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Dt^classifit'd per Executive Order 13526, vSection 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 2011 

VLC Settlement of the Conflict ^6 Vols,) 

Histories of Contacts (4 Vols,) 

2, Polish Track 

Declassified per Execuiive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Projeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 201 1 




- 1967 





Dccbssified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Projecn Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dme: 201 1 


>! 1 


VI. C. 2. 



C. Histories of Contacts 

2. Marigold 

Sec Def Cent Sr- X-, 

i :^5 

Declassified per Execuiive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: N WD Dale: 201 1 







D€cJassificd per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Prtjject Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Diiie: 2011 



This study consists of two parts ^ a chronology of the principal 
events in the negotiating initiative known as Marigold (Part II)^ and 
an analytic discussion of some of the principal questions raised by 
ferigold (Part 1). Part I is based on Part IIj with citations to it 
indicated by date, V/hile Part I can be read without reference to 
Part II J it may be easier going with Just a few of the main dates and 
happenings in mind: 

I^te in June 1966^ the Polish ICC Representative ^ Levandowski^ 
rettirned to Saigon from Hanoi vith some ideas he felt could serve as 
a basis for negotiations. These were conmunicated to the US through 
the Italian government and followed up by discussions in Saigon with 
Lewandowskij D'Orlandi (the Italian Ambassador) and Lodge participating 
in various combinations. In addition^ Lewandowski made several visits 
to Hanoi. On November 30 ^ he presented a 10 point formulation^ reflecting 
his understanding of the US position^ '>7hich he said Hanoi woxild accept 
as a basis for direct ^^conversation" betvreen US and DRV representatives 
in Warsaw. On December 2. Hanoi-;, vhich had not been bombed since mid- 
Aug:ustj was hit by US airstrikes. On December 3^ the Poles protested 
the attack as endangering the prospective Warsaw meeting; and the US 
officially accepted Levandovskl's 10 points^ subject to "important 
differences of interpretation." On December k^ Hanoi was bombed again. 
During the next 10 days^ the Poles and Americans argued about the pattern 
of US bombing and ttie "differences of interpretation" clause. In the 
interim (December 6)j how^ever^ Hanoi was officially informed of the US 
acceptance J as (qualified. On December I3 and Ik^, Hanoi was bombed again; 
and the DRV instructed the Poles to end all conversations about the 
proposed contact. On December 2^!-^ the US infonned the Ccmmunists that 
it would refrain from bombir^ within a 10 mile radius of Hanoi ^s center ^ 
expressing the hope that this vo^Jild permit the V/arsaw meeting to take 
place; but the offer was not accepted. 

Strictly J the irea within 5 miles of the center of Hanoi 


Declassified per Execuiive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Diite: 201 1 





f ^ 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
KND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


The Role of the Polish Intermedlar:^ 

The part played in Marigold "by the DRV is veiled in mystery^ 
because all US transactions in the matter passed through Polish hands* 
The initiative for the contact can only be traced back as far as the 
Poles, It begins with Levandowski*s retui\^ from Hanoi in late June 
1966, Irfhether he acted on Hanoi's request^ on Soviet urging^ or his 
ovn sense of enterprise is not knovn. The sub servient flow of informa- 
tion on DRV vievs and reactions came almost entirely through the Polish 
channel J and the Poles verej intent icnallyj ambiguous in distinguishing 
between their own thoughts and Hanoi's, 

Drawing conclusions from the story is a compounded problem because 
the PoleSj by their own account^ conceived of their function as guite 
different from neutrally passing messages: 

— They acted as brokers^ probing us (and perhaps Hanoi) to find 
elements of "give'' that would narrow the gap between US and DRV posi- 
tions on the terms of settlement. Their most inventive act in this 
role was producing a Polish formulation of the official US position as 
a starting point for US-DRV talks. In this way^ each side had a 
glimpse of possible areas of negotiation ^ without first committing 
itself to specific language or firm concessions. 

— They tried to steer the exchanges away from topics we preferred 
(especially de-escalation) toward those they said had greater chance 
of acceptance in Hanoi (the terms of an overall settlemant). 

--They acted as friends of Hanoi^ not neutrals, 

"-Most importantly J they applied pressure on the U3 to participate 
in good faith J by the ever present threat of disclosing their version 
of the matter to influential world leaders or the public at large. Thus 
our first intimation of Marigold came via the Italian Government ^ which 
had been informed in Saigon and Rome by the Poles. ¥e knew immediately^ 
and were forcefully i^minded at critical moments later^ that US responses 
which might be viewed by others as reluctance in the pursuit cf peace ^ 
skepticism about finding a "political^' solution^ or intransigence on 
matters of substance j might be used against us. 

The only tenable working assumptions on the US side^ therefore j 
were that the Poles pursued at least three objectives in ferigold ^^ 
and most likely a fourth as well: (l) Ending the violence in Vietnam. 

(2) Doing so on teims relatively favorable to the Communist side. 

(3) Building a case that could be used against the US^ as pressure 
during the development of the contact or as a source of embarrassment 
to the US should the whole venture fail, (in addition^ the Poles no 
doubt sought to cast themselves in a role of historical importance.) 


Declassined per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 


As so often with multiple objectlTCSj none seams to have been maxi- 
mized. For example J if the Poles vere concerned solely vlth ending the 
var (regardless of the terms )j they should have acted vith greater 
discretion after the contact broke down, because this would better pre- 
serve their usefulness as an inteimediary in the future . On the other 
hand J had they been concerned solely with discomfitting the USj they 
could have used their ammunition to greater effect by leaking earlier 
and more sensationally to the press * Perhaps different individuals on 
the Polish side gave differing priorities to this objective or that,! 
In any case^ the fact that none of the objectives was pursued to its 
logical maximum must mean that^ in some larger Polish scheme of things ^ 
all were accorded considerable inportance • 

El is is critical in interpreting the episode as a whole j because it 
implies that^ with whatever degree of imprecision^ the Poles were in fact 
trying to find areas of compromise between the DEV and US on acceptable 
outcomes to the war, Their effort was taken seriously enough in Hanoi to 
result in DRV agreement to meet with a US representative in Warsaw, ^ This 
in turn must mean they received seme serious guidance on policy frcm the 
DEV^ even though it is quite unlikely that they were privy to Hanoi's 
minimum bargaining positions, V/hat they conveyed to us about promising 
directions for negotiations j therefore j should reflect something of Hanoi's 
considered judg:aentSj but cannot of course be read as a map of finn and 
final DEV positions. 

It was apparently not until after the Warsaw contact was canceled 
that the Poles were asked to specify those messages they had passed on 
explicit instruction from Hanoi. {Siere were three^ they said: Lewandowski's 
message to Lodge expressing DEV agreement to the Warsaw talks; the warning 
after the December 3 (sic) boaibing of Hanoi that the contact was being 
reassessed by the DEV; and the decision to cancel the Warsaw meeting after 
the December 13-14 bombing of Hanoi. In add it ion ^ the Poles said they had 
numerous exchanges with Hanoi during the period of Gronouski's contacts 
with Sapacki in Warsaw (i-e.j after December 5) and claimed that they were 
therefore able to reflect Hanoi's views accurately even when speaking on 
their own initiative, 

For e^xample^ the cable traffic conveys a picture of Lewandovski as mere 
detached than E^packij more concerned simply with bringing the contending 
parties together than with exacting concessions from the US or throwing 
the onus for failure upon it. On the other hand^ this may reflect differ* 
ences between the US reporters in Saigon and Warsaw as much as actual 
differences between the two Poles. 

^e do not know what the DEV expected from the Warsaw meeting nor how its 
prospects were represented to Hanoi by the Poles. Bis evidence that the 
DEV did in fact agree to the meeting is examined in another section. 

"iQV ^y^zmii - NODIS 

Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


How accurate and explicit they were in transmitting US views to 
Hanoi is not known. They seem to have made at least one major blunder 
(described in the next section)^ and may well have made others. 





Declassified per Executive Order J 3526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 03316* By: NWD Date: 20 i 1 


Did the DRV Agree? 

It is at least possible that the Poles had no commi-biient from the 
DRV at all J but on balance this seems highly improbable. By the begin- 
ning of December J they had gone far out on a l±mb in their contacts and 
arrangements vith at least the Americans ^ the Italians and^ apparently^ 
the Russians, It is hard to see what could have motivated them to go 
this far purely on speculation^ given the consequences for them of a 
revelation that the vhole venture was built on air. 


The evidence that the DRV did in fact agree to a meeting in Warsaw 

(1) Rapacki's statement to Gronouski that Levandovski i^ras acting 
on DRV instructions in "the message he gave to Lodge , , . upon his 
return from Hanoi expressing ^TVtT iDositive response to the Warsaw talks" 

(2) Zinchuk^s statement to Bundy that "the Polish effort was 
serious and that the Soviets were fully with it" and that "he had been 
surprised J in discussing the Polish initiative in the Department . . , 
to see that it was treated as doubtful" (12/22/66); 

(3) Burchett^s statement to Isham that a DRV official had actually 
been en route to Warsaw for the proposed meeting when "the US resumed 
bombing Hanoi" and the contact was canceled (I2/6/67). 

If Eurchett's information is accurate j it would mean that Hanoi 
had been informed by the Poles of US acceptance of the Lewandowski formu- 
lation and was satisfied with the US response - The US formally accepted 
Lewandowski^s 10 points on December 3^ with the qualification that "several 
specific points are subject to important differences of interpretation." 
If the Poles accurately conveyed the US positioUj therefore; it would also 
follow that the DRV had acquiesced in this extremely broad reservation* 

Here J however^ some further questions arise, Hapacki^ in a meeting 
with Gronouski J indicated that Lodge had "confiimed" Lewandowski's formu- 
lation on December 1^ introducing the "important differences of interpre- 
tation" clause as a further condition two days later. (I2/5/66) ITnis 
would Imply that Lodge accepted Lewandowski^s 10 points without referring 
them to Washington J which seems extremely unlikely. Apparently the Poles 
informed Hanoi prematurely of US acceptance j omitting the qualification 
about interpretation- ( 12/6/ 66) But by December 6 they had conveyed 
the US message In its final form* (I2/7/66) If the DEV official was 
en route when the bombing of Hanoi resumed — December 13-14 — the interpre- 
tation clause must have been transmitted and accepted by the ^lorth Viet- 



DeclassiOed per Executive OrcJcr 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 

L / 


Tais would mean that the content of tiie interpretation clause did 
not in itself cause the contact to abort- However^ three days (December 
3-^6) may have been lost vhile the Poles urged us to withdraw the clause 
and ve demurred. Woxild the Warsaw talks actually have begun before the 
December I3-IU bombing if this time had been saved? Would they have been 
continued if the bombing occurred after the first meeting or two? 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i 



The Polish Vision of a Vietnam Solution 

At four points during JVlarigold^ Levando'wski offered sketches of 
a negotiated outcome to the war. None of these is precise or complete, 
Kone is an authoritative statement of what would be acceptable to the 
DEV, They differ in content^ each serving a different purpose in his 
development of the contact. All^ however^ are consistent with each 
otherj suggesting they derive from a single set of concepts. They are 
consistent J tooj with several key planks of the revised ULF Program^ 
released In Augus-fc I96T — in particular ; the call for new elections 
with universal sufferage and the establishment of a government with 
Communist participation. 

His revelations have a pattern; The first was the come-on^ 


in the most attractive but vaguest terois of all. The second and third 
were explorations of much the traffic would bearj testing in turn the 
reactions of the Italians (perhaps as bellwethers of 'Vorld opinion") 
and of official feshing^ton. The last was the most serious ^ his own 
fonnulation of the US posit ion j designed to provide a substantive basis 
for direct talks between the US and DRV. Its language had therefore to 
encompass the minimum outcomes acceptable to both sides ^ using ambiguity 
to cloak the differences his brokerage could not eliminate. 

Apparently^ -the best terms he hoped to obtain were eventual US 
military withdrawal based on US acceptance of the NLF in a coalition 
governtnent^ along with a sharp reduction in the role played in that 
government by militant anti^ communists* The minimum he felt acceptable 
as a basis for talks Is^ naturally ^ harder to discern. It seems to have 
been less a final solution to the conflict than a change in the ground 
3:iiles under which the struggle to rule SW would continue. The principal 
elements seemed to be acceptance of the Communists as legitimate contenders 
for power; and the substitution of international machinery of some sort 
for US artned participation in regulating the outcome. Left open is the 
question of whatj if anything^ the Communists would give in exchange (e,g.^ 
NVA withdrawal^ etc* ) 

Lewandowski^s thoughts on settlement are described briefly telow- 
MDre detail is given xa the chronology^ for which the relevant dates are 
also indicated below, 

(1) The Tteaser , US interest (and Italian) was first aroused 
by a statement of things the DRV did not demand as part of a final 
settlement, levandcwskij just back from a trip to Hanoi in June 
1966^ billed this negative list as "a very specific peace offer/^ 
even though it lacked the positive demands that would inevitably be 
in a final settlement. >Jhat Hanoi did not demand included: 


Declassined per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
KND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



immediate reunification; socialism in SVIT; a change in SW 
relations in foreign affairs; neutralization; immediate with- 
dxaval of US forces; DRV interference in the SVN government. 
The last pointy hovever^ vas modified to the extent of asking 
for a government led by "someone other than Ky." 

On the positive side^ Hanoi *s demands seemed to concern 
i^gotiation procedures. It would enter negotiations if the NLF 
could '^take part" (though not as sole representative of SWl) 
and if the bombing of the North vera suspended. The first of 
these demands J of course ^ is not purely procedural ^ since giving 
the NLF a formal role in negotiations would move it toward a 
position of legitimacy in SVN politics ^ whatever the outcome of 
the negotiations • 

Lewandowski^ then^ seemed to suggest that the war could be 
brought to an end by strengthening the position of the NLF^ 
weakening that of Ky (and^ no doubt j the anti- communist tendency 
in SVN he represented )j fudging all other issues over at least 
the short run. (6/27/6?) 

(s) Ruminations . During September^ Lewandowski communed 
with D'Orlandl in Saigon on possible solutions. All of his 
thoughts J however J returned to a single theiae: coalition 
government. The bulk of the ministers could be "sensible SVIT 
politicians/* with a man or two from the right (meaning the Ky 
government) and a man or two from the left (meaning the NLF) in 
"unimportant ministries." Of perhaps even greater significance ^ 
he firmly opposed any development designed to reinforce the 
status quo with respect to the then existing GVl" -- including ^ 
specifically J measures for mutual de-escalation of the war. 

Later j D^Orlandi outlined a settlement package that he 
thought would get immediate; seri.ous consideration in Hanoi. 

It included US withdrawal "eventually"; internationally con- 
trolled elections "after one or two years"; leading to a 
neutral J coalition government. Coalition^ in his mind^ was 
"not a 'must.f" V,Tiether this package rei^lected Lewandowski 's 
appraisal^ or D ^Orlandi^s softening of the Pole's vleWj is not 
clear. (10/I6/66) 

(3) Probing the US . Just before visiting Hanoi in mid- 
November^ Lewandowski tried to take a serious reading on US 
attitudes. His questions were so phrased as to make the response 
desired by the communist side apparent. They dealt with pro- 
cedures that might follow a ceasefire and were no doubt an effort 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



to find a set of actions vhich^ if accepted by the US^ would 
ultimately result in a situation in SVN acceptable to the 

Specifically^ he wanted to know if US troop withdrawal 
depended on GW control over areas then governed or contested 
by the VC; if the US would withdraw from combat areas and not 
interfere in the creation of a new government in SW; if the 
US would oppose progress toward peaceful reunification; if the 
US would accept the ICC as the machinery for bringing peace to 

All but the third of these questions boil down essentially 
to one: to what extent would the US remove itself from the 
contest over who should rule in SVET? All were framed without 
indication of a quid pro quo. Thus they reveal nothing of DRV 
willingness to remove itself from the contest, (ll/lij^/66) 

(h) Speaking for the US . When Lewandowski returned from 
Hanoi at the end of Dlovember^ he brought along his own fozmula- 
tion of the US position on a final settlement. The critical 
points on the future of SVN include: US military withdrawal 
after the restoration of peace; US acceptance that ^'the present 
status quo in SW would be changed in order to take into account 
the interests of the parties presently opposing the policy of 
the US in SW'' ; and US acceptance of the results of ''free and 
democratic elections/' held 'Vith the participation of all/' 
under "the necessary control machinery." (I2/7/66) 

The political complexion of the new status quo is left 
open J but clearly SVTJ comiiunists would be entitled to contend 
for power* Clearly ^ tooj the phrase "necessary control machinery" 
could not refer in Communist minds to the US presence or the 
existing GVST, On the other hand^ no piece of "machinery" less 
forceful than these could be expected by the communists to enforce 
an electoral outcome regarded as unacceptable to the aimed parties 
contending in SVJI. Thus the formulation does not provide a peace- 
ful solution to the problem of who shall rale SW. It offers a 
way for the US to end its part in the war. It leaves open the 
question of what the communist side would do in return. Ttils, 
presumably J is what the foimulatlon left as the subject of nego^ 



Duclassifled per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Pmject Number NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



Unilateral Concessions 

Lewandovski probed for US concessions on the terras of final settle- 
ment beyond previously stated official positions ^ such as the Fourteen 
Points and the Manila Communique, His method of operation was such as 
to conceal vhat reciprocity (if any) might come from the DEV. In the 
end J hovever^ he got virtually no concessions of substance. As a result ^ 
it might be argued the greatest unilateral movement avay from previous 
positions vas on the DEV side^ which agreed to meet with the US without 
a cessation of the bombing of the Korth. IVhile the natiire of the pro- 
spective contact remained ±n total obscurity — we had no indication of 
what matters the DKV representative would be prepared to address -- the 
DPV must have hoped for something of value and was prepared to probe for 
it while the bombing continued. In effect ^ this meant tacitly accepting 
the bombing as an American blue chip in the bargaining process ^ something 
the DRV had sought tenaciously to avoid in the past. (See^ however ^ the 
XYZ episode.) 

In response to the four questions Lewandowski posed in mid-November ^ 
the US replied: the i^lanila formulation spoke for itself with respect to 
US troop withdrawal; the US supported the constitutional processes then 
emerging in Saigon as the route to representative government in SVN; the 
US would accept peaceful^ freely chosen reunification (as already indicated 
in the Fourteen Points); the machinery needed to enforce and supervise a 
final settlement should be decided hy negotiations j taking acco^ont of 
problems revealed in the recent past -^^ i-e.^ with the ICC. Nothing was 
conceded at all. (ll/lif-15/66) 

Tae US accepted Lewandowski's final 10 Point foimulation as broadly 
reflecting its position^ but qualified this by stating^ "We must add that 
several specific points are subject to important differences of interpre- 
tation/^ Q?he qualifier was not elaborated^ even though the Poles urged 
that the specific points at issue be indicated or that the formulation be 
revised to eliminate the need for this sweeping reservation. The point 
which raised the sharpest apprehension in Washington was that indicating 
US acceptance that the "status quo in SW would be changed" to take 
account of communist interests, E^^en this language^ however^ as State 
pointed outj was broad enough to mean aii^^thlng from putting the I^TLF into 
the government forthwith to a simple endorsement of the electoral pro- 
cesses then being elaborated in Saigon. US troop withdrawal is explicitly 
linked to the ^^anila Communique ^ though the specific conditions of the 
Manila offer are not repeated. Lewandowski^s fifth point j however ^ may 
have added something to the previous US stance ^ by calling for a GW 
based on '^the participation of all through free democratic elections j" 
held under "the necessary control machinery," The US seemed to be 
accepting universal suffrage (no exclusion of communists and neutralists ^ 
as later specified in the EM constitution) and supervisory machixiery not 
controlled by the non-Communist side^ though what all this could mean in 
practice would have emerged only through negotiations. (12/5/66^ 12/7/66) 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



Givea the suspicion vith which the DRV uadoubtediy views US 
intentions^ the Levandowski foimf-ilation^ especially when seasoned vith 
the "impoirfcant differences" clause j is unlikely to have struck the 
Morth Vietnamese as at all forthcoming. In spite of this^ they agreed 
to meet. While they may not have intended to offer much at Warsaw^ 
their willingness to come while the bombing continued undercut the 
seriousness we wo\ild attach from then on to their declarations of 
negotiating preconditions^ their confidence about their military 
progress^ etc, etc- OSiese factors are weighty enough to give 
importance to the question: why were they willing to meet at all? 
According to the reasoning above ^ the answer does not lie in our 
responses to Lewandowskl. If not^ we should look for factors external 

to Marigold — the rising confusion in China ^ perhaps ^ or a pessimistic 
estimate of Communist military prospects in SM^ or .... Furthermore^ 
if we did not lure them toward the conference table with the attractions 
of our offerj the possibility arises that the other pressures pushing 
them in that direction were sufficient to induce significant concessions j 
had the contact occurred. 



Declassified per Execuiive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Projeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



The Soviet Role ia ^^^igold 

In the naaterials available for this study ^ the first explicit 
discussion of Marigold between US and Soviet officials does not appear 
until veil after the ¥arsav contact had been canceled; On December 22 ^ 
the Soviet Charge in Washington^ Alexander Zinchuk^ called on \llllxam 
Eundy to express Soviet support for the Polish initiative and to dis- 
courage the US from seeking a "militaristic^* solution in Vietnam, 
Zinchufc indicated that the matter had been discussed with DEV leaders 
visiting Moscow in late November and again in early December* He 
implied that the Soviet Union had felt unable to encourage the DSV to 
continue with the contact because of the bombing of December 2 and h. 

The lateness of Zinchuk^s approach to Bundy and the content of 
his message would suggest the Soviets played at most a passive role in 
lylarigold. This would be consistent with their abandoning sponsorship 
of the prospective Conference on Cambodia In May 1965j their refusal 
to transmit the US letter to the DRV Eubassy in Moscow during Mayflower 
{¥iB,y 1965)^ and their frequent rebuffs thereafter of US efforts to 
invoke their mediation* 

On the other hand^ the Italians on several occasions early in 
Marigold indicated that they understood the Poles to be acting on 
Soviet instructions. D^Orlandi also q^uoted Lewandowski as saying that 
Hanoi was "tightly controlled" by the Chinese and hence preliminary 
talks woTold have to be between Washington and MoscoWj with overt DEV 
participation only as an acceptable basis for negotiations emerged, 
(6/29/66^ 7/9/66^ 9/1 V66) There are no further references of this 
sort J however J after mid- September. 

It is at least possible ^ then^ that the Russians were the principal 
sponsors of Marigold. If so^ they minimized their v^isibility when 
Marigold appeared to be succeeding^ emerging to express their interest to us 
only after the bombing of Hanoi and the collapse of the Warsaw contact - 
TDiis is followed chronologically by the unusually active Soviet role in 
Sunflower, Given past Soviet reluctance to mediate ^ it is noteworthy 
that the Russians would come to the fore at a time when conditions seemed 
relatively unpropitious* 

5his raises at least two q;aestlons: 

(1) As noted above (tender "Unilateral Concessions'*) the DRV may 
have had reasons external to the I&rigold exchanges for wanting direct 
talks with the US at just this tirne. Did the Russians receive encourage- 
ment from. Hanoi to try further? 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Projet:! Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 20 U 



(2) Or was it the Decerriber basbing of Hanoi that stimulatecl the 
Russians? Zinchuk expressed apprehension both to Burdy and Harry Mac- 
Hierson that Hanoi might call for Soviet volunteers under the tertns of the 
Bucharest Declaration ('^if the war escalates and if help is necessary")- 
The Russians no doubt wished to avoid such ^'escalations" whatever Hanoi's 
feelings in the natter. 

The Trinh foimula (of Januaiy 28^ 1967) iiiade these two possible 
motives compatible-, by tying US-DRY talks to the "unconditional cessation 
of US bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV," At this pointy 
the DRV attitude bad hardened in one important respect^ softened in 
another. It officially closed the door on the possibility of talks 
while the bombing continued^ but it implied publicly (and made explicit 
privately) its willingness to talk if its conditions on bombing were met. 
Hiis at last gave the Russians a license to try on Hanoi's behalf ^ even 
though worsening the chances for success because of the stiff conditions 
demanded of the US. 

I I 


Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



Leaks and Pressures 

From the beginning^ Levandowski stressed the Importance of secrecy 
to the possible success of ^larigoldj the reason given being opposition 
by canmunist hardliners^ especially the Chinese. In spite of this^ the 
Poles leaked portions of their version of the episode at strategic noments 
during the contact in a relatively obvious effort to put pressure on the 

The US responded in part^ as the Poles wished^ by cooperating with 
Lewandovski 's initiatives, T-Jhere this proved inadequate^ ve took counter 
measures which combined the defensive leaking of the US version of por- 
tions of the episode on the one hand with incentives and exhortations 
intended to induce other participants to maintain the privacy of the con- 
tact on the other. 

The first Polish approach to the US in Iferigold vas conveyed through 
the Italians: D'Orlandi contacted Lodge in Saigon; Fenoaltea contacted 
State in Washington* Meanwhile ^ Fanfani described the matter to U Thant, 
Somevhat later ^ Saragat took it up with Goldberg, It vas iRnr^ediately 
recognized in feshington that any indication of US reluctance to respond 
would quite soon be -widely interpreted as lack of interest in a peaceful 
end to the war* ¥e therefore undertook to develop the contact^ even 
though skeptical about the real promise it held forth. At the same time^ 
ve protested politely to the Italians about trying to do business in this 
manner. (6/27-30/66, ?/ 6- 10/66) 

During the rest of the summer and fall^ as Levandowski felt he vas 
making progress ^ the problem of leaks abated. Immediately following the 
December 13-14 "bombing of Hanoi and the DRV*s cancellation of the Warsaw 
ineetingj however^ pressure through leaks resigned • 

On one day alone ^ December L5> Lewandowski revealed emotional tidbits 
of the episode to the Dutch Charge in Saigon , the Polish Anbassadcr in Some 
managed to have the Pope quiz him about Vietnam^ and Hanoi cabled Harrison 
Salisbury permission to visit the DSV, A few days later, the Polish 
Ambassador gave the Pope ''the vhole story." (IP/15-I9/66) 

Ve responded first by suspending the Hanoi targets in Rolling Thunder 
52 J then by offering to halt all strikes within a 10 mile radius of the 
center of Hanoi ;ji exchange for a similar show of restraint by the VC 
around Saigon, and finally putting the 10 mile Hanoi sanctuary Into effect 
unilaterally — when the prospects of getting explicit reciprocity seemed 
too faint, Tnus in order to revive Marigold^ we offered formal assurances 
of restraint on our bombing that went well beyond those the Poles had 
urged us to accept informally after the strikes of December 2 and h. 
(12/15/66, 12/21/66, I2/2V66) The US version of Marigold was explained 
in some detail to the Pope, U Thant^ and the Canadian, Italian, Australian^ 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Nutnber: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



New Zealand and Eritisli Governments. The 10 mile sanctuary around Hanoi 
vas stressed as a potential basis for reviving the contact ^ reflecting 
US goodwill and making it essential that the widening circle of those 
privy to the matter preserve the utmost discretion about itj secrecy 
being the sine qua non for success » tfeanv/hile a m.uch less detailed 
report on the contact was given the GW and other troop contributing 
countries J to forestall possible misgivings should they hear of the 
matter first from other sources* 

I^ mid -January J then. Marigold was knovm in varying degree to a 
large circle of diplomats^ some briefed by us^ some by the Poles and most 
by both sides. On January ig^ a brief reference to l^rigold and its dis- 
ruption by the mid-December bombing of Hanoi was filed in the press from 
Ottawa. The information was attributed to "high Cans.dian officials." 
By Februarj^ h^ a much more complete version had been filed from UK Head- 
quarters in New York, kt this point j with so many possible sources for 
the story, there was no agreement among the Americans on the origin of the 
leak to the press, Goldberg thought the Poles were responsible j while 
Gronouski argued that it had been the Canadians. (2/I-2/67, 2/7-8/67) 

The wai- of leaks gradually escalated during the spring. By May^ 
the Poles were expressing concern to Gronouski over a z*umor they had 
picked up in Washington — that the US contemplated publishing a white 
paper on Iferigold. Hxis would force them^ they said^ to retaliate in kind 
Just at this time^ an e:x±reniely detailed account of the episode was pub- 
lished by John Hightower of the AP. The most controversial point in his 
story was the statement that US "officials were not sure the Poles had 
any commitment from North Vietnam to begin talks- Some ... doubted that 
Mr. Papacki was in fact ,,* making kno^ni Washington's readiness for talks 
to Hanoi/' Washington felt the Hightower account was ^'essentially 
accurate and reasonably favorable-'" The Poles were told the US would 
publish no white paper. They replied that "US officials had apparently 
chosen another way to put out the story." However, no official Polish 
rebuttal vas made public and the war of leaks simmered down on this 
acrimonious note. (5/3-9 /67) 

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the war of leaks is the 
silence of the DEV, Although Hanoi did mount a propaganda campaign 
against US bombing of the DEV immediately after the collapse of the 
Marigold contact — e.g.^ through the Harrison Salisbury visit^ etc,-- no 
mention was ever made of the prospective Warsaw contact and its cancel- 
lation after the mid -December bombing. Properly handled^ this could have 
been made a telling point with world opinion. Presumably^ secrecy about 
the contact was of greater value to the DHV. It is quite possible^ there- 
forOj that the Polish leaks were not appreciated in Hanoi and the Polish 
handling of the matter was criticized there ^ as in Washington, (Alterna- 
tively^ however J it may be that the Polish leaks satisfied the URV^s 
propaganda req^uirements ^ within the constraints imposed by DRV relations 

with Chinaj the maintenance of rank-and-file morale among Vietnamese 
communist forces ^ etc. In that case, Hanoi '2 silence would not in itself 
imply an adverse jud^ent on the Polish role.) 



DccJassilled per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NISTD Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 201 1 


Bombing the North I; Blue Chip or Topic for Talkst 

The US proposed repeatedly duriia^ J-larigold that de-escalation be 
taken as the first topic between the two sides » What would the Conmu- 
nlsts do if the US stopped bombing? 

Lewandowski with eaual persistence refused to accept this question 
as a point of departure. The DRV woiild reject it^ he sald^ because 
de-escalation would be viewed as strengthening the governmental status 
quo in SWj whereas it was precisely a change in the SVR government 
that the Communist side required. Instead^ therefore ^ he urged that 
this subject be left for last- Once both sides agreed on tertas for the 
ultimate situation in SVU^ finding the route there via de-escalation 
would be easy. 

Although Lewandowski never j of course^ made the argument himself j 

his approach meant Communist acceptance of the bombing as a blue chip 

in the bargaining process because the talks on settlement terms would 

have to take place while the bombing continued. One inducement the 

Cormunists would have to accept terms desired by the US would be that 

this would end the bombing. ToOj his approach saved more face for the 

Communist side than ours^ which required that the bombing be addressed 

When^ finally J the US went along with Lewandowski^s approach ^ it 
upped the ante by the December bombings of Hanoi. The DRV cancellation 
of the contact meant, then^ that It would neither accept de-escalation 
as a starting point for talks nor accept augmentation of the US blue 
chip through strikes on more sensitive targets. 

The cancellation of the talks over this issue measures the failure 
of Lewandowski's brokerage- He had not narrowed the gulf between the 
two sides sufficiently. His version of possible settlement terms was 
not attractive enough to make the US forego upping the ante^ on the one 
hand J or to induce the DRV to accept the higher ante^ on the other. 



DeclassiHed per Executive Order 13520, Sectiun 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Datei 201 1 



Bombing the North II: Signals, Intended and Inadvertant 

As is shown in a separate study ^ beginning in June 1966^ there vas 
a marked increase in the amount of ordnance e:,3>ended against north Viet- 
nam^ Itiis was time for the country as a whole ^ for Eoute Package VI 
and for the areas within 10 miles of the center of Hanoi and 5 miles of 
the center of Haiphong, The general level of ordnance expenditure 
remained high until mid-JTovember. During the last two weeks of November ^ 
probably on account of weatherj air strikes against the M'orth were at 
their lowest level since June^ rising markedly again during the first 
and second weeks of December. 

The most sensitive area of all, that within 5 miles of the center 
of Hanoi^ was str^ack (with about 25 tons of ordnance) for the first time 
in the war during the last week of June^ as part of a general attack on 
^GL facilities , About 3 tons more were expended in this area in mid- 
Au^gust. It was not hit again until the first week in December (the 2nd 
and ii'th) when almost 50 tons were ejcpended, then hit yet again during 
the second week in December (the 13th and iHh) -with over 100 tons. The 
intended targets in all of the December attacks were the Yen Vien Rail- 
road Yard and the Van Dien Vehicle Depot , but apparently there was 
collateral damage in all cases. In particular, during the December 13-1^1- 
attacks, the Chinese and Rumanian Etnbassies seem to have been hit, along 
with some residential structures in central Hanoi. From the ground, then, 
there might appear to have been an increase in the intensity of attack, 
measured both in tons of ordnance expended and type of target j commencing 
December 2, i.e.^ immediately following Hanoi's assent to some form of 
US-DEV meeting in Warsaw. 

^e Poles expressed alarm about the '^intensification of the bcanbing" 
on December 2, 7, 8^ and 9^ arguing that ''such attacks could only threaten 
or destroy the possibility of contact in Warsaw," They expressed these 
views as their own, not as a message transmitted from Hanoi. However, 
I^wandowski told D 'Orlandi (who in turn told US on December 9) that he 
believed Hanoi had attached significance to the fact J:hat during the two 
weeks he had been in Hanoi ( approximately Novanber I6-3O) the bombing 
had appeared to be at a reduced level. Lewandowski thought Hanoi had 
interpreted this as a tacit signal of US support for his mission - 

In fact, the targets near Hanoi which were the object of attack in 
December had been authorized as part of Rolling Thunder 52, for which the 
execute message was sent on November 10, This was prior to Lewandowski 's 
departure for Hanoi, though the approximate timing of his impending visit 
("after the US elections") was known in Washington when the execute 
message was sent. (IO/15-I6/66) Presumably^ had weather not intervened, 
the strikes near Hanoi might well have occurred during his visit, rather 
than after his return with Hanoi ^s "positive response.'' Hanoi's review 
of Lewandowski 's proposals would have occurred in quite a different con- 
text, one reflecting more accurately, perhaps ^ US attitudes. 


Duclassiried per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Project Number NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



On December 10^ Washington inTormed both the ¥arsaw and Saigon 
Enabassies that it had been decided to leave the bombing pattern 
unchanged. Gronouski vas forewarned that this might involve some 
targets Rapacki would Insist reflected further escalation. 

Apparently J the strikes of December 13-14 vers so inteorpreted 
in Hanoi ^ which instructed the Poles on December ik to terminate all 
conversations . 

On December 2^^ the US informed the Communists that bombing within 
10 miles of the center of Hanoi had been suspended as an act of goodwill 
in the hopes of reviving the ¥arsaw contact. Ihis vas a more substantial 
concession on the bombing than the Poles had urged after the December 2 
and k strikes^ in that it reflected an explicit^ well-defined commitment j 
rather than the tacit^ unformalized restraint suggested by the Poles. 
The DRV may have concluded that propaganda repercussions ^ actual and 
prospective J had forced a change in the US posture ^ causing Hanoi in 
turn to stiffen the conditions it imposed in exchange for talks . The 
Trinh formula of January £8^ 1967^ demanding an end to all bombing of 
the DRVj may reflect this calculation. 

IT ■ TOP SECPJilT - rroDis 


Docliissifit'd per Executive Order 13526. Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 2011 


US Good Faith 

Prior to the Decemher 2 bombing of Hanoij no conditions vith 
respect to US military actions had been demanded by the Communists as 
a price for the Warsaw meeting. The only terms ^ as expressed by 
Levandowski to Lodge on I^ovember 30^ vere: "I am authorized to say 
that if the US are really of the vievs vhich I have presented (i-e.^ 
his 10 points)^ it would be advisable to confirm them directly by con- 
versation vith the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Warsaw/^ In 
addition to this^ he urged only speed and secrecy. 

The US had several times previously suggested that mutual de- 
escalation be undertaken by the two sides. In a major policy state- 
ment ^ Goldberg offered "a cessation of all bombing of North Vietnam— 
the moment ve are assured^ privately or other^/Zisej that this step 
vill be answered promptly by a corresponding and appropriate de- 
escalation on the other side/' (9/22/66) But de-escalation was 
rejected ^u^ lewandowski as the wrong subject with which to start. 
Thus the US had no cominitment to avoid bombing Hanoi stemming from 
the agreement to meet in KarsaWj and in fact^ as noted above, strikes 
against Hanoi had been authorised since mid-November but had not 
occurred J presumably for reasons of weather. 

The Poles argued that there was a difference between de-escalation 
and non- escalation, ¥3 should have been willing to trade the latter 
for talks J even if not the former, Secondlyj they stretched the meaning 
of our official position, Eapacki claiiaed, "yo^ have said over and over 
again that you would end all bombing if there was an assurance from Hanoi 
that there would be a response toward peace from Hanoij however ^ we did 
not ask that you stop bombing but only that you not intensify it." And 
"recalling speeches of Goldberg ^ the President ^ Secretaiy Rusk and others ^ 
once we received the signal we dld^ we would have had every right to call 
for a stop in the bombing," (I2/19/66) Without eiKiorsing this particu- 
lar formulation^ E'Orlandi indicated his general agreement with the Polish 
Interpretation, (I2/18/66) Gronouski feared it would be widely shared 
and that the Communists "will have no trouble convincing the leadership 
in every capital of the world that our stated desire for peace negotiations 
is insincere." (I2/1 4/66) In their minds^ the issue t'orned less on the 
precise language of previous US expressions than on a general tenor which 
they felt was undercut by the December bombings. Washington apparently 
soon came to share this view^ and the 10 mile bombing sanctuary around 
Hanoi's center was established to underline the seriousness of US intentions. 


Declassified perExecuiive Order 13526, Section 33 
NNDPmjea Number: NND 63316. By: NWDDaie: 201 1 





Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 


The £ollo^i±n.g chronology consists of brief 
summaries and interpretative statements about 
each date J follovred by indented documentation. 

. *^ 

Declassified perExecuiive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Pmjecn Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dme: 201 1 


Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



June 27, 1966 
* — ' — ^ — '- — If ■ ■ — ■ 

Jfe.rigold begins with a contact between D'Orlandi^ the Italian 
Ambassaclor in Saigon ^ and Levandovskij the Polish Representative on the 
ICG J also working out of Saigoa. Lewandowski^ just returned from Hanoi ^ 
reported that he had a ^Very specific peace offer^^ to transmit^ one 
that vouJ.d lead to a "political compromise" settling the whole Vietnam 
question once and for all. The attractive features were (a) Hanoi 
would not ask for immediate reunification^ (b) it would not demand a 
socialist system in SVlTj (c) SM would not have to change its relation- 
ships in the field of foreign affairs^ (d) ^'neutralization" would not 
"be demanded _j (e) U.S. withdrawal could be sdieduled along a "reasonable 
calendar J " (f) Hanoi did not seek to interfere with the SVTI government. 

Hanoi's conditions for entering negotiations were that (a) the 
HLF "take part'' and (b) there be a "suspension" of the bombing* 

D'Orlandi communicated all this to Lodge In Saigon^ two days later 
(June 29); on instructions from Fanfanij who was also transmitting it 
directly to Washington. 

Saigon 58^0 (to SecState)^ TS/l^odis^ 29 June I966 
(Section 1 of 2} 

Literally Eyes Only for the President^ The Secretary^ 
and the Acting Secretary 

"1. This afternoon D^Orlandi^ Italian Ambassador, 
telephoned to say it was xirgent that I come to his office 
as soon as the Catholic service honoring the anniversary 
of the coronation of Pope Paul VI had ended. I went to 
his office at about 6;45j ^^d he began as follows: - 


"2. Two days agOj the Polish representative on the 
J Levandowskij came to him with a ^very specific 

peace offe 


"3« D*Orlandi said he had requested instructions 
from Fanfanij who told him (1) to submit the whole pro- 
posal to me^ and (2) said that he^ Fanfanij would send 
the whole thing to Washington for their consideration," 

"9« ^e Pole began "oy saying that Hanoi has been 
deeply disappointed lij the proposals made by Ronning 
which J they are surCj had emanated originally from the 
United States and not from the Canadians. Ronning had 


Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NNTD 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



proposed that the U.S. stop the "boml^ing if Forth Viet-KTam 
stopped the Irifiltratlonj and had talked alDout the exchange 
of prisoners- parcels and letters- T^is had bitterly dis- 
appointed North Vietnam, ©le first pointy they had said^ 
vonld be unconditional surrender j and they could not 
accept it J but they are open to a 'political compromise' 
settling once and for all the entire Yiet-TTaiu q_uestion- 

'^10. When D'Orlandi said that he was skeptical^ the Pole 
said that Hanoi 'was prepared to go 'guite a long way.' 'It 
is useless for me to add^' said the Pole^ 'that should there 
not be any kind of a preliminary agreement ^ Hanoi will deny 
flatly ever having made any offer,* According to the Pole, 
the Forth Vietnaiaese are 'tightly controlled' by the Chinese 
Communists. Hie preliminary talks, therefore , should be 
between Moscow and Washington. Waen and if proposals should 
emerge which could be considered as a basis for negotiations , 
Hanoi woiild at that time and under those circmtstances get 
into it. Eie Pole said that Hanoi was afraid of the Chinese 
Concmunists who have an interest in dragging on the war for 
many years. D'Orlandi added that the Pole was evidently 
'proud of himself for having brought these proposals about, 

"U- The proposals are as follows: 

A. They insist that the so-called National Libera- 
tion Front 'take part' in the negotiations. The key word is 
'take part.' According to D'Orlandi, there is 'no question of 
their being the representative; they are not to have bxpj monopoly,' 

B. There must be suspension of the bombing. 

"12- These are the two proposals. 

"13, Then there are other points^ which D'Orlandi called 

'negative ones,' which are that (a) Hanoi will not ask for 

Immediate reunification, either \i'^ elections or otheiTwise, of 

North and South Vietnam'' 


(Section £ of 2) 

"(b) They will not ask for establishment of a 'socialist' 
system in South Viet-ITam; (c) They will not ask South Viet-Nam 
to change the relationships which it has in the field of 
foreign affairs; and (d) They will not ask for neutralization. 



Dedassificd per Executive Order ^526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 633 i 6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


(e) Although they will ask for U,S. vithdravalj they 
are ready to discuss a ^reasonable calendar,^ (f) 
Although 'we would like scmeone othur than Ky' - to 
quote the words of Hanoi - they do not want to 
interfere with the South VietnsJaiese Government." 

*^18. The Pole said that his Government would be 
villlng to arrange for D'Orlandi to meet with appro- 
priate Polish spokesmen any^^rhere -- Hong Kong or 
Singapore, In response to a question by D'Orlandi as 
to why they had come to himj the Pole said they wanted 
'an able debater to put the case to President Johnson ^ 
and we feel that the Italian Government has the sym- 
pathy of the United States Government,' Moreover ^ the 
Italians have the same interest we have in agreement 
bet^/een Washington and Moscowj and in shutting out 
Peking . 

"19. D'Orlandi's impression is that the Poles 
are desperately seeking a way out on Moscow's instruc- 
tions* BiiSj he said J may need further exploration. 
He had the definite impression that noi^ Hanoi 'was 
amenable to common sense' saying 'they do not want 
anything that would not stop the whole war, They want 
a political settlementj and are prepared tc go a long 
vay, *" 


June 29, 1966 

On the same day that D'Orlandi saw Lodge in Saigon^ the Italian 
Ambassador Fenoaltea brought the information to the State Department 
in Washington, State saw little new in it, with two exceptions. The 
Italians were therefore asked to inquire discreetly if there was real 
movement on the following points : 

(1) Did the condition that the TTLF '^talce part" in negotiations 
mean it need no longer be accepted as the ^'oole representative" of 
the SW people? 

(2) Did the woi-d ^^suspension" mean that a bombing "cessation" 
was no longer a prerequisite to negotiations? 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


State i;108 (to .Amemljassy Saia*on)j TS/NodiSj 29 June 1966 
Literally Eyes Only for Ambassador 
Embtel 58UO 

"Italian Ambassador Fenoaltea came In today with 
Faxochej Italian Ambassador-designate to Canada j who 
had hand -^carried message similar to that contained 
reftel and who said he was under instructions to hand- 
carry our reply back to Rome 


• * • 

'^Je told Fenoaltea that^ except for use of term 
'participate' with respect to DILFj vhich couJ-d have 
ioiplication Hanoi was not insisting NLF be "sole 
representative^ of SVHj and 'suspension of bombing' in 
place of ^cessation of bombing^' position Hanoi indicated 
to Pole was very similar to previous indications their 
position. Thus in light of various translations these 
woi^s have gone through ^ it is not clear whether their 
use has any significance* Therefore ^ without indicating 
to Pole that message had been passed to USG^ suggested 
Italian Government on its own responsibility j guery 
Polish Eep on these two terms to determine whether form- 
ulations contained in Polish version of Hanoi ^s position 
were used advisedly by Hanoi and indicate some shift in 
position or were accidents of translation.,,," 


June 3Qj I966 

xhisk expressed skepticism about the value of the DEV proposal^ 
even if there were some movement on the points enumerated^ because 
allowing the KLF to "take part" might lead it eventually to a major -- 
even ''fatal" — role in SW politics^ however the negotiations caLne 
outj and because a bombing "suspension" would produce pressures for 
a "cessation." Given the risks of recrimination from ?anfani and 
Eapackij though^ he felt it necessary to follow up. He also predicted ^ 
correctly J that the POL strikes then prograrnmed for Rolling Thunder 
might stiffen the DRV position momentarilyj arguing against trying 
to move too fast. 

Lodge J on the other hand^ thought the package so forthcoming as 
to arouse suspicions about the intermecliary. Presumably ^ he was 
less familiar than State with the content of previous Hanoi communica- 
tions of the sort. Much of the proposal^ as conveyed^ ^7as old^ but 
two points to which hc; drew attention were new: the apparent acceptance 
of the existing Saigon government and of its foreign relationships. 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3J 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 


Canberra 58 (to SecState)^ S/jrodis^ 30 June I966 
Syes Only for Acting Secretary ar^i Ambassador 
from Secretary 

* m 

"2. I cannot from here make any full assessment of 
that message. The NLF part seems vague^ encouraging 
only in that it abandons the *sole representative* 
position- Hovever^ this position has always seemed a 
maximum opener^ and we must keep in mind alvays that 
even 'taking part* on a full basis vould go very far 
to give the NLF a majors and likely fatal j part in SVN 
politics. On the bombing^ a 'suspension' could easily 
lead to heai'y pressure for a 'cessation'. For the rest^ 
the disclaimers of any ioimediate 'Socialist' set-up in SVN 
or of Immediate reunification plans have a familiar ring 
from some past noises by DEV Eeps trying to make them- 
selves sound reasonable^" 

* • 

"^, All this being saidj I suppose that if Fanfani 
asks us to let D'Orlandi follovr up^ we would virtually 
have to agree*... With careful instructions and 
reasonable precautions ^ we should be able to minimize 
risks. In any case refusal to follow up — even if 
message wholly phony ^~ would expose us to recrimination 
from Fanfani and Eapacki alike*.,," 

"5* Moreover J there might o^st be something in It. 
Poles and Italians may seem devious channels ^ but not all 
that implausible if Hanoi is having any second thoughts. 
If so J POL strike might stiffen them momentarily ^ to avoid 
any appearance of weakness or effect of strike ^ and this 
argues for not moving too fast." 

. . 


Saigon 5855 (to SecState)^ TS/i^Todis^ 30 June I966 Eyes Only for the President ^ the Secretary 

and the Acting Secretary 

, * * 

"3* I^e proposals attributed to Hanoi j as a package j 

;o far beypnd anything we, have heard mentioned Joe fore. 
.n fact J they appear So forxhcoming as xo arouse 



Dccbssified perExecuiive Order 13526, Section 33 
NNDPmjea Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



suspicion concerning the credibility of the Polish 
intemedip.ry. It seems to us that not only is the 
so- called KLF being abandoned as the sole bargaining 
agent J but so also is the NLF progi-am of a 'socialist' 
state J of unifying the Uorth and South j and of 
* neutralization. ' Also the phrase 'reasonable calendar* 
Indicates a definite softening of position regarding 
IGMS. Ttroops, IHae same is true of acceptance of the 
Government of South Viet-ITgm and its foreign relation- 

* • 


July 6 & 7 , 1966 

Fanfani also described the contact to U Hiantj who in turn passed 
it on to Goldberg at UTT headquarters » This increased fears of a leak 
from Fanfani on the US side. In fact^ the disclosure to U Thant vas 
considered such a leak and doubtless put pressure on the USG to pro- 
tect itself by piorsuing the contact j on the one handj and by taking 
defensive positions on the other* 

Geneva 6I (to State)^ TS/ETodis^ 6 July I966 
For Acting Secretary from Ambassador Goldberg 

"5- Syg informed me that on recent visit to Italy 

Fanfani reported to him that POL ICC Ambassador had had 
conversation with Ho Clii Minh on June 27 in which Eo 
presumably said that they would be prepared to engage 
in serious discussions with us^ no'tv^ithstanding Chinese 
and Soviet objections j it bombings were suspended and 
If Vlet^Cong participated in talks. According to Thant^ 
this inforcaation relayed by POL ICC Ambassador to 
Italian Ambassador in Saigon who in turn communicated 
it to Fanfani. Ihant further reported that Fanfani 
believed message contained two new elements: (A) 
that Ho was not insisting on unconditional cessation of 
bombing, merely a suspension; and (:3) Ho not insistent 
that Viet- Cong be sole representatives of South Vietna- 
mese people at such negotiations. Fanfani had also told 
the Secretary General that he thought this message of 
such importance that it warranted sending a special 
Italian emissaiy to Washington to communicate the sub- 
stance of it to United States officials. Syg said 

Fanfani did this and that special emissary was asked in 
Washington to remain there pending a probe through 


Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NNTD 63316. By: NWD Dale: 201 1 


Fanfani of the vord^ suspension^ and also to inquire vhat 
Ho meant b^ saying Viet- Cong would have to participate in 
the talks. Fanfani swcx*e U Thant to secrecy and the 
Secretary General therefore imparted this information to 
me in the strictist confidence saying he had not coimnuni- 
cated to anyone in Secretariat, He asked in particular 
that I not raise this ^ith Fanfani^ but if latter mentioned 
I it to me J I should disclaim knowledge of it from Syg^ 

except as I might receive knowledge of it from Washington." 



State 2673 (to J\men"bassy Tol<yo)j TS/lTodis^ 7 July I966 

For the Secretary from the Acting Secretary 1 

"As you vill have already seen from TOSEC 188^ Fanfani 
has already begun to leak, having told U Thant of Polish 
message and in turn U Thant having passed it on to Goldberg 

• • 



"I privately spoke to Fenoaltea today and^ without 
mentioning Goldberg j said that ve had indirectly heard that 
Fanfani had mentioned matter to U Tbant . Fenoaltea said 
he would drop a private note to Fanfani. Fenoaltea 
expressed full understanding of problem of attempting to 
do business in this manner and much skepticism as to whether 
there was any real substance in approach* He said though 
that J as we kneWj Fanfani felt impelled to 'do something** 


* * 

state 2619 (to US Mssion G^neva)^ TS/l^odis, 7 July I966 
Literally Eyes Only for Ambassador Goldberg from 
Acting Secretary 

"Re paras 5 and 6 of Geneva's 6I strictly FTIj we have 
received report from Italians along lines indicated by 
Fanfani to XJ Iliant,.,ve are folJ^owing up in very discreet 
manner to test its authenticity " 

July 7^9, 1966 

Lodge was instinicted to develop the contact further ^ by meeting with 
D'Orlan^i and Lewandovrski himself in Saigon^ but to tell Ky something of 


— *^W¥— i~-^"^^ 


Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NTsTD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



a general na.ture in case niEnors "began to circulate p Lodge's inquiries 
were to address procedures ^ but one matter of substance was raised^ as 
it woiild be again and again from the US side: ^That would Hanoi do to 
reciprocate the suspension of bombing? He carried cut these instruc- 
tions two days later (July 9). 

State 2626 (to Amembassy Saigon) ^ OS/jTodiSj 7 July I966 

"...we suggest that .Ambassador D'Orlandi seek 
discreetly to arrange a meeting between himself j Lewan- 
dowski and iimbassador Lodge in Saigon* 

" — • At such a meeting you should^ referring to 
USG*s understandings of Levandowski-s statem^ents to 
B'Orlandlj and making clear that you are acting under 
instruct ions J state as follows: 

"1. State that the United States shares the 
desire for an over-all political settlement. 

"2. Inquire when^ where and with what parties 
Hanoi contemplates that negotiations would take place. 

"*3' Inquire what if any action Hanoi on its 
part would propose to take or not tal^e during the period 
of suspension of bombing* 

"k* inquire whether Hanoi believes it realistic 
to keep negotiations secret if the United States suspends 
bombing with the inevitable speciJilation this vould entail* 

".... ¥e are inclined to feel it wouJ.d be desirable 
for you to say something of a general nature to Ky without 
disclosing specifics ^' 


Saigon 60k (to SecState)^ TS/lTcdiSj 9 July I966 

"1, Lewandowskij D'Orlandi and I met at D'Orlandi's 
office at 1^:30 July 9. 

^*2. After mj^ saying it was a personal pleasure for 
me to see him again , I began^ pursuant to your 2626 _, by 
referring to our understanding of Lewandovski's indication 
that Hanoi was open to a 'political settlement ' which 
would settle the Viet-I^Tam Question once and for all* 




i 3Z 

DecIa^ssHled per Execuiive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Projcci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 201 1 


"3* I added that ve understood that Lewandowski 
had said to D'Orlandi that Hanoi in effect made tvo 
proposals : 

(a) nihe ITational Liberation Front would 
'take pa-rt' in the negotiations. 

(b) Biere must be a suspension of the 
bombing in 3^Torth Vietnam- 

"ii-. Our understanding of Amb. Lewandovski * s 
approach to Amb. D'Orlandl vaSj I said^ that if pro- 
posals emerged as a basis for negotiations ^ then Hanoi 
-would be prepared to enter into negotiations. 

"5» I then said that acting under instructions of 
the United States Government ^ I was authorized to state 
the follovin,^: 

"6- And I stated the four points in your 2626^^^ 

• t * 


July 9, 1966 

Saragat gives Goldberg an account of the D'Orlandi-Lewandowski 
contacts in Saigon similar to that already passed by D'Crlandi to 
Lodge and by Fanfani to U Thant and Washington. 

He adds two points to the previous versions : 

1. Lewandowski^s intention is that the negotiations take place 
substantially between Moscow and Washington. If secrecy is preserved ^ 
this will permit Peking to be ignored. 

ii* Sie US air strikes against oil depots near Ifenoi and Haiphong 
on June 25 have not^ in Lewandowski's viev^ prejudged the effort to 
arrange contact . 

Rome 1^5 (to SecState)^ TS/lTodis^ 9 July I966 
From Goldberg and Sisco 

*'Amb Goldberg saw Saragat privately Friday night 
July 8 " 

* • • 


Declassifled per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 \ 


*^Following in fiill is text of document which Saragat 
gave to Mb, Goldberg*... Begin text: On June 27 the 
Italian Ambassador in Saigon D'Orlandi reported that the 
Polish representative to the ICC Amhassador Savira just 
"back froBi Hanoi had told him that the riorth Vietnam 
Govermnent Yere prepared to enter secret pourparlers in 
order to reach a political compromise with the United 
States at two preliritinary conditions: i-e,^ suspension 
of bombing over North Yietnam and Viet Cong participation 
in the negotiations. As to the nature of such compromise j 
the Hanoi Government were willing: (l) not to ask for 
the immediate reunification of North and South Vietnam; 
(2) to relinquish their claim to imposition of U,S, 
socialist system in South Vietnam; (3) not to ask for 
changes in the existing relations between South Vietnam 
and the western countries; (^) to discuss the timing of 
the withdrawal of xAmerican troops from South Vjetna^m 
while maintaining their request for such withdrawal. 

"Moreover J the Polish representative made it clear 
that in his own opinion negotiations were to take place 
substantially between Moscow and Washington, If absolute 
secrecy were maintained about the preliminary contacts ^ 
Hanoi J he thought^ could have ignored Peking* 

^^On Jijne 28 it was reported that oil depots in Hanoi 
and Haiphong had been bombed, The Polish Ajiibassador 
expressed seme reservations as to the conset^uences of 
such initiative but later reported that the attempt to 
open negctiatioriS was not in his o\ni eyes pre- judged. 

"In connection with Ambassador D^Orlandi^s reports j 
the Italian PriMin and the Italian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs J who were then in Bonn^ decided to send Signor 
Farace^ Deputy Dir Gen for Political Affairs ^ to Washing- 
ton so that he may sound ^ together with Ambassador 
Fenoalteaj the reactions of the American Govt..,, Farace 
and Fenoaltea on July 1 met in Washington Acting Secy of 
State Ball (Rusk was then in Australia) and Ball's Deputy 
Alexis Johnson, The t^ro Amc^rican officia.Is- . .suggested 
that D^Orlandi should request clarification from the Polish 
Rep on two points: (l) He should find out whether the 
words 'participation of the Front of Liberation to the 
negotiations' were meant to exclude the Go'.^ of Saigon; 
(2) He should also find out whether the word * suspension' 
as applied to bombing was deliberately meant as something 
different from 'cessation,' On Jijily 2j 3, and k Ambassador 
D^Orlandi made clear that JTorth Vietnam s Imply asked for 
suspension of the bombing as a preliminary condition for 
the beginning of negotiations aimed at reaching a political 


Declassifled per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



comproniLlse on the above-msntioned lines » Viet Cong 
participation^ furtheimore^ obviously did. not rule out 
the paartlcipation of the South Vietnam Govt. It vas 
only suggested that once the negotiations had begun 
General Ky may be replaced vith a less extremist 
political personality. On July 5 Fenoaltea aiad Farace 
in the course of a new meeting vith Ball and Alexis 
Johnson passed on to these tvo American officials the 
inToriiiation received from D^Orlandi. The Americans,*, 
reserved their position because President Johnson vas 
avay in Texas and Ltr, Rusk vas still abroad. According 
to Ambassador Fenoaltea^ further American communications 
vould not he forthcoming for tvo or three days . 

"On July 7 Ambassador Fenoaltea reported that he had 
again met together vith Farace the tvo American officials 
They had expressed their opinion that Ambassador 
D'Orlandi and Ambassador Cabot Lodge should get in touch 
jointly and unofficially vith the Polish Ambassador to 
explore the possibilities of the Jlorth Vietnamese offer ^" 

July 10, 1966 

T'Jhen Lodge inentioned the matter to Ky^ he expressed doubt that it 
vould tixrn out to have any real substance j but said it vould be folloved 
up. Ky apparently vent along graciously^ suggesting that it might be a 

good time for a US leaflet campaign in the 

DRV. stressing our desire for 

Saigon 6h2 (to SecState)^ S/Nodls^ 10 July I966 

"1, Pursxiant your 2626^ I csLlled on Ky ostensibly 
to discuss General Tiai and acquisition of suitable 
premises for the US consul in Danang. But as I vas 
leaving J I remarked that 'by the vay' ve had been get- 
ting some rumors out of Hanoi indicating a desire to 
find a way out. None of these seemed to have any real 
substance^ but we vould follow all of them up and^ if 
ariything important occurred ^ we vould of course tell 
him at once," 

* • 4 

*'3p He made the folloving suggestion which I thought 






j Si 

Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NNTD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


"^. The time has come for the -Americans to put on 
another 'gooti vill leaflet^ cainpaign. The message on 
the leaflets should bg that ve (Yietnamese and Americans) 
want negotiations j it is your rulers ¥ho don't," 

■ ■ * 


July 2^, 1966 

When Levandowski replied to Lodge j under instructions from Warsav^ 
he could say only that there could "be no results without a bombing 
cess at ion J that the DEV's k points nust be recognized ^ etc. This 
seemed a step bacfarard to all participants. The matter vas left for 
some veel^. 

Saigon 1785 (to SecState)^ S/Hodis^ 2^ July I966 

"1, D'Orlandij Lewandovski and I met at D'Orlandi's 
office at ^:30. The meeting lasted for t-^renty minutes. 
Lewandowski talked as follows: 

"2. 'I have the following instructions from Warsaw 
which 1 have been asked to transmit to Ambassador Lodge: 

A» 'It is difficult to discuss any proposition 
dui'ing the current important escalation of war activities 
in the South ^ and of the bombing in the E"orth. 

B, 'To hold such discussions could be looked 
upon as a maneuver to force the DUV to negotiate under 
American conditior^* 

C. ^-Je know very well that the DRV will not 
give up the fight while the United States pursues its 
present policy of military pressui^e. 

D, 'We have reasons to state that no proposi- 
tion without the cessation of the bombing of the DRV will 
produce results* 

E. 'United States Government has no ri^t to 
bomb the DEY and no right to propose conditions for its 

F» *If the United States desires a peaceful 

solution, it must recognise the four points proposed by 
the DSV and prove it in practice • 




Declassifled per Executive OrcJcr 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 


G, 'The United States must stop bombing and 
other militazy activit^r against north Viet-Nam, Only 
then can a political solution be expected.'" 

• « 

"l6* D^Orlandi then spoke as follows: 

"17. '^is is definitely a step backward. I had 
thought that the first meeting was rather encouraging. 
Both the opening and the American questions were 
encouraging. I felt something might come out and^ as 
a matter of fact^ I still feel this as a hunch. 
Accordingly J I hope the stiffness of your reply today 
is due to prevailing circumstances^ and that this 
channel may be kept open and resumed as soon as 
possible. ¥e vere expecting a reply* Now we have a 
statement* I understood what led to this statement. 
It is the circumstances of the moment.' 

"18* I asked to vhat circumstances he vas 
referring. He said to all of the rumors in the news- 
papers of peace talk." 


» « « 


September t-8 , I966 

•^^^^ ~ ' — *• 1 1 I 

After a period of inactivity and a discouraging visit to Hanoi by 
Lewandowskij D'Orlandi and Lewandowski att^anpted to revive the contact. 
Ihey saw two main problems: that their exercise not be viewed as 
probing for Hanoi ^s minimum position; and that it not be directed at 
reinforcing the status quo or facilitating deescalating^ but rather at 
finding an overall settlement that would penait the war to end. 

Saigon 5229 (to SecState)^ S/l^^odis, h September I966 

"1. D'Orlandi said that Lewandowski had returned 
from 16 days in Hanoi profoundly discouraged. His two 
closest contacts Fna:m Van Dong and General Giap were 
both away. His talk with Ho Chi Minh produced nothing 
of interest. There vas absolutely no sign of a desire 
to stop the war." 

'« . 





Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND ProjeiJi Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 20 U 


"4. D'Orlandi said he would "be willing to work 
with Lewandawski to tiy to develop a compromise 
f ormula^ which could then he submitted to Moscow or 

"5- Comment: V?hat are Department's views of 
this suggestion? It could "be that some ideas and 
clarification mi^t come out of itj and that it would 
not J of course J commit us to anything. I doubt 
whether the Pole will be authorized. End Comment," 


State ^1695 (to AmEHbassy Saigon) ^ 6 September I966 

"... we see no objection to D'Orlandi's pursuing 
this with Pole if latter is so author!:: ed. . ." 

Saigon 5517 (to SecState)^ S/lJodis^ 8 Septes^ber I966 

"1. D*Orlandi told me that in his recent talk 
with Lewandowskij the problem referred to in my 
last telegram regarding Lewandcwski and D'Orlandi 
working up a proposal to submit to Washington and 
Moscow was discussed. Lewandowski made three points: 

"A. He did not "waut the only outcome of 
the procedure between D^Crlandi and himself to be to 
inform the United States as to ^ just how far the 
North Vietnamese would give in.' 

^'3. Although Lewandowski recognizes that I 
had already given him ample assurances, he feels that 
emphasis must be given to the need of the U*S« 
approaching the problem so as to concern South Viet-Nam 
alone and not South Viet-IIam as a 'piece of a general 
Chinese puzzle.' Lewandcwski feels that the problem 
could be 'simple enough' if limited to South Viet-Nam — 
but not if the United States is thinking of using con- 
versations with Lewandowski (and Lewandowski^s talks in 
Hanoi) as a way of getting at China or Chinese cuestions " 



Declassined per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 


"C. Levandowski said that it vas only fair 
to state that the 'aim of the exercise' hetween him and 
D'Orlandi should not be to reinforce the status guo^ 
but to get a ^global' settlement. ^^Jhen he says ' global 'j 
he obviously does not mean vorld-vide; he means 'over 
all' as regards South Viet-Nam. ThiSj said D'Orlandi^ 
quoting tewandowski^ means 'guarantees^ etc*'; therefore 
*iiot just de-escalation. ^^^ 

* * 

"5. Lewando^.rski said he was sure that something 
could be done, Hanoij he sald^ looks at the situation 
through the distorted spectacles of the Viet Cong 
through vhom they get all their information about the 
situation. ^My Job^* said Levandowski_, 'is to e^lain 
to Hanoi that they have a vrong vie'w.' !I?he last time 
he had been in lianoi neither PhamVan Dong nor General 
Giap vere there ^ and 'they are the only two in the 
whole place who talk sense and understand the real 
situation in the south*'" 

• * • • 


September 12^ - 9_^_ 

State agreed that the contact be pursued j reserved its position 
on ^^changes in the status quo/^ and offered to look for a gesture of 
good intent to encourage Hanoi (and D'Orlandi}^ such as a proposal of 

mutually- timed withdrawal^ or trading a bombing cessation plus a halt 
in the US troop buildup for an end to infiltration. 

State ^^917 (to Amembassy Sai^n)^ S/Nodis^ 12 September 

Bef: Saigon 55IT 

"2, Lewandowski-s remark that the aim of the 
exercise should not be to ^reinforce the status guo' 
is all right if he is talking about the present 
status quo in South Viet-iram. But we cannot "buy a 
discarding of the status quo ante^ i.e. the 195^' 
and 1962 Agreements. * .we do not rule out considera- 
tion of revisions of the 'Drovisions, of the Geneva 
AgreeHonxs iDut \re coula a'ceepc- no changes uncj-l we 


Dedassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By; NWD Date: 20 U 



had a clear picture of what vas the total context 
of an underst.anaing vith the Coinniuiiists 


* ■ B • 

• • « * 



Pi f~* 

5- -HP. ve vill consider here whether there 
is something that could be given to D^Orlandi for 
his 'possible agreement foroiula' vhich could 
demonstrate our earnest desire move forward and 
smoke out Hanoi ^s intentions, This might lie^ 
for example J in realm of mutually- timed with- 
drawal formula J or qtuid pro cjuo on cessation of 
bombing and halt in expansion US forces against 
end to infiltration by Hanoi." 

m * 


September lU^ I966 

D'Orlandl reports that Lewandovski is not interested in Se- 
es calat ion or any other sequence that will lead to preserving the 
present personnel of the GM, It is this part of the "status quo" 
which must change* On the other hand^ the Geneva agreements of 195^1- 
and 1962 need not be affected. 

Saigon 5965 (to SecState)^ S/lTcdiSj ll^ September I966 

"1. Pursuant to your kk^lj I had a long session 

with D'Orlandi. 

"2, He says the phrase 'status quo* refers 
exclusively to the political and governmental status 
quo in Saigon and has nothing whatever to do with 
the 195^ and I962 agres:rients. . . . 

"3. Lewandowski was definitely not referring to 
the 195^ and I962 agreements , Ke is not interested in 
de-escalation or any kind of negotiation which would 
lead to a settlement and which would at the same time 
perpetuate the personnel of the present government. 
Lewandowski means that those on his side are not 
interested in ending military activities if j by so 
doing, the political and governmental situation in 
Saigon is thereby frozen." 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



*^12. D'Orlandi would like to test how influential 
Levandov^ki is vith Pham Van Dong and Vo Ilguyen Giap^ 
with vhouL Lewandowski claxEns to be so close. He is 
looking around for ^some little thing' which could be 
interpreted as an indication. He is sure Levandowski 
speaks for Eapacki and with Moscow approval every inch 
of the way. He is inclined to believe that Lewandovskl 
speaks for Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap, but would 
like to iHake sui-e, 

"13. I ventured the guess that nothing could be 
expected out of Hanoi until our November elections were 
over* The time between now and then^ therefore j I 
suggested J could be valuable in discussing and fortnu- 
lating proposals. 

*^lk* D'Orlandi did not agree. He thought we 
should not ^discard the possibility of discussions ncyw' 
due to the internal upheaval in Chinaj which he 
believes brought the Peking Government very close to 
a breach of diplomatic relations witii Moscow, ThiSj 
he surGiised--and not our elections — was dominating 
official thinking: in Hanoi " 

k • . * 


September I8, I966 

Lewandowski tells D'Orlandi that a coalition government should 
be considered J the bulk of which would be "sensible SW politicians j" 
with a man or two from the right and a man or two from the NLF in 
"unimportant ministries/^ SVII would become a "second CaaiQodia/' 
But he is discouraged about US intentions because of the incompati- 
bility of "military escalation and political proposals." 

Saigcn 628O (to SecState)^ S/Nodis, I8 September 1966 

"1. D'Orlandi had a meeting with Lewandowski 
Friday night. It started as a social affair on 
D'Orlandi's invitation and on Lewandowski 's initia- 
tive became a discussion of the war. According to 
Orlandij Lewandowski said the following: 

* » ■ * 

17 ■ 

ll \ 

Dcclassifted per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20t I 


"5* If the ^ericans ever raally cared^ they should 
especially concentrate on Hiam Yan Dong's fourth point con- 
cerning ^¥ho is to speak for South Vietnam. ' This does 
not mean that Hanoi vould he trying to ram the Viet Cong 
down our throats. We could consider the setting up of a 
coalition government the bulk of which vould be made up of 
^sensible South Vietnamese politicians.* To preserve 
appearances you could have 'on the fringe' men from the 
'right' in one or two 'unimportant ministries' and from on 
* the 'left' fill one or t^^ro 'unimportant ministries with the 
Bo-called NLF.* 

"6- D'Orlandi — this is unthinkable. If this is what 
you want to talk about^ it is better for us to stop the 

"7.. Lewandowski asked whether D'Orlandi realized that 
what he meant to say was that this would be the last step 
not the first, 

"8, D*Orlandi said; What would be the ultimate goal? 
If it is to have the Viet Cong in the Government of Viet 
Jlam^ I won't even submit such a proposal to Ambassador 

"9. Lewandowski said that is r^t at all vhat he meant 
to put to D'Orlandi, Plainly ^ the ultimate aim would be: 
*to make of South Vietnam a second Cambodia,' 

"10. D'Orlandi said that makes more sense ^ it is at 
least worth talking about, 

"11. LewaMovski said: 'But I don't believe the 
Americans really wish to talk. They are trying to do two 
things at once: military escalation grouped with political 
proposals „ You can't do both. So long as they won't make 
up their minds ^ we can't do anything. We must wait until 
November. '" 

. • . 


September 22 I966 

Goldberg's speech to the OTT General Assembly stresses the US desire 
for a negotiated settlement ^ proposing a reduction in Communist milltai^^ 
activities in SVI^ in response for a bombing cessation^ and mutual with- 
drawal of militai*y forces under International supervision^ He er- 
ates President Jonnson's statement that Vietcong" representation m peace 

negotiations would not be an insijrmountable problem. 


DeclassiHed per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



Kew York Tlises ^ 23 September I966 

^'Otext of Goldberg's Address" 

United IJationSj New York^ Sept* 22nd 

• • 

"U.S. Offers 'First Step' 

"...United States is villing once again to take 
the first step. ¥e are prepared to order a cessation 
of all bombing of Ij'orth Vietnam -- the moment ve are 
assured^ privately or otherwise^ that this step vill 
be answered promptly by a corresponding and appropriate 
de-escalation on the other side. We therefore urge 
before this Assembly that the Government in Hanoi be 
asked the folloving question^ to which we would be 
prepared to receive either a private or a public response; 

'Vould it J in the interest of peace ^ and in response 
to a prior cessation by the United States of the bombing 
in North Vietnam ^ take corresponding and timely steps to 
reduce or bring to an end its own military activities 
against South Vietnam? 

"Another obstacle is said to be North Viet riain^ 3 
conviction or fear that the United States intends to 
establish a permanent military presence in Vietnam. Ihere 
is no basis for such a fear- The United States stands 
ready to "vjithdraw its forces as other w^ithdrav theirs so 
that peace can be restored in South Vietnam j and favors 
international machinery -- either of the United Nations or 
otlier ma,chinery -- to insure effective supervision of the 
withdrawal. We therefore urge that Hanoi be asked the 
following question also: 

*%Jould IToirth Vietnam be willing to agree to a time 
schedule for supervised j phased withdrawal from South 
Vietnam of all external forces — those of North Vietnam 
as well as those from the United States and other countries 
aiding South Vietnam? 

"A further obstacle is said to be disagreement over 
the place of the Vietcong in the negotiations. Some argue 
that J regardless of different vie'v/s on who controls the 
Vietcong^ it is a combatant force and^ as such^ should take 
part in the ne.TOtlations. 



DccJassificd per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Diiie: 201 1 

' i f 



"Some tiioe ago otot view on this matter vas stated 
by Rresident Johns on ^ who made clear that^ as far as we 
are concerned^ this question would not be *an insur- 
mountaljle problem.' We therefore invite the anthorities 
in Hanoi to consider whether this obstacle to negotiation 
may not be more imaginary than real." 

October 5. I966 

' ■ I 


When D*Orlandi tells Levandowski he plans to return to Rome shortly^ 
the latter protests^ "You must not leave; there will be much to do after 
the 15th of ITovember*" 

Saigon T712 (to SecState)^ S/KodiSj 5 October I966 

"1. On Tuesday* October h^ at the Apostolic Dele- 
gate's receptionj D'Orlandi said to Lewandovski that 
he intended to say to Fanfani that there was no longer 
any reason for him to stay on in Saigon at the expense 
of damage to his health when thex^e was absolutely 
nothing to do. 

"2, According to D'Orlandi^ Lewandovski said with 
great emphasis and earnestness ^ *^You must not leave; 
there will be much to do after the fifteenth of Novem- 

• • 


October lU., I966 

Lewandovski probes D'Orlandi with respect to possible US-Chinese 
collusion^ reporting that Chinese permission for Soviet flights to Viet- 
nam have been withdrawn. He also raises the possibility of ousting ^f:j ^ 
though whether as part of the negotiating arrangements or part of their 
outcome is not clear. 

Saigon 8567 (to Sec vState)^ S/JTodis, 14 October I966 

• . . 

"5* Levandowski went on to say that he was worried 
about reports about the(^inesej pairbicularly that the 




DccJassHled per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NKD Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


'Americans are trying to feel out the Chinese.* He 
added: *In such a case^ ve are out*' 

"6. He said there vere 'added strains' between 
China and Russia and thatj due to a recent Chinese 
decision J there are now 'no Russian flights going 
through China to Viet-ITam.^ 

"7- Lewandovski then^ according to D^Orlandi^ 
asked whether he thought 'Ky could be ousted** 

"8. D^Orlandi says he replies that he absolutely 
refused to ^haggle* and would not get into a situation 
in which they agreed to this in exchange for our 
agreeing to that. In any case^ this was a matter which 
vould *take care of itself in a few months when the 
new constitution goes into effect/^ 

• * • 


October 15^ 1966 

State inquires if Leva,ndcwski liad a particular reason for attach, 
ing importance to the date of l^Tovember 15. 

State 66655 (to AinEmbassy SAIGON), S/ilodis 

15 October I966 
Eef : Saigon 7712 

* * 

"2, D'Orlandi at next suitable occasion should 
ask LeiTandowski if he had particular reason to attach 
Importance to the date of November I5 after which 
according to him there vould be 'much to do^ (Para 2^ 
Saigon 7712)." 


October ig, I966 

D'Orlandij on probing from Lodge ^ indicates that Lewandow'ski 
reflects the views of Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap, Bleither 
D^Orlandi nor Lewando>;ski can judge the relative influence of these 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Project Number NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



men in the l^noi power structure. D'Orlandi refuses to pick up the lead 
given by Goldberg ^s IM speech and help devise a bombing- infiltration 
formula that might be acceptable to Hanoi. He says Levandovskl is 
interested only In a total package j son^thing ^'finalj" not de-escalation 
or even a ''truce to allov conversation," 

To illustrate the total package he suggests ; internationally con- 
trolled elections after one or two years; a neutral government; US 
withdrawal "eventually"; a coalition government ("not a 'must'V.) 

In response to State's guery^ Lodge reports that Lewandovrski plans 
to go to Hanoi shortly after the U.S. elections. 

Saigon 8583 (to SecState); S/NodiSj I6 October I966 

"1. This is in reply to your 66655* 

'^2- On Saturday I asked D'Orlandi this question; 

Does Lewandowski's strong position against 
what he calls any form of ^barter*^ i.e. 'We stop 
doing this and you stop doing that' reflect his own 
appraisal of Hanoi's position or is it based 
explicitly on what he has been told by North Viet- 

"3* D'Orlandi^s reply: 'Eiis question is not 
phrased so as to reflect the realities, Lewandovski's 
views reflect Fnaoi Van Long and Vo Nguyen Giap who 
are the only t>70 North Vietnamese with whom Lewandowski 
has been in contact. Are or are these not the real 
power in Hanoi? Lewandowski does not know. D'Orlandi 
believes you know more than we do about that. 

^%* Question: Could Lewandowski envisage any 
variation on Goldberg's September 22nd bombing- 
infiltration formula which would be compatible both 
with the principle of reasonable reciprocity and with 
Hanoi's apparent determination to avoid actions which 
could be interpreted as bowing to U.S. pressure? 

''5* Answer: D'Orlandi says: I don't thinly he 
would answer that question. It would be going back on 
what he has said he refused to do. He w^ants an over- 
all agreement — not a truce which would allow conversa- 
tions. He wants a "package deal* "which covers eveiy- 
thlng and which thereby avoids any chance of publicity. 
Hanoi will buy something that is 'final,' 



i J 

1 I 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Nutnber: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


^^6, VJhen I asked D'Orlandi what would be the 
elements of a package deal he said for illustration: 
after one or two years ^ elections internationally 
controlled; a Vietnamese C-overnment which would abide 
by a policy of neutrality; the United States to leave 
'eventually' (this word was stressed); a coalition 
government (which he said was not a *m.ust') which 
voiild contain representatives of so-called 'extremists' 
having nominal ministries. By 'extremists' he meant 
the Ky regime on the one hand and the Viet Cong on the 
other. D'Orlandi was sure there would never be an 
answer to the Q_uestion 'what will you do if the bomb- 
ing stops?* But a ^real package deal' would get 'very 
serious' consideration and it would get it 'Immediately, 


• « • 

*'8. As far as the question of your paragraph 2 
is concerned I think it is answered effectively by 
Lewandowski^s intention to go to Hanoi immediately 
after the U,S, elections, Lewandowski says he 'attaches 
special importance' to these elections. Even though 
he says he does not understand our national politics 
he knows that the fact that the elections have been 
held will 'clear the air^ whatever the results may be*' 
It will mean that the electoral question will have been 
removed arid he will know that the United States 'can 
deal if it wants to.' 

"9. Comment: I find this interesting since it 
confirms the belief which you and I have had for a long 
time that they must at all costs avoid publicity and 
consequent loss of face. I think long drawn out peace 
talks ai^e very dangerous for us. It appears now that 
they are convinced that long drawn out peace talks are 
utterly unacceptable for them. End comment." 

October 25, I966 

Ttie USGj GVl^ and Troop Contributing Countries propose settlement 
terms at the Manila Conference. Ihese include an end to aggression; 
territorial integrity for SVTI; reunification by free choice^ resolution 
of internal differences in SVE through a program of national reconcilia- 
tion; and removal of all allied military forces and installations no 
later than srx months after "the military and subversive forces of North 
Vietnam are withdrawn^ infiltration ceases j and the level of violence 
thus subsides." The settlement would be assured by international 
guarantees, particulars of which are open to negotiation. 



Declassifled per Executive OrcJcr 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 


Eie pivotal^ features of the proposal are that (l) the future of 
the insurgents is to be settled through the national reconciliation 
program; and (2) allied ^rithdraval is to come after law and order are 
restored. These provisions would not allov a coalition government in 
which the Communists or i^TLF participated as an organized entity. 

Few York Times , 26 October I966 


The Communique 

"27. So that their aspirations and position would 
be clear to their allies at Manila and friends every- 
where , the Government of the Republic of Vietnam 
solemnly stated its views as to the essential elements 
of peace in Vietnam: 

(i) Cessation of aggression. At issue in 
Vietnam is a struggle for the preservation of values 
which people eveiywhere have cherished since the dawn 
of history: the independence of peoples and the freedom, 
of individuals, Olie people of South Vietnam ask only 
that the aggression that threatens their independence 
and the externally supported terror that threatens their 
freedom be halted. No self-respecting people can ask 
for less. No peace-loving nation should ask for more, 

(ii) Preservation of the territorial integrity 
of South Vietnam* The people of South Vietnajn are 
defending their own territory against those seeking to 
obtain by force and terror what they have been unable 
to accomplish by peacefxil means, l^Jhile sympathising 
with the plight of their brothers in the North and whife 
disdaining the regime in the North j the South Vietnamese 
people have no desire to threaten or harm the people of 
the North or invade their country. 

(ill) Reunification of Vietnam, The GovernLient 
and people of South Vietnam deplore the partition of 
Vietnam into Horth and South. But this partition 
brought about by tha Geneva agreements in 195^^ however 
unfortunate and regrettable ^ will he respected until j 
by the free choice of all Vietnamese ^ reunification 
is achieved. 



Duclassifled per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Pmject Number NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



(iv) Eesolution of internal problems. The people 
of South ^?"ietnain seek to resolve their own internal differ- 
ences and to this end are prepared to engage in a program 
of national reconciliation. \Jhen the aggression has 
stopped J the people of South Vietnam will move more rapidly 
toward reconciliation of all elements in the society and 
will move for^^ard^ through the democratic process j toward 
human dignity^ prosperity and lasting peace. 

(v) Removal of allied military forces, ^e 
people of South Vietnam will ask their allies to remove 
their forces and evacuate their installations as the mill- 
tary and subversive forces of North Vietnam are withdrawn, 
infiltration ceases ^ and the level of violence thus subsides 

Effective guarantees. The people of South Vietnam^ 
mindful of their experience since 195^^ insist that any 
negotiations leading to the end of hostilities incorporate 
effective international guarantees. They are open-minded 
as to how such guarantees can be applied and made effective. 

"28, The other participating governments reviewed and 
endorsed these as essential elements of peace and agreed 
they would act on this basis in close consultation among 
themselves in regard to settlement of the conflict. 

"29. In particular J they declared that allied forces 
are in the Republic of Vietnam because that country is 
the object of aggression and its Government requested 
support in the resistance of its people to aggression. 
They shalJ. be withdrawn^ after close consuJ-tation^ as the 
other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases 
infiltration^ and the level of violence thus subsides. 
Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not 
later than six months after the above conditions have been 
fulfilled , " 


November 10 ^ I9 66 

Rolling Thunder 52 is authorized. The targets include the Yen Vien 
Eailroad Yard and the Van Dien Vehicle Depot near Hanoi ^ the Thai Nguyen 
Steel Plant ^ the Haiphong Cement Plant and two other targets near Haiphong 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3,3 
NND Prujeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 2011 


JCS 7735 (to CINCPAC), TS/LTM)IS, 10 November I9 66 
Refs: (a) JCS 6008 
(b) JCS 3kZJ 

"1. (U) This is an execute message. 

"2. (5S) Guidance goveriEmg ROLLING THUNDER 5I 
set forth in reference (a) remains in effect for ROLLING 
33EMDER 52, except for added targets and additional 
guidance contained in this directive. 

"3. (TS) Effective upon receipt of this message;, 
you are authorized to conduct air strikes against the 
following objectives in North Vietnam; 


a. l8.i|-2 Xuan Mai Hwy Br 616-024^^ 

h. 19 Yen Vien ES Clf Yazxi 6l6-022l 

c. 51.1 Ea Gia POL St or SSV/ (Former Phuc 616-O662 

Yen POL Stor) 

d. 51.18 Can Then POL Stor (Former l^e-p POL 616-I340 


e. 63.11 Van Dien Vehicle Dpo (Note 2) 616-O696 

f . Kinh Uo SAM Stor 6l6-009ll^ 

g. Banoi SM Stor W, 6l6-025T 

h. Haiphong SMA Assembly 6l6-<y2.Qhh 

i. 76 Kiai Nguyen Steel Plant (Areas 616-O2U 

G, Kj All Rolling Stock) (Notes 1 and 3) 

3. 76 Thai Nguyen Steel Plant (Area Q) 6l6.021i)- 

(Notes 1 and 3) 

k. 77. 1 Haiphong Cement Plant (Note 3) 6I6-O706 

1. 80 Haiphong IPP W (iTote 3) 616-OOO7 

m. 82.12 Haiphong O^PP E (Note 3) 616-OO5I 




DtcJassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Diiie: 2011 


November 11^ I966 

Rolling Thunder 52 is amended to defer strikes against the Eiai 
l^guiyen Steel Plant and the three targets near Haiphong, 

JCS 7783 (to CIKCPAC), TS/L]M)ISj 11 HoTember I966 
Ref: JCS T735 

"1, (TS) Air strikes vill be deferred repeat 
deferred (not canceled) against the following object- 
ives in Eforth Vietnam* 

^T # 


Thai Nguyen Steel Plant 

77-1 Haiphong Cement Plant 


Haiphong TPP W 

82.12 Haiphong TPP 



November 13^ I966 

On the eve of a major visit by Levanfiowski to Hanoi^ State tries' 
through Lodge to clarify Levandovski^s relationship to Hanoi and his 
ovn conception of his role. His concept of offering Hanoi a "'final" 
settlement is challenged j on the grounds that it req^uires the US to 
modify its position before an^"" indication of concessions from the other 
side. Another attempt at finding a de-escalatory fomiiila is offered^ 
the "Phase A- Phase B" package. (Under this concept^ the US would 
suspend bombing as Phase A, After a while, mutual de-escalatory steps 
would be taken as Phase B, Thus all the reciprocit;)'' would appear to 
be contained in Phase Bj even though the total de-escalation on each 
side over both phases would be matching.) This formula is offered by 
State as a way to save face for Hanoi while retaining reciprocity for 
a bombing suspension. 

State 83786 (to Amembassy Saigon) ^ TS/Nodis 

13 November I966 
Eef: Saigon's I07IU 

* • * « 

*^3. These are queries to be put to Lewandowski; 

a. "What role does he envisage for himself? 
Is he J on the one hand^ seeking merely to facilitate a 



Dccliissificd perExecuiive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Pmjecn Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 201 1 



better understanding on each side of the other *s 
position in order to pave way toward some kind of 
direct contact^ and^ if soj does he have reason to 
"believe Hanoi will agree to such contact? Or^ on 
the other hand^ does he contemplate serving as an 
intermediary J conveying a series of proposals and 
counterproposals between two sides to try to 
achieve agreement on specific issues? 

b. What does Hanoi consider to be his 
role? Has Hanoi entrusted specific messages to 
him and J if soj to whom were they to be conveyed? 

c. As we understand it^ Lewandowski 
wants an overall agreement and says Hanoi will buy 
something that is 'f inal^ ' he doesn't want a truce 
just to 'allow conversations.' How does he px'opose 
to get from here to there? How would he envisage 
overcoming our considerable reluctance to modify 
our position on one point or another without having 
any indication of what if ai^ helpful response 
this would evoke from Hanoi? 

d, X-/e understand that considerations of 
face inevitably play a role in Hanoi's thinking* 
Does this perhaps explain^ in Lewandowski^s view^ 
why we are unable to get any meaningf^ol response to 
the question ^what would happen if the bombing of 
IP/N stopped? ' Does Lewandowski see any way around 
this? Could some package deal be worked out which 
i n its totality represented what both we and Hanoi 
Would agree to as a reasonable measure of mutual 
de-escalation J but which would have two separate 
phases in its execution, Faase A would be a 
bombing suspension^ while Phase Bj which would 
follow after some adequate period ^ would see the 
execution of all the other agreed de-escalatory 
actions • Hanoi's actions taken in Phase B would 
appear to be in response to our actions in Phase B 
rather than to the bombing suspension- 

'^t* Lewandowski should understand that none 
of the foregoing represents a position which he is 
authorised to put to Hanoi on our behalf. ¥e will 
review his replies to our q^uestions and will then 
wish to determine what we wish to propose concerning 
his forthcoming visit to Hanoi." 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Projet:t Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 U 



November 1^-lg, I966 

Lewandovski answers State's queries: His rcle is part broker ^ part 
interlocutor. If he can narrow differences between the two sides 
suff iciently^ they vould wish to talk directly with each other and he 
would step out completely. He evades as "theoretical" the difficulties 
in his "final" settlement concept and chooses to interpret the Hiase A - 
Phase B proposal as a US recognition that "you can^t trade the bombing 
suspension for something else*" He expects the package deal to begin 
its evolution without a bombing suspension^ but with an end to the 
bombing fitting someTfhere in the evolutionary process, 

He too has questions to pose : 

i- Does the ^!anila offer mean US troop withdrawal depends 
on GW control of areas not now under Saigon control? 

11- In case of a cease-fire^ would the US withdraw from 
I combat areas and not interfere in the creation of a new government in 

i Vietnam? 

iii, in case of. a cease-firej would the U5 not interfere in 
peaceful reunification^ whether brought about by referendum or election? 

iv. In the case of a cease-fire and negotiations ^ would the US 
publicly declare its willingness to use the Geneva machinery and ICC to 
bring peace to Vietnain? 

Staters replies are carefully worded and not full;'' responsive to 
Lewandowski^s probing: 

1. The Manila formulation speaks for itself. It offers a 
"definite withdrawal period" as a basis for negotiations which could 
include the mechanics of phased withdrawal. 

ii* We support the presently emerging constitutional process 
in Sm and would abide by the results of free elections/ 

ill* ¥e would accept peaceful j freely chosen reunification^ a 
pre -requisite for which is the restoration of peace and order in SW. 

for peace 
may be needed. 

lY, The 195^ aJ^d I962 Geneva agreements are an adequate basis 
in SE Asia J but developments since 195^ suggest better laachineiy 

State reiterates tliat the route to a final settlement must bes^in 
with de-escalation and asks again what Hanoi would do if we stopped 

The meaning of this exchange is not very clear. Lewandowski seons 

to be asking if we would accept procedu^t^s (tvoon withdrawal. Inter^ 
national inspection^ ei;c.) tuax vo^uld allow cnanges m the tfiW 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



government favorable to the communists. We seem to reply negatively. 

Secondly^ Levandovskij hj ostensibly putting the bombing question 
aside until more of the total package emerges j may be villing to accept 
our attack on tha North as a pressure on Hanoi for comprGmlsing other 
issues. State ^ l:)y attempting to address bombing as an identifiable 
issue J may be aggravating Hanoi ^s problem of face. The difficulty from 
Staters point of vleWj of course^ is knowing what^ if any^ concessions 
Hanoi is making on other issues as the total package is built up- Having 
Levandovskij a Communistj as middleman aggravates this problem, 

Saigon IO856 (to SecState), TS/NodiSj Ik November I966 

*'l- I met Lewandotrski at D^Orlandi's apartment at 
3:00 p.m. Saigon time. 

"2. .*,on the eve of his visit to Hanoi.... He 
had four questions^ as follows: 

a, 'Eegarding the offer at fenila concerning 
the withdrawal of U^S, forces from Viet-Nam on the i 

- condition that the troops of Ilorth Viet-Nam would with- '_ ^ 

draw (and^ he said^ North Viet-ITamj of course ^ doesn't , 

admit that they are there at all)j does this condition 
mean the United States withdrawal depends on control by 
the present South Vietnamese Government of territories 
not now under the control of Saigon^ 1 

b. 'In case of a cease-fire^ would the United ' ,1 
States be prepared to withdraw from the combat areas and 

not to interfere in the creation of a new government in 1 

Viet-Nam? Ihe question of how the new government of 
Viet-Nam will be formed will certainly arise. 

c. 'In case of a cease-fire j would the United 
States undertake not to interfere in peaceful progress 

toward unification of Viet-Nam if the people so wish^ , i 

whether hj referendum or by election? 

d. 'In the case of a cease-fire and negotia- 
tions ^ would the United States be ready to use the Geneva. 
Agreement and the machineiy of the International Commission 
in bringing peace to Viet-Nam ^ and if so^ would the United 
States pubicly declare its intention to this effect? ' 

"3* I said that there ware questions which I would 
have to refer to the U*S, Government ^ and that I wo^old do so 
and provide answers as soon as I could. 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Nutnber: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


TO? SECRET - rrcDis 

"4. I then said T had scrae questions to askj and 
I asked hitn the four sets of questions listed in your 

• • « « 

* * m 

"6* Without any prodding at all from me or D^Orlandi^ 
he said *Vellj some of your questions cannot be answered 
novf. As to your Question ITo, 1^ my present role is in 
accord vith the instructions of my government vho vould 
be prepared for me to take any role which would bring 
peace nearer* The two roles set forth in your questiouj 
that is J on the one hand^ to work to facilitate a better 
understanding and pave the way to contact or^ on the 
other J to be an intermediary ^ do not exclude each other. 
In fact J they could be done together. If the ideas which 
can be developed are not too far apart j then there can be 
talks J and if the ideas then start separating ^ both sides 
can withdraw - On the other handj if I am successful in 
bringing the two sides together and they agree on something 
together J I can withdraw feeling that I have achieved 
sonething useful. 

"7- As to the secoM questioUj Lewandowslu. said 
*you have worked in Southeast Asia and you realize that 
diplcoiiacy in Vlet-ITam is different than what it is in 
Europe or the United States. Clear-cut answers are very 
difficult to get^ one has to be very patient and look for 
indirect symptoms.^ He was not^ he saidj an agent of the 
Hanoi Governiaentj but 'if and when they decide they want 
you to know something/ he saidj *they would tell me. Of 
this I am confident. Each time I go^ the Prime Minister 
asks me about Americans and what the Americans think.' 

"8* 'On your third qaestion^ it is a frame without 
a picture J it is very theoretical. ' 

"9* 'Ajb to the fourth question^ it recognizes that- 
you can't trade bombing suspension for something else. 
The question of bcmclng suspension in the first instance 
could be discussed informally. B-it if well founded hopes 
developed for reaching soin.e agreement ^ then the bombing 
suspension could be brought in in- the second phase.' 

"10. D'Orlandi remarked that in the beginning of our 
talks J Lewandowski had agreed that the bombing suspension 
would not be a precondition^ 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


"11. Lewandowski said^ 'Yes^ there must be positive 
steps -- not speeches or declaratiotir. . A package deal 
is not only the most practical way of going at it; it is 
the only one- The A and B in your fourth question are 
the beginnings of the alphabet. It might be quite useful, 
¥e must go right through to Z^ including everything that 
needs to be in the package deal,'-^ 

* « M • 


State 8k233 (to Amembassy Saigon);, TS/l^Iodis^ 

Ik November I966 
Hef: (a) Saigon's IO856 
(b) State 83786 

* ■ 

''t. ...while -^e remain intent on finding a path to 
a reasonable and honorable settlement, we are not pre- 
pared to irlthdrav and find that armed subversive elements 
from the ETorth have moved in again. Ve are serious in 
expressing our vlllingness to remove our troops ^ to dis- 
mantle our bases ^ and accept a non-aligned South Viet-Fam 
so long as It is genuinely non-aligned. We do not regard 
the genuine neutrality of South Viet-JI^n as opposed to 
our interests. With respect to our efforts to find an 
approach tovrard reciprocal actions of de-escalationj we 
are aware that Hanoi must assign veight to considerations 
of face J and -tre have said that so long as we were certain 
that the elements from the Jlorth were removed^ we would not 
Insist on any acknowledgement that these forces had ever 
been in the South. 

"5* In addition to the foregoing^ we have the follow- 
ing specific comments on Lewandowski's four questions: 

A* The Manila formulation on withdrawal was con- 
sidered and worded with the greatest care - It was included 
in the communique in the light of specific indications from 
Eastern European sources that such a mention of a definite 
withdrawal period would help in establishing an acceptable 
basis for negotiations. The mechanics of a phased with- 
drawal would probably have to be a matter for negotiation 
although the initial de-escalatory steps might be taken by 
mutual examnle. 



Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



B. ¥e have often said that we supported free 
elections in South Viet-Nam to give the South Vietnamese 
people a government of their own choice. We are pre- 
pareii to abide by the genuine manifestation of that free 
choice. \Je support the emerging constitutional process 
Id. South Yiet-Nam. The orderly formation of a responsive 
and representative government based on free elections will 
receive our support, 

C. We are on record that the question of the 
reunification of Viet-Ham should be determined by the 
Vietnamese of both Uorth and South through their o'^n 
free decision^ without any interference from outside. 

Eow soon that can take place depends on a number of factors ^ 
above all the restoration of peace and order in South 
Viet-Fam so that South Viet-DTam will be in a position to 
treat freely with MVil on this matter, 


D. We have already declared our view that the 
195^ sl^^ 1962 Geneva agreements are an adequate basis 
for peace in Southeast Asia, Since 195k there have been 
many developments which have revealed sharply the need for 
an effective and truly neutral mechanism of supervision 
and control. We wo^old be prepared to discuss all m=E.tters 
bearing upon this complicated problem. 

"6, We would also observe that what Lewandowski 
terrris our 'theoretical' third question of how we get from 
here to there bears most directly upon his proposal for a 
'package deal^ including ^ as he put it^ not only A and B 
but all the other letters of the alphabet. These range 
all the way from the reciprocal measures of de-escalation 
to the components of a final settlement. The immediate 
issue is to find out precisely and concretely even if 
quite privately what steps Hanoi would take if we stopped 
bombing. .,," 

• • « 


Saigon IO955 (to SecState)^ TS/lTodiSj I5 November I966 

"2. When we three met^ I read him slowly the full 
text of your 8^38. Then T read it a second tima. Both 
B'Orlandi and Lewandowski took very careful notes and 

were at great pains to get evervthing exactly right. 1^ 
reference to Item 3.1>. of your 8 378 cT was not lost: on 



DeclassiHed per Executive Order 13520, Section 3.3 
NKD Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Datei 201 1 


Levandovski. Comment: I am beginning to vonder if this 
is not becoming the crux of the loatter. End Comment. 


* • • • 


November 16-gOj I966 

A separate attempt to elicit a response to the Phase A - I^ase E 
fozmulation is made by passing it to the Russians via George Brown 
during his visit to Moscow. Ihey indicate interest^ provided that the 
DRV"s k points and the NLF*s 5 points are accepted as a ''basis for 
discussion" in the negotiations that follow. Brown is not informed of 
the Lewandowski contact^ and it does not come up during his talks in 

State 86196 (to Amembassy London) j S/jTodiSj 

16 Tfovember I966 
Please pass following message from Secretary to 

FonSec Bro^m 

"•..Bear George: Your forthcoming visit to Moscow 
is obviously of the greatest importance in sounding out 
the Soviets on the possibilities of action toward peace 
in Viet-nam..,/' 

"As one way of saving Hanoi's face^ you may wish 
to explore on your otm initiative the possibility of a 
package deal vhich in its totality represented what 
both we and Hanoi would agree to as a reasonable measure 
of mutual de-escalation J but which would have two 
separate phases in Its execution. Phase A would be a 
bombing suspension^ while Phase B^ which woiold follow^ 
would see the execution of all the other agreed de- 
escalatory actions. I^noi's actions taken in Phase B 
might appear to them to be in response to our actions 
in Phase E rather than to the bombing suspension. 
Obviously J Fanoi cannot have the bombing suspension 
without also accepting Phase B. \le would^ of course^ 
like to hear Moscow or Hanoi *s reaction to this 
admittedly general proposition before we make any 
specific commitments/^ 




Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NTsTD 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



State 91787 (to Amembassy London)^ S/lTodiSj 

20 I^Tovember I966 
El^es Only for Ambassador from Secretaiy 

"I* Following text message to me from George 
Brown delivered by UK Mbassy here,... 

"On the first day I tried hard to get Gromyko 
to lay off his gramophone record and get down to 
the q^uestion of the three issues (paragraph 10 of 
your message). However^ he gave no ground but his 
interest was sufficiently intent to encourage me to 
give him an outline of the package (paragraph 1^ of 
your message). This I did orally before dinner on 
the first evening^ giving it to him as my ovn pro- 
posal, ivjext morning J purely for the sake of clarity ^ 
I gave him a piece of paper. Tae actual words used 
are enclosed. He was pretty suspicious but promised 
to pass it on to Kosygin only. 

''It was on the basis of this piece of paper 

that I talked with Kosygin this morning On his 

side after a lot of the usual stuffy pretty muted ^ 
about American aggress ion^ he said that they were 
prepared to make the IJorth Vietnamese four points 
and the HLP five points 'a basis for discussion.^ 
When I said that I had interpreted a basis of dis- 
cussion as meaning that they wovild be flexible 
neither he nor Mr, Grcmyko contradicted me. ISieir 
package woixLd seem to be an unconditional stopping 
of the bombing J some de-escalation in the South and 
then negotiations on the basis as above...-" 


November 30-December 1, I966 

Lewandowski returns from Hanoi. He has formulated 10 points to 
reflect the US position with respect to an overall solution of the 
Vietnam war. There is sufficient interest in Hanoi^ he says^ that the 
U.S. should^ if the foi^ulation is acceptable^ confirm it directly to 
the DEV Ambassador in Warsaw. He urges speed to guard against a leak 
or sabotage by those "working against a solution." His source in 
Hanoi^ he says^ is Fhata Van Loag^ who has the "Presidium behind him/* 

Most of Lewandowski 's 10 points reiterate familiar US positions. 
His principal imiovaticn is US acceptance that "the present status quo 
in S^/N must be changed in order to take into account the interests of 



Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NTsTD 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



the parties presently opposing the policy of the U.S. in SM." He 
does not include the Phase A - Phase B foimula for de-escalation^ hut 
states that the US would stop bombing to facilitate a peaceful solution^ 
■would "accept DE^y modalities on the cessation^" and "would not require 
the DRV to admit infiltration into SVH. Lodge believes ^ however^ that 
he did give his presentation in Hanoi in accord vith the full Phase A - 
Phase B fonnulatiorii 

Lodge refers the 10 points to Washington^ to see if they are an 
accepta^ble representation of the US position. He points out two 
difficulties hj[j:aself ^ however: the phrase "status ^uo in SW must 
change" would be more acceptable if it read "status quo in STO would 
change"; and the terms for de-escalation are poorly expressed. 

Saigon 122^^-7 ^ TS/NodiSj 30 November I966 

"Lewandovski summarized the 10 points to Lodge as 
follows : 

(1) The U.S. is interested in a peaceful solu- 
tion through negotiations. 

(2) Negotiations should not be interpreted as 
a way to negotiated surrender by those opposing the 
U.S. in Vietnam, A political negotiation would be 
aimed at finding an acceptable solution to all the 
problems^ having in mind that the present status quo 
in SVN must be changed in order to take into account 
the interests of the parties presently opposing the 
policy of the U.S. in South Vietnam. 

(3) ^e U.S. does not desire a permanent or a 
long-term military- presence in SW. 

(U) The U.S. is willing to discuss all problems 
with respect to the settlement. 

(5) ^e U.S. is willing to accept the partici- 
pation of 'all* in elections and the supervision of these 
elections by an appropriate international body. 

(6) The U.S. believes that reunification should 
be settled by the Vietnamese themselves after peace 

and proper representative organs are established in SVH. 

(7) Tne U.S. is prepared to abide by a neutral 

South Vletnaci, 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Nutnber: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

' CI 


(8) The U.S, is prepared to stop bombing *if 
this will facilitate such a peaceful solution,^ In 
this regard the U.S, is prepared to accept DRV 
modalities on the cessation and not require the DRV 
to admit infiltration into SVIff. 

(9) The U.S. will not agree to * reunification 
under military pressure.* 

(10) The U.S. 'will not declare now or in the 
future its acceptance of Korth Vietnam's i; or 5 points,' 

"Lewandowskl asked if these 10 points were a 
proper fozmulation of the U.S. position. Lodge said 
that they seemed to be in order ^ but that the matter 
was of such sensitivity and importance that he would 
have to refer the points back to Washington for 
approval. Lodge added ^ however j that he saw two 
difficulties right off. First^ he suggested changing 
Point 2 to read 'would' instead of *must.' Second j 
he guestioned the phraseology in Point 8 — 'if this 
would facilitate such a peaceful solution. * 

"Lewandowski insisted that his statement was a 
serious proposition "based on conversations with the 
'most respectable government sources in Hanoi-* 
Later Lewandowski admitted that Hiam Van Dong was 
the source and that he had the ^Presidium behind him,' 

"Lewandowski stated: 'I am authorised to say that 
if the U.S. 3^e really of the views which 1 have 
presented^ It would be advisable to confirm them 
directly by conversation with the JJorth Vietnamese 
Ambassador in Warsaw.* 

"Lewandowski said that there was a vital need to 
move quickly because (l) there was a danger of a leak 
and that secrecy was essential for Hanoi; and (£) that 
delays would give those 'working against a solution' 
time to 'put down the clamps on talks.*" 

State 9U66O (to Amembassy Saigon) ^ TS/l^Tcdis 
1 December I966 

. > . 

"(5) Do we interpret your comment at the end of 
para D-8 correctly to mean that Lewandowski presented 
our phasing formulation fully and accurately?" 



Declassified per Execuiive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Projeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 201 1 


Saigon 12323 (to SecState), TS/Hodls, 

1 December I966 
Eef: State 9^660 

* * ■ • 

"5* Your para 5. Lewandowski did not repeat not 
present your phasing formulation 'fully and accurately' 
in his conversation vith me- He merely cited ^our 
Phase A and Phase B, ' with clear implication that HS 
(Sic) had giren his presentation in Hanoi in accordance 
vith your formulation," 


December 2, I966 

Air strikes are run against the Van Dien Vehicle Depot and the Ha Gia 
POL Storage Facility 6.7 and I6 nautical miles ^ respectively^ from the 
center of Hanoi. 

December 3, I966 

(NB- DOD files do not contain Washington- Saigon or Washington-Warsaw 
traffic on Marigold for December 2-4. What follows is derived fron later 
cables. ) 

On instructions from State ^ Lodge meets Levandovski again to state 

i. The U.S* Snbassy in Warsaw will contact the LRV Bnbassy on 
December 6 or soon thereafter; 

ii, Levandovski's 10 points broadly reflect the US position; but 

111* "Several specific points are subject to important differences 
of interpretation." 

Lewando^/Jskij in turn^ expresses concern about US bcsmbing of Hanoi ^ 
acting on instructions frcm Eapacki. (Saigon 12^28) 

De cember k^ I966 

Air strikes are run against the Yen Vien Piailroad Yard and the F^ Gia 
POL Storage Facilityj 5»5 ^^d I6 nautical mileSj respectively, from the 
center of Hanoi, 




I f 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316* By: NWD Date: 201 1 


December 5j I966 

Groxmouski is suHanoned by the Foreign Minister in Warsaw and giv^en a 
Polish recapitulation of Marigold, According to Kapacki's account of the 
December 1 meeting in Saigon^ Polish support for a US-DRV contact in War^ 
saw was extended "after Lodge confirmed Levandowskl's resume." Thus 
Lodge's December 3 statement about "important differences of interpreta- 
tion" appears as a revision of earlier U3 acceptance, 

Rapacki argues that the US reservations about interpretation are so 
broadly stated as to put the whole basis for the contact in doubt. Alsoj 
coming "after all the conversations which were held/' the statement might 
undermine the role of Poland as intermediary. He urges instead that it be 
replaced by a statement defining the differences of interpretation the 
U£G has in mind and asks Gronouski to take this up with the President. 

He also refers to the "intensification of bombing near Hanoi subse- 
quern: to the Lodge-Lewandowski conversations" as likely to create doubts 
on the DEY side. 

It is hard to know precisely what has happened in Polish-DBV communi- 
cations at this point, Rapacki 's account suggests that the Poles told 
Ife,noi they had US approval of Lewandowski's 10 points after the December 1 
meeting. If so, the events of December 3 (the air strikes near Hanoi 
and the "differences of interpretation") migjit well have been viewed in 
Hanoi as casting doubt on Polish reliability, on the sincerity of US 
interest in negotiations^ or both- Alternatively^, Eapacki may simply have 
been trying to extract additional concessions or statements of position 
from the Americans^ using these developments for leverage. 

Warsaw I363 (to SecState)^ 5 December I966 
For the President and Secretaiy 

"1- I was called to FornMin 11:30 a.m. Dec 5 by Dir- 
gen Michalowski who^ after determining that I knew what 
meeting was about j took me in to see FornMin Eapacki," 

» » 

^%* Eapacki continued that on Dec 1^ after return 
of Lewandowski from Hanoi j Lewandowski had third meeting 
with Lodge in which he gave a resume of USG position as 
he had understood it from the two previous conversations* 
After Lodge confirmed Lewandowski's resumOj Lewandowski 
said contact of USG and ITorth Vietnamese Ambassadors In 
Warsaw^ would have supDort of Poles, 



i (^ 

Declassined per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
KND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


"5- Continuing his accoiont of prior events ^ Eapacki 
said that on the afternoon of Dec 3j at a fourth meeting 
"between Lodge and Le'vjandowsl^ij Lodge ^ on the basis of the 
President's instructions ^ read a statement as follows: 

A. Kie President vill instruct the U.S. PiOibassy 
in Warsav to contact the ITorth Vietnamese Ambassador In 
Warsaw on Dec 6 or as soon as possible thereafter* 

B, [Hie U,S» Einbassy in Warsaif vill be in a 
position on Dec 6 to confirm to the North Vietnamese 
Ambassador that the Levandowskl Dec 1 resume of the Lodge- 
Levandowski conversations broadly reflects the position of 
the USG. 

C» 'We must add that several specific points 
are sub^ject to important differences of interpretation,*" 

"6. Kapacki said that Lodge was unable at the Dec 3 
meeting to precisely say which points were subject to 
differences of interpretation and -what the nature of these 
differences of interpretation might be* 

"7* Eapacki then stated that question of interpre- 
tation put in doubt whole basis on which contact with North 
Vietnamese Ambassador in Warsaw was to have taken place - 
He expressed grave concern as to how equivocation will be 
read by Hanoi* He added that Poles must transmit USG 
position to ETVIT Govt.; and that rather than a general 
reference to differences of interpretation it vould be 
better if position transmitted contained statement defining 
differences of Interpretation ^e have in mind. He said 
such a statement might have a significant effect on Hanoi's 
attitude toward both a meeting in Warsaw and the whole 

"8* Eapacki then asked what can be the position of 
Poland in its role as intermediary if after all the con- 
versations which were held and statements made there still 
remains this doubt? He asked again how this reservation 
will be read by Hanoi j particularly with intensification 
of bomb lug near Hanoi subsequent to tlis Lodge-Levandowski 
conversations? He said these questions had already been 
raised by Levandowski during his Dae 3 conversation with 

« ■ « 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



"12 • Eapacki asked that I transmit to the Presi- 
dent the Poles deep concern caused by modification of 
USG position which has 'been signaled by the Dec 3 
declaration of Mr. Lodge and his hope that para on 
differences of interpretation can be deleted on grounds 
that it vas based on misunderstandings vhich have 
since been clarified/^ 

• « ■ 


December gj I96 6 

Gronouski is instiructed to stick with the reservation as vorded on 
the grounds that ve might be charged vith bad faith if we did not make 
clear the wide latitude for interpretation of the general language used 
by Lewandowski, 

State 97016 (to Amembassy Warsaw )j ITodis^ 

5 December I966 
Ambassador Eyes Only TOSBC 1^ Secretary E^es Only 
Pef : Your I363 

■ « • » 

We might expose ourselves to charges of bad 
faith in any subsequent negotiations if ve did not 
make clear that there is a wide latitude for interpre- 
tation of the general language used by Lewandowski- 

'^Lewandowski^s formulation broadly reflects the 
position of the US Government on the issues covered 
and we would be prepared to accept it as the basis 
for direct discussions with the Korth Vietnamese if 
they are in fact interested in pursuing the matter j 
and if they wsre informed that latitude for inter- 
pretation of such general language is inevitable," 

• • 

December 6, I966 

Gronouski carries out his instructions and is told by Eapacki 
that the US statement will now be transmitted to Hanoi. 

Eapacki says that the LEV expects to receive at the first Warsaw 1 

meeting the precise and official position of the USG in order that it 

can express its position at an appropriate time. He apparently i 

1^1 TOP SECRg? - N0DI3 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
KND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 




tmderstands Lodge to have indicated that such a package proposal vould 
be forthcoming. 

Gronouski replies that he had anticipated a more limited scope 
for the first meeting — confi2:*ining Le-v7andovrski^s formulation^ dealing 
vith matters such as time and place j etc. He refers the matter to 

Meanwhile^ Lewandowski makes many of the sajue points to Lodge 
in Saigon* He adds that the ^'V/arsav contact vas shadowed by the 
bcmhing of Hanoi" and asks the U3 to ^^avoid addins to the difficulties/^ 

Warsaw 1375 (to SecState)^ TS/Nodis^ 

6 December I966 
Eef: State 970I6 

"1, tfet with Fonl4in Hapacki I3OO hours Dec 6 and 
conveyed material in reftel," 

w m M 

"5- Eapacki said that he understood Lodge to 
have done the following: 

A. Presented official USG position or 
principles for peaceful solution; 

B, Stated that a new package deal of tJ3G 
proposals would be forthcoming: 

C- Expressed willingness o± USG to discuss 
fo^jr points and any other points raised by other side, 
(FYI: TJiis summary was apropos of nothing. It was 
simply interjected in the conversation,} 

'*6, After repeating his view that proposal for 
meeting in Warsaw was a significant 'ETVN response ^ he 
said Poles must reserve judgment until they can study 

situation further to determine whether USG had 
actually made step forward. He expressed the opinion 
that what had transpired betvreen Lodge and Lewandowski 
prior to la,tter*3 trip to Hanoi did represent step 
forward but the aualifi cations made by Lodge on Dec 3 
cast doubt on this judgment." 


"9* Eapacki said that at any rate they cannot 
delay any longer in transmitting information to Hanoi 


. ill. 



Doclassifit'd per Executive Order 13526. Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 2011 


He added that the original position of Lodge is liiiovn 
to Hanoi; and it remains a qiiestion as to how the 
qualification of Dec 3 vill be interpreted by sensi- 
tive elements in the iwi Go^/t, Eapacki said that 
infommtion transmitted to NVN will reflect the 
material presented to hi^i today ^ but Poles must also 
express their own doubts and misgivings over the 
question of interpretation raised by Lodge, 

"10. Eapacki then turned to the substance of the 
first Warsav meeting vith TIVN Ambassador *in the event 
it takes place.* He said it is his understanding that 
during that meeting ve -will present to the NVN side 
the position of USG in order that the W^ Govt can 
express his position at an appropriate time on the 
attitude of the USG and on subsequent modes of pro- 
cedure. He said the NVK Govt- expects to receive at 
the first Warsaw meeting the precise and official 
position of the USG and he assumes (with a smile) 
that it will not be different than the one presented 
to Lewandowski* He said he presumed I already have 
locked in my safe such a statement which will be able 
to identify the specific points on which there is wide 
latitude for interpretation, (FYI: Rapacki read from 
a Dec 3 statement given to Lewandowski ^^^ Lodge when 
making his reference to specific points.) He said he 
hoped at that meeting we will be able to discuss 
differences in intarpretation (adding that he still 
was looking for an answer to the question ^differences 
vith whom' inasmuch as the NVI^ Govt, has not yet pre- 
sented their interoretation, ) 

"11, I said that I had presided that the first 
meeting would be more limited in scope. I expected 
that the first meeting would be primarily concerned 
vith establishing that both sides were interested in 
beginning negotiations^ and deal vith such matters as 
time and place of negotiation session. I added that we 
would also expect at the first meeting to confirm Mr. 
Lewandovski's foim^ilation of our position as broadly 
reflecting the position of the USG with the qualifi- 
cation regarding interpretation. I added ^ however^ 
that 1 would inform Washington of his understanding 
of the nature of the first meeting," 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20t I 


Saigon 12601 (to SecState)^ TS/Fodls^ 6 December I966 

"1. Levandowski asked to meet me at D'Orlandi's 
today. He began by saying that he had asked for the 
in3eting "because of a communication which he had received 

from Mr, Eapacki in Varsav^ which asked him: 

"2- *Please turn the attention of Ambassador 
Lodge to the fact that the form^Jilation oi" the last para- 
graph of the statement of December Hiree may be under- 
stood as raising a question about the whole position 
embodied in the ten paragraphs and which was to form the 
platform for the Warsaw Meeting.^" 

« a 

"5- Lewandowski then said^ rather as an after- 
thought ^ that 'the overture of the Warsaw contact was 
shadowed by the bombing of Hanoi and we should therefore ^ 
avoid adding to the difficulties.'" 

December 7j I96 7 . .- 

Gronouski is told that the USG position was conveyed to Hanoi the 
previous day^ that the intensification of the bcmbing is raising suspicions 
in Warsaw as well as Hanoij and that the DEV will be keenly disappointed if 
the first meeting doss not include a direct statement of the USG position. 
Kie DRV "is not interested in what Lewandowski said," 

With respect to the bombing problem^ the Poles reject the explana- 
tions that the target list cannot be suddenly altered without alerting 
many people that something unusual is happening and that what appears as 
an intensification of bcmbing is in fact due to improved weather conditions, 
Eapacki says "policy is more important than weather j" and we are urged not 
to bomb in the vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong, 

Warsaw I376 (to SecState)^ TS/Nodis^ 7 December I966 
Hef ; State 97016 and Warsaw I375 

, * 

"3- Mlchalowski said Rapackl had conveyed USG 
position to Hanoi shortly after my meeting with him Dec 

• • , ■ 

"5- Michalowski said,., that ITOT Go^rb, and even 
some in Polish Govt, are suspicious that recently 


Dedassificd per Executive Order ^526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 633i6. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRSP ~ nod:k 

stepped up bambing outside Hanoi is the vork. of same 
elements in USG who are tiying to undercut Presi- 
dent's peace move. He added that vhen this question 
-was raised vith Lodge the latter had replied that 
such raids are planned long in advance j and that a 
quick reversal would alert many people that some- 
thing unusual vas happening. Michalowski said that 
to many people this is an unconvincing answer^ and 
expressed fervent hope that we can avoid future 
highly sensitive honibing raids in vicinity of Hanoi 
and Haiphong.,,, 

"6, Michalowskl said he wanted to underscore 
Rapacki's insistence that at the first meeting with 
the NVTT Ambassador in Warsaw we do more than con- 
firm^ with qualification j Lewandowski's resume of 
Lodge's ten points. He said the NW Govt, is not 
interested in what Lewandc^-rski saidj but rather in 
hearing USG position directly from us. He stressed 
extreme importance of first meeting ^ and said the 
NVN Govt. viH be keenly disappointed if its expec- 
tation of receiving direct statement of USG posi- 
tion at first meeting Is not realized..,." 


t^farsaw^ I376 (to SecState)j TS/Nodis^ T December I966 
Eef : Warsaw I376 

"1. FouMin Rapacki called me to his office at 
1800 hours Dec T ■•--'' 

* . * • 

**3- Rapacki then said that Poland could not 
continue in its role unless it is convinced that we 
have or will put an end to this intensified bombing - 
He added that if Poland has been satisfied on this 
score J and if it so happens that contact in Warsaw 
between the USG and NM Govt, will occurs then 'I 
avail myself of this opportunity to state * that it 
is necessary for the USG to recapitulate to the ITVK 
Representative its whole position as described by 
Lodge with a degree of clarity so that the other side 
would no longer fear that the USG position as formu- 
lated might subsequently be changed through recourse 
to Lodge's 'important differences of interpretation' 
clause , . , , 



Declassifled per Executive OrcJcr 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Pmject Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 \ 


"^. •..! said that if I recall correctly^ there vas 
a lull in bonibing flights in late October and early Novem- 
ber simply because of bad weather conditions^ and what 
appears to him to be an intensification of bombing may 
simply be a resumption of bombing to its nonaal level. 

"5* Eapacki responded that 'policy is more impor- 
tant than weather ' - . . • 

"6, .• .bombing against the vhole of NVU vas intensi- 
fied and also was more directed to Hanoi. KiiSj he added^ 
clearly appears to he provoking." 

* * . • 


December 7, 19^6 

Gronouski^s instructions for the first meeting are refined. He is 
to stick with Levandovski f s formulationj jjidicating its acceptability as 
a basis for negotiation even though subject to further elaboration and 
clarification as talks proceed. \le do not wish to reformulate it our- 
selves because we would have to take harder positions than Lewandowski * s 
if we were to be held to precise language and because any formulation 
attributable directly to us could be used to embarrass the GM or our 
relations with them. Gronouski is therefore to avoid being drawn out 

on specifies J though for purposes of illustration he may point to the 
following : 

1. In negotiating a bombing cessation (point 8)^ the Phase A - 
Phase B formula might be considered. 

ii. Changes in the governmental status quo would have to be made 
in accordance with the desires of the people of SW. Electoral procedxires 
or other arrangements cotild be ascertained through consultations and 
negotiations there (points 2 and 5). 

(!Ehe most contentious pointy he is warned^ is that calling for a 
change in status quo^ as it could m^an anything from putting the NLF 
into the government immediately to a simple endorsement of the election 
process under the Constitution then being drafted by the GW. Gronouski 
is to resist discussing this altogether.) 

He is to reassure the DRV that oar reservation about "differences of 
interpretation'' means only that complex matters are inevitably subject 
to clarification. For example j the phrase "long-term" in point 3 has been 
partially clarified by the 6 months provision of the Manila Comtnuniq^ue , 



Doclassifit'd per Executive Order 13526. Section 3,3 
NND Prajeci Number NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 2011 


¥e urge direct^ secret discussion with the DRV as a matter of the 
highest importance and urgency. We hope that the Poles have no idea of 
pajt;iGipating and Gronouski is to avoid further substantive discussions 
¥ith them if the DRV contact materializes. 

State 9T930 (Memhassy Warsaw) , TS/Nodis^ 

7 December I966 
Kef: Warsaw's I375 

"!• Your reference telegram will receive urgent 
consideration here tcmorrow and you will receive 
further guidance from us then. 

^'2. In the meantime^ you should take no further 
initiative with GOP, 

"3. In the unlikely event that^ before receiving 
further instructions ^ you should receive notice that 
HVI^I representative is ready and available for talks 
with us J we submit the following for your interim 

"i^. If such a meeting with FVW representative 
should occur J you should follow prior instructions. 
If desirable^ you are then authorized to read rpt read 
to him Levandowski ' s 10-point presentation of USG 
position as set forth at end of this cable ^ stressing 
that it is Lewandowski^s formulation. 

"5 ' You should then inquire whether points as 
presented ^y you are the same in all particulars as 
those passed on to Hanoi by Lewandovski. 

"6. For your information only^ one of our princi- 
pal conceiTis about the ten points is set forth in the 
next following paragraph^ but even if pressed you 
should avoid discussing the substantive problems re- 
lating to these points with the Wvll representative at this 
stage and stress that such discussions should be the 
subject of actual negotiations. We would assiune that 
WVDT representative would have no authority on this first 
contact to do more than report ycur presentation to 
Hanoi so we vould not anticipate such probing at this 
time. Further cable tomonrow will spell out our thinking 
in greater detail and may suggest initiative to be taken 
if you have heard nothing after additional lapse of time. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



"7* Lewandovski ' s point two relating to change of 
present status quo in SW is obviously most troublesome. 
^is point could be interpreted variously to mean (a) 
NLF must be put into government of South Vietnam forth- 
with or (b) simple endorsement, of election process under 
constitution now being drafted. If it is necessary to 
point out ambiguities in Lewandowski's statement^ however^ 
you should not refer to this point but allude to less 
contentious ambiguities elsewhere in statement, 

"8* Lewandowski's ten point statement follows: 

'1. I have insisted that the United States 
is interested in a peaceful solution through negotiations, 

'2- Negotiations shouJ-d not be interpreted as 
a way to negotiated sixrrender ^j those opposing the 
United States in Viet-Namt. A political negotiation would 
be aimed at finding an acceptable solution to all the 
problems J having in mind that the present status quo in 
South Viet- Nam would be changed in order to take into 
account the interests of the parties presently opposing 
the policy of the United States in South Viet-NarCj and 
that such a solution may be reached in an honorable and 
dignified way not detrimental to national pride and 
prestige. (FII: Lewandowski's original presentation 
states status quo 'm.ust' be changed but when Lodge 
questioned this point Lewandow^ski said he would be glad 
to change word from *must^ to Hjould'j EI^Ei Til). 

'3- That the United States are not interested 
from a point of view of its national interests in having 

. a pez^inanent or long term military in South 

Viet-Nam once a peaceful solution to the 

reached. Ihat is why the offer made in Manila regarding 
the withdrawal of U.S, troops and the liquidation of 
iimerican bases should be considered in all seriousness, 

^k* The United States would be ready , should 
other parties show a constructive interest in a nego- 
tiated settlement J to work out and to discuss with them 
proposals of such a settlement covering all important 
problems involved from a cease-fire to a final solution 
and wi-chdrawal of U. S. troops . 

'5* That the United States ^ within a general 
solution^ would not oppose the formation of a South 
Vietnajnese Government based on the true will of the 
Vietnamese people with participation of all through, free 
democratic elections ^ and that the United States would 


Declassifled per Executive OrcJcr 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



be prepared to accept the necessary control machinery 
to Eeciire the democratic and free character of such 
elections and to respect the results of such elections. 

'6- The United States held the viev that 
unification of Viet-Nam must he decided by the Viet- 
namese themselves for vhieh the restoration of peace 
and the formation of proper representative organs of 
the people in South Viet-Ham is a necessaiy condition. 

'7. The United States are ready to accept 
and respect a true and complete neutrality of South 

*8, 5he United States are prepared to stop 
the bombing of the territory of Forth Viet-Fam if this 
will facilitate such a peaceful solution. In doing so^ 
the United States are ready to avoid any appearance 
that North Viet-Nam is forced to negotiate by bombings 
or that North Viet-lTam have negotiated in exchange for 
cessation of bombing. Stopping of bombings vould not 
involve recognition or confirmation by North Viet-Nam 
that its aimed forces are or were infiltrating into 
South Viet-I^am.' 

"At this point you should interrupt recitation of 
Lewandovski's points and state as follows: QUOTE I^. 
Le'wandowski clearly implied to Ambassador Lodge that 
in Hanoi he had given his presentation in connection 
with the point on the bombing of North Viet-Nam in 
accordance with Ambassador Lodge's earlier formulation^ 
which was as follows: A package could be worked out 
which in its totality represented what both the United 
States and North Viet-Nam would agree to as a reasonable 
measure of de-escalationj but which would have two 
separate phases in its execution. Phase A would be a 
boabing suspension^ while Phase B^ which would follow 
after some adequate period ^ would see the execution of 
all the other agreed de-escalatory actions. North 
Vlet-r^am's actions taken in Phase B would appear to be 
in response to United States actions in Phase E rather 
than to the bombing suspension^ EEffi QUOTE. You should 
then resume the recitation of the ten points. 

'9- I have InforEned the proper governmental 
sources that at the same time^ the United States^ while 
not excluding the unification of Viet-Nam^ would not 
agree to unification under military pressure. 

^10, ^Jhlle the United States are seeking a 
peaceful solution to the conflict^ it would be unreal^ 
istic to expect that the United States will declare 


TOP SECHET - rroDis 

Declassifled per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



now or in the future its acceptance of TTorth Viet-Nan's 
four or five points.^ (EM) OF EWAITOOVSKI'S ST^'EEME^TT) 

"9» If N"^^ representative probes further on 
cessation of bombing^ you should merely state that 
as you have already indicated Mr, Levandovski has 
suggested a possible procedure for agreeing on phasing 
and timing which could be the subject of later 
discussions ." 


State 9875^ (to Amembassy Warsaw )j ffi/llodis 

7 December I966 
Eef: State 97930 

"1- If a meeting vith the ITorth Vietnamese is 
arranged J you should proceed in accordance with 
instructions contained in State 96235 and State 95711 
except as modified belov. As regards the presenta- 
tion to the JTorth Vietnamese representative of our 
position^ you should follov closely the following 

^a. Lewandowski has informed us of his 
discussions with your government in Hanoi and of the 
position he conmunicated to them as that of the U,S,^ 
based on Levandowski's prior oral discussions with 
Ambassador Lodge in Saigon. Ve assume that his dis- 
cussions in Hanoi were conducted entirely orally as 
they were with Lodge in Saigon and that no pieces of 
paper have been exchanged which purport to state 
governmental positions. We are prepared to enter 
into direct disciissions with yo^or government on the 
basis of the position which Lewandowski has informed 
us he presented to your government in Hanoi* 

'b. The position was stated to us by Lewan- 
dowski as follows: (Here you should read the ten 
points as contained in State 979 30 j para 8 with the 
additional point about bombing covered uner Point 8), 

*Co We wish to emphasise that this language 
is that of Lewandowski and not that of the United States • 
Kevertheless it presents a general statement of the US 
position on the basis of which we would be prepared to 
enter into direct discussions,' 



Declassifled per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Prnject Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



"2- FII The North Vietnamese aM perhaps the Poles 
as veil appear to be seeking a reformulation of our 
position in order to compare it vith vhat Lewandowski 
ha^ said, v/hile we are entirely prepared to have Lewan- 
dlovski's formulation stand as ^presenting a general 
statement of the US position^' we are anxious to avoid 
a restatement of our position in our o"^m words because 
(a) this vould oblige us to take some harder positions 
than those put forward by Lewandovski which apparently 
have gone far enough to make the Horth Vietnamese ready 
to consider talking vith us and (b) any formulation 
which can be attributed directly to us could be used 
to embarrass the GVK or to embarrass us in our relations 
with them. In other words ^ if we stand on Levandowski^s 
formulation thi'ough the first step in discussions with 
the North Vietnamese ^ we can always say with regard to 
any specific point that we don't accept just those words 
used by Lewatidowski and thus maintain some room for 
maneuver at least until we know the discussions are 
really under way. EMD FIX. 

"3- After reading the ten points you should point 
out to the J^orth Vietnamese that some matters j because 
of their complexity aixL the danger of varying interpreta- 
tiotij would be the subject of further elaboration by us 
as soon as discussions were to get under way- One of 
these has to do with the package agreement containing the 
so-called phases A and B vith respect to bombing and a 
program of de-escalation. The second relates to certain 
points which directly involve matters of basic concern 
to the people of South Viet-^Nam (as for example points 
2 and 5)* Vlhatever detailed arrangements are made on 
those matters would have to be acceptable to the South 
Vietnamese people; however ^ this could be ascertained 
tha^ough consultations and negotiations there* 

^'k. If the I^Torth Vie t name se refer to the earlier . 
point made by us that several specific points are sub- 
ject to important differences of interpret at ion ^ you 
should explain that this is not intended to suggest that 
the statement as it stands is any less a general state- 
ment of the U»S^ position but rather that it is inevitable 
with matters as complex and controversial as those covered 
in the ten points that they would be subject to interpre- 
tation and that their clarification would be the noimal 
function of the discussions which we hope ve will be 
embarking on. If the l^orth Vietnamese press for an 
Illustration you might refer to the phrase 'long-term' 
in Point 3^ noting that it was specifically to clarify 
this point that the I/ianila Communique specified a six- 
month period. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND G3316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


"5- otherwise you should be guided in your 
discussion with the ETortli Vietnamese "by the limi- 
tation set forth in para 6 of State 97930^ stress^ 
ing that fxirther discussion of substantive questions 
should be the subject of the actual direct negotia- 
tions vhich ve hope can be got under way promptly. 


In conclusion you should say that yoiir 
governinent is prepared to enter into secret dis- 
cussions with the ETorth Vietnataese Governmant at 
any time and "^e regard this as a matter of the 
highest importance and urgency. 

''T* We understand from your latest repoi'ts 
that the next stepj if all goes wellj vill be the 
opening of the direct discussions with the Forth 
Vietnamese and if this in fact materialities you 
should avoid any further substantive discussions 
vith the Poles, Vfej of course j are anxious for 
direct and private discussions vith the ITorth Viet 
name 3 e and hope that the Poles have no idea of 
participating therein." 

• A • 


Dec^^ber 8, I966 

Rusk and Katzenbach reiterate ouj: willingness to consider a 
bombing cessation or other de-escalatory measures on terms previously 
indicated J but not as a precondition for talks. If Eapacki threatens 
to interrupt the contact over this issue ^ he is to be 'warned the 
responsibility for the breakdown will be his. 

State 9S924 C"*^o Amembassy Warsaw)^, TS/iTodis^ 

8 December I966 
For Mbassador Gronouski from Katsenbach 

"1. In response to Eapacki's statements reported 
in your 139^** -you should remind Papacki that the sub- 
ject of bombing was one of the matters discussed in 
Hanoi by Lewandowski and that ve are prepared to pursue 
this matter with the -forth Vietnamese in the same tenns 
vhich \ie, affirmed to him. You should read reference on 
package contained in paragraph 3 of Levandowski's 10 
points (state 97930) to remind him of Levandowski's 
statement to Lodge ^ You should underline that inherent 
in this formulation is the paci^age approach to de- 




Declassiflecl per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


"2. If Eapacki attempt to nail us to anythim 
on bombing beyond our first contact with the Jorth 
Vietnamese J or again threatens to break off tiie 
ope rat ion J you should infora him in no uncertain 
terms that if he maintains this position he will 
have to accept the full responsibility for the 
breakdo^'m of what appears to us to be a promising 
possibility for peace." 


Taipei 10T2 (to SecState)^ TS/Nodis^ 

8 December 1966 
Ref: TOSEC 6^ 
FOR the Acting Secretary from the Secretary 


» • • • 

1 do not believe we should be drawn into 
conunitments about our o>ni military operations with- 
out some Indication from the other side as to what 
they are going to do about their military operations 
Ifevertheless^ we should be ready to discuss this 
problem alongside or before a broader discussion 
of political matters." 

* » • 


December 6- 9^ I966 

Eapacki protests the differences of interpretation" clause and 
the bombing of Hanoi in a strong demarche to Fanfani and^ through 
Lewandowskij to D^Orlandi and hence Lodge in Saigon. Hanoi cannot be 
expected to enter discussions in the face of such "escalation/' 
Fanfani on the one hand urges Eapacki to go ahead and arrange the 
contact in ¥arsaw^ on the other instructs D'Orlandi to convey the 
message to Rusk (then in Saigon) and to seek a reply. 

At their meeting on Dacember 8^ D'Orlandi tells Lewandowski that 
no contact has yet taken place because of Eapacki *s apparent refusal 
to convey the US message to Hanoi. He is apparently unaware that the 
message was passed December 6. 

On December 9j Eusk asks D'Orlandi to tell Lewandowski and Fanfani 
that we are in direct touch with Eapacki on both points. He adds that 
bombing can be the first topic for discussion^ if this is of especial 
concern to Hanoi. 





DtcJassificd per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Prtjject Niimben NND 63316. By: NWD Diite: 201 1 


D'Orlandi gives the following as vievs of LevELadowski : 

i. Clarifications prereqiiisite to the Warsaw contact should 
occur in Saigon j vith a Levandowski visit to Hanoi immediately possible 
if needed. Thus D'Orlandi surmises that Eapacki's taking over this 
phase may bs an effort ^'to "be clever and get the U.S. to withdraw 
"all reservations" before the contact is made. 

ii. De-escalation is a difficult topic to start on. It is 
more promising to look for a final package. This might be a cabinet 
of Ik positions J 2 each for the Ky Group and the NLFj the remaining 
10 for "neutrals or whatever." (This is the formula proposed by 
Lewandowski September 18.) 

lii. During November 16-30^ when Lewandovrski was in Hanoi^ ba-ubing 
appeared to be at a reduced level at least in the Eanoi area. Tais was 
interpreted in Hanoi as a tacit signal of US support for Lewandowski 's 
mission, (fffi. in fact^ these were the first two weeks of ET 52- 
Presumably^ weather accounts for the lack of action against targets 
near Hanoi. ) 

Eusk stresses to D'Orlandi several times that the USG is indicating 
its position with no reciprocity from Ifenoi or even assurance of how 
Lewandowski has presented the points to Hanoi. D'Orlandi urges "a little 
faith in Lewandowski," He himself completely credits Lewandowski ^s 
claim to have gotten Hiaci Van Dong to obtain Presidium agreement to the 
Warsaw contact. 

Saigon 12953 (to SecState)^ TS/Nodis^ o December 1966 

'*D*Orlandi asked to see Secretary and Ambassador 
this evening following dinner party in Secretary's 
honor. Conversation w^as a follows: 

"1. Lewandowski had cs-lled urgently on D'Orlandi 
evening of December 8^ on instructions ^ to express 
grav^e concern that U,S* had carried out heavy bombing 
attacks in Hanoi area on December 2 and December k^ 
directly following December 1 conversation between 
Lewandowski and Lodge. Lewandowski conveyed lurid 
reports from Polish attache Hanoi alleging that 
December 2 attack had Included bombing and machine- 
gunning within city ax^ea and I^d caused 6C0 casualties. 
December h attack also described as serious and in 
Hanoi area. Lewandowski protested to D'Orlandi - urgin 
htm to convey message to Lodge and to Secretary if 
possible " that such attacks could only threaten or 
destroy possibility of contact in Vfersaw. Lewandow^ski 

argued that Hanoi could not be exnected to enter 



nccbsslfied per Execuiive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Dale: 201 1 



discussions in face of such escalation, (Wiile vhole 
tenor of message vas extremely strong^ Lex^randa^^ski 
did not repeat not state that hs was actually report- 
ing Hanoi *s expressions of vieVj hut rather ¥arsav 


^'2- D'Orlandi had responded to Lewandowski that 
no contact had in fact taken place as yet because of 
apparent refussJ. of Eapacki to convey firm message ^ 
that U*S, had taken forthcoming action in declaring 
itself ready for discussions and prepared to make 
contact on December 6; and that it was thus not fair 
to say possibility of contact destroyed by U,S. action 
D^Orlandi went on to say that his hope had been to 
make contact in any event. 

"3, In addition to Lewandowski message December 
8 J D'Orlandi had just received cable from Fanfanij on 
evening December 9j reporting that Eapacki had sent 
Fanfani strong demarche protesting U, S, insistence on 
reservations of interpretationj and further protesting 
U,S, bombing attacks. In this cable^ Fanfani had 
instructed D'Orlandi to convey substance of message to 
Secretary^ if possible^ and ask for reply- Fanfani 
had also included in the cable statement that he him- 
self had replied to Rapacki urging that he go ab.ead 
and arrange contact nonetheless- 


4* Secretary responded to D'Orlandi as follows: 

A, He asked D'Orlandi to tell Lewandowski 
that we were in direct touch with Rapacki on the 
points raised , , . , 

B, D'Orlandi should reply to Fanfani with 
same first pointy adding that if Hanoi was concerned 
about bombing^ this could be first topic in discussions <*» . 

*'5* During course of conversation j D'Orlandi pro- 
vided following additional conjecture and infonnatioa: 

A, D'Orlandi was fairly sure that Lewandowski 
had wished ¥arsaw contact to take place ^ with any points 
requiring clarification to be explored through tripartite 
talks in Saigon and possible Lewandowski further visit 
to Hanoi (which Levandov/ski had also suggested D'Orlandi 
as immediate possibility), D'Orlandi therefore surmised 
that Kapacki had 'tried to be clever' and get U.S. to 
withdraw all reservations before contact made. (U.S, 
side at no time conf ironed that this was in fact exactly 
what Eapacki had said in Warsaw.) Secretary suggested 



Declassifled per Executive OrcJcr 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 


that - in light of prior expressed statement that Soviets 
informed - Eapacki actions might have heen dictated from 
Moscov. D^Orlandi expressed doubt^ on basis his reading 
of LewandotTslsLi attitude and reirarks by Levandav/ski about 
Rapacki over a period of time, flatter was dropped at 
this point. 

B, , . *Lewandowskl had particularly expounded 
to him diffictilties he saw in getting discussions started 
on reciprocal actions in connection with bombing. Hence, 
at D*Orlandi's suggestion Lewandovski had started to vork 
out hovr sitiiation in SVTJ might look one or two years hence 
and might be described in acceptable form to Hanoi and 
Washington^ so that in effect a package deal would emerge. 
D^Orlandi stated that, when he asked Levandovski just 
vhat kind of role VC might have - would it be like Czecho- 
slovakiaj or what - Lewandowski had come up with sample 
formula of Ik cabinet positions with 2 each for present 

Ky Group and VC/KLF, and remaining 10 allotted to 'neutrals 
or whatever.* (This is of course fonnula given by D'Orlandi 
to Harrimanj as D*Orlandi<s o^^mj in Rome conversation in 
early HoYember.) 

C, In connection with 2fe.noi attitudes on U.S. 
bombing of ITorthj Lewandowskl had told D*Orlandi that he 
"believed Hanoi had attached significance to fact that 
during the two weeks Levandowski had been in Hanoi (approxi- 
mately November I6-30} bombing had appeared to be at 
reduced level at least in Hanoi ai^ea. D'Orlandi said 
Lewandowski thought Hanoi had interpreted this as tacit 
signal of U.S. support for Lewandowski mission. 

^^6. Secretary several times pointed out that whole 
episode to this point vas unique in that we were acting 
on. Lewandowski f£ statement of U.S. position without any 
clear indication whatever of Iianoi position, or even an^^ 
assurance Lewandowski had discussed points with Hanoi in 
manner covered by statement. L^Orlandi appeared to 
accept that we had indeed taken forthcoming attitude in 
view of these circimistanceSj although he himself stressed 
view that one had to have a little faith in Lewandowski^ 
and he appeared to credit completely Lewandowski claim 
that he had finally got Fnam Van Dong to obtain Presidium 
agreement to Warsaw contact/' 

. • . * 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


December 9^ I966 

In Warsaw^ Gronouski assures the Poles that the Levandotrski fonuu- 
lation is consistent vith our vie^rs^ that he ^'assumes" Phase A - Phase B 
de-escalation formula is the "new package deal^^ the Poles believe Lodge 
to have promised ^ and that the pattern of cur bombing is not related to 
the projected US-DHV contact. 

Eapacki is satisfied with respect to the interpretation clause* 
He rejects de-escalation as too narrow a pac^ge but blurs the issue 
by suggesting that "de-escalation'' may be US shorthand for a deal 
including all outstanding issues. 

On the bombingj he is adamant in his dissatisfaction. He reads 
what he says is a November 1^ statement by Lodge ^ declaring USG 
willingness to hear suggestions on "practical measures^* it might take 
to show its good intentions and allay the distrust the IfLF and Hanoi 
may have of it. He feels the Pole^s bombing suggestions were not 
received in this spirit- He implies that Lodge's statement was not 
conveyed to Hanoi, 

As Gronouski found no threat to break off the talks ^ he did not 
issue the warning on his instructions of December 3. 

Warsaw 11^^21 (to SecState)^ TS/l^TodiSj 9 December I966 
Section 1 of 2 
Ref : State 9892!^ 

"1. Met Eapacki at my request at I6OO Dec 9, 
Michalowski and Jancsewski present, 

'^2, ity opening reniarkSj based on reftel^ were 
as follows : 

A. J, have requested today's meeting as a 
result of consultations I have had with Vashlngtcn 
since oar meeting Wednesday afternoon. 

B» I can now assure you that at the time 
of the first Warsaw mseting with representatives of 
the Iforbh Vietnamese Government j I will be prepared 
to confirm to the INl^ Go^/i: the position of the USG 
with respect to negotiations. I can also assure you 
that this confirmation will be consistent with the 
discussions Mr. Lewandowski had with them and with us. 

C. ¥ith respect to the question you raised 
Wednesdajv- on bombing^ I can state flatly that the 
pattern of our bombing in ]\n/TJ has nothing to do with 
with the current efforts of the Polish and USG's to 
get underway the projected US-tlW talks 



Declassifled per Executive OrcJcr 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



D, You vill recall that the sul^ject of bombing 
IWTf was one of the imtters discussed in Hanoi by Mr. 
Levandowski. After his return froi]i Eanoi Mr. Levandovski 
clearly implied to Amb Lodge that he had discussed this 
matter In Hanoi in accordance with Amb Lodge's earlier 
formulation. Amb Lodge had suggested that a package 
could be vorked out.... Inherent in this forraulation is 
the package approach to de-escalation which I assume you 
had in mind vhen you referred to ^a nev package deal' 
during our conversation last T^uesday," 

. V a * 

"3 * Eapacki responded . . • . " 

"J+» . , .vith respect to my first point (presentation 
of USG negotiating position to WVIf) he said if this is 
done in a way which vill dispel doubt on invoking interpre- 
tation clause J then one of the difficulties has been reduced, 

"5- On bombing guestioUj he said. * .bombing was 
clearly intensified at tlie precise tiiae it would create 
provocation. • , . 

"6. Rapacki read what he said was Nov. Xk statement 
by Lodge : USG understands that the Liberation Front and 
Hanoi have deep-seated distrust of USG; that is why USG 
is willing to take practical measures to show good 
intentions J and would be willing to hear any suggestions. 
Rapacki said this statement by Lodge was treated as 
addressed 'only to Polish ears^ ' adding Poles have been 
proved right in treating it so because in the case of 
their b 0:11b ing suggestion they have not found such readi- 
ness to listen to suggestions as Lodge indicated » 

"T* Eapacki expressed concern over my use of term 
Me-escalation^ ^ noting that Lodge said Washington was 
convinced that not much can be accomplished in getting 
talks under way with partial de-escalation. He said 
lodgers accent was on the package deal which would cover 
all problems J including withdrawal of US troops. If my 
use of de-escalation represents a short- cat for a package 
deal including cessation of hostilities and the resolution 
of a variety of other outstanding problems ^ then his 
concern over my use of the term is simply a matter of 
semantics. Ha asked if ir^^ use of the term was consistent 
with Lodgers declaration on a package deaL" 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Project Number NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



¥arsair lUl2 (to SecState)^ 9 December I966 
Section 2 of 2 

"8. I sal3 I did not clearly rnderatand vhat he 
¥as driving at "but referred to my opening text and 
pointed out that the degree or manner of de-escalation, 
is not subject to unilateral determination. I said 
that this -would have to be resolved in negotiating 
sessions between the U3G and JTOI. . , " 


« a • 

*^1T* Ccmnient: Hapacki's position was much less 
intransigent toiay than during Dec 7 meeting » I thought 
it significant that when I stressed importance of initi- 
ating talks Mchalowskij Eapaclii's major adviser on 
Vietnam war^ nodded his head affirmatively three or four 
times. Because I found no threat to break off talks 
that was implied Dec 7^ I did not use para 2 of reftel/' 


De cember I Q, 1956 

Rusk and Gronouski are informed that Washington does not wish to 
withdraw authorization for RT 52 at this time. It is anticipated j 
therefore^ that some targets may be hit which Rapacki will insist reflect 
further escalation. 

State 10062^ (to Amembassy Saigon)^ TS/l^'odis 

10 December I966 
Eef : A. Saigon 12953 

B, Warsaw 1^21 

C, Warsaw 1^22 

For Secretary from Katzenbach 

4 * 

"2» On the bombing pointy you should teow that 
R2^-52 stands as it was at time of your depart lore from 

Washington and targets earlier set anide rems-in in 
suspense. '' 




Declassified per Executive OrcJcr 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 




state 10067 (to Amembassy Warsaw )j TS/Kodis 

10 Dacember I966 
Bef : A. Vfarsav 1^21 
B. Warsaw 1422 

« a * 

'%. FYI only (rpt. FYI only). You should be aware 
that for the immediate future the bombing pattern vill 
remain unchanged from ^irhat it has been over the past 
several veeks. This may well involve some targets which 
Eapacki will insist represent further escalation^ just 
as in the past he took to be escalation certain varia- 
tions in our bombing pattern which in fact represented 
no real new departures in the pattern as a whole* With 
foregoing in mind you should avoid giving Poles even 
any slight indications which they mi^t take to mean 
that we are escalating or de-^escalating at present- 
Present bombing pattern has been authorized for scms titne 
and we do not wish to withdraw this authorization at 
this time." 

• « 


December 13^ I966 

Eapacki quotes a US Navy spokesman as saying that new targets have 
recently been placed on the bombing list^ adding "you can assume what 
effects such statements have in Hanoi^ given the fact that in recent 
weeks new targets have in fact been added/' He again urges restraint 
in bombingj arguing that overt pressure "will be utilized by all those 
who have a different vision of this peace move than we have here in 
Warsaw • " 

Warsaw 1458 (to SecState}^ TS/i^odis^ I3 December I966 
Section 1 of 2 
Eef ; Warsaw l'+29 

4 4 

"8, Bapacki added that we shc^aid realise that 
leadership of DE1T^/J[ does n^t want to and cannot yield 
under pressure; every step tvo^ our side that evokes 
impression that W^ is acting under pressure would be 
interpreted as sls^n of weakness and be utilised by all 
those who have a different vision of this peace move 
than we have here in Warsaw. (Comment; Sapacki 
repeated this point with emphasis and was^ I belie vej 
making a clear reference to Communist China.) 



D€cJassifit^d per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Diite: 20 11 


"9- Eapackl said that in first position expressed 
by Lodf^e it appeared that this truth was grasped by USG 
and this Is why Poles were so hopeful. However the 
events of Deceinber mean^ if the working hypothesis Poles 
are using is sound ^ that US does not fully appreciate 
this situation. He added that recent statements by USG 
officials leave the impression that USG- wants to evoke 
pressure. He quoted from Renter news stoiy of Dec 12 
US ITavy spokesman's statement that US intends gradually 
to increase air raids oa '^M; Rapacki interjected at this 
point his realization that Navy spokesman may not have 
known all that was going on and this coxxld very well be 
an old Idea, Bit he added that the Navy spokesman's sub- 
sequent reference to escalation and to new targets having 
been recently placed on bombing list represented current 
information* He said 'you can assume what effects such 
statements have in Hanoi, given the fact that in recent 
weeks new targets have in fact been added. ^" 


December 13- IJ^^, I966 

The Yen Vien Railroad Yard and Van Dien Tehicle Depot are bombed. 
They are both 5 nautical miles from the center of Hanoi j and have been 
struck previously. Tass cla^ias^ in addition^ that residential areas 
in Hanoi and its suburbs were hit. 

A later US official investigation shows that only these targets 
were intended, but it is possible that US ordnance fell within the Hanoi 
city limits by accident. 

State IO35S6 (to ^embassy Warsaw) ^ s/NodiSj 
15 December I566 

* * • 

"2. .., Washington approval of targets including 
high level review by Defense and State is required and 
takes into consideration location of targets with 
respect to population centers in effort to minimize 
civilian casualties. T^ype3 of targets struck have 
included lines of communication^ bridges ^ POL storage , 
selected thei^nal power plants , militaiy installations^ 

and anti-aircraft missile sites and missile facilities 
that are a threat to o^ar aircraft. 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND G3316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


"3* Latest strikes near Hanoi were Yen Vien 
railroad yard ^M Van Dien vehicle depot ^ vhich are 
5 nautical miles northeast and south of Hanoi 
respect ively_^ and well outside of Hanoi city iDjnits, 
Both of these targets were struck on December 13 
and 1^ but this was not first time in either case,*.. 

"4, [Eass alleges our aircraft bombed built-up 
area of Hanoi at west end of Bed River bridge and 
suburb of Dhatran to the southwest (have been unable 
locate Dhatraa on any map). Hanoi has made similar 
charge. We have not received complete reports; how- 
ever ^ nothing in reports so far to substantiate this 
and area alleged to have been attacked nowhere near 
areas targetted for attack. It is important to note 
that there was heavy SA^-l^ anti-aircraft and MIG 
activity and our aircraft took action against SM 
sites. Qiiite a number of SAt^ were fired at our air- 
craft; errant SATls or anti-aircraft shells of course 
could cause damage . 

^ • ft . * . 

(e) There is no basis for charging us with 
escalation of conflict over past few daySj either in 
geographic terms or as to t^'pes of targets. Hanoi's 
FOL facility three nautical miles from center of Hanoi 
was struck on June 29^ and FOL facilities on edge of 
Haiphong were struck June 29 j July T and August 2, Two 
targets of December Ik are both five nautical miles 
from Hanoi's center (farther than June 29 strikes); both 
had been struck earlier." 

. . 4 

"(f) .... In comparable periods of good 
weather^ e,g.^ November 22 and 23^ December 2j 3^ k and 
5; and Dec 13-1^ essentially same type of targets were 
struck^ Some intensity of air activity in and around 
Hanoi took place as has frequently been the case for at 
least six months . . * . " 




Declassified per Execuiive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Projeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 201 1 

State 106358 (to Amenibassy Warsaw)^ 21 December 1966 

* • * 

**1. Our investigation of allegata bombing in Hanoi has 
been thorough, The only targets vere military ones more 
than five miles from tlie Ifenol city center. However we 
cannot rule out completely the possibility of an accident. 
Any US ordnance that may have fallen within the Hanoi city 
limits was the result of such an accident/^ 


December ik^ I966 

State does not interpret Rapacki^s December I3 statement as a nega- 
tive reply from Hanoi ^ closing the Marigold door. It Is^ however ^ now 
Inclined to wonder whether the Poles ever had a commitment from the DEV 
for the Warsaw contact. In any case^ further conversations in Warsaw 
are to have two objectives: 

i. Keeping the door open for talks to develop, 

ii. lettii^ the record show our persistent efforts to move 
forward J while refuting Polish contentions that our actions and state- 
ments blocked the opening of conversations. 

Gronouski is therefore instmcted to make the follow^ing points to 
Papacki : 

i. Military" actions oj both sides were taking place througihout 
the conversations in Sai^oriT 

ii. As soon as the US began talking with the Poles preparatory 
io meeting with the DEV^ new terms and conditions were put forward 
for opening the talks , 

iii. We are now confused about what reflects the views of Hanoi j 

as opposed to the Polish Government. Direct contact is needed, 

iv. To leave no stone unturned^ we suggest taking up de-escalation 
along the lines of the Phase A.- Phase B formula ^ as a manageable opening 
piece of the total picture. 

V. If the other side prefers^ though^ we will start at the other 
end^ looking first at possible terms of an agreed settlement, 

vi. Eapackl is to be warned that he will bear full responsibility 
if Polish obstructionism prevents the contact, 

^^ile these instructions are en route ^ however j Gronouski is 
summoned by Rapacki to learn that the DRV has asked for all conversations 
to be terminated. The "brutal raid on the residential area in Hanoi 


Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 201 1 



precisely at the moment vhen the USC- knev that the matter of a Varsa-vr 
contact with Hanoi was actively "being considered" is the reason, 
Eapacki claims that immediately after the Poles transmitted "a direct ^ 
positive response from Hanoi ahout the possihllity of talks in VarsaVj 
-•-the USG reserved the possibility of modifying its attitude and^ of 
far greater Importance^ entered a new stage of escalation/' 

Gronouski appeals to the President* If the newspaper accounts of 
the Hanoi raids are true^ "then ve are in an incredibly difficixlt 
position. I am convinced that if this represents the breakdown of the 
current peace initiative- . -the Soviets , the Poles and the Worth Vietna- 
mese T?ill have no trouble convincing the leadership in eveiy capital 
of the world that our stated desire for peace negotiations is insincere 
.-•• We have no choice but to take iinmediate action to tiy to get dis- . 
cussions back on the track." 

He proposes J therefore j to accept Eapacki 's reasoning: to give 
no impression of bombing intensification during the negotiations about 
opening talks in Warsav — in particular ^ to halt bombing near Hanoi 
and Haiphong, 'Ve would again express our deep desire for the initia- 
tion of talks and ask the Poles to continue their efforts," 

Thus just as Gronouski is ordered to launch a pre--emptive offensive^ 
he is himself recommending retreat. 

State 162295 (to Amembassy PiffilS) TS/Uodis 
I4 December I9 66 

For the Secretary from the Acting Secretary 
Eef : SEGTO 62 

"I do not rpt not interpret Hapacki's statement of 
December I3 to Gronouski as a negative reply from Hanoi in 
effect closing the ferigold door- Firm instructions are 
being prepared for Gronouski designed to keep the dialogue 

going J while at the same time making a clear record of the 
legitimacy of our participation in the MAEIGOID effort 
since its inception." 

• '•'*• 


State IC2960 (to Amembassy Warsaw). TS/lfodis 
Ik December I966 

Eef : Warsaw 1429 

(info to Amembassy Paris & Saigon: Paris for Secretary 

E^es Only; Saigon for Ambassador Porter Only) 

"1, *,-, In light of Polish tactics we are now 
inclined to wonder whether they ever had any WM 

.commitment to a meeting in Warsaw or whether it is 
not more likely that they have been engaging in an 
effort to get us committed to something as close as 
possible to our maximum position and then see whether 
they could get Hanoi lined up to talk on that basis. 
In any event we must bear two following objectives 
in mind in further conversations with Poles on this 



Declassifit'd per Executive Order 13526. Section 3,3 
NND Prujeci Number NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 2011 



(a) We msan to keep the door open as long 
as there seems to be any possibility of talks develop- 
ing ^ but at the same time sticking to our position as 
generally represented by Levandovrski's 10 points j and 

(b) We sincerely want to begin substantive 
talks and the record shoizld clearly show our persistent 
efforts to move forv^ard and that Polish contention that 
our actions and statements have thrown roadblock in the 
way of opening -of conversations in Warsaw are thoroughly 
refuted . 

"2* Therefore you should ask fox further meeting 
with Eapacki and present him with following full state- 
ment of our position at present time: 

(a) You should first review history of 
Lodge-D'Orlandi-Lsvandowskl conversations starting with 
Kovember ll|^~15 conversations in Saigon 

(b) You should then point out to Papacki 
that before J during and after all this was taking place ^ 
the conflict in Viet- Nam continued^ including the 
bombing of North Viet-Nam^ the infiltration of North 
Vietnamese men and supplies into South Viet-Hamj Viet 
Cong terrorist bcmbingSj assassinations^ kidnappings ^ 

e u c • • c , 

(c) As soon as we began to talk with the 
Polish Goverrjnent in Warsaw^ presumably preparatory to 
our meeting directly with the North Vietnamese repre- 
sentatives ^ we found that new teims and conditions 
seemed to be put forward with the opening of direct 
talks contingent on our f ulf iUin,^ them. . . . 

(d) But our desire is to move toward peace 
and our conviction is that the best road to take is one 
of direct discussion with Hanoi^s representatives. We 
are somewhat confused as a result of the conversations 
in Warsaw as to what Hanoi has said and what represents 
the views of Polish Governments Our strong impression 
is that J in spite of our readiness both In Saigon with 
Lewandawski and now in Warsaw to present quite fully 
and frankly our posit ion ^ we have not received any 
communication at all froni the North Vietnamese Govern- 
ment , , . , 



DtcJassifit^d per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
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(e) Nevertheless ve want to leave no stone 
unturned in our search for peace and vould like to 
turn for a moment from the total picture to one sec- 
tor of it in which coaceivably ve might begin to move 
!Hiis is with respect to the possible beginning of de- 
escalation through a two-'ohased arram^ement referred 
to in Lewandowski's eighth point.... Perhaps the 
coining holidays and the truces associated with thenij 
offer an opportune occasion to take some useful steps 
along these lines; this in turn shoiild make it easier 
for the authorities in Hanoi to proceed then to dis- 
cuss other matters standing between us and a peaceful 

(f ) On the other handj if they wish to 
proceed promptly to a total agreement representing 
the terms of an agreed settlement j we are prepared to 
move along that track including de-escalation as the 
final item, (FII: In other words we will start at 
either end of a total agreement, EMD FIX) 

(g) You should conclude your statement of 
our position with the language contained in para 2 
of State 9892^^- J leaving Eapacki in no doubt that we 
have done ever^rthing possible to open up the way to 
peaceful settlement and we are very much disturbed at 
our having been unable to move for^^a2rd at Warsaw as 
we had been led to expect from the earlier conversa- 
tions in Saigon." 


Warsaw 11^71 (to SecState)^ TS/Kodis, 

15 Decembler I966 
For the President from Ambassador Gronouski 

"1, I met with Eapacki (Michalowski and Janczew- 
ski present) at Poles* request at ISOO Dec 1^!-, (in 
contrast to previous meetings^ Hapacki entered the 
room unsmiling^ and during entire meeting maintained 
a calirij serious and matter-of-fact attitude.) 


2- Eapacki said that first he would like to 
bring some precision with respect to our conversation 
of yesterday (V^arsav ItjS). He said that this con- 
versation took iDlace before Poles were aware of last 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


bombing of Hanoi. He said^ 'If I had had this news then^ 
our eouversation of course would have had different 
character than it did.' 

^^3* Eapacki continued^ 'Today I must state the 
follcn^ing facts. First j that the U.S. had to be con- 
scious of and realize the importance of establishing 
direct contact vith Hanoi,' He added^ 'You had stressed 
the unique possibility of a peaceful settlement that the 
Warsaw talks vith Hanoi presented,' He continued ^ 'We 
thought so too J ever since ve obtained the signal for 
vhich the USG had asked for for so long in so many 
official statements.' He added^ 'In this instance we 
received more than a signal; we received a direct ^ 
positive response from Hanoi about the possibility of 
talks In Warsaw,' 

"t, Eapacki said that immediately after this dir- 
ect response was transmitted to the USG the US reserved 
the possibility of modifying their attitude and^ of far 
greater importance j entered a new stage of escalation. 

"5- Rapacki continued that the USG was bound to 
be conscious of the reaction which its conduct would 
evoke and of the consequences of such action. He added 
that the Poles have done everything in their power to 
dispel any illusions^ noting that on six occasions in 
Warsaw and Saigon^ *We have warned the USG- side in all 
seriousness ar,d with the greatest emphasis of the conse- 
guences of their actions.' 

"6- 'Yesterday/ Hapacki continued, 'The US Air 
Force engaged in a new and particularly brutal raid on 
the residential area in Hanoi precisely at the moment 
when the USG knew that the matter of a T-Farsaw contact 
with Hanoi was actively being considered. This^^ he 
added J «was the last drop that spilled over the cup. 
From the moment^ in Hanoi and Warsaw^ all doubts as to 
the real Intentions of the USG disappeared ^ including 
doubts not only in the present case but with respect to 
all other instances in the past when the US has advanced 
positions which it has described as peaceful initiatives.' 

"T* Papacki then said^ 'We understand therefore and 
fully share the wish of the Leraocratic Republic of Worth 
Vietnam J which was transmitted to us today j that we 
terminate all conversations begun months ago in Saigon. 
The Polish Go^^i: states that the whole responsibility for 
losing this chance of a peaceful solution to the Vietnam 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Nutnber: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


var rests on the USG.' He added^ 'I vould like to 
express nore than regrets because of the utilization 
by the USG of our good will. Once again it "becomes 
clear how difficult it is to believe in your words.* 
He added^ ^In future only facts can be taken into 
consideration. ' 

"8, I said that I would have no comment except 
to say that I regretted this turn of events and would 
inimed lately convey these observations to ¥ashington. 

"9* Comment: If Moscow dateline account of 
latest Hanoi bombing published in Dec 1^ Paris edition 
of New York Times and Herald Tribune ^ and recounted 
to me tonight by Eapackij is true then we are in an 
incredibly difficult position. I am convinced that 
if this represents the breakdown of the current peace 
initiative — and it surely does unless we take deci- 
sive and Immediate action — then the Soviets ^ the 
Poles and the North Vietnamese will have no trouble 
convincing the leadership in every capital of the 
world that our stated desire for peace negotiations 
is insincere. If we treat this turn of events as any- 
thing less than a crisis in our worM leadership role 
then I believe we are making a tragic mistake. 

"10. I am convinced that up till now the Poles ^ 
accepting the genuineness of our interest in negotia- 
tion^ have used whatever influence they have in Hanoi 
(in all likelihood with Soviet backing) in an effort 
to initiate US-ITV?! peace talks , I also am convinced 
that Rapacki was expressing genuine concern when he 
warned that the increase in bombing was destroying 
what appeared to him a good chance that WTi^ would over 
come Chinese influence and encase in Warsaw talks. 


"11. We have no choice but to take immediate 
action to try to get discussions back on track. For 
any chance ox" success this would requirej in my judg- 
ment^ conveying to Poles that we are willing to accept 
Bapacki's Dec I3 reasoning (iv'arsaw 1^58) and are pre- 
pared now to assure the Poles that we will take care 
not to create impression of bombing intensification 
in DA/II during the period of delicate negotiations over 
the holding of Warsaw USG-l^IVIT peace talks. We would 
also assirre the Poles that we do not intend to bomb in 
the immediate vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong during 
this period. We would again express our deep desire 
for the initiation of talks and ask the Poles to con- 
tinue their efforts." 

a . • « 




Declassifled per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
KND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



Decemljer 1^^ I966 

After consulting the President j State again instructs Gronouski to 
present a strong rejection of Bapacki's arguments, ¥e doubt the accur- . 
acy of the Communists' bombing accounts and that the Poles really intend 
to sell their view of Marigold to world opinion. 

At the sane time, Rolling Thunder 52 is amended to suspend strikes 
against the two Hanoi targets hit December l3"lli*. This is not comiiani- 
catedj however^ to the other participants in iMarigold, 

Meanv/hile Lewandovski has begun to leaic his version of Marigold by 
giving a few salient points to the Uutch Cliarge in Saigon, Ve do not 
learn of this until December 17^ and know only that Lgvrandowski^s con- 
versation with the IXitch Charge occurred sametime between November 30 
and December I5. 

Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times receives a cable from 
Hanoi, A visa to visit the DKY, for which he had applied some months 
earlier J has been granted and may be picked up immediately in Paris, 

^e Polish tohassador in Heme is contacted by the Pope who inquires 
if the former can '^tell hiia anything with respect to Vietnajnj" according 
to a later conversation betvreen the Polish Ambassador and Fanfani, (For 
source^ see December I9 entiy,) 

State 1033if2 (to Aiaembassy Warsaw)^ IS/llaUs^ 

15 December I966 
For -Ambassador Gronouski from Acting Secretary 
Pef : (a) Warsaw IU7I 

(b) State 102960 
(info to Amembassy Paris & Saigon: Paris for Secretary 

'Eyes only; Saigon for Ambassador l^as only) 

"1, Your message (reftel a) has been discussed 
with the President and he has approved the comments and 
additional instructions w^hich are set forth below. 

"2» -41 though Rapacki's message to you reported 
ref (a) is also discouraging it does not alter our basic 

assessment as conveyed to you in State's IO2960 In 

spite of his reference in paras 6 and 7 reftel (a) to 
views and decisions of ilVKj we remain doubtful about hew 
much part Hanoi has played in scenario which has unfolded 
in Warsaw over past two weeks." 

. • 

*^7- Finally J and in spite of the fact that Bapacki's 
line as reported reftel (a) makes it essential that he get 





Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NNTD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


the full force of our rejection of his arguments and 
our indignation at the Polish Governirent's changing 
the signals and then seeking to put the blame on us^ 
ve feel neTert?ieless that you should In the course 
of your presentation to Eapacki leave no doubt about 
our continuing strong desire to move forward in 
direct conversations vita the North Vietnarnase ^^ 

'*8. Your further interpretation and discussion 
contained Varsav^s 1^75 i^ very much appreciated and 
1 am sure you fully realize that all of us here pro- 
foundly share your concern over the tui-n events have 
taken in the last fev days. Likewise I can veil 
imagine that in the atmosphere of Warsaw and without 
full information available ^ particularly concerning 
the bombing of ITorth Viet-^Nanij the Polish position 
may appear to be a strong one, whatever their motiva- 
tion in presenting it as Rapacki has just done. Ve 
want to as&i.ire youj however ^ that on the basis of the 
over-all picture as we can see it from Washington^ 
the Polish case^ except for some fairly superficial 
and transitory matters^ is a weak one and we wonder 
whether they will tiy to sell it to world opinion." 

* « 


JCS Ikrjl (to CUTCPAC), TS/LB1DISj IS Decem"ber I966 
Ref : JCS 7735 

"1, (TS) Ref authorizes air strikes against 
folloving targets in Hanoi area. 





Yen Yien EE Clf Yd 

Van Dien Veh Dpo 


"2. (TS) Suspend further air strikes against 
these targets until further notice." 



O -" 


Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NTsTD 63316, By: NWD Dale: 201 1 


Saigon I364O (to SeeState), TS/Nodis 
17 December I966 

*'l. CAS Station Chief came to political counselor 
Dec 17 and reported that one of his officers had been 
queried by Netherlands Charge Derksen about a statement 
by Lewandowski concerning negotiations vlth Hanoi,.. # 

"2, In response to retiuest CAS submitted follow- 
ing as ^lemorandum of conversation with Terksen: 

A. In a conversation vhich took place in 
Saigon on an unspecified date between Nov 30 and Dec 15^ 
1966 J Ambassador Levandovski told Mr. Derksen that he 
vas recently in Hanoi for a somewhat longer period than 
usual. He vent on to say that 'an organization' — 
later he used the vord 'group' — was negotiating with 
Hanoi on the subject of peace talks. I^h:. Lewandowski 
did not further identify the group or organization. 

B, Mr. Lewandovski was bitter because pro^ 
grass in these talks was halted by the recent American 
bombing of Hanoi (dates of air raids not specified). He 
told Mr. Derksen he was so bitter than he planned to 
write >a paper ^ on the subject.., 


Behind the Lines— Hanoi , hj Iferriscn E. Salisbury 
tBantacij July 1967)^. p. 8 

^^^en^ on the morning of December 15^ Seymour 
Topping^ the foreign editor of Tb^ Tmes^ walked over 
to my desk and put a cablegraci before me.... The visa 
to Hanoi did^ indeed, await me in Paris." 

December IJj I966 

State expresses alaim over the possible impact on the talks in Warsaw 
and also on Ky. should Lewandowski's leak to the Dutch Charge reach him. 
Lodge is told to give Ky a lew key Indication that a possible lead toward 
peace is being investigated. 

State 10i^673 (to Aiaeiabassy Saigon)^ TS/jIodis 

17 December I966 
Kef: Saigon 136^0 

"1. Lewandcwski ' s indiscretions are indeed most 
unfortunate and potentially harmf^ja to talks in Varsaw, .. 



DeclassiHed per Executive Order 13520, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Datei 201 1 



"2. This leads us to suggest you should te prepared 
vith line to use vith Ky should outright leak occur ^ 
should Ky raise with you on has is rumors floating around 
Saigon J or should you feel rumors ha^^e reached point 
vhere you should take initiative vith Ky as preventive 
measures. Our thought is that in such eventuality^ you 
would simply in low key take following line: As ve have 
told Ky before we get many apparent leads on subject of 
peaceful settlement. ¥e feel responsibility not to over- 
look any possible lead which might offer soiae promise - 
Most of these leads dissipate iJBmed lately j sane seem 
slightly more productive and are pursued further. 
Lewandowski contact with us over past few months has been 
such lead. At times it has appeared to offer more 
possibilities and at times less, Yj may be assured that 
if any lead offers any real prospect of discussions with 
Hanoi J he will be promptly consulted." 


December 18. I9 66 


D'Orlandi tends to reject our ratioriale for what has happened in favor 
of the Polish version. He feels there is a "strong prima facie case 
against us" and that we should do "something quickly In Warsaw." much the 
same view expressed by Gronouski on December 1^. 

Saigon I3618 (to SecState)^ TS/Kodis 

18 December I966 
Bef : State 10^^673 

* * 

"6. D^Orlandi then said to Habib that he was himself 
surprised at bombing on the l4th. Ee wondered 'If there 
were not some people in the US who had deliberately sought 
to create a problem. » Hiis was denied in precise terms 
and with an expression of surprise that D^Orlandi would 
have such a thought. It was pointed out that as D'Orlandi 
knew there was no connection between bombings and Lewan- 
dowski^s proposals. Habib then gave D-Orlandi the rebut- 
tal material contained in State's Circular 1038^1-9 and went 
over it in detail ^ suggesting it be used if Lewandowski 
again raises issue of banbings." 

. * • 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



"12, Comment: Our Judgment is that foregoing confirms 
correctness of changing venue to Warsaw- D'Orlandi is not 
only shoving his personal pique at turn of events ^ but is 
displaying definite tendency to discard our explanations 
while endeavoring to induce us to do ^something quickly in 
Warsaw,' Instead of focusing on infonaation provided "by 
Habihj he launched into extended presentation of Lewan- 
dowski's latest animadversions (sic)^ adding his own 
belief that there is ^strong prima -facie case against us' 
as well as exhortation mentioned preceding sentence,^' 

« « • * 


Deceiriber ig^ I966 

Gronouski carries out Staters instructions of December 15 . In an 
angry exchange ^ Eapacki attacks both the accusations leveled against the 
Polish role and the US suggestion that the Warsaw contact still be 
attempted , 

In Rome J the Pope is given the ^^whole story" on Marigold by the 
Polish Ambassador J who later reports the episode to Fanfani^ adding that 
he had been contacted by the Pope on December 15^ to ask if the Poles 
"could tell him anything with respect to Vietnam,'^ 

Warsaw I513 (to State )^ TS/jTodis 

19 December I966 
Eef : Warsaw I50S 

* « fe 

"9 He (Eapacki) added that Poles did not put 

forth new conditions but 'recalling speeches of Goldberg j 
the President^ Secretaiy Busk and others ^ once we 
received the signal we did we would have had everj'' right 
to call for a stop in the bombing,* He said^ *you have 
said over and over again that you would end all bombing 
if there was an assurance from Hanoi that there would be 
a response toward peace from Hanoi; however , we did not 
ask that you ston bombing but only that you not intensify 

• • 4 


TOP SECRsrr - zioms 

Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NTsTD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


"13 He saidj 'I am astonished that at came time 

you accuse us of stalling talks j you ask us to help you 

get them going again. ^ * Inasmuch as NVW asked Poles 

to discontinue these discuss ions ^ vhat vas nev to justify 
returning to wm on this matter? .../' 


Rome 31^09 CtQ Sec State )j TS/Nodis 
28 Decembei* I966 

• • 

"^- Fanfani said that according to the Polish 
Ambassador the Pope on December I5 sent word to the Polish 
Government asking if they could tell hija anything with 
respect to Vietnam. On December 19 the Polish Government 
responded by telling the Pope the vhole story, Fanfani 
indicated he did not ]rpt not know just what the Polish 
Ambassador meant oy the 'whole story' but presumably the 
Polish Governm,ent had told the Pope everything they knew." 

* » « » 


December 21, ig66 

M M l i ■ » ■-■li» ■ ■ T il I I , „ ,^ 

Eapacki clarifies the Polish role in I^rigold, The following were 
conveyed to us on instruction from Hanoi: 

i. Lewandowski's message to Lodge immediately upon his return 
from Hanoi expressing a positive response to the Warsaw talks. 

ii. Eapacki 's warning after the December 3 bambing^ that Ife^noi 
would have to reassess the situation, 

iii. The decision to terminate discussions in Warsaw. 

He added that there had been frequent exchanges between Hanoi and 
Warsat/ during the conversations and felt confident the Poles accurately 
expressed Hanoi's views j even when acting on their o\m initiative. 

While Gronouski is learning this in Warsaw^ instructions are enroute 
for him to tell the Poles that ary deinage from US ordnance within Hanoi 
city limits was accidental. We are now prepared to state there will be no 

Y4 ' ^ 

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Nutnber: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 


TOP SECRET - rraDis 

bombing vlthin 10 miles of the center of Hanoi for an indefinite period 
if talks with the DEV can begin shortly* We "anticipate'* some "appro- 
priate reciprocal action" vith respect to HLF activities within 10 miles 
of the center of Saigon as "evidence of Rood faith." 

Warsaw I535 (to SecState)^ TS/Nodis 

21 December I966 
Eef : State IO5909 

« m 

''2, X asked Eapacki to clarify for me the role 
that Hanoi played in our discussions. Eapacki replied 
that the message lewandowski gave to Lodge (he referred 
to 'three sentences*) upon his return from Hanoi 
expressing W^ positive response to Warsaw talks ^ 
Eapacki *s warning after the Dec 3 bombing j that Hanoi 
would have to reassess the situationj and the decision 
to tennir^te discussions in Warsaw were all decisions 
by ETVK which were conveyed to us oy the Poles . He 
said further that comnients Poles made regarding danger 
of creating the impression of pressure on Hanoi were 
comments of the Polish Govt, but the fears that Poles 
expressed in this regard were verified subsequently by 
Hanoi. He also said that during process of Warsaw 
discussions there vere a number of other exchanges 
between Warsaw and Hanoi j adding that the Poles are 
confident that what they expressed on their own initia- 
tive acciorately reflected Hanoi's opinton. 

"3. Eapacki then made the pointy in reference to 
our accusation that Poles have raised new conditions 
since tallcs shifted to Warsaw^ that interpretation clause 
question was raised by Lewandowski immediately upon 
hearing it expressed by Lodge on Dec 3- He said 
'clearly you kiiov that we felt this was a matter of 
concern from the very beginning; it wasn't scm,ething 
interjected as a new condition after^^-rards . * He added^ 
^our concern was well taken because the reaction to 
interpretation clause from Hanoi turned out to be what 
we iDredicted. ' " 






Dcclassined per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


State 106358 (to Ataembassy Warsaw) 
21 December I966 

• • • 

"1. Our investigation of alleged bomtiag in Hanoi 
has been thorough. The only targets were military ones 
more than five miles from the Hanoi city center. How- 
ever we cannot rule out completely the possibility of 
an accident. Any US ordnance that may have fallen 
within the Hanoi city limits vas the result of such 
an accident. 

"2* Nonetheless we are prepared to state that 
there will be no bombing within ten miles of Hanoi city 
center measured from 21 degrees 1 minute 37 seconds 
north J 105 degrees 5I minutes 21 seconds East^ for an 
indefinite period if talks with ]Sorth Vietnamese can 
be gotten unden-zay shortly. Appropriate reciprocal 
action with respect to bombs ^ mortar and similar 
terrorist activities within ten miles of the center of 
Saigon measured from 10 degrees j k6 minutes ^ 28 seconds 
north; 106 degrees J kl minutes ^ 10 seconds East, would 
be anticipated by us as evidence of good faith/^ 

> « 


December 22, 1966 

^ ' ■ I ■ I I I ■ I W I 

Kapacki prefers to wait a day or two (by which time Gronouski is 
to have returned to Washington for consultations) before transmitting 
the new US position to Hanoi. He is afraid the suspension of bombing 
near Hanoi appears to depend on reciprocal action frcm the HLF and a 
signal that Hanoi will establish contact. Gronouski argues that we 
are not asking a quid-pro-quo but simply removing the factor that had 
blocked the contact and suggesting a quiet way for Hanoi and the NLF 
to indicate readiness to discuss peace. 

Rapacki repeats a theme expressed (less clearly) by him earlier: 
ildberg stated that if there was some indication from Hanoi regardin 

1_ * !__»__ ^ ... ^_ __ _ _ . _ _ _ _ 


negotiations J bombing would cease throughout W/IJ and not simply around 
a small area of Hanoi. ^^ He is presumably referring to Goldberg's 
September 22 speech, though neither it nor Goldberg's December 20 
letter to U Thant contain such a sweeping proposal. 

On the same day, Zinchuk sees Bimdy in \Fashington to indicate 
Soviet awareness of I^arigold and Soviet support both for Polish actions 



Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NTsTD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



and the Polish interpretation of developments to date. He is appre- 
hensive that the US vill adopt a militaristic approach to the var. (The 
Soviet concern to get US-DEV talks started arises in large part the 
possibility that Hanoi will call for volunteers under the Bucharest 
Declaration (^^if the war escalates and if help is necessary")* 

Warsaw 15 37 (to SecState)^ T3/B[odis 

22 December I966 
Ref : State IO6358 

* « • 

"2* Eapackij expressing desire to understand pre- 
cisely^ asked for reiteration of message. In response 
to his question as to whether this meant we had no 
intention to bcmh Hanoi proper but that it was possible 
we could have inadvertently hit residential area^j 1 
responded I did not exclude that possibility- In 
response his question whether orders would be issued 
to exclude from bombing area within coordinates described 
for indefinite period^ I responded that this my under- 
standing reftel* After brief discussion of relationship 
of cessation of terrorist activities in Saigon to cessation 
bombing in Hanoi perlmeterj I reread section again and 
pointed out there was no direct auid-pro-quo on cessation 
Saigon activities but that this was anticipated reaction 
l>y Hanoi as measure of good faith. 

"3, I expressed again my personal conviction that 
this proposal provided basis for movement in resolving 
the problem of initiating negotiations.*.. 

"k Eapacki noted however that t^ro things 

intraded which might reduce the significance of this step: 
(a) The text of the coiMiunication appears to make U,S, 
action dependent on some signal that a contact will be 
established by Hanoi; (b) There is an indirect linking — 
or request — that an appX'opriate step (re Saigon) will 
be taken by the other side. He added that it would be 
vexy nojipQi'tant to avoid the appearance of forcing JIW 
into negotiations,,,. Cjoldberg stated that if there was 
some indication from Hanoi regarding negotiations _, bombing 
would cease throughout IT^li and not simply aroxmd a small 
area of Hanoi. Furthermore ^ regarding the alleged NLF 
activities around Saigon^ while this is admittedly 
expressed in terms of an expectation^ the impression is 
given that you are tiyin,^ to 'kill too many biirds with 
one stone.' This is a matter to be resolved with the WLF 

and I (Eapacki) have tried to dissuade you from linking 
NVIT action with ITLF matters . . . . " 

■ J • 


• ml 


Dccbssificd per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NNDProjeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWDDiite: 201 1 


"8 I argued that RapacM must view our 

proposal not as an exercise of pressure "by making 
cessation of bcmbing dependent on Hanoi's indication 
of a willingness to talkj but as a removal of what 
Poles had regarded as overt pressure which Eapacki 
had Insisted interfered with the prospects for talks 
Cessation of action in Saigon was not a direct quid- 
pro^quo but a quiet way for Fanoi and the IJLF to 
give an indication of readiness to discuss peace* 

"9- Eapacki, * .concluded with statement that 
he would prefer to delay day or two before trans- 
mitting our proposal but expressed willingness to 
convey it now if that was what I desired. 

"10, I e>5>ressed willingness to discuss matter 
immediately on my arrival in ¥ashin,gton/^ 

• • 


MemCon^ TS/Kodis/lMEIGOLDj 22 December I966 
Participants: Alexander Zlnchuk^ Soviet Charge 

William P. Bundy 

* n 

"2. immediately after these exchanges^ Zinchuk 
launched into a discussion of MASIGOID. After learning 
that I was fully aware of the exchanges between Lewan- 
dowski and Lodge j as he put it initially ^ he said that 
it was very hard for them to understand why we had 
intensified the bombing of the Ilorth with the attacks 
on December 2nd and ^th^ and then again on December 13th 
and lij-th. He said that there was great sensitivity in 
Hanoi an. this subject^ and strongly Implied -- without 
directly saying so — that there were differing schools 
of thouglit. Our bombing actions had left the Soviets — 
and by implicationj Hanoi — in complete doubt as to 
what our intentions and views really were. Speaking 
more specifically for the Soviets j he said that he had 
thought they pretty well understood our views ^ but that 
this episode left them in real doubt whether there were 
military forces at work and whether they simply did not 
understand fully what we thou^t and meant to do* 



Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NNTD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


"3. More specirically^ he said that he himself had 
been in Moscow^ in late N"oveiiiber and had gained the 
impression that Hanoi (or elements in it) were seriously 
interested in starting something. 'Biey had been encour- 
aged by the apparent slackening In the pace of onr bomb- 
ing during this period. I at once askied '^rhether this was 
just a general impression or whether it had something 
more specific behind it. He replied that it was 'more 
than a general sense,' Then^ following the bombings of 
December 2nd and kth^ some Hanoi leaders (un-named) had 
been in Moscow on their way back from Budapest ^ and had 
met with top Soviet leaders. (I think he mentioned 
Kosygin and Brezhnev specifically)* In the face of our 
bombings J the Soviet leaders had been unable to clarify 
U.S. thinking or (by clear implication) to encourage 
Hanoi to pursue the Lewandowski avenue. Then^ he himself 
had seen Ambassador Kohler on December 9thj intending to 
convey a clear message against continued intensif Icstion 
of the bombing* He thus found it particularly difficult 
to understand our actions." 

* * . . 

"6. I then said specifically that^ while we had 
made a considered decision that we should not alter the 
planned bombing pattern earlier^ we were definitely aware 
of Hanoi's sensitivity to intensification of the bombing, 
I said that therefore we had made a specific proposal 
within the last 2^ hoxors^ directed to precisely this point 
I also noted that within the last 2^^- hours we had had a 
contact that had substantially ill^jminated exactly what 
the Polish contacts and discussions with Ifenoi had been. 
Finally J I reiterated that ve were prepared to see really 
quiet and secret talks get under way on the basis of the 
approaches that had been made.'* 

"8. In short J Zinchuk did not really seek to defend 
Polish handling of the matter^ but was most emphatically 
tiying to get it across that the Polish effort was serious 
and that the Soviets were fully with it*...'' 

"9* * • -he said that he had been surprised j in dis- 
cussing the Polish initiative in the Department at some 
earlier stage In December^ to see that it was treated as 
doubtful . . , . " 





Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NTsTD 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 






* • 

"2* He then said (as he had to Harrj'' P-fecFherson 
on Monday) that the Soviet concern to get something 
started arose from a number of factors j but above all 
the possibility that Ife^noij under the Bacharest 
Declaration ('if the var escalates and if help is 
necessary^ ' in essence) might at some point be faced 
with a Hanoi request for military'" volunteers. He 
noted the report today of No3rth Korean pilots (which 
I of course did not deny) and something unspecified 
that the Cubans vere doing. He said that the Soviets 
vould be put in a most avkvrard and difficult position 
if ifenoi asked for volunteers^ and they hoped the 
issue vould not arise, 

'*3* He then 8,sked me about soirie coimnentator's 
statement that the President saw tvo alternatives j 
seeking a peaceful solution or escalating the war 
markedly by bombing so that the American people vould 
become engaged in simple loyalty to their aimed forces 


« <• * 

■ * • 

December £3^ I966 

Ttie problems of reciprocal de-escalation are illustrated by a 
cable from SaigoHj "a3Si:c!iing" that the proposed cessation of terrorist 
activity in the Saigon area does not require a cessation of GW/US 
counter-VC activities. 

Saigon 1^039 (to SecState}^ TS/Fodis^ 

23 December I966 
Kef: A. State IO6358 
E. State 105909 

"1, ...we assume department proposal on cessation 
terrorist activity in Saigon area does not envisage 
cessation GVI^US counter- VC activities/' 

• • • 




Decla.ssified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



December 24 j I966 

We drop the request for reciprceal action from the DHV in maintaining 
tlie 10 mile bomting Ifjnit around Hanoi • 

(lIB. source needed) 

December 26--£7j I966 

After newspaper reports of bombing ^^12 miles from Hknoi/' the Poles 
inquire if our circle about Hanoi is measured in nautical or statute 
miles. Gronouski expresses concern over strikes this close to the 
proscribed circle. He is told ^'not to be diverted from the main effort 
'^y niggling and haggling about whether a particular bomb fell on this 
side or that side of this or that circle." 

Warsaw I567 (to SecState), TS/HodiSj 27 Decenaber I966 
Ref : State IO79II 

"1- ..,Michalowski.,. asked 'for the record' whether 
reference in re ft el to ten miles from Hanoi was in 
nautical or statute miles,,,. 

"2. *,.NY Times- AP Dispatch speaks of * target 
only twelve miles from Hanoi * • • . • 

"3 T am most concerned if we are choosing 

targets so close to the margin that even a slight error 
could put us in technical violation of our commitment...." 

• • 


State 10Q66h (to Amembassy Warsaw )j TS/Uodis 
27 December I966 

" may Inform I^chalowski or Eapackl that 
orders have been issued to refrain fx^om bombing within 
the ten nautical miles from Hanoi city center.-., it 
is very important for you and the Poles not to be 
diverted from the main effort by niggling and haggling 
about whether a particular bomb fell on this side or 
that side of this or that circle. The important thing 
is that an area of some Slk square nautical miles will 
be free from bombing and that; thus farj we have not 
seen an^^' readiness on the T)art of Hanoi to sit down 






DeclassiOed per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
MND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


and talk business. The next move is up to them and ve 
cannot let them play games with a side issue in view 
of the major concession we have made to clear the way 
for talks .. .military briefers are not aware of MAEIGOLD 
and that some looseness in language can be anticipated,^^ 


December 27-28, I966 

Fanfani is told by the Polish Ambassador about the latter 's contact 
with the Pope, We in turn tell Fanfani of the 10 mile bombing sanctuary 
around Hanoi and of our continuing hopes to get talks started. We 
stress the importance of secrecy^ if talks are to succeed. Meanwhile 
we decide to move the operation out of Saigon to the maximum extent ^ 
for security reasons. Gronouski is instructed to take up the security 
problem with Eapacki^ with special reference to the leak to the Pope . 
He is also apprised of doubts by Eusk that the Poles ever intend.ed to 
press Eanoi for talks irithout an unconditional and unreciprocated cessa- 
tion of the bombing. 

Rome 31^09 (to SecState)^ TS/NodiSj 23 December I966 

"1. Points contained State IO8773 were conveyed 
privately to Fanfani evening Dec 28, 

"2. Fanfani said he had been very severe in his 
conversation with Polish _Ambas3adorj he had emphasised 

A. Poles should initiate US contact with 
Hanoi without further delay; 

B* Lewandowski should by all means remain in 
Saigon as would D'Orlandij and 

C. It was a great mistake break secrecy hy 
informing the Pope, 

"3- Fanfani said Polish Ambassador had returned to 
see him evening December 27. Polish Aiabassador had said: 

A. Poles cannot undertake initiate US contact 
with Hanoi unless there is a cessation of bombing; 

B, Lewandov7ski will repeat will remain in 
Saigon; and 

Co It was not repeat not the Polish Government 
which had taken the initiative in informing the Pope but 

rather it was the Pope who had approached the Polish 

Government , 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Project Number NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


"4* Fanfani said that according to the Polish 
Ambassador the Pope on December 15 sent word to the 
Polish Government asKing if they could tell him 
anything with respect to Vietnam, On December 19 
the Polish Government responded by telling the Pope 
the whole story. Fanfani indicated he did not rpt 
not know ^just what the Polish Ambassador meant by 
the ^whole story ' but presumably the Polish Govern- 
ment had told the Pope everything they knew.'^ 


State 109639 (to Amembassy Warsaw)^ T3/Kodis 

28 December I966 

^\ . , • I call your attention to the statement 
made by the Polish Ambassador to Fanfani on the even- 
ing of December 2J that Q3S Poles cannot undertake 
initiate US contact with Hanoi unless there is a 
cessation of bombing IWQTE. Ihis could result from 
Polish Amba.ssador Home not being informed of our move 
on December 2^. But it also raises the possibility 
that the Poles have never had any intention of 
pressing Hanoi for talks without an unconditional 
and unreciprocal cessation of bcmbing*'' 


State 106773 (to Amembassy Eome)^ TS/Nodis 
27 December I966 


* * • 

a. ¥e are most grateful for prompt Fanfani 
report of his conversation with Polish Ambassador 
Rome J 

• * V 

b. Fanfani himself should be aware that on 
Dec 2k ve conveyed to Hapacki that we had given firm 
orders not repeat not to bomb within ten nautical 
miles of point ±n center of Hanoi for an indefinite 
period. . , , ' 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526» Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 




c, ¥e are most grateful to Fanfani for 
expressing concern that Pope has heen informed* We 
too are concerned over this and would na^ appreciate 
Fanfani advice vhether ve should ourselves indicate 
to Popti our knowledge that he has been infonaied. We 
recognise that it may he desirable not repeat not to 
indicate such awareness ^ in order to preserve Fan- 
fani's ovm sources and channels; however^ we are 
also concerned if Pope may be receiving one-sided 

• • • • 

"2, Saigon should take no action. For security 
reasons alone j we are trying to get this operation out 
of Saigon to maximum extent possible* . . * 

"3 If Eapacki or Michalowski admit that 

Pope has been inf orxned you should say that jou must 
report this to Washington and have no doubt it will 
have disturbing effect on security grounds alone,. **"^ 


December 30. I966 

Eapacki tells Cjronouski the 10 mile sanctuary has come too late and 
that the Poles now consider their role "at this stage as teiralnated/' 

In Washington, Dobrynin tells Thompson the Soviet Government is 
"frankly baffled by (US) action in Vietnam,--, He said there were mar^-^ 
and he was one^ that wondered whether some of our military were deliber- 
ately trying to frustrate a policy of moving toward negotiations." 

Warsaw I596 (to SecState), TS/lJodis^ 30 :December I966 
Section 1 of 2 

"1. Rapacki opened by saying Poles have taken 
further action on j^" statement of Dec 2^, but un- 
fort^jnately this step could v^ot make up for damage 
done by previous actions, particularly Air Force, 
during first part of December. 

"2. Rapacki added that *we have to consider our 
role at this stai^ce as terminated -.,,." 

4 * . « 



Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NNTD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



7* Eapaeki saidj •••if that step you brougttfrcan 
Washington (on 2h December) had occurred on December h -- 
admittecliy after the first bo^nbing of Hanoi — then I 
feel personally tre "^iould have had the first contact vlth 
the DHV behind us. Moreover^ I think I have sufficient 
reasons for inj^ personal feeling. Even betveen Dec ^4- 
and Dec 13^ the matter was again actively being re- 
considered. There had been no negative reaction as yet. 
¥e know J because we had contact with the proper quarter. 
The decision regarding breaking off the talks was made 
after Dec I3 " 

«-'* * * 

MemConj TS/lIodis/l-IABIGOLD^ 30 December I966 
Participants: Ambassador Dobrjuinj USSR 

Jimbassador Thompson 

"I asked the Ambassador if he had brought back any 
reply to the President's letter to Kosygin. He replied 
that if he could speak completely off the record he 
could tell me that a reply had nearly been completed 
and that it was one ve would have liked but then the 
bombing of llano 1 had occurred and this draft had been 
torn up and another one of quite a different character 
started. He said he had seen the report from their 
Enbassy in Hanoi and that there was no doubt in the 
Soviet minds as a result of this report that our bombs 
had fallen on Hanoi itself... a reply would be made in 
due course,^' 

<■ . 

"The ^^bassador remarked that the initial stages 
of this affair had given the Soviet Governoient con- 
siderable hope and he said rather cryptically that they 
had other reasons for some optimism but that our action 
in bombing Hanoi had spoiled BYer^thln^^ I pointed out 
that o^Jir targets were selected several weeks in advance 
and that it had been pure coincidence that the attacks 
on the targets near Hanoi had occurred at this time. 

"The Ambassador said that his Government was 
frankly baffled by our actions in Viet-tlam and did not 
kno;/ how to judge our policy. He said there were many^ 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 


and he vas one of them^ that vondered whether some of 
our military were deliberately trying to frustrate a 
policy of moving toward negotiations or whether our 
policy really was one of military victory," 

December 31^ I966 

Porter suggests from Saigon that we switch to a more trustworthy 
channel J from the Poles to the Canadians. 

Saigon 1^+702 (to SecState)^ TS/ETodis 
31 December I966 

"1, We have been watching with increasing puzzle- 
ment the Polish Minuet danced by Eapacki..., ¥e cannot 
disregard possibility that Poles constantly manipulated 
tei"ms of understandir^ whether involving 'ten points' 
or later 3,ttempts to add provisos. Rapacki's frequent 
return to question of cessation of bambing and his 
allure to arrange contact with Hanoi are suspicious," 

« • 

"3, With the breakdown of the Polish charjiel,.. 
we suggest Department consider bringing in another party 
more trustworthy as an intermediary from US point of 


View, . ., 


• * 

"6. We lean in favor of the Canadians. It just 
so happens that the Canadia.n Commissioner Victor Moore 
is going to Hanoi on January 6 to spend a few days making 
his farewell cslls at the end of his tour.,.." 

■ • 


January 3. I90T 

Goldberg gives the US view of Ifeirigold to U Thant^ who promises to 
hold it in confidence . 



Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NTsTD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



As incidental intelligence ^ U Thant mentions that Peter^ the 
Hungarian Foreign Minister^ vas visited in Bncapest by Le Duan (Secretary 
General of the Lao Dong) early in December. Le Duan took a very hard 
line J much harder^ Peter believes ^ than vould Trinh^ the DRV Foreign 
Minister. The latter had been expected ^ but urgent problems in Hanoi 
detained him and LeDuan came instead. 

USUK 3l;53 (to SecState), TS/Nodis^ 3 January I967 

"As agreed upon with the Secretai^'-j I had an 
extensive discussion vlth U Thant this afternoon 
lasting almost 1-1/2 hours. 

"I gave azm the full account of Iferigold^ " 

* * i • 

'^Syg assured me tliat he ¥ould keep this in 
confidence and I do not believe that ve need be 
concerned about his making a public disclosure 
absent any additional dramatic events." 

• ■ 

"...he told me that ^hen FiA Peter of HvLngar;>^ was at 
the W.J Peter had told 5;/-g th^t they vere expecting a 
visit from the North Vietnamese PM in Budapest in early 
December. Syg said that he had since been advised by 
the Hungarians -^ presumably the Hungarian OTT Rep — 
that the North Vietnamese FM found it impossible make 
the visit because of urgent problems at home. In 
his place Hanoi dispatched the Syg of the Communist 
Party who visited Budapest early last month and who 
has since returned to Hanoi, Hungarians reported 
that Syg of Communist Party took a very hard line about 
settlement of Vietnamese conflict — a harder line than 
they believe would have been taken by North Vietnamese 
JM. Of possible interest to US in this connection was 
the observation of Syg of Communist Party that it was 
by iio means cerbain that the NLF would support any 
peace proposal which might be acceptable to Hanoi, Syg 
observed that this ^^jas a similar line taken l:y ]Jorth 
Vietnamese 'Re;^^ in Algiers in September of last year as 
reported to him by his Algerian sources . 

. * 


07 — 


Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NTsTD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



J anuary kj 1$&J 

Rusk soothes George Brovn's injured feelings over finding that he 
vas not the sole inteimediary for the Phase A-Ptiase B de-escalation 
proposaJ. , 

State 112632 (to Membassy London) ^ TS/Uodis 
h January I967 


"Please deliver following personal message to 
Foreign Secretary George Brown: QTE Dear George: 
Thank you for your message- I do want to clear up 
one point J namely^ that there was nothing on which we 
could have informed you prior to your visit- to Moscow 
Your vis3.t came at the time of Lewandowski's visit to 
Hanoi "but "before we had any infonriation whatever from 
him on his visit. We understand he was in Hanoi most 
of the last half of November ^ and our first report 
upon his return to Saigon was received in a meeting 
on December 1, In faetj ve gave you for your trip 
a major concession to the other side in the form of 
a two-phased proposal in which we would stop the 
bombing if they would agree that subsequently there 
could be a de-escalation of the violence, I am 
sorry if there has been any misunderstanding on this 
point. With personal regains ^ Sincerely ^ Dean Rusk, 


January h^ I967 

Gronouski takes issue with Porter ^ that the Canadians replace the 
Poles as our channel to Hanoi because they are more ^^trustworthy." He 
considers the Poles better suited to the mission because they carry 
more weight in Hanoi. 

Warsaw 163I (to SecState); TS/Nodls^ k January I967 
Eef : Saigon iJ^TOS 

■ . • 

"3 The fact that Poles presumably acted 

in Jfenoi's interests in attejnntiup: to extract from US 
best possible terms prior to actual negotiations is 
no basis for concluding that Poles were not interested 
in initiating Warsaw talks as soon as feasible. 



DeclassiOed per Executive OrcJcr 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 \ 


Feasil3ilityj however, depended on Hanoi's agreement^ 
and I submit Poles had no reason on their own 
initiative to delay that agreement ten minutes..,. 

"4. Given this analysis^ I cannot conceive of 
Canada or ar^- other friend of the USG heing more 
satisfactory than Poles as intermediary (see also 
paras 3 and k^ ¥arsav I630); true^ they "vrould he 
more trustvorthy from our point of viev. But for 
this reason they would also he even less effective 
than Poles >rere in convincing Hanoi. I have no 
doubt that Poles had access to and exchanges vith 
top officials of WJ!\^ and that they delivered our 
messages, I am also convinced^ especially after 
Dec 2k ^ that they encouraged Hanoi to meet vith us 
in Warsaw. A trustwoi^thy friend of USG could do 
no more and I suspect would be able to do much less. 
What we need is help of someone with more influence 
on Hanoi than PoleSj not less. It is for this 
reason that I suggested we turn immediately to 

« • 


January h^ I967 

Goldberg gives U Thant and Ignatief f ( Canadian Ambassador to the VE) 
a review of "the entire ferigold episode" along the lines suggested dj 
the Depar-tzaent . (Source; USUU SkS'^y lA/^Tj TS/nodis) 

January ^j I96T 

Saigon reports I3 YC incidents in the Saigon^Gia Dihh area. 

Saigon ikS^k (to SecState)^ TS/jfodis^ 5 January I967 

"1, ¥e have been keeping a special vatch on 
incidents and actions in the Saigon Gia^-Dinh area 
ever since Christmas. As a rough approximation 
border of Gia-DirJi province averages about 11 miles 
from the center of Saigon, 

"2. From Dec 23 to Jan 3 there were I3 incidents 
clearly initiated by VC in the area , 

• * • • 



Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NTsTD 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 

li I 


"5 In order not to call attention to our 

interest in the 10 mile radius ve are using standard 
statistics derived from police reports vliich are not 
alvays complete or absolutely accurate/' 

January 5j ^967 

Heirihardt gives the Pope a similar review. He stresses that the 
US has been forthcoming by offering its Phase A- Phase B fomiulaj by 
affirming Lewandovski*s statement of the US position with no recip- 
rocal act from the DPV side^ and by offering to meet with the DKV 
to discuss all outstanding issues^ and that no militaiy preconditions 
for the talks were initially asked by the other side. Even nowj we 
are keeping open our suspension of bombing within 10 niles of Hanoi's 
center. IVtille the DRV has given a negative response ^ we continue to 
tiy to open talks. Secrecy is imperative if this effort is to succeed. 
We therefore request the Pope's cooperation in maintaining complete 

State 112886 (to Amembassy Rome)^ s/]^Todis 

5 January I96T 
"Eyes Only for .Ambassador 

"1* Ambassador should see Pope Paul coonestj 
Since Poles ^ and according to their report Hanoi j 
have stressed vital need for complete secrecy^ USG 
is deeply conscious of need to maintain rigid 
security this matter. However^ in view of 
importance these discussions and their possible 
bearing on other initiatives to which His Holiness 
is a party J ve now believe it essential that His 
Holiness receive full and accurate account." 

* * 

"7* At this stage^ the US had taken two 
Important steps. It had put forvrard the possi- 
bility of a two-phase handling of the bombing 
question^ together with the possibility of dis- 
cussing in one setting the whole range of issues 
including the future situation within South Viet- 
nam. Moreover J the USG had agreed to affirm the 
statement of its position to Hanoi ^ subject only to 
the obvious necessity of interpretation while 
Hanoi itself had indicated only^ as reported to 
us J that it was prepared to listen to such an 
affirmation. The USG- at this point had not — 
and still has not — received any statement of 

Hanoi's own views. Moreover ^ the message con- 
veyed by Lewandco-rski contained no mention of any 
prior condition other than secrecy^ for the direct 
contact in Warsaw that was proposed.^' 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 




* • « 

"Ik* On December 22 j Gronouski again saw Rapacki 
to convey a new proposal on l:ehalf of the USG. Ttls 
vas tliat the USG was prepared to undertake that there 
would he no hombing within ten miles of the center of 
Hanoi for an indefinite period^ if talk^ with the 
llorth Vietnamese could begin shoarfcly; in the original 
proposal of December 22 ^ this ^ras linived with evidence 
of good faith in the form of action on the other side 
with respect to incidents near Saigon, However^ when 
Eapacki demiirred to the proposed linkage and asked 
reconsideration^ Gronouski was authorised en December 
2^^- to state that the US had now given firm orders not 
to bomb within ten miles of the center of Hanoi for 
an Indefinite period. !Ehis revised US proposal stated 
the understanding thatj on the basis of what Bapacki 
had told us J direct talks could now begin shortly, 
^e message also noted thatj in judging the good faith 
of the other side^ we would be 'impressed* hj similar 
restraint^ for ezaaiple^ with respect to incidents^ 
movement of forces (itself a violation of the Geneva 
Accords) in the D^E^ or action with respect to infil- 
tration; it was stressed that there were examples ^ 
and the phrasing made clear that these were not pre- 
conditions, Hapacki indicated that he would convey 
this message promptly to Hanoi. 

"15- On December 30 Hapacki reported to Gronouski 
that Hanoi had given a negative response and was flatly 
not prepared for talks in Warsaw , " 

"Suiamary of Key Points 

• * « 

"6, Most basically of ell^ the US rejuains entirely 
prepared for secret bilateral contacts with Eanoi. Even 
though Rapacki has stated that he considers the channel 
nc^^ dead^ the US order of December 2k remains in force 
and will so remain for the present. ¥e have in fact 
reviewed this whole matter carefully ^rith Soviet repre- 
sentatives j pointing out our difficulty in understanding 
Polish actions at several points. Moreover j we have in 
mind the continued possibility of constructive action 
by the Secretary' General, For all these reasons^ and in 
the light of our basic view that any disclosure of this 
whole series of discussions could affect Hanoi ^s willin^q; 
ness to participate^ we have maintained the tightest 
security on the whole project,; will continue to do so^ 
and must ask you in the strongest terms to act in same 
manner . 



• • o • 




Declassifled per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 




January 6, 19 67 

Saigon is instructed to tell Ky a little more about Iferigoldj 
interpreting it priinarily as a DEV peace offensive designed to get the 
bombing stopped and reassuring Ky about our resolution. 

Rome is to tell Fanfani that we etill hope to open contact with 
the DRV and it is, therefore, iiLit)erative to maintain the strictest 
secujTity concerning what has happened in the past. 

In Warsaw J the Poles tell Gronouski that the December 13-1^+ 
attacks typed the scale in favor of DEV Presidium members who felt that 
talking with the USG made little sense. Only a complete cessation would 
restore the necessary level of confidence. On the other hand^ if we 
stopped bombing it should be possible to get negotiatioxis going over 
Phase B in 3-^ weeks. Gronouski urges the Poles to try again^ proposing 
Instead a Phase B agreement between the two sides before the bombing 
cessation and the opening of talks* 

State replies by instructing Gronouski to avoid further initia- 
tives for the tiaie belnp:. 

State 114277 (to Amembassy Saigon) ^ TS/Nodis 

6 January I967 


-..Canadians on January 2 gave us report they 

had obtained from U Ihant on December 28^ and whidi U 
Ihant had received from Poles on December 23j 


"2. to seek to minimize leak riskj decision 

was taken to inform Pope^ SYG^ Canadians ^ and also 
British '' 

''5< Cur conclusion is that time has come when 
it is wise to convey word to Ky that would mitigate 
anj'- MAEIGOID disclosure or any stories based on 
Indian or Salisbury matters. Moreover^ Salisbury 
speculation gives us good cover for making statement 

to Ky now. 


'^6. Accordingly J you should see Ky if possible ^ 
and Tran Van do as well^ to say that GVJJ may be noting 
wave of speculation on DRV willingness to talk. USG 
has been receiving a number of third countx^- messages 
sometimes based on conversations with DRV representativeSj 



' la 

Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


from "whicli third nations are on occasion drawing 
conclusions ve do not "believe warranted. Ve our- 
selves are inclined to believe that DEVj as Salis-, 
hury visit alone shows ^ has become nuch more 
sophisticated in building up world opinion against 
the bombing. They may well be engaged j with help 
fxan. U Thantj Soviets^ and others^ in a determined 
effort to get us to stop the bombing or cut it 
back in return for hints of DEV willingness to 
talk. Moreover J DKV may be probing for any change 
in our position, GVN may be assured that ve have 
no intention cf changing our well-known position 
on conditions for the cessation of bombing j or 
yielding to pressures on any eleiaent of our posi- 
tion. As i\mbassador Lodge told Ky last July 
(Saigon 642 of July 10 ) we will of couxse be 
following up any nimors^ ho^^ever unlikely j that 
might indicate Hanoi was really seeking a way out. 
If anything of real substance or importance happens ^ 
we will of course be in touch with GW at once " 


State 11^+278 (to Amembassy Eome)^ TS/?]odis 

6 January 19 6T 
Kef: State 112886 

"1 You should emphasise to Fanfanl that 

although ^^^arsaw phase of exercise appears to have 
come to tei'iporary conclusion we still mean to con- 
tinue in whatever manner feasible to proiiiote initia- 
tion of substantive discussions with North Viet- 
namese. Therefore it continued to be of prime 
importance that strictest security be maintained 
conceriilng what has occurred in past.'^ 

« . . * 


Warsaw l6k6 (to SecState)^ TS/l^fodis 

6 January I967 
Section 1 of 2 

w « 

"4. Michalowski opened his reply hj observing 
that at one point in my discussions vith Eapacki I 



DtcJassint^d per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Diite: 201 1 


hatS e^ressed the hope that someone vas putting as much 
pressure on Hanoi as Poles were placing on us to get 
negotiations started. He said with some feeling that 
he could assure ne that Poles put hea^/y pressure on 
Hanoi and in fact put prestige of GOP on line in getting 
Hanoi to agree at outset to idea of having talks in 
Warsav. He added that he personally knev how much 
pressure was brought to "bear because he was engaged in 
exercising some of it. He went on to say that leader- 
ship in Hanoi is by no means a monolithic group and that 
from the beginning^ when Poles got agreement from Hanoi 
to initiate talks in Warsaw^ it was a Tery close decision 
vith many of the Hanoi leadership strongly opposed. He 
said they obtained such agreement after exerting strong 
pressure and putting Polan^i's prestige on the line; but 
it was a delicate matter in Hanoij implying that agree- 
ment vras by a narrow margin anxong the leadership. He 
said at this point the Poles had been able to convince 
Hanoi to have at least a small degree of confidence in 
intentions of U.S. He added that bombing of Dec 3 had 
given a \reapon to those in Hanoi who had not wanted to 
agree to negotiations in first place. He said it was 
for this reason that Poles had repeatedly conveyed to 
Lodge and me their fear of negative effects of a 
repetition of Dec 3 bombing. But he said even after 
Dec 3 when bombing was explained by Lodge as no new 
departure but smply something in the military pipeline, 
Poles were able to prevail in Hanoi to keep possibility 
of talks open^ and 'believe me we talted to them 
several times a day to keep pressure on them and con- 
vince them*' But he said bambing of Dec 13-14 'under- 
cut our whole argument ^ destroyed that little bit of 
confidence that exist; ed in Hanoi about intentions of 
U.S.J and left us wide ox^^en to charges of being com^ 
pletely naive,' He said with bcaabing of Dec 13-lij- 
those who had initially been skeptical about negotiations 
were gi^^en a powerful tool to support their case and in 
fact prevailed. He added that even with Dec 3 bonbing, 
if we had been able to interval between Dec 3 and I3 to 
come in with the message we did cane in with on the 2Hhj 
that part of leadership in Hanoi which wanted negotia- 
tions vould have prevailed and he is confident that talks 
would have happened. But he said by Dec 2k a whole new 
condition existed; *Ve were accused of being naive and 
had lost our effectiveness and those who on Dec 3 had 
been able to control situation and m.ove toward negotia- 
tions were 'bj this time discredited.' Hius he said 
situation by Dec 2U in Hanoi had so changed that it was 



DeclassiOed per Executive OrcJcr 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



impossilDle to go back to Dec 1 or the Post -Dec 3 period 
M'ow lie said he feels that only stopping ETOT baabing 
completely -w^ill restore influence of those who are 
interested in negotiations* He said if bombing stopped 
Poles would be willing to tzy for a third time and that 
he is guite confident that three or four weeks there- 
after negotiations between U, S> and Hanoi on Phas e_ B 
could become a reality^ He said^ ^ short of thiSj I am 
vevy pessimistic of any effective role we coizld play^, 
given pressure we had exerted in ETov and Dec and the 
undercutting of our position in Hanoi by events of 
Dec 13"1)+, ' He vent on to say that he will never under^ 
stand how this could possibly have happened but 'this 
is past history^ I guess »'" 


Warsaw l6h6 to State 
Section 2 

"Conversation between Michalowski and Grcnousfci, 

^'Michalowski said that the situation had now 
entirely changed. Hie Poles ^ he said^ had been able 
to convince Hanoi to go on with the possibility of con- 
tact after the December 3rd U.S. bombings^ but that the 
bonbings of December I3 and 1^ had made the future of 
negotiations between the DHV and the IJ,3. very bleak. 
He now maintained that only a coaplete cessation of U,S, 
bombings will restore the necessarj^ level of confidence 
needed to get negotiations started. He added that 
Hanoi's original decision to talk with the U.S. in 
Warsaw had heen hotly contested in the Presidium and 
that the bombings had now persuaded those who wanted 
to talk with the U.S. that there was little sense in 
doing so. 

^Gronouski noted that this now put the parties back 
where they had started from. He suggested that the Poles 
try- to get the thing going again by proposing to the DEV 
an initial Phase S agreesnent prior to the meeting between 
the U.S. and the DRV in Mcscow. Thls^ Gronouski said^ 
would (1) meet Hanoi's insistence on stopping the bombing 
Defore talks began^ and (2) meet the U*S. desire for some 
sort of indication that talks would occur in order to 
stop the bombing. 



Declassified per Execuiive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Projeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Diite: 201 1 



State 11^^370 (to Amam"bassy Warsaw)^ TS/Koais 

6 January I967 
Hef: Warsaw's l6i^ 

"1. In viev of complex of developments relating 
to Vlet-IIam problem we would like you to avoid for 
the present any further initiatives along lines 
section 2 reftel," 

*- • « * 

"3 It has he en our conception that . . 

Hanoi's actions under Phase B vould he expected to 
he generally equivalent to our actions in Phase B 
plus repeat plus our cessation of homhing of Forth 

Viet-I^Tam, " 

* » • 


Jan u,ary 9-10. I96 7 

Saigon and Ronie carry out their instructions to hrief the GW^ 
the Pope and Fanfani, The results reported are satisfactory. 

In Washington J ve learn that Brown is still very hurt. Btmdy 
points out how complex the matter is and explains the necessity for 

the US to mana.^e its own role. 

Saigon I5POI; (to SecState)^ T8/Nodis 

9 January I967 
Eef : State 11^^277 

**1, I sent Hahib to see Tran Van do to convey 
substance paragraph 6 reftel. This was done, rather 
than a direct approach to Prime Minister^ to keep 
our d ial og^ae with Gv^i in appropriate low key**.. 

''2 He was pleased to note our assurance 

that we have no intention of changing our position 
on cessation of bombing. . _ ." • 


^g ' TOP SECPirr - NODI S 

f \ 

Declassifled per Executive OrcJcr 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 


Some 3531 (to SecState)^ S/TTodis 
9 January I967 


"2. [The Pope reiterated his deep appreciation 

of being infoimed He told me that he had publicly 

encouraged the Vilson-Broi^n initiative because they 
had officially informed him of it. Ke had been unable 
to do the same i^ith respect to U Thant's efforts 
because he had not been officially adv^ised of them. 
He had however sent a private message to the Secretary 
General to avoid any feeling on his pa3rt that the Pope 
was shovinf^ preferences vith respect to various 
initiatives for peace." 

n m m 


Rome 3571 (to SecState)^ TS/Hodis 

10 Januaiy I967 
Eef : State 111^278 

"1- I saw Fanfani last night Jan 9 ^^^ carried 
out lnstru.ctions in reftel. Ee told me that shortly 
after the It'ew Year^ Polish Ambassador had informed 
him of the interr^uption of the procedural ta2ks In 
Warsaw an(3 had said that it was impossible to expect 
Jlorth Vietnamese to enter into discussions with the 
US as long as the bombing of ITorth Vietnam continued 
Fanfani said he had taken strong exception to this 
statement and had pointed out that US proposal envis- 
aged terminatioa of bombing and that Poles had known 
this all alonR, ../' 

• a « • 


State 1189 05 (to Ansaibassy Ioiidoa)j S/Jiodls 

10 January loBj 

• # 

^'2. Sean said Broviia still very hurt over our 
failure to tell him we were conveying n^w tvro-stage 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


proposal on stopping "bombing through Lewandcvski channel 
at same time that Brovn was going to Moscow with it. 
Brown did not wish to raise direct wioh mOj hence Bundy. 

'*3* Bandy made following points in reply^ which 
we now assume will go direct to Brown and also to PM: 

a. We gave proposal to Lewaudowski on IS^h 
or iHh and to Brown on l6th,.*, 

b. , . *we felt that we should honor Polish 
Insistence that 1 channel be kept totally secui^e^-... 

c. Brown message was the clear and solid 
one we were sure would get through • !foreoverj Brown 
was armed in the rest of our letter to discuss the 
underlying principles in depth^ as L was not* Brown 
could have a real exchange of views on the basis of 
total knowledge of our position. 

d. In response to Dean remark that Soviets 
must have known of message to L^ and that this perhaps 
accounted for cross-examination of Brown *s authority 
to talk for uSj Bundy said that we did not see how 
Brown's opportunity could have been prejudiced by this 
even if true . . ,we had always regarded Soviets as much 
more serious and responsible^ and Grcmyko in October 
had responded to Secretary's question which Eastern 
l^JLropeans were closest to Hanoi by saying pointedly: 
'We are * ' 

^^h Speaking on private basis^ Bandy added 

that we recognized absolute obligation never to put 
British in false position and hence to provide them 
with all infortiiation they needed for any contacts they 
had. This applied to forthcoming Kosygin visit. At 
same time^ we were playing a multiple chess game and 
could not be expected to cut the British in on all 
boards at all times.,.*., 

"5- Bundy then. , .reminded Dean of account Secre- 
tary had given Friday night of cur ccnTidential read- 
out from Salisbury J in which Pham Van Dong's unpublished 
parts of interview had spoken of Hanoi taking 'an 
appropriate stand ' and also said 'we kriow what we should 
do' if US stopped bombing; Secretaiy had told Dean this 
was same formula used last summer to Sainteny and that^ 
since Pham Van Dong resolutely refused to elaborate ^ it 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 




was at most atmospherics and did not get us mucli further 
Since Friday night report to Deanj there had been follow^ 

ing developments; 

a. Baggs-Ashmore team had come out of fianoi 
and voula be giving us their report this veek . 

b, Sainteny had made strong pitch to go to 
Hanoi to pursue what would happen if bombing stopped 
and to get general reading. We were taking him up on 
this and would be arming him with the two-phase proposal 

t m 

c. Thompson would be talking Vietnam seriously 
in TfoscoWj probably this week " 

"7- In light of all this^ I am seeking authority 
for you to see Wilson soonest j perhaps Monday *^ 

• * • 

"11. For yoxor call en Wilson-, you shotild know that 
he has sent two-sentence message to Pi*esident speaking of 
his talk with you on matter seriously affecting our 
relationships . , * . " 


January l3j I 967 

Brown has forgiven us . 

London 5692 (to SecState), TS/i^odis 
IS January I96T 


• B • 

"2, All is well. Fc apologies from me. 
from Brown, Ifo whining from ?M ^' 

Ho abuse 


January/- 19j I96T 

^ I » l I ^»| l »^Ff -■ 

Salisbury's interview with Fham Van Dong produces a number of 
apparently forthcoming statements couched in very general language. 



DtcJassint^d per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Diiie: 2011 


¥e surmise they are essentially mood music^ accompanying a strong 
attempt to get us to stop bccibing without reciprocity. Gronouski 
is to tell the Poles ^ if they raise the subject ^ that there must 
be reciprocal actions. 

State 121586 (to Amembassy Warsaw) j S/lIodis 
19 January I967 

. « 

"3. Ve have also received an extensive account 
from Harrison Salisbury of his ob:^ervation.'=5 in i^ 
highlighted by Hiam Van Dong*s response to Salisbury" ^s 
question as to what actions Hanoi would take if the 
US stopped bombing J natnely *we will talce an appro- 
priate stand.' He also said; (l) if the US 'stops 
doing harm to the North ^ we know what we should do'; 
(2) the moment the ^US puts an end to the war^ we 
will respect each other and settle every guesticn'; 
and (3) after the cessation of hostilities^ there will 
be 'no lack of generosity on our pai-t.^ Our net 
judgment is that these statements are interesting 
mood music but do not get us very far, The first two 
statements are replays of earlier statements to other 
sources. The latter two appear to be without substance. 

"l^'. At the same timej while ve are treating 
these reports seriously for action purposes^ we believe 
we may be dealing with a strong atteiapt hj Hanoi ^ 
perhaps aided consciously by the Poles and in any case 
sympathized with by the Indians ^ to get us to stop 
bombing fully without anj.^ reciprocal action e:<cep" 
possibly some claimed willingness to talk..,. 


"5* •.^if the Poles raise the subject^ you leave 
them in no doubt whatever that any stopping of the 
bombing on our part requires a clear picture of reciprocal 
actions repeat actions that amount to an equitable 


reduction of hostilities/' 

tTanuary 19 , I967 

Estabrook of the Washington Post files a story fram Ottawa which 

apparently alludes to l^Iaxigold: "Canadian authorities blame some of 

the difficulty (in beginning US-^DEV talks) on the accidental US 

bombings of Hanoi in mid -December. Private soundings then under.;ay 

were disrupted^ they say^ and the attitude in JTorth Vietnam apoeared 
to harden. ..." 



Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NTsTD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



Paris Heraia Tribune ^ 20 January I967 
Es tab rook - "Ottava Sees Hanoi Eeady to Ease ¥ar" - 
Ottava^ Jan I9 

^^Some high Canadian officials believe that ITorth 
Vietnam is now prepared to de-escalate the war in the 
south if the U.S. halts bombing in the North. Ihis 
is essentially what United Hatioas Secretary General 
U Ihant and others have been saying for some time-j 
but there are two important distinctions: firsts 
Canada has a representative on the ICC who regijilarly 
visits Hanoi and talks directly with authorities there; 
second^ Canada is a close friend and ally and does not 
want to see the U.S. disadvantaged. The key unresolved 
question authorities here assert is how soon af'cer a 
bombing halt a reciprocal move 'by NVN would take place. 
This move could be an end to the infiltration of the 
south J where U,S, sources say there are 20 identified 
North Vietnamese regiments j but It probably could not 
be expected immediately* These cor3 elusions persist 
despite the fact that feelers for peace discussions 
haive.. produced nothing tangible so far and are in 
abeyance at the moment. Canadian authorities blame 
some of the difficulty on the accidental U»S. bombings 
of Hanoi in mid-December. Private soundings then 
underway were disrupted they say and the attitude in 
North Vietnam appeared to harden. Fov they cannot be 
sure whether Iforth Vietnam wants to talk seriously 
because of the propaganda success it has enjoyed 
through world protests at the bombing. Nevertheless ^ 
they would take the change dn the ground that 
discussions J once started ^ and even with North 
Vietnam's unacceptable li-points as part of the 
agenda J would inevitably broaden. They do not 
believe that Hanoi has really retracted its offer to 
make the i|-points a basis for discussion rather than a 
mandatoiy outline for settlement. Although they believe 
that the U.S. must be a bit more flexible ^ they do not 
believe that a bcombing halt must be unconditional* They 
view as a distinct advance the U.S* offer to halt the 
bombing upon some signj public or private ^ that the 
other side would be willing to mak^ some comparable move, 
'If 1 were the Px^esident^* said one higji Canadian 
official J *I would simply announce that the bombing had 
been stopped with no reference to conditions. If nothing 
developed over a period or if JMJ took advantage of the 
situation the Ijomblng of military' targets could always 
be resi^med and the world would know that the U.S. had 
tried »' Canada's ovm confidential initia-cives on VN have 


Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NTsTD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 





been centered in the ICC in which it shares responsi- 
bility vith Poland and Tn^ia, The Canadian Bepre- 
sentativej Victor ViDore^ has just been siomaoned home 
after a 10-day visit to Hanoi aryl will be replaced 
by Norman Dier. Simultaneously ^ Canada is pressing 
Poland to agi'ee to a meeting of the ICC powers at 
an ^bassadorial level in the hope that this will 
lead to a meeting of foreign ministers. Poland last 
week rejected an Indian suggestion for a con-ference in 
New Delhi." 

Janu ary 20-21, I967 

I I ■ ' - -- - rf' ii 11 1 ^ „ i II ' 1 1 

Saigon continues to check on VC incidents in Saigon-Gia Dinh area 
There uiay be some ditEinution. Permission is reqiiested^ therefore^ to 
inform ¥estmoreland about Marigold so that he may participate more 
effectively in the incident watch. 

State doubts that there has been a real VC slowdown and does not 
wish to enlarge the circle priv^- to details of Marigold. 

Saigon l6ll^.i^ (to SecState), TS/llcdis 

20 Januaiy I96T 

Ref \ Saigon 1^4-89^1- 

"1. A continuing check on VC incidents in the 
Saigon-Gia Dinh area raises question of whether there 
is not some d iminution in number of incidents initia- 
ted by YC since Januaiy k. This report is a seguel 
to that given reftel. (underlining supplied) 

''2. As best we can detexmine there have been 
five incidents of this sort from January k to 20 
as follows : 

A- January k; Chclon; Body of Policeman 
found. Presumed to have been victim of terrorist act. 

E, January 5; Go Vap (5 ^ from Saigon); 
Two U.S. soldiers injured when terrorists tossed 
grenadri into their jeep- 

C. January 6; Thu Due (ll km from Saigon); 
Two APAli soldiers injured when their steamroller 
exploded a mine , 

D. January I3; Thu Due (11 ion from Saigon); 
National Police apprehended two VC in terrorist 

iit'&^^S>t s..3glnst equipment. Inc. facility. One VC 
BbCcL^Feaj o^ner captui'ea. ^ "^ 



^, »: 


Declassified perExecuiive Order 13526, Section 33 
NNDPmjea Number: NND 63316. By: NWDDute: 201 1 


E. January l8; Eastern Gia Dinh Province 
(l6 km nortlieast of Saigon); Vietcong platoon 
attacked three bridge sites ^ slightly damaged one. 
Fo^or friendly -wounded. 

"3- ^e question nov arises 'whether we are 
seeing a VC pause in the area ten miles around 
Saigon as a response to our own action in the Hanoi 
area. So far the answer on the surface "would appear 
to be negative J but the number of incidents is small 
recently and some of them may not be properly counted 
as either VG initiated or within the t^n. mile limit j 
e.g. J items A and E in Paragraph 2- 

^%. General Westmoreland is not aware of the 
Marigold Er-^ercise* He ISj therefore^ not avrare of 
any connection between the Hanoi bomb-free area and 
our search for an equivalent VC pause in Saigon area. 
I "vTould like to be able to tell him that we have made 
such a proposal to Hanoi ^ without revealing the 
^fe,rigold conte:d:.. I tliink we will be able to analyze 
VG actions in the Saigon area better with his help 
and J more significantly^ we might possibly be able 
to use the knowledge to our oi/n military advantage/' 


State 123198 (to Amembassy Saigon) ^ S/lIodis 

21 January I967 
Ref ; Saigon I60I7 and l6li;4 

"1, Keur iSll^-Uj our impression is that recent 
action not far from Tan Son Ilhut may have cancelled 
out yoiir iiapression that there may be a real slowdovrn 
of any sort on other side* Moreover ^ ve wculd prefer 
not to enlarge circle privy to details in this series, 
Can you not create a special quiet watch on incident 
rate within designated radius of Saigon on general 
basis without informing: Westmoreland? " 

• • 


Januarj^ 23 ^ ^967 

In Moscow^ Podgorny says that mediation ^rj the USSR would be fruit, 
less until the bombing stopped. With respect to Tliompson's question 


Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NTsTD 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



about what the BRV or USSR vould do if we did stop bombing^ Podgorr^ 
suggests we stop and see. Eiompson draws attention to the agreements 
about Laos^ which were not kept by the other side. 

Moscow 3159 (to SecState)j S/Nodis 
23 January I967 

• * * 

"h Podgornj^ then asked whether end to 

Vietnam war was in sight. 

''5. I replied we all very much hoped war 
would end soon and also hoped USSR could help us 
in bringing this about,... Podgorny said it was 
difficult e:<pect something new and stressed that 
since main parties to conflict were US and Viet^ 
n^m one could hardly count on mediation. He then 
said he did not exclude possibility of Vietnam 
taking csx'tain steps but pointed out pre-condition 
for that irould be at least minim^am move by US^ 
such as. initially^ cessation of bombings* Since 
no such move evident ^ hardly anyone could mediate. 

I I rir 

D. I said.... It would be helpful if we 
knew at least when a response could be expected. 
Alsoj as Secretary had said to Dobiyniaj it would 
be interesting to know what USSR would do if we 
stopped boanbings and other side continued its 

"7- Podgorny asserted US had always placed 
conditions on cessation of bombings. US had said 
it would stop bombings if other aide gave certain 
guarantees... , 

"8 As to reference to guarantees if we 

stepped bombing J we did not ask for guarantees but 
only for indication as to what would happen in 
response. For reason I mentioned earlier^ this 
important to us, Podgorny interjected -we could 
stop banbings and then we would see. 1 continued 
that in considering situation ve had also to keep 
in mind fact that despite agreements which had been 
reached on Ia:oSj leotian territoiT li^^ been used hy 
Horth Vietnam to infiltrate south 

. > * . 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dute: 201 1 



January 27 j 196? 

Fried J the IJI Daily Jlevs correspondent^ tells Lodge in Saigon that 
he knows of Gronouski^s contact vith the Poles in Warsaw, 

Saigon 16677 (to SecState)j TS/Nodis 
27 January I967 

''Joseph Fried J Viet-KTaia correspondent of the 
New York Daily Nevs^ told me on Friday that he 
Umav* that A^iba.ssador Gronouski and the Polish 
Government had been having conversations about 
settling the war in Viet-]}Iam." 


January 29, I967 

J "-^^1 

Saigon continues to feel that VG incidents in the Saigon- Gia Dinh 
area may have abated. 

Saigon I6785 (to SecState)^ S/Nodis 

29 Januaiy I967 
Eef : A. Saigon l6li^^ 
B, State 123193 

"1, This is another in the series of reports 
■we have been providing on VC initiated incidents 
within ten miles of Saigon. We shall send these 
reports each week. 

'^2- For the period January 21-27 within the 
zone there were fo^jr incidents that can be char- 
acterized as VC initiated : 

A. January 22 j four miles west of 
Saigon^ an unkno^-m number of enemy fired two rifle 
grenades at police station^ wounded 2 W civilians . 

B. January 23 j Gia Diuh City^ unknown 
person threw grenade at house, no casualties, 


C. January 23 j 9 miles west of Saigon j 
booby trap J 2 VJT killed and two wounded, 

D. January 24 ^ Saigon ^ unknown per^^on 
threw grenade J wounded three W civilians. 


Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


TO? SKcmni " iTODis 

"3. In addition to these incidents ^ there vere 
t'wo others in the area resulting from VIJ police and 
AEVIj rtiakijig a sveep and running on to VC* QIaese do 
not meet the criteria cf being VC initiated. 

^%, With respect to the action not f!ar from 
Tan Son Mint on January 20 (cited para one ref B)^ 
we have looked into this. The record of the action 
shovs that elements of two AEvlT hattalions on a 
search and destroy mission encountered a VC force 
nine miles vest northvrest of Saigon, The ensuing 
fight st.^:iiiaied from that contact. There is no infor- 
iiiai:ion. as to "^Jhether VC was on the way to Tan Son 
Whutj or any other special target. ITo available 
information as to vhich side fired first shot. A2M 
■units J however J were definitely on the prowl. From 
interrogation prisoners taken day later VC force 
was sixth battalion from VC I65 Regiment which is 
regularly present on fringes Gia Dinh Province, 

^'5* ^e have also examined the record of VC 
initiated incidents during the area for the m.onth 
of K'overaber I966. During that period thex^e were 11 
incidents J ranging frcm the shelling of Saigon on 
Koveraber 1^ National Day^ to platoon and S(^uad attacks 
to isolated grenadings. Of the 11 incidents, seven 
can be characterised as serious in the sense that 
they were obviously well-planned attacks l:^j small VC 
units, ^' 




February 1-2, I967 

Estabrook files a more complete stor^^ on T^ferigold from IJIew York. 
In private J he gives different versions of the story's source • He 
apparently first got word of the matter from the Canadians in Ottawa 
and later confirmed it with U Thant. In one conversation he indicates 
that he also "had it from a high Polish so^urcs.,- corroborated by 
* other Eastern E'jiropean sources,^" In another ^ he denies that it 
"came from the Poles." Goldberg believes the Poles to be the 
original source of the story and recommends that neither they nor ar^y 
other Bloc countrj'" be used as a channel to Hanoi* 

USUIT 3SI17 (to SecState)^ S/iJodiSj 2 February I967 

"Estabrook (Wash Post Correspondent) told 

Nisoff Feb 2 that his story, in Feb 2 Post about 
Hanoi readiness to talk jus-& prior to Sec I3 


DeclassiHed per Executive Order 13520, Sectiun 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Datei 201 1 




boinbing of Hanoi vas founded on several sources. He 
had it from high Polish Gource vhich he vould not 
identify. It was corroborated by 'other Eastern 
European sources.' He had been given similar impres- 
sion earlier in Jan from Can ForJ^Iin Martin. He had 
taken story to U Thant i^ho stated his belie v that 
it was correct." 

9 • 

''(Trt separate brief conversation with Pedersen 
Estabrook denied story came from Poles. Said it came 
from Martin^ while Estabrook was in Canada^ and then 
from U Thant. Estabrook said he had had story for 
couple of weeks. In response expression of surprise 
he had used word 'learned' instesi-d of something like 
^alleged' J Estabrook indicated this based on evalua- 
tions both of Martin and U Thant.)" 

• . 

"^"'ty assessment is that the original source of 
this story is the Poles themselves- They have ci_uietly 
been spreading this story throughout the UK; I even got 
some of it from the Danish Deputy Fon Min the other day^ 
who attributed it to roles." 

• « • 


• * • 

This leads me to reconiTLendation that we 
siioixld no longer use Poland or any other Bloc country 
as channel to Hanoi, It vcuJ.d be far preferable in my 
opinion to deal directly or through Sovs than to continue 
vlth this type of intermediary/' 



State 131^2 (to Jkaembassy \Ja,Tsa\r)y C/Nodi 

k Pebruaiy 1967 
Ref ; Warsaw I695 

"Test of February k V/ashington Post story by 
Estabrook will reach you in form clrctel. Text of 
February 2 stozy filed from New York ^under FebI^7ary 1 
dateline follows: 




Dt^classifit'd per Executive Order 13526, vSectitin 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 2011 



"A Polish initiative to establish peace dis- 
cussions between north Vietnam and the United States 
failed because of American bombing of the Hanoi area 
in mid-December J it has been learned on excellent 

'Exactly hov far the Poles had succeeded in 
obtaining CDmraitments from Hanoi is not clear ^ but 
high-level outr.iders ^jho knev7 about it regarded 
the initiative *as promising before the bombing 
hardened Hanoi's attitude. QUOTE The Americans 
bungled it mD QUOTE^ one informed source stated. 

'.S. officials said that any bombing of non- 
military targets was accidental^ af-cer Western 
reporters observed damage to civilian areas that 
the North Vietnamese claimed vas caused by U.S. 
bombing. Since December _, U.S. planes have report- 
edly been ordered to stay away from the Eanoi area 
unless engaged in self-defense. 

"At the momenis the Poles are said to have 
suspended their efforts. Tliey are represented as 
extremely frustrated^, not merely over the effect 
of the bombing J but more particularly vith the 
uncooperative attitude of JIanoi. 

"Recently Poland declined a suggestion of 
India that representatives of the three countries 
constituting the Intermt ioixal Control Commission 
in Vietnam - Poland^ India and Canada - meet in 
New Delhi to consider vhat could be done* Use of 
the Commission framework to promote peace discus- 
sions is an old suggestion of Can-adian External 
Affairs Mnister Paul Martin. 

"I?ven after the attitude in lianoi changed in 
the wake of the bombing^ the Poles kept tiylng. 
Among other moves a top Polish diplomat^ Jer^y 
Michalowskij made an urureported visit to the United 
States in January. 

"X'/hether any American representative saw him 
cannot be learned ^ but two Canadian diplomats were 
sent to talk with him. 



Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NTsTD 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



"Michalowskij a foimer delegate to the United 
TTatloris and more recently in the Polish Foreign 
Office J went on a special Mission to Hanoi in 
Januar^^ 19^6^ as the resxilt of the visit to Warsaw 
of roving U.S. Ambassador W, Averell Harrinian* 

"Apparently the Polish effort stemmed in part 
from a conversation between Foreign Minister Adam 
Eapacki and Martin vhen the Canadian Foreign Minis- 
ter visited fersav last December. 

"All this has transpired outside the United 
Nations , Although he has been given a mandate by 
the United States to do what he can to facilitate 
peace discuss ions ^ Secretary General U Thant is said 
by others to feel that nothing more can be accomp- 
lished at the moment, 

"Diplomats from 11 non-aligned coup„tries have 
met here three times within the last 10 days to 
discuss whether they can undertake any initiative 
to ad^^ance a solution. As a result j Sudanese dele- 
gate Fal^hreddime Mohamed was designated to call on 
Thant to inquire whether a new initiative would be 
useful. He reportedly received no encouragement. 


February 3. I96T 

At his press conference j the President says it would not be 
helpful "to comment on any particular channel or communications 
at this point." Referring to Hanoi's attitude, he adds, ^'I must 
say that I da not interpret any action that 1 have observed as 
being a serious effort to either go to a conference table or to 
bring the war to an end." 

Hew York Times, 3 February I967 

Transcript of the President's ])Tews Conference 

"FolloTring is a transcript of President Johnson's 
news conference in Washington yesterday as recorded 
by The New York Times : 

. ■ 

109 TOP sec?;et - noDis 

•■ ? 

Declassifled per Executive OrcJcr 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 \ 



''1- Prospects in Vietnam 

Q, ¥e've *been reading and writing a good deal lately 
about diplomacy aamed at a Yietriam settlement, I 
vender if you could give us your assessment of the 
peace front at this tiiae. 

A. !4r. (Frank) Cormier of the Associated Press states 
a question that I knoir is on the minds of all the 
people here today and all the people in this country. 
As you knoVj I have underlined over and over again 
the very deep interest of the United States in a 
prompt and peaceful settlement of all of the problems 
in Southeast Asia. 

I have said many times that ve are ready to go 
more than half way in achieving this result. I would 
remind all of you that we v/ould velcome a conference 
in Southeast Asia and this might be a Geneva conference j 
it could be an all- Asian conference j or any other 
generally acceptable forum. 

¥e vould be glad to see the unconditional dis- 
cussions to which I referred in my statement of 
A.pril^ 19^5; at Johns Hopkins. We would participate 
in preliminary discussions which might open the way 
for forsial negotiations* \le are prepared today to 
talk about mutioal steps of de-escalation* Me would 
be prepared to talk about such subjects as the 
exchange of prisoners ^ the demilitarization or the 
demilitarized zone or any other aspect which might 
take even a small step in the direction of peace. 

We should be prepared to discuss any points 
which the other side wishes to bring up along with 
points which we and our allies very much want to 
raise ourselves^ or there couJd be preliminary 
discussions to see whether there could be an agreed 
set of points which could be the basis for negotiant ion. 

So it is against this background that we study 
veiy carefully all of the public statements made which 
appear from time to time and which bear upon Southeast 
Asia and all the views which we receive from or 
through other governments. 

It would not be helpful to me -- and I do not 
intend to do so -- to comment on an^^ particular 
cliannel or communications a*t: this point. But you may 

be sure that we are diligent in our search for the ) 

possibility of a peaceful settlement. 


Declassified per Execuiive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWDDute: 2011 


In all candor I must say that I am not avare of 
any serious effort that the other side has made in 

my Judgment to hring the fighting to a stop and to 
stop the var . " 

"2. Personal Role in Tall^ 

Q< You've heen so eloquent in the past about express- 
ing your desire for peaceful negotiations. I'd like^ 
to ask you whether or not If you thought it would 
speed this var dovrn the road to peace whether you 
vouJ-d be willing personally to participate in negctia- 
tion^ with scone of your opposite numbers j such as 
the leadership in Hanoi? 

A. We have made clear that if the other side desires 
to discuss peace at any time well ve will be very 
happy to have appropriate arrangements made to see 
that that's carried out, 

VJhere we would talk and who would talk and what 
we would talk about are all mattei's that could be 
worked out between the two governments involved, 

Ve have made clear to them and to the world th& 
principles that we believe m.uEt govern a peace moeting 
of this klnd^ and a settlement that we wo^old hope 
would corae out of it like the honoring of the Geneva 
accords of ^5t and '62^ the right of self-determination 
of the people of South Vietziamj and to insure that they 
are freed from the threat or use of force. 

But we have J 1 must say^ as of today j no indica- 
tion that the other side is prepared in any way to 
settle on these limited and decent teims. ¥e hope 
very much that we can have some signals in that 
direction^ but I^ in candor^ must say that as of now 
we do not have." 

"3- Concessions for Peace 

Q. Mr, President J does your expressed willingness to 
negotiate a peaceful settlement imply any willingness 
to compromise on any of our stated objectives in that 
part of tiie world? 

A. I think that any peace agreement will involve 
understanding on both parts and certain concession on 
both parts and a certain understanding. 

I don*t think we can determine those before we 
come together or through any press conference tech- 
niques • 1 can only repeat what I said in the State 



Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 201 1 




of the Uniorij that I wish that the conflict in Vietaaza 
-was over and I can only repeat vhat I^ve said so many 
times "- I vill do arching I can on the part of this 
Government to go more than halfway to hring it at an end 

I must say that we face great costs j we face agony, 
¥e do plan to carry out our effoi'ts out there ^ we are 
going to support our troops in the field ^ we are going 
to work with our Vietnamese allies toward pacification 
and constitutional government^ tfut while we're doing 
that J every hour of every day the spokesmen for this 
Government are under instructions to explore every possi- 
bilD^ty for peace. 

But I do not vant to disillusion any of you and I 
don*t want any of you to be caught by speculation. As 
of this moment I cannot report that there are any 
serious indications that the other side is ready to stop 
the war." 

^%» Indications From Enemy 


Q, You have three times now used that phrase: "no 
serious efforts by the other side to bring the war to a 
close." Kow would you characterize what has been going 
on in the last couple cf weeks? Do you recognise any 
signs of ma,neuverability or fluidity in their position? 

A. I see alines t every day some speculation by some 

individual^ or some hope or desire expressed by some 
Government • And I assume that different individuals 
get different impressions j certairily they have different 
hopes . 

I can only 'speak for myself; John-* And with the 
information that I have^ with the knowledge that's brought 
to me J I must say that I do not interpret any action that 
I have observed as being a serious effort to either go to 
a conference table or to bring the war to an end," 

a ■ • 

"Q, Woiild you discuss the reports thi,t there has been a 
decline in the infiltration rate to the South and say 
whether you think the bombing has had any effect? 

A. Well J I stated in my Baltimore speech in early '65 
vhat we expected to come from the bombing, ¥e felt that 
it would improve the morale of the people in South Viet- 
nam who felt that they'd almost lost the war. We felt 
that it would make the North Vietnamese pay a much 
heavier price for what they were doing and we felt that 
it would make the infiltration more difficult. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Project Number NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



We think it has achieved all of those ei^ressed 
purposes, \Ie cannot speak with cold assurance on the 
inTiltration and the mjnibers each day or each week 
or each month. 

In soine quarters of the year oxir indications 
are that they Increase. In other periods of the 
year — the next quarter — then they go down some. 
I know of nothing that I can conclude as highly 
significant from the guesses and the estimates that 
we have made. 

Q, Sir J we have said in the past that we would be 
villing to suspend the bombing of North Vietnam in 
exchange for some suitable step by the other side* 
Are you prepared at all to tell us what kind of other 
steps the other side should take for this suspension 
of bombing? 

A. Just almost any step. As far as we can see^ they 
haven't taken any yet and we would be glad to explore 
any reciprocal action that they or any of their spokes- 
men would care to suggest. 

We have made one proposal after the other to — 
we'd like to have a cease-fire; we'd be very glad to 
stop our bombing as we have on two previous occaslonSj 
if we could have any indication of reciprocal act ion j 
but as of now they have given none and I assume they are 
willing to give none until I hear further," 

February Ji^ I967 


Saigon J the VC are reported to mortar the 7th Precinct and 

carry out k grenade attacks diaring the period January 28-February 3. 

Meanwhile^ Ky is distressed l>y news stories of US-DEV contacts 
and asks Lodge if we still require concessions in return for a bombing 
suspension and whether there are "divergences on such matters between 
Washington and Saigon • Lodge is instructed to reply by giving Ky more 
background on ferigoldj stressing (a) our doubts about the genuineness 
of the Polish contact ^ (b) on the other hand oin: obligation to follow 
all potential leads^ and (c) the need to avoid publicity during this 
"extremely interesting and delicate^' phase of diplomacy. In connection 
with the latter J his attention is to be drawn to the "recent public 
comments of Presidential Advisor Walt Sostow." 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



Saigon 17295 (to SecState)^ S/lfodis 
k February 19^7 

^'Following is the record of VC initiated incidents 
vithin 10 miles of Saigon during the period Jan 28 to 
Feb 3. 

A. Jan 30* Saigon- grenade superficially 
vounds two US servicemen. 

B, Jan 30j Saigon- grenade injures one US 
serviceman and one VII civilian. 


C< Jan 31 J 5 miles W of Saigon- grenade 
killing policeiLien and civilian^ wounding school- 
teacher . 

D. Feb Ij Saigon-six mortar shells fired 
into seventh precinct ;, wounding seven VU civilians. 

F, Feb 2 J Saigon- VC small arras and grenade 
attack on seventh precinct outnost^ one civilian 
killed . " 


Saigon I7317 (to SecState)^ S/E:^dis 

k February I967 

"1. During a call on Ky. ,. • 

"2, .,* he said^j 'Does Washington agree that there 
should be no publicity of any kind until there has been 
a concrete offer from the Communist side?' 

"3* 1 said that I felt sure that Washington vas 
very much in favor of not having publicity ^ since 
publicity not only presented awkward problems for us 
and for the Government of South Vietnam < but also made 
it difficult to get any kind of a peaceful understanding 
"With Hanoi. He agreed that we should avoid forcing 
Hanoi up against the wall by making them lose face. 

"i;. It was evident that his attention had been 
attracted by the statements of Senator Robert Kennedy 
and the apparent leaks of the messages from Cairo and 
New Delhi to a point vhere he wanted to be sure that 
there were no ^divergencies ' between Washington and 
Saigon • He asked whether we still believed that in 

lilt TOP SECRIJr ■ NOD IS , 


Declassified per Executive Order 13526» Section 33 
NND Project Nutnber: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 

TOP SECRET - iroD.13 

exchange for a bonbing suspension ve vanted some sort 
of concession on their part. Did we envisage a bar- 
gaining process or vere ve to suspend bombing with no 
quid pro quo? 

^^5* I called his attention to the President's 
press conference and to the fact that on three sepa- 
rate occasions during the press conference j the Presi- 
dent had said that so far there was nothing of sub- 
stance from Hanoi- . , , " 

« * * « 


State I3ITI5 (to Amembassy Saigon), S/!Iodis 

1;- February' I96T 
Eef : Saigon IT3I7 

• » 4 

"3- Believe you should also give Ky fill-in 
generally.,,. For his information^ story is^ as he 
may imagine^ quite incomplete and misleading in a 
number of respects • , . * We were never sure whether 
the Poles were speaking for Hanoi or entirely for 
themselves and we concluded ultimately that the 
exercise had been primarily a fishing expedition by 
the Poles in order to get us to change our position 
with respect to bombing of IJIorth Viet-IIam Through- 
out this exercise we had not undertaken to vmke any 
change in our basic position. At the same time we 
had indicated a readiness to consider the possibility 
of direct talks without conditions with Horth Viet -Ham 
with the ob^3 active of bringing about a peaceful 
settlement. You should add that we would naturally 
be in touch with the GW if there were really sub- 
stantive de^/ielopments in this field. 

^%. VJlth reference to Ky's query (para 2 of 
reftel) about Washington views on publicity ^ suggest 
you call to his attention recent public conmients of 
Presidential Advisor VJalt Bostow, After referring to 
'extremely interesting and delicate' phase of diplomatic 
probes now under way Eos tow noted that publicity could 
destroy effectiveness of behind-the-scenes efforts to 
ascertain Banoi's intent and added 'this is a bad time 
to talk about an^- partic^olar stand which might turn out 
to be a negotiating situation,'" 





Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NNTD 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 


Washington Post j 5 February I967 

U.S. Is Wary on Eeport of Peace Bid^ oy Murrey ^^rder 

"United States attempts to launch peace talks vith 
ETorth Vietnam are now in 'an extremely interesting and 
delicate phase ^^ a Iftiite House adviser said yesterday. 

'Vith that cot3ment and variations upon it^ the 
Administration declined to confirm or deny a report 
that the United States and North Vietnajn had tried to 
start peace talks in Warsaw in December ^ at American 

"Walt W» Rostov^ President Johnson's special 
assistant for national security affairs^ said; 

"*I!his is an extranely Interesting and delicate 
phase in what is or what might turn out to he a 
negotiating process, Nothing has yet happened that 
would justify us in saying we have a serious offer to 
negotiate, This is a had time to discuss any particu- 
lar negotiating track. ' 

" Lack of V igor. Postow's commeats were made 
during a panel debate at a conference of college news- 
paper editors at the Sheraton- Park Hotel, Another 
panelist J Richard N. Goodwin j who had served as an 
adviser to "both Presidents Kenndy and Johns on ^ charged 
there was a lack of vigor in the present pursuit of 

"'If Hanoi wishes to negotiate seriously^ ^ said 
Rostov^ 'yoi^i* government vould not be embarrassed. 

It vould he delighted . ^ 

"Rostow was questioned specifically hy the students 
about the validity of a report in TJie Washington Post 
yeste2rday^ by staff writer Robert H. Es tab rook at the 
United Nations. 

"It reported that an authoritative Western source 
said that U,S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge j in Saigon 
on Dec. 2 and 3^ asked a Polish diploinat to set up 
contacts with North Vietnam. On Dec* kj the report 
said J Polish Foreign ^iinister Adam Rapacki said Hanoi 
agreed to have ambassadorial-level talks with the 
United States in Warsaw, The report said that Hanoi 
attached no conditions about first halting the Ameri- 
can bombing of North Vietnam. 




Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


"Withdrew In Ar^er , According to the report Hanoi 
angrily vitlidrev its agreement after American bombing 
raids near Hanoi on Dec, 13-1^^- allegedly hit civilian 

"Eostov declined to get any more specific about 
that account except to repeat that 'this is a bad time 
to tallc about a pairticular strand of vhat might be a 

^^Other soiirces sought to emphasize that the frus- 
trated negotiating effort described in the report from 
the United Nations vas only one of many efforts being 
made to launch talks. 

^^Scme Administration soui'ces said the point in 
■Ihe Washington Post account that they ^ould challenge 
was that Hanoi had 'agreed* to the Warsaw talks, JTo 
official^ however J would discuss whether this question 
of agreement was a matter of differing interpretations 
or not. 5^.ere was no challenge by any official of the 
reported Lodge-initiative to arrange for talks in Varsaw. 

"The State Department ^ in coBimenting Friday on 

earlier and considerably less -detailed versions of a 

similar report 1::^ The Washington Post and others said 

it saw 'no merit' to contentions that the bombing of 

North Vietnam interfered with efforts to start peace 


"m a new comment yesterday the State Department 

"'As a matter of policy we do not believe it 
would promote the cause of peace in Vietnam to comment 
on accoiints of an^- alleged private talks or events 
relating to them. The President fully characterized 
the situation at his press conference last Ilhursday.* 

"At that press conference j President Johnson 
repeatedly said that 'I do not interpret any action 
that I have observed as being a serious effort to either 
go to a conference table or to bring the war to an end,' 
The Unitecl States^ he said^ was anxious 'to explore any 
reciprocal action' to curb or end the war. 

"That comment J Administration sources said^ amounted 
to turning do^m^ as inadequate^ a bid by North Vietnam's 
Foreign mnister in which he said there 'could' be talks 



Declassified per Execuiive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Diite: 201 1 


if there was an Uinconditiona.!' end to the "bcEibings 
of his coiontiy. 

'^ Administration officials emphasized that the 
offer only held out the possibility^ not the proraisej 
of talks^ in any event, 

"The Soviet news agency^ Tass, charged yesterday 
that President Johnson had spurned the 'good"yfill* 
gesture by North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen 
Duy Trinh. Ikss said the minister had displayed an 
'indication of willingness' by the Hanoi regime to 
talk with the United States- 


"!Dae Soviet news agency added: 

"*Bie unwillingness of U.S. ruling circles to 
stop the critninal bombing of the D.R.V. (North 
can only be regarded as a refusal to ineet around the 
conference table ^ and as a sign of their deteimination 
to further escalate the aggressive war in Vietnam.' 

"Tass's correspondent in Hanoi said President 
Johnson's statements pi^oduced ^legitimate indignation' 
in Hanoi, '" 

February 6-Tj I96T 

Australia and ITew Zealand are briefed on I&rigold in seme detail. 
More general acco^^nts are given to the GVhJ and the I^nila countries. 

Ky accepts our explanation in good spirit ^ but points to alaim 
about so-called ^^peace" talk among Catholic leaders ^ certain Buddhists 
and the military in SVM, His and Thleu's strong anti-coTmnunisni would 
be reassuring to these elements ^ he believe; 


State I323W (to Amembassy Canberra; i^embassy Wellington) , 

TS/NodiSj 6 February I96T 
Ref : DEPCmTEL I3170O 

"1. On February k Bundy separately gave Ambassador 
Waller and Charge d^Aff aires Shepherd a full account of 
the discussions between USG and Poles about the possi- 
bility of direct discussions betvreen USG and Hanoi...." 



Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NTsTD 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


"27 I^Tille ve may have erred in not informirii 

you fully on this matterj we vere guided throughout by 
the absolute necessity of secrecy in seeking to deter- 
mine whether Hanoi was in fact prepared to sit do"v/n 
quietly without preccaditions . » . . 

"28. Ihis full account is being given to 
Australia and New Zealand ^ with the request for the 
jpreservation of total confidence. A more general 
account Is being given to Saigon and to the Manila 
countries. We have assured Saigon^ as we have repeat- 
edly assured you^ that if we should get clear evidence 
of a serious change in Ifenoi^s position we would keep 
them fully informed." 


Saigon 17l|8£ (to SecState)^ S/Kodis 

T Februaiy 1967 
Kef: State I3ITI5 

"1* Pursuant to your I31715J I called on Prime 
Minister Ky ^esday morning ,,,•" 

« ■ ■ 

"3» Ky seemed to accept all of the above in good 
spirit. He evidently thinks that the purpose of the 
rather careful wording is to make it possible to 
achieve scMe kind of understanding irithout making Kknoi 
lose face* In all my many talks with himj he has often 
voiced his belief that ve should be trying to persuade 
Hanoi and make it easy for them to go along with uSj 
and that we did not want to humiliate thenij make them 
lose face J put them up against the wall- 

"U. Changing the subject slightly ^ he then said 
that Catholic leaders in Viet-BIam were becoming alarmed 
by the so-called fpeace^ talk which they feared would 
actually mean military advantage for Kanoi^ and were 
taking an attitude very different fran that of the Pope. 
He was afraid that similar divisions laight occur among 
Buddhists and among the military. The hopeful element 
of the situation was that 'everyone knew^ how strongly 
anti-Communist he^ Kj, and Ihieu were." 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



F ebruary- 7- 8 ^ 19 6? 

Wilson comments in Parliament about discussion ^ith the Poles and 
a definite ^^peace feeler^^ last December. Highest levels in Washington 
fear this may undercut the President's Februaiy 3 remarks. 

Gronouski takes issue ^fith Goldberg^ arguing that the Canadians 
vera probably Estabrook's source and that the Poles remain a better 
channel for communication with I^noi- 

State 133105 (to Amembassy London) j S/lIodis 
8 Februaiy I967 


"1* Highest levels are deeply disturbed by Wilson 
reference to December discussions with Poles in Parlia- 
mentary response yesterday. Wilson comment is of course 
being widely reported as confiimng that some definite 
'peace feeler' did exist at that time^ and is therefore 
being construed to 'undercut' President's remarks of 
last week. Moreover^ revelation that Wilson has 'all 
the details' is bound to have serious complicating 
effect on our relations with Saigon and with S^Ianila 
allies J who had not repeat not received any similar 
full account , . , * " 

* • 


Warsaw I939 (to SecState)^ TS/Nodis 

8 February I967 
Eef: (A) State I305SO 
(B) State 131716 

"1. Based on person-al knowledge of the precedents^ 
I have reached quite different inferences and conclu- 
sions regarding Es tab rook articles than those drawn ^oj 
Amb. Goldberg in reftels* 

With respect to Feb 2 story j while Esta crook 
referred to high Polish sourceSj he denied that story 
came from the Poles. Rather ^ he said it came from 
Canadian Fou Min I^^rtin while Ss tab rook was in Canada ^ 
and that he had story a couple of weeks. This rings 
tr-ae^ for Estabrook on Jan I9 filed from Ottawa essence 
of his Feb 2 stoiy (which appeared in Jan 20 Paris 
Herald Tribune) saying 'Canadian authorities blame some 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 I 



of the difficiilty on the accidental U.S. bombing of 
Hanoi in mid-December. Private soundings then under 
Tr/ay were disrupted ^ they say^ and the attitude in 
Uoiiih Vietnam appeared to harden.' Alsoj note that 
in his Feb 2 article Estabrook speaks of 'high level 
outsiders' as source^ and links Polish peace effort 
to r&ftia-Kapacki discussions in December (which is 
not true J btit it does not hurt Martin's iniage to be 
case in this role}^ alsoj note that Estabrook spoke 
of Westem sources In his Feb h story*" 

^'5* What does surprise mSj if we accept Esta- 
brook 's statement that story came from Martin (and I 
see no a priori reason for Estabrook to implicate 
fertin and U Ohant and protect the Poles )j is that 
Feb 2 story places developments in so unfavorable a 
light from standpoint of USG,,*," 

* ■ 

"8. I am particularly concerned vith recommen- 
dation in final para of reftel A^ that 've shouJ_d no 
longer use Poland or ar^ other Bloc country as 
channel to Hanoi,* As I noted in m^f analysis of 
Marigold role played by Poland (Warsaw 1631)^ I too 
had hoped that Soviets might play an Intermediary 
role. But to my knowledge experience has been that 
Poles are only Communist countiy willing to take on 
this chore 

■ > 4 tt 


Febniaxy 10^ l8j 20 ^ I967 

Sizeable TC incidents within 10 miles of Saigon lead Lodge to 
suggest that there is no further need to look for indications of reci- 
procity to oLir suspension of bombing near Hanoi. He suggests that the 
10 mile limit around Hanoi be dropped. 

Saigon 1T759 (to SecState)^ S/KTcdis 
10 February 1967 

"Following is the record of VC initiated inci- 
dents within ten miles of Saigon during the period 
Febn^axy k to February 9." 

* . 



1 . €J 

Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NNTD 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


^ — ^.^ — ^ 

^^C. February 6^ four miles west of Saigon 
unirlentified platoon- sized unit fired submachine 
bursts near police station aad then withdrew." 

«■« 'd » 


Saigon IS329 (to SecState), S/Uodis 
18 February I96T 

"Following is the record of VC initiated inci- 
dents within ten miles of Saigon during the period 
February 10 to February 15/' 

* ■ • 

"C. February 13^ Saigon - VC fired four mortar 
rounds in vicinity of MCV-I (details have been 
reported separately)." 

« « 

"2. With this spate of activity it is clear 
that considerations behind preparing this series of 
reports are no longer relevant. This villj therefore^ 
be the last telegraphic repoi't of this sort." 


Saigon l8>35 (to SecState)^ TS/liodis 
20 Feb27uary I967 

* w m 

"2. [Jhe recent mortaring in town, other terror- 
ist incidents in the Saigon area^ and the likelihood 
that we will get niore^ prompts me to suggest we con- 
sider Infonning Hanoi j via the Poles ^ that we no 
longer consider ourselves bound by the 10 miles liiait." 



March 3, I967 

Goldberg (acconipanied by Lodge) sees D*Orlandi in Saigon^ to hear 
the D.atter's version of Marigold* His objective is a first-hand confirm^ 
at ion from an inclependent source of the inaccuracy of the Polish version 
conveyed to U Thant. D'Orlandi^s account^ he finds^ contains "no 


DeclassiOed per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 




discrepancies from the version we already have- In particular D^Orlandi 
is guite categoric in stating that the 10 points passed to Hanoi were 
foroiulated by Lewandowski^ not by Lodge — as Goldberg believes the Poles 
told U Thant. On the other side, D^Orlandi is of the view that the 
December 13-lt bombing derailed the Warsaw talks. He expresses great 
confidence in Lewandovski's Integrity, 

USIM 1^238 (to SecState), S/ETodis 

6 lylarch I967 


"On ferch 3^ day before leaving Saigon ^ I arranged 
entirely private and off record meeting with D^Orlandi^ 
with agreement of and in presence -Amb Lodge . l^ objec- 
tive was to secnre first-hand confirmation from entirely 
independent source of inaccuracy of Polish version of 
late IToveniber^early December Marigold events ^ i.e.^ that 
it was Lodge who had formulated ten point proposal 
Lewandowski transmitted to Hanoi ^ only to take position 
subsequently that some of these points needed clarifica- 
tion, (underlining furnished) 

"Without any prompting on my partj D'Orlandi 
really and fully recited course of events. His recital 
contained no discrepancies from version we already had 
and he was guite categoric in stating that ten points 
passed Hanoi by Levandowski had been formulated by 
Lewandowski himself," 

■ * * 4' 

"It is necessary to add^ however^ that D^Orlandi 
is of view that bombing of Dec 13-1^ derailed Warsaw 
talks. He also expressed view that it would have 
fu3rbhered progress towards negotiations if Rapacki had 
not insisted upon transferring venue to Warsaw. 
D*Orlandl's view is that it would have been preferable 
to carry on discussions through himself and lewandowski 
In Saigon^ with Lewandowski commuting to Hanoi. 

^'D^Orlandi expressed great confidence in Lewan- 
dowski 's integrity and confirmed that both Lewandowski 
and he will be leaving Saigon for respective home or 
other posts • " 





DeclassiDed per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


March Ik, 19 67 

On returaing to ITew York^ Goldberg tries to arrive at a common 
version of the facts about J-feirigold with the Polish TOT Representative^ 
Tomorowicz. The Polish version agrees 'vrith ours that the 10 points 
-were formulated by LevaMowski . Goldberg ndt^B three points of 
difference J however: 

i. Their version does not mention that Lodge indicated the 
need to clarify certain points at the December 1 meeting in Saigon. 

ii. Their version indicates that Lodge first raised clarifica- 
tion at the December 3 meeting ^ through the "important differences of 
intei^pretation" clause, 

iii. According to their version^ the Poles stressed avoiding 
intensification of the bombing either before or during talks from the 

December 1 meeting on, 

Goldberg urges Tomorcwicz to revlev Marigold with Warsai; so that 
these factual differences can be cleared up. 

USIM 4390 (to SecState)j S/Nodis 

15 mvch 1967 

"1, I arranged meet with Polish Perm Eep Tomoro- 
vicz Mar ll|. FM shortly after he had called on SIG and 
just before he was due leave for roughly ten days con- 
sultation in ¥arsaw," 

A m 

"3- Specif ically^ I noted there is one point of 
some importance re developments in early Dec on vhich 
there are two differing versions ^ namely ^ who formu- 
lated ten points which lewandowsKi presented tc Hanoi- 

''k. I said I had talked with D^^rlandi privately 
while in Saigon^ that D^Orlandi had reviewed ^krigold 
developments without any prompting from me^ and that 
his review entirely confirmed our understanding of 
facts on this point, Tomorowicz said that^ In princi- 
ple j facts of this point as we understood them were 
quite accurate, (underlining furnished) 

5. His further comments ^ however^ engendered 
discussion of Marigold developments throughout Dec 
which revealed three other points on which we and 
Poles have differing facts, specifically: 



Duclassifled per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 J 
NND Pmject Number NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


a) PoliE^h vers ion J as presented by Tomoro- 
wiczj makes no mention of fact that at Dec 1 mtg in 
Saigon, when Levandowski pre sent ed ten points to 
Lodge^ Lodge raised question of need to clarify some 
of points^ noting Points B and H in particular » 
(underlining furnished) 

B) Acco3?ding Polish version^ Lodge first 
mentioned need for clarification at Dec 3 jtntg j when 
he said there were important differences of inter- 
pretation on 'serious matters^ in ten points ^ although 
Lodge would not reply when asked to identify points 

in need of clarification, (underlining furnished) 

C) According Polish version^ Poles placed 
stress on relation between bombing and progress 
toward US-TTOI talks from Dec 1 mtg on: Lewandowski 
allegedly told Lodge on Dec 1 that there must be no 
intensification of bombing either before or during 
talks; at Dec 3 mtg with Lodge ^ he allegedly made 
strong representations re Dec 2 bombings; and^ on 
Dec 5 J Rapacki allegedly made another strong repre- 
sentation re bombing to Gronousklj claiming Dec 2 
and 3 bombings had not ruled out chances of direct 
US-IIVJr talks but had certainly made progress toward 
talks more difficult, (underlining furnished) 

"6. As these differences carae to light during 
discuss ion^ I presented our understanding of facts 
and urged Tcmorowicz to review Marigold developments 
while in Warsaw so that -we could clear up factual 
differences betveen us * , , . '* 


March l6-lTj I96T 

Fanfani writes Rusk that Lewandowski has proposed a new initiative 
to D'Orlandi, Lodge is instructed to follow up^ but he replies that 
D'Orlandi has left Saigon for Rome, Reinhardt is therefore instructed 
to contact D*Orlandi later in Home, 

F.QEie 4767 (to SecState)j s/Fodis^ I6 March I96T 

• • 

"My Dear Secretary of State ^ 


Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NTsTD 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



'^I voiild feel remiss in my duty if I failed to 
infoiTiL you of what Aml^assador D^Orlandi has communis 
cated to me after meeting vith Lewandovskij a few 
days ago J and reviewing with him the current Viet- 
namese situation* D'Orlandi felt he had to tell me 
that J in the present circumstances ^ a resumption of 
negotiations wotild require a three week long sus- 
pension of baiEhings and the admission^ on the part 
of the United States ^ that they are still willing 
to accept the well known ten points. 

"D^Orlandi adds that the duration of the sus- 
pension Gould he kept secret and that it should not 
rpt not he difficult to seciire a substantive counter^ 
part from Hanoi j to be presented as a compensation 
for Some otherj purely token^ concession frcei the 
United States/* 

• • • * 


State 156826 (to Amembassy Saigon) ^ S/Kodis 
16 March I96T 

*'l. By now you will have seen* . .message from 
FonMin Fanfani to Se dietary Rusk 

* * * 

"2* Points of greatest interest on which we 
most want clarification are following: 

(a) When would the negotiations be 
resumed J after suspension had run three weeks or 
at initiation of three-week period? If the former^ 
should it be assumed that suspension would be 
expected to continue as negotiations proceeded? 

(b) V/hat would be the 'substantive 
counterpaii}' from Hanoi? Presume it would not 
merely be resumption of negotiations but rather 
some de-escalatory action affecting infiltrationj 
guerrilla or terror activity in the South or the 
like . 

(c) In phrase 'resumption of negotiations* 
does this refer to (i) direct UPV/US talks which were 
to hav^ been undertaken in Warsaw last December 2 
and which we welcomed ^ or (li) resumption of arid 

exchanges between C-ronouski and Papacki? 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Seutiim 3 J 
NND Project Number NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


(d) vihat is entailed in 'accepting* the 

ten points? ¥e assi*me this means nothing more than 
that ve have in no vay receded from acceptance in 
terms ve made known to Lewandov/ski and Rapacki in 
November and December. 

^'3. Please review these matters vith D^Orlandi 

Saigon 20590 (to SecState)j S/Nodis 
16 ferch 1967 

"1. In response to your 156826^ D'Orlandi 
left Saigon yesterday, Thursday, March l6.,.," 


State 158132 (to Ameiabassy Rome)j s/Nodis 

17 March I967 
Ref : (a) Saigon 20590 

(b) Rome kjBj 

(c) State 156826 

« • • 

''2 The Secretary vould be most grateful 

if Minister Fanfani vould let Ambassador Reinhardt 
know when Ambassador B'Orlandi has reached Rome so 
that the two Ambassadors miglit discuss Lewandcwski's 
approach . 

"3- For Reinhardt, Assuming the arrangement 
outlined above works out, we would appreciate your 
following up vith D*Orlandi along lines slcetched 
out Deptel I56826 '" 


^ ) 

March I9, 19 67 

Rapacki has told Uilson and Brown that (l) Lodge first accepted 
Lewandovski's 10 points, then reneged through the "important differ- 
ences of interpretation^^ clause^ and (2} the December 13-1^ bombing 
had sabotaged the entire project. State cables a rebuttal: (ij 
Lodge reserved the US position on the 10 points when first presented, 
December 1; hence he did not renege^ (2) Although Lewandowski 

complained on December 3 about our bombing Hanoi ^ "there was no 
suggestion that the prospect for DRV-U8 talks depended in any direct 
way on such matters*" 






Declassified pt^r Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 
NND Project Niiitiber". NND 63316. By: HWD Date: 2011 


State 1582U6 (to Amembassy London) ^ TS/TTodis 

19 Iferch 1967 
Hef: London's 6998 and 7172 and State's lli6303 

"Account in London's 6998 of Ea^acki's conver- 
sations with Bro-vm and Wilson about the events of 
December provide further evidence of Kapacki's con- 
tinuing Yindictiveness. \Je assume that his feelings 
will badly discolor the Polish contribution to a 
'more detailed post mortem' between the British and 
the Poles. 

"During his London vis it , Eapacki evidently 
made two charges against us: (l) Lodge had reneged 
after giving firm agreement to the Lewandowski Ten 
Point package and (2) the December 13-1^ bombing 
had sabotaged the entire project, 

"The cable exchanges between Lodge and the 
Department in the early days of December provide 
an absolutely clear record that Lodge did not repeat 
not agree to Lewandowski's version of the Ten Points 
and therefore did not repeat not renege- On Decem- 
ber Ij Lewandowski told Lodge he had presented to 
Hanoi his understanding of the US position based on 
his conversations with Lodge on IJovember Ik and 
earlier. He then read his Ten Points ^ which Lodge 
recorded precisely. Lodge was not^ however j shown 
a paper containing the Ten Points. 

"At the end of his statement ^ Levandowski asked 
Lodge if he had correctly stated the US point of view. 
Lodge responded carefully that 'obviously on a matter 
of such importance J I would have to refer to my 
government for a definitive reply ^ but I could say 
off hand that much of what he cited was in keeping 
with the spirit of our policy*' He then pointed out 
specific difficulties with Point 2 and Points 8. 
Neither in this nor in later discussions with Lodge 
did Lawandowski indicate any misunderstanding of the 
qualified riature of Lodge's response to his presen- 
tation of the Ten Points, For example. Lodge informed 
him on December 3 that our Snbassy in Warsaw would 
contact the DRV representative on December 6 to confirm 
'that the Lewandowski formulation broadly represented 
our posit ion J although several specific points were 
subject to important differences of interpretation,,,. 


.... It is also worthy of hate that D^Orlandi 
told the Secretary on December 9 that Eapacki had 


Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


TOP SECRET ' r:oDis 

'tried to be clever' aM to get the US to withdraw 
all its reservations about the Lewandowski formu- 
lation before he established a direct contact in 
Warsaw between the US and DRV representatives*..* 



It is tiijie that on December 3; Levan- 
dowski under instructions ^ coiriplained to Lodge 
about bombings in the vicinity of Hanoi but there 
was no suggestion that the prospect for DEV-US talks 
depended in any direct way on such matters, 

"Subsequently J while Eapacki haggled^ we wez^e 
blocked from a direct contact with the DEV at which 
this and all other pertinent subjects could have 
been discussed.,,/^ 


Apri l Tj ^I j. IggT 

Eeiriha.rdt reviews prospects for resuming contact via Lewandowski 
with D'Orlandi in Rome, State instructs him to arrange a three-party 
meeting when Lewandowski passes through Rome in May. 

Rome 326G (to SecState)^ S/lTodiSj T April I967 
State 164750 (Eef?) 

"1. In lengthy private conversation today at 
villaj D'OrlaMi exposed his conviction that possi- 
Dility to achieve something through Lewandowski was 
good and should be pursued without undue delay 
since Pole would be leaving Saigon in >Iay. D'Orlandi 
believed lesson of last try was that more details 
should be clarified and nailed dovna through Lewan- 
dowski channel before actual negotiations between 
principals initiated. No doubt^he had discussed 
these and other views in detail with Lodge* It 
was clear to me that D^Orlandi considered himself 
essential link to Lewandowski channel. 

. Regardirig specific questions (State 156826^ 
para 2)j he stated: 

A, Lewarjiowski thought that suspension 
of bombing sho^jad be initiated not later than his 
arrival in Hanoi to sound ITorth Yietnamese and that 
three or four weeks would be necessary to allow 
sufficient time for initial exchanges ^ suspension 
would of coui'se be without any comiuitment^ and whether 
it continued firrther would presi^jnably depend on 
whether constrictive developments take place. 






Dccbssiried per Execuiive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Diile: 201 1 


B. » Substantive contribution' would ^ he 
imagined J be something specific in military field 
which US Command considered useful. 

C. ^Resumption of negotiations' he 
thought meant US/DEV but vas not sure that Hapacki/ 
Gronouski stage could be completely finessed if venue 
were Warsaw, 

D. 'Accepting ten points' he understood 
simply to mean reaffirmation of previous position 
including US reservations on interpretation and 

assurance that there had been no recession in US 

*'3» D'Orlandi said Lewandovski had revealed 
nothing rpt nothing in his conversation vhich might 
cast light on why Hanoi published Johnson- Ho- Chi 
Minh. exchange . " 

* » « « 


State 180271 (to Memhassy Eome)^ TS/Nodis 

21 April 1967 
Eef: Rome 5266 

"1, \Je appreciate having these additional 
comments by D'Orlandi and suggest that in order to 
explore Hanoi's position further j as it is untier- 
stood by Lewandowski^ you propose quiet meeting 
between the three of you next month when Lewandowski 
passes through Rome en route to Warsaw/' 


May 8- I967 

Hightower files a lengthy account of ^3arlgold from Washington, The 
story contains enough detail to Indicate that some of his sources were 
insiders. It is critical of the Polish role and reflects Washington's 
doubts the reliability of Poland as a channel to Hanoi, 



^ \ss 

Declassified perExecuiive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Pmjecn Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


Key York Times , 9 May I96J 

Eight over of the Associated Press 

• • * 

"One of the 10 points provided that the United 
States voiild not insist that North Vietnai]i acknowl- 
edge publicly the presence of its forces In South 
Vietnam. The Johnson Administration decided this 
should be clarified to require that if the troop 
issue was to be covered up for face-saving purposes ^ 
then the Uorth Vietnamese forces should be with^ 
drawn from the South. 

''Mr. Lewaudowski was infortned of this and other 
clarification points. The others seemed mainly 
matters of wording. But this one seemed to be sub- 

"Mr. Eapacki*s strong resistance to the clari- 
fication proposal caused some concern in Washington, 
Officials were not sure the Poles had any coniniitment 
from North Vietnam to begin the xalks. Some high 
officials here doubted that I-lr. Hapacki was in fact 
relaying United States views and making known 
Washington's readiness for talks to Hanoi-" 


m * 

"Informants say an Important element in the 
Administration decision not to suspend the bombing 
plan was an attack by Communist forces on Saigon's 
main airfield and an unsuccessf-ol attempt to blow 
up a major bridge in Saigon," 

• * » • 

"United States officials publicly took issue 
with this. Privately they said that while the 
attack at Hanoi might have destroyed the Polish 
plan J it might also have presented Hanoi or Warsaw 
with a convenient pretext for not going through 
with it." 

# > • « 

May 9-10, I967 

In Warsaw^ Polish concern is expressed over rumors that the US 

plans to publish a white paper on Marigold* This would force them^ 

1^1 TOP SECH^ - rrODIg 

Declassifled per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 




reluctantly J to publish their own account, Gronouski recoHsnends against 

Washington replies that the Eightover piece is ^^essentially accurate 
and reasonably favorable from our point of view." The Poles are to be 
told that ve will not publish a white paper. 

When so infonnedj the Poles respond that "US officials had apparent- 
ly chosen another way to put out the stoiy," They are especially dis- 
tressed at the question raised as to whether they had actually transmitted 
US messages to the Ifforth Vietnamese, Tliey state that they had delivered 
the messages . 

Warsaw 2T00 (to SecState)^ S/Nodls^ 9 May I967 

"1. During my separate calls on Winievicz and 
Mlchalowski this morning ^ both of them expressed 
Polish concern about news reports originating in U.S. 
that U.S. intends to publish within next few days a 
white book covering Warsaw talks of last December,,.." 

* • ■ 

"5 Poles WQf-ild be most reluctant to pub- 
lish their own white book but they would be left with 
no alternative if U*S. published its own," 

. ■ 

"T* -..- I wouJ.d therefore recomraend against 
publication of official dept. version of MARIGOIiD 
events. . , J^ 


State 190899 (to Amembassy Warsaw)^ S/lTodis 

9 May 1967 
Eef : Warsaw 2699 and 27OO 

"We consider news stories filed yesterday on 
December peace probes to be essentially accurate 
and reasonably favorable from our point of view. 
We would prefer let matter rest there avoiding to 
extent feasible public exdaange of interpretations 
with the Polish Government, When queried about 
story yesterday^ official spokesman said he pre- 
ferred not rpt not to comment on STJory^ adding 
FOR BACKGEOUDID that he 'would have no q.i.u3,rrel with 
it, ^ We intend maintain this position. 


Declassified pei Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



"Since we have no desire exacerT^ate US-Pol ish 
\ relations over "fchis matter ^ we have no present 

intentions publish H'Tnite Book' on this subject* 
You should so inform Michalowski 

• > • 

> » •' 


Warsaw 272? (to SecState)^ s/JIodis 

10 I4ay 1967 
Eef; State I90899 

"1 \Ihen Kaiser said U.S. has no present 

intention of publishing white book^ Michalowski 
responded that U.S. officials had apparently chosen 
another way to put out the story- He then referred 
to Hightower article which j he said^ according to 
summary received by Polish FonMinj seemed to be 
based on high level official sources. There were 
disturbing distortions j errors and innuendos 
challenging the integrity of Rapacki and question- 
ing whether Polish side had actually transmitted 
messages to North Vietnamese. He added that Poles 
had of course delivered messages," 

M m w * 


fey 28 J 1967 

US Eabassies in Tol^o and Seoul are given background information 

on l^Iarigold . 

State 2039314- (to AmSnbassies: Tokyo^ Seoul)^ s/Nodis 

28 fey 1967 
Kef: State 197li.26 to Tokyo 
. State 198946 to Seoul 

"We are repeating to you State's 1582^5-6 and 
1323^7 which provide bac'^xground info on Polish 
initiatives re Vietnam which aborted last December. 
Text of Lewandovski's Ten Points which were pre- 
sented to Aabassador Lod,^e on December 1 follows:" 


. b 




DcL-lassified per Execuiive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 


June 6, I96T 

The three-party talks in Eome vill not be possible as Levandovskl 
is not passing through. 

Rome 6506 (to SecState)j s/Uodis 

6 June I96T 
State 191171^ and Home 599I 

"D'Orlandi has informed me that Lewandowski 
is not repeat not coming to Rome," 


December 6j I967 

Wilfred Burchett tells US officials in Paris that the DPV had an 
official en route to the Marigold Warsaw meeting at the time of can- 
cellation — "vhen the US resinned bombing Hanoi/' 

Paris 75^0 (to SecState)^ S/Nodis^ 
6 December I967 

* * 

"Burchett said North Vietnamese accuse us of talking 
peace vhile intensifying war. For example; ITorth 
Vietnainese had agreed to talk at Warsaw last December 
and even had official en route when US resumed bombing 
Hanoi- He also mentioned North Vietnamese readiness 
to talk at Rangoon during 37 day pause/' 

« a • *