg. 3) 




(Joint Asahi-::ainichi Interview with Phsa Van Dong October 4, 1965 - Tab'CC, 
pp. 2, 3, 9) 

,: ...The United States is proposing peace talks 5 in which it doe. not I 
believe, in order to escape criticise frcn these third parties of good in- 
tention and vrorld public clinic;-, tthich is steadily counting against it, 
Through these various methods the United States is trying to test our attitude. . . 

r V.. # It is not possible to seise this opportunity and move forward toward 

T^e^iCe «^ o •!-. c* v»w « w..^ v*>^ Lj—v-tv^ ..v*-* --^ wj.^-.'w.^— -- >j v c- -/ c, — * — i — w -^*> wW^w—.**/, — ^ ow *.. »-- — -js-» 

\73 i:e1cc:za ^oza people v;ho are niaking various efforts ^ vrith good intentions 
of ueace. I'Je are planning to prove to ;hese people 07 actual deeds hov: 
lacking in good indentions ths united Stages is. Tne \:a^r to prove this 
lies solely in driving the A rican ag^re_ : 5 to the v;ell and by pressing 






*J 



« • III V 



117 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3-3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 






.nd the liberation Front of the South frill cake the ulti~£t; 



,- s sa *— - L — i j> c r t **■■ a *" m b s^ r t ~ ri "^ " ■ <* '-■---'- 



i: 









Liberation 






118 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






(JEW Foreign Ministry Stetesent, Hey IS, 1965 - Tab £, pp. 1-2) 

• 1, e 3.CGQ- vi2,U^ UO /£LIU,UU5 SUtii^C*c:Sp L»*.-S w«^>* Uv., v vliv *.c_i» -^iU-wSu 

a nuaher of other governments that air raids upainsi the DRY are to be 
suspar.dc;d frora noon (VJashingicn time) 12 Kgy 1S^5 till the follo-vjing 

VrB$l£ g a.,C k»Hcu Mil© UTiiwU wwi^S —5 .o'cC^/ v*C> *co :.- i — 3 rfilGS x-i U.*^« 
ana CVl^^Bu w>i OOUo £X e S*wj^C<-»;j'~* oO ^ ^ ^.-^_ c^VOc^C%S — . D^uuH /IcJl—--* 



> i » 






in teafcitsg this perfidious allegation., the U.S. aggressors have no 
ether aim than to cover up their emtremely dangerous acts intensifying 
the icar in Vietnam and Southeast Asia and at the sane tine to deceive 
;.orld public opinion on the so-called U*S/ peace will..," 

''•♦•This time % in the face cf the counting movement for an end to 
the aggressive war in Souuh Vietnam and mo the bos&ins Sfcd strafing 
of the DRY* the U»S. Government has put forward the so-called suspension 
of air raids against icrth Vietnam* It h^s gone so far as to siame 
arrogantly that the suspension of U.S. air raids on the north must be 
responded to by a cessation of attacks against the 0-»S« aggressors and 
their agents oy the people and liberation army in South Vietnam*. •" 

,J «.#The D3V Cover, ut resolutely exposes the U e S. Government's 
trick in the so-called suspension of air raids against Korth Vietnam as 
a deceitful maneuver dec id to pave the way for n:u: U.S. acts of v:ar. 
The p^ ..-loving peoples and governments in the v:orld are firmly demand- 
ing that the united States end its i ressive m:.u in South Vietnam 3 suop 
for good the savage bombing and strafing raids against the DRV 5 and 
scrupulously observe aid correctly implem.ent the 195^ Geneva agreements 
on Viei,nam. The DRV Government affirms once a,gain that the four-point 
stand made public on 8 April 19^5 is the only sound basis for a political 
settlement of the Vietnam problem « n 

(!:han Dan Protests U.K. Governr.ent* s Connivance lith the United States., 
June 7, 19o5 ^:Tab P s ?- 3) 



; 'wln isid-Kay, -ivhile the U.S* leading circles boasted about a pause 
in the airstrikes against lorih Vietnam^ the U.S. imperialisms did not 
cease sending aircraft to reconnoitsr and strike North Vietnam and rushing 
more u.S» troops and ireapens into South Vietnam, These facts enable v,s 
zo unaers^anci mnam xnmenf^iacamion ana expansion 01 the ^ aggressive T .;ar in 
Vietnar* is the basic policy of the u*S* imperialists* As for the argu- 
ments about negotiations and cease-fire » ^~zy are but tricks aimed at 
creating favorable conditions for the carrying out of their policy J 1 



119 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3-3 
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T&b CC S p?. 4, ?) 



-.-*/■ 



r-ha^: Van Dons In Hanoi October ^ 19°5? 



''•••The unrtea stages "cer.porari.iy suspanc^a coir.oxngs against "tna 
north at one tisie but that ^as on3; pra^ r strer*gthenir.S 
e se&X&ticm 



u u o 



"v#»Barlier 3 the United States propagandized that it had suspended 
bombings against the north for so:.:a days* HosreVer 5 -ca vera not, able 
to respond 5 as the s^ , ansion of the bonbin^s were airbed &t eliciting 
cur consent *co aenancis ivaiOii ire cannon possxoiy accept, Tr.e temporary 
suspe on was rather a prst^xt for further escalation. "We cannot 
possibly accept such temporary suspension or such de: is/-. 11 



120 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011 



extracts ?rc:»: ::cr:?H vitt na: ■ stati^nts cm 

U.S. K0V:-3 

■ — I 

(DRV Statement July 5, 1964 - Tab B, ??. .1-2) 

"...V/ith regard to North Vietnam, the U.S. imperialists have intensi- 
fied their provocative and sabotage activities and threatened to extend 
their v;ar to the north, . , . " 

"...the National Assembly of the DRV resolutely demands that the U.S. 
Government stop at once all its provocative and sabotage activities against 

the DRV.? 

"Should the U.S. imperialists and their stooges be rash enough to 
expand their war to North Vietnam , all people of North Vietnam , millions as 
one man, would stand up together with the people in the south to defeat them..." 



(DRV Foreign Ministry Letter September 4^ 19&4 - Tab C, pg. 1) 

11 ...Since its unwarranted attack against the DRV on 5 August 1964* 
the U.S. Government has increased its military build-up in South Vietnam 
and southeast Asia. ... ■' 

"While carrying out this large-scale movement of troops, the U.S. 
authorities have openly announced the possibility that wider action against 
North Vietnam night become necessary. , , ," 



(Khan Dan Editorial, December 19, 1964 - Tab D) 

"...While being unable to win in South Vietnam, they even threaten to 
attack the North, thus opening a new war... ." 



(DRV Note of Protest February 9, 1965- Tab E, pg, l) 



"...The 7 and 8 February 19o5 air attack is a new, extremely serious 
act of war perpetrated by the United States against the DRV, a most brazen 
violation of international lav; and the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam, 
and an intolerable challenge to the world's peoples...." 



(DRV-USSR Joint Statement February 10, 1965 -* Tab F, pg. 2) 

"The two governments energetically condemn the aggressive acts on 
5 August 1964 of the United States, especially the barbarous attacks by the 



U.S. 



121 



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NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



U.S. Air Force on the territory of the DRV on 7 and 8 February of this year . 
in the areas of Dons ^-oi- and Virih Linh. 7hoy regard these acts as completely 
inconsistent with international law and the 1954 Geneva Agreements . . m . " 



(Ko Chi Minhjs Interview with Akahata April 5, 19o5 - Tab G, pp. 1-2) 

"...For over 10 years now, the U.S. Imperialists have waged an aggressive 
war in South Vietnam in an attempt to turn that zone into a U.S. new-type 
colony and military base and to prolong the partition of our country.,.." 

,: In an attempt to extricate themselves from their impasse, the U.S. 
imperialists are feverishly intensifying and steooing uo the aggressive war 
in South Vietnam, . .the war is being carried to the north with repeated air 
and naval attacks being brazenly launched on many places of the territory of 
the DRV " 

n 0£ late , the U.S. imperialists have put forward misleading talk about 
peace and negotiation. The peoples of the world are fully aware of their 
aggressive and warlike nature. To step \xp aggression in South Vietnam 
and to bomb the no. th are part of their policy of special warfare. oy such 
acts , they also aim at bri: g about an advantageous position so as to be 
able, in case of necessity, to negotiate from a position of strength. This 
policy is wrong and cannot be carried out...." 



(Pham Van Dong's Report to DRV National Assembly April 8, 1965 - Tab H, pp.2,3,5) 

"...Today, the U.S. imperialists are oblighed to refer to the Geneva 
agreements on Vietnam but with the aim of distorting the basic principles of 
the agreements in order to perpetuate our country's division and to consider 
the north and the south as two entirely different nations...." 

"...In his speech, President Johnson spoke of peace, the end of. the 
war, and unconditional negotiations, however, the U.S. government is now 
intensifying the aggressive war in South Vietnam and extending the war to 
North Vietnam, and according to General Taylor's statement,- there will be 
no limit to the aggression against North Vietnam,..." 

m 

"...By engaging in this highly dangerous military adventure, they 
stupidly hope to cow our people and also intimidate peace-loving governments 
and peoples in the world. ?hzy hope that our people and the peoples of the 
world will flinch out of fear, and thus they will* be in a position to shift 
from a weak to a strong position!" 

"...VJhat causes us to be moved and enthusiastic is that in recent months, 
in the United States itself, a movement has been developing widely to oppose 
the U.S. imperialists who are stepping up the war of aggression in South/ 
Vietnam and increasing their acts of war against North Vietnam...." 



122 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Pruject Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



(Joint communique April 17, 1965 - Tab I, pg. 1) 




"It is significant that the statement oy the U.S. President on a so- 
called peaceful settlement has been made at athne when further bcnfoings of 
the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam are taking place , whan 
there are further movements of American military units and weapons to 
South Vietnam to step up the blood;/ aggression against the people of South 
Vietnam — and these aggressive actions continue.... 11 



(DRV Statement Rejecting 17 Nation Appeal - Tab J, pg. l) 

"...To soothe and mislead public opinion, on 7 April 1965, U.S. 
President Lyndon Johnson spoke of peace and independence in South Vietnam, 
of unconditional negotiations toward a political solution to the war in 
South Vi im. He even promised to set aside 1 billion dollars to develop t" 
economy and raise the living standard of the peoples in southeast Asian 
countries. But in this -very speech, Johnson declared that the United States 
vail not withdraw from South Vietnam and will intensify its air raids against 
North Vietnam. 



(llhan Dan Attack on President Johnson's Kay 13, 1965 Speech - Tab M, pp. 1-2) 

"...Cnce again Johnson clamored that the United States is ready for ' 
unconditional discussions. But he could not hide his sinister design, 
which is disclosed in his own speech. Before speaking of unconditional 
discussions, Johnson declared that the United States will not abandon 
its commitment to its henchmen in Saigon, and right after speaking of un- 
conditional discussions, he threatened that if North Vietnam refuses to 
negotiate on U.S. terms, this will only mean damage to North Vietnam;..." 

"...As regards fforth Vietnam, the U.S. imperialists have unceasingly 
intensified their war of destruction.... 11 



"...The U.S. aggressors are escalating the war in a dangerous manner. 
This is an undeniable fact. The so-called unconditional discussions are 
obviously a big swindle. ..." 



123 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



(D2V Statement on Suspension of U.S. Attacks May 13^ 19o5 - Tab S, pp. 1-2) - 

"« # .The U.S. trick is nothing new. It is to be recalled that on ? April 
1965 U.S. President Johnson had to speak of unconditional discussions and 
peaceful settlement of the Vietnam. problem. , . .Tut within one month after 
these hypocritical words ^ another 3.6*000 U.S. troops have been sent to 
South Vietnam 9 thus bringing the strength of U.S. troops there to nearly 
50^000. U.S. air raids against iCorth Vietnam have increased fourfouid as 
compared with the period frorn 5 August 1964 to 7 April 19o5...." 

"By making the cessation of the South Vietnamese people's just straggle 
a condition for the ending of the U.S. bombing and strafing of fforth Vietnam* 
the U.S. Government has clearly revealed its scheme to prepare for an 
intensification and expansion of the war against the DRV...." 

"The DRV Government resolutely exposes the U.S. Goverrmient • s trick in 
the so-called suspension of air raids against North Vietnam as a deceitful 
maneuver designed to pave the way for new U.S. acts of war...." 



(Khan Dan Protests U.K's Connivance with the U.S. June 7, I965 - Tab ?, pg. 2) 

"...Being bitterly defeated in" South Vietnam and strongly protested 
and condemned by the world peoples > the U.S. imperialists are madly stepping 
up and expanding the war, hoping by so doing to get out of their Isroasse.,.. 11 



(DRV "White Paper" ~ Tab Q, pp. 2-5) 

"...In an attempt to find a way cut of this crumbling position,, the 
United States plots to extend the war beyond South Vietnam 1 ^ borders. 

"Since early 1964 the U.S. ruling circles in Washington have envisaged 
carrying the war to 1,'orth Vietnam...." 

* 

"...Noteworthy is plan No. 6 worked out by Walt T .v. Rostov^ the policy 
planner of the U.S. State Department. This plan envisages three stages; 
first stage: naval blockage of Haiphong port: second stage: naval attacks 
on North Vietnam coastal installations; and third stage: air berthings of 

North Vietnam. ..." 



"...The United States says that it wants a peaceful. settlement of the 
war in Vietnam., but at the ssme time it declares that it will not withdraw, 
either openly or under the cloak of a : ningless agreement, A peaceful 
settlement which does not include the withdrawal of U.S. satellite troops 
from South Vietnam cannot be regarded as such by sound-minded people../," 

"The United States says that it wants to seek a peaceful settlement of 
the war in Vietnam because it wants peace to be quickly restored } but it 
deems it necessary to increase its response and make attacks by air...." 



22k 



in ;JhHe 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i 



"^•.vlhile talking about peace , the United States continue to intensify 
the war in South Vietnaa and to extend the war with its air force and navy 

to North Vietnam. This niay lead to unforeseeable consequences. . . . t! 



"The aggressive and bellicose features of the U.S. Gove: t are furt;: 
laid bare by the following arrogant action: Cn 24 April 19o5 President 
Johnson designated the whole of Vi.efcnsa and the waters adjacent thereto u? 
to ICO miles from the Vietnamese coasts, and part of the territorial waters 
of the Chinese Peoples Republic around the Par ac els of Islands, as a combat 
zone of the U.S. armed forces. This is in essence a move toward a blockage 
of the DEV and, at the same tine^ a preparation for larger-scale ailit&ry 



adventures. . . . 



tr 



(Thong Nat Article July 1965 - Tab R, pg. 2 ) 

^..Obviously, as long as the U.S. imperialists continue to spin such 
nonsensical stories and to explain the southern people's uprising as a 
reaction to North Vietnamese aggression so as to have a pretext for attacking 
the D3V, this will mean that the U.S. imperialists still want to continue 
war and that it will be impossible to achieve peace; in other words, the 
United States will continue to attack the North and the northern people 
will be obi: i to return blows ,... f i 



(DRV Government Statement on President Johnson's July 2S, 19o5 Press Conference 
Tab T, pg. 1) 



truth . 



11 ...This hypocritical talk cannot possibly cover up and distort the 
In fact, the U.S. Government has sabotaged the 1954 Geneva agree- 
on Vietnam, trampled upon international laws., continuously intervened 
in the internal affairs of the Vietnamese people, sent U.S. troops against 
the South Vietnamese people, bombed and strafed the territory of the DRV, 
and has gone to the length of bluntly stating that it will not withdraw 
from South Vietnam. . . . " 

"...It is talking about peace discussions to conceal the plan for in- 
tensified war. Its design is to prolong indefinitely the partition of 
Vietnam and to stick to South Vietnam in a bid to turn that zone into a 
U.S. new type colony and military base for attack against the DRV, t£us 
jeopardis: 



\2in2 rseace in asia and the world.. 



n 



. V 



"The DRV Government once again exooses the U.S. authorities 1 deception 



J^A 



,1 



,L, ^ 



of unconcr&xonai discussions, wnicn is in essence a pernoious maneuver 

to impose hy force on the Vietnamese people submission to the U.S. policy o 

agression. . . • 






I! 






125 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






(Quan Doi Hhan Dan Editorial August 2C, 1965 - Tab V, pg. 2) 

^..To beat a drua Tor this deceitful peace, Johnson has been bslly- 
hooir.g that the United States has made considerable concessions, that VJash- 
ington tried again and again to change its attitude, that the United States 
does not oppose free elections throughout all Vietnam and is ready to dis- 
cuss Hanoi f s proposals . . . . !: 

a. ..the Vietnamese people have "seen clearly the U.S. aggressive design 
through their peaceful negotiations smokescreen: the United States never 
speaks of withdrawal of U.S. troops and weapons from South Vietnam, abolition 
OJC liV^i . niilitary bases in Son^h Vietnam, and a definite end to fcholr crteixftvX 
bembing raids on Korth Vietnam. This means that the U.S. imperialists will 
continue to carry out their aggress in Vi< -m and violate most 
seriously the basic provisions of the Geneva agre; roc while unleashing 
their peaceful negotiations swindle.- Moreover, right at the moment when 
they were speaking of peaceful negotiations, they have brazenly poured tens 
of thousands of aggressive troops into South Vietnam and increased bombing 
raids on north Vietnam to an ever fiercer extent. By so doing, unquestionably 
the U.S. imperialists are deliberately throwing every possibility on the 
political settlement of the Vietnam issue into the 



greatest impasse ... . 



■ 



ry— •*<— w*--*t 



■ 



■ _ =- . _ - _• ... - -. , , . I^fcX— 



* - ■ - .... 



(?ham Van Dong's National Day report August 31> 1965 - Tab X, pp. 2-4, 6) 

"...The extension of air attacks on Ilorth Vietnam by the U.S. imperialists 
is an extremely blatant war act against the DRV, an independent and sovereign 
country. This is a rr.ost serious violation of the 19o4 Geneva agreements on 
Indochina j of the U.l\ Charter, and of international law. In their escalation 

;ainst Month Vietnam the U.S. imperialists have committed inhumane crimes, 
bombing and strafing densely populated areas, many hospitals..." 



"...The U.S. imperialists still continue the escalation in the north...."' 
They may even start a nm Korean war in this area...." 

■ 

"...In his speech on 23 July President Johnson even began to talk about 
his readiness to discuss Hanoi's proposals, to mention the question of re- 
unifying Vietnam, and the ?!?LSV. Why is there such a change? Is that an 
indication of Washington's willingness for ^eace? 



"Heplying to this question, we must consider not the statements by the 



U.S. ruling circles, but their deeds- 



:iat have fcney done 



^hey have 



been intensifying the aggressive war in South Vietnam and stepping up the 



escalation in the north.... 



1: 






T>V*a«4j4&v«£ 



4-~1 1 



enn iionnson ^aiKS aocut t;eace m an attest; 



^ - 



♦ j. 



-us 



cover up his war schemes; the more he talks about peace the more he steps up 






• • 



u 



V. 



• * • r.b 



126 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3-3 
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,: «..As for the U«S. escalation of the war to the north-, it obviously 
constitutes an intolerable act of agression* ...To bov; devm before the 






threats of the U.S. imperialists or to compromise with them would consti- 



tute a 



n act of encourag ::t fraught with incalculably serious consequences 



t: 



t • # • 



(ERV Foreign Ministry Memorandum September 23, 19&5 - Tab Z, pp. 1-2) 



/ *- 



,! # . .Since 7 April 19o5 the U.S. authorities have on repeated occa- 
sions professed readiness to engage in r unconditional discussions' and 
made proposals for a 'cease-fire, r a ! suspension of the bombing of the 
north. 1 But is is in this very period that U.S. President Johnson has 
decided to send in 50,000 more U.S. combat troops, raising the U.S. strength 
in South Vietnam to nearly 130,000; and a further dispatch has also been 



announcea. * * . 



ii 



"The 'unconditional discussions' proposal of the U.S. authorities 
is but an attempt to compel the Vietnamese people to accept their own 



t*erms . . * . 



». # .The T cease-fire r trick of the U.S, authorities is designed in 
fact to compel the Vietnamese people in both zones to lay down their arms 
while U.S. troops continue to be reinforced, to occupy and commit aggression 
against Vietnam. This is also an attempt to play for tine to consolidate 
the puoset administration and ar&y, to increase forces for further expansion 
of the war in Vietnam. . . . » 



*—■*.**. , 



* - - . . ■■ 



(Vietnam Courier Article - Tab 33, pg. l) 

If ..,Such allegations as peace, discussions — put forth by the imperial- 
ists — are but deceitful words. The U.S. imperialists have openly unleashed 
war against the DRV. . . . " 



( Jo int Asahi-Hainichi 
pp. 1-2, 7, 10) 



Interview with ?ham Van Dong October 4, 1965 - Tab CC 



no 
the 



"...Mo, the United States is definitely not desiring peace. They have 
intention at all of ending the war..*. are they not expanding war in both 
south and the north, while talking about peace? Tiiey still believe in 



power, and they think that if they further increase their forces and strengthen 
the bombings against the north, they will produce effects. That is very 
foolish, but it happens to be the truth. That is why we do not trust thei 



&c ^rcoosal. 






continuing the war, we chose the course of continuing war without the slightest 
nosn^a^— on. • • « 



"... 



Q 



127 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



"...The v,:i:^8a S: es 1 escalation £;a:ns; i,te north nas izzlea so iar. 
Its ^re^cst failure lies in its having bean unable to brin£ the north to 



■"^V-L~- fi^% +\ *■"• 



~ ~t 



xne conference ^ao~e sy 



threatening its people*. • . ,J 



tr # . .President ciohnscn beran to talk about oeace ne"-:otiatior.s half a 



»^"» l»rV>-^ 



x~ 



year a^o, no^rever^ vnoneYer ne spo.ee asou^ peace j ne oraerea remicrce- 
nent of the U.S. forces in South Vic - :. and !I escalaied If the v;ar against 









128 






GENEVA 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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EXC ERPTS FROM SOUTH VI^Ti-: .-V: 35 NATIONAL LIBERATION 
FR0i;T — I:0a?H VI ST: FATrE3LAI!I) FRO^T^ J0j?:T 

STAT^MEiJT OF'CCTOB?:^ 30, 19o2 



(The Joint Statement was issued on the occasion of a visit 
to Hanoi from October 19 to 31, 1962 of a NFLSV delegation led by 
Secretary General Kguyen Van Rieu. The Statement, broadcast in 
English by Hanoi's VKA on October 30, 1962 accuses the U.S. and 
the Diem "clique" of violating the Geneva Agreements. It also 
states the Front, which came into being owing to the growth of 
the South Vietnamese, is the genuine representative of the South 
Vietnamese people. It calls for neutrality of South Vietnam, 
and for peaceful reunification.) 



11 ...1. Both parties note that over the past eight years or so the 




fe red nore and more de eply in South Vietnam arid directed the ilgo Dinh Die 
authorities to seriously sabotage the implementation of these agrel s. The 
U.S. imperialists are plotting to partition Vietnam permanently, turn South 
Vietnam into a new type U.S. colony and military base... Over 10,000 U.S. 
j officers and men and hundreds of thousands of Mgo Dinh Diem troops armed with 

modern U.S. weapons and noxious chemical are repeatedly conducting terrorist 
raids and barbarously persecuting the South Vietnamese people, regardless of 
age, sex, religion, nationality, or political tendency. Millions of South 
Vietnamese peasants have been herded by the U.S. -Diem clique into concentration 
camps, so-called strategic hamlets, •• . 



,f The U.S. imperialists are also plotting to use South Vietnam as a ba.sb 
! to sabotage the peace and neutrality of Cambodia and Laos, threaten peace in 

j ' southeast Asia and the world, and, at the same time, to make South Vietnam a 
| " proving ground for the suppression of the national liberation movement in" 
; Asia, Africa, and Latin America. 



''Both parties denounce to world public opinion the criminal U.S. -Diem 
schemes and acts, severely condemn the aggressive and warlike policy of the 
U.S. imperialists and the antinational and antidemocratic policy of the Ngo 
Dinh Diam authorities, hangers-on of the United States. 

,r 2. In the face of the U.S. imperialists 1 aggressive acts and Ngo Dinh 
Diem's traitorous acts, the South Vietnamese people have been compelled to 
rise up to straggle for their right to live and for independence, democracy, 
GENEVA and peace. This is a j ust strug gle 3 which conforms to the 1 9 54 G eneva 



j *?he Fatherland Front of ::orth Vietnam is the replacement for the Viet Minh 

group. The Front organizes and coordinates all the mass organizations, the 
trade unions and the three political parties. (All members of the National 
Assembly are elected as members of the Fatherland Front.) All these organi- 
zations operate under the aegis of the Fatherland Front as well as independently, 



129 



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n Viet nam, to the principles of the U.N. Charter and the spirit 
Bandung conference. This struggle is an integral part of the 



agreements on_ 



of the 1955 Bana 

movements for national liberation and peace in the world. Yet, in oheir^ 
special report to the cochaixmen of the 1954 Geneva conference"-, the Indian 
and Canadian delegates to the International Commission have deliberately tuned 
into the tf.S.-Biea allegation, misrepr; snting the South Vietnamese peopled 
just struggle as infiltration and subversion by the North. This is an offense 
to the sacred patriotism of the Vietr. se people. The Vietnamese people fr 
North to South energetically object to it. 



1 FRONT n ^e_ Vietn am Fath e rland Front held stha t the HF LSVj ...which came_into^ 

bein? owinn: to "the growth of the South Vietnamese people's struggle and which 
ralli es broadl y the patriotic and . anti-U.S . -Diem xorc es dji South Vietnam , is^ 
1 the g enuine repre se ntative of the people there, arid is one of the decisive 

j factors for their certain v . "The" Vi etnam Fatherlan d Front fully: suopoarts 

\ the pro gram and the urg ent steps advocated by the NFLS V to realize indepen- 

■? dence~ de mocra cy , inprovenent of the people ?s ; conditions, and peace and . 

I neutral it y in South Vietnam 5 in an adv an ce t d thepeacefii reunification^ 

j of the fath erland. The pro-ram a nd v :nt steps of the IIFLSV me et th e 

interestsand aspirations of the South Vietnamese people and conform to the 



practical situation in South Vietnam at present 



V • « # 



"3. ...The delegation of the NFLSV welcomes the policy of the Vietnam 
Fatherland Front for national reunification on the basis of independence, 
democracy, and by peaceful means, without coercion or annexation of one side 
by. the other, and taking into due consideration the legitimate interests and 
aspirations of the people of all shades in the two zones. This policy matches 

| the political program of the NFLSV, which provides for Reunifying the country 

step by step by peaceful means on the basis of negotiations between the two 

i - zones and discussions in all forms and measures beneficial to the Vietnamese 

people and fatherland ' . 

■ 

r, 4* In the face of the present extremely serious situation in South 
] * Vietnam created by the U.S. -Diem (clique?) both parties hold that the urgent 
| DRV TERMS t asks of the people in both zones are t o str engthen solidarity 3 resolutely 
; - strur^ le against the U.S. -Diam (clic ) urge an end to war and persecution, 
j - dissolve th e "strategic h amlets" and other concentration camps in South 
! VietnamT^amand the dissoluti on of the U.S. Military Co: . : r. and in Sai gon and the 

j withdra wal of U.S . _ troops , mili tary pers onnel, a rms, and wa r material f rom 

I • South Vietnam. The U.S. Gov er nment must respect the soverei gnty and indepen--^ 

denc e of the S outh Vietnamese people. The latterjjs intern a)., a ffairs must be 
settled by themselves; no foreign country has the right to interfere in them. 

M ■ ■ ■■ ■ r fc— fc^ MH Ill II »■ II 1 ■ II I I'll — . I ■ I ■ ■ . , i I,, | | » ■ 1. ■ —■ .11 I ^— — n —>— — m— M^J— n MB p) « II I 1 ■ I — — I i Ml 



I 

I 

t 

i 



* Special report to the Co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference on I ri Jo-China, 
issued in Saigon on June 2, 1962. 



! - 130 



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!, Eoth sides hold that, at a time when the country is still temporarily 
divided it as a must to boost the struggle Tor normal relations between the 
people of the zones in the economic,, cultural, and postal fields. The Vietnam 
Fatherland Front and the NFLSV vail strive to overcome difficulties, create 
favorable conditions for representatives of mass oi'ganizations of the two zones 
- to contact each other, and at the same time, to exchange cultural articles of 
these mass organizations , such as films > books, and papers. 

"5. Both sides are very happy to note that the just struggle of South 
Vietnamese compatriots for the emancipation of South Vietnam and that of all 
the Vietnamese people for peaceful national, reunification have won the active 
and warm approval and support of the world's peoples, including the progressive 
people in the United States, and the governments of many countries. On behalf, 
of the people of both zones, the two sides express thanks for that valuable 
support . 

"Both sides hold that the Vietnamese and the world's people have a common 
enemy, U.S. imperialism, the war-seeking diehard of the colonialists and 
imperialists. The anti-U.S. struggle of the Vietnamese, people and the struggle 
of peoples for national independence and peace are closely connected with each 
other. That is why both sides warmly welcome the peaceful settlement of the 
Laotian question and the formation of the national Union Government in Laos . 
The peaceful settlement of the Laotian issue proves that international disputes 
can be settled satisfactorily, by means of negotiations, Both sides demand the 
. scrupulous respect for and strict implementation of the 1962 Geneva agreements 
on Laos, and the complete withdrawal from Laos of all military men of the United 
States and its satellites. 

"The two sides protest against the infringement upon the sovereignty and 
territory of Cambodia by the South Vietnamese and Thai authorities on U.S. 
orders. They welcome the proposal of Head of State Prince Norodom Sihanouk 
for convening an international conference to discuss a guarantee of Cambodia's 
independence and neutrality. 

"The two sides demand a complete withdrawal of American troops from 
Thailand, and the dissolution of the aggressive SEATO military bloc headed 
by the United States. 

"Both sides support the struggle of the Chinese people to liberate Taiwan 
and oppose the scheme to create two Chinas, support the Chinese people in their 
defense of national sovereignty and territory, support the proposal of the CPR 
. " Government for the settlement of the Sino-Indian border question by peaceful 
negotiations, and demand restoration of the legitimate position of the CP?w 
in the United Nations. 

" "6. The two sides unanimously hold that nowadays the world's people l s 
forces of national independence ana peace are stronger than the aggressive and 
bellicose forces of the imperialists headed by the United States, No matter 
I how small they are, the peoples are able to win if they are united closely and 

struggle valiantly. Though the U.S. -Diem clique still has mjvj evil designs 
and the South Vietnamese compatriots' struggle is still difficult, hard, and 

■ 

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FROKT 



long; no reactionary force can check the growth or the patriotic movement 
in South Vietnam. 

"The 1 4 mil lion So uth Viet: :>se com patriot s will develop more and more.. 
their val iant and ir.de- itable trad ition arid unite rr.ore and ir:ore widely and. 
closely within the ] S V to dir ectly oppose the U.S. -Diem clique* The 16 
m il"! inn North Vietnamese compatriots will support more actively the South 
Vietnamese cc .trlots* liberation struggle , and endeavor to emulate with 
each other to build North Vietnam into a strong and firm basis for the struggle 
to reunite the country. The socialist countries > the peaceful and neutral 
countries j the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and peace-loving 
people throughout the world will obviously support more wholeheartedly and 
practically (word Indistinct) South Vietnamese and all the Vietnamese, 
people. The U.S. -Diem clique will certainly meet with failure. The Vietnamese 
people from north to south who are closely united and who struggle resolutely, 
will undoubtedly achieve success/' 



■ 



132 



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HO CHI KIKH'S INTERVIEW VJITH AK AHATA 

APRIL 5, 19^5 

a 

(Ho's interview with Xoshita Takano of Akahata > organ 
of the Japanese Communist Party, was broadcast by Hanoi VNA 
in English on April 9> 1965* Ho expressed the view that to 
settle the South Vietnamese question first of all the U.S. 
must withdraw from South Vietnam , let the South Vietnamese 
people decide themselves their own affairs, and stop their 
provocative attacks against the DRV. "The carrying out of 
these basic points will bring about favorable conditions for 
a conference along the pattern of the 1954 Geneva conference. 
Such is a reasonable and sensible approach which is 
beneficial to peace and to the U.S. people. n ) 
» 
"Question: The U.S. imperialists have suffered repeated defeats in South Vietn 
However j they are still contemplating bringing in superweapons, up-to-date 
weapons in an attempt to subjugate the Vietnamese people. From the people T s 
viewpoint what is the character of the war in Vietnam and what is its signi- 
ficance in contemporary history? The U.S. imperialists are said to have 
landed themselves in an embarrassing dilemma in South Vietnam- YJhat is the 
relation between this position and their recent frenzied aggressive acts 
vis-a-vis North and South Vietnam? In such circumstances, what is the most 
important immediate task of the Vietnamese people? 

DVES "Answers For over 10 years now, the U.S. im peria lists have waged an ag gressive 
war in South Vie tnam i n an a t tempt to turn that zone into a U.S. new-type 
colon y and military base and to prolong the partition of our countr y . They 
Eave^brought in over 30,CCQ troops and military personnel, thousands of air- 
craft, hundreds of warships and hundreds of thousands of tons of arms, they have 
carried out a most ruthless policy of terror and repression against all patriotic 
people in South Vietnam. 

■ 

"Confronted with such a situation* our comoat riots in the south have had 
to rise ud agains t the U.S. stressors in defence of their life and their 
country. This struggle has recorded tremendous victories. Over three-quarters 
of the area with two-thirds of the population have been liberated. The United 
States and its agents have sustained heavy defeats. The U.S. special war 
in South Vietnam is going bankrupt. 

"If the South Vietnamese people are becoming every stronger and winning 
ever greater victories, as "the fight goes on, that (proves that?) their cause 
is iust, because they a re a nimated with an ardent patriotism and guided bv the 

V J v ** '"' ■ • ' ■ ■ ■ - ' - 11 ill. ^ «|| . II I, , «■ ■ 1 1 1, ■ ii ■ ■ ■■ II ■ 1 H i — ■ H liri . P - 1 . ■■ - fi ll ** L, . - 

sound policy of the M?LSV. The war being waged by our. compatriots in the south 
* is a peoples revolutionary war against foreign aggression , for national in- 

dependence and peace. It is an active part of the world peoples movement 
against ..imperialism colonialism, and neocolonialism, headed by U.S* im- 
perialism, for national independence, democracy, peace, and social progress. 



FRONT 

~v _ _ -i 



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US MOVES 



GENEVA 



That is precisely the reason why the peoples of the whole world are ex- 
tending us their sympathy and support* The increasing victories of the 
South Vietnamese people show that in our epoch, a nation closely united and 
waging a resolute struggle is fully capable of defeating the imperialist 
aggressors , however ferocious , cruel , and well armed they may be. 



"In an attempt to extricate themsel*v 






from their imoasse. the U.S. 

it.— i -i . - .iinii i~ ■' ■ i "i .!■■■ ■ r ~\mi - i— ■ ~i' ^~ r ■ ■■ i i ■ ^ -~~ ■^ 

imperialists are feverishly intensify. and stepping up the asrHressive war 
in So u th Vi et nam . They have brought in U.S. marines and South Korean mercena- 
ries , their planes are daily strafing and dumpting napalm bombs and toxic gas 
on liberated areas, destroying hospitals, schools, and p das, and massacring 
the civilian population including old people, women, and children. On the 
other hand, the war is bei r-r carried to t h e north with repeated, air .and naval 
attacks being brazenly laun 1 on m any places of the territory of the DRV. 
Meanwhile the war is intensified in Laos and provocations are staged against" - 
Cambodia. The IK S, im perialists 1 acts of aggression and war in Vietnam are of 
the utmost gravit y; they -os sly tramp le upon the 195k Geneva a greements on 
Vfetnam^ and const itute violati ons of ititernationaf lav/" and mani festatio ns of 
disregard for world public opinion •. 



"The U.S. rulers claim that the north is waging aggression on South 
Vietnam and that their attacks on the north aim at putting an end to the 
assistance extended by the north to the South Vietnamese people. These are 
deceitful contentions designed to fool the world's peoples and to cover up 
the U.S. aggressive acts. It must be pointed out that it is the legitimate 
right of the South Vietnamese people to drive out the U.S. aggressors, to 
defend their country and to decide themselves their own international affairs. 
It is the sacred right of the Vietnamese in the north as well as in the south 
to oppose and defeat the U.S. imperialists 1 aggressive acts to defend their 
national independence and their life. The U.S. imperialists 1 acts, however 
frenzied and reckless they may be, cannot prevent the Vietnamese people. from 
carrying on their patriotic struggle until final victory. 

"Question: There is now much talk about a peaceful settlement and negotiations., 
to end the war in South Vietnam, What is in your view the inijnimum basis for 
the settlement of the Vietnam problem? 



US MOVES "Answer: Of late, the U.S. imperialists have p ut forwa rd misleadi n g talk about 

peace and negotiation. The peonies of the world are fully aware of their 



— *- L -^- 



siv< and war like nature, To step up aggression in South Vietnam and to 



bomb the north are Dart of their policy of special warfare. By such acts, 
they also aim at bringing about an advantageous position so as to be able, in 
case of~necessity. to negotiate from a position of s trength. This policy is 

out. 



wron? ana cannon oe 
wj 



carried 



"The Vietnamese people cherish peace and have always respected and 
correctly implemented the 1954 Geneva agreements. However, they are determined 
to fight to the end against the aggressors. If the U.S. imperialists stubbornly 
persist in their policy of aggression and war, they will, certainly suffer a 
humiliating defeat. 



13^ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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TERMS "To settle the South Vietnam question , first of all the United Stat es 

_must withdraw from South Vietnam let^: So uth Vietj ^.pjaoplejihgras elves 
dpcjde their own affairs, z stou its provocative ,Al;ta-d^_aisaii^tLJJbe.ja^ 
Thi» carrvin^ out of these basic joints will bring about favorable cond 



GENEVA for a conference along the pattern o f the 1954 Geneva c onference* Such is 

a reas onab le and sensib le ap proach which is^b eneficial to peace a nQxTtne 
U.S. pcodIc. 



rm 



"Question: What is your appraisal of the Indoehinese peoples' conference 
recently held in Phnom Penh? 

"Answer: The Indoehinese peoples 1 conference convened at the initiative of 
Prince Norodom Sihanouk,, the Cambodian head of state, has recorded good 
successes* This is a bis victory for the peoples of Vietna, Cambodia, and 
Laos in their united struggle against their common enemy , the U.S. imperialists 
While the United States is stepping up and expanding the aggressive war in 
South Vietnam, attacking the DRV, intensifying the war in Laos, and repeatedly 
' encroaching on the territory and national sovereignty of Cambodia, the success 
of the conference shows the determination of the three Indoehinese peoples 
to fight against the U.S. imperialists in defense of national independence 
and peace in Indochina and southeast Asia. 

"Question: Of late, the U.S. imperialists have schemed to direct the re- 
actionary and militarist Japanese administration to rapidly conclude the 
Japan-ROK talks. They also plan to set up the SEATO aggressive military bloc. 
This is directly related to their aggressive acts in South Vietnam. What are 
your assessments of the dangerous de " *ns and activities of the U.S. and 
Japanese reactionary forces on Japanese soil and of the Japanese peoples 
struggle against these dangerous schemes and acts? 

"Answer: The Japan-ROK talks are a maneuver of the U.S. imperialists aimed at 
establishing the SEATO aggressive military bloc and intensifying war prepara- 
tions. This maneuver is in complete contradiction with the interests of the 
Japanese and Korean peoples and poses a threat to peace in the Far East and 
the world. The U.S. imperialists who are the aggressors in South Vietnam are 
also occupying the Japanese islands of Okinawa and Ogasawara and occupying 
South Korea. The Japanese militarists who have colluded with the United 
States and repressed the Japanese people have also sent sailors and 
technicians to help the United States in South Vietnam and allowed Japanese 
territory to be used as a base for aggression against South Vietnam. The U.S. 
imperialists are the common enemy of the peoples of Vietnam, Japan, and Korea. 
The same may be said of the Japanese militarists and the South Korean puppets. 
The Vietnamese people fully support the struggle of the Japanese people against 
the Japan-ROK talks and the reactionary policy of the U.S. imperialists and 
Japanese militarists. They sincerely thank the Japanese people for warmly 
supporting their struggle against the U.S. aggressors, 

"I take this opportunity to convey my cordial greetings to the editorial 
board of AXAHATA and request your paper to convey to the fraternal Japanese 
people the greetings of militant solidarity of the Vietnamese people." 



135 



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REPORT -OF T.-iK DRV GOVSfttS-ISriT SUBMITTED BY 
PHAI-I VAN D0;.G TO TtW, DRY KATIOIiAL ASSI-ilBLY 

ON APRIL 8, 1965 . 

— mm I ' - 

(The first section of this report was broadcast by 
Hanoi VMA in English on April 12, 1965- The concluding 
section containing Pham Van Dong's four points was trans- 
lated by FBIS from a Hanoi domestic broadcast on April 13* 
The four points and other pertinent excerpts from the 
report are included below, The report contains a lengthy 
indictment against U.S. activities in South Vietnam as 
veil as a report on conditions in North Vietnam.) 

"...The unswerving policy of the DRV Government is to respect strictly 
the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and to implement correctly their basic 
provisions as embodied in the following points: 

h POINTS M l« Recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietn amese 

p eopTe^^pcacej independence,' sovereignty, unity , and' territorial integ rity . 
Accor ding to the Geneva agreements 3 t he U.S. Government must withdra w from 
South Vi etnam U.S. troops > m ilita ry perso nnel , and weap on s of all kinds, dis- 
mantle all U.S. military bases ther e, and cancel its mili tary allianc e with 
South Vietnam. It must e nd i ts p olicy ^ interventi on and aggression in South 
Vietnam, Ac coining to the Gene agreements, the U.S. Government must stop its 



J M w ■ ■■■»■ . 



acts of war against Ko rl h Va :.n and completely cease all encroachments o n 
the territory and sovereignty of the DRV. 

j ^ - .11 || '■^ — ■i ■ m, ■!.-■■■ i i » -ii ■ M i, i U<B ^^■j__Mi_| „ 

n 2. P ending th e peacef ul re u nificat i on of Vietnam, while Vietna m is 
still temp orarily divi ded into two" zones tn e^JTitary "'provis ions of^the 1954 
Geneva a greements on V ietnam mus t "be strictl y respe cted. The two zones mu st 
refrain from entering into an y mili t ary alliance wit h forei gn countries and 
ther e must he _• no^oreigq ^niXjt ar y bases , troop s , or mi litary personnel in 
their "respective territory. 

i 

"3. The in ternal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled b y t he Sou th 
Vietnamese p eople themselve s in accordance with the program of the NFLSV with- 
out any foreign interference. 

"4 • The p eaceful reunification of Vietnam is t o b e settled by the 
Vietnamese people in both zones , without any foreign interference. 

"This stand of the DRV Government unquestionably enjoys the approval and 
support of all peace and justice-loving governments and peoples in the world. 
The government of the DRV is of the view that the stand expounded here is t he 
basis for the J>oundest_ politic al settlement of the Vietnam prob lem. 

GENEVA "If this basis' is recognized, favo rable c onditions will be created for the 

.peaceful settlement of the" Vietnam people, and it wiUTbe possiBIe to cons'id er" 



the reconvening of an international conference alo ng the pattern of the 1954 
Geneva conference en Vietnam. 



"The DRV Government declares that any approach contrary to the aforementioi. 

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" 1T N stand is inappropriate j any apr r cach tending to secure U.N, i ntervention in * 

the Vietnam situation is also ina ppro priate. Such appro aches e basica lly at 
"variance wltTTLne rfrlffPffeneva eements on Viet nam,.. . . 

I GENEVA n We believe the world's people were awakene d on hear ing President 

US MOVES Johnson streak of a return to the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam. This was 

a laurch, ver yone knows the U.S. im peri alists are the en a ny of the Gen eva 
agreenientp. Never have they and their Saigon henchmen officially recognized 
3 these agreements. Worse still, they have never officially recognized the 

i ICG's execution of the Geneva agreements. At this very moment they are down- 

trodding the Geneva agreements more brazenly than ever. The U.S . imp cripQ.ists 
have n ever resp ect ed the 1954 Gene va agree ments o n Camb odia and th e 19 54_and 
1962 Geneva agree <s on Lao s, At present, they persistently refuse to 
reconvene the international conference on Cambodia and Laos. Today, the U.S. 
imp eri alists are oblige d to refer to the Geneva agreements on Vietnam bu^vri.th 
the aim of distorti n g the b asic principles of t he ag reements in order. to 
perpetuate our c ountry' s division and to con si der the nor th and the south as 
two entirely different nations. 

"As for our government and people, they have continuously struggled to 
maintain the Geneva agreements on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and considered 
these agreements as a legal basis for the sacred and inviolable national 
interests of the people of the three friendly countries. 

"President Johnson 's 7 April speech is full of irreconcilable contradictions 
between the deceitful words and the criminal acts of the U.S. Government in 
Vietnam. 

US MOVES "1- In his speech, President Johnson spoke 01 peace, the end of t he war, 

and un c ond xtional nego t i at ion s , how g v g r , the U.S. government is now intensi- 
f yinr; the aggressive war in Sout h Vietnam and ex t endin g the war to North Vietnam, 
and according to General Taylor's statement, th ere will be no limit t o the 
aggression against North Vietnam. 



•■■k^ilWa..^ »^1 



"2 . President Johnson spoke a lot about S outh' Vietnam's indepen dence: 
South Vietnam will not be bound to any foreign intervention or bound to any 
alliance and will not allow any country to set up its military base there. 
However, it is the U.S. imperialists who are seeking at all risks to cling to 
South Vietnam and have increased the number of U.S. combat units in South 
Vietnam and the number of aggressive acts against North Vietnam in an attempt 
'to cling to South Vietnam. It is crystal clear that the U.S. Government is* 
waging this aggressive war against South Vietnam, but it has brazenly accused 
North Vietnam of being the aggressor. President Johnson stated in his speech 
that "we will not withdraw publicly or under any (word indistinct) agreement." 
This brazen statement has completely laid bare the U.S. policy on Vietna. It 
is a threat to world public opinion. 



develo 



"3 * Pr q s ident.^ J o hn son^l sa_g££ t end ed „ frj^Qjaaan^ £ ^ec.31 is 

waenb andthe imm^v^ent^ 



137 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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1 trU! ion dollars, but his rjuroose was to woo the southeast Asian peoples. The 
U.S. imperialists are really the creators of all danger of war in Vietnam, Laos, 
and other places. They have committed considerable criminal acts and have feven 
-used toxic gas not only in the war, but in the repression of anti-U.S. people 
in the urban centers, 

"A. President Johnson threatened to continue the use of force. This 

"^ w i - - — — — * — ii — -— — — — — ■- ■ 

threat cannou ingnten us. The Vietnamese people are determined to fight and 
win. Triey are not afraid of any difficulty or enemy* As they are suffering 
defeats, the U.S. imperialists v;ill certainly be defeated completely. As the 
U.S. Government has been urged by public opinion the world over and in the 
United States to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam and put an end to the 
war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, President Johnson was obliged 
to utter demagogic words, and these were only maneuvers or tricks aimed at 
deceiving public opinion and appeasing the increasingly widespread and vigorous 
opposition in the United States and the world over to the war of aggression in 
Vietnam. 

* 

"So, our Vietnamese people and the world's people must heighten their 
vigilance against the U.S. imperialists 1 new acts of war and, at the same time, 
against their deceitful move to intensify the war under the label of peace and 
negotiations and to slander other people as warmongers,... 



US MOVES "The NFISV 



V, the mobjlizer and organizer of the patriotic forces in South 
eader wnxch has t n the people to ever greater victories, is 



Vietnam, t he J e; 

now controlling three-fourths of the territory and o-thir ds of the popu latio n 
of South Vietnam . It ha^eyer hig h er intern ational prestig e and posit ion , 
afid is bean tore and more recognized by foreign countries and i Id public 

"-"* . . m mm „ T _ ! twill ii '■ * I ^~»fc i,l ■■■■ LI-" ■ *m I ii «i ^ ' i~ -——U—m' i * ■ — fa — ■ ■■ ^™ — '■ ■ — wW ^l ■ ■» ■— ■ — ■ i — n . !■ ■ — i» ' ■ ■ ■> ■ ■ ■ i ■ ■ * ■ " ■ ■ ■ ■ * ' " ■* *^ J ■ ' "" mm ^^— ^~ ^—— • •— **'*' ■■■ «■•* 

opinion as the sole genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people. 

"Its sound program constitutes the banner of unity and struggle for national 
salvation. • .with a view to achieving independence, democracy, peace, and neu- 
trality in South Vietnam, and eventual peaceful reunification of the country. 
The statement of 22 March 1965 of the front is resounding in the world as the 
strong voice of a people determined to fight and to win, the voice of justice, 
the voice of the just cause of the Vietnamese people and of the present epoch,,.. 



"The Government of the DRV sternly exposes and denounces to compatriots in 
the whole country and to the peoples of the world the, new, extremely serious 
war acts of the U.S. imperialists: on the one hand the latter are intensifying 
the aggressive war in the South, and on the other they are launching air and 
naval attacks on the north. 



US MOVES "By engaging in this highly dangerous military adventure, they stupidly 

hooe to c ow our people a nd also int imidate oeace-lovin? governments and peonies 
^in the world. They hope that our people and the peoples of the world will 
flinch out of fear, and thus they will be in a position to shift f rem a weak 
to a strong position! 



138 



" 



. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



"But in the face of their new aggressive acts, the Vietnamese people 
from the south to the north are waging an all the more resolute struggle* and 
the world's peoples are extending us an all the more vigorous support* It is 
clear that still heavier defeats are in store for the U.S. imperialists 



4 # • • 



"Ten years ago the French Expeditionary Corps , in spite of its 200*000 
crack troops, ended in defeat at Dien Bien Fhu. AU.S, expeditionary corps 
will inevitably meet with the same ignominious fate in South Vietnam. For 
their part, our s out hem compatriots are prepared to fight with determination, 
to fight to the end, and to fight until not a single U.S. soldier is any longer 
to be seen in our country, even if they will have to fight for 10 or 20 years 
or more, and however great their difficulties and hardships may be (22 March 
! 1965 statement of the NFLSV). 

* 

"While intensifying the aggressive war in South Vietnam, the U.S. im- 
; perialists are expanding it to the North with their air force on the grounds 

that the DRV is at the origin of the patriotic struggle in South Vietnam. 
I These are obviously impudent acts and perfidous tricks of corsairs .... 

GENEVA "By attacking the DRV they have completely scraoued the Geneva agreements 

and crossly violated international law and all human laws. They must pay 
for their crimes.... 



"The entire people of the north, united as one, are determined to struggle 
- in a self-sacrificing spirit to defeat all enemy aggressive schemes, to defend 
the north, and, more closely than ever, to stand side by side vrith our 
southern compatriots and wholeheartedly support their liberation struggle 
till final victory. 

"In laying hands on the north, the U.S. warmongers expose themselves not 
only to well-deserved counterblows in the north, but also to still more telling 
blows in the south, as was pointed out in the 22 March 1965 statement of the 
liberation front: 

1 "To defend the beloved north, the army and people of the 

j south have vented their flames of anger at the U.S. aggressors 

| and their agents. If the U.S. imperialists lay hands on the 

| north of our fatherland once, the amy and people of the south 

are resolved to strike twice or three times as hard at them, . . 



; "In these circumstances, the more frenzied the United States attempts to 

j . extend the war to North Vietnam, the more disastrous will be their defeat! An 

| anti-U.S. wave of indignation is now surging up in the world. The governments 

i and people of the socialist countries, nationalist countries, int er nation al 

organizations, peoples the world over, and progressive circles and various 

i social strata in the United States itself are extending an ever more resolute 

i and vigorous support and assistance to our just struggle 



i # 



"Today we are much stronger than before, strong in the north; strong 5ji the 
south, and strong in worldwide support. For their part the U.S. imperialists are 



139 






— 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



FRONT 



being bogged down in South Vietnam and encountering great difficulties in 
various fields in many places. That is why our people are all the more 
heightening their will and determination, are animated with even greater 
enthusiasm and confidence in their just and certainly victorious struggle, 
and are resolved to devote all their forces to drive the U.S. aggressors 
out of our country j to defend the north, to liberate the south, to eventually 
build a peaceful, reunified, independent, democratic, and prosperous Vietnam, 
arid to contribute to the defense of peace in southeast Asia and the world...* 

"The whole peo ple of t he north are warml y re sponding to the statement^ 



ofjLhe_^rPLSV and the statement of the Vietna m Fathe rland Front , they are 
simultaneously carrying out production, fighting, and combat preparations, 
determined as they are to do their best to build and defend the north and to 
extend wholehearted support to the cause of the liberation of the south. In 
the present juncture, all social strata and all citizens must work more with a 
higher sense or urgency and higher productivity. Everybody must, according to 
his capacity and strength, make his most effective contribution to the common 
i cause of the country. 

* 

^In response to _the_ appeal of the NFXSV, it the South Vietnames e _cadr es_^ 
arm ymen^ and ordin ar y citizens regroup ed to the nort h have enthu siastically 

'voiced their readiness to return to their na t ive la nd and t o fig ht, arm s in 
h^nd, or to do any work to contribute to the annihilation of the en emy and to 
national salvation. Pe nding o rders to this effect, all of them are striv ing 

' with one Hiind^t"bo ost up pro duction and ac"£ively^brir"to contribute to the 
defense and the building of the nor th. \!e warmly hail their patriotism and 

^^bat^cadincss ! . . . 

1 * "In -the process of production and fighting, the administration in the 

north will be ever more consolidated and ever stronger. The northern part of 

' our country, the DRV, will bring into play its great impact as the base for the 

liberation of South Vietnam and the peaceful reunification of the fatherland... 



ttq Mmreo "VJhat causes us to be moved and enthusiastic is that in recent months, in 

i th e United States itsel f, a movement h as been develop ing widely to op pose the 

j U.S. imperialists who are stepping up the war of a g gression in South Vie tna m and 

I increasing their act s of wa r against North Vietnam. This'movement includes a 

great numbers of American people from all walks of life — workers, youth, women 

i students , intellectuals , religious people, congressmen, and journalists. The 

: * struggle forms have gradually become stronger and more abundant.*.. 

: • * "Dear comrade deputies of the National Assembly, the anti-U.S. struggle of 
; our people has received never-before-seen sympathy and wide support from the 

: people in the world, from fraternal socialist countries to people from all 

walks of life of various Western countries, including the United States. This 
is an event having an international meaning of great importance.... 

"We must carry out this task properly because the U.S. Imperialists 
: . continuous! ;/ seek aH means to deceive world opinion and to sow confusion 

concerning prob l ems (several words indistinct). "Worse still, they are so 



,' 



1^0 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



I 



crafty as_to_jtry to (wipe out? ) and t o chang e black into white. For exam ple j 
they say they have to expand the war to the north because the DItV has cause d 
the 1x1 ition war in the south. 



! 1fe must unmask the U.S. aggressors in time and vigorously and sharply 
because they are used to stealing while crying for help, V/e must awaken the 
world's people to these dishonest tricks of the U.S. bandits. Ca.ro must be 
taken when they speak of love and justice because they surely want to get in 
a house -without having to break down the door."..*- 



1M 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



■ _ 



VIIA, "AbTKOElIZSD" STATZISKT jSJSC TIKG THE 

17 i;o:;-AiiG:ia3 ij-vrio;; appeal 

(VKA. "broadcast a st&tenent April 19; 19^5 in Snglish which 
d "been "authorized 11 to issue rejecting the 17 Non-Aligned 



it 



FROI.T 



Nation appeal passed at the Belgrade meeting of non-aligned 
countries on March 15, 1965* Eae " authorization 1 ' presumably 
was by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs . ) 

Ijjll BSJBEKSLiOMfl^ ^-Qf^SputhJ/i stnam's 

territory and fofp ^thirds iu off its 'population* It, is , clc-.:^ thqt_.a t r the 

present time any solution to the South Vietnam issue without the 
jsili&is Ave voi c q^s£ ^ tl i^JSELSlL i s inpracti e al . . . 

"To soothe and mislead nubile opinion, on? AxpriLl 1965, U.S. 
President Ir/ndon Jc on suoke of r>eace and independence in South Vietnam, of 



US MOVES 




economy and raise the living standard of the peoples in southeast Asian 



'-*-•,»*-- -^■■•^■— *r X*** f~*~ » - -^-- - 



...• r.r,^~. 



-• - .-'-..• t*kr/itn4i 



countrie s < But iti this very speech^ j' dec b t; tps 

iri.ll not withdraw from South Vietnam and -will' intensify its air raid:-, agains 
Korth Vietnam* 



jj-_ -»._^ J k. 



"In point of fact; since 7 April 19o5> *he U.S. imperialists have 
introduced into South Vietnan two more "battalions of U.S. Marines totaling 
3 j 000 men and a large quantity of modern weapons • American aircraft have 
continually "bombed many towns and vi.llases^ sovdng so much mourning and 
devastation in both South end Ilorth Vietnam. It is clear that Johnson's speech 
is but a smokescreen to cover up the U.S. imperialists 1 new military adventures 
in Vietnam, directly jeopardizing peace and security of the peoples in this area* 

"To se ttle the Vietnam problem at present, the only correct way is to 
k POINTS carry out the points laid down by DRV Pr emi er Pharq V an Donp; on S~A~orii 1955* 

n It is the unswerving poli c y of the E RV Government to_ stri c. t ly_r e spe c_t 
the 19^^ Geneva agreemen ts on Vietnar.i azia to correctlv implement their basic 
provisions as embodied in the f ollowing points: 

"1* Recosnition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people: 
peace ^ independence 3 sovereignty > unity ; and territorial integrity. According 
to the Geneva agreements } the U.S. Government must Withdraw from South Vietnam 
all U.S. troops } military personnel, and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all 
U.S. military bases there, canc'cl its military alliance with South Vietnam. 
It must end its policy of intervention and aggression in South Vietnam. 
According to the Geneva agreements, the U.S. Government must stop its acts 
of war against North Vietnan, completely cease all encroachments on the 
territory and sovereignty of the DRV. 



ite 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



I 



"2. Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, vhile Vietnam is 

still temporarily divided into two zones , the military provisions of the 

19;; h Geneva agreements on Vietnam must "be strictly respected (vhile?) the 

two zones must refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign 

countries; there must he no foreign military "bases , troops, and military 
personnel in their respective territory. 

"3» The internal affairs of South Vietnam must he settled "by the 
South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance vith the KFISV program, 
vithout any foreign interference. 

"U. The peaceful reunification of Vietnam is to he settled hy the 
Vietnamese people in hoth zones j without any foreign interference. 

» 

"This stand unquestionably enjoys' the approval and support of all 
peace- and justice -loving governments and peoples in the world. 

* » ■ 

" The 333V Government is of the vi ev tha t the above -expou nded s ta nd is 
b POINTS the basis far the sou n dest p olitic al sett lemen t of t h e Vi eta _pri>blenij JX 

this oasis is ^recogni zed, favorable coi blon s m il, be cr eated for the 
" peacefu!_ggtole::-:e nt of th e Vietnam pro' t and it vill be possible tn 
"consi der the reconvening of an international conference in the pattern of th e 
15?5 j 4- G eneva conference on Vie tnam, 



U1J 



"The DRV Government decla r es that any approach contrary to th e abov e 
^st andTs inappropria te; any approach tending to secure a U.II. interv ention 
in the Vi e tnam s ituation is also, inap propria te,, because such approaches are 
basically at variance vith the 195^ Geneva agreements on Vietnam. 



"Among the 17 countries vhich sent representatives to the meeting held 
in Belgrade on 15 March 19o5 ; some did not sign the appeal issued by this " 
meeting. Others, vho signed it because they were not accurately informed 
about the bloody var provoked in South Vietnam by the U.S. imperialists and 
the latters* piratical attacks against the DRV, have now shown unwillingness 
to support that appeal...." 



. 



143 



FRONT 



Declassified per Executive Order 13326, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



MHAli DAM EDITO RIAL, AP RIL 23, 19 6 5 ON THE KFLSV 
AS THS OIXY GXWr k- K ^JSS^TATITO 0? THS SOUTH 

viet;:a:;hsk pkopls 

(The Khan Dan editorial marks a strengthening of the 
DRV characterization of the KFLSV role in South Vietnam, 
marking it out as the "only' genuine representative" of the 
South Vietnamese people which must have "its decisive voice." 
The following extracts from the editorial were broadcast in 
English by Hanoi Radio April 21, 19&5-) 

"From a place in the liberated area in South Vietnam, on 22 March 19&5 
the epic statement of the JIFLSV Central Committee was broadcast all over the 
world. Within only a month, this appeal for national salvation has rapidly ^ 
won a broad and powerful response throughout Vietnam, .In^the^^rlc^ jbhe voice 
of the K FLSV is the deci sive one in the settlement of t he South Vietnam _ 
question, one of the most important questions at present on which all of man- 
kind is focusing its attention. 



'With its just cause of national liberation and its correct line of 
resistance for national salvation, the MFLSV has continually led the^S outh 
Vi etnamese people from one vic tory to, another . At present, over t hr ee-fourths 
of the territox y and two -thirds of t he South Vietftamese^pptLLations„. have_been 
liber ated. The front has actually become the organizer and guide of all 
facets of the life of the 9 million people in the liberated areas, while the 
people in areas under the temporary' control of the enemy are constantly turning 
their thoughts to the front and responding to and carrying out all its policies, 
The front 1 s prestige in the world is growing daily. The front and the mass 
organizations affiliated with it have established relations with hundreds of 

international and national organizations in the world. It h as setr.up 

r cores ent at ive organs in man y co untries in As ia., Europe,, Jlf r ic .a,_and, Lat in 
America, The front's Central C ittee has regularly exchanged letters and 
messaged with the governments and state leaders of many countries. 

-"The foundation day of the front, 20 December, has become one of the 
: anniversaries to which progressive people and political circles in many 

countries are paying great importance. On the rostrums of various inter- 
national conferences of mass organizations, the voice of the front's delegates 
is regarded by all as that of a valiant fighter on the front line against U.S. 
imperial ism . The NFLSV representative attended the Indoc hin ese p _eonle r s 
conference last February and the recent 10th anniversary of _the_Bandung^con- 



^fgrence as the only ge nuine representa tive of the heroic South Vietnamese, 

people. 

■ 

"Faced with the great prestige of the KFLSV, the U.S. imperialists and 
their lackeys are extremely frightened. In an attempt to overshadow the 
front r s role, the U.S. aggressors have endeavored to doll up the Saigon puppet 
administration. But they will never be able to achieve their goal. Chairman 

A. N. K o in declared: Today everybod y must see t hat the KFLSV, which is 

leading the So uth Vietnamese people *s struggle 5 is a rea l force which decides 
the pre s ent as well as the future of South Vietn am ._ Premier Chou 5n-lai has 
on many occasions asserted that the KFLSV is the only legal representative 



Ikk 



* 
• 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



of the South Vietnam^ population , and the Chinese people firmly* respond to 
Ther"22'Karch"st; merit of the KFLSV and will send to the South Vietnamese 
people all material aid to defeat U.S. imperialism. President Sukarno has 
very correctly remarked that nobody regards the Saigon regime as a govern- 
ment* It is the United States which is occupying Saigon. 

ll The role and mission of the NFLSV have been entrusted by history and 
recognized by all the Vietnamese people and people all over the world. Just 
as t he I'lFLSV C entral Committee > declared in ,_itg__ communique _qf__15_April-.j _&ny 
■ settlement of the South Vietn am fpggffi/^gl?'. 1 lose its pracl^ip^^and posj-tiye 

Secisive role. 

"The U.S. imperialists and their lackeys are stubbornly intensifying 
and expanding their war of aggression in South Vietnam. They will cert airily 
receive more telling blows from the KFLSV and the 14 million South Vietnamese 
people. The front has clearly defined its stand: 

"The South Vietnamese people and their armed forces are resolved never 
to relax their grip on their anas so long as they have not reached their 
goals: independence j democracy, peace, and neutrality..., and all negoti- 
ations jwith the U.S. imp er ial is t s at* t his _mc t_ _ar e . entirely., us el ess .if ..they 
FRONT still refuse to withdraw from South Viet nam all their troops and all^kinds_ 

of war materiel and means — and those of the satellites — if they still do 



.-*/ — .. — =^ 



not^digjriantle all their n iilitary_bases in South Vietnam^ if the trait or ^ still 
surrender t he Sout h Vie tnamese people's sacred rights to^ independence and ~" 
democrac yjto_jbh e U.S. Impe rialists y and if the N FLSV ^^ heTon^ 
r epresentat ive of the 14 million South Vietnamese people — doe s not h ave its 
ctecisive voice. 1 ' 



1*5 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



DRV "WHITE PAPER" ON "US AGGRESSION AMD INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM" 

(On July 10, I965 North Vietnam released a "White Paper" 
on "US Aggression and Intervention in Vietnam" which had been 
prepared by the DRV Foreign Ministry, The timing of release 
of the white paper was related to the 11th anniversary of the 
signing of the Geneva Agreements on Vietnam on July 20, 195^» 
but the paper itself was prepared in flay, 19&5* The full text 
of the paper was released by Hanoi VKA in English July 16. 
The white paper is divided into six chapters, 

1 — First US intervention in Vietnam, 

2 — Second US intervention in Vietnam, systematic sabotage of 

the 195^ Geneva agreements. 

3 — US armed aggression against South Vietnam, 

h — The United States launched air and naval attacks on the 
DRV. 

5 — The so-called will for peace of the aggressors. 

6 — The sound basis for a settlement of the Vietnam problem. 

Excel pts from chapters two, three, four and five and the 
full text of chapter six are given below.) 



> . 



GENEVA 



: 

I 

1 



FRONT 



Chapter 2 

"...The U.S. policy of intervention has trampled upon the deep aspi- 
rations of the people of South Vietnam and of all Vietnam for peace, unity, 
independence, and democracy. Even the rights to life and peaceful labor 
have not been respected by the ruthless fascist dictatorial policies of the 
Ngo Dinh Diem administration. Therefore, exercising their rights of self- 
defense and self -determination -- which are the inalienable rights of all 
peoples — the undaunted South Vietnam people have resolutely risen up 
against the U.S. imperialists and their agents. ; 

"The patriotic movement in South Vietnam has rapidly developed into 
a mightly tidal wave which threatens to sweep away the positions of the 
United States and its agents. Once again the U.S. policy of intervention 
in South Vietnam has sustained disastrous failure,.*" 

Chapter 3 

"But the heroic South Vietnam people have risen up in arms against the 
aggressors for national s: ;tion and self -liberation. Theirs is a there 
iust struggle which fully conforms to the 195^ Geneva agreements and to 

international law ♦ 

* ., , . . — * — . — *- 

"The NF ISV, founded on 20 Dec ember 19 & 0, more and more clearly proves 
to be th e sole genuine r epresen tative of the peo ple 3 .the, .localizer and 
org aniser of all ratriotic forces in South Vie tnam . Born in the mids tTof 
the anti~U.S,~Diem upsurge, the NFLSV, with Lawyer Ngueyn Huu Tho as its* 



» ■* ■- 



1^6 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3-3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 1 I 



president, unites all social strata, classes, nationalities, political 
parties , organization s ^ re l ig ious groups* and patriot ic personalities^ 

irr espec e of ^political tendency ^ , to. fight, and overthrow .the rule,. of 
the U,S^_imp_eria lists and, their, agents, achieve ^independence^ democracy, 
bett er livi ng; conditions, peace^^^ neutrality for South Vietnam jipd, 
event ual pea c ef ul jia tional reunificfi tipn, 

"The front has succeeded in rallying oven broader patriotic forces 
to the struggle against the U.S. imperialists and their South Vietnam 
agents. Our southern compatriots, who enjoy the broad sympathy and 
vigorous support of the peoples of the socialist countries and peace- 
loving people throughout the world, have scored increasing victories. 
Tojiate , the NF LSV has gained control of four-fifths. _ of . the _ territory 
ar^JjjnijJ.ion people; that is , tw o -thirds _of^the__populatipn_ ; in. South 
Vietna m . It has become a powerful force which has a deci s ive voice . in 
jflte South Vie tnam p y oblew. 

lr The front is enjoying growing prestige in the world. It has 
successively established official representations in Cuba, Algeria, the 
GDR, Chechoslovakia, Indonesia, China, and the Soviet Union. It has 
also established a permanent representation to the Afro-Asian People's 
I Solidarity Council in Cairo and a permanent observer near the executive 

r committee of the International Union of Students in Budapest, 

"Its delegation have been warmly welcomed to various international 
conferences, where they were regarded as the genuine representatives of 
I the South Vietnam people. In particular, three major international con- 

I • ferences were recently held to express the world people's full support \ 

for the patriotic movement in South Vietnam, They are: the meeting of 
the International Trade Union Committee for Solidarity With the Workers 
' and People of South Vietnam, held in Hanoi at the end of October 1963; 

the International Conference for Solidarity With the People of Vietnam 
Against U.S. Imperialist Aggression and for the defense of peace, held 
in Hanoi in November 19&V, and the Indochinese People's Conference held 
early in March 19^5 in Phnom Penh. Committees for solidarity with the 
South Vietnam people are being set up in an increasing number of countries,.." 

Chapter k 

"The question no longer is whether war is being lost, but how fast 
the United States and South Vietnam are losing it and., whether there 

: still is any flimsy hope of saving the situation. 

■ 

US MOVES "I n an at tem pt to find a way out of this crumbling p o sition, the 

Unit ed States plots to extend the war beyond South Vietnam's borders. 

"Since early 196'f- the U.S. ruling circles in Washington have envisaged 

^ , * . — 1 . — — V _ , ,_ ■_ _. , ■ , ■ . . — „_ ■- J -- - - » _ 

carrying the war to North Vi e tnam . Many plans have been mapped out by 
the U.S. strategists in the State Department and the Pentagon, noteworthy 



1 



i^'i 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



is plan_ No. _6_}£orked out by Vfelt_W,_ ,Ro_stgw, _the^j>olicx P_lanner_o£^the 
U.S.' State Department. This j>larL_envj ^jthree^stages: first-stagci 

jmv^J^lockag e °- ^ Haiphong port ; j§BCond^teiiei-_^ 
Vietnam coastal instal lation s; and third stage: a ir bombinEsof. North _ 

Vietnam, . . 



"These are cynical premediated war activities, brazen violations 
of the sovereignty and territory of the DRV, undeniable violations of 
the 195^" Geneva agree ts on Vietnam and all norms of international law. 
They pose a heavy threat to peace in Indochina and southeast Asia. That 
is the reason why the U.S. air and naval attacks on the territory of the 
DRV have been sternly condemned by the peoples of the whole world and 
by many governments,.. 









■ 

* 



"The U.S. Government has put forward one argument after another, 
and published a blue book and a white paper in an attempt to cover up 
its aggression in South Vietnam. 

4 

" Since ? A pril 19&5 U«S, President Johnson has repeatedly stated 
that the United States has come to South Vietnam to defend freedom, to 
allow the people of South Vietnam to guide their own country in their 
own way. He also has accused North Vietnam of aggression against South 
Vietnam, and he has said that th e Un ited S ta tes is re ady to engage i n 
unconditional discussions to find a peaceful settlement of the war i n 
Vietnam, , . 

■ ■ II I ■ !■ ■ ■ IP - "- 

"After the conclusion of the 195^ Geneva agreements, when Vietnam' 
was temporarily partitioned into two zones, the South Vietnam people 
longed to see South Vietnam achieve independence, democracy, peace and 
•neutrality. But the United States had set up a fascist regime under the 
Ngo Dinh Diem brothers and, later on, under a succession of military 
dictators, it sabotaged the peaceful reunification of Vietnam as provided 
for in the Geneva agreements. It has brought into South Vietnam nearly 
50,000 troops from the United States and thousands of mercenaries from 
a number of satellite countries to wage, together with the Saigon puppet 
army, an undeclared war, thus encroaching on the sovereignty and territory 
of Vietnam. It is crystal clear that the United States, instead of 
defending freedom, is carrying out an armed aggression in South Vietnam. 
It docs not allow the people of South Vietnam* to guide their own country 
in their own way, but is stifling their deepest and most sacred aspirations 
in an attempt to turn South Vietnam into a U.S. military base and new- 
type colony 



. , • 



" The South Vietn amese people have e v : :y right to rise up_ in arms 
against t he H«5, aggres sors and th eir lackey to defend their country 
and their fr eedom 3 and _the y are full y entitle d to us e all necessary :?ans 
in accordance with t heir right of self-defense and self -determination, 

- — — -_ — » ■ ■ ■ " * — fa— — — ' » ■'"■■■ ""M*^"*— *- J— ■— 11. 11 — . — - — 'MBHAA ■ — . — -_____. ' _ — __ _ _ . _ _ _ *" 



includin g an appeal to peace- and .just ice-lovin g countries for mora 1 
support , and material_aid in .the form of funds ^ . weapons j and volun teers . 



3A8 



<r , 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 201 1 



"Is it true that the United State s is r eady to _ engage, in ,,uncgndltiQnaX 
US MOVES di sous slon s with a view to findin g a peac eful_£Lettlement^^ 

' in Vietnam? - . 



. . "It will be recalled that net long a to Pr esi dent Johnson d ei nded. a*s 
a precondit ion to any neg otiations for a settlem e nt of the JSouth Vie tn a m_ 
question , that II or th Vietnam should stop its, .aggression against South 

Vietnam. This t: J}£.J?E9£9. S 23 >^ c P^^^9P a .L c *S} 3 , 3 ^ or }*i.PT Q:r -' -9^-y ,De P? us 5. 

" he wan ts to r;ive_ better proofs of '^^^J^^^^^^J^^PjuJ^d^v&i of his_ desire 

to raise t te Jtivia tandards of s out heast. Asian peoples . The U.S. ruling 

circles probably hope that Johnson's 7 April. speech might mislead the 

■world's peoples into taking this as the sign of a change in U.S. policy. 

"Unfortu nately, th e 7. .April speech is full of contraditions : 

"It is a fact that U.S. puppet troops are fighting against the South 
Vietnam Liberation Army and peg-pie which are led by the NFLSV. ThsJttoi-t-ad 
States talks_about its_desire to hold discussion v;j th a view to finding 
■ FRONT a peacef ul "solu tion to th e South Vietnam g tion, but it refuses to 

recognise the IIFLSV as the sole genuine representative of the South ^Vietnam 
people * It is obvious that the United States want s neither peace nor 

"negotiation • 



,0VES 



" The United States says that it wants a peaceful settlement of the 
war in Vietnam , but at the same time it declares that it will not withdraw, 
either openl y or .under ifae cloak of a meaningless agreement . A peaceful 
settlement_which d oes n ot include the withdrawal of U.S. satellite, jtroops. 
from South Vietna m cannot be regarded as such b y sound-minde d people. It 
"only mea"ns"That the United States, which has launced as armed aggression 
against South Vietnam, is insolently asking the heroic South Vietnam people 
to lay down their arms and surrender to those on whom they have inflicted 
defeat after defeat. This is the kind of negotiations from a position of 
strength repeatedly mentioned by the U.S. ruling circles, from Johnson to 
Deak Rusk and McKamara. But they should not have any illusions about it. 
The indomitable South Vietnam people deeply love peace, but they are deter- 
mined to struggle against the U.S. imperialist aggressors; never will they 
lay down their arms until they win final victory. 

"The United States says that it wants to seek a peaceful settlement 
of the wa r in Vietna m jbecause_ it .v its peace to , be quickl;/ restored , „ but_ 
it deems_it necessary to increa se i ts response and r a ttack s by ai r» 
1ifeile~President Johnson says that the United States will strive not to 
extend the hostilities, Maxwell T aylor, the initiator of the theory of 
special war, who is now the plenipotentiary representative of the U.S. Govern- 
ment in South Vietnam for carrying out this kind of war, bluntly state s 
that no limit exi - to the potential escalation of .jthg^war. and that 
America may directly enter the ground fighting; if necessa ry. 



1^9 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



US MOVES l^e 



"Wh ile talking about peace, the United States con tinue jto J : ntensif^ 
war in South Vietnam and to extend the war with its air force and 



FRONT 



navy to North Vietnam . This may lead to unforeseeable consequences. It 
is clear that the U.S. aggressors and warmongers are using double talk to 
cover up their new dangerous military adventures in this area 



... 



"The aggressive and bellicose features of the U.S. Government are 



: ._ 



furth e r laid bare by the following ; arroga n t action: On ?Jh A pril 19o5 
^Presiden t Johnson designated the whole of Vietnam and the^a±er~a"d"jacent 
the reto up to 100 miles from the Vietnamese coasts, and part of the terri- 
torial waters jpf the Chinese Peoples Rep u blic around the Paracels I s lands , 
as a combat zone of the U.S. armed forces . This is in essence a move 
toward a blockag e of the DRV and, at the sane time, a prep a ration for 
larger^scale military adventures. 



" In fact, the United States is frenziedly intensifying; the aggressive 
war in South V ietnam, stepping up the war of destruction with it s 



air 



force against Worth Vietnam , and menacing the territorial waters of the 
DRV with its naval forces, in an attempt to turn defeat and weakness into 
victory and strength, get out of its present impass in South Vietnam, 

and obtain at the conference table what it cannot win on the ba tt lefie ld. 

■ 

"The so-called will for peace and economic aid recently mentioned 
by Johnson are but familiar tricks of psychological warfare of the U.S. 
imperialists designed to soothe and deceive public opinion and cover up 
their attempt to extend the war and enslave the Indo Chinese and southeast 
Asian peoples. But such tricks, however perfidious, can fool no one. The 
U.S. rulers know better than anyone else how many countries have courageously 
denounced the noose of U.S. aid and how many U.S. personnel 'carrying out 
the Food for Peace and Alliance for Progress programs have been expelled 
from Asian, African, and Latin American countries." 

Chapter 6 

"The South Vietnam Army and^ people, starting with almost- bare hands, 
have scored great achievements, recorded glorious victories, and driven 
"the U.S. imperialists and their agents into a corner. In an attempt to 
retrieve this critical position, the U.S. imperialists are embarking on 
new, extremely dangerious military adventures, thereby threatening peace 
in Indochina and southeast Asia jnore seriously than ever. 

"In its 22 March 19^5 statement, the JIFLSV Central Committee exposed 



the U.S. imperialists 1 policy of aggression and 



',Mcxr_j 



demonstrated the inevit* 



ability of their defeat, and made clear its stand on the South Vietnam 
problem: 

• s^. 

a 

"The South Vietnam people and their armed forces are resolved never 
to lose hold of their arms so long as they have not reached their basic 
goals, namely, independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality. The South 
Vietnam people aredetermined to go on striking hard at the U.S. aggressors 

■ 150 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3-3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



and their lackeys, and they are sure to win final victory. All negoti- 
ations at this moment are entirely u seless if the U.S, i mpe riali sts 
stil l persist in refusing t o withdraw from So uth Vi etnam all th eir troops 

"and war materials of all k inds and those of th eir sa teliites , and to 

d.smantle all their military bases in South Vietnam^ if the Viet ese 



tr aitors continue to surrender to the U»S. imperialis ts the South Viet- 
Sanies e people's sacred rights to independence, and if~~the NFLSV — the 

only genuine representative of the 1^ million South Vietnamese people — 
,is not asked to say its decisive say, 

" All the Vietnamese people and the DRV Government warmly hail and 
support this correct stand of the NFLSV , 

1 ' The DRV Government has always held that the correct, j^ 
GENEVA of the 195^ Geneva agreements on Vietnam is the correct way of settlin g 

the South Vietnam problem. 



. 



1 * 



"On 8 Ap^il at the second session of the third National As^enibly 
of the DRV, Premier Pham Van Dong once again made clear the position of 
.the DRV Government regarding the present situation in Vietnam. 

4 POINTS "T he unswervin g policy of the DRV Government is to str i ctl y respect 

t he 195** Geneva agreements on Vietnam and to corre ctl y imp le ment thei r.. 

basic pro visions as embodied in tie following points : /See Pham Van Dong's 

" -7 

k .points at Tab tL/ 

"This stand unquestionably enjoys the approval and support of all 
peace- and justice-loving governments and people in the world. 

" The DRV Government holds that the above-mentioned stand is t he basis 
for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem. If thi s basis 
is accepted, favorable conditions will be created for the, peaceful settle- 
ment of the Vietnam problem and it will be possible to consider the recon- 
verting of an international conference of the type of the 195-^ Geneva con- 
■ " ference on Vietnam, 



" The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam declares tha t 
UN # an^ ap proach contrary to the above stand is irrelevant, any approach leading 
to a U,N, intervention in the Vietnam situation is also irrelevant, because 
such appr oahes are bas ically at variance with the 195^ Geneva = nts on 
Vietnam, 

Hanoi, May 1965. 



151 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



B3V GOVSRH SITP STAT S-SI?? Oil gRgSID^TT JOTIIISOIT'S 
JUIZ 28, 1965 E^3S CC <] S&ITHI-SKT 



(Following Resident Johnson's press conference Statement on 
July 28, the DRV issued a Government statement (on August 2) 
r conde:min;3 the Statement but oisitting any reference to the 

President's references to the IRV's "four points 1 ' or the 
KFL. The Statement focused on criticism of the build-up of U.S. 
forces in South Vietnam and the continued U.S. bor.foin^ of 
llorth Vietnam. Following are excerpts from the English- 
language broadcast of the Statement by Hanoi Radio.) 

" ■ ' *In_ an attemp t t o de ceive the Amor lean people and world gubllc jygjnion 
and to justify the massive dispatch of U.S. troops for intensified agression 




discussion and claimed himself to be ready to move from the battlefield to 
the conference table* 

"This hypocritical talk cannot possibly cover up and distort the truth. 



US 




internal affairs of the Vietnamese people, sent U*S. troons against the South 

■ .—, — - _-,,,«,•>-.- 

Viet: 




"It is also a fact that the U.S. Government is waging a var of aggression 
in Vietnam. It is talking about peace discussio ns to conc eal t he p lan for 
intensified war* J ts d esign is to prolonrc indefinitely the partition of" 
Vietnam and to sticl: to South Vietnam in a bid to turn that zone into a 
U.S. nev type colony and military base for attack. against the DRV, thus 
jeopardizing peace in Asia and the "world.. 



. . 



"The D3V Government once again exposes the U.S. authorities 1 deception 



■** .j ■ *■■ 



, _._,.__-,.-,-■ .*. 



>w -J"*--*-*— "■v** M- -*~ » ■*■ -=-■ 



■ 1 a .. 



of unconditional discussions, vhich is in essence a perfidious maneuver to 
imoose by force* on the Vietnamese "oeo'ole submission to the U.S. nolicy of 



aggression- 

. 1 ■ 1 1 11 — 



"The ERV Government solemnly declares that Vietnam is one, the Vietnamese 
people are one. The U.S. imperialists having encroached on Vietnamese 
territory, every Vietnamese is duty-bound to fight against the U.S. aggressors 
for national salvation. This is an imprescriptible sacred right of the 
Vietnamese people. The yietharrse.se people, millions as one, are determined 
to stand firm on the frontline of the vorld people's struggle against 
imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism for peace, national independence, 
democracy, and social progress." 



152 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3-3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 1 I 



"Even if the U.S. imperialists send in 100,000 or 200,000 -or more 
• American troops, even if the struggle is to last 10, 20 years, or more, 
The Vietnamese people are determined to fight until complete victory. 

"This stand as veil as the 22 Kareh 19o5 statement "by the KRLSV have 
elicted vara approval and support from many governments and from the 
world's people. 

"For t: U._S. Government there is only one vay to an honorable peace; 
>k P0I>3TS that 1& 7 "to^cpr rec tly ^Itaglement the 1 93^ G eneva cements on^ Vietnam and 

accept the four -poi nt s tana of the DRV Government. *"* * "^ 

,! Ihe U.S. Government must stoD at once its ail* war against the DRV and 
comple tely cease all_encroachmgnts on the sovereignty and se curlier. of the 
];;/. It must -out an immediate end to the a ive war in South Vietnam, 
withdraw all U.S. troops and veanons therefrom, and let the South _ Viet:: se 
- T^nvp -pebble^settle "their own affairs in accordance irith the -nrosran of the R5T£" 

the only genuine representative of the South Vietnamese neople. 

M 1 1 r -*-_t j~r>i ■■ r ^' * *rj ■■ — r -i _■_■ ■ p . ■ _ ■! _prtir . •»■* fn^i ii i i u.j I i i j - mIm tm b i m rt ■ • ■>ii ~-it-ii i i i - ' - - . ■■ - r i — ■ ■ 1 1 ii — r t 

"There is no other v ay, not even the reso rting to JJjJj._in^i^ention 

1 UK in Vietnam.... 



"U.S. President Johnson has spoken ah out an honorable peace. It will 
. be recalled that all along for the past 11 years the Government of the 
DHV has repeatedly put forward reasonable and sensible proposals with a view 
to achieving a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem on the basis of 
the 195^ Geneva agreements* 

"More recently, on 8 April 1965* it made clear its four~noint stand 
4« POINTS as a basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem." 



._— v 



153 



Declassified per Executive Order 13326, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



LE MONDE INTERVIEW WITH HO CHI MHJH 



(On August 15 > 1965 Hanoi broadcast in English the text 
of Ho Chi Jlinh's responses to four questions submitted in 
writing by Fr en ch c or respond en t f r_Le Kqnde, Philippe 
Deyillers. Ho insisted that the US must give "tangible 
proofs " that it accepted the DHV's "four points" and 
appeared to completely rule out any role for the GVM in any 
negotiations . ) 

"Question: Does the position of the Government of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam remain that which was defined by Premier Pham Van Dong on 8 April, 
namely the South Vietnamese people must be left to solve their own affairs 
themselves without foreign interference and on democratic bases? 

"Answer: That's right, and this on the basis of the program of the NFLSV, the 
tkuwi so "L e authentic reoresentative of the South Vietnam ueo-ole. 



»-^-.^'j'^>-. , -» -*■■"■ 



miWHl~ "'" *V.*"V*%»«" -.»• ■-'■■'.'i .. «.!-•■ -^. k l ,^> BU ,„ , l ^_ J % „ 4*— ,» »T .*■-■— '.'_'— lii«<M 



.,_ ,*-..*- - - ».-».-»+ ~ * -_,(■_»-.•*■ 



"Question: Is the Democratic Republic of Vietnam ready to accept, so long as 
the South Vietnamese people will so desire, the existence of an autonomous 
South Vietnam, neutral of course, but disposed to establish with the north 
the relations implied by fraternity and a common nationality? 

"Answer: Of course, Along with preparations for the national reunification of 
Vietnamjwhich wil l be carried out through peaceful means, o n the basis of the 
free consent of the north and the south, according to the program of thg^ KFI SV 
- .and "the program, of .the Vietnam Fat heriancL_Eront , our entire people are How 
struggling with their main and might against the U.S. aggression in our countrj 
to defend the DRV, liberate South Vietnam, and achieve peaceful reunification, 
highest goal of all the Vietnamese. 

"Question: In case the U.S. Government would solemnly reaffirm its will to 
respect the basic principles of the Geneva agreements — namely, unity and 
independence of Vietnam and prohibition of any base and any presence of foreign 
troops on its soil — would the Government of the DRV agree to discuss with it 
the conditions and guarantees for disengagement which this U.S. declaration 
would imply? Also, in your opinion, is an end to the U.S. air attacks aga5_nst 
the DRV territory a sine qua non condition leading to a settlement of the 
Vietnam problem? 

"Answer: To this end, theJLS . Gover nment m ust _ give_ta^?ibIf^prpofS-Jtha,t,-it, 

is, 

precr.ent on 
Vie tn am ; itjnust Immediately, stop the air attacks .eg eABSfiJQSSL £ e r r it'pry , stop 
forthwith the^ggr essive vrar against the south' *_ of our c ountry , and withd ra w 
from there all U.S. tr oops and weapons . That is peace in honor; there is 
"no other way out* ~" * 




1^ 



* •, 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



\ 



!! Question: Do you think, Mr, President, that the solution to the Vietnam 
problem depends directly on the Hanoi and Washington governments — withoir 
the holding of an international conference — or do you think that it rest; 
essentially with the NFLSV and the Vietnamese authorities in Saigon to fin< 
a settlement? 



o 



"Answer: The four-point stand of the Government of the DRV gives a clear 
answer to this question, and t he re is no question of Saig on author jAieSj_ 
a creation of the Americans which is c u rsed by our peo ple t and which, jiobojfc 
55Tthe world takes seriously. 



"Friendly greetings . " 



155 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



QUAN DPI mm DAN EDITORIAL 0? AUGUST 20, I965 
CRITICIZING ATTEMPTS AT MEDIATION IN VIETNAM 

(A commentaiy signed "Observer" in the PAVN daily- 
newspaper, Chi an Pol Nhan Dan , makes the first open 
criticism of attempts at outside mediation of the Vietnam 
conflict and also expresses DRV sensitivity to U.S. bombing 
raids. The following excerpts wore taken from the text of 
the commentary as broadcast August 20, 19^5 over Hanoi 
VNA in English.) 

"..♦Can there be any conciliation between these two diametrically 
incompatible stands? Conditional or unconditional? 

"The Vietnamese people have always been stressing that only 
/i TytrwTQ when the U.S. Government shows concrete manifestations of its_ 

re co gni t ion of_ the four ~ooint stan d of the DRV G overnme nt and the 

settlement of the war in Vietnam. 



■■*»■.* ■!%■**• »■• » v ^— - *• »_-»■»<■» p wp %*» ^a 1 1 . *.■%»* *> - ■ 



t fc 



"The U.S. imperialists have talked so ranch of their stand of 
peaceful negotiations, unconditional discussions.. • «At first hearing, 
people may think that the U.S. imperialists put forward no conditions 

whereas the Vietnamese people raise certain conditions. 

- 

"The truth is that the Vietnamese people do not put any conditions 
to the UeSo imperialists. They only demand that the latter strictly 
implement the provisions of the Geneva agreements which were signed 
" 11 years ago and which the U.S. imperialists undertook to respect. 
The content of the four point stand of our government conforms to 
the main political and military provisions of the 195^ G e neva agree- 
ments on Vietnam. 

nr _ Trvir . f, Now the Vietnamese people only demand that the U.S. imperialists 

return to trie 195^ Geneva agreements : they must stop their a ggression* 
withdraw uVg . tr oor ro^South V^ * 

Tii^alTlmd l et the Vietnamese people settle their internal affairs 

themselves. 

n By so doing, how can it be said that the Vietnamese people put 
forward new conditions to the U.S. imperialists? 

I ' "vrnat is the stand of the U.S. imperialists? Since 195^ the 

U.S. imperialists have sabotaged all political and military provisions 

« of the 195^ Geneva agreements. Whereas these agreements recognize 1 

the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of 



156 



US MOVES 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



Vietnam, thjgJB^S^imperiali st s_have,. turned .South Vietnam into a 
colony, set up in South Vietnam a separate state, plotting to 
perpetuate" - partition of ~J/iet:v.. ■. 3 and a re now brazen ly ^carrying 
out ^combing raids against the DRV, thus violating her sovereignty 



. « » * 



"I5y raising the stand of peaceful negotiations and unconditional 
discussions* tho U-S, imporialist*? pursuo a dark schema of legaliz- 
ing their acts of serious violations of the 195** Geneva .agreements 
over the past 11 years, compelling the Vietnamese people to recognize 
the presence of U.S. troops and the existence of U.S, military bases 
in South Vietnam, and imposing on the South Vietnamese people their 
lackey governments. 

"Therefore, the so-called unconditional discussions proposal of 
the U.S. imperialists actually asks for one basic condition: recognition 
of the sabotage of the 195^' Geneva agreements by the U.S. imperialists 
and recognition of their aggression in Vietnam in the past as well as 
at present, 

•'To. Jbeat_a_drum_for ; this deceitful peace* Johnson has be en 
ballyhooing that the United States has made considerable concessions, 
%h&t WasHxr^onTtrxeS again and again to change its attitude 4 that 
the United States doe s not oiraose_f ge& jelactoons. J^hf^ng3b^mJL>al3 i .^yiatna^ 
and is ready to discuss Hanoi's proposals.... 



„~vw*.~- rrv«»-».^ ■ >~-~- -■-■'■■->r~^ ■ >CV*»* 



i . \ 



"This psychologica l wa r tri ck of the United Sta tes K as exposed 

ty the*TT7S~ press itself, AP cc mted that what seems to be con- 
cessions was" considered by Washington as a tactical measure, and 
that negotiations. mght_be,^Dr.olpn£ed so as to eive. the South Vietnam 
puppet administration a breathing soell. 

"Indeed, -without waiting for the disclosure by U.S, papers of 
this U.S. trick, the Vietnamese people have seen clearly the U.S. 






ag gressive d esign through their peaceijil^negotiati ons s aoke scre en s 
the~~United States never s peak s of *dthdrawal of UiS.__troops^ and 
weaoons i^m^S'outTn~Viet t. am , aBoTx^ion of U.S. military bases in 
Soircn Vxetnam, ana a deixnx te en a ^o_ thexr crxrixn al bomo xng raxds 
orTlvorth Vietnam. This ns that the U.S. imperialists. will continue 




peaceful negotiations swindle* Moreover- right at the moment when 
TSey~wcre speaking of peaceful negotiations, they have brazenly poured 






,-._...,,, *_ 



tens of thousands of aggressive troops into South Vietnam and increased 
bombing raxcis on North Vietnam to an ever fiercer extent m 3y so doing* 
uncue gM^abjy ^ the _ U .5 ._ _imperi.ali st s are_ deliberately throwing every r 
. possi bility on the political settlement of the Vietnam issue .into the 
greatest impasse. 



157 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



"The policy of using violence to force the Vietnamese people 
to recognize the U.S. conditions and to submit themselves to the 
aggressors has been openly stated by Johnson. He said that to 
continue bombing North Vietnam along with intensifying terrorist 
raids in South Vietnam remains a key to victory and only this 
double blow can pprsUitda North Vietnam. Tha United St&tos still 
holds that it is necessary to continue raiding and killing until 
the Vietnamese people lose all hopes in victory. That means the 
I United States must fight until their aggressive goal is achieved. 



KBDKTI03 



"Obviously, while talking of peaceful negotiations the United 
States has not in the least given up its aggressive stand. 

,J So long as the UcS. aggression continues* the Vietnamese 
people are resolved to resist aggression until complete victory ■ 

"The aggressors cannot be put on a par with the victims of 
aggression. 

"The U.S. imperialists are the aggressors, the Vietnamese 
people arc victims of aggression. In order to solve the war issue 
in Vietnam, the U.S. aggressors must stop their aggression. That is 
the only correct measure to restore peace in Vietnam. ... 

"Our people j who have suffered over 20 years of war, profoundly 
cherish peace, but peace must always link with national independence. 
One cannot mediate between the U.S. imperialists' stand to carry out 
aggression to the end and the Vietnamese people's thorough stand to 



_oppp_se aggre ssipn . i i any oedy wants to stand as mediator without 
condemning_the aggress i demanding t the latter 'stop" their 
aggression and without approving and su pportin g the victims of ag~ 

"gresslon^in ~t7Tei r* s tni^gle^^in s'E^h e*"alj^ ressors7~K e^irPbut "en- 
courage^ the .aggressors, to. continue their .aggression. The situation 

"in Vietnam at present is very tense. The only cause of this tension 
is the war acts committed by the U.S. aggressors. To relax the 
tension, the question now is not to recommend that both sides show 
less intransigeance, but to compel the United States to give up its 
aggressive scheme. As for them, the Vietnamese people hold that 
only by determinedly straggling against the U.S. aggressors can the 
situation be relaxed. 11 



158 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 L 1 






. . DH7 EMBASSY IS KCSCGW ISSUES "C0RRSCTI0N n OF LORD 

BEDCKWAY PRESS. BiTERVISf. 

(On August 2Uj 1965 a DRV spokesman in rloscov issued a statement 
stressing the DEV's h points vera the basis for the soundest political 
solution to the Vietnamese question* This statement vas issued after 
-western press agencies including (AP. A?? and UP) had quotio lord 
Brockvay as saying that the North Vietnamese ambassador in Koscow 
told him that "Hanoi has novor caict that all U*3 fc forces must be 
tfithdravrTL before negotiations for a cease-fire or peace begin* 
They did not insist on this©-* 1 lord 3roclcv;ay also said the DKV 
ambassador told him Hanoi v:as prepared to rcake one concession I; 
beyond the Geneva Agreements ie South Vietnam should have 
tempoz^arilly a separate government , a democratic y national coalition , 
both politically and militarily neutral*) 

" #€ .According to a TOA correspondent in Moscow, the spokesman of the 
DRV Embassy in the Soviet Union has issued the following statement: 

"On 19 August 1965 Nguyen Van Xinh^ I)R7 ambassador to the Soviet Union,, 
received Brockway, chairman of the British Committee for Peace in Vietnam, 
at the latter 1 s cm request*. 

"The spokesman of the DRV Embassy in the Soviet Union recalls that at 
this meeting Ambassador Nguyen Van Kinh explained to Brockeay that the jfour- 
^ point stand of the I3HV Government as expounded by Premier Pham Van Dong 
k POim S cn ~'$~£yr il "fiyffili the basis for all soundest, pqlitic?a^plutiorus.,to. the . 

Vieinam question* If this basis is recognj d, favorable conditions -tfill_; 
bVjgreated _for the peaceful settlerr jbf J \ e^y3?etSim^ problem, jmd lit, ifill 
be possible to co nsider 'the rec qnvenin g, of u an in ternational conf eirenc e jaf 
the type of the 19$k Geneva Sonference on Vietnam* 

' "All the reports released by a number of Western agencies vhich do 
not conform to these explanations are without foundation and intended 
to distort the truth*" 



159 



* 
■ 



i 



J 

i 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



- 

DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY MEMORANDUM OF SEPTEMBER 23 , 19&5 



(The DRV Foreign Ministry Memorandum broadcast in 
English by Hanoi ViIA September 23, 1965 states that the 
DRV's four points are the "sole correct basis 11 for a 
settlement, Following are excerpts from the Memorandum,) 



v 



1 US MOVES " ,.*. : Since ? April 19&5 the U.S. authorities have on repeated occa- 

sions professed readiness to engage in 'unconditional discussions f _and 



made proposals for a ' cease-fire , * a f suspension of the bombing of the 
"north. r ~ But it is in this very period that U.S. President Johnson has^ 
decided to send in 50>000 more U.S. combat troops, raising the U.S. • 
\ ' i strength in South Vietnam to nearly 130,000; and a further dispatch 

has also been announced. 11 



"Along with the Introduction of various types of modern weapons' 
into the South Vietnam battlefield, the U.S. authorities have used 
B-52 strategic bombers and toxic gas to massacre the people and raze 
• villages in South Vietnam. They have unceasingly * escalated 1 the air 
war of destruction against the DRV. U.S. aircraft have bombed even 
l' schools, hospitals, dams, and densely populated areas, massacring 
civilians and disrupting the peaceful labor of the people in North 
Vietnam. 11 



•-• 



•» 



} : "The above facts show that the U.S. Government talks peace to 

j [." cover up its war designs, and each time it speaks of f peace negotiation' 

it takes a further step in intensifying the war of aggression in South. 
% Vietnam and in 'escalating 1 the war in North Vietnam. Faced "with ever . 
j ; ? stronger protests from the peoples of the world, including the Amer- 

i * \ ' ican people, it has been compelled to resort to hypocritical talks 

* •! , _about f peace negotiations 1 with a view to _ deceiving and appea sing ' . 

{- \ paace-and justice-loving public opinion •" 



I • "The j unconditional discussions* proposal of the U.S. authorities 

is but a n atte mpt to compel the Vietnamese people'to accept their own 

terms, 11 









"Thesejare; U.S. troops will not withdraw ? but will cling on to 
South Vietnam; jthe United States always regards South Vietnam as a 
separate nation, that is to say, it wants the partition of Vietnam to 
FROST be prol on ged indefinite ly Tit does V>ot "'recognize the'NFLSV/ the sole, 

■ m 

w 

160 ■ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam. As a matter 
of fact, its scheme is to try to '.achieve at the conference table 
what it has been unable to gain on the battlefield. The Vietnamese 
people will never accept such insolent conditions. 11 



"The •cease-fire 1 trick of the U.S. authorities is designed in 



o' 



US KGVE5 fact to compel the Vietnamese people in both zones to lay down their 

arms while U.S. troops continue to be reinforced, to occupy and cossnit 
aggression against Vietnam. This is also an attempt to play for time 
to consolidate the puppet administration and anqy* 9 to- increase forces 
for further expansion of the war in Vietnam. But the Vietnamese 
people will never slacken their fight so long as U.S. troops still 
occupy Vietnamese territory and so long as their sacred national 
rights — independence j sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity- 
arc not achieved and guaranteed. Let the United States stop its 

■» *" mm 

aggressive war against Vietnam and withdraw from South Vietnam av.d 
peace wall be immediately restored.... 1 ' 

"What xs more, they brazenly arrogate to themselves the right of 
bombing the DRV, an independent and sovereign country. They have 
seriously violated the 195'!- Geneva agreements on Vietnam, grossly 
trampled underfoot international law, and eoiGEsitted monstrous crises 
against the Vietnamese people. Now they are saying that they •will- 
cease bombing the north' if there is some 'response' from Hanoi. u 

"The DHV Government solemnly declares that the U.S. authorities ■ 
must stop their criminal war acts against the DRV. They have no right 
to impose any condition on the DRV Government. Besides, they must end 
the war of aggression in South Vietnam. ... u 

FRONT "The KFLSV, the organizer and leader of the South Vietnamese 

people's fight against the U.S. aggressors, has gained sympathy 5 
support, and recognition from ever broader sections of the world's 
peoples. Yet the U.S. Government refuses to recognize it as the sole 
genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam. It has declaimed 

"that it does not regard the front as an independent party in negotia- 
tions. This further exposes its talks about negotiations as a mere 

* swindle. There cannot be any negotiations on the South Vietnam prob- 
lem ^without thteTSFXSV having its decisive say." 

Ujj m "The U.S. authorities are also feverishly trying by ever/ means 

to secure a U.K. intervention in Vietnam. They have 'requested help 
from the United Nations membership at large in getting peace talks 
started, f This is a maneuver to use the United Nations to impose on 
the Vietnamese people negotiations under U.S. terms." 

"The DRV Government has on repeated occasions declared that 
G2XSVA internationally speaking the consideration of the U.S. Government's^ 

war acts against the DRV and, the U.S. war of s ession in South 
Vietnanjfalls within the competence of the participants in the 195^ 

■ 

■ 

161 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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Geneva conference en Indochina* and- not of the United Nations. Any 
UN U.N. resolution in furtherance of the above U.S. scheme will be null 
and v oid and vail c ompletely discredit the United Nations ■■■«• ■« " 

"They have striven to entice political circles in a number of 
countries to respond to their proposals and to come out with c nds 
for 'negotiations, 1 for 'a cessation of all hostile activities* 1 and 
for 'concessions 1 from both sides, but to equate the victim with the 
aggressor is to fall into the U.S. imperialists 1 trar> and to negate 
all elementary principles of freedom and justice. Therefore the U.S. 
scheme can by no means deceive peace-and freedom-loving people in the . 
world . " 



FOUR 



z^SVA 



"The lofty aims of the Vietnamese people's just struggle have 



POiNTS been fully embodied in the four-point stand of the DRV Government • " 



"This stand proceeds from the fundamental principles of the 195*** 
Geneva agreements, which recognize the national rights of the Viet- 
namese people — independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial 
"integrity — and from the essential military clauses of the said agree- 
ments." - — — 

"The 195^' Geneva agreements are an international legal document 
which* all participants must respect and correctly implement. At th e 
195^ Geneva conference the U.S. Government, through its delegate, 
jrecognised and pledged respect for them. Yet throughout the past 11 
years it has systematically violated tl and has thus brought about 
a serious situation in Vietnam." 

"The four-point stand of the DRV Government also conforms to the 
actual situation prevailing in South Vietnam and throughout Vietnam 
.for more than 11 years now — the United States has engaged in aggression 
against Vietnam and sabotaged peace in Indochina and southeast Asia, 
and the Vietnamese people have been fighting against the aggressors in 
defense of their sacred national rights." 

"To settle the Vietnam problem it is essential to remove the roots 
of the serious situation in Vietnam — U.S. aggression. Any approach 
■ which puts the aggressor and the victim on the same footing or which 
does not proceed from the real situation in Vietnam will fail to bring 
about a settlement of the Vietnam problem," 

"This stand also proceeds from the legitimate aspirations of the 

Vietnamese people in both zones, as embodied in the program of the 

FRONT "Vietnam Fatherland Front and that of the KFLSV; namely, peace, inde- 
pendence , unity j and democracy . " 



162 



FOUR 
POINTS 



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"Trie Vietnamese people and the DRV Government earnestly call on 
the governments and peoples of the world to resolutely struggle and 
demand that the U.S. Government accept the four-point stand of the 
DRV Government. The U.S. Government must put an icrxediate end to 
the air war against the DRV and completely stop encroaching on the 



- 



latter 1 s sovereignty and security. It must immediately end tne wa 
of aggression in South Vietnam and withdraw all U.S. troops and 
weapons from there.... 1 ' 



1r* 



J[The_ four-point stand_pf the DRV Government is enjoying an ever- 
warner sympathy and support from the peace-loving govern seats and 
peoples all over the world. It is the sol-e correct basis for a 
settlement of the Vietnam problem. Any solutions at variance with 
it are inappropriate and so are any solutions which seek U«H» inter- 
vention in the Vietnam situation , because such solutions are funda- 
mentally "contrary to the 195^ "Geneva agreements on Vietnam. 11 



'jTheLKS. Government must solemnly declare its acceptance of 
this four-point stand bafore a political settlement of the Vietnam 
probl em can b e considered . 



... 



it 



163 






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vikti:a:i courier artici- o:t u nc:: sho ul d tie ::ost cohrs 

SOLUTION TO TIE VI: ,:: PHG3L2S 33 UiID^RSTCCD" 



(On September 27 Hanoi's VIIA in English, broadcast a 
"Vietnam Courier" article entitled "how Should the Most 
Correct Solution to the Vietnam Problem be Understood? " 
This article was originally published en July 9 in the 
Vietnamese~lan| ;e newspaper^ Thong Kat (Reunification) 
as Part III of a four port series called "With any type of 
war the U.S. imperialists will surely fail and we will 
surely win.* 1 The July 9 edition states that 
"the DRV Government is of the opinion that the above-mentioned 
stand (four points) is the basis for a correct political 
solution. The September 2? article states "the DRV Government 
is of the view that the stand esa>ounded above (four points) is 
the basis for the soundest political settl ement of the Vietnam 
problem. The article has s cue. =addit ions , which are given 
below, which do not appear in the original July 9 article.) 



"...These dictators succeed one another at the beck and call 
Department and the CIA. 



of the State 



"According to many American congressmen and newspapers, the Saigon Govern- 
ment, which is something completely alien to the South Vietnam people, cannot 
exist even for a week without American dollars and troops, even in 1958 and 
1959 when it was said to enjoy a certain stability. Whom does it claim to 
represent, especially in such a deteriorating situation as today?... 

* 

"If the defense of the North is the bounden duty of_ our southern ccmr 
p^riots , in return the sup port given to th e So uth i s the s acred dut y of our 
'norther n people. Vi e tnam is on e, the Vietn ames e people ar e_ one . U.S. 
"imperialism is invading our fatherland. Each Vietnamese is dutybound to fight 
it and save the country. This is a natter of course and an inviolable right 
of all people suffering from imperialist aggression. 



* • 



US K0V33 



SAsHtVA 



"Following the 22 March 1965 NFLSV statement, the Central Committee of 
the Vietnam Fatherland Front issued a declaration on 2? March and an appeal on 
6 April 1965 j excerpts of which are as follows: if the U.S. Government is 
adamant not to implement the Geneva Agreements on Viet . and does not respect 
the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Vietnam and is rash 
enough to step up its aggressive war in North Vietnam, it will certainly suffer 
a bitter failure at the hands of over 30 million" Vietnamese people. 

"Such alle g ations as p e ace, dis cus sions — out forth by the imperialists — 
gre but deceitful words . The U.S. imperialists have openly unleashed war 
against the DRV. They have torn away the 1954 Geneva Agreements, outrightly 
violated the independence and sovereignty of our people, seriously threatened 
the peace of Indochina, Southeast Asia, and the world. The on ly Vfay out for 
theU.S. imperialists is to put an end to their aggressive war, to withdraw 
ail their troops and weapons as well as those of their satellites, to resoec 






1& 



« 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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the _in dependence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of oui 
country as stipulated, in the l§5j* Geneva Agreements. • . 

Ir lf we do not solve the South Vietnam problem on the basis of 
these fundamental conditions put forth by the people of the tvro zones 
of Vietnam and if \>:e accept the U.S. imperialists 1 unconditional dis- 
cussions offer, this would bo tantsjr^ount to coining to this conference 
table to recognize their aggression and their parliament presence in 

South Vietnam and negotiate under the pressure of their bombs. If a 
countiy face s imperial ist aggression and is compelled to sit at the 
xon£erence_table_whil.e_it5_e: ; srsistsTn his ^aggression until"* it_ 

accept s_his_term s , __can that country y i e ld t o its enemy? Ce r t ainiy 

not," 



165 



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JOINT ASAHI-MAINIGHI INTERVIEW WITH 
PHAM VAN DONG TH HANOI IN OCTOBER 4, 1965 



(The Asahi interview published inJapanese in Tokyo 
on October 5 and The Mainichi interview published in Japanese 
on October 5, plus written questions answered b y Pham Van Dong 
for Mainichi published in Tokyo on October 9 are included below. 
Both articles and the written questions spell out the DRV 1 s position 
that if the US wants negotiations it must declare clearly that it 
accepts the four points. ) 

* 

Asahi Foreign News Editor Weiryu Hata on Interview With Vietnamese 

_ | i . V.... . .. 1 I ■ ■ ■■■! I * I II | | | | . ■ 

Prem i er Pham Van Dong : 

- 

4 "Premier Pham Van Dong of the DRV stated in a very strong tone 

• on 4 October that ' The pr esent Vietna m war c an ne ver be settled unless 

POINDS the United States accepts the four conditions presented by our si de. And 
without that, there also can be no discussions. ' 



■■ffTpiW*'"»j"V»»*t»>l -■ .it rt 



"During the interview, we asked considerably frank questions, but 
on each occasion, the Premier smiled calmly, and as if to say that he had 
been waiting for that question. He explained carefully why North Vietnam 
is taking the position that it is now taking. He also repeatedly asked us 
"to understand this point fully and make it known not only to Japanese people 
but* also to American people. The Premier is a quiet gentleman with a 
reddish face 3 aged 57. The gist of the questions and answers exchanged 
between us was as follows: 

"Question: The peaceful settlement of the Vietnam war is the most 
pressing question today. We have come to your country, seeking an opening 
to settlement. What are your views toward negotiations? 

* ■ 

"Answer: Your question touches upon the most important and basic 
question of the present time. However, as a friend 3 there is one thing 
which 1 wish to ask you first. Do you think that United States is really 
seeking an armistice and peace? 

(We replied that the United States can probably end the war itself 
tjq if it tried; but that we think that since the United States has committed 

MOVES itself in various places, it find it difficult to end the war unless it can save 

face, and in response to this, he replied); No, the United States is definitely 
not desiring peace . They have no intention at all of ending the war. Asa 

/matter 



166 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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matter of fact, are they not expanding war in both the south and the north, 
while talking about peace ? They still believe in power, and they think that 
if they further incr^ase^their^ foix^^jinc^ strengthen the bombings against 
"the north* they will produce effects. That is very foolish, but it happens 
to be the truth. That is why we do not trust their peace proposal. In the 
choice between accepting the John s_on proposal and con tinuin g the war, 
we chose the course of continuing war without the slightest hesitation. 



■,»-. m - • *--., 



"Question: The U.S. authorities concerned say, however* f We 
wish to settle the problem in accordance with the spirit of the Geneva 
Agreement, The United States does not have any territorial ambitions 
toward Vietnam. It does not even wish to set up military bases there. 
Vietnam should settle its own internal problems without receiving inter ~ 
« ference from outside, ,! If your contention is that their words contain no 
sincerity, why do you not respond to such discussions, or advocate 
negotiations from your side? Frankly speaking, why can you not take the 
initiative in order to eliminate th e possibility of the misunderstanding that 
it is the Uni ted States which is proposing unconditional discussions and it 
is the North Vietnamese side which is insisting on continuing the war? 



4 

POINTS 



MED- 
IATION 



"Answer: Y/e proposed four conditions for the settlement of the 

present war some time f^g^.* They asked for respect of the Geneva A<?;ree- 

ment of 1954 concerning the Vietnam question and sought the correct 
observance of the basic clauses of .this agreement. We proposed at the 
time that if the United States were to issue a statement to the effect that 
it accepts the four conditions, we will agree to negotiate at any time. 
However, the United States refuses to accept these conditions. They have 
no intention of ending the war, We must expose this fact thoroughly. There 
is no other way for us to expose this fact to the whole world and shame them 
except by firmly fighting against their aggression and defeating them com- 
pletely. We are determined to do so. 

"Question: What is your evaluation of the activities of third parties, 
such as the call for the suspension of the bombings against the north and 
peace negotiations, advocated by Ghana and other nonaligned nations? 

"Answer: The United States is proposing peace talks, in which it 
does not believe, in order to escape criticism from these third parties of 
oood intention and world public opinion which is steadily mounting against it. 
Through these various methods the United States is trying to test our attitude. 
Their peace calls are a threat to us, similarly as their war expansion policy. 

■ 

Question: 



167 



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MED- 
IATION 



FRONT 



"Question: If that is so, there is the method of vising the same 
means against them, seizing this opportunity when the United States is 
talking about peace* 

* 

"Answer: It is not possible to seize this opportunity and move 
forward toward peace because the US side has no sincerity at all. It is 



- *»* i **™ * * 



a ^ v «^, ». + -_ «-«i-»i ^ .-___- + T „ — -,-v- „ #v ^ t a ++.m 






possible to seize this opportunity and expose the true nature of the United 
Stat e s . Of_co\irsej we welcome those people. who, are making various^ efforts , 
with good intentions of peace. We are planning to prove to these people by 
actual deeds how lacking in good intentions the United States is. The way 
to prove this lies solely in driving the American aggressors to the wall 
and by pressing them to the last point, or in other words, in continuing 
the war, 

"The Liberation Front in the South and we in the North must fight 
and win. Until then, the United States will not wake up. The leaders of the 
United States are fools. Therefore, we must fight more fiercely and win 
-greater victory. Of course, we will have to be prepared to sustain still 
greater hardships and sacrifices in the future, but we will never give up, 

"Question: We understand fully your side's determination. However, 
we wish to ask you once again whether there is room for third-party nations 
of Asia to act within this difficult situation. At the same time, in the sense 
of moving forward even by one step, what will you do if the United States 
were to agree to suspend bombings against the North? 

"Answer: (With a big smile) We and the Liberation Front of the - 
South will make the ultimate provisions for the settlement of the Vietnam 



SH 



estion. Of course, third parties can fulfill certain roles, but the final 



deciders are ourselves and the t>eople of the Liberation Fronts 

"The most important thing is for the United States to recognize 
the stren gth of the Liberation Front , We highly evaluate the Liberation 
Front 1 s military and political power. It is a very great force, and it is 
the only force which truly represents the people of South Vietnam, I ask 
you to study their policy platform very carefully. Their policies are very 
correct and are exactly suited to the actual situation in the South . It i s very 
foolish of the United States not to recognize this Liberation Front which is 



o 



"• " --."*- ■ *• *~ l - ". - * -.-,.» »»—*--_.- rt ».-».*,»,- - .*, , «... », , % ~ .- 



the on ly force which has the ability to settle the Vietnam problem. It must be said 
that that is why the United States is repeating failures. 

* 
» 

Question: 



168 



fro; 



POINTS 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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"Question: Can negotiations be realized if the United States recog 
nizes The People 1 s Liberation Front of the South? The United States is 
saying that it may recognize it as a party to negotiations, 

"Answer: The best way is for the United States to negotiate first 

•— ■ —* > * - ■ - ■ - a _ ■ ■■■■!, ■ I ^fc — 1 ■ ■ ■ — ■ — »■ 

with the L iberation Front, That, is only _ natural, considering that the 
United States is act^lly fighting the Liberation Front. The United States 



■ - - 



is spreading the argument that we of the North are the enemy, but that 
is only an excuse for expanding the war to the North, It has already been 
made clear that the question of the South cannot be settled through bombings 
against the North. The United States should negotiate with the Liberation 






Front of i South first of jail. However, it will be out of the question if 
it were to take the attitude of negotiating with the Liberation Front as if 
it were conveying a favor. The primary and decisive party for the United 
States to deal with is the Liberation Front M 



r ^, m £m<»mw*---m.^ ■*• . •? •■m*mr*r »-* • *"^i ■ "*r p»*%*-W ~— * nt *m\^mw ■ _ »-*#, ag \* 



Full Ja panese Version of MAINICHI Correspondent Minor u Omori' s Report 
From Hanoi o n Interview With DRV Premier Pham Van Dong ; 

"MAINICHI head office foreign news department editor Omori- -This 
reporter had an interview with North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong 
for one hour and fifteen minutes from 3:00 p.m. on 4 October, The premier, 
at this interview, clarified a very firm determination of resistance against 
the United States and made the following points, saying that there is no room 
for negotiations: To uphold four conditions to the last, no intention of 
negotiating with the United States under the present situation. 

"The premier made clear the following points: 1) He has no inten- 
4 tion at all of negotiating with the United States under the present situation; 






Z) If the United States wants negotiations, itjnust accept the four conditions 
and recognize the NFL5V; 3) The United States temporarily susDended 
^, bombings against the north at one time but that was only a pretext for 

strengthening esca lation; 4) His side is using missiles, and in the future, 
anti-air firepower, from missiles to rifles will be strengthened; 5} He 
" relies on aid from brother socialists countries; 6) The Liberation Army 
side did not lose in the fighting .in Chu Lai; 7) Media tion by third powers 
will have some effects but final settlement must be made bv the parties 
directly involved in the war; and 8) His side is strengthening close contacts 
with the South Vietnamese People 1 s Liberation Front. 

■ 

The interview 



169 



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t 



"The interview with the premier took' place in the reception room 
of the president' s office; it w?-s a joint interview by this reporter and 
the ASAHl' s foreign news department editor Hata, The premier was 
wearing an old but clean white shirt and well-creased yellow trousers. 
He has a broad forehead, and his eyes are mild. However, when he 
talks about the United States, his eyes gleam with the fierce flame of 
fighting spirit. He was deeply impressive, voicing throughout the 
interview his fierce determination that the present situation leaves no 
room for negotiations. The contents of the interview with Premier PhaiT 
Van Dong were as follows: 

"Omori: Today, in 1965, when the 20th century is nearing its end, 
it is not reasonalbe that war is still going on. We can well understand 
North Vietnam' s position, but is there no room for negotiations between 
the north and the south? 

"Premier Pham Van Dong: Your question is a basic question, 
and I think it also has news value, I will tell you about the possibility of 
stopping the war. Mr. Omori says that he understands our position, but 
the most important thing is whether the politicians of the United States 
have any intention of stopping the war. The United States reinforced 
its military strength in the south by 100, 000 men in a very short period 
of time. Why did it do so? That is because the United States has been 
repeating mistakes and failures in the south to date, and has fallen into 
a bog. The United States will be crushed in the south if it does not send 
in huge reinforcements. That is why it has brought in a large number of 
troops, 

"However, a very important point is that even if it brings in huge 
military strength, the situation in the south will not change. The United 
States and allied satellite force's number 150, 000 men, and the puppet 
troops number 600, 000 men. They certainly have great firepower, but 
it v/ill not change the victory in the liberation army side. The United 
States is providing a very good target for the people of the south. You 
know from your own experience of fighting the Americans that they have 
no spiritual power. Furthermore, the United States is waging a war 
which is against justice. It is the U.S, soldieiswho are at a loss in a 
battlefield where the topography and climate are unsuited to them. 
Therefore, the Liberation Army will win without fail. The Liberation 
Army will secure greater victory than that in the battle of Ban Tsuon 
(meaning the fighting in Chu Lai~~MAINICHI} in the future, 

■ - /"Omori: 

170 



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"Omori: The U.S. side says that it won in Chu Lai, but what is the 
true situation? 

"Premier: The United States claimed a false victory for propaganda 
purposes. It bro\ight in huge forces, and it has to make propaganda to 
encourage them and also public opinion within the United States, In 
fact, the United States suffered a big failure in Chu Lai. The Liberation 
Army completely destroyed four battalions consisting of 1, 000 men, 
You will find out about this if you go to Saigon and ask American soldiers 
who actually took part in the battle of Chu Lai. Next, I wish to touch 
upon questions of politics. The United States sent its expeditionary 
forces into South Vietnam* and has decided to carry out direct aggression by 
itself. This proved to the South Vietnamese people that the United States 
is a robber. All strata of the people , even the puppet military forcesj 
will come to stand up and fight against the U.S. forces. The United 
States has already lost face. This, too, has brought good results for 
the Liberation Army side. The people do not yet know the huge size of 
the military forces the United States has brought into South Vietnam, 
and in South Vietnam, a sacred war of resistance against the U.S. forces 
is continuing. 

"Meanwhile, the United States is even resorting to atrocious methods; 
The people 1 s sense of resistance is being fanned by these atrocious 
methods. The U.S. forces are like an island isolated in a sea of people 1 s 
hatred, and if they were to take even one step out of the island, they will 
be destroyed. What can the U.S. forces, isolated on an island, do? This 
is proved by the history of the war of resistance against France, 

"Omori: What the United States really wants is to stop the war. 
The problem lies in the fact that the United States has made a promise 
to the South Vietnamese Government and the world, and I think the key to 

settlement lies in how the United States can save face. 

* 

"Premier: All questions focus on that point. The United States 

~~~~ — — ■ - ■ , IM ■ ■ .1 11 

has no intention of stopping the war; it is rather strengthening the war. 
It has sent huge forces into the south and is also preparing escalation 
toward the north. 



,l Omori: What do you think of the mediation efforts of the special 
envoy of Ghanaian President Nkrumah and the 17 neutral nations ? 



/ u Premier: 



171 



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US 
MOVES 



^Premier: Unless we see the United States' .real sincerity _and 
eff o r t s f o r settlemen t > w e canno t feel 1 ike trusting the United St a te s 
at the moment, the Uni ted States is testing us. Whilg^ talking about 



pe ace, it is threatening us. At the same time, it is laying plots 
against world public opinion, too. World opinion is fiercely against 
the United States, ■ 

n (In reply to Hata 1 s question asking, n The United States must talk 
about peace to the world J is it not possible to grasp and utilize this 
point?) Premier: It is not yet possible to grasp that chance and move 
forward to peace. We will prove justice to the world with actual deeds 
and drive the United States to the wall. We intend to fight through 
fiercely, in both North and South Vietnam , prepared for still greater 
difficulties and further sacrifices. Therefore, we want you to under- 
stand our position. For that purpose, I will explain briefly the important 
points of the present war situation in the north and the south. The U,S. 
forces carried out operations to build foothold bases, just as in the case 
of French General (Tussini- -phonetic), but failed* Neither U.S. Ambas- 
sador Lodge nor General Lansdalc has been able to bring about big 
political results. Their v/ay is no different from that of Ngo Dinh Diem, 
The United States definitely cannot win even if it increases its forces 
in the south. 



US 



PAUSE 



"Oinori: However, there is order in matters, and as it is not 
possible to settle everything at once at one stroke, what will you do if 
the United States were to suspend bombing against the north for a long 



pe 



riod of time. 

1 'Premier: The United States 1 escalation a gainst the north has 



KOVKS - — - 



failed so far. Its greatest failure lies in its having; been unable to bring 



the north to the comer e nee table by thre atening its people. World 



opinion, on the contrary, is starting to demand the suspension of U.S. 
bombings against the north. Earlier, the United States propagandized 
that it h ad suspen ded ._ bombings against ^the north for some days. How- 
ever, we were not able to respond, as the suspension of the bombings 
were aimed at eliciting our consent to demands which we cannot possibly 



- — j 



*" -■-*-- . - .* n *.. A 



accept. The temporary suspension was rather a pretext for further 
"escalation. We cannot possibly accept such temporary suspension or 
such demands. Rather, we are pushing forward preparations to expose 

/further 



Tf2 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



* 






FRONT 



further the United States 1 plots. We will further strengthen our anti- 
air power without fail. And, we will prove the unprofitableness of the 
United States 1 escalation. 



n Omori: Is North Vietnam using missiles for the defense of Hanoi? 
Premier: Yes, we used them, exactly as you say, Omori: How many 
times have you used them? Premier: I do not remember exactly how 
ynany limes wo used them, but our p*iv dofenso weapon:;, from nii^rjilop 
to rifles, are effective, and we will strengthen all of them in the future. 
-And, we will effectively increase damage to U.S. planes and pilots. 
The pilots are all excellent American fliers, but if escalation is fnrther 
pushed forward, the casualties among them will rise to several thousand, 

"Toward Hata 1 s three questions, that is, 1) the people of the north 
all have rifles today, so does the strengthening of anti-air firepower 
mentioned by the government mean the increasing of missiles?; 2) 
Do you intend to attack the other side 1 s take-off (hasshin-kichi) bases 
for planes, from the North?; and 3} Are you using planes for defense 
battles? The premier said that he could not reply to question 2, but 
said as follows in ansv/er to questions 1 and 3: Premier: We will 
strengthen all kinds of weapons, and in the future, we shall rely on 
brother socialist nations. We are also using planes, 

"Omori: Is the north in contact with the People 1 s Liberation Front 
in the south? Premier: We are in full contact. Omori: In what way 
are you maintaining contact? Premier: That, I cannot say. However, 
what I wish to say is that the Liberation Front has great authority and 
prestige in the south. 

n I hope you will tell the United States this fact. The people now 
holding political power in the United States are fools. They cannot see 
this fact. We have been saying that the sole representative government in 
the south is the Liberation Front side. The United States should know 
that. Mr. Omori urges negotiations, but as long as the United States 
does not reco gni ze the Pe ople s Liber at i on F ront of the south, th e re 
cannot be any negotiations. The Liberation Front side holds the key, 
"both politically and militarily. We highly esteem and respect the People 1 s 
Liberation Front, . 

"Omori: If the United States were to recognize the People's Libera- 
tion Front as a party to negotiations, v/ill it be possible to discuss the 
problems of the south? 

/"Premier: 
173 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



FHOIft 



MED- 
IATION 



4 
POINTS 



"Premier: That would be most desirable, but that is the problem , 
Who is fightlng^aeJJnited States ■ in_the south ?„It. is Jthe . liberation, army. 
And yet, the U.S. side is escalating the wat against the north. Does 
it think that it can negotiate with the north alone and settle the problem? 
A third party 1 s contribution to settlement is limited. 

n Omori: Before coming here, I stopped in Djakarta and discussed 
with Indonesian President Sukarno about the possibility of seeking a way 
to settlement by holding a summit conference of the leaders of Asian 
nations near Vietnam and about the possibility of adopting a declaration 
for settlement of the issue at an Afro- Asian conference. What do you 
think of these ideas? 

"Premier: The most important point in regard to the Vietnam 
question is that all matters must be pushed forward in close liaison with 
our side and with the People 1 s Liberation Front in the south. It is 
possible for third parties to make co ntributions to a certain extent, but 
the final settlers, or deciders, are ourselves and the Liberation Front 
of the south. 



-i-*"**-***- 



"Hata then asked: n The United States says that it respects the 
Geneva agreement and that it does not have territorial ambitions. It 
also says that the Vietnam question should be settled by the Vietnamese 
people themselves. Is it not possible for you to take hold of these state- 
ments and propose negotiations on the basis of your four conditions 
from your side? There are some people even in Japan who think that 
it is the North Vietnamese side which is rejecting negotiations. " To 
this, the premier replied as follows: Premier: In that regard, we 
have announced that if the United States issues a statement to the effect 



that it will recognise the four conditions, we will r^Ppj^d.*? tf^ks. The 
United States, however, has no such intention. We are ready to fight 



as lon<? as necessary. We have faith in the Japanese people 1 s friendship 
The United States is attacking Vietnam from bases in Japan, we hope 
that the good sense of Japan will stand up and see to it that trie ground 
is laid for the maintenance of truly friendly relations in the future when 
our country becomes united, - 

Main ichi Questionnaire to Pham Van Dong: 

"Minoru Omori, chief foreign news editor of Mainichi, submitted 
a questionnaire regarding a peaceful solution to the Vietnam dispute to 

/North 



ijh 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong, irrespective of the 4 October 
interview with him, MAINICHI received a cable reply from Fha.ni Van 
Dong on 8 October. Here follow excerpts from Pham Van Dong 1 s 
important answers, omitting the same answers made by him in the 
above interview, 

* 

"Question: What do you think about President Johnson s proposals 
for "unconditional talks 11 and "peace talks?" 

"Answer: President Johnson began to talk about peace negotiations 

m ■ i i ■ . r _ ' "i"^ i ii i ■ i i ■ ■ i i i ■ j ii ■ ■ i ■ i ■ i !■ n ■!!■ i ■ ■ ■ ■ ^ i ■■■!■» i —i ■■■■-■ i ■ "p»* ■"»•■■• » ■ ■ ™ — m **- 

US half a year ago. However, whenever he spoke about peace, ^he ordered 

MOVES xe info rcem e nt of the U.S. forces in South Vi etnam and "esc ala t e d^ the 
war a gainst j^ort^Vietnairi. Johnson has been speaking about peace 
while carrying out the war. His "unconditional talks" would b e n othi ng 
but the Vietname se peo ple's acceptance of the U. S. -proposed conditions. 
In a word, President Johnson s hypocritical appeal for peace is designed 
to cover up war activities, to cheat the world, and to dodge the protest of 
the "people of the world, including the United States. 

"Question: What is your opinion of the neutral Afro-Asian nations 1 
wish for a settlement of the Vietnam war? 

"Answer: The Vietnamese people and the DRV Government heartily 
appreciate the fact that many Afro-Asian peoples and governments are 
worried about the Vietnam issue, that they bitterly denounce the U.S. 
imperialist aggression in our country, and that they support our patriotic 
fighting from the bottom of their hearts. We believe that the socialist 
countries and the people of the world, including Asia and Africa, will 
strengthen their sympathy with us and their support for us to completely 
smash the U.S. imperialist aggression. The only just way to se ttle the, 
4 Vietnam i ssue is to accept, in li ne w ith th e 19 54 Geneva agreement, JUhs 

POI NTS four conditions p ro posed by the North Vietnamese gov ernment a nd the 

stand explained in the NFLSV 1 s March statement. 



.•.■•-+>"«.-*»%.*»-'—»■-- V 



"Question: Concerning the so-called four conditions which you 
submitted to the DRV }£. Parliament last April, should we understand 
them as your ultimate conditions? Can we not consider them precon- 
itions for talks ? 

/Answer: 



IT 5 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 1 I 



"Answer: North Vietnam s four conditions are in complete 



..> 



A accord with ever y one of the ess fcial, political* and milit ary pro visions 

POlriiS £ n the Geneva accords of _ 1_954» The four condit ions alone can b e the 

basis to bring a correct solution to the Vietnam issue. The U«S. Govern- 



i 
v 



ment must de clared ea r ly_th a t_ it__^£cept s th e_f gur_c o ndi tip ai s . A political 
"solution can be considered after that* 



. . „ - — - 



"Question: What will be your country 1 s response if the United 
States suspends its northern bombing for a due period? Also, do you 
think the U.S. forces will bomb Hanoi in the near future? 

"Answer! The U.S. imperialists are shamelessly 'escalating 1 
the war and bombing North Vietnam* As the result, however, they are 
meeting an intensified offensive by the South Vietnamese people, as 
well as huge losses inflicted by the North Vietnamese people. Not 
being the least daunted, and intensifying their enmity against the U.S. 
aggressors, all the Vietnamese people are strengthening their deter- 
mination to fight for national salvation. Availing myself of this 
occasion, I ask MAINICHI to convey to the Japanese people our deep 
gratitude for extending warm help to our patriotic anti-U.S, war. u 



IT 6 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



MAI VAN BO STATEMENT, 5 JANUARY I967 
THE MEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JANUARY 6, 1967 



,\ 



NZW YORK TIMES 
/JANUARY 1967 P-I 




nRIW 




By KICIIAKH E. MOONEY 

SpceJM lo Tti* Star York Ti 

PARIS, Jan. 5— North Viet- 
nam's chief diplomatic rep 
sentative in Western Europe 
said today that if the United 
States stopped bombing ht3 
country, "definitively and un 
conditionally," the Hanoi Gov- 
ernment would ''examine and 
study" American proposals for 
negotiations to end the war. 

He denounced several recent 
peace initiatives, including the 
efforts of the United Nations' 
Secretary General, U Thant, and 
inted that his Government 
v.\,„.u be more responsive If the 
bombing stopped. His remarks 
were interpreted here as pos* 
sibly, but not certainly, a favor- 
able signal to Washington. 

However, he did not meet 
Washington's requirement that 
Hanoi give assurances of scal- 
ing down its own effort if the 
bombing stopped, 

U. S. Aggression Charged 

Rather, he said that the 
United States "could not hope 
for reciprocal action of any 
sort/' noting that "the Ameri* 
can aggression" was still un- 
declared war and that Hanoi 
had insisted on an unconditional 
cessation of the bombing from 
the very start. 

The remarks came in r 
luncheon talk to French and 
foreign correspondents here by 
Mai Van Bo, wfio is, in a sense, 
Hanoi's ambassador here al- 
though officially he heads a 
diplomatic, office that is called 
a "general delegation." Mr. Bo 
holds the personal rank of min- 
ister plenipotentiary. 




Everything he said was in 
response to questions— eight of 
an. Much of what he said was 
■ insistent repetition of hts coun- 
! try's charges against Washing- 
ton and of his countrymen's de- 
termination- and ability to v.in 
§ the war. His hint of flexibility 
; ion peace talks, if it was that, 
was well padded with combative 
remarks to the contrary. 

) vench Reds Hear Talks 
By coincidence or design 
there were also speeches hers ^ 
today by a North Vietnamese 
CJorrtmunlst leader and a loader 
of the National Liberation front, 
the political arm of the Viet- 
cpng. Both were made at the 

I French Communist Party con- 
gre ; in suburban Lcvalloi 
Neither hinted at flexibility 

Nguyen Van Tntti, secretary 
of the North Vt tn m;.* re Work- 
ers party and Minister for 
Heavyy Industry in the Hanoi! 
Government, said thai United 
states peace initiatives were a 
farce. 

Dang Quau£ Mirth, reprosi ut- 
Ing the Nathmal Liberation 
Front, said that "the possibility! 
of winning militarily has be- 
come a living reality for us." 

At the press luncheon, Mr. 
Bo maintained a sober and un- 
emotional expression through- 
out. He was derisive toward 
recent peace appeals of Wash-: 
ington's United Slates dele-' 
gate, Arthur J. Goldberg, and 
the British Foreign Secret- 
George Brown. 

He called Mr. Goldberg's ef- 
fort "the same old song." Mr. 
Brown's proposal for immr 
ate talks, lie said, "is the Eng- 
lish version of the Amcrk 
proposal of unconditional nego- 
tiation, designed to placate Brit- 
ish public opinion, which de- 
mands that its Government 
break away from the American 
policy," 

In the same response he said 
of Mr. Thant's efforts that "the 
Government of the Democratic 
Republic of [North] Vietn 
rejects all intervention by the! 
United Nations in the Vietnam 
affair for the good reason that 
this intervention would be con- 
trary to the Geneva agr 
merits" of 1934, which ended the 
French Indochina war. He made 
no distinction between the 
United Nations and Mr. Thant. 















! 









177 



"Every proposal aimed at pro-' 
moting a settlement of the Viet- 
namese problem must conform 
to the reality of the war," he 
said. "In other word.?, the dis- 
tinction must be made be- 
tween the American aggressor 
and the Vietnamese victim, and 
the responsibility of the Ameri- 
can aggressor must be well de- 
fined. ' 

On a question about Premier 
Pham Van Dong's interview in 
Hanoi yesterday with Harrison 
E. Salisbury, an assistant man- 
aging editor of The New York 
Times, and particularly on the 
status of Hanoi's four-point 
peace program, Mr* Bo refus 
to comment on the published 
article, but said the following: 

'The United States must f; 
recognize the National Libera- 
tion Front of South Vietnam, 

which is the only authentic rep- 
resentative of the South Viet- 

rr\Qt* people, to negotiate 
with them arid settle all the 
questions of South Vietnam. 
[Hanoi], for its part, insists 
that the United States recog- 
nize the four-point program as 
a basis for a settlement of the 
Vietnamese problem, and to 
demonstrate its goodwill by 
stopping the bombing of North 
Vietnam definitively and with- 
out conditions." 

In this, Mr. Eo seemed to 
repeat the Premier's declaration 
that the four points are a ba 
ifor settlement rather than a 
: condition for talks. 

Hanoi's four points are: Rec- 
ognition of the Independent 
sovereignty, unity and tcrrito- 
rr-l integrity of Vietnam and 
the withdrawal of United States 
forces from the area pending 
reunification of Vietnam; re- 
spect for the military provisions 
of the 1$5& Geneva agreement 

rring foreign forces; settle- 
ment of South Vietnam's Inter- 
nal affairs by the South Viet- 
namese in accordance with the 
program of the National Liber- 
ation Front and peaceful reuni- 
fication of Vietnam by the 
peoples of North and South 
without foreign interferenfo. 

Questioned about 11, | istMl- 
ity of allowing other Western 
Journalists to visit North Viet- 
nam now, Mr. Bo said that he 
could not understand their en- 
th: lasm for such a risky as- 
signment, and expressed regr 
that considerations of safct\ 
3 not permit his Govern- 
ment to admit as many as it 
would like to. 



it- 



'In the light of their inef- 
fectiveness, and the' unanimous 

condemnation of which they are 

the object," he said, "if the 

United States comes to halting 

the bombardment definitively 

and without conditions, this fact 
will be examined and studied 
by the i 1] Government, 

"If, after the definitive and 
unconditional cessation of the 
b anbardmonts, the Amei 
Government proposes to enter 
into contact with the [Hanoi J 
Government, I believe that t! 
proposal will be examined and 
studied, too." 

Mr. Bo was not asked about 
and did not volunteer to com- 
ment on the Chinese Soviet S] 
as it relates to the wa*— a fa- 
|vorite theme at the French par- 
ty's current congress. 

Arvid Y. Pel she, a member of 
the Politburo of the Soviet par- 
ty, told the congress today that 
China's refusal to act jointly 
with other Communist coun- 
tries in supporting Vieit. 
"carries water to the mill of the 
American imperialists and en- 
courages : them to enlarge their 
aggression." 

Mr. Peishe reported that more 

than eo Communist parties had 

1 arcd that they favor a world 

Communist conference. But Lui* 

pi Longo, the Italian partj 

icf, and the most import 
foreign Communist at the C01 
gross, said that he prrfered "ex- 
changes of opinion" and "rnul 
Utateral meetings" rather th 
a world assembly. 



Asked whether there were 
North Vietnamese troops in 
South Viet Mr. Bo did not 

respond d tly. He said that 
"the armed forces of the Na- 
il Liberation Front [the 
Viet con;;] and the people 
South Vietnam arc sufficient to 
hold in check t mierican ex- 
peditionary force," and that the 
rebels could also "recall to 

uth Vietnam the men who 

ve been regrouped in t 
north." 

In a preface to his ansv 
to one question, Mr. Eo said, 
"For thousands of years tl 
Vietnamese people have be 
one nation, one people, spen 
Ing the same languai 

"While it has sometimes been 
divided, it has been able to 1 
establish its national unit ch 
time it has rec d its in- 

dependence." 

Of the bon gs, Mr. Bo said 
that they had failed to under- 
mine morale, disorganize the 
economy or shake the Govern- 
ment. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 









JJJ 1 \ ; 



•"" 



• N li T H Vlli 1* l\ A H 

- 
' ' 30 January log? 

■ 
* 

Hanoi VKA International Service in English OlfJO/Gl-lT 23 January 1 967-- 23 



(£e>:t) Hanori , £8 January — ilguyen Buy Srirth* DRV foreign minister, has granted an 
interview to Australian journalist. Wilfred Burehest* Questions and answers follow: 

Question: I : ". Minister,, what in your view are the most significant recent develop- . 
merits in the Vietnam war. and tfoat are the prospects for fcne immediate future? 

Answer: She P*S. imperialists are waging tne most barbarous war of aggression 
against our epuntry. threatening more and more seriously peace in southeast Asia 
and the world,* But; they have sustained heavy defeats ;ri South and ±n lloi-ih 
Vietnam.* '- people of South Vietnam., figi: ^ uith great heroism, have foiled all 
their military plana in spite or the commitments of over 1 million U.S., puppet, 
and satellite troops* 5he people of iterth Vietnati h&vo not been and will never be 
cowed by the barbarous bombing "raids af the U.S. imperialists and have dealt them 
well- deserved counterblows, . >- ■ • 

All Vietnamese people are resolutely fighting against- the U.S. aggressors to defend 
.their sacred hatiotul rights and fulfill their duty to the peoples of the friendly 
countries now struggling for their independence and freedom. The fotuvpoint stand 
of the DUV Government is a stand of independence and peace, md it is the expression 
of the fundamental priti&af&cs and fefce pain pr Lsions of. the 1S5^ Geneva agreements 
on Vietnam* It is the basis for the cost correct political solution to the Vie than 
problem^ a basis which fully meets the deep aspirations of the Vietnamese people, 
and fully conforms to she spirit of the five-point statement of the NFLSV, the only 
genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam. 

ffiie peoples of the world; including verj large sections of the population of the 
United States itself, more and more strongly support our jus*; stand and demand ever 
more firmly that the U,S. Imperialists stop their war of agression in Vietnam and 
let the Vietnamese people settle their ov;n affairs themselves 



'L* 



The U,S. imperialists tall; of peace negotiations, but they still show great obduracy, 
President Johnson recently stated tilth impudence that he will- go on intensifying 
»nd expanding the ^ar of aggression in an attempt to cling tc- the south and to prolong the 
partition of Vietnam. But however perfidious the i.aneuv.en 'of the U.S. imperialists 
j;iay be, the Vietnamese people, united as one nan and fearing neither hardships nor 
sacrifices, are determined to carry on their resistance v;ar to the end to safeguard 
the independence and freedom of the fatherland, and contribute to the .maintenance 
of peace in southeast Asia and the world. 

The Vietnamese people will win. the U.S. imperialist aggressors will be defeated- 

Question: In the face of documentary evidence and eyewitness reports from foreign 
witnesses, ineludihj American journalists, tfashington continues to claim that 
U.S. aircraft have b^ea striking only at solitary targets and not at civilian targets 
In lior'ch Vietnam. What are your views on this subject? 

Answer: The 3RV is an independent and sovereign country and the U.S. imperialists 
have absolutely ne right to violate this independence and sovereignty. 

• . • . : 1T8 • * • 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



■■* -* 



;i0 January -$ui 



OuJ,? 



iioiim i-jm 



U.S. bobbing o£ any point of its territory, uhethes 1 a military or a civilian 
r-ii^et, is a blatant act of aggression and em unpardonable c: : ir.e. It is an 
undeniable facs thtit civilian targets iri Hortfc Viet: have been attacked. 
The peoples of the world, including la:*£o sections of the American i ' c 3 are 
strongly protesting against the U.S. imperialists 1 savage acts of a^grc^sion. 

- 

The U.S. imperialists r,iust stop definitively and unconditionally the bonbang 
raids and all other acts of war against tiie DUV. 

Question: The United States has spoken of the need for dialer; or contact between 
itself and the DTiV. Would you comment en this statement? 



> 



Answer; r i % r.z United States has made such statements, but in its deeds it has 
shown the utmost obduracy and perfidy aitd continues the escalation, stepping 
up and expanding the aggressive war. If it veally wants talks , it must first 
halt unconditionally the bonbjjjtfi raids and aX3 other acts of War against the 
DRW It i^ only after the unconditional cessation of U.S. bombing and all other 
acts of war against the DRV mat there could be talks between the DRV and the 
United States, 






/ 



The four-point stand and the cor. attitude of the EOT Government enjoy, v;e 

are sort:- ever stronger approval and support fjwaa all peace loving; 'and justice- 
\o^.inz peoples and governments ii\ the world. If the United St^uc-s refuses to 

■ 

lister; to reason, it nil! further unnas« , itself as an obdurate a^^res^cr. The 
Viefcaam^s^ people are deteraxj to tigjtit- u&tsl (ot&l victory to d d ihs 
north, literate the souiJT, achieve the pea:- (el reunification of the fath-r-rland, 
and* contribute to the in&inter*a&ee of peace- i: this area and in the world. 



i 
t 

! 

* 



i 
■ 

:• 

: 



- 
i 

i 



t 






■ 
- 



■ 
-' 



179 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



MAI VAN BO STATEMENT, 22 FEBRUARY I967 



THE NEW YORK TIMES > THURSDAY 5 FEBRUARY 23, 1967 



V 



NEW YORK TIKES 

23 February 1967 II 

Hanoi Offers Anew 
To Join U.S. in Talks 
If Bombing Is Ended 



1 -**"*■ 



By HENRY TANNER 

Spec!*! 10 The Kew Verk Tlmti 

PA HIS. Fob. 22— A spokes- 
man for Hanoi reaffirmed to- 
day its o!f<T to enter into 
talks with the United Stales 
if American bombing attacks 
against North Vietnam were 
unconditionally ar perma- 
nently halted. 

Mai Van fib. the North 
Vietnamese representative in 
Paris, indicated that his Gov- 
ernment's position on this 
point had not changed in 
spite of the resumption of 
American bombing Feb. 14 
following a six-day suspen- 
sion. 

Mr. Bo made \vs statement 
in a conversation with repor- 
ters from The New York 
Times at the headquarters of 
the North Vietnamese mis- 
sion near Montparnasse on 
the Left Bank of Paris. 

Before his statement, there 
had been widespread specula- 
tion for several days that the 
North Vietnamese position 
had hardened after the re- 
sumption of the bombings 






and the failure* of the media- 
tion attempted in London by 
Prime Minister Wilson and the 
Soviet Premier, Aleksei N. 
Kosygin. 

The principal reason fnr this 
spc Ion was a message 

from President Ho Chi Minh to 
Pope Paul VI on Feb, 13 re- 
stating Hanoi's four-point de- 
mands, including withdrawal 
American forces from Vietnam. 

As originally put forward in 
April 1965 by North Vietnam's 
Premier, Pham Van Dong, these 
demands were described as the 
basis for a peaceful settlement. 
They called for United Stat 
withdrawal from South Viet- 
nam, a prohibition against the 
stationing of any foreign troops 
in Vietnam, a settlement of 
South Vietnam's internal affairs 
In accordance with the political 
program of the National Libera- 
tion Front, and a reunification 
of North and South Vietnam 
without foreign interference. 

Uo Chi Minh (Hps IJmnhlilg 

President Ho Chi Minh, in his 
message to the Pope, phrased 
the demands as follows: 

"The U.S. imperialists must 
put an ond to their aggression 
in Vietnam, end unconditionally 
and definitively the bombi 
and all other acts of war against 
the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam, withdraw from South* 
Vietnam all American and satel- 
lite troops, recoqnize the South 
Vietnam National Liberat 
Front and let the Vietnamese 
people thomselyes jsctUe their 



own affairs,* 1 

Mr. Bo said today that Hi* 
President's message ind re- 
ferred to the terms of a settle- 
ment and imt to the proec 
of getting peace talks started. 
Therefore, he added, it did not 
constitute a change in the 
Vietnamese position. 

Mr. Bo repeated over and 
. over that the Italt of American 
bombing had to be "permanent 
and unconditional.'' 

He said the North Vietnamese 
would not talk "under bombs" 
or "the threat of bombs." He 
said that any cessation of bomb- 
ing that was not clearly label 
"permanent and unconditional" 
would leave the "threat of 
bombing" intact and thus would 
constitute an unacceptable in- 
terference with the negotiation. 

Asked how a distinction could 
be made between a temporary 
and a permanent halt to bomb- 
ing, he answered that the United 
States would have to declare 
at the outset that the halt was 
"permanent and unconditional," 

Trhi h Interview Recalled 

Mr. Bo said that Nguyen Duy 
Trinh, the North Vietnamese 
Foreign Minister, made an im- 
portant gesture of goodwill to- 
ward the United States in late 
January when he told Wilfred 
Burchctt, an Australian cor* 
, respondent, that talks between 
Washington and Hanoi would be 
possible If the bombing stopped. 

The North Vietnamese rep- 
resentative said that that had 
constituted a basic change in 
Hanoi's position. Earlier, he said, 
his government's stand was that 
if the United States stopped 
bombing unconditionally, this 
new fact would be studied and 
that, if Washington then pro- 
posed to negotiate, this proposal 
also would be studied. 



180 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526 Section 3 3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By. NWD Date: 201 1 



Mr. Bo charged that the 

United States Government had 

ponded in "bad faith" to the 

kh Vietnamese "gesture of 

goodwill." 

He asorlcd that neither Presi- 
dent Johnson nor Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk had ever 
quoted Mr, Trinh's statement 
fully or accurately. 

This, he added, was proof of 
bad faith si nee Hanoi's real 
position was fully known and 
understood in Washington. 

He repeated several times 
that the Hanoi Government bad 
made its "gesture" and that 
it was up to the United States 
now to make the next move. I 
said a "concession" of the kind 
that was made by Mr, Trinh in 
the Burchett interview re- 
mained "valid" only it if was 
followed up by the other side. 

Mr. Bo's remarks indicated 
that the North Vietnamc 
would not be moved by Presi- 
dent Johnson's demand for a re- 
ciprocal move on their part to 
accompany any United States 
cessation of bombing, 

Mr. Eo. a slightly built man 
in his late forties or early fif- 
ties, was wearing a business 
suit when he received his visi- 
tors in a sitting room that was 
simply but comfortably fur- 
nished. 

Deep green upholstered 
chairs and a sofa were grouped 
around a low table. Deep-red 
azalea plants were standing on 
the table and on a high side- 
board. The only decoration on 
the wal! was a portrait of Ho 
Chi Minn. 

Mr. Bo carries the rank of 
a minister plenipotentiary and 
is Hanoi's chief representative 
J ln Europe, 



Hi* mission occupies a mod- 
' >t three-story brick house at 
2 Rue le Verrior. Over the en- 
tram c is the rmblrm of North 
Violin in. a g,,Jd star and a g 
fcojrwhcel on a red but Rgr*iund. 

Mr. Bo, underlining his re- 
marks In turn with easy smiles 
and cnioUnn-chokod scowls, an- 
swered questions freeiv and ex- 
temporaneously in perfect 
Kivii.'h, 

He made it clear that t! 
was a "conversation' 1 and not 
an "iiitmi, y,V He sr\4 that 
fur ail interview he would have 
insisted on written qi ins 

and would have given written 
answers. He asked that his re- 
marks be reported fairly and 
correctly. 

Mr. Bo indicated, but did not 
specifically say, that the four 
point program of Hanoi was 
subject to negotiation once 
United States-North Vietnamese 
talks had started. 

When asked whether the four 
points constituted absolute 
terms for a settlement or 
whether a. compromise might be 
possible, he answered that he 
could not say what would hap- 
pen In any talks since no talks 
were now taking place, 

Mr. B. called the four points 
"the most correct" solution. 
Asked whether this could be 
translated into English as "the 
best" solution, he said "no." 

It is "the most correct** solu- 
tion, he declared, because K 
would assure the North Viet- 
namese people the full exercise 
of their national rights, real in- 
dependence and lasting peace. 



181 



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Strong Bucking for Front 

Mr, Bo was asked about the 
third of the four points, which 
calls for the settlement of the 
affairs of South Vietnam ac- 
cording to the program of the 
National Liberation Front. 

He said that the North Viet- 
namese Government regarded 
the National Liberation Front 
as the only "authentic repre- 
sentative"' of the South Viet- 
namese people. 

He said the program of the 
front was to give South Viet- 
nam independence, democracy, 
peace and neutrality. He added 
that Hanoi supported this pro- 
gram and regarded all the pn 
terns of South Vietnam as the 
sole concern of the front. 

Therefore, he stated, there 
could be peace only If the 
United States settled South 
Vietnamese problems with the 
fmnt. 

Mr. Bn denounced in strong 
emotional terms the continua- 
tion of United States bombing. 

He charged that the United 
States government was commit- 
ting "crimes" In Vietnam — 
"crimes which are worse than 
those of Hitler." He said "mil- 
lions" of Vietnamese suffered 

Mr, Bo. asserted that the ori- 
gin of the war lay in the Ameri- 
can decision to support the 
"phantom government" of the 
late President of South Viet- 
nam, Ngo Dinh Diem, and to 

bring in an expeditionary force 
of more than 400.000 men to 
wage what he described as a 
colonial war, 

■ He said the American people 
had to be told about the 
crimes" committed by 
Government. 

Mr. Bo's voice choked when 
he said : 

, "One must demand that the 
American Government stop the 
war against an entire people 
whose only crime Is to refuse 



"war 
their 



to accept American law. 

"That's what the war is about 
— Vietnamese independence. All 
the rest is propaganda, lies 
turned out by a propaganda ma- 
chine/" 

Mr. Bo made a distinction be- 
tween the American people and 
leaders of the American Gov- 
ernment. He said the people 
"like all peoples," wanted peace 
and that the North Vietnamese 
knew this. 

He said the spirit of Ameri- 
can officials was illustrated re- 
cently by a statement by Gen. 
Curtis LcMay form Air 

Force chief of staff. 

Mr. Bo charged that the gen- 
eral had advocated saturation 
bombing of the North and had 
declared that, even if two brk 
remained untouched it was too 
much. 

,Thc North Vietnamese rep- 
resentative said this was the 
language of "the cannibals of 
i lie 20th century." He added 
that he could not believe that 
the general, though retired, did 
not reflect the state of mind of 
official Washington. 

Criticism by LeMay H**en1l*»cl 

General LcMay has frequently 
called for stepped-up bombing 
of North Vietnam. 

In an article for U.S. News 
and World Report last October, 
he denounced the United States 
strategy in Vietnam as the 
"ultimate in military blindness" 
and said: 

"ThQ only way to win a war 
is to escalate it one way or ( 
another above what the enemy 
can take." 

Last month he said In an in- 
terview with The Associated 
Press: 

"It Is not our aim to invade 
North Vietnam or destroy 
North Vietnam. What we want 
to do is stop them from carry- : 
ing out their aggression." 



182 



* 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
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NORTH VIET N A I J 
1 September 1967 



HANOI MEETINGS HELD TO MARK NATIONAL DAY 



Pham Van Dong Speech 
Hanoi VNA International Service in English I506 GMT 31 Aug 67 B 

/Text/ Hanoi- -The 22d anniversary of the foixnding of the DRV has just "been 
celebrated at a grand meeting in Hanoi. 

President Ho Chi Minh was present on the Presidium. 

Among those on the Presidium were Vice President Ton Due Thang; Le Duan, first 
secretary of the VWP Central Committee; Truong Chinh, member of the Political 
Bureau of the VWP Central Committee and chairman of the national Assembly Standing 
Committee; Premier Pham Van Dong., member of the political bureau; and Vice 
Premier General Vo Nguyen Giap, member of the Political Bureau and commander in 
chief of the Vietnam People's Army. 

Nguyen Van Tien, head of the permanent NFLSV representation in the DRV was 
present. Members of the diplomatic corps in Hanoi and foreign guests now visitii 
Vietnam also attended the celebration. 

After the opening speech by Chairman Truong Chinh, Premier Pham Van Dong 
delivered an important speech in which he reviewed the situation in Vietnam 
expounded the just stand of the Vietnamese people, and reiterated their 
determination to march forward still more vigorously in order to win final victory 
over the U.S. aggressors. 

Premier Pham Van Dong recalled the brilliant victories won by the armed forces 
and people in both the north and the south in their fight against U.S* 
aggression and for national salvation, as well as in economy, culture, and 
other fields. He stressed that all this had driven the U.S. imperialist 
aggressors into a serious impasse and isolation in the United States and 
in the world. He particularly pointed to the growing indignation among the 
American people of all strata over the U.S* ruling circle's policy in Vietnam 
and expressed the Vietnamese people's firm support for the just struggle of 
black people in the United States for freedom and equality. 

Premier Pham Van Dong vehemently denounced the U*S. imperialists, who, although 
suffering heavy defeats, are still obdurately intensifying their war of 
aggression in South Vietnam, escalating their war of destruction against North 
Vietnam, and, at the same time^ staging an election farce in South Vietnam in 
the hope of dolling up their puppets and making fallacious allegations about 
peace negotiations in an attempt to mislead world public opinion. 

Recalling the stand of the Vietnamese people regarding a political settlement 
of the Vietnam problem and the question of negotiations, Premier Pham Van Dong 
said; 

On these questions, the standi viewpoint and attitude of the Vietnamese people, 
the DRV government, and the NFLSV are very clear and correct. On our 
government's four-point stand: This stand is the basis for a correct political 

solution to the Vietnam people. 

183 



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1 September 19&7 NORTH VIETNAM 

* 

In the very days when the United States ex led the war from the south to the 
north, brazenly carrying out air attacks against the DRV; our government proclaimed 
its four-point stand and the MFLSV issued its five-point statement. That is the 
standpoint of our people's inalienable national rights, and an expression of the 
main military and political provisions of the Geneva agreements. That is our 
people's fighting stand against the U,S wax of aggression* 

Along with our military and political victories and, at the same tempo, the 

strength and justness of this stand have become ever clearer, and have won ever 

more resolute and vigorous approval and support from the world's peoples, world 
opinion, and progressive American opinion* 

On its side, the U S. Government has so far completely failed to propose any 
solution to the Vietnam problem* All it has been doing is quibbling and resorting 
to hypocritical talk, putting forward now 1^, now 7 points, with the sole purpose 
of camouflaging its aggressive design to cling to South Vietnam at all costs and 
to prolong the partition of our country. 

On the 28 January 1967 statement of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs: We know 
quite well that the United States does not want to negotiate a settlement of 
the Vietnam problem, because imperialism is aggressive and warlike by nature. 
All it wants is war and it is stepping up its aggressive war. To make it 
possible for everybody and for world opinion to see clearer through the U.S. 
peace negotiation hoax, and, at the same time, to show our good will, our foreign 
minister issued his statement of 8 January 1967* 






The U.S. Government has brazenly unleashed a criminal war against the DRV, an 
independent and sovereign state, a socialist state. It must therefore definitively 
and unconditionally stop its bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV, 
and respect its independence, sovereignty, and territory. Tbit is a legitimate 
demand of the Vietnamese people, and also an elementary requirement of international 
law. If the American side really wants to talk it must first of all stop 
unconditionally the bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV. 

The United States has no right to demand any reciprocity whatsoever. Yet it 
is asking for mutual deescalation, and to back this piratical claim, each time 
it clamors about peace negotiations, it steps up its aggressive war in the south 
and its escalation against the north. By so doing, the U.S ruling circles 
hope, through bombing, and under their conditions, to force us to the conference 
table. With regard to the world's peoples, including the American people, they 
hope to confuse white and black, and blur the line between the aggressor and the 
victim of aggression. 

Our people deeply love peace, but this must be real peace closely linked to 
independence and freedom, not the kind of American peace under the iron heels of 
the aggressors. So long as the United States pursues its aggression, we will 
continue to fight. As the KFLSV has said in its statement, our southern compatriots 
will resolutely fight on until not a single American aggressor is left on their beloved 
soil. Our people will never submit to force and will never talk under the threat 
of bombs. 

18I1 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



1 September 1967 WORTH VIETNAM 

Our people are making every effort to step up the military and political fight on the 
battlefield, and, at the same time, the struggle on the international front. They 
have unceasingly developed their initiative and offensive position and exposed the true 
features of the perfidious U.S. aggressors. 

The U.S. government has provoked the war of aggression in Vietnam, It must cease its 
aggression; that is the only way to peace in Vietnam. The U.S. Government must 
definitively and conditionally stop the bombing and all other acts of war against the 
DRV, withdraw all U.S. and satellite troops from South Viet na^ra, recognize the NFLSV, 
and let the Vietnamese people settle their own affairs. There is no other way! 

Premier Fham Van Dong pointed out: Our people's great resistance war against the U.S. 
aggression and for national salvation is a concentrated expression standing on the 
frontline of the revolutionary struggle of the worl i ; people and the oppressed 
nations in the world against the U.S. imperialists and for peace, national independence 
democracy, and social progress. Our victories are also victories of the revolutionary 
forces in the world. Other peoples fully understand this fact, which is why the 
support movement for our people is gaining in strength, scope and depth. As a matter 
of fact, a world people's front in support of Vietnam against the U.S. imperialist 
aggressors has gradually taken shape. The more our patriotic war drives the 
United States into the impasse and records great victories, the mightier, the deeper, 
and the broader the world people's movement in support of us grows, taking on 
diverse forms. 

On the 22d celebration of National day, our people extend cordial greetings and heart- 
felt thanks to the fraternal socialist countries which are granting to them whole- 
hearted support and assistance in all fields—moral and material, political, military, 
and economic. We warmly hail the fraternal Soviet people who are recording great 
achievements in building the material and technical basis of communism. This year, 
we warmly celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Great October Revolution which ushered 
in a new era in the history of mankind, strongly Inspired the working class and the 
oppressed nations, and showed them the way to make revolution, to wipe out, step by 
step, imperialism and the other reactionary forces, and to win victory for socialism 
on a world-wide scale. We are unswervingly following the path of the October 
Revolution, the path of the Great Lenin, as we have been doing since the founding 
of our party. We are doing our utmost to bra ng into play the revolutionary ardor 
of the masses and to overcome all difficulties, determined to win victories in our 
revolutionary cause and, in the immediate future, to win victory in the struggle 
against U.S. aggression and for national salvation and, at the same time, make our 
worthy contribution to the revolutionary cause of the world's peoples. 

We warmly hail the fraternal Chinese people who are successfully building socialism. 
In our present struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation, the great 
Chinese People v s Republic is our great rear and the Chinese people are brothers, as 
close to us as the lips and the teeth. The resist the United States and aid Vietnam 
movement of the several hundred million- strong Chinese people, a broad, deep, powerful 
and diversified movement, is a brilliant manifestation of the militant solidarity 
between the two peoples. 

« 

185 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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1 September 1967 WORTH VIETNAM 

China's successful test of Its hydrogen bomb and nuclear warhead missiles is a 
positive contribution to strengthening the socialist countries , vigorously stimulates 
the peoples who are struggling for national independence , and is a great encourage- 
eitt to our people's struggle against U.S. a assion and for national salvation. 

True to Marxism -Leninism, our party and people have always been strengthening 

solidarity with the fraternal socialist countries and the international communist 

and workers movement on the basis of Marxism -Leninism and proletarian internationalism. 

On the 2Pd celebration of National Day, our people extend cordia] greetings and 
sincere thanks to the fraternal Khmer and Laotian peoples who have always been standing 
on our side in a spirit of mutual approval and support in the struggle against the 
common eneray, U.S imperialism, to defend national rights. We deeply rejoice at the 
happy development of the militant solidarity between our people and the Khmer people 
as shown by the establishment of diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level between 
the two countries and by our country's statement to recognize and respect the 
present frontiers of the Kingdom of Cambodia. Our people resolutely and unreservedly ' 
support the people of Arab" countries who continue to carry aloft the banner of 
struggle against the U.S. imperialists and the Israeli reactionary forces, in 
defense of their national independence and territorial integrity. 

On the 22d celebration of National Day, our people extend cordial greetings and 
sincere thanks to the international working class, the Asian, African and Latin 
American peoples, and the peace-loving peoples throughout the world, including the 
^American people, who are actively supporting our resistance against U.S. aggression 
and for national salvation. 

We are very glad to note that the movement of support for our people is being mo^e and 

more closely combined with the struggle of the working people and oppressed nations 
in the world for independence, freedom and their vital interests and against the 
U.S. imperialists 1 policy of intervention and aggression in various countries. We 
highly appreciate the success of the first session of the Bertrand Russell 
International Tribunal to judge the U.S. imperialist aggressors and expose their 
odious crimes in the south and in the north of our country: crimes of aggression, 
crimes of war, and crimes against mankind. The Bertrand Russell International 
Tribunal clearly shows that the broad sections of world opinion and the conscience 
of progressive mankind are on our side. 

Pham Van Dong said: More than ever our compatriots and fighters all over the country 
nurture deep hatred for the landgrabbers , resolutely turn their hatred into strength 
and determination to fight and to win, give play to their initiative and offensive 
position on all fronts — military, political, and international — and strike even harder 
and more accurately at the U.S D aggressors. On the occasion of the current National 
Day, all our people further arm themselves with the rock-like will of President Ho as 
expressed in his 17 July 1966 appeal: We are determined to fight until total victory, 
to perseveringly fight a protracted war, fearing no difficulties, hardships and 
sacrifices. Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom 1 Once victory 
is won, our people will rebuild our country and provide it with bigger and more 
"beautiful constructions! 

186 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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1 September 19^7 



NORTH VIETNAM 



This splendid victory day is awaiting us. Compatriots and fighters , march forward 
with the mettle of victors , with the determination to defend the n fa 9 liberate 
the south, proceed toward the peaceful reunification of the fatherland, build a 
peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, prosperous and powerful Vietnam, thus 
contibuting to the defense of peace in southeast Asia and in the world. The U 8«, 
imperialist aggressors will surely be defeated! Our people will be victorious! 






187 



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o 



j 



i 



CO 






C/3 

< 

C/) 



GO 
*•» 

CD 

3 

a> 

*— ► 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



3. kflsv position statements 

(unclassified) 



INDEX 



•— 



SUBJECT 

KFLSV program Enunciating Major Aims., Made Public in 
February, 19^1 .....,«... 



Statement of Central Committee of KFLSV, March 22, 1965, Pro- 
claiming the KFLSV 1 s Five Points Concerning the War in South 
Vietnam and its Settlement . . 



PAGE 



I89 



193 



Statements of KELSV Central Committee Spokesman on May 12, 1 965, 
Reiterating the Central Committee's Statement on Mar 22, I965. 199 



KFLSV Central Committee Statement of June 12, 1965 Assailing 
U.S. Aggression 



KFLSV Restates Peace Conditions Against Military Escalation 



KFLSV Spokesman in Algiers, December 20, 1965 



Liberation Radio on Bombing Suspension, January 11, 1966 , 
KFLSV Will Mot Recognize U.K. Decisions, February 3, 1966. 
KFLSV Presidium Hails President Ho's Appeal, July 21, 1966 
KFLSV Attacks Peace fr Farce" of ASA Countries, August 22, 1966 
Interview with the VC on Huntley- Br inkley Show, Aug. 27, 19 66 
Burchett Interviews KFLSV Presidium Head, September 1^, 1966 



. 203 
. 206 



- 207 
. 208 
• 209 
. 211 
. 213 
. 215 
. 218 



Political Program of the SVM KLF - full text adopted by congress 
of the Front convened mid-August 19&7; September 1, 1967 • * • 222 



188 



• 






: 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



NFLSV PROGRAM ENUNCIATING MAJOR AIMS, 
' ' MADE PUBLIC IN FEBRUARY, 19 6l 

■ 
- 

(The ten-point program of the NFLSV was radioteletyped 
by VNA in English to Europe and Asia on Februaiy 11, 19^1. 
i ' VNA staCcB^aTthe program of the "newly founded" NFLSV 

! had "recently 11 been released by LNA (Liberation News Agency) , 

I ( - the official organ of the NFLSV. Listing of the ten points 

• t is prefaced by mention of the struggle of the South Vietnamese 

! people against Japanese and French domination, and the crimes 

r ■ perpetrated by the cruel and dictatorial United States-Diem 

rule*) 



"♦••The NFLSV undertakes to unite people of all walks of life, 
all social classes, nationalities, political parties, organizations, 

; religious communities, and patriotic personages in South Vietnam, 

-without distinction of their political tendencies, in order to 
struggle and overthrow the rule of the U.S* imperialists and their 
henchmen, the Ngo Dinh Diem clique, and realize independence, de- 

i ' mocracy, life improvement, peace, and neutrality in South Vietnam, 

: ' * and advance toward peaceful reunification of the fatherland. 

■ 

| FRONT . "The program of the NFLSV includes the following 10 points: 

"1— To overthrow the disguised colonial regime of the U.S. 
imperialists and the dictatorial Ngo Dinh Diem administration, 
lackey of the United States, and to form a national democratic 
coalition administration* ~* 

"The present regime in South Vietnam is a disguised colonial 
regime of the U*S. imperialists. The South Vietnamese administration 
is a lackey which has been carrying out the U.S* imperialists political 
lines* This regime and administration must be overthrown, and a broad 
national democratic coalition administration formed to include repre- 
sentatives of all strata of the people, nationalities, political 
parties, religious communities, and patriotic personages; to wrest 
back the people 1 s economic, political, social, and cultural interests; 
to realise independence and democracy; to improve the people 1 s living 
conditions; and to cany out a policy of peace and neutrality and 
advance toward peaceful reunification of the fatherland • 

M 2»— To bring into being a broad and progressive democracy. 

,! To abolish the current constitution of the Ngo Dinh Diem 
dictatorial administration, lackey of the United States, and 
to ele ct a new National Ass e mbly throu gh universal suffrage* 



1«9 



- 



! 

i 



i 
J 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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"To promulgate all democratic freedoms: freedom of 
expression, of the press, of assembly, of association of 
i movement* . .(ellipsis as received); to guarantee freedom 

j of belief with no discrimination toward any religion on 

| the part of the state; and to grant freedom of action to 

I - the patriotic political parties and mass organizations 9 

j irrespective of political tendencies. 

"To grant general amnesty to all political detainees, 
dissolve all concentration camps under ai$r form whatsoever, 
abolish the fascist lav: 10-59 and other antidemocratic laws J 
and to grant the right of repatriation to all those who had 
to flee abroad due to the U.S. -Diem regime • «.. 

fl To abolish the economic monopoly of the United States 
and its henchmen; to build an independent and sovereign 
economy and finance, beneficial to the nation and people; 
and to confiscate and nationalize the property of the 
U»!Si ^imperialists "and" the Truling clique, their stooges...* 

"To help northern compatriots who had been forced or 
enticed ty the reactionaries to go south after the restoration 
of peace to return to their native places if they so desire... 



H 5-«To build a national and democratic education and culture.... 

w 6~To build an army to defend the motherland and the people. 

♦'To build a national arny defending the fatherland and 
the people; and to cancel the system of U.S. military advisers.. 

"To abolish all the militaiy bases of foreign countries 
in South Vietnam." 

* ■ 

"7— .To guarantee the right of equality between nationalities...; 
i to protect the legitimate rights of foreign residents and overseas 

; Vietnamese. 



"To insure the right of autonomy of the national minorities; 
to set up, within the framework of the great family of the 
Vietnamese people, autonomous regions areas inhabited by minority 
peoples;. ..to abolish the U.S. -Diem clique's present policy of 
ill-treatment and forced assimilation of the minority nationali- 
ties. . . 



190 



-» ■ ■'.— .^*» 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



in Vietnam; and to defend and care for Vietnamese nationals 



"To protect the legitimate rights of foreigners residing 
et 
abroad ♦ 

"£U~To carry out a foreign policy of peace and neutrality. 

11 To cancel all unequal treaties signed with foreign 
countries by the U.S. henchmen which violate national 
- sovereignty. 

"To establish diplomatic relations with all countries 
irrespective of political regime, in accordance with the 
principles of peaceful coexistence as put forth at the 
Bandung conference. 

"To unite closely with the peace-loving and neutral 
countries; and to expand friendly relations with Asian and 
African countries, first of all, with neighboring Cambodia 

and Laos* 

"To refrain from joining any bloc or military alliance 
or forming a militaiy alliance with any country. 

"To receive economic aid from any country ready to assist 
Vietnam without conditions attached. 

"9— To establish normal relations between North and South ' 
Vietnam as a first step toward peaceful reunification of the country. 

•'The urgent demand of our people throughout the country is to 
reunify the country ty peaceful means* The NFLSV undertakes the 
gradual reunification of the country by peaceful means, on the 
principle of negotiations- and discussions between the two zones of 
all forms and measures beneficial to the people and fatherland. 
Pending the national reunification, the governments of the two zones 
I will negotiate and undertake not to spread propaganda to divide the 

t . peoples or favor war, nor to use military forces against each other; 
J to cany out economic and cultural exchanges between the two zones; 

! . and to insure for people of both zones freedom of movement, of liveli- 

! hood, and the right of mutual visits and correspondence. 



"10 — -To oppose aggressive jwar and actively defend world peace* 



, "To oppose aggressive wars and all forms of enslavement 

| by the imperialists; and to support the national liberation 

struggles of peoples in various countries. 

i 

; ' ' • 

• ■ 191 • • 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



n To oppose war propaganda; and to demand general 
disarmament, prohibition of nuclear weapons, and demand the 
use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. 

M To support the movements for peace, democracy, and 
social progress in the world; and to actively contribute to 
the safeguarding of peace in Southeast Asia and the world.. •♦" 



192 



1 - 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



ST ATEMENT OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF KFLSV, MARCH 22, 1965 
PROCLAIMING TKS .NFLSV'S FIVE POINTS CONCERNING THE WAR 

IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND ITS SETTLED i 



(According to a Liberation Radio broadcast 
of March 23, 1965 , in Vietnamese to South Viet- 
nam, the NFLSV Central Committee held an 
important press conference to proclaim the 
NFLSV* g five -point atjafcam^mfc concerning fcho 
escalation of the war. The lengthy statement 
contains only a small paragraph on negotiations. 
It states "at present all negotiations are use- 
less as long as: 

* 

a. The U.S. imperialists do not withdraw 
all the troops, weapons and means of 
war of the United States and its 
satellites from South Vietnam and 
destroy their military bases in 
South Vietnam; — ' 



b. "As long as the sacred rights of the 
South Vietnamese people --rights to 
independence and democracy—are still 
sold by the Vietnamese traitors to the 
U.S. imperialists; 

* a 

c. "As long as the NFLSV- -true and only 
representative of 14 million South 
Vietnamese people—does not have the 
decisive voice.") 

FRONT n »»«A t the pres s conference > Cha irman Nguyen Huu Tho 

p rocla im ed an im portant five - poll ii: s t atemen t condemning 
£he systematic wa r- se eking _atid aggressive policy of the 
U.S. imperial i-Sjbsr in S outh_ Vi e tn am and enunciating the 
hero ic Sou th Vietnamese people's unchanged_standpoint 
wh ich is resol utely to kick out_the_ U»S ; imp erialis ts 

/in order 



1/ We understand that the correct Vietnamese translation 
of this point states that negotiations are useless as 
long as the U,S. imperialists ' have not yet withdrawn 
all the troops, etc. 

193 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
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In order to liberate the south 3 build an independent, 
democratic, peaceful, and net al South Vietnam, and 
"achieve national unification. Here is the NFLSV state- 
ment about the intensification and enlargement by the 
U.S. imperialists of their aggressive war in South 
Vietnam: 

"♦..Faced with the present and extremely grave 
situation, the NFLSV deems it necessary to solemnly 
proclaim once more Its unchanged stand of struggling 
GMEVA against the Americans to save the country. The IKS. 

Imperialists are saboteurs of the Geneva Accords, 
extremely rude and cruel aggressors and warmongers, 
and deadly enemies of the Vietnamese people, 

. * n ,,.The Vietnamese people are well aware of the 
value of those accords. The Vietnamese people have 
always and correctly applied those accords and resolutely 
struggled so that those accords would be implemented in 
accordance with the spirit and letter of this international 
document which ha^ all the characteristic s of leg ality. 
US MOVES On the other hand, U.S. imperialists and their lackeys 

South Vietnam have gra dually and in an inc reasingly 
jyzazen manner tram gled on_J|he j3eneva_Accords^ and (word 
indistinct) destroying those accords by openly waging 
an atrocious war in South Vietnam over the past 11 
yea rs wi th a v iew to enslaving and oppressing the South 
Vietnamese p eople, turning" South Vietnam into one of 
their - colonies and military bases, and - par t i t i onihg" 



Vietnamese territory forever 



"..•Naturally the criminal actions of the U.S. 
imperialists and their lackeys aroused hatred throughout 
Vietnam and gave rise to a wave of boiling anger through- 
out the world. Public opinion in Vietnam, public 
opinion in Asia, and the impartial public opinion the 
world over severely condemned and energetically protested 
against the cruel actions of the U.S. imperialists and 
their lackeys and loudly demanded that they put an end 
to their war -seeking and aggressive actions against the 



/South 



19*4- 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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US MOVES 



South Vietnamese people and that they correctly implement 
the 1954 Geneva Accords, But all this fell on deaf ears. 
The U.S. imperialists continued to trample on justice 
and to rush ahead with their piratical war in South 
Vietnam. 

2/ 
!1 2. The heroic South Vietnamese people are 

d etermine d t o" kick" ~ out^theTUVS ,~~ iuiper ial is t s in or d er to 

liberate S outh Vie tnam; buil d an jmdgyjenden t~, democrat icj_ 

peaceful, and neutral South Vietnam; and ad vance to ward 

national unification. 



"The South Vietnamese people are fond of peace, 
but the South Vietnamese people cannot stand idle and 
let the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys freely trample 
on the country and dominate the nation. They prefer 
death to bondage. The 14 million people have risen in 
one bloc and struggled gallantly to defeat the U.S. 
invaders and the country-sellers, liberate South Vietnam, 
achieve independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality 
in South Vietnam, and contribute to maintaining (peace 
in Indochina?) and southeast Asia. 

11 . « J o esc a pe th i s dan g erous sit uation, the U.S. 
impe r ia lists are en ga ging in ex tremely dang er ou s 
adwnHirous military actions. The fact that they 
introduced into South Vietnam combat units of their air, 
naval, and ground forces, additional U.S. weapons, and 
mercenaries from South Korea and other satellites and 
used planes to bomb the DRV and the Laotian Kingdom and 
so forth does not reflect their strength at all. On the 
contrary, these are the crazy actions of a (hooligan?) 
who, faced with deadlock, engages in adventurous actions. 
They cannot threaten anyone. 3y its nature, the U.S. 
imperialist scheme of intensifying and enlarging their 
present aggressive war reflects one of their humiliating 
defeats. It proves that their 11-year-old colonialist 
and aggressive policy in South Vietnam and their so- 
called special war have gone bankrupt. 

/ n . . .Since 



2/ The preceding part vas not numbered. 

195 



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,J Since the U.S. imperialists have bogged down 
and almost died during the special war, they will be 
completely wiped out in (the regional war?). If they 
dare to extend the war to North Vietnam, to all of Indo- . 
china, and further, they will face more humiliating 
defeats more quickly. Previously, with empty hands the 
southern pciopla ctaaXt heavy blows on the U.S. imperialists 
and their lackeys and fulfilled a great and glorious 
revolutionary task. Now, with their own strength, with 
the wholehearted support of powerful North Vietnam and 
the rich and powerful socialist countries, and with the 
sympathy, support, and encouragement of the Asian, 
African, and Latin American countries and all peace - 
and justice-loving peoples the world over, the South 
Vietnamese people will surely and gloriously triumph 
over the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys in any 
regional or special war waged by the latter. Now more 
than ever b efore , th e South Vietnamese people must 
firmly^ hold rif les in hand and struggle to achieve their 
fundamental goal, which is to kick out the U.S. imperial- 
i s t_s and bu ild a n in d e pen den t, deirio crati c , _ peaceful , and 
neutral South Vietnam, 



US MOVES ' " The NFL SV asserts once mo re that th e U.S. scheme 

of introducing U.S. and satellite air, naval, and ground - 
force units into South Vietnam and bombing North Vietnam 
and Laos to reduce the combativity of the South Vietnaraese 
people, to stop the aid of the North Vietnamese and world 
peoples to the just struggle of the South Vietnamese 
people, and to_cr^eate_ a_st_rong position fro m which they 
can fotrce the KFLSV and the South Vietnamese people" to~sell 
their fa th erland to t he m ch eaply through certain nego~-~ 
*tiations i s on ly an empty dream of ma n who "are " cr azy" " 
politically and adventurous militarily" 

*" ~ - — m i —i ■ i ■ i ■» ■ ■ 1 fr_ | ■— — ->- -m i ■■ ■ ■ ■ i H ill ■■■ 

""T he Sou th Vietnamese people^inf orm the U.S. 

imperiali sts and th eir lac keys : ^ou are hooligans""' You 

are stupid. -How can you hope to deceive people when each 



/time after hitting the nor th without warning you repeat 
again"~^da gain~~that you do not~inten3 to "ehT ar ge the \ 7 ar , 



/that 



196 



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that the attacks are retaliatory measures, that the 
attacks are aimed a;t b ring ing about negotiations, and 
so forth? You _are more stu pid when you say you want to 
negotiate fr om a position of strength. The South Viet- 
namese people point their fingers in the faces of the 
U.S. imperialists and their lackeys and tell them: 'Your 
only way out is to withdraw from South Vietnam* If you 
stubbornly pursue the war, you will suffer the greatest 
and most humiliating defeat you have ever suffered. 1 

FRONT n ,.. At nresent all n egotiations are useless as long 

as the U.S. imperialists do not withdraw all the troops, 
weapons, and .means of war of the United States and its 
satellites from South Vietnam and destroy their military 
bases _in South Vietnam; __as_ long as the sacred rights of 
the South Vietnamese people —ri ghts to independence and~~ 
d emo cr acy- ~ ( ar e s till _s o^d? ) _^by^_the_ Vietnamese traitors 
to_ the U.S. imperialists; and as long as the NFLSV— true 

§ndU9J^y-Jr-£. P ^Bsen t atlve^ of 14 mil lion S outh Vi etn ame s e 
-people — doe s not have the de cisive voice . With regard 
to the South Korean clique and other satellites of the 
Americans who are planning to introduce mercenaries 
into South Vietnam, the South Vietnamese people tell 
them the following: Although you are involved in waging 
the war, you will never be given your share. You are 
simply shameful scapegoats for U.S. imperialism. Since 
nearly 30,000 U.S. generals, field grade officers, and 
men with nearly half a million lackey troops are being 
heavily beaten by the army and people in South Vietnam, 
what can a handful of you do? 

"•••3. T he heroi c S outh Vi etnamese people and libera- 
tion troons are determined to fulfill their sacred mission 



which_is to^ chase^away the U.S. imperialists to liberate 
"South Vietnam and t o def end Nort h Vie tnam, Vietnam is 
one , the Vietn amese people are one, nor th^a nd south "afe_ 
pne_. Their affection is as high as a mountain c as 
deep as the sea. Ttrs truth is as sure as the sun rises 
in the east. Nothing can change it. In their hot and 

/deadly 



197 



■ 






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deadly struggle against the U.S. Imperialists and their 
lackeys, the South Vietnamese people have always received 
the great and extremely precious assistance of 17 mil- 
lion northern brothers. The northern compatriots are 
enthusiastically working day and night for the southern 
part of the country, 

" On behalf of the 14 million South Vietnamese 
people, the NFLSV wishes to extend its full confidence 
and unchangeable promise to the 17 million northern 
compatriots. The South Vietnamese people are determined 
to fight and defeat the U.S. imperialists. The heroic 
South Vietnamese people and liberation troops are 
determi ned to fulfill t he ir sac red mi s si on_:_to chase^ 
away the U» S, imperialists, to liberate Sout h Vie tnam, 
to defend the north, and to advance toward the reunifi- 
c ation of the countr y, 

11 • . , Th e K?LSV alway s r elies prim ar i 1 y on its own 
force and a bility , but i s re ady to continue to receive 
all as sistance , moral and material, including assistance 
in weapons an d wa r materiel from the^so'cialist^countries" 
a nd n a tionalist c ountries, jail world organizations and 
a ll peace-lovin g people^ the w or Id. Mo r e o ve r , 

the front reserves for itself the right to buy weapons 
and war materiel from any country and organization ready 
to sell them to the South Vietnamese people to help them 
strengthen their defensive potential, 

"•••All people must be united. All people must be 
armed and must heroically continue to move forward with 
the determination to fight to win over the U,S, enemy 
and the Vietnamese traitors, 

",..We are absolutely convinced that wa will cer- 
tainly be victorious. We also pledge to our beloved 
Vietnam that wa are determined to strike strongly, truly 
strongly; to strike to the last man, to the last breath, 
to the last drop of blood; and to strike very accurately 
at the heads of the U,S. enemy and his lackeys* We are 



determined to liberate the south, protect the north, and 



«** — - — 



r auni f y the fa the* 1 an ^ * 



198 



• 









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STATEMENT 0? NFLSV ClOiTR/ L COMMITTEE SFOXSSM 



ON MAY 12, 1965, REITERATING THE CENTRA: 

— ^ ^^ * ^ i MM i i ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ i . 

COMMITTEE l S STATEMENT OF MARCH 22 , 19 65 



(Liberation Radio broadcast on May 14, 1965, in 
Vietnamese to South Vietnam., a May 12 , 1965 state- 
ment of a NFLSV Central Coiamttee spokesman. The 
broadcast reiterates the NFLSV' 1 s five points. It 
also cqitraeiits on recent 0*3. actions, including 
"the economic trick, called cooperation for economic 
development" and the creation of "smokescreens of 
deceitful peaceful negotiations". The statement 
stresses the role of the NFLSV as the true master 
of South Vietnam.) 

"The South Vietnamese people, as well as the Cambodian people and 
other fraternal peoples in southeast Asia and throughout the world, will 
never forget the past 11 years of misery, shame and suffering caused 
by the 4 billion dollars of U.S. aid* President Johnson made a great 
mistake. U.S. dollars cannot corrupt, seduce, or subject the Viet- 
namese and other Asian peoples. (?We say) to the U.S. imperialists' 
face that the Asian peoples, with their culture dating back thousands 
of years s with their traditional respect for justice and disdain far 
ill-gotten wealth, and with their respect for moral principles and 
virtues, can never be subjected by violence. Poverty cannot change 
'their hearts and misery cannot soil their purity and honor. You U.S. 
imperialists are conceited and disdainful, because you are well-off, 
but you have gained and will gain only insults, shame, and bankruptcy. 
Your 4 billion dollars cannot purchase (few words indistinct) South 
Vietn am and cannot purchase p eace"" fo r" the pirat es. 

"At present, with even 40 billion dollars you can purchase only 
the souls of a few more scores of country-selling, traitorous Viet- 
namese such as Ngo Dinh Diem and Phan Huy Quat. Formerly, in order 
to deceive, the fascist Hitler had to invent something called spiri- 
tual values. Today U.S. President Johnson need only wear dollars and 
guns on his chest in place of a religious medal.... 

US n At present, it is obvious that because of their heavy military 
M defeats and their considerable political isolation, the U.S. imperia- 
lists have re sort ed to the economic trick called cooperation""; for - aeve^- 
2 foment id the label of fal se pe ace wh i le_ s tubborn ly intensifying and 
q expanding the war of acqression acainst bur'countrvT 



-» _■> 



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i 



"What is noteworthy in this trick is the U.S. imperialists? evil 
effort to create a smokescreen to cover up their colonialist and beli- 
icose nature3~ ar ^ f ooiishnilitaryjactions in South Vietnam 

anc forth Vietnam. Of course, if the U.S. aggressors carry out agg- 
ress ion" "by "resorting to military means , we the Vietnamese people, will 
fight; if they carry out aggression by resorting to the label of false 
peace, we will fight. Vie will fight until final victory, until not 
one U.S. aggressor remains on our Vietnamese territory. To carry out 
their colonialist, aggressive policy, the U.S. imperialist? have re- 
sorted to numerous cunning stratagems and tricks and (word indistinct) 
the traditional wicked effort to sow disunion.,.. 

"Is the South Vietnamese people's resolute struggle against the 
aggressive U.S. imperialists .to save the country and win back indepen- 
dence and freedom and unjust struggle? Is progressive mankind's 
spiritual and material assistance to our struggle for national libera- 
tion, including weapons and (few words indistinct) , an illegal act? 
Is it incorrect to say that the foreign intervention in many forms 
that aggravates the Vietnamese situation is none other than the war 
of aggression waged by the U.S. imperialists against our country? 
W hat is the si gnif icance of Johnson 1 s unc ond it ional negotiations? Do 
they_ mean that our ^people must lay^ ■t'lo-vh their wea pons and receiTve^che 
qj. S. "b ahd its"in thei r homes as honored guest's?' 






"At present, the nationalist countries in southeast Asia and 
Africa constitute a great force unanimously supporting the Vietnamese 
people f s patriotic struggle. Therefore, in their attempt to isolate 
us and reduce their shameful isolation, the U.S. imperialists have 
not concealed their evil and vile intention of sowing disunion among 
them and taking advantage of them. But in face of the correct atti- 
tude shown by these nationalist countries, Johnson has lost his en- 
thusiasm. It is crystal clear that the U.S. imperialists are very 
cruel and cunning, especially when they have suffered heavy defeats 
and are on a desperate path. However, diamond cuts diamond. . , , 



"As everyone knows, the British government is a cochairman of the 

Vi *. .- J= - ~ — T7-' - J . * * _ _ -: 1_ 1 _ / *> JH J -I i 




T Minister Wil son co ntinues to assert tha t hi s policy is to agree and 
\ support the" U.S. imperialists 1 aggressive policy and war In South' 
If Vie tn< _At present r JP ripe minister Wilson is carrying out tie duty 

pf a stooge for ^e_t3mSj^^^^d£tipTi8Liy__. troops , while Pre sident" Johnson 

Is calling for peaceful negotiations. 



II AT 



Now more than ever, all the U.S. imperialists 1 deceitful an< 
psychological warfare measures are useless, no matter how cunning and 
brazen. It cannot be otherwise. Even their most recent measure (?has 
only aroused) the anger of progressive mankind and millions of hon 
American people. 



:ic 



P ^?or_our_part,_our stand_ is extremely clear. The NFLSV 22 March 

statement ha s_ful_iy_ reflected the nnchanged aspirations, stand, and" 
2 .determ:' tion o_f 14 million southern people ^ It is al so the unswerv- 
^ ing line oz the" NFLS V, the only^ leg al and urue repr esentative of 14 
: million southern compatriots: 

' 200 



i 



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ir 



1 — The U.S. imperialists are the saboteurs of the Geneva 



^accords, the extremely rude aggressors and Warmongers, ancTtlie deadly 
enemy of the Vietnamese people. 



national unification. 

Qj* ,. — - .- . — — ■—. —— . *-— — ■- 



"3 — The people and liberation troops of heroic South Vietnam are 
re solved t o fulfill co mplet.e ly their sac red dut y ^ which is to kick "the 
JJ. S . jjaperialists o ut in or d er t o libera. t e So uth Vietnam and_ proteci: 

North Vietnam, 
* — — 

"4— -The South Vietnamese ^people are deeply grateful to all the 
peace-andpeace ioving peopies~~thfdughout the world for their warm 
suoport and declare that they are ready to receive any aid from friends 
on the five continents, including weap ons and other war materiel. 



« - 



'5 — All the united and armed people are rising up heroically in 
order resolutely to defeat the U.S. bandits and their lackeys. In the 
name of 14 million South Vietnamese people , the NFLSV s olemnly d eclared 
in its five-point statement that "the South Vietnamese t and their 

armecPf or ce s are reso lyed not tb_ ab ando n their Weapons" "as^long"" as™"th air 
basic objective s — independence , democracy, peace, and "neutr'ality-^-aVe - 
not achieved. 

I. ■ III Mil ■ 1 m»» ll -jw — . ■ ' ■■ ■ ■ '■ ■ 1 ■ . ■ !>' » ^ ■ ■ Ml 

"The South Vietnamese people are resolved to continue dealing heav 
blows to the U.S fr imperialists and their lackeys in order to achieve 
final victory. All negotiations with the U«S« imperialists at the 
present time are"" entirely meaningless 1 .-..'.ess the -U7s\ "imperialists with 
draw" "all" troops and war materiel and a .bon s — d f " the tfnxt e" d""St' afes^anc" 



* . . m __ 



its satellites from South Vietnam and destroy all their military base 
: in South yi^nak, u nless the Vietnamese traitors stop sacrificing the 
' South Vietnamese people* s _s acred rights to independence "and democracy 
and unless the NFLSV-Hbhe only tme_rep^seii€atTve*"of "14 'million" South 
Vietnamese people—has the right to exparess'^eir^deci'siv e voice, 

"Through the U.S. president's 7 April speech, and (several words, 
indistinct) one can see that the U.S. imperialists are extremely 
frightened by the brilliant image of the NFLSV, the single and genuine 
representative of the South Vietnamese people and the organizer and 
leader of the South Vietnamese people's struggle for self-liberation, 
against the U.S. imperialists 1 warlike and agressive policy and against 
the oppression of the lackeys and traitors to the fatherland. The 
". NLPSV is the i mage of the solidarity and unity of a ll patriotic ana" 
" ^emocr^tic forces in South Vietnam, The NFLSV is now _the "true "master 
of South Viet nam a nd control s f o u r - fi f ths_o f the t erri to ry an d " 1 r " 
mill people^ With its liberated armed forces and ' paraiSIlarEary^ 
xorces, the NFLSV is the victor which is smashing the strength of th 
U.S. imperialist and colonialist aggressors. 

201 



3 



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"Everyone knows that (few words indistinct) the USSR, China/ and 
the socialist countries nave bean actively supporting the South Viet- 
namese people in their struggle for self-liberation. It is thus clear 
that the South Vietnam revolution has been organized and led by the 
NFLSV. This truth is as shining as the sun. The U.S. imperialists, 
the most stubborn people, can no longer deny tTi at "the South Vietnam 
problem cannot be solved without the NFLSV and without the NFLSV plate- 

for jfi~ &&" ™ ri §q6Tg VVQ cla rriQ nt in vi cv; o £ iih o p ru ;,cnt b^lanco o-~ forcas m 

SoutH" Viet nam'." 

* 

"In Vietnam, in Asia and the world, where will the U.S. imperia- 
lists go if they stubbornly continue to intensify the war in South 
Vietnam and to strike North Vietnam? It is clear that in the present 
situation in our country, President Johnson can only choose and is ob- 
liged to choose one of these two decision; either to prolong and expand 
the accressive war in our country or to follow the way out reserved for 
the U.S. imoerialists, that is, to cruit South Vietnam as soon as possible, 

"As for the South Vietnamese, and the rest of the Vietnamese people, 
they will continue the resistance for five or ten years more. In reality 
we will have to lose only (word indistinct) final vict cry will certainly 
be ours. The South Vietnamese and Vietnamese people have sworn that they 
prefer death to bondage, and they are determined to fight until final 
ictory, and to exterminate the U.S. bandits to the last man in their 
country, no matter wha%> sacrifice they have to endure. 



• • 



"In the struggle against 14 million South Vietnamese people, you 
are unable to win and are, on the contrary, being bitterly defeated, 
and now you are planning to (? fight) all 31 million Vietnamese people. 
It is true that you want to rush to death, unless you are great im- 
postors (few words indistinct) the people of North and South Vietnam 
have answered and are answering you (few words indistinct) all the peo- 
ple are prepared and (passage indistinct) 700 million peoples of the 
. brotherly countries, with their fraternal close friendship are also 
ready to cooperate closely with the Vietnamese people in resolutely 
exterminating the U.S. aggressors to the last man if they venture to 
expand the war to North Vietnam and Indochina and encroach on China. 

F30J5T ""At present, it is clear that it would be wise for U.S. officials 
%<^^t^dr^^ll^rbpps_j^ m J&jSL United States" ancf its" satellites and wea- 
p ons an d war material from Sout h Vietn am a nd let the Vietnamese people" 
settle, .their own affair s — i n accordance^ w ft h _ t ne~N F '£s V~p late f o rm- - and 
.st op their ag gres si on a gainst Nor th Vie tna m. Thi s is the only way out 
which (few words indistinct)." 



202 



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/ 



US MOVES 



IIFLSV CENTRAL CGMITTSS ST ? 0? JIEJE 12, 1965 

ASSAILING U.S. AGGHSSS 



(Liberation Radio released on June 14, 1965, a KFLSV 
Central Cccrrdttee statement of June 12, 1965 aimed at 
"the U.S. imperialists ' new adventurous acts and deceitful 
tricks l: of escalating the war in South Vietnam. It also 
reiterates the NELSV's five points of March 22.) 

" . . .During the past few months, face d with h eavy defeats, the_Johrsson_ 
^ovemnmeiTu has openly and directly carried on the plan to intensify and enlar 



he U.S. aggressive war in our country, its attitude arid acts have beer: those 









of a group of 100 percent colonialists*. Regardless of public opinion and 
international law, the U.S. administration has ordered units of U.S. combat 
expeditionary troops and troops from satellite countries sent to South Vietnam 
■with an unprecedentedly great quantity of weapons and war material. 



... 



"Faced with these concrete actions, can one say anything except that the 
U*_S-. authorities are crazily eri^ging thei r desp icable aggressive war in 
Vietnam? Is it possible to b elieve tha t thee i ons are t he mani fest a tions 
of_Fresident Johnson's genuine desire for peace and of the U.S. authorities' 
determina tion to respect and protect the 1954 Gene va ac cords on Vietnam? A 
normal man — one who is not crazy and who is not an accomplice of the U.S. 
bandits — must conclude that the actions of the U.S. imperialists are the 
rudest possible aggressive and warlike actions,.. * 

"Thus^ wh ile inten sifying arid enlarging their aggressive war ,_ they set 
forth deceitful pea ce p roposes L Recently U.S. L President Johnson, with one 
hand, raised hi^hjhis^ comm and baton — thus "giving the signal" for U.S." officers, 
soldiers, planes, and war shipsPto" come to South Vietnam in large numbers — and 




ful arguments, especially in the speech delivered in Baltimore on ? April. 



lt Concerning so-called unconditional discussions, Johnson contradicted 
himself in trying to explain the content of his policy: He said that the 
Americans would stay in Souths Vietnam at any cost and that the Americans are 
preparing for a long and continuous war. This is the same as if Johnson ordered 
the South Vietnamese people to lay down their weapons and surrender to the 
* Americans in order to have the so-called peace that would be enjoyed in their 
lifetime* only as slaves to the invaders and traitors. The_result of the U#5» 
authoritie s' trick of unc on dition al disc ussions would be t hat the Am eric ans 
would conifxnue_ to occupy and rule South Vietnam and that Viet nam would be 
partitioned for ever . 

"Johnson set forth conditions not only for_dis cuss ions, but also for 
arr i^ng"^t^di£cu? ?^5?JLi --- e U.S. authorities continuously shouted that if 
the Vietnamese refused to hold discussions with them, they would destroy 
Vietnam on an unprecedented scale. This means that the U.S. administration 



203 



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\ ' gives itself the right to wage aggressive wars and Sow destruction a. any 

moment and any place in accordance with its colonialist desires. 

"In fact, Johnson's arguments about peace discussions constitute a policy 
of brazen bandilry. That is why" the South" Vietnamese people are not alone in 
"their hatred of the U.S. bandits and their determination, millions as one, 
to oblige the latter to pay for their crimes and why the world peoples, in- 
cluding the U.S. people, are also angry at then. (Several words indistinct) 
the Vietnamese people have estimated their strength and (?elearly realized) 
the extremely cruel nature of U.S. imperialism ^ the international gendarme. 
They are resolved to keep thoir word — wc prefer to die than to become 
slaves — and to fight to vanquish the U.S. bandits. 

"Johnson a lso, in exp la inin g why the Americans are attacked, Inven ted the 
legend that I *orth_ Vietnam invades South Vietnam andthat China forces the 
Vietnam ese p eople'to" struggle'agairist the M£fxcans . Then "he "invented the 
trickiTof esc^ation aM^&istto^ of North Vietnam, without 




deceitful and contradictory — that the Vietnamese aggress against the 



Vietnamese and that the Americans are under attack although their country, in 
which there is not one single liberation soldier, is separated from Vietnam by 
a whole ocean, 

f 'It is necessary to remind the U.S. authorities that the Vietnamese nation 
not only has personal experiences in the struggle against colonialism and im- 
s . . perialism, but also has survived and prospered by itself for thousands of years 

before the birth of U.S. capitalism. In fact, it is necessary to stress that 
the rudely aggressive and warlike policies :and acts by the U.S. authorities""] 
in our^co^€ry^during . the p lastT!I years , especially during the last few * ** 
months , have erased for a long time theoreticall y as wel l as practically t he 
temporary, d^arcation line at the 17th parallel which divides Vietnam into 
two zones — north and south. Our compatriots^ in both ilorth and South 
lrietnant~ffi c[0€ssi i "l^~nece3gai y and consider i t a sacred duty to pay attention 
to and settle definitely this problem^ "It is clear that the "U.S." authorities 
have intentionally fired smoke flares with a view of escaping the court of 
world public opinion, including that of U.S. public opinion, which .is severely 
denouncing the U.S. imperialists as colonialist aggressors and war criminals 
in Vietnam, They thought that in so doing they could sow disunity inside 
the steel solidarity bloc of the Afro-Asian peoples who are actively directing 
the spearheads of their attacks at the common enemy — the U.S, imperialists. 
Tney were, however, greatly mistaken. 



"It is clear that in inventing the legend of aggression against South 
Vietnam by North Vietnam, the U.S. authorities have intentionally concealed 
a real fact vrhich has been considered as striking truth. It is the South 



"° 



PT> -^ Vietnamesg_peop le ' s pat riot ic struggle its elf 3 wh ich has been wag ed under 
"the banner of the HSLSV the organization that represents them truly T ^.t* 



v -r- 



ruly. Naturally, 



all deceitful and threatening actions of the U.S. imperialists are completely 



ineffective.- .. 



20*f 



T- 



FRONT 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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continue t 



,s The KFLSV sternly warns the U.S. imperialists that if .they stubbornly 
o step up and enlarge their aggressive war, 31 million Vietnamese 
people certainly will not tolerate their crimes; their blood debts should be 
paid for by blood; and that the U.S. imperialist failure will be extremely 
lamentable and will happen within a shorter period of tinie;. At present 3 no 
cunning ruse of the U.S. imperialists and no reactionary power in the world 
can ameliorate their deteriorating deadlock situation in South Vietnam, . . . 



on 



a 



■*ln view of the fact that the U.S. imperialists are recklessly (?embarki:v 

adventurous step, the NFLSV finds it necessary to assert once 



i « j- 



nev; mixiLa 



'r; 



again the unchanged adamant stand and determination of 14 million South 



u 

'*-• 



Vietnamese people^ v'hicii was clearly stated in the front's five point statement 
of 22 March. Trie So uth Vietnamese people and their armed forces are detc 
mined never to lay down arras before achieving their basic goal of independence, 
democra cy j peace , and neutrality. The South Vietnamese people are determined 
to deal thundering blows onto the heads of the U.S. aggressors and their 
henchmen and will surely achieve final success. At_ present, all negotiations^ 
with the U. S. impe rialists are useless if the U.S. imperialists have rjotyet 
withdrawn from Sout h Vi etnam all troops and war equipment and means 
bel in.g to them and their satellites, if the" Vietnamese traitors continue 
to kneel down and offer the U.S. '"imperialists the South Vietnamese people *s 
sacred rights concerning independence and democracy, i f the ri?LSV — the 
unique legitimate representative of 14 million South Vietnamese people — 
'3 ls not allowed to raise i ts decisive voice, and if the U.S. imperialists still 
^refuse to stop air strikes against the nor£hern""piFf~of our country. If. . • 



•* 



205 






f 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



NFLSV RESTATES PEACE CONDITIONS AGAINST MILITARY ESCALATION 



(On September 29 Hanoi broadcast in English a statement re- 
leased on September 25 by the Presidium of the Central Committee 
of the NFLSV condemning expanded U.S. and South Vietnamese 
military operations in Vietnam and reiterating the Front r s con- 
ditions for a settlement of the conflict*) 

"...Therefore, the pre sidium of the NFLS V Central Committee deem s it 
n ecessary to declare solemn l y once again thaiTXr~~the U.S. iri i perraXisXs~ F cfus e 
to withdraw the^ troops and dismantle i th eir mili tary base s in South Vietnam 
but continue to send more troops andT build new military "Eases, ref uslTto stop 
all war acts but continue to use B-52's and other aircraft and artillery to 
carry out wanton bombardments against the South Vietnamese people, if th e y refuse 
to st op usin g chemicals and other lethal gases , refuse to stop their bloody 
repression of unarmed people's demonstrations and definitively put an end to 
their public execution or other acts of murder of prisoners of war, political 
detainees as well as demonstrators , if they d o not respect and implement the 
1954 Geneva a greem ents on Vietnam in the spi rit of re spe cting the in dependencg 
and sove reignty's? the Sou t h Vietna mese people, and leaving the latter alone to 
settle their own affa irs 5 if they persist in their stubborness, there can b e 
no contact nor political solution with them . It is impossible to have conditions 
leading to a real and guaranteed peace in South Vietnam as long as the South 
Vietnamese army and people have not yet completely defeated the U.S. aggressors 
and completely liberated their country. . . ■ " 



206 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



RETYPED 

FBIS 50 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

KFLSV SPOKESMAN IN AKJIEBS 

PARIS AFP in English 13^6Z 20 Dec 65 E 

(Text) Algiers-A.- leading member of the South Vietnam National Liberation 
Front j Huynh Van Tarn, said here today there is no question of negotiating 
a peace settlement in South Vietnam as long as it is oc cu pied by the Americans 
Huynh Van Tam, who expressed his faith in final victory, said his National 
Liberation Front now occupies four-fifths of Vietnam, containing 11 million 
out of 1^ million inhabitants. 



He said: All negotiation with the Imperialists would be absolutely useless 
at this time as long as they have not withdrawn all their troops and all their 
war material and those of their satellites outside South Vietnam * 

Referring to recent statements by U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Huynh 
Van Tarn warned against fallacious American declarations of peace. A3.! such 
declarations always had been followed by a new U.S. war effort , he said, he 
added that Vietnam had known 31 days of peace in 25 years of struggle. 

Huynh Van Tarn claimed that in one month , between 15 October and 15 November , 
the National Liberation Front had destroyed more than half the number of planes 
and more than all the enemy tanks put out of action in the first nine months of 
the year. He was giving a press conference under the auspices of the Algerian 
National Liberation Front , during the Algerian-Vietnamese Solidarity Week. 

Speaking of French President Charles De Gaulle, he said the NFLSV appreciated 
the realistic positions he adopted, he added: Our position vis-a-vis France is 
very clear: We consider President De Gaulle's position on the South Vietnamese 
problem to be realistic. Here, in Algiers, we have relations with the French 
Embassy. We do not consider France to be a satellite of the United States. 

He said he had never had discussions or official or unofficial meetings with 
representatives of President Johnson or of U.S. satellite countries. He charged 
that Britain, though not the British people, (word indistinct) in the forefront 
of American satellites. It was followed by countries that sent mercenaries to 
Vietnam or helped the U.S. war effort: these were Australia, New Zealand, 
Thailand, Japan, South Korea, Nationalist China, and so forth, he said. 



20 Dec 152UZ RW/AC 



•% 



207 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



FBIS U3 

LIBERATION RADIO OK BOMBING SUSPENSION 

FOR YOUR INFORMATION 

LIBERATION RADIO (CLANDESTINE) IN VIET EESE TO SOUTH VIETNAM 
AT 2330 GMT ON 10 JANUARY I966 CARRIES A SIX-MINUTE COMMENTARY 
ENTITLED "THE MONK'S CLOAK BEARING THE U.S. TRADEMARK CANNOT COVER 
UP THE TRUE NATURE OF A BRIGAND, WHICH HAS NOT BEEN REVEALED." 

THE COMMENTARY SAYS: "THE U.S. AGGRESSIVE CHIEFTAINS HAVE 
RECENTLY INITIATED THE SO-CALLED TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF BOMBING 
OF NORTH VIETNAM TO CREATE CONDITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS 
A SORT OF U.S. -LABELLED MONK'S CLOAK DONNED BY CHIEFTAIN 
JOHNSON IN AN ATTEMPT TO COVER UP THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS' NEW DARK 
PLOTS AND ACTIONS." 

LIBERATION RADIO CONTINUES "AT PRESENT, THE UNITED STATES 
WANTS TO USE THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF BOOTING OF NORTH VIETNAM 
AS A CONDITION FOR THE NORTH. VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S WITHDRAWAL OF 
SUPPORT FOR THE SOOTH VIETNAMESE COMPATRIOTS. THE CUNNING U.S. 
MANEUVER IS TO MAKE US TAKE THE AGGRESSORS FOR THOSE ATTACKED." 

"IN INITIATING THE SO-CALLED TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF BOMBING OF 
NORTH VIETNAM," THE COMMENTARY CONTINUES, "THE UNITED STATES 
EXPECTS TO REAP WHAT IT HAS NOT OBTAINED ON THE BATTLEFIELD. 
FOR THIS REASON, WHILE SHOUTING THAT THE BOOTING OF NORTH VIETNAM HAS 
BEEN TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED TO CREATE CONDITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, 
THE UNITED STATES HAS STRIVEN TO DOUBLE ITS MILITARY EFFORTS IN 
SOUTH VIETNAM. AS EVERYONE KNOTS, WHILE CARRYING OUT THE SO-CALLED 
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF BOOTING OF NORTH VIETNAM, THE UNITED STATES 
HAS HAD ITS AIRCRAFT INTENSIFY THEIR ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM." 

■LIBERATION RADIO CONCLUDES: "THESE FACTS ARE ENOUGH TO SHOW 
US THAT THE PEACE DOVE OF JOHNSON IS REALLY THE DECEITFUL 
MANEUVER OF A MEAT-EATING MONK. BECAUSE IT IMPLIES A NEW PLOT 
TO ESCALATE THE WAR OF THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS. THE MONK'S 
CLOAK OF SUSPENSION OF BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM TO CREATE CONDITIONS 
FOR NEGOTIATIONS CANNOT COVER UP THE TRUE NATURE OF A U.S. 
BRIGAND, WHICH HAS BEEN COMPLETELY EXPOSED. 



11 JAN 08152 AHD/GS 



208 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 1 I 



SOUTH VIETNAM 
3 February 1966 

NFLSV WILL WOT RECOGNIZE U.N. DECISIONS 

Hanoi VNA International Service in English 17U9 GMT 2 February I966--B 

(Text) Hanoi, 2 February — The NFLSV today declared that the United Nations has no 
right to decide on problems of the South Vietnamese people and that it will consider 
all decisions of the U.N. Security Council on Vietnam as null and void. In a statement 
made by its Central Committee spokesman and released by South Vietnam LIBERATION PRESS 
AGENCY, the NFLSV said: 

According to Western reports, on 31 January, right after sending planes to resume the 
bombing of North Vietnam, the U.S. authorities requested a meeting of the u N. Security 
Council so that they could present a complete report on Vietnam and a resolution which 
might open the door to negotiations. 

This is an arrogant and perfidious move of the U.S. imperialists. By resuming its air 
raids against North Vietnam, after failing in their peace efforts farce, the U.S. 
imperialists once again crudely challenged the Vietnamese people and all of peace-loving 
and justice-loving mankind. Yet, they try to gloss over their unjust act by asking 
the convening of the U.N. Security Council, attempting to use this organization to 
spread their fallacious good will for peace, slander the Government of the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam, and distort the just struggle for national salvation of the 
South Vietnamese people in the service of their schemes and acts of increasing and 
widening the war. 

During the pause in the bombing of North Vietnam, to open the way for negotiation, 
the U.S. imperialists continued to send reconnaissance planes to make repeated 
encroachments upon the airspace of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, sent 13>000 
additional U.S. troops to South Vietnam, increased raids and massacres, and committed 
many new crimes against the South Vietnamese people. 

At the same time they used the U.S. Air Force for intensive bombings of the liberated 
areas of Laos, instigated the Thai and South Vietnamese puppet armies to launch 
repeated provocative attacks against the border areas of the Kingdom of Cambodia-, 
and made active preparations to increase and expand the war in Indochina. 

All the aforesaid acts of the U.S. imperialists have laid bare the essence of the 
so-called U.S. peace efforts and have been condemned by public opinion all over the 
world. Decidedly, the U.S. imperialists cannot use the U.N. Security Council to cover 
up the truth and justify their schemes and acts of aggression in South Vietnam, 
still less to negate the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination and 
force them into submission. 

The NFLSV energetically condemns the U.S. imperialists 1 bombing of North Vietnam, 
intensification of the aggressive war in South Vietnam and Laos, and their attacks 
of provocation and sabotage against Cambodia. The U.S. imperialists must bear full 
responsibility for all the extremely serious consequences arising from their acts. 

The NFLSV resolutely exposes before public opinion the perfidious attempt of the U.S. 
imperialists to hide under the U.N. banner to intensify their war of aggression in South 
Vietnam and sabotage the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. 

209 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



3 February 1966 SOUTH VIETNAM 



The KFLSV solemnly declares that the United Nations has no right at all to decide 
problems of the South Vietnamese people. The front will consider all decisions of 
the U.K. Security Council on Vietnam as null and void and as an act of encroachment 
on the principles of independence, sovereignty 3 unity , and territorial integrity of 
Vietnam which were guaranteed by the 195^ Geneva agreements on Vietnam. 

The only correct solution to restore peace in South Vietnam is that the U.S. 
imperialists must withdraw all troops and weapons of the U.S. and its satellites 
from South Vietnam, dismantle all U.S. military bases there, and let the South 
Vietnamese people settle by themselves their own internal affairs. 

Should the U.S. iirrperialists refuse to abandon their aggressive ambition, they will 
in no way be able to avoid complete and most ignominious failure, whatever barbarous 
and perfidious maneuvers they may resort to. 



210 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 201 1 






r 



*i 






>.*, * 



SOUTH "VIET K A M 



21 July 196*6* 



NFLSV PBESIDIUH KAILS PRESIDE:;? HO'S APPEAL 

Liberation Radio (Clandestine) in Vietnamese to South Vietnam Q5?0 GOT 20 July 1966— S 

(South Vict nan National Liberation Front /UFLSY/ Central Cetsaiittee Presidium statement, 

20 July) ' 

. ... 

(Text) On 17 July President Ho called on the compatriots and combatants throughout the 

country to step up resolutely the resistance war against the U.S. imperialist aggressor?; 

to protect the north M to liberate the south, and to \ nee toward the reunification 

of the country. President Ho said: \For the sake of the fatherland' s independence 

and out of s sense of duty toward the peoples who are struggling against U,S; imperialism, 

all of our people and combatants are united and of one mind, are not afraid of sacrifices 

and hardships, and are determined to fight until complete victory. 

Also on 17 July, President Ho ordered partial mobilisation in'- the north in order to 
step up the resistance war. The T"FLSV warmly responds to the appeal of Preside: J 
Ho, the leader of al] the people, and regardsithis appeal as a reflection of our peopled 
stand, will, and aspirations* The 1IPLSV warmly acclaim? this new effort of the northern 
people, In contribution to the sacred ariti-U f S„ national salvation struggle of the 
entire people* This is a tremendous encouragement for the southern eoripatri:ts on the 
anti-U<S, frontline. The KFLSV is deeply grateful to our northern compatriots for the 
unreserved support of the beloved north for South Vietnam, 

The entire people and Liberation Armed rorses in South Vietnam are resolved to devote 
all of their material and moral strength to fulfilling their duty to the fatherland: 
Defend the north, liberate .the;. south, and reunify 'the country, --This is a sacred c : \. . 
duty and a high honor* The southern combat and people, who do not snare their 
blood, are resolved to fulfill that duty at any cost. 



The \Jt.S» imperialists are plunging more decplv into the criminal war of aggression in 
Vietnam, After being defeated in their special" war, they have sent U,S* and satellite 
troops "to occupy South Vietnam brazenly and have intensified and escalated the war of 
destruction against North Vietnam, They have even attacked the Hanoi and Haiphong areas* 
In South Vietnam, they have occupied many cities and territories of our fatherland, used 
all kinds of weapons to kill our people, and applied the scorched-earth "burn all, kill 
all, destroy all" policy. They have killed old as well as young people and men as well 
as women in both the cities and rural areas. Worse still, they have killed Innocent 
children. 

In North Vietnam, they have Indiscriminately bombed and strafed hospitals, schools, 
factories, dikes, and dams in order to sew mourning and destruction, and thereby force 
our people to submit. In the world, they have professed the will for peace negotiations 
to fool public opinion and conceal their extremely ruthless, brazen, warmongering, 
aggressive faces* But, our people are determined not to submit, nor are they letting 
themselves be fooled by the U.S, imperialists 



■Z 



211 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



+ - 



i 



21 July 19C6 



:.% 



* 



• 



.' 



SOUTH VlEftfAK 



The South Vietnamese people, who have long nurtured a deep hatred for the U.S. 
aggressors, are resolved not to tolerate then or live with then under the same sky. 
Rivers may run dry and mountains nay wear a way, but the oath of determination not 
to serve as slaves of the aggressors taken years ago still regains fresh In the 
minds of the South Vietnamese people. As months and years go by, it will become 
even none resounding. 



•r^'* 



The South Vietnamese people, together with the people throughout the country, ar 
determined to fight the Americans until complete victory, even though they have to 
fight for 5, 10, or 20 years, or longer. Like the people throughout the country, 
the South Vietnamese people ardently cherish peace. To our people, peace near 
that not a single U.S. aggressor or mercenary remains on Vietnamese soil to provoke 
war against our people. This Is the only way to restore peace. As long as the 
U.S. Imperialists cling to our country, the South Vietnamese will continue to fight 
them until independence and democracy are achieved and peace is accordingly 
established, 

Responding to President Ho's appeal, the people and the Liberation Armed Forces in 
South Vietnam are determined to strive to learn from the northern people, to emulate one 
another in scoring achievements in all fields, and to step up the national salvation 
resistance war. The southern amy and people are determined to march forward urgently 
to annihilate and whittle down many mere forces of the U.S. and puppet army, and 
In the immediate future to score the greatest victories in all activities during 
the current rainy season. 

The southern army and people are determined to overcome all difficulties and 
hardships to buildup their forces in all fields, enthusiastically 'step up the 
movement to join the liberation army, or c?£cr free labor, or join shock youth 
teams in order to contribute to the victory. The southern army and people are 
determined to maintain and expand the liberated areas, to cling to their land and 
houses, to strive for an increase in production, and to foil the pacification plan 
of the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys. 



The southern urban people are determined to strengthen and broaden unity, build up a 
strong force, step up the struggle against the.U.S. imperialists and their lackeys 
to achieve national and democratic rights and vital Interests, obliterate the 
oppressive machinery right in the heart of the cities, and be ready to take advantage 
of opportunities to score great achievements. 

■ 

Our army and people are victoriously fighting against the U.S. imperialists and 
their lackeys and will certainly win complete victory. The resistance war of our. 
armies and people is making big leaps forward. The situation at hone and abroad 
Is very favorable for us. Our army and people will certainly defeat the U.S. 
imperialists, as they once defeated the Japanese fascists and the French colonialists. 






Signed: Tr^ tfPLSV Central Committee Presidium, South Vietnam, 20 July i960 



212 



Declassified per Executive Order !3o26. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



. * - 



SOUTH V X E T U A K 



s s 



22 August I960 



( 



i 



KFLSV ATTACKS PEACE 'FARCE' OP ASA COUOTHIES ' ■ " - . - 

Hanoi VSA International Service in English 0553 g:?T 22 August 1966—B 

(Text) Hanoi, 22 August— Tito spokesman or the Commission for External Relations 
of the Smith Vietnam National Liberation. Fro.it (IfFLSV) issued a statement or. 
19 August strongly condemning the so-;uIled peace Initiative of the Association- of 
Southeast fcsia (ASA J countries regarding a solution to the Vietnam problem. The 
statement, released by the South Ylefcr&a Lli i| -I 'ATXOa PRESS AGEXCZj said: 

™ 

As is kno^n to everybody* each tine the U,S, imperialists take a new step in 
expanding their war of aggression in Indochina, particularly in South Vietnam, they 
stage a ns * ; peace farce in an. attempt to ctislead public opinion end Bitigate the wrath 
of the Vietnamese people: the people in the United States, and other peace-loving 
people of the worlds 

In a few nonthSj the stateaen^ went on, the chief war crir tlSj Johnson, BcKajaara, 
zn& their accomplices, have introduced into South Vietnam some 10,000 additional 
U.S t troops* They are preparing to increase the number of V.S* troops in this area 
to ^00,000, 500,000, or even more by the end cf this year. Besides, they have pu " ed 
their war escalation in forth Vietnam to a very dangerous decree by bombing several 
areas in ih*2 periphery of H-moi and Haiphong, 

The statement strongly denounced the willful U.S, servants in Thailand, t: 
Philippines, and Malaysia for contributing to the US. aggressive war in Vietnam 
While brutally repressing the movements for genuine independence and peace at home* 
It pointed out that the Thai ruling circles, uh> are noisily campaigning for a 
peace conference of Asian countries, are actually those who have been no£t zealously 
serving the aggressive U.S. plans in southeast Asia. They have not enly sent Thai 
navy an:! air force units to South Viet to take part in the U t S. war fcut also 

of fere;! all of Thailand to the U.S. imperialists, turning their country into a huge 
U.S. tase of agression against Vietnam and other countries in Indochina and 
southeast Asia, 



The statement continued* It is thus stark clear that the ASA peace Initiative is 
but another peace farce of the type already staged by the Johnson-Bean Jtask clique 
aimed at serving the U.S* schemes of war expansion and intensification agai-st the 
Vietnamese people and other peoples in Asia. Tna ASS. peace proposal cells for 
settlement of Asian problems by Asians-, but in fact it serves the classic "J.S t 
policy of using Asians to fight Aszans, That is \;hy several Asian countries have 
sternly c o:riemr.ed and rejected -ho proposal* 

m 

The statement stressed: The 3PLSV once again reaffirms its immovable st^;: that so 
long as the U.S. imperialists hive not recognized the South Vietnamese people's legal 
right to independence, democracy, peace, neutrality, and national reunification., so 
long as they have not evacuated all U,S and satellite troops and weapons from South 
Vietnam and disranvled all their military bases in this area, so long as they have 
not recognised the SfJISV as the enly genuine representative of the South Vietnamese 
people, and so long as they have not let the South Vietnamese people settle their 
internal affairs themselves, there will be no genuine peace in South Vietnam ar.d all 
conferences on the South Vietnar, issue will fee null and void- 



-- 



213- 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






fa 






r 



22 August I566 






•- south viEiiiA:-: 



After reiterating the South Vietnamese people's determination" to carry through 
to the end their resistance Against the U.S. aggression, Tor national salvation, 
the statement stress*;!: Any peace frauds of the U.S. aggressors and their 
satellites, including the so-called Asian peace conference proposed "by Thailand 
at U.S. instigation, will end in ignominious .failure. . 



• TRI-THIE^' PROVINCES URGED TO FIGHT HARDER 

Liberation Radio (Clandestine} in Vietnamese to South Vietnam OJOO GMT 
19 -August 1566--S 

. .- ■ 
(Commentary: "The troops and people of 'Tri-Thien' must strike more strongly, 

uninterruptedly, and spontaneous] .y" ) 



■ 

_ 



■ 
■ 



.T . 



*, 



*• V 



(Excerpts) Quang Tri and Thua Thien are the too northernmost provinces lying 
close to the southern side of the temporary border. The U.S. aggressors and 
their lackeys have attempted all ruthless :»nd .insidious plots to transform the 
Tri-Thien provinces into an absolutely safe area for the;:.. Aside from the police, 
civil guards, and Ranger forces, they have stationed the First Infantry Division 
of the puppet army in the Tri-Thien area in addition to one armored regiment, 
four U.S. Marine battalions, and recently, three to five airborne and carina 
battalions of the puppet .army's general vzztvvc Which have been regularly 
■deployed in the Tri-Thien theater if war. A network of posts dot the area from 
Route 1 and Route 9 to inter-provincial roads. Moreover, the U.S. aggressors 
have built special forces camps posfciaiid'ca directly by the Americans alor* the 
Vietnamese-Laotian border. 

* a * 

■» ■ " 

In conjunction with the military measures, the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys 
have resorted to bribery and flattery to buy off the people of Tri-Thien, 
particularly those who live close to the demarcation 3ine, However, the 
indomitable people of Quang Tri and Thua Thien, bearing in mind the thought of 
attacking the cr.orvj, have bravely moved ahead to wage political and armed 
struggles at the same tir.e and are winning greater and greater successes. With 
ardent patriotism,, the people and youth in Hue have risen to face the enemy 
with forms of struggle ranging from meetings and demonstrations to denounce 
the enemy's crimes to armed occupation of the Rue broadcasting station, the. 
ranseaking of the U.S. information office and the U.S. Consulate, and 
demonstrations to demand that the Americans 50 home and that the Thieu-K^ clique 
be overthrown. Proa towns and municipalities to rural areas, successive 
political struggles have erupted to jheck the bloody hands of the enemy.- ■ . 






-".The guerrilla warfare which has been vigorously developed in the mountainous 
Y. areas as well as in tie lowlands and coastal region has delivered stunning blows 

s head, flank, and back. The guerrillas have not enly surrounded, 



to the enemy' 

encroached or. the enemy's territory and forced him to withdraw from some 
posts such as the A Luoi outpost in western Thua Thien, and sniped at and 
killed dozens of Americans at Fhu Bai each month, but have also regularly 
-attacked the wicked self-defensemen in the support of our compatriots living 
- ".. in strategic haslet's. The guerrillas and regional troops have also launched 
.successive attacks against Route $ 2nd against military convoys on the Ea Sang- 
"Hue Highway, have destroyed bridges zn£ attacked reinforcements coming to repair 
the bridges or rone's, and have regularly shelled the enemy' 5 military sub-rector 



Zlh 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






t ■. 



UNCLASSIFIED 






y 



' t 



FAR EAST 

^.^Hy^HLllJ:^ 1 the ,Y C on HuntlG y-Briiikley Sho7; - In a 10- 

minute film interview made August 27 with KBC ! s Sander Van 

m 

ociir-" and Tran Haoi Nam, NLF representative in Algiers th 

i 

following points were developed: 



e 



• s. 



a. Peace . ~ According to Tran, real peace can only come 
to Viet-Kam when the U*S* and its allies withdraw all their 
troops and dismantle their bases. Until then the South 

- 

Vietnamese people resolve never to give iru 

b. A Ceasefire ~ The U*S. talks of peace and negotiations 
but each time it is preparing to send more reinforcements to 
escalate the war. At the same time U.S. rulers try to fool 

■ ■ 

world opinion by blaming "the Vietnamese people for not 
negotiating. The U*S # is attempting to change its .position 
of weakness on the battlefield to a position of strength at a 
conference table. This is a move to cover U*S t weaknesses 
and to hoodwink U.S. public opinion. 

c* Political Aims of the NLF - To overthrow the disguised 



-j-- ; -i— — .»- 



j--. _ i .- r 



colonial government; to form a coalition of all elements in 

* 

South Vietnamese life and hold general elections; to set up 
a progressive democracy; this unaligned government would 



.215 






.* 






- ' 



V 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 I 



• o 



*• 



UN CLASS I FIED 






m 

establish diplomatic relations with all governments In the 
spirit of the Bandung Conference , and would accept aid from 
all countries; it would desire to live in peace with its 
neighbors* 

4 

d* Unification of the two Viet-Nams « The Front stands 



■ »» - «"-- — — ^— "» i ■ ■ i * ■ h 



> * ■ ■ ii ■ i 1 -. 



for gradual unification by discussions and negotiations between 
the two zones. It would hold elections with this in mind, the 
same elections spoken of before ♦ Organized general elections 
are not possible as long as the U*S* does not withdraw its 

+ 

presence c The present election plan is a political bluff and 

■ 
■ 

will not be recognized by the Liberation Front* 



Prisoners ~ As long as the IKS* does not recoproize 



o 



w 



% the Liberation Front, it. is not possible to discuss the exchange 
or release of prisoners* 

f e Meetings with U*S* Officials - Leaders of the Front 



■ r >.-— e,. h i r T--.n i ■ < ■■» . m i ) mi i i i ■ * ! ■» .■♦■ I'M — ' — ., ■ — * ■ m f ■ ii _ , . , 



have never - met with U*S # officials. We consider any U*S* 

* 

* ■ 

proposal for meetings now as a cover up for the aggressive' plans 

■ 

m 

of President Johnson and* his. intentions to hoodwink U.S., and 
world opinion. ^ • 

■ 
# 

f>L. 1954 Geneva Accords *» The essential spirit of the 
1954 Geneva agreements recognizes the independence, sovereignty 



216 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
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UNCLASSIFIED 



and territorial unity of Viet -Nam, While the NLF did not 
participate in the Accords and is not hound by them, neverthe- 
less the NLF is in agreement with the basic principles of the 
Geneva Accords because they represent the just aspirations of 
the Vietnamese people. 

h. Postscript - Tran Haoi Nam added at this point in 
the interview his thanks to those members of the intelligentsia 
workers y students, and religious groups in the U.S. who 
manifest and have manifested solidarity with the struggle of 
the Vietnamese people. 



(UNCLASSIFIED) NBC News Huntley-Brinkley Report, 8/31 19*+5 



217 



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SOUTH V I E T N A M 
ik September 1966 

BORCHETT IIWERVIEWS KFLSV PRESIDIUM HEAD 

Liberation Radio (Clandestine) in Vietnamese to South Vietnam 1000 GMT 
13 September 1966--S 

(Text) On 25 August , Australian journalist Burchett met with lawyer Nguyen Huu 
Tho, chairman of the KFLSV Central Committee Presidium ^ in a place in the liberated 
area of South Vietnam. During this meeting Australian journalist Burchett inter- 
viewed Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho about the development of the war in South Vietnam 
and about the policies and 3i.ne of the KFLSV,, the only true leader of ik million 
South Vietnamese people in the struggle against U.S. aggression. Here are the 
questions and answers of this interview: 

Question: Since the day the Americans started their military buildup in South 
Vietnam and escalated their air war of destruction to Worth Vietnam > have the 
basic combat objectives of the KFLSV been changed? 

Answer: Our unchanged combat objectives are: to completely defeat the 
aggressive war of the U.S. imperialists; to overthrow the Saigon puppet authori- 
ties: to set up a wide and democratic national coalition government composed of 

•^ _ M 1, _ 1 __ ■*** 1 J — m j 1 I 1 rm 1 n ■-- I r 1 i i n 1 'h i i i i ■ ■■■!■ ■ ■ m\ ■■! ■ ■■ ■■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■!■!■» m i. ■ ■ 1 11 ■ 1 ■ ■ - 1 1 ■ 1 1 ' *t I I ■ II 11 ■ 1 

representatives of the people from all strata, all nationalities, all religions, 
all political parties , and patriotic personalities ; to restore the sacred national 
rights of the South Vietnamese people; to achieve independence and democracy; to 
improve the living conditions of the South Vietnamese people; and to achieve 
peace, neutrality ? and national unification. 

The intensification and widening of the aggressive war by the U.S. imperialists 
has demonstrated that our previous assessment of the U.S. imperialists 1 nature 
and plans is completely correct. Since nothing is more precious than independence 
and freedom, we feel it impossible to detach ourselves from these basic combat 
objectives, no matter how savage the U.S. imperialists 1 means of war are and no 
matter how cunning their political tricks are. All the people and armed forces 
in South Vietnam are determined to fight and fight strongly. Final victory will 
surely be ours. 

Question: Is it true that the introduction of U.S. and satellite troops into 
South Vietnam has shrunk the liberated areas and reduced their population? 

Answer: Nothing is farther from the truth. (?It is true that) in certain areas., 
at certain times-, the U.S. imperialists have occupied a small portion of the 
liberated areas. But, generally speaking, we have enlarged our areas and liberated 
an additional million people (?in very) important areas. I must add that although 
at present almost k million of our compatriots still live in disputed areas and 
areas under temporary control of the enemy, the great majority of these people- 
including officials, soldiers, and officers of the Saigon puppet authorities — are 
fed up with the Americans and their lackeys and feel sympathy for and support the 
front . 

Question: A number of people are of the opinion that neither the Americans nor the 
KFLSV will win militarily in South Vietnam. "What do you, Chairman,, think of this 

view? 

218 . 



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Ik September 1966 SOUTH VIETNAM 

Answer: These distorted opinions have usually been set forth by the Washington 
ruling circles so that they could present themselves in a favorable light by 
restricting the importance of our victories and making everyone doubt our chances 
of achieving complete victory. In fact, we have achieved victory after victory 
in the struggle against the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys. We have defeated 
the "special war" strategy and overwhelmed the puppet troops who have been organi- 
zed , equipped j trained, and commanded by the Americans. 

Rushing in to participate directly in combat since mid-1965 by massively intro- 
ducing their troops in South Vietnam — Including the seasoned units of which Mc- 
Namara has often boasted — the U.S. imperialists have been unable to change the 
situation. On the contrary , they have suffered ignominious defeats. The fact 
that the Pentagon is continuing to pour more troops into South Vietnam, raising 
the total strength to 300^000 men, and is making preparations to send more rein- 
forcement troops is eloquent proof that the South Vietnamese troops and people 
are winning, have the initiative on the battlefield, and are attacking continuously. 

It is necessary to recall that at one time McEFamara promised to withdraw U.S. 
troops from South Vietnam by the end of 1965. The ignominious failure of the 
I565-66 dry season counteroffensive of the Americans, although the latter had 
carefully worked out the plan and (several words indistinct) forces, proves that 
they have been powerless In carrying out their plot aimed at recapturing the initia- 
tive and changing the war situation. 

Participating in glorious combat with their bare hands, our people have quickly 
built a firm, strong political and military force and are achieving increasingly 
important victories. The Americans have the most powerful military and economic 
potentials in the Western world, but we have the invincible power of the people's 
war and the creativeness which is being developed to a high degree. 

We are of the opinion that in a war, military power is composed of many factors, 
the most decisive being the political and moral ones. Politically and morally 
we are absolutely stronger than the Americans. Our people across the country 
are carrying out the war without yielding before sacrifices and hardships, with 
the determination never to put down their weapons so long as our combat objectives 
have not been reached. 

We are also stronger than the Americans in other basic factors, such as strategy, 
rear areas, war leadership, and ground forces; these are the factors that decide 
the final victory of a war. Although they are strong materially and technically, 
the U.S. bandits have basic weaknesses in the political, military, strategic, 
and tactical fields. The factors of U.S. power are not limitless, partly due 
to their policy of dominating the world, to the fact that they are undertaking 
an aggressive war in our territory (several words indistinct), and partly due 
to the fact that they are powerless in (several words indistinct) any portion 
of our territory (several words Indistinct). On the contrary, their weaknesses 
are truly basic and unsurmountable. 



219 



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lh September 1966" 



?: 



sotr::? vi£?mt 



During the process of war develop 3 there basic weaknesses have become inc.:-? i singly 

obvious and prominent and will finally lead the Americans to an unavoidable d~f'.-t. 
The eve* i* great victories which we have achieved since the U.S. miliary buildup, 
and especially curing the 1953-66 dry season, prove thai thee:.*? *■ ieally as weli 
as .practically we are fully able to exterminate not* only the puppet troops, but 
also the most seasoned units of the U.S. expeditionary forge; we are fully abljj 
to maintain the initiative on the battlefield arid the tempo *f our attacks and 
"wcTare fully able to victoriously oppose the new U.S. reinforcements and militarily 
defeat the U.S. aggressors ur?dez- any situation. ~ 



Question: in your opinion, chair- ., is there now a possibility of cooperating 
with the other political organizations in South Vietnam? 



Answer: Our unchanged policy has always been to achieve a large d»cX-z &- national 
un i ty a i m :* d a t car i y i i \ g ou t the res 5 s tanc e a g a i ns t the U.S. aggre s s oj-s aa J f o r 
national salvation. Thank:- to this correct policy, we have succeeded in building 
a national united front based on a sound foundation and having a large i&effibership. 
Apart froa patriotic uoliticnl parties, religious and national groups : , and indi- 
viduals who have joined the front, we have succeeded in cooperating with ether 
patriotic political and religious organizations and individuals, On this basis, 
ve have scored great victories. » 

* • 

At pre lent, the U.S. troops are directly participating on a large scale in fcl 
aggressive war in South Vietnam, fcrai . [ ng underfoot our country, usin^" extremely 
cruel means of war to massacre our compatriots, and e-oscnitting extremely barbarous 

rimes. The traitors Nguyen Van ?hiou and Nguyen Cao Ky have fully obeyed America/; 

r**ers and have scld national sovereignty for U.S. dollars arc; weapons, nevertheless, 
apart rton\ a small group of reactionaries dependent on the Americans, all other 
Vietnamese are patriots who feel great indignation toward the U.S. aggressors 
and their henchmen. Therefore, we can say that there is a possibility of enlar- 
ging our cooperation with other organizations, forces, and individuals in South 
Vic tna m , re ga rdless of th e ir previous .activities. 

Question: By this, do you mean all the people who had participated in the If go 
Dinh Diem government and the governments that succeeded it? 

Answer: Yes. Regardless of their past activities, political tendencies and views, 
or their nationality or religion, (rev; words indistinct) aimed at the following 
objectives: opposition to the war of the Americans and their henchnen, restoration 
of na ti ona 1 s o v e r e i gn ty , a ch 5 ri t o f d e r.oc rat i c f r e ed cms , c c s s a t ion o f the 
U.S. interventionist and aggressive policy, achieve! I of peace and neutrality 
in South Vietnam, and improvement of the living conditions of the people. Bat 
the strength of the NFISV political and military forces will certainly be the 
decisive factor for victory. 



Question: Chairman, can you let us know the conditions for a political solution 
to the South Vie: i problc: • 






220 



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111 September JSȣ 



^ 



SOffl'iJ Vjiv 



,.<..,.,. For many months the Johnson administration ha, never stopped tr^pc. 
InHioUt the so-called "desire for peace* ■* «* i»«WiM«*l ^*f£n 
ta g abo k. the llkc vords> howe ver, are in full contradiction w t-w 

FT? c- Sn £. criming acts. At the very time when the President of U» 
S±,! sSS and his Secretary of State utter fine «df, the U. . O^rmsnt 

l»^4!eive war 5.. Sooth Vietnam and continue to escalate tat 
expands the M^*?*™ "- 1 Washington wants the VI y_Pl : ' ej^accept 

r^iSoS thfs ^ W^SS-STlI^^Sr I the dot: .M * 

^-^^^r^t^rSv' to restore the" sacred Ration al sovereignty and to 

f^U S C c ount ii C i'"^.h^Uo:°-ic are read, to fight to the end. aUhough 
liberate t.ie coun ^ v?m to . face 

o,,r ancMU.rs •» litarstefl tjrw the U.S. • re rM.ow< yofce. 

, , ^ t-i-n nMn?H^ fo- ?0 years, the Vietnamese people are eager 

on the basis of ind ependence and democracy . 

wT«S imperialists arc invaders in South Vletnap. The 0,S> imperialists have 
f Sfa So foot the basic national sovereignty of South Vietnam. Therefore 
tramyled ****** ™ „ f . ace - n SOufch vie£n am and, at the sane tine, for 

ot- .r f ' f v a^ressive war in South Vie tnam, withdraw U.S. 

^SiiaifflajH-^ffia OM?_j^ Ljss&a^ Y **** .- an, oi s- 

tey ri : 1fi an y.S, military bases in South Ytetg gfiu 



,.-«« Americans must respect thJJ^aUo^yj^ts^ ih^So^h^tp^ 
U<*h that 3s, i ndij ien^eTdeidcracy, peace, and neutrality. .©• lnvjru.1 
Pe 5t B of South Vietnam must be .solved by the South Vietnamese people yne,,- 
Sr a J wS ^eign intervention. Reunification of Vietnam must he 
^T**i t* hv the reoplc of both zones.^ 

^-;;;; ■V>.^v:oJce_L 1 ^y._PPX5tie i a ..scOutj^in.? -^Vie^u*. 

^estien: Chairman, can yon tell us the "g^™**™ SiSSS? 
have used Modern means of war such as B-52 bombers ana Lew 

,,, r „,i..-- r to barbarous means of war such as B-52 bombers, toxic 
Answer: *"**»« ££££! and to a scorched -earth policy of kill all and 
f S ;*?anf buSnvSlSS! the U.S. imperialists want to oppress orr people 
an f £r?c - £> sunnier .*" B ul those means of war can only <%™"£ 
^MoSriots' indignation at the aggressors and further strengthen ««* 
S5S tion to Ji*t bravely until final victory, in defiance of a 1 dif£ 
eu.i : ' es The use of a strategic air force (.for tactical purpose s) is - 1. 
report in the war and proves the confusion of the aggressors; i, «ill no, bri 
them the expected results, as you can sec. 



221 



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* > 



5 September 19' 7 



text of political frog ram adopted by KFLSV 

Hanoi VICA Interna tional Service in English 1710 Gin 1 S?o 67 B 



SOU'iil VIETNAM 



tcuth 



[Text] Har.ci--Following is the full te;:l of iha political program of the Scutl 
Vietnam National Front fer Lite ration adopted by an extraordinary congress of th 
Front convened by its Central Committee in mid-August 1967, The program was distri- 
buted to Vietnamese and foreign pressmen'at a news conference here today by Nguyen" 
Van Tien, head of the NFLSV permanent representation in North Vietnam 

Political Program of the South Vietnam national Front for Liberation 

In i960, the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation came imo being with its 
10-point progran aimed at uniting the entire- people against the ii.S* imperialist? 
and their lackeys. Since then, the Front has achieved a broad union of the various 
sections of the people, the political parties, organizations, nationalities religious 
coramuni ties, and p 3 1 r i 1 i c per s c na li t i e s wi th a vi e w to Jointly f i gh ting a g al ns t U.S. 
aggression, for national salvation, It has success fully consolidated its base among 
the broad masses of the people; at the same time, it has achieved joint action with 
many political and religious forces and won over many industrialists and traders, 
many officials and functionaries of the puppet a dm tration, and many officers and 

men of the puppet amy, 

■ 
The Front has constantly enjoyed wholehearted encouragement and assistance from our 
compatriots in the north and abroad. It has also enjoyed ever stronger approval 
and support fron the peoples of neighbor 5 Cambodia and Loas, from the peoples cf 
the socialist, nationalist, and other countries in the world, including progressive 
people in the United States, 

Under the leadership of the ISFLSV, our people in the south have gone fron victory 
victory. The prestige of the Frort has been unceasing!; enhanced at home and abroad. 
The South Vietnam National Frunt for Liberation has he come the sole genuine repre- 
sentative of the heroic South Vietnamese people. 

- 

These great achievements have proved that the line and policy of the front are 
correct, and that the strength of our people *s unity and struggle is invincible. 

At present, despite heavy defeats, the U.S 4 imperialists are still unwilling to give 
up their aggressive designs against Vietnam. They are stepping up the war, trampling 
upon the south, p.n* intensifying th« MmV.r.- ^ * , .*!n rn^t*? of ot i r coir.tr n 

monstrous crimes of the U.S. imperialists, houever, have only served to deepen our 
people : s hatred and increase their indomitable will. The people of South Vietnam, 
regardless of social standing, and even a number of persons in the puppet army and 
administration, have seen through the true features of the U.S. imperialists and their 
lackeys, hate then, and want to contribute to the struggle against U.S. aggression, 
for national salvation. 

Never before in our nation's history has the mettle of our entire people united for 
the fight to wipe out the enemy and save the country been so strong as now. Our 
people are in a victorious, initiative, and offensive position. The U-S. imperialist 
and the lackeys hav e been increasingly drive;, into passivity and embarrassment; 
they are in an impasse and are sustaining defeats. 



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5 Septcinl :• 291 



SOUTH VIETVr.K 



A: this K " ■ , ni spirit of develop!: the form m, the IIFkSV has • 

lipis : Leal pro, rai with a I w to furth r broadening the bloc of j. • ' 

: Lcn, encouraging ' ■ stimulating the en: : : | _; to rush forward* res 3 to fi 

id dei ; aggressors, and to build ah independent. tic, peaceful , 

n-_ is South Vietnam. 

I. Unite the Entire People* Fight the U.S. Aggressors * Save the Country. 

1 — During 4*000 years of their history, the* Vietnamese people have united and fought 
gainst foreign invasion to preserve their indepenuc and freedom . Ever since our 
cc was conquered by the French colonialists, our people have fought u ly 
f v their liberation. In 15^5, our people from north to south rose up, sueces: : ly 
carried out the August revolution, seized political power from the Japanese militarists 
and tfreir lackeys, and founded the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. 

When ;he ! ch colonialists came hack to invade our country a&a our en* 
people heroically Touch', for nearly nine years, brought our sacred resistance to the 
great victory of Di en Bien Phu, smashing the aggressive schemes of the French colonialists 
and the interventionist policy of the U.S. imperialists. 



Th> independence , savor- nty, unity, and territorial intc pity of Vietnam were 
formally recognized by the 195 ; J Geneva conference, Since then, our eompariots in 
South Vietnam together wit.* the people all over the country* should have been living 
in peace and building a free and happy life. However, the U.S. imperialists have 
sabotaged the Geneva agreements, ousted the French colonialists, set up in South 
Vietnam an extremely cruel puppet regime, and tried to turn the southern part of 
Vietnam into a neoeolony and a military base in an attt: to prolong the partition 
of our country, conquer the whole of Vietnam, and impose their domination throughout 
Indochina and Southeast Asia. 



The U.S, imperialists have shrunk from no cruel method to carry out their dark design. 
Defeated in their special war, they have switched to a local war, using over half a 
million U.S. and satellite troops, along with more than half a million puppet soldiers, 
for aggression against South Vietnam, At the same time, they have undertaken a war of 
destruction against the northern part of our count:; They have also stepped up their 
special war in Laos and carried out continual provocations aimed at wrecking the 
independence and neutrality of Cambodia* 

The U S. imperialists are daily causing untold sufferings and mourning to our cam- 
patriots thrc ; hout the country! They have resorted to all kinds of modern war means 
and weapons, inclu strategic aircraft, napalm bombs, toxic chemicals, and poison 
s to massacre cur follow countrymen. They have launched repeated operations, again 
and again sweeping many areas, carrying out the k;ll ai! , burn all, destroy all policy 
to raze villages and hamlets to the ground. They have herded the population, grabbed 
land, and set up a ncnan's land and fascist -type concentration camps dubbed strategic 
hamlets, prosperity zones, resettlement areas, and so on. In the north, have 
wantonly .bed and strafed streets, villages, industrial centers, and heavily populated 
areas. They have even struck at dikes, dams, schools, hospitals, churches, and pagodas* 

Obviously the U.S. imperialists are the most ruthless aggressors in hist , the 
saboteurs of the 1954 Gmova agreements, the saboteurs of the peace and security of 
the peoples in Indochina, Southeast Asia, and the world- -the enemy number one of our 
o p 1 e a nd of man); i no . 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



5 Scpl ■ - or 1 S 



VIETOAK 



Over the past few years, the U.S. imperialists h c -. escalated the uai* t 

yet they have unceasingly clamored about peace negotiations in an attempt to fool the 
American and world people. 

T.c) £ igon puppet administration has sold out South Vietnam to the U.S. Imperialists. 
It has oppressed znd exploited our southern compatriots in an extremely ruthless .. y. 
It has forced South Vietnam youth into the army to serve the United States in ssassactfing 
our fellow countrymen-. In a demagogic bid, it has also staged the farce of working 
out a constitution and holding elections. It is only a clique of traitors, an 
instrument for the U.S. imperialists to enslave the South Vietnamese people, prolong 
the partition of our country and further the U.S. war of aggression. 

2- -The U.S. aggressors and their lackeys think they can in lidate i *r people bi the 
use of force and deceive them by means of tricks, Bu" they are grossly mistaken, 
Our people definitely will never submit to force, never let themselves be deceived! 
Bringing into play our nation's tradition of undauntedness, our 31 million compatriots 
from the south to the north have resolutely stood up and united as one man to fight 
against the U.S. aggressors and save the country. 

On the frontline of tue fatherland, our southern fellow countrymen have over the past 
13 years shown marvelous heroism Irrespective of nge, sex, political tendencies, 
religious beliefs, and no matter whether * they live in the plains or in mountain areas, 
our people of all strata and all j Legalities nave resolutely fought shoulder to 
shoulder to liberate the south, defend the north, and proceed toward the reunification 
of the 2atherland« 

Since 1959-1960, our compatriots in the South Vietnamese countryside have carried 
out successive, simultaneous uprisings, destroyed a sor of concentration camps 

and prosperity somes of the U.S. imperialists and the puppet administration and 
• liberated vast rural areas. Our armed forces and people then rushed forward, destroyed 
thousands of strategic hamlets, liberated millions of people, and defeated the U.S. 
special war. 

Since 1965, although the U.S. aggressors have brought in hundreds of thousands of 
U.S. expeditionary troops for direct aggression against South Vietnam, our armed 
forces and people have repeatedly won big victories, smashed two successive t'.s* 
dry-season strategic counter offensives, defenzcd over 1 million enemy troops--U.S. , 
puppet, and satellite. 



The liberated areas have continuously expanded and now e up four-fifths of th 

South Vietnam territory with two- thirds of its population. In .these liberated are:., 
. a national and democratic power Is taking shape ar.d a new life is blossoming. In 
addition to big military victories, we have also recorded important successes xn the 
political, economic, cultural, and diplomatic fields, 

In the beloved northern part of the fatherland, our 17 million compatriots are heroically 
defeating the U.S. imperialist's war of destruction, maintaining and boosting production, 
and wholeheartedly encouraging and helping the cause of liberating the south, thus 
fulfilling the obligations of the great rear toward the great front. 

In the world, the peoples of the soci :±st, notionalist, and other countries, including 
the progressive people in the United States, are sternly condemning the U.S. 
imperialist's war of aggression, and are giving their approval, support, I assistance 
to our people's struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation. 



224 



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5 September I967 SOUTH VIETNAM 

Facts have clearly shown that the more the U.S. imperialists obdurately intensify 
and expand their war of aggression against our country, the more they sustain 
bitter defeats and are driven into isolation; on the other hand, our people win 
greater victories and get more friends. 

3 — The most dangerous enemies of our people at present are the U.S imperialist 
aggressors and their lackeys— the traitorous puppet administration. 

The tasks and objectives of the South Vietnamese people in the struggle for 
national salvation are now as follows: To unite the entire people, resolutely 
defeat the U.S. imperialist's war of aggression, overthrow their lackey puppet 
administration, establish a broad national union and democratic administration 
and build an independent, peaceful, neutral, and prosperous South Vietnam, and 
proceed toward the peaceful reunification of the fatherland. 

The force that guarantees the fulfillment of the above task of fighting 
against U.S. aggression and saving the country is our great national union. 
The MFLSV constantly stands for uniting all social strata and classes, all 
nationalities, all political parties, all organizations, all religious communities, 
all patriotic personalities, all individuals, and all patriotic and progressive 
forces, irrespective of political tendencies, in order to struggle together 
against, the U.S. imperialists and their lackej^s, wrest back our sacred national 
rights, and build up the country. 

The MFLSV is prepared to invite and welcome all patriotic forces and individuals 
who oppose the U.S. aggressors to join its ranks, and to shoulder together the 
common duties. It proposes that any force which, for one reason or another, 
does not adhere to its ranks, take joint action against the common enemy- -the U.S. 
aggressors and their lackeys. 

The KFLSV pledges itself to strive, shoulder to shoulder with the Vietnam father- 
land front, to fulfill gloriously the common task of fighting against U.S 
aggression to liberate the south, defend the north, and proceed toward the 
peaceful reunification of the fatherland. 

While fighting for their sacred national rights, the people of South Vietnam 
actively accomplish their internationalist duty. Their resistance war against 
U S 9 aggression is an integral part of the revolutionary struggle of the people 
all over the world. 

The EFLSV undertakes to stand within the united b3.oc of the Indochinese peoples 
to fight against the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, to defend to fight 
against the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, to defend the independence, 
sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. 

The JJFLSV pledges to take an active part in the common struggle of the world's 
people against the bellicose and aggressive imperialists headed by U.S. 
imperialism, for peace, national independence, democracy, and social progress. 

225 



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5 September 1967 ■ SOUTH VIETNAM 

h — The cruel U,S* aggressors are trampling upon otir homeland* We, the people of 
South Vietnam > mast stand up to make revolution and wage a people's war with a 
view to annihilating tfcera, driving them out of our borders, and wresting back 
national independence and sovereignty. 

Having experienced over 20 years of war, our southern compatriots eagerly want to 
live in peace and rebuild our war-devastated country. But the U S« imperialists 
have trampled underfoot this legitimate aspiration. That is why our people have 
to fight against them to win peace in independence. Nothing is more precious 
than independence and freedom. Only when real independence is secured can we 
have genuine peace I 



225a 



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::ib: 






-I' 



south . a:: 



The enemy of nation is ruthless and obdurate* : our entire people ar< 

rained to fight and to defeat the U.S. aggro: and their lackeys. So lortg 

as the U.S. Lalists do not end their war of a: ssion, u ; ull U.3. a 

satel] '■' troops from our country, and lot the South 7J i less people settle then- 
selves t i -rr.al affairs of South V: tci without foreign iat< .e:^io:i, our pec:" 

will rcsolu : -:;.' fight on until total victory, The South Yietnaaese peoi 'a 
liberation war ia a long and hard one, but it is sure to end in victory, 

■ 

Our people rely Da. inly on their own forces; at the sane time th strive to win the 
,*npathy. sup] rt, and assist-an of the world's peoples. 






s 



- 



To defeat the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys, our people do not spa: c 

sacrifice, They enthusiastically contribute mnnj r, aa -rial resources, and talent 

-q the national liberation war in the spirit of doing everything for victory, 

ie HFIiSV undertakes to develop the Liberation Armed Forces cornea Eg the nain 
fo units j the regional troops. and the militia and guerrilla units, with the a In 

of pronoti.no people's war, combining guerrilla war far- wip . out 

as nany live eaeny forces as p hie, crushing the enemy r s i/ill for aggression, and 

winning the final victory. 

The f:\mi s to build and develop the political forces of the masses ... 

promote movement of political s'truggl e armed struggle with political 

: le and ag: a aiaong enemy troops j thus To . :y three converging : >ngs to 
defeat the eaafiiy 

The MPLSV undertakes to encourage all strata of the population in v towns an ral 
areas still under cnc.sy control to unite and struggle in every possible : to break 

g Lp if e U S, aggressors and u^:.^ lackeySj des*. the Fhuong (co | .rati ) 

and s ;gic tablets, demand Icinocratic freedoms national sovere and a better 

life, oppose the pressg _. of troops a. id forcible leosr draft, struggle against 

ftslavin£j and • spraved culture and march foivard, together with th ire people, 

to overthrow -- enorr, r s rule ^.nd seize political power. 

■ 

At ;he sane bixtCj the Front undertakes to encourage all . ata of poop! • in the 
liberop ! areas to unite closely be build the people ! 5. relf-nanagenort.syst^ia, to 
achieve s .;' hy step a loea? national democratic administration, so build ireaSj 



rj 5 



■•: :■ to produce tid fight against U S, aggress . 'or national salv ■ e\ 



• . .icced with a good settlement of tii agrarian question q build * le -•■ ~ :: v - 

2,-5 Is.c : :>f the liberated areas,, to foster the people's f i is with a view 

,:,i,i: i M l : • s for '-lie front and carrying the resistance war 1 a to 

etc vict ):y. 

II, Build oi. Xndcj at, D> ratio. Peaceful, fifcutral, and Prosperous Sou . naci 

T..o people of South Vietnam a determined to defeat the U.S, aggress . one loIv 
lackeys . and to devote their might and nain to build a political system ante 

the indej . .~ ice and sovereignty of the nation and the freedosi and . 
per. 1' ; to hoal the wounds of war, to liquidate the social evils left over by the U,3« 

regirae, to restore moral life and build an independent, democratic, peaceful, 
{■■ tral, an J prosperous South Vietnam. 

To achieve so objectives, the MFLSV lays down the following concrete policies: 



226 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



5 Septe: V 19&J SOUTH VIET',;:" 

1 — To achieve a broad and progressive democratic regimes 

To abolish the disguised colonial regime established by the U.S. imperialists 'r. South 
Vxetnant, to overthrow the puppet administration, hireling of the United States, 
not in recognize the puppet national assembly :ed up by the U.S. imperialists and 
their lae'.ieys, to aboJ ish the constitution and, all ant j : Lonal and anti-rdexapcratie 
laws enacted by the U.S. imperialists and the puppet administration. 

Tc hold free general elections, to elect the national assembly in - really democratic 
way in accordance tilth the principle of universal, equal* direct suffrage and secret 
ballot This national assembly will be the state body with the highest i ty * 
in South Vietnam. It will work out a democratic constitution which • bodies 
the most f undane I and most eager aspirations of all social strata in South yi&tn 
and guarantee the establishment of a broad, progressive, democratic state s tr ue frurg , 
To guarantee thcTTnnunity of the depu to the national assembly. 

To set up a national union democratic government including t represent 
persons among the various social strata, nationalities, religious communities, 
patriotic and democratic parties, patriotic personalities, and forces which have 
contributed to the cause of national liberation, 

To proclaim and enforce broad democratic freedoms- -freedom of speech, freedom of the 
press and publication, freedom of as ibly, trade union freedom, freedom of association, 
freedom to form political parties, freedom of creed, freedom to demonstrate. 

To guarantee to oil citizens inviolability of the human person, freedom of residence 
and lodging, secrecy of correspondence, freedom of movement, freedom to work and rest, 
and the right to study, 

To enforce equality between nan end woman and equality among the various nationalities. 

To set free all persons detained by the U S S, imperialists and the puppet administration 
on account of their patriotic activities. 

To dissolve the concentration camps set up in oil forms by the U,S* imperialists 
and their lac':eys. 

All these people who have had to see:: asylum abroad because of the U*S. and puppet 
regime, have the right to return to the country to serve the fatherland- 

■ 

To severely punish the diehard cruel agents of the U.S. imperialists. 



c 



2--Tc build an independent and self-supporting economy, to improve the oeople T 
living conditions. To abolish the policy of economic enslavement and monopoly of the 
U„S* imperialists. To confiscate the property of the l.S. imperialisms and their 
diehard cruel agents and turn it into state property. To build an independent and 
self-supporting economy. To rapidly heal the wounds of war, to restore and develop 
the economy so as to make the people rich and the country powerful, To protect the 
right to ownership of the means of production and other property of the citizens under 
the laws of the state. 

To restore and develop agricultural production. To improve farming, animal husbandry, 
fish v^^ring, and forestry. 



227 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



L September 19 1 



S UTJ VICTNAH 



•The state will encourage the peasants to unl&e and help orn another n boosting 
product : ■ ■. grant them loans at low interest for the parol I buffaloes, oxer,, 

farming implements, agricultural machines, seeds, fertilizers, etc, Help theni develop 
irrigation works, and apply advanced techniques in agriculture. To guarantee outlets 
for agricultural products. 



ri%, 



To restore and develop industry, snail industries and handicrafts, to guarantee to 
workers and empl< ees the right to take part in the tent of enterprises. 



ne 



The state will encourage the capitalists in industry and trade to help develop industry 
small industries and handicrafts. To enforce reedom of enterprise to the benefit of 
nation-building and the people's welfare; to apply a customs policy designed to .? 
encourage and protec ; home— production. To restore and develop communications and trans 
port To encourage and step up economic exchanges between t and country, bet-.ee:-) 
the plains and the mountain areas. To give due consideration to the interests of the 
small traders and petty shopkeepers. To set up a state bank. To build an independc: 
currency* To apply a fair and rational tax policy The state will adopt a policy of 



rp. 



granting loans at low interest to encourage production, and will prohibit usury, 
develop economic relations with be north; the two zones will help each other so thai 
Vietnam's economy may prosper rapidly. 

In accordance with the front's policy of neutrality and on the principle of equality, 
mutual benefit and respect for the Independence and sovereignty of the Vietnamese 
nation, trade with all countries will be ex ie-d, and economic and technical assistsn 
fron foreign countries will be accepted, regardless of political and social i e&s 



3— To 



onr: - 



en=*ct the land policy, to carry out the slogan "Land to the Tiller. '• 
cate th; lands of the US. imperialists and the ; : d cruel landlords — I ■;_ lad 
allot those lands to landless o: land-poor peasants To confirm and protect the 
Ownership of the lands allotted to peasants by the revolution.. 

The state will ner, ate the purchase of* land from landlords who possess land upward 
of a certain amount , : varying with the situation ir each locality. It will allot these 
lands to landless or lar.d-pocr peasants. The recipients will receive the lands 
free of charge and will not be bound by any condition whatsoever. In areas where 
the required conditions for land reform do nc: yet obtain, land-rent reduction will 
be carried out. 

To entrust the lands be! ; ing to absentee landlords to peasants for cultivst 3 
enjoyment of the produce. Adequate steps will be taken on this subject at a iat£j 
stage in consideration of the political attitude of each landlord. To allow landl.: 
to offer land to the Liberation Peasants Association; the state will allot these Isnc. 

to landless or land-poor peasants. To encourage fcH* -- -^ f *id»*?tf r 'te*t ^rons or 

fruit-tree plantations to keep their farms going. To respect the legitimate right to 
ownership of land b; the churches t lagodas, and noly sees of religious sects. To carry 
out a fair and rational redistribution of communal lands, o guarantee the legitimate 
right to ownership of reclaimed lands to those who reclaim them. 

Those compatriots who have been forced into strategic hamlets, or concentration canps 
In any other form, will be free to return to their former villages. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



1 $! • • i \bvr • ■ 



SOUTH Viil 



T? : . have b- •■ : compelled to evacuate or to ch abodes atnd who wish f 

living ' i re. Mil' , recognition . i eir ewnershi] ai the 1 

prey * '*'-' re-su] i from their labor, ana will be helped tc ci 

Living in the saine place? the. ,;no wisi to rr~>jr:~i to their native places .■ 
also re :eiv p 

■ 
4— To Id a national democratic culture and education.) to develop £ ..ce »2o£ 

bo promote public ~o fight .against the American -type e and j. 

culture and education now adversely affecting our people* 3 fine, lcn£; ■ • 
traditions;. To build a national democratic culture and education, to develop science 
and technology in of national construction and defense. To educate the r : 

in the Viet] ■ e nation's tradition of struggle against forej its 

pole history To preserve and develop the fine culture ana good oust ais and ha o. Its 
of our nation. 



To raise tnc ple»s cultural standards; to liquidate illiteracy, to pr e 

complementary education, no open new genera] education schools, t.iri^fr learning 
establishments , and voc na2 schools. 7c an all-out effort to train and fost 

a eontJ of scientific workers, technicians, and skilled workers. : e 

V ■ amese language as'Jtte teaching medium Ln h Ler learning establishments T*- 
reduce school fees for pupils and students, To exempt poor pupils and student from 
school fees, or grant them scholarships. ^o reform the system of examinations. 

Til- s;ate will give every possible ht-lp to those youth and children who have render- 
services to the fight against U\ S, aggression and for national salvation, to t 
children born into the fan: lies who have rendered serv s to the revolution, and to 
ot: t outstanding youths so as to enable then to studj and develop their capabilities. 



Kvcrj citizen is free to carry out scientific and te alogical research, to indulgt 
in literary and artistic creation, and to participate in otner cultural activities. 
To encourage the intellectuals writers, artists, ana scientists and, to afford them the 
required conditions for research work, creation, and invention in the service of the 
fatherland and the people. To afford opportunities to those cultural work , writers 
and artists who have been persecuted by the US, imperialists and their lack 
for their patriotic activities. To develop health service and the movement for hyglei 
d prophylaxis. To attend to the people's health. To control epidemics. ic a&ay 

irith dangerous diseases left over by the U.S. and puppet regime. To develop r-he 
movement for physical training and sports. To develop cultural relations v;; ; the 

h; the two zones will help each otner to raise the people's educational level and 
uho (development) or qualified people, ^o prontote cultural relations with foreig 
:-Ies on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. 

j) To guarantee the rights and cater to the livelihood of wooers, laborers, and civil 

rvants* To promulgate labor legislation. To put into practice the eight -hour 
working day. To provide for a regime of rest and recreation. To set up a rational 
system of wages and bonuses for increased productivity. To improve tne living and 
working conditions of th( workers, laborers, and civil servants. To apply a policy 
of adequate remuneration for apprentices. To provide jobs to the workers and th^ 
poor people in the towns. To make every effort to do away vMth unemployment. t 
put Into practice a policy on social security to care for and assist workers, labors 
and civil servants in case of disease, incapacitation, old age, or retirement. To 
Improve living conditions in working people's residential quarters. 



rs 



t ■ 



229 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






sci n . i . 



T»c se ■ kes between employers and h n between 

tiro sidj3 an Li&tioji :•;. the national aertocratic administrate n 

; K - ' : of workers and laborers, to strictly : hi-bit fines ; Croc 

v; md unjttstifi i sacking of workers. 

--To build up strong ttli Vietnam J Lis &r<3 ■ i itrme.d F •■■■ is with a view to liberat .;; 
the people mti h -tm<iUx fatherl I ' 5Si oouth 7,et>nas Liberation A^ned Pj: 

ccr . Lai c tile main force units > the : : r. , a: th« militia and guerrillas-- 

are the children 01 s ' people, and are bound tssly loyal to the interests of t1 

Eierland and the people, and are du abound so fight shoulder to shoulder with the 
gjiti ■ &o 1 fcj*e south, defend che fatherland, an Lv ^ontri- 

on to tl ■ : >?ense of peace in k\ tnd in the world . To pa:; duo attention ! 

:j tdini " be I*ib ration fcrmed Forces, To strive to rai3: their quai2 ; asc 

41 <<r fight ' capacity with a vie;; to copies war, do; she U.S. 

satellite, and pupoet troops-- j and bringing; the fight against U\ S i -on, rcr 

national salvation co total victor. To s n the political work with a view ; 

enhancing .; pal ' ls-m and determination to fight and to win of tne U \ »ra1 . :. Aran 
Forces , enhancing the sense of discipline, and continuously tightening the "fish a: 
water 11 relations between the army and the population. 



7- -To sh ow z r a 1 - '- ' ld ° ** ° ^ ho M J ' * y r s * fc ° c a T< G : " f ° r f -^ ^ s s ' i:> - oa a ™yifto n ■ to rewa r J. , t i 

hte rs a nd c o mpa t ri ot s i rti ! \ - vt a n qutstaa id j nr roc c rd in t h e f i en t aga i nsfc . S . 
agression and for national salvatic The entire people are fateful to, and .-on- 
j r in mind the moxtory of the maj ho belonj : to the Liberation A 

pees or ;o - i,ous services and revolutionary Qrcanisations, and those who laid 
down their lives in political stru£jjloi Their fa;; lies are catered for and ssisted 
by the state and the people. Aril ijapatriots disabled in the course of tr. 

armed and political struc^le are tar 1 for and feelpe To reward i - wbr jnanher 

all fighters and compatriots who have an outstanding record in the struggle 
U 3 a£G^ es ^i° n crrL ^ or national salvation The entire people are grateful to and 
help the families who have rendered services to the re julioru 

* 
-To organise social relief. To five relief to the compatriots --victims c: tie mi 
of across ion unleashed by the U.S. imperial ;jts and the p ; regime To attenc to 

orphans f old folks, and invalid people. To organ se relief for the areas affected b; 
natural calamities or bad crops. Consideration is also riven to disabled puppet arry- 
men and to the i'aisilies of puppet arrr.ymen killed in action, who are poor and forloris 
To help those veev'le driven cc desperation by the U.S. imperialists and their laefc 
to rebuild their lives and serve the fatherland and <;he people. 

j--Tc put into practice equality b- en r i and w i an, to protect mothers 1 emldi' n 
r 2o pa: -■.' - ion to raisir^ the political, cultural, and vocational r- tard-i : 

.. r; in a :. :\or fitting with their v. is in tto stru£;jle ' s/z U. S r. ;ressioi ; i 

for national salvation, To develop fno Vietnamese women's traditions of her , ui - 

aauntedness, loyalty, and aptitude to shoulder every responsibility V/ ;qi 

clan politically, e c ono mic ally , c ul t ura lly /and socially. V/om, n who do s am 

receive the same salary ^nd allowances, and enjoy all other rights as men. Wo:: :. 
Workers and ■ s rvants enjoy two months maternity leave with full pay before ..: 
arte r chi i db 1 rth . 



230 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



5 September J 67 



SOU'l'lI VJETJ3 " 



* 



-\ put :. ;-■ Lee a \ Licy of a ly helping perf< ■. w 1 

7.- r; > jn U ; , regressive r - and fain actions. To pre 1 ;h1 r 

gjid children. 7u develop a r t* ; or maternity homes, c: , anJ ir. 



lali -ts and 



To do aw 11 social evils brought about by :he J. 

lackeys, which are harmful to women 1 s health and dignity, 

1C--T& strengthen unity, to practice equality and tsutual assistance at ... nati 

a'pplish - systems and policies applied by the imperialists and tin :■ lac3 1 fch 

a view to divit ../, oppressing, ond exploiting the various . ies . 

ciisc tati< : - forcible assimilation of the nationality Tc • 

Ion i-s-taiiding tra&i on of unity and mutual assistance amen ;arious fraternal 



: i&litie 



\ ¥ . 



nationalities witli view to defending and building the country 
a r e e q , 1 l ] in ri gh t s 3 n & ob 1 i cat i or. 

To implement the agrarian policy with : minority peasants To encourage ar 
them settle down in 1 ::q<1 residences , to improve their lands, to deVeloj 
J culture, to raise thear living standards so as to keep abreast of the general 
level, The nations,! minorities have the right to use th own spokei and wr ! a 
languages to a eve lop own culture and art and to jaaintain or to change their 
customs and habits. 

To strive to train minority cadres so as to quickly brine about conditions for good 
management of the local affairs by the concerned minority itself, In the areas in- 
habited by big communities of a specific minority and where the required cone 
exist, autonomous zones will be established within in lent and free Vietna: 

11 --To respect freedom of creed, to achieve unity and equality among the different 
religious communities. To firfit against all maneuvers and trices of the imperialists 
and their lackeys who use a number of persons under the cloak of religion to oppose our 
peoplc ! s struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation, to sew issen- 
sion between believers and nonbelievers and among diff 1 nt religious commui 
to harm the country, the people, and the religion. To inspect freedom of creed and 

are 



worship, To preserve pagodas, churches, holy sees, temple All religions 
and none is to be discriminated against, to achieve unity among; believers of various 
:■ ligions and between believers and the entire nation for the sa) of the s: le 
against* U.S. aggression and their lackeys to defend and build the country. 

\2 — Welcome puppet officers and men and puppet officials back to th just cause, sac\-: 
leniency, and give a humane treatment to rallied armymen and prisoners -of -war. To 
oppose the U.S.. imp-: lists and the puppet administration 1 s attempts to pressgan 
mercenaries to serve the U.S. a£gressors against the fatherland and massacre the pec; 
To severely punish the diehard thugs acting as efficient agents of the U.S. impe: .lists. 



7 



fford conditions for puppet officers and puppet officials to cone back to the j; 



cause and Join the people's figh against U.S. aggression to save and build the 
country . 



231 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NMD 633 16, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



• a 



Sen -7 



SOUTu VIETIIliM 



Riots individuals, groups, or units of the puppet amy and administration whc render 
services to the cause of fighting against l\S aggression for - Ltional salvation 111 
be reuzvCed and entrusted with responsible jobs, Those who sympathize with ana support 
the etr le against U.S. aggression for national salvation or those who refus- > 
carry put orders of the United States and puppets to harm the people will have t c 
ne r 1 1 s : • e c o r d e d . 

individuals, groups, or vnits who have broken away fro: fche . uppet amy and 
voluntarily apply to join the Liberation Armed Forces for fighting against the bed 

States to save the country are welcomed and enjoy equal fcre tent* Regarding those 
individuals or units who have broken away from the puppet army and administration :. : 
riser, against the LLS, aggressors to save the country, the front st redely to Jc 

actions . itii them in the fight against the IKS. aggressors on a basis of equality, 

ual respect, and assistance so as together to protect the pecple andliberate the 
fa the -id. 

Those functionaries of the puppet administration who iroluntear to serve the country 
and the people in the state machine after the liberation or South .ill 

enjoy equal treatment. Those in the puppet amy and the puppet adt Ihlstration at 
any level who have committed crimes against the people but are how sincerely repentant 
Hill be pardoned, There who redeem their crimes by meritorious deeds ..ill be rewarded 
accord! ' y Captured officers and men of the puppet array Jill enjoy humanitarian 
treatment and clemency. 

Those in the U.S. Army and its satellite armies who cross over to the people's side 
w ill be given hind treatment end helped t - return to their f Lies when conciil ss 
permit. Captured U.S. and satellite troops will be treated as captured puppc troops. 

Xj To protect the rights and interests of overseas V aese. 

To welcome the patriotism of overseas Vietnamese and highly value all their contribu- 
tions to the resistance to U.S.. aggress for national salvation of the people. To 
protect the rights and interests of overseas Vietnamese, To help these overseas 
Vietnamese who wish to return to take pare in the building of the country, 



14 --To protect, the legitimate rights and interests of foreign residents in South Vietnam 
To -welcome those foreign residents who have contributed to the Vie riese pec: r s 
resistance to U*S« aggression for national salvation All foreign residents lli r'-r in 
South Vietnam must respect the independence and sovereignty of Vietnam and obey 
law of the national democratic administration To protect the legitimate rights a. 
interests of all foreign residents who do not cooperate with the U.S. imperialists 
and their henchmen in opposing the Vietnamese people and who do not harm the 
independence and sovereignty of Vietnam, To give adequate consideration to the 
rights and interests of those foreign residents who have directly or indirectly 
supported the Vietnamese people's resistance to U.S. aggression for national salvation. 



232 



* 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



* < 



i - .:;; er IS 



v; :■;■; 



?: re&o] ''"; f oppo: • ' tsh all do cies ; the 1. S : t m< their- 

hi •.-:. ained at s**s lsc< ' betweei i W« e C nese resi'iy:*" 

Ln Victnsyn aru exploiting, repressing, and fore tese res ten" :' 

Vietn ness clsizenshl; To punisl ird ag nts and seere agents t>j the 

imperialists and a South Vie- tw ippet £ it til b ration. 

II,! to Restore Iior::.:0 Relations 3etweei vf-Iortli an th Vietnam Proceed Ten 

Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland 

Vietnam is one. Ths Vietn&j pe< . ••.■• one. Ho force can i & &ur fat! i rlar 

Reunification of the country is the sac rod aspiration of c - c entire le, Vic 

■ be reunifie : 

The policy of the: BFLSV consists of the following: 

1--The retn fieation of Vietnam will be realized step :y step and through peaceful 
means on the principle of negotiation between the two zone: without eifche ie 

using pressure against the other and without foreign interference 

2— Fending the . Ificatior. of the country, the people in \ -ones will nakc joint 

efforts to oppoc reign invasion and 'oCend the fatherland at the sane ti: 

endeavor to e^psiftc! ec ;ic and cull 1 exchanges* The pe,< in both zones arc 

free to e:.c!in:^e letters, to go fron one rone to another, an to choose tl * pla 
cf residence 



IV. To App\y a Foreign Policy of Peace and neutrality 



rrv 



The IFPXiSV applies a foreign policy of peace and neutrality, a foreign policy L;hiel 
guarantees the independence, sovereignty, unity, and t- LtoriaJ integrity cf the 
country a a helps safeguard world peace. In ctore concrete terots this policy c 
of the following points; 

l--To establish djplonatic relations with all countries regardless of their social 
and political : tern on the principle of mutual respect for each other's indeps: ace, 
sovereignty, and territorial integrity » without infringement upon each other, without 
interference into each other's internal affairs, territory, equality, mutual benefits, 
and peaceful cc istence To abolish all unequal treaties which the puppet 

ijnistration has signed with the United States or any Other country To re;, pec the 
cononic and cultural Interests of those countries which sympathise with, support or 
assist the str ■■ ! e against U.S. aggression for national salvation of the Vi -;c3o 
fie. To accept technical and economic assistance from any covntr; withcu* 

ions attached. To join no military alliance, to accept no military personnel 
or nil: ary bases of foreign countries on South Viethaa territo 

2--To strengthen friendly relations with all countries which pathise fc'ith, support, 

or assist the struggle against U.S. aggression for national salvation of the 
Vietnamese people To strengthen relations of good neighborhood with Can 1 - a and 
Lacs. To unceasingly consolidate solidarity and mutual assistance between the 
rjcooles of the Indochinese countries with a view to defending their respective 
independence! sovcrei, , and territorial integrity against the aggressive and ; r- 

: revocation policy of the U.S. imperialists and their henchr.ien. 



233 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NMD Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i 






i ■ p I e ; . . i I r 



SO'.': ViE ; 



-- Active . support the] nation a] i iteration mo«Ffcoen1 of the peoples in .'.sia. ":;:>?&, 
and latin America against imperialism and old ar lialisci Active 

Support th* stru >f the American people agairst t- e t'.3. imperisli war of 

aggression m iTietnas Actively sapport trie sr,ru£s2e for peace, democracy, and 
sog iail pr ogre ss in aJ c on n t r ie s ih th e w arid* 

- 

f r *~ :uivc.'jy struggle? to contribute to the safeguarding of world peace, oppose 
bellicose and aggressive iroperiaxisl u by U.S. imperial 1-s Demand the 

dissolution of the fiscres&lyfc military blocs and forei _;.\ military bases o: 

ceasii ;' ; consolidate arid develop relations with international democratic 
organisations and the peoples of alJ count] ss mcM 5 U •., the ;ari people Actively 

itribute to the consolidation and devel >p nt of the worig pe ple : s front lupi 
of Vietnas alalia I 'j 3. imperialist aggre&s ■„ for natici se and 

peace 



truggle against n ; aggression, for ... i nai saival oi aur people is e 

t&elj ■ 5 b**i -ici'LOur, cause It concerns not only vhe dest of our people a 

present and all a future jfenera tons au* also the Interests of the peoples in t: 
world who are strug Lxng for peace t nations] independence, democracy t and social 
progress In order to accomplish tnat glorl- cause, our people, already united j 
n at unite still more closely and broadly 






The tJJvLSv teralj welcomes all pblil parties, r.a^3 organizatidhSj and patridti 

and progressive personalities who broadly rail} within and outside the front in order- 
to defeat together the U.S. aggressors and their : 

te struggle against S, agaves- ,, for rmfcionaa salvation ot our people is - Jusi 
cause Oar peopJe throughout country &£*e of one rcind to fight a defeat the If. 5, 

aggressors and their henchmen, s rapathy, support j and assistance of the people 

c socialist countries, tin Asian, African arid Latin American countries, and peace- 
loving, Justice- loving people alj wgr'the world, inc. ting the progre&i re pe pie in 

te United Stater, are oe coming deeper ami stronger daj &y clay V'e are billing z< 
will surely win complete victory, 

II o matter how frenzied, brutal, obdurate, and perfidious the U S. imperialists raaj 
be, they will inevitably meet with bitter failure In their criminal schemes^ 

In the supreme interests of the fatherland, Jet our entire people in South Viet iai 
Stren^.thc t..elr solidarity, millions as one, and rush roruzrd shoulder to s! 
In the impetus of bur victories to completely defeat the t] a pressors anrj theii 

stooge administration, and together with 'our northern compatriots to fulfil] the 
great and glorious cause of liberating the souths defend ij the north, %n& pv ■• Ji -.; 
toward the peaceful reunification of the fatherland 



The WfltSV pledges to be always worthy of the confidence of our compatriots and our 
Trie: lis the five continents Vie Vietnamese people wi!3 surely be victor 

Z. aggressors and their henchmen trill certainly be de eo, The "FLSV program 

for liberation is "sure to materialise ( Fighters and compatriots throughout Soutl 
Vietnam, under the glorious banner of the IfFLhV, M?.rch forward heroically! 






234 



— — - 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



o 



o 



) 



> 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






h. ADDENDA 
(UMCLASSIFIED) 



INDEX 



Subject 



Page 



Hanoi Attitude on Bombing, 10 September I967 . . 236 

Chronology of Viet Peace Efforts December 1966-February 3.967 237 

The Ashmore letter to Ho Chi Minli - 1967. 238 

Publication of Ashmore Peace Feeler Attempts: 

* 

New York Times . . . 239 

Washington Post . 2**1 

Comparison of Ashmore-LBJ Letters (by New York Times ) 2kk 

State Department Denial of Ashmore Charges ( "NY Times Account) 2^5 

Text of State Department Comment on Ashmore Episode. 246 

State Department Press Conference Held by William P. Bundy on 



235 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






Sunday, 5«»tf. 20, 1961 • THE WASHINGTON POST 

• . » I"lJ 



' 



Hanoi Stifle s "'. 




n n ° 








amide i 



Doiab Step-111. 

Ji J- , 

- 

By Murrey Mardcr 
* Was&tnttoa To.^ staff Writer 

North Vietnam is growing; ~ Schocnbrun, who was In 

North Vietnam for nine clays, 




*> 



more unyielding about peace 
talks, rather than more flexi- 
ble, as American bombings in- 
tensify, according to diplomat- 
ic reports reaching Washing- 
ton. 

This rising mood of militan- 
cy in Hanoi was one reason 
why Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk on Friday deliberately 
downgraded prospects for ne- 
gotiations. 

All accounts coming out of 
Hanoi, through public and pri- 
vate channels, »how that the 



related his experiences in 
Bangkok on Thursday. They 
were broadcast last night 
tABC Television's "Scope/' to 
be reb road cast here at 1 p.m. 
today on Channel 7;. 

Pham Van Dong was dos* 
cribed as "planning for an 
Ai. jrican invasion and ex- 
pecting the aerial devastation 
of Hanoi. 

* 

Prepare d lo Fight On 

"He believes," said Schoen- 
brun t "that in a hist act of des- 
peration we ate going to wipe 
out Hanoi. . . , He is prepared 
to fight on in the mountains 



officially disseminated view of for as long as it can possibly 
the- war from there is pre-' take." 



ciscly Jhc reverse of the offi- 
cial version in Washington. 

North Vietnam contends, 
and what is more, perhaps be- 
lieves, that time and strategy 
are on its side for outlasting 
the United States. 

Premier Is Quoted 

In an interview in Hanoi 
last week with North Viet- 
namese . Premier Pham Van 
Dong by American newsman 
David Schoenbmn, the Pre- 
mier was quoted as saying: 

"As for peace talks . . , the* 
initiative Is up to the United 
States. You have to stop bomb 
ing us unconditionally. Jf you 
want peace talks, they can fof 
low, but . . . there wMl be no 
reciprocity. There will be H*J 
bargaining. There will bo no 
blackmail, and wc will not pay 
ransom to pirates." 

As for the subject of talks, 
according to other reports re- 
layed to Washington, Hanoi 
maintains there is essentially 
only one real topic: Withdraw- 
al of United States forces 
from Vietnam. 



The Premier was reported 
reluctant even to talk' about 
the possibility of peace discus- 
sions. ''He is, I think" said 
Schocnbrun, "totally a hawk.* 1 

Despite the heavy American 
bombing of North Vietnam 
Schoenburn, like other visi- 
tors, said he could detect "no 
evidence of fatigue" among 
the people but only resiliency 
—strengthened, not weakened, 

by the escalating air war. 

Pham Van Dong was quoted 
as saying: 

"We have one overriding 
problem only, and that is how 
to exist and how lo survive, 
and our whole country is 
geared to this. 

"You Americans have other 
problems, You have racial 
problems. You have world 
commitments. Vietnam is only 
one of your problems. Maybe 
you have got a million— maybe 
you have got 2 million— Amer- 
icans who are. devoting them- 
selves seriously, full time to 
the Vietnamese war. We have 
16 million. So wc outnumber 
I you 8 to L" 



kike a Time Bomb* 

In focusing on the racial 
rioting in American cities as a 
major plus in North Vietnam's 
favor, Dong in an Aug. 31 
speech said: "This struggle is 
like a time bomb at the heart 
of the U.S. capitalist society/ 
* Dong *3S reported by 
Schoonbrun to have scoffed at 
the Sept. 3 presidential elec- 
tion in South Vietnam m the 
same vein as have North Viet* 
nam's public statements scorn- 
ing it as "low comedy/ 1 But 
American analysts believe the 
election seriously discomfited 
Hanoi. They note that the pro- 
pram of the National Libera- 
tion Front, the political arm of 
the Vkteong guerrillas In 
South Vietnam, has been re- 
vised lo pledge a "really demo- 
cratic" election. 

At the Texas' White House 
yesterday, press - secretary 
Georse Christian said the 
President "is aware" of re- 
ports that South Vietnam has 
advised Great Britain that it 
means to approach North Viet- 
nam soon with an offer of db 
rcct peace talks that would in* 
elude the NLF-Vietcong. .• 

Secretary Husk on Friday 
Said the United States "would 
welcome some basis on which 
there could be a general re- 
there could be a general rec- 
onciliation among the people 
ble basis." But"*he said "that 
doesn't mean that the NLF 
has a status as a government 
. . . or that it should be given 
a veto on the possibility of 
pulling North Vietnam and 
South Vietnam apart milita- 
rily." 

A leading House Kept* 
can, Jtfelvin R. Laird (R-Wis.), 
said in Chicago on Thursday 
night that: "It's increasingly 
evident that the Administra- 
tion is pressing Saigon to I 
gotiate directly with the Viet- 
cong." Laird said "they (the 
NLF) have the power in South 
Vietnam at the present time 
and must take part in negotia- 
tions." 

236 ' 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



r: 



■ 



t 



Hhrono&osrv 



?--. 




By Chalmers M. Roberts 

T7asb!nstoa Post Staff Writer 

The record indicates that 
the Ashmore-Baggs peace ef- 
fort ran afoul of a change 
in American policy which oc- 
curred at the moment they 
were involved in Vietnam di- 
plomacy. 

This is the record, as far 
as it is now known, of the 
pertinent events: 

D33C- 4, 19G$— Poland re- 
ported to the United States 
that North Vietnam was pre- 
pared to send a man to War- 
saw to meet an American 
representative and to do so 
without demanding as a pre- 
condition an end to the 
American bombing of the 
North. . ■ 

American officials subse- 
quently contended that in- 
dependent checks showed 
this to be a Polish view, 
not that of North Vietnam. 

Dec. 13-14— A merican 
planes raid near Hanoi, Po- 
land later privately blamed 
the raids for ending chances 
"or a meeting. Aficr the 
aids Hanoi began to stress 
the demand that bombing 
must cease unconditionally 
before there could be talks. 

Dec. 26-Jan. 6, 19C1— Har- 
rison Salisbury of the New 
York Times created a furor 
with dispatches from Hanoi 
picturing civilian destruc- 
tion from the American 
raids. Officials here said 
Hanoi had let Salisbury in 
as part of a campaign to 
force an end to the bomb- 
ing. Ashmore and Baggs ar- 
rived in Hanoi the day 
Salisbury left. 

Jan. 12 — Ashmore and 
Baggs met Ho Chi Minn who 
stressed an end to the bomb- 
ing Ashmore now writes 
that "we had not brought 
back" from this interview 
"any hard proposal" from 
Ho "beyond the reiteration 
of his unqualified commit- 








M it 




s 



(P £ 



■^Jj 




n 



Utai, 



ment to enter into negotia- 
tions' 1 if the U.S. halted the 
bombing. 

Ashmore reported to State 
Department officials that he 
and Baggs fejt that "Ho 
seemed prepared to consider 
a specific proposal based on 
a formula of mutual de- 
escalation* 3 of the fighting. 

Early January to early 
February — The United 
States secretly sent four 
memoranda to Hanoi de- 
scribing, officials say, possi- 
ble methods of deescalation. 
These messages, yet to be 
made public' were handed 
by an American embassy of- 
ficial in Moscow to a North 
Vietnamese representative. 

Jan. 27 — Hanoi's man in 
Moscow gave a reply to the 
American official. Later the 
State Departmnt described 
the reply as "a diatribe 
against the United States" 

Jan. 28— North Vietnamese 
Foreign Minister Nguyen 
Duy Trinh in an interview" 
with Australian Communist 
journalist Wilfred Burchctt 
said that "it is only after 
the unconditional cessation 
of U.S. bombing and all 
other acts of war against the 
DRV (North Vietnam) that ■ 
there could be talks between 
the DRV and the U.S." 

Feb, 2 — President- Johnson 
prepared a. letter to Ho in 
which he took up the Bur- 
chett interview points. Mr./ 
Johnson said he would "or- ■ 
der a cessation of bombing" 
and also halt "further aug- 
mentation of U.S. forces in 
South t Vietnam as soon as I 
am assured that infiltration 
into South Vietnam by land 
and sea has stopped." These 
"acts of restraint," he said, 
"would make possible se- 
rious private discussions." 
This letter, however, was not 
turned over to Hanoi's man 
in Moscow until Feb. 8 and 
the delay has never been ex- 
plained^ 



WtettttfSwLW' V«Jeff-W» 



ul 



Feb* 4 — A shmore and 
Baggs met at the Stateo Be* 
partment with Undersecre- 
tary Nicholas deB. Katzen- 
bach and other top officials 
but not including Secretary 
Dean Rusk, 

A letter from Ashmore to 
Ho was drafted with Assist- 
ant Secretary William P. 
Bundy, whose area includes 
Vietnam, as the chief de- 
partmental draftsman. 

The key sentence in the 
letter stated that "senior 
officials" at State "expressed 
opinion that some reciprocal 
restraint" was necessary 
along with a halt to the 
bombing and an end to the 
influx of American troops 
if talks were to take place. 

Feb. 5— The draft letter 
was delivered to Ashmore at 
Fu lbright's house, Ashmore 
mailed it that afternoon. The 
letter did not specify the 
"reciprocal restraint" al- 
though the President's letter 
of three days earlier had 
specified an end to North 
Vietnamese infiltration into 
the South. 

In addition, on the day 
(Feb.« 2) the Administration 
said the Presidential letter 
was drafted, Mr. Johnson 
told a press conference that 
"just almost any step" would 
be a suitable response from 
Hanoi. He also had said that 
"we would be glad to ex- 
plore any reciprocal action." 
Sometime between Feb. 2 
and 9 the official American 
terms were hardened. 

Feb. S — Soviet Premier, 
Alexei Kosygin, who. was in 
London Feb. 613, said at a 
press conference that the 
Trinh interview with Bur- 
chctt " boils down" to say- 
ing that if the U.S. uncon- 
ditionally stopped the bomb- 
ing, "then it would be pos- 
sible" to open talks, Kosygin 
thus publicly changed 
Trihh's crucial word "could" 
into "would." He was never 

contradicted by Hanoi on. 
this. Furthermore, Kosygin 
passed the word to Wash- 
ington, which had inquired 
as to when talks would be- 
gin, that they could start in 
three or four weeks, 

Feb. 9 — Secretary Husk, 
at a press conference which 
had been announced by the 
White House, said that "for 

' some time now there has 
been evident a systematic 

^campaign by the Commu- 



nist side to bring about an 
unconditional and perman- 
ent cessation of the bombing 
of North Vietnam without 
any corresponding military 
action on their side, in ex- 
change for the possibility 
of talks — talks which are 
thus far formless and with- 
out content." 

Rusk also distinguished 
between a "pause in the 
bombing (here he seemed to 
indicate he would agree to a 
pause in exchange for talks) 
and a "permanent cessa- 
tion." For the latter to take 
place, he said, "we must 
know the military conse- 
quences." The U.S., he said, 
cannot stop the bombing 
without reciprocity for that 
would be "closing off one- 
half of the war while the 
rest of it goes on full force," 

In short. Busk was surfac- 
ing the central point of the 
President's letter to Ho, the 
contents of which were not 
made public until Hanoi 
broadcast it March 21. 

Feb. 10 — Ho said he re- 
ceived the Johnson letter on 
this day. Ashmore assumes 
it arrived before his own 
letter with the less specific 
request on the point of 
reciprocity. 

During this period, Feb.- 
8-14, there was a pause in 
the bombing over the Tet 
holiday in Vietnam, includ- 
ing a Presidentially ordered 
short extension. ^ 

Feb. 13— Ho in a letter to 
Pope Paul VI assailed the 
U.S. He coupled an uncon-. 
ditional end to the bombing 
with the withdrawal of 
American forces and the 
recognition of the National 
Liberation Front, the politi- 
cal arm of the Vietcong. In 
Washington this was taken 
as a reply to the President. 
Resumption of the bombing 
was ordered. 

Feb. 15— Ho replied to the 
President in words similar 
to the Pope. "A little later," 
writes Ashmore, he and 
Baggs received a reply to 
the Ashmore letter saying 
there did not seem to be 
any point to their making a 
second visit to Hanoi. 



^7 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



(n»\^J\s 1<1 w foreran tW,. IS ^<t : Y. Kit V 



^ 



* 



' Acii: 







re 



_• 



I Letter to ■ 
Hanoi Chief 



FoHou big is the text of the 
letter by Harry S. Ashmore £o 
President Ho Chi Mink: 

Dear Mr. President: 

Mr. William Baggs and I 

•have made a full report to 

appropriate officials of the 

United States Government on 

■,our recent conversation with 

you in Hanoi. Ambassador 
Luis Quintanllla has commu- 
nicated his views to the U.S. 
Ambassador in Mexico City. 

The State Department has 
• expressed itself as most 
grateful for your thoughtful 
approach to the possibility of 
an ultimate settlement of the 
hostilities between the United 
States and the Democratic Re- 
public of Vietnam. 

In our several discussions 
with senior officials of the 
\ State Department they took 
occasion to reiterate points 
.we believe are already known 
to you. They emphasized that 
the U.S. remains prepared for 
.secret discussions at any time, 
without conditions, and that 
such discussions might cover 
the whole range of topics n 
vant to a peaceful settlement. 
They reiterated that the Ge- 
neva Accords might be the 
framework for a peaceful so- 
lution. 

They expressed particular- 
interest in your suggestion to 
us that private talks could be- 
gin provided the U.S. stopped 
bombing your country, and 
ceased introducing additional 
U.S. troops into Vietnam, They 
expressed the opinion that 
some reciprocal restraint to 
Indicate that neither side in- 
tended to use the occasion of 
the talks for military advan- 
tage would provide tangible 
evidence of the good faith of 
all parties in the prospects for 
a negotiated settlement. 






In the light of these con- 
cerns, they expressed great 
interest in any clarification of 
this point that you might wish 
to provide through a commu- 
nication to us. 

Speaking now wholly for 
ourselves, we believe the es- 
sentia! condition for produc- 
tive talks is an arrangement 
under which neither side 
stands to gain military advan- 
tage during the period of nego- 
tiation. To achieve this end 
it mny be that preliminary 
secret discussions would be 
helpful to determine the out- 
- line of a possible peaceful 

settlement. 
'As we see it, these are prac- 
tical considerations that have 
nothing to do with questions 
of "face." There is no doubt 
in our minds that the Ameri- 
can Government genuinely 
seeks peace. As private citi- 
zens, our sole concern is in 
facilitating a discussion that 
will bring all matters at issue 
to official consideration. It is 
in this sense that we convey 
these comments, and invite 
any reply you may wish to 
make, which' of course we 
would report to our Govern- 
ment in complete discretion. 

May I take this occasion to 
renew our thanks for the 
courteous and considerate 
treatment we received in 
Hanoi throughout our visit 
and for the honor of our most 
useful conversation with you. 

If you feel that further per- 
sonal conversation with IUr. 
Baggs and me is in order we 
would, of course, return to 
Hanoi at your convenience. 

HAKRY S. ASHMORE I 






238 



Declassified per Executive Order J 3526, Section 3 3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20J I 








i 



'Ashmore, Editor Who Met 

With Ho Chi Minb, Says 

Efforts Were Undercut 



TWO LETTERS AT ISSUE 






One From the White House 
i Said to Have Conflicted 
With Intermediary's 



By HEDRICK SMI7 

5?«tel lo The Sfc* York H 

■ WASHINGTON, Sept. 17— The! 
editor and writer, Harry S. Ash- 
more, reported-today that he re- 
layed a peace bid to Ho Chi 
Minh on behalf of the State De- 
. partment last February. But Mr. 
Ashmore charged that President 
Johnson then "effectively and 
-utafly canceled" the secret 
.ittfativc by sending an uncom- 
promising letter to the North 
Vietnamese President 

Mr, Ashmore said his letter 
had been written in response to 
a "conciliatory" conversation he 
had had with Ho Chi Minh in 
Hanoi last January* He added 
that Mr. Johnson's letter, set- 
ting forth "most stringent" 
American terms for peace, 
reached Hanoi before the mes- 
sage that Mr. Ashmore had been 
authorized to send. 

'Duplicity* Charged 

Ho Chi Minh, in a letter to 
,Mr. Johnson dated Feb. 15 — 
which became public last 
March 21 — rejected Mr. John- 

• son's demands. ■ As a conse- 
quence, Mr. Ashmore has indi- 
cated, the secret State Depart- 
ment message routinely re- 

* ceived a . negative response 
from Hanoi. 

" Mr. Ashmore, former execu- 
Itive editor of The Arkansas 
Gazette, is now executive vice 
esident of the Center for the 
.^itudy of Democratic Institu- 
tions at Santa Barbara, Calif. 

■'•He said President Johnson's let- 
ter had contradicted the terms, 

*~of the message approved by[ 






1 



the State Department. Mr.' Ash- 
more also accused the Presi- 
dent of "crude duplicity" 2nd 
I the Administration of ^'double 
dealing." 

. William P. Bundy, Assistant 
Secretary of, State for East 
Asian Affiars, said the State De- 
apartment "had discussions with 
.Mr. Ashmore and Mr. Baggs, 
as we would with any Ameri- 
can who has talked with lead- 
ers in Hanoi." 

But he refused to comment 
on Mr. Ashmore's reported 
peace approach or his charge 
that the President's interven- 
tion had upset the effort 

Intensive Efforts Recalled 

"Any comment must await a 
careful study _ of Mr, Ashmore's 
-story " Mr. Bundy said. "I can- 
not comment on something like 
this uver the phone." 
Y Other officials, without con- 
firming the report, recalled that 
♦last winter was a time of com- 
plicated contacts with Hanoi. 
The State Department has pre- 
viously disclosed that the 
United States Embassy in Mos- 
cow made five contacts with 
. North Vietnamese diplomats in 
[January, culminating with the 
;. delivery of President Johnson's 
-letter. 

Early in February, the United 
States was also communicating 
with Hanoi through Prime 
Minister Wilson of Britain and 
Premier Aleksei N, Kosygin of 
the Soviet Union, who were 
meeting in London. 

Mr. Ashmore told of the 
peace approach in a 15,000- 
. word article, "The Public Pveia- 
tions of Peace," printed in Cen- 
ter Magazine, a new bimonthly 
publication of his organization. 
The peace approach, he re- 
; ported, was an outgrowth of a 
.trip he took to Hanoi last Jan- 
I uary with William 0. Baggs, 
* editor of The Miami News. They 
-'arrived in Hanoi Jan, 6, had a 
- private two-hour conversation 
.with Ho Chi Minh Jan. 12, left 
Hanoi on Jan, 14 and reported 
to the State Department on 
■ Jan. 18. 
. In a telephone interview to- 
day, Mr. Ashmore said he had 
.refrained from disclosing the 
; episode until now because "we 
-thought that as long as we 



' 



■ 



might bo a useful channel we 
didn't want to jeopardize it." 

But he said the latest expan- 
sion of the war indicated tl 
"whatever kind of channel we 
bad is no use now" and that 
there was no longer any point 
in keeping secret the unsuc- 
i cessful maneuvering of last 
' winter. 

Mr. Ashmore said that dur- 
ing the contacts with North 

■ Vietnamese leaders he and Air. 

• Baggs four.d Ho Chi Minh and 
J other senior officers "deliver- 
l ately conciliatory" 

Ho seemeel prepared to con- 
sider a specific proposal based 
on a formula of mutual de-es- 
calation/ 1 Mr. Ashmore added. 
"Ho had understood that we 

■ would report our conversation 
■to the State Department and 
' expected some response, since 

* he had made arrangements to 
have any, further message sent 

■ directly to him." 

• t In the telephone Interview, 
Mr. Ashmore recalled that Ho 
■Chi Minh had insisted on a halt 
in American bombing of Norih 
.Vietnam as a requisite for 
peace talks. Ho Chi Minh also 
indicated that Hanoi would like 
to sec a halt in the steady 
build-up of American forces in 
South Vietnam before talks be- 
gan, Mr. Ashmore went on. 

In his article, Mr, Ashmore 
says he ihan drafted, in col- 
laboration with Mr. Bundy, a 
carefully worded letter of a 
page and a half. It was sent 
to Hanoi Feb. 5 through a pre- 
viously established channel in 
Cambodia. 

Mr. Ashmore says the letter 
appeared to reduce American 
conditions for a halt in bomb-' 
ing, asking for some move of 
"reciprocal restraint" by Hanoi. 

In public statements, admin- 
istration officials were dsmand- 
: ing a "reciprocal reduction" of 
the fighting by Hanoi. 

Key passages of the Ashmore 
. letter, as reported in the article, 

■ were as follows: 

Key sections of the letter, as 
reported in the article, referred 
to the efforts of Mr, Ashmore 

. and Mr, Baggs as follows: 

"In our several discussions 
with senior officials of the 
State Department they empha- 
sized that the U.S. remains 
prepared for secret discussions 
at any time, without 'condi tiers, 
and that such discussions mi 
cover the whole range of topics 
relevant to a peaceful settle- 
ment, They reiterated that the 
Geneva, accords might be the 
framework for a peaceful 
solution. 

- "They expressed particular 
interest in your f :tion to 
us that private tall >utd be- 
gin provided that U.S. stopped 
bombing your country, m and 

•_ ceased introducing additional 
U.S. troops into Vietnam. They 



239 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 i 



expressed the opinion that some 
reciprocal restraint to indicate 
that neither side intended to 
use the occasion of the talks 
[for military advantage would 
I provide tangible evidence of I 
good faith of all parties in the 
prospects for a negotiated 
settlement." * 

President Johnson's letter to 
Ho Chi Minh, dated Feb. 2, was 
relayed through the United 
States Embassy in Moscow to 
North Vietnamese diploma 
President Chi Minh said he re- 
ceived President Johnson's let- 
ter on Feb, 10. 

Mr. Ashmore charged that 
tlie Presidential message con- 
tradicted the Ashmore-Baggs 
message In several important 
respects and thus nullified it. 
He noted that the Presidential 
letter did , not mention the 
Geneva accords as a basis for 
negotiation, as the other mes- 
sage had. 

He also, noted that the Presi- 
dent had offered to stop the 
bombing and the American 
troop build-up in South Viet- 
nam, but to do so only after 
receiving assurances that North 
Vietnamese infiltration into 
South Vietnam had ceased. 

Mr. Ashmore referred to this 
passage from the Johnson 
letter: 

"I am prepared to order a 
cessation of bombing against 
your country and the stopping 
of further augmentation of U.S. 
forces in South Vietnam as 
soon as I am assured that in- 
filtration into South Vietnam 
by land and by sea has stopped. 
These acts of. restraint on both 
sides would, I believe, make it 
possible for us to conduct seri- 
ous arid private discussions 
leading toward an early peace. 
Mr. Ashmore maintained that 
j-the Presidential letter #was 
timed to put a "time squeeze" 
on Hanoi, an aspect that had 
carefully been avoided in the 
drafting of the Ashmore-Baggs 
message. He referred to this 
excerpt: 



"I make this proposal to you 
now with a specific sense of 
urgency arising from the im- 
minent new, year holidays in 
Vietnam, If you are able to 
accept this proposal I see no 
reason why it could not take 
effect at the end of the new 
year, or Tet, holidays. The pro- 
posal I have made would be 
greatly strengthened if your 
military authorities and those 



of the Government of South 
Vietnam could promptly negoti- 
ate an extension of the Tet 
truce.' 1 

Mr. Ashmore's article com- 
ments: "William Budy and the' 
others who labored over our 
draft letter had insisted that it 
would be a mistake to tie any 
proposal to the Tet bombing 
pause, sir.co this would be in- 
terpreted by Ho as an effort to 



force his hand without adequate 

opportunity to consult with his 

own people and the National? 

Liberation Front," or Vietcortg. ! 
The bombing pause, part of 
Tet, began 7 A.M. Feb, S. It 
Feb. 12, but President Johnson 
extended it about 40 hours to 
avoid embarrassing Premier 
Kosygin, who had bQQii in Lon- 
don over the Tet period trying 
to arrange peace talks. 



w 



> 



2h0 



*■ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526* Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



■« — — ■ — i—. ■ ■■ ■■I.. ■ ■ ■*»■ « ■.. i -. . — - - 



i v 



jw\ i— * * K^y^- i 



\~l \& r 



« ■ 



' 



Ashmore Says 
Feeler lo Hanoi 
Was Nullified 

m 

By Murrey Marder 

Washington Fast StafC Writer 

A prominent former 
newspaper editor charged 
yesterday thai the Johnson 
Administration joined In 
and then "effectively and 
brutally cancelled' 1 a previ- 
ously undisclosed peace 
overture to Hanoi last Feb- 
ruary. 

The disclosure plus accusa- 
tions of "double dealing 1 * and 
an "almost total absence of 
candor" on the part of Presi- 
dent Johnson and the State 
Department were made by 
' Harry S. Ash more, executive 
vice president of the Center 
for the Study of Democratic 
Institutions at Santa Barbara, 
Calif. - 

Ashmore visited Hanoi in 
January. He portrayed the 
President, and by implication, 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 
^as nullifying a secret "con- 
ciliatory" letter to Hanoi that 
her State Department offi- 
cials joined Ashmore in draft* 
ing, by sending a presidential 
letter setting tougher terms 
for peace talks. 

The conditions for halting 
the American bombing of 
North Vietnam to produce ne- 
gotiations are still at the cen- 
ter of current national and 
international debate. 

White House Press Secre- 
tary George Christian said 
last night that he was unfa- 
miliar with Ashmore's account 
or the letter he cited. Secre- 
tary Rusk said he had not 
talked with Ashmore or his 
associates and thus felt it in- 
appropriate to get into the 
matter now, a spokesman said. 
Other officials had no imme- 
diate comment 

Ashmore, formerly the Pul- 
itzer Prize-winning editor of 
the Arkansas Gazette of Little 
j Rock, Ark., met . with .North 

Vietnamese President Ho Chi 
Minh in Hanoi last Jan. 12. 
With Ashmore were William 
*C. Baggs, editor of the Miami 
(Fla.) News and also a dlrec- 
r of the Santa Barbara Den- 
ver, and Luis QuiniamUa, for- 
mer Mexican Ambassador to 
the United States. 



Their meetings with North 
Vietnamese leaders were des- 
cribed at the time only as an 
effort to solicit North Viet- 
nam's attendance at an unoffi- 
cial peace convocation spon- 
sored by the California-based 
Center at Geneva, last May. 

Ashmore, in a lengthy arti- 
cle written for his organiza- 
tion's Center Magazine, said 
the trip was undertaken with 
secret recognition by the Ad- 
ministration that it also might 
"open up a useful channel of [ 
communication with the North 
Vietnamese." 

Newsman Departs 4 

At the State 3 ; tment, he 
said, "we were asked to keep 
the trip secret as long as possi- 
ble . . ." They entered Hanoi 
on Jan. G, the day that Harri- 
son Salisbury of The New 
York /Times was departing on 

the International Control 
Commission plane that carried 
them to North Vietnam from 
Cambodia, and the news of the 
Ashmore * Baggs - Quinanilla 
visit became known. 

They saw President Ho for 
about two hours on Jan. 12. 

By the time Ashmore and 
Baggs returned to Los Angeles 
on Jam 15, Ashmore wrote, the, 
Salisbury articles about civil- j 
ian casualties caused by bomb- 
ing North Vietnam had "creat-' 
ed a national furore," with a 
"concerted effort" in Washing- 
ton "to discredit Mr. Salisbury 
. . ™ Ashmore said "our re- 
ports were a complete vindica- 
tion of Mr, Salisbury," but he 
and Baggs avoided any com- 
ment about their, attempts to 
open private communications 
with Hanoi. 

"At the State Department's 
request," said Ashmore, he 
and Baggs "managed to hide 
out for three days after our re- 
turn, and to meet secretly in 
Washington with the Depart- 
ment's top echelon." 

Departmental Briefings 

"The briefings (at State) 
went on intermittently .for a 
day and a half," said Ashmore, 
and covered the conversation 
with Ho in great detail. 

"We had not brought back, 
any hard proposal from Ho ; 
Chi Minh," Ashmore contin- 
ued, "beyond the reiteration of 
his unqualified commitment to 
enter into negotiations if the 
United States halted the 
bombing of NQrth Vietnam. 
This could not on its face be 
said to meet the stated Ameri- 
can requirement of a recipro- 



cal gesture of reduced military 
action by Hanoi. 

"But Mr. Baggs and I/' Ash- 
more said, "could offer our 
judgment that the tone of the 
conversation had been deliber- 
ately conciliatory and that Ho 
seemed prepared to consider a 
specific proposal based on a 
formula of mutual de-escala- 
tion. , 

"Moreover, no real risK was 
entailed m finding out 
whether this was so. Ho had 
understood that we would re- 
port our conversation to the 
State Department and had 
made arrangements to have 
any response sent directly to 
him." 
'Schizoid Quality' 

Ashmore and Baggs then 
left Washington. Ashmore said 
"our dealings with the Depart- 
ment had begun to take on a 
pronounced schizoid quality/ 

Baggs, he said, had done 
some confidential diplomatic, 
errands for the late President 
Kennedy in the Caribbean, 
and "was on fairly intimate 
terms with a good many" top 
State Department officials. 

Ashmore described himself 
as "encumbered by identifica- 
tion with the eclipsed Adlai 
Stevenson wing of the Demo- 
cratic Party and by a long per- 
sonal association with the 
Johnson Administration's lead- 
in* bete noire, (Sen.) J. \\ li- 
tem Fulbright" Added Ash- 
more, "Finally, we represented 
the Center, an unconventional, 
and therefore automatically 
■ suspect, institution." 

Ashmore wrote that we 
soon began to feel that we 
were confronted by two dis- 
tinct State Departments." 

"One, which obviously 
regarded us with profound dis- 
trust, apparently was headed 
by Secretary Rusk," said Ash- 
more, "who never saw us or 
otherwise acknowledged our 

presence. 

"The other (State) Depart- 
ment," said Ashmore, "which 
appeared to be seriously inter- 
ested in negotiations with 
Hanoi, included Under 
Secretary Nicholas deB. Kat- 
zenbachf Averell Harriman, 
the elder statesman who 
speaks with the authority of a 
personal representative of the 
President, and Assistant Sec- 
retary William Bundy. who is 
immediately in charge of 
[Southeast Asian Affairs." 



.21+1 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



i 



Invitations Rejected I The composition of a page- 

J fand-a-half letter, to bo sent 

At the State Department's over Ashmore's signature, 
request, said Ashmore, he and! "consumed most of a Saturday 
Baggs rejected invitations to afternoon" he said. "It was 
*p**ify before either Senate or .allowed to simmer overnight, 
se committees, and to stay! was reconsidered without our 
~««. of the news as much as j presence at an upper-echelon 
possible during "the next few meeting on Sunday after- 
weeks, while our report pre-: noon," said Ashmore, and ""the 
sumably bounced back and final version was delivered in 
forth between the two (State) a plain manila envelope to the 
Departments." J residence of Sen, Fulbright, 

Finally, he said, Sen. Ful 



i 



1 



brig h t expressed surprise- 
when he asked Baggs if they 
had reported their conversa- 
tion with Ho to President 
Johnson personally, and was 
told no. Fulbright raised that 
with the President at a White 
House function, said Ashmore, 
"and thereby pinked the nerve 

that activates the President's 
consensus reflex." 

Ashmore related that the 
President said he thought it 
unwise to see Ashmore and 
Baggs personally" and start 
speculation, but wanted Ful- 
bright "to be absolutely satis- 
fied that we were being taken 



where Mr. Baggs and I had 

gone for luncheon." 

"I mailed it myself that 
afternoon, Feb. 5," said Ash- 
more, "under the perhaps pro- 
'pbetie postmark of the John 
Foster Dulles International 
Airport, By prior arrange- 
ment, the letter was to be 
mailed to Cambodia by regu- 
lar mail and forwarded from 
there to Hanoi." 

Ashmore said: 

"The key passages in our 
letter (to Ho) read: 

" In our several discussions 
with senior officials of the 
Slate Department . . . they 
emphasized that the U.S. re- 



seriously and treated proper- mains prepared for secret dis- 
ly" The President, Ashmore cussions at any time, without 
said, suggested that the Sena-, 
tor sit in at the next session. 



at the State Department, , 

"The President's interven- 
" Ashmore continued, pro-, 
u ,ed a meeting with the "De-; 
partmcnl's upper hierarchy, 
(minus Secretary Rusk)," and: 
Fulbright, "plus a silent While 
House observer as witness," 

Ashmore said last night that, 
they met in Under Secretary; 
Katzenbaeh's- office on the 
morning and afternoon of 



conditions, and that such dis- 
cussions might cover the whole 
range of topics relevant to a 
peaceful settlement. They re- 
iterated that the Geneva Ac- 
cords (of 1954 and 1962 on 
Southeast Asia) might be the* 
framework for a peaceful solu- 
tion, i 

" 'They expressed particular 
interest, in your suggestion to 
us that private talks could 
begin provided the U.S. stop- 
; ped bombing your country, 



Feb. 4. The principals there A an( j ceased introducing addi-' 
he said, also included William ^ional U.S. troops into Viet" 



Bundy and Harrmian. | 

"When Sen. Fulbright had 
finished" outlining his views, 
Ashmore wrote, "and the air- 
con ditionins had whisked 



iaway the last traces of brim- 
[stone, the decision was taken 

to dispatch a reply to Ho Chi 
Minh . . ." 

In it, Ashmore, it was agreed 
that Baggs and he "would ex- 
press the Department's view 
that it might be possible to 
suspend the bombing and in- 
itiate negotiations, without 
specific concessions beyond an 
agreement that neither side 
.would use the occasion to im- 
prove Us military position/ 1 

'The letter also was to sug- 
gest that Mr. Baggs and I 
1 return to Hanoi for fur- 
inform ?.l discussions, or 
that arrangements could be 
made to phase us out if it 
were desired that the matter 
proceed directly to the official 
level." 



nam. They expressed the opin- 
ion that some reciprocal re- 
straint to indicate that neither 
side intended to use the occa- 
sion of the talks for military' 



advantage would provide tan- 
gible evidence of the good 
faith of all parties in the 
prospects for a negotiated set- 
tlement ..." 

,The key phrase here was 
-the call for "reciprocal re- 
'straint," sources on the Ash- 
more-Baggs side of the issue 
stressed last night. These 
sources said it was emphasized 
in the discussions in the State 
Department that this termi- 
nology would leave open many 

options, without settin* out 
*ny specific demand for* what 
would be termed adequate ™e 
ciprocal restraint" on either 
side s military actions 



Said Ashmore: 

"This conciliatory feeler was 
effectively and brutally can- 
celled before there was any 
chance to determine what re- 
sponse Hanoi might have 
made. 

Cessation for Holiday 

"On Feb. 14, after a tempor- 
ary cessation of the bombing 
for the Tet holiday (in Viet- 
nam) and an ostentatious two- 
day extension beyond the orig- 
inally announced termination, 
the aerial attack on North 
[Vietnam was resumed and es- 
calated" 

But it was not until after- 
ward that Ashmore and Baggs 
learned, apparently when the 
rest of the world did, that a 
presidential letter considerably 
different than the one they 
collaborated on, was written 
even before theirs was, on Feb. 
2. 

"Later (on March 21, 1967) 

it was revealed in Hanoi, and 

confirmed in Washington, that 

the President, under date of 

Feb. 2, had already dispatched 

fan offsetting message," said 

[Ashmore, "to Ho Chi Minh 

(over his own signature. 

"This was transmitted from' 
Moscow on Feb. 8, the day the 
bombing was suspended and 
received in Hanoi on Feb, 10. 
It was certainly in Ho's hands 
when ours arrived " 

That letter from the Presi- 
dent, Ashmore contended, "set 
forth ... the most stringent 
demands yet made for advance 
assurance that Hanoi would 
halt infiltration of troops to 
the South, The uncompromis- 
ing tone of the presidential 
message thoroughly disposed 
of the careful tempering we 



2k2 



> 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63310. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



*© 



! 

i 



had undertaken In those Ion* said Ashmore, '*, . . the dis- 
. fly-specking sessions** in the: Maimers consisted of no more 

State Department. 

The key language in 
Presidents message was: 

"I am prepared to order a ( 
cessation of bombing against] 
your country and the stopping ]** jW - - • may he less a case 
ol further augmentation r of deliberate dissembling than 
United States forces in South of Pervasive ignorance of ulti- 
Vietnam as soon as I am w ™Uc POtay that goes right jo 
sured that infiltration into the to P of the Cabinet * Ic 
South Vietnam by land and 



than assurance that those he 
was addressing, at least, were 
sincerely seeking a settle- 
ment." , - 

Ash more said "the credibil- 



sea has stopped." , 
Extending Truce 



President Johnson also told 
Ho that the proposal "would 
be greatly strengthened if 
your military authorities and 
those of the Government of 
South Vietnam could promptly! inally responsible/' 

negotiate an extension of the charges ^onMe-DeaHa*' 

Tet (lunar New Year holiday) 



the 
said: 

"A President who insists 
on keeping his options open 
as long as possible, and per- 
sonally revealing his choices, 
leaves even his own most ex- 
alted associates embarrassing* 
ly mute in 'regard to large af- 
fairs for which they are nom- 



truce/* then under way. 

Hanoi, however, always had 
adamantly refused any nego- 
tiations with the regime in 
Saigon, 

Ashmore said that "William 
Bundy and the others who 
labored over our draft letter 
had insisted that It would be 
a mistake to tie any proposal 
to the Tet bombing pause, 
since this would be inter- 
preted by Ho as an effort to 
jforce his hand without ade- 
quate opportunity to consult 
with his own people and the 
NLF" (National Liberation 
Front, the political arm of the 
Vietcong guerrillas in South 
Vietnam.) 

"Under date of Feb. 14," 

Ashmore charged, "Mr, John- 

json got from Ho Chi Minh the 

sharp, negative reply he must 

have expected/* 

"Ours came a little later," 



Ashmore said that the Presi- 
dent "has taken a ping-pong 
approach" to Vietnam to try 
to get out of Southeast Asia 
without appearing to have suf- 
fered a major military and 
political defeat." He said "the , 
double-dealing to which Wil- 
liam Baggs and I were sub- 
jected" reflects alternate presi- 
dential responses to military 
pressure and the unpopularity 
of the war. 

The Administration, Ash- 
more charged, set out "to dis- 
credit" the unofficial confer- 
ence on peace held in Geneva 
in May entitled "Pacem in 
Terris II." 

The intensified American 
bombing of the Hanoi-Hai- 
phong area in April, he said, 
led to North Vietnam's refusal 
to attend the conference, un- 
dermining the concept of the 
original conference objective. 

Ashmore said the State De« 



f.said Ashmore, "the simple, un- partment sent a young diplo- 
exceptionable statement that 
there did not seem to be any 
point in Messrs, Ashmore and 
Baggs coming back to Hanoi 
at that time." 

^Necessarily Subjective* 

Ashmore said he could only 
offer a "necessarily subjec- 
tive" account of "what actu- 



mat, Frank Sieverts, to Ge- 
neva in line with its "success- 
ful effort to implant in the 
American media the notion 
that the Convocation was de- 
liberately and suspiciously 
loaded against the United 
States.". 

President Johnson, in his 
dealings with "the American 



ally went on in the upper [? 
reaches of the Administration" mteilmual community. Ash- 
to account for the diverse let-' mQre charged, "made the 
ters. i tactical error of confusing his 

"From beginning to end of critics with his enemies." Ash- 
our dealings with the Depart • more salci that "preaching con- 
ment," he charged, "there was sensus/' the President "had 
an almost total absence of ni2fJc il impossible of attain- 
candor on the official side/ ment &>' constant resort to the 

". . m We never got a satis- kind of crude duplicity that 
factory answer," he said, ku>* s l » me but destroys con- 
"whether the Administration fidence." 
was realty willing to negotiate! "What the Administration 
a compromise settlement in desperately needs," said Ash- 
Victnam or was committed to more, "is the support of men 
a military victory." !of intellectual capacity and 

When Fulbright, at one of ; nioral passion, but these are 
the State Department meet-! qualities primarily associated 
ings, "bluntly stated his view! with those Lyndon Johnson 
that the latter was the case," 'no Idi)£gt» tolerates." 

Hi 



. % 



SB 



Declined per Executive Order 13526, Section 3. 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



3 







lUAfc^, 



'■'•**V*i:v»'.HrT-.«., 



/ 



/ 



\M ^eore\K^m< »ifc t 






••* 



*. "v 



Johnson and Ashmore Letters to Hanoi Compared 



Following is a comparison 



flble evidence of the good faith 



highlights o*f a letter by Presi-;° f aI1 P ar "? s t *? ^prospects 
dent Johnson to President Ho^^^. g*g55^ 
Chi Minh of North Vietnam,!. PRESIDENT JOHNSON. Thete 

sent Feb. S, and a letter by^. * *?? d w f y f to overc <? n - e 
Harry S. Ashmore, the editorjthis problem [of communica- 

sent Feb 5 tKm J an£ * t0 rnove forward 

" President Johnson wrote: 

"I am prepared to order a 
cessation of bombing against for direct talks between trusted 
your country and the stopping representatives in a secure set- 
of further augmentation of ting and away from the glare 

of publicity. Such talks should 



greatly strengthened if your where contacts have already 



; 



search for a peaceful settle- 
ment. That is for us to arrange 



occurred. They could meet in 

no other country such as 

Burma, You may have other 



United States forces in South 
Vietnam as soon as I am as- 
sured that infiltration in South 
Vietnam by land and by sea 
has stoppea. 

"These acts of restraint on 
>oth sides would, I belie%'e, 
nake it possible for us to con- 
iuct serious and private discus- 
dons leading toward an early 



>eace. 

MR. ASHMORE wrote; "They 
high officials of the State De- 
partment] expressed particular 
nterest in your suggestion to 
js that private talks could be-J 
£in provided the United States 
stopped bombing your country 
and ceased introducing addi- 
tional United States troops into 
Vietnam. They expressed the 
opinion that some "reciprocal re- 
straint to indicate that neither 
side intended to use the occa- 
sion of the talks for military year, or Tet, holidays. The pro- 
advantage would provide tangi-|posal I have made would be 



not be used as a propaganda 
exercise, but should be a seri- 
ous effort to find a workable 
and mutually acceptable solu- 
tion." 

MR. ASHMORE: "They [State 
Department officials] empha- 
sized that the United States re- 
mains prepared for secret dis- 
cussions at any time, without 
conditions, and that such dis- 
cussions might cover the whole 
range of topics relative to a 
peaceful settlement/* 

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: "I 
make this proposal to you now 



military authorities and thosa 
of the Governent of South Viet- 
nam could promptly negotiate 
an extension of the Tet truce." arrangements or sites in mind, 
MR. ASHMORE relate a pos- and I would try to meet vge: 
sible agreement to the new 
year's truce in Vietnam, 

MR, ASHMORE: "They [i 
State Department officials] re- 
iterated that the Geneva ac- 
cords might be the framework 
for a peaceful solution." 

PRESIDENT JOHNSON did 
not mention the Geneva gree- 
ments of 1954 as a possible 
framework. 

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: "As 
to the site of the bilateral dis- 
cussions I propose, there arc 
several possibilities'. We could, 
for example, have our repre- 
sentatives meet in Moscow 



suggestions. 

MR. ASHMORE's letter pro- 
posed no specific meeting place. 

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: "If 
you have any thoughts about 
the actions I propose, it would 
be most important that I re- 
ceive them as soon as possi- 
ble." 

MR, ASHMORE: "in the light 
of these concerns, they [trie 
State Department officials] ex- 
pressed great interest; in any 
clarification of this poire [about 
mutual restraints] that you 
might wish to provide through 
a communication to us." 



with a specific sense of ur- 
gency arising from the immi- 
nent new year holidays in 
Vietnam. If you are able "to ac- 
cept this proposal I see no 
reason why it could not take 
effect at the end of the new 



i 



2J44 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






•I01S0N MATED! 






In addition, taking direct is- 
sue with Mr. Ashmore, Mr. 
Bundy said there was "no in- 
consistency** between the Gov- 



Bul when a reporter asked 
« if the Administration had been 



K-j bi 



n , ;a „ B 




Rejects Ashmore Contention 

That White House Letter 

to Hanoi Stiffened Terms 



; stringing along" the two men, 
- Mr. Bundy replied, "Absolutely 

I not." 

ernment - drafted message sent ; The Government's chagrin 
to Hanoi on Feb. 5 through Mr. P ver the disclosure of the Ash- 

more-Baggs peace effort was 
evident both in Mr. Bundy's 
*• comments and in a statement 
; issued by the State Depart- 
ment. The statement ended 



Ashmore and a letter that 
President Johnson sent to Ho 
Chi Minh through the Moscow 
channel on Feb. 8. Mr. Ashmore 
had contended that the Presi- 
dent's letter contradicted the 
one given him and thus "effec- 
tively and brutally canceled' 1 
his efforts. 



with the observation that the 
disclosure "will not reassure 
Hanoi" that future private 
peace contacts would remain 
secret. 



<i, 



Mr. Bundy also spoke of "u 
Mr. Ashmore, reached by \ dertaklngs" from Mr. Ashmore 

and Mb Baggs that thev "would 



Text of the State Department 
statement is on Page 24. 



Ey HEDFJCK SMITH 

SpgdiX to The Sew 5*rt Times 

WASHINGTON, Sept. IS— 
The Administration today de- 
nied charges that President 
Johnson had "effectively and 
brutally" sabotaged a peace ap- 
proach to Hanoi through pri- 
vate channels. 

The State Department went 
to elaborate lengths to reply 
to the charge by the editor and 
writer Harry S. Ashmore. Mr. 
Ashmore wrote yesterday that 
he acted as a Government-ap- 
proved intermediary last Feb- 
ruary only to be undercut by 
the President, who hardened 
American terms. 

The controversy has arisen 
out of a trip to Hanoi last Jan. 
6 to 14 by Mr. Ashmore and 
William C. Baggs, editor 
of The Miami News. They 
brought back reports of a "con- 
ciliatory" conversation with 
President Ho Chi Minh and 
were later given a State De- 
partment message to send to 
Hanoi. 

Bundy Gives Account 

William P. Bundy, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Far East- 
ern Affairs, confirmed today 
that the Ashmore peace effort 
had taken place, but he said at 
a crowded news conference 
that Mr. Ashmore's version of 
the events was "misleading." 

The burden of his argument 
was that the Ashmore efforts 
had been "subsidiary" to a far 
more active, important and di- 
rect official contact with 
North Vietnamese representa- 

ves " in Moscow in January 
,and early February. m 



telephone late today, said the 

Government's argument 

"doesn't add up very well/ 1 

"My view is that the two let- 
£ters are inconsistent in tone 

and content," he added, "Any* 
.one can figure it out: they're 
-both available, now. The tone 

of ours is quite conciliatory. 

The tone of the President's is 
: quite harsh/* 

; The President's fetter to 
.Hanoi was published in The 

New York Times last March 22 

"and Mr. Ashmore's today. 

If the Moscow contacts were 

so vital. Mr. Ashmore asked, 

"why did they send our letter?" 

"They were under no com* 

pulson," be added. "They could 

Ihave said to us: Thank you 
very much, gentlemen. If you're 
ever back in Hanoi, send us a 

*psstcard/ That would have 

\ closed the matter." 

Mr. Bundy, who was one of 
Mr. Ashmore's principal Gov- 
ernment contacts last winter, 
dismissed as nonsense'Mr. Ash- 
more's assertion that his role 

■ had been undermined by con- 
flicts between "two State De- 
partments" — one sympathetic 

"to conciliatory efforts and the 

/other taking a hard line toward 

-Hanoi. 

// "Ashmore understandably 

-felt his own channel was at 
e center of the stage/' Mr, 

-Bundy said. "It was not." 

Mr, Bundy said the Adminis- 
tration had been concentrating 

, on its exchanges in Moscow,! 
which North Vietnam disclosed 
last March 21. He said he was, 

r "simply astounded" that Mr. 
Ashmore, in his published ac- 

- count of last winter's maneu- 
vering, had failed to "consider" 
the impact of the Moscow con- 
tacts. , 

„ Not 'Stringing Along 1 

In an hour-long news brief- 
ing, unusually detailed for a 
.subject so delicate as peace ap- 
proaches, Mr. Bundy said Mr. 
* Ashmore and Mr. Kaggs had 
Miot at the time been told of 
J the Moscow efforts. It would 
-have been "very unwise*' to 
^'disclose them to private citi- 
zens, Mr. Bundy added. 



not publish" details of their tion, the North Vietnamese 
effort leader was "deliberately con- 

Mr.* Ashmore disclosed the cHiatory" and "seemed pre- 
i- ■ ica™ pared to consider a specinc 

peace approach m a 15,000- proposal fcased m a form * uIa of 

word in Center Maga- mutual de-escalation" of the 

fighting. 

The State Department, while 
conceding that the two men 



zinc, a new bimonthly publica- 
tion ef the Center for the Study 
of Democratic Institutions tn 
Santa Barbara, Calif. Mr. Ash- 
more is executive vice presi- 
dent of the -center and Mr. 
Baggs one of its directors. 

In his article, Mr. Ashmore 
said they went to Hanoi to ar- 
range for North Vietnamese 
participation in the convoca- 
tion Pacem in Terris II, a world 
forum on peace. It was being 
arranged by the center to open 
in May in Geneva. 



had reported a "conciliatory 
tone" in their Hanoi conversa- 
tions, asserted that their re- 
ports, dictated to the Govern- 
ment on Jan, IS, "did not indi- 
cate any give" in Hanoi's terms. 

"In this conversation, Ho 
had insisted that there could 
be no talks between the U.S. 
and Hanoi unless the bombing 
were stopped, and also unless 



the U. S. stopped all rein force- 
Mr. Ashmore wrote that on merits during the period of the 
Jam 12, h and Mr. Baggs met talks," the State Department 
President Ho Chi Minh and said. 

that, in a two-hour co nversa- Contradicting the Ashmore 
—^~ r " * * J--.. — — — ■* - , ,. 

v vi sron — dt — tnc™ epiauue; — cnC 

Government statement went on 
;to say, "Ho was reported to be 
adamant against any reciprocal 
military restraint by North 
(Vietnam/* 

Mr. Bundy reported that at 
the time, Government officials 
saw "nothing hopeful" in the 
Ashmore-Haggs efforts but felt 
that it should not be neglected. 

"You have to go on prob- 
ing," he explained. 

On Feb. 4, Mr. Ashmore and 
Mr. Baggs were called to the 
State Department to meet with 
top officials including Mr. 
Bundy and Under Secretary 
Nicholas deB, Katzenbach," 
Senator J. W. Fulbright. chair- 
man of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, was also present. 



2k r > 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526* Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



* , , 



- 






' - 



\Text of SUde Department Comment on Peace Feeler 



* 



Special to The N>w York Tln« j ng jy f the pos ; t j on f the 

WASHIXGTOH, Sept 18— United States Government on 

'ollowing Is the text of a state- fa v issues relating to peace 

.tent issued by the State Dc- was discussed at some length, 

Ipartment today regarding a so that Ba „ and Ashmore 

: report that President Johnson cou]d represent it accurate _ 

had undermined a peace op- i v in vranni 

proach to North Vietnam: ty m * ian0L 



t 
t 

r 
K 
t= 

r_ 

t 
i 

x 

c 

V 

F 



the 



We have had a number of 
inquiries concerning news 
stories published today, based 
on an article by Mr, Harry 
Ashmore in a publication 
of the Center for the 
Study of Democratic Insti- 
v-tutions (C.S.D.L). 
J,; The facts concerning 
i department's contacts with 
{ Messrs. Ashmore and Baggs 
[William C. Baggs, editor of 
; The Miami News] are as 
i follows: 

in 

* During the summer of 
*- 196G, Mr. William Baggs told 
t the department that C.S.D.L 
** was planning a major con- 
; ference in May of 1967 in 
» Geneva, to follow up on the 
'first Pacem in Terris meet- 
ing held in New York in 
February of 1965. Mr. Baggs 
disclosed to us efforts that 
the center was making to 
invite North Vietnam to at- 
tend, and the department re- 
sponded sympathetically to 
* the idea of the conference 
"and to these efforts. These 
r initial contacts were with 
Mr. George Ball and Mr, Wil- 
J liam Bundy. The President 
t and Secretary Rusk were in- 
■ formed, and Mr. Ball, was 
i" directed to handle contacts 
with Mr. Baggs on behalf of 
the United States Govern- 



I 



'. 



♦*. 

r ment 



[2] 



In mid - November and 
; x again m early December, Mr. 
Baggs was joined by Mr. 
Ashmore in calls at the de- 
partment In these calls, the 
J progress of the conference 
plans was reviewed, and the 
'; two visitors indicated that 
t they had a tentative invita- 
4 tion to go to Planoi, with 
Mr. Luis Qulntanilla of Mex- 

* ico. Messrs, Baggs and Ash- 
more also suggested that, if 
they were able to visit 
Hanoi, they might be able to 
conduct useful explorations 
of North Vietnamese views 

* wards peace. Mr. George 
I Ball having then left the de- 
partment, the primary re- 

. sponsibility for these conver- 
sations passed to his suc- 
cessor, Mr, Katzenbach, who 
kepC the President and the 
Secretary of State informed 
as a matter of course. 
In these conversations, de- 

* partnvent representatives acn 
: ceptcd the Baggs-Ashmore 

suggestions and undertook 
to cooperate fully. Accord- 



m 

^ On Dec, 23, Baggs visited 
the department just prior to 
the departure of the three- 
man group on Dec. 23. At 
that meeting, the basic un- 
derstanding of the United 
States Government position 
was reaffirmed, and it was 
further agreed that Baggs 
and Ashmore would report 
confidentially what they were 
able to pick up in Hanoi. 

Messrs, Baggs and Ash- 
» 2K l?Sy S l ^o^is channel (of which; 






fore Hanoi in these Moscow 

contacts, without at any time 

producing any useful re- 
sponse. 

[61 

Toward the end of Janu- 
ary, Messrs, Baggs and Ash- 
more returned to Washing- 
ton and expressed to the de- 
partment the strong hope 
that they could be given 'a 
message for transmission to 
Hanoi. The department de- 
cided t!;at, while the direct 
channel in Moscow was cru- 
cial and must at all costs be 
preserved, it would be use- 
ful to send a more general 
message through Messrs. 
Baggs and Ashmore, which 
would be consistent with the 
important messages being 
exchanged in Moscow, In 



returned to the U.S. and on 
Jan. IS dictated for the de- 
partment a full and confiden- 
ticular a conversation with 
President Ho on Jan. 32. In 
this conversation, Ho had in- 
sisted that there could be 
no talks between the U.S. 
and Hanoi unless, the bomb* 
ing were stopped, and unless 
also the U.S. stopped all re- 
inforcements during the pe- 
riod of the talks. Ho was 
reported to be adamant 
against a/iy reciprocal mili- 
tary restraint by North .Viet- 
nam. The record does not 
show that he solicited any 



Hanoi from f v ] 

Baggs-Ashmore 



were, una- , 
ware) there was some ques- ■ 
tion as to the further utility ; 
of detailed informal com- 
munications. * 

It seemed clear from the 
account given by Messrs. 
Baggs and Ashmore that their 
channel of communication 
had been established with 
thB primary purpose of ex- 
changes concerning North 
Vietnamese attendance at the 
May conference. Neverthe- 
less, Baggs and Ashmore said 
they could send any mes- 
sages for Hanoi through the 
regular mail to a North Viet- 
se ' representative in 



name 



Ji±<!=™ nt reS '° nSe t0 l Pnompenh, "who in turn 

J would relay it to a North 



these remarks. 



[5] 



Vietnamese official who had 



Concurrently, prior to Jan. 
18,^ on U.S. initiative and 
without any connection to 
the Baggs-Ashmore actions, 
U.S. Government representa- 
tives had established a direct 
channel for communication 
with North Vietnamese rep- 
resentatives in Moscow. With 
the apparent agreement of 
both sides, this channel was 
being kept wholly confiden- 
tial, and was therefore not re- 
vealed to Messrs. Baggs. and 
Ashmore in their discussions 
at the department. . 

It is, of course, funda- 
mental to the U.S. Govern- 
ment dealings with Messrs. 
Baggs and Ashmore that 
there existed at the time 
this direct and secret channel. 
Exchanges through this di- 
rect channel continued 
through January and early 
February and culminated in 
President Johnson's Jetter to 
President Ho of Feb. S (mis- 
takenly stated by Mr. Ash- 
more as Feb. 2). As has been 
stated by representatives of 
the department, a wide vari- 
ety of proposals was put be- 



been the principal contact of 
Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore 
in Hanoi, Accordingly, the 
letter now published by Mr. 
Ashmore worked out with 
the representatives of the de- 
partment, and authorized to 
be sent on Feb. 5, We were \ 
subsequently informed by Mr. . 
Ashmore that this letter 
reached Pnompenh on Feb. 
15. 



[7] 



tter/ 
:ebJ 

.V 



f No useful purpose could be 
served by giving further de- 
tails on what took place in 
the Moscow channel. We can 
jsay, however, that on Feb. 
7, while that channel was 
FStill opsn and in operation, 
■separate discussions v/cre 
initiated in London between 
Prime Minister Wilson and 
.Premier Kosyg'm of the 
U.S.S.R. 

* The combined reading of 
the Moscow channel and of 
these discussions led to the 
dispatch on Feb. S of Presi- 
dent Johnson's letter to Pres- 
ident Ho. This letter was of 
course published unilaterally 
by Hanoi on March 2i, and 



■ 



, . , .. . 'in - •' ■ • - 






- 2k6 



..*, * 



.. 



{ 

is a matter of public record. 
It rested on, and was of 
course read by Hanoi in re- 
lation to, the" various pro- 
posals that had been con- 
veyed in the Moscow channel. 
There was no change of basic 
position whatever between 
Feb. 5 and T^b. S, but Presi- 
dent Johnson's letter did in- 
clude a specific action pro- 
posal that speaks for itself, 
as docs the tone of his com- 
munication. 

[SJ 

As already noted, Hanot 
had not responded in any 
useful way to the variety of 
suggestions conveyed in the 
Moscow channel.' Its sole and j 
apparently final response was 
reflected on Feb. 13, in a 
letter by President Ho to 
•Pope Paul VL This letter, in 
the words of one press ac- 
count today, "coupled an un-. 
conditional end to the bomb- 
ing with the withdrawal of 
American forces and the rec- 
ognition of the National Lib- 
eration Front" On Feb. 15, 
President Ho replied formally 
to the President in similar 
terms. At the same time, 
Hanoi broke off the Moscow 
channel. 

Hanoi's attitude remained 
negative throughout. The 
Baggs-Ashmore efforts w*re 
necessarily handled by the 
department with an eye to 
the direct and then-confiden- 
tial channel that existed con- 
currently to Hanoi. .The lat- 
ter appeared to be by far the 
more reliable and secure 
method of ascertaining Ha-. 
noi's views* I 

; -. [10]' • :> 

Finally, we note with re- 
gret that Mr. Ashmore is ap- 
parently ignorant of the sub- * 
sequently published reports ' 
of the Moscow contacts, and 
of their confirmation by de- 
partment representatives. 
We noted with still greater 
regret that at no time since 
has he consulted with the 
department in order to at- 
tempt to understand the in- 
terrelationship that necessar- - 
ily obtained between the 
Moscow channel and his own 
efforts. As this case shows, 
the Administration has been 
prepared at all times to co- 
operate with private individ- 
uals who may be in contact 
with Hanoi in any way, and 
who are prepared to act re- 
sponsibly and discreetly. 
This policy continues, al- 
though it seems clear that/ 
the present disclosure will! 
not reassure Hanoi that such 
private contacts will be hop 
secret. 



. I ,* • 2i 



H 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






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info amembassv bangkok priority 00$ 
amembassy Vientiane 0000 



UNCLAS STATE 39365 






FOLLOWING IS FULL TRANSCRIPT] DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING SEPTET 
18i 

(DISTRIBUTION OF "STATEMENT 3Y THE DEPARTMENT OF •STATE* 1 DATED 
SEPTEMBER l8/> 1967* , 

1 !06 P«Mo 

QUOTE MR« ;MCCLOSKEYj IT APPEARS THAT iMOST OF YOU NC I HAVE 
BEEN ABLE 'TO GET THROUGH THE STATEMENT^' ■ :; IS A 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE STaTEMEHTo 



AS ONE OF THE 6ENTELMEN CONCERNED 

MESSRS* BAGGS AND ASH MORE ^ 

OU E S T I N £ T H A T Y U M A Y H A V E j> A F 7 £ R 



247 



Tl ■ CONVERSATION WITH 
3UN0Y ! HERi TO 
HAVtNQ Rl D THE / . . IT. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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MR* hCCOSKFY* ON HE RECORD* 



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assistant secretary wills -aw bundys i will 3 c on the : - . ; 
in responding to your questions* in tri" scope of this diso'jssio? 
a\ : d all of what has been s'-aio about mr« ashttore's an.£ r« 
baggs; contacts with us- ano .so on 



/* 






■ 



r DO WANT TO SaT' ONE THINS* I :" I HAY* On BACKGROUND* .» 

READ THE WHOLE Of-" Th£ ARTICLES THR0U£H*'TH£ S&l :RC'S.1TY OF 

ONE OF THE LOCAL NEWSPAPERS! AND/ THAT . WITH RES? 

ALL THE W'iCuE SWEEP OF KiS ALLEOATEqNS PC imlitQ THE MEETING 

IN GENEVA* IN MaY; I ^0! : T WAN' TO COMMENT ON THOSE IN DETAIL* 

A GREAT DEAL COULD BE SAID; AND 'WE aRE DOING SOME WORK 

THAT MAY RESULT IN SOMETHING LATER c BUT LET HE JUST 



SAY* ON 



ACKGROUNDa THAT ALL OF ¥01 RE WELL AWARE i AM S - ■■>: $ ^::H : ";; 
TO ONE POINT IN THAT »« AMBASSADOR GOLQ6ERG WAS* IN "ACT* 
SCHEDULED TO APPEAR IN GENEVA AT THAT tfEETlNSi AS A SENIOR 
ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMAN a THE FACT THAT .HE C0ULDN»T S£ 
THERE'/- AND THAT NO SENIOR MAN .:/.£: ,,V,'.-', z JO TAKE . -3 P.-ACE; 
WAS DUE ENTIRELY TO THE FACT THAT THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS 
CAME IN THa" WEEK. AND I MEREL'Y 3~ATE THaT TO REMIND YOU 
OF WHAT TOOK PLACE/ ON ONE PARTICULAR POINT ON UbKCn KE IS 
CRITICAL Or US, 






WITH THAT 3*Ci<3R0UNL> 
QUESTIONS 



COMMENT j I AM OPEN 70n ON Tri 



RECORD 



QUcTSTrONS^ AND ANSWERS BY KR.o £ JNDYs 



• 






Q WILL YOU RESPOND DIRECT V TO WHAT SEEM To BE THE NEWS PO] - 
OF THE ASHMGRE MAGAZINE ARTICLEi JHaT. 'THE PRESIDENT -S LETTER* 
IN FEBRU, ', I THINK THE QUOTE «A§ "EFFECT; VELY AND I.,' '.";■„.. 
CANCELED THIS WHOLE EFFORT "0 DRAW HO INTO A PEAT. ./, 



A WELL; LET ME SAY AT THE C^rr: ...... ,.-. s IS OBVIOUS FRO 

BEFORE YOU;. THAT THE PRINCIPAL REM . E ■ , vNQ . ., 

secure -- channel :;.' cgj'.munic* no ~g 33 .- in'm 
this was the one to kh; we ws devoting all our ■■ 

2U8 



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AMH f l '"AS '- HAT 0J. r < I THE BA £S/7 E HATTER 



V !N a\. ! R£JU0:ci THE SECREC : THAT CHi .Ei 



I ■■.- 'S ! E ■ JRSSED SI """ t ! t "O ^S MUCH ►£ H, 1 : ■■■ "_ 

SMTtS€STJS WOULD ■ . . rOOK PLACE ON i'HA iANh!? . 

■ ■■ ' 4 N .. ;.;; F PRC . S -:■ pORWj s : : \:,,( 

■ A'SAfNPT TH£ BACkORSUNi 0.F THOSE ' LS TH/ THE PR] 'T'S 

i - . . w> . ;f .c ac" reN p* ■ - . • .0 . 3 was 

READ *N KAM< 






THE POSS i : i. I T T 0!" A NNSL pSVf O.P.ING : . B AND 



t TV 
riofcn WA£, or COURSE 



, ur (,u«i«»i THE :, BJ, WE 3 HO D 3? 

• H4.NO- W a S REAt LIST YIN6 TO V.- ! iff AS SAiD IN KOS'COWj 

-AMD TH.TS W . ' CULMINATED IN THE I'DENT'S LETTER* 




SE1 INCONSISTENCY 8ETWEEI THE TWO* 



ONE IS THE KTNO Of »ESSA1 TOO WqULO ■- . ' EXPLORATORY 

3ASIS JN A N C W A"-:'; AN U. I CHAN'NEi , i'HE OTHER 3 A V V 

ECSflC SUBSEST;0?v POLLC !*G MORE 5EN.ER ... SUSGES'VlSNS I'N 
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'.' ■ JK.6 • . . . 



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jrj a N'JTSHELL.^ WHAT - i E " ! ! 3 

ASHMORE ' WHILE WE TREATED IT SE^T . A.N'D IT .• ! £ V HAVE 

L E T A C h * \ - N E I '- C GtlMUN I C A T I N - . W AS D E > I N ." 7 E „ T S . . 1. ft R V » 

5 IN OTHER wORDSj v C. DPN*T R SARD | '. s£ - : RLV :'■':' -H 

restra::nt*« «hsch v ;■ ^hs ,-..,;■: v..". 

AS GREATLY OlEF! ;.a'.' FRO* THE PRESh"iE S ^^ WW . c. LED r 0S 

A MUTUAL DE-Es ' 1 :OK; ! ^; S ;C 1 '■ 



* HAT s :r :ECT wha' . ; ; , -:- ■ :. 



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IN A CONTENT THAI 
ACTIONS DN QUfi PART* 

PART OF HANOI 



W A S 



CALLED FOR VERY SPECIFIC AT '£ 

B TH S T P P 3 N •:: V H E 3 QMS. N ■ 

A VERY Si : C FORM G RES' N ■ CJN THE 



Q COULD WE CLARIFY THIS QUESTION OF THE DATES OF THE F .0E.\T'S 
LETTERS? THIS IS NOW SEPTE1 :R-, OX' MARC* 2 31 WhEN f'iESE 
LETTERS WERE MADE P'OE : 3Y HANOI* tHE'S ATE TOLD 

US THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER ■ DATED F^3^<j.- NQWj 

SEVERAL MONTHS LATER* WHEN THE DA' Y HAVE . CE* 

YOU SUDDENLY SAY. 1R« A- ' HAS MISTAKENLY S7a" - S .:;T;," 



AT THE 
HANDED 

OF THE 



rim you 

V E R i N 

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a scow c 



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THE 8TH !E NEVER 37 AM £'/:. .. .':. ' 



WHY IS jfT THAT SUDDENLY Tr DATE IS BEING CHANGED? 



A i U i rit 



;S7 OF MY KNOWLEDGE* IT INS C T- 



; HAVE BEFORE MS THE PUBLIC :, . RMATION SERIES 0" :>;• DEPAHTME 
OF STATE, UNDATED* WHICH WAS HE COMPENDIUM :,.' A .vlUHBEU DF 
T H ! NO S » TH ;: S Is 1 AS LATE M ARCH- 5 U T I A M SU R E . T F : 7 S WITH W . 1 A T 
WAS SAID -BEFORE - - WHICH DA' . S THE LETTER AS J>:E 8TH IH ALL 
RESPECTS* I WILL SAY; FOR THE RECORD,' THE LETTER fS - ■-> \ 
TRANSMITTED ON THE EARLY MORNING OF THE i-' tN MOSCOW* AND* FT 
S DATED THE SAME DAYc 



Q WHEN WaS IT WRITTEN? 

- 

A IT IS "K£ .EFFECTIVE DATE* I WJL- N( GO \. j THE 



t* /\ ,*% ».. 



DATE ON WHICH IT Was WRITTEN; ' , ," SEEMS To ME /• 



INTERNAL GOVERNMENT BUSINESS* BUT "HAT'S 
jY WAS WRITTEN*" AND DELiVERED» 



n ::. 



DATE ON WHI 



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G YOU A«£ CONTRADICTING F STATEMENT Tl "..' DEPARTMENT GA' 
A T T H E T IM£ I T WAS W '^.""L N * N 1 H I ? N D ' : 



A T F 

THE 

DATE 



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PAGE 0.6 STATE 39365 
THE 7TH? 






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W r • 



W0N r T GO INTO THAT OTHER THAN "C S AT W 
IN THE LETTER TOG:.: ACCOUNT OF ALL THE • AM ABuS 

TO US ON ALL CHANNELS = 

Q THERE HAVE SEEN A NUMBER OF THESE PEACE PROPOSAL ! 5r ONE 
KIND OH ANOTHER* AND' IN" MY MEMS .V.- ' STATE D£?/ '• " HAS 
N£tfES RESPONDED. TO IT v m SUCH DETAIL D WITH SUCH GF, T 
El ASORA'TE C^RE CAN YCU .EXPLAIN '■. YO E DOING IT Itt THIS 

case* and did not In , iese previous ga-Jes.? 

A HELL j £T DEPENDS ON THE CASE* JN TH : »E ARE :C0I !TED 
WrTH A VERY. DETAILED SET OF ALLEGATIONS? IDS - ' EVERY SENTENCE 
-N THIS RESPONDS IN ONE WA* OS ANC HER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY 
TO THE ACCOUNT 1 T MR* AS! jRE HAS GjVEN* 2 fVCNK WE OWE 
IT- TO EVERYBODY TO GIVE A FULL ACCOUNT AND SINCE Hi 
DEALING KITH A "FULL > AND I AM AFRAID 'M*SLE At 10 ACC > 
WE THOUGHT WE HAD TO DEAL WITH 'HIS 0N§ ,■ THE MANNER THA*: 
E HAVE DESCRIBED, 



m= MCCL03KEY« EXCUSE ME* YOU MIGHT ALSO RECALL fHAT . 1 
EXCHANGE :n THE ITALIAN CHANNEL THERE &AS /, VERY CQMPREHE.VS -'£ 
ACCOUNT OP THAT PROVIDED KZRZ* 

Q .THE FANEANI? 

MR-, MCCLOSKEy* FANFANIo 

A | M R « BU N C Y CONTINUED A N S W £ R .. N G Q J E S 1 "OH) 



WE HAVE HAD TO DO THIS ViHE?^ Vl;?. MISLEADING *£££ 'NTS " W- 

TOOK PEACE ARE PUT Q'jT IN DETAIL* THERE IS NO OTHER - _"ER TVE 



Q FROM HINDSIGHTj IT IS ALWAYS E Eft _C FIGURE jKESE " » riXNGs. 
OUT; BUT FROM WHAT YOU HAVE SAID YOU THOUG! T THE : " E/ 
BAGGS CHaNNEI MIGHT OFFEi TOM, BOBi I. ■ V ASSIST. i . 'THIS 
THlNGo IN TRCZPZC", WAS : >!£SE '. CONSIDERAT A 1 
JUST POSTPONING ACTiON fHROUSi tl UNTIL ' DENT 



H^D GO vt Hi- L.E; ic 






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CONTENDS WAS &LL. IN THE WORKS . -\ ;? 

252 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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A WE IX* . : HAVE 
Of' THE .LAST. I 



COMMENTED 



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WOK 5 : TAKE '.'OUR 

stand on a ; e sTa>em r 



: hi/ «'AC :; ■•'. ' ' aw 

H AOi ' BE R E - 



LET ME S*Y WHAT THE PROBLEM 
THAT.-' MESSRSo BaGSS AND .A. 
A R E S P N S E B 1 • i . ■■ £ J A N D M , 
THEY HAD SOME IinD.CaT.DNG 
RECORDED ACCOUNT; ■■H- D ': 
WJTH HO.. I WAVE CHECKED- T1 
T H E-Y . WE R S URGING US V E R Y S T 
I rlMED 1 A'TG RESPONSE • 

I THINK.' FRANKLY.-. THAT HAD 



WGUL 3 WAVE SEEN* ' fT* t :aRL 1 1 

.Hi. 

MORE WERE .URGING VERY STRONGLY MAT 

E GUTCKL /. . S£ ■>■".■ ' 

I HAVE DESCRIBED* PROM 

TAKE PLACE t;N rKEIR OONVERS ,7 : JH 

AGAINST THE' : R£CORD ThE'Y DICTATED* 
R'ONGLY TO £0 a- EaD' fcNO MA 



SORT j 



OR SOMETHING OF THAT 

ELSE WAS GOING OMp pR THAI 



F W H I C H s V HE LA" I E R 7 ■ U H I 
WOULD HAVE BEEN AROuSED^ AN 
PREJUDICIAL TO THE VERY IMP 

WERE H-AV!NB« 

miCfi WHY £HN THEY ASKED 




-,. .._- 



Q YOU USED THEM AS PALL GUYS. 



LM THA7*S A CYNICAL PHRASE; W£ HAD NO CHOICE BUT 'TO 
T IT THE WAY WE DID; IN TERMS OP WHAT I *« . D< WE WSULO 
BEEN SuAO TO SEE IF HANOI 'HAD ANY DIFFERENT CHANNEL .. 

h it washed to sat any •hng o:~:'c.Rr-:. we SERa SE< :o< J 

HA 7 RESPECT- WE NEVER KNOW THROUGH WHOM THE L.EAi '■ 



A WE 
TREA 
HAVE 
WHIG 
IN T 

hanoi may wish to com hun ?c ate o but we had to con! 
sa:d 

TO 
IN M 



u . ■ 



■ • » - 



■ 



IN THE -3AGGS/ASHM0RE CHANNEL WITH AN EYE TO WHAT iEEHEt 
NLY REALISTIC JUDGMENT — THa'Tj WITH ,-. DIRECT C MEL -G?E 
OS COW a THAT WAS THE MAIN ONE TO CONCENTRATE C-N« 



WHY WAS SENA! OR PULBRl'GH" 
SESSIONS? 



A [LUi/C £ i FS A I v_:L 



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A NEULj MV UND£RS*ANDXNe !S THA7 ,:'3RS^ B'AScS AND ASHMORE 

HAD DISCUSSED WITH HIM THE FACT T AT TJjEY MADS V 

AND THAVj ALTHOUGH THEV HAD BEEN ALLOWED -> ■ HO" ..., ; j 

253 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



-1 



■ 



i 



* 



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UNCLASSIFIED 









• ,. 






• - - 



. 



PAGE PS STATE 39365 

■ * 

THEV HAD B::^ ; INVITED BY PREVIOUS ..-..-. ttG* . . :. TO G 
F ijLL AND C C N F I D £ N T I A L A C C C IJ N T ., " ; -. E v . 
GO" 70.fc*3H QUARTERS- JN FACT* OF COURSE* 






1 ^- 



i.,- 



■ 



"0 . 



ORDER TO MAKE THIS c^Vg . : : ' . *7 W 

FUL6RISHT MIGHT ATTEND A GENERAL D | ■. . . ,-. 

K i T H M R - :< A T Z E ,'•< B A C K A M D T K E R 3 . .-. ': i • 3 . . ; . . C N " 



« - 



■ 












I 



J 



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C THERE IS SOMETHING WERV CONfUS NQ H£Pf. you RE .": . .Ha" 
JANUARY S2TH'8AGG3 AND ASHMGRE fOLQ OF W.-iA" HO ', / .. INSIST. 
UPCW> WHICH WAS BEIN3 ADAMANT -V. ' <QCA! . .. i 

RESTRAIN? BV NORTH VSEY-NAMs IN ■' • ■■ o:" THAT* WHY ;._ .. . 

OR ANYBODY IN THE DcP^RTMENT; «0P£ ;.. ,' ,>.,' " ,: ., - . 

E E A p R M I S I No C J ! A N N E i. ■? "" 



' .' * 



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■.- - 



A FRANKLY^ ON THE FaCE OF THi )MSl ('A !, 
HOPEFUL* NONTHEuESS* WE FELT THV ■ TMR! 
ASHMORE CHANNEL -- THAT* IN ITS IERHS*"*R£LA1 
SEE^ fHE SEQUENCE. OF REMARKS THAT HAD TAKEN .'■ , 
CONVERATiON WITH HO «« Mi'GHT PROSERIN A :■ . ; 

ON WHETHER HANOI was PREPARED TO ;i.§£R <■• R 
RESTRAINT*.. AND 17 HAS ALWAYS "HE >U8S?0IaR 
WHETHER* IN FACTj THIS IS A CHANGE THAT 



-■ 



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IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THE SPEC. G AT AN 
MAY 3rT NEGATIVE, 



W A N T 
VEN 



3 '' 



. 



IN PR-ISIDFNT JOHNSON'S REPLY TQ HO* THERE IS ., :„i' 
IN (THERE "0 HAVING BEEN ASSURED - •• WITHIN r,->£ PaSV." ]■■ | 
OF THE TIME HE WROTE THE LETTER—" >..'.' H :. . .,/: . " : : ,.- 
RENAlNEP ~HF SAME AS IT HAD BEEN* Ik ofHER I. : . v :-i .!•;. •; 
MUST ^E UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF B0M8INC . .- 
WITHDRAWAL OF UoS? FORCES* 



is r h i s 



f 3 



THE BAGG3/A3HKCRE 



CON ; Ai- , 






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THERE'^ 1 IS THIS MOSCOW? 



A NO a THE STATEMENT IN THE PRESIDENT*^ LETTcR* II CH ;>, ~ 
BEFORE M£> REFERS TO PUD . C STAT- "S I v '. 'I PAST ''4Q ,• • .; ; 
AND 'i^t'., ?N "URN;. REFERS TO THE W£Li . : Nl :. 
BURCHETTE INTERVIEW;. WHICH PUBLISHED B'l -;-A:/. ■.: ^. 

2&> AND THERE IS A STATE! !T IN I" V 7 < ; ,:. ig 

RESPONSIBLE PARTIES HAVE ASSURED US I I THAT ',; 

25U 

UNCI ASS ' \ .'" 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 






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PAGE f>9 STAT1 39.: 



- • - 



IN FAC' 1 -, YOU »RQPQ.S *' 
STAND ON I7S OWN gStTOM* 



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Q AS A SEN JOS CK; 
CGtfr'tN" ON MIS S' 
AND TV AT ONE WAS 



■;CCR lM ' HE i . D V , . : r~ TQ 

ATEMEf RE ■ STATE 0" ' 

sousi v nig i : :onc i ; . tc ...\ r y,. * ? 







THE F^C" JS WE 0lDiN«T KNOW ;, :: 3U« 

UNTIL HE GOV K0&D THAT HE HAD ANS ": ON '-.. ■- -' . 



HIS FIRST STORIES APPEALED ON 



W£ £A 



i ' 






. I 



HARDLY- BE CHANGED A'GAl'NST US ON THAT 3j-« 






AND/ AS FAR A? j"HE 

only sat that they 



gORAO SU8S ' :e OF "' ; 

WERE " i'v-Y C !0' 






Q THERE IS A aO 
IS'pRED'IcTaPuS* 



■ 



ST ION ] WOULD . ■'.'. TO •:■• ; 

3UT ! WOtluD L;KE TQ ' OK Ti 

RECORD PEC A USE OF VAFi_, E L! iff! . h 









255 






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Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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uncla$s:fjep 



PAGE 1-0 STATE 32365 

F LJ i , 3 R l Q H T W a S I N T HSS E D I S C U S 3 r D K 3 s A N D » , S ., I t H I UK V .-. . 
ASHMQRE B.A/S -- I AM NOT ABSOLUTELY '., \ HERE 

SOMEONE THAT ASKED HIM N0*i TESTIFY UP J\ THE HlL_ Q 
FORTH 1 ". NOT rO APPEAR BEFORE \NY CQMMJ !?7££s 0. . ; ■: ...... 

ARISE* IN KINDS MORE ^CYNICAL THAN \ / .0 -V 

ADMINISTRATION MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN STf ; -YY. 

ALONG IH ORDER TO KEEP THEM FROM GOING Up ON i '■•!' Hli-Li ■■ 
SUPPORTING SALISBURY'' 8 REPORTSo 

A ABSOLUTELY NOT- 



AS FAR A 


S THEIR OBSERVa 


f!ON 


BOMB IN 3 


WERE CONCERNED^ 


: 


FULL NEW 


S ARTICLES. WE 




WERE TO 


MAKE THIS KIND 


P T 


TURN TO 


THE CONFIDENT: A 




I THINK 


REASONABLY AND 


w : s e 


ACCOUNTS 


c BUT THERE WAS 


NO 


DOWN THE 


IR RIGHT OF EXP 


r"i f~ '"• *"* 

r< l a 


RESPECT 


TO THE BCMBjNGfl 


» 


OF ARTIC 


LEg AS FULLY AS 


HE 



s :;: north vZE?„ i c :e 

V HAD/ ;n ANY EVENT, 

^ * HO ' ;;v A6SCE0. 



! CM 



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I " 



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-■ - ... 



. 



: 



'EC7S HlCH^ThEY I D NOT 



- 



1 



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- 



A?' D 






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i( D -N .HEIR 



DESIRE Dp IN ANY SESE* . 

ION ■ Ml ' "THEY 

j If -HID, 8A6SS D lb fT . . 

x :■•..■ HOW. IS Was i r: 






) 



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-~ ' <• 



' '•;-: 






. 






_ 



-HaY I ASK A QUESTION HERE? A POINT THAT PUZZLES ME .. Y:~ 

IS WHY -« SINCE THESE TWO GENTI ..E:- E- .' '0.-3 IN a 3UAS> 
DIPLOMATI-C ROLE* WITH AT LEAST ' R CG-OPE flQN TO i 

EXTENT -= WHY THERE WAS NO -CONSIDERATION 3] y: TO . YY. „ NO THEM 

ABOUT THE'SECRET CHANNEL* WITH THE UNDERSTANDING :.!' -:E '. K£ 
IT SECRET? ' • 



.-. 



LET ME °« I AM AGRAID- YOU 1! ■ ■ E ME TO CO INTO 3 i" . [ . S . 

ONE IS THE GENERAL CUES'." ■ ON WHETHER PF - TE INDIVID .. V- SHO 

SHOULD BE ENTRUSTED WITH SECRETS OF ■ THE GREATEST' IM I 
THAT WERE KNOWN ONLY TO A HANDFUL OF P-SOF IN THE •. • 






-* - . - - 



AND* I REGRET TO SAYj i WILL ALSO CALL ATTENTIO ■— HQUT 



— 



ATTEMPTING TO GIVE *N VCCCUNT OF ." - TO 1ATTER5 pj a ; ;!;C-: 
OUOMAN IS BETTER INFORMED T- yE EPJS : THAT l.~ ; up 
THE UNFORTUNATE DISCLOSURE OF >.E - P MESSAGE :"Y 
HANOI INCLUDED «R» ASHMORE 'S PAST IT i "HA1 , I REGRET ' 
AM I WR0N6« M Rn DUDMALY 



'. 



'.i 



v- .-, 



- 



MR--. DUDMANs I DON'T KNOW WHAT YOU .- 

256 

UNCLAS! "XED 



• • 






• 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 












1 












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PAG 



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3 S 3 6 5 



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A SMRo B'UNOV STILL aNSWE HE WAS IMS '/i : ■. 
SETTING UP HIS OWN S. CHANNEL TO HJ LA PIR . I 
SOMEONE ASSOCIATED WlTI .; cEnTE** WHICH j i £ ! 



1 



AVE 



V u 



■*• i r 



ST0RV« IS TH 



r 



ORRECT 



MRo-DUDMaN that is not correct* 



A WELL:- WAS P SOMEBODY- WHO 



'-> i n 



HEi R ! FROM MR'- ASi )F ; 



HR<> DUDMANs THAT'S POSSIBLE* 



A LET Mc 
WE WERE 
HATTER:. 



SAY THAT WE HERE DEAL NG PRIy., C S 



»_. i 






i*t 



NO 



DcLAING AGAINST A 



BACKGROUND 'HAT 0. '. DE ' HIS 



1 



- 



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i 



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at OSS -*h:S MOo 



Q GIVEN THE FACT K.AT YOU DION*! ^N*f TO DISC 

CHANNEL BY ANY MEANS.* DID V 0U C0N3iDSR*Y-A C-. ■; " ■ " --.v .; ■ 

F SANCTION 

TO THEIR APPROACH TO HANOI , AT E SAME 'TIME '■ ' YC 

GOING -0 Ha^E ANOTHER VERY OFF C •] APPRO, M?6'JSK MOSCO , 

MIGHT MAKE HAND J WONDER MO HAS TALKING FOR 

G V E R N M EN ~ ? 



i 



- -, 






- bo 




BY "AS 

LONG 
A V£R 

IN A 



DON ■ 






Y DIRECT AND f«MEDUT£ CHANNEL • i yyn- i ;n.^ n> 
SOPHISTICAVEO WAYj COULC PC.SSIBIL? HAVE iISU*vDER3'*0i 






- 
i 






Q BOTH YOU AMD HR« a S HMO RE REFERRED 

CHI MINH* AND HIS C0MVERSA" ION '■< ", ASHMORE 

257 



r> r. : * <- •■ Mr* r *-■ 






F 



■^ H 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 1 I 






i 














c?£^f. ?; t 






* 












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UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 12 3"aTE 33365 



THE NEED "OR -HE U.S. TO AGRE,-" 
IN THE SOUTH « NOW.' aS FAR AS J 
ANYWHERE E-..SE PUBLICLY, WAS .. ■ 



To STOP Re-INFORcIWO ITS ';'•;' 
NOW, 'THIS _ . 
ADE ANYWHERE E- 6E j . ;, . . 



OH* THAT'S NOT TURE« THIS QUESTION OF C SING US W . H 
CONTINUING REINFORMCEMENTS GOES BACK* AT THE • .;, V [AST. 
TO "HE 37 -DAY PAUSE IN EARLY J966« 

Q BUT DIRECTLY CONNECTED AS A PRIOR fcpND-JTlQN OF TALKS? 

A ! AM NOT SURE WHETHER WE HAD EVER HEARD IT BE TO :. 
HAD -CERTAINLY HEARD ENOUGH' R1 ARKS IN THIS SENERAi. TO 
BE AWARE OVER A LONG.- LONG PERIOD THAT~THJ3 '.;.•. A PCS^: ISL'E 
ADDITIONAL ELEMENT* IF WE COULD WORK OUT A BALANCED ?RC( 
OF MUTUAL DE-ESCALATION ° 









u 



Q WELL j ON PaGE THREE p 



Q IN THE MOSCOW 



1> 



L E T ii R -' <-: 



H A T 



CHA 
W A S 



EL DID "OU EVER MENTION -;E 6ASCS/AS MORE 



A 



i 



CAN'T COMMENT ON THAT. TO 



nit 



E EST OF MY RECOLLECT : 



WE DID NQTo 



ON PAGE THREE -- GETTING BACK TO -'HE QUESTION R, 
IS WRITTEN HERE AS THOUGH HO IS INSISTING ON TWO V : . 
BEFORE AGREEElNG TO TAlKSs BOTH A STOP TO THE BOM ■ .. AN 
STOP TO REINFORCEMENTS* NOW THAT - 



- 



YESo 






Q WELL* TWO QUESTIONS* WAS THAT YOUR ;LR W ,• OF 
POSITION, BASED ON OTHER EVIDENCE? AND* SECOND; •,'.<■ 
UNDERSTANDING OF HO -3 POSITION TODAY? 



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IS 



HAT TO: 



A« WELL* THE STATEMENTS IN PARAG -; Fp'JR SPEAK FOR . „ (£$• 
AND ARE DIRECTLY FRQ'M "THE E . f .. TED ACCOUNT KESSR3* 56.5 

ASHMOREc 






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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






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AM PREPARED TO ACCEPT* rTHOUT 



QUESTION* THAT THAT IS : . -' HO SAl : ON 'THIS" 0CCa3:« 

IT IS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE TO 5££ IN THE 

BURCHETT INTERVIEW.- IN HC REPLY TO THE 

PRESIDENT* AND IK 0T " NORTH VIEJN •' 'ZMENTSj • 

ABSENCE OF MENTION G? PHIS IS: E* 



NOW* I W|LL LEAVE IT AT ■ • IN OTHER *DSj 

SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS HAVE- NOT API '0 

TO T*AE THJJ POST;'. ON NOW WHAT THEIR '. ., POSIT 

AMY BE. I REGRET "0 SAY r CAN! T 

AT THIS MOMEN' 07 TIKE* 

EXCEPT To SAY THAT THE PUBLIC RECC . NOT 

■ 



_•;;..: 






q, WELL/ DID YOU USE THE INFC ■■■■ PROVIDED BV ESI 
GENTLEMEN TO FASHION THE RERLK OF THE PRESIDENT? 



A- 

SM* 



IT WaS PART OF THE TOTAL PICTURE D« BUT 






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IF* INDEED* IT PLAYED IT AT 









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OF C 
MATTERS' 



SZi AVAILABLE TO ALL " US W IRE ,iO ■-■' 



Qo IN OTHER WORDS* YOt DID NOT REPLY SPEC: IF ! TALLY TG THIS f 
OF REINFORCEMENT BECAUSE YOU SOT IT ' OUG.u BAS6S ANC : 1" 



A. NO- AG I HAVE SAID- THIS A3 POS : T E.. " ". 

TO"AL PICTURE OF MUTUAL DEES, . ' IAD LONG BEEN PRESE.N 

OUR KSKOs* AND HAD BEEN RAISED BV HANOI :.. ITS PCs 






IF YOU WILL* °N "HE JANUARY 



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DAS PA .- ■' 






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SO IT HAS SOMETHING THAT WE HAD GIV-N A LOT Of THOU 1 
LONG PERIOD OF Tl-HE, 



Co WHAT Z [JON'T UNDERSTAND !S CONS >: Tt 
ASKHOBE BROUGHT BACK 3RD 7 P.O HAS ADAMAN"] . 
RECIPROCAL ACTION - - WHY* ON PHE FACE OF Hi FROM 
VvEw* IT Was AM aSSuRD HD HOuLOtv P£AC? EFFORT* 

mean anytk:"ns* HO N US "0 STOP BCf<5 SO : 

YOl; JUST 7£._L THIM^ "LOOK. ,. S HOT GO} TO DC - 

IT'S HOPELESS* FOR T 1 






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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3-3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



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Department oj State 




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UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE H STATE 39365 

Aj WELL, IF YOU ACCEPT 
G THE DOOR TO ANY POSSi 
EXPLORATION/ WE WOULD P 
600N PROBING* AND YOU 



LD 


EVERY N 


egaT 


JVE S- 


BSLITY OF 






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uA 1 


NLY GET 


NOW 


K^RE o 


HAVE TO RE 


CXON 


' SJ U 



FATEMENT BY HANOI AS C 
I 'THINK YOU HAVE TO 



Q 



IT WON'T DO ANYTHING? 



Ao LET ME FINISH, YOU 
WITH INDIVIDUALS* TO Wh 

he would take in secret 
or with general suggest 

but you can't take a ne 
foreclosing the desirab 
the way you negotiate i 
point of negotiating i 



HAV 

OM H 

» CO 
IONS 

GAT I 

I L I T 
N AN 
GUES 



TO 



MI 

NFRO 

i AN 

VE S 
Y OF 



RECKON THAT THIS WAS AN EN CO UN'S 
Gh'T TAKE A HARDER P03; ON 'THAN 

: ■ 






1 



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nteo with a concrete pfjcpos 
d this Is what Was done in f 

t'ajement to an individual ag 

PROBING ON tr* IT IS aUST 
TUAYlONB OR TRY TO GET "TO A 
HAD BETTER ;SAYe . 



iiU i 



Q DO YOU PLAN TO HAVE SCHR0EN3RUN WRITE A LETTER WHEN HE GET? 
BACK? 

A» WE HaVE HAD NO CONTACT FOR THAT PURPOSEo ' ' . 

■ • 

Gc DID T 
OF YOU FE 



EY EVER TELL YOU ANYTHING THAT HO SAID THAT MADE 
EL FOR A MINUTE THAT MAYBE HO WANTED TO HAKE PEACE? 



A° 

WHAT 
KEY 
ANY 

TYM* 

CONV 

REPO 

AND 

THE 

THE 

AND 

THER 



THEY 
ASHM 

POINT 

GIVEo 

TO E 
ERSAT 
RTED 

IT IS 

FULL 
FACT 
THAT 
E> 



*."> 



3E 
c 



DID SAY THAT THE TONE Op "HE CONVERSATION*- AND THI 
ORE SAYS IN THE ARTICLE* WAS X'ONC I 1 I ATORY • ON TH 
S, THEIR DICTATED ACCOUNT DID NOT APPEAR TO IttD'XCA 

NONETHELESS* THE FaC~ THAT HE Was PREPARED- 70 RECEIVE 

XPRESS HIS VIEWS-- IT' WAS CERTAIN OMISSIONS IN THE 
ION. IT WaS THE KIND OF CONVERSATION WE HAVE HAD 

to us over a long peri-od of time from many sources 
very hard ever to give a capsuled summary that q£ 
flavoro they thought it was conciliatory — merel 
that they were received and 'talked to in this way. 
the tone was conciliatory 3 an6j of course '$ they we 



3 

»'S 



RF 



Q. I BELIEVE THE ASHMORE ARTICLE SaYS THAT HO MADE A lATEGGR.C 

COMMITMENT* OR— IT IS INCORRECT -- IT REFERS TO HQ«S 

CATEGORICAL COMMITMENT TO TALK IF THE BOMBING WERE STOPPED. 

DO YOU REMEMBER THIS — SOME SUCH PHRASE AS THIS? 

260 

UNCLASSIFIED 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NMD 633 16, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



■ 

. - . ... . - .......... - .. . .•*-.■ 






ffmif** Department of State , 

■8 ft 4f '' - 3 









*y 



£ 






•*. 



UNCLASSIFIED 






PAGE 15 STATE 39365 

As I DON'T RECALL IT IN THE LETTER, 

Qo - IT WaSN'T-'THAT/ but very close. 

Qo ' IT IS NOT IN THE LETTERS IT IS IN THE ARTICLE* 

a« now* .wait a second* do rr again. o i»m sgrry° 

■ 

G. HAS HO CHI MINH EVER"- EITHER PUBLICLY OR IN SECRET 
EXCHANGES ««■ MADE A FIRM COMM I :TM£NT s A*V IRM ;SYAT£t<ENT "HA IF V; 

bombing or north viet-nam was stopped he would .enter peace .'-.. . 

A a TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE/ THE ANSWER TO THAT GUEST J ,S- 
■ "NOo" I KNOW OF NOTHING -« XERTAlNLY* WTHING T^AT !IA3 BEEN 
■■-. CONVEYED AUTHORITATIVELY TO US THAT SAYS THAT FLATLY* 

Qo DO YOU HAVE ANY INFORMATION • - 

Q THROUGH THESE THIRD PARTIES*- THEY ALWAYS !USE THE COMDfTIONAL 
COULD* OR -SOMETHING LIKE THAT.- 

- % 

I 

A o THAT HAS BEEN THE NORMAL FORMULATION. THERE HAVE BEEN ' 

.' THIRD COUNTRY REPORTS THAT INDICATE IT IS MORE POSITIVE, BUT 

NOTHING THAT HAS BEEN CONVEYED OR INTENDED TO SE CONVEYED 70 US; 
THAT i AM AWARE OF • " . . 

Qo DO YOU GET .'•»' IN WHAT IS CONVEYED TO YOU •»• THE USE OF t£ 
CONDITIONAL? '• 

A. THAT s S THE NORMAL FORMULATION', 

Q a DID THE STATE DEPARTMENT AT ANY TIME EVER FEEL THa" 7;":E3E 
' TWO MEN WO'JLD~HAVE ANY BENEFICIAL AFFECT ON TALKS* OR WERE :*HEY 
JUST BEING PAMPERED'/ 

■ 

A. NO* AS i SAID BEFORE* THEY HAD ACTED REASONABLY AND 
RESPONSIBLY. THEY HAD CAREFULLY GONE OVER THE POs's 'ION BEFORE 
' THEY WENT" THEIR ACCOUNTS OF THE CONVERSATIONS INDICATED THAT 
IN SO FAR AS THEY PURPORTED TO DESCRIBE THE VIEWS 07 THE 3CV . . 
THEY HAD DONE'SO HONESTLY AND FAlRLYo THEY HAD AGREED TO REPORT 

26l 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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PAGE 16 STATE 39365 



•■ 



CONFIDENTIALLY WHEN THEY GOT BACK 3 A ND THEY HAD DONE.SQ* 

THEY REPORTED THAT THEY MAD A WAY Or- - COMMUNlCATiNG WITH HANOI. 
WE- ARE PREPARED TO TRY ANY WAY -OF COMMUNICATING WITH HANQJ* 
IT DID NOT SEEM -J TO BE PERFECTLY HO ST --.LIKELY THAT ,'CU 
WOULD OPEN UP A NEW INDIRECT,, AND VE*V" — I WON'T SA* ' v ' 
«»"WELL* I WOULD SAY TENUOUS -* BUT* RUNNING THROUGH THE -: 
TO PHNOM PENH* AND SO ON.- DIDN'T GIVE ONE THE VAST FEE tNG 



: l s 



THAT THIS WAS GOING TO OPEN UP'o BUT* NONETHELESS, We. 



r iuc -> :/ 



PREPARED TO GIVE IT A CHANCE*. IF THEY HaDj IN SOME FASHION* 
STRUCK HO "AS PARTICULARLY REASONABLE MEN THROUGH WHOM HE WOULD 
LIKE TO DEAL* THIS WAS CERTAINLY WORTH WHATEVER SMALL CHAN E 
THERE MIGHT BE THAT THIS WOULD COME OFF* 



;, 



Qo A RELATED QUESTION,, BILLc IN THE .LAST SENTENCE .OF 
STATEMENT YOU SAY " *«o THAT THE PRESENT DISCLOSURE '.. 
REASSURE HANOI "HAT SUCH' PRIVATE CONTACTS WILL BE KEPT 
ARE 'YOU SAYING THIS MIGHT HAVE A SERfQUS AFFECT ON ANY 
CONTACTS OR NEGOTIATIONS' THAT ARE UNDERWAY NOW? 



Ao I. THINK 1 WILL LE i THE STATEMENT "SPEAK FOR ITSE 
I THINK IT IS A SELF-EVIDENT STATEMENT* 



YQU! 

L ' 

SEC " 



.-. ; 



. 



Ft SPENCER • 



> 

> 



Q RELATED TO THE LAST GUEST ION OVER HERE* ON THE PAMPERING* 
DOES THE FACT THAT THIS HAD SENATOR FUtBRlGHT : S IMPRIMATUR 
CAUSE YOU'TO GIVE IT MORE CREDENCE? 

- 

Ao WELL, IT WAS AN ELEMENT OF FACT,. PHIL." BUT I WOULDN'T 
ATTEMPT TO GIVE ANY WEIGHT TO IT* THE REAL QUESTION WAS [ETHER 
IT WAS A CHANNEL WORTH SEEKING A PROBE TO SEE J F ~ 1 7 OPENED UP„ 
AND TO SAY NOTHING IN IT INCONSISTENT* ■ A GENERAL M ; 
CONSISTENT WITH WHAT We WERE SAYING IN THE DIRECT ,CH. SELo 

Q. WOULD YOU EXPLAIN WHAT YOU MEANT BY USJNG'THE WORD 
"MISLEADING" EARLIER .ABOUT THE ASHM0Re"aR7 \Z'„Z -« IN WHAT SENSE? 

Ao MISLEADING IN THE VERY BASIC SENSE -« THAT IT TAKES MO 
ACCOUNT Or MATTERS THAT ARE MATTERS GF PUBLIC RECORD- I AM 
SIMPLY ASTOUNDED* To BE PERFECTLY BLUNT ABOUT IT- "HAT 
MRo ASHMORE -= WHO SEEMS TO HAVE STUDIED T.Ht PRESIDENT -*S LET 
»=> DOESNvT TAKE NOTE OF THE FACT THaT THE PRESIDENT'S LETTS 

262 

UNfM.ASS" - FO 



- r« 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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THE FACT THAT MRo ASHMORE COlK-D ATTEMPT TO DESCRIBE OUR CON ' i " 
KITH HIM/ EXTENDING QUITE SELF-EV-DENtCy OVER THE SAME ?'Ek . 0d* 
WITHOUT ANY REFERENCE TO THE POSSIBILITY "HAT THERE >■' ' > 
A PROBLEM IN OUR MINOS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE fWG* 
SEEMS' TO ME TO DESERVE THE WORD MISLEADING,/ 

G« WE ARE ALWAYS IN A POSITION OF DISCUSSING WITH t'QU ISSUE*; 
LIKE THIS EIGHT OR NINE MONTHS AFTER THE FACT* AND* IN ORDER 
'TO AVOID THIS EIGHT MONTHS FROM NOW* a"E YOU INVOLVED *N 
GREAT EFFORT WITH HANOI AT THIS "TIME? 

Ac I THINK YOU KNOW MY ANSWER TO ".'HAT-, tj IS THE STOCK 
ANSWER THAT WE ALWAYS GIVE TO QUESTIONS OF THIS SORT-. ;T IS. 
NOT TO BE READ ONE WAY OR ANOTHER- AND THAT IS "NO CQMMENTc" 

Qo IT WAS WORTH A TRYo 

Qo is this using the press media to carry on secret 

NEGOTIATIONS? 

& I 

A* 'JS^Ng WHAT? 
■ Qo THE PRESS MEDIA o 

■ . 

' . WELL; I .WOULDN'T DESCRIBE IT IN "KA~ SENSE 
BECAUSE IN 

respect to the views that Phey got trom us a and [heir imparting 
of those views j and their imparting back To us what was said 
to them/ it was quite clearly understood wjfh messrs ggs 

AND ASHMqRE THAT THY WERE ACTING AS AMERICAN "CITIZENS AND NOT 
AS PRESS MENc THE* UNDERTAKINGS EXCHANGED BETWEEN USj . \ EFFECT.; 



UNCLASSIFIED 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 









4 & 



•Mr*..,.--..* ^.i..^.. 



Department of State 



r.t 



* 



• 



V 



* •' 



. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 18 STATE 39365 • " 

* 

WERE UNDERTAKINGS THAT THEY WOULD NOT PUBLISH THIS 



El 



Go ■ DO YOU FEEL THEY HaVE' BROKEN THAT UNDERTAKING BY POBLlS* 
WHAT THEY .HAVE PUBLISHED? 



Ac I WILL LEAVE THAT FOR YOU TO JU06E* AND I WILL LEAVE . 
THE LAST SENTEN~E OF THE RELEASE. 



r! . 



Qc JUST TO CLARIFY ONE POINT 'HERE., AND TO GET THE MAIN i'Hn-JS'i 
OF ONE OF THE POINTS '"HAT YOU ARE MAKINGS IS IT '.ACCURATE ?G 
SAY THE EXISTENCE OF THE SECRET MOSCOW CHANNEL WAS <:: D. _0S£O 
TO THESE TWO GENTLEMEN* BECAUSE IT WAS FEARED "HAY I \.Ci NG 
IT IN SECRET TO THEM MIGHT ' SOMEHOW IN SOME WAY DESPITE '': r 
BEST EFFORTS LEaD To EXPOSING iAJ YCU"*BEL IEVED 'TO RE A P,T.^ : L . - 
CHANNEL OF CONTINUING DIRECT NEGOTIATION? 



A= -THAT'S TRUE* THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE 'MOSCOW XHANNEL 
EXTREMELY CLOSELY HELDo NOW* FOR ~ObV?OUS. REASONS s "/OU C/.Y ' 
CONDUCT SECRET DIPLOMACY WITHOUT THAT* TO SUGGEST THAT TWO 
PRIVATE CITIZENS* HOWEVER WELL "MEANING* SHOULD BE INFORM; 



r ■■ 



v ■■ • 

i 1 



SEEMS TO ME/ ON k'TS FACE* AN UNWISE SUGGESTION* 



Qo WAS THERE ANYTHING EXCHANGED IN THE MOSCOW CHANNEL PRICR \'0 
THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO HO THAT GaVE"YOU ANY ENCOURAGEMENT^ 



i 



Ao I HAVE SAID IN THE STATEMENT THE ONLY ANSWER I WlL 
THAT* WHICH IS THAT WE NEVER HAD ANY USEFU* RESPONSE TO 
THE PROPOSALS" BUT, TO REPEAT.* V 0U KEEP TRYING" 



G I '■! E 7 
ANY OF 



Q„ ON PAGE SEVEN OF YOUR STATEMENT YOU SAY THAT YOU " »c, NOTE 
WITH REGRET THAT MR a ASHMCRE IS APPARENTLY IGNORANT OF THE 
SUBSEQUENTLY PUBLISHED REPORTS OF THE MOSCOW CON-TACTS, AND OF. 
THEIR CONFIRMATION BY DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVES* WE N< WITH 
STILL- GREATER REGRET THAT AT NO TIME SINCE HAS HE CONSULTED 
WITH THE DEPARTMENT IN ORDER TO ATTEMPT TO UNDERSTAND 
AND SO ON* AND SO 0N« 



4 i. 



f! 



ARE YOU SAYING THERE THAT YOU HAD NO CONTACT WITH 
PUBLISHED THE LETTERS? AND WOULDN'T 1*7 HAVE BEEN. 
WISE TO HAVE CALLED HIM AND SAID; "NOW'YO'J SEE •■■■'-', 

CAREEUL" AND SO ON? 

264 

■ *"• ■ UNCLASSIFIED 



. s: 



C 



HO 
PERHAPS-, 

- JE 30 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






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PAGE j9 STATE 39365 



Ao 1 SAY THAT WE HAVE CERTAINLY HAD NO i; CO NT-ACTS Of THE K . ! iC 
THAT IS DESCRIBED IN THE SENTENCE* I AM NOT AWARE 0' ANY CF 
ANY SORT. WE HAVE KEPT IN TOUCH WITH REPRESENTATIVES DF ,mE 
CENTERS AND WE HAY HAVE TALKED TO MR. AXflRE ON MATTERS RE_A 'ED 
TO THE GENEVA CONFERENCE; IN MAYo J 'SUPPOSE WE "CQtJLD HAVE 
TRIED TO CLARIFY JT fl BUT WE COUL0N»T HAVE GONE FURTHER 
WHAT WOULD HAVE SEEMED TO ■ MOST CF US A FAIRLY SECF-t . DE 
CONCLUSION FROM THE PUBLISHED R'EPORYS, 



- 
» i ; r • . 



PU 



DID THE DEPARTMENT .LEARN IN ADVANCE 
ISH THIS PIECE 1 ? 



THAT HE WAS GOING 70 



Ao NO* WE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE WHATSOEVER" 



t* ' ( 



..,, Qc WHY DIDN'T YOU INCLUDE IN MR* ASHMpRE 9 S .LETTER A SPEC:" .. 
■. CONDITION .LIKE THE PRESIDENT MADE? 



Ao WELL, LET: ME PUT YOURSELF IN OUR !SHQES« WE HAD A'VERV C;.; 
DIRECT CHANNELS WE HAD IN THE BAGGS/ASJ RE THING ONLY THE 



ST 



■'CONCEIVABLE MAKINGS Of- A CHANNEL c YO START.' CM THE F I R 
'• COMMUNICATION* THROUGH A NEW. AND UNTRIED CHANNEL W! E . . . v3 
• SPECIFIC IS NOT* ■PERHAPS* ALWAYS THE WISEST STRATEGY., ?,.;, ,;j_',V. 

WHEN YOU HAVE GOT A DIRECT CHANNEL THROUGH WhICH"Y0U CAN SAY 
' ANYTHING YoU WANT* 

Q MR* BUNDY* ARE THERE ANY MORE CF THESE FREE-LANCE .EFFORTS 
GOING ON/'SiNCE THEN? " 

■ 

. Ac WELL.- LET ME SAY THERE HAVE BEEN A GREAT MANYt AND I WON'T 
COMMENT ON WHETHER THERE ARE ANY UNDER WAY AT THE PRESENT "TIME* 
FOR THE SAME REASONS THAT I GAVE THE RESPONSE I D I D TO MR- KAi_8o 

1 

THIS HAS BEEN RECURRENT* AND* A3 WE MAKE CLEAR IN THIS STATEMENT* 
REASONABLE AND DISCREET ACTION BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS IS SOMETHING 
WE ARE PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH* i'V ;HAS TO BE WEIGHED 
AGAINST THE TOTAL PICTURE OF CONTACTS THAT "EXIST AT ANY ONE TIME* 

Q«' SHALL WE MEET AGAIN. IN EIGHT MONTHS? 



(LAUGHTER J 



265 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



1 
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of State 



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UfNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 20 STATE 39365 



i 



Qa MR 


o B^NDY 


s A C C 


ON THE 


LETTER 


— T 


TO THE 


DEPARTI 


1 E N 1 


PART I C 


ulaR IN' 


7£R£ 


COULD 


BEGIN* 1 


3 ROVI 


CEASE 


IN'RODU 


:ing 


EXPRES 


SEO THE 


OP IN 


INDl'CA 


te That 


NE I T 


PROVI0 


E TANGIi 


3LE E 


THE PR 


C3PECTS 


FOR 



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RY 



OR DING TO THE LETTER J "HEY GAY -- 
HAT THEY SENT TO MO.XHl MINH (IT 
S. OFFICIALS ) -« "HEY SAY* QUOTE* 'THE 
T IN YOUR SUGGEST JON TO US THAT ?R . . 
DING THE U« Ss STOP BOMBING r : C : 
ADDITIONAL U« S^> TROOPS JNTO V2g 'NAM * 
ION THAT SOME RECIPROCAL RESTRAINTS BE 
HER SIDE GETS TH1 ,D VANTAGE* WHjfCH WOU[ « 
VlDENCE OF THE GOOD FAITH OF A! .. PAR"' 
A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT ••» 



RE 


'ORT 


EF 


ER ' . 


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I RETURN AGAIN TO MY QUESTIONS WHAT MAKES YOU SO .SURE THAT 
•HANOI WASN'T READING 'THI ; S AS :S0METHlN6~:C0NTRA0;cTORY TO Mi ' 
THEY RECEIVED LATER FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON? 



A. WELL* BECAUSE I THINK .HANOI IS SOPHISTICATED ENOUGH T 
REALIZE THAT A DIRECT CHANNEL AND A DIRECT COMMUNICATION; 
SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED ?TA"ES.. IS THE H IAT 
v/O r CEs AND I THINK THEY WOULD I E SEEN CLEARLY WHAT WE '■ E 
Du T NG* THEY KNEW MESSRS- BASGS AND ASKMORE, AND THEY :UsV HAV 






SEEN CLtARLYj. 






WHAT THE DISTINCTION WAS, 



HA < D-io-h 



EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME KIND Of. A RESPONSE* HAD THEY 
BEEN LESS NEGATIVE ON THE BAGGS/'aSHMORE CHANNEL; i'F THEY 
WISHED TO DEVELOP IT» 

I REALLY D0N'<T THINK SOPHISTICATED RECIPIENTS WOULD HAVE HAD 
ANY TROUBLE SORTING THAT ONE OUTo 



Q. DID YOU •-, IN SPEAKING WITH BAGGS AND 
THE VIEW THAT WE SH0ULDN»T SEEK TO'TIE AMY 
BOMBING TO THE TRUCE: IN OTHER WORDS* TAKE 
APPARENTLY WAS CONTRADICTED' BY THE OFFICIA 
PRESIDENT MADE ONLY A FEW DAYS .LATER? 



SHMORE « E rss 



ryr 

I r^c. 



SUSPENSION GF 
A PO'SITION WHICH 
PROPOSAL THAT 7H 



A* LET ME SAY WHAT WE WERE DEALING WITH THERE -* WE WERE DEALING 



WITH; AMONG OTHEI iHINGSj* TIMING fACiORS« 



i He 



PtR-OD OF THE 



TET TRUCE' THE AGREED PERIOD* RAN FROM THE STH TO THE ISTHi 
WE WERE DEALING WITH A LETTER TH a T WAS GOING TG BE* AIR MAILED 
ON THE 5TH TO PHNOM PENH, TO SUPPOSE THAT ?T COULD REACH HANOI 
IN TIME TO REELECT IN ANY WAY* BEFORE "HE EXPIRATION 0^ THE TRUCE 



UNCLASSIFIED 



266 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



■ 






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, PAGE 21 STATE 39365 • ■ ' 

* 

PERIOD* R A N AGAINST ANY REASONABLE CALCULATION OF TIME AND* 
AL$0»' THiS HAPPENS TO FIT WITH THE ?,' ■.'7.'.' REVEALED BY "US 

-- TO MR„ AXMRE >- DELIVERY DATE* WHICH WAS THE !3"H N 
PMOM PENH" THERE WAS NO POINT IN ST« WE WANTED ' TO GET A:. 
FROM THAT- AND, INCIDENTALLY* THE REFERENCE- :N THE PRESlC " S 
LETTER SpEAKS FOR ITSELF ON THAT SUBJECT, AND I WILL LET . " 
SPEAK FOR ITSELFi bUT I THINK* IF YOU REREAD $T* ,L : 

THAT IT DOESN'T HAVE THE IMPLICATION THAT SOME OF •<* . tSH S 
WORDS APPLY TO ITo 

Q 3 WAS THE SPECIFIC DEMAND FOR ADVANCE ASSURANCE OF THE HALT 
IN NORTH VIETNAMESE INFILTRATION INTO THE SOUTH FORM uATED ' 
'- BEFORE* OR AFTER* THE ASHMORE LETTER WAS DRAFTED? 

' Ao THAT'S MOT A QUESTION I .CAN REASONABLY OR PROFITABLY D^SCUSi 
THIS IS A L'xNE OF THOUGHT THAT HAD GONE ON FOR A U3NG .-■ LOi WHILE* 






0- CAN YOU SAY WHAT IT IS *= NOT FOR MR » SCALI *.S BEN H 

FOR THE BENEFIT OF MR- SCALI'8 HEARERS »- WHAT IMPLICATION "YOU 

ARE TALKING ABOUT WHEN YOU REFER TO THE PRESIDENT'S .f' l:- 

MR« ASHMORE *S STATEMENTS? 

Ac WELL, THE TREATMENT IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER Of ANY 
EXTENSION OF THE TET TRUCE* I THINK, . I § NOT REALLY OPEN TO THE 
KINDS OF FEARS THAT ARE .ASCRIBED BY MR* ASHMQRE *?0 US IN OUR 
DISCUSSIONS OF THE SAME TOPIC IN RELATION TO THEIR CONVERSATION,, 
IS THAT C-EAR? 

Q* NOo TRY AGAIN, 

. 

A, ALL RIGHT' IF YOU GET OUT THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER, YOU 

WILL SEE THAT ITS TREATMENT OF THIS IS NOT MADE A CONDITION OR 

ANYTHING Op THIS SORT = IT MERELY SAID IT WILL BE HELPFUL \ F 

YOU LOOK AT THIS PROBLEM.- WHICH HAD B£?N THE SUBJECT OF STATEMENTS 

FROM SAIGON, BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOV 1£NT, OF OURSELVES - 

IF YOU COU^D LOOK iO SEE IF WE COULD EXTEND THIS* THIS WOULD BE 

HELPFUL s BUT I T 3 S IN No SENSE '•' i ME • L I Mj TED OR CONO I T I ONED 5 ■' THAT -. 



q. DO YOU AGREE; BILL, WITH 
PRESIDENT'S LETTER CONST I TUT 
CONDITIONS? 



rHE WIDELY STATED VIEW Tj 
D A HARDENING OF THE AMERJ 



* * 









UNCLASSIFIED 
267 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number; NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



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Department of State 






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unclassified 



.PAGE! 22 STATE 39365 



A, NO* I DO N0T« IT ADDED A VERY MAJOR ACTION 0?g OUR SIDE, 
THE CESSATION Or REINFORCEMENTS IMMEDIATELY. IT FF-GPO^ED A 
VERY MAJOR ACTION ON ".'HE OTHER SIDE IN RESPONSE* THERE IS A 
LONG SERIES OF PROPOSALS 0" A GENERAL SORT ,N TH-S • ,'.T 
BEEN MADE PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY,"" I DO NOT CON 
TO HAVE BEEN A HARDENING* ON THE CONTRARY* »7 ADDED ■ 



HAVE 

THIS 



VERY MAJOR NEW ACTION ON OUR PARTo 



Q 



THAT'S THE SOFTEN I NGo 



A i 1 
HAVE 



CONSIDER n CONSISTENT WITH THE BASIC WAV IN 
PPROACHED THIS WHOLE QUESTION OF .CESS AT I ON - 



WHICH WE 







THE IMPLICATION OF 



v,j i 



SAYS 



I THINK HE ALMO 
GOOD THl'NG GOING WHXCr 
SOME KIND OF AGREEMENT 
A VERY To"JGH LETTER TO 



ASHMORE'S STATEMENT IN HIS ART! '-.:-:, <',■ 
IT IN SO MANY WORDS* IS THAT HE 3 A 
WOULD HAVE VERY* VERY PROBABLE .-J I'D 
TO STOP THE WAR;' AND THE PRESIDENT SENT 
HO ^KICV KNOCKED IT ALL IN 



< * t- 






NOW, IN VERY SIMPLE PEASANT LANGUAGE* THIS IS WHAT A LOT OF 

THIS WHOLE CONTROVERSY IS ABOUT* WILL. YOU COMMENT ON /KJ3 POiNVl 



A, YES* I WILL COMMENT TO SAY THAT IT'S .AGAIN OBVIOUS TO ANY 
STUDENT OF THE RELATIVE" WEIGHT TO BE ATTACHED TO THE CHANNELS AS 
OF THAT TIME THAT THE DIRECT CHANNEL IN MOSCOW WAS BY FA?? THE 
MOST IMPORTANT* I THINK MR, aSHMORe 'YIELDS TO AM UNDERSTANDABLE 

PERSONAL FEELING THAT HIS OWN WAS THE CENTER OF "HE STAGE. 

I THINK THE ACCOUNT I HAVE GIVEN MAKES' CLEAR THAT IT WAS NOT* 

AND IN THE NATURE OF THINGS COULD NOT BE - 



IS 



N 



THE QUESTION IS WHAT THE SUM TOTAL OF WE EXCHANGE 

MOSCOW -« WHICH I HaVE CHARACTERIZED A§ TAR AS ITS IN THE 

NATIONAL INTEREST TO DO « AND OF ThE PRESIDENT'S LETTER; AN 

WHAT HO c S REPLY IS. AND I THINK IT' : S CLEARp IF YOU TAKE 

ALL, TOGETHER* THAT THE READING WAS TKA"f HANOI HAD NO DESIRE I 

MOVE AT THAT TIME* 



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o» to what extent did :he 

CONVERSATION WITH HO ■• - T '0 
THE END PRODUCT/ NAMELY TH 



6AC.3S-ASHM0RE REPORT HAVE THE 
WHAT E >' T E N T "• D I P 7 H A T C N 7 R \ 5 U '. E '." 
LETTER OF FEBRUARY 8?H BY 'T PRESlD-i 



* 



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! UNCLASSIFIED 

268 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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page 23 state 39355 



A« I THINK I HAVE ALREADY ANSWERED THAT QUESTION- 
Q„ I AM NOT CLEAR. 

A-- WHAT i SAID WAS THAT THAT IT WAS OBVIOUSLY PART OF OUR 
TOTAL INFORMATlONo I DON'^T THINK IT PLAYED A •SIC-::'."..: V 
PART* BUT !-;T WAS A PART OF OUR TOTAL STOCK OF INFORMATION? 

I * r 

Q COULD I ASK THE QUESTION ANOTHER WAY? ARE YOU PREPARED 
SAY THAT THE PRESI DENTf S .LETTER WAS IN NO WAY IHASINA8 Ej 
CONCEIVABLE* RELATED TO THE BA-GG8-A-SHM.QRE 







et 



A a NOr I DIDN'T SAY ANY SUCH THING- I SAID IT WAS BASED ON 
TOTAL ANALYSIS OF ALL INFORMATION OVER A L.QNG PERIOD OF TIME 
AND* IN PARTICULAR ON THE I NFGRNAT I OH , NEGATIVE THOUGH IT WAS; 
OF RESPONSE TO THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS MADE IN MOSCOW TO 0TH1 
INFORMATION THAT HAD REACHED US FROM OTHER QUARTERS VERY CENT: 
AND REFERRED TO IN THE RRES I DENT* S -.LETTER AND'TO'tKE TOTALITY 
0," ALL WE HAD* . 

NOWj OF COURSE.-) IN THAT TOTAL tSENSE* 'WHAT BAGG3 AND ASHM0RE HAD 

s'rVEN us w A s a part OF I7«' so to say t hat it had MO IMPACT HA3J 

i would say; ny own summation •»« no significant impact «- but 
it was a part of the 'totality* 

qo but you will not say that the cay that you drafted the letts 
with ashmore that you were in the process of drafting 7k£ 

PRESIDENT'S LETTER? 



Ac NO* SIR. I WILL NOT COMMENT ON THE DRAFTING OF LETTER 
WRITTEN BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED~STATES.y 



C3 



Q a 



WELL,- THIS IS THE CENTRAL POINT OF HIS ARGUMENT.. 



k, NOT AT ALL* IN THE ACCOUNT I HAVE OlVENo THE EXACT DAY AT 
WHICH YOU COME TO A DECISION TO HANDLE A THING,; 17* SEEHS TO ME-* 
IS A MATTER THAT A GOVERNMENT IS ENTITLED TO .LET STAND UN "THE 
RECORD o 

Q« BUT VOU ARE TRYING TO ANSWER HIS ACCUSaT ; C-N* ■ AND HIS 



UNCLASSIFI 



269 



Reclassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



■v> 



*4W 0« 



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ep art met 



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.UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE ?H STATE 39365 

ACCUSA-IQN IS THAT ONE-HALF Of 
THE OTHER HALF WAS D0:NG- 



TH 



GOVERNMENT D. V KNOW . ■ :, : 



A* I HAVE ANSWERED THA 
WHO FRAMEO THE RESPONSE 
FULLY AWa^E OF ALL THAT 
OTHER CHANNEL* 



QUESTION TOO, I 
THAT WAS GIVEN TO 
WAS UNDER WAY AND 



: 



-.- 



HAVE SAID THAT 

MR* AS'-!,: ORE WERI 
CONTEMPLATED I" THE 



Q* WAS THE LETTER UNDER WAY AND CONTEMPLATED AT '.'HAT TH1E7 

Ao THAT'S ,4 QUESTION THAT I REGARD AS A MATTER OF EXECUTIVE 
PRIVILEGE. AND NOT A MATTER IN WHICH ANY SPOKESMAN FOR THE 
ADMINISTRATION SHOULD COMMENT; r^>E LETTER SPEAKS FOR H'SELF* 

I 

', Co BUT YOU STAND BY WHAT YOU SAID BEFORE* THAT THE LETTER Was 

t i 

1 

A* WE WILL NEVER COMMENT ON DATE? LETTERS ARE WRITTEN* 



0- YOU DID SAY BE FOR 



'C • « sa 



•s — 



'- 



YOU ORIGINALLY TOLD US IT WAS WRITTEN ON- THE SND& ''OU DID. 



A« N0» I MERELY CORRECTED THE RECORD ON THATvCfiAL* 



Q 



AFTER IT BECOMES -- 



A= IF IT WAS SAID AT ANY TIME BY ANY ADMINISTRATION 
SPOKESMEN THAT IT WAS FEBRUARY 2ND .« AND THIS ISAM 
THAT DOUBTLESS BOB MCCLGSKEY HAS GOV SOMEBODY LOOKING 
THIS MOMENT--" THAT WAS IN ERROR* THAT LETTER WAS \ 



(TTER 

' AT 
ITS PUB 



m 



FORM DATED FEBRUARY 8?H> 



- 
A 



HAVE TOLD YOU TriE FACTS o 



I 



Q 



I THINK WHEN WE WERE GIVEN THE LETTER THERE WaS NO DATE ON 






Ap THAT QUITE- OFTEN "HAPPENS WITH CORRESPONDENCE o 



1 . • w 



• NORMALLY GIVEN A DATE CORRESPONDING TO THE DATE 

" TRANSMISSION* WHICH IN THIS CASE WAS VERY EARLY ON THE 3TH* 



MR» MCCLOSKEY! I HAVE 'THE RECORD OF TH£ TRANSCRIPT ON TH <~ 
DAY- THERE'S NO REFERENCE TO FEBRUARY'S IN THE RECORD 0,N THaT« 



;• 



UNCLASSIFIED 
270 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


















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Department of State 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 25 STATE 39365 



AND 



RE ALLY DON'T KNOW HOW 
WILL HAVE TO LEAVE IT 



HE FEBRUARY 
ONE SIDE. 



2 STOR'/ GOT S ;AR 'Eds 



Q 







HIGHER OFFICIALS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF StX.TE TOLD US 'THA-T DATE a 



Ac WELL* IN THA 
RUSK 



EVENT WE WERE WRONG. UNQUOTE* 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



271