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VLC Settlement of the Conflict ^6 Vols,)
Histories of Contacts (4 Vols,)
2, Polish Track
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STATES
1945
VIETNAM RELATIONS
- 1967
VIETNAM TASK FORCE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4lX
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VI. C. 2.
VI. SET'XLEMEIff OF THE COBIFLICT
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C. Histories of Contacts
2. Marigold
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MARIGOLD
This study consists of two parts ^ a chronology of the principal
events in the negotiating initiative known as Marigold (Part II)^ and
an analytic discussion of some of the principal questions raised by
ferigold (Part 1). Part I is based on Part IIj with citations to it
indicated by date, V/hile Part I can be read without reference to
Part II J it may be easier going with Just a few of the main dates and
happenings in mind:
I^te in June 1966^ the Polish ICC Representative ^ Levandowski^
rettirned to Saigon from Hanoi vith some ideas he felt could serve as
a basis for negotiations. These were conmunicated to the US through
the Italian government and followed up by discussions in Saigon with
Lewandowskij D'Orlandi (the Italian Ambassador) and Lodge participating
in various combinations. In addition^ Lewandowski made several visits
to Hanoi. On November 30 ^ he presented a 10 point formulation^ reflecting
his understanding of the US position^ '>7hich he said Hanoi woxild accept
as a basis for direct ^^conversation" betvreen US and DRV representatives
in Warsaw. On December 2. Hanoi-;, vhich had not been bombed since mid-
Aug:ustj was hit by US airstrikes. On December 3^ the Poles protested
the attack as endangering the prospective Warsaw meeting; and the US
officially accepted Levandovskl's 10 points^ subject to "important
differences of interpretation." On December k^ Hanoi was bombed again.
During the next 10 days^ the Poles and Americans argued about the pattern
of US bombing and ttie "differences of interpretation" clause. In the
interim (December 6)j how^ever^ Hanoi was officially informed of the US
acceptance J as (qualified. On December I3 and Ik^, Hanoi was bombed again;
and the DRV instructed the Poles to end all conversations about the
proposed contact. On December 2^!-^ the US infonned the Ccmmunists that
it would refrain from bombir^ within a 10 mile radius of Hanoi ^s center ^
expressing the hope that this vo^Jild permit the V/arsaw meeting to take
place; but the offer was not accepted.
Strictly J the irea within 5 miles of the center of Hanoi
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The Role of the Polish Intermedlar:^
The part played in Marigold "by the DRV is veiled in mystery^
because all US transactions in the matter passed through Polish hands*
The initiative for the contact can only be traced back as far as the
Poles, It begins with Levandowski*s retui\^ from Hanoi in late June
1966, Irfhether he acted on Hanoi's request^ on Soviet urging^ or his
ovn sense of enterprise is not knovn. The sub servient flow of informa-
tion on DRV vievs and reactions came almost entirely through the Polish
channel J and the Poles verej intent icnallyj ambiguous in distinguishing
between their own thoughts and Hanoi's,
Drawing conclusions from the story is a compounded problem because
the PoleSj by their own account^ conceived of their function as guite
different from neutrally passing messages:
— They acted as brokers^ probing us (and perhaps Hanoi) to find
elements of "give'' that would narrow the gap between US and DRV posi-
tions on the terms of settlement. Their most inventive act in this
role was producing a Polish formulation of the official US position as
a starting point for US-DRV talks. In this way^ each side had a
glimpse of possible areas of negotiation ^ without first committing
itself to specific language or firm concessions.
— They tried to steer the exchanges away from topics we preferred
(especially de-escalation) toward those they said had greater chance
of acceptance in Hanoi (the terms of an overall settlemant).
--They acted as friends of Hanoi^ not neutrals,
"-Most importantly J they applied pressure on the U3 to participate
in good faith J by the ever present threat of disclosing their version
of the matter to influential world leaders or the public at large. Thus
our first intimation of Marigold came via the Italian Government ^ which
had been informed in Saigon and Rome by the Poles. ¥e knew immediately^
and were forcefully i^minded at critical moments later^ that US responses
which might be viewed by others as reluctance in the pursuit cf peace ^
skepticism about finding a "political^' solution^ or intransigence on
matters of substance j might be used against us.
The only tenable working assumptions on the US side^ therefore j
were that the Poles pursued at least three objectives in ferigold ^^
and most likely a fourth as well: (l) Ending the violence in Vietnam.
(2) Doing so on teims relatively favorable to the Communist side.
(3) Building a case that could be used against the US^ as pressure
during the development of the contact or as a source of embarrassment
to the US should the whole venture fail, (in addition^ the Poles no
doubt sought to cast themselves in a role of historical importance.)
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As so often with multiple objectlTCSj none seams to have been maxi-
mized. For example J if the Poles vere concerned solely vlth ending the
var (regardless of the terms )j they should have acted vith greater
discretion after the contact broke down, because this would better pre-
serve their usefulness as an inteimediary in the future . On the other
hand J had they been concerned solely with discomfitting the USj they
could have used their ammunition to greater effect by leaking earlier
and more sensationally to the press * Perhaps different individuals on
the Polish side gave differing priorities to this objective or that,!
In any case^ the fact that none of the objectives was pursued to its
logical maximum must mean that^ in some larger Polish scheme of things ^
all were accorded considerable inportance •
El is is critical in interpreting the episode as a whole j because it
implies that^ with whatever degree of imprecision^ the Poles were in fact
trying to find areas of compromise between the DEV and US on acceptable
outcomes to the war, Their effort was taken seriously enough in Hanoi to
result in DRV agreement to meet with a US representative in Warsaw, ^ This
in turn must mean they received seme serious guidance on policy frcm the
DEV^ even though it is quite unlikely that they were privy to Hanoi's
minimum bargaining positions, V/hat they conveyed to us about promising
directions for negotiations j therefore j should reflect something of Hanoi's
considered judg:aentSj but cannot of course be read as a map of finn and
final DEV positions.
It was apparently not until after the Warsaw contact was canceled
that the Poles were asked to specify those messages they had passed on
explicit instruction from Hanoi. {Siere were three^ they said: Lewandowski's
message to Lodge expressing DEV agreement to the Warsaw talks; the warning
after the December 3 (sic) boaibing of Hanoi that the contact was being
reassessed by the DEV; and the decision to cancel the Warsaw meeting after
the December 13-14 bombing of Hanoi. In add it ion ^ the Poles said they had
numerous exchanges with Hanoi during the period of Gronouski's contacts
with Sapacki in Warsaw (i-e.j after December 5) and claimed that they were
therefore able to reflect Hanoi's views accurately even when speaking on
their own initiative,
For e^xample^ the cable traffic conveys a picture of Lewandovski as mere
detached than E^packij more concerned simply with bringing the contending
parties together than with exacting concessions from the US or throwing
the onus for failure upon it. On the other hand^ this may reflect differ*
ences between the US reporters in Saigon and Warsaw as much as actual
differences between the two Poles.
^e do not know what the DEV expected from the Warsaw meeting nor how its
prospects were represented to Hanoi by the Poles. Bis evidence that the
DEV did in fact agree to the meeting is examined in another section.
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How accurate and explicit they were in transmitting US views to
Hanoi is not known. They seem to have made at least one major blunder
(described in the next section)^ and may well have made others.
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Did the DRV Agree?
It is at least possible that the Poles had no commi-biient from the
DRV at all J but on balance this seems highly improbable. By the begin-
ning of December J they had gone far out on a l±mb in their contacts and
arrangements vith at least the Americans ^ the Italians and^ apparently^
the Russians, It is hard to see what could have motivated them to go
this far purely on speculation^ given the consequences for them of a
revelation that the vhole venture was built on air.
Is:
The evidence that the DRV did in fact agree to a meeting in Warsaw
(1) Rapacki's statement to Gronouski that Levandovski i^ras acting
on DRV instructions in "the message he gave to Lodge , , . upon his
return from Hanoi expressing ^TVtT iDositive response to the Warsaw talks"
(12/21/66);
(2) Zinchuk^s statement to Bundy that "the Polish effort was
serious and that the Soviets were fully with it" and that "he had been
surprised J in discussing the Polish initiative in the Department . . ,
to see that it was treated as doubtful" (12/22/66);
(3) Burchett^s statement to Isham that a DRV official had actually
been en route to Warsaw for the proposed meeting when "the US resumed
bombing Hanoi" and the contact was canceled (I2/6/67).
If Eurchett's information is accurate j it would mean that Hanoi
had been informed by the Poles of US acceptance of the Lewandowski formu-
lation and was satisfied with the US response - The US formally accepted
Lewandowski^s 10 points on December 3^ with the qualification that "several
specific points are subject to important differences of interpretation."
If the Poles accurately conveyed the US positioUj therefore; it would also
follow that the DRV had acquiesced in this extremely broad reservation*
Here J however^ some further questions arise, Hapacki^ in a meeting
with Gronouski J indicated that Lodge had "confiimed" Lewandowski's formu-
lation on December 1^ introducing the "important differences of interpre-
tation" clause as a further condition two days later. (I2/5/66) ITnis
would Imply that Lodge accepted Lewandowski^s 10 points without referring
them to Washington J which seems extremely unlikely. Apparently the Poles
informed Hanoi prematurely of US acceptance j omitting the qualification
about interpretation- ( 12/6/ 66) But by December 6 they had conveyed
the US message In its final form* (I2/7/66) If the DEV official was
en route when the bombing of Hanoi resumed — December 13-14 — the interpre-
tation clause must have been transmitted and accepted by the ^lorth Viet-
namese.
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Tais would mean that the content of tiie interpretation clause did
not in itself cause the contact to abort- However^ three days (December
3-^6) may have been lost vhile the Poles urged us to withdraw the clause
and ve demurred. Woxild the Warsaw talks actually have begun before the
December I3-IU bombing if this time had been saved? Would they have been
continued if the bombing occurred after the first meeting or two?
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The Polish Vision of a Vietnam Solution
At four points during JVlarigold^ Levando'wski offered sketches of
a negotiated outcome to the war. None of these is precise or complete,
Kone is an authoritative statement of what would be acceptable to the
DEV, They differ in content^ each serving a different purpose in his
development of the contact. All^ however^ are consistent with each
otherj suggesting they derive from a single set of concepts. They are
consistent J tooj with several key planks of the revised ULF Program^
released In Augus-fc I96T — in particular ; the call for new elections
with universal sufferage and the establishment of a government with
Communist participation.
His revelations have a pattern; The first was the come-on^
cou^
hed
in the most attractive but vaguest terois of all. The second and third
were explorations of h.aw much the traffic would bearj testing in turn the
reactions of the Italians (perhaps as bellwethers of 'Vorld opinion")
and of official feshing^ton. The last was the most serious ^ his own
fonnulation of the US posit ion j designed to provide a substantive basis
for direct talks between the US and DRV. Its language had therefore to
encompass the minimum outcomes acceptable to both sides ^ using ambiguity
to cloak the differences his brokerage could not eliminate.
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Apparently^ -the best terms he hoped to obtain were eventual US
military withdrawal based on US acceptance of the NLF in a coalition
governtnent^ along with a sharp reduction in the role played in that
government by militant anti^ communists* The minimum he felt acceptable
as a basis for talks Is^ naturally ^ harder to discern. It seems to have
been less a final solution to the conflict than a change in the ground
3:iiles under which the struggle to rule SW would continue. The principal
elements seemed to be acceptance of the Communists as legitimate contenders
for power; and the substitution of international machinery of some sort
for US artned participation in regulating the outcome. Left open is the
question of whatj if anything^ the Communists would give in exchange (e,g.^
NVA withdrawal^ etc* )
Lewandowski^s thoughts on settlement are described briefly telow-
MDre detail is given xa the chronology^ for which the relevant dates are
also indicated below,
(1) The Tteaser , US interest (and Italian) was first aroused
by a statement of things the DRV did not demand as part of a final
settlement, levandcwskij just back from a trip to Hanoi in June
1966^ billed this negative list as "a very specific peace offer/^
even though it lacked the positive demands that would inevitably be
in a final settlement. >Jhat Hanoi did not demand included:
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immediate reunification; socialism in SVIT; a change in SW
relations in foreign affairs; neutralization; immediate with-
dxaval of US forces; DRV interference in the SVN government.
The last pointy hovever^ vas modified to the extent of asking
for a government led by "someone other than Ky."
On the positive side^ Hanoi *s demands seemed to concern
i^gotiation procedures. It would enter negotiations if the NLF
could '^take part" (though not as sole representative of SWl)
and if the bombing of the North vera suspended. The first of
these demands J of course ^ is not purely procedural ^ since giving
the NLF a formal role in negotiations would move it toward a
position of legitimacy in SVN politics ^ whatever the outcome of
the negotiations •
Lewandowski^ then^ seemed to suggest that the war could be
brought to an end by strengthening the position of the NLF^
weakening that of Ky (and^ no doubt j the anti- communist tendency
in SVN he represented )j fudging all other issues over at least
the short run. (6/27/6?)
(s) Ruminations . During September^ Lewandowski communed
with D'Orlandl in Saigon on possible solutions. All of his
thoughts J however J returned to a single theiae: coalition
government. The bulk of the ministers could be "sensible SVIT
politicians/* with a man or two from the right (meaning the Ky
government) and a man or two from the left (meaning the NLF) in
"unimportant ministries." Of perhaps even greater significance ^
he firmly opposed any development designed to reinforce the
status quo with respect to the then existing GVl" -- including ^
specifically J measures for mutual de-escalation of the war.
(9/V66-9/1V66)
Later j D^Orlandi outlined a settlement package that he
thought would get immediate; seri.ous consideration in Hanoi.
It included US withdrawal "eventually"; internationally con-
trolled elections "after one or two years"; leading to a
neutral J coalition government. Coalition^ in his mind^ was
"not a 'must.f" V,Tiether this package rei^lected Lewandowski 's
appraisal^ or D ^Orlandi^s softening of the Pole's vleWj is not
clear. (10/I6/66)
(3) Probing the US . Just before visiting Hanoi in mid-
November^ Lewandowski tried to take a serious reading on US
attitudes. His questions were so phrased as to make the response
desired by the communist side apparent. They dealt with pro-
cedures that might follow a ceasefire and were no doubt an effort
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to find a set of actions vhich^ if accepted by the US^ would
ultimately result in a situation in SVN acceptable to the
coEnnunists.
Specifically^ he wanted to know if US troop withdrawal
depended on GW control over areas then governed or contested
by the VC; if the US would withdraw from combat areas and not
interfere in the creation of a new government in SW; if the
US would oppose progress toward peaceful reunification; if the
US would accept the ICC as the machinery for bringing peace to
SW,
All but the third of these questions boil down essentially
to one: to what extent would the US remove itself from the
contest over who should rule in SVET? All were framed without
indication of a quid pro quo. Thus they reveal nothing of DRV
willingness to remove itself from the contest, (ll/lij^/66)
(h) Speaking for the US . When Lewandowski returned from
Hanoi at the end of Dlovember^ he brought along his own fozmula-
tion of the US position on a final settlement. The critical
points on the future of SVN include: US military withdrawal
after the restoration of peace; US acceptance that ^'the present
status quo in SW would be changed in order to take into account
the interests of the parties presently opposing the policy of
the US in SW'' ; and US acceptance of the results of ''free and
democratic elections/' held 'Vith the participation of all/'
under "the necessary control machinery." (I2/7/66)
The political complexion of the new status quo is left
open J but clearly SVTJ comiiunists would be entitled to contend
for power* Clearly ^ tooj the phrase "necessary control machinery"
could not refer in Communist minds to the US presence or the
existing GVST, On the other hand^ no piece of "machinery" less
forceful than these could be expected by the communists to enforce
an electoral outcome regarded as unacceptable to the aimed parties
contending in SVJI. Thus the formulation does not provide a peace-
ful solution to the problem of who shall rale SW. It offers a
way for the US to end its part in the war. It leaves open the
question of what the communist side would do in return. Ttils,
presumably J is what the foimulatlon left as the subject of nego^
tiation.
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Unilateral Concessions
Lewandovski probed for US concessions on the terras of final settle-
ment beyond previously stated official positions ^ such as the Fourteen
Points and the Manila Communique, His method of operation was such as
to conceal vhat reciprocity (if any) might come from the DEV. In the
end J hovever^ he got virtually no concessions of substance. As a result ^
it might be argued the greatest unilateral movement avay from previous
positions vas on the DEV side^ which agreed to meet with the US without
a cessation of the bombing of the Korth. IVhile the natiire of the pro-
spective contact remained ±n total obscurity — we had no indication of
what matters the DKV representative would be prepared to address -- the
DPV must have hoped for something of value and was prepared to probe for
it while the bombing continued. In effect ^ this meant tacitly accepting
the bombing as an American blue chip in the bargaining process ^ something
the DRV had sought tenaciously to avoid in the past. (See^ however ^ the
XYZ episode.)
In response to the four questions Lewandowski posed in mid-November ^
the US replied: the i^lanila formulation spoke for itself with respect to
US troop withdrawal; the US supported the constitutional processes then
emerging in Saigon as the route to representative government in SVN; the
US would accept peaceful^ freely chosen reunification (as already indicated
in the Fourteen Points); the machinery needed to enforce and supervise a
final settlement should be decided hy negotiations j taking acco^ont of
problems revealed in the recent past -^^ i-e.^ with the ICC. Nothing was
conceded at all. (ll/lif-15/66)
Tae US accepted Lewandowski's final 10 Point foimulation as broadly
reflecting its position^ but qualified this by stating^ "We must add that
several specific points are subject to important differences of interpre-
tation/^ Q?he qualifier was not elaborated^ even though the Poles urged
that the specific points at issue be indicated or that the formulation be
revised to eliminate the need for this sweeping reservation. The point
which raised the sharpest apprehension in Washington was that indicating
US acceptance that the "status quo in SW would be changed" to take
account of communist interests, E^^en this language^ however^ as State
pointed outj was broad enough to mean aii^^thlng from putting the I^TLF into
the government forthwith to a simple endorsement of the electoral pro-
cesses then being elaborated in Saigon. US troop withdrawal is explicitly
linked to the ^^anila Communique ^ though the specific conditions of the
Manila offer are not repeated. Lewandowski^s fifth point j however ^ may
have added something to the previous US stance ^ by calling for a GW
based on '^the participation of all through free democratic elections j"
held under "the necessary control machinery," The US seemed to be
accepting universal suffrage (no exclusion of communists and neutralists ^
as later specified in the EM constitution) and supervisory machixiery not
controlled by the non-Communist side^ though what all this could mean in
practice would have emerged only through negotiations. (12/5/66^ 12/7/66)
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Givea the suspicion vith which the DRV uadoubtediy views US
intentions^ the Levandowski foimf-ilation^ especially when seasoned vith
the "impoirfcant differences" clause j is unlikely to have struck the
Morth Vietnamese as at all forthcoming. In spite of this^ they agreed
to meet. While they may not have intended to offer much at Warsaw^
their willingness to come while the bombing continued undercut the
seriousness we wo\ild attach from then on to their declarations of
negotiating preconditions^ their confidence about their military
progress^ etc, etc- OSiese factors are weighty enough to give
importance to the question: why were they willing to meet at all?
According to the reasoning above ^ the answer does not lie in our
responses to Lewandowskl. If not^ we should look for factors external
to Marigold — the rising confusion in China ^ perhaps ^ or a pessimistic
estimate of Communist military prospects in SM^ or .... Furthermore^
if we did not lure them toward the conference table with the attractions
of our offerj the possibility arises that the other pressures pushing
them in that direction were sufficient to induce significant concessions j
had the contact occurred.
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The Soviet Role ia ^^^igold
In the naaterials available for this study ^ the first explicit
discussion of Marigold between US and Soviet officials does not appear
until veil after the ¥arsav contact had been canceled; On December 22 ^
the Soviet Charge in Washington^ Alexander Zinchuk^ called on \llllxam
Eundy to express Soviet support for the Polish initiative and to dis-
courage the US from seeking a "militaristic^* solution in Vietnam,
Zinchufc indicated that the matter had been discussed with DEV leaders
visiting Moscow in late November and again in early December* He
implied that the Soviet Union had felt unable to encourage the DSV to
continue with the contact because of the bombing of December 2 and h.
The lateness of Zinchuk^s approach to Bundy and the content of
his message would suggest the Soviets played at most a passive role in
lylarigold. This would be consistent with their abandoning sponsorship
of the prospective Conference on Cambodia In May 1965j their refusal
to transmit the US letter to the DRV Eubassy in Moscow during Mayflower
{¥iB,y 1965)^ and their frequent rebuffs thereafter of US efforts to
invoke their mediation*
On the other hand^ the Italians on several occasions early in
Marigold indicated that they understood the Poles to be acting on
Soviet instructions. D^Orlandi also q^uoted Lewandowski as saying that
Hanoi was "tightly controlled" by the Chinese and hence preliminary
talks woTold have to be between Washington and MoscoWj with overt DEV
participation only as an acceptable basis for negotiations emerged,
(6/29/66^ 7/9/66^ 9/1 V66) There are no further references of this
sort J however J after mid- September.
It is at least possible ^ then^ that the Russians were the principal
sponsors of Marigold. If so^ they minimized their v^isibility when
Marigold appeared to be succeeding^ emerging to express their interest to us
only after the bombing of Hanoi and the collapse of the Warsaw contact -
TDiis is followed chronologically by the unusually active Soviet role in
Sunflower, Given past Soviet reluctance to mediate ^ it is noteworthy
that the Russians would come to the fore at a time when conditions seemed
relatively unpropitious*
5his raises at least two q;aestlons:
(1) As noted above (tender "Unilateral Concessions'*) the DRV may
have had reasons external to the I&rigold exchanges for wanting direct
talks with the US at just this tirne. Did the Russians receive encourage-
ment from. Hanoi to try further?
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(2) Or was it the Decerriber basbing of Hanoi that stimulatecl the
Russians? Zinchuk expressed apprehension both to Burdy and Harry Mac-
Hierson that Hanoi might call for Soviet volunteers under the tertns of the
Bucharest Declaration ('^if the war escalates and if help is necessary")-
The Russians no doubt wished to avoid such ^'escalations" whatever Hanoi's
feelings in the natter.
The Trinh foimula (of Januaiy 28^ 1967) iiiade these two possible
motives compatible-, by tying US-DRY talks to the "unconditional cessation
of US bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV," At this pointy
the DRV attitude bad hardened in one important respect^ softened in
another. It officially closed the door on the possibility of talks
while the bombing continued^ but it implied publicly (and made explicit
privately) its willingness to talk if its conditions on bombing were met.
Hiis at last gave the Russians a license to try on Hanoi's behalf ^ even
though worsening the chances for success because of the stiff conditions
demanded of the US.
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Leaks and Pressures
From the beginning^ Levandowski stressed the Importance of secrecy
to the possible success of ^larigoldj the reason given being opposition
by canmunist hardliners^ especially the Chinese. In spite of this^ the
Poles leaked portions of their version of the episode at strategic noments
during the contact in a relatively obvious effort to put pressure on the
US.
The US responded in part^ as the Poles wished^ by cooperating with
Lewandovski 's initiatives, T-Jhere this proved inadequate^ ve took counter
measures which combined the defensive leaking of the US version of por-
tions of the episode on the one hand with incentives and exhortations
intended to induce other participants to maintain the privacy of the con-
tact on the other.
The first Polish approach to the US in Iferigold vas conveyed through
the Italians: D'Orlandi contacted Lodge in Saigon; Fenoaltea contacted
State in Washington* Meanwhile ^ Fanfani described the matter to U Thant,
Somevhat later ^ Saragat took it up with Goldberg, It vas iRnr^ediately
recognized in feshington that any indication of US reluctance to respond
would quite soon be -widely interpreted as lack of interest in a peaceful
end to the war* ¥e therefore undertook to develop the contact^ even
though skeptical about the real promise it held forth. At the same time^
ve protested politely to the Italians about trying to do business in this
manner. (6/27-30/66, ?/ 6- 10/66)
During the rest of the summer and fall^ as Levandowski felt he vas
making progress ^ the problem of leaks abated. Immediately following the
December 13-14 "bombing of Hanoi and the DRV*s cancellation of the Warsaw
ineetingj however^ pressure through leaks resigned •
On one day alone ^ December L5> Lewandowski revealed emotional tidbits
of the episode to the Dutch Charge in Saigon , the Polish Anbassadcr in Some
managed to have the Pope quiz him about Vietnam^ and Hanoi cabled Harrison
Salisbury permission to visit the DSV, A few days later, the Polish
Ambassador gave the Pope ''the vhole story." (IP/15-I9/66)
Ve responded first by suspending the Hanoi targets in Rolling Thunder
52 J then by offering to halt all strikes within a 10 mile radius of the
center of Hanoi ;ji exchange for a similar show of restraint by the VC
around Saigon, and finally putting the 10 mile Hanoi sanctuary Into effect
unilaterally — when the prospects of getting explicit reciprocity seemed
too faint, Tnus in order to revive Marigold^ we offered formal assurances
of restraint on our bombing that went well beyond those the Poles had
urged us to accept informally after the strikes of December 2 and h.
(12/15/66, 12/21/66, I2/2V66) The US version of Marigold was explained
in some detail to the Pope, U Thant^ and the Canadian, Italian, Australian^
13 TOP SECRET - KODTS
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New Zealand and Eritisli Governments. The 10 mile sanctuary around Hanoi
vas stressed as a potential basis for reviving the contact ^ reflecting
US goodwill and making it essential that the widening circle of those
privy to the matter preserve the utmost discretion about itj secrecy
being the sine qua non for success » tfeanv/hile a m.uch less detailed
report on the contact was given the GW and other troop contributing
countries J to forestall possible misgivings should they hear of the
matter first from other sources*
I^ mid -January J then. Marigold was knovm in varying degree to a
large circle of diplomats^ some briefed by us^ some by the Poles and most
by both sides. On January ig^ a brief reference to l^rigold and its dis-
ruption by the mid-December bombing of Hanoi was filed in the press from
Ottawa. The information was attributed to "high Cans.dian officials."
By Februarj^ h^ a much more complete version had been filed from UK Head-
quarters in New York, kt this point j with so many possible sources for
the story, there was no agreement among the Americans on the origin of the
leak to the press, Goldberg thought the Poles were responsible j while
Gronouski argued that it had been the Canadians. (2/I-2/67, 2/7-8/67)
The wai- of leaks gradually escalated during the spring. By May^
the Poles were expressing concern to Gronouski over a z*umor they had
picked up in Washington — that the US contemplated publishing a white
paper on Iferigold. Hxis would force them^ they said^ to retaliate in kind
Just at this time^ an e:x±reniely detailed account of the episode was pub-
lished by John Hightower of the AP. The most controversial point in his
story was the statement that US "officials were not sure the Poles had
any commitment from North Vietnam to begin talks- Some ... doubted that
Mr. Papacki was in fact ,,* making kno^ni Washington's readiness for talks
to Hanoi/' Washington felt the Hightower account was ^'essentially
accurate and reasonably favorable-'" The Poles were told the US would
publish no white paper. They replied that "US officials had apparently
chosen another way to put out the story." However, no official Polish
rebuttal vas made public and the war of leaks simmered down on this
acrimonious note. (5/3-9 /67)
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the war of leaks is the
silence of the DEV, Although Hanoi did mount a propaganda campaign
against US bombing of the DEV immediately after the collapse of the
Marigold contact — e.g.^ through the Harrison Salisbury visit^ etc,-- no
mention was ever made of the prospective Warsaw contact and its cancel-
lation after the mid -December bombing. Properly handled^ this could have
been made a telling point with world opinion. Presumably^ secrecy about
the contact was of greater value to the DHV. It is quite possible^ there-
forOj that the Polish leaks were not appreciated in Hanoi and the Polish
handling of the matter was criticized there ^ as in Washington, (Alterna-
tively^ however J it may be that the Polish leaks satisfied the URV^s
propaganda req^uirements ^ within the constraints imposed by DRV relations
with Chinaj the maintenance of rank-and-file morale among Vietnamese
communist forces ^ etc. In that case, Hanoi '2 silence would not in itself
imply an adverse jud^ent on the Polish role.)
1^ TOP SECEET - xVODIS
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Bombing the North I; Blue Chip or Topic for Talkst
The US proposed repeatedly duriia^ J-larigold that de-escalation be
taken as the first topic between the two sides » What would the Conmu-
nlsts do if the US stopped bombing?
Lewandowski with eaual persistence refused to accept this question
as a point of departure. The DRV woiild reject it^ he sald^ because
de-escalation would be viewed as strengthening the governmental status
quo in SWj whereas it was precisely a change in the SVR government
that the Communist side required. Instead^ therefore ^ he urged that
this subject be left for last- Once both sides agreed on tertas for the
ultimate situation in SVU^ finding the route there via de-escalation
would be easy.
Although Lewandowski never j of course^ made the argument himself j
his approach meant Communist acceptance of the bombing as a blue chip
in the bargaining process because the talks on settlement terms would
have to take place while the bombing continued. One inducement the
Cormunists would have to accept terms desired by the US would be that
this would end the bombing. ToOj his approach saved more face for the
Communist side than ours^ which required that the bombing be addressed
explicitlv.
When^ finally J the US went along with Lewandowski^s approach ^ it
upped the ante by the December bombings of Hanoi. The DRV cancellation
of the contact meant, then^ that It would neither accept de-escalation
as a starting point for talks nor accept augmentation of the US blue
chip through strikes on more sensitive targets.
The cancellation of the talks over this issue measures the failure
of Lewandowski's brokerage- He had not narrowed the gulf between the
two sides sufficiently. His version of possible settlement terms was
not attractive enough to make the US forego upping the ante^ on the one
hand J or to induce the DRV to accept the higher ante^ on the other.
15
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Bombing the North II: Signals, Intended and Inadvertant
As is shown in a separate study ^ beginning in June 1966^ there vas
a marked increase in the amount of ordnance e:,3>ended against north Viet-
nam^ Itiis was time for the country as a whole ^ for Eoute Package VI
and for the areas within 10 miles of the center of Hanoi and 5 miles of
the center of Haiphong, The general level of ordnance expenditure
remained high until mid-JTovember. During the last two weeks of November ^
probably on account of weatherj air strikes against the M'orth were at
their lowest level since June^ rising markedly again during the first
and second weeks of December.
The most sensitive area of all, that within 5 miles of the center
of Hanoi^ was str^ack (with about 25 tons of ordnance) for the first time
in the war during the last week of June^ as part of a general attack on
^GL facilities , About 3 tons more were expended in this area in mid-
Au^gust. It was not hit again until the first week in December (the 2nd
and ii'th) when almost 50 tons were ejcpended, then hit yet again during
the second week in December (the 13th and iHh) -with over 100 tons. The
intended targets in all of the December attacks were the Yen Vien Rail-
road Yard and the Van Dien Vehicle Depot , but apparently there was
collateral damage in all cases. In particular, during the December 13-1^1-
attacks, the Chinese and Rumanian Etnbassies seem to have been hit, along
with some residential structures in central Hanoi. From the ground, then,
there might appear to have been an increase in the intensity of attack,
measured both in tons of ordnance expended and type of target j commencing
December 2, i.e.^ immediately following Hanoi's assent to some form of
US-DEV meeting in Warsaw.
^e Poles expressed alarm about the '^intensification of the bcanbing"
on December 2, 7, 8^ and 9^ arguing that ''such attacks could only threaten
or destroy the possibility of contact in Warsaw," They expressed these
views as their own, not as a message transmitted from Hanoi. However,
I^wandowski told D 'Orlandi (who in turn told US on December 9) that he
believed Hanoi had attached significance to the fact J:hat during the two
weeks he had been in Hanoi ( approximately Novanber I6-3O) the bombing
had appeared to be at a reduced level. Lewandowski thought Hanoi had
interpreted this as a tacit signal of US support for his mission -
In fact, the targets near Hanoi which were the object of attack in
December had been authorized as part of Rolling Thunder 52, for which the
execute message was sent on November 10, This was prior to Lewandowski 's
departure for Hanoi, though the approximate timing of his impending visit
("after the US elections") was known in Washington when the execute
message was sent. (IO/15-I6/66) Presumably^ had weather not intervened,
the strikes near Hanoi might well have occurred during his visit, rather
than after his return with Hanoi ^s "positive response.'' Hanoi's review
of Lewandowski 's proposals would have occurred in quite a different con-
text, one reflecting more accurately, perhaps ^ US attitudes.
16 TOP SECRhIT - NODIS
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On December 10^ Washington inTormed both the ¥arsaw and Saigon
Enabassies that it had been decided to leave the bombing pattern
unchanged. Gronouski vas forewarned that this might involve some
targets Rapacki would Insist reflected further escalation.
Apparently J the strikes of December 13-14 vers so inteorpreted
in Hanoi ^ which instructed the Poles on December ik to terminate all
conversations .
On December 2^^ the US informed the Communists that bombing within
10 miles of the center of Hanoi had been suspended as an act of goodwill
in the hopes of reviving the ¥arsaw contact. Ihis vas a more substantial
concession on the bombing than the Poles had urged after the December 2
and k strikes^ in that it reflected an explicit^ well-defined commitment j
rather than the tacit^ unformalized restraint suggested by the Poles.
The DRV may have concluded that propaganda repercussions ^ actual and
prospective J had forced a change in the US posture ^ causing Hanoi in
turn to stiffen the conditions it imposed in exchange for talks . The
Trinh formula of January £8^ 1967^ demanding an end to all bombing of
the DRVj may reflect this calculation.
IT ■ TOP SECPJilT - rroDis
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US Good Faith
Prior to the Decemher 2 bombing of Hanoij no conditions vith
respect to US military actions had been demanded by the Communists as
a price for the Warsaw meeting. The only terms ^ as expressed by
Levandowski to Lodge on I^ovember 30^ vere: "I am authorized to say
that if the US are really of the vievs vhich I have presented (i-e.^
his 10 points)^ it would be advisable to confirm them directly by con-
versation vith the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Warsaw/^ In
addition to this^ he urged only speed and secrecy.
The US had several times previously suggested that mutual de-
escalation be undertaken by the two sides. In a major policy state-
ment ^ Goldberg offered "a cessation of all bombing of North Vietnam—
the moment ve are assured^ privately or other^/Zisej that this step
vill be answered promptly by a corresponding and appropriate de-
escalation on the other side/' (9/22/66) But de-escalation was
rejected ^u^ lewandowski as the wrong subject with which to start.
Thus the US had no cominitment to avoid bombing Hanoi stemming from
the agreement to meet in KarsaWj and in fact^ as noted above, strikes
against Hanoi had been authorised since mid-November but had not
occurred J presumably for reasons of weather.
The Poles argued that there was a difference between de-escalation
and non- escalation, ¥3 should have been willing to trade the latter
for talks J even if not the former, Secondlyj they stretched the meaning
of our official position, Eapacki claiiaed, "yo^ have said over and over
again that you would end all bombing if there was an assurance from Hanoi
that there would be a response toward peace from Hanoij however ^ we did
not ask that you stop bombing but only that you not intensify it." And
"recalling speeches of Goldberg ^ the President ^ Secretaiy Rusk and others ^
once we received the signal we dld^ we would have had every right to call
for a stop in the bombing," (I2/19/66) Without eiKiorsing this particu-
lar formulation^ E'Orlandi indicated his general agreement with the Polish
Interpretation, (I2/18/66) Gronouski feared it would be widely shared
and that the Communists "will have no trouble convincing the leadership
in every capital of the world that our stated desire for peace negotiations
is insincere." (I2/1 4/66) In their minds^ the issue t'orned less on the
precise language of previous US expressions than on a general tenor which
they felt was undercut by the December bombings. Washington apparently
soon came to share this view^ and the 10 mile bombing sanctuary around
Hanoi's center was established to underline the seriousness of US intentions.
18 TOP SECRET - NODIS
Declassified perExecuiive Order 13526, Section 33
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\
O
ID
O
o
Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3
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^
The £ollo^i±n.g chronology consists of brief
summaries and interpretative statements about
each date J follovred by indented documentation.
. *^
Declassified perExecuiive Order 13526, Section 33
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'ZY
Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3
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2a
TOP SECRET - NOD IS
June 27, 1966
* — ' — ^ — '- — If ■ ■ — ■
Jfe.rigold begins with a contact between D'Orlandi^ the Italian
Ambassaclor in Saigon ^ and Levandovskij the Polish Representative on the
ICG J also working out of Saigoa. Lewandowski^ just returned from Hanoi ^
reported that he had a ^Very specific peace offer^^ to transmit^ one
that vouJ.d lead to a "political compromise" settling the whole Vietnam
question once and for all. The attractive features were (a) Hanoi
would not ask for immediate reunification^ (b) it would not demand a
socialist system in SVlTj (c) SM would not have to change its relation-
ships in the field of foreign affairs^ (d) ^'neutralization" would not
"be demanded _j (e) U.S. withdrawal could be sdieduled along a "reasonable
calendar J " (f) Hanoi did not seek to interfere with the SVTI government.
Hanoi's conditions for entering negotiations were that (a) the
HLF "take part'' and (b) there be a "suspension" of the bombing*
D'Orlandi communicated all this to Lodge In Saigon^ two days later
(June 29); on instructions from Fanfanij who was also transmitting it
directly to Washington.
Saigon 58^0 (to SecState)^ TS/l^odis^ 29 June I966
(Section 1 of 2}
Literally Eyes Only for the President^ The Secretary^
and the Acting Secretary
"1. This afternoon D^Orlandi^ Italian Ambassador,
telephoned to say it was xirgent that I come to his office
as soon as the Catholic service honoring the anniversary
of the coronation of Pope Paul VI had ended. I went to
his office at about 6;45j ^^d he began as follows: -
ICC
"2. Two days agOj the Polish representative on the
J Levandowskij came to him with a ^very specific
peace offe
■y*
"3« D*Orlandi said he had requested instructions
from Fanfanij who told him (1) to submit the whole pro-
posal to me^ and (2) said that he^ Fanfanij would send
the whole thing to Washington for their consideration,"
"9« ^e Pole began "oy saying that Hanoi has been
deeply disappointed lij the proposals made by Ronning
which J they are surCj had emanated originally from the
United States and not from the Canadians. Ronning had
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^^'
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proposed that the U.S. stop the "boml^ing if Forth Viet-KTam
stopped the Irifiltratlonj and had talked alDout the exchange
of prisoners- parcels and letters- T^is had bitterly dis-
appointed North Vietnam, ©le first pointy they had said^
vonld be unconditional surrender j and they could not
accept it J but they are open to a 'political compromise'
settling once and for all the entire Yiet-TTaiu q_uestion-
'^10. When D'Orlandi said that he was skeptical^ the Pole
said that Hanoi 'was prepared to go 'guite a long way.' 'It
is useless for me to add^' said the Pole^ 'that should there
not be any kind of a preliminary agreement ^ Hanoi will deny
flatly ever having made any offer,* According to the Pole,
the Forth Vietnaiaese are 'tightly controlled' by the Chinese
Communists. Hie preliminary talks, therefore , should be
between Moscow and Washington. Waen and if proposals should
emerge which could be considered as a basis for negotiations ,
Hanoi woiild at that time and under those circmtstances get
into it. Eie Pole said that Hanoi was afraid of the Chinese
Concmunists who have an interest in dragging on the war for
many years. D'Orlandi added that the Pole was evidently
'proud of himself for having brought these proposals about,
"U- The proposals are as follows:
A. They insist that the so-called National Libera-
tion Front 'take part' in the negotiations. The key word is
'take part.' According to D'Orlandi, there is 'no question of
their being the representative; they are not to have bxpj monopoly,'
B. There must be suspension of the bombing.
"12- These are the two proposals.
"13, Then there are other points^ which D'Orlandi called
'negative ones,' which are that (a) Hanoi will not ask for
Immediate reunification, either \i'^ elections or otheiTwise, of
North and South Vietnam''
LODGE
(Section £ of 2)
"(b) They will not ask for establishment of a 'socialist'
system in South Viet-ITam; (c) They will not ask South Viet-Nam
to change the relationships which it has in the field of
foreign affairs; and (d) They will not ask for neutralization.
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(e) Although they will ask for U,S. vithdravalj they
are ready to discuss a ^reasonable calendar,^ (f)
Although 'we would like scmeone othur than Ky' - to
quote the words of Hanoi - they do not want to
interfere with the South VietnsJaiese Government."
*^18. The Pole said that his Government would be
villlng to arrange for D'Orlandi to meet with appro-
priate Polish spokesmen any^^rhere -- Hong Kong or
Singapore, In response to a question by D'Orlandi as
to why they had come to himj the Pole said they wanted
'an able debater to put the case to President Johnson ^
and we feel that the Italian Government has the sym-
pathy of the United States Government,' Moreover ^ the
Italians have the same interest we have in agreement
bet^/een Washington and Moscowj and in shutting out
Peking .
"19. D'Orlandi's impression is that the Poles
are desperately seeking a way out on Moscow's instruc-
tions* BiiSj he said J may need further exploration.
He had the definite impression that noi^ Hanoi 'was
amenable to common sense' saying 'they do not want
anything that would not stop the whole war, They want
a political settlementj and are prepared tc go a long
vay, *"
LODGE
June 29, 1966
On the same day that D'Orlandi saw Lodge in Saigon^ the Italian
Ambassador Fenoaltea brought the information to the State Department
in Washington, State saw little new in it, with two exceptions. The
Italians were therefore asked to inquire discreetly if there was real
movement on the following points :
(1) Did the condition that the TTLF '^talce part" in negotiations
mean it need no longer be accepted as the ^'oole representative" of
the SW people?
(2) Did the woi-d ^^suspension" mean that a bombing "cessation"
was no longer a prerequisite to negotiations?
3 TOP SECRET - N0DI3
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State i;108 (to .Amemljassy Saia*on)j TS/NodiSj 29 June 1966
Literally Eyes Only for Ambassador
Embtel 58UO
"Italian Ambassador Fenoaltea came In today with
Faxochej Italian Ambassador-designate to Canada j who
had hand -^carried message similar to that contained
reftel and who said he was under instructions to hand-
carry our reply back to Rome
ir
• * •
'^Je told Fenoaltea that^ except for use of term
'participate' with respect to DILFj vhich couJ-d have
ioiplication Hanoi was not insisting NLF be "sole
representative^ of SVHj and 'suspension of bombing' in
place of ^cessation of bombing^' position Hanoi indicated
to Pole was very similar to previous indications their
position. Thus in light of various translations these
woi^s have gone through ^ it is not clear whether their
use has any significance* Therefore ^ without indicating
to Pole that message had been passed to USG^ suggested
Italian Government on its own responsibility j guery
Polish Eep on these two terms to determine whether form-
ulations contained in Polish version of Hanoi ^s position
were used advisedly by Hanoi and indicate some shift in
position or were accidents of translation.,,,"
BALij
June 3Qj I966
xhisk expressed skepticism about the value of the DEV proposal^
even if there were some movement on the points enumerated^ because
allowing the KLF to "take part" might lead it eventually to a major --
even ''fatal" — role in SW politics^ however the negotiations caLne
outj and because a bombing "suspension" would produce pressures for
a "cessation." Given the risks of recrimination from ?anfani and
Eapackij though^ he felt it necessary to follow up. He also predicted ^
correctly J that the POL strikes then prograrnmed for Rolling Thunder
might stiffen the DRV position momentarilyj arguing against trying
to move too fast.
Lodge J on the other hand^ thought the package so forthcoming as
to arouse suspicions about the intermecliary. Presumably ^ he was
less familiar than State with the content of previous Hanoi communica-
tions of the sort. Much of the proposal^ as conveyed^ ^7as old^ but
two points to which hc; drew attention were new: the apparent acceptance
of the existing Saigon government and of its foreign relationships.
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Canberra 58 (to SecState)^ S/jrodis^ 30 June I966
Syes Only for Acting Secretary ar^i Ambassador
from Secretary
* m
"2. I cannot from here make any full assessment of
that message. The NLF part seems vague^ encouraging
only in that it abandons the *sole representative*
position- Hovever^ this position has always seemed a
maximum opener^ and we must keep in mind alvays that
even 'taking part* on a full basis vould go very far
to give the NLF a majors and likely fatal j part in SVN
politics. On the bombing^ a 'suspension' could easily
lead to heai'y pressure for a 'cessation'. For the rest^
the disclaimers of any ioimediate 'Socialist' set-up in SVN
or of Immediate reunification plans have a familiar ring
from some past noises by DEV Eeps trying to make them-
selves sound reasonable^"
* •
"^, All this being saidj I suppose that if Fanfani
asks us to let D'Orlandi follovr up^ we would virtually
have to agree*... With careful instructions and
reasonable precautions ^ we should be able to minimize
risks. In any case refusal to follow up — even if
message wholly phony ^~ would expose us to recrimination
from Fanfani and Eapacki alike*.,,"
"5* Moreover J there might o^st be something in It.
Poles and Italians may seem devious channels ^ but not all
that implausible if Hanoi is having any second thoughts.
If so J POL strike might stiffen them momentarily ^ to avoid
any appearance of weakness or effect of strike ^ and this
argues for not moving too fast."
. .
EUSK
Saigon 5855 (to SecState)^ TS/i^Todis^ 30 June I966
Literal.ly Eyes Only for the President ^ the Secretary
and the Acting Secretary
, * *
"3* I^e proposals attributed to Hanoi j as a package j
;o far beypnd anything we, have heard mentioned Joe fore.
.n fact J they appear So forxhcoming as xo arouse
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%t)
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suspicion concerning the credibility of the Polish
intemedip.ry. It seems to us that not only is the
so- called KLF being abandoned as the sole bargaining
agent J but so also is the NLF progi-am of a 'socialist'
state J of unifying the Uorth and South j and of
* neutralization. ' Also the phrase 'reasonable calendar*
Indicates a definite softening of position regarding
IGMS. Ttroops, IHae same is true of acceptance of the
Government of South Viet-ITgm and its foreign relation-
ships."
* •
LCCiGE
July 6 & 7 , 1966
Fanfani also described the contact to U Hiantj who in turn passed
it on to Goldberg at UTT headquarters » This increased fears of a leak
from Fanfani on the US side. In fact^ the disclosure to U Thant vas
considered such a leak and doubtless put pressure on the USG to pro-
tect itself by piorsuing the contact j on the one handj and by taking
defensive positions on the other*
Geneva 6I (to State)^ TS/ETodis^ 6 July I966
For Acting Secretary from Ambassador Goldberg
"5- Syg informed me that on recent visit to Italy
Fanfani reported to him that POL ICC Ambassador had had
conversation with Ho Clii Minh on June 27 in which Eo
presumably said that they would be prepared to engage
in serious discussions with us^ no'tv^ithstanding Chinese
and Soviet objections j it bombings were suspended and
If Vlet^Cong participated in talks. According to Thant^
this inforcaation relayed by POL ICC Ambassador to
Italian Ambassador in Saigon who in turn communicated
it to Fanfani. Ihant further reported that Fanfani
believed message contained two new elements: (A)
that Ho was not insisting on unconditional cessation of
bombing, merely a suspension; and (:3) Ho not insistent
that Viet- Cong be sole representatives of South Vietna-
mese people at such negotiations. Fanfani had also told
the Secretary General that he thought this message of
such importance that it warranted sending a special
Italian emissaiy to Washington to communicate the sub-
stance of it to United States officials. Syg said
Fanfani did this and that special emissary was asked in
Washington to remain there pending a probe through
6 - TOP SECRET - N0DI3
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Fanfani of the vord^ suspension^ and also to inquire vhat
Ho meant b^ saying Viet- Cong would have to participate in
the talks. Fanfani swcx*e U Thant to secrecy and the
Secretary General therefore imparted this information to
me in the strictist confidence saying he had not coimnuni-
cated to anyone in Secretariat, He asked in particular
that I not raise this ^ith Fanfani^ but if latter mentioned
I it to me J I should disclaim knowledge of it from Syg^
except as I might receive knowledge of it from Washington."
TUBBI
I
State 2673 (to J\men"bassy Tol<yo)j TS/lTodis^ 7 July I966
For the Secretary from the Acting Secretary 1
"As you vill have already seen from TOSEC 188^ Fanfani
has already begun to leak, having told U Thant of Polish
message and in turn U Thant having passed it on to Goldberg
• •
K
*
"I privately spoke to Fenoaltea today and^ without
mentioning Goldberg j said that ve had indirectly heard that
Fanfani had mentioned matter to U Tbant . Fenoaltea said
he would drop a private note to Fanfani. Fenoaltea
expressed full understanding of problem of attempting to
do business in this manner and much skepticism as to whether
there was any real substance in approach* He said though
that J as we kneWj Fanfani felt impelled to 'do something**
u
* *
state 2619 (to US Mssion G^neva)^ TS/l^odis, 7 July I966
Literally Eyes Only for Ambassador Goldberg from
Acting Secretary
"Re paras 5 and 6 of Geneva's 6I strictly FTIj we have
received report from Italians along lines indicated by
Fanfani to XJ Iliant,.,ve are folJ^owing up in very discreet
manner to test its authenticity "
July 7^9, 1966
Lodge was instinicted to develop the contact further ^ by meeting with
D'Orlan^i and Lewandovrski himself in Saigon^ but to tell Ky something of
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a general na.ture in case niEnors "began to circulate p Lodge's inquiries
were to address procedures ^ but one matter of substance was raised^ as
it woiild be again and again from the US side: ^That would Hanoi do to
reciprocate the suspension of bombing? He carried cut these instruc-
tions two days later (July 9).
State 2626 (to Amembassy Saigon) ^ OS/jTodiSj 7 July I966
"...we suggest that .Ambassador D'Orlandi seek
discreetly to arrange a meeting between himself j Lewan-
dowski and iimbassador Lodge in Saigon*
" — • At such a meeting you should^ referring to
USG*s understandings of Levandowski-s statem^ents to
B'Orlandlj and making clear that you are acting under
instruct ions J state as follows:
"1. State that the United States shares the
desire for an over-all political settlement.
"2. Inquire when^ where and with what parties
Hanoi contemplates that negotiations would take place.
"*3' Inquire what if any action Hanoi on its
part would propose to take or not tal^e during the period
of suspension of bombing*
"k* inquire whether Hanoi believes it realistic
to keep negotiations secret if the United States suspends
bombing with the inevitable speciJilation this vould entail*
".... ¥e are inclined to feel it wouJ.d be desirable
for you to say something of a general nature to Ky without
disclosing specifics ^'
BALrL
Saigon 60k (to SecState)^ TS/lTcdiSj 9 July I966
"1, Lewandowskij D'Orlandi and I met at D'Orlandi's
office at 1^:30 July 9.
^*2. After mj^ saying it was a personal pleasure for
me to see him again , I began^ pursuant to your 2626 _, by
referring to our understanding of Lewandovski's indication
that Hanoi was open to a 'political settlement ' which
would settle the Viet-I^Tam Question once and for all*
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"3* I added that ve understood that Lewandowski
had said to D'Orlandi that Hanoi in effect made tvo
proposals :
(a) nihe ITational Liberation Front would
'take pa-rt' in the negotiations.
(b) Biere must be a suspension of the
bombing in 3^Torth Vietnam-
"ii-. Our understanding of Amb. Lewandovski * s
approach to Amb. D'Orlandl vaSj I said^ that if pro-
posals emerged as a basis for negotiations ^ then Hanoi
-would be prepared to enter into negotiations.
"5» I then said that acting under instructions of
the United States Government ^ I was authorized to state
the follovin,^:
"6- And I stated the four points in your 2626^^^
• t *
LODGE
July 9, 1966
Saragat gives Goldberg an account of the D'Orlandi-Lewandowski
contacts in Saigon similar to that already passed by D'Crlandi to
Lodge and by Fanfani to U Thant and Washington.
He adds two points to the previous versions :
1. Lewandowski^s intention is that the negotiations take place
substantially between Moscow and Washington. If secrecy is preserved ^
this will permit Peking to be ignored.
ii* Sie US air strikes against oil depots near Ifenoi and Haiphong
on June 25 have not^ in Lewandowski's viev^ prejudged the effort to
arrange contact .
Rome 1^5 (to SecState)^ TS/lTodis^ 9 July I966
From Goldberg and Sisco
*'Amb Goldberg saw Saragat privately Friday night
July 8 "
* • •
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*^Following in fiill is text of document which Saragat
gave to Mb, Goldberg*... Begin text: On June 27 the
Italian Ambassador in Saigon D'Orlandi reported that the
Polish representative to the ICC Amhassador Savira just
"back froBi Hanoi had told him that the riorth Vietnam
Govermnent Yere prepared to enter secret pourparlers in
order to reach a political compromise with the United
States at two preliritinary conditions: i-e,^ suspension
of bombing over North Yietnam and Viet Cong participation
in the negotiations. As to the nature of such compromise j
the Hanoi Government were willing: (l) not to ask for
the immediate reunification of North and South Vietnam;
(2) to relinquish their claim to imposition of U,S,
socialist system in South Vietnam; (3) not to ask for
changes in the existing relations between South Vietnam
and the western countries; (^) to discuss the timing of
the withdrawal of xAmerican troops from South Vjetna^m
while maintaining their request for such withdrawal.
"Moreover J the Polish representative made it clear
that in his own opinion negotiations were to take place
substantially between Moscow and Washington, If absolute
secrecy were maintained about the preliminary contacts ^
Hanoi J he thought^ could have ignored Peking*
^^On Jijne 28 it was reported that oil depots in Hanoi
and Haiphong had been bombed, The Polish Ajiibassador
expressed seme reservations as to the conset^uences of
such initiative but later reported that the attempt to
open negctiatioriS was not in his o\ni eyes pre- judged.
"In connection with Ambassador D^Orlandi^s reports j
the Italian PriMin and the Italian Minister of Foreign
Affairs J who were then in Bonn^ decided to send Signor
Farace^ Deputy Dir Gen for Political Affairs ^ to Washing-
ton so that he may sound ^ together with Ambassador
Fenoalteaj the reactions of the American Govt..,, Farace
and Fenoaltea on July 1 met in Washington Acting Secy of
State Ball (Rusk was then in Australia) and Ball's Deputy
Alexis Johnson, The t^ro Amc^rican officia.Is- . .suggested
that D^Orlandi should request clarification from the Polish
Rep on two points: (l) He should find out whether the
words 'participation of the Front of Liberation to the
negotiations' were meant to exclude the Go'.^ of Saigon;
(2) He should also find out whether the word * suspension'
as applied to bombing was deliberately meant as something
different from 'cessation,' On Jijily 2j 3, and k Ambassador
D^Orlandi made clear that JTorth Vietnam s Imply asked for
suspension of the bombing as a preliminary condition for
the beginning of negotiations aimed at reaching a political
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comproniLlse on the above-msntioned lines » Viet Cong
participation^ furtheimore^ obviously did. not rule out
the paartlcipation of the South Vietnam Govt. It vas
only suggested that once the negotiations had begun
General Ky may be replaced vith a less extremist
political personality. On July 5 Fenoaltea aiad Farace
in the course of a new meeting vith Ball and Alexis
Johnson passed on to these tvo American officials the
inToriiiation received from D^Orlandi. The Americans,*,
reserved their position because President Johnson vas
avay in Texas and Ltr, Rusk vas still abroad. According
to Ambassador Fenoaltea^ further American communications
vould not he forthcoming for tvo or three days .
"On July 7 Ambassador Fenoaltea reported that he had
again met together vith Farace the tvo American officials
They had expressed their opinion that Ambassador
D'Orlandi and Ambassador Cabot Lodge should get in touch
jointly and unofficially vith the Polish Ambassador to
explore the possibilities of the Jlorth Vietnamese offer ^"
July 10, 1966
T'Jhen Lodge inentioned the matter to Ky^ he expressed doubt that it
vould tixrn out to have any real substance j but said it vould be folloved
up. Ky apparently vent along graciously^ suggesting that it might be a
good time for a US leaflet campaign in the
negotiations.
DRV. stressing our desire for
Saigon 6h2 (to SecState)^ S/Nodls^ 10 July I966
"1, Pursxiant your 2626^ I csLlled on Ky ostensibly
to discuss General Tiai and acquisition of suitable
premises for the US consul in Danang. But as I vas
leaving J I remarked that 'by the vay' ve had been get-
ting some rumors out of Hanoi indicating a desire to
find a way out. None of these seemed to have any real
substance^ but we vould follow all of them up and^ if
ariything important occurred ^ we vould of course tell
him at once,"
* • 4
*'3p He made the folloving suggestion which I thought
interesting:
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"^. The time has come for the -Americans to put on
another 'gooti vill leaflet^ cainpaign. The message on
the leaflets should bg that ve (Yietnamese and Americans)
want negotiations j it is your rulers ¥ho don't,"
■ ■ *
rODGE
July 2^, 1966
When Levandowski replied to Lodge j under instructions from Warsav^
he could say only that there could "be no results without a bombing
cess at ion J that the DEV's k points nust be recognized ^ etc. This
seemed a step bacfarard to all participants. The matter vas left for
some veel^.
Saigon 1785 (to SecState)^ S/Hodis^ 2^ July I966
"1, D'Orlandij Lewandovski and I met at D'Orlandi's
office at ^:30. The meeting lasted for t-^renty minutes.
Lewandowski talked as follows:
"2. 'I have the following instructions from Warsaw
which 1 have been asked to transmit to Ambassador Lodge:
A» 'It is difficult to discuss any proposition
dui'ing the current important escalation of war activities
in the South ^ and of the bombing in the E"orth.
B, 'To hold such discussions could be looked
upon as a maneuver to force the DUV to negotiate under
American conditior^*
C. ^-Je know very well that the DRV will not
give up the fight while the United States pursues its
present policy of military pressui^e.
D, 'We have reasons to state that no proposi-
tion without the cessation of the bombing of the DRV will
produce results*
E. 'United States Government has no ri^t to
bomb the DEY and no right to propose conditions for its
cessation,
F» *If the United States desires a peaceful
solution, it must recognise the four points proposed by
the DSV and prove it in practice •
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G, 'The United States must stop bombing and
other militazy activit^r against north Viet-Nam, Only
then can a political solution be expected.'"
• «
"l6* D^Orlandi then spoke as follows:
"17. '^is is definitely a step backward. I had
thought that the first meeting was rather encouraging.
Both the opening and the American questions were
encouraging. I felt something might come out and^ as
a matter of fact^ I still feel this as a hunch.
Accordingly J I hope the stiffness of your reply today
is due to prevailing circumstances^ and that this
channel may be kept open and resumed as soon as
possible. ¥e vere expecting a reply* Now we have a
statement* I understood what led to this statement.
It is the circumstances of the moment.'
"18* I asked to vhat circumstances he vas
referring. He said to all of the rumors in the news-
papers of peace talk."
^;
» « «
LODGE
September t-8 , I966
•^^^^ ~ ' — *• 1 1 I
After a period of inactivity and a discouraging visit to Hanoi by
Lewandowskij D'Orlandi and Lewandowski att^anpted to revive the contact.
Ihey saw two main problems: that their exercise not be viewed as
probing for Hanoi ^s minimum position; and that it not be directed at
reinforcing the status quo or facilitating deescalating^ but rather at
finding an overall settlement that would penait the war to end.
Saigon 5229 (to SecState)^ S/l^^odis, h September I966
"1. D'Orlandi said that Lewandowski had returned
from 16 days in Hanoi profoundly discouraged. His two
closest contacts Fna:m Van Dong and General Giap were
both away. His talk with Ho Chi Minh produced nothing
of interest. There vas absolutely no sign of a desire
to stop the war."
'« .
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"4. D'Orlandi said he would "be willing to work
with Lewandawski to tiy to develop a compromise
f ormula^ which could then he submitted to Moscow or
Washington.
"5- Comment: V?hat are Department's views of
this suggestion? It could "be that some ideas and
clarification mi^t come out of itj and that it would
not J of course J commit us to anything. I doubt
whether the Pole will be authorized. End Comment,"
LODGE
State ^1695 (to AmEHbassy Saigon) ^ 6 September I966
"... we see no objection to D'Orlandi's pursuing
this with Pole if latter is so author!:: ed. . ."
Saigon 5517 (to SecState)^ S/lJodis^ 8 Septes^ber I966
"1. D*Orlandi told me that in his recent talk
with Lewandowskij the problem referred to in my
last telegram regarding Lewandcwski and D'Orlandi
working up a proposal to submit to Washington and
Moscow was discussed. Lewandowski made three points:
"A. He did not "waut the only outcome of
the procedure between D^Crlandi and himself to be to
inform the United States as to ^ just how far the
North Vietnamese would give in.'
^'3. Although Lewandowski recognizes that I
had already given him ample assurances, he feels that
emphasis must be given to the need of the U*S«
approaching the problem so as to concern South Viet-Nam
alone and not South Viet-IIam as a 'piece of a general
Chinese puzzle.' Lewandcwski feels that the problem
could be 'simple enough' if limited to South Viet-Nam —
but not if the United States is thinking of using con-
versations with Lewandowski (and Lewandowski^s talks in
Hanoi) as a way of getting at China or Chinese cuestions "
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"C. Levandowski said that it vas only fair
to state that the 'aim of the exercise' hetween him and
D'Orlandi should not be to reinforce the status guo^
but to get a ^global' settlement. ^^Jhen he says ' global 'j
he obviously does not mean vorld-vide; he means 'over
all' as regards South Viet-Nam. ThiSj said D'Orlandi^
quoting tewandowski^ means 'guarantees^ etc*'; therefore
*iiot just de-escalation. ^^^
* *
"5. Lewando^.rski said he was sure that something
could be done, Hanoij he sald^ looks at the situation
through the distorted spectacles of the Viet Cong
through vhom they get all their information about the
situation. ^My Job^* said Levandowski_, 'is to e^lain
to Hanoi that they have a vrong vie'w.' !I?he last time
he had been in lianoi neither PhamVan Dong nor General
Giap vere there ^ and 'they are the only two in the
whole place who talk sense and understand the real
situation in the south*'"
• * • •
LODGE
September 12^ - 9_^_
State agreed that the contact be pursued j reserved its position
on ^^changes in the status quo/^ and offered to look for a gesture of
good intent to encourage Hanoi (and D'Orlandi}^ such as a proposal of
mutually- timed withdrawal^ or trading a bombing cessation plus a halt
in the US troop buildup for an end to infiltration.
State ^^917 (to Amembassy Sai^n)^ S/Nodis^ 12 September
1966
Bef: Saigon 55IT
"2, Lewandowski-s remark that the aim of the
exercise should not be to ^reinforce the status guo'
is all right if he is talking about the present
status quo in South Viet-iram. But we cannot "buy a
discarding of the status quo ante^ i.e. the 195^'
and 1962 Agreements. * .we do not rule out considera-
tion of revisions of the 'Drovisions, of the Geneva
AgreeHonxs iDut \re coula a'ceepc- no changes uncj-l we
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had a clear picture of what vas the total context
of an underst.anaing vith the Coinniuiiists
11
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• • « *
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5- -HP. ve vill consider here whether there
is something that could be given to D^Orlandi for
his 'possible agreement foroiula' vhich could
demonstrate our earnest desire move forward and
smoke out Hanoi ^s intentions, This might lie^
for example J in realm of mutually- timed with-
drawal formula J or qtuid pro cjuo on cessation of
bombing and halt in expansion US forces against
end to infiltration by Hanoi."
m *
RUSK
September lU^ I966
D'Orlandl reports that Lewandovski is not interested in Se-
es calat ion or any other sequence that will lead to preserving the
present personnel of the GM, It is this part of the "status quo"
which must change* On the other hand^ the Geneva agreements of 195^1-
and 1962 need not be affected.
Saigon 5965 (to SecState)^ S/lTcdiSj ll^ September I966
"1. Pursuant to your kk^lj I had a long session
with D'Orlandi.
"2, He says the phrase 'status quo* refers
exclusively to the political and governmental status
quo in Saigon and has nothing whatever to do with
the 195^ and I962 agres:rients. . . .
"3. Lewandowski was definitely not referring to
the 195^ and I962 agreements , Ke is not interested in
de-escalation or any kind of negotiation which would
lead to a settlement and which would at the same time
perpetuate the personnel of the present government.
Lewandowski means that those on his side are not
interested in ending military activities if j by so
doing, the political and governmental situation in
Saigon is thereby frozen."
t
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*^12. D'Orlandi would like to test how influential
Levandov^ki is vith Pham Van Dong and Vo Ilguyen Giap^
with vhouL Lewandowski claxEns to be so close. He is
looking around for ^some little thing' which could be
interpreted as an indication. He is sure Levandowski
speaks for Eapacki and with Moscow approval every inch
of the way. He is inclined to believe that Lewandovskl
speaks for Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap, but would
like to iHake sui-e,
"13. I ventured the guess that nothing could be
expected out of Hanoi until our November elections were
over* The time between now and then^ therefore j I
suggested J could be valuable in discussing and fortnu-
lating proposals.
*^lk* D'Orlandi did not agree. He thought we
should not ^discard the possibility of discussions ncyw'
due to the internal upheaval in Chinaj which he
believes brought the Peking Government very close to
a breach of diplomatic relations witii Moscow, ThiSj
he surGiised--and not our elections — was dominating
official thinking: in Hanoi "
k • . *
LODGE
September I8, I966
Lewandowski tells D'Orlandi that a coalition government should
be considered J the bulk of which would be "sensible SW politicians j"
with a man or two from the right and a man or two from the NLF in
"unimportant ministries/^ SVII would become a "second CaaiQodia/'
But he is discouraged about US intentions because of the incompati-
bility of "military escalation and political proposals."
Saigcn 628O (to SecState)^ S/Nodis, I8 September 1966
"1. D'Orlandi had a meeting with Lewandowski
Friday night. It started as a social affair on
D'Orlandi's invitation and on Lewandowski 's initia-
tive became a discussion of the war. According to
Orlandij Lewandowski said the following:
* » ■ *
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"5* If the ^ericans ever raally cared^ they should
especially concentrate on Hiam Yan Dong's fourth point con-
cerning ^¥ho is to speak for South Vietnam. ' This does
not mean that Hanoi vould he trying to ram the Viet Cong
down our throats. We could consider the setting up of a
coalition government the bulk of which vould be made up of
^sensible South Vietnamese politicians.* To preserve
appearances you could have 'on the fringe' men from the
'right' in one or two 'unimportant ministries' and from on
* the 'left' fill one or t^^ro 'unimportant ministries with the
Bo-called NLF.*
"6- D'Orlandi — this is unthinkable. If this is what
you want to talk about^ it is better for us to stop the
talks.
"7.. Lewandowski asked whether D'Orlandi realized that
what he meant to say was that this would be the last step
not the first,
"8, D*Orlandi said; What would be the ultimate goal?
If it is to have the Viet Cong in the Government of Viet
Jlam^ I won't even submit such a proposal to Ambassador
Lodge,
"9. Lewandowski said that is r^t at all vhat he meant
to put to D'Orlandi, Plainly ^ the ultimate aim would be:
*to make of South Vietnam a second Cambodia,'
"10. D'Orlandi said that makes more sense ^ it is at
least worth talking about,
"11. LewaMovski said: 'But I don't believe the
Americans really wish to talk. They are trying to do two
things at once: military escalation grouped with political
proposals „ You can't do both. So long as they won't make
up their minds ^ we can't do anything. We must wait until
November. '"
. • .
LODGE
September 22 I966
Goldberg's speech to the OTT General Assembly stresses the US desire
for a negotiated settlement ^ proposing a reduction in Communist milltai^^
activities in SVI^ in response for a bombing cessation^ and mutual with-
drawal of militai*y forces under International supervision^ He re.it er-
ates President Jonnson's statement that Vietcong" representation m peace
negotiations would not be an insijrmountable problem.
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Kew York Tlises ^ 23 September I966
^'Otext of Goldberg's Address"
United IJationSj New York^ Sept* 22nd
• •
"U.S. Offers 'First Step'
"...United States is villing once again to take
the first step. ¥e are prepared to order a cessation
of all bombing of Ij'orth Vietnam -- the moment ve are
assured^ privately or otherwise^ that this step vill
be answered promptly by a corresponding and appropriate
de-escalation on the other side. We therefore urge
before this Assembly that the Government in Hanoi be
asked the folloving question^ to which we would be
prepared to receive either a private or a public response;
'Vould it J in the interest of peace ^ and in response
to a prior cessation by the United States of the bombing
in North Vietnam ^ take corresponding and timely steps to
reduce or bring to an end its own military activities
against South Vietnam?
"Another obstacle is said to be North Viet riain^ 3
conviction or fear that the United States intends to
establish a permanent military presence in Vietnam. Ihere
is no basis for such a fear- The United States stands
ready to "vjithdraw its forces as other w^ithdrav theirs so
that peace can be restored in South Vietnam j and favors
international machinery -- either of the United Nations or
otlier ma,chinery -- to insure effective supervision of the
withdrawal. We therefore urge that Hanoi be asked the
following question also:
*%Jould IToirth Vietnam be willing to agree to a time
schedule for supervised j phased withdrawal from South
Vietnam of all external forces — those of North Vietnam
as well as those from the United States and other countries
aiding South Vietnam?
"A further obstacle is said to be disagreement over
the place of the Vietcong in the negotiations. Some argue
that J regardless of different vie'v/s on who controls the
Vietcong^ it is a combatant force and^ as such^ should take
part in the ne.TOtlations.
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"Some tiioe ago otot view on this matter vas stated
by Rresident Johns on ^ who made clear that^ as far as we
are concerned^ this question would not be *an insur-
mountaljle problem.' We therefore invite the anthorities
in Hanoi to consider whether this obstacle to negotiation
may not be more imaginary than real."
October 5. I966
' ■ I
i
When D*Orlandi tells Levandowski he plans to return to Rome shortly^
the latter protests^ "You must not leave; there will be much to do after
the 15th of ITovember*"
Saigon T712 (to SecState)^ S/KodiSj 5 October I966
"1. On Tuesday* October h^ at the Apostolic Dele-
gate's receptionj D'Orlandi said to Lewandovski that
he intended to say to Fanfani that there was no longer
any reason for him to stay on in Saigon at the expense
of damage to his health when thex^e was absolutely
nothing to do.
"2, According to D'Orlandi^ Lewandovski said with
great emphasis and earnestness ^ *^You must not leave;
there will be much to do after the fifteenth of Novem-
ber.'"
• •
LQDGS
October lU., I966
Lewandovski probes D'Orlandi with respect to possible US-Chinese
collusion^ reporting that Chinese permission for Soviet flights to Viet-
nam have been withdrawn. He also raises the possibility of ousting ^f:j ^
though whether as part of the negotiating arrangements or part of their
outcome is not clear.
Saigon 8567 (to Sec vState)^ S/JTodis, 14 October I966
• . .
"5* Levandowski went on to say that he was worried
about reports about the(^inesej pairbicularly that the
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'Americans are trying to feel out the Chinese.* He
added: *In such a case^ ve are out*'
"6. He said there vere 'added strains' between
China and Russia and thatj due to a recent Chinese
decision J there are now 'no Russian flights going
through China to Viet-ITam.^
"7- Lewandovski then^ according to D^Orlandi^
asked whether he thought 'Ky could be ousted**
"8. D^Orlandi says he replies that he absolutely
refused to ^haggle* and would not get into a situation
in which they agreed to this in exchange for our
agreeing to that. In any case^ this was a matter which
vould *take care of itself in a few months when the
new constitution goes into effect/^
• * •
LODGE
October 15^ 1966
State inquires if Leva,ndcwski liad a particular reason for attach,
ing importance to the date of l^Tovember 15.
State 66655 (to AinEmbassy SAIGON), S/ilodis
15 October I966
Eef : Saigon 7712
* *
"2, D'Orlandi at next suitable occasion should
ask LeiTandowski if he had particular reason to attach
Importance to the date of November I5 after which
according to him there vould be 'much to do^ (Para 2^
Saigon 7712)."
HUSK
October ig, I966
D'Orlandij on probing from Lodge ^ indicates that Lewandow'ski
reflects the views of Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap, Bleither
D^Orlandi nor Lewando>;ski can judge the relative influence of these
£1
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men in the l^noi power structure. D'Orlandi refuses to pick up the lead
given by Goldberg ^s IM speech and help devise a bombing- infiltration
formula that might be acceptable to Hanoi. He says Levandovskl is
interested only In a total package j son^thing ^'finalj" not de-escalation
or even a ''truce to allov conversation,"
To illustrate the total package he suggests ; internationally con-
trolled elections after one or two years; a neutral government; US
withdrawal "eventually"; a coalition government ("not a 'must'V.)
In response to State's guery^ Lodge reports that Lewandovrski plans
to go to Hanoi shortly after the U.S. elections.
Saigon 8583 (to SecState); S/NodiSj I6 October I966
"1. This is in reply to your 66655*
'^2- On Saturday I asked D'Orlandi this question;
Does Lewandowski's strong position against
what he calls any form of ^barter*^ i.e. 'We stop
doing this and you stop doing that' reflect his own
appraisal of Hanoi's position or is it based
explicitly on what he has been told by North Viet-
namese?
"3* D'Orlandi^s reply: 'Eiis question is not
phrased so as to reflect the realities, Lewandovski's
views reflect Fnaoi Van Long and Vo Nguyen Giap who
are the only t>70 North Vietnamese with whom Lewandowski
has been in contact. Are or are these not the real
power in Hanoi? Lewandowski does not know. D'Orlandi
believes you know more than we do about that.
^%* Question: Could Lewandowski envisage any
variation on Goldberg's September 22nd bombing-
infiltration formula which would be compatible both
with the principle of reasonable reciprocity and with
Hanoi's apparent determination to avoid actions which
could be interpreted as bowing to U.S. pressure?
''5* Answer: D'Orlandi says: I don't thinly he
would answer that question. It would be going back on
what he has said he refused to do. He w^ants an over-
all agreement — not a truce which would allow conversa-
tions. He wants a "package deal* "which covers eveiy-
thlng and which thereby avoids any chance of publicity.
Hanoi will buy something that is 'final,'
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^^6, VJhen I asked D'Orlandi what would be the
elements of a package deal he said for illustration:
after one or two years ^ elections internationally
controlled; a Vietnamese C-overnment which would abide
by a policy of neutrality; the United States to leave
'eventually' (this word was stressed); a coalition
government (which he said was not a *m.ust') which
voiild contain representatives of so-called 'extremists'
having nominal ministries. By 'extremists' he meant
the Ky regime on the one hand and the Viet Cong on the
other. D'Orlandi was sure there would never be an
answer to the Q_uestion 'what will you do if the bomb-
ing stops?* But a ^real package deal' would get 'very
serious' consideration and it would get it 'Immediately,
I"
• « •
*'8. As far as the question of your paragraph 2
is concerned I think it is answered effectively by
Lewandowski^s intention to go to Hanoi immediately
after the U,S, elections, Lewandowski says he 'attaches
special importance' to these elections. Even though
he says he does not understand our national politics
he knows that the fact that the elections have been
held will 'clear the air^ whatever the results may be*'
It will mean that the electoral question will have been
removed arid he will know that the United States 'can
deal if it wants to.'
"9. Comment: I find this interesting since it
confirms the belief which you and I have had for a long
time that they must at all costs avoid publicity and
consequent loss of face. I think long drawn out peace
talks ai^e very dangerous for us. It appears now that
they are convinced that long drawn out peace talks are
utterly unacceptable for them. End comment."
October 25, I966
Ttie USGj GVl^ and Troop Contributing Countries propose settlement
terms at the Manila Conference. Ihese include an end to aggression;
territorial integrity for SVTI; reunification by free choice^ resolution
of internal differences in SVE through a program of national reconcilia-
tion; and removal of all allied military forces and installations no
later than srx months after "the military and subversive forces of North
Vietnam are withdrawn^ infiltration ceases j and the level of violence
thus subsides." The settlement would be assured by international
guarantees, particulars of which are open to negotiation.
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Eie pivotal^ features of the proposal are that (l) the future of
the insurgents is to be settled through the national reconciliation
program; and (2) allied ^rithdraval is to come after law and order are
restored. These provisions would not allov a coalition government in
which the Communists or i^TLF participated as an organized entity.
Few York Times , 26 October I966
TEKTS OF COIU'fuNIQUE MD DECLARATIONS SIGNED AT
CLOSE OF THE MANILA CONFERENCE
The Communique
"27. So that their aspirations and position would
be clear to their allies at Manila and friends every-
where , the Government of the Republic of Vietnam
solemnly stated its views as to the essential elements
of peace in Vietnam:
(i) Cessation of aggression. At issue in
Vietnam is a struggle for the preservation of values
which people eveiywhere have cherished since the dawn
of history: the independence of peoples and the freedom,
of individuals, Olie people of South Vietnam ask only
that the aggression that threatens their independence
and the externally supported terror that threatens their
freedom be halted. No self-respecting people can ask
for less. No peace-loving nation should ask for more,
(ii) Preservation of the territorial integrity
of South Vietnam* The people of South Vietnajn are
defending their own territory against those seeking to
obtain by force and terror what they have been unable
to accomplish by peacefxil means, l^Jhile sympathising
with the plight of their brothers in the North and whife
disdaining the regime in the North j the South Vietnamese
people have no desire to threaten or harm the people of
the North or invade their country.
(ill) Reunification of Vietnam, The GovernLient
and people of South Vietnam deplore the partition of
Vietnam into Horth and South. But this partition
brought about by tha Geneva agreements in 195^^ however
unfortunate and regrettable ^ will he respected until j
by the free choice of all Vietnamese ^ reunification
is achieved.
2k
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(iv) Eesolution of internal problems. The people
of South ^?"ietnain seek to resolve their own internal differ-
ences and to this end are prepared to engage in a program
of national reconciliation. \Jhen the aggression has
stopped J the people of South Vietnam will move more rapidly
toward reconciliation of all elements in the society and
will move for^^ard^ through the democratic process j toward
human dignity^ prosperity and lasting peace.
(v) Removal of allied military forces, ^e
people of South Vietnam will ask their allies to remove
their forces and evacuate their installations as the mill-
tary and subversive forces of North Vietnam are withdrawn,
infiltration ceases ^ and the level of violence thus subsides
Effective guarantees. The people of South Vietnam^
mindful of their experience since 195^^ insist that any
negotiations leading to the end of hostilities incorporate
effective international guarantees. They are open-minded
as to how such guarantees can be applied and made effective.
"28, The other participating governments reviewed and
endorsed these as essential elements of peace and agreed
they would act on this basis in close consultation among
themselves in regard to settlement of the conflict.
"29. In particular J they declared that allied forces
are in the Republic of Vietnam because that country is
the object of aggression and its Government requested
support in the resistance of its people to aggression.
They shalJ. be withdrawn^ after close consuJ-tation^ as the
other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases
infiltration^ and the level of violence thus subsides.
Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not
later than six months after the above conditions have been
fulfilled , "
....
November 10 ^ I9 66
Rolling Thunder 52 is authorized. The targets include the Yen Vien
Eailroad Yard and the Van Dien Vehicle Depot near Hanoi ^ the Thai Nguyen
Steel Plant ^ the Haiphong Cement Plant and two other targets near Haiphong
25
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['
^
■Q
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TOP SSCRin' - IT0DI3
JCS 7735 (to CINCPAC), TS/LTM)IS, 10 November I9 66
Refs: (a) JCS 6008
(b) JCS 3kZJ
"1. (U) This is an execute message.
"2. (5S) Guidance goveriEmg ROLLING THUNDER 5I
set forth in reference (a) remains in effect for ROLLING
33EMDER 52, except for added targets and additional
guidance contained in this directive.
"3. (TS) Effective upon receipt of this message;,
you are authorized to conduct air strikes against the
following objectives in North Vietnam;
TCT # N.AME BE NUl'IBER
a. l8.i|-2 Xuan Mai Hwy Br 616-024^^
h. 19 Yen Vien ES Clf Yazxi 6l6-022l
c. 51.1 Ea Gia POL St or SSV/ (Former Phuc 616-O662
Yen POL Stor)
d. 51.18 Can Then POL Stor (Former l^e-p POL 616-I340
Stor)
e. 63.11 Van Dien Vehicle Dpo (Note 2) 616-O696
f . Kinh Uo SAM Stor 6l6-009ll^
g. Banoi SM Stor W, 6l6-025T
h. Haiphong SMA Assembly 6l6-<y2.Qhh
i. 76 Kiai Nguyen Steel Plant (Areas 616-O2U
G, Kj All Rolling Stock) (Notes 1 and 3)
3. 76 Thai Nguyen Steel Plant (Area Q) 6l6.021i)-
(Notes 1 and 3)
k. 77. 1 Haiphong Cement Plant (Note 3) 6I6-O706
1. 80 Haiphong IPP W (iTote 3) 616-OOO7
m. 82.12 Haiphong O^PP E (Note 3) 616-OO5I
26
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November 11^ I966
Rolling Thunder 52 is amended to defer strikes against the Eiai
l^guiyen Steel Plant and the three targets near Haiphong,
JCS 7783 (to CIKCPAC), TS/L]M)ISj 11 HoTember I966
Ref: JCS T735
"1, (TS) Air strikes vill be deferred repeat
deferred (not canceled) against the following object-
ives in Eforth Vietnam*
^T #
76
NAI^ffl
Thai Nguyen Steel Plant
77-1 Haiphong Cement Plant
80
Haiphong TPP W
82.12 Haiphong TPP
BE mJMBER
616-0214
616-0706
616-0007
616-0051
November 13^ I966
On the eve of a major visit by Levanfiowski to Hanoi^ State tries'
through Lodge to clarify Levandovski^s relationship to Hanoi and his
ovn conception of his role. His concept of offering Hanoi a "'final"
settlement is challenged j on the grounds that it req^uires the US to
modify its position before an^"" indication of concessions from the other
side. Another attempt at finding a de-escalatory fomiiila is offered^
the "Phase A- Phase B" package. (Under this concept^ the US would
suspend bombing as Phase A, After a while, mutual de-escalatory steps
would be taken as Phase B, Thus all the reciprocit;)'' would appear to
be contained in Phase Bj even though the total de-escalation on each
side over both phases would be matching.) This formula is offered by
State as a way to save face for Hanoi while retaining reciprocity for
a bombing suspension.
State 83786 (to Amembassy Saigon) ^ TS/Nodis
13 November I966
Eef: Saigon's I07IU
* • * «
*^3. These are queries to be put to Lewandowski;
a. "What role does he envisage for himself?
Is he J on the one hand^ seeking merely to facilitate a
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better understanding on each side of the other *s
position in order to pave way toward some kind of
direct contact^ and^ if soj does he have reason to
"believe Hanoi will agree to such contact? Or^ on
the other hand^ does he contemplate serving as an
intermediary J conveying a series of proposals and
counterproposals between two sides to try to
achieve agreement on specific issues?
b. What does Hanoi consider to be his
role? Has Hanoi entrusted specific messages to
him and J if soj to whom were they to be conveyed?
c. As we understand it^ Lewandowski
wants an overall agreement and says Hanoi will buy
something that is 'f inal^ ' he doesn't want a truce
just to 'allow conversations.' How does he px'opose
to get from here to there? How would he envisage
overcoming our considerable reluctance to modify
our position on one point or another without having
any indication of what if ai^ helpful response
this would evoke from Hanoi?
d, X-/e understand that considerations of
face inevitably play a role in Hanoi's thinking*
Does this perhaps explain^ in Lewandowski^s view^
why we are unable to get any meaningf^ol response to
the question ^what would happen if the bombing of
IP/N stopped? ' Does Lewandowski see any way around
this? Could some package deal be worked out which
i n its totality represented what both we and Hanoi
Would agree to as a reasonable measure of mutual
de-escalation J but which would have two separate
phases in its execution, Faase A would be a
bombing suspension^ while Phase Bj which would
follow after some adequate period ^ would see the
execution of all the other agreed de-escalatory
actions • Hanoi's actions taken in Phase B would
appear to be in response to our actions in Phase B
rather than to the bombing suspension-
'^t* Lewandowski should understand that none
of the foregoing represents a position which he is
authorised to put to Hanoi on our behalf. ¥e will
review his replies to our q^uestions and will then
wish to determine what we wish to propose concerning
his forthcoming visit to Hanoi."
RUSK
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November 1^-lg, I966
Lewandovski answers State's queries: His rcle is part broker ^ part
interlocutor. If he can narrow differences between the two sides
suff iciently^ they vould wish to talk directly with each other and he
would step out completely. He evades as "theoretical" the difficulties
in his "final" settlement concept and chooses to interpret the Hiase A -
Phase B proposal as a US recognition that "you can^t trade the bombing
suspension for something else*" He expects the package deal to begin
its evolution without a bombing suspension^ but with an end to the
bombing fitting someTfhere in the evolutionary process,
He too has questions to pose :
i- Does the ^!anila offer mean US troop withdrawal depends
on GW control of areas not now under Saigon control?
11- In case of a cease-fire^ would the US withdraw from
I combat areas and not interfere in the creation of a new government in
i Vietnam?
iii, in case of. a cease-firej would the U5 not interfere in
peaceful reunification^ whether brought about by referendum or election?
iv. In the case of a cease-fire and negotiations ^ would the US
publicly declare its willingness to use the Geneva machinery and ICC to
bring peace to Vietnain?
Staters replies are carefully worded and not full;'' responsive to
Lewandowski^s probing:
1. The Manila formulation speaks for itself. It offers a
"definite withdrawal period" as a basis for negotiations which could
include the mechanics of phased withdrawal.
ii* We support the presently emerging constitutional process
in Sm and would abide by the results of free elections/
ill* ¥e would accept peaceful j freely chosen reunification^ a
pre -requisite for which is the restoration of peace and order in SW.
iy
for peace
may be needed.
lY, The 195^ aJ^d I962 Geneva agreements are an adequate basis
in SE Asia J but developments since 195^ suggest better laachineiy
State reiterates tliat the route to a final settlement must bes^in
with de-escalation and asks again what Hanoi would do if we stopped
bombing.
The meaning of this exchange is not very clear. Lewandowski seons
to be asking if we would accept procedu^t^s (tvoon withdrawal. Inter^
national inspection^ ei;c.) tuax vo^uld allow cnanges m the tfiW
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government favorable to the communists. We seem to reply negatively.
Secondly^ Levandovskij hj ostensibly putting the bombing question
aside until more of the total package emerges j may be villing to accept
our attack on tha North as a pressure on Hanoi for comprGmlsing other
issues. State ^ l:)y attempting to address bombing as an identifiable
issue J may be aggravating Hanoi ^s problem of face. The difficulty from
Staters point of vleWj of course^ is knowing what^ if any^ concessions
Hanoi is making on other issues as the total package is built up- Having
Levandovskij a Communistj as middleman aggravates this problem,
Saigon IO856 (to SecState), TS/NodiSj Ik November I966
*'l- I met Lewandotrski at D^Orlandi's apartment at
3:00 p.m. Saigon time.
"2. .*,on the eve of his visit to Hanoi.... He
had four questions^ as follows:
a, 'Eegarding the offer at fenila concerning
the withdrawal of U^S, forces from Viet-Nam on the i
- condition that the troops of Ilorth Viet-Nam would with- '_ ^
draw (and^ he said^ North Viet-ITamj of course ^ doesn't ,
admit that they are there at all)j does this condition
mean the United States withdrawal depends on control by
the present South Vietnamese Government of territories
not now under the control of Saigon^ 1
b. 'In case of a cease-fire^ would the United ' ,1
States be prepared to withdraw from the combat areas and
not to interfere in the creation of a new government in 1
Viet-Nam? Ihe question of how the new government of
Viet-Nam will be formed will certainly arise.
c. 'In case of a cease-fire j would the United
States undertake not to interfere in peaceful progress
toward unification of Viet-Nam if the people so wish^ , i
whether hj referendum or by election?
d. 'In the case of a cease-fire and negotia-
tions ^ would the United States be ready to use the Geneva.
Agreement and the machineiy of the International Commission
in bringing peace to Viet-Nam ^ and if so^ would the United
States pubicly declare its intention to this effect? '
"3* I said that there ware questions which I would
have to refer to the U*S, Government ^ and that I wo^old do so
and provide answers as soon as I could.
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TO? SECRET - rrcDis
"4. I then said T had scrae questions to askj and
I asked hitn the four sets of questions listed in your
State
• • « «
* * m
"6* Without any prodding at all from me or D^Orlandi^
he said *Vellj some of your questions cannot be answered
novf. As to your Question ITo, 1^ my present role is in
accord vith the instructions of my government vho vould
be prepared for me to take any role which would bring
peace nearer* The two roles set forth in your questiouj
that is J on the one hand^ to work to facilitate a better
understanding and pave the way to contact or^ on the
other J to be an intermediary ^ do not exclude each other.
In fact J they could be done together. If the ideas which
can be developed are not too far apart j then there can be
talks J and if the ideas then start separating ^ both sides
can withdraw - On the other handj if I am successful in
bringing the two sides together and they agree on something
together J I can withdraw feeling that I have achieved
sonething useful.
"7- As to the secoM questioUj Lewandowslu. said
*you have worked in Southeast Asia and you realize that
diplcoiiacy in Vlet-ITam is different than what it is in
Europe or the United States. Clear-cut answers are very
difficult to get^ one has to be very patient and look for
indirect symptoms.^ He was not^ he saidj an agent of the
Hanoi Governiaentj but 'if and when they decide they want
you to know something/ he saidj *they would tell me. Of
this I am confident. Each time I go^ the Prime Minister
asks me about Americans and what the Americans think.'
"8* 'On your third qaestion^ it is a frame without
a picture J it is very theoretical. '
"9* 'Ajb to the fourth question^ it recognizes that-
you can't trade bombing suspension for something else.
The question of bcmclng suspension in the first instance
could be discussed informally. B-it if well founded hopes
developed for reaching soin.e agreement ^ then the bombing
suspension could be brought in in- the second phase.'
"10. D'Orlandi remarked that in the beginning of our
talks J Lewandowski had agreed that the bombing suspension
would not be a precondition^
31
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"11. Lewandowski said^ 'Yes^ there must be positive
steps -- not speeches or declaratiotir. . A package deal
is not only the most practical way of going at it; it is
the only one- The A and B in your fourth question are
the beginnings of the alphabet. It might be quite useful,
¥e must go right through to Z^ including everything that
needs to be in the package deal,'-^
* « M •
LODGE
State 8k233 (to Amembassy Saigon);, TS/l^Iodis^
Ik November I966
Hef: (a) Saigon's IO856
(b) State 83786
* ■
''t. ...while -^e remain intent on finding a path to
a reasonable and honorable settlement, we are not pre-
pared to irlthdrav and find that armed subversive elements
from the ETorth have moved in again. Ve are serious in
expressing our vlllingness to remove our troops ^ to dis-
mantle our bases ^ and accept a non-aligned South Viet-Fam
so long as It is genuinely non-aligned. We do not regard
the genuine neutrality of South Viet-JI^n as opposed to
our interests. With respect to our efforts to find an
approach tovrard reciprocal actions of de-escalationj we
are aware that Hanoi must assign veight to considerations
of face J and -tre have said that so long as we were certain
that the elements from the Jlorth were removed^ we would not
Insist on any acknowledgement that these forces had ever
been in the South.
"5* In addition to the foregoing^ we have the follow-
ing specific comments on Lewandowski's four questions:
A* The Manila formulation on withdrawal was con-
sidered and worded with the greatest care - It was included
in the communique in the light of specific indications from
Eastern European sources that such a mention of a definite
withdrawal period would help in establishing an acceptable
basis for negotiations. The mechanics of a phased with-
drawal would probably have to be a matter for negotiation
although the initial de-escalatory steps might be taken by
mutual examnle.
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B. ¥e have often said that we supported free
elections in South Viet-Nam to give the South Vietnamese
people a government of their own choice. We are pre-
pareii to abide by the genuine manifestation of that free
choice. \Je support the emerging constitutional process
Id. South Yiet-Nam. The orderly formation of a responsive
and representative government based on free elections will
receive our support,
C. We are on record that the question of the
reunification of Viet-Ham should be determined by the
Vietnamese of both Uorth and South through their o'^n
free decision^ without any interference from outside.
Eow soon that can take place depends on a number of factors ^
above all the restoration of peace and order in South
Viet-Fam so that South Viet-DTam will be in a position to
treat freely with MVil on this matter,
■B
D. We have already declared our view that the
195^ sl^^ 1962 Geneva agreements are an adequate basis
for peace in Southeast Asia, Since 195k there have been
many developments which have revealed sharply the need for
an effective and truly neutral mechanism of supervision
and control. We wo^old be prepared to discuss all m=E.tters
bearing upon this complicated problem.
"6, We would also observe that what Lewandowski
terrris our 'theoretical' third question of how we get from
here to there bears most directly upon his proposal for a
'package deal^ including ^ as he put it^ not only A and B
but all the other letters of the alphabet. These range
all the way from the reciprocal measures of de-escalation
to the components of a final settlement. The immediate
issue is to find out precisely and concretely even if
quite privately what steps Hanoi would take if we stopped
bombing. .,,"
• • «
KATZEmkCS
Saigon IO955 (to SecState)^ TS/lTodiSj I5 November I966
"2. When we three met^ I read him slowly the full
text of your 8^38. Then T read it a second tima. Both
B'Orlandi and Lewandowski took very careful notes and
were at great pains to get evervthing exactly right. 1^
reference to Item 3.1>. of your 8 378 cT was not lost: on
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Levandovski. Comment: I am beginning to vonder if this
is not becoming the crux of the loatter. End Comment.
"o
* • • •
LODGE
November 16-gOj I966
A separate attempt to elicit a response to the Phase A - I^ase E
fozmulation is made by passing it to the Russians via George Brown
during his visit to Moscow. Ihey indicate interest^ provided that the
DRV"s k points and the NLF*s 5 points are accepted as a ''basis for
discussion" in the negotiations that follow. Brown is not informed of
the Lewandowski contact^ and it does not come up during his talks in
Moscow.
State 86196 (to Amembassy London) j S/jTodiSj
16 Tfovember I966
Please pass following message from Secretary to
FonSec Bro^m
"•..Bear George: Your forthcoming visit to Moscow
is obviously of the greatest importance in sounding out
the Soviets on the possibilities of action toward peace
in Viet-nam..,/'
"As one way of saving Hanoi's face^ you may wish
to explore on your otm initiative the possibility of a
package deal vhich in its totality represented what
both we and Hanoi would agree to as a reasonable measure
of mutual de-escalation J but which would have two
separate phases in Its execution. Phase A would be a
bombing suspension^ while Phase B^ which woiold follow^
would see the execution of all the other agreed de-
escalatory actions. I^noi's actions taken in Phase B
might appear to them to be in response to our actions
in Phase E rather than to the bombing suspension.
Obviously J Fanoi cannot have the bombing suspension
without also accepting Phase B. \le would^ of course^
like to hear Moscow or Hanoi *s reaction to this
admittedly general proposition before we make any
specific commitments/^
RUSK
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State 91787 (to Amembassy London)^ S/lTodiSj
20 I^Tovember I966
El^es Only for Ambassador from Secretaiy
"I* Following text message to me from George
Brown delivered by UK Mbassy here,...
"On the first day I tried hard to get Gromyko
to lay off his gramophone record and get down to
the q^uestion of the three issues (paragraph 10 of
your message). However^ he gave no ground but his
interest was sufficiently intent to encourage me to
give him an outline of the package (paragraph 1^ of
your message). This I did orally before dinner on
the first evening^ giving it to him as my ovn pro-
posal, ivjext morning J purely for the sake of clarity ^
I gave him a piece of paper. Tae actual words used
are enclosed. He was pretty suspicious but promised
to pass it on to Kosygin only.
''It was on the basis of this piece of paper
that I talked with Kosygin this morning On his
side after a lot of the usual stuffy pretty muted ^
about American aggress ion^ he said that they were
prepared to make the IJorth Vietnamese four points
and the HLP five points 'a basis for discussion.^
When I said that I had interpreted a basis of dis-
cussion as meaning that they wovild be flexible
neither he nor Mr, Grcmyko contradicted me. ISieir
package woixLd seem to be an unconditional stopping
of the bombing J some de-escalation in the South and
then negotiations on the basis as above...-"
EUSK
November 30-December 1, I966
Lewandowski returns from Hanoi. He has formulated 10 points to
reflect the US position with respect to an overall solution of the
Vietnam war. There is sufficient interest in Hanoi^ he says^ that the
U.S. should^ if the foi^ulation is acceptable^ confirm it directly to
the DEV Ambassador in Warsaw. He urges speed to guard against a leak
or sabotage by those "working against a solution." His source in
Hanoi^ he says^ is Fhata Van Loag^ who has the "Presidium behind him/*
Most of Lewandowski 's 10 points reiterate familiar US positions.
His principal imiovaticn is US acceptance that "the present status quo
in S^/N must be changed in order to take into account the interests of
35
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the parties presently opposing the policy of the U.S. in SM." He
does not include the Phase A - Phase B foimula for de-escalation^ hut
states that the US would stop bombing to facilitate a peaceful solution^
■would "accept DE^y modalities on the cessation^" and "would not require
the DRV to admit infiltration into SVH. Lodge believes ^ however^ that
he did give his presentation in Hanoi in accord vith the full Phase A -
Phase B fonnulatiorii
Lodge refers the 10 points to Washington^ to see if they are an
accepta^ble representation of the US position. He points out two
difficulties hj[j:aself ^ however: the phrase "status ^uo in SW must
change" would be more acceptable if it read "status quo in STO would
change"; and the terms for de-escalation are poorly expressed.
Saigon 122^^-7 ^ TS/NodiSj 30 November I966
"Lewandovski summarized the 10 points to Lodge as
follows :
(1) The U.S. is interested in a peaceful solu-
tion through negotiations.
(2) Negotiations should not be interpreted as
a way to negotiated surrender by those opposing the
U.S. in Vietnam, A political negotiation would be
aimed at finding an acceptable solution to all the
problems^ having in mind that the present status quo
in SVN must be changed in order to take into account
the interests of the parties presently opposing the
policy of the U.S. in South Vietnam.
(3) ^e U.S. does not desire a permanent or a
long-term military- presence in SW.
(U) The U.S. is willing to discuss all problems
with respect to the settlement.
(5) ^e U.S. is willing to accept the partici-
pation of 'all* in elections and the supervision of these
elections by an appropriate international body.
(6) The U.S. believes that reunification should
be settled by the Vietnamese themselves after peace
and proper representative organs are established in SVH.
(7) Tne U.S. is prepared to abide by a neutral
South Vletnaci,
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(8) The U.S, is prepared to stop bombing *if
this will facilitate such a peaceful solution,^ In
this regard the U.S, is prepared to accept DRV
modalities on the cessation and not require the DRV
to admit infiltration into SVIff.
(9) The U.S. will not agree to * reunification
under military pressure.*
(10) The U.S. 'will not declare now or in the
future its acceptance of Korth Vietnam's i; or 5 points,'
"Lewandowskl asked if these 10 points were a
proper fozmulation of the U.S. position. Lodge said
that they seemed to be in order ^ but that the matter
was of such sensitivity and importance that he would
have to refer the points back to Washington for
approval. Lodge added ^ however j that he saw two
difficulties right off. First^ he suggested changing
Point 2 to read 'would' instead of *must.' Second j
he guestioned the phraseology in Point 8 — 'if this
would facilitate such a peaceful solution. *
"Lewandowski insisted that his statement was a
serious proposition "based on conversations with the
'most respectable government sources in Hanoi-*
Later Lewandowski admitted that Hiam Van Dong was
the source and that he had the ^Presidium behind him,'
"Lewandowski stated: 'I am authorised to say that
if the U.S. 3^e really of the views which 1 have
presented^ It would be advisable to confirm them
directly by conversation with the JJorth Vietnamese
Ambassador in Warsaw.*
"Lewandowski said that there was a vital need to
move quickly because (l) there was a danger of a leak
and that secrecy was essential for Hanoi; and (£) that
delays would give those 'working against a solution'
time to 'put down the clamps on talks.*"
State 9U66O (to Amembassy Saigon) ^ TS/l^Tcdis
1 December I966
. > .
"(5) Do we interpret your comment at the end of
para D-8 correctly to mean that Lewandowski presented
our phasing formulation fully and accurately?"
EUSK
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Saigon 12323 (to SecState), TS/Hodls,
1 December I966
Eef: State 9^660
* * ■ •
"5* Your para 5. Lewandowski did not repeat not
present your phasing formulation 'fully and accurately'
in his conversation vith me- He merely cited ^our
Phase A and Phase B, ' with clear implication that HS
(Sic) had giren his presentation in Hanoi in accordance
vith your formulation,"
LODGE
December 2, I966
Air strikes are run against the Van Dien Vehicle Depot and the Ha Gia
POL Storage Facility 6.7 and I6 nautical miles ^ respectively^ from the
center of Hanoi.
December 3, I966
(NB- DOD files do not contain Washington- Saigon or Washington-Warsaw
traffic on Marigold for December 2-4. What follows is derived fron later
cables. )
On instructions from State ^ Lodge meets Levandovski again to state
that:
i. The U.S* Snbassy in Warsaw will contact the LRV Bnbassy on
December 6 or soon thereafter;
ii, Levandovski's 10 points broadly reflect the US position; but
111* "Several specific points are subject to important differences
of interpretation."
Lewando^/Jskij in turn^ expresses concern about US bcsmbing of Hanoi ^
acting on instructions frcm Eapacki. (Saigon 12^28)
De cember k^ I966
Air strikes are run against the Yen Vien Piailroad Yard and the F^ Gia
POL Storage Facilityj 5»5 ^^d I6 nautical mileSj respectively, from the
center of Hanoi,
38
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December 5j I966
Groxmouski is suHanoned by the Foreign Minister in Warsaw and giv^en a
Polish recapitulation of Marigold, According to Kapacki's account of the
December 1 meeting in Saigon^ Polish support for a US-DRV contact in War^
saw was extended "after Lodge confirmed Levandowskl's resume." Thus
Lodge's December 3 statement about "important differences of interpreta-
tion" appears as a revision of earlier U3 acceptance,
Rapacki argues that the US reservations about interpretation are so
broadly stated as to put the whole basis for the contact in doubt. Alsoj
coming "after all the conversations which were held/' the statement might
undermine the role of Poland as intermediary. He urges instead that it be
replaced by a statement defining the differences of interpretation the
U£G has in mind and asks Gronouski to take this up with the President.
He also refers to the "intensification of bombing near Hanoi subse-
quern: to the Lodge-Lewandowski conversations" as likely to create doubts
on the DEY side.
It is hard to know precisely what has happened in Polish-DBV communi-
cations at this point, Rapacki 's account suggests that the Poles told
Ife,noi they had US approval of Lewandowski's 10 points after the December 1
meeting. If so, the events of December 3 (the air strikes near Hanoi
and the "differences of interpretation") migjit well have been viewed in
Hanoi as casting doubt on Polish reliability, on the sincerity of US
interest in negotiations^ or both- Alternatively^, Eapacki may simply have
been trying to extract additional concessions or statements of position
from the Americans^ using these developments for leverage.
Warsaw I363 (to SecState)^ 5 December I966
For the President and Secretaiy
"1- I was called to FornMin 11:30 a.m. Dec 5 by Dir-
gen Michalowski who^ after determining that I knew what
meeting was about j took me in to see FornMin Eapacki,"
» »
^%* Eapacki continued that on Dec 1^ after return
of Lewandowski from Hanoi j Lewandowski had third meeting
with Lodge in which he gave a resume of USG position as
he had understood it from the two previous conversations*
After Lodge confirmed Lewandowski's resumOj Lewandowski
said contact of USG and ITorth Vietnamese Ambassadors In
Warsaw^ would have supDort of Poles,
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"5- Continuing his accoiont of prior events ^ Eapacki
said that on the afternoon of Dec 3j at a fourth meeting
"between Lodge and Le'vjandowsl^ij Lodge ^ on the basis of the
President's instructions ^ read a statement as follows:
A. Kie President vill instruct the U.S. PiOibassy
in Warsav to contact the ITorth Vietnamese Ambassador In
Warsaw on Dec 6 or as soon as possible thereafter*
B, [Hie U,S» Einbassy in Warsaif vill be in a
position on Dec 6 to confirm to the North Vietnamese
Ambassador that the Levandowskl Dec 1 resume of the Lodge-
Levandowski conversations broadly reflects the position of
the USG.
C» 'We must add that several specific points
are sub^ject to important differences of interpretation,*"
"6. Kapacki said that Lodge was unable at the Dec 3
meeting to precisely say which points were subject to
differences of interpretation and -what the nature of these
differences of interpretation might be*
"7* Eapacki then stated that question of interpre-
tation put in doubt whole basis on which contact with North
Vietnamese Ambassador in Warsaw was to have taken place -
He expressed grave concern as to how equivocation will be
read by Hanoi* He added that Poles must transmit USG
position to ETVIT Govt.; and that rather than a general
reference to differences of interpretation it vould be
better if position transmitted contained statement defining
differences of Interpretation ^e have in mind. He said
such a statement might have a significant effect on Hanoi's
attitude toward both a meeting in Warsaw and the whole
problem-
"8* Eapacki then asked what can be the position of
Poland in its role as intermediary if after all the con-
versations which were held and statements made there still
remains this doubt? He asked again how this reservation
will be read by Hanoi j particularly with intensification
of bomb lug near Hanoi subsequent to tlis Lodge-Levandowski
conversations? He said these questions had already been
raised by Levandowski during his Dae 3 conversation with
Lodge*"
« ■ «
''0
■+
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"12 • Eapacki asked that I transmit to the Presi-
dent the Poles deep concern caused by modification of
USG position which has 'been signaled by the Dec 3
declaration of Mr. Lodge and his hope that para on
differences of interpretation can be deleted on grounds
that it vas based on misunderstandings vhich have
since been clarified/^
• « ■
GR0N0U3KI
December gj I96 6
Gronouski is instiructed to stick with the reservation as vorded on
the grounds that ve might be charged vith bad faith if we did not make
clear the wide latitude for interpretation of the general language used
by Lewandowski,
State 97016 (to Amembassy Warsaw )j ITodis^
5 December I966
Ambassador Eyes Only TOSBC 1^ Secretary E^es Only
Pef : Your I363
■ « • »
We might expose ourselves to charges of bad
faith in any subsequent negotiations if ve did not
make clear that there is a wide latitude for interpre-
tation of the general language used by Lewandowski-
'^Lewandowski^s formulation broadly reflects the
position of the US Government on the issues covered
and we would be prepared to accept it as the basis
for direct discussions with the Korth Vietnamese if
they are in fact interested in pursuing the matter j
and if they wsre informed that latitude for inter-
pretation of such general language is inevitable,"
• •
December 6, I966
Gronouski carries out his instructions and is told by Eapacki
that the US statement will now be transmitted to Hanoi.
Eapacki says that the LEV expects to receive at the first Warsaw 1
meeting the precise and official position of the USG in order that it
can express its position at an appropriate time. He apparently i
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tmderstands Lodge to have indicated that such a package proposal vould
be forthcoming.
Gronouski replies that he had anticipated a more limited scope
for the first meeting — confi2:*ining Le-v7andovrski^s formulation^ dealing
vith matters such as time and place j etc. He refers the matter to
Washington.
Meanwhile^ Lewandowski makes many of the sajue points to Lodge
in Saigon* He adds that the ^'V/arsav contact vas shadowed by the
bcmhing of Hanoi" and asks the U3 to ^^avoid addins to the difficulties/^
Warsaw 1375 (to SecState)^ TS/Nodis^
6 December I966
Eef: State 970I6
"1, tfet with Fonl4in Hapacki I3OO hours Dec 6 and
conveyed material in reftel,"
w m M
"5- Eapacki said that he understood Lodge to
have done the following:
A. Presented official USG position or
principles for peaceful solution;
B, Stated that a new package deal of tJ3G
proposals would be forthcoming:
C- Expressed willingness o± USG to discuss
fo^jr points and any other points raised by other side,
(FYI: TJiis summary was apropos of nothing. It was
simply interjected in the conversation,}
'*6, After repeating his view that proposal for
meeting in Warsaw was a significant 'ETVN response ^ he
said Poles must reserve judgment until they can study
situation further to determine whether USG had
actually made step forward. He expressed the opinion
that what had transpired betvreen Lodge and Lewandowski
prior to la,tter*3 trip to Hanoi did represent step
forward but the aualifi cations made by Lodge on Dec 3
cast doubt on this judgment."
....
"9* Eapacki said that at any rate they cannot
delay any longer in transmitting information to Hanoi
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He added that the original position of Lodge is liiiovn
to Hanoi; and it remains a qiiestion as to how the
qualification of Dec 3 vill be interpreted by sensi-
tive elements in the iwi Go^/t, Eapacki said that
infommtion transmitted to NVN will reflect the
material presented to hi^i today ^ but Poles must also
express their own doubts and misgivings over the
question of interpretation raised by Lodge,
"10. Eapacki then turned to the substance of the
first Warsav meeting vith TIVN Ambassador *in the event
it takes place.* He said it is his understanding that
during that meeting ve -will present to the NVN side
the position of USG in order that the W^ Govt can
express his position at an appropriate time on the
attitude of the USG and on subsequent modes of pro-
cedure. He said the NVK Govt- expects to receive at
the first Warsaw meeting the precise and official
position of the USG and he assumes (with a smile)
that it will not be different than the one presented
to Lewandowski* He said he presumed I already have
locked in my safe such a statement which will be able
to identify the specific points on which there is wide
latitude for interpretation, (FYI: Rapacki read from
a Dec 3 statement given to Lewandowski ^^^ Lodge when
making his reference to specific points.) He said he
hoped at that meeting we will be able to discuss
differences in intarpretation (adding that he still
was looking for an answer to the question ^differences
vith whom' inasmuch as the NVI^ Govt, has not yet pre-
sented their interoretation, )
"11, I said that I had presided that the first
meeting would be more limited in scope. I expected
that the first meeting would be primarily concerned
vith establishing that both sides were interested in
beginning negotiations^ and deal vith such matters as
time and place of negotiation session. I added that we
would also expect at the first meeting to confirm Mr.
Lewandovski's foim^ilation of our position as broadly
reflecting the position of the USG with the qualifi-
cation regarding interpretation. I added ^ however^
that 1 would inform Washington of his understanding
of the nature of the first meeting,"
GHOJroUSKI
^3
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Saigon 12601 (to SecState)^ TS/Fodls^ 6 December I966
"1. Levandowski asked to meet me at D'Orlandi's
today. He began by saying that he had asked for the
in3eting "because of a communication which he had received
from Mr, Eapacki in Varsav^ which asked him:
"2- *Please turn the attention of Ambassador
Lodge to the fact that the form^Jilation oi" the last para-
graph of the statement of December Hiree may be under-
stood as raising a question about the whole position
embodied in the ten paragraphs and which was to form the
platform for the Warsaw Meeting.^"
« a
"5- Lewandowski then said^ rather as an after-
thought ^ that 'the overture of the Warsaw contact was
shadowed by the bombing of Hanoi and we should therefore ^
avoid adding to the difficulties.'"
December 7j I96 7 . .-
Gronouski is told that the USG position was conveyed to Hanoi the
previous day^ that the intensification of the bcmbing is raising suspicions
in Warsaw as well as Hanoij and that the DEV will be keenly disappointed if
the first meeting doss not include a direct statement of the USG position.
Kie DRV "is not interested in what Lewandowski said,"
With respect to the bombing problem^ the Poles reject the explana-
tions that the target list cannot be suddenly altered without alerting
many people that something unusual is happening and that what appears as
an intensification of bcmbing is in fact due to improved weather conditions,
Eapacki says "policy is more important than weather j" and we are urged not
to bomb in the vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong,
Warsaw I376 (to SecState)^ TS/Nodis^ 7 December I966
Hef ; State 97016 and Warsaw I375
, *
"3- Mlchalowski said Rapackl had conveyed USG
position to Hanoi shortly after my meeting with him Dec
6...,"
• • , ■
"5- Michalowski said,., that ITOT Go^rb, and even
some in Polish Govt, are suspicious that recently
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stepped up bambing outside Hanoi is the vork. of same
elements in USG who are tiying to undercut Presi-
dent's peace move. He added that vhen this question
-was raised vith Lodge the latter had replied that
such raids are planned long in advance j and that a
quick reversal would alert many people that some-
thing unusual vas happening. Michalowski said that
to many people this is an unconvincing answer^ and
expressed fervent hope that we can avoid future
highly sensitive honibing raids in vicinity of Hanoi
and Haiphong.,,,
"6, Michalowskl said he wanted to underscore
Rapacki's insistence that at the first meeting with
the NVTT Ambassador in Warsaw we do more than con-
firm^ with qualification j Lewandowski's resume of
Lodge's ten points. He said the NW Govt, is not
interested in what Lewandc^-rski saidj but rather in
hearing USG position directly from us. He stressed
extreme importance of first meeting ^ and said the
NVN Govt. viH be keenly disappointed if its expec-
tation of receiving direct statement of USG posi-
tion at first meeting Is not realized..,."
GRONOUSKI
t^farsaw^ I376 (to SecState)j TS/Nodis^ T December I966
Eef : Warsaw I376
"1. FouMin Rapacki called me to his office at
1800 hours Dec T ■•--''
* . * •
**3- Rapacki then said that Poland could not
continue in its role unless it is convinced that we
have or will put an end to this intensified bombing -
He added that if Poland has been satisfied on this
score J and if it so happens that contact in Warsaw
between the USG and NM Govt, will occurs then 'I
avail myself of this opportunity to state * that it
is necessary for the USG to recapitulate to the ITVK
Representative its whole position as described by
Lodge with a degree of clarity so that the other side
would no longer fear that the USG position as formu-
lated might subsequently be changed through recourse
to Lodge's 'important differences of interpretation'
clause , . , ,
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"^. •..! said that if I recall correctly^ there vas
a lull in bonibing flights in late October and early Novem-
ber simply because of bad weather conditions^ and what
appears to him to be an intensification of bombing may
simply be a resumption of bombing to its nonaal level.
"5* Eapacki responded that 'policy is more impor-
tant than weather ' - . . •
"6, .• .bombing against the vhole of NVU vas intensi-
fied and also was more directed to Hanoi. KiiSj he added^
clearly appears to he provoking."
* * . •
GRONOUSKI
December 7, 19^6
Gronouski^s instructions for the first meeting are refined. He is
to stick with Levandovski f s formulationj jjidicating its acceptability as
a basis for negotiation even though subject to further elaboration and
clarification as talks proceed. \le do not wish to reformulate it our-
selves because we would have to take harder positions than Lewandowski * s
if we were to be held to precise language and because any formulation
attributable directly to us could be used to embarrass the GM or our
relations with them. Gronouski is therefore to avoid being drawn out
on specifies J though for purposes of illustration he may point to the
following :
1. In negotiating a bombing cessation (point 8)^ the Phase A -
Phase B formula might be considered.
ii. Changes in the governmental status quo would have to be made
in accordance with the desires of the people of SW. Electoral procedxires
or other arrangements cotild be ascertained through consultations and
negotiations there (points 2 and 5).
(!Ehe most contentious pointy he is warned^ is that calling for a
change in status quo^ as it could m^an anything from putting the NLF
into the government immediately to a simple endorsement of the election
process under the Constitution then being drafted by the GW. Gronouski
is to resist discussing this altogether.)
He is to reassure the DRV that oar reservation about "differences of
interpretation'' means only that complex matters are inevitably subject
to clarification. For example j the phrase "long-term" in point 3 has been
partially clarified by the 6 months provision of the Manila Comtnuniq^ue ,
kG
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¥e urge direct^ secret discussion with the DRV as a matter of the
highest importance and urgency. We hope that the Poles have no idea of
pajt;iGipating and Gronouski is to avoid further substantive discussions
¥ith them if the DRV contact materializes.
State 9T930 (Memhassy Warsaw) , TS/Nodis^
7 December I966
Kef: Warsaw's I375
"!• Your reference telegram will receive urgent
consideration here tcmorrow and you will receive
further guidance from us then.
^'2. In the meantime^ you should take no further
initiative with GOP,
"3. In the unlikely event that^ before receiving
further instructions ^ you should receive notice that
HVI^I representative is ready and available for talks
with us J we submit the following for your interim
"i^. If such a meeting with FVW representative
should occur J you should follow prior instructions.
If desirable^ you are then authorized to read rpt read
to him Levandowski ' s 10-point presentation of USG
position as set forth at end of this cable ^ stressing
that it is Lewandowski^s formulation.
"5 ' You should then inquire whether points as
presented ^y you are the same in all particulars as
those passed on to Hanoi by Lewandovski.
"6. For your information only^ one of our princi-
pal conceiTis about the ten points is set forth in the
next following paragraph^ but even if pressed you
should avoid discussing the substantive problems re-
lating to these points with the Wvll representative at this
stage and stress that such discussions should be the
subject of actual negotiations. We would assiune that
WVDT representative would have no authority on this first
contact to do more than report ycur presentation to
Hanoi so we vould not anticipate such probing at this
time. Further cable tomonrow will spell out our thinking
in greater detail and may suggest initiative to be taken
if you have heard nothing after additional lapse of time.
1^7
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"7* Lewandovski ' s point two relating to change of
present status quo in SW is obviously most troublesome.
^is point could be interpreted variously to mean (a)
NLF must be put into government of South Vietnam forth-
with or (b) simple endorsement, of election process under
constitution now being drafted. If it is necessary to
point out ambiguities in Lewandowski's statement^ however^
you should not refer to this point but allude to less
contentious ambiguities elsewhere in statement,
"8* Lewandowski's ten point statement follows:
'1. I have insisted that the United States
is interested in a peaceful solution through negotiations,
'2- Negotiations shouJ-d not be interpreted as
a way to negotiated sixrrender ^j those opposing the
United States in Viet-Namt. A political negotiation would
be aimed at finding an acceptable solution to all the
problems J having in mind that the present status quo in
South Viet- Nam would be changed in order to take into
account the interests of the parties presently opposing
the policy of the United States in South Viet-NarCj and
that such a solution may be reached in an honorable and
dignified way not detrimental to national pride and
prestige. (FII: Lewandowski's original presentation
states status quo 'm.ust' be changed but when Lodge
questioned this point Lewandow^ski said he would be glad
to change word from *must^ to Hjould'j EI^Ei Til).
'3- That the United States are not interested
from a point of view of its national interests in having
. a pez^inanent or long term military in South
Viet-Nam once a peaceful solution to the
reached. Ihat is why the offer made in Manila regarding
the withdrawal of U.S, troops and the liquidation of
iimerican bases should be considered in all seriousness,
^k* The United States would be ready , should
other parties show a constructive interest in a nego-
tiated settlement J to work out and to discuss with them
proposals of such a settlement covering all important
problems involved from a cease-fire to a final solution
and wi-chdrawal of U. S. troops .
'5* That the United States ^ within a general
solution^ would not oppose the formation of a South
Vietnajnese Government based on the true will of the
Vietnamese people with participation of all through, free
democratic elections ^ and that the United States would
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be prepared to accept the necessary control machinery
to Eeciire the democratic and free character of such
elections and to respect the results of such elections.
'6- The United States held the viev that
unification of Viet-Nam must he decided by the Viet-
namese themselves for vhieh the restoration of peace
and the formation of proper representative organs of
the people in South Viet-Ham is a necessaiy condition.
'7. The United States are ready to accept
and respect a true and complete neutrality of South
Viet-Nam,
*8, 5he United States are prepared to stop
the bombing of the territory of Forth Viet-Fam if this
will facilitate such a peaceful solution. In doing so^
the United States are ready to avoid any appearance
that North Viet-Nam is forced to negotiate by bombings
or that North Viet-lTam have negotiated in exchange for
cessation of bombing. Stopping of bombings vould not
involve recognition or confirmation by North Viet-Nam
that its aimed forces are or were infiltrating into
South Viet-I^am.'
"At this point you should interrupt recitation of
Lewandovski's points and state as follows: QUOTE I^.
Le'wandowski clearly implied to Ambassador Lodge that
in Hanoi he had given his presentation in connection
with the point on the bombing of North Viet-Nam in
accordance with Ambassador Lodge's earlier formulation^
which was as follows: A package could be worked out
which in its totality represented what both the United
States and North Viet-Nam would agree to as a reasonable
measure of de-escalationj but which would have two
separate phases in its execution. Phase A would be a
boabing suspension^ while Phase B^ which would follow
after some adequate period ^ would see the execution of
all the other agreed de-escalatory actions. North
Vlet-r^am's actions taken in Phase B would appear to be
in response to United States actions in Phase E rather
than to the bombing suspension^ EEffi QUOTE. You should
then resume the recitation of the ten points.
'9- I have InforEned the proper governmental
sources that at the same time^ the United States^ while
not excluding the unification of Viet-Nam^ would not
agree to unification under military pressure.
^10, ^Jhlle the United States are seeking a
peaceful solution to the conflict^ it would be unreal^
istic to expect that the United States will declare
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now or in the future its acceptance of TTorth Viet-Nan's
four or five points.^ (EM) OF EWAITOOVSKI'S ST^'EEME^TT)
"9» If N"^^ representative probes further on
cessation of bombing^ you should merely state that
as you have already indicated Mr, Levandovski has
suggested a possible procedure for agreeing on phasing
and timing which could be the subject of later
discussions ."
KAOEENBACH
State 9875^ (to Amembassy Warsaw )j ffi/llodis
7 December I966
Eef: State 97930
"1- If a meeting vith the ITorth Vietnamese is
arranged J you should proceed in accordance with
instructions contained in State 96235 and State 95711
except as modified belov. As regards the presenta-
tion to the JTorth Vietnamese representative of our
position^ you should follov closely the following
formulation:
^a. Lewandowski has informed us of his
discussions with your government in Hanoi and of the
position he conmunicated to them as that of the U,S,^
based on Levandowski's prior oral discussions with
Ambassador Lodge in Saigon. Ve assume that his dis-
cussions in Hanoi were conducted entirely orally as
they were with Lodge in Saigon and that no pieces of
paper have been exchanged which purport to state
governmental positions. We are prepared to enter
into direct disciissions with yo^or government on the
basis of the position which Lewandowski has informed
us he presented to your government in Hanoi*
'b. The position was stated to us by Lewan-
dowski as follows: (Here you should read the ten
points as contained in State 979 30 j para 8 with the
additional point about bombing covered uner Point 8),
*Co We wish to emphasise that this language
is that of Lewandowski and not that of the United States •
Kevertheless it presents a general statement of the US
position on the basis of which we would be prepared to
enter into direct discussions,'
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"2- FII The North Vietnamese aM perhaps the Poles
as veil appear to be seeking a reformulation of our
position in order to compare it vith vhat Lewandowski
ha^ said, v/hile we are entirely prepared to have Lewan-
dlovski's formulation stand as ^presenting a general
statement of the US position^' we are anxious to avoid
a restatement of our position in our o"^m words because
(a) this vould oblige us to take some harder positions
than those put forward by Lewandovski which apparently
have gone far enough to make the Horth Vietnamese ready
to consider talking vith us and (b) any formulation
which can be attributed directly to us could be used
to embarrass the GVK or to embarrass us in our relations
with them. In other words ^ if we stand on Levandowski^s
formulation thi'ough the first step in discussions with
the North Vietnamese ^ we can always say with regard to
any specific point that we don't accept just those words
used by Lewatidowski and thus maintain some room for
maneuver at least until we know the discussions are
really under way. EMD FIX.
"3- After reading the ten points you should point
out to the J^orth Vietnamese that some matters j because
of their complexity aixL the danger of varying interpreta-
tiotij would be the subject of further elaboration by us
as soon as discussions were to get under way- One of
these has to do with the package agreement containing the
so-called phases A and B vith respect to bombing and a
program of de-escalation. The second relates to certain
points which directly involve matters of basic concern
to the people of South Viet-^Nam (as for example points
2 and 5)* Vlhatever detailed arrangements are made on
those matters would have to be acceptable to the South
Vietnamese people; however ^ this could be ascertained
tha^ough consultations and negotiations there*
^'k. If the I^Torth Vie t name se refer to the earlier .
point made by us that several specific points are sub-
ject to important differences of interpret at ion ^ you
should explain that this is not intended to suggest that
the statement as it stands is any less a general state-
ment of the U»S^ position but rather that it is inevitable
with matters as complex and controversial as those covered
in the ten points that they would be subject to interpre-
tation and that their clarification would be the noimal
function of the discussions which we hope ve will be
embarking on. If the l^orth Vietnamese press for an
Illustration you might refer to the phrase 'long-term'
in Point 3^ noting that it was specifically to clarify
this point that the I/ianila Communique specified a six-
month period.
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"5- otherwise you should be guided in your
discussion with the ETortli Vietnamese "by the limi-
tation set forth in para 6 of State 97930^ stress^
ing that fxirther discussion of substantive questions
should be the subject of the actual direct negotia-
tions vhich ve hope can be got under way promptly.
fT
In conclusion you should say that yoiir
governinent is prepared to enter into secret dis-
cussions with the ETorth Vietnataese Governmant at
any time and "^e regard this as a matter of the
highest importance and urgency.
''T* We understand from your latest repoi'ts
that the next stepj if all goes wellj vill be the
opening of the direct discussions with the Forth
Vietnamese and if this in fact materialities you
should avoid any further substantive discussions
vith the Poles, Vfej of course j are anxious for
direct and private discussions vith the ITorth Viet
name 3 e and hope that the Poles have no idea of
participating therein."
• A •
KAOEEffiACH
Dec^^ber 8, I966
Rusk and Katzenbach reiterate ouj: willingness to consider a
bombing cessation or other de-escalatory measures on terms previously
indicated J but not as a precondition for talks. If Eapacki threatens
to interrupt the contact over this issue ^ he is to be 'warned the
responsibility for the breakdown will be his.
State 9S924 C"*^o Amembassy Warsaw)^, TS/iTodis^
8 December I966
For Mbassador Gronouski from Katsenbach
"1. In response to Eapacki's statements reported
in your 139^** -you should remind Papacki that the sub-
ject of bombing was one of the matters discussed in
Hanoi by Lewandowski and that ve are prepared to pursue
this matter with the -forth Vietnamese in the same tenns
vhich \ie, affirmed to him. You should read reference on
package contained in paragraph 3 of Levandowski's 10
points (state 97930) to remind him of Levandowski's
statement to Lodge ^ You should underline that inherent
in this formulation is the paci^age approach to de-
escalation.
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"2. If Eapacki attempt to nail us to anythim
on bombing beyond our first contact with the Jorth
Vietnamese J or again threatens to break off tiie
ope rat ion J you should infora him in no uncertain
terms that if he maintains this position he will
have to accept the full responsibility for the
breakdo^'m of what appears to us to be a promising
possibility for peace."
KATZEMBACH
Taipei 10T2 (to SecState)^ TS/Nodis^
8 December 1966
Ref: TOSEC 6^
FOR the Acting Secretary from the Secretary
ft
» • • •
1 do not believe we should be drawn into
conunitments about our o>ni military operations with-
out some Indication from the other side as to what
they are going to do about their military operations
Ifevertheless^ we should be ready to discuss this
problem alongside or before a broader discussion
of political matters."
* » •
KcConaughy
December 6- 9^ I966
Eapacki protests the differences of interpretation" clause and
the bombing of Hanoi in a strong demarche to Fanfani and^ through
Lewandowskij to D^Orlandi and hence Lodge in Saigon. Hanoi cannot be
expected to enter discussions in the face of such "escalation/'
Fanfani on the one hand urges Eapacki to go ahead and arrange the
contact in ¥arsaw^ on the other instructs D'Orlandi to convey the
message to Rusk (then in Saigon) and to seek a reply.
At their meeting on Dacember 8^ D'Orlandi tells Lewandowski that
no contact has yet taken place because of Eapacki *s apparent refusal
to convey the US message to Hanoi. He is apparently unaware that the
message was passed December 6.
On December 9j Eusk asks D'Orlandi to tell Lewandowski and Fanfani
that we are in direct touch with Eapacki on both points. He adds that
bombing can be the first topic for discussion^ if this is of especial
concern to Hanoi.
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D'Orlandi gives the following as vievs of LevELadowski :
i. Clarifications prereqiiisite to the Warsaw contact should
occur in Saigon j vith a Levandowski visit to Hanoi immediately possible
if needed. Thus D'Orlandi surmises that Eapacki's taking over this
phase may bs an effort ^'to "be clever and get the U.S. to withdraw
"all reservations" before the contact is made.
ii. De-escalation is a difficult topic to start on. It is
more promising to look for a final package. This might be a cabinet
of Ik positions J 2 each for the Ky Group and the NLFj the remaining
10 for "neutrals or whatever." (This is the formula proposed by
Lewandowski September 18.)
lii. During November 16-30^ when Lewandovrski was in Hanoi^ ba-ubing
appeared to be at a reduced level at least in the Eanoi area. Tais was
interpreted in Hanoi as a tacit signal of US support for Lewandowski 's
mission, (fffi. in fact^ these were the first two weeks of ET 52-
Presumably^ weather accounts for the lack of action against targets
near Hanoi. )
Eusk stresses to D'Orlandi several times that the USG is indicating
its position with no reciprocity from Ifenoi or even assurance of how
Lewandowski has presented the points to Hanoi. D'Orlandi urges "a little
faith in Lewandowski," He himself completely credits Lewandowski ^s
claim to have gotten Hiaci Van Dong to obtain Presidium agreement to the
Warsaw contact.
Saigon 12953 (to SecState)^ TS/Nodis^ o December 1966
'*D*Orlandi asked to see Secretary and Ambassador
this evening following dinner party in Secretary's
honor. Conversation w^as a follows:
"1. Lewandowski had cs-lled urgently on D'Orlandi
evening of December 8^ on instructions ^ to express
grav^e concern that U,S* had carried out heavy bombing
attacks in Hanoi area on December 2 and December k^
directly following December 1 conversation between
Lewandowski and Lodge. Lewandowski conveyed lurid
reports from Polish attache Hanoi alleging that
December 2 attack had Included bombing and machine-
gunning within city ax^ea and I^d caused 6C0 casualties.
December h attack also described as serious and in
Hanoi area. Lewandowski protested to D'Orlandi - urgin
htm to convey message to Lodge and to Secretary if
possible " that such attacks could only threaten or
destroy possibility of contact in Vfersaw. Lewandow^ski
argued that Hanoi could not be exnected to enter
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discussions in face of such escalation, (Wiile vhole
tenor of message vas extremely strong^ Lex^randa^^ski
did not repeat not state that hs was actually report-
ing Hanoi *s expressions of vieVj hut rather ¥arsav
Judgment.)
^'2- D'Orlandi had responded to Lewandowski that
no contact had in fact taken place as yet because of
apparent refussJ. of Eapacki to convey firm message ^
that U*S, had taken forthcoming action in declaring
itself ready for discussions and prepared to make
contact on December 6; and that it was thus not fair
to say possibility of contact destroyed by U,S. action
D^Orlandi went on to say that his hope had been to
make contact in any event.
"3, In addition to Lewandowski message December
8 J D'Orlandi had just received cable from Fanfanij on
evening December 9j reporting that Eapacki had sent
Fanfani strong demarche protesting U, S, insistence on
reservations of interpretationj and further protesting
U,S, bombing attacks. In this cable^ Fanfani had
instructed D'Orlandi to convey substance of message to
Secretary^ if possible^ and ask for reply- Fanfani
had also included in the cable statement that he him-
self had replied to Rapacki urging that he go ab.ead
and arrange contact nonetheless-
TT)
4* Secretary responded to D'Orlandi as follows:
A, He asked D'Orlandi to tell Lewandowski
that we were in direct touch with Rapacki on the
points raised , , . ,
B, D'Orlandi should reply to Fanfani with
same first pointy adding that if Hanoi was concerned
about bombing^ this could be first topic in discussions <*» .
*'5* During course of conversation j D'Orlandi pro-
vided following additional conjecture and infonnatioa:
A, D'Orlandi was fairly sure that Lewandowski
had wished ¥arsaw contact to take place ^ with any points
requiring clarification to be explored through tripartite
talks in Saigon and possible Lewandowski further visit
to Hanoi (which Levandov/ski had also suggested D'Orlandi
as immediate possibility), D'Orlandi therefore surmised
that Kapacki had 'tried to be clever' and get U.S. to
withdraw all reservations before contact made. (U.S,
side at no time conf ironed that this was in fact exactly
what Eapacki had said in Warsaw.) Secretary suggested
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that - in light of prior expressed statement that Soviets
informed - Eapacki actions might have heen dictated from
Moscov. D^Orlandi expressed doubt^ on basis his reading
of LewandotTslsLi attitude and reirarks by Levandav/ski about
Rapacki over a period of time, flatter was dropped at
this point.
B, , . *Lewandowskl had particularly expounded
to him diffictilties he saw in getting discussions started
on reciprocal actions in connection with bombing. Hence,
at D*Orlandi's suggestion Lewandovski had started to vork
out hovr sitiiation in SVTJ might look one or two years hence
and might be described in acceptable form to Hanoi and
Washington^ so that in effect a package deal would emerge.
D^Orlandi stated that, when he asked Levandovski just
vhat kind of role VC might have - would it be like Czecho-
slovakiaj or what - Lewandowski had come up with sample
formula of Ik cabinet positions with 2 each for present
Ky Group and VC/KLF, and remaining 10 allotted to 'neutrals
or whatever.* (This is of course fonnula given by D'Orlandi
to Harrimanj as D*Orlandi<s o^^mj in Rome conversation in
early HoYember.)
C, In connection with 2fe.noi attitudes on U.S.
bombing of ITorthj Lewandowskl had told D*Orlandi that he
"believed Hanoi had attached significance to fact that
during the two weeks Levandowski had been in Hanoi (approxi-
mately November I6-30} bombing had appeared to be at
reduced level at least in Hanoi ai^ea. D'Orlandi said
Lewandowski thought Hanoi had interpreted this as tacit
signal of U.S. support for Lewandowski mission.
^^6. Secretary several times pointed out that whole
episode to this point vas unique in that we were acting
on. Lewandowski f£ statement of U.S. position without any
clear indication whatever of Iianoi position, or even an^^
assurance Lewandowski had discussed points with Hanoi in
manner covered by statement. L^Orlandi appeared to
accept that we had indeed taken forthcoming attitude in
view of these circimistanceSj although he himself stressed
view that one had to have a little faith in Lewandowski^
and he appeared to credit completely Lewandowski claim
that he had finally got Fnam Van Dong to obtain Presidium
agreement to Warsaw contact/'
. • . *
LODGE
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December 9^ I966
In Warsaw^ Gronouski assures the Poles that the Levandotrski fonuu-
lation is consistent vith our vie^rs^ that he ^'assumes" Phase A - Phase B
de-escalation formula is the "new package deal^^ the Poles believe Lodge
to have promised ^ and that the pattern of cur bombing is not related to
the projected US-DHV contact.
Eapacki is satisfied with respect to the interpretation clause*
He rejects de-escalation as too narrow a pac^ge but blurs the issue
by suggesting that "de-escalation'' may be US shorthand for a deal
including all outstanding issues.
On the bombingj he is adamant in his dissatisfaction. He reads
what he says is a November 1^ statement by Lodge ^ declaring USG
willingness to hear suggestions on "practical measures^* it might take
to show its good intentions and allay the distrust the IfLF and Hanoi
may have of it. He feels the Pole^s bombing suggestions were not
received in this spirit- He implies that Lodge's statement was not
conveyed to Hanoi,
As Gronouski found no threat to break off the talks ^ he did not
issue the warning on his instructions of December 3.
Warsaw 11^^21 (to SecState)^ TS/l^TodiSj 9 December I966
Section 1 of 2
Ref : State 9892!^
"1. Met Eapacki at my request at I6OO Dec 9,
Michalowski and Jancsewski present,
'^2, ity opening reniarkSj based on reftel^ were
as follows :
A. J, have requested today's meeting as a
result of consultations I have had with Vashlngtcn
since oar meeting Wednesday afternoon.
B» I can now assure you that at the time
of the first Warsaw mseting with representatives of
the Iforbh Vietnamese Government j I will be prepared
to confirm to the INl^ Go^/i: the position of the USG
with respect to negotiations. I can also assure you
that this confirmation will be consistent with the
discussions Mr. Lewandowski had with them and with us.
C. ¥ith respect to the question you raised
Wednesdajv- on bombing^ I can state flatly that the
pattern of our bombing in ]\n/TJ has nothing to do with
with the current efforts of the Polish and USG's to
get underway the projected US-tlW talks
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D, You vill recall that the sul^ject of bombing
IWTf was one of the imtters discussed in Hanoi by Mr.
Levandowski. After his return froi]i Eanoi Mr. Levandovski
clearly implied to Amb Lodge that he had discussed this
matter In Hanoi in accordance with Amb Lodge's earlier
formulation. Amb Lodge had suggested that a package
could be vorked out.... Inherent in this forraulation is
the package approach to de-escalation which I assume you
had in mind vhen you referred to ^a nev package deal'
during our conversation last T^uesday,"
. V a *
"3 * Eapacki responded . . • . "
"J+» . , .vith respect to my first point (presentation
of USG negotiating position to WVIf) he said if this is
done in a way which vill dispel doubt on invoking interpre-
tation clause J then one of the difficulties has been reduced,
"5- On bombing guestioUj he said. * .bombing was
clearly intensified at tlie precise tiiae it would create
provocation. • , .
"6. Rapacki read what he said was Nov. Xk statement
by Lodge : USG understands that the Liberation Front and
Hanoi have deep-seated distrust of USG; that is why USG
is willing to take practical measures to show good
intentions J and would be willing to hear any suggestions.
Rapacki said this statement by Lodge was treated as
addressed 'only to Polish ears^ ' adding Poles have been
proved right in treating it so because in the case of
their b 0:11b ing suggestion they have not found such readi-
ness to listen to suggestions as Lodge indicated »
"T* Eapacki expressed concern over my use of term
Me-escalation^ ^ noting that Lodge said Washington was
convinced that not much can be accomplished in getting
talks under way with partial de-escalation. He said
lodgers accent was on the package deal which would cover
all problems J including withdrawal of US troops. If my
use of de-escalation represents a short- cat for a package
deal including cessation of hostilities and the resolution
of a variety of other outstanding problems ^ then his
concern over my use of the term is simply a matter of
semantics. Ha asked if ir^^ use of the term was consistent
with Lodgers declaration on a package deaL"
GSONOUSKI
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¥arsair lUl2 (to SecState)^ 9 December I966
Section 2 of 2
"8. I sal3 I did not clearly rnderatand vhat he
¥as driving at "but referred to my opening text and
pointed out that the degree or manner of de-escalation,
is not subject to unilateral determination. I said
that this -would have to be resolved in negotiating
sessions between the U3G and JTOI. . , "
I
« a •
*^1T* Ccmnient: Hapacki's position was much less
intransigent toiay than during Dec 7 meeting » I thought
it significant that when I stressed importance of initi-
ating talks Mchalowskij Eapaclii's major adviser on
Vietnam war^ nodded his head affirmatively three or four
times. Because I found no threat to break off talks
that was implied Dec 7^ I did not use para 2 of reftel/'
GROIJOUSKI
De cember I Q, 1956
Rusk and Gronouski are informed that Washington does not wish to
withdraw authorization for RT 52 at this time. It is anticipated j
therefore^ that some targets may be hit which Rapacki will insist reflect
further escalation.
State 10062^ (to Amembassy Saigon)^ TS/l^'odis
10 December I966
Eef : A. Saigon 12953
B, Warsaw 1^21
C, Warsaw 1^22
For Secretary from Katzenbach
4 *
"2» On the bombing pointy you should teow that
R2^-52 stands as it was at time of your depart lore from
Washington and targets earlier set anide rems-in in
suspense. ''
KAVZmBACH
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'i'i
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state 10067 (to Amembassy Warsaw )j TS/Kodis
10 Dacember I966
Bef : A. Vfarsav 1^21
B. Warsaw 1422
« a *
'%. FYI only (rpt. FYI only). You should be aware
that for the immediate future the bombing pattern vill
remain unchanged from ^irhat it has been over the past
several veeks. This may well involve some targets which
Eapacki will insist represent further escalation^ just
as in the past he took to be escalation certain varia-
tions in our bombing pattern which in fact represented
no real new departures in the pattern as a whole* With
foregoing in mind you should avoid giving Poles even
any slight indications which they mi^t take to mean
that we are escalating or de-^escalating at present-
Present bombing pattern has been authorized for scms titne
and we do not wish to withdraw this authorization at
this time."
• «
KATZiENBACH
December 13^ I966
Eapacki quotes a US Navy spokesman as saying that new targets have
recently been placed on the bombing list^ adding "you can assume what
effects such statements have in Hanoi^ given the fact that in recent
weeks new targets have in fact been added/' He again urges restraint
in bombingj arguing that overt pressure "will be utilized by all those
who have a different vision of this peace move than we have here in
Warsaw • "
Warsaw 1458 (to SecState}^ TS/i^odis^ I3 December I966
Section 1 of 2
Eef ; Warsaw l'+29
4 4
"8, Bapacki added that we shc^aid realise that
leadership of DE1T^/J[ does n^t want to and cannot yield
under pressure; every step tvo^ our side that evokes
impression that W^ is acting under pressure would be
interpreted as sls^n of weakness and be utilised by all
those who have a different vision of this peace move
than we have here in Warsaw. (Comment; Sapacki
repeated this point with emphasis and was^ I belie vej
making a clear reference to Communist China.)
SO
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"9- Eapackl said that in first position expressed
by Lodf^e it appeared that this truth was grasped by USG
and this Is why Poles were so hopeful. However the
events of Deceinber mean^ if the working hypothesis Poles
are using is sound ^ that US does not fully appreciate
this situation. He added that recent statements by USG
officials leave the impression that USG- wants to evoke
pressure. He quoted from Renter news stoiy of Dec 12
US ITavy spokesman's statement that US intends gradually
to increase air raids oa '^M; Rapacki interjected at this
point his realization that Navy spokesman may not have
known all that was going on and this coxxld very well be
an old Idea, Bit he added that the Navy spokesman's sub-
sequent reference to escalation and to new targets having
been recently placed on bombing list represented current
information* He said 'you can assume what effects such
statements have in Hanoi, given the fact that in recent
weeks new targets have in fact been added. ^"
GSONOUSKI
December 13- IJ^^, I966
The Yen Vien Railroad Yard and Van Dien Tehicle Depot are bombed.
They are both 5 nautical miles from the center of Hanoi j and have been
struck previously. Tass cla^ias^ in addition^ that residential areas
in Hanoi and its suburbs were hit.
A later US official investigation shows that only these targets
were intended, but it is possible that US ordnance fell within the Hanoi
city limits by accident.
State IO35S6 (to ^embassy Warsaw) ^ s/NodiSj
15 December I566
* * •
"2. .., Washington approval of targets including
high level review by Defense and State is required and
takes into consideration location of targets with
respect to population centers in effort to minimize
civilian casualties. T^ype3 of targets struck have
included lines of communication^ bridges ^ POL storage ,
selected thei^nal power plants , militaiy installations^
and anti-aircraft missile sites and missile facilities
that are a threat to o^ar aircraft.
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"3* Latest strikes near Hanoi were Yen Vien
railroad yard ^M Van Dien vehicle depot ^ vhich are
5 nautical miles northeast and south of Hanoi
respect ively_^ and well outside of Hanoi city iDjnits,
Both of these targets were struck on December 13
and 1^ but this was not first time in either case,*..
"4, [Eass alleges our aircraft bombed built-up
area of Hanoi at west end of Bed River bridge and
suburb of Dhatran to the southwest (have been unable
locate Dhatraa on any map). Hanoi has made similar
charge. We have not received complete reports; how-
ever ^ nothing in reports so far to substantiate this
and area alleged to have been attacked nowhere near
areas targetted for attack. It is important to note
that there was heavy SA^-l^ anti-aircraft and MIG
activity and our aircraft took action against SM
sites. Qiiite a number of SAt^ were fired at our air-
craft; errant SATls or anti-aircraft shells of course
could cause damage .
^ • ft . * .
(e) There is no basis for charging us with
escalation of conflict over past few daySj either in
geographic terms or as to t^'pes of targets. Hanoi's
FOL facility three nautical miles from center of Hanoi
was struck on June 29^ and FOL facilities on edge of
Haiphong were struck June 29 j July T and August 2, Two
targets of December Ik are both five nautical miles
from Hanoi's center (farther than June 29 strikes); both
had been struck earlier."
. . 4
"(f) .... In comparable periods of good
weather^ e,g.^ November 22 and 23^ December 2j 3^ k and
5; and Dec 13-1^ essentially same type of targets were
struck^ Some intensity of air activity in and around
Hanoi took place as has frequently been the case for at
least six months . . * . "
62
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State 106358 (to Amenibassy Warsaw)^ 21 December 1966
* • *
**1. Our investigation of allegata bombing in Hanoi has
been thorough, The only targets vere military ones more
than five miles from tlie Ifenol city center. However we
cannot rule out completely the possibility of an accident.
Any US ordnance that may have fallen within the Hanoi city
limits was the result of such an accident/^
EUSK
December ik^ I966
State does not interpret Rapacki^s December I3 statement as a nega-
tive reply from Hanoi ^ closing the Marigold door. It Is^ however ^ now
Inclined to wonder whether the Poles ever had a commitment from the DEV
for the Warsaw contact. In any case^ further conversations in Warsaw
are to have two objectives:
i. Keeping the door open for talks to develop,
ii. lettii^ the record show our persistent efforts to move
forward J while refuting Polish contentions that our actions and state-
ments blocked the opening of conversations.
Gronouski is therefore instmcted to make the follow^ing points to
Papacki :
i. Military" actions oj both sides were taking place througihout
the conversations in Sai^oriT
ii. As soon as the US began talking with the Poles preparatory
io meeting with the DEV^ new terms and conditions were put forward
for opening the talks ,
iii. We are now confused about what reflects the views of Hanoi j
as opposed to the Polish Government. Direct contact is needed,
iv. To leave no stone unturned^ we suggest taking up de-escalation
along the lines of the Phase A.- Phase B formula ^ as a manageable opening
piece of the total picture.
V. If the other side prefers^ though^ we will start at the other
end^ looking first at possible terms of an agreed settlement,
vi. Eapackl is to be warned that he will bear full responsibility
if Polish obstructionism prevents the contact,
^^ile these instructions are en route ^ however j Gronouski is
summoned by Rapacki to learn that the DRV has asked for all conversations
to be terminated. The "brutal raid on the residential area in Hanoi
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precisely at the moment vhen the USC- knev that the matter of a Varsa-vr
contact with Hanoi was actively "being considered" is the reason,
Eapacki claims that immediately after the Poles transmitted "a direct ^
positive response from Hanoi ahout the possihllity of talks in VarsaVj
-•-the USG reserved the possibility of modifying its attitude and^ of
far greater Importance^ entered a new stage of escalation/'
Gronouski appeals to the President* If the newspaper accounts of
the Hanoi raids are true^ "then ve are in an incredibly difficixlt
position. I am convinced that if this represents the breakdown of the
current peace initiative- . -the Soviets , the Poles and the Worth Vietna-
mese T?ill have no trouble convincing the leadership in eveiy capital
of the world that our stated desire for peace negotiations is insincere
.-•• We have no choice but to take iinmediate action to tiy to get dis- .
cussions back on the track."
He proposes J therefore j to accept Eapacki 's reasoning: to give
no impression of bombing intensification during the negotiations about
opening talks in Warsav — in particular ^ to halt bombing near Hanoi
and Haiphong, 'Ve would again express our deep desire for the initia-
tion of talks and ask the Poles to continue their efforts,"
Thus just as Gronouski is ordered to launch a pre--emptive offensive^
he is himself recommending retreat.
State 162295 (to Amembassy PiffilS) TS/Uodis
I4 December I9 66
For the Secretary from the Acting Secretary
Eef : SEGTO 62
"I do not rpt not interpret Hapacki's statement of
December I3 to Gronouski as a negative reply from Hanoi in
effect closing the ferigold door- Firm instructions are
being prepared for Gronouski designed to keep the dialogue
going J while at the same time making a clear record of the
legitimacy of our participation in the MAEIGOID effort
since its inception."
• '•'*•
/
State IC2960 (to Amembassy Warsaw). TS/lfodis
Ik December I966
Eef : Warsaw 1429
(info to Amembassy Paris & Saigon: Paris for Secretary
E^es Only; Saigon for Ambassador Porter Only)
"1, *,-, In light of Polish tactics we are now
inclined to wonder whether they ever had any WM
.commitment to a meeting in Warsaw or whether it is
not more likely that they have been engaging in an
effort to get us committed to something as close as
possible to our maximum position and then see whether
they could get Hanoi lined up to talk on that basis.
In any event we must bear two following objectives
in mind in further conversations with Poles on this
subject:
6k
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(a) We msan to keep the door open as long
as there seems to be any possibility of talks develop-
ing ^ but at the same time sticking to our position as
generally represented by Levandovrski's 10 points j and
(b) We sincerely want to begin substantive
talks and the record shoizld clearly show our persistent
efforts to move forv^ard and that Polish contention that
our actions and statements have thrown roadblock in the
way of opening -of conversations in Warsaw are thoroughly
refuted .
"2* Therefore you should ask fox further meeting
with Eapacki and present him with following full state-
ment of our position at present time:
(a) You should first review history of
Lodge-D'Orlandi-Lsvandowskl conversations starting with
Kovember ll|^~15 conversations in Saigon
(b) You should then point out to Papacki
that before J during and after all this was taking place ^
the conflict in Viet- Nam continued^ including the
bombing of North Viet-Nam^ the infiltration of North
Vietnamese men and supplies into South Viet-Hamj Viet
Cong terrorist bcmbingSj assassinations^ kidnappings ^
e u c • • c ,
(c) As soon as we began to talk with the
Polish Goverrjnent in Warsaw^ presumably preparatory to
our meeting directly with the North Vietnamese repre-
sentatives ^ we found that new teims and conditions
seemed to be put forward with the opening of direct
talks contingent on our f ulf iUin,^ them. . . .
(d) But our desire is to move toward peace
and our conviction is that the best road to take is one
of direct discussion with Hanoi^s representatives. We
are somewhat confused as a result of the conversations
in Warsaw as to what Hanoi has said and what represents
the views of Polish Governments Our strong impression
is that J in spite of our readiness both In Saigon with
Lewandawski and now in Warsaw to present quite fully
and frankly our posit ion ^ we have not received any
communication at all froni the North Vietnamese Govern-
ment , , . ,
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(e) Nevertheless ve want to leave no stone
unturned in our search for peace and vould like to
turn for a moment from the total picture to one sec-
tor of it in which coaceivably ve might begin to move
!Hiis is with respect to the possible beginning of de-
escalation through a two-'ohased arram^ement referred
to in Lewandowski's eighth point.... Perhaps the
coining holidays and the truces associated with thenij
offer an opportune occasion to take some useful steps
along these lines; this in turn shoiild make it easier
for the authorities in Hanoi to proceed then to dis-
cuss other matters standing between us and a peaceful
settlement,
(f ) On the other handj if they wish to
proceed promptly to a total agreement representing
the terms of an agreed settlement j we are prepared to
move along that track including de-escalation as the
final item, (FII: In other words we will start at
either end of a total agreement, EMD FIX)
(g) You should conclude your statement of
our position with the language contained in para 2
of State 9892^^- J leaving Eapacki in no doubt that we
have done ever^rthing possible to open up the way to
peaceful settlement and we are very much disturbed at
our having been unable to move for^^a2rd at Warsaw as
we had been led to expect from the earlier conversa-
tions in Saigon."
KAOEMffiACH
Warsaw 11^71 (to SecState)^ TS/Kodis,
15 Decembler I966
For the President from Ambassador Gronouski
"1, I met with Eapacki (Michalowski and Janczew-
ski present) at Poles* request at ISOO Dec 1^!-, (in
contrast to previous meetings^ Hapacki entered the
room unsmiling^ and during entire meeting maintained
a calirij serious and matter-of-fact attitude.)
fi.
2- Eapacki said that first he would like to
bring some precision with respect to our conversation
of yesterday (V^arsav ItjS). He said that this con-
versation took iDlace before Poles were aware of last
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bombing of Hanoi. He said^ 'If I had had this news then^
our eouversation of course would have had different
character than it did.'
^^3* Eapacki continued^ 'Today I must state the
follcn^ing facts. First j that the U.S. had to be con-
scious of and realize the importance of establishing
direct contact vith Hanoi,' He added^ 'You had stressed
the unique possibility of a peaceful settlement that the
Warsaw talks vith Hanoi presented,' He continued ^ 'We
thought so too J ever since ve obtained the signal for
vhich the USG had asked for for so long in so many
official statements.' He added^ 'In this instance we
received more than a signal; we received a direct ^
positive response from Hanoi about the possibility of
talks In Warsaw,'
"t, Eapacki said that immediately after this dir-
ect response was transmitted to the USG the US reserved
the possibility of modifying their attitude and^ of far
greater importance j entered a new stage of escalation.
"5- Rapacki continued that the USG was bound to
be conscious of the reaction which its conduct would
evoke and of the consequences of such action. He added
that the Poles have done everything in their power to
dispel any illusions^ noting that on six occasions in
Warsaw and Saigon^ *We have warned the USG- side in all
seriousness ar,d with the greatest emphasis of the conse-
guences of their actions.'
"6- 'Yesterday/ Hapacki continued, 'The US Air
Force engaged in a new and particularly brutal raid on
the residential area in Hanoi precisely at the moment
when the USG knew that the matter of a T-Farsaw contact
with Hanoi was actively being considered. This^^ he
added J «was the last drop that spilled over the cup.
From the moment^ in Hanoi and Warsaw^ all doubts as to
the real Intentions of the USG disappeared ^ including
doubts not only in the present case but with respect to
all other instances in the past when the US has advanced
positions which it has described as peaceful initiatives.'
"T* Papacki then said^ 'We understand therefore and
fully share the wish of the Leraocratic Republic of Worth
Vietnam J which was transmitted to us today j that we
terminate all conversations begun months ago in Saigon.
The Polish Go^^i: states that the whole responsibility for
losing this chance of a peaceful solution to the Vietnam
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var rests on the USG.' He added^ 'I vould like to
express nore than regrets because of the utilization
by the USG of our good will. Once again it "becomes
clear how difficult it is to believe in your words.*
He added^ ^In future only facts can be taken into
consideration. '
"8, I said that I would have no comment except
to say that I regretted this turn of events and would
inimed lately convey these observations to ¥ashington.
"9* Comment: If Moscow dateline account of
latest Hanoi bombing published in Dec 1^ Paris edition
of New York Times and Herald Tribune ^ and recounted
to me tonight by Eapackij is true then we are in an
incredibly difficult position. I am convinced that
if this represents the breakdown of the current peace
initiative — and it surely does unless we take deci-
sive and Immediate action — then the Soviets ^ the
Poles and the North Vietnamese will have no trouble
convincing the leadership in every capital of the
world that our stated desire for peace negotiations
is insincere. If we treat this turn of events as any-
thing less than a crisis in our worM leadership role
then I believe we are making a tragic mistake.
"10. I am convinced that up till now the Poles ^
accepting the genuineness of our interest in negotia-
tion^ have used whatever influence they have in Hanoi
(in all likelihood with Soviet backing) in an effort
to initiate US-ITV?! peace talks , I also am convinced
that Rapacki was expressing genuine concern when he
warned that the increase in bombing was destroying
what appeared to him a good chance that WTi^ would over
come Chinese influence and encase in Warsaw talks.
"K«_
"11. We have no choice but to take immediate
action to try to get discussions back on track. For
any chance ox" success this would requirej in my judg-
ment^ conveying to Poles that we are willing to accept
Bapacki's Dec I3 reasoning (iv'arsaw 1^58) and are pre-
pared now to assure the Poles that we will take care
not to create impression of bombing intensification
in DA/II during the period of delicate negotiations over
the holding of Warsaw USG-l^IVIT peace talks. We would
also assirre the Poles that we do not intend to bomb in
the immediate vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong during
this period. We would again express our deep desire
for the initiation of talks and ask the Poles to con-
tinue their efforts."
a . • «
GEOITOUSKI
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Decemljer 1^^ I966
After consulting the President j State again instructs Gronouski to
present a strong rejection of Bapacki's arguments, ¥e doubt the accur- .
acy of the Communists' bombing accounts and that the Poles really intend
to sell their view of Marigold to world opinion.
At the sane time, Rolling Thunder 52 is amended to suspend strikes
against the two Hanoi targets hit December l3"lli*. This is not comiiani-
catedj however^ to the other participants in iMarigold,
Meanv/hile Lewandovski has begun to leaic his version of Marigold by
giving a few salient points to the Uutch Cliarge in Saigon, Ve do not
learn of this until December 17^ and know only that Lgvrandowski^s con-
versation with the IXitch Charge occurred sametime between November 30
and December I5.
Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times receives a cable from
Hanoi, A visa to visit the DKY, for which he had applied some months
earlier J has been granted and may be picked up immediately in Paris,
^e Polish tohassador in Heme is contacted by the Pope who inquires
if the former can '^tell hiia anything with respect to Vietnajnj" according
to a later conversation betvreen the Polish Ambassador and Fanfani, (For
source^ see December I9 entiy,)
State 1033if2 (to Aiaembassy Warsaw)^ IS/llaUs^
15 December I966
For -Ambassador Gronouski from Acting Secretary
Pef : (a) Warsaw IU7I
(b) State 102960
(info to Amembassy Paris & Saigon: Paris for Secretary
'Eyes only; Saigon for Ambassador l^as only)
"1, Your message (reftel a) has been discussed
with the President and he has approved the comments and
additional instructions w^hich are set forth below.
"2» -41 though Rapacki's message to you reported
ref (a) is also discouraging it does not alter our basic
assessment as conveyed to you in State's IO2960 In
spite of his reference in paras 6 and 7 reftel (a) to
views and decisions of ilVKj we remain doubtful about hew
much part Hanoi has played in scenario which has unfolded
in Warsaw over past two weeks."
. •
*^7- Finally J and in spite of the fact that Bapacki's
line as reported reftel (a) makes it essential that he get
69
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the full force of our rejection of his arguments and
our indignation at the Polish Governirent's changing
the signals and then seeking to put the blame on us^
ve feel neTert?ieless that you should In the course
of your presentation to Eapacki leave no doubt about
our continuing strong desire to move forward in
direct conversations vita the North Vietnarnase ^^
'*8. Your further interpretation and discussion
contained Varsav^s 1^75 i^ very much appreciated and
1 am sure you fully realize that all of us here pro-
foundly share your concern over the tui-n events have
taken in the last fev days. Likewise I can veil
imagine that in the atmosphere of Warsaw and without
full information available ^ particularly concerning
the bombing of ITorth Viet-^Nanij the Polish position
may appear to be a strong one, whatever their motiva-
tion in presenting it as Rapacki has just done. Ve
want to as&i.ire youj however ^ that on the basis of the
over-all picture as we can see it from Washington^
the Polish case^ except for some fairly superficial
and transitory matters^ is a weak one and we wonder
whether they will tiy to sell it to world opinion."
* «
KATZENBACH
JCS Ikrjl (to CUTCPAC), TS/LB1DISj IS Decem"ber I966
Ref : JCS 7735
"1, (TS) Ref authorizes air strikes against
folloving targets in Hanoi area.
TARGET NO.
ITBffi
BE HUMBER
19
63.11
Yen Yien EE Clf Yd
Van Dien Veh Dpo
616-0221
616-0696
"2. (TS) Suspend further air strikes against
these targets until further notice."
TO
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Saigon I364O (to SeeState), TS/Nodis
17 December I966
*'l. CAS Station Chief came to political counselor
Dec 17 and reported that one of his officers had been
queried by Netherlands Charge Derksen about a statement
by Lewandowski concerning negotiations vlth Hanoi,.. #
"2, In response to retiuest CAS submitted follow-
ing as ^lemorandum of conversation with Terksen:
A. In a conversation vhich took place in
Saigon on an unspecified date between Nov 30 and Dec 15^
1966 J Ambassador Levandovski told Mr. Derksen that he
vas recently in Hanoi for a somewhat longer period than
usual. He vent on to say that 'an organization' —
later he used the vord 'group' — was negotiating with
Hanoi on the subject of peace talks. I^h:. Lewandowski
did not further identify the group or organization.
B, Mr. Lewandovski was bitter because pro^
grass in these talks was halted by the recent American
bombing of Hanoi (dates of air raids not specified). He
told Mr. Derksen he was so bitter than he planned to
write >a paper ^ on the subject..,
V
Behind the Lines— Hanoi , hj Iferriscn E. Salisbury
tBantacij July 1967)^. p. 8
^^^en^ on the morning of December 15^ Seymour
Topping^ the foreign editor of Tb^ Tmes^ walked over
to my desk and put a cablegraci before me.... The visa
to Hanoi did^ indeed, await me in Paris."
December IJj I966
State expresses alaim over the possible impact on the talks in Warsaw
and also on Ky. should Lewandowski's leak to the Dutch Charge reach him.
Lodge is told to give Ky a lew key Indication that a possible lead toward
peace is being investigated.
State 10i^673 (to Aiaeiabassy Saigon)^ TS/jIodis
17 December I966
Kef: Saigon 136^0
"1. Lewandcwski ' s indiscretions are indeed most
unfortunate and potentially harmf^ja to talks in Varsaw, ..
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"2. This leads us to suggest you should te prepared
vith line to use vith Ky should outright leak occur ^
should Ky raise with you on has is rumors floating around
Saigon J or should you feel rumors ha^^e reached point
vhere you should take initiative vith Ky as preventive
measures. Our thought is that in such eventuality^ you
would simply in low key take following line: As ve have
told Ky before we get many apparent leads on subject of
peaceful settlement. ¥e feel responsibility not to over-
look any possible lead which might offer soiae promise -
Most of these leads dissipate iJBmed lately j sane seem
slightly more productive and are pursued further.
Lewandowski contact with us over past few months has been
such lead. At times it has appeared to offer more
possibilities and at times less, Yj may be assured that
if any lead offers any real prospect of discussions with
Hanoi J he will be promptly consulted."
KATLMBACE
December 18. I9 66
iriH
D'Orlandi tends to reject our ratioriale for what has happened in favor
of the Polish version. He feels there is a "strong prima facie case
against us" and that we should do "something quickly In Warsaw." much the
same view expressed by Gronouski on December 1^.
Saigon I3618 (to SecState)^ TS/Kodis
18 December I966
Bef : State 10^^673
* *
"6. D^Orlandi then said to Habib that he was himself
surprised at bombing on the l4th. Ee wondered 'If there
were not some people in the US who had deliberately sought
to create a problem. » Hiis was denied in precise terms
and with an expression of surprise that D^Orlandi would
have such a thought. It was pointed out that as D'Orlandi
knew there was no connection between bombings and Lewan-
dowski^s proposals. Habib then gave D-Orlandi the rebut-
tal material contained in State's Circular 1038^1-9 and went
over it in detail ^ suggesting it be used if Lewandowski
again raises issue of banbings."
. * •
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"12, Comment: Our Judgment is that foregoing confirms
correctness of changing venue to Warsaw- D'Orlandi is not
only shoving his personal pique at turn of events ^ but is
displaying definite tendency to discard our explanations
while endeavoring to induce us to do ^something quickly in
Warsaw,' Instead of focusing on infonaation provided "by
Habihj he launched into extended presentation of Lewan-
dowski's latest animadversions (sic)^ adding his own
belief that there is ^strong prima -facie case against us'
as well as exhortation mentioned preceding sentence,^'
« « • *
PORI!EIR
Deceiriber ig^ I966
Gronouski carries out Staters instructions of December 15 . In an
angry exchange ^ Eapacki attacks both the accusations leveled against the
Polish role and the US suggestion that the Warsaw contact still be
attempted ,
In Rome J the Pope is given the ^^whole story" on Marigold by the
Polish Ambassador J who later reports the episode to Fanfani^ adding that
he had been contacted by the Pope on December 15^ to ask if the Poles
"could tell him anything with respect to Vietnam,'^
Warsaw I513 (to State )^ TS/jTodis
19 December I966
Eef : Warsaw I50S
* « fe
"9 He (Eapacki) added that Poles did not put
forth new conditions but 'recalling speeches of Goldberg j
the President^ Secretaiy Busk and others ^ once we
received the signal we did we would have had everj'' right
to call for a stop in the bombing,* He said^ *you have
said over and over again that you would end all bombing
if there was an assurance from Hanoi that there would be
a response toward peace from Hanoi; however , we did not
ask that you ston bombing but only that you not intensify
it.^"
• • 4
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"13 He saidj 'I am astonished that at came time
you accuse us of stalling talks j you ask us to help you
get them going again. ^ * Inasmuch as NVW asked Poles
to discontinue these discuss ions ^ vhat vas nev to justify
returning to wm on this matter? .../'
GPOI^TOUSKT
Rome 31^09 CtQ Sec State )j TS/Nodis
28 Decembei* I966
• •
"^- Fanfani said that according to the Polish
Ambassador the Pope on December I5 sent word to the Polish
Government asking if they could tell hija anything with
respect to Vietnam. On December 19 the Polish Government
responded by telling the Pope the vhole story, Fanfani
indicated he did not ]rpt not know just what the Polish
Ambassador meant oy the 'whole story' but presumably the
Polish Governm,ent had told the Pope everything they knew."
* » « »
EEBIHAPDT
December 21, ig66
M M l i ■ » ■-■li» ■ ■ T il I I , „ ,^
Eapacki clarifies the Polish role in I^rigold, The following were
conveyed to us on instruction from Hanoi:
i. Lewandowski's message to Lodge immediately upon his return
from Hanoi expressing a positive response to the Warsaw talks.
ii. Eapacki 's warning after the December 3 bambing^ that Ife^noi
would have to reassess the situation,
iii. The decision to terminate discussions in Warsaw.
He added that there had been frequent exchanges between Hanoi and
Warsat/ during the conversations and felt confident the Poles accurately
expressed Hanoi's views j even when acting on their o\m initiative.
While Gronouski is learning this in Warsaw^ instructions are enroute
for him to tell the Poles that ary deinage from US ordnance within Hanoi
city limits was accidental. We are now prepared to state there will be no
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bombing vlthin 10 miles of the center of Hanoi for an indefinite period
if talks with the DEV can begin shortly* We "anticipate'* some "appro-
priate reciprocal action" vith respect to HLF activities within 10 miles
of the center of Saigon as "evidence of Rood faith."
Warsaw I535 (to SecState)^ TS/Nodis
21 December I966
Eef : State IO5909
« m
''2, X asked Eapacki to clarify for me the role
that Hanoi played in our discussions. Eapacki replied
that the message lewandowski gave to Lodge (he referred
to 'three sentences*) upon his return from Hanoi
expressing W^ positive response to Warsaw talks ^
Eapacki *s warning after the Dec 3 bombing j that Hanoi
would have to reassess the situationj and the decision
to tennir^te discussions in Warsaw were all decisions
by ETVK which were conveyed to us oy the Poles . He
said further that comnients Poles made regarding danger
of creating the impression of pressure on Hanoi were
comments of the Polish Govt, but the fears that Poles
expressed in this regard were verified subsequently by
Hanoi. He also said that during process of Warsaw
discussions there vere a number of other exchanges
between Warsaw and Hanoi j adding that the Poles are
confident that what they expressed on their own initia-
tive acciorately reflected Hanoi's opinton.
"3. Eapacki then made the pointy in reference to
our accusation that Poles have raised new conditions
since tallcs shifted to Warsaw^ that interpretation clause
question was raised by Lewandowski immediately upon
hearing it expressed by Lodge on Dec 3- He said
'clearly you kiiov that we felt this was a matter of
concern from the very beginning; it wasn't scm,ething
interjected as a new condition after^^-rards . * He added^
^our concern was well taken because the reaction to
interpretation clause from Hanoi turned out to be what
we iDredicted. ' "
...
GEONOUSICI
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State 106358 (to Ataembassy Warsaw)
21 December I966
• • •
"1. Our investigation of alleged bomtiag in Hanoi
has been thorough. The only targets were military ones
more than five miles from the Hanoi city center. How-
ever we cannot rule out completely the possibility of
an accident. Any US ordnance that may have fallen
within the Hanoi city limits vas the result of such
an accident.
"2* Nonetheless we are prepared to state that
there will be no bombing within ten miles of Hanoi city
center measured from 21 degrees 1 minute 37 seconds
north J 105 degrees 5I minutes 21 seconds East^ for an
indefinite period if talks with ]Sorth Vietnamese can
be gotten unden-zay shortly. Appropriate reciprocal
action with respect to bombs ^ mortar and similar
terrorist activities within ten miles of the center of
Saigon measured from 10 degrees j k6 minutes ^ 28 seconds
north; 106 degrees J kl minutes ^ 10 seconds East, would
be anticipated by us as evidence of good faith/^
> «
EUSK
December 22, 1966
^ ' ■ I ■ I I I ■ I W I
Kapacki prefers to wait a day or two (by which time Gronouski is
to have returned to Washington for consultations) before transmitting
the new US position to Hanoi. He is afraid the suspension of bombing
near Hanoi appears to depend on reciprocal action frcm the HLF and a
signal that Hanoi will establish contact. Gronouski argues that we
are not asking a quid-pro-quo but simply removing the factor that had
blocked the contact and suggesting a quiet way for Hanoi and the NLF
to indicate readiness to discuss peace.
Rapacki repeats a theme expressed (less clearly) by him earlier:
ildberg stated that if there was some indication from Hanoi regardin
1_ * !__»__ ^ ... ^_ __ _ _ . _ _ _ _
"Goldb
negotiations J bombing would cease throughout W/IJ and not simply around
a small area of Hanoi. ^^ He is presumably referring to Goldberg's
September 22 speech, though neither it nor Goldberg's December 20
letter to U Thant contain such a sweeping proposal.
On the same day, Zinchuk sees Bimdy in \Fashington to indicate
Soviet awareness of I^arigold and Soviet support both for Polish actions
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and the Polish interpretation of developments to date. He is appre-
hensive that the US vill adopt a militaristic approach to the var. (The
Soviet concern to get US-DEV talks started arises in large part the
possibility that Hanoi will call for volunteers under the Bucharest
Declaration (^^if the war escalates and if help is necessary")*
Warsaw 15 37 (to SecState)^ T3/B[odis
22 December I966
Ref : State IO6358
* « •
"2* Eapackij expressing desire to understand pre-
cisely^ asked for reiteration of message. In response
to his question as to whether this meant we had no
intention to bcmh Hanoi proper but that it was possible
we could have inadvertently hit residential area^j 1
responded I did not exclude that possibility- In
response his question whether orders would be issued
to exclude from bombing area within coordinates described
for indefinite period^ I responded that this my under-
standing reftel* After brief discussion of relationship
of cessation of terrorist activities in Saigon to cessation
bombing in Hanoi perlmeterj I reread section again and
pointed out there was no direct auid-pro-quo on cessation
Saigon activities but that this was anticipated reaction
l>y Hanoi as measure of good faith.
"3, I expressed again my personal conviction that
this proposal provided basis for movement in resolving
the problem of initiating negotiations.*..
"k Eapacki noted however that t^ro things
intraded which might reduce the significance of this step:
(a) The text of the coiMiunication appears to make U,S,
action dependent on some signal that a contact will be
established by Hanoi; (b) There is an indirect linking —
or request — that an appX'opriate step (re Saigon) will
be taken by the other side. He added that it would be
vexy nojipQi'tant to avoid the appearance of forcing JIW
into negotiations,,,. Cjoldberg stated that if there was
some indication from Hanoi regarding negotiations _, bombing
would cease throughout IT^li and not simply aroxmd a small
area of Hanoi. Furthermore ^ regarding the alleged NLF
activities around Saigon^ while this is admittedly
expressed in terms of an expectation^ the impression is
given that you are tiyin,^ to 'kill too many biirds with
one stone.' This is a matter to be resolved with the WLF
and I (Eapacki) have tried to dissuade you from linking
NVIT action with ITLF matters . . . . "
■ J •
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"8 I argued that RapacM must view our
proposal not as an exercise of pressure "by making
cessation of bcmbing dependent on Hanoi's indication
of a willingness to talkj but as a removal of what
Poles had regarded as overt pressure which Eapacki
had Insisted interfered with the prospects for talks
Cessation of action in Saigon was not a direct quid-
pro^quo but a quiet way for Fanoi and the IJLF to
give an indication of readiness to discuss peace*
"9- Eapacki, * .concluded with statement that
he would prefer to delay day or two before trans-
mitting our proposal but expressed willingness to
convey it now if that was what I desired.
"10, I e>5>ressed willingness to discuss matter
immediately on my arrival in ¥ashin,gton/^
• •
GE0N0U3KI
MemCon^ TS/Kodis/lMEIGOLDj 22 December I966
Participants: Alexander Zlnchuk^ Soviet Charge
William P. Bundy
* n
"2. immediately after these exchanges^ Zinchuk
launched into a discussion of MASIGOID. After learning
that I was fully aware of the exchanges between Lewan-
dowski and Lodge j as he put it initially ^ he said that
it was very hard for them to understand why we had
intensified the bombing of the Ilorth with the attacks
on December 2nd and ^th^ and then again on December 13th
and lij-th. He said that there was great sensitivity in
Hanoi an. this subject^ and strongly Implied -- without
directly saying so — that there were differing schools
of thouglit. Our bombing actions had left the Soviets —
and by implicationj Hanoi — in complete doubt as to
what our intentions and views really were. Speaking
more specifically for the Soviets j he said that he had
thought they pretty well understood our views ^ but that
this episode left them in real doubt whether there were
military forces at work and whether they simply did not
understand fully what we thou^t and meant to do*
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"3. More specirically^ he said that he himself had
been in Moscow^ in late N"oveiiiber and had gained the
impression that Hanoi (or elements in it) were seriously
interested in starting something. 'Biey had been encour-
aged by the apparent slackening In the pace of onr bomb-
ing during this period. I at once askied '^rhether this was
just a general impression or whether it had something
more specific behind it. He replied that it was 'more
than a general sense,' Then^ following the bombings of
December 2nd and kth^ some Hanoi leaders (un-named) had
been in Moscow on their way back from Budapest ^ and had
met with top Soviet leaders. (I think he mentioned
Kosygin and Brezhnev specifically)* In the face of our
bombings J the Soviet leaders had been unable to clarify
U.S. thinking or (by clear implication) to encourage
Hanoi to pursue the Lewandowski avenue. Then^ he himself
had seen Ambassador Kohler on December 9thj intending to
convey a clear message against continued intensif Icstion
of the bombing* He thus found it particularly difficult
to understand our actions."
* * . .
"6. I then said specifically that^ while we had
made a considered decision that we should not alter the
planned bombing pattern earlier^ we were definitely aware
of Hanoi's sensitivity to intensification of the bombing,
I said that therefore we had made a specific proposal
within the last 2^ hoxors^ directed to precisely this point
I also noted that within the last 2^^- hours we had had a
contact that had substantially ill^jminated exactly what
the Polish contacts and discussions with Ifenoi had been.
Finally J I reiterated that ve were prepared to see really
quiet and secret talks get under way on the basis of the
approaches that had been made.'*
"8. In short J Zinchuk did not really seek to defend
Polish handling of the matter^ but was most emphatically
tiying to get it across that the Polish effort was serious
and that the Soviets were fully with it*...''
"9* * • -he said that he had been surprised j in dis-
cussing the Polish initiative in the Department at some
earlier stage In December^ to see that it was treated as
doubtful . . , . "
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^
^
*
* •
"2* He then said (as he had to Harrj'' P-fecFherson
on Monday) that the Soviet concern to get something
started arose from a number of factors j but above all
the possibility that Ife^noij under the Bacharest
Declaration ('if the var escalates and if help is
necessary^ ' in essence) might at some point be faced
with a Hanoi request for military'" volunteers. He
noted the report today of No3rth Korean pilots (which
I of course did not deny) and something unspecified
that the Cubans vere doing. He said that the Soviets
vould be put in a most avkvrard and difficult position
if ifenoi asked for volunteers^ and they hoped the
issue vould not arise,
'*3* He then 8,sked me about soirie coimnentator's
statement that the President saw tvo alternatives j
seeking a peaceful solution or escalating the war
markedly by bombing so that the American people vould
become engaged in simple loyalty to their aimed forces
TT
« <• *
■ * •
December £3^ I966
Ttie problems of reciprocal de-escalation are illustrated by a
cable from SaigoHj "a3Si:c!iing" that the proposed cessation of terrorist
activity in the Saigon area does not require a cessation of GW/US
counter-VC activities.
Saigon 1^039 (to SecState}^ TS/Fodis^
23 December I966
Kef: A. State IO6358
E. State 105909
"1, ...we assume department proposal on cessation
terrorist activity in Saigon area does not envisage
cessation GVI^US counter- VC activities/'
• • •
POEOIER
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December 24 j I966
We drop the request for reciprceal action from the DHV in maintaining
tlie 10 mile bomting Ifjnit around Hanoi •
(lIB. source needed)
December 26--£7j I966
After newspaper reports of bombing ^^12 miles from Hknoi/' the Poles
inquire if our circle about Hanoi is measured in nautical or statute
miles. Gronouski expresses concern over strikes this close to the
proscribed circle. He is told ^'not to be diverted from the main effort
'^y niggling and haggling about whether a particular bomb fell on this
side or that side of this or that circle."
Warsaw I567 (to SecState), TS/HodiSj 27 Decenaber I966
Ref : State IO79II
"1- ..,Michalowski.,. asked 'for the record' whether
reference in re ft el to ten miles from Hanoi was in
nautical or statute miles,,,.
"2. *,.NY Times- AP Dispatch speaks of * target
only twelve miles from Hanoi * • • . •
"3 T am most concerned if we are choosing
targets so close to the margin that even a slight error
could put us in technical violation of our commitment...."
• •
GEOKOUSKI
State 10Q66h (to Amembassy Warsaw )j TS/Uodis
27 December I966
"...you may Inform I^chalowski or Eapackl that
orders have been issued to refrain fx^om bombing within
the ten nautical miles from Hanoi city center.-., it
is very important for you and the Poles not to be
diverted from the main effort by niggling and haggling
about whether a particular bomb fell on this side or
that side of this or that circle. The important thing
is that an area of some Slk square nautical miles will
be free from bombing and that; thus farj we have not
seen an^^' readiness on the T)art of Hanoi to sit down
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and talk business. The next move is up to them and ve
cannot let them play games with a side issue in view
of the major concession we have made to clear the way
for talks .. .military briefers are not aware of MAEIGOLD
and that some looseness in language can be anticipated,^^
RUSK
December 27-28, I966
Fanfani is told by the Polish Ambassador about the latter 's contact
with the Pope, We in turn tell Fanfani of the 10 mile bombing sanctuary
around Hanoi and of our continuing hopes to get talks started. We
stress the importance of secrecy^ if talks are to succeed. Meanwhile
we decide to move the operation out of Saigon to the maximum extent ^
for security reasons. Gronouski is instructed to take up the security
problem with Eapacki^ with special reference to the leak to the Pope .
He is also apprised of doubts by Eusk that the Poles ever intend.ed to
press Eanoi for talks irithout an unconditional and unreciprocated cessa-
tion of the bombing.
Rome 31^09 (to SecState)^ TS/NodiSj 23 December I966
"1. Points contained State IO8773 were conveyed
privately to Fanfani evening Dec 28,
"2. Fanfani said he had been very severe in his
conversation with Polish _Ambas3adorj he had emphasised
that;
A. Poles should initiate US contact with
Hanoi without further delay;
B* Lewandowski should by all means remain in
Saigon as would D'Orlandij and
C. It was a great mistake break secrecy hy
informing the Pope,
"3- Fanfani said Polish Ambassador had returned to
see him evening December 27. Polish Aiabassador had said:
A. Poles cannot undertake initiate US contact
with Hanoi unless there is a cessation of bombing;
B, Lewandov7ski will repeat will remain in
Saigon; and
Co It was not repeat not the Polish Government
which had taken the initiative in informing the Pope but
rather it was the Pope who had approached the Polish
Government ,
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"4* Fanfani said that according to the Polish
Ambassador the Pope on December 15 sent word to the
Polish Government asKing if they could tell him
anything with respect to Vietnam, On December 19
the Polish Government responded by telling the Pope
the whole story. Fanfani indicated he did not rpt
not know ^just what the Polish Ambassador meant by
the ^whole story ' but presumably the Polish Govern-
ment had told the Pope everything they knew.'^
EEHmAEQ']?
State 109639 (to Amembassy Warsaw)^ T3/Kodis
28 December I966
FOE OHS AI^ASSADOR FROll THE 3ECRETAEY
^\ . , • I call your attention to the statement
made by the Polish Ambassador to Fanfani on the even-
ing of December 2J that Q3S Poles cannot undertake
initiate US contact with Hanoi unless there is a
cessation of bombing IWQTE. Ihis could result from
Polish Amba.ssador Home not being informed of our move
on December 2^. But it also raises the possibility
that the Poles have never had any intention of
pressing Hanoi for talks without an unconditional
and unreciprocal cessation of bcmbing*''
EUSK
State 106773 (to Amembassy Eome)^ TS/Nodis
27 December I966
"1.
* * •
a. ¥e are most grateful for prompt Fanfani
report of his conversation with Polish Ambassador
Rome J
• * V
b. Fanfani himself should be aware that on
Dec 2k ve conveyed to Hapacki that we had given firm
orders not repeat not to bomb within ten nautical
miles of point ±n center of Hanoi for an indefinite
period. . , , '
Q-3
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c, ¥e are most grateful to Fanfani for
expressing concern that Pope has heen informed* We
too are concerned over this and would na^ appreciate
Fanfani advice vhether ve should ourselves indicate
to Popti our knowledge that he has been infonaied. We
recognise that it may he desirable not repeat not to
indicate such awareness ^ in order to preserve Fan-
fani's ovm sources and channels; however^ we are
also concerned if Pope may be receiving one-sided
account.
• • • •
"2, Saigon should take no action. For security
reasons alone j we are trying to get this operation out
of Saigon to maximum extent possible* . . *
"3 If Eapacki or Michalowski admit that
Pope has been inf orxned you should say that jou must
report this to Washington and have no doubt it will
have disturbing effect on security grounds alone,. **"^
RISK
December 30. I966
Eapacki tells Cjronouski the 10 mile sanctuary has come too late and
that the Poles now consider their role "at this stage as teiralnated/'
In Washington, Dobrynin tells Thompson the Soviet Government is
"frankly baffled by (US) action in Vietnam,--, He said there were mar^-^
and he was one^ that wondered whether some of our military were deliber-
ately trying to frustrate a policy of moving toward negotiations."
Warsaw I596 (to SecState), TS/lJodis^ 30 :December I966
Section 1 of 2
"1. Rapacki opened by saying Poles have taken
further action on j^" statement of Dec 2^, but un-
fort^jnately this step could v^ot make up for damage
done by previous actions, particularly Air Force,
during first part of December.
"2. Rapacki added that *we have to consider our
role at this stai^ce as terminated -.,,."
4 * . «
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fti
7* Eapaeki saidj •••if that step you brougttfrcan
Washington (on 2h December) had occurred on December h --
admittecliy after the first bo^nbing of Hanoi — then I
feel personally tre "^iould have had the first contact vlth
the DHV behind us. Moreover^ I think I have sufficient
reasons for inj^ personal feeling. Even betveen Dec ^4-
and Dec 13^ the matter was again actively being re-
considered. There had been no negative reaction as yet.
¥e know J because we had contact with the proper quarter.
The decision regarding breaking off the talks was made
after Dec I3 "
«-'* * *
MemConj TS/lIodis/l-IABIGOLD^ 30 December I966
Participants: Ambassador Dobrjuinj USSR
Jimbassador Thompson
"I asked the Ambassador if he had brought back any
reply to the President's letter to Kosygin. He replied
that if he could speak completely off the record he
could tell me that a reply had nearly been completed
and that it was one ve would have liked but then the
bombing of llano 1 had occurred and this draft had been
torn up and another one of quite a different character
started. He said he had seen the report from their
Enbassy in Hanoi and that there was no doubt in the
Soviet minds as a result of this report that our bombs
had fallen on Hanoi itself... a reply would be made in
due course,^'
<■ .
"The ^^bassador remarked that the initial stages
of this affair had given the Soviet Governoient con-
siderable hope and he said rather cryptically that they
had other reasons for some optimism but that our action
in bombing Hanoi had spoiled BYer^thln^^ I pointed out
that o^Jir targets were selected several weeks in advance
and that it had been pure coincidence that the attacks
on the targets near Hanoi had occurred at this time.
"The Ambassador said that his Government was
frankly baffled by our actions in Viet-tlam and did not
kno;/ how to judge our policy. He said there were many^
N
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and he vas one of them^ that vondered whether some of
our military were deliberately trying to frustrate a
policy of moving toward negotiations or whether our
policy really was one of military victory,"
December 31^ I966
Porter suggests from Saigon that we switch to a more trustworthy
channel J from the Poles to the Canadians.
Saigon 1^+702 (to SecState)^ TS/ETodis
31 December I966
"1, We have been watching with increasing puzzle-
ment the Polish Minuet danced by Eapacki..., ¥e cannot
disregard possibility that Poles constantly manipulated
tei"ms of understandir^ whether involving 'ten points'
or later 3,ttempts to add provisos. Rapacki's frequent
return to question of cessation of bambing and his
allure to arrange contact with Hanoi are suspicious,"
« •
"3, With the breakdown of the Polish charjiel,..
we suggest Department consider bringing in another party
more trustworthy as an intermediary from US point of
"T
View, . .,
ti
• *
"6. We lean in favor of the Canadians. It just
so happens that the Canadia.n Commissioner Victor Moore
is going to Hanoi on January 6 to spend a few days making
his farewell cslls at the end of his tour.,.."
■ •
PORTER
January 3. I90T
Goldberg gives the US view of Ifeirigold to U Thant^ who promises to
hold it in confidence .
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As incidental intelligence ^ U Thant mentions that Peter^ the
Hungarian Foreign Minister^ vas visited in Bncapest by Le Duan (Secretary
General of the Lao Dong) early in December. Le Duan took a very hard
line J much harder^ Peter believes ^ than vould Trinh^ the DRV Foreign
Minister. The latter had been expected ^ but urgent problems in Hanoi
detained him and LeDuan came instead.
USUK 3l;53 (to SecState), TS/Nodis^ 3 January I967
"As agreed upon with the Secretai^'-j I had an
extensive discussion vlth U Thant this afternoon
lasting almost 1-1/2 hours.
"I gave azm the full account of Iferigold^ "
* * i •
'^Syg assured me tliat he ¥ould keep this in
confidence and I do not believe that ve need be
concerned about his making a public disclosure
absent any additional dramatic events."
• ■
"...he told me that ^hen FiA Peter of HvLngar;>^ was at
the W.J Peter had told 5;/-g th^t they vere expecting a
visit from the North Vietnamese PM in Budapest in early
December. Syg said that he had since been advised by
the Hungarians -^ presumably the Hungarian OTT Rep —
that the North Vietnamese FM found it impossible make
the visit because of urgent problems at home. In
his place Hanoi dispatched the Syg of the Communist
Party who visited Budapest early last month and who
has since returned to Hanoi, Hungarians reported
that Syg of Communist Party took a very hard line about
settlement of Vietnamese conflict — a harder line than
they believe would have been taken by North Vietnamese
JM. Of possible interest to US in this connection was
the observation of Syg of Communist Party that it was
by iio means cerbain that the NLF would support any
peace proposal which might be acceptable to Hanoi, Syg
observed that this ^^jas a similar line taken l:y ]Jorth
Vietnamese 'Re;^^ in Algiers in September of last year as
reported to him by his Algerian sources .
. *
GOLDBUSa
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J anuary kj 1$&J
Rusk soothes George Brovn's injured feelings over finding that he
vas not the sole inteimediary for the Phase A-Ptiase B de-escalation
proposaJ. ,
State 112632 (to Membassy London) ^ TS/Uodis
h January I967
PERSOFAL FOE AiMBASSADOR FROM SECKEmEY
"Please deliver following personal message to
Foreign Secretary George Brown: QTE Dear George:
Thank you for your message- I do want to clear up
one point J namely^ that there was nothing on which we
could have informed you prior to your visit- to Moscow
Your vis3.t came at the time of Lewandowski's visit to
Hanoi "but "before we had any infonriation whatever from
him on his visit. We understand he was in Hanoi most
of the last half of November ^ and our first report
upon his return to Saigon was received in a meeting
on December 1, In faetj ve gave you for your trip
a major concession to the other side in the form of
a two-phased proposal in which we would stop the
bombing if they would agree that subsequently there
could be a de-escalation of the violence, I am
sorry if there has been any misunderstanding on this
point. With personal regains ^ Sincerely ^ Dean Rusk,
KJS-K
January h^ I967
Gronouski takes issue with Porter ^ that the Canadians replace the
Poles as our channel to Hanoi because they are more ^^trustworthy." He
considers the Poles better suited to the mission because they carry
more weight in Hanoi.
Warsaw 163I (to SecState); TS/Nodls^ k January I967
Eef : Saigon iJ^TOS
■ . •
"3 The fact that Poles presumably acted
in Jfenoi's interests in attejnntiup: to extract from US
best possible terms prior to actual negotiations is
no basis for concluding that Poles were not interested
in initiating Warsaw talks as soon as feasible.
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Feasil3ilityj however, depended on Hanoi's agreement^
and I submit Poles had no reason on their own
initiative to delay that agreement ten minutes..,.
"4. Given this analysis^ I cannot conceive of
Canada or ar^- other friend of the USG heing more
satisfactory than Poles as intermediary (see also
paras 3 and k^ ¥arsav I630); true^ they "vrould he
more trustvorthy from our point of viev. But for
this reason they would also he even less effective
than Poles >rere in convincing Hanoi. I have no
doubt that Poles had access to and exchanges vith
top officials of WJ!\^ and that they delivered our
messages, I am also convinced^ especially after
Dec 2k ^ that they encouraged Hanoi to meet vith us
in Warsaw. A trustwoi^thy friend of USG could do
no more and I suspect would be able to do much less.
What we need is help of someone with more influence
on Hanoi than PoleSj not less. It is for this
reason that I suggested we turn immediately to
Soviets,"
« •
GEONOUSKl
January h^ I967
Goldberg gives U Thant and Ignatief f ( Canadian Ambassador to the VE)
a review of "the entire ferigold episode" along the lines suggested dj
the Depar-tzaent . (Source; USUU SkS'^y lA/^Tj TS/nodis)
January ^j I96T
Saigon reports I3 YC incidents in the Saigon^Gia Dihh area.
Saigon ikS^k (to SecState)^ TS/jfodis^ 5 January I967
"1, ¥e have been keeping a special vatch on
incidents and actions in the Saigon Gia^-Dinh area
ever since Christmas. As a rough approximation
border of Gia-DirJi province averages about 11 miles
from the center of Saigon,
"2. From Dec 23 to Jan 3 there were I3 incidents
clearly initiated by VC in the area ,
• * • •
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"5 In order not to call attention to our
interest in the 10 mile radius ve are using standard
statistics derived from police reports vliich are not
alvays complete or absolutely accurate/'
January 5j ^967
Heirihardt gives the Pope a similar review. He stresses that the
US has been forthcoming by offering its Phase A- Phase B fomiulaj by
affirming Lewandovski*s statement of the US position with no recip-
rocal act from the DPV side^ and by offering to meet with the DKV
to discuss all outstanding issues^ and that no militaiy preconditions
for the talks were initially asked by the other side. Even nowj we
are keeping open our suspension of bombing within 10 niles of Hanoi's
center. IVtille the DRV has given a negative response ^ we continue to
tiy to open talks. Secrecy is imperative if this effort is to succeed.
We therefore request the Pope's cooperation in maintaining complete
discretion*
State 112886 (to Amembassy Rome)^ s/]^Todis
5 January I96T
"Eyes Only for .Ambassador
"1* Ambassador should see Pope Paul coonestj
Since Poles ^ and according to their report Hanoi j
have stressed vital need for complete secrecy^ USG
is deeply conscious of need to maintain rigid
security this matter. However^ in view of
importance these discussions and their possible
bearing on other initiatives to which His Holiness
is a party J ve now believe it essential that His
Holiness receive full and accurate account."
* *
"7* At this stage^ the US had taken two
Important steps. It had put forvrard the possi-
bility of a two-phase handling of the bombing
question^ together with the possibility of dis-
cussing in one setting the whole range of issues
including the future situation within South Viet-
nam. Moreover J the USG had agreed to affirm the
statement of its position to Hanoi ^ subject only to
the obvious necessity of interpretation while
Hanoi itself had indicated only^ as reported to
us J that it was prepared to listen to such an
affirmation. The USG- at this point had not —
and still has not — received any statement of
Hanoi's own views. Moreover ^ the message con-
veyed by Lewandco-rski contained no mention of any
prior condition other than secrecy^ for the direct
contact in Warsaw that was proposed.^'
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T
* • «
"Ik* On December 22 j Gronouski again saw Rapacki
to convey a new proposal on l:ehalf of the USG. Ttls
vas tliat the USG was prepared to undertake that there
would he no hombing within ten miles of the center of
Hanoi for an indefinite period^ if talk^ with the
llorth Vietnamese could begin shoarfcly; in the original
proposal of December 22 ^ this ^ras linived with evidence
of good faith in the form of action on the other side
with respect to incidents near Saigon, However^ when
Eapacki demiirred to the proposed linkage and asked
reconsideration^ Gronouski was authorised en December
2^^- to state that the US had now given firm orders not
to bomb within ten miles of the center of Hanoi for
an Indefinite period. !Ehis revised US proposal stated
the understanding thatj on the basis of what Bapacki
had told us J direct talks could now begin shortly,
^e message also noted thatj in judging the good faith
of the other side^ we would be 'impressed* hj similar
restraint^ for ezaaiple^ with respect to incidents^
movement of forces (itself a violation of the Geneva
Accords) in the D^E^ or action with respect to infil-
tration; it was stressed that there were examples ^
and the phrasing made clear that these were not pre-
conditions, Hapacki indicated that he would convey
this message promptly to Hanoi.
"15- On December 30 Hapacki reported to Gronouski
that Hanoi had given a negative response and was flatly
not prepared for talks in Warsaw , "
"Suiamary of Key Points
• * «
"6, Most basically of ell^ the US rejuains entirely
prepared for secret bilateral contacts with Eanoi. Even
though Rapacki has stated that he considers the channel
nc^^ dead^ the US order of December 2k remains in force
and will so remain for the present. ¥e have in fact
reviewed this whole matter carefully ^rith Soviet repre-
sentatives j pointing out our difficulty in understanding
Polish actions at several points. Moreover j we have in
mind the continued possibility of constructive action
by the Secretary' General, For all these reasons^ and in
the light of our basic view that any disclosure of this
whole series of discussions could affect Hanoi ^s willin^q;
ness to participate^ we have maintained the tightest
security on the whole project,; will continue to do so^
and must ask you in the strongest terms to act in same
manner .
o
n
• • o •
misK
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January 6, 19 67
Saigon is instructed to tell Ky a little more about Iferigoldj
interpreting it priinarily as a DEV peace offensive designed to get the
bombing stopped and reassuring Ky about our resolution.
Rome is to tell Fanfani that we etill hope to open contact with
the DRV and it is, therefore, iiLit)erative to maintain the strictest
secujTity concerning what has happened in the past.
In Warsaw J the Poles tell Gronouski that the December 13-1^+
attacks typed the scale in favor of DEV Presidium members who felt that
talking with the USG made little sense. Only a complete cessation would
restore the necessary level of confidence. On the other hand^ if we
stopped bombing it should be possible to get negotiatioxis going over
Phase B in 3-^ weeks. Gronouski urges the Poles to try again^ proposing
Instead a Phase B agreement between the two sides before the bombing
cessation and the opening of talks*
State replies by instructing Gronouski to avoid further initia-
tives for the tiaie belnp:.
State 114277 (to Amembassy Saigon) ^ TS/Nodis
6 January I967
EYES OLILY FOR PORTm MD HABIE
TT-i
-..Canadians on January 2 gave us report they
had obtained from U Ihant on December 28^ and whidi U
Ihant had received from Poles on December 23j
...»
"2. to seek to minimize leak riskj decision
was taken to inform Pope^ SYG^ Canadians ^ and also
British ''
''5< Cur conclusion is that time has come when
it is wise to convey word to Ky that would mitigate
anj'- MAEIGOID disclosure or any stories based on
Indian or Salisbury matters. Moreover^ Salisbury
speculation gives us good cover for making statement
to Ky now.
I.
'^6. Accordingly J you should see Ky if possible ^
and Tran Van do as well^ to say that GVJJ may be noting
wave of speculation on DRV willingness to talk. USG
has been receiving a number of third countx^- messages
sometimes based on conversations with DRV representativeSj
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from "whicli third nations are on occasion drawing
conclusions ve do not "believe warranted. Ve our-
selves are inclined to believe that DEVj as Salis-,
hury visit alone shows ^ has become nuch more
sophisticated in building up world opinion against
the bombing. They may well be engaged j with help
fxan. U Thantj Soviets^ and others^ in a determined
effort to get us to stop the bombing or cut it
back in return for hints of DEV willingness to
talk. Moreover J DKV may be probing for any change
in our position, GVN may be assured that ve have
no intention cf changing our well-known position
on conditions for the cessation of bombing j or
yielding to pressures on any eleiaent of our posi-
tion. As i\mbassador Lodge told Ky last July
(Saigon 642 of July 10 ) we will of couxse be
following up any nimors^ ho^^ever unlikely j that
might indicate Hanoi was really seeking a way out.
If anything of real substance or importance happens ^
we will of course be in touch with GW at once "
EUSK
State 11^+278 (to Amembassy Eome)^ TS/?]odis
6 January 19 6T
Kef: State 112886
"1 You should emphasise to Fanfanl that
although ^^^arsaw phase of exercise appears to have
come to tei'iporary conclusion we still mean to con-
tinue in whatever manner feasible to proiiiote initia-
tion of substantive discussions with North Viet-
namese. Therefore it continued to be of prime
importance that strictest security be maintained
conceriilng what has occurred in past.'^
« . . *
EUSK
Warsaw l6k6 (to SecState)^ TS/l^fodis
6 January I967
Section 1 of 2
w «
"4. Michalowski opened his reply hj observing
that at one point in my discussions vith Eapacki I
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hatS e^ressed the hope that someone vas putting as much
pressure on Hanoi as Poles were placing on us to get
negotiations started. He said with some feeling that
he could assure ne that Poles put hea^/y pressure on
Hanoi and in fact put prestige of GOP on line in getting
Hanoi to agree at outset to idea of having talks in
Warsav. He added that he personally knev how much
pressure was brought to "bear because he was engaged in
exercising some of it. He went on to say that leader-
ship in Hanoi is by no means a monolithic group and that
from the beginning^ when Poles got agreement from Hanoi
to initiate talks in Warsaw^ it was a Tery close decision
vith many of the Hanoi leadership strongly opposed. He
said they obtained such agreement after exerting strong
pressure and putting Polan^i's prestige on the line; but
it was a delicate matter in Hanoij implying that agree-
ment vras by a narrow margin anxong the leadership. He
said at this point the Poles had been able to convince
Hanoi to have at least a small degree of confidence in
intentions of U.S. He added that bombing of Dec 3 had
given a \reapon to those in Hanoi who had not wanted to
agree to negotiations in first place. He said it was
for this reason that Poles had repeatedly conveyed to
Lodge and me their fear of negative effects of a
repetition of Dec 3 bombing. But he said even after
Dec 3 when bombing was explained by Lodge as no new
departure but smply something in the military pipeline,
Poles were able to prevail in Hanoi to keep possibility
of talks open^ and 'believe me we talted to them
several times a day to keep pressure on them and con-
vince them*' But he said bambing of Dec 13-14 'under-
cut our whole argument ^ destroyed that little bit of
confidence that exist; ed in Hanoi about intentions of
U.S.J and left us wide ox^^en to charges of being com^
pletely naive,' He said with bcaabing of Dec 13-lij-
those who had initially been skeptical about negotiations
were gi^^en a powerful tool to support their case and in
fact prevailed. He added that even with Dec 3 bonbing,
if we had been able to interval between Dec 3 and I3 to
come in with the message we did cane in with on the 2Hhj
that part of leadership in Hanoi which wanted negotia-
tions vould have prevailed and he is confident that talks
would have happened. But he said by Dec 2k a whole new
condition existed; *Ve were accused of being naive and
had lost our effectiveness and those who on Dec 3 had
been able to control situation and m.ove toward negotia-
tions were 'bj this time discredited.' Hius he said
situation by Dec 2U in Hanoi had so changed that it was
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impossilDle to go back to Dec 1 or the Post -Dec 3 period
M'ow lie said he feels that only stopping ETOT baabing
completely -w^ill restore influence of those who are
interested in negotiations* He said if bombing stopped
Poles would be willing to tzy for a third time and that
he is guite confident that three or four weeks there-
after negotiations between U, S> and Hanoi on Phas e_ B
could become a reality^ He said^ ^ short of thiSj I am
vevy pessimistic of any effective role we coizld play^,
given pressure we had exerted in ETov and Dec and the
undercutting of our position in Hanoi by events of
Dec 13"1)+, ' He vent on to say that he will never under^
stand how this could possibly have happened but 'this
is past history^ I guess »'"
GHOMUSKI
Warsaw l6h6 to State
Section 2
"Conversation between Michalowski and Grcnousfci,
^'Michalowski said that the situation had now
entirely changed. Hie Poles ^ he said^ had been able
to convince Hanoi to go on with the possibility of con-
tact after the December 3rd U.S. bombings^ but that the
bonbings of December I3 and 1^ had made the future of
negotiations between the DHV and the IJ,3. very bleak.
He now maintained that only a coaplete cessation of U,S,
bombings will restore the necessarj^ level of confidence
needed to get negotiations started. He added that
Hanoi's original decision to talk with the U.S. in
Warsaw had heen hotly contested in the Presidium and
that the bombings had now persuaded those who wanted
to talk with the U.S. that there was little sense in
doing so.
^Gronouski noted that this now put the parties back
where they had started from. He suggested that the Poles
try- to get the thing going again by proposing to the DEV
an initial Phase S agreesnent prior to the meeting between
the U.S. and the DRV in Mcscow. Thls^ Gronouski said^
would (1) meet Hanoi's insistence on stopping the bombing
Defore talks began^ and (2) meet the U*S. desire for some
sort of indication that talks would occur in order to
stop the bombing.
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State 11^^370 (to Amam"bassy Warsaw)^ TS/Koais
6 January I967
Hef: Warsaw's l6i^
"1. In viev of complex of developments relating
to Vlet-IIam problem we would like you to avoid for
the present any further initiatives along lines
section 2 reftel,"
*- • « *
"3 It has he en our conception that . .
Hanoi's actions under Phase B vould he expected to
he generally equivalent to our actions in Phase B
plus repeat plus our cessation of homhing of Forth
Viet-I^Tam, "
* » •
HJSK
Jan u,ary 9-10. I96 7
Saigon and Ronie carry out their instructions to hrief the GW^
the Pope and Fanfani, The results reported are satisfactory.
In Washington J ve learn that Brown is still very hurt. Btmdy
points out how complex the matter is and explains the necessity for
the US to mana.^e its own role.
Saigon I5POI; (to SecState)^ T8/Nodis
9 January I967
Eef : State 11^^277
**1, I sent Hahib to see Tran Van do to convey
substance paragraph 6 reftel. This was done, rather
than a direct approach to Prime Minister^ to keep
our d ial og^ae with Gv^i in appropriate low key**..
''2 He was pleased to note our assurance
that we have no intention of changing our position
on cessation of bombing. . _ ." •
PORTER
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Some 3531 (to SecState)^ S/TTodis
9 January I967
-#■''•
"2. [The Pope reiterated his deep appreciation
of being infoimed He told me that he had publicly
encouraged the Vilson-Broi^n initiative because they
had officially informed him of it. Ke had been unable
to do the same i^ith respect to U Thant's efforts
because he had not been officially adv^ised of them.
He had however sent a private message to the Secretary
General to avoid any feeling on his pa3rt that the Pope
was shovinf^ preferences vith respect to various
initiatives for peace."
n m m
EEIMAEDT
Rome 3571 (to SecState)^ TS/Hodis
10 Januaiy I967
Eef : State 111^278
"1- I saw Fanfani last night Jan 9 ^^^ carried
out lnstru.ctions in reftel. Ee told me that shortly
after the It'ew Year^ Polish Ambassador had informed
him of the interr^uption of the procedural ta2ks In
Warsaw an(3 had said that it was impossible to expect
Jlorth Vietnamese to enter into discussions with the
US as long as the bombing of ITorth Vietnam continued
Fanfani said he had taken strong exception to this
statement and had pointed out that US proposal envis-
aged terminatioa of bombing and that Poles had known
this all alonR, ../'
• a « •
RSBIHARDT
State 1189 05 (to Ansaibassy Ioiidoa)j S/Jiodls
10 January loBj
LITERAiLY FjfES OtILY FOR At^BASSADOB FKO!^ SECSETMY
• #
^'2. Sean said Broviia still very hurt over our
failure to tell him we were conveying n^w tvro-stage
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proposal on stopping "bombing through Lewandcvski channel
at same time that Brovn was going to Moscow with it.
Brown did not wish to raise direct wioh mOj hence Bundy.
'*3* Bandy made following points in reply^ which
we now assume will go direct to Brown and also to PM:
a. We gave proposal to Lewaudowski on IS^h
or iHh and to Brown on l6th,.*,
b. , . *we felt that we should honor Polish
Insistence that 1 channel be kept totally secui^e^-...
c. Brown message was the clear and solid
one we were sure would get through • !foreoverj Brown
was armed in the rest of our letter to discuss the
underlying principles in depth^ as L was not* Brown
could have a real exchange of views on the basis of
total knowledge of our position.
d. In response to Dean remark that Soviets
must have known of message to L^ and that this perhaps
accounted for cross-examination of Brown *s authority
to talk for uSj Bundy said that we did not see how
Brown's opportunity could have been prejudiced by this
even if true . . ,we had always regarded Soviets as much
more serious and responsible^ and Grcmyko in October
had responded to Secretary's question which Eastern
l^JLropeans were closest to Hanoi by saying pointedly:
'We are * '
^^h Speaking on private basis^ Bandy added
that we recognized absolute obligation never to put
British in false position and hence to provide them
with all infortiiation they needed for any contacts they
had. This applied to forthcoming Kosygin visit. At
same time^ we were playing a multiple chess game and
could not be expected to cut the British in on all
boards at all times.,.*.,
"5- Bundy then. , .reminded Dean of account Secre-
tary had given Friday night of cur ccnTidential read-
out from Salisbury J in which Pham Van Dong's unpublished
parts of interview had spoken of Hanoi taking 'an
appropriate stand ' and also said 'we kriow what we should
do' if US stopped bombing; Secretaiy had told Dean this
was same formula used last summer to Sainteny and that^
since Pham Van Dong resolutely refused to elaborate ^ it
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was at most atmospherics and did not get us mucli further
Since Friday night report to Deanj there had been follow^
ing developments;
a. Baggs-Ashmore team had come out of fianoi
and voula be giving us their report this veek .
b, Sainteny had made strong pitch to go to
Hanoi to pursue what would happen if bombing stopped
and to get general reading. We were taking him up on
this and would be arming him with the two-phase proposal
t m
c. Thompson would be talking Vietnam seriously
in TfoscoWj probably this week "
"7- In light of all this^ I am seeking authority
for you to see Wilson soonest j perhaps Monday *^
• * •
"11. For yoxor call en Wilson-, you shotild know that
he has sent two-sentence message to Pi*esident speaking of
his talk with you on matter seriously affecting our
relationships . , * . "
EQSK
January l3j I 967
Brown has forgiven us .
London 5692 (to SecState), TS/i^odis
IS January I96T
FOR SEGRESffiX MIOM COOPER
• B •
"2, All is well. Fc apologies from me.
from Brown, Ifo whining from ?M ^'
Ho abuse
BRUCE
January/- 19j I96T
^ I » l I ^»| l »^Ff -■
Salisbury's interview with Fham Van Dong produces a number of
apparently forthcoming statements couched in very general language.
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¥e surmise they are essentially mood music^ accompanying a strong
attempt to get us to stop bccibing without reciprocity. Gronouski
is to tell the Poles ^ if they raise the subject ^ that there must
be reciprocal actions.
State 121586 (to Amembassy Warsaw) j S/lIodis
19 January I967
. «
"3. Ve have also received an extensive account
from Harrison Salisbury of his ob:^ervation.'=5 in H8.no i^
highlighted by Hiam Van Dong*s response to Salisbury" ^s
question as to what actions Hanoi would take if the
US stopped bombing J natnely *we will talce an appro-
priate stand.' He also said; (l) if the US 'stops
doing harm to the North ^ we know what we should do';
(2) the moment the ^US puts an end to the war^ we
will respect each other and settle every guesticn';
and (3) after the cessation of hostilities^ there will
be 'no lack of generosity on our pai-t.^ Our net
judgment is that these statements are interesting
mood music but do not get us very far, The first two
statements are replays of earlier statements to other
sources. The latter two appear to be without substance.
"l^'. At the same timej while ve are treating
these reports seriously for action purposes^ we believe
we may be dealing with a strong atteiapt hj Hanoi ^
perhaps aided consciously by the Poles and in any case
sympathized with by the Indians ^ to get us to stop
bombing fully without anj.^ reciprocal action e:<cep"
possibly some claimed willingness to talk..,.
>4-
"5* •.^if the Poles raise the subject^ you leave
them in no doubt whatever that any stopping of the
bombing on our part requires a clear picture of reciprocal
actions repeat actions that amount to an equitable
*
reduction of hostilities/'
HUSK
tTanuary 19 , I967
Estabrook of the Washington Post files a story fram Ottawa which
apparently alludes to l^Iaxigold: "Canadian authorities blame some of
the difficulty (in beginning US-^DEV talks) on the accidental US
bombings of Hanoi in mid -December. Private soundings then under.;ay
were disrupted^ they say^ and the attitude in JTorth Vietnam apoeared
to harden. ..."
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Paris Heraia Tribune ^ 20 January I967
Es tab rook - "Ottava Sees Hanoi Eeady to Ease ¥ar" -
Ottava^ Jan I9
^^Some high Canadian officials believe that ITorth
Vietnam is now prepared to de-escalate the war in the
south if the U.S. halts bombing in the North. Ihis
is essentially what United Hatioas Secretary General
U Ihant and others have been saying for some time-j
but there are two important distinctions: firsts
Canada has a representative on the ICC who regijilarly
visits Hanoi and talks directly with authorities there;
second^ Canada is a close friend and ally and does not
want to see the U.S. disadvantaged. The key unresolved
question authorities here assert is how soon af'cer a
bombing halt a reciprocal move 'by NVN would take place.
This move could be an end to the infiltration of the
south J where U,S, sources say there are 20 identified
North Vietnamese regiments j but It probably could not
be expected immediately* These cor3 elusions persist
despite the fact that feelers for peace discussions
haive.. produced nothing tangible so far and are in
abeyance at the moment. Canadian authorities blame
some of the difficulty on the accidental U»S. bombings
of Hanoi in mid-December. Private soundings then
underway were disrupted they say and the attitude in
North Vietnam appeared to harden. Fov they cannot be
sure whether Iforth Vietnam wants to talk seriously
because of the propaganda success it has enjoyed
through world protests at the bombing. Nevertheless ^
they would take the change dn the ground that
discussions J once started ^ and even with North
Vietnam's unacceptable li-points as part of the
agenda J would inevitably broaden. They do not
believe that Hanoi has really retracted its offer to
make the i|-points a basis for discussion rather than a
mandatoiy outline for settlement. Although they believe
that the U.S. must be a bit more flexible ^ they do not
believe that a bcombing halt must be unconditional* They
view as a distinct advance the U.S* offer to halt the
bombing upon some signj public or private ^ that the
other side would be willing to mak^ some comparable move,
'If 1 were the Px^esident^* said one higji Canadian
official J *I would simply announce that the bombing had
been stopped with no reference to conditions. If nothing
developed over a period or if JMJ took advantage of the
situation the Ijomblng of military' targets could always
be resi^med and the world would know that the U.S. had
tried »' Canada's ovm confidential initia-cives on VN have
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been centered in the ICC in which it shares responsi-
bility vith Poland and Tn^ia, The Canadian Bepre-
sentativej Victor ViDore^ has just been siomaoned home
after a 10-day visit to Hanoi aryl will be replaced
by Norman Dier. Simultaneously ^ Canada is pressing
Poland to agi'ee to a meeting of the ICC powers at
an ^bassadorial level in the hope that this will
lead to a meeting of foreign ministers. Poland last
week rejected an Indian suggestion for a con-ference in
New Delhi."
Janu ary 20-21, I967
I I ■ ' - -- - rf' ii 11 1 ^ „ i II ' 1 1
Saigon continues to check on VC incidents in Saigon-Gia Dinh area
There uiay be some ditEinution. Permission is reqiiested^ therefore^ to
inform ¥estmoreland about Marigold so that he may participate more
effectively in the incident watch.
State doubts that there has been a real VC slowdown and does not
wish to enlarge the circle priv^- to details of Marigold.
Saigon l6ll^.i^ (to SecState), TS/llcdis
20 Januaiy I96T
Ref \ Saigon 1^4-89^1-
"1. A continuing check on VC incidents in the
Saigon-Gia Dinh area raises question of whether there
is not some d iminution in number of incidents initia-
ted by YC since Januaiy k. This report is a seguel
to that given reftel. (underlining supplied)
''2. As best we can detexmine there have been
five incidents of this sort from January k to 20
as follows :
A- January k; Chclon; Body of Policeman
found. Presumed to have been victim of terrorist act.
E, January 5; Go Vap (5 ^ from Saigon);
Two U.S. soldiers injured when terrorists tossed
grenadri into their jeep-
C. January 6; Thu Due (ll km from Saigon);
Two APAli soldiers injured when their steamroller
exploded a mine ,
D. January I3; Thu Due (11 ion from Saigon);
National Police apprehended two VC in terrorist
iit'&^^S>t s..3glnst equipment. Inc. facility. One VC
BbCcL^Feaj o^ner captui'ea. ^ "^
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E. January l8; Eastern Gia Dinh Province
(l6 km nortlieast of Saigon); Vietcong platoon
attacked three bridge sites ^ slightly damaged one.
Fo^or friendly -wounded.
"3- ^e question nov arises 'whether we are
seeing a VC pause in the area ten miles around
Saigon as a response to our own action in the Hanoi
area. So far the answer on the surface "would appear
to be negative J but the number of incidents is small
recently and some of them may not be properly counted
as either VG initiated or within the t^n. mile limit j
e.g. J items A and E in Paragraph 2-
^%. General Westmoreland is not aware of the
Marigold Er-^ercise* He ISj therefore^ not avrare of
any connection between the Hanoi bomb-free area and
our search for an equivalent VC pause in Saigon area.
I "vTould like to be able to tell him that we have made
such a proposal to Hanoi ^ without revealing the
^fe,rigold conte:d:.. I tliink we will be able to analyze
VG actions in the Saigon area better with his help
and J more significantly^ we might possibly be able
to use the knowledge to our oi/n military advantage/'
LODGE
State 123198 (to Amembassy Saigon) ^ S/lIodis
21 January I967
Ref ; Saigon I60I7 and l6li;4
"1, Keur iSll^-Uj our impression is that recent
action not far from Tan Son Ilhut may have cancelled
out yoiir iiapression that there may be a real slowdovrn
of any sort on other side* Moreover ^ ve wculd prefer
not to enlarge circle privy to details in this series,
Can you not create a special quiet watch on incident
rate within designated radius of Saigon on general
basis without informing: Westmoreland? "
• •
EUSK
Januarj^ 23 ^ ^967
In Moscow^ Podgorny says that mediation ^rj the USSR would be fruit,
less until the bombing stopped. With respect to Tliompson's question
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about what the BRV or USSR vould do if we did stop bombing^ Podgorr^
suggests we stop and see. Eiompson draws attention to the agreements
about Laos^ which were not kept by the other side.
Moscow 3159 (to SecState)j S/Nodis
23 January I967
• * *
"h Podgornj^ then asked whether end to
Vietnam war was in sight.
''5. I replied we all very much hoped war
would end soon and also hoped USSR could help us
in bringing this about,... Podgorny said it was
difficult e:<pect something new and stressed that
since main parties to conflict were US and Viet^
n^m one could hardly count on mediation. He then
said he did not exclude possibility of Vietnam
taking csx'tain steps but pointed out pre-condition
for that irould be at least minim^am move by US^
such as. initially^ cessation of bombings* Since
no such move evident ^ hardly anyone could mediate.
I I rir
D. I said.... It would be helpful if we
knew at least when a response could be expected.
Alsoj as Secretary had said to Dobiyniaj it would
be interesting to know what USSR would do if we
stopped boanbings and other side continued its
activities.
"7- Podgorny asserted US had always placed
conditions on cessation of bombings. US had said
it would stop bombings if other aide gave certain
guarantees... ,
"8 As to reference to guarantees if we
stepped bombing J we did not ask for guarantees but
only for indication as to what would happen in
response. For reason I mentioned earlier^ this
important to us, Podgorny interjected -we could
stop banbings and then we would see. 1 continued
that in considering situation ve had also to keep
in mind fact that despite agreements which had been
reached on Ia:oSj leotian territoiT li^^ been used hy
Horth Vietnam to infiltrate south
. > * .
THOMPSON
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January 27 j 196?
Fried J the IJI Daily Jlevs correspondent^ tells Lodge in Saigon that
he knows of Gronouski^s contact vith the Poles in Warsaw,
Saigon 16677 (to SecState)j TS/Nodis
27 January I967
''Joseph Fried J Viet-KTaia correspondent of the
New York Daily Nevs^ told me on Friday that he
Umav* that A^iba.ssador Gronouski and the Polish
Government had been having conversations about
settling the war in Viet-]}Iam."
LODGE
January 29, I967
J "-^^1
Saigon continues to feel that VG incidents in the Saigon- Gia Dinh
area may have abated.
Saigon I6785 (to SecState)^ S/Nodis
29 Januaiy I967
Eef : A. Saigon l6li^^
B, State 123193
"1, This is another in the series of reports
■we have been providing on VC initiated incidents
within ten miles of Saigon. We shall send these
reports each week.
'^2- For the period January 21-27 within the
zone there were fo^jr incidents that can be char-
acterized as VC initiated :
A. January 22 j four miles west of
Saigon^ an unkno^-m number of enemy fired two rifle
grenades at police station^ wounded 2 W civilians .
B. January 23 j Gia Diuh City^ unknown
person threw grenade at house, no casualties,
V
C. January 23 j 9 miles west of Saigon j
booby trap J 2 VJT killed and two wounded,
D. January 24 ^ Saigon ^ unknown per^^on
threw grenade J wounded three W civilians.
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"3. In addition to these incidents ^ there vere
t'wo others in the area resulting from VIJ police and
AEVIj rtiakijig a sveep and running on to VC* QIaese do
not meet the criteria cf being VC initiated.
^%, With respect to the action not f!ar from
Tan Son Mint on January 20 (cited para one ref B)^
we have looked into this. The record of the action
shovs that elements of two AEvlT hattalions on a
search and destroy mission encountered a VC force
nine miles vest northvrest of Saigon, The ensuing
fight st.^:iiiaied from that contact. There is no infor-
iiiai:ion. as to "^Jhether VC was on the way to Tan Son
Whutj or any other special target. ITo available
information as to vhich side fired first shot. A2M
■units J however J were definitely on the prowl. From
interrogation prisoners taken day later VC force
was sixth battalion from VC I65 Regiment which is
regularly present on fringes Gia Dinh Province,
^'5* ^e have also examined the record of VC
initiated incidents during the area for the m.onth
of K'overaber I966. During that period thex^e were 11
incidents J ranging frcm the shelling of Saigon on
Koveraber 1^ National Day^ to platoon and S(^uad attacks
to isolated grenadings. Of the 11 incidents, seven
can be characterised as serious in the sense that
they were obviously well-planned attacks l:^j small VC
units, ^'
LODGE
A
I
February 1-2, I967
Estabrook files a more complete stor^^ on T^ferigold from IJIew York.
In private J he gives different versions of the story's source • He
apparently first got word of the matter from the Canadians in Ottawa
and later confirmed it with U Thant. In one conversation he indicates
that he also "had it from a high Polish so^urcs.,- corroborated by
* other Eastern E'jiropean sources,^" In another ^ he denies that it
"came from the Poles." Goldberg believes the Poles to be the
original source of the story and recommends that neither they nor ar^y
other Bloc countrj'" be used as a channel to Hanoi*
USUIT 3SI17 (to SecState)^ S/iJodiSj 2 February I967
"Estabrook (Wash Post Correspondent) told
Nisoff Feb 2 that his story, in Feb 2 Post about
Hanoi readiness to talk jus-& prior to Sec I3
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boinbing of Hanoi vas founded on several sources. He
had it from high Polish Gource vhich he vould not
identify. It was corroborated by 'other Eastern
European sources.' He had been given similar impres-
sion earlier in Jan from Can ForJ^Iin Martin. He had
taken story to U Thant i^ho stated his belie v that
it was correct."
9 •
''(Trt separate brief conversation with Pedersen
Estabrook denied story came from Poles. Said it came
from Martin^ while Estabrook was in Canada^ and then
from U Thant. Estabrook said he had had story for
couple of weeks. In response expression of surprise
he had used word 'learned' instesi-d of something like
^alleged' J Estabrook indicated this based on evalua-
tions both of Martin and U Thant.)"
• .
"^"'ty assessment is that the original source of
this story is the Poles themselves- They have ci_uietly
been spreading this story throughout the UK; I even got
some of it from the Danish Deputy Fon Min the other day^
who attributed it to roles."
• « •
tt
• * •
This leads me to reconiTLendation that we
siioixld no longer use Poland or any other Bloc country
as channel to Hanoi, It vcuJ.d be far preferable in my
opinion to deal directly or through Sovs than to continue
vlth this type of intermediary/'
GOLDBERG
is
State 131^2 (to Jkaembassy \Ja,Tsa\r)y C/Nodi
k Pebruaiy 1967
Ref ; Warsaw I695
"Test of February k V/ashington Post story by
Estabrook will reach you in form clrctel. Text of
February 2 stozy filed from New York ^under FebI^7ary 1
dateline follows:
107
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BEGDI TEXT:
"A Polish initiative to establish peace dis-
cussions between north Vietnam and the United States
failed because of American bombing of the Hanoi area
in mid-December J it has been learned on excellent
authority,
'Exactly hov far the Poles had succeeded in
obtaining CDmraitments from Hanoi is not clear ^ but
high-level outr.iders ^jho knev7 about it regarded
the initiative *as promising before the bombing
hardened Hanoi's attitude. QUOTE The Americans
bungled it mD QUOTE^ one informed source stated.
'.S. officials said that any bombing of non-
military targets was accidental^ af-cer Western
reporters observed damage to civilian areas that
the North Vietnamese claimed vas caused by U.S.
bombing. Since December _, U.S. planes have report-
edly been ordered to stay away from the Eanoi area
unless engaged in self-defense.
"At the momenis the Poles are said to have
suspended their efforts. Tliey are represented as
extremely frustrated^, not merely over the effect
of the bombing J but more particularly vith the
uncooperative attitude of JIanoi.
"Recently Poland declined a suggestion of
India that representatives of the three countries
constituting the Intermt ioixal Control Commission
in Vietnam - Poland^ India and Canada - meet in
New Delhi to consider vhat could be done* Use of
the Commission framework to promote peace discus-
sions is an old suggestion of Can-adian External
Affairs Mnister Paul Martin.
"I?ven after the attitude in lianoi changed in
the wake of the bombing^ the Poles kept tiylng.
Among other moves a top Polish diplomat^ Jer^y
Michalowskij made an urureported visit to the United
States in January.
"X'/hether any American representative saw him
cannot be learned ^ but two Canadian diplomats were
sent to talk with him.
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"Michalowskij a foimer delegate to the United
TTatloris and more recently in the Polish Foreign
Office J went on a special Mission to Hanoi in
Januar^^ 19^6^ as the resxilt of the visit to Warsaw
of roving U.S. Ambassador W, Averell Harrinian*
"Apparently the Polish effort stemmed in part
from a conversation between Foreign Minister Adam
Eapacki and Martin vhen the Canadian Foreign Minis-
ter visited fersav last December.
"All this has transpired outside the United
Nations , Although he has been given a mandate by
the United States to do what he can to facilitate
peace discuss ions ^ Secretary General U Thant is said
by others to feel that nothing more can be accomp-
lished at the moment,
"Diplomats from 11 non-aligned coup„tries have
met here three times within the last 10 days to
discuss whether they can undertake any initiative
to ad^^ance a solution. As a result j Sudanese dele-
gate Fal^hreddime Mohamed was designated to call on
Thant to inquire whether a new initiative would be
useful. He reportedly received no encouragement.
END T2KT."
RUSK
February 3. I96T
At his press conference j the President says it would not be
helpful "to comment on any particular channel or communications
at this point." Referring to Hanoi's attitude, he adds, ^'I must
say that I da not interpret any action that 1 have observed as
being a serious effort to either go to a conference table or to
bring the war to an end."
Hew York Times, 3 February I967
Transcript of the President's ])Tews Conference
"FolloTring is a transcript of President Johnson's
news conference in Washington yesterday as recorded
by The New York Times :
. ■
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''1- Prospects in Vietnam
Q, ¥e've *been reading and writing a good deal lately
about diplomacy aamed at a Yietriam settlement, I
vender if you could give us your assessment of the
peace front at this tiiae.
A. !4r. (Frank) Cormier of the Associated Press states
a question that I knoir is on the minds of all the
people here today and all the people in this country.
As you knoVj I have underlined over and over again
the very deep interest of the United States in a
prompt and peaceful settlement of all of the problems
in Southeast Asia.
I have said many times that ve are ready to go
more than half way in achieving this result. I would
remind all of you that we v/ould velcome a conference
in Southeast Asia and this might be a Geneva conference j
it could be an all- Asian conference j or any other
generally acceptable forum.
¥e vould be glad to see the unconditional dis-
cussions to which I referred in my statement of
A.pril^ 19^5; at Johns Hopkins. We would participate
in preliminary discussions which might open the way
for forsial negotiations* \le are prepared today to
talk about mutioal steps of de-escalation* Me would
be prepared to talk about such subjects as the
exchange of prisoners ^ the demilitarization or the
demilitarized zone or any other aspect which might
take even a small step in the direction of peace.
We should be prepared to discuss any points
which the other side wishes to bring up along with
points which we and our allies very much want to
raise ourselves^ or there couJd be preliminary
discussions to see whether there could be an agreed
set of points which could be the basis for negotiant ion.
So it is against this background that we study
veiy carefully all of the public statements made which
appear from time to time and which bear upon Southeast
Asia and all the views which we receive from or
through other governments.
It would not be helpful to me -- and I do not
intend to do so -- to comment on an^^ particular
cliannel or communications a*t: this point. But you may
be sure that we are diligent in our search for the )
possibility of a peaceful settlement.
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In all candor I must say that I am not avare of
any serious effort that the other side has made in
my Judgment to hring the fighting to a stop and to
stop the var . "
"2. Personal Role in Tall^
Q< You've heen so eloquent in the past about express-
ing your desire for peaceful negotiations. I'd like^
to ask you whether or not If you thought it would
speed this var dovrn the road to peace whether you
vouJ-d be willing personally to participate in negctia-
tion^ with scone of your opposite numbers j such as
the leadership in Hanoi?
A. We have made clear that if the other side desires
to discuss peace at any time well ve will be very
happy to have appropriate arrangements made to see
that that's carried out,
VJhere we would talk and who would talk and what
we would talk about are all mattei's that could be
worked out between the two governments involved,
Ve have made clear to them and to the world th&
principles that we believe m.uEt govern a peace moeting
of this klnd^ and a settlement that we wo^old hope
would corae out of it like the honoring of the Geneva
accords of ^5t and '62^ the right of self-determination
of the people of South Vietziamj and to insure that they
are freed from the threat or use of force.
But we have J 1 must say^ as of today j no indica-
tion that the other side is prepared in any way to
settle on these limited and decent teims. ¥e hope
very much that we can have some signals in that
direction^ but I^ in candor^ must say that as of now
we do not have."
"3- Concessions for Peace
Q. Mr, President J does your expressed willingness to
negotiate a peaceful settlement imply any willingness
to compromise on any of our stated objectives in that
part of tiie world?
A. I think that any peace agreement will involve
understanding on both parts and certain concession on
both parts and a certain understanding.
I don*t think we can determine those before we
come together or through any press conference tech-
niques • 1 can only repeat what I said in the State
F
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of the Uniorij that I wish that the conflict in Vietaaza
-was over and I can only repeat vhat I^ve said so many
times "- I vill do arching I can on the part of this
Government to go more than halfway to hring it at an end
I must say that we face great costs j we face agony,
¥e do plan to carry out our effoi'ts out there ^ we are
going to support our troops in the field ^ we are going
to work with our Vietnamese allies toward pacification
and constitutional government^ tfut while we're doing
that J every hour of every day the spokesmen for this
Government are under instructions to explore every possi-
bilD^ty for peace.
But I do not vant to disillusion any of you and I
don*t want any of you to be caught by speculation. As
of this moment I cannot report that there are any
serious indications that the other side is ready to stop
the war."
^%» Indications From Enemy
11.
Q, You have three times now used that phrase: "no
serious efforts by the other side to bring the war to a
close." Kow would you characterize what has been going
on in the last couple cf weeks? Do you recognise any
signs of ma,neuverability or fluidity in their position?
A. I see alines t every day some speculation by some
individual^ or some hope or desire expressed by some
Government • And I assume that different individuals
get different impressions j certairily they have different
hopes .
I can only 'speak for myself; John-* And with the
information that I have^ with the knowledge that's brought
to me J I must say that I do not interpret any action that
I have observed as being a serious effort to either go to
a conference table or to bring the war to an end,"
a ■ •
"Q, Woiild you discuss the reports thi,t there has been a
decline in the infiltration rate to the South and say
whether you think the bombing has had any effect?
A. Well J I stated in my Baltimore speech in early '65
vhat we expected to come from the bombing, ¥e felt that
it would improve the morale of the people in South Viet-
nam who felt that they'd almost lost the war. We felt
that it would make the North Vietnamese pay a much
heavier price for what they were doing and we felt that
it would make the infiltration more difficult.
ll2
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We think it has achieved all of those ei^ressed
purposes, \Ie cannot speak with cold assurance on the
inTiltration and the mjnibers each day or each week
or each month.
In soine quarters of the year oxir indications
are that they Increase. In other periods of the
year — the next quarter — then they go down some.
I know of nothing that I can conclude as highly
significant from the guesses and the estimates that
we have made.
Q, Sir J we have said in the past that we would be
villing to suspend the bombing of North Vietnam in
exchange for some suitable step by the other side*
Are you prepared at all to tell us what kind of other
steps the other side should take for this suspension
of bombing?
A. Just almost any step. As far as we can see^ they
haven't taken any yet and we would be glad to explore
any reciprocal action that they or any of their spokes-
men would care to suggest.
We have made one proposal after the other to —
we'd like to have a cease-fire; we'd be very glad to
stop our bombing as we have on two previous occaslonSj
if we could have any indication of reciprocal act ion j
but as of now they have given none and I assume they are
willing to give none until I hear further,"
February Ji^ I967
In
Saigon J the VC are reported to mortar the 7th Precinct and
carry out k grenade attacks diaring the period January 28-February 3.
Meanwhile^ Ky is distressed l>y news stories of US-DEV contacts
and asks Lodge if we still require concessions in return for a bombing
suspension and whether there are "divergences on such matters between
Washington and Saigon • Lodge is instructed to reply by giving Ky more
background on ferigoldj stressing (a) our doubts about the genuineness
of the Polish contact ^ (b) on the other hand oin: obligation to follow
all potential leads^ and (c) the need to avoid publicity during this
"extremely interesting and delicate^' phase of diplomacy. In connection
with the latter J his attention is to be drawn to the "recent public
comments of Presidential Advisor Walt Sostow."
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Saigon 17295 (to SecState)^ S/lfodis
k February 19^7
^'Following is the record of VC initiated incidents
vithin 10 miles of Saigon during the period Jan 28 to
Feb 3.
A. Jan 30* Saigon- grenade superficially
vounds two US servicemen.
B, Jan 30j Saigon- grenade injures one US
serviceman and one VII civilian.
■I
C< Jan 31 J 5 miles W of Saigon- grenade
killing policeiLien and civilian^ wounding school-
teacher .
D. Feb Ij Saigon-six mortar shells fired
into seventh precinct ;, wounding seven VU civilians.
F, Feb 2 J Saigon- VC small arras and grenade
attack on seventh precinct outnost^ one civilian
killed . "
LODGE
Saigon I7317 (to SecState)^ S/E:^dis
k February I967
Eeadd: CBTCPAC (KFiOM CJCS- INCLUSIVE FOR AOM SmBF)
"1. During a call on Ky. ,. •
"2, .,* he said^j 'Does Washington agree that there
should be no publicity of any kind until there has been
a concrete offer from the Communist side?'
"3* 1 said that I felt sure that Washington vas
very much in favor of not having publicity ^ since
publicity not only presented awkward problems for us
and for the Government of South Vietnam < but also made
it difficult to get any kind of a peaceful understanding
"With Hanoi. He agreed that we should avoid forcing
Hanoi up against the wall by making them lose face.
"i;. It was evident that his attention had been
attracted by the statements of Senator Robert Kennedy
and the apparent leaks of the messages from Cairo and
New Delhi to a point vhere he wanted to be sure that
there were no ^divergencies ' between Washington and
Saigon • He asked whether we still believed that in
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exchange for a bonbing suspension ve vanted some sort
of concession on their part. Did we envisage a bar-
gaining process or vere ve to suspend bombing with no
quid pro quo?
^^5* I called his attention to the President's
press conference and to the fact that on three sepa-
rate occasions during the press conference j the Presi-
dent had said that so far there was nothing of sub-
stance from Hanoi- . , , "
« * * «
LODGE
State I3ITI5 (to Amembassy Saigon), S/!Iodis
1;- February' I96T
Eef : Saigon IT3I7
• » 4
"3- Believe you should also give Ky fill-in
generally.,,. For his information^ story is^ as he
may imagine^ quite incomplete and misleading in a
number of respects • , . * We were never sure whether
the Poles were speaking for Hanoi or entirely for
themselves and we concluded ultimately that the
exercise had been primarily a fishing expedition by
the Poles in order to get us to change our position
with respect to bombing of IJIorth Viet-IIam Through-
out this exercise we had not undertaken to vmke any
change in our basic position. At the same time we
had indicated a readiness to consider the possibility
of direct talks without conditions with Horth Viet -Ham
with the ob^3 active of bringing about a peaceful
settlement. You should add that we would naturally
be in touch with the GW if there were really sub-
stantive de^/ielopments in this field.
^%. VJlth reference to Ky's query (para 2 of
reftel) about Washington views on publicity ^ suggest
you call to his attention recent public conmients of
Presidential Advisor VJalt Bostow, After referring to
'extremely interesting and delicate' phase of diplomatic
probes now under way Eos tow noted that publicity could
destroy effectiveness of behind-the-scenes efforts to
ascertain Banoi's intent and added 'this is a bad time
to talk about an^- partic^olar stand which might turn out
to be a negotiating situation,'"
HJSK
TOP SECRET -^ TOiDlS
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Washington Post j 5 February I967
U.S. Is Wary on Eeport of Peace Bid^ oy Murrey ^^rder
"United States attempts to launch peace talks vith
ETorth Vietnam are now in 'an extremely interesting and
delicate phase ^^ a Iftiite House adviser said yesterday.
'Vith that cot3ment and variations upon it^ the
Administration declined to confirm or deny a report
that the United States and North Vietnajn had tried to
start peace talks in Warsaw in December ^ at American
initiative.
"Walt W» Rostov^ President Johnson's special
assistant for national security affairs^ said;
"*I!his is an extranely Interesting and delicate
phase in what is or what might turn out to he a
negotiating process, Nothing has yet happened that
would justify us in saying we have a serious offer to
negotiate, This is a had time to discuss any particu-
lar negotiating track. '
" Lack of V igor. Postow's commeats were made
during a panel debate at a conference of college news-
paper editors at the Sheraton- Park Hotel, Another
panelist J Richard N. Goodwin j who had served as an
adviser to "both Presidents Kenndy and Johns on ^ charged
there was a lack of vigor in the present pursuit of
negotiations.
"'If Hanoi wishes to negotiate seriously^ ^ said
Rostov^ 'yoi^i* government vould not be embarrassed.
It vould he delighted . ^
"Rostow was questioned specifically hy the students
about the validity of a report in TJie Washington Post
yeste2rday^ by staff writer Robert H. Es tab rook at the
United Nations.
"It reported that an authoritative Western source
said that U,S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge j in Saigon
on Dec. 2 and 3^ asked a Polish diploinat to set up
contacts with North Vietnam. On Dec* kj the report
said J Polish Foreign ^iinister Adam Rapacki said Hanoi
agreed to have ambassadorial-level talks with the
United States in Warsaw, The report said that Hanoi
attached no conditions about first halting the Ameri-
can bombing of North Vietnam.
116
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"Withdrew In Ar^er , According to the report Hanoi
angrily vitlidrev its agreement after American bombing
raids near Hanoi on Dec, 13-1^^- allegedly hit civilian
areas.
"Eostov declined to get any more specific about
that account except to repeat that 'this is a bad time
to tallc about a pairticular strand of vhat might be a
negotiation.*
^^Other soiirces sought to emphasize that the frus-
trated negotiating effort described in the report from
the United Nations vas only one of many efforts being
made to launch talks.
^^Scme Administration soui'ces said the point in
■Ihe Washington Post account that they ^ould challenge
was that Hanoi had 'agreed* to the Warsaw talks, JTo
official^ however J would discuss whether this question
of agreement was a matter of differing interpretations
or not. 5^.ere was no challenge by any official of the
reported Lodge-initiative to arrange for talks in Varsaw.
"The State Department ^ in coBimenting Friday on
earlier and considerably less -detailed versions of a
similar report 1::^ The Washington Post and others said
it saw 'no merit' to contentions that the bombing of
North Vietnam interfered with efforts to start peace
talks.
said;
"m a new comment yesterday the State Department
"'As a matter of policy we do not believe it
would promote the cause of peace in Vietnam to comment
on accoiints of an^- alleged private talks or events
relating to them. The President fully characterized
the situation at his press conference last Ilhursday.*
"At that press conference j President Johnson
repeatedly said that 'I do not interpret any action
that I have observed as being a serious effort to either
go to a conference table or to bring the war to an end,'
The Unitecl States^ he said^ was anxious 'to explore any
reciprocal action' to curb or end the war.
"That comment J Administration sources said^ amounted
to turning do^m^ as inadequate^ a bid by North Vietnam's
Foreign mnister in which he said there 'could' be talks
117
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if there was an Uinconditiona.!' end to the "bcEibings
of his coiontiy.
'^ Administration officials emphasized that the
offer only held out the possibility^ not the proraisej
of talks^ in any event,
"The Soviet news agency^ Tass, charged yesterday
that President Johnson had spurned the 'good"yfill*
gesture by North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen
Duy Trinh. Ikss said the minister had displayed an
'indication of willingness' by the Hanoi regime to
talk with the United States-
■
"!Dae Soviet news agency added:
"*Bie unwillingness of U.S. ruling circles to
stop the critninal bombing of the D.R.V. (North yietr.am)
can only be regarded as a refusal to ineet around the
conference table ^ and as a sign of their deteimination
to further escalate the aggressive war in Vietnam.'
"Tass's correspondent in Hanoi said President
Johnson's statements pi^oduced ^legitimate indignation'
in Hanoi, '"
February 6-Tj I96T
Australia and ITew Zealand are briefed on I&rigold in seme detail.
More general acco^^nts are given to the GVhJ and the I^nila countries.
Ky accepts our explanation in good spirit ^ but points to alaim
about so-called ^^peace" talk among Catholic leaders ^ certain Buddhists
and the military in SVM, His and Thleu's strong anti-coTmnunisni would
be reassuring to these elements ^ he believe;
3,
State I323W (to Amembassy Canberra; i^embassy Wellington) ,
TS/NodiSj 6 February I96T
Ref : DEPCmTEL I3170O
EVES OKLY FOR AlfflASSADOR
"1. On February k Bundy separately gave Ambassador
Waller and Charge d^Aff aires Shepherd a full account of
the discussions between USG and Poles about the possi-
bility of direct discussions betvreen USG and Hanoi...."
....
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"27 I^Tille ve may have erred in not informirii
you fully on this matterj we vere guided throughout by
the absolute necessity of secrecy in seeking to deter-
mine whether Hanoi was in fact prepared to sit do"v/n
quietly without preccaditions . » . .
"28. Ihis full account is being given to
Australia and New Zealand ^ with the request for the
jpreservation of total confidence. A more general
account Is being given to Saigon and to the Manila
countries. We have assured Saigon^ as we have repeat-
edly assured you^ that if we should get clear evidence
of a serious change in Ifenoi^s position we would keep
them fully informed."
RUSK
Saigon 17l|8£ (to SecState)^ S/Kodis
T Februaiy 1967
Kef: State I3ITI5
"1* Pursuant to your I31715J I called on Prime
Minister Ky ^esday morning ,,,•"
« ■ ■
"3» Ky seemed to accept all of the above in good
spirit. He evidently thinks that the purpose of the
rather careful wording is to make it possible to
achieve scMe kind of understanding irithout making Kknoi
lose face* In all my many talks with himj he has often
voiced his belief that ve should be trying to persuade
Hanoi and make it easy for them to go along with uSj
and that we did not want to humiliate thenij make them
lose face J put them up against the wall-
"U. Changing the subject slightly ^ he then said
that Catholic leaders in Viet-BIam were becoming alarmed
by the so-called fpeace^ talk which they feared would
actually mean military advantage for Kanoi^ and were
taking an attitude very different fran that of the Pope.
He was afraid that similar divisions laight occur among
Buddhists and among the military. The hopeful element
of the situation was that 'everyone knew^ how strongly
anti-Communist he^ Kj, and Ihieu were."
LODGE
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F ebruary- 7- 8 ^ 19 6?
Wilson comments in Parliament about discussion ^ith the Poles and
a definite ^^peace feeler^^ last December. Highest levels in Washington
fear this may undercut the President's Februaiy 3 remarks.
Gronouski takes issue ^fith Goldberg^ arguing that the Canadians
vera probably Estabrook's source and that the Poles remain a better
channel for communication with I^noi-
State 133105 (to Amembassy London) j S/lIodis
8 Februaiy I967
FOE AMBASSADOR AIE) COOPER
"1* Highest levels are deeply disturbed by Wilson
reference to December discussions with Poles in Parlia-
mentary response yesterday. Wilson comment is of course
being widely reported as confiimng that some definite
'peace feeler' did exist at that time^ and is therefore
being construed to 'undercut' President's remarks of
last week. Moreover^ revelation that Wilson has 'all
the details' is bound to have serious complicating
effect on our relations with Saigon and with S^Ianila
allies J who had not repeat not received any similar
full account , . , * "
* •
HJSK
Warsaw I939 (to SecState)^ TS/Nodis
8 February I967
Eef: (A) State I305SO
(B) State 131716
"1. Based on person-al knowledge of the precedents^
I have reached quite different inferences and conclu-
sions regarding Es tab rook articles than those drawn ^oj
Amb. Goldberg in reftels*
With respect to Feb 2 story j while Esta crook
referred to high Polish sourceSj he denied that story
came from the Poles. Rather ^ he said it came from
Canadian Fou Min I^^rtin while Ss tab rook was in Canada ^
and that he had story a couple of weeks. This rings
tr-ae^ for Estabrook on Jan I9 filed from Ottawa essence
of his Feb 2 stoiy (which appeared in Jan 20 Paris
Herald Tribune) saying 'Canadian authorities blame some
120
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of the difficiilty on the accidental U.S. bombing of
Hanoi in mid-December. Private soundings then under
Tr/ay were disrupted ^ they say^ and the attitude in
Uoiiih Vietnam appeared to harden.' Alsoj note that
in his Feb 2 article Estabrook speaks of 'high level
outsiders' as source^ and links Polish peace effort
to r&ftia-Kapacki discussions in December (which is
not true J btit it does not hurt Martin's iniage to be
case in this role}^ alsoj note that Estabrook spoke
of Westem sources In his Feb h story*"
^'5* What does surprise mSj if we accept Esta-
brook 's statement that story came from Martin (and I
see no a priori reason for Estabrook to implicate
fertin and U Ohant and protect the Poles )j is that
Feb 2 story places developments in so unfavorable a
light from standpoint of USG,,*,"
* ■
"8. I am particularly concerned vith recommen-
dation in final para of reftel A^ that 've shouJ_d no
longer use Poland or ar^ other Bloc country as
channel to Hanoi,* As I noted in m^f analysis of
Marigold role played by Poland (Warsaw 1631)^ I too
had hoped that Soviets might play an Intermediary
role. But to my knowledge experience has been that
Poles are only Communist countiy willing to take on
this chore
■ > 4 tt
GROKOUSKT
Febniaxy 10^ l8j 20 ^ I967
Sizeable TC incidents within 10 miles of Saigon lead Lodge to
suggest that there is no further need to look for indications of reci-
procity to oLir suspension of bombing near Hanoi. He suggests that the
10 mile limit around Hanoi be dropped.
Saigon 1T759 (to SecState)^ S/KTcdis
10 February 1967
"Following is the record of VC initiated inci-
dents within ten miles of Saigon during the period
Febn^axy k to February 9."
* .
121
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^ — ^.^ — ^
^^C. February 6^ four miles west of Saigon
unirlentified platoon- sized unit fired submachine
bursts near police station aad then withdrew."
«■« 'd »
LODGE
Saigon IS329 (to SecState), S/Uodis
18 February I96T
"Following is the record of VC initiated inci-
dents within ten miles of Saigon during the period
February 10 to February 15/'
* ■ •
"C. February 13^ Saigon - VC fired four mortar
rounds in vicinity of MCV-I (details have been
reported separately)."
« «
"2. With this spate of activity it is clear
that considerations behind preparing this series of
reports are no longer relevant. This villj therefore^
be the last telegraphic repoi't of this sort."
LODGE
Saigon l8>35 (to SecState)^ TS/liodis
20 Feb27uary I967
* w m
"2. [Jhe recent mortaring in town, other terror-
ist incidents in the Saigon area^ and the likelihood
that we will get niore^ prompts me to suggest we con-
sider Infonning Hanoi j via the Poles ^ that we no
longer consider ourselves bound by the 10 miles liiait."
LODGE
O
March 3, I967
Goldberg (acconipanied by Lodge) sees D*Orlandi in Saigon^ to hear
the D.atter's version of Marigold* His objective is a first-hand confirm^
at ion from an inclependent source of the inaccuracy of the Polish version
conveyed to U Thant. D'Orlandi^s account^ he finds^ contains "no
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^
discrepancies from the version we already have- In particular D^Orlandi
is guite categoric in stating that the 10 points passed to Hanoi were
foroiulated by Lewandowski^ not by Lodge — as Goldberg believes the Poles
told U Thant. On the other side, D^Orlandi is of the view that the
December 13-lt bombing derailed the Warsaw talks. He expresses great
confidence in Lewandovski's Integrity,
USIM 1^238 (to SecState), S/ETodis
6 lylarch I967
FROM GOIDBEEiG
+
"On ferch 3^ day before leaving Saigon ^ I arranged
entirely private and off record meeting with D^Orlandi^
with agreement of and in presence -Amb Lodge . l^ objec-
tive was to secnre first-hand confirmation from entirely
independent source of inaccuracy of Polish version of
late IToveniber^early December Marigold events ^ i.e.^ that
it was Lodge who had formulated ten point proposal
Lewandowski transmitted to Hanoi ^ only to take position
subsequently that some of these points needed clarifica-
tion, (underlining furnished)
"Without any prompting on my partj D'Orlandi
really and fully recited course of events. His recital
contained no discrepancies from version we already had
and he was guite categoric in stating that ten points
passed Hanoi by Levandowski had been formulated by
Lewandowski himself,"
■ * * 4'
"It is necessary to add^ however^ that D^Orlandi
is of view that bombing of Dec 13-1^ derailed Warsaw
talks. He also expressed view that it would have
fu3rbhered progress towards negotiations if Rapacki had
not insisted upon transferring venue to Warsaw.
D*Orlandl's view is that it would have been preferable
to carry on discussions through himself and lewandowski
In Saigon^ with Lewandowski commuting to Hanoi.
^'D^Orlandi expressed great confidence in Lewan-
dowski 's integrity and confirmed that both Lewandowski
and he will be leaving Saigon for respective home or
other posts • "
BUFFUH
123
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March Ik, 19 67
On returaing to ITew York^ Goldberg tries to arrive at a common
version of the facts about J-feirigold with the Polish TOT Representative^
Tomorowicz. The Polish version agrees 'vrith ours that the 10 points
-were formulated by LevaMowski . Goldberg ndt^B three points of
difference J however:
i. Their version does not mention that Lodge indicated the
need to clarify certain points at the December 1 meeting in Saigon.
ii. Their version indicates that Lodge first raised clarifica-
tion at the December 3 meeting ^ through the "important differences of
intei^pretation" clause,
iii. According to their version^ the Poles stressed avoiding
intensification of the bombing either before or during talks from the
December 1 meeting on,
Goldberg urges Tomorcwicz to revlev Marigold with Warsai; so that
these factual differences can be cleared up.
USIM 4390 (to SecState)j S/Nodis
15 mvch 1967
"1, I arranged meet with Polish Perm Eep Tomoro-
vicz Mar ll|. FM shortly after he had called on SIG and
just before he was due leave for roughly ten days con-
sultation in ¥arsaw,"
A m
"3- Specif ically^ I noted there is one point of
some importance re developments in early Dec on vhich
there are two differing versions ^ namely ^ who formu-
lated ten points which lewandowsKi presented tc Hanoi-
''k. I said I had talked with D^^rlandi privately
while in Saigon^ that D^Orlandi had reviewed ^krigold
developments without any prompting from me^ and that
his review entirely confirmed our understanding of
facts on this point, Tomorowicz said that^ In princi-
ple j facts of this point as we understood them were
quite accurate, (underlining furnished)
5. His further comments ^ however^ engendered
discussion of Marigold developments throughout Dec
which revealed three other points on which we and
Poles have differing facts, specifically:
124
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a) PoliE^h vers ion J as presented by Tomoro-
wiczj makes no mention of fact that at Dec 1 mtg in
Saigon, when Levandowski pre sent ed ten points to
Lodge^ Lodge raised question of need to clarify some
of points^ noting Points B and H in particular »
(underlining furnished)
B) Acco3?ding Polish version^ Lodge first
mentioned need for clarification at Dec 3 jtntg j when
he said there were important differences of inter-
pretation on 'serious matters^ in ten points ^ although
Lodge would not reply when asked to identify points
in need of clarification, (underlining furnished)
C) According Polish version^ Poles placed
stress on relation between bombing and progress
toward US-TTOI talks from Dec 1 mtg on: Lewandowski
allegedly told Lodge on Dec 1 that there must be no
intensification of bombing either before or during
talks; at Dec 3 mtg with Lodge ^ he allegedly made
strong representations re Dec 2 bombings; and^ on
Dec 5 J Rapacki allegedly made another strong repre-
sentation re bombing to Gronousklj claiming Dec 2
and 3 bombings had not ruled out chances of direct
US-IIVJr talks but had certainly made progress toward
talks more difficult, (underlining furnished)
"6. As these differences carae to light during
discuss ion^ I presented our understanding of facts
and urged Tcmorowicz to review Marigold developments
while in Warsaw so that -we could clear up factual
differences betveen us * , , . '*
GOLDBERG
March l6-lTj I96T
Fanfani writes Rusk that Lewandowski has proposed a new initiative
to D'Orlandi, Lodge is instructed to follow up^ but he replies that
D'Orlandi has left Saigon for Rome, Reinhardt is therefore instructed
to contact D*Orlandi later in Home,
F.QEie 4767 (to SecState)j s/Fodis^ I6 March I96T
• •
"My Dear Secretary of State ^
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TO? SEGHST - NOBIS
'^I voiild feel remiss in my duty if I failed to
infoiTiL you of what Aml^assador D^Orlandi has communis
cated to me after meeting vith Lewandovskij a few
days ago J and reviewing with him the current Viet-
namese situation* D'Orlandi felt he had to tell me
that J in the present circumstances ^ a resumption of
negotiations wotild require a three week long sus-
pension of baiEhings and the admission^ on the part
of the United States ^ that they are still willing
to accept the well known ten points.
"D^Orlandi adds that the duration of the sus-
pension Gould he kept secret and that it should not
rpt not he difficult to seciire a substantive counter^
part from Hanoi j to be presented as a compensation
for Some otherj purely token^ concession frcei the
United States/*
• • • *
KEimiAEDT
State 156826 (to Amembassy Saigon) ^ S/Kodis
16 March I96T
*'l. By now you will have seen* . .message from
FonMin Fanfani to Se dietary Rusk
* * *
"2* Points of greatest interest on which we
most want clarification are following:
(a) When would the negotiations be
resumed J after suspension had run three weeks or
at initiation of three-week period? If the former^
should it be assumed that suspension would be
expected to continue as negotiations proceeded?
(b) V/hat would be the 'substantive
counterpaii}' from Hanoi? Presume it would not
merely be resumption of negotiations but rather
some de-escalatory action affecting infiltrationj
guerrilla or terror activity in the South or the
like .
(c) In phrase 'resumption of negotiations*
does this refer to (i) direct UPV/US talks which were
to hav^ been undertaken in Warsaw last December 2
and which we welcomed ^ or (li) resumption of arid
exchanges between C-ronouski and Papacki?
126
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(d) vihat is entailed in 'accepting* the
ten points? ¥e assi*me this means nothing more than
that ve have in no vay receded from acceptance in
terms ve made known to Lewandov/ski and Rapacki in
November and December.
^'3. Please review these matters vith D^Orlandi
Saigon 20590 (to SecState)j S/Nodis
16 ferch 1967
"1. In response to your 156826^ D'Orlandi
left Saigon yesterday, Thursday, March l6.,.,"
LODGE
State 158132 (to Ameiabassy Rome)j s/Nodis
17 March I967
Ref : (a) Saigon 20590
(b) Rome kjBj
(c) State 156826
« • •
''2 The Secretary vould be most grateful
if Minister Fanfani vould let Ambassador Reinhardt
know when Ambassador B'Orlandi has reached Rome so
that the two Ambassadors miglit discuss Lewandcwski's
approach .
"3- For Reinhardt, Assuming the arrangement
outlined above works out, we would appreciate your
following up vith D*Orlandi along lines slcetched
out Deptel I56826 '"
RUSK
^ )
March I9, 19 67
Rapacki has told Uilson and Brown that (l) Lodge first accepted
Lewandovski's 10 points, then reneged through the "important differ-
ences of interpretation^^ clause^ and (2} the December 13-1^ bombing
had sabotaged the entire project. State cables a rebuttal: (ij
Lodge reserved the US position on the 10 points when first presented,
December 1; hence he did not renege^ (2) Although Lewandowski
complained on December 3 about our bombing Hanoi ^ "there was no
suggestion that the prospect for DRV-U8 talks depended in any direct
way on such matters*"
127
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State 1582U6 (to Amembassy London) ^ TS/TTodis
19 Iferch 1967
Hef: London's 6998 and 7172 and State's lli6303
"Account in London's 6998 of Ea^acki's conver-
sations with Bro-vm and Wilson about the events of
December provide further evidence of Kapacki's con-
tinuing Yindictiveness. \Je assume that his feelings
will badly discolor the Polish contribution to a
'more detailed post mortem' between the British and
the Poles.
"During his London vis it , Eapacki evidently
made two charges against us: (l) Lodge had reneged
after giving firm agreement to the Lewandowski Ten
Point package and (2) the December 13-1^ bombing
had sabotaged the entire project,
"The cable exchanges between Lodge and the
Department in the early days of December provide
an absolutely clear record that Lodge did not repeat
not agree to Lewandowski's version of the Ten Points
and therefore did not repeat not renege- On Decem-
ber Ij Lewandowski told Lodge he had presented to
Hanoi his understanding of the US position based on
his conversations with Lodge on IJovember Ik and
earlier. He then read his Ten Points ^ which Lodge
recorded precisely. Lodge was not^ however j shown
a paper containing the Ten Points.
"At the end of his statement ^ Levandowski asked
Lodge if he had correctly stated the US point of view.
Lodge responded carefully that 'obviously on a matter
of such importance J I would have to refer to my
government for a definitive reply ^ but I could say
off hand that much of what he cited was in keeping
with the spirit of our policy*' He then pointed out
specific difficulties with Point 2 and Points 8.
Neither in this nor in later discussions with Lodge
did Lawandowski indicate any misunderstanding of the
qualified riature of Lodge's response to his presen-
tation of the Ten Points, For example. Lodge informed
him on December 3 that our Snbassy in Warsaw would
contact the DRV representative on December 6 to confirm
'that the Lewandowski formulation broadly represented
our posit ion J although several specific points were
subject to important differences of interpretation,,,.
11
.... It is also worthy of hate that D^Orlandi
told the Secretary on December 9 that Eapacki had
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'tried to be clever' aM to get the US to withdraw
all its reservations about the Lewandowski formu-
lation before he established a direct contact in
Warsaw between the US and DRV representatives*..*
tt
mm*
It is tiijie that on December 3; Levan-
dowski under instructions ^ coiriplained to Lodge
about bombings in the vicinity of Hanoi but there
was no suggestion that the prospect for DEV-US talks
depended in any direct way on such matters,
"Subsequently J while Eapacki haggled^ we wez^e
blocked from a direct contact with the DEV at which
this and all other pertinent subjects could have
been discussed.,,/^
KATZEE^IBACH
Apri l Tj ^I j. IggT
Eeiriha.rdt reviews prospects for resuming contact via Lewandowski
with D'Orlandi in Rome, State instructs him to arrange a three-party
meeting when Lewandowski passes through Rome in May.
Rome 326G (to SecState)^ S/lTodiSj T April I967
State 164750 (Eef?)
"1. In lengthy private conversation today at
villaj D'OrlaMi exposed his conviction that possi-
Dility to achieve something through Lewandowski was
good and should be pursued without undue delay
since Pole would be leaving Saigon in >Iay. D'Orlandi
believed lesson of last try was that more details
should be clarified and nailed dovna through Lewan-
dowski channel before actual negotiations between
principals initiated. No doubt^he had discussed
these and other views in detail with Lodge* It
was clear to me that D^Orlandi considered himself
essential link to Lewandowski channel.
. Regardirig specific questions (State 156826^
para 2)j he stated:
A, Lewarjiowski thought that suspension
of bombing sho^jad be initiated not later than his
arrival in Hanoi to sound ITorth Yietnamese and that
three or four weeks would be necessary to allow
sufficient time for initial exchanges ^ suspension
would of coui'se be without any comiuitment^ and whether
it continued firrther would presi^jnably depend on
whether constrictive developments take place.
129
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3
•■
liTIf
Dccbssiried per Execuiive Order 13526, Section 33
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B. » Substantive contribution' would ^ he
imagined J be something specific in military field
which US Command considered useful.
C. ^Resumption of negotiations' he
thought meant US/DEV but vas not sure that Hapacki/
Gronouski stage could be completely finessed if venue
were Warsaw,
D. 'Accepting ten points' he understood
simply to mean reaffirmation of previous position
including US reservations on interpretation and
assurance that there had been no recession in US
position.
*'3» D'Orlandi said Lewandovski had revealed
nothing rpt nothing in his conversation vhich might
cast light on why Hanoi published Johnson- Ho- Chi
Minh. exchange . "
* » « «
REBIHAFDT
State 180271 (to Memhassy Eome)^ TS/Nodis
21 April 1967
Eef: Rome 5266
"1, \Je appreciate having these additional
comments by D'Orlandi and suggest that in order to
explore Hanoi's position further j as it is untier-
stood by Lewandowski^ you propose quiet meeting
between the three of you next month when Lewandowski
passes through Rome en route to Warsaw/'
RUSK
May 8- I967
Hightower files a lengthy account of ^3arlgold from Washington, The
story contains enough detail to Indicate that some of his sources were
insiders. It is critical of the Polish role and reflects Washington's
doubts the reliability of Poland as a channel to Hanoi,
130
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^ \ss
Declassified perExecuiive Order 13526, Section 33
NND Pmjecn Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1
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Key York Times , 9 May I96J
k-mWUil U.S. BID IGNORED BY HAITOI, by John M.
Eight over of the Associated Press
• • *
"One of the 10 points provided that the United
States voiild not insist that North Vietnai]i acknowl-
edge publicly the presence of its forces In South
Vietnam. The Johnson Administration decided this
should be clarified to require that if the troop
issue was to be covered up for face-saving purposes ^
then the Uorth Vietnamese forces should be with^
drawn from the South.
''Mr. Lewaudowski was infortned of this and other
clarification points. The others seemed mainly
matters of wording. But this one seemed to be sub-
stantial,"
"Mr. Eapacki*s strong resistance to the clari-
fication proposal caused some concern in Washington,
Officials were not sure the Poles had any coniniitment
from North Vietnam to begin the xalks. Some high
officials here doubted that I-lr. Hapacki was in fact
relaying United States views and making known
Washington's readiness for talks to Hanoi-"
^
m *
"Informants say an Important element in the
Administration decision not to suspend the bombing
plan was an attack by Communist forces on Saigon's
main airfield and an unsuccessf-ol attempt to blow
up a major bridge in Saigon,"
• * » •
"United States officials publicly took issue
with this. Privately they said that while the
attack at Hanoi might have destroyed the Polish
plan J it might also have presented Hanoi or Warsaw
with a convenient pretext for not going through
with it."
# > • «
May 9-10, I967
In Warsaw^ Polish concern is expressed over rumors that the US
plans to publish a white paper on Marigold* This would force them^
1^1 TOP SECH^ - rrODIg
Declassifled per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
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^^^^
IC^'>?
TOP SECRST - NOBIS
reluctantly J to publish their own account, Gronouski recoHsnends against
publication,
Washington replies that the Eightover piece is ^^essentially accurate
and reasonably favorable from our point of view." The Poles are to be
told that ve will not publish a white paper.
When so infonnedj the Poles respond that "US officials had apparent-
ly chosen another way to put out the stoiy," They are especially dis-
tressed at the question raised as to whether they had actually transmitted
US messages to the Ifforth Vietnamese, Tliey state that they had delivered
the messages .
Warsaw 2T00 (to SecState)^ S/Nodls^ 9 May I967
"1. During my separate calls on Winievicz and
Mlchalowski this morning ^ both of them expressed
Polish concern about news reports originating in U.S.
that U.S. intends to publish within next few days a
white book covering Warsaw talks of last December,,.."
* • ■
"5 Poles WQf-ild be most reluctant to pub-
lish their own white book but they would be left with
no alternative if U*S. published its own,"
. ■
"T* -..- I wouJ.d therefore recomraend against
publication of official dept. version of MARIGOIiD
events. . , J^
GEOi^'OUSKI
State 190899 (to Amembassy Warsaw)^ S/lTodis
9 May 1967
Eef : Warsaw 2699 and 27OO
"We consider news stories filed yesterday on
December peace probes to be essentially accurate
and reasonably favorable from our point of view.
We would prefer let matter rest there avoiding to
extent feasible public exdaange of interpretations
with the Polish Government, When queried about
story yesterday^ official spokesman said he pre-
ferred not rpt not to comment on STJory^ adding
FOR BACKGEOUDID that he 'would have no q.i.u3,rrel with
it, ^ We intend maintain this position.
^ TO? SECRET - NODIS
Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1
^5^
TOP SECKST " NODIS
"Since we have no desire exacerT^ate US-Pol ish
\ relations over "fchis matter ^ we have no present
intentions publish H'Tnite Book' on this subject*
You should so inform Michalowski
• > •
> » •'
RUSK
Warsaw 272? (to SecState)^ s/JIodis
10 I4ay 1967
Eef; State I90899
"1 \Ihen Kaiser said U.S. has no present
intention of publishing white book^ Michalowski
responded that U.S. officials had apparently chosen
another way to put out the story- He then referred
to Hightower article which j he said^ according to
summary received by Polish FonMinj seemed to be
based on high level official sources. There were
disturbing distortions j errors and innuendos
challenging the integrity of Rapacki and question-
ing whether Polish side had actually transmitted
messages to North Vietnamese. He added that Poles
had of course delivered messages,"
M m w *
jEiocras
fey 28 J 1967
US Eabassies in Tol^o and Seoul are given background information
on l^Iarigold .
State 2039314- (to AmSnbassies: Tokyo^ Seoul)^ s/Nodis
28 fey 1967
Kef: State 197li.26 to Tokyo
. State 198946 to Seoul
"We are repeating to you State's 1582^5-6 and
1323^7 which provide bac'^xground info on Polish
initiatives re Vietnam which aborted last December.
Text of Lewandovski's Ten Points which were pre-
sented to Aabassador Lod,^e on December 1 follows:"
^o'
. b
SUSK
133 TOP CTC-HKT - IFODIS
15S
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June 6, I96T
The three-party talks in Eome vill not be possible as Levandovskl
is not passing through.
Rome 6506 (to SecState)j s/Uodis
6 June I96T
State 191171^ and Home 599I
"D'Orlandi has informed me that Lewandowski
is not repeat not coming to Rome,"
RErNILAH)a?
December 6j I967
Wilfred Burchett tells US officials in Paris that the DPV had an
official en route to the Marigold Warsaw meeting at the time of can-
cellation — "vhen the US resinned bombing Hanoi/'
Paris 75^0 (to SecState)^ S/Nodis^
6 December I967
* *
"Burchett said North Vietnamese accuse us of talking
peace vhile intensifying war. For example; ITorth
Vietnainese had agreed to talk at Warsaw last December
and even had official en route when US resumed bombing
Hanoi- He also mentioned North Vietnamese readiness
to talk at Rangoon during 37 day pause/'
« a • *
13!^ TOP SECRET - NODIS
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