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Full text of "Pentagon Papers"

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Seciion 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



VIC Settlement of the Conflict (6 Vols.) 

Histories of Contacts (4 Vols.) 

4. 1967-1968 




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STATES 



VIETNAM RELATIONS 



VIETNAM TASK FORCE 



OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 



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SJ-^T'i'LEi-ffiiv-T OF 7M. COI-ii'LICS 



Hop:o''i^ n.a-tio3-iK^ 1 9 57 - 1963 
HISiCORY OF CONTACTS 




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KIS SETTING 



I. INTROPUCTIO N' 

Since mid-196-tj there vras a halting but gradua.1 diplomatic move- 
ment hy both NVN and the U.S. toward a negotiated settlement, Hanoi 
had been .insisting preYXously on U.S. .withdrawal rz^om SVN> acceptance 
of the- Four Points a.s the only correct solution^ the M.F as the sole 
legitimate representative of the South Vietnaraesc people^ and a perma- 
nent, as vrell as unconditional cessation of U.S. action against IWNj 
prior to beginning either talks or negotiations. In other vmrds^ Hanoi 
was demanding that the U.S, make all the requisite concessions before 
the two sides even sat dovm at the table- By mid-19S7> it seemed clear 
that the only condition for talks was the cessation of U.S. borrhardnient 
and all other acts of war against I^fVH. V/hile the U.S. repeatedly main- 
tained the position of either '^unconditional discussion.^;" at any time, 
or de-escalation> or both, it too gradually modified its stand. By the 
end of I9S7J the U.S. no longer pressed for a virtually LmmediatG vrith- 
drawal of North Vietnamese forces or for "assurances that infiltration 
has stopped.'* The San A'atonio formula vras a recognition that the vrar 
in the South Trdght continue at about the present rate^ even if negoti- 
ations were in process. 

Diplomatic differences v^ere narrowed to the point v^hore though 
there will be real disputes at the barge^ining table ^ initial contacts 
leading to negotiations could readily begin* A-IJ, these diplomatic moves 
served as a quiet backdrop to the vmr in Vietnam itself. The fig}) ting 
* *in South Vietnam stepped up as both sides increased their force J ivels 
and am^^itions. The U,S. bombardment of IMorth Vietnam escala^ted as nevr 
targets were struck throughout I9S7- " . 

1 ■ ■-— J'l I II L I 

■I- 

Fi^oiri the close of SariFLOVJER in Septem.ber I967 until President 
Johnson's dra^matic speech of Karch 3^j 1968> diplomatic activity to 
bring the opposing sides to the conference table was carried on essen- 
tially through five different and sometimes overlapp3.ng channels J 

First, there vras the Ru.manian track (to become "PACPCERS" in 
December I9S7) v:hieh extended tram. October 1966 through February I968. 
Periods of intensity in tliis track \:^Te January 1967, October and 



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^^oveiviber 196? ^ and Deceinber I967 through January I968. Private 
exclianges "in this track vrere being confirmed by public statements on 
both sides. . * ■ ' 

Second J the Govermisnt of S;7Gden ('^ASHCN") p3.aycd a continuing 
though minor role from November I9S6 through February I968. Svredish- 
DRY contacts were intense in November of I9665 February 195? ^ vrith 
contacts occurring throughout the vhoD.e 1967-68 tiriieframe* 

Third J there vere infrequent and lovr-key contacts betv:een the 
Kor^regians and the DRV ("Oilio") which lasted from June I967 through to 
March of I968, There was not much activity in OIlIOj since v^e preferred 
to use other chamielfi^ but the key messages in this channel were passed 
in June 1967 and March 1968, 

Fourth^ thei^e was a contact in Paris ("pj^NNSYLVAllIA'') , with great 
intensity and freciuency of exchanges in September and October of I967. 
Private exchanges in this track v/ere being confirmed by pub3.ic stateiaents 

Fifth :i the Italia-n-DEV track (*^KILLY'*) was seemingly being con- 
sidered a prijne channel by both sides' in February and the beginning of 
March I968- This was the la.st contact prior to President Johnson's 
speech of March 31^ I968. 

. Tlie difference in the quality of reporting and intermediation in 
these tracks is^ in retrospect ^ quite pronounced* Since very fevr 
written messages v/ere exchanged^ we were 'continual3.y relying on the 
ear^ predi2-ectio.ns and prejudices, of the intermediary. Sinc^ all the 
intermediaries J in one way or another, he,d a definite interest in the 
success of their role as well as in bringing the opposing sides to the 
- conference table, all transmissions from thenrhave to be vievred with some 
skeptncism. All of their efforts seem to focus on one issue^-^-the cessa- 
tion of U,S, bombing. It must be assujned that in addition to good 
offices and good wi3-lj all of these intermediaries wanted us to stop 
the bombing. Since }lanoi vras apparent3.y representing to them that 
nothing else could occur unless the bombings were stopped 5 they tended 
to "Uike this declaration as a given- All were j in one viay or another^ 
'wary of the 'spread of the war^ j.nternational tensions , and especially 
* bf the impact of the war on their domestic polJLcies, - " ' 

The Rumanians constantly pressured us on the bombing issue- At 
one timcj they were clajining they had received the "signal*^ from Kanoi 
in response to Goldberg's UF speech in the fall of 3.966. (Goldberg 
had stated that Hanoi only needed to give "an indication as to w}iat 
/it/v^o^^H cb in response to a prior cessation of bonibing by the U,S.^^) 
Later J they admitted that they had received no specific "signal,^' The 



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R-iL^iatiians vere q.uite frank about aritnitting the.i they vrere only inter- 
ested in the stopping of the U.S. bombing- They accepted that the 
two sides v:ere now far apart ^ but argued that pnce they sat doim at the 
table "then the other nations desirous of seeing an end to conflict 
Vfould try to push the two sides together," Teirns of final settJ^ement^ 
they believed^ should not be discussed before the bombings stoppsd 
since it would only drive the parties further apart- The Rumanians 
Mere also saying that t}iey did not blame, either party for the Vietnam 
situation^ and that they were only interested 3n a peaceful settlement. 

It seems' from hindsight that the Rumanians were very poor reporters: 
they did not pick up distinctions such as talks ^ negotiations ^ and settle- 
ment ternts; and they repeatedly claimed that the DRV wanted to talk directly 
vrith us; and^ after all signs pointed in the opposite direction^ they were 
stll3- representing Hanoi's demand for a U.S. boaibing cessation as both 
unconditional and perm.anent- It is likely that Hanoi did not take the 
Ruiaanians seriously- Despite these indications a.bout the Rumanians ^ tvro 
GOH envoys vrere used by the U,S, to tra.nsmit'and receive messages during 
the crucial December 196? through February I968 period- Airibassador Suu 
(in Killy) laughed when d' Or land! suggested that serious exchanjies were 
taking place through the Rumanians. 

5^^ . Si^Gdes were more active over time than any other Intermediary — 
and produced the least amount of information- The important point to 
note about the Swedish ro.le was that t>ie Swedes seemed to have more 
ready and freq.uent access to the DRV (both in Hanoi and in V7arsaw) than 
any other nation . The Sifedes were unabashedly anxious to be the successful 
go-between. On May 9^ 1?67 if-^ey even v.^ent so far as to say that they 
v;ould "take responsibility for a position which /the^ felt convinced 
about," In other words ^ they were willing to be a broker as well an a 

message carrier - 

* 

The vrhole S"^redish role was very much dominated hy their domestic 
politics: there vrere frequent press leaks on .GOS-DRV contacts; Vietnam 
policy wa: frequently and vituperatively discussed in the S^-^edish Parlia- 
,ment; the Russell VJar Crimes Tribunal began to hold its hearings in Ju3-y 
1967^ and the GOS kept hinting about establishing consular relations with 
Hanoi,. Swedish GVl^' relations began to strain^ and in the spring and sum- 
mer of 1957 J a:eden reduced the level of its diplomatic representation in 
Saigon. Finally; on ITovember ^f^ 1967j t]ie GOS publicly denounced U.S,- 
Vietnam, policy, ' » '■ , , - . . - • . 

iSie U.S. ^ because of the above j never put much stock in the Swedish 
m-cssageSj and this track never became an Important one- 

. \ 
The r7Qr>-:eg ien rple was not treated with great djuportance by Washing- 
ton^ and th_e track vras never a very active one. Nevertheless ^ in retro-- 
spectj the exchanges between the DHV Ambassadoi^ and Peking (Loan) and 



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the fTor\'7e'gian Ai^^assador in Peking (Algard) v:ere probably the most 
reliable of ell- Algard seems to have been a careful note^^taker^ and 
his messages look like he was using Hanoi tuinas of phrases. Ue.ny of 
the points made by Algard irere £^ubseq,uently boi^ne out by other contacts 
and by public BRV statements* 

Because JTon^/ayj unlike S^-reden^ was not visibly more friendly to 
the DRV than to the U.S.^ Hanoi did not seem really comfortable in 
activating this cliannel into a major one, On IJovember 2^ 195? ? Loan 
hinted to Algard that Non-jay^ s role was ^'not neutral" and that Koivay 
^'as "indirectly involved/" Ron-^egian domestic politics were^ like those 
iti Sweden ^ vehemently ant i -American on the Vietnam issue ^ but this never 
seemed to get in the way of objective Norv^^egian Government reporting. 
Uiilike the Sv^/edes^ the Non'7cgia.ns did .not press us hard on the bombing 
issue* 

The exchanges among the PEMHSyLVAlUA p^^x-ticij^nts (tvro unofficial 
Rrenchmen^ Mai Van Bo and Henry Kissinger) seemed to have been handled 
with great care and accuracy, vrnile the tvjo Frencto-en, Marcovich and 
Aubrac^ were clearly committed to getting the U,S* to stop the bonibing^ 
there is no evidence that their reporting ^ or message carrying^ was 
adversely affected. Kissinger for the U,S, handled the play with consum- 
mate skill ;t clarifying points and m^,king interpretations that could lead 
to a cont:inuing dialogue. Both Hanoi and Ifeshington treated this chamiel 
as a m,ajor one^ and yet little was accom.plished except the clarification 
of the U,S, "no ad\^ntage'' formula- This cla.r if i cation was to be J.ost in 
Eubseq^uent refoririuJ^ations of the U,S. position on "no advantage." 

The Italians vrere old hands at playing the role of intermediary. 
5/heir role in MARIGOLD had been respected by both sides* They were not 
pushy about inter],x>sing themselves beU/een Hanoi and Washington and always 
stood ready to break off contacts if the U.S. so desired. It is jjnportant 

-to remember that in Killy the Worth Vietnamese" sought out d*Orlandi 
(according to d'Orlandi) and not the reverse. The Killy contacts vrere 
betvreen d*Orla^di and the DRV Ambassador in Prague ^ Sau. It is also 
importarnt to reiriember that d'Orlandi had a very special view about the 
role of intermedlatiozi. Unlike all th^a other go-betweens vrho were inter- 
ested alm-ost solely in a cessation of U.S* bombing^ d'Orlandi^s approach 
was to focus oii terms of fins^l settlemant* Only when the fiitra:*e of 
South Vietnam could be foreseen^ d' Or land! argued, would the two sides 

'■ sit dovm and' genuinely and seriously negotiate* 



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HI- NORTK VIKTrgiM^SE STRATEGY 

It hafe always been clear that insofar as Hanoi is Interested in 
negotiations J it is only as another way of achieving its objectives. 
Since the earliest months of 1966^ party leaders in Hanoi have been 
preparing their people for a "fight and negotiate policy." Captured 
docxxrnents have reaffirmed the prevalence of this policy, 

Hanoi frames its strategy in terms of tvro stages: "decisive 
victory" and ""final victory-" "Decisive victory" is defined in teriiis 
of breaking the U.S. vill to persist — namely ^^ when the course of war 
in the South reaches a "deadlock." The U.S. recognition of this "dead- 
lock" and its willingness to negotiate on Hanoi's terms then would be 
tested at the bargaining table. Moreover^ when negotiations are in 
process^ Hanoi says that it vmuld create "another fjront" with vrhich to 
"disintegrate" South Vietnamese armed forces and exacerbate "contra- 
dictions" vrithin the Saigon Governirient and between U-S. azid Saigon. 
"Final victory" could come when all Vietneim was effectively under Hanoi's 
control. 



Seen in this lights Hanoi's failure to assui^e military reciprocity 
for a bombing cessation in advance of talks could be (a) a matter of 
principle; as they assert j or (b) a q^uestion of strategy -- that iSj s> 
test of U,S, v/ill to persist J or (c) simply a tactic^ a way of concealing 
their willingness to retreat until convinced that the U.S. has F^ade its 
best offer* 



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Hanoi's designing of the three stages of bargaining (talks ;; nego- 
tiations^ settlement) can be viewed as part of this same fabric. Each 
stage is so constructed that it depends on the successful comi>letion of 
the preceding stage. Hanoi recognizes its own morale problem and does 
not ^vrant to risk creating expectations of a sett-lement until it is 
pretty sure that the settlement will accord with its objectives- 



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THE U.S. AMD DRV COE^JDITIONS FOR '*TALKS" CONVERGE 



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Ag of SUNI'^ LOynCK (February , 19o7)> the DRV position on conditions 
for "talks" with the U.S. had been conveyed as follows: 



(1) Ribliclyj Trinh had said; '*It is oray after the uncon- 
ditional cessation of US boiiibing and all other acts of v/ar against the 
DRV that there could be tallLS betv/een the DRV and the US." (Trinli 
interview with Burchett of 1/28/67; af> broadcast in English by Radio 
Hanoi . ) 

(2) Privately; in writing^ the DRV saidj "The unconditional 
cessation of bombing and a,ll other acts of war against the DRV being 
materialized J the DRV could then exchange viev^s with tlie US concerning, 
the place or da.te for contact between the two parties as the USG pro- 
posed in its message handed over on January 10, 1967." (DRV Aide- 
Memoire given us in Moscow ; 1/27/67^ in Hanoi's "unofficial translation" 
into English. This replied to our Aide-Mcmoire suf^gesting exchanges on 
"the possibilities of achieving a peaceful settleiaent of the Vietnamese 
dispute,") ^ ; 

(3) Kosygin privately told the British (they said) on 2/6/67 » 
that he had been in direct contact with Hanoi and could confirm that 
Hanoi would talk if the bombing stopped. He rex:>eated this in essence to 
Thompson in Moscow on l?/l8/67- (See London 6316; 2/7/67; and Moscow 

3562, 2/18/670 - , ; 

Our position was that we would enter 'talks without eonditSons, or 
we vrould stop the bombing in return for some recipr6cal' act of military 
restraint but that V7e v/ould not stop bombing simply in exchange for talks. 

After SUX^FLOVJER j the two sides bounced varying formulations back 
and forth; eventuality inching toward each other. The U.S. positipn remained 
essentially unchanged until August 25; 1967 > v;hen the San Antonir formu- 
lation V7as privately passed to the DRV- The meaning of this pro]_osal ■ 
seems to have been obscure to Hanoi, Several later messages passed in 
clarification varied among themselves^ aiid the DRV persisted in seeing 
"conditions" attached to the San Antonio fonraila; making it unaci ptable 
by Hanoi '.s lights. The U.S, was' probing to see if Hanoi understood, our 
"assumption"; and this probing was apparently interpreted by the DRV as 
asking advance assurance that the "no advantage" vjould in fact be taken ; 
a condition. By the end of KILLY (3/1/68)^ hov?ever^ when d'Orla^ndi (as 
he reported) warned that "if bombing stopped and .talks began^ assaulting 
Klie Sanhj invading oy trying to detach the two northern provinces of SVJT; 
launching a second wave of attacks against one or more, cities or creating 
a sensation with something else like an assault on Camp Carrol^ would sink 
the whole thing;" DRV Ambassador Su gave his "personal" view: "Prom the 
moment the two sides rneet^ it was obvious no such thing could happen," 
(Rome i^590, 3/h/6Q.) 

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At this point Hanoi probably felt it had replied affirmatively and 
officially to the "prompt'' and "productive" conditions- (in public state 
ments^ the DRV- had indicated that talks could begin ''as soon as" the 
boiribin^^ and all other acts of v/ar stopped ^ and that the subject of the 
talks vjould be ^'q^uestions related to a sett lenient of tlie Vietnam problem 
on the "bas'is of the 195^^ Geneva agreements on Vietnam. ,, -also questions- 
>j^iich could be raised by either side.") Assmrang Su >ras accurately 
reported J it had also gone part of the v/ay on "no axlvantage^j" though 
not so far as to acknowledge it had troop.^ in the South or to (^ive us 
an official pledge against vrhich we could allege violations ^ resume 
bombing or break off talks. 



In early Aprils Hanoi indicated its representative at the contact 
would have ambassadorial rank and would be empowered to agree on a date^ 
place and level for "formal talks^' af'ter the bombing cessation. In the 
events tlie DRV representative Xuan Thuy^ has ministerial rank and his 
proposed contact with us in I^.ris has been described by Ha^noi (in English) 
as "formal talks." 

V/hat follow are the majoi' statements ^ public and private ^ made by 
the two sides since SUNFLOV/ER- 



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CHRONOLOCIY 



DEV {S/lh/Sl )- Tlie DRV Ambassador to Peking ^ RgO;, told the Kor^':egian 
Ambassador there that the cessation of U,S, bombing is the -only condition 
for their coming to the conrerence table, 

OSLO lf531 to SecState (ESCRKT-EXDIS)^ ik June I967: 

m n 

"2. Fo]JLo;;ing is my informal rendition Algard's report ^ 
transposed frt^ra -first' to third person: - 

"3* Aiabassa,rjor Mgo underlined strongly Horth Vietnatiese 
Govt disposed to-;a,rd negotiations; At same time they vrere deeply 
mistrustful of A^aericans ''intentions in Vi^driam;, Steady escala- 
tion and sending of nsv; troops indicated A?aericans had intention 
of staying pernanently in Vlotnairi. r 

"k. l-Igo underlined TTorth Vietnamese Govt imposed only -one 
condition for negotiations > namely that bombing of Ilorth Viet- 
nam, be Ktoppc;d* Clearly having in mind tlie Chinese^ he -went 
to lengths to underliriO that spe^:^ches froia other quarters vrhich 
imposed other conditions including full /aierican vrithdra',-;al from 
South Vietnam did not RPT not reflect North Vietnam Govt's thought. 
On North Vietna.Tiese side one" ga.vc decisive v eight to stop in bomb- 
" ing because this was vievred as respect for Korth Victnainese 
sovereignty and such a respect was an absolute condition for 
coming to conference ts-ble, but vras also the orJ-y condition • ' 
'Vrnen they had cor.ie to conference table ^ ITorth Vietnain position 
vpuld be Ycry flexible. 'Vi^e are^ ' said Arfoassador MgO;^ 'ready 
for very far rea.chir.g coniproniises to get an end to the vrar,', 
Ambassador Algard noted that recently one had i:ripression that 
North Vietna:ae3e side \;as cooler' toward negotiations, Ariib.assa- 
dor Mgo denied this strongly » He said that fcrirrerly v:hen t,-crth 
Vietnaivx shov/ed an interest in negotiations Americans had taVien 
such interest as a sign of vreakness and v;ith results of st? nger 
escalation* This v;as background against vrhich one nust judge 
•some recent speeches on North Vietnamese side. Provided there 
vroiild be a stop in, bonbing^ North Vietna^fi was ready at any "f-iiue 
* fpr negotiations and far reaching coiaproniise.s*. 



U,S, (6/20/67) > The U.S. repeated that it reQuired "at least som 
private assurance of appropriate reciprocal action by North Vietnam/'. 

State 213389 to Oslo (SECRET-EXDIS) ^ 20 June 19j7: 

■ ^2.0, Expressed concern that U.S. intends to stay perr:a^ 
nently in Vietnam is of inteVest, 'Ve assii_mo GOIT is fully avrare 



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of our repeatGd statements of intent to withdraw and most speci- 
fically the precise wording used in the Manila Communique, which 
your should furnish them. 



f "d. Discussion of cessation of bombing of only condition 

^ for tallts fits with other private readings as well as Trinh- 

Burchett interview and appears to us highly plausible. 

"c. USG accepts that 'cessation' of the bombing of the 
North and military action against the North is only NVN condi- 
tion for holding talks. NVN has referred to cessation being 
on 'unconditional' basis: What is meant by this? (Purpose 
here is to clarify whether there may be any distinction between 
usual NVW statements that bombing must be stopped ' indefinitively 
and unconditionally' --which we have construed to mean pernia- 
nently -- and occasional other statements that stoppage of bomb- 
ing must merely be 'unconditional. ' We ourselves have assumed 
that no difference is intended between these two foi"TmilationSj 
but direct inquiry could be useful in nailing this down.) 

'^d. Assuming that WN condition calls for^ in effect ^ 
permanent cessation of bombing^ USG position remains as it has 
been stated throughout and particularly by ^bassador Goldberg 
in September I966 at UN and by Secretary Husk in January. U,S„ 
view is that cessation of bomhingj v/ithout at least some pi-ivate 
asstdraace of appropriate reciprocal military action by NVN^ 
would create situation of major military advantage to WVN and 
would not be conducive to fruitful talks. USG has put forward 
several general suggest iotts for timing and nature of NVI^ recipro- 
cal actions^ and President's letter to Ho contained one specific 
proposal that added the element of stopping of reinforcement 
by USG in the South. Canadian proposal of April called for link 
between cessation of bombing and restoring demilitaris^ed status 
of DMZ under effective supervision, but Hanoi rejected this. 
Vrtiat is present Hanoi view on these proposals ^ or do they have 
any other suggestion to make? 

DRV {ll?nl^l) ' Pbam Van Dong told Aubrac and Marcovich (PENNSYLVANIA) 
that the DRV would settle for a de facto stoppage ^ though it preferred a 
public statement. 

"Now I shall talk to you about negotiations and 
solutions. We have been fighting for our independence 
for four thousand years. We have defeated the Mongols 
three times. The United States Army^ strong as it isj 
is not as terrifying as Genghis Khan. We fight to have 
peace at homej we have no wider aims. We have made 



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clear our position in our four points and in the interview 
of January 28, I967* /Vha^n Van Dong did not explain 
what this interview was 5 Aubrac and Marcovich did not 
khbWj nor do J^J We are ready to talk at any time 
provided that actions against the North are unconditionally 
ended. I want to repeat what I said yesterday: we are 
, willing to settle for a defacto stoppage*" Marcovich 
interrupted to ask whether he correctly understood that 
no public acknowledgment of an end of bombing was needed. 
PhaiQ Van Dong replied that he would prefer a public 
statement^ but would settle for a de facto cessation* 
^here was disagreement between Aubrac and Marcovich 
about the meaning of de facto cessation. Aubrac thought 
that a bombing pause could be followed within a few days 
by an invitation to negotiate* Marcovich was of the view 
that Hanoi might want a more formal — though secret — 
assurance_*y 

TJ^S, (8/2^/67} . The *'no advantage" formulation was passed to the 
DRV via Kissinger and Mai Van Bo in Paris. (PEM'SYLVAMIA) 

Messrs A and M rr;et with Bo in Paris to Inquire 
why their visas had not been received* Bo 
told them it vjas too dangerous to visit Hanoi 
due to the boiabing, M and A then informed Bo 
they had assurances in that respect^ without 
identifying the nature of the assurances^ which 
would be effective until September U» 



Messrs M and A then presented the US message 
as set forth below to Bo for the first time ♦ 
He read it vrlth interest and observed that it 
was ^^ clearly significant". Bo queried them 
about the significance of para. 2 of the message. 
He was informed that it expressed US doubt that 
the existence of US/DRV discussions could be 
kept secret if bombing ended , and Bo recognized 
that this would be a problem. Bo was impressed 
and was told that the message vms authorized by 
top levels of the USG. M and A gaVe Bo a- 
-vnritten description of their contacts with 
Kissinger. Eo agreed to cable the message to 
Hanoi and to report their desires to visit Hanoi 



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to discuss t:hG ncsnago. Bo belicrved' a reply 
s ho u 1 d boa va ilab 1 e by A ugiis t 2 9 , 



The Kn^llfih liexC of the xao-is^.ge given to Bo 
in both French and English is as'iollovrs: 

"Xhe baited States is v;ill:lng to stop the aerial and naval bom- 
bardiiierit of North Viet-ITam with the understanding tliaL: this will- -lead 
pr OTop L- 1 y to prod u c t i ve d i f^ c u s s i oris b e t v;e c n* r e or c s g n t a t i ves o f th e Uiu't;; 

-■ "" " ■ -"It ^- 

^"Stat.es and the Dc^raocrrct5-C P.cpubllc of Vie L --Hani looking tovrard a 
resolvition oi: the issues between llie^n, VJhile dlscusso'-ons proceed 
^Dxther v:5,t:h public knqvjledge or seci:etly^ the United States 

. . '\-} D u 1 d a H s It- lie t h a t t h e E s :no c ra t i c 71 e puh 1 i c of Viet -li a en \vO u 1 d not 
take advantage oil the boablng cesf;ation. Any such ruove on the 

, part of the Democratic Republic of Viet-'Nam v?ould obviously be 
iTicqnsistont v:xth the Tnoveiuent tmcard resolution of the issues 
bev/Gcen the United States and the Deraocratic Republic of Viet -Main 
vliich th.e discussions are intended to achieve . 

* m 

The United States is prepared to enter into 'discussions 
either openly or secretly. It vouXd seern^ hovvcverj that a ' . • 
total cessation of Che borabing is inconsistent v?ith keeping 
s ecrxi t- the fact - tha t d i s o u s s ion s \ a r e t ak ing p lace - A cc o r d 1 n^ ],y ^ 
the Deraocratic Republic of Viet- Kara ir;ay prefer to consider the 
_alternat:Lve of a cutback in the ir.agnitude or scope of the bombing 

vhile secret .discussions are in progress. * " ■ y 

■> • 

^ The United States is ready to have iF-mediate private contact 

v?iththa DeriOc ratio Republic of Viet'-uaTn to explore the above 

approach or .any suggestions the' Democratic Republic of Viet-1'ara 

■ laight v?ish to propose in the savue direction , " * 

* 

'" DRV (s / J-\/6y) . A number of nc\Ty sensitive DRV targets were struck 

; . QXi Au^;:u5^t 2V22j 19^73 but restrikes and strikes near Hanoi were sus-. 

pended on August 2k as a gesture or goodwill. The DRV reacted negatively^ 
however^ to both the gesture and the "no advantage" proposal^ terming 
them tlireatanlng^ conditipnalj etc.^ in line Vfith the general DRV objec- ' 
, tive of removing the bombirig as a bargaining blue clrJp for the U E " 

jpi ' In response to a phone recjuest from Bo at 

6:00^ p. in, (Paris time) ^ Sunday^ Septerr.ber 10^ 
llarcovich called on Bo at 9:30 a-ra^ After 



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an GX change! of pleasantrlGS ■ Bo handed 'co M the 
■ J:ollov7ing .I:G3<t'- of Hanoi^'s off Icial 'reply Co the 

^ *^The essence of thei /iniG;rlcau propositious. 
Is the stopping of the boinbicg under coudltion?;. 
The American bombing of the DeiiiOeratlc Republic 
of Viet-Nant i^ illegal- The United States' 'an\ 
.should put an end to the bombing, and cannot pose / 
conditions* - ' ^ ' 

■ ■ 

**Xhe American message has been cor;':::iLmicatGd 
after an escalation of the attacks against Hanoi 
and under the threat (mennnce) of continuation 
of the attacks against Hanoi. It is clear 
that this constitutes an ultimatui^i to the 
Vietnamese people* ^ , - '^ 

.V * ,' 'The bove r nmon t o f ' th-e 1) emo era t ic "" ^ -^ ;■ ■ '- ^'' ^" ' ^ v-"''''^-' " 

Republic of Vlet^-Ham energeticfply rejects 

the Ainerican propositions-. , ..- ^ --,*,/... , 

f . ' 

vv.VThc;position of the Gove'rnn.ient of the, \...^\^:-\: 
-Democratic Republic of Yiet-^Maiu is^ that the 
United States shuuld^ cease definit^ely and 
v?ithDut conditions the boLiibing and all 
other acts of A7ar against the Democratic ' 
Republic of Viet-'Na:iu It should vjithdrav; 
American troops and satellites from South 
V i e t ^ IJ am ^ r e c og n i2.e t h e Na t i o na 1 L 5.b e"r a t i o n \. 
Front of South Yiet-n-?am and. 1-c^t the 
Vietnamese people themselves regulate their 
"internal affairs • It is , only after the un- 
conditional stopping by the United States of 
,the bombing and all other acts of v?ar against 
the Democratic Republic of Viet-'Kam, that it 

v?ould be possible to engage in. conversations 

■ 

X^^f^official^ translation; ■ . 



n 



Bo told H to give the text to Kissinger and 
added that-'V.s soon as there is a reply'* M 
sh o ul d r omiau n 1 c a t e \-i 1 th 13 o a (: . a n y 1 5 me of day 
or night* VJhen K urged Eb to meet Kis singer ^ ' . 

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Bo f^aicl '^give tae ir.essc^e to Kissinger and 
vhen the reply is here \:e shrill s a g- about: 
nioetiag"* In co:-nrf.anting on the text of the 
DRV mess^.^e Bo made the. following- stateraent: 



\c> 



»• * 



'^Xhe bombing of ^Hanoi at the same time as the 
£ ending of the (August 21) tuessagc conc^titutes 
a pressure- Stopping of the bombing along v7ith 
'the threat of a rehev:al lias the character of an 
ultimatura.'' . (Paris 3097). 



t '.I 



U»^' ( 9/ 16/6 7 ) , Vfe protested tlmt the DRV must Viave misunderstood 
the Q/2^j6j message J as it contained neither conditions nor threats. V/e 
iQerely wished to confirm that a bombing cessation vrould lead promptly to 
productive discussions leading to peace. VJe did not ask the DRV to reply 
to the "no advantage" assuir.ption. (PEJMISYLVATITA) 



js 



M and A met vjith Bo' for over- an hour^ starting 
at noon. A^ \Aio did most of the talking at the 
meeting v^ith Bo and kept the.notes^ reported 
on the meeting. Ro greeted A and M affahlv- and 
^'offered theai drinks* Bo said Ho had charged 
him \v'ith inquiring about the health of A's 
J: a iQ i 1 y . A t h e n ha n d e d to Bo i n a s e a 1 a d 
envelope French and English texts of the 
follovzin;^, US message: 



t' e 



September 13. 1967 

'''The USG believes that the September 11 
message from the DRV may be based on a mis- 
understanding of the American proposal of 

August 25. The American proposal contained 
neither conditions nor threats and should 

■ 

not be. rejected on these .grounds . 



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**Xt\Iias been the under standing of the 
AISG that the DRvt v/oul'd be v^illing promptly 
to enga^jG in proJuctive diseusslons leading to 
peace v^hen there \ms a cessation of aeriaX and 
ri a va 1 b omb a r dme n t , . Th e US G so ii jrh t to c o n f i r iii , 
this fact in its' proposal V/hich the DRV has in 
.front of itt 



c 



€ 



'^As a demons tratio[i of its^ -gpod faith and 
in order to create the best atmosphere for 
the consideration of its proposal the US 
voluntarily undertook not to bomb Hanoi from 
August 25 onward - the day on v^hich itp pro^josal 
V7as sub[aitted to Hanoi- This restraint has been 
rna intaincd \?i thou t time 15_mit even thouj-h 
activities by opposing forces 5n the south have 
in if:act been stepped up since August 25-. 



■^. ^ 



The August 25 proposal of the USG remains 
-open.'^ (END OF >ESSAGE) ■ 

.... * * " . , , .. . 
A told 15o he did not knov; the content of ^the 
Tiiessage but described it as ^Conciliatory" , 
a v;ord v^hich Eq made him v/rite down.- Bo did 
not opea the envelope "in l\ and A s presence. 

A asked ho about the significance of the AFP ' / 
September 14 Hahoi story (State 38031)^ quoting 
"reliable sources" as indicating that talks v;ould 
.start three or four x-;eeks after a bombing j 
cessation^ "and" A shov;ed 156 Paris press stories 
based on the AFP r-eport» Bo replied that the , 

■I 

thr e e -* t o f o ur - V7e ek i n t e r va 1 be tvre en the - e n d ■ ' 
of bombing and the beginning of negotiations* 
V7aS "an invention, of journalists"o ' He noted 
that Pham Van Dong's statement had given no 
ground lor the time period mentioned in the 
nev.'spaperS; . * ' . 



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' ' U/S' ,(9/^ 5/67 ) * We ask Hanoi to confim oiu* understanding of U,S-/ 
DHV dirferencGs: We are irilling to £jtop bombing if Hanoi coiifUi'ms that 
this vil2. lead promptly to productive negotiations; Hanoi has 3.Trplied^ 
but not confirniedj th,at this vrould be the result. (BilMNSyiTVAI'IIA) 

M callGd on Bo a,!: 8:30 a,m, and read to Eo the 



^ 



< i 



^ 



iio 1 ] aw i n ^ five point rae s s a g e f r 010 Kiss in 



C' ^i 



^^ J_ ^ ..^Lli *>.i-^x »_r J.J-J^v,. J- , 



*'(!) 1 v?ill transnit to the appropriate. ' * ^ 

Vashington officials later today the nrossage - 
^ you (Bo) gave M yesterday. (2) X see no point 

xn trading charges and countercharges about 
[^ past activities', Iii fact Washington has oiiered 

to stop^ houibing based on the assumption it 
. -^^ou 1 d 1 e a d t o p romp t ^ p r o dn c t iv e t a J,k s , Ttia t 

o f i e r r evaains o 'p'c^ n , 1 1: \7 a s xne. d e s inc ox e 1 y . 
■'If accepted^ there v/ill b.e no need to cliseuss 
escalation or borabing prpblcitis. (3) The 
exchange indicates that VJashington and lla'noi 
- have groat difficulty unde:rstand5.ng each 

o t I'l e r ' s 1:1^ ough t p r o c e s s e s . Th i s mak e s d i r e c t 
' 11 S /D ?sV c on t act ess en t i a 1 . 1 11 1 e v m e d i a/i" i e s ^ n o 
matter how trustv^orthy^ are not satisfactory 
.substitutes. {A) y^^merican military actions ■ 

during the past month reflect in part the I 

extrerae secrecy v?ith v?hlch VJashi/ngton has 
, "'handled this exchange. The USG has considered ' 
'it unwise to change decisions made prior to the. 
- ^ -r e p'c> r t o f II and A ^ s t r i p to H an.o i 3 ex c e p t i n 

regard to bombing Hanoi itself^ because it ^ ) 

* v?anted to l:eep the circle of avrareness of tliis 
cxchan<^,a as sraall as possible to avoid v,7:eiiiatura 
public debate. (5) The' difference in the posi- 
tions of the tv7o governments "could be surr::Liari?; ' 
a 's f 6 ] 1 ov? s : 11 a s h i ng t o n ha s i n d i c a ted i t s ■ 
readiness to stop borabing and has pnly asKed ' 
t o c o n f i r m i. t s \m d e r s I: an d 5.n k o 1: II i ino i ' s ' ' 

viev; that this t^^ould lead proi^iptly to pro- [ ' 

ductive negotiations. Hanoi has in'iplied that 
an end of boiubing v;ouXd in fact have this result 
If this is indeed the, viev; or both governtAents ^ 
the reuiaining obstacles to direct talks can be 



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overcoaie* I am certain that the abDve correct:!}" 
reflects US views. Could Bo confina th?-t it 
also reflects the vigw of Hano?!.-. ", * "■ ^ 



H said Bo's response to the foregoing message 
v?as favorable; M the a questioned Bo about 



' * ■* 



P'Av . (9/^9 /^^0 * T^^ President speaks at San Antonio j publicly 
confirming the **no advantage'' fori rinlat ion and noting that it had been 
given repeatedly to Hanoi, 

"As ¥e have told Hanoi time and time again, the heart of 
the matter is this: The United States is grilling to stop a3.1 
aerial and na.val bombardment of Nortli Vietnam vhen this vrill . 
lead pi^omptly to productive discussions. V/e^ of course^ 
assume that v:hile discussions proceed, North Vietnam would 
not take advantPvge of the boBibing cassation or lindtation- " 
(President's remarks in San Antonio before the National 
LeElslative Conference,) 

flRV ( 10/2 /67)' Marcovichj after taking careful notes on Mai Van Bo's 
coMnents^ described Trinh's I/28/67 statersient as a "soleron engagement to 
talk after the unconditional end of the bombing*" TvfO days later, Bo 
denied using the term "solemn engagementy^^ to vzhich J-iarcovich took strong 
except ion . ( PEM^IS^T^VAmA ) 

. ^,,\A follov?ing the; uieetiug and alter a flight 

'to Home v^here he discussed the ir,essc:,^';e in 

d e t a X 1 V? i t h. A f r o :a Toza e - . • ^ n^a x 1 c d i t b y ^' - 

special delivery air-post to Kissinger in 

Boston late on October 2, The te^t of the' 

no t e r ec e i v e d b y Kiss in 5; e r f o 1 1 ow s t , 

/ ■ 

' ■ ' ■ / ^. . . ' ■ V 

; ''The position of the RD\^^ reraains alvjays 

1 tbe-samCe If the United States really 

■ VJished .to talk^ let them stop first v?lthout 
• conditions the bombardment of the territory . • , 
oi the lUXV;^. ■ ^ - ■ ■ . 

* 8 

» f . 

b 

:**Starting from that position there are -- 
several eventualities: ■ -/ 



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(a) A pviblic declaration ^by the Gover nine tit 
of the United States about the cessation* 
This declaration could take place either 

'- before or after the cessation, 

(b) An official declaration but non-public 
pre cG ding the cessation of the bombardment. 
This declaxation could be coiamunlcated by 
the channel K/A-M (officieusement)-not 
quite officiallyj and after this indication 
it can be transmitted officially by an 
accredited person, 

(c) An end of bombardment without preceding 
official declaration follo'i-red by an official 
but not public communication of the Govern- 
ment of the United States. 

"Eventuality (a) vould represent a public 
declaration replying to that made on the 28th 
of January by M, Trinh^ Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the EDVIIj vhich constitutes a 
solemn engagement to talk after the uncon- 
ditional end of bombing. This public declara- 
tion would be follovred by the transmssion of 
an official text by an accredited person. 

U.S. (10/8/67) - We offered to set a date for stopping the bombing 
and a date and place for beginning discussions if the DKV indicated it 
vould enter promptly into productive discussions on U.Se/l)RV issues. 

M and A called on Eo at 9^00 s--^- Paris 
time and spent 1^ hours >rith him. As in 
the past Bo vms cordial to his visitors 
throughout the meeting;, 

M and A handed the written portion of the 
message from Kissinger to Bo 5 which Bo read 
closely. M and A then read to Bo Kissinger's 
four ''oral points j" and Bo ^JTote them down 
carefully in his ovni notes. (M and A did 
not leave with Bo the "oral'' part of the 
message.) The written message and oral points 
are as follows: 



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^'M should tell B that K woxild be authorized 
to deliver to B in v/riting the following message 
whenever B is prepared to meet with him 
officially or unofficially: 

'The United States Government under- 
stands the position of the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam to be as follovrs: 
That upon the cessation hy the United 
States of all forms of bombardment of 
the Democratic Republic of Yietnam^ 
without expression of condition^ the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam would enter 
promptly into productive discussions with 
the United States. The purpose of these 
discussions would be to resolve the issues 
betv/een the United States and the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam, 

^Assuming the correctness of this 
understanding of the position o_f the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam^ the 
United States Government is prepared ^ 
in accordaace with its proposal of 
August 25, to transmit in advance to 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam the 
precise date upon which bombardment of 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would 
cease and to sxiggest a date and a place 
for the commencement x)f discussions.' 

"In addition M should convey to B the 
following oral points from K: 

"1. K believes that this understanding 
is consistent with E*s statements of 
October h^ as reported by M^ and with the 
proposal of the United States Government 
of August 25 » 

"2. When B meets with K^ K would also 
be prepared to state the precise date on 
which the cessation of bopibardment would occur 



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fmd t:o\^,ive t:bc aur;e,est:ions of the United St:c:tcs , 
v;xt:b respect to the elate and s'lte of the clis^" 
.cy\ s s i o n s f o ]. 3. o v; :l ng the c e s s a 1 5, o h of bo rab a r ct:ri a n t ^ 
and K v.'OLild be authorized to receive the viev;s ^ 
of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam vjith respect 
to tiiese and other modalities. ' , ^ ' . 

3. K noted that the Deinocratic Republic 
of Vietnam had not commented on observations by 
■^ the United States Government on August 25 v;itn 
respect to secrecy of the fact of discussions, 
bctv?een the Deiaocratic Republic of Vietnam and 
the United States Qovernir.Gnt'^ - : 

Vi . K observed that officials of the United 
States Government had taken note of a reduction 
of military activities * in the vicinit}^ of the 
d Citiil it: a r iz e d z o n e o Un do ub t e dl y 3 the Demo or a t ic 
Republic, of Vietnam had noted the absence in 
re c e n t v?e ek s of aerial'b omb a r dm e n t in the ' 
ij^imediate vicinity of Hanoi 0" 

V ]Bo told M to tell Kissin^^er hov? much Bo 
appreciated K^ s personal effortSo Bo then 
dictated to H and A the follov:in?, short 
messac'G of acknovjledfjuent to K: 



*■ 



"H and A have passed the note froai K to - 
B * In ca s c B \i x \ 1 iiav e a r. e p 1 y to" ma k e ^ ' 

he' V7ill make it tbrou^'h this channel 



Tl 
o 



f 



U.5, (10/12/6 7) ■ The San Antonio formula was erplained to tVe 
&recles- "No advante^e^e" vjas not a "condition** l)ut a "self-evident descrip- 
tion" of \vhat would constitute good faith. They were asked to find out 
if Hanoi \:ould agree to a degree of restraint that vould compromise a no 
adva.ntage situation in return for stopping the bombing* 



* 1 



STATE 51^361 to /ciieiiibEissy Stockholm (SECRET, KODIS, ARPE^l), 
12 Oito'Der I967. 

, "lu IXiring this conversation the Sec'rotEiry'nade a 
nujnber of observations on the main poinis raised by the 
J'oreign Minister's -p^-^ev. Fe voald, have nothing -to add 
to his corrjTients at this tjjne beyond reaffiming the ijiipor- 
. tance of eliciting any additional dotBlls on Foreign 
Minister Trinh's remark: to fefoassador Petri in Jun- that 



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Hanoi 'understood' the ir^iportance the United States 
■ attaches to reciprocal action on the part of North Viet-* 
iiamese in connection v:ith a halt in the bombing- We 
note Ambassador Petri's view that some concrete act of 
reciprocity can be expected after the cessation of the 
. borabing^. ^even if .Foreign Minister Trinh gave no jjrecise 

indication that Hanoi v/as considering taking such a stepj and 
Ve vould of course always be keenly interested in any new 
evidence which /iiabassador Petri might obtain from North 
Vietnamese officials which would bear out his view. 

"5» Since the Secretary's conversation with I^'oreign 
Minister llilsson^ President Joh.nf^on in his speech of 
Eepteinber 29 has set forth our willingness iiiiniediateDy to 
stop aerial and naval bor^ibardment of 'North Viet-Ksm when this 
will, lead j^romptJy to productive discussions- As the Foreign 
■ Minister will hrive seen from this speech^ as veil as from 
Ambassador Goldberg's September Si speech at the United 

\ . Nations J we are interested in two poii;its — whether there 

vould be productive discussions^ and whether we could 
reasonably assiune that K^noi v:oiLld not take advantage of a 

( bombing stoppage* The latter point has not been posed as 

a 'condition J ' but rathbr as a self-evident description of 
a state of affairs that would evidence good faitli on both 
sides* Foreign Minister Nilsson may note that the desired 
'no advantage' situation would rocxuire restraint from Hanoi ^ 
but this might fall short of total cessation of anus dispatcli 
end infiltration to South Viet'-Kajri. If Hanoi were pr -spared 
to consider such a cessatlonj a balanced arrangerricntj not only 

f>toj>ping the bonibing but also cessation of reinfoj^cenent , 

by United States and others} would be possible. But 
: there remains the possibility that Hanoi might* be pre- 

pared to agree to some lesser restraint^ in return for ' 

stopping the boribing only^ that could comprise an \ 

' . effective 'no disadvantage' situation. " '^ • - 



*'6. II' Ambassador Petri could eli.cit any precise 
information on Hanoi's position concerning these points 
dio'ing his forthcoming visit to Ilanoij this could be of ! 

the greatest ii^portnnce- As the Secretary remarked at the 
conclusion of the conversatlonj we would hope that ve eoulcl 
be infon.'Led^ in advance- of the tiraing of .febassador Petri's 
next visit to Hanoi so that we might consider vrliether we could 
submit aiiy additional points to make during his dlscusisions 
vitli North Vietnamese officials," ^ . i 

» ,. 

mSK (drafted by Islian) 



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pPN (1 0/17/ 67)^ Through the PKm\fSyLVAIO'A channel,^ Bo o^^^ ^^ ^ 
vrittcn massage chansing the verb "could^" (Trxnh's I/28/67 intervlevr) 
to '^can/^ He also, indicated the DRV toolc "productive" to mean that 
the U.S. insisted on discussing SVN in U,S./^^V exchanj^es* 



lt^*M 



lUjfTI 



K sa^.r.BOj expz^essed }iop3 to keep the churmel open^ and handed 
M" the following lEiessage: 

i 

a ■ 

"Actually the U.S, has been follovrinj^ a policy of 
escalation of an extremely serious nature. In thecc 
conditions the U.S. proposals of poace are double-faced. 
At a tiirie vrlien the U,S, is piu-^suing a policy of escalation 
we cannot 're ceive^ Kiss inj^er 5 nor connri^^nt on the Ainerican 
proposals transiriitted through this channel, 

"The position of the Governinent of the DRV is perfectly 
clear: it is only vhen the U.S. has ended v.^ithout condition ^ 
Ihc bombardjnent that discussions c^.n take place." 

'^M and IjO discussed what *the conditions' vrere in the U,S, pro- 
posal. M said he thought tha,t th,e U.S, nsant that vre vanted a 
guarantee of serious discussions vrhen ^^e used the word 'productive-' 
Bp said the ])RV tliought that by use of the word 'productive' we 
meant that we wanted to talk ^.bout object:lves in the South also^ 
since discitssions could not be fu.lly productive i^itiiout this subject 
bein^ considered* 5 



WI-^L^^^'^J-^lL).' Burchett reported the DKV vrould offer nothing 
"except taiks^^ for a cessation of the bombardmeni:.- He stressed the 
distinction betv;een "talks'" and "negotiations ," without making clear 
what the difference vrould be. He quoted. Trinh. as. saying the talks would 
be "meaningful^" but whether they vrould be "fi^uitful" or "productive" 
vjoiild depend on the U.S. 



;■ I'he. follovring article by V'ilf^^ed J>iii*chc.tt v/as -z-ead in irashj.ngton 
on-tMs date: ' - ^ - " " '.-,:■• " ■ . - . 

"Hanoi 5 North Vietns^ni AP - There is no possibility of any talks 
or even contacts betvfeen Hanoi and the U.S. government unless 
the boriibardnient and other acts of war against North Vietnara 
are definitively }]alted- 



%• 



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J ''This is the position stated to i!>e cliirini^ conversations 

in the 3^st fevr days vith Premier Kiam Van Uon^^ Hgi^Jyen I>ay 
Trxxil'jj foreign ninister and deputy premier ^ and ot}ier high- 
ranking {government and party leader;^ . 



« , tr 



- ' -Jlanoi is in no mood for concessions or bax^gaining 



and there is an absolute refusal to offer anything — 
except talks -- for a ce*ssation of Die boribardnicnt - The 
v;ord stressed is ' talks j' not negotiations/ . . . 

"j'iuring an informal talkj lictfeverj Trinh repeated 
^ that Id^ statenent to this cor.^'-i^Tipond^nt last ^Januo^ry 26 -- 
that talks could start if the L^\.:bing vas halted -- still 
held good. He said there could be- 'mea,ningfi).l' talks- 
Wiiether they would be 'fruitful' or ^product5.ve' depended 
on the United States, 

U. S. (11 / 3/67 ). The Eussla^ns Mere told that ve vould stop the 
bombing if they coiiid tell us that the DRV would stop its infiltration r 

MemCon, dated Nov 3. 196? (approved in S: II/8/67) (SECRET/nODIS) 

Part II of IV 

Sub j e c t : V i e tnam 

Rirticipants : U. S. 

The Secretary 

Foy D. Kohler^ Deputy Undersecretary 

Johji M, Leddyj Assistant Secretary for EUR 

MalpoLni Toon^ Country Director ^ SOV 

USSR 

Y- V< Kuznetsov^ First Deputy Foreign Minister 

Anatoliy F, ■Dobr;inainj Soviet Ambassador 

Yui^i N. Chernyakovjj Minister^-Counseloif;-; Soviet Ei-ibass^ 

Igor D. BubuQYj Counselor ;j Soviet Efubassy 



■I- 

■"TrIE 'SECRETARY said v.^e had no proW^era- with this at all- The Soviets^ 
however J must be perfectly clear on one fimdartiental point. V,e v;ill con** 
tinue to oppose the spread of vrorld revolution by force* V7ith regard to 
Vietnam the Secretary sav; no need for a conflict of interest betv:Den the 
United States a.nd the Soviet Union, It was important that the Soviets 
recognize that \re have a vital interest in what happens in South Vietnaraj 
just as we recognize that the Soviets liave B.n interest as to what happens 
in Rorth Vietnam- We are prepared to stop the bombing nov/ if the Soviet 
Union can tell us th€i.t the Kortli Vietnamese \nJJi stop its infiltration." 



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'U. S.- (1 1/2 3/67) ^ The Svredes vere given iXlustra-lions of DRV action; 
that v^ould run counter to the ^^x\o advantage" asEumption* They v;ere 
aslred to seek clarification from the DRV. 

• 

*;7< The third point relates to the understanding of a 
''no acivantago' situation^ as described in the President's San 
i\nt02iio speech and In ry October 6 message to you in connection 
with a bOLibing cessation and the start of talks. One way to 
clai\liy this is in texv^.s of questions that I en^phasi%e are 
illustr^Ltivc oV cxarriples only, T^fiint vould happen witli respect 
to the flow of supplies and men into South Vict-Kam and to 
positions directly tlrt^eatenin^ South Viet-^KaTi? For exsniplej 
if following a cessation or lljriitation of boi^ibj.ng^ there was 
a marked -incresse in the flow of' trucks southvardj if a nevj 
North Victnanese regiment vere to appearj or if v:e saw a 
;nassive increase in the flow of supplies just to the north of 
the DMZj we woald be negatively ircipressed, S5inilarlyj to take 
another example^ we would vrant to iinow what vrould happen W'ith 
respect to the three Korth Vietnamese Divisions now In the area 
of the De-militarized Zone v-^hich have been erjployed as part of 
offensive ©Derations against our forces south of the niZ. 
Vfould artillery located noii:h of the demarcatioji line be eriployecl 
against our forces? And^ if soj would ire be expected not to 
boiab these artillery positions? * 

"8- These questions ai'ej of coiU'sej not easy ones to 
ansvrer. K3vert}ielessj ve believe they are central to an 
accm^ate understanding of what is involved on both sides. Ve 
vould be grateful for any clarif icatzon that you night be able 
to obtsin through yovir contacts vith North Vietnamese ropre- 
" sentatives on these matters," 

U. S, (12/^7/67). The Russians gave their understanding of S^n 
Antonio as requiring Hanoi to agree in advance to a de-- escalation of the 
conflict before tlie bonibing vfould stop. HarriTna^n corrected thep.^ drawing 
attention to the DMZ as a special problem^ however. 



MeinCon/;. p:-..ted December 27. 196? CsSCR]?t/nOD1S) 
TIME: 12:li5 to 3:^5 



PIACE: 3033 \\ Street 



Participants; Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin 

Aitibassador at Large W, Aver ell Harr:>.an 



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'**,-, (3) I stated that the San Antonio formila was certainly 
a reasonable one and vrent as far as the US GoYerrimeut could be expected 
,to go. I asked v:hether his Government could inform hs \fhy it had been 
rejected by Hanoi and al^o whether the Soviet Union had a practical 
alternative suggestion* He asked some detailed questions regaaxling the 
San Antonio foriaila. I repeated wliat I had told him in my last conversa^ 
tion- 'Productive discussions' did not^ as Hanoi had interpreted it^ 
mean a guarantee of favorable conclusion^ bvit considering our Korean 
experience 5 \ie wanted assua^ance that talks vjould be serious and in good 
faith and in an attempt to find an agreement. He told nitj that his Govern- 
ment had gained the mpression that the Bresident's statement 'we v:ould^ 
of course- assume that vrhile discussions proeaed North Viet-- fern v/ould not 
take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation' neant that Hanoi 
would have to agree in advance to a de-- escalation of the conflict. I stated 
that this vms not true* 'Taking advantage* meant what it said^ namely^ 
tha.t Hanoi would not use the advantage of no boinbing to send more supplies 
and reinforcements to the South than vrere now getting through, I also 
referred to the DI^Z as a special proBlem* They were using artillery, and 
oua^ bombing of tlie gun positions ar-d other bases just north of the DMZ 
was a tactical operation which wou3.d have to continue unless there was 
inutua.l restreant in that area which ve thought vmuld be the best solution, 

" Dobrynin said that he vrould inform his Government , but \mder lined 
that both his Government and Hanoi believed that Hanoi had interpreted 
the San Antonio forimlaj taken in connection v;ith other statements > to mean 
that Hanoi v:ould have to agree in advance to some sort of de-escalation of it 5 
operations if v:e were to stop the bombing/" 



DRV (12/g 9/67) > Tri'iih, Speaking publicly, changes the verb from "could" 

to "will^^ talk, 

* 
. * 

^ On peceiri ber. 2 9^ Trinh spoke at a Mongolian reception. TJie substance 
of his talk vras broadcast by Hanoi Vll\ in English on January 1. He stated" 
in part: • . , . 



r 



^ c' ^ . • / The stand of the Vietnamese people is quite clear, That 

. • " . is the .four-^point stand of the DHV GoverrL^iient and the political 
program of the IffLSV. Tliat is the basis for the settlement of 
the VietnaKi question. 

* PI, 

1 . '. ' • '^*the U.S. GoveiTmerit ha.s" unceasingly c:i aimed that it v:ants\ 

to talk with Hanoi but has received no response- If the U.S, 
Government truly wants to talk 5 it must^ 'as v^as made clear in 
, our statement on 28 January 12o7^ first of all stop unconditionally 
the bonfoiiig and all other acts of war against the DliV, After 
the United St^/ces has ended imconditionally the bombing and all 
other acts of war against the DHV^ the DRV will hold talks with 
the United States on questions concerned." 



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DBV (1/V6 8), Tlie S^/j-edes were told of DKV conccrii that /'no 
advantage'^ "v/ould "leave our brothers In the South unprotected " 

STOCKHOIM 662 to SecState (SECRET^ KODIS^ ASPErO^ 
January hj I968. Ref: Stockliolrn 6^9. 

''*3, Oberg saw Ch.^irge Vu Each Kai (Oberg's spelling) 
Dec 21 nnd handed over paper described Para 2A* Paper had been 
translated into French; illustrative exa:^ples para 7 State 73693 
vere also given in English. 

"h. WW CViarge raised three points v;hich Oberg on 
instructions refused to discuss saying that Swedes had 
this paper froni US aide and that Sv.^edes not competent 
go beyond vhat was in psper. ' ' - 



11 



5, Three points l^E Charge raised v;cre; 



A- Did Sv;'edes have any suggestions on how to 

M. 

describe bombing pause? t^ 

; . , B- On question of flow of innterlal in no-advantage 
situation Charge said 'we cannot leave our brothers in the South 
unprotected* ' It vas not clear to Oberg v/hether he was referring 
to NI.P in South Vietnam or to f:ujjplieG to INii troops north of 
II'IZ- ( Oberg coiT^aented that in his contacts IWl^ representatives 
never referred presence KVi^J troops in South ^Vietnam-) 

C- On question seriousness of negotiations Charge 
said this vas unclear to hiM. In any negotiation both sides 
started froni positions widely apart and with quite different' 
aiias. In such' cases there would be different interpretation^ 
of ^serious or productive. '*' - ^ . 



* DRV (l/ ^/63). The Kumanians reported that Trinh made clear to them 
that the condition for talks vas an "unconditional" bvit not "permanent" 
bombing cessation. They also claiiaed that the DRV would not insist on 
U.S. acceptance of the k Paints as the basis for negotiations; each side 
would come t^ith its ovni viev;s* . . ■ ' . 

■ ■ ■■ 

"Material in quotation narks v:as read slowly and carefulHy by 
Macoyescu, ^ . - ■ ' " 

"Jlcre is the answer to the question that you asked Mr. Harriu^^^n 
T^-om this point on there is a passage v/hich in the tort is in quota- 
tion marks . 



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■ 'V;e affirm 'the fo3J,ov:ing-, If tlie USG really v;ants 
dif^cussions v;ith the Government of the TfxVJ it should first 
K ' ■ " uncontlitionally cease borriing and B.ny other act of v/ar 

.against tlT(r-DRV. "After the unconditional cessation of all 
bomhing and of a,ny other U.S, act of var against the DRV and 
t ' ' ' at the end of an appropriate period of time the governrrxent 

of the DRV will enter into serious discussions vrith the USGp' 

"VHiile he vas reading this paragraph I stopped hini and told him 
comrade Minister \ihen I mentioned cessation I said final and uncon- 
ditional, Trinh looked at^^e and reread the sentc^'.ce, I said I , 
mentioned * final a,nd unconditional cessation.' He reread the 
sentence again. I interrupted for the third time- May I under- 
& - stand you are no longer speaking of final cessation. His ansv;er ^ 
was, that publicly we may continue to r:;5ntion it t .it vrith a, view 
to negotiations, V/liat I have said is our position- 



r . •■ "l asked him vrhether the CovGrnrfient of RoiTiania is authorized 

to i^ss this coifununi cation to the USG- He s*aid yes* He repeated 
it but he said to retain spirit of tl^e messarce/* 



Harrirnan jsaid th_at the Trinh public statement was much the same as 
the M & I rr.essagej hut that the K & I statenvent placed more emphasis on 
.^ the acceptance of the four points as a basis of negotiations . M said that 
he did not establish any connection bctvreen his visit to VJashington^ 
unknov/n to Han_oi^ and the TrinJi public £tatet^:ent- Harrirnan argued that. 



,^^there must be some connection/' M responded that he did not believ 
LI ■ .there was a contradiction between- the tvjo messa,p:es: 



e 



"in the publ.}c statement it says the basis for negotiations 

is the four points^ but in private conversation they say vre V7ill 

come ivith this basis but the U.S. side, we expect ^ will comie 

with its Qvm point of viev;, Hiey especia,lly said this-" 

I- 

Harrirnan then questioned vjhether it was the DRV view that discussions 
vrill be fruitful only if v,^e accept their foiu^ points. M responded: 



"That is not the impression I gained from my discussions- *" 
j ' ■ They will come v;ith their claims but would have to negotiate on 
T . vrtiat the U.S. puts forth- They said this specifically.'* 

With resp3ct to the tiraing of discussions^ M said that Trinh stated 
C . there could be no contacts "as long as U.S. acts of war continue j,.. 

\\^ ' but as soon as bombing and other acts of aggression a-gainst North Vict- 

■ ' namese c^ase^ we are prep?,red to receive anybody*..*" Trinh added: . "V/e 
shall consider these contacts as normal diplomatic activities. The 
A^rierican rejjresentcative will be received by our diplori^ats at their suggestion 

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"they v:i.ll try to test (l don't knovr hy vrhat means) the 
sincerity of your 5ntsntions — ycur 'i-jish to havG discupsians, 
I could not deduce the period ^ but I do not think it v:ill "be 
too long. If an understanding, is reached, that 'you stop> -at a 
certain established period ^ discussions ^ not negotiations ^ 
i-rill take place." 



.V. 



* 



4& 



U then read from a document: 

*'As long as the US acts of v;ar go on we cannot have 
any contacts vrith the:n> Ap. soon ?,s* they cease the bo^^ibings' 
and discontinue the act£; of aggre^vsion we shaDJL be prepared 
-to a^eceive rmy person^ even a re"presentatiYe of the United 
States^ vjho may wish to inake kiiov/n to us the /Lnierican point 
of view or to get in-formed on our vievraalnt. VJe shall regard 
these fixture contacts as norrnal diploir.atic activity. The 
;\jnerican representatives will be received by our representa- 
tives rit tlie fornici^'s suggestion.^' . -- ' - 



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"3-. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam has co^rimunica-ted to 
the United States Cover orient this staterr.ent of the Democratic 
Republic of Vietiiam position: 

• * ■ ■ 

'If the United %States Governm.ent rea^lly vrants dis- 
cussions vrith the Governjnent of the Democratic Republic 

* ' of Vietnam it should first unconditionally cease bombing 
and any other acts of war against the Deniocratic Reixiblic 
of Vietnam, After the unconditional cessation of all 
bombing and of any other United States act of war against 

' / thCj/Deifiocratic Republic of Vietnam and at the end of an 

appropriate period of time the Goveimment of the De]T:o'cratic 
'Republic of Vietna^m \vill enter into serious discussions with 
the United States Governinent- * 



* 



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DRY (a/l6/68). Bo says that talks vrould begin V.fter a suitable 
time follov'-ing'^ the halt of attacks ;^ a.nd tlmt the tvro parties would 
then raeet to agr^se on the level and scope of their talks* 

I ■ ■ ' ' ' • ■ ■ ■ ■ 

f QVES ?i -J^E HALTIK^G OF THE BOHBING IS CLF-AR.. fiUT WHAT DOES '^THE 

CES?;ATiDN Or ALL OTH[:r acts of WAf^ AGAINST THE DEi-iOCRaTIc RfPIjBLIC 
Or VIEV WAMe'* ^EAN TO YCUv 

^'^^^^ ?^'^^ ^ ^„?^ ^Jl^ ^ ^^L! ^^^ ^^^^' J'IILjtary ACTIo^' that vioLATrs THM 

SOVERF: GnTT and Tlit TERRTrO^Ry""OF^V'Mr''br'^' OF' 



*J 



vtE^r'FAr^U" 



>'4'-<H*_^kl 



i«^i*^k.>«,*#'4i1fentt4^..«ir>dtH.~h*^ ^'-.V- 



b« Vb^ATLd ^H-b^ta ^t.- 



QUES 3£ I'K' what WaY MUsT THEViSERIcaK GOVE ANK^OUNCE THE END OF THE 
BOHBIMG? > . '^ ' 

m 

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ANSf THE US GOVT MAY ANNOUNCE THIS UK'CON'D I T ^ OMAL HALTING OF THE 
B M 3 I J^ G "aU d" F " A LX ' T H E R AC T s ^ r " K' a T^ " TH f? U G H ' A E C L A R A T J N OR Vl 
MAV"7lTr£''^0SE'Dr^ANY'' OTHER" "PRhCEOURr 

RE>:arn' 






'-' — ^*i- i^i^^fct 



■fr^Mh'^T'^ ■.«■'- ^ wvb .^■^''.V'''-^«B-- 



.^.ti--"^-'^* t .lm.#^««>^ .^>^-k— «>i^«'~* 



QUES ^n HOW MUCH TIME WILL ELAPSE BETWEEN THE END OF THE nOf^^BING 

akd the Opening or the negotiations? 



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ANSf THE TALKS WILL BEG FN AFTER A SUITABLE J^lME FOLLOWING THE 
UNCONOITIoITaL "halting' of' the BOi^iGiNG AND* OF ArC'O'TlkR^AXTS^nF WAR 



AGAINST THE D^^VN* 



■i ^aa-^'^'ri*^^ «-^A»-V^~^-1b>b.*4 ■'■^■^k^- *#— Rf'-J 



4'^ «V< V^^^H--^ 



QUES Hf aT what level IN YOUR OPiNlON, ARE THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO 
BE HELD AND WITH WHAT QUEST toNS ARE THEY Tq DEAL? 

ANSs TOLL The UNCOND I T I N AL CfSS AT J ON OF BOMBINa ANp OF ALL OTHER 
ACXS^Qf_yijRlATiAlHsY^^ THE TWO-PART I FS'^^'nTLL ' HE'ft TN"(DRn"ER 
TO REACH AGpEEMENT On" GUCH^ QurSTlTDNSV^'^^ "-" ^: — 



■■— » >|. ] j M j . 



(Birphasis Added) 



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U.S. (1/25/68). Clifford defined the "no advantage" assumption to 
tile ^Senate. Armed Services Coiimiittee as ?--r.siLTiing the enemy vfill continue 
to transport the normal ai5iount of goods j munitions ^ men^ to SVN." 

"SEiiaTOR (STROM) TIIURMOim: Vflien you spoke of negotiating^ in that 
case you would "be vfilling to have a cessation of bordDing. I pre- 
suine that that would contemplate that they would stop their mili- 
tary activities J too^ if vre vould be expected to have a cess action 
of bombing* 




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*'A- NOj that 5l^ not what I said- I do not expect them to 
3 top their military activitiGs- I vould expect to fol3.cn'j the 
langua^je of the Pt^esident whe3i he said that xf they vould agree 
to start negotiations promptly and not take advantase of the - 
r- . pause ±n the bombings 



[ 



"Q, l^^lat do you mean by taking advantage if they continue 
their nilitary activities? 



"A- Their military activity vill continue in South Yietnafa^ 
I assuiiiG, imtil there is a cease fire agreed upon- I assurrie that 

Cthey will continue to transport the normal aiTiount of goods ^ munitions ^ 
men, to South Vietnam, I assume that vre vzill continue to ^raintain 
our forces during that period. So v;hat I am suggesting iSj in the 
r- language of the President ^ that he would insist that they not take 

\ advantage of the suspension of the bombing. 



"Qp How v:ould you keep them from taking advantage if v^e had 
a cessation of bombing? . ^ ^ 

"Ar There is no v.-ay to keep them from taking adve.ntage. If they 
state they are going to refrain from taking advantage ^ and then 
refuse to do so^ then they have not met their agreem.ent^ and the 
conditions for the negotiations have failed. 

"Q. And then J if they did violate tliiat^ you v/ould favor then 
l^esundng bornbing^ I vould prefjtrme. 

"A- I would assiHiie ve wou3-d have' no alternative- If they did 
not meet their obligations or w^e do not meet our obligations^ tl'ien 
I assume there is absolutely no sense in negotiating- It would be 
a useless task. 1o negotiate there has to be good faith if any 
result is to be achieved and if^ during the negotiations ^ bad faith 
is evidenced then there is no need to negotiate-" 



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DRV (g/8/68). Trinh defined the questions to be raised in " talks ^' 
as -^questions related to a settlement of the Vietnam problem on the 

C basis of the 195^1 Geneva agreements on Vietnam, Tbsy are also other 

> - . * * '^ tt * 



■ questions vrhich could be raised by either side." This blurred^^ possibly 
erased^ the distinction that may have existed earJler betvzeen '^ talks" 
and "negotiations." He also said talks would begin "as soon as" the 
U.S, "proved" it had stopped attacks. . ; 



r" "Question: In yoiu"- 29 December 196? speech^ you stated in part; 

) After the unconditional cessation* of the bo^nbings and all other 



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acts of v^ar a^jainst the DBM^ the DRV will hold ta,lks with the 
United States on relevant prohlams. VJliat do you ir.ean by x^elevant 
j prohlems? ' 

"Ansifer: They are questions related to a settlement of the 
Vietnam problem on the basis of the 195'^ Geneva agreements on 
Vietnam. They are also other questions i/hich could be raided 
by either side. 

"Question r It liu?. been subsequently clarified that the talks can 
begin after an appropriate time folloT-ring the uixconditional cessation 
of the bombings and all other acts of irar against the DRV- Could -■' 
you clarj.fy further the meaning of ai:»propr3.ate tme? ' ; 

"Ansver: The talks vrill begin as soon as the United States has 

proved that it has really stopped unconditionally the bombings ■ 

and all other acts of vrar against the Demoeratlc Republic of Vietnam/' 

U,S , (g/17/68). The a-redes were asked to explain the San Antonio 
formula to the DRV- "Productive" \ib.s defined as "serious exchanges" 
in vrtiich either side could raise "any matter -" Attention was called 
to the Tet offensive^ as casting doubt on Hanoi's Intentions^ but it 
V7as not labeled a breach of '*no advantage*" 



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"The U,S,^ cons;i stent with President Johnson's stateinent 
of April 7 J 3,955 :► remains wi:i.ling to enter into talks viithout 
preconditions at any time. * 

m 

-"The U.S, position on the cessation of the bombardment of 
North Viet-Mam is set forth in President Johnson's Septeirlier ?-95 
1967 speech in San Antonio, As the President said: , 

'The U,S* is vnMling to stop a.lj_ aerial and naval 
bombardment of Nortli Viet-rian when this wil-1 lead promptly 
to productive discussions • "VJgj of course ^ assiirae that 
vniile discussions proceed ^ North Viet- Nam v^ould net take 
adva.2itage-of .the bombing cessation or limiitation- ' 

"The U.S. is not assuming that North Vlct-Nam will cease its 
" support to its forces' in the South. ' On the contrary^ as Secretary 
of Defense designate Clark Clifford tet^^tif 5;ed before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Commtteo^ we assu?Tie tbat until a 'cease fii^e ^ 
is agreed on^ Hanoi 'v;ill continue to transjaort the noriTial amount 
of goods J men and munitions.' 



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- "in sotting forth its assumption^ the U,»S. is not sett5.ng a 
I" pond it 5 on "but attempting to 2iiar:e clear to ITortli Viet^Kom that 

any 'cessation of U.S. bombing foUowed V/ actions by Hanoi taking 
advantage; of the cessation (such as a,n increase by Hanoi of its 
infiltration of men a.nd supplies ox' attacks in the area of the 
DMZ) ¥ould constitute such bad faith on Hanoi's part a.s to jiiake 
. continued U.S. forebearance iir^ppssible. IfJIanoi^ by taking 
advantage;^ forces the U.S. to resa^ne bombing; the possibilities of 
a riegotiated solution vould drastically recede. Under such 
cdrcui^stances calls for. intensified U,S. iralitary action vould 
increase -and the possibi3-ity of another halt in the bombing vrould 
be lovr. ihe U.S. is trying to ascertain whether Hanoi p.ppreciates 
[_ this vital fact and fully understands the jirfportance the U*S. 

attaches to the no-advantage assuj^ption. ^ : 



"At San Anto^do the President^ in addition to setting forth 
his assimiption^ stated his, readiness to stop the bombing vrtien such 
action v:ould lead ''pro27ij:jt3,y to productive di^^cussions . * 'Productive 
discussions* are serious exchanges in v:hich either side vi3-l be ^ 
a.l\lc to put foi^.7ard for fixll consideratioii in good faith its pota- 
tion on any iriatter, 'Prompt' of course refer/? to a ^/illingness by 
Hanoi to begin discussions vith the U.S. ijnmediate3.y after cessation 
of bombing, * . - - * . 

"it is worth noting that JIanoi is imvrilling to give a clear 
xoz^gonse to questions as to the length of time betvreen a U*S, 
bombing cessation ancl the beginning of talks. If Hanoi \;ere 
serious in desiring talks then surely 'its response vrould have 
been one of uneq^uivocal readiness to begin im^icdiately. 

"The U.S, evaluation of Hanoi's ciurrent position takes into 
account Hanoi's actions as v/ell as its words. The unprecedented 
offensive, against most of South Viet-Kam's urban centers^ which 
Hanoi treacherous.ly launched in the midst of the traditional Tet 
holidays J causing v^ide spread civilian ca^sualties and suffering 3 " . 
was Tfiadc notvrlthstanding the fact that we vrere still exploring with 
JIanpi its position through diploma^tic channels^ and that we had 
exercised restraint in bombing targets in the immediate vicinity 
of Hanoi and Ha^iphong. * In this context^ v^e ca^mot but. vjcigh . . j 
Hanoi's words v:lth great skepticism and caution. These actions 
carry a h^irsh political message. / ^ , * , 1 

• 

"The U.S. favors every effort to obtain clarification of Hanoi's 
position- Vie shall continue to evaluate all inforir=ation and to 
pui%sue every possible avenue which prdjnlses to bi'ing us closer to 
the resolution of this cofiflict through serious negotiations." 



(State 117383) 



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U ,*S. (2/20/68 ) , The :DTQrvreglans v?ere asked to convey the same message 
as the Swedes, . 

I ■ ■ 

"'I'he US, consistent vrith President Jo}inson's stateriient of 
April 7 J 1965 J remains vriUJ-ing to enter into talks i;ith/out - 
amended State 118719/ prcconditiDns at any tlme^ 

*'The US po^iltion on the cessation oi* the bcinbe-rdnent of 
North Vlet-ITara \7as set forth in President Johnson's Septerriber 29 ;> 
1967 speech in San Antonio, As the President said: 

.'The US is vrillinf^ to stop all Pvcrial and naval _ "^ 

borrPoardjp.cnt of Korth Viet-JTatri vhen this \;ill lead 
promptly to productive discussions. We^ of course ^ 
assii^ae tl'iat v;hilo, discussions proceed ^ Korth .Viet -Nam 
vould not take adva^nta^e of the bombing cessation or 
lirriitation, ' 

"The US is not assu_mins that Kortl^ Viet-riaia ^^'ill cease its 
sujjport to its forces in the South', On the contrary/ as.Secrc^ 
tary of Defense designate Clark Clifford testified before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Corniaitteoj v;e assu/ne tliat until a cease- 
fire is agreed on^ Hanoi ■ 'vrill continue to' traaisport the nonr-al 
amotint of goods ^ men and munitj.ons,' 

, "In setting forth its assu^ription^ the US is not setting a 
condition but a-ttenrptlng to i>:ake c].ear to TTorth Viet-rTa!a that any 
cessation of US bombing follovred by actions by llazioi taking 
advantage of the cessation (such, as an increase by Hanoi of its 
v'* . infiltration of riien and supplies or attacks in the area of the 
WxY^) vould constitute such bad faith "on Hanoi's part as to make 
continued US forebearance impossible. If Hanoi j by taking 
a^dvaritage J forces the US to resmne bombing, the possibilities 
of a negotiated solution v;ould drastically recede. Under such 
circm:istances^ ca,lls for intensified US iinJatary action vrould 
increaf^e and the possibility of another halt in the bo^/bing ^ 
vould be lovr. The US is trjrlng to ascei-^tain Vfhether Hanoi 
appreciates this vital fact and fully rjider stands the 'iiriporta,nce 
t lie OS 'attaches to the. no--ad vantage assun-ption. 



* 



- '^'At San Antonio the President ^ in additj.on to setting forth 
his a,s sumption J slated his readiness to stop the bombing v;hen 
such action vould load 'proinptly to productive discussions.' 
'Productive discussions' are serious exchanges in-v;hich either 
side vill be a^ble to put fon/ard for full consideration in good 



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faith its position on aily matter* 'Prouspt' of course refers 
to a vrillingness by Hanoi to begin Jiscusf-ions vitli the US 
3irjrtec]iately after cessation of bor;l 






''it is V70rth notiiig that Hanoi is unvrilHng to give a 
clear response to questioais as to the length of tfee betvreen 
a, Ufi bonibing cessation and the beginning of talks. If Hanoi 
}jcre serious In desiring talks then surely its response v:oulcl 
have been one of uneciuivocal rea^viness to begin ^iir.ni-^diately. 

*'The US evaluation of Hanoi's current position takes into 
fiiccount Hanoi's .actions as i;c3.1 as its vords. The unprecedented 
offensive against j^ost of South Viet-- Islam's lux^an centers ^ which 
Hanoi treacherously" la.miched in the nidst of the traditional 
Tet ho3.idaySj causing V7idespread civilian casualties and 
suffering^ vas niade notvithstanding the fa^^t that v;e v;ere 
still exploring with Hanoi its position through di'ploBiatic 
chaimels^ and that \:e had exercised restraint in hoinbing 
targets in the iiriiiiedia-te vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong- In 
this context J. \ie camiot but weigh Hanoi's v;ords wS.th great 
skepticism and'^ caution, niesc actions carry a harsh political 



laessage. 



ft 



''The US favors every effort to obtain clarification of 
Hanoi's position. We shall continue to evaluate all informtign 
and to pursue every possible avenue vrhich promises to bring us 
closer to the rec'J^lution of this conflict through serious 
negotiations , " - ' ' - 

(state n8092) 

* 
■ 

DRV (g/2H/63), '^All other acts of war" was defined to mean that 
'*no airplanes vrere per^iitted to fly over JIRV territory," 

*"Mr. Chan repeated the statement of /his Foreign Minister 
January I967 -and of the .29th of Doccraber 1957- He tlius 
repeated that negotiations would begin as soon as the United 
Sto^tes had proved tliat it has stopped eJX bomb5xdir-ents and 
iall other acts of .var against the Darr-ocratic KepubD.ic of 
Vietnam. He specif iecl 'all other acts of var' to rcean that 
no- air\Dlancs v.'ere permitted to fly over. PHV territory and no 
naval vessels were to have their guns or other weapons directed 
against DliV territory after th.at had been done, the Democratic 
Itepublic of Vietnarii would negotiate \;ith the United States 
about relevant auestions. , Tlie Ainbassador in 'this comieGtion 



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^ also referred to Foreign Sinister Trinh^s statemGnt of the 8tli 
or February 3.968, to the effect that the Vietnain conflict had 
to be f^olved on the basis of the 19^ '^ Gent^va A^jreernents and that 
^ negotiations could begin as soon as the United States had shov?n 
■ that it vould stop the boirliardrients of Tv'orth Yietna^u and all 
. other actions of v/ar against the DSV* He rrzentioned a delay of 
some three V'eeks 'or less'," 



(STOciaiOM 901)^ 



DRV (3/1/68), DRV AintjaRsador Su told d'Orlandi that his "personal 
,aev v/as there vould be no assault on IQie Sanh^ etc.^ etc,^ once the 
jtv.^o sides had begun to talk. 



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D'Orlandi m% iJith Meloy and Davidson to report on his March 1 
meeting in Ecague v;ith Ambassador Su, D^Orlandi asked Su if he v;ere ready 
to ansvvor the (iuestiorx concerning the period of delay between the stopping 
of the boi^ibing and the first U*S. -Hanoi meetings? Su responded rather 
lartiely that he thought this contact had coLie to an end a.nd, therefore ^ he 
tras not able to supply a precise ^ansvrer. "He could stat'e that the matter 
of a date would be no prob3-em. The real problem ivas San Antonio," 



^' D'Orlandi said that he had dictated to Su t}]e first portion of the-. 
^ ^ . ]>aYldson MemCon of the February 28 meeting to the Horth Vietn^jiiese^ but 

the Worth Vietnamese did not cojTi^ient on this, 

r '* i ■ ' ■ 

CJ ' The most iraportant point that Su made in these talks was \rxth respect 

to '^no ad\'antage-" Although he said he iras speaking personally, it is 
/ highly doubtful that he v/ou.ld have said the rollov;ing without specific 
instructions: . - ' 

m 

L.", , , .D'Orlandi then tol^^ Su that .if bombing stopped and . 
talks began, assaulting Khe Sanli, invading or trying to detach ■ 
the two northern provinces of South Vxct^^rTani^ loAuiching a second 

L* * . wave of. attacks against one gr more cities or creating a sensa- . 
tion \/ith something else like an assault on Caj^tip Carrol, would 
sink the whole tiling. ^ "Su replied that 3 speaking personally and 
not on instructions, sucli thing would be ^out, that from the 
' morcient the tv;o sides meet it v;as obvious no such thing could 

■ happen* {1 questioned d'Orlandi about this rema^rk of S\V s and- ' ^ 

.- d'Orlandi replied that while he took no notes he is certain this 

Cis the sense of \i:hat Su said,) D'C.^ UKii "told Su that whatever 
he or Su thought of the efx'cct of bo:::bing, it is a fact th?,t 
.the US Governjiient and US public opinion considers bonbing of the 
f Kortli a m.ost ijr^portant v;eapon and that no President could give 

L away such a w^eapon vrhile soniethnng terrible was happening either 

in the K-IZ or the South. Su did not respond to this coioent* 
r ^ l)'0r3.andi also reLiarked that it might be necessary for him to go 

1 ^ to Hanoi to receive assua^ances directly from the top and again Su 

did not re^Dly," 



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DI^V (3 /10 /68) . Trinli gave ]\^or-^regian Ambassador Algard to under 
tand that- the DRV did not req^uire the U.S. to accept its h Toints 
'^"beforeliand" (apparently before negotiations) though the BRV v/ould 
insist on them as the "fotindation for a political resolution of the 
conflict" at the talks - 



OSLO 35YO " Simi?s^ry of Ainbassador Algard 's visit to Kanoi^ March 3-- 10 



• • 



"7* Tlie Foreign f-ii-nisterjunder lined also_^that the_lforth Vi etziamese 
hzP^.-^-P. P.^'^S^IIL mist be the' |5;vtndai l^-i^ poll t ic:?J^_r e soluti on of the 



-^ *^^EQ^-^?-^; Apart fi^om vh?.t co>icernect the stopping of the boiribing and 

J cessation of the acts of 'v/ar against l^Iorth Vietnatn^ he did not set 

^ n^ntters forth in such a vray that theJJnited States beforehand pus t accept^ 

- tBe^ entire 'j -: point 'progr^, He did "hot say anything on the point of 
r tiifie for American vjithdrav:al but gaid that vas a question v/hich inust be 

4-^ . handled at tlie conferc^nce table* i^ror v:ould he say anything on ho-.^ t}ie 

reiurlfi cation x:)roble:n ivould be settled nor hov/ long it vrould take but ^ 
he repeated that fir^t there must be a political solution in South 
Vietnam and referred to the "ULF program: \."hich assumed a separate South 
Vietnamese state for the immediate fivuure. Insofar as it concerned a- 
p* ^ political solution for South Vietn^^-ni^ the Foreign Minister repeated the 

Iforth Vietnejnese position that this vras a ciuestion vrhich must be dis- 
cussed ivith the riLF and t]iat Hanoi cannot speak on behalf of South Vietnam., 
He underlined very strongly that i*ecG?rt events i?i South Vietnam had shovm 
I * that the regime in Saigon vas totally without political b^asis but at the. 

^ same tSjiie events made clear that there ^-as a possibility of cooperation 

b'etvreen the KLF and other political groups, Ho^'ever he did not go into 
detail on this point/' (Emphasis added) ^ ■ 



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DKV, (^'/8/68), Trinli :, in his interview ifith Colfiing- rood ^ repeated 



. ^_, ^j 



DKV V:,ttacks'on reciprocal restraint as the condition for a complete ' ■ 
bombing ha3,t* He specified that the DRV representative at the contact 
to comp3.ete the bombing halt would have Ambassadorial rank and would 
be prepa^red to reach agreement on "the da-te^ place and level of the 
formal talks" bctvjcen the DRV and U.S. ■ ' 

''Question: President Johnson said that 'even this limited bombing 
of tlie north CQuld come to e-n early end if our restraint is matcl^ed 
by restraint in Hanoi-'- Would your government be willing to make 
such a move? 



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"Answer: The Democrs-tic Republic of Vietnejji is an ixidepc^ndent 
Said sovereign country .sorr.G 10^000 -nxLles B,\jB,y from the United States, 
and has done no harm v/hat soever to It. Tlie unvjarranted U.S. 
t^ombing of the Der^ocratic Eepublic of Vietnam is an impudent act 
of a£;5gression- Tlie United States Must bring it to an end. 



^^To ask for 'reciproeity' as a conditionj or 'restraint' as 
P a price; is nothing but a trick to blur the distinction bet\7een 

C ' the aggressor and the victim of aggi^ession. The United States has 

shown no 'restraint' in using its huge war inachine against a small 
r countrj^j and still deBiands that we should sho^v 'restraint' a2id should 



not exercise our sacred rights to defend our fatherland, Tiiis is - 
pure nonsense," 



'^Question: In its 3 April statementj youj: govermnent declared 'its 
I readiness to appoint its representative to contact a U.S, representa- 
tive vjith a view to deteriidnlng with the Araoi^ican side the uncondi- 
tional cessation of the U,S, bombing raids and all other acts of v;ar 
against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam so that the talks may 
start r' Ih'* Minister^ w^hat v.dll be the rank of your representative? 
Wien and vzhere vrill he J^ake contact with the U,R, representative? 
Wien and whei'e will the formal talks between the Deiaocratic Republic 

\ ! of Vietnaiii and the United States start j and at what level? 

to 



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Ansvrer: A representative with ambassadoi^ia^l rank of the Govermrient of 
the Democratic Republic of Vietna-m is "ready to make contact with a 
representative of the U.S. Government in Phnom PenJi or in another 
place to be mutually agreed upon. In the course of this contact, the 
Mierican side will specify the date when tlie unconditional cessation 
of the U.S* bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Deino- 
cratic Republic of Vietneo-n will become effective; then the two sides 
vrill reach agreement on the date^ place ^ and level of the formal talks 
between the Derjocratic ReTDublic of Vietnam s^nd the United States.'* 



•n 

■ DRV'.{5/3/fS) ' The DRV appointed Xuan Thuy as its representative 
to entei^'foTinal "talks" v/lth the US in Paris, 



I ' . " . • » the DRV Government is of the view that the formal 

■ talks betv;een Hanoi and Vasiiington should be held iiriined lately 

The DHV Goverri]nent has decided to appoli.it Minister Xuan Thuy 

Cas its representative to enter into foi^ial talks with the U-S 
Government's representative^ to determine wiL]i the U.S* side 
the unconditional cessation of the U.S. hanbang raids and all 
f other acts of v,^ar against the DRV> and then hold tallis on 

i ._. other problej^is of cpncerii to the tv/o sides-" 



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SETTLEI-KHT TERI-4S 



X- Kutu^.\ Withdrawal 



Sxuii jn a ry 



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[Hie U.S. position on withdrawal of JTorces is clear and^ y^t, 

r leaves us \?ith a (pi-eat deal of flexibility. VJe have said In the 

lU Points (1/3/66) that "vre vant no U,S* bases in Southeast Asiaj" 
and that "we do not desire to retain U-S. troops in Soxxth Vietnam 
after peace is as^^ured." In other \;ords^ the U.S. is on record as 
f^ being cpiiiniitted a£-a,inst keeping its forces in South Vietnara when peace 

L ■ is restored- The U.S, record is also clear in insii^tiilg on mutual 

withdraxval of forces- In the k Points which \ieTe pft-ssed to the DEV 

Lin Rangoon (PIFIA 2/16/66)^ we stated that dlsciiSBions should consider 
1 "appropriate inean-G^ including agreed stages ^ for the vrlthdrawal of 
, • , jnilltaiy and qucvsi-^uiilitary personnel and weapons introdixced into 
^, South Vietnam or North Vietnaja ftom one ai-ea to the other or into ■ 

I either area from any other outside soxn-ce* . ,and the regroxjping a.nd 

^ ' redeplo^'ment of indigencais forces," U.S. flexibility on withdrawal 

is built into its "until peace" qualification. In the Manila Declara- 
p tion (10/25/66)^ v.^e stated that all.ied forces "shall be vrithdrawn^ after 

L close consultation^ if the other sicfe vjithdraws its forces to the norths 

' ceases infiltration^ a.nd the level of violence thus subsides- Those 
f forces will be withdraim as soon as possible and not later than six 

months after the above conditions have been fulfilled." 

- The DRV has always given the prlneiple of U.S. withdrawal top 

[ : billing. Pham Van Dong directly told^us TP>-i^3:iSYLVAMA 7/25/6Y) that 

the end of the wo.r means "a withdravral of U.S. forces*" In the h Points ^ 
for exajiip3-,e ;, JIanol states:. "The US Goverrjr.ent must withdi^aw from South 
Vietnam US troops^ military personnel^ and weapons of all kinds 5 dis- 
mantle all US military bases there > and cancel its mili-tary alliance 
with South Vietnam." Hanoi has^ however ^ displc^yed increasing flexibility 

Con the timing of U.S. withdravral* Recent statements indicate that they 
■ vmuld be prei:^ared for ns to stay imtil a political settlement in the 
south had been achieved* Hanoi's hooker on this issue is' similar to 

C those other matters on which it has evinced flexibility (reunification 

'and free elections )j namely ^ that this Is an issue of secondary Importance 
compared to the crunch point on v^ho governs in the south. Tactically ^ 
then^ ?Iajioi is likely to present an initial hard front on this iiiatter and 
r then "give in" in order to gain concessions 021 the central issue of power 

LL . ' . ' in *the south- . ■ , . ^ ' % 



Wk presence in S o u th Vietna m 

Hanoi has repeated3.y denied the presence of regular PAVS forces 
or even Korth Vietnamese volunteers in South Vietnam. Tiiese public 
denials are iiaportant to Hanoi for several reasons: the denials 
reaffirm their propaganda about the war being essentially a South Viet- 
nam.es e affa^ir fought by the South Vletnaanesc thex:;selveSj that is a 



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civil vjar. The denials may also hcvvc been tied to their anti-U^S* 
bombing campaign^ allovjirjg them to niaintain that the U.S* vras comrratting 
aggression against the noxH-h -^-^ithout tht: north- coinrnitting aggression 
against the soiith, Also^ a,t this tiiae^ Hanoi has an interest in not 
making itself out to be a liar for all these years. As far as vre luiov/j 
they have even been telling the Eussians that they do not have regular 
forces in the south- In other vords^ this fiction has assi^i^ed propa- 
ganda and leverage value uhich Hanoi v:ill not give up easily- 

>Biile Hanoi ^s public record on this issue has been consistent ^ 
there Imve been two private slips in v/hich they vcre on the verge of 
admission* The first occasion ivas in the XYZ conta.cts vjhen Bo did 
not deny DEV troop presence in South Vietnam (8/18/65) ^'^ even that the'^ 
325th WA division vzas in South Vietnam — altliou^h he claimed tljat ^^it 
vas not then engaged in military operations" (9/3/65)' After the XYZ 
contacts had ended ^ Bo said there v:ere no regular troops in Saigon 5 but 
laorthern volunteers might have joined the Viet Cong (11/27/65)- The" 
second occasion of near truth telling came during the MRIGOLD contacts,, 
Lev;andov7ski asked us (11/1^4/66)^ regarding the offer at Manila coiicernlng 
the withdrawal of U,S, forces from Vietnam on the condition that the troops 
of Ifcrth Vietnaro- v;ould v-^ithdraw^ and> he said^^Morth Vietn^^m^ of course^ 

doesar't admt that they are there at al3 " Lifter in Vr.z 10-Point 

MARIGOLD formulation (11/30/66)^ the 8th Point read; "in this regard the 
US is prepared to accept DKV modalities on the cessation /of bombing/ and 
not reciuire the DRV to admit infiltration into South Viet nam • " 

Would tlie ])RV withdra-^r? 

t 

>?hen played off against the public sta^tements of denial ^ these private 
statements in-ovide a hint as to how the DRV mght handle this issue. 
The fiction of no presence will be maintained^ but it v;^ill not be allowed 
to stand in the way of actual I^Iorth Vietnamese troop v/ithdrawals should 
the conditions be appropriate. In all livelihood- hov:cver; these with- 
drawals vfill be de facto, unannounced ^ ujiilaterally made — and not ■ 
necessarily back into North Vietnara itself. The more likely stopping 
'place "on their way home from South Vietnam v.^ould be the Laotian Banhandle. 
The furthest Hanoi ever v/ent on dealing with this issue was again in the 
XYZ contacts- Because Bo did not deny FVA troop presence in South Vietnam^ 
he was ab2.e to agree with the principle that troop withdrawals would have 
to ,be mutual^ balanced and phased (8/15/65)' Bo reaffirmed his agreement 
to this principle (8/18/65)^ but then denied any such agreements (9/3/65)' 

vniat emerges is the link between North Vietnamese troop withdra\vals 
and their control of the south- Wien Lewandowski, asked us about the 
Manila withdrawal formula (ll/lJi/66)j the tie vms clear: ".-*does this 
condition mean the U*Sa withdrawal depends on control by the present 
South Vietns^iesG government of territories not novf under the control 
of Saigon?" Ha?ioi will asX ns this Question again^ arnd depending upon 
our answer will decide to vrithdraw or not. 



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TiiTiinf^ — the DRV vievi^ on the tining or U,S. vrithdravral. 



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As the DKV began to play out its diplojna.tic hand over the last t\ro 
years 5 It has becoine increasingly flexible .on when it would like the 
U.S. to leave* Bo told iis that U,S, withdrawal vras a "technical problem" 
(11/16/65). Lewandowski said that they could take place according to 
a "reasonable guarantee" (6/27/66)* Loan told Algard (OHIO^ 8/ 16/6?) 
that the tiirdng '*was not a decisive question-" In this connection, 
Lewandot-rski pointed out the agreement on withdrawal of l^*ench troops 
as an example* He added that the Americans "would have to accept the 
political situa.tion in South Vietnam as it is 5 as De Gaulle did in 
Algeria." All this does not mean that Hanoi V7ill leave the issue open .' 
to principle- One of Lewandowski' s 10 Points (MA.RIGOLDj II/30/66) stated: 
*^The U.S. does not desire permanent or long-term nilit^^^y presence in 
South Vietnam/' The Tnost forthcoming of all DHV statements on this 
issue was the one made by Fnam Van Dong (PSMSYLVAKA^ 7/25/67): ."Some 
US troops vjould have to stay /in South Vietnam/ until the end of political 
settlement." This probably means that the U*S, forces would be allov/ed 
to linger on as long as they did not interfere with the process of political 
settleinient- Indeed^ the contijiued presence of U,S, troops in South Vietnam 
during this period could a.dd legitimacy to the now governiiient. 

Non-I]"Ltervention 



i ■ P li ■ I h- 



The DRV also w^ants to get some guarantee in principle that the U,S, 
vrill refrain from intervening in Vietnam after a political settlement 
has taken place. In the 'j Points^ Hanoi states tMt the U.S, "must end 
its policy of intervention and aggression in South Vietnam^" and that 
during the period pendiilg reunification^ the two zones must refrain from 
entering into any military alliances vrith* foreign countries and there 
rmst be no forej.gn military bases ;i troops ;^ or foreign m^-litary personnel 
in their respective territory. 



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2. Se.lf"Deternn\natloh' for SVN: i^'-ec Elections? 



The main parties to the v/ar agreed early on the principle of self- 
detGrni nation for the people of SV^* .It xs endorsed j Inter e^lis.^ in the 
first KTLF program (i^/ll/6l)> President Johnson^ s Johns -Hopkins speech 
(^^/7/65), the DRV's k Points (h/3/6^) and the GVlV s k Points (6/22/6^), 
The Vietne^rfi Alliance of l^tional, Deinocrei-tic and Peace Forces (A.MDFF) is 
for it J too (1^/26/68)- But the different sides haye different ideas ahout 
hov tlie people of SVN should orpress their vriU- Tlie U,S. and the GVN 
prefer the elector^.l processes of the cuj?rent Constitute on ^ vfhereas the' 
DRV and KLF v;ant to scrap that Constitution and set up a nei-7 electoral 
authority. The ANDH? has not stated a formal position on the Constitution^ 
but is clearly opposed to the GVN as the country's electoral authority. 
Everyone no doubt susx^ects that the outcome of elections will be determined 
by vho runs them. Thus to a large extent ^ the war is now being fought over 
who shall run future elections^ making the apx>arent agreeinent on '' self- 
determination'^ illusory. In addition;; vrhile "both sides "have exprevssed 
themselves favorably about elections ^ neither is irrovocab-ly co:nmitted 
to elections as the o)ily means of self-determination. 



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Tile k l^oints (k/Q/G'^) call only for self-deterinination "in accordance 
v/ith the program of the i^fLF without any foreign interference-" V/hen these 
Points were first published;, the M^F prograra (issued 2/U./6l} called for 
overthrowing Diem and substituting a coalition government as one phase ^ 
apparently the first ^ in bringing about "pi'ogressive democracy^'' inpluding 
a new constitution and elections. 

+ • 
Later in 19^5^ Kai Tan Bo stressed self-deterjiilnation* as the "one 

basic premise" that vould permit all other problems to be, solved (XYZ, 
7/16/65)5 but he subseq.uently amended this to say that s elf- det elimination 
.through elections would only he possible after U-S, military withdrawal 
{XIZ^ i/SY/66)* As he explained^ "How can elections be held in a country 
over which no authority is exercised?" (XYZ^ 5/6/66) Ke was probs^bly 
not worried about the meche^nlcs of holding elections. Kore likely, he 
felt the eiectoral authority v:ould determine the outcome. 

• '- '■ ^-" ■ ' ' ■ ' . . . . ■ . . . / 

These stands were x-epeated by Trinh (to the Sv:edes)j v:ho said he 
wanted a coalition government and general elections (ASPEN> II/11/66). 

Waen Lewandowski was probing us on settlement terms (l.tAKiaOXD, ll/l^t/66)> 
he asked J "in case of a cease-fire^ v;ould the US be prepared to withdraw 
from the combat areas and not interfere in the creation of a .new government 
in Vietnam?" He also wanted to know if t'ne Manila withdrawal provisions 
depended on GVI^I control of areas not then under its control and v/hetlicr 
w^e v?ould declare our willingness to accept the Geneva and ICC machinery 
in "bringi;ig peace to Vietnam^ ^' perhs.ps including inspection of an election. 



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H'^ was no doubt searching for a foruiuJ^a under Kliich IttF authority 
could be exercised prior to U,S, withdrawal, VH'ien he formalated his 
10 Points (M^iRIGOLD, I1/30/66), he indicated o\iT irillingne.ss to "accept -, 
"bhe participation of 'all' in e,lections and the supervision of these 
elections by an appropriate international body*'' If ^ as the Poles a2id 
Russians clainijad^ the DKV was willing to enter discussions on this basis ^ 
they ]T\B-y }iave been willing to see elections of this sort before U,S. 
vithclrawa,!, V/lio v;ou3.d run the elections^ and how^ would be subject to 
legotiation—as^ therefore^ in DRV eyes would be the probable outcome. 

■I- 

I VJl'ien the new IMLF Pr'ograHi was issued^ just aftei' the election of 

Thieu, Ky and the lower house ^ it lists first the goal of abolishing 
the "puixpet administration ^^ the "puppet national asseiribly^" and their ' 

1 constitution- It called for "free general elections^" for a new nfttiohal 

■ asscDibly that wou3,d w-ork out a nev/ con^stitution^ and for the establish- 
ment of a "national union deinocratic government*" Wiile it does not 

. specify the order in which things are supposed to happexij it is clear 
enough that abolishing the GYIJ and its con,stitution would have to come 
before new elections ^ etc. In the li>st of objectives^ new elections and 
the ncvr constitution also cosie before. establJ^shing the coalition govern- 
ment* Perhaps this hints that the issue is negotiable (9/5/6?)' 

However^ at the end of February 1968^ the DRV position expressed to 
Fanfani by Ajnbassador Su was: Hanoi wanted "absolutely free general 
elections. To insure liberty of vote^ it was necessary to constitute a 
government vrith very broadly based participation" (KIIiLy;^ 2/23/68), 

Tlie AlffiPF Pi'cgram attacks the GVN as a "lackey administration/' calls 
for setting up a coalition "governjnent and speaks of the future political 
regime in SVW as a "republic" with "just and honest jslections." Again 
the sequence is not crlsp3-y specified j but the program seems to caLl for 
setting up the coalition government as a condition necessary to "wirjiiia*^ 
back national sovereignty." This would make it a condition for ending 
the war — something to be negotiated or won on the battlefield^ rather 
than the outcome of an electoral process (k/2^/68). 



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3- The Legit ImatG HerKreGentativG of SVN: GVN or TfLF? 



Smmnar y 



As noted in the previous sectionj elections as an impartial v;ay of 
r - deciding wlio shall govei-n SVIT nay not solve the problem. The ccTiposi- 
L tion of the {^overniBent may have to be negotiated or decided in battle. 

A prime v;ar aim of the coniniiuiists is establishing legitimacy for the 
KIjF^ while undercutting that of the GVN- The GVIF is fighting to bolster 
its authority ;i v;hile destroying that of the I^ILF* Th~as "v:hD shall govern 
SVi^l" is what the vrar is all abovit^ and "v;ho shal-1 represent SVM^' in 
negotiations is one round in thG battle - 



As DpX->osed to the principle of "self*-deterx.iinationj" the issue 
■ of who shall represent SVTJ"-at the conference or in Saigon- -is one on 
whicli almost no agreement has been reached betvjeen the U.S. and DRV- 
Essentially J each side has insisted on the legitimacy of its party in 
SVJ\% denied the J.egitimacy of the other ^s^ but offered a way for indiv- 
iduals from the other's party to enter political life by ^'reconciling" 
thainselves* The communists are probably prepared to go beyond this^ 
accepting tlu^ee 'Apolitical tendencies" ( right ^ neutral and left) as 
theoretically co-cciual^ in exchange for our a,greeirig that a nev; govern- 
ment be foiTied by the "tendencies" — after the model of the 19o2 Agreements 
on Laos, 

* * * 

I'he DRV and W...S. 

From the outset^ the communists' carrot has been their willingness 
to see "no]i"Conjmunists" included in the governrjient or at the conference 
table. The vmpalatable part has been their insistence on a role for the 
' KLF and no role for the GVN as an institution/ 

In June 196^^ Hiain Van Dong insisted to Seaborn , "The Laos pattern 
of 1962 sliould serve as a guide for SVN- " Ttiore should be a coalition^ 
iiacluding the KIF- Wien -Seaborn said the MjF might dominate^ Dong said 
only^ "There is no reason to have such fears." • 

In his /sta1;ement anbodying the h Points ^ Eham Van Dong said the HLF 
* v/as "more' and more recognized by. , *v."02\ld opinion as the sole genuine 
representative of the SViI i:>eople" (^1/8/65)- The follovring January ;i Ho Chi 
Minh saidj "if the US readily vants peace it irrust recognize the iffiF as the ■ 
sole genuine representative-.-" (l/2if/66). Tliis i^ublic stance v.-as softened 
in various private communications passed subseciuentlyj but never to the 
extent of conceding legitimacy to the GVII. 



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4 • 

The DRV rcljuttecl the U,S- 1^1 Points (Eangoon, I/31/66) by rejecting 
the legitiiijacy of the GVIT: asking the IJLF to "lay dovni its arms and 
ask amnesty'* aii^oimted to jriaintaining a "puppet re^irne"' in Saigon. ^ 

In Lewando^fski's first overctures (VAKLGOJJ)^ 6/29/66)5 he repre- 
sented the conimimists as asking only that the HJjF "take part" in negoti- 
ations- -"they are tiot to have any monopoly"'- --and said that Ka.noi did 
"not vant to interfere with the SW Governjnent," tho-jgh "vre vould like 
someone other than Ky." L?^ter ha suggested a coalition government made 
up ji^ainly of "sensible SVN politicians" i^?ith men "on the fringe" from the 
"right'* and the left^ "the so-called I^JLF/* in one or tv:o "anirnportaut 
Lainistrie>s" each" (MRIGOLD 9/18/66), This too is after the Laos pattei-n, 
(Souvahna's neutralists \n.th 11 ministries^ Eoun Oum vri'^-h h and Soux:?h?^ndvong 
v;ith h.) . . 

Much the saine propositio?i came to us thrL^ough the Swedes (ASPSN^ 
11/11/66). 

Burchett^ claiming to reflect the yievrs of senior DEV and TTLF 
officials ;i reported that Ky and Thieu vould not "be acceptable in a 
coalition J, but ''some members of their cabinet or. * -previous Saigon- 
governments" rndglit he- The communists considered "negotiations beti/een 
Hanoi and the Ky goverriment" as "an ImxDOssibJ.lity." Ky and his top 
'' supporters were expected to emigi'ate (2/10/67)- 

I In Ju3_y 1967 5 Pham Van Dong repeated that the coalition could be 

^ "broad" and cduld include members "du gouvernement fantoche et cadres 

d'ai'^iiee fantoche-" He said the IBLF need not participate in negotiations-- 
as long as the issues do not concern SVN (PEMSYLVAICTA, 7/^5/67)- 

A 

The latter point vas repeated through the Koivegians in August 
(OlilOj 8/16/67). But in the end^ the Amerlca,ns would "have to accept 
tlie political situation in SVN as it is^ as de Gaulle did in Algeria." 
"The question of representation was of great importance" (OHIO^ 8/16/67)- 
Jiater^ the Hon-regians were asked to find out if the U->S. was "willing to 
■ ■ accept the liberation front as a political factor" (OiriO^ 6/21/67)- .The 
* Kon'^Ggians took this to mea^n as a "factor in prelimina-ry talks ^ actual 
negotiations (c-^nd) in a post-settlement situation," * They also conveyed 
to us the DHV's desire for a "non-cojiir;iianist" coalition government in SVN. 
(The DriV^indic:ated to thein that it considered the I&F "non- communist" too*) 
llioir interXocutor 's "tone gave the ijnpression" that neinbers of the QYH 
v?ould be acceptable 5 a3-though this was not n^ade exp3-icit; the North Viet- 
namese did concede that the GVN "was a political factor in SVN (9/B/67). 
This too is in the patteD^n of the 1j?.os settlement j. in which representation 
at the conference finally devolved upon three political "tendencies" .(^rightj 
neutral and left)^ which ultlt.iately becarae the three elements of a coalition 
goveriHient . 



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Last Fe'bruaryj DKV Arabassador Su told the Italj.ans that there 
should be a ^Wery broadly based" {^overimient^ "excluding oiily 'v/ar 
crmins'ls' (md.efined)"(KILLY^ 2/23/68). . - 

As late as Mar eh ^ the Norwegiaiis were told regain that a poli.tical 
solution for SYtJ "^i-jas a question v/hich n-iust be discussed v/ith the KLF 
and llo^noi cannot speak on belialf of SVN-" 

The ANDH^ Program denomices the GVN as a ^^laekey adrranistraticia'^ and 
says th^ KLF "cannot be excluded froir- the settle?iient of all problen^s 
in SVN. We advocate contacts with the KT^F.-*-" But it offers^ apparently 
acting alone^ "to discuss these problems with the US governrrieut'* (h/2^/CQ). 
This is possibly intended as a face saving way for the U.S. to begin 
negotiations with tlje coimnmiists without according status to the IUjF- 
The ATOFF may also offer the "neutralist" political tendency from i^hich 
a solution after the Laos p?vttern could be fashioned: i^3LF members on the 
left; AEIDPF in the middle: selected GVU meirijers on the richt. 



The GVi^ 



6 



Tlrjroughoutj the GVTT has insisted u^jon its sole right to speak for 
SVlf* Its k Points state J "the Hanoi Coirjmmist regime must dissolve all 
the puppet organizations it has formed in SVK' under the names of * Front 
for the Liberation of the South/ 'Liberation Radio* and the ^Peoples 
Eevolutionary Party* (6/22/65)' Thieu's current position is that the 
GVN and Hanoi are the parties to the v:ar» If there are to be negotiations ^ 
they should be the protagonists vn-th no role for the NIiF. His pr5j[ie objec- 
tive is clearly to van iVcognition for his governinent from Hanoi ^ v/it}ioat 
our according any fitrther status to the I!LF, Although the preseiit GVN 
constitution excludes commvmists and "pro-coimnmiist. neii1:^ralists" from the 
electora>l process^ Kiieu has e,ccepted the principle of "one m?.n-one vote^" 
and agreed to meet v:ith Individuals v7ho leave the ¥(LF^ but he v/ould not 
accept the IJLF itself as a "political entity" (Bunker's Meet the Press 
interview;, ll/ig/67). ■ ^ ' 

*^ ' ■ I '■ ^m 

id 

Our position has been consistently that the PJI^F had no role "as of 
right" in SVII and that vre would not guarantee a role for it before 
elections J because to do so vrouLd be contrary to free dstei'inination. 
Individual members of the TJLFj hovrever^ could ps^rticipate in the political 
process in SVII (XYZ; 9/8/65 J Pangoon^ 2/1&/66). Should the BRV decide 
to negotiate^ "the Viet Cong would not have difficulty being represented 
and having their views presented" (U,S. 1^ Points ^^ I/3/66; Golciberg, 2/10/67)' 
We drevr attention to the internationally reeognl:ied status of the GVF and 
argued that the GV1\^'b Mtional Reconcilation Program offered a route by' 
v^hich individual members of the I^!LF could participate in the "normal 
political processes of SVIV'" under GVN ausi^ices (iJanila Com^viuniciue^ IO/25/66; 
Goldberg, 2/lO/67)- 



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Several episodbc may have s'.ugc^ested to the BRV some elements 
of ?^glvG^^ in our position: Gullion's instinictions stated> "At most^ 
the futiure'of the l^fLF shouJ,d he a matter for discussion, not something 
settled in principle before ne^^otia^tions begin" (XYZ^ 8/15/65)' 
^evrandovjGki ' s 10 points^ accepted by us "subject to important differences- 
of interpretation" said^ ^'tbe present status q.uo in SVN vould be changed 
in order to take into account the interests of the parties presently 
opposing the policy of the US in SVK" (MRIGOLD, 11/30/66),^ Goldberg 
(11/2/67) told the Senate Foreign Relations Cornraittee that the U.S. 
'Vould not stand in the way of groups^ including the ELFj" being invited 
to ap^jear before the UlT Security Council* Tlie U.S* privately indicated 
to the UJI Secretariat tliat visas would be Issued for such a group if 
Certain clarifications ijcre obtained; the latter, however ^ vero apparently 
not forth r:or,iing and no visas \;ere actually issued. In his March 3I speech^ 
President Jolmson said^ "tbere may come a time when South Vietnamese-- 
• on both sides — are able to work out a v/ay to settle their ov:n differences 
by free political choice rather than by war." 



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TOP 8]:)CRri;T - HODIS 



RGunification 



I J ■ ■ ■ I ■ i^ii m — -■■ 

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Tlie U,S- position on reunification of Vietnam can be separated 
into what v^e have been saying publicly and what we really want* 1Mb- 
licly, the U.S. ik Points (1/3/66) state: 

"10, T}ie question of reunification of Vietnam sliould be 

determined by the Vietna7iiese tlii^ough their ov:n free decision; 

I 

'^11, The cauntries of Southee-st Asia can be nonaligned 
or neutx'al if that be their option;" 

4 

Tlie U.S. position is parhaps more accurately stated in the ]4anila 
Coriiiiiuiiq,ue (IO/25/66): 

"The Govertment and people of South Vietnam deplore 
the partition of Vietnam into iJorth and South- But this 
partition brQU{^ht about by the Geneva Agreements of 195^^ 
however unfortunate and regrettable ^ will be respected 
until J by the free choice of all Vietnpanesej reunification 
is achieved." 

Pi^esident Johnson has gone even farther O'Jl/S^) when he said that "our 
objective is the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from 
attack." Oar preference is clearly for the conti2uied sei>arate existence 
of South Vietnajiij but the 5jnpression of our public statements has been 
that we favor reunification through free Vietnam-wide elections after 
aggression has ceased- 

The North Vietnariese position appears forthcorrdng and appears similar 
to the impressions of our own public statements < They have indicated that 
they v;ould not press for reunification^ that reunification could be deter- 
mined vrell in the future by free decision of all the Vietnamese x^^ople, 
and that the interim state in South Vietnam would be non- socialist and 
neutral. ^ Hanoi can afford to make their reunification position look 
appealing beca^use it is really a secondary issue. T^ieir position is a.nd 
they will press for a political solution in Soutii Vietnam favorable to 
them J and tben let the issue of reunification take care of itself ™- in 
a t^me period when U.S. interests will not be hujiiiliated . 

VJViat i.ri t he DRV p osition? 

There are several statements in the k Points -which bear on this 
issue: (a) "The USG must. . .dismantle all U.S, military bases /in SVN/^ 
and cancel its military alliance with SVir'-j (b) "Pending the peaceful 
reunification of Vietnam^ vjhile Vietnam is still temporarily divided 



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^ ' ■ i:i*XQ. tv70 zones "j and (c) ^'Ths peaceful reunifica-lion of Vietnam is 

to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both xones^ v/ithout any 
V foreign interference*" 



In June 195U^ Biam Yan Dong told Blair Seaborn that reunification 
is a "drame national^ fonclajnents^.1-" He added^ somewhat inconsistently^ 
that neutrality for SVK'^ and by ii^iplicatlon remiiflcationj ^joulcl 1)g 
something for the people of SVN to decide; he did not "prejudge^^ the 
outcoTfte, More recently (PEiWSYLVAI^JA 7/25/6?) j» Pham Van Dong said Uiat 
Hanoi goals for South VietnaTn vera "indepezidencej deiaocracyj peace ^ and 
neutrality." ■ 

VJliat do these general sta^terientK add u-d to in operatlonpvl terms? VBien? ,* 

On the timing of reunification^ the YS^ has given a rs.nge of statements 
including, "no hurry" (XYZ 7/16/65), ''indefinite postponement" (Ojiio ^/xG/Qj)^ 
"until Soxith Vietnam is ready/' "3.0 or 20 years" (Burchett 2/II/67) . But, 
as the Swedes informed us (ASPM ll/ll/66)j Trinh said to then that it is 
necessary to qreate such conditions as ifiXl pari?iit a move in the direction 
of reunification* In other v:ords, rejmification, according to the DKV need 
not occur at B^ny specific or early time, but that it v:i3.1 hax:)pen at some 
future point mast he assured by present decisions. These decisions basically 
seem to revolve around a political settlement in South Vietnam, As Loan 
told A3.gard (OHIO 3/3/67)5 "first there must be a political solution in 
South Vietnam." At first glance, Hanoi's position on reunification looks 
.liKe a compromise. Indeed, "Hanoi has been p3_aying it up a,s a comprom/ise, 
indicating that postponement of reimifi cation is at va^riance vjith the Xd')h 
Geneva Accords vfhich called for reunification within fc-?o years of settle- 
ment, i*e*, 1956, The hooker, of course > is that the realization of reunifi- 
cation in the fixture is merely a corollary of other points, mainly control 
of the government in the south, and need not be fought for in its own terms* 

\\o\j and by I.Tiom? 



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le^andowski (KARxGOID ll/lU/66) spoke of reunification by free deter- 
p c < jrilnatiqn;^ adding the,t this could take the form of either a referendum or 
\ * an election, Vfriile he did not spell out this issue, apparently a referendum 

would be a Vietnam-^vide single issue vote on reunification- By elections, 

the could have meant that reunificevtion would be decided on a government to 
goveriTnent basis (the DRV with the new South Vietnam government);, each 
government having been chosen by "fi-ee elections-" In support of tx^e latter 
method, Pnam Van Dong stated (PSm\iSYLVAI^nA 7/25/67 ): "Once the war in the 

L South is sett led,, vre shall ^discuss with the South ,and find the best means," 

Additionally, and to confuse the issue further ^ virtually all the DKV state- 
ments on this issue stress that reunification is to come through free 
r determination "by the pejople in both zones" (the h Points), This is the' 

I wording of the 195^^ Geneva Accords, and it means that the people of South 

Vietnam alone will not decide the matter, that the people in the north must 
haTC their say as well. By this country-wide vote for-uula^ it is likely 
that even a solid majority vote in SVH against reunification would be oyer- 
t?.kcn by the neC':T unanimous vote for reunification in North Vietnam. 



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A final and related ciualifiGr is that the Tree decision on remiifi ca- 
tion* must* "be v;ithout foreie;n interference. IVest'ana'blyj this is to convey 
the DRV belief that ho outsiders can or shoiild be present in Yietnani when 
the decision on reunification is being raade. 



r^yature of interim state in Sou th Vietnam? 

The DRV has used three elements to define \diat the Government of 
louth Vietnam v;ould look like pending' reunification. Firsts Hanoi has 
Jescribed it as neut ral in the ''Cambodian inanner" (l^iARIGOia) 9/18/66). 
This implies indexjendence^ but more reliance on Asian a^ld particularly 
Asia^n co:mr:U.nist influences. Carrbodian neutrality is not noted for bGing 
sympathetic to the U.S*^ nor is it noted for knuckling uaider to China or 
Ifortli VietnauK Cambodia has also renounced SMTO protection. Hanoi 
^ has also described thie governxient as bein^ ^' non- social 1st ." After talking 
, with the DRV leadership^ Eurchett (2/11/67) said that Hanoi thought of 
■ itself as a "soci3.1ist countt^y and ?- mesnber of the socialist world but 
. without military alliances or foreign military bases ;j militarily Init not 
politically neutral^" and thought of the south as '^nan-socialist and 
neutral mlltarily^ politically, and diplornatically." In a very revealing 
statement (PEi^H^ySYLVANIA 7/25/67), Tham Van Dong said: "Some people think 
we want to impose socialism on the south, We are convinced that the NLF 
will not make such an error," It is important to recall^ however , tlmt 
the comjLUnists consider the KJjF to be "non-coifanunistj" a front of diverse 
political groupings. The third element has been the implication that there 
need be no change in the foreign affairs of the interim South Vietnam 
goverjB:ient (KVRIGOID 6/^7/66}. Such a statement would imply tha.t South 
Vietnam could continue under western alliance protection and that the 
government wov^ld be able to receive aid from all countries. This element ^ 
reported only in the first -WvRIG 01 tD conta^ct, is in contradiction vrith the 
first element emphasizing neuti^lity. Except ^ perhaps ^ for the aid 
proviclon^ it is probably nothing' more than a come-on - 

V?hat do these statements add up to? . * 

Tliey seem to mean that Hanoi understands that the U.S. has a definite 
stake in South Vietnam^ and that even in the future would not take happily 
to the appearance (or the reality?) of South Vietnam being absorbed into 
the communist bloc, ^rnan Kiam Van Dong said that "the MLP will not make 
such an error /^ he probably meant that they imderstood the Importance in 
U.S. eyes of appearances* Tlie DliV must get its v:ay^ but it is saying that 
. it wi;Ll not^do so in a way that will threaten western interests. 

Relation of interim South Vietnam government to DRV? 

. .. ^ — r ■ -^ r M» 1 ■ ■ I I 1 ■■ I ■ I I ■ ' ■ I ''^' — ' ~ ' ' • ' 1 • I I I 1 ■ 11 ■ M ill 

Burchett (2/11/67) even gives us a glimpse of ho\7 Hanoi views 
relations betvreen t)ie two Interim zones or goverm-isnts- Ke says; "For 
regulating north- south reJ^ations^ there would be a tj'pe of general assembly^ 
presiunably nOBiinated by the respective parliaments to handle questions 
important to both zones ^ such as, trade > post and telegraphy inter- i*.onal 



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travel J inc3_ucUng sports and culbui^a.! ezchaxiges, Tlie assembly^ in 
fact J T:ould have some rese^riblance to the inter-German council^ an 
idea bein£5 tried out by the V7est German social deinocratics as a means 
to handle current practical xjroblems betv;een East and VJest Gerimny, 
This idea goes back as far as 1955 > ^rtien the DW introduced the proposal 
for the Fatherlcmd Front, 



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5- ir^n?ERNATIOPI?iL GUAMI^?JEEG AND .WSP]':CTION 



This has alvja;y"s been a very real and jjriportant issue to the U.S. 
and the GVH on the one handj and kind of a non-isGue to Hanoi on the 
otlier hand. In the four points vhich \re handed to the DRY in Rangoon 
(PIMTA 2./2£/&6)^ \re stated: "Strict compliance v.^ith the military 
provisions of the Geneva Accords must he aciileved in accordance with 
schedules and ap23ro2"3rlate safeguards to be agreed upon in the said 
discussions or negotiations." Later^ in the Manila Communigue 
(10/25/66) J it was stated that: "Tlie people of South Vietnamj mindful 
of their ex^jerience since 195^^ > insist that any negotiations leading 
to the end of hostilities incorporate effective international 
guarantees. Tney are open-rrtinded as such guarantees can be applied 
and jnade effective." 

There are four DSV statements on this subject; 

First J Pham Van Dong has stated (SEfflOl^IE 6/l8/6^0 that 
"as far as the ICC is concerned^ we are very glad to have you here. 
But don't put too many items on the %igendaj don't give yourself 
too nmch work to do," 

Second; I^ewandowski asXed us (iviARIGOLD JJ./lh /66): "to the 
ease of a ceasc-fire and negotiations; would the U.S- be ready to use 
the Geneva Agreanent and the Jnachinery of the International Cormisslon 
in bringing peace to Vietnamj and if soj v;ould the U^S- publicly 
declare its intention to this effect?" 

TMjrd, in Lewandov^ski ' s ten pojjits (i-yiRIGOID II/30/ 66), the 
fifth point states: "The U/d. is willing to accept the participant ion 
of 'all' elections and the supervision of these elections by an 
appropriate international body." 



Fourth; Su told d'Orlandi (KEELY 2/S3/68); "Both parties 
felt that problem of guaranteeing an agreement vras Increasing to 
r . decisive jjnportance, " Accox-ding to d'Orlandi^ S:\ seemed to categorically 
1^ ■ exclude tlie UTf as a guaranteeing agency and Fanfani and Su agreed 

that the ICC was not in a position to guarantee anything. ^ 

I ^ These dtateiaents do not add up to muchj but they are suggestive 

• ' bf the bWd irillingness to compsromise on a point that they know 

is iiux>ortant to the U-S- -- as in the case of many other issues^ so 

rlong as it does not detract from the central issue of w^ho controls 
the govex-mient In the Soiith. Hanoi's opposition to the VB is wellkno^in ■ 
and of long standing^ and they would probably object to UN supervision.; 
The problem of Worth Vietnam and Communist China not being members 
of the UN would seem to preclude the UT'J's playing a role* SJmilarlyj 
the DKV has evinced no affection for the ICC. However^ the DRV has over 



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the years continued to report violations or the Geneva Accoi-ds to 
the ICCj and because of the importance which the DRV attaches to the 
Geneva Accordn^ vrould not likely take a stand against a future ICG 
role* In all probab:Llityj neverthelecsj Eanoi would not itself prajjose 
the ICC- It is also doubtful that they vould accept an enlarived and 
strengthened ICC proposed by us* The possibility ranains of an all- 
Asian supervisory body established on an ad hoc basis to deal v/lth 
Vietnaj^ij but we liave no evidence that IfeLnoi vrould be receptive to this* 

As long as the DltV feels assured that their control In the South 
is becoming a reality or is a reality^ they are not likely to quarrel 
seriously over inspection and guarantee machinery- ; 



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COP SECRLT/NODIS 



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J Although Kanoi has repeatedly stated^ .and* we have assijmed all 

jalongj t?]at the DRV vill adoi)t a flghtixig-vhile-negotlatins strategy^ 
there Is seme chance that they vill take the Initiative in proposing 
a cease-fire once negotiations are imdervray* 

* 
We have had two hints on this possihility- The firbt came from 
Lewandowski (il4KIG0ItD ll/jA /66); i/hen he asKed the following questions: 

^'Si case of a cease-^firej would the United States be prepared 
to withdravr from the ccjnbat areas and not to interfere in the 
creation of a new goyernitient in Viet«Nam? The question of ho\i 
the new goveriiment of Viet^-Kam w:l11 he fori^cd will certainly 
arise* 

"In case of a cease-fire^ vould the United States undertake 
not to interfere In peaceful progress toward unificatioji of 
Viet-NaiTi if the peoi^le so wishj whether by referendum or by 
election? ^ 



"In the case of a cease-fire and negotiations^ would the 
United States be ready to use the Geneva Agreement and the 
niachinery of the International Coiiimission in bringing peace 
to Viet-Nain^ and if -so^ v/ould the United States publicly declare 
P , its intention to this effect?" 



The second indicat j'on^ came from the very reliable Algard Loan 
exchanges ,(OHI0 2/lO/6S). Loan said that, "Hanoi presupposed (assumed) 
that the military opex-ations be stox^iiscd v.diile negotj'atipns are being 
conducted . 



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Hanoi's interest in a cease-fire does not mean that they would be 
interested in a genuine cease-fire. More like_lyj as in the case of 
Laos J they will pursue a strategy of negotiate -cease fire-fight- cease fire- 
I c -figlit,' breaking the ground rules v/henever they believe it appropriate. . 

Hanoi's possible interest in a cease-fire has a readily determinable 
purpose. If agreed to by us^ it would give the MF uncliallengcd 
authority "in th^ areas it now controls. Such civil administration 
arrangements as rnay be made (as in the period foi_lQwing the 195*^ 
Geneva Accords) would allovf the KLF to develop local coalition govern- 
ments. ■ ' ' 

The U*S* is on record publicly as favoring a cease-fire. The U.S, 
Fourteen Points^ for exaiiiplej state: "A cessation of hostilities could 
be the first order of business at a conference pr could be the subject 
of preljjninary discussions," 

President Jolmson has m.ade repeated and unqua,lif led statements 
about duJT vrillingnoss to accept a cease-fire - 



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S MEORIT laSSION TO IRITOI, jmm 3.8, 3JjSk 

3CCEKPTS) 



Seaborn Report on Initial Visit to Hanoi: 



n.;-S»" 



Call o n BA Fiaaj^i Ve.n Pon/^ 



- "7- Fna"[n Van Dong o^jGned rcniarkfi by saying v/e ifiust learn to 

'joexlst and to find solution to prol>lem irhich has vrracked Indochina 
;or 25 years- But just solution is only v:ay to provide stability - 

VTliat just solutio]! means in DKW is^ as Prosidont Ho Chi Minli has 

J explained (a) USA wlthdi^s.wal (b) i:jeace and neiitrality for SYfJ in 
""anibodian pattern in accovdance vdth pro^-L^ajriniG of Liberation Front 

, v/hich must p9.rtieipate in deterniinationof Vietnora as result of 

'negotiation vhen SVN ready for negotiation*" 



^'10. In separate tel vrithout 'Bacon' restrictions I sha3.1 z^eport 
in greater detail P^i's comments on Laos situation- Essence of his 
remarks i^ras (a) only viable solution i\;as return to status quo ante 
April couj) d'etat and Govt* of national Coalition as per Geneva 
Accord of 1962 (b) necessity of convening Ik nation conference to 
achieve this result and (c) essentiality of no RFf no American 
interference in Laos, Pie said DHVil vas 'very vrorried by step-up of 
USA military activities in Lacs and complained of USA overfliglits of 
DRVl^I territoi^y and of coinuiando raids across border. He denied that 
PAVN had sent QTE units UilQTE across border to aid Pathet Lao but did 
not RPJ? not specifica3-ly* deny my earlier statement that VSk v;as avare 
DRVTJ vjcre helping Pathet Lao and Viet Cong, with men^ a^rins and ir-aterial 



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I said I \jd.s interested to heai^ from him that as a condition 
for restoring peace SVl^f should become neutral as a first step prior 
to reunification. He stopped me and said he had not RPT not referred 
J:o neutrality as a first step only* V/liether .SVXr vrould continue neutral 
Tmuld depend upon people of SVN. He did not KPT not prejudge. As for 
Liberation Front I said I realized it represents a certain force in 
SVN^ though not RPT not in noy viev; all people as the proj^^ganda asserted 
nor even majority. He did not RPT not demur at this downgrading. I 
said I aj^preciated that the- Front v^^ould have to participate should a 
coalition ever emerge. My fear houever vas that coalition vould soon 
be taken over by Fron.t as had happened in other countries and that 
other rep elements \70uld suffer or be ousted. Ed merely said there 
\fas no RPJ? no reason to liave such fears." 

^^15. 1 then asked i/hether H-i ai>precia,ted fully that USA's continued 
accej^temce of obligations tovards aillies in SVi"I liad implications ijhich 
extended far beyond Southeast Asiy, and related to USA deterraii^ation to 



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resist gi^errilla subversion in Asia j Africa and Lo^tin-Anierica? FA 
laughed anci said he did indeed appreciate It. A USA defeat in SVJI 
vould in all probability start a chain reaction vhich vould extend 
much .farther J hut UBA should understa.nd that principles and stakes* 
involved vere just as high for Liberation Front in SVil and its sup- 
porters and this helped to explaim their determination to continue 
to struggle regardless of sacrifice*" 



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SEVEORji ^.g SSI on to hai'Ioi, jum ^; i8, 196U 

- 

(EXCERPTS) 



Ke mx-kr. o f Px^lme J-Iinister Bjain Van^Dong 
to J.Bp Seaboirn, Hanoi . June iB, 19&h 



"President Ho Chi Minh ha^s explained what ve itiean by a just 
solution* First it requires aai American i-jlthdra^-ral from InclocMna* 
Secondly it means that the afTairs of the Srjuth must be arranged 
by the people of the South- It m^st provide Tor the participation 
of the Liberation Front. No other group represents the broad i-rishes 
of the, people. The prograriirrie of the Front is the best one possibJ.e* 
There must be peace and neutrality for South Vietnam^ neutrality in 
the Carrliodian manner. Thirdly ^ a just solution means re -unifi caption 
of the comitxy- This is a VVrame^ national^ fonde.mental' - But ve 
\mnt peaxeful reunification ^ vrithout ;nilitAi"*y pressures • We vzant nego- 
tiation 'i^ound a table. Maere must be sincere satisfaction v;ith 
the arrangement for it to be viable. We are in no hurry • TJe are 
i?illing to te/Xk but ^^e shall v:ait till STO is ready- \le are a 
divided people^ without even personal links across the dividing 3,ine. 

"The United States must shoif good vill^ but it is not easy for 
the USA to do so. Meanwhile the vrar intensifies, USA aid may increase, 
in all areas ^ not only for the SVN ariry but in terms of USA army per- 
sonnel as well. I suffer to 'see the var go on^ dovelopj intensify. Yet 
ciir people are determined to struggle- It is iiripossiblcj quite iinrpos-- 
sible (excuse me for saying t]iis) for you I7esterners to understand the 
force of the people's will to resist and to continue. The stru^^gle of 
the people exceeds the imagination. It has astonislied us too- * 

' "Since the fall of the KTro brothers, it has ^been a 'cascade' - 



The prospect for the USA and its friends in SVN is sans issu' . Rein- 
forcing the Khanh army doesn't count. The people have had enough. 
The SVN m.ercenaries have sacrificed themselves vithout honom^* The 



Americans, are jiot .loves j for they eoiriiplt atrocities. Ecvr can the 
-neo-ple suffer such exactions and terror?"' 



"Let me stress^ insofar as the internal situation in SVN is 
concerned^ the realistic nature of the Libei-ation I^^ont's progrcjVinie , 
It is impossible to have a representative government v;hich excludes 



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the rVont. llie idea of a government of national coalition 'fait 
boulc de riiege' in the South. Tlje L'dos pattern of I96H should serve 
as a guide for SVIT. 

"As for Laos^ ve are not reassured l>y the USA i^oil.c, \le must 
retimi to the *62 Geneva Accord* The pi-esent eovernmciat of l£.os is 
'fan-toche'- Souvanna Fnouma^ \jho is no better than a prisoner of the 
liillitary^ has acted like a co'^-jard. His present government provides 
no solution. 

m 

"We do not send units to the FatViet Lao. \Iq do not deniand nore 
than a return to the situation irhich existed prior to the April coup- 
Eat there nust be no American interference in Laos* There are daily 
incursions of our air space across the Laotian border by overflights 
of military aircraft and by coiMiande units bent on sabotage," 



rt 



'A nev conference of the fourteen parties is necessary- Restora- 
tion of peace and neutrality for Laos are im^^ossible otheriflse. There 
is little utility in the Polish proposal. Only the lU-nation conference 
is competent to deal v/ith the L?.os si'tuation- 

"To return to Vietnaraj it is a q^uestion of a 'guerre a outrance ' ^ 
\7hich the U8A won't V7in in ?Jiy events or neutrality* He had not (as 
I had suggested) referred to neutrality as a first step only, VJliether 
SVN would continue neutra.l would depend upon t}ie people of SVN, Pie 
did not prejudge the issue. 

"The DRVK realize that the * loss ' of.SViM for the ABericans v?-ouT,d 
S£?t off (v/hat was the atomic e>q)ression? ) 'a chain reaction which would 
extend much fm-'ther. The USA is in a difficult position, because 
Khanli's troops \v^ill no longer figlit- If the war gets w^orse> we shaLl 
suffer greatly but i;e shaU_ win* If v^e vrin in the Souths the peoj^le 
of. the world will tirrn against the USA. Our people l-rt 11 therefore 
acceiut the sacrifice^ whatever they rrjay be- But the DRVI^ v;x3.1 not enter 
the war. 

"if the war were pushed to the Worth, 'nous somrnes un pays soei- 
aliste, vous savez et le pcuple se dressera*- But \re shall siot force 
the UjSA,- vre. shall not provoke the USA. 

^'As far as the ICC is concerned^ we are very glad to have you 
here. But don't put too Mtny items on the agenda, don't give yourself 
too much work to do." - . 



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PI^EGIDBHT J Qim SOE, ^' BvTTERI? POE PMCE HT SOUTIffAST ASTy\ '' 

April 7 , 196:j 

Cf^^ccidrpis) 



* 



"Oiu- objective is the InclepenclencG of South ViGt-lfem and its " 
i^eedom fi'om attack, We v;ant notMng fox- oui^s elves — only that the 
people of South Viet -Ham be allo\vetl to guide theii-* ovm country in 
their oi-m leay. We vriU do ei'^rything necessary to reach that objec- 
tive^ and vre ?7il]. do only v?hat is pJ^ifjolutely necessary." 



"These are the essentials of any final settleinent* 

"VJe vjill never be second in the search for such a peaceful 
settlement in Viet-'Kajn. & 

'^There F^y be irany ways to this kind of peace: in discussion 
or negotiation vrith the f^oTerniaents concerned; in large groups or 
' in small ones; in the reaffirjiiation of old agreements or their 

strengthening vith nev7 ones*, 

ij '*We have stated tliis position over and over again 50 times and 

more to friend and foe alike- And ve remain ready >^ith this piu^pose 
for unconditional discussions- 



# 



"And until that bright and necessary day of peace \je will try 
to keep conflict from spreading. VJ"e have no desire to see thousands 
die in battle — Asians or Americans, T/e have no desire to devasta-te that 
T/hich the people of. North Viet-IIoin have built vath toil and sacrifice - 
\le vill use our power with restraint 8.nd with all the vasdom that we 
can command- * . 



"But \iQ will use it; 



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"The first step is for the countries of Southeast Asia to associ- 
ate themselves in a greatly expanded cooperative effort for deveD-opment . 
Vfe would hope tha-t Korth Viet-Mam vrould take its place in the coiriii^cin 
effox't just as soon as peaceful cooperation is possible," 



"For oiu' ij3,rt I will ask the Congress to join in a biindon-dollar 
American iuvestiricnt in this effort as soon as it is uiider^iay- And I I 
would hope that all other industrialir^'^ed couj'itries^ including the Soviet 
Union ^ v:iU- join in this effort to replace despair with hope and terrox^ 

\7ith progress . " 



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EXTRACT 1^-; QM Hl/VH VAN DOKG SiRECH 
■" April 8, ig^lj ' 



DBV FOUR POIilTS 



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' .,,The xlnswerving policy of the DBV Goyern-ment is to respect strictly 
tbo 195^1^ Geneva agree3r]3n"ts on Vietnam and to ijrip3,enent correct-ly their 
basic provisions as embodietl in the follo^vins points: 

"1. KecognitioD of the basic national rights of the Vietna^nese people— 
peace;! independence- soreTelQi^ty^ unity^ Pvnd territorial integrity. Accord- 
ing to the Gene\^ agreer^ients^ the U.S. Governinant rauct v;ithdravr from South 
Vietnam U.S. troops ^^ millta^ry personnels and v^eapons of all kinds j disiiiantle 
all U,S, iiiilitary "bases there ; and cancel It-s military aUaance vrith Sotith 
Vietnam, It must end its policy of intervention and aggression in South' 
Vietnam, According to the Geneva agrceineats^ the U.S, Goverrjment miat stop 
its acts of \ra,r against Korth Vietnam p^nd comx^letely cease all enc^^^oachjnents 
on the territory and sovereignty of the DRV. 

"2, Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam^ v/hile Vietnam is 
still tempoi^arily divided into t\jo zones the military provisions of the 195'l 
Getieva agreements on Vietnam must be -^strictly respected. Tlie ti70 zones 
must refrain from entering into any raj-litary alliance vjith foreign count i^ies 
and there must be no foreign military bases ^ troops ^ or niilitaj^y personnel 
in their respective territoi^jj-. 

A 

^'3* K^e internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South 
Vietnamese people themselves in accordance vrith the program, of the NHiSV 
without any foreign iirterference. 

"^N The peaceful reunification of Vietnam is to be settled by the 
Vietnamese people in both ^ones, i-zithout any foreign interference. , 

"This stand of the D.RV Government unquestion^,bly enjoys the approval 
and support of all peace and ju3tiae-3-oving governments and peoples in the 
vrorld* The government of the DRV is of the vlexf that the -utand expounded here 
is the basis for the soundest x^-bitical settlement of the Vietnam problem, 
* ■ . ■ ■ . 

i 

"if this ba.sis is recognized;^ favorable conditions wii,l be created for 
the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam people > and it v.all be possible to 
consider the reconvening of an international conference along the xJ^-'ttern 
of the 195^ Geneva conference on. Vietnam.." 

* t m * 

"The Kl^LSV;, the mobillzer and organizer of the patriotic forces in South 
Vietxiamj the loader which has taken the people to ever greater victories 5 is 
no\7 controlling tlxree-foux-ths of the teridtory and ti-ro-thirds of the popu- 
lation of South Vietnam. It has ever higher inten:^ational prestige and posi- 
tion^ and is being jaore and more recognised by foreign coLmtrles and world 
public opinion as the sole genuine x'epresentative of the South Vietnamese 
people • " 



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EXTitACT OF SP2J5CH BT so uTii v:r]-:'fi mM 

FOHKIG-Jl MIIsnS':!.'i':R TPaFj VAN "00 



I .l \ V * -"^ 



June £2, I965 



. ' 1. Since the present vsr in V-et-Kon vas provo!-:ed 
by Cc:rr;unlot oggression and subversion^ -first of all^ 



0.^ IS 



iir^ortant thr.t subver^-iv 



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ii ni_Lixsiry riCt;i\' 



^^^ ^'.eG 



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urJ^Ier^akc"J directed and supported b/. outside forces 
against the independence arA IToerty of th3 peaple o; 
South Viet-Nein niust reas5- The tjrinciole of non- 
interference in the Internal affairs of the tvo parts-- 
principles declared in the Geneva Accords of IQ^^i as 
Veil OS by inter*'iational r.orality -« r/iUst be respected- 
Con sequ-^n tly^. the Hanoi Ccr.:3iLnist Te^pme must dissolv-:^ 
all the p\:ppet organizations it has forrned in South Viet- 
Nan under the n^^^T^es of *'?ront for the Idberation ol^ the 
South/' ''Liberation Radio" and the "People's Revolu- 
tionary Party." Also it rnust vithdi^av frcr.i South Viet- 
Karri troops, political and military/ cadres It had illesaUy 
introduced into South Viet-irr-r:. 



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2. South Viet-Na::i nust be left alone^ to choose and 
shape for its self its d^^t;i destiny in accordance vith 
established dericc ratio processes vithout any intervention 
of whatever for:.i and vhatever source* Obviously these 
could be realised only vhen the aggression initiated by 
the Hanoi regir.e is ended ana its inti:;idaticn cazrpai^^ 
against the South Vietnajnese people decisively st:ppr333ed* 

3' Only when aggression has ceased, and crj^ then, it 
vill be pooslble for the Government of the Republic of 
Vietna:^! and for nations vhich provide it vith. assistance, 
to withhold defensive nilitai^' Lieasi^es on the territory of 
South Viet"?fen and outside its borders. Such neasures are 
presently necessary for defending the territoi^ of South 
Viet-^Ka^n against CcTi^runist aggression. Besides, the 
Govern;.:ent of the Republic of Yiet-?ian is ready to ask 
these friendly countries to «"ithdrav their nilltary forces 
frc^L SQuth-Vietnan. iJo^-rever, it shall reserve its ri^ht 
to take ali.nea sures to restore order and lav on the entire 
territory' of Souta-Viet-J^am and t6 ?.ssure security for the 
people of South Viet--Nam as well as the right to call again 
for foreign assistance in case of renewed aggression or 
renewed threat of aggre.ssion- 

w 

h. Flna2.2:y'^ the independence and liberty of the Viet- 
namese people must be effectively g^iarantecd* 



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PRESIDEI'FJ JOim SOH, "H^PS CO JJTEB^IfC E," 

July 28/ll9o5" 

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(excerpts) 



• ■ 



^'Wiat are our goals in that uar- stained .land? 

^'First^ we intend to couviiice the Corrxmup-ists that vre cannot he 
defea^tcd l^y force of arms or by superior pov^er. Tliey a,re not e?..sily 
convinced i . - -" 



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"SeconcT^ once the Coipijimxists knovr^ as \7e kno^v^ that a violent 
solution is iLmpossible^ then a. i;)3aceful so3_ution is inevitable, 

"We are ready navi^ as v;e have alvrays been- to move fron the 
bo>ttlefield to the conference table- I have stated publicly and 
many times ^ again and again^ America ''s vallingness to begin imcon- 
ditional dif^cussions vith any govermient at ^aiy place at any time. 



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". , .we do not seek the ^destx"*uction of any governjiientj nor do \io 
covet a foot of any territory ;^ but x-re insist e.nd \ie will alvrays insist 
that the people of South Vietnsj^i shall have the right of choice j, the 
right to shape their own destiny in free elections in the souths or 
throughoi:t £vll Vietnam under internatlona>l supervision^ and they sliall 
riot have any goveriirp.cnt imposed upon them by force and terror so long 
as we can prevent it," 



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U.S. -DRV COICT/iCTS ("XY Z" FO'JR FOIHTS) , 

August 6. I9S5 



Tile folJ_owlng v.ms given to ^lai Van Bo on August 6^ 3.965: 

"Point I - The basic rights of the Vietnamese pe&x>^-e to peace ^ 
independence J sovereifnity-^ unity and terrxtori?vl integrity are recog- 
nized as set forth in the Geneva Accords of 195^^* Obtaining compliance 
vith the essential principles in the Accords is an a;fyp,i*Dpriate subject 
for iirdTiediatO; international discussions without preconditions and sub- 
seq^uent negotiatloiiB. Such dlSGUSslong and negotiations should consider^ 
among other things ^ a>ppropriate means ^ including agreed stages^ for the.- 
withdrawal of foreign military and quasi-iailitary personnel and weai:>ons 
fron} South and North Viet-ITam; the dismantling of foreign military 
bases in both areas; the cancellation of military alliances In contro- 
vention of the Accords; and the regroux:)ing and redeploj^rrient of indigenous 
fof ees* 

"Point II - Strict co:i:x^liance v/ith the military provisions of the 
Geneva Accords must be achieved in accordance v;lth schedules a/nd a,T>pro^ 
priate safeguards to be agreed upon in the said discussions and subsecxuent 
negotiations. 

"Point III - The internal affairs of South and Forth Viet-Ham must 
be settled by the South and"Korth Vietnamese peoples themselves in 
conformity vrith the principles of self-- determination vrithout anj'^ foreign 
interference- 

F 

"Point IV " The issue of reunification of Viet-Kam must be decided 
peacefully, on the basis of free determination by the peoples of Sotith 
and North Viet -Kam without foreign Interference." 



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U.S. -PHY cQr-?TACTS ("XTz" FO-JR Tonrrs) 



' tei V an Bo Sta teire n ts l>, u-xnf;: ^^XYZ" C ontacts 



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During these contacts^ I3o did not deny DRV troop presence in 
STO (6/18/65), or even that the 325th NVA Division v/as in SVN^ but 
claimed it v?as not then engaged in military operations (9/3/65). 
After the XY^ contact had ended ^ Bo said there vzere no regular 
northern troops in SVK but tliat northern volunteers mijsht have 
joined the Viet Conrj (1/27/66), 

Because Bo did not deny WVA troop pre.?enee in SVN/ he was able 
to agree v/ith the principle that troop \?ithdrawal would have to be 
mutual^ balanced J and phased (8/1S/65). Bo reaffirjned his agreement 
to this principle on 8/l8/65j but then denied any such agreements on 

9/3/65 - 

ft 

On the timing of U.S, troop withdrawals^ BO;^ at firsts said that 
thi,s would be a "technical problem^ as easily solved as vrith the French 
in 195^/^ and that "it could take place over 2 or 3 years" (7/I6/65)- ^ 
Bo also said that the final settlement should sec troop vithdi^av/als 
completed (8/18/65 )• At the end of these contacts ^ Bp was insisting 
that U.S. troops must lesive before elections v;efc? held (9/3/65). 

After the contacts v.^ere over^ Bo told a French Journalist: "it 
contemplates three stages-^ln the first stage^ the U.S. ifould agree 
en the principle of their departure before the South Vietnan^ese 
settled by themselves their probleins^ whicli cannot be resolved so 
long as a foreign arjiiy is on their n?-tlonal territory- llie second 
- Btage is that of negotiation. The third is departure*" {5/6/66) 

VJith respect to self-deternnna.tion^ Bo had said to Dantov that 
this j'jas '^the one basic prerfiise" needed for a solution to the Vietnam 
problem C7/I6/65). Later^ Bo seemed to be a,rgi:ing that the Vietnanose 
\jlXl be left to solve their problems through elections only after the 
Americans have left (I/27/65). Much later ^ Bo told a French journalist 
(5/6/66): .'^How^can elections be held in a country over whicli no 
■ '■ authority is exercised?" Did he mean the exercise of authority is 

decisive in the electoral process? No doubt. In vjhich case^ the ques- 
tion of who should organise the elections --the MjF with DRV help^ or 
the GVN with U.S. help — ;7ould.be the real issue. 

■i 

The U.S. position throughout the contacts was that the ITLF had 
no role "as of right" in South Vietnam (9/O/65) and vrould not guarantee 
a role for it before electioiis because to do so would be contrary to 
"free determination,^* Individual members of the tU^F could participate 
in the political process. At most^ the future of the IJJJF should be 



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a matter for discuss ion ^^ not something settled in principle before 
negotiations began (8/15/65)* In tlie event of a cease«fire^ it was 
the U,S, intention to insist on the GVH's ri^ht to operate throughout 

svK (9/1/65)' 

With respect to reunification^ both the U.S, 3Aid Bo agreed (8/6/65) 
that it come about "on the basis of free determination. '^ Bo said that 
the jyRV \•^^.B in a hurry to see rcimification accomplished (7/16/65)* 



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UMT-ED STATES FOURTHEJI POIFXS 



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January 3, 1Q66 

r . - . : 

t- ' 1. The Geneva Af^reements of 195-1 ^'-nd 1962 a.re an adecLX^ate basis 

for peace in Southeast Asia; 



2. We vould welcoraG a confex^ence on Southeast As5,a or any pr.rt 
thereof; 

3* ' We vould ^jelcome ''negotiations without pre-- conditions" as the 
17 nations put it; 



I U. ¥e ifould welcome imconditional disOT.ssions as pi."esident Johnson^ 

L put it; ' 

5- A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business 
L at a conference or could be the subject of preliijiinary discussions; 

6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along vjith other points 
vjhich others ml^}t -^-zish to propose; ^^ 

7- V^e Trant no U*S, bases in Southeast Asia; 

■I- 

8- IJe do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Vietnain after 
peace is assiu^ed; 

C3 9' VJe support free elections in South Viet--Haiii to give the South 

Vietnamese a goveriiment ef their own choice; 



10, The question of reimification of Vietnam should be determined 
by the Vietna^nese through their own free decision; 

11- The countries of Southeast Asia can be non-aligned or neutr£?J- 
if that be their option; ' ' , 

12,. \]p would m'ach prefer to use our resources for tlie economic 
reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace ^ North 
Vlet~Nam could participate in a regional effort to wKich we would be 
prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars; 

• 13. -The President has- said "The Yiet.Ccng vrould not have diffi- 
culty being represented ajid having their viev7s represented if for a 
moment Hanoi decided she v:anted to cease aggression, I don^t think 
tliat would be an insurmountable problem.." 

1^, V^e have said publicly and privately that v;e coiild stop the 
bojnbing of North Vietnairi as a step toirard peace although there has not 
been the slightest* hint or suggestion from the other side as tiD i-rhat 
thoy \70uld do if the borrbing stopped. 



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Je.}Taavy 31 , I966 



E/VKGOO¥ 392 



'^Toxt of Aide memoire rex erred to in Etnbtel 391 as follcAjs: Quote 
1 ajji ,forrfarding to you the statement attacliecl hcrervritli made \yy the spokes- 
iL'in of the Foreign Kinistry of tho Democratic Republip of Vietn^jn dated 
-^anuary h^ 1$66 rega/rding the so-called 'Peace -efforts' jiiade recently by 
he United States. 

i 

i "With regards to the 14 points and the cubseqvxent statements of the 

" nited States Government I hold that the American authorltiGG utill refuse 

jOo recognise the fnndajnental national rights of the Vietnamese and people 

namely peace irjdepandencc^ sovereignty^ unity and territorial integrity 

of Vietnam as stipulated by the 195^1 Geneva agreements of Vietnam- 

I "The United States Government states that \7itbdra-jal of its troops 
from South Vietnain vill be effected only under /^^ierica,n terms j that means 
the United States refuses to vith dra'^f its troops from South Vietnam. 

"The United States Goveriment states tl'^at it seeks no military bases - 
in South East Asian countries but on the otliar hand says it has to fulfil 
its comMtment s vzith the S , E , A , T , , Bloc , 

"Tlie United States Governanent says it respects the right to sclf- 
deteirtJiinatlon of the South Vietnarnesc people on condition that the South 
Vietnam National Front for Liberation lay dovm arms and be granted amnesty -- 
that means the United States tries to maintain a. puppet reg:une in poorer 
countering the South Vietnainese people^ does not recognize the South 
Vietue;jii National Front for Liberation as the sole genuine representative 
of the entire South Vietna^nese people and i/ill not engage in negotiations 
vith the Front- Tlie United States Governji'-ent refo.sGs to accept Point 3 
.of the ^^ -point sfc^jid of the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam^ 
that s.mounts to A)'nerica.n rejection of a.11 the foui' points, 

V Concerning the J[-- point stand of the Governraent of the Democratic 
Republic of Vietna^a* . I beg to quote the above- said stateznent of the 
spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; 
'A poliltical settlement of the Vietnam problaiB can be envisaged only 
vhon the United ^States Government has accepted the i^-j^oint stand of the 
Goverrmfent of this Democratic Republic of Viotnamj has proved this by 
actual deeds ; has stoppsd unconditional3,y and for good its air raids 
and all other acts of v-ar against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. 

'^X am ready to listen to what the Ambassado> :nay ifish to e:vpound 
on the United States position/' 



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MRIGQLD TE?T POIi^TJ^S ATO IffilATED C/VBI^FS, 

' ■ F -•— , i l^-F . .. I 11.^^^, ^ , , , .i, .- , , _ i^ 

Se'pteinbGr-];)G ceirib £r , 1966 



[ 

p Saigon 62OO (to SecState), s/i^oclis, 18 September X966 

► "1- D^ Or land! had a iieeting with LsT)'andov:ski Frldtay ni^ht- 
It started as a social a,rfa:i.r on D^Orlandi^s invita^tion and on 
[ Lewandow»^>^i's initiative became a discussion of the var- According 

*- to Orlandl J Levrandov/ski said the following; 

[ 



* * i * 



"7, LeTrandcnrski asked vrhether D'Orlandi rea^lis^ed that v:hat he 
meant to sa,y was that this would be the le.st step not the first. 

"8, B' Or land! said: Vmat would be the ultiTJiate goal? If it 
is to have the Viet Cong in the CovcrniTient of Viet Nam^ I won't even 
subijvlt such a proposal to Ambassador Lodge* 

r 

^^9» Lewandov/ski said that is not at all what he Bieant to put to 
D'Orlandi. ElaipJ^y^ the ultimate aim vrould be: _\to make of South Vietnam 
. a second Cambodia-' 

"10. D'Orlandi said that makes laore sense j it is' at least v:orth 

talking about* 
. - ^ ^ .-. ^ - . . ■ ' . 

"11. Lewandovrskl said: 'But 1 don't believe the AXiiericans really 
wish to talk. They are trying to do two tilings at once: military 
escalation groupsd with political proposals. You can't do both. So 
long as ttiey won't make up their minds ^ we can't do anj'iihing* VJe must 
wait imtil November.'" 



tf . . 



LODGE 



5' If the Americans ever really cs>red; they should especially 
f- concentrate on Hiam Van Dong's fourth point concerning 'who Is to J 

I speak for South Vietn.aBi. * This does not mean that Hanoi would be 

trying to ram the Viet Cong down oujt throats. V/e could consider _ ! 

Cthe setting up of a coa.lition goverma^nt the bulk of which would be 
made up of 'sensible South Vie t name se^ politicians. ' To preserve ^ 

appearances you could have 'on the fringe' m.en from the 'right' in I 

one or two 'un'Jjiiportant mdnistries' and from on the 'left' fill one ; 

or two ^miimportant ministri.es vrith the so-called NLF.' 

V 

"6* D'Orlandi -- this is unthinkable- If this is w-liat you 
r- want to talk about^ it is better for us to stop the talks » 



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Dcila^isifled per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



( 



SEXT OF THE JOII^T GOM-^TDmQUE ISSUED AT THE MA- 
NILA SUMMIT C0WEREH(S1^ MAMLA^ THE PIGLIPPIl^S^ 

IHTEODUCTION 

|l. In response to an invitation from the Pi^esident of the Hepublic 
of the Philippines J after consultations mth the President of the Hepuh- 
lic of Korea and the Prime Ministers of Thailand and the fiepublic of 
Vietnam^ the leaders of seven nations in- the Asian and Pacific region 
hr\d a summit conference in Manila on October 2h and 25^ 1966;^ to 
CGiiSider the conflict in South Vietnam and to review their \rlder pur- 
PQses in Asia a.nd the Pacific, The participants ^^ere Prime Minister 
Harold Holt of Australia j President Pax*k Chung Hee of the Republic 
of Korea^ Prime Minister Keith Holyoalce of New Zealand^ President 
Ferdinand E* Marcos of the Philippines, Prime Minister Thanom 
Kittikachorn of Thailand^ Pi^esident Lyndon B. Johi:LSon of the United 
States of America, and Chairman Nguyen Van Thieu and Prime 
Minister ITguyen Cao Ky of the Republic of Vietnam, 

BASIC POLICY 

2, The nations represented at this conference are united in their 
determination that the freedom of South Vietnam be secured^ in their 
resolve for peace, and in their deep concern for the future of Asia and 
the Pacific. Some of us are now close to the actual danger, while others 
have learned to know its significance through bitter past experience. 
This conference symbolizes our common purposes and high hopes, 

3* VJ'e are united in our determination that the South Vietnamese 
people shall not be conquered by aggressive force and shall enjoy the 
inherent right to choose their own way of life and their own form of 
government. We shall continue oiir military and all other efforts, as 
firmly and as long as may be necessary, in close consultation among 
ourselves until the aggression is ended. 

k* At the same time our united purpose is peace — peace in South 
Vietnam and in the i^est of Asia and the Pacific, CXir common coiiimit- 
ment is to the defense of the South Vietnamese people. Our sole de- 
mand on the leaders of Horth Vietnam is that they abandon their 
aggression. We are prepared to pursue aiiy avenue which cotild lead 
to a secure and just peace, whether through discussion and negotiation 
or through reciprocal actions by both sides to reduce the violence. 

5, We are united in looking to a peaceful and prosperous future for 
all of Asia and the Pacific, We have therefore set forth in a separate 
declaration a statement of the principles that guide for common 
actions in this vdder sphere. 

6, Actions taken in pursuance of the policies herein stated shall be 
in accordance \d.th our respective constitutional processes. 

PROGRESS AM) PROGRA^^LS IN SOUTH VIETNAM^ THE MLITARY EFFORT 

7, The Governjnent of Vietnam described the significant military 
progress being made against aggression. It noted with particular 
gratitude the substantial contribution being made by free world forces, 

"I White House press release dated Oct. 25 j 1956. 

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3, Nonetheless J tlie leaders noted that the movement of rorces from 
Ulorth Vietnam continues at a high rate and that firm military action 
and free Tforld support continue to be required to meet the tlireat. 
The necessity for such military action and support must depend for 
its size and duration on the intensity and duration of the Communist 
aggression itself. 

9. In their discussion^ the leaders revleved the px^oblem of prisoners 
of -w^ar* The participants observed that Hanoi has consistently re- 
fused to cooperate with the International Coirimittee of the Red 
Cross in the application of the Geneva Conventions ^ and called on 
Hanoi to do so. They reaffirmed their determination to comply fully 
with the Geneva Conventions of I9J19 for the Protection of War 
Victims > and welcomed the resolution adopted by the Executive 
Committee of the League of Red Cross Societies on October 8, 1966^ 
callin- for complicanc with the Geneva Conventions in the Vietnam 
confl." ^ full support for the International CoiTmiittee of the Red 
Cross 5 :ind Immediate action to repatriate seriously sick and wounded 
prisoners of war^ They agreed to vork toward the fulfillment of this 
resolution^ in cooperation with the International Committee of the 
Red Cross ^ and indicated their willingness to meet under the auspices 
of the TCRC or In any appropriate forum to discuss the immediate 
exchange of prisoners* 

PACIFICATION AM) EEVOLUTION DEVELOBfENT 

10. The participatifiLg governments concentrated particular attention 
on the accelerating efforts of the Goverrunents of Vietnam to forge a 
social revolution of hope and progress. Even as the conflict continues^ 
the effort goes for^^rard to overcome the tyranny of poverty, disease ^ 
illiteracy and social Injustice. 

11. The Vietnamese leaders stated their intent to train and assign 
a substantial share of the armed forces to clear^ and- hold actions in 
order to provide a shield behind which a new society can be built, 

12. In the field of Revolutionary Development^ measures along the 
lines developed Xu the past year and a halt will be expanded and In- 
tensifled, Tlie training of Revolutionary Developjnent cadres will 
be improved. More electricity and good water will be provided. 
More and better schoold will be built and staffed. Refugees will be 
taught ne\-r skills. Health and medical facilities will be expanded. 

13* The Vietnamese Government declared that it is working out a 
series of measures to moderrfize agriculture and to assure the cultivator 
the fruits of his labors* Land reform and tenure provisions mil be 
granted top priority. Agricultui^al credit will be expanded. Crops will 
be improved and diversified, 

1^, The Vietnamese leaders emphasized that underlying these 
measures to build confidence and cooperation among the people there 
must be popiilar conviction that honesty^ efficiency and social justice 
form solid cornerstones of the Vietnamese Governm_ent's programs. 

15. This is a program each of the conferring govertmients has 
reason to applaud recognizing that it opens a brighter hope for the 
people of Vietnam, Each pledged its continuing assistance according 
to its means J whether in l\inds or skilled technicians or equipment* 
They noted also the help in non- military fields being given by other 
countries and exi^ressed the hope that his help will be substantially 
Increased. 

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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 201 1 






ECOi^ICMC STABIIJTY MJD PHCCFvESS 

16. The Conference was told of the success of the Government of 
Vietnam in controlling the inflation i^hich^ if unchecked^ could 
undercut all "efforts to bring a more fulfilling life to the Vietnamese 
people* However J the .Vietnamese leaders reaffirmed that only by 
constant effort cotild inflation be Xept under control. They desci^ibed 
their intention to enforce a vigorous stabilization program^ to control 
spending J Increase revenues ^ and seek to promote savings in order to 
hold the 1967 inflationary gap to the minimum practicable level. 

Thf^y also plan to take further measures to insiire maximmn utiliza- 
t m of the Port of Saigon^ so that imports urgently needed to fuel the 
military effort and buttress the civil economy can flow rapidly into 
Vietnam. 

17. Looking to the long-te2?m future of their riclily endowed country ^ 
tl i Vietnamese representatives described their views and plans for the 
building of an expanded postwar economy, 

, 18. Military installations ^^^here appropriate will be converted to 
this pvirposGj and plans for this will be included. 

' 19* The conferring nations reaffirmed their continuing support for 
Vietnamese efforts to achieve economic stability and progress, Thailand 
specifically noted its readiness to extend substantial new credit 
assistance for the purchase of rice and the other nations present 
reported a number of plans for the supply of food or other actions 
i-elated to the economic situation. At the same time the pai'ticipants 
agreed to appeal to other nations and to international organizations 
committed to the full and free development of every nation^ for fui^ther 
assistance to the Republic of Vietnam, 

20. The representatives of Vietnam noted that^ even as the Con- 
ference anetj steps were being taken to establish a new constitutional 
system for the Republic of Vietnam through the work of the Con-' 
stituent Assembly, chosen by so large a proportion of the electorate 
last month. - 

21. The Vietnamese rei>resentatives stated their expectation that 
work on the Constitution would go forward rapidly and could be 
completed before the deadline of March 196?* The Constitution will 
then be promulgated and elections will be 2ield within six months 

to select a representative goverrmient. 

22. The Vietnamese Government believes that the democratic 
process must be strengthened at the local as well as the national 
level. The Government of Vietnam announced that to this end it 

will begin holding village and hainlet elections at the beginning of 1967- 

23. The Government of Vietnam announced that it is preparing a 
program of National Reconciliation. It declared its determination to 
open all doors to those Vietnamese who have been misled or coerced 
into casting their lot mth the Viet Cong. The Government seeks to 
bring them back to participate as free men in national life under 
amnesty and other measures. Former enemies are asked only to lay 
down their weapons and bring their skills to the service of the South 
Vietnamese people. 

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NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Dale: 20! 1 



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2^1. The other paxticipatin^ nations '^^relcOFled the stated expectation 
of the Vietnamese representatives that work on the Constitution 
vdll proceed on schedule, and concurred in the conviction of the Gov 
ermaent of the Republic of Vietnam that building representative ^ 
constitutional government and opening the vay for national recon- 
ciliation are indispensable to the future of a free Vietnajn. . 

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE 

25. The participants devoted a major shai^e of their deliberations to 
peace objectives and the search for a peaceful settlement in South 
Vietnam. They revievred in detail the many efforts for peace that have 
been undertaken^ hy themselves and other na^tions^ and the actions of 
the United Nations and of His Holiness the Pope. It was clearly 
understood that the settlement of the war in Vietnam depends on 

the readiness and willingness of the parties concerned to explore and 
work out together a just and reasonable solution. They hoced that 
Hanoi still showed no sign of taking any step toward peace, either 
by action or by entering into discussions or negotiations. Nevertheless ^ 
the participants agreed that the search for peace must continue, 

26, The Cover nraent of the Republic of Vietnam declared that the 
Vietnamese people j having suffered the ravages of war for more than 

two decades, were second to none in their desire for peace> It welcomes 
any initiative that wiH lead to an end to hostilities ^ preserves the 
independence of South Vietnam and protects the right to choose their 
o^m way of life* 

27- So that theii* aspirations and position would be clear to their 
allies at Manila and friends everywhere^ the Governiaent of the 
Republic of Vietnain solemnly stated its views as to the essential 
elements of i^eace in Vietnam: 

* ' (1) Cessation of aggression. — At issue in Vietnam is a struggle 
for the preservation of values which people every^.^here have 
cherished since the dawn of history: the independence of peoples 
and the freedom of individuals. The people of South Vietnam 
ask only that the aggression that threatens their independence 
and the externally supported texror that threatens their freedom 
be halted. No self-respecting people can ask for less. No i^eace- 
loving nation should ask for more. 

(2) Preservation of the territorial integrity of South Vietnam, — 
The people of South Vietnam are defending their own territory 
against those seeking to obtain by force and terror what they have 
been unable to accomplish by peaceful means, 1/hile sympa- 
thizing with the plight of their brothers in the North and while 
disdaining the regime in the North, the South Vietnamese people 

have no desire to threaten or harm the people of the North or 
invade their country. 

(3) Reunification of Vietnam, — The Government and people of 
Soxith Vietnam deplore the partition of Vietnam into North and 
South. But this partition brought about by the Geneva Agree- 
ments of I95U however unfortunate and regrettable ^ will be 
respected until by the free choice of all Viotnajnesej reunifica- 
tion is achievedl 



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(k) Resolution of internal x^roblens. — The people of South 
Vietnam seek to resolve their own internal differences and to this 
end are prepared to engage in a program of national reconcilia- 
tion. When the aggression has stopped ^ the people of South 
Vietnam vill move more rapidly tovard reconciliation of all 
elements in the society and mil move forward ^ through the 
democratic process, tov/ard hiiman dignity, prosperity and 
lasting peace, 

(5) Removal of allied military forces.— The people of South 
Vietnam vill ask their allies to remove their forces and evacuate 
their installations as the military and subversive forces of North 
Vietnam are withdrawn, infiltration ceases ;> and the level of 
violence thus subsides, 

(6) Effective giiarantees.""The people of South Vietnam, mind- 
ful of their experience since 195^ insist that any negotiations 
leading to the end of hostilities incorporate effective internatioual-- 
guarantees. They are opetmrdnded as such guarantees can be 
applied and made effective. 

The other participating governments reviewed and endorsed 
these as essential elements of peace and agreed they would act on 
this basis in close consultation among themselves in regard to settle- 
ment of the conflict. 

29* In particular, they declared that Allied forces are in the Re- 
public of Vietnaja because that country is the object of aggression 
and its government requested supx:)ort in the resistance of its people 
to aggression. They shll be withdrawn^ after close consultation, as 
the other side withdraws its forces to the Horth^ ceases infiltration^ 
and the level of violence thus subsides. Those forces v;ill be v/ith- 
drawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the 
above conditions have been fulfilled » 

COIWIMJING COWGULTATION Af40NG THE PARTICIPATING HATIOHS 

30. All the participants agreed that the value of a meeting among 
the seven nations had been abundantly demonstrated by the candid 

and thorough discussions held. It was further agreed that, in addi- 
tion to the close consultation already maintained tlirough diplom^atic 
channels, there should be regular meetings ai^ong their Ambassadors 
in Saigon in association with the Government of the Republic of 
Vietnam- Meetings of their Foreign Ministers and Heads of Govern- 
ment will also be held as required. 

31. At the close of the meeting, all the visiting participants ex- 
pressed their deep gratitude to President Marcos and to the Govern- 
ment of the Republic of the Riilippines for offering Manila as the 
conference site, and expressed their appreciation for the highly efficient 
arrangements. 



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SVmDISH-DRV. COmYiCTS (ASPBKt ) 
(Excerpts from Rusk^Mlsson MernCon,^ K'oyember 11 ^ I96S) 



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II • The &fedish Ambassador in PeKansj Mr. Petri ;j recently 
visited Hanoi and had a conversation with the Foreign Minister of North 

Vietnam^ Mr. Trinh. 

I 
1 

"a) Vo:^ Trinh strongly emphasiz^ed that the Tlorth Vietnamese 

Governjiient alraed at a political solution of the Vietnairicse conflict j 

not a inildtary one* ilr* Trinh said tliat tvro conditions ]a^st be fill- 

filled in order to bring about . a climate for negotiations ^ which could 

lead to a political solution* 

1- The bonibing of Kort}^ Vietnam must be put to an endj 
without any conditions and def5.nitely. 

8. Tl:e FNTj must be accepted by the US Government as one 
of the spokesmen for the South Vietnai^iese people and, 
as l^, Trinh expressed it^ the most valid one, 

"if both tliese conditions v;erc f^ilfilled and the US Govermnent thus 
took Vfhat he called *an ai}propriate attitude' then 5 Ut. Trinh said^ 
know v;hat \\'e \rlH have to do ' , 



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**It should be added- that> in this connection, the q.uestion of a tiirie- 
table for the withdrawal of US troops v/as not raised* 

*'b) As to the possibility of a final settlement of the Vietnamese 
conflict^ Ifv, Tr inli said that - in addition to the vn'.thdrawal of US and 
other foreign troops - both the Hanoi Govermiont and the FMj had the 
following req,uests: , , ' . - 

1- Tbe creation of a national coalition goveiniinent founded on 
a very broad basis and including all political and religious 
groupings as w^ell as all social classes^* genuinely desiring 
to achieve national independence, 

2,'' General elections in an' atrnosjibere of freedom and democracy, 

3, Although no inimediate reunification was envisaged;^ it vras 
necessary to create such conditions in South Yietnaic as to 
permit a move in the direction of a fature reimi float ion of 
North and South Vietnam - 



"Mr, Trinh reiterated that if the US Govern^fient gave proof of good- 
will 5 they would find that ^ 'the Vietnamese side knew v^hat they lioxl to ^Lo 



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m/vrigoIpD tebt FOii^jrn ai^id retated CAm^is 



Septe^ru^er-Da ceniber j 1966 



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Saigon 108^^6 (to SocState};, T,s/Lrodis, llf NoyeJ^iber I966 



*'3_, I met Lc^Tandovrski bX D^Orlaiidi*s p.partment nt 3:00 p,]n, 
Saigon t^jne- 

"2 on the eve of his A^dnit to Hanoi*-., Jle had four questions ^ 

as follo\is: 

a* * Regarding the offer at Manila concGrning the withdrr^val 
0'£ U*S* forces, from Viet-]\^a,m on the condition th^j.t the troops of Korth 
' Vict -- flam vould v.athdraw (^^nd^ he Kaid^ I\^orth Viet-l^raia^ of course ^ 
doesji't adt3iit tha.t they are there at aU,)^ does tMs condition mean 
the United States v:ithdraival dependf^ on control by the present South 
Vietnamese Governjnent of territories not now under the control of Saigon?' 

h, 'In case of a ceevse-fire^ v7ou].d the United States he pi^e- 
pared to withdrav; Trom the coiribat areas and not to interfere in the 
creation of a new government in Viet-Nara? The question of how 
the nev? goverjunent of Viet-^ITan will be formed will certainly arise.' 

c, 'In case of a cease-fire^ v:ould the United States under- 
take not to interfere in peaceful progress toward unification of 
Viet^Nam if the peoi:)le so wlsh^ v/hether \>^' referonclum or by election?' 

d» 'In the case of a cease- fire '^and negotiations^ woi^ld the 
UUited States be-rea-dy to use the Geneva Agreement and the machinery 
of the International Comjiiission iti bringing peace to Viet-Nam^ and if 
£o^ would the United Slvates publicly declare its intention to thns effect?' 

"3. I said that there were questions which I would have to refer 
to the U,S. Government 5 and that I would do so and provide ansvrers as 
soon as- I could /^ 



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mRlGOLD TEN POIKTS AITD RELATED CABIilS 



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Sep t ejEib e r " De ccpher ^ , lg66 



Saigon ISg'fY^ .Tfj/Nodis^ 30 Novernber I966 



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■ "Lev;andov/Gki siLTiii^ai^i zed the 10 points to Lodge as foDJovrs: 

'^(1} The U.S. is interested in a peacoful Eolution through 
negotiations, 

"(2) Negotiations should not he interpreted as a \vay to negoti- 
ated surrender by those opposing the U,S, in Vietnam* A political ^ 
' nogotiation would be aiiaed ^t rinding an acceptable solution to all , 
the problems-^ having in Blind that the present status quo in SVW must 
be changed hi order to take into accoimt the interests of tlie parties 
presently opposing the policy of the U.S. in South Vietnam. 

"(3) The U,S, does not desire a permanent or a long-tei^ mili- 
tary preseJice in SVT^. 

"(h) The U.S. is willing to di.scuss all problems v/ith respect 
to the settlement. 

"(5) Ttje U,S, is V7illing to accept the participation of *all* 
in elections and the supervision of these elections by an apj^ropriate 
international body, 

^^(6) The U.S. believes that reunification should be settled by 
the Vietnamese themselves e.fter peace and 'proper representative organs 
are established in SVIT- 

"(7) Ihe U.S. is prepared to abide by a, neutral South Vietnam, 

"(8) Tile U.S. is prepared to stop bombing 'if this will facilitate 
such a peaceful solution,^ In this regard the U.S. is prej^ared to accept 
'DRV modalities on the cessation and not require the DRV to admit infil-- 
tration into SVN, 

*U9) . Tlie U.S. v;ill not agree to 'reunification under military 
pressure-.' - . - ^ ^ 

"(10) The U.S. 'vdll not declare no'.-; or in the future it>s acceptance 
of I\^orth Vietnam's h or 5 points.' 

"Lewandowski asked if these 10 points vrere a proper formulation of 
the U.S. position- Lodge said that they seeiT^ed to be in order^ but that 
the matter was of such sensitivity and import^^jice that he i;ould have to 



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'*Levranclov:ski insisted that Ms stateirient was a serious proposition 
based on conversations with the 'most respectable goveriTinent sourceft in 
Hanoi,' , Later Lei:andovjGki ads^itted that Eoam Van J)oi*f{ vas the source 
and that he had the ^PresidiULi beliind him.' 



i^ 



*'Levjandovr3ki stated: ^I a^n a^uthorized to say that if the U-S, 
are really of the yievrs vvhich I have presented, it woula be advif^ab^e 
to confirm them directly by conversation vlth the Horth Vietnaniese 

iUnbassador in 17arsa¥* * 

*■ 

"LcwaMovrski said that there was a vital need to move ciuickly 
because (l) there was a danger of a leak ?.nd that secrecy v:as essential " 
for Hanoi J and (2) that delays vrould .give those ^forking aga^inst a 
solution' time to 'put down the clamps on talks,'" 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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ADDRESS BY AMBASSADOR ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG^ UiaTED 
STAT His REPEECSEMTATIVE TO TliE UmTEC NATIOIJS^ 
AT A SPECIAL CONVOCATION AT HOWilRD UmVERSITY, 1 
WJi^IilNGTON, D,C,, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 10, I967 j^xcerpts/ 

Oixr effort to open the cloor to p^ace in Vietnam has been con- 
tinuous • In recent weeks public attention has been focused on this 
effort by an unusual nuraber of statements^ reports and events: 
pronouncements by the governments involved^ appeals by vrorld 
leaders including Pope Paul and Secretary General Thant^ nei^r stories 
and interviews with various personalities — and the perplexing events, 
in Mainland China. Right now we are in the midst of another pause 
in the fighting, the Lunar i}Jew Year Truce. Thus this may be a good 
moment to assess the present status of our efforts for peace. 

In such an assessment ^ a responsible official, must in all that he says^ 
in public, avoid damaging the hopes for progress through private 
dix^lomacy. But in a free society he must also accept the inescapable 
responsibility to keep the public adequately informed , It is difficult 
to deal on both levels at once but it is essential to do so as well as 
we can. 

Let me begin, then^ by recalling the basic Anerican peace aims in 
Vietnam, These aims have been stated many times by President 
Johnson and other responsible spokesmen of the United States, 
They have been stated over a span of two years, but the ebb and flow 
of the military situation during that time has not made them any less 
valid as guidelines for peace negotiations. We do not subscribe to the 
false notion that a strong military position obviates the desirability 
of seeking peace through negotiations. Today, therefore, I wish to 
review the essence of these American aims. 

The United States seeks a political solution in Vietnam, We do not 
seek the unconditional surrender of our adversaries, VJe seek a settle- 
ment whose terms will result not from dictation, but from genuine 
negotiations — a settlement whose terms will not sacrifice the vital 
interest of any party, Iti the words of the Manila Commiinique: 
"The settlement of the war in Vietnam depends on the readiness and 
willingness of the parties concerned to explore and work out together 
a just and reasonable solution." As President Johnson said a vraek 



1 U,S« mission to the United Nations press release No. 13^ dated Feb, 10, I967 



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ago here in V7ashington: Such a solution "will involve . . . conces- 
sions on both parts." 

V7e are not engaged in a "holy v:ar" against con3r:unism. We do 
not seek an Merican sphere of influence in Asia; nor a permanent 
American "presence*^ oa ny kind- -mill tciry or otherwise- -in Viet- 
najn] nor the imposition of a military alliance on South Vietnajn, 

We do not seek to do any injury to Mainland China nor to threaten 
any of its legitimate interests* 

We seek to assure to the people of South Vietnam the affirmative 
exercise of the right of self- deteiininat ion— the right to decide their 
pvm political destiny f^ee of external interference and force and 
t' :ough de2rLOcratic processes. In keeping with the announced South 
Vietnamese Government's policy of national reconciliationj we do 
not seek to exclude any segment of the South Vietnamese people 
from peaceful participation in their country- s future. We ai-^e pre- 
p ;ed to accept the results of that decision v/hatever it may be. We 
support the early consummation of a democratic constitutional 
system in South Vietnam^ and welcome the progress being made to 
this end. 

As regards ITorth Viet nam ^ ve have no designs on its territory^ 
8ind we do not seek to overthrow its govermnent whatever its ideology. 
We are prepared fully to respect its sovereignty and territorial in- 
tegrity and to enter into specific undertakings to that end. 

We believe the reunification of Vietnam should be decided upon 
through a free choice by the peoples of both the North and the South 
without any outside interference; and the results of that choice also 
will have our full support. 

Finally J when peace is restored we are willing to make a major 
commitment of money^ talent and resources to a multilateral coopera- 
tive effort to bring to all of Southeast Asia^ including I^orth Vietnam, 
the benefits of economic and social reconstruction and development 
which that area so sorely needs. 

These, then^ are the peace aims of the United States. They parallel 
the objectives stated by the South Vietnamese Government at Manila. 
Our aims are strictly limited and we sincerely believe they contain 
nothing inconsistent with the interests of any party. Our public 
pronouncements of them — both in Washington and at the United 
H'ations--are solemn commitments lyy the United States. 

Our adversaries --have also placed their aims and objectives on 
the public record over the past two years. The major statement of 
these aims is the well-known four points of Hanoi , which I will sum- 
marize without departing too much from their own terminology. 

The first point calls for recognition of the basic national rights of 

the Vietnamese people: peace, independence^ sovereignty, unity and 

territorial integrity. It also calls for the cessation of all acts of war 

against the North; the ending of United States intervention in the 

South; the withdrawal of all United States troops ^ military personnel 

and weapons of all kinds ^ the dismantling of American bases and the 

cancellation of what they term the United States "Military Alliance" 

with South Vietnam. 

The United States would not find any essential difficulty with a 

reasonable interpretation of any of the terms included in this point. 

Our dhief concern is what it does not include; namely, that North 

Vietnam also cease its intervention in the South^ end all of its acts 

of war against the South, and withdraw its forces from the South. 

* 

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Such a requirement is obviously essential to the **peace" to ifhich 
this first point refers. 

The second point relates to the military clauses of the Geneva 
agreements. It provides that;, pending the peaceful reunification of 
Vietnanij both the North and the South jnust refrain from Joining 
any military alliance; and that there should he no foreign bases ^ troops 
of military personUel in their respective territories, 

! Here again ^ the only real difficulty Is the omission of any obligation 
on the north to withdra-w its military forces from the South — although 
the Geneva Accords which established the demarcation line in Vietnam 
forbids military interference of any sort by one side in the affairs of 
t' ^ other^ and even goes so far as to forbid civilians to cross the 
demilitarized zone. 

The third point calls for the settlement of the South' s Internal 
affairs *'in accordance vith the program of the National Liberation 
T. jnt for South Vietnam/^ This pointy of course^ was not a part of 
the Geneva Accords at aJ.l, It introduces a new element which I shall 
discuss later in this analysis. 

The fourth p^^int calls for the peaceful reunification of Vistnamj to 
be settled by the people of both ^ones without any foreign interference, 
V7e have no difficulty with this point as was indicated in my speech 
to the General Assembly on September 22, 

There has apparently been added a fifth point — put forward and 
repeatedly endorsed by both Hanoi and the National Liberation 
Front since the enunciation of the four points in April I965* This 
fifth point was stated by Ho Chi ^iinh in January I9S6 when he said 
that if the United States really wants peace, it must recognize the 
National Liberation Front as the "sole genuine representative" of 
the people of South Yietnamj and engage in negotiation with it.. 
This^ like the thli^d of the "Four Points," introduces a new element 
which was not part of the Geneva Accords. 

Iffow, from this brief suinmaJ;ion of our aims and those declared 
by Hanoi^ it is clear that there are areas of agreement and areas 
of disagreement. Recent public statements by Hanoi have been 
helpful in certain aspects , but how great the disagreements are is 
still uncertain because the stated aims of Hanoi still contain a number 
of ambiguities. I would like to discuss some of these ambiguities 
because they relate to very consequential matters. 

There is ambiguity^ for example , on the role of the National Libera- 
tion Front in peace negotiations. I have already noted the statement 
of Ho Chi Minh and other spokesmen for our adversaries who have 
said that we must recognize the Front as "the sole genuine repre- 
sentative of the South Vietnamese people^ and negotiate with it." 
If this means* that we are asked to cease our recognition of the Gov- 
ernment in Saigon and deal only with the Front , insistence on this 
point would imperil the search for peace. For the Front has not been 
chosen by any democratic process to represent the people of South 
Vietnam, Nor has the Front been recognised by the world community. 
It is pertinent to recall that more than 60 nations recognize the Gov- 
ernment of the Republic of Vietnam in Saigon, whereas none recog- 
nizes the National Liberation Front as a government. 

On the other hand, some public statements seem to call for the 
National Liberation Front to be given a place or voice at the negotiat- 
ing table. If this were the position of our adversaries^ the prospects 

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vrould be brighter; for President JohnsoHj as long ago as July 1965, 
said that "the Viet Cong would not have difficulty in being repre- 
sented and in having their Tievs presented if Hanoi for a moment 
decides that it wants to cease aggression." He added that this did not 
seem to him to be "an insurmountable problem^" and that "I think 
that could be worked out." 

A further ambiguity relates to the role of the National Liberation 
Front in the future political life of South Vietnam. Hanoi asks that 
the affairs of South Vietnam be settled "in accordance with the pro- 
gram of the National Liberation Front," Our adversaries, in their 
various comments on this point, take no notice of the internationally 
recognized Governjiient of South Vietnam or of the steps which the 
South Vietnamese leaders have taken^ and have currently under way, 
and the institutions they are now creating, for the pui-pose of providing 
their country with a constitutional and representative government, ^ 

Wor would their statements seem to leave any place for the South 
Vietnamese who have participated in and promoted such steps. Such 
an interpretation would pose serious obstacles to a settlement. 

However^ some claim that what the National Liberation Front 
really seeks is no more than the opportunity to advance its program 
peacefully along with other elements and groupings in the South in 
a free political environment. 

We have already made it clear that v?% do not msh to exclude any 
segment of the South Vietnamese people from peaceful participation 
in their country's future and that we support a policy of national 
reconciliation endorsed by the South Vietnamese Government in the 
Manila Coimnunique. Indeed^ as Secretary Rusk said in an interview 
last week J if the Viet Cong were to lay down their arms^ ways could be 
found to pei^mit them to take part in the normal political processes 
in South Vietnam, 

Further ambiguities arise concerning the question of foreign troops 
in South Vietnam, VHiat does Hanoi mean by "foreign troops?" 
They clearly include in this term the forces of the United States and 
other countries aiding the South, but they have never admitted the 
presence of their own forces in the South, Of course, a one-sided i-rLth- 
drawal by our side would not lead to an acceptable peace. All external 
forces must withdraw, those of Hanoi as v^ell as oursj if peace is to be 
achieved. 

There is ambiguity also in Hanoi's position on the timing of the 
withdrawal of external forces, "Do our adversaries consider x^rithdrawal 
of forces as a precondition to negotiations, as some of their statements 
imply? If so^ this again would raise a serious obstacle to progress. But 
if they look on withdrawal of forces as a provision to be incorporated 
in a settlem.ent this clearly could be worked out* ^he United States 
and its allies are already on record in the Manila Communique that 
their forces "will be withdrawn , . , as the other side withdraws its '. 
forces to the Norths ceases infiltration, and the level of violence tVius I 
subsides. Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not ; 
later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled." 
Further, we have indicated our willingness to join in a phased and 
supervised withdrawal of forces by both sides. 

Next, there is ambiguity in Hanoi's position on the cessation of 
bombing of North Vietnam. At times their public statements have I 
demanded that the bombing be end^-d unconditionally, ■in.thout any ; 

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reference to a possible response from their side. On the other hand 
quite recently a spokesman of Hanoi said that ^'if^ after the definitive 
and iinconclitional cessation of the bombardjnents^ the American 
CiOYernment proposes to enter into contact with the /North Viet- 
namese/ Government. . , . this proposal \fill be exa-^ned and 
studied," And Just this weelc ve have seen a farther statement ^ in an 
interview hy the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister j that cessation 
of the bombings "could lead to talks between North Vietnam and the 
U*Sj^ Many of their statements^ insisting that the bombing ce^se 
have also contained other expressions^ such as that the American 
military presence in South Vietnam be completely withdrawn and 
that the "Four Points" of Hanoi must be reeognized and accepted as 
"the" basis— or possibly as "a" basis— for settlement of the conflict. 
This creates an additional ambiguity as to whether Hanoi means to 
add still other prenegotiating conditions. 

The position ■ of the United States on this bombing question has 
been stated by a number of Acljiiinistration spokesmen^ including me 
at the United Nations* The United States remains prepared to take 
the first step and order a cessation of all bombing of rforth Vietnam 
the moment we are assured j privately or otherwise ^ that tlais step 
will be answered promptly by a tangible response toward peace from 
North Vietnam. In his letter of February 8 to His Holiness^ Pope Paul^ 
President Johnson said: & 

... I know you would not expect us to reduce military action unless the 
other side is vrilling to do likev^ise. We are px^epared to discuss the 
balanced reduction in military activity ^ the cessation of hostilities or 
any practical arrangements which could lead to these results. We shall 
continue our efforts for a peaceful and honorable settlement until they 
are crowned with success. 

Some analysts contend that our terms of settlement should be more 
precisely defined. But it is very difficult to be more precise in advance 
of nef^otiation and particularly in light of the substantive ambiguities 
on the other side. But whatever questions may be raised^ they should 
and can best be resolved in discussions between the parties who have 
the povfer to resolve them. For our part^ we stand ready to negotiate 
in good faith unconditionally to resolve all outstanding questions. 

The United States approach to negotiations is flexible. We and our 
applies do not ask our adversaries to accept, as a pre-condition to dis- 
cuss ions or negotiations ^ any point of ours to vrhich they may have 
objections. Nor do we rule out the discussion of any points of theirs^ 
however difficult they might appear to us. We are willing to discuss 
and negotiate not only oui" own points but Hanoi's four points and 
points emanating from any other sources, including the Secretary 
General of the United Nations, . ; 

It remains to be seen whether our adversaries share this concept of 
negotiations ♦ As I have already pointed outj their various public 
declarations of peace aims have often been coupled with statem.ents 
that the goals they put forward must, for example ^ be "accepted" or 
"recognized" as the "sole basis" or *'the most corsrect basis" or "the 
only sound basis" or "the basis for the most correct political solu- 
tion." ; 

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Such statements contain ^stiLl further ajnbiguity--in one sense the 
most fundamental of all^ since it relates to the concept of negotiation 
itself. Do these statements mean that Hanoi is willing to enter ne- 
gotiations only if there is an assurance in advance that the outcome 
will he on their terms and villj in effect , simply ratify the goals they 
have already stated? Such an attitude Kould not he conducive to 
peace and would make the outlook for a settlement hleak indeed. 

If J on the other handj North Vietnam were to say that their points 
are not pre-conditions to discussions or negotiations ^ then the prospects 
should he more promising. 

Our negotiating approach would permit each side to seek clarificat- 
tion of the other side's position. It does not require the acceptance in 
advance of any points^ least of all those whose meaning may be in 
need of clarification. We do not ask that of Hanoi — and progress 
toward a settlement will be facilitated if Hanoi does not ask it of us* 

In this situation J how can we best move toward a sett].F^ nent? 

One essential eai'ly step is to analyze the positions of all parties in 
order to ascertain whether there is some element or some kernel com- 
mon to all. Many students of the subject have pointed to one fact 
vrhich may prove to be such a kernel — namely ^ the fact that both 
sides have pointed to the Geneva Agreements of 195^4 and 1962 as an 
acceptable basis for a peaceful settlement. 

But I must add quickly that this does not necessarily indicate a 
real meeting of the minds ^ because of doubts that all sides interpret 
the Geneva Agreements in the same light. Hanoi has said that the 
essence of the Geneva Agreements is contained in its "four points," 
But the toivrt points would not put Hanoi under any restraint or 
obligations in its hostile activities against the South , which the Geneva 
Accords explicitly prohibit. Besides ^ as I already pointed out^ these 
points insist that the South' s future be regulated in accordance with 
the program of a group which was not referred to in the Geneva 
Accords and did not even exist when they were -m^itten, and in any 
case J if the Geneva Accords were to serve as a basis for settlement, 
it would obviously be necessary to revitalize the international ma- 
cinery which they provided for supervision--v/hleh is presently 
operating under severe limitations; to incorporate effective interna- 
tional guarantees; and to update other provisions of the Accords 
vrhich on their face are clearly out of date. 

Despite these problems of interpretation, it can be said that if the 
meaning of the Geneva Agreements were accepted as a matter for 
genuine negotiations ^ then the constant reference to th"$se agreements 
by both sides would be more than a verbal similarity j it would be a 
significant and hopeful sign of the prospects for settlement. 

Fi^om all this analysis^ there emerges one basic and practical 
question^ and it is this: How are all these apparent obstacles to a 
settlement to be overcome? 

The first and essential pre-requisite is the will to resolve them — 
not by unconditional surrender or by the dictation of terms, but 
through a process of mutual accomjuodation whereby nobody's 
vital interests axe injured^ which would be a political solution. Speaking 
for the United States. Govern-ment^ I affirm without reservation the 
willingness of the United States to seek and find a political solution, 

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The next question^ tlien^ is by v/hat procedures such a political 
settlement can "be reached. One veil-tested and tijne-proven vay is- 
the conference table. Pi^esident Johnson has repeatedly stated our 
readiness to join in a conference in Geneva^ in Asia, or in any other 
suitable place* V/e remain prepared today to go to the conference 
table as soon as^ and -wherever ^ our adversaries ai^e prepared to join 
us, 

■ There is also a second procedure by which to pursue a political 
settlement: namely ^ private negotiations- -either by direct contact 
or tlirough an intermediary. There is much to be said for this private 
method^ for ain a situation as grave as thiSj -isrith its complex historical 
1: ^kground and its present political cross currents, it would be exceed- 
ingly difficult to negotiate in a goldfish bowl. 

■ I therefore affirm that the United States Government stands ready 
to take this route also toward a political settlement* And we give our 
a? iurance that the secrecy and security of such private explorations 
iw^Otild be safeguarded on our side* Of course we do not and should 
not ask that freedom of expression be curtailed in the slightest degree* 
Nevertheless- -as that conspicuous champion of free e^^^jression^ Dr* 
Er^'^in D. CanhajBj recently reminded us — no one's credibility ought 
t'o suffer because of what is better left unsaid under such circuinstances. 

Let me quickly add that at this Juncture I do not want to raise 
any false hopes by this remark. I am simply stating a principle vhich 
is inherent in the concept of the secrecy and security of private 
explorations , 

Such then is my analysis of the problems involved and the methods 
to be employed in seeking a negotiated solution of the Vietnamese 
conflict. Nor should we overlook the possibility that negotiations 
private or public^ might be preceded or facilitated by the process of 
imitual de-escalation or a scaling down of the conflict without a 
formally negotiated ceasefire, This^ of course,, would be welcome on 
our part. 

It is altogether possible ^ too^ that there will be no negotiations 
cuLninating in a formal agreement j that our adversaries will sooner 
or later find the burden of the war too exhausting and that the conflict 
will gradually come to an end. 

Perhaps this will indeed prove to be the outcome. But our most 
respected military authorities have cautioned us not to expect that 
this will happen quickly, and that we must face the possibility of a 
long struggle. Surely^ if there is any contribution tliat diplomacy can 
make to hastening a just and honox^able end of this struggle, we cannot 
in all conscience spare any effort or any labor, day or night, to make 
that contribution — no matter how difficult and frustrating the effort 
may be^ or how many false starts and failures and new beginnings it 
may entail. 

As students of history know, one obstacle to a negotiated end of 
any war can be psychological. The frame of mind appropriate to 
fighting and the frame of mind appropriate to peacemaking are by 
nature very different. And yet a stage inevitably comes when both 
these seemingly contradictory efforts must go on side by side. 



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Many citizens, viewing this complex dual process, are likely to "be 
confused and distressed "by vhat se'ems like an inconsistency in their 
leaders' policies. Some coraplain that the talk of peace suggests a 
weakening of our resolve and of our v^ill to van. Simultaneously others 
complain that the continued military effort suggests an attempt to 
bring the adversary to his knees, to hreak his vill^-and thus casts 
doubt on the sincerity of our will to peace. 

The great difficulty of achieving peace should serve to remind us 
that there are substantial conflicting interests at stake which stub- 
bo^^nly resist solution; that peace cannot be bought at any price, nor 
c^ . real conflicts of purpose be waved away with a magic wand. By 
the same token^ the ferocity of war should not be an incitement to 
h4tred but rather a stern discipline — a reminder of the imperative 
di^^^y to define responsibly the limited interests for which our soldiers 
f^jht and which a peace settlement must protect. 

! The effort to make such a responsible definition^ and to carry it 
through the process of peace negotiations, is *'piled high with diffi- 
culty." A genuine meeting of the minds may never be wholly achieved. 
It is unlikely that terms of settlement for this stubborn conflict can. 

h 

be found which would be wholly pleasing to either side. But it is in 
our highest national interest that an acceptable ^ livable solution 
should be found. 

I Lt no one suppose that patriot ism^ which is so inspiringly displayed 
on the battlefield, is not also present at the negotiating table. All cur 
i"ecent Pi^esidents have testified to our country's dedication to negotia- 
tion as a means of peacefully bridging difference. 

President Eisenhov;er said in 1955? on the eve of the first Suiiimit 

Conference with the Soviet leadership; 
I 

■■ 

We shall work with all others so that peaceful and reasonable negotiations 
may replace the clash of the battlefield, 

I^esident Kennedy, in his Inaugural Address,, said: 

Let us neYer negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to 
negotiate. 

An President Johnson has summed up the true value of negotiation 
as follows: 

To negotiate is not to admit failure. It is to show good sense* We 
believe that collective gargaining is working as long as parties stay in 
negotiation. Only when bargaining breaks off do we speak of failure. And 
so also in foreign policy. There, too, the rule of law and the resort to 
the bargaining table are the hallmnarks of success* 

An to these words the President added specifically: 

This rule applies without qualification to Vietnam. Vl^e shll count it 
a mark of success when all the parties to that dispute are around a conference 
table. VJe Americans ai'e experienced in bargaining; we have nothing to fear 
from negotiation. And we Americans know the nature of a fair bargain; none 
need fear negotiating with us. 

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I am sure all three of these Presidents vould a^^ree today that the 
effort to discover through negotiation^ the common ground on vhich to 
build a Just and honorable peace ^ is worthy of our most sincere and 
dedicated efforts. 



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WRITER GIVES PLMS OF HAI^OI AND VIETCONG FOR 

FUTURE VIEXHAM "^ 

The Associated Fx-ess asked Wilfred Burchett^ an Aiistra- 
lian Conmiunist vrriter^ to report the strategy of Hanoi and 
the Vietcong as he ha.d been able to discern it in his trips 
to Vietnasi, Eurchett has often been a Communist spokesnaa 
in Korea J Vietnam and Germany, 

Phnom Penh^ Cambodia^ Feb. 10 (AP) — Hov Hanoi and the Viet- 
cong viev a future Vietnam vhich might einerge out of any negotiated 
settlement was revealed in a series of talks I recently had with top 
Vietnamese leaders of North Vietnam plus Liberation Front (Vietcong) 
representatives in Hanoi and talks last August with the Front's 
president^ Nguyen Huu Tho^ whom I met ifor the foux^th time in his ^ 

jungle headquarters in South Vietnam. 

The general idea is that Viethan as such must be an independent 
country without any foreign presence. Reunification is a long- range 
project realizable only in the far distant future ^ which Vietnamese 
leaders in the North and Liberation Front leaders in the South 
privately agree may be 10 to 20 years away* 

Meantime, the J!forth would remain a Socialist country and a mem- 
ber of the Socialist world but without military alliances or foreign 
military bases ^ militarily but not politically neutral* The South 
would be non-Socialist and neutral militai-ilyj politically and diplo- 
matically. 

The seeds for all this are provided for in North Vietnam's four-point 
plan enunciated by Premier Phain Van Dong in April j 1965j ^"^^ 
acceptance of which until very recently had been thought in Washing- 
ton to be a precondition for talks. 

But in Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh's replies to my questions, 
in which he said talks could start if bombings stopped^ it was made 
clear that acceptance of the four points was not posed as a precondition, 
and far less was withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam made 
a prior condition, as seems to have been though over a long period 
in Washington. 

The formula used by Foreign Minister Trinh was that the "four- 
point stand and correct attitude the government of the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam enjoy were sure of even stronger approval and 
support from all peace^-and justice — loving peoples and -governments 
the world." 

That this is not being posed as a precondition is one of the most 
important of the clarifications in the Foreign Minister's statement. 

But if Washington took a long, hard look at the four points one 
top Vietnamese official said, it would find they entail important 
concessions compeared to the Geneva agreements. 

The latter provided reunification by 1956 ^ with the assumption that ^ 

the pro "Communist Vietminh would rule over the whole country. 



1 From the VJashington Post, by Wilfred Burchett, Feb, 11, I967 



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The four points ;, which neatly dovetail into the five-point plan of the 

Kational LilDeratioa Front ^ vere specifically formulated, according 

to the sasiie official^ to facilitate American disengagement. While the 

plan contains nothing contrary to the Geneva agreements , it makes 

an important 'concession the indefinite postponenent of reunification^ 

halts the spread of communism south of the 17th Parallel^ and accepts 

certain restrictions on the sovereignty of the North, 

^he Geneva agreements of July 21^ 195 ^j which partitioned Viet- 
nam along the 17th Parallel^ provided for unification elections by 
July 20, 1956. However^ the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in South Vietnaia 
sp'-irned any such vote. 

j/pham Van Dong's four points of April, 1965^ included: (l) With- 
drawal of all U.S. military forces from South Vietnam and an end 
tcj) all acts of vrar against the North j (2) No foreign military alliances 
fc"^ either North or South; (3) Settlements of South Vietnam's internal 
a: Tairs in accordance with the program of the National Liberation 
Front; {k) peacef^Il reunification without foreign interference^^? 
I What type of regime could the North and the Liberation Front 
accept in the South? The Liberation Front considers it is in a strong 
ehought position militarily and politically to have a "decisive place 
and voice'* in any settlement of the Southern half of the problem. 

In fact^ as the Front's President Nguyen Huu Tho told me last 
August^ he envisages that a "broad coalition government of national 
union" could be formed which , while excluding personalities like 
deuerals Nguyen Cao Ky and Nguyen Van Thieu^ the present 
Premier and President respectively^ would not exclude some numbers 
of their cabinet or others who served in previous Saigon governments 
far back> even including that of Diem. 

Such a government must be iz^revocably committed to an autono- 
mous South Vietnam independent and neutral* But explicit in the 
Liberation Front and the North's five and four points is that inde- 
pendence means withdrawal of all U.S, forces and the dismantling 

of bases » 

^,S, officials in Washington examined v^ith interest the Communist 
viewpoint as reported by Burchett^ John Hightower of the Associated 
Press reported, 

/rae officials said Comjnunist acceptance of the idea of a long-term 
non-Communist regime in the South was an interesting indication of 
flexibility J Hightower reported. 

/The plan for a coalition government in the South was also viewed 
with interest J but the United States was pictured as being unwilling 
to accept any such coalition that included "a decisive place and voice" 
for the National Liberation Front. Tlie U.S. view is said to be that 
participation in South Vietnamese political life hy individual Vietcong 
leaders who would be loyal to an independent government would be 
acceptable 3 hut not participation by the NLF as an organization^ 

The Front's leaders^ including those of the Marxist Revolutionary 
Party J insist that although they vfould carry out the distribution of 
land — this has already been done in areas administered by the Front — 
they do not intend the collectivation of land or the socialization of 
industry and commerce. They would accept aid from the West and 
East^ protect existing foreign interests ^ and would accept foreign 



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investments to help rebuild and develop the country vhen this did not 
infringe national sovereignty. 

In this connection it is interesting to note that Mhan Dan (The 
People) "-which is North Vietnam's BraTada*---camjnenting on the 
Foreign Mnister's statement on the possibilities of talks^ seven times 
mentioned the term ''x^^^*^^ ^^^ independence" as defining the Viet- 
namese main aiins^ hut not a single mention of socialism. This fact 
is noted by foreign diplomats in Hanoi. This certainly does not imply 
any intention of abandoning socialism in the PTorth^ but does mQ^n 
that the emphasis is on national aims^, which do not foresee a SociEilist 
regime for the South. And ^'socialism for the north^ Democracy in the 
South" i^as the title of speech by Le Buan^ secretary of the North's 
Communist Party, early in January. 

A fei^r months ago a bureau of the National Liberation Front was 
establi3hed in Hanoi —housed in the repaintedj refurnished former 
American consulate. 

Unlike other diplomatic missions it is not accredited to the govern- 
ment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam^ but in careful political 
distinctions is called the "representation of the National front for the 
liberation of South Vietnam in North Vietnam," 

Tlie desired implication of thls^ as carefully explained by gray-haired 
NLF central committee member Nguyen Van Tien, vho has the 
"representation/' is that it is a "concrete image of reunification*' with 
the clear implication of South and North enjoying equal status, 

VHien I asked if there vms not a contradiction between the North's 
stated aims of "defending the North, liberating the South and re- 
unifying the country," the Front's program of independence and 
neuti^ality^ and his own statement that reunification is nearing^ he 
said "no" and then gave the clearest exposition of how the North and 
South — as represented by the Liberation Front — viev;ed the future 
of North and South relations if the war ended and the Front was the 
dominant element of a government in the South. 

His views are shimmed up as follows: 

North and South Vietnam remain autonomous in internal and foreign 
affairs. The North would remain Socialist and a member of the So- 
cialist bloc. The South would be neutral, unallled to any blocs. Each 
v;ould have its own foreign ministries and own diplomatic representa- 
tives abroad. The Front already has over a dozen de facto embassies 
abroad. 

For regulating North-- South relations, there would be a type of 
general assembly, presumably' nominated \>y the respective parlia- 
ments to handle questions important to both zones such as trade, post 
and telegraphs, interzonal travel , including sports and cultui^al ex- 
changes. The assembly in fact would have some resemblance to the 
inter ^German council, an idea being tpyed with by the VJest German 
Social Democrats as a means to handle current practical problems, 
between East and West Germany. 

The question of negotiations between Hanoi and the Ky government 
in Saigon is seen as an iBipossibility, The latter is considered as repre- 
senting no national interests or any section of the population and 
would die a natural death the moment serious negotiations started. 

It is assumed Ky and a handful of Ms top supporters would make 
suitable dispositions, as so many of their predecessors did, for a com- 

fr fortable exile. But it is also considered that national reconciliation is 

I entirely possible with personalities and groups less engaged, if they ^ 

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are prepared to take a cleai"* stand on the question of complete aational 
independence. On that belief everyone is adamant- Ho Chi Mlnh 
told a group 5 Including niyself j "the United States is offering us the 
choice of colonial slavery or victory, Ohviously we fight till the end." 

Another personality^ in replying to a question whether North Viet- 
nam is prepared to offer anything in exchange for an American with- 
drawal^ shrugged his shoulders^ laughed and said: 

"VJhat do they ^';ant? 

"Do they want us to invite into the North ^400^ 000 Chinese^ ^40^000 
Forth Koreans and a few thousand Cubans and then propose their 
withdrawal as a counterpart for withdrawal of the United States 
and her Allies from the South? Is that what they are after?" 



ft 



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iroRVfflG.mM -DRV coif JACT S (OlflO) 



OSLO ^531 to SecState (SECEET-EXIiIs)^3.4 June I967, 



"U- Loan uncierlilned Nortli YxetneMiese Govt lmx:)osecl only one condi- 
tion for negotiations^ namely that boniJDiiig of Forth Vietnpjn be stopped* 
Clearly having in mind the Chinese ^ he went to lengths to underline 
that speeches from other quarters vrhich imposed othei* conditions including 
fu:i.l Anicrican vjithdrEvral from South Vtetnej^ did not R?T not. reflect 
Drorth Vietnam Govt's thought- On TTorth Vietnamese side one gave decisive 
vjeight to stop in "boiribing because this v;as viewed as respect for North 
Vietnamese sovereignty and sxxch a respect wa.s an absolute condition fo^ 
coming to conference table ^ but vjas also the only condition, Wien they 
had come to conference table ^ North Vietna-m position v^oulcl be very flexible 
*¥e are^' said JVmbassador Loan 'ready for very far reaching coiriprcvuises to 
get an end to the ^-mr. ' Arribassador Algard noted that recently one had 
impression that fforth Vietnamese side vas cooler tov^ard negotiations. 
Ambassador Loan denied this strongly. He said that formerly when North 
Vietnam shovred an interest in negotiations toericans had taken such 
interest as a sign of vea>uiess and v:ith results of stronger esca.lation. 
This v;o,s background against vrhich one must judge some recent speeches 
on North Vietnamese side. Provided there V70uld be a stop xn bombing^ 
Morth Vietnam was ready at any t'me for negotiations and fa.r reaching 
com]pro3aises." 



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KISSJ.KgTC R-BO CONTACTS ( HUm-i aYLVANIA ) 
Jxxly - October 196? 



Second Meetinr^ v.'xth Fnarg Van Dong, July 25 ^ 196?- Present: Aubrac^ 
Marcoviehj Fnara Van Dongj Tachj note- taker. 



"Hiam Van Dong resumed . * Ending the war for us has tuo meanings: 
l) An e3id of boir=blng \rhich is perrrianent and unconditlona.!; 2) A vithdrawal 
;0f United States forces, lie like the formula of President de Gaulle • ' 
Marcovich interrupted to say that it uas not realistic, Biaia Van Dong 
.greed and said that he reali^.ed that sone U*S* troops vould he.Ye to stay 
juntil the end of the process of political sett-TeTr,ent, He added: 'V/e ^o 
;not \;ant to huiniliate the U.S. Lenin did not llhe \:ar but fought v^hen ■ 
necessary. As Lenin we are CoM:iunists, ' 

^ '"'Novr 3.et me speak of U.S. policy and the KLP. Vfe should have had 
imifi cation in 1956- ITae period 19^6-'^9 vras a political fight- It sa^; the 
mutual assistance pact bet^-;^een the U.S. and Saigon and the introduction of 
U.S, staffs. Tlais led to the formation of the ITl^, The second period , 
1960-6^^ saw a disintegration of the U.S, position to which the U.S. responded 
by 'special' war* /I suppose he meant 'special forces' war_-7 In 196^5^ the 
United States started a * limited' war which lasts until today. At the same 
^ titne the NLF has expanded its activities frora the country into the cities 

and from inside Vietnam to t2ie outside. Our position is: Forth Vietnam is 
^ socialist and vjants to remain so- As for the South^ our goals are national 
independence J democracy , peace and xieutrality* So:ne people thinl^: vj-e want to 
impose Socialism on the South, We are convinced that the NLF will not make 
Sjich an error* Tlie NLF envisages a broad -coalition goverixment ,, ineludnig all 
significant groups and religions wit h out consideration of past a ctivities 
inc lu di n g rfiembers du g ouverneme nt f anto che et cadr es d^ar n>e e f antoche. ^ZF® 
repeated the underlined vrordsT/ The essential, thing is to forget the po,st, 

" ^As for unification^ v/e recognize that the important first step is 
a political settlement of the South. We agree not to push things toward 
unifice«tlon. Once the war in the South is settled ^ we shall discuss 
with the South and find the best m.eans. Our people are magnificent - 

" 'Peace- would have been easy for the U.S, three years ago. But 
. HWith'uvery ^'ear tlie political situv^.tion worsens » VJe do, not like secret-. 
negotl?vtions^ but w^e recognise their necessity in tins situation. As 
long as the issues do not concern South Vietnajn^ the VILF need not partici- 
pate- However J we do not beLieve that the United States is ready for a 
settlement.' 'Ihen turning to Aubrac he asked: '-Que veulent les Aiaericains? ''^ 

These statements were confirmed by Bo on October 9^ -^9^7 — after pei^sist^ 
ent requests by the U.S. through II 8c A for confirmation. Bo said: "He who 
does not say 'no' agrees,^' 



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OSLO 66U to SecState (SECKET-liKDIS), l6 Auglist'lS'S? 



'". , < -Ainbloan thGH discussed the assiLmptions for the staxtlxi^ of 
negotiations and repeated the position that an absolute ^ but the only^ 
condition for negotiations vas a cesf^ation of the bojTibin'^ by Americans, 

. He attain pointed out that this i-ras a question %;hich involved the sov- 

' ereignty of North VietnaiEi. It \?ould be to admit the existence of a state 
of war if Rorth Vietnarn accepted to QUOTP] respond UijQUOTii; in the form of 

i a corresx^oiiding reduction of forces* In this connection I stated that "^ 
it was probably not EFT not certain thp.t e;a official declaration by North' 

. Vietxiam on the extent of a possible QUOTE response UNCiUCfE v;as asstoicd. 
A confidential coimriunication indicating v.^hat the Horth Vietnamese intended 
to undertake might be sufficient* Amb Loan said that unsuccessful necoti-- 
ations v/ould be vorse than no RFf no negotiations r^t all, Tlie opening of 
negotiations v:ould create a i/ave of optimism throughout the vjorld^ and a 
possible breakdovai might Xmd to con^ecLuences iriiich v;ould be difficult to 
foresee. It therefore appeared desirable to a^ssure^^ prior to the starting 
of negotiations^ that they would yield re:Hu3,ts, The possibilities for a 
faYoz^£Jl)le result vjoiil^d thus have to be clarified to a certain degree in 
adva-nce. If negotiations >;ere started^ the florth Vietnamese attitude vmuld 
be flexible^ as the Airb had stated previously^ and the Tforth Vietnamer^e 
vcre prepared to enter into far-reaching compromises. But as he did not 
RPT not possess exact in^'^orifiation* he vas not EHT not in a position to 
indicate in concrete tenuis, where this willingness to compromise v^ould 
express itself on the North Vietnamese side- He did^ hovreverj mention the 
Kortli Vietnamese attitude with regard to the demarcation 3.ine dui'ing the 
Geneva negotiations as an exa/:iple of North Vietnamese readiness to com,- 
prondse* If^irthei-morej he said^ North Vietnam had P^Iready made known a 

, very significant concession^ based on a rea-listic eve.luation of the situ- 
ation. The Geneva agreei^ient stipulated that Vietnam should be unified 
within two years- Our objective today ^ he ss^id^ is considerably lower - 
The question of unification is postponed to an indefinite point of time ■ 
in the future. North VietnaE-i is toda-y ready to accept a separate South 
Vietnamese state vjhich is neutral and based on a coalition govb. Such a 
govt could have connections both with East and Ivcst and accept assistance 
from couixtries^that nrlght \i±^h to give sucJi assistance." -^e Amb stated 
that the time of t]:te irithdrawal of the Ar/iericp^n troops was not RPT not 
a. decisive quefc^tipn. In this connection he pointed to the agreement on 
the withdravjal of the l^^ench troops. Hca-jever; the question of repre- 
sentation was of great importance. On thj.s point the Araericans \vonld 
have to accept the political sitvation in South Vietna.m as it is^ as 
de Gaulle did in Algeria, North Vietnapj could not RPT not negotiate 
on be}ialf of the South Vietnamese, Amb Lor-.n finally said th?.t he appreci- 
ated the contact established with tJ^e Norv-regian Ejnbassy^ and that lie 
vmuld like it to bo jriaintained. , . J^ 



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WmmotMl- DR V COIlQlCTS ( OIIIO ) 



OSLO 722 to SecState (SECRET-EXDIS), 21 August I967: 



^^2, ,,-Loan asked if Algard v^illliig to accept ^jrivitation to Hanoi, 
Algard proinised earHy reply. Lo?.n gave no RPT no dilreat reaction to our 
previous coMnuni cation. He again underlined tjie q.uestion of the ces^^a- 
tion of borabing. national sovereignty and di(3nity^ but at the sarfle time 
test the Bincere vrill of the M^ericans to negotiate . Hovrever^ interested 
in concrete information about ¥hat is meant by /u.S^ QUOTJil flexible as 
to form and nature of some coi:*r^spondlng restraint Ul^Pj.^'^TE In above men*^ 
tioned telegi^am^, Point B< ^oan/ said Airiericaii recognition national 
self-determination decisive point. Concretely he a.sked us find out if 
USA wiUang to base possible negotiations on this principle e^nd billing 
accept liberation front as political factor..,-" 






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OSLO 1063 - Meeting on Fr 5-day ^ September 8 



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"5* /cooper/ soug;ht clarification of Loan's cornments on the role 
of the lUJF^ specifically whether 'political factoi^' meant as a factor in 
preliminary talks ^ acti^al negotiations^ or in a post-£:ettleuient situation- 
Algard said his iiripression i-ras that Loan ineant all three stages, I then 
elaborated on the extent to which \re recognitLod the ELY as a political 
factor in a post-settle^ient situation a,nd/or the vays they might particle 
pate in negotiatiorts, IVe cannot recognxEe them as a go. eniinent or as the 
►sole representative for the pedpleof Vietnajn, In the last analysis^ we 
believe the W^ question should be resolved in South Vietnam hy the various 
elements there- \le will be pirepared to accept anything v?iich the Govern- 
ment of South Vietna!Ji is ready to accept. It v-rill be troublesome if in 
the preliminary negotia,tions the JffiF must particix)ate in every stage- 
We need c3-ar if 1 cation on this point. . Algard said he was not quite sure^ 
but he had the 3jT)]pression that the North Vietnamese divided the problem 
into q,ue/3tlons affecting rela,tions between Hanoi and the U.S. on the one 
hand- and South Vietnainese problems on the other. Loan had stx^essed that 
Hanoi could not spsak for the Ii[LF on matters affectirj^j South Vietnam- 
Algard said Loan had not been inore specific on this point/' 



11 



7- On the question of 'non^-cor.'miunist South Vietnam^* I said that^ 



if indeed Loa,n had said they \-70uld accept a non-couEiimist South Vietnam 
a,nd had sa-id so under instructions^ this v:as probab3,y the first time this 
formula had been used- Algard said Loaii had stressed that Hanoi was 
vrilling to accept a non-commimist govermaent which was a neutral govern- 
ment > and which would have relations with both East and West and received 
-aid* from both sides. Sub sequent ly^ at a reception on the day before 
Algard left^ Loan had said that Ifenol recognisted the fact that they had 
to live for some years to corie in a Vietnam which v:ould have two different 
social and political, situations. 

"8. Loan had not explained what he meant by a -t coalition govern3r.e2-it ' 
andj in fact^ used the term_s 'coalition goveriiment^ and 'non^corrinunist 
goverriinrtnt*. a.lmost interchangeably without giving an indication as to the 
■ poss*ible'. ;^ tract ure of the governineKt." political grouping, etc. He had ■.. 
not stated that they w^ould accept representatives of the present South 
Vietnojnese Government^ but his tone gave the impjression that they v?ould- 
In fact J Loan had said he de^;.^ly disliked the South Vietnamese Government 
but^ nevert}ieless> it was 'a political factor' in South Vietnam. (Algard 
cautioned that in cozisidering the tei"]!! 'non- communist government' Loan 
has indicated from time to time he does not consider the IiL-F corii^iunist. ) 
Loan told Algard he envisages a govemnient ijith cor.jnixnist participation 



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but vbicli is not commmist- controlled* Loan had repeated his reTTiarks 
about a non-coonimiet govGrnment directly to Algard in I^Vendi at a 
subseq^uent casual meeting^ again usjng the phrase *noz:i"Comnunist* ' 

"9* 1 raised the CLUestion concerning Loan^s co:miient that the 
matter of the U.S. withdra^wal v/as not decisiye. Algard said Loan had 
referred to the Geneva, Agreement in this context using the examx^le 
of the v/ithdrawal of French troops \ih±ch^ he said> had been no problem-" 



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BUmTtlj\]\f-DfiV COr^ACTS ( PACKl^RS), 
December 16 ^ 1967 



January 5^ I968 - Hax^i^iTnan-Macovescu Merrioranclui.i of Conversat.ldn: 



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Hie follovdng statements vere me.de by Trinli: 

*"Tbe basis for settlement of the Vietnamese issue is provi^ded 
by the four po?lnts of April 8^ 19^5 J the Ministry of Foreifsn Affairs 
subseq.uently issued its January 28 ^ I967 statement- This is our posi^ 
tion of principles on v*ich no concession is possible.'" 



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"'We are not against discussiozis but a,ny diticussions should take 
place according to principle. As soon as discussion engaged in^ our 
attitude irill be serious and responsible but it depends on attitude of 
the U.S, v^hether such discussions are fruitful.'" 



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NOm??;GIAW- DRVCCBT ACTS (oino.l 



OSLO 3275 to Se estate ( SECRET- IvODIS), 10 February I968 



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"2 /Lo-ii/ sa-id tim-1; Hanoi presupposed (assumed) that the 
. Llitary operations be stopped ivliile negotiations are being con- 
ducted. . . , '' 



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ITALUN-DRV C ONTACTS (KILLY) 
Feb ruG.ry "Mar oh , 19S8 - 



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Excei^pts from feGting of D*0rlaih1i-Su* 



'\,,.Botla parties felt that prolDlem of guaranteeixis an agreem^^nt 
vas increasing to decisive importance. Su cGe!rtcd to categorically 
exclude tlie UK as a gua-ranteeing agency and Faufani a,nd Su agi'eod that 
the ICC was not in position to gu?.ra.ntee anything/' 



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^' ( J ) Su stated tha,t declared s.nd also real aim of Hanoi w8>;^ to 
have a,bsolutely free general elections- To insure liberty of vote^ 
it vas necessary to constitute a govern_Tient with very broadly based 
parti cipa,tion excluding only S-^r criminals ^ (undefined). Thei^e was 
discussion of various South Vietnamese personalities as possible msrriijers 
of a Govermnent, Su v;ould raise a name and d'Orlandi vzoiLld cozrjiient. 
Su generally did not reveal his opinion hut ICy was obviously unacceptPvhle 
to him." 



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OSLO 3570 « SWiimary of Ajnbassador Algard's visit to Hanoi ^ March 3 -10: 



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"7< 1^16 ForGign Minister underlined also that the North Vietnairiece 

U^point progra;ja must be the fomxlation for a po3,itical resolution of the 

conflict- Apart from what concerned the stopping of the bombing and 

cessation of the acts of war agciinst I^orth VietnejA^ he did not £:et 

Letters forth in such a wcay that the United State^i beforehand must accept 

the entire ^l -point prograjn. He did not say anything on the point of 

time for A^-icrican wibhdrs7;;al but said that \:as a question irhich znust be 

^ndled at the conference table. Nor i^pidd he say anything on how the 

tt'eunificatlon problem vjould be settled nor how long it would take but 

ne repeated that first there vmBt be a political solution in South 

Vietriain and referred to the WIF prograjn vzhich assiimed a separate Sovith 

Vietnamese state for the imniediate f\iture. Insofar as it concerned a 

, political solution for South Vietnam^ the Foreign Minister repeated the 

North Vietnamese position that this was a q^uestion i;Aich must be dis-- 

cussed with the NLF and that Hanoi camiot speak on behalf of South Vietnam 

! He ujiderlined very strongly that recent events in South Vletnairi had shewn 

\ that the regnjiie in Saigon v.^as totally without political basis but at the 

same time events made clear that there was a possibility o£ cooperation 

between the NLF s.nd other political groups < Hovrever he did not go j.nto 
■ 

detail on this point 






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HOR\-?EGIMI-HORTH VIS Timi.IESE COMTA.CTS, JUl^rS I967 - raSRUARY I968 

~ ■■ ■ ■ ^^ 1 " I I L I J ■ .. m . 1 II I I I I i m I J ■ . II .1 _ 1 ■ < I ■ I 1 J . 1 i f . 1 - 

June 1-13, 1967 - Meeting; Wo. 1 

OHIO began^ in effect^ with a transmission by Ambassador Tibbetts 
of a conversation in Peking on 1 June between Ambassador Ole Algard^' 
Norwegian Ambassador to Peking j and the North Vietnamese Ambassador to 
Peking J ITgo Loan* Norwegian Foreign Minister Lyng gave the substance 
of the Algard-Loan ODnversation to Tibbetts, Despite some very interest 
ing and important statements made by Loan^ this cable and subseguent 
cables for several months were EXDIS and were not given a code name. 

Loan stressed four points to Algard: (l) NVN fear that the U.S. 
intended to stay permanently in Vietnam; (2) that Hanoi had only one 
condition for negotiations (sic)^ na.mely the cessation of U.S. bombing; 
(3) that when Hanoi came to the conference table, it ^'would be very 
flexible/^ and is ^'ready for very far-reaching compromises to get an 
end to the war"; and (k) that Hanoi felt it was able to cope with a.lLnost 
any U.S. military activity with its own resources --- except for direct 
occupation of all North Vietnam. 

Algard ex-pressed concern about North Vietnamese treatment of U.S* 
prisoners* Loan said that formal recognition of these men as anything 
but "war criminals" would "legalize American participation in the war-" 

OSLO U53I to SecState (SECRET-EXDIS)^ 1^^ June I967: 



'*2. Following is my informal rendition Algard 's report^ 
p transposed from first to third person; 



"3, Ambassador I^Igo underlined strongly North Vietnamese 
Govt disposed toward negotiations- At same time they were deeply 
mistrustful of Americans' intentions in Vietnam, Steady escala- 
tion and sending of new troops indicated Americans had intention 
of staying permanently in Vietnam- 



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^%, Mgo underlined North Vietnamese Govt imposed only one 
condition for negotiations ^ namely that bombing of North Viet- 
nam be stopped. Clearly having in mind the Chinese^ he went 
to lengths to underline that speeches from other quarters which 
imposed other conditions including full American withdrawal from 
South Vietnam did not EFT not reflect North Vietnam Govt's thought 
On North Vietnamese side one gave decisive weight to stop in bomb- 
ing because this was viewed as respect for Iforth Vietnamese 
sovereignty and such a respect was an absolute condition for 
coming to conference table j but was also the only condition- 
VJhen they had come to conference tabJ.e^ North Vietnam position 
would be very flexible. 'We are^ ' said Ambassador Mgo^ 'ready 
for very far reaching compromises to get an end to the war, * 
Ambassador Algard noted that recently one had impression that 
North Vietnamese' side was cooler toward negotiations. Ambassa- 
dor Mgo denied this strongly* He said that formerly when North 



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Vietna-m showed an interest in negotiations Ajsiericans had taken 
such interest as a sign of weakness and with results of stronger 
escalation* This was background against v/hich one must judge 
some recent speeches on Morth Yietnamese side. Provided there 
would be a stop in bombing ^ Worth Vietnam was ready at any time 
for negotiations and far reaching compromises- 

"6* Arab Mgo said he hoped developments would not RPT not 
take such form that North Vietnam must ask for foreign^ and in 
first Instance Chinese, help. That was one thing that they would 
do their utmost to avoid. To question under what conditions 
would North Vietnamese Govt feel forced to ask for help, he said 
that beforehand one could not KPT not determine fixed criteria* 
He said however that an American invasion of Tforth Vietnam in 
itself would not EPT not necessitate foreign help- North Viet- 
nam had an army of UOO thousand men w^hich would be capable of 
mastering such a situation, Amb Algard had mpression that 
only danger of direct occupation of all North Vietnam would 
force North Vietnamese Govt to ask foreign help. It was plain 
Pjrh ^!go considered it very important to clarify IJIorth Vietnamese 
position on question of foreign help." 

TIBBETTS. 



Jmie 20, 1967 



State responded with an exprei^sion of interest and a desire to have 
the Ulorwegiaris continue the contact- Noting the four major points in the 
l^ first Algard-Loan conversation^ and admitting that Loan's statement that 

bombing was the only condition for talks , was "highly plausible^" State 
suggested Algard react as follows: (l) ascertain the authority with which 

CLoan spoke; (2) stress the Manila Communique in general terms in response 
to Loan's fear of the U,S, intending to stay permanently in Vietnam; (3) 
ascertain whether North Vietnam was insisting on a permanent bombing cessa- 

Ltlonj* (k) stress the U,S. view that the bombing cessation must be accom- 
panied by '^at least some x^^^vate assurance of appropriate reciprocal 
action by North Vietnam"; (5) indicate that the Geneva Accords of 195^ 
p, could be a basis for settlement and try to probe Loan on the compromises 
f envisaged by WJ>h 

State 213389 to Oslo (SECRET-EXDIS), 20 June I967: 

"2,c. Expressed concern that U*S, intends to stay perma- 
nently in Vietnam is of interest- V7e assiLme GON is fully aware 
r of our repeated statements of intent to withdraw and most speci- 

[ fically the precise wording used In the Manila Communique , which 

you should furnish them. 



'M, Discussion of cessation of bombing as only condition 
for talks fits with other private readings as well as Trinh- 
Eurchett interview and appears to us highly plausible. 



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e. Key passage appears to us to be reference to IJVN 
position being 'very flexible' and ITOJ being 'ready for very 
far-reacbing compromises - ' 



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Statements on NTO view of U Tliant likewise seem 
plausible^ although GOM' may be interested that we had strong 
indications IWTJ was displeased with U Thant*s latest initiative 
teijag launched after IWII had apparently given negative reaction 
in Hangoon meeting. 



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References to fTOI reluctance to seek Chinese help 
are highly interesting. Ife are not repeat not ourselves sanguine 
that HTO woiUd not call for Chinese help in event of U,S, in- 
vasion ^ but report of Loan position remains extremely interest- 
ing as indicating depth of IJVIi reluctance. 

"h. We arc particularly appreciative of Algard remarks 
on U,S* prisoners In NVTT, v^hich we believe hit exactly right 
note* 

"3- On basis of this evaluation, we believe it would be 
extremely useful for Algard to have farther conversation with 
Loan, This could be through special meeting or chance encoun- 
ter^ aiid we would see no problt^m with speciaJ_ meeting^ since 
we surmise Loan remarks were intended to elicit some reaction 
and that NVIT would have assumed that we would be informed* 

'^U* Points we suggest Algard make would be as follows: 



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a. Earlier conversation reported to USG, and GON has 
reviewed U.S. views on matters stated. Both GON and IJ,S, 
that Loan was speaking with authority- (This could be so put 
as to elicit any contrary indication,) 



assiane 



, From conversations with USG^ GON is clear that USG 
fully understands IWN concern as to whether USG intends to stay 
permanently in Vietnam, From discussions v/ith USG over long 
period, GON is convinced that USG is toteilly sincere in repeated 
statements that it would seek no permanent military presence 
or bases in Vietnam once settlement is reached ^ and that USG 
and other nations assisting SVIT meant just what they said in 
Manila Coinmunique, (We would prefer that this portion of 
message be left in this general form* It is possible that Loan 
would pick up elements of Manila statement, such as req.ulrement 
of withdrawal of both 'military and subversive' forces. If 
this question should arise ^ Algard might say that it is GON 
understanding that U.S. is referring to regular NVN military 
forces but also to personnel originally from South who accepted 
move to WT^ in 195^ ^^"^^ were thereafter sent back to South* 
Algard might say that he would be glad to get further clarifi- 
cation on this point if desired*) 

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"d. Assuming that I^JW condition calls for^ in effect, 

r permanent cessation of bombing^ USG position remains as it has 

been stated throughout and particularly by Ambassador Goldberg 
In September I966 at TJU and by Secretary Rask in January. U,S, 
p view is that cessation of bomhingj without at least some private 

[^ assurance of appropriate reciprocal military action by NW, 

would create situation of major military advantage to N\'n and 
P would not be conducive to fruitful talks. USG has put forward 

j several general suggestions for timing and nature of KVIir recipro- 

^ cal actions J and President's letter to Ho contained one specific 

proposal that added the element of stopping of reinforcement 
by USG in the South. Canadian proposal of April called for link 
between cessation of bombing and restoring demilitarised status 
of DI4Z under effective supervision^ but Hanoi rejected this* 
What is present Hanoi view on these proposaJ-s^ or do they have 
any other suggestion to make? 



"c. USG accepts that 'cessation' of the bombing of the 
JS^orth and military action ..^^.Linst the Korth is only NVW condi- 
tion for holding talks. NTO has referred to cessation being 
on 'unconditional' basis; V/hat is meant by this? (Rirpose 
here is to clarify whether there may be any distinction between 
usual IJVN statements that bombing must be stopped ' indef initively 
and unconditionally' -- which we have construed to mean perr.a- 
nently -- and occasional other statements that stoppage of bonib- 
ing must merely be 'unconditional. ' We ourselves have assumed 
that no difference is intended between these two formulatioiiSj - 
but direct inqtuiry could be useful in nailing this down.) 



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"e- USG natux^ally particularly interested in Loan remark 
that WT^ v^ould be flexible and prepared for compromises. !fesie 
USG position is that settlement could be based on Geneva Accords 
of 1954 J and USG would be prepared an any time to talk directly 
^or indirectly about all the elements of such a settlement, in- 
cluding any aspects WTO wished to discuss. If Loan could at 
least indicate areas in which MVIT envisages ' compromises ^ ' this 
might be helpful in furthering better understanding of positions. 
Would the areas of possible compromise include the timing and 
sequence of actions related to withdrawal of forces on both 
sides J for example? Would they relate to position of UILF in 
the South? USG has consistently taken position that lUSF can- 
not possibly be regarded as 'sole legit jjnate representative* 
of SV]^ and has also made clear that it cannot accept third of 
Hanoi four points, for which it finds no warrant in Geneva 
Accords of I95U? Is Hanoi suggesting its position on these 
points is now flexible? (Purpose of this inquiry is of course 
to feel out the key question of what Loan had in mind. If we f 
knew the area Loan was referring to, a most fruitful exchange 
of views might then become possible > and we v/ould of course be 



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prepared to discuss these issues in depth with GOrL ) In this 
connection, USG has made it clear to GOIf that it too is prepared 
to discuss realistic compromises^ viewing the matter of an ulti- 
I mate settlement from the standpoint of the Geneva Accords of 
. 195^' USG has repeatedly noted IWIi statements likewise express- 
ing approval of Geneva Accords of 195^^ > ^nd areas of common ground 
of compromise might well be found within this framework. 

"f • We would leave it to Algard whether to raise the suh- 
. ject of prisoners again. We v^ould have nothing to add to his 
i excellent presentation^ and it may be that he should merely say 
that his previous remarks reflected GON view^ and that he would 
be interested in anything Loan might have to say to him on this 
subject, (We think representations on prisoners can be more 
effective coming^ as they did in first conversation, from view- 
point of GON itself, a.nd that USG support might if anything be 
less helpful in explicit form.) 



"g. We would not repeat not suggest Algard try to reflect 
r ' any USG views on conditions of MVl^ calling for Chinese help. 
L. \ If this topic should come up, Algard might express clear GOrf 

understanding that USG has repeatedly said it does not threaten 
HV¥ territory or regime and has no objective other than permitting 
l_ SVH to detez^mine its own future without external interference." 

KATZENMCli (Drafted by W.P, Bundy) 



1 June 2 9. I967 



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Tibbetts reported that after his first conversation with Algard, Loan 
had left for Hanoi, and that he was not expected to return to Peking until 
August. Algard was going back to Oslo for further instructions. 



August 5-lS, 1967 - Meeting J7o. 2 



■ The second meeting between Algard and Loan carried both dialogue and 

f substance forward, Algard made it plain that he was informed of U.S. views, 

^- and Loan said that he would report to Hanoi. Loan did add, however, that 

he was prepared to comment "from a personal nature." This may indicate 
that Loan's standing in party circles is quite high and secure. 



After reiterating the two mjxin points of the first meeting (bombing pause 
is the only condition for talks and flexibility and compromise once talks 

! begin), Loan made several interesting observations. He said that every time 

NVN "had previously shown willingness to negotiate, it had been misunderstood 
in the U.S. and seen as a weakness* The conseq^uence. . .each time /being7 

r a new escalation on the American side." In this respect, he noted that 



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world opinion was against the U.S. and that negro riots in the U,S. were 
part of this overall picture. 



CLoan eraphasized a very new element in Hanoi's thinking* He said that 
"unsuccessful negotiations would be worse than no repeat no negotiations 
I at all. . .It therefore appeared desirable to assure^ prior to the starting 

Cof negotiations^ that they would yield results." As a sign of Hanoi's 
flexibility in this regard j Loan gave examples of compromise: (l) re- 
I unification could be ''postponed to an indefinite point of tinie in the 

f" future"; (2) ".WN is today ready to accept a separate South Vietnamese 
; j state which is neutral and based on a coalition government" j and (3) that 
^ the timing of the withdrawal of U.S. troops is not a decisive issue. 



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communist" when describing this South Vietnamese state. It subseq^uently 
turned out that he had. 

Loan expressed a desire to maintain the contact. 

OSLO 66^4 to SecState (SECIIET-EXDIS) , 16 August I967 (Section 1 of 2): 



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"3 ^^hen North Vietnam had previously shown willingness 

to negotiate J it had been misunderstood in the U.S. and seen as 
a sign of weakness . The conseq.uence had each time been a new 

I . escalation on the Ajn^i^ican side. It was obvious that tTorth 

Vietnam did wish to reach a peaceful solution^ but the military 

f-n situation was from the North Vietnamese vie\-rpoint very favora- 

ble^ and there was no HFF no reason for North Vietnam to let 
itself be forced into negotiations- QUOTE Sooner or later we 
will win this war UNQUOTE, he said. QUOTE V^e know how to 

f fight J and m^QUOTE^^ he added with a smile, QUOTE We are not 

^ RPT not any Middle Eastern nation UNQUOTE. He also pointed out 

that the Amex^ican position was weakened by the pressure of world 

C# opinion on the U.S. and by the internal problems of the Ameri- 
cans, particularly the recent race riots which he considered 
had a direct connection with the resistance of the American ne- 

Cgroes against the war in Vietnam- In this connection he recalled 
that the French did not RPT not lose Vietnam at Dien Bien Riu, 
but in P5.ris. However^ even if North Vietnam did not RPT not feel 
herself under pressure^ militarily or otherwise, to enter into 
negotiations, it was of course realized that it would be of 
benefit to end the war, and he underlined that the previous 
declarations on willingness to negotiate, provided that the 
bombing be stopped^ remained valid." 



[ 



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Section 2: 

"....Amb Ngo then discussed the assumptions for the start- 
ing of negotiations and repeated the position that an absolute^ 
but the only, condition for negotiations was a cessation of the 
bombing by Americans, He again pointed out that this was a 

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question which involved the sovei^eignty of ITorth Yietnam* It 
v/ould "be to admit the existence of a state of war if North Viet- 
nam accepted to QUOTE respond UNQUOTE in the form of a corres- 
ponding reduction of forces. In this connection I stated that 
it vras probably not KPT not certain that an official declaration 
by Iforth Vietnam on the extent of a possible QUOTE response 
UNQUOTE vj^as assumed. A confidential communication indicating 
what the North Vietnamese intended to undex^take might be suffi- 
cient, Amb Ngo said that unsuccessful negotiations would be 
worse than no RPT no negotiations at all. The opening of ne- 
gotiations would create a v:ave of optimism throughout the worlds 
and a possible breakdown might lead to conseq^uences which would 
be difficult to foresee. It therefore appeared desirable to 
assui^ej prior to the starting of negotiations ^ that they would 
yield results- The possibilities for a favorable result would 
thus have to be claz^ified to a certain degree in ad'^'ance^ If 
negotiations ^vere started ^ the North Vietnajnese attitude would 
be flexible^ as the Amb had stated previously^ and the Iforth 
Vietnamese were prepared to enter into far-reaching coirrpromises. 
But as he did not RPT not possess :exact information, he was 
not HPT not in a position to Indicate in concrete terms where 
this willingness to compromise would express itself on the North 
Vietnamese side. He did^ however ^ mention the North Vietnamese 
attitude with regard to the demarcation line during the Geneva 
negotiations as an example of North Vietnamese readiness to 
compromise. Furthermore, he said. North Vietnam had already 
made knovm a very significant concession^ based on a realistic 
evaluation of the situation- The Geneva agreement stipulated 
that Vietnam should he unified within two years. Our objective 
today J he said> is considerably lower. The qxiestion of unifica- 
tion is postponed to an indefinite point of time in the future. 
North Vietnam is today ready to accept a separate South Viet- 
namese state which is neutral and based on a coalition govt- 
Buch a govt could have connections both with East and West 
and accept assistance from countries that might wish to give 
such assistance. The Amb stated that the tiiae of the with- 
drait;al of the American, troops was not HPT not a decisive 
question* In this connection he pointed to the agreement on 
the withdrawal of the French troops. Hov^ever, the question of 
representation was of great importance. On this point the 
Americans would have, to accept the political situation in 
South Vietnam as it is, as de Gaulle did in Algeria. North 
Vietnam could not HPT not negotiate on behalf of the South 
Vietnamese, Amb Ngo finally said that he appreciated the con- 
tact established with the Norwegian Embassy^ and that he vould 
like it to be maintained,-- 

TIBBETTS, 



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August 18, 1967 

^' — III -' . ■ J J 

State responded matter-of-ractly to the second meeting between Algard 
and Loan- While there seemed to be rc^riy provocative statements made^by 
Loan^ State's analysis said that except for the point about talking in ad- 
vance of negotiations in order to assure that the negotiations are success- 
ful, everything else was old hat- Further explanation on this talks- 
negotiations point was needed. 



rStat.e also began to grapple vith the thorny problem of North Vietnamese 
reciprocity for U.S. bombing pause. The cable said that the U*S. was "flex- 
ible as to the form and nature of some corresponding restraint." In other 
words J Hanoi need not make a formal declaration of reciprocity. A bone 
\ was th.rown in to the effect that we would discuss at a very early stage 

recognition of Ilorth Yietnamese sovereignty. 



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state 23083 to Oslo (SECEET-SrXDIS), l8 August 196? 

"1, Vfe have read with greatest interest Ambassador Algard's 
full report of his August 5 conversation with North Vietnamese 
Ambassador Loan. For most part^ views expressed by Loan do not 
represent substantive change from known Hanoi positions ^ e.g, 
seeming flexibility on such matters as timing of U,S, withdrawal 
and reunification coupled with unbudglng Insistence that U.S- 
accept TILF-type coalition and apparently recognize and negotiate 
with IttiF on Algerian parallel. This of course goes to heart 
of matter J whether HLF is to be permitted dominant role in souths 
and Loan's comments add nothing to what vre already know on this 
score* 



C^'2* Nevertheless J one passage of report we find of consider- 
able interest^ namelyj Loan's conclusion that if 'negotiations' 
were begun and broke dovm^ this might lead to consequences which 

C*would be difficult to foresee^ and that it would therefore appear 
desirable to assure in advance that negotiations would yield 
results. Loan's subse<iuent statement that 'the possibilities for 
-- a favorable result would thus have to be clarified to a certain 

i degree in advance' represents perhaps clearest indication that 

^' we have had thus far that Hanoi might be interested in preliminary 

secret, private discussions in order to explore outline of possi- 
r ble settlement. 



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^"3* We think it important to clarify this point without 
waiting for response from. Hanoi to Loan's report of August 5 
conversation- (We note Loan's expression of doubt on August 15 
that he would receive any reaction.) We would therefore propose 
that Algard be instructed to contact Loan right away and take 
following line: 



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(a) Horv-^egian governinent has noted Loan's observation that 
unsuccessful negotiations would be vorse than no negotiations 
at all and th^at it is desirable to explore in advance all possi- 
bilities to that negotiations could yield results- The Nor^fegian 
govermiLent has reason to believe that the USG is prepared to con- 
sider practical means to avoid this difficultyjt if in fact it 
arises J and to explore all possibilities that exist for favorable 
outcome of negotiations, Non-fegian government would be inter- 
ested in learning Ambassador Loan's views on this. 

(b) In this connection^ v^ith respect to Ambassador Loan's ccrmnent 
that cessation of bombing was <iuestiQn involving sovereignty of 
North Vietnam^ and that if North Yietnam agreed to responsive 
action it v/ould h?.ve to admit existence of a state of war with 
U,S, ^yorwegian govertment believes that this issue does not in 
view of USG represent insuperable obstacle. USG has never sought 
any formal declaration by 5orth Vietnamese government as to what 
it might do in response to bombing cessation and has always made 
clear that it was flexible as to form and nature of some corres- 
ponding restraint. On this point also Norwegian government be- 

I 11 eves USG could furnish assurances as to recognition of Iforth 
Vietnam sovereignty and that this question should be subj'ect 
for preliminary secret discussions mentioned above." 

RUSK (Drafted by E- I sham) 

In Oslo 693 J Tibbetts clarified Loan's "non- communist" statement. 
Tibbetts reported: "Algard said Loan had spoken of a separate South Viet' 
namese state which would be neutra.! in foreign affairs and of which coali 
tion govt would be non-- communist and that Loan clearly assumed such govt 
would not repeat not be communist dominated *, even though it would have 
Viet Cong participation," 



State responded on the same day in 23631^ saying that "We have heard 
^ the sfeiae noise before j" but w^ould be interested in seeing if Algard could 

1^ elicit "specifics on safeguards against eventual communist domination." 



^ust 21, 1967 - Meeting No, 3 



Loan invited Algard to come to Hanoi for further discussions. The 
jWori'/egians recommended Algard 's accepting the invitation. Loan also showed 
Interest in what the U.S. meant by being "flexible" on "some corresponding 
restraint," 

OSLO 722 to SecState (SECRET-EXDIS) , 21 August I967: 

"2. ...Loan asked if Algard willing to accept invitation 
to Hanoi. Algard promised early reply* Ugo gave no RPT no direct 



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I reaction to our previous communication. He again underlined the 

question of the cessation of bombing^ national sovereignty and 

^^ dignity, but a-t the sane time test the sincere will of the Ameri- 

cans to negotiate- Hov/ever, interested in concrete information 
about vhat is meant by QUOTE flexible as to form and nature of 
some corresponding restraint UNQUOTE in above mentioned telegram^ 

r Point B* He said American recognition national 3elf -determination 

decisive point- Concretely he asked us find out if USA v^illing 
to base possible negotiations on this principle and v/illing accept 
r^ liberation front as political factor- Eepeated that Eanoi accepts 

i non-cormp-unist coalition govt neutral in foreign affiars. Grate- 

ful early reply invitation Hanoi. Desirable consultations in 
Oslo before possible trip. UNQUOTE- " 

Y TIBBETTS. 

August 22 - September 1$, 1967 

^ Ambassador Algard returned to Oslo from Peking, and on September 8 

and 13 met with Chester Cooper to receive further instructions. In this 

C meeting the Norvfcglans stressed that they "wouJ^d not in any sense serve 
as a mediator-" Cooper c[ueried Algard' on a number of points- First, 
Algard said th3,t it was his impression that Loan intended the NLF role 
as a "political factor" in all stages of negotiations. Cooper said tliat 
it ¥Ould be troublesome to have the IttF represented at the preliminary 
negotiations- AJ-gard said that he had the impression that WN divided 
the negotiations into q_uestions "affecting relations between Hanoi a.nd 
•^ the U.S. on the one hand and South Vietne.mese problems on the other." 
12 Secondly, on the "non- communist issue," Algard said that Loan stressed 

Hanoi's recognition of the need to live with two differexit social and 

E political situations "for some years to corae*" Third, Loan said that the 
present GVN was "a political factor" in SVTTj implying that there would 
have to be dealings with it. 



Cooper Indicated to Algard that we would be "prepared to indicate 
near the beginning of negotiations and in detail our conception of the 
final settlement," 

There was much discussion about obtaining a visa to Hanoi for Algard, 
and gezieral acceptance that some considerable delay would be entailed. 



L State Memorandum from s/aH - Chester L. Cooper for s/S - Benjamin H. 

Read J dated September 15 j 19S7j Subject: Report on Conversations 
in Oslo with Mr- Jacobsen of the Norwegian Foreign Office and 
f Ambassador Algard, Norwegian Ambassador to Peking: 



"a. Meeting on Friday, September 8 (sent as Oslo IO63) 

"5- I sought clarification of Loan's comments on the 
role of the NLF, specifically whether 'political factor' meant 



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as a factor in preliminary talks j actua.l negotiations ^ or in 
i^ a post-settlement situation* Algard said his impression was that 

Loan meant all thz*ee stages. I then elaborated on the extent 

Cto which we recogni2ed the NLF as a political factor in a post-, 
settlement situation and/or the ways they might participate in 
negotiations. We cannot recognize them as a government or as the 

Csole representative for the people of Vietnam.. In the last analy- 
sis^ we believe the ELF q^uestion should he resolved in South 
Vietnam by the various elements there. We will be prepared to 
accept anything which the Government of South Vietnam is ready 
I to accept. It will be troublesome if in the preliminary nego-^ 

L. tiations the riLF must participate in every stage. We need clari- 

fication on this point. Algard said he was not C3^uite sure^ but 
r he had the impression that the North Vietnamese divided the problem 

} into cLuestions affecting relations between Hanoi and the U-S, 

on the one handj and South Vietnamese problems on the other* 

rLoan had stressed that Hanoi could not speak for the JJIiF on 
matters affecting South Vietnam. Algard said Loan had not been 
more specific on this point. 



''7, On the cLuestlon of /non^communist South Vietnam^' 
I said that^ if indeed Loan had said they vrould accept a non- 
coEmiunist South Vietnam and had said so under instructions ^ this 
was probably the first time this formula had been used, Algard 
said Loan had stressed that Hanoi was wlU.ing to accept a non- 
communist government which was a neutral government j, and v/hich 
would have relations with both East and West and received aid 
from both sides. Subseq.uently> at a reception on the day before 
AJ^gard left^ Loan had said that Hanoi recognized the fact that 
they had to live for some years to come in a Vietnam which would 
have two different social and political situations , 

^'8, Loan had not explained what he meant by a 'coal- 
»ition goverimicnt' andj in fa,ctj used the terms 'coalition govern- 
ment" and 'non- communist government' almost interchangeably 
without giving an indication as to the possible structure of the 
government^ political grouping, etc. He had not stated that 
they would accept representatives of the present South Vietnamese 
Goverrmientj but his tone gave the impression that -they would. 
In fact. Loan had said he deeply disliked the South Vietnamese 
Government but, nevertheless , it was 'a political factor' in 
South Vietnam. (Algard cautioned that in considering the term 
'non-conmiunist government* Loa.n has indicated from time to time 
he does not consider the NLF communist.) Loan told Algard he 
envisages a government with communist participation but which is 
not cammunist-controlled. Loan had repeated his remarks about a 
non- communist government directly to Algard in French at a sub- 
sea^ent casual meeting^ again using the phrase 'non-communist. ' 



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L ■ ^*lU, In response to questions^ I dealt at seme length 

I' on our recognition of the problem of 'face* for North Vietnam. 

CI I said we can go fairly far^ but there are Worth Vietnamese troops 
; in South Vietnam (v/e have ]}forth Vietnamese prisoners as well as 
' documentary evidence); they must get out and their departure must 
be monitored. This would be a matter for the negotiations phase 
rather than for Algard to deal vrith. We are very flexible as to 
^ hew the negotiations should proceed > whether in secret or public 

view J and also flexible as to level andj within limits of security 
J and commimications^ place. The problem of withdrawing military 

forces is extremely complicated and will present great difficulties 
for the Worth Vietnamese if they refuse to acknowledge their 

C presence in South Vietnam. But so long as they get out and we 

are sure they get outj Hanoi can deal with its "face* problem. 



< 



J 



^^9* I raised the question concerning Loan's com^ient 
that the matter of the U.S, withdrawal was not decisive. Algard 
said Loan had referred to the Geneva Agreement in this context 
using the exanrple of the withdrawal of French troops which ^ he 
said J had been no problem- 

"10. I asked about the statement Loa,n had made to the 
effect that if negotiations failed* it would be worse than no 
negotiations at all* Algard said this had been a rather sudden 
statement by Loan who had not elaborated further. 

'*11. I said we had thought it might be useful to have 
a type of pre -negotiation negotiation which would create the 
setting and mood and clear away some of the problems; Jacobsen 
said this would give them no trouble • Algard said it would de- 
pend on where the preliminaries ended. 



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"15 • Algard said It seemed that we were thinking of two 
pliases^ the first to establish the conditions of negotiations, 
the second the negotiations themselves; his mission would be in 
the first phase* I said that we are prepared to indicate near 
the beginning of negotiations and in detvail ovx conception of 
the final settlement. In effect ^ we are prepared to settle first 
and negotiate later- Hanoi knows pretty much already from our 
public statements what we will agree to, including our willing- 
ness to" accept self-determination within South Vietnam and for 
Vietnam as a whole. We are ready to have the people of South 
Vietnam decide the extent to which the I^fLF participates in its 
government * 

"B. Meeting on Wednesday^ September 13 (sent as Oslo IO87) 

*^7* Algard said his Swedish colleague in Peking is con- 
vinced that there is a marked divergence between Hanoi and the IffiF, 



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to which I replied that there may^ of Gourse^ be naturaJ_ 
differences of view between North and South and long-time combatants 
as opposed to more recent reinforcements^ but this did not change 
the basic factor of North Vietnamese control* Algard said that 
in Peking the Viet Cong representative apparently had very few 
contacts with the Vietnamese Embassy which could ^ of course > be 
part of the pretense." 



L 



State 35015 sent on 9 September indicated that further study was re- 
quired of the NorT/7egian conversations. State also indicated seme concern 
p about Cooper's remarks to Algard with respect to his impending trip being 
1^ "construed as an insurance related to our bombing of Hanoi," Tibbetts 

responded in Oslo 1079 of H September that the insurances given Algard 
P^ were vague and that there was no problem with respect to commitments on 

U-S. bombing while Algard would be In tla^noi. 



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State responded to both Oslo conversations T^ith instructions to hold 
off on the "immediate pursuit of OHIO channel" since USG was now in "indirect 
channel of communication to Hanoi," Responding to Cooper's suggestion on 
rejecting the IvJAllIGOLD ten points^ State suggested j instead ^ confining 
Algard 's fut^ire conmients to the North '\[ietnamese to points previously made 
by Loan ajid to the reciprocity issue, 

STAEE 36328 to AmEmbassy Oslo (SECKET-NODIS), 12 September 1967j 
Kef: State 35015; Oslo 1063j 108?: 

"l- As you can surmise^ developments in another area 
have caused us to hold off in giving you instructions on 
message that Algard might take- Weighing delay and possi- 
ble GON feeling that we have lost interest, we now believe 
you should inform them in utmost confidence that indirect 
channel of .communication to Hanoi opened up following 
Algard 's last contact ^ and that we are now pursuing cer- 
^ tain inq^uiries through that channel. Response is so far 
negative J but we are continuing to probe ^ and therefore 
frankly feel immediate pursuit of Ohio channel could be 
embarrassing to Algard and ourselves. Please request 
Algard to notify us as soon as he has heard from his post 
in Peking re travel permit to Hanoi, and advise him that 
we will then give him most meaningful^ timely message 
we can then devise in light of all developments up to 
point of his departure, 

"2. In conveying this message^ you might add that^ 
since Hanoi is of course aware of the indirect channel * 

currently in use^^ it would be our best guess that they 
Will hold off in giving Algard his visa. In shorty they • 
will probably be playing a waiting game just as we are. 



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"3- You should make clear that this reflects no 
decline whatever in our interest in develorping the Algard 
channel* As sophisticated diplomats ^ they must realize 
that this kind of duplication of channels can arise in 
a situation of this sort, and that it then becomes unwise 
to attempt duplicate channel- At same time^ other channel 
is tenuous and may break down^ and this among other factors 
prevents us from describing to GON what exactly is being 
discussed. 



r"4, FYI. Provisionally we are negative on inject- 
ing the Polish Ten Points ^ which Hanoi has never taken up 
in any way. We dre more inclined to thiols: that any use- 
r' ful message through Algard will confine itself to the 

1^ subjects^ other than reciprocal action fox bombing, on 

which he has had faintly interesting comments from Loan. 

LBut we are holding our fire couipletely until we see how 
the next few days develop. End FYI." 

Tibbetts responded in Oslo 1132 of 13 September^ saying that the Nor- 
l wegians understood the sensitivity and Lwould wait for further instructions 

L> from Washington. 

r Oslo 1366 of £8 September and Oslo 1J4O7 of 30 September dealt with 

the problem of Algard 's returning to his post in Peking. It was learned 
that Ambassador Loan had departed Peking for Hanoi on 7 September and had 
returned to Peking probably around 29 September- Loan ha,d not as yet 



[.. given any indication regarding the authorization of Algard *s visit to 



Hanoi J nor did he give any sign of interest on substantive matters. In 
the meantime J a Norvregian journalist indicated that he suspected Algard 's 
return to Peking might have something to do with North Vietnamese contacts 
and a Vietnam peace settlement. 

# 
3-17 October 1967 

State (^7603) responded to Oslo I366 and 1^07 on 3 October. Ihe gist 
of the message was that USG^ desired that Algard stay on in Ilorway until 
at least the end of that week, giving "further time both to see whether 
Hanoi follows up in providing visa, and to permit us to weigh other indi- 
cations' of Hanoi's attitude that might emerge following Pi^esident's speech 
of September 29 and other developments. 

Bovey replied in Oslo 1^57 on 3 October that there vrould be no diff i- , 
culty in Algard remaining at least to the end of the week- Some problems > 
were also raised with respect to communications betv/een Oslo and Peking, 
It was decided that communications were not adeq.uate for rapidity or security. 



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On 5 October^ Bovey sent Oslo I5O3 which repeated that there were no 
further developments on the Algard trip to Hanoi ^ and that Algard felt 
he should not delay his return to Peking. Algard 's intention was to 
leave Oslo on 19 Octoher unJ.es s he hears othei-^^ise regarding authorisa- 
tion to visit Hanoi, In this same cable ^ Bovey reported that the Nor- 
wegian Charge in Peking passed the following message: "During absence 
Loan in September NVN Embassy Peking had stated that Hanoi still inter- 
ested in contact and Algard did not HPT not think this v/as merely casual 
remark." Algard explained Hanoi's Inaction regarding his visit in terms 
of increased U.S. bombing in JWN, 

On 9 October in Oslo 1567> Bovey reported the following message 
from Norwegian Charge in Peking: 



"2. Begin text --^ Ambassador Kgo emphasized in a 
long conversation today that a visit to Hanoi for the 

rtlme being is not EPT not in q^uestion^ because of the 
American escalation/ The Pforth Vietnamese Ambassador 
stressed in particular that Hanoi views with distrust 
all American peace proposals and that Hanoi cannot 
J EPT not be forced to negotia1?e, A visit can be possible 

L only after cessation of the bombing. The Amb Indicated 

that further contact in Peking v/ould be unwise for all 
parties^ and mentioned possible contact Hanoi -Washington 
via the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. End text," 

Algard^ therefore ^ decided to depart for his post on 12 October, 

•- On 10 October > State 51536 reported that U,S. still regarded an Algard 

trip to Hanoi as constructive^ and that "v/e are interested in obtaining 

E elaboration of mention by Loan of possible contact Hanoi-V^ashiiigton via 
Soviets as well as other aspects of Loan's remarks to Charge." Bovey 
responded in Oslo 1597 on 11 October that State 51536 had been received 
and feocuted. 



October 18, 1967 

■I ■ I I 1^1 I r - 

On 16 October J AJ^gard transmitted further details on conversation 
between NoiTfegian Charge and Loan, 

OSLO 1739 to SecState (SECRET-NOJ)IS)> I8 October I967, 
Ref : Oslo 1567 and 1597 

''2, Begin Msg - Amb Ngo used the expression 
QUOTE insecure to both parties UNQUOTE regarding a 
continuation of exchange of views in Peking. The 
reference to the Soviet Ministry of foreign Affairs 



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was clearly intended to give a hint to alternative 
possibilities for contact. The general tenor of Aifib 
Ngo's statement gave the impression^ on the other 
hand, that Hanoi for the time being is not HPT not 
very interested in making contact. End Msg<" 



Ifcveinber 2. I967 



The Tforvegians ha^nded Bovey a farther elaboration of recent despatches 

rfroin Peking. One point that emerged clearly was Loan's questioning of Norway's 
role as a middleman in negotiations ^ implying that the Norwegians yrere 
T ally bartering for the Americans* Loan also gave the Norwegians to 
r uaderstand that H3,noi would not negotiate under present circumstances ^ 
[^ especially the U.S. bombings. Loan added that Peking vas an "insecure" 

^lace for contacts j and that Moscow would be more desirable. 



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OSLO 1903 to SecState (SECRET-MODIS)^ 2 November I967, 
Hef: Oslo 1739 

"1, PonOff (SecGen Boye and Desk Sandegren) 
handed me evening Nov one translation of (a) despatch 
dated Oct I8 from Ainb Algard in Peking and (b) enclo- 
sure thereto which is Norwegian Charge's fuller report 
of his talk with Loan Oct 10 ^ mentioned reftel. 






^ , ; A, QUOTE enclosed is a note of the 11th 

October J 19^7 j on the conversation between Secretary 
of Embassy Tangeraas and the Amb of North Vietnam 
the 10th Oct J 1967> in Peking p Amb Ngo's remarks 

Cseem to indicate not RPT not only that a harder atti- 
tude on the question of peace negotiations in general 
is evident in Hanoi ^ but also that the desirability 
p of using Norvray as a middle -man has been reconsidered - 

I While Ngo as late as the 19th August expressed full 

confidence in the Koi'wegian government xa this matter ^ 
it is now being^said that Norway is QUOTE indirectly 
r involved EPJD QUOTE. The Amb also used^ in a different 

L context^ the term QUOTE Amez'ican satellite countries 

UNQUOTE > but it was not HFT not clisar whether this 
^ referred to Norway as well, , . .Obsei'vers in Peking 

L agree that the North Vietnamese attitude towards nego- 

tiations for peace has hardened j while at the same 
p . time believing that a struggle concerning the future 

line in this question presently is taking place within 
the party leadership in Hanoi, It is being pointed 
out that the intensification of the American bombing 
j attacks probably has strengthened the more extremist 

^ group ^ led by Le .Duan and Truong Chinh- In the summer 

the impression was that this group v^as in a weaker 

L position^ as a consequence of the death of 

General Thanh UNQUOTE- 






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B, QUO'rE Having received the Ministry's 
instructions the 6th October^ I immediately contacted 
%Oj who J however J did not EPT not receive me mitil 
the 10th October* I began by asking if there was any- 
thing new with regai-d to the time for the planned 
visit of Amb Algard to Hanoi, I said that \^e vjould 
appreciate it if we could receive a reaction if possi- 
ble within the next day^ as l^r- Algard planned to 
retiu'U to Peking the iHh Oct if the visit only could 
take place later* I emphasized that Algai'd was ready 
to postpone his depart i^r-o if a visit could take place 
in the near future- Ngo replied that the situation 
in Vietnam had totally changed in the course of the 
last few months, since he last law ¥r. Algard, The 
reason was the American bombing of North Vietnam and 
the general escalation of the war. He underlined that 
Hanoi is stronger militarily and that American losses 
constantly increase. The frequent peace feelei's from 
the American side via Airier lean QUOTE satellite coun- 
tries UNQUOTE is now being viewed with suspicion a^d 
considered as attempts to lur,e Hanoi into a trap, 
Ngo stressed that because of this a visit by ]-lr» Al- 
gard was not RPT not desirable for the time being - 
If a visit had taken place not it could do more harm 
than good as far as a futtire soJ.ution was concerned. 
Ngo asked if I knew the contents of Mr- Algard 's in^ 
structions and he appeared very interested in this. 
I replied that I was not EPT not infoi-med of the con- 
tents and that I asstimed they would be ready only 
liTimediately before the visit takes place. 1 empha- 
sized that Algard J for this reason, later would have 
to return to Oslo for consultations if the visit did 
not RFr not take place in the immediate future, Kgo 
then said that US iias no EPT no business at all being 
in Vietnam and that one should rather attempt to in- 
flueiice Washington to Initiate cessation of the bomb- 
ing and a military de-escalation^ which can lead to 
a Bolutiouj than constantly to exert pressure on 
Hanoi. To this I replied that the Norvregian Govt 
was interested^ indeed that negotiations would start, 
which of cotirse did not EPT not presume that a solu- 
tion should tax unilaterally the interests of Hanoi, 
Ngo answered that he was aware of the Nor^;egian posi- 
tion on the Vietnam question, but he added that Norway 
vas not EPT not neutral, but QUOTE Indirectly involved 

UNQUOTE vmen I was about to leave, Mr. Ngo said 

that further exchange of opinions in Peking was QUOTE 
insecure for both parties UNQUOTE and that Hanoi had, 
in other places, contacts able to convey messages, 
if further contact is desired. He mentioned the 
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow as 

one of these contacts," 




17 



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. r rrovember ik^ 196? 

L ^ 

I In Oslo 2033 J Tibbetts reported that Norwegian politics might coBipli- 

rcate and compromise the OHIO track* It seemed that in a recent visit of 
Prime Minister Lyng to Poland, he and Rapacki exchanged inforniation about 
negotiations contacts, Lyng claimed that Rapacki had told him ''in great 

C detail about the Polish effort 'on U.S. behalf to open contact in Decem- 
ber 1966/' In replyj Lyng said that the Norwegians had also unsuccess- 
fully tried to open contact. Jacobsen brought to Lyng's attention^ in 
the meantime J that "Algard channel not HFT not so dead as FonHln seemed 
{ to believe J since on November 9j ^^^e day I<yng left for Poland, a message 

had been received from Algard stating that Loan had expressed interest 
in continuing discreet contacts with Algard (as well as telling Algard he 
had been satisfied with Mr, Lyng's speech in the Ulf)-" T-^^bbetts feared 
that Lyng might be tempted to use the Forvregian contact as ^*a possible 
easy way out of domestic difficulty over foreign policy," Tibbetts asked 

r State authorisation to tell Lyng that "we consider this channel too im- 
portant to Create prejudice against it-" On 1^^ November in State 69391^ 
State concurred in Tibbett's request. On I6 Noveoiber in Oslo 2120, Tibbetts 
said: "Estimates are that government will survive debate with narrow margin 

L despite pigheadedness of sone liberals ^ So maybe Lyng will relax for time 
being." 



December 1^^ I967 



Loan sought out Algard on two occasions in early frovember. Loan's 
P message was simple — American escalation meant that there was no puz^pose 

in Hanoi negotiating at this time. 



p OSLO 2501 to SecState (SECEET-NODIS), ik December 1967, 

L Ref: Oslo 2083: 



"1* There follows text Ailler report received by 
FonOff by pouch from Axrh Algard Peking re further con- 
tacts with WM Amb Loan (Ngo), This report, which is 
dated Nov 10, expands info already given by under Secy 
Jacobsen (para four reftel) to Amb Tibbetts Nov ik. 
QUOTE Some time after iny return to Fekii^ I met Amb Ngo 
at a reception and had an opportunity to exchange a few 
words with him. The Axobassador regretted that my trip 
to Hanoi could not RPT not take place, and he maintained 
that the American escalation of the air war the last 
few months had confirmed that the distrust of the 
North Vietnamese vrith regard to the intentions of the 
Americans was Justified. There was for Hanoi no RPT 
no purpose in negotiating under these circuiristances. 



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Amb Hgo approached me dui^ing the reception at the Soviet 
Embassy Nov ?• He let it be understood that he rather 
wished that our contacts continue ^ in a discreet manner ^ 
that is, that we exchange points of view when meeting 
accidentally at receptions and sijnilar occasions. 
Without stating it directly, he let me understand 
that there would be other days after this one and 
that our contacts then could prove to be useful. 
UNQUOTE 

"2- In conveying this report Desk Officer Sande- 
gren called my attention to phrasing which indicates 
that Loan appears to have taken initiative on both 
occasions and that on second he seems to have sought 
Algard out, 

"3- Norwegian FonOff regards second Loan apprach 
Nov 7 ^'3id Implications of last sentence, however de- 
viously conveyed, as hopeful indication WN desire 
not RFf not to close down circuit entirely. Sandegren 
said expression QUOTE days after this one UNQUOTE 
liaplies in Norwegian that better days may lie ahead." 

BOVEY 



I- 



January H, 1958 



OSLO £727 to SecState (SECKET-NOJ}IS), h January I968, 
tr Ref; Oslo 2501- 

"1. Ans teen sen called me on January h to give me 
the following translation of a cable sent by GON Amb 
to Peking January 3j. I968. 



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"2. QUOTE A representative of the Embassy of 
North Vietnam yesterday (January 2) said to Ambassa- 
dor Algard that the Foreign Minister's speech on 
C December 29 5 I967 contained 'new elements,' He 

declined to make further coirj3ients, but would- send 
the complete text as soon as it was received in 
r Peking J 'as it will be of interest to the Norwegian 

L Government * ' Letter follows . UNQUOTE " 



[ 



TIBEETTS 



January 9> 1968 



r OSLO 2789 to SecState CSECEE'T-KODIS), 9 January I968, 

*■- Eef: Oslo- 2727: 

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"1. Ansteensen gave me January 9 following two 
texts: First text is tVanslation of pouched report 
dateci January U from Ambassador Algard in Peking 
amplifying report sent by cable reftel: 

I *At a Cuban reception on 2nd inst, a younger 

staff member of the North Vietnamese Embassy approached 
me and asked if I had heard that the North Vietnamese 
Foreign Minister I^Jguyen Trinh had made an important 
speech on December 29 ^ 196? ? in the Mongolian Embassy 
in Hanoi. I replied that X had hea.rd over the radio 
; the Agence Finance Presse report on the speech^ but, 
\ as far as I understood/ some uncertainty was prevail- 

ing as to whether the I^ench correspondent had under- 
stood the speech correctly. The said staff member 
I stated that the North Vietnamese Embassy not yet had 

received the full text of the Foreign Minister's 
; speech. Nevertheless^ he could say that the speech 
^' contained QUOTE new elem^ents UMQUOTE He declined 

to make further comments ^ but would send me the com- 
plete text as soon 3,s it was received in Peking, 
I QUOTE as it certainly will bq of interest to the 
j Norwegian Government UNQUOTE. 

"2. Second text is the translation of a cable 
received by Foreign Office from Ambassador Algard in 
Peking dated January 3- 

■ 

; . 'The said representative of the North Viet- 

^ namese Embassy confirms that AFP's (Agence France Press^ 

account of the Foreign Minister's speech is accurate. 

C North Vietnam is prepared to undertake genuine talks 

as soon as the bombing ceases. Hie word QUOTE perma- 
nent UNQUOTE has consciously been omitted. He expressed 
C disappointment with the fact that so far there had 

been no Amt=:rican reaction* He saw this as a demonstra- 
tion of lack of will to negotiate. 



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'East European sources are confident that 
there is now KPT now a genuine North Vietnamese will 
to negotiate. They refer to the fact that China^ 
due to her internal situation^ is not RPT not In 
a position to exert decisive influence on Hanoi. 
East European sources likewise distrust the Ameri- 
can intentions.'" 



February 10., I968 

Loan once again invited Algard to come to Hanoi, and he also indicated 
a desire to send an NVl^ representative to Norway, Loan also introduced 
a very new element into the play: "that Hanoi presupjjosed (assumed) that 

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the military ox^erations be stopped while negotiations are being conducted,** 

+ 

OSLO 3275 to SecState ( SECRET-NODIS ) , 10 February I968, 
Kef: Oslo 2930: 

"1. Boye and Ans teens en called me in morning 
February 10 and passed me following message from 
Algard in Peking received late February 9 ^^ Osloi 



"2. QUOTE Ambassador Ngo who has just returned 

Cfrom Hanoi today (February 9) conveyed a message from 
the Foreign Minister that Algard would be welcome 
Hanoi whenever convenient. He emphasized that the 
visit should take place at earliest possible time- 

CAmb TTgo also req.uested that a Vietnamese repres-^nta- 
tive^ presumably an ambassador in Eastern Ei:irope, 
shouJ.d visit Norway. Algard asked for further details 

r concerning the character of this visit and emphasized 

that N"orway is only interested to assist in establish- 
ing possible contact between the combatant pa^rties. 
rNgo promised details and stated that the visit was 
not RPT not intended as propaganda, ITgo emphasized 
that last week's events had not RPT not changed Hanoi's 
desire for negotiations and that the Foreign Minister's 
statement of Dec £9, I967 was still valid. He said 
l_ that Hanoi presupposed (assumed) that the military 

operations be stopped while negotiations are being 
p conducted. Cable soonest whether in principle North 

L- Vietnamese representative welcome in Oslo, Suggest 

I leave Peking February ik for consultations Oslo, 
UNQUOTE 



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"3. Boye said with respect to foregoing that if 
US Govt feels Norwegian Foreign Service can be of any 
help in establishing contacts with Hanoi j they are 
prepared to do so but^ of course^ GON does not EPT 
not want to mess up anything which may be in progress* 
If USG considers it desirable ^ GON prepared to ask 
Algard to come to Oslo for consultations with a US 
rep either from Embassy or from Washington in middle 
of February* Algard could then be asked to proceed 
to Hanoi as soon as possible although GOH will have 
to think hard as to what would be a^px^ropriate cover 
story for such visit at this time* As regards pro- 
posal for arranging a journey to Oslo for some North 
Vietnamese rep, further info will be passed on to 
USG as soon as received from Norwegian Embassy Peking 
as indicated Algard 's tel^ but in meantime GON would 
appreciate any views and comments USG might have on 
this subject, Norwegians standing hy for earliest 
possible reply from Washington*" 

TIBBETTB 

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The Uon-regians informed Tibbetts that the Ilorth Vietnamese Ambassa- 
dor in Moscow might be planning a trip to Norway as well, (OSLO 339^) 

February 20, 1968 

In the event of the North Vietnamese Ambassador's visit to Oslo^ 
State sent the follm^ing explanation of "no advantage" for use by the 
: rion^egians. The explanation of "no advantage" stressed our desire "to 

^ ascertain whetlier Hanoi appreciates /the consequences of taking advantage/" 

and understands the importance the U.S, attaches to the *no advantage' 
^ as suogptlon . " 

"The US, consistent with President Jolmson's statement of 
p April 7, 1965^ remains vailing to enter into talks withy^ut - 

i ■ amended State ]J_87197 preconditions at any time. 



[ 



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"The US position on the cessation of the bombardment of 
Iforth Viet-Nam was set forth in President Johnson's Septeml)er 29^ 
1967 speech in San Antonio. As the President said: 



'The US is wilJ-ing to stop all aerial and naval 
■ l^ bombardment of Worth Viet-Wam when this will lead 

promptly to productive discussions, \Je^ of couz'se, 
I ^ assimie that while discussions proceed^ ^orth Viet-Nam 

U would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or 

^ limitation.' 

r"The US is not assuming that North Viet-Nam will cease lbs 
support to its forces in the South, On the contrary, as Secre- 
tary of Defense designate Clark Clifford testified before the 
r Senate Foreign Relations Committee, we asstmie that until a cease- 

^ fire is agreed on, Hanoi *vill continue to transport the normal 

3^i0unt of goods, men and munitions-' 

[ "in setting forth its assumption, the US is not setting a 

■^ condition but attempting to roake clear to Noi^th Viet-Nam that any 

cessation of US bombing followed by actions by Hanoi taking 
r advantage of the cessation (such as an increase by Hanoi of its 

L. infiltration of men and supplies or attacks in the area of the 

DMZ) would constitute such bad faith on Hanoi's pax't as to make 
continued US forebearance impossible. If Hanoi, by taking j 

advantage, forces the US to resume bombing, the possibilities f 
*" of a negotiated solution would di^astically recede. Under such , 

circumstances, calls for intensified US military action v/ould 
I increase and the possibility of another halt in the bombing 

^- would be low. The US is trying to ascertain whether Hanoi 

appreciates this vital fact and folly understands the importance 
( the US attaches to the no -advantage assumption, I 



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d 

*^At- San Antonio the President^ in addition to setting forth 
his assuiription*, stated his readiness to stop the bombing vfhen 
1 I such action T'?oiild lead 'promptly to productive discussions*' 

'Productive discussions' are serious exchanges in v;hich either 
side V7111 be able to put foxn-;axd for full consideration in good 
faith its position on any matter* 'Prompt' of course refers 
to a villingness by Hanoi to begin -discussions with the US 
immediately after cessation of bom[DJ.ng* 

r 

"It is vrorth noting that Hanoi is unwilling to give a 
"^ ' clear response to q^uestions as to the length of time between 

a US bombing cessation and the beginning of talks. If Hanoi 
{ [ were serious in desiring talks then surely its response v/ould 

V ha,VG been one of uneq.ui vocal readiness to begin immediately* 

■I- * 

p ■ "The US evaluation of Hanoi's current position takes into 

/ account Hanoi's actions as well as its words. The unprecedented 
"" offensive against inost of South Viet-Ham's urban centers^ which 

[[ Hanoi treacherously' launched in the. midst of the traditional 
Tet holidays^ causing widespread divilian casualties and 
■ suffering^ was made notwithstanding the fact that we were 
still exploring with Hanoi its position tiirough diplomatic 
channels^ and that we had exercised restraint in bombing 
targets in the ixnmediate vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong. In 
this context > we cannot but weigh Hanoi* s words with great 
, skepticism and caution. These actions carry a harsh political 

}— " message- 



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"The US favors every effort to obtain clai* if i cation of 
Hanoi's position. We shall continue to evaluate all infoi*mation 
and to pursue every possible avenue which promises to bring us 
closer to the re>solution of this conflict through serious 
negotiations . " 

(State 118092) 

February 2;^, I968 

The Iforwegians reported that they had heard nothing further about 
the rjorth Vietnamese Ambassador's visit to Oslo. A Stredish radio report 
said that he was returning to Moscow from Stockholm- (OSIX) 3^^i6) 

February 2h^ 1968 

I' 

Boye and AnSteeuseu informed Tibbetts that on February 23 Loan again 
approached Algard concerning the latter 's visit to Hanoi and suggested 
the date of February 29- (OSLO zkSk) 



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Ma,rch 1, I96& 

* 1"* »^ 1 4 ^^ ' 

I Jacob sen infoitoed Tlbbets that Algard had left for Hanoi hy plane 
on. February 29 • The U,S* had not been consulted prior to Algard'a 
departure. Jacobsen offered domestic politics as the explanation of 
the need for the Algard trip. (OSLO 3570} 

April 5. 1968 



t 



Following is a sumnary of Ambassador Algard's visit to Hanoi^ 



Me ch 3-10: 



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'^5- Foreign Fdni^ster Trinh reiterated that his speeches 
of December 29 and Februaiy 2 still vere valid- He considered 
these speeches to be an ansv/er to the repeated American demand 
for a clarification whether the tTorth Vietnamese would be willing 
to have negotiations if the bombing and other acts of \var against 
North Vietnam should be stopped. It was now up to the Americans 
to take the next step but because of the reaction up to now the 
Foreign Minister concluded the United States v^as not interested 
in negotiations. 

''6. The Foreign Minister discussed the San Antonio formula 
and said it could not be accepted even in the somewhat diluted 
form which the new Defense Mnister Clifford had given in his 
meeting with the Senate. The North Vietnamese insist that there 
must be a distinction between the attacker and the attacked and 
acceptance of any form of reciprocity would be inconsistent with 
North Vietnam's sovereignty. I remarked in this connection that 
in and for itself it was understandable that tlie Americans would 
view with disquiet a situation where negotiations could result in 
a serious change in the military positions of strength. Even if 
the North Vietnamese side could not accept any form of recipz'ocity^ 
I said I assumed they already had laid out what policy they v;ould 
follow in practice when it concerned the question of suspending 
acts of war under eventual negotiations. The Foreign Minister 
answered that would depend on the Americans' position. Negoti- 
ations must not lead to a change in the relative positions of 
strength to the advantage of the Americans. He v/as not v/i3_lirig 
to develop this point fui^ther^ 



p "7- The Foreign Minister underlined also that the North 

I Vietnamese ^h point program must be the foundation for a political 

resolution of the conflict. Apart from what concerned the stoppiiig 

Lof the bombing and cessation of the acts of v/ar against North 
Vietnam^ he did not set natters forth in such a way that the 
United States beforehand must accept the entire ^l-^point program. 



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He did not say anything on the point of time for American witli- 

drawal but said that was a (luestion which must be handled at 

the conferencB table. Nor would lie say anything on how the 

remiification problem would be settled nor how long it would 

take but he repeated that first there must be a political 

solution in South Vietnara and referred to the MIF program \ 

which assumed a separate South Vietnamese state for the ijTimedi- j 

ate future* Insofar as it concerned a political solution for 

South Vietnam^ the Foreign Minister repeated the North Vietnamese ' 

position that this was a question which must be discussed with 

the NLF and that Hanoi caimot speak on behalf of South Vietnam, 

He underlined very strongly that recent events in South Vietnam 

had shown that the regime in Saigon v/as totally without political , 

basis but at the same time events ma.de clear that there was a 

possibility of cooperation between the NIjF and other political 

groups- However he did not go into detail on this point. 

'*8- Eoth Foreign Minister Trinh and his civil servants 
underlined that Hanoi desired a political solution of the 
coirflict. At the sajne time they aisserted that if the Americans 
did not want negotiations, Hanoi was in a position to continue 
the war indefinitely and they were convinced that eventually 
they would gain a military victory- 



"9 It was clear that Hanoi because of the military 

advances in the South now felt that politically their position 
I j^- ' had been strengthened-" (OSLO ^4120, Sections 1 & 2 of 2) 



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April g, 1968 

Algard sent a second report on his visit to Hanoi, This. one dis 
cussed the leadership in ITorth Vietiiam. 

"labels 'Hawk-Dove' are said to be no longer valid within 
the top leader sh5,p. Up until late autinnn of 1967 it v^as said — 
but without identification of individuals concerned -- that 
inside top leadez'ship there were two lines of thought about 
continuing the v/ar* Today it appears such is not the case* 
The reason is said to be both the American escalation of last 
autumn and the military victories in the South • The comjnon 
denominator now believed to predominate is supposed to be 
nearer the Hawk standpoint than the Dove's." (OSLO kl2"j) 



A .pril 5, 1968 

Algard met with Loan in Peking, 

''Loan said even though still fearing American initiative 
was political maneuver with eye on world opinion and internal 
situation USA, and even though strong bombing still 'continuing^ 

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Hanoi in any event had chosen to treat it as genuine peace 
initiative and depart from fundamental position not rpt not 
to negotiate so long as bombing proceeded • He strongly 
emphasized Hanoi ready for real negotiations if USA really 
desires them. Hanoi's latest reaction \ia.B proof of will to 
negotiate and to compromise." (OSLO U133) 



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SVJEDISH - NORTH VICTNMESE COI, TACTS, OCTOBER, I966 - I968 

' ■ I " • ■ ^' ' — ■ ■■ ■ I T 1 

Novembe r llj I966 

The first exchange in the Aspen track came on 11 November in a 
meeting between Secretary Rask and Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Nilsison. Nilsson infoiiued Rusk of Swedish contacts with the DRV in 
Warsaw and in Hanoi. Both contacts with the DRV dealt Vlth *'creating 
a climate favorable to negotiations," The DRV contact in Varsaw called 
for; (1) "an unconditional and unlimited stop of the banbing of Viet- 
namese territory^ North as well as South Vietnam;" (2) "the FNh must- be 
regarded as a legitimate party to negotiations*" He added that "no mili- 
tary actions should be undertaken in the Eiffi" and a "process of evacuation' 
of allied forces should be begun-" The Hanoi contact^ also talking about 
a climate for negotiations^ listed two conditions that appeared a little 
softer than the Warsaw counterpart; (l) "the bombing of Korth Vietnam 
must be put to an endj without any conditions and definitely;" (2) "recog- 
nition of the FMj 'as one of the spokesmen for' the South Vietnamese pejople; " 
in addition; the Hanoi contactj Mr. Trinh^ described additional matters for 
*'a final settlement": coalition government^ general elections^ and eventual 
steps toward reunification- 



In response^ Secretary Eixsk indicated that "we could not impose a 
coalition government on the south/' He also said that; DRV insistence 
on a permanent end to the borabing represented "an increased demand on their 
part and we must have something in exchange for a permanent cessation*" 
i As a way out of the reciprocity dilemma , Secretary Rusk suggested a process 
^ of deescalation by mutual example rather than final agreement- Rusk also . 

recognized the difficulty of proceeding with bargaining at initial stages 
because "Hanoi was hesitant about discussing the first step until they saw 
how the negotiations would end-" 



Department of State Memorandum of Conversation (TOP SECRET^ 
MODIS; aspen); dated November 11^ 1966^ Subject: Swedish 
Diplomatic contacts with North Viet-Nam. Participants - 
U nited States : Secretaiy Rusk; Leonard Unger (Dep Asst Secy); 
David McKillop (eUR/scAN); Hey^ward Is ham (EA/vn) . Sweden: 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Tprsten Nilsson; R- Hichens-Bergstrcm 
(Dir of Political Affairs^ Foreign Ministiy); Hubert de Besche 
(Ambassador to United States); J. C. S. Oberg (First Secretary; 
Pol. Div-^ Ministiy of For, Affairs). 

"After preliminary exchange of greet ingS; Foreign Minister 
Nilsson read a report of two recent conversations between Swedish 
diplomats and representatives of North Viet -Nam which took place 
In Warsaw and Hanoi (The text of this paper is attached). 



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(text) 

^^The Sfedish Government hasj since 19^5 j c»n its 
Gfwn initiative J been in contact^ in various places j 
with representatives of the National Liberation Front 
of South Vietnam and also with representatives of t)ie 
Hanoi Government. Those contacts hJve been kept secret 
and they have been taken for the only purpose of ob- 
taining general information on the vievs of the 'other 
side' in Vietnam. 

"l. Some weeks ago a representative of the Swedish 
Foreign Ministry met in Iv^arsaw a senior member of the 
North Vietnamese Embassy there* Dulling their conver- 
sation the North Vietnamese diplomat made some remarks 
which seemed to differ sonievhat frcm the oxiicial state- 
ments Issued earlier by the Eanoi Government re^rdlng 
the possibilities of creating a climate favourable to 
negotiations. 

^'According to the North Vietnamese diplomat j the 
US Goverrmient must give ^tangible proofs^ of its willing- 
ness to negotiate- In reply to a question asked by the 
Sv/edish diplomat what such proofs should amount tOj the 
A^orth Vietnamese ansvered that such proofs should j first 
; of all J be: an unconditional and unlimited stop of the 

L-- bombing of Vietnamese territory^ North as veil as South 

Vietnam. ITurtheimore; no military actions should be 
^^- undertaken in the demilitarized zone and a process of 

i^ evacuation of allied forces should be begun. Finally: 

the FItt must be regarded as a legiti^Jiate party to negoti- 
ations • 



"The North Vietnamese diplomat said that his remarks 
could be transmitted to the US Government ^ while adding 
that the official North Vietnamese standpoint on the 
question of negotiations was made clear in Premier Pham 
Van Dong's speech of April 8^ 19 ^5; i-e. the so-called 
four points. The North Vietnamese diplomat also mentioned 
that his Government appreciated this contact with Sweden, 
He hoped that this channel would rernaip available- 

"II. The Swedish Ambassador in Peking^ Mr- Petrij 
recently visited Hano i and had a conversation with the 
Foreign Minister of North Vietnam^ Mr, Trinh. 

"a) Mr- Trinh strongly emphasized that the North 
Vietnamese Government aimed at a political solution of 
the Vietnamese conflict^ not a military one- Mr, Trinh 
said that two conditions must be fulfilled in order to 
bring about a climate for negotiations, which could lead 

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to a political solution. 

1. The bombing of Nortia Vietnam must be put to 
an end J without any conditions and definitely, 

2. The FIIL must be accepted by the US Government 

as one of the spokesmen for the South Vietna:mese 
people and J as Mr. Trinh expressed it^ the most 
valid one. 

"if both these conditions were fulfilled and the US 
Government thus took what lie called 'an appropriate attitude' 
theHj Mr. Trinh said^ 've know what we will have to do'* 

"it shoTxId be added thatj in this connection^ the ques- 
tion of a time-table for the withdrawal of US troops was not 
raised. 

"b) As to the possibility of a final settlement of 
the Vietnamese coiiflictj Mr. Trinh said that - in addition 
to the withdrawal of US and other foreign troops - both 
the Hanoi Government and the FKL had the following requests: 



1- 



2. 



3. 



The creation of a national coalition government 
founded on a very broad basis and including all 
political and religious groupings as well as all 
social classes genuinely desiring to achieve 
national independence. 

General elections in an atmosphere of freedom 
and democracy* 

Although no immediate reunification was envisaged^ 
it was necessary to create such conditions in South 
Vietnam as to pexi^iit a move in the direction of a 
future reunification of North and South Vietnam. 



iti 



'Mr. Trinh reiterated that if the US Government gave 
proof of goodwill J they would find that 'the Vietnamese 
side knew what they had to do'- 

"^ftiat characterised the two talks refer red to was^ in 
the view of the Swedish participants^ the moderate tone in 
which the views of the Noi'th Vietnamese side were conveyed." 
(EMD text) 

Having read the paper^ the Foreign Minister summarized the 
salient points of what DKV Foz-eign Minister Trinh had told 
Ambassador Petri in Hanoi: iv'orth Viet-Wam preferred a political 
to a military solution and was interested in a climate favoring 



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a political settlement provided certain conditions vere ful- 
filled; withdrawal was not specifically jnentioned; the National 
Liberation Front was described as one of the spokesmen for the 
South Viet"Nam people although the most valid one* Regarding 
the possibility of reaching a final settlement ^ the JELF and 
Hanoi supported the formation of a l^lational Coalition Government 
in South Viet-Nara founded on a broad basis including all political 
and religious groupings as well as all social classes generally 
desiring to achieve national independence. Moreover^ conditions 
should be created peiTmitting moving in the direction of future 
re-unification* < * < 

"....The Secretary went on to note that there were one 
or two positive and one or two negative elements in v^hat had been 
told to the Swedish representatives* On the positive slde^ 
I^noi's interest in a political rather than a military solution 
represented a small step forward. 

"..-.After all thiSj Trinh had sent him an invitation to 
come see hiiui Petri had not asfced to be received by Trinh. \Vhile 
there was no discussion of conveying Trinh' s remarks to the United 
StateSj neither did Trinh say Petri could not do so and he empha- 
sized the iiirportance of maintaining secrecy* The Swedes inter- 
preted Trinh *s attitude as a tacit indication that his remarks 
could be conveyed to the United States. 

"The Secretary^ continuing his coninentary on Trinh* s remarks 
said the missing element was what Hanoi would in fact do on the 
military side. At least 19 regular North Vietnamese regiments 
were in the South and tliree Noirth Vietnamese divisions were in 
the UAZ and north of it. They could attack our Marines at any 
moment . If v/e committed ourselves to stop bombing pennanentlyj 
we must know what would happen on the gi'ound militarily. We 
could not possibly make a commitment on the ground unless we Imew 
what Hanoi would do with those 19 regiments. Trinh had used the 
phrase J 'We know what we will have to do' in the event their 
conditions were accepted. The Secretary said we would want to 
know what that plurase means. ' 

"...•Ambassador Petri had observed to Trinh that if the two 
conditions were fulfilled^ the North should follow suit. Bergstroa 
did not Indicate whether there had been any comment to his remark. 

The Secretary said that Ifenol had denied^ even to the 
Soviets^ that they had troops in the South. However, we must 
have corresponding action on the ground; we could not be children ' 
in this matter. As to the role of the Front, v;e knew who their 
leaders were including north Vietnamese Generals in the South 
using a variety of names. The Liberation Front is Hanoi. Some ' 



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southern individuals i/ith other associations were included 
in the Fronts but they had no influence. When Trinh said 
the Pront was the most valid spokesman for the South Viet- 
namese people and that the situation must be consistent vith 
moving tovrard reunification^ he was expressing Hanoi's political 
objective of permanently unifying the country on a Communist 
basis. We were prepared to have South Viet-Kam decide on a 
solution through elections but so far Hanoi vas not prepared 
to do so. The Secretary said we could not irripose a coalition 
governiaent on the South; we could not turn our men around and 
start them shooting in the other direction to impose a coalition 
government* If the South Vietnamese people were to decide on 
this it was up to them and ve would abide by the result^ but a 
coalition would not be imposed by our arms and our power 



rj 



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The Secretary added that the other side had made 
clear we must end the bombing pexmanently^ since they insisted 
that a suspension would imply an ultimatum. This represented an 
increased demand on their part and we must have something In 
exchange for a penaanent cessation. 

"The Swedish Foreign Minister noted that they had contacts 
x^ith the Front or Hanoi in Algiers^ Warsawj Moscow/ end Hanoi 
as well as Peking. The Secretary noted tliat the only serious 
Interlocutor was Hanoi - not the Front. The Secretary said that 
we did not discount the importance of any third party channels. 
In past crisesj we naver knew which channel would be important. 
In this case J we did not know whether Hanoi would say soraething 
iDiportant through the Swedes rather than through someone else.- 



• . 



*Vne Secretary vent on to say that the 3!^ stern H^uropean 
countries would probably be Interested in settling for the status 
quo ante at the IJth Parallel but on account of Peking^ were un- 
able to move forv/ard. We axe prepared^ he said^ to accept the 
Communist world's interest in North Viet-N"am if they are prepared 
to accept otu* interest in the South- Until Hanoi abandoned its 
objective of seizing South Viet-Nainj there could be no peace. It 
was as simple as that.-.*The Secretary continued that two things 
were vital: (l) Hanoi must abandon its attempt to seise South 
Viet-Nam hy force^ and (2) the people of South Viet-Nam must 
have a chance to decide what government they want and to express 
their views on reunification without being subjected to force by 
the t]orth..-.We liad suspended bombing in the DMZ to see if there 
would be any response, but there was none and the ICC had been 
denied access to the area under the North. Nevertheless the 
Trinh statement could be important if we had more precision - 



"Ambassador Unger caJJ-ed attention to the reference by the 
North Vietnamese in Warsaw to 'no military action being undertaken 
in the demilitarized zone'. He suggested^ and the Secretary agreed, 
that this was also a point on wMch the Swedes might make further 



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soimdings In Hanoi* Ve t^ere certainly ready to see the zone 
truly demilitarized and would velccme an ^nd^ to violations of it 
by Jlorth Viet- Nam. 

"The Foreign Minister mentioned possible differences of 
opinion between the Front and Hanoi and pointed out that all 
elements of the Front were not CoBnnunists, The Secretary 
responded there was no problem about contact with the Frontj 
the South Vietnamese were able to coimuniGate with its repre- 
sentatives. South Viet^Nmn could take care of the indigenous 
problem through reconciliation and bringing the dissidents back 
into the body politic- United States troops had only entered 
when North Viet -Nam regulars had come down. If the Swedes were _. 
in the same position^ they would not accept a cc-ilition govern- 
ment thus imposed on them. 

".,*-The Secretary noted tliree channels to Hanoi: the 
direct one through which little was said because of Hanoi's fear 
of Peking; the ctennel through Moscow to which we attach impor- 
tance because of Moscow's attitudes and influence — but here 
again Hanoi was probably afraid of Peking; and finally a channel 
through a third party^ which could be Sweden- Eut^ he continued^ 
this represented perhaps 5^^ of the q^uestion; the other 5^^ ^^^^^ 
the possibility of resolving the problem by defacto action on 
the ground in the pattern of the Greek insurrection and the 
Quemoy-Matsu crisis. Ho Chi Minh might prefer to pull back 
troops rather than enter negotiationSj calculating that itaericans 
might go home and could not come bockj although^ the Secretary 
saldj we can get back faster than they can. We would be pre- 
pared to try this route. There need be no confessions that they 
have 19 regijnents in the South. 

"In response to an analysis by the Foreign Minister of 
Hanoi's problemj the Secretary noted that we had reports from 
Eastern European sources that confirmed this precisely: Hanoi 
feared the effect of negotiations on the morale of the Viet Cong 
and Hanoi's present leaders feared that they could not survive 
a failui"*e to achieve their objectives. However^ the Seeretaiy 
said on this we cannot help them; they are^ in places they have 
no right to be* 

"Further^ on the point of gradual de-escalationj the Secre- 
tary said that since January we had made clear our interest in 
responding to actions on the ground — wliat we call a process 
of 'mutual example* — without evoking thus. far any interest 
on Hanoi*s i:3art. If Ti'inh's phrase pointed in the direction of 
positive Hanoi responsej this could be important. 

^^As to'Trinh's ovm alignment in the regime as between hawks 
and doves^ l^i'- Bergstrcm commented that the French considered 



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him pro-Chinese but that A^nbassador Petri did not have 
that impression. 

"The Foreign Minister asked whether it would be necessary 
to specify hov long v/e would halt the bombing. The Secretary 
said that under our system the press and Congress would force 
us to answer this question. A permanent bombing halt would 
require a very important reciprocal action. Ambassador Unger 
commented that Trinh's remarks implied some readiness to discuss 
now not only conditions for negotiation but also the terms of 
ah eventual settlement. Ihe Secretary agreed that Hanoi was 
hesitant about discussing the first step imtil they saw how the 
negotiations would end. He indicated that another reason for 
keeping further inquiries on the basis of a Swedish- DRV dialogue 
was to avoid having to bring Saigon into the picture^ which we 
were disinclined to do at this stage* 



' L '^G?he Secretary suggested as a technical point it night not 

I be wise to pursue the dialogue with Kanoi through other capitals*" 

Clh order to protect Trlnh's position if there are divisions within 
the leadership it vj^as important not to have coiimiunications from 
abroad available to too v^ide a group in Eanoi. Foreign Minister 
NilssoQ agreed with this suggestion* The Secretary emphasized 
; the importance of examining very carefully all indications bearing 

on Hanoi's position but as he had told the press on another occasion 
' we could only negotiate with those who could stop the fighting. 

] ^' If we entered into too great detail on our conditions for settle- 

G mentj the other side would just put that in their pockets and then 

propose to ^plit the difference. We were not worried about real 

L southern insurgents — 16^000 of them had defected this year — 

but the Northern Generals must go home. \Je would even be prepared 
to give them a villa on the Hiyieral.... 



".,, .Responding to a final question from the Foreign Minister 
about Hanoi's difficulty of believing tliat the United States 
could abandon such expensive United States bases^ the Secretary 
pointed out that the United States' capacity in this regard should 
not be under estiiaated* We had built reads in_^Ihdiaj over the 
hnmpj and Alaska during the war which we had never used^ and we 
had demobilized 100 divisions after World War II. In the last 
five years we had closed 600 bases. As the President had saidj 
we had no intention of leaving our soldiers in South Viet -Nam as 
tourists. 



"Following the general conversation^ Ajnbassador Unger 
privately mentioned to Minister Nilsson and Mr. Bergstrcm our 
r concern over reports that Ambassador Petri had spoken rather 

}_ openly about his contacts in Kanoi, They agreed and said that 

recently they had twice communicated with Petri and instructed 
him to treat this subject with maximum discretion-" 



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Hovember l8j XS66 

As a result of the Rusk-I^ilsson meeting^ State cabled Stockholni 
on "points for clarification." 

STATE 88123 to Amembassy STOCKHOIM (TOP SECRET;, NODISj ASPEN)j 
l8 November I966. 

"1 



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"2 

'1- What does the llorth Vietnamese Foreign Minister 
intend that his government woLild do when he says 'We know what 
ve will have to do'/i.e-^ if US stops bombing of NV^? Mr- Trinh" 
named two conditions which the United States must fulfill to bring 
about a climate for negotiations. It is understood of course that 
if those conditions vmre fulfilled^ negotiations could promptly 
be undertaken^ but since the fulfillment of those conditions \70uld 
represent significant steps for the United States^ what would be 
the reciprocal actions by Morth Viet-Nam? It is encouraging to 
know that the Noi'th Vietnamesq apparently recognize this reciprocity 
but it is essentialj if their position is to be accurately evalu- 
atedj to know what it is that they recognize they 'will have to do'- 



C, '2, Wiiat is the significance of the FWL being charac- 

terizedj as Mr. Trinh puts itj as 'the most valid* spokesman for 
p "the South Vietnamese people? ^^hat is this intended to convey con- 

Lj cerning the status of the FNL vis-a^-vis other spokesmen? 



'3* With reference to the q^uestion of reuniTicationj 
Mr. Trinh referred to the necessity of creating conditions in 
South Viet- Nam 'to pernait a move in the direction of a future 
reunification'. The conditions in South Viet-Nam as Mr. Trinh 
himself implied would grow out of general elections held In an 
atmosphere of freedom and democracy. Would Mr. Trinh not envisage 
that the question of unification would be resolved at that time 
in accordance with the mandate given a new government by the 
people through tho^se general elections? 

^h. If Mr. Trinh should mention the point raised by 
the North Vietnamese representative in Warsaw^ namely that no 
military actions should be taken in the demilitarized zone% Mr. 
Trinh might be asked whether this is Intended to be in effect a 
proposal for the strict observance of the Geneva Accords in the 
demilitarized zone north and south of the demarcation line with 
the full functioning of the ICC throughout the zone,'" 

< 

"6. There was some substantive discussion of the issues 
which might arise in Petri's next conversations in Hanoi^ it being 
understood that this exchange was between the Svredes and ourselves 



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rand not for discussion in Hanoi, Unger mentioned Goldlaerg 
* formula's referenda to private and other assurances about a 

/ response to bombing cessation and illustrated the kinds of 

de- escalator/ actions by Ifenoi which ve would take to be appro- 

tpriate responses j such as a cessation of infiltration^ a reduc- j 

tlon of the level of military activity and/ or terror in South j 

Viet~i!^sm or some troop withdrawal fron South to North. In 
r* response to further Swedish probing as to what would come next » 

I ' after these first steps toward de-escalation and their mention 

of a possible ceasefire^ Unger said it was not possible without 

r knowing more of E^noi's views^ to carry the process farther, 

j We would hope that once a beginning has been made it would 

; be possible to establish some mode of communication with I^anoi 

: to arrive at some understanding of the next phases of de-e:^calation^ 

p ; although it was not to be ruled out that this might proceed by 

L ■ mutual example. He also made clear our recognition of the prob- 

lem of face for lianoi and our readiness to consider ways to meet 
El with problem. With reference to the fourth point in the ^^Points 

! for Clarification" Unger emphasized that we were suggesting this 

' be raised only if the North Vietnamese themselves refer to the j' 

WZ problem. He added that it would alvrays have to be understood 
that any arrangements that might conceivably be worked out for 
i-^ the DM2 would have to provide for a reasonably reliable means of 

detecting and dealing with viola t Ions j we couD-d not agree to i 

f" putting American and Vietnamese forces in jeopardy exposed to ' 

[^ surprise action by the North Vietnamese or Viet Cong." 

EUSK (Drafted by Unger) 
I November 28 thru December 21j I966 



t 



On 28 November J Parsons cabled State^ in Stockholm &i-lj saying that 
"Swedes will not repeat not be ready talk with me before mid-week at 
earliest* '' 



On 29 Novemberj responding to State 88128 with Stockholm 652;, Parsons 
said that in ajnplifying aide memoire "there was no doubt at all in Petri's 
mind that Trinh meant and expected whtat he had said would be passed on to 

EUS.^' Petri also wanted to qualify that when Trinh used the phrase "most 
valid spokesman" with respect to NLFj that these were not Trinh's precise 
wordsj but the meaning. Petri also emphasised that he could not draw Trinh 
out on meaning of his "we know what we will have to do" statement. AlsOj 
r on 29 November J in Stockholm 653^ Petri confinned the contents of the memo 

L transmitted to Secretary ftusk on 11 November. The intention was that Petri 

return to Hai^oi by way of Peking about 10 December. 

I On 30 November^ in Stockholm 659^ Parsons added a piece to the 

previous conversation with Petri in Stockholm 652* This was th^t: "also^ 
Petri had not repeat not put in his report Sj Trinh had shown 'good deal 

r of understanding' that problem of face existed also for US/' 



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On 3 December J State (STi^E 95326) queried about cryptographic 
facilities foi" Petri, and worried about public speciilatlon on Petri's 
"frequent visits to lianoi," State added: "This will also bear on question 
of when we bring GVW into picture, something we do not contemplate for 
present . " 

On 5 December Bergstrom and Parsons met once again. 

i 

STOCKHOIM ^1 to SecState (TOP SECBErj?, IIODIS^ ASPEN), 
December 6, I966, Ref: State 96236- 

F p 

h- 

^ "3' As Swedes feel there Is no denyii:tg they have been 

in touch with us at Fon Minister levels formula arrived at 
j in Petri's instructions Is for him to describe what he tells 
I Trinh as ^iimressions % perhaps 'general impressions' foimed 
; by Nils son in Washington* Precise formula t ion has to be 
: left to Petri's discretion. However^ he is enjoined to be 
I most careful not to say he is speaking at our reqxiest or 

conveying message fram us* Bergstrcm says Petri will also 
I take 'great care not to affect any American interest in a 

negative v/ay, ' » 

i 

"i|-. On substance^ primary point of interest for Petri 
to emphasize is that Nils son felt we were interested In 
finding road to political solution and that this road not 
closed • Petri is not to volunteer any suggestions or 
attribute any to us. However^ he will try hard to ascer- 
tain what response there would be from Hanoi's side if US 
should — as xaentioned in first of our points — stop bombing 
Korth Viet"Nam. Here again exact foruiulatlon will depend 
on Petri's judgment in light clrcucastances of talkj but I 
vras assured he will try to cover points on which we need 
more infom^tloni 

"5. If Petri concludes Trinh does not want to react 
at time J he is not to press but merely say tliat he would 
be at Trinh' s disposal at any time 



It 



L 



PARSONS 

On 9 Dec ember J in StockhoJ-m 702^ Parsons reported that Obergj Foreign 
Ministry Officer in Charge of Asian ATfairs^ indicated that the British 
Embassy was probing for information once again- On 10 December^ in Stock- 
holm TOT; Parsons reported that Trinh was at a Communist Party meeting in 
Budapest and was not expected In Hanoi until the IgK^h. It was agreed that 
Petri should wait for Trinh to return to Hanoi rather than intercepting 
him en route. On 10 December^ in State 1006^^5^ State agreed on holdirtg the 
line against British probes and on waiting for the Trinh return to Hanoi - 
On 21 December^ in Stocldiolm 739j Parsons reported that Bergs traTi had 
informed him that Petri had not yet been granted an entrance visa to Hanoi. 
Petri could not explain the delay. 



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January 11^ 1967 

On 11 January; in State ll6773> State wanted Bergstrom to query 
Petri on the latter 's assessment of recent Hanoi efforts to increase 
pressures for unilateral bombing halt. State also wanted to "know if 
Petri felt there vas any connection in the delsy in obtaining his visa 
and recent U.S. bombings - 

January 13j 19 67 

Word had been received from Petri that Hanoi wanted him to cane to 
liorth Vietnam as soon as possible. Because of the delay^ the GOS had 
decided on its own to reactivate its I-farsav channel- 

Bergstrom questioned Parsons on whether a declaration on Hanoi's 
part to negotiate would lead to a U^S, bombing stop. 

STOCKHOII-1 822 to SecState (TOP SECRET, WDIS, ASPEW), 
January 13^ 1967- Ref: State 116773. 

"4. Late on 12th word came from Petri that North Viet- 
namese wanted him come to Hanoi by January 16. He had replied 
in accord his Instructions on giving Stockholm adequate lead- 
time that he could not make it before 19th, This response has 
today' been approved here* 

'^5. In meantime^ not having heard from Hanoi^ GOS decided 
reactivate Warsaw channel which they had earlier avoided so as 
not to cross wires. (Response to my query \ihy was so vague as 
to lead me believe second and third rationales paragz^aph 3 above 
weighed more with Swedes than Bergstrom admitted-) Bergstrom 
said Oberg of Ministry had this week been sent Warsaw renew 
his contact with North Vietnamese representative there* (This 
is first disclosure to us of this previously tightly held channel 
to DRV and it is interesting to note Swede is regular PouMinistry 
official- ) 

"6. Oberg 's instructions signed out by Nils son were to 
pave way for Bergstrom himself proceed Warsaw about l6th to explore 
situation. Now that Petri has his visa^ Ministry today has hastily 
instructed Oberg not to make contact in Vj^arsav/^ but it is not yet 
known whether he had already done so. In any event Bergstrom will 
not now go there next week- " 

"8. One question which Bergstrom put to me for referral 
Washington was whether a tlrm^ or at any rate more precise^ 
declaration on Hanoi's part of its willingness to negotiate 
could load to a bombing stop. On this pointy I described- 



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Department's impressions of Dong's prepared statement to 
Salisbury • Bergstrcm is of coiirse thoroughly faniiliar vith 
Hanoi's obvious tactics in seeking obtain unilateral cessation 
of bCMbing but there is lingez'ing disposition to hope Dong 
statement is significant • " 



PARSOIJS 



January 1?^ I967 



Bergstrom reported on an Oberg contact in Warsaw. The North Viet- 
(* namese contact told Oberg: (l) ^^^A final and unconditional cessation 

j 1^ of the bombing vas an absolute and indispensable prerequisite in order 

to pave the ^^sy for negotiations- As soon as the bombings had ceased^ 

ri the North Vietnamese GOVT was prepared to take all. peace offers from 

the American Government under considerationj ' " (2) The four points 
vere not a precondition for negotiations but only a foundation for negotia 
tions^ (3) the NLF problem could be disposed of "through recognition on 

tthe part of the Americans of the right ^of the Front to take place at 
the negotiation table; ^^ (h) Reunification v^as an internal matter to be 
settled "after the restoration of the peace/' 



i^: 



STOCKKOm 831 (CC) to SecState (TOP SBCEEP, KOBlSj ASPEN), 
January ITj I96T. Hef: State 118951. 



I "3* Oberg (knowledge of liis identity as source should 

^ not rpt not be revealed) has reported frofli T/^rj^aw (para 5 

Stockho.hn 822)* His visit there required no special rationale 

Cas North Vietnamese reps had agreed he would take contact from 
time to time- As this visit was pre-arranged^ Hanoi rep had 
had time to inform his principals and in Oberg' s opinion had been 

L carefully briefed by them- At outset Oberg 's contact^ who vas 

second-ranking man in Hanoi representation^ said door was always 
open to Oberg and then proceeded to give following as Hanoi ^s 
position- Text in sub -para graph below is Bergs tram's translation 
from Oberg' s Swedish message except where Oberg incorporated 
Hanoi reps exact words in French: 



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'A final and unconditional cessation of the bombing was 
an absolute and indispensable prerequisite in order to 
pave the way for negotiations- As soon as the bombings 
had ceased^ the I^orth Vietnam.es e Govt was prepared to 
take all peace offers from the American Government under 
consideration ( 'pret a considerer toutes off res de paix 
de la part des Ajaericaines quelles que soient'), A bomb- 
stop was essential- On the other liandj the four points 
of Hanoi were no 'precondition' for negotiations but only 
'une base a la negotiation*. The contents of the four points 
could always be discussed at the negotiation table.' 
(Ccmirient by Oberg; 'Contact man gave the jjnpression of ] 



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being authorized to express liimGeJjf in the vfay he did, ) 
The question of 'FllL could be solved^ for instance^ tirrough 
recognition on the part of the American side of the right 
of the Front to take place at the negotiation table. The 
q^uestion of reunification was an Internal matterj which 
could be solved later on between North and South Viet-I^am 
after the restoration of peace.' (Coniment by Oberg: 
'Generally speaking^ the contact-man this time ^ve the 
impression of considerable flexibility as to Hanoi's 
position in regard to the contents of a possible negoti- 
ation if only a climate could be created which rendered 
negots possible, ' ) 

'%» Although Hanoi rep in Warsaw was aware of Ifilsson's 
visit to XJ-S. in November, he did not rpt not ask Oberg about 
any talks with U<S. officials and latter did not rpt not refer 
to Nilsson's talks with Secretary and Vice Pres in any way. 

"5, Oberg also explained to DRV man that when he had pro- 
posed Bergstrcm also visit Warsaw to meet Hanoi reps^ COS had 
not rpt not known that Petri was about to visit Hanoi, Now 
that this visit was to take place (which was obviously already 
known to ¥arsaw Hanoi rep)j there seemed no need for Bergstrom 
visit Warsaw nov» 



• • 



'^6. Oberg' s report has been repeated to Petri in Peking^ 
1 with coimnent tliat GOS will be interested to learn if Trinh 



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parallels exactly Warsaw Hanoi xe^s statement to Oberg . 
PARSONS 



January 20 ^ 1967 



in ^Stockholm 8^7 j Parsons reported that '^Oberg found PICL rep /in 
\JaTBa\f/ both knowledgeable and Intelligent, Tliere was 'mutual briefing' 
on previous Swedish contacts with FNL reps at Algiers and Moscow, •,." 
State queried on the same day (State 122 506) on more ijaformation about 
Swedish-IJLF contacts in Algiers and Moscow. 



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January 26j I967 _ 

In Stockholm 8^^ Parsons reported that a Social Democratic afternoon 
tabloid had revealed from authoritative sources that: "Ambassador Petri 
durjng his talks with the Hanoi Goveriiment and the FKL 'is naturally also 
seeking to send sentiments and views' concerning the proposals for peace 
negotiations, " 



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January 27, 19 67 

In Stockholm SjO^ Parsons cabled that Petri had retiirned to his 
post In Peking and had only sent a brief telegram on his Hanoi talk 
In the raeantime^ Parsons noted press publicity continued and vas 
probably designed "to serve democratic political needs of social demo 
crats/' 



s. 



F jruary gj I967 



1 ; In StockhoJiTL ^^Tj Parsons indicated that the Svredes seem to be 

getting "a bit nervous about their Aspen role noi^," Bergstroci did not 
w: it to wind \ip '^looking foolish-'' Bergstrcan also indicated that Petri's 
I report vas not sufficiently precise and that the Foreign Ministry was 
^ waiting for a full written report before passing it on to the U.S* 

Bergstrom did say that the brief telegram from Petri contained "nothing 

C spectacular * " Bergstrom addedj however^ that 'there were one or two 
possible signs,' 

p I Bergstrom avoided answering questions about Swedish contacts with the 
I KLF- Bergstrom 's remarks^ however j indicated seme syinpathy for the IJLB'. 

Along this same line^ Bergstrom threw out the thought tliat Sweden might 
be interested in establishing consular relations with Hanoi^ but then 
back tracked when pressed on this point* 

"if. ^flien I asked Bergstrom substance and timing of 
^ J Swedish-NLF contacts in Algiers and in Moscow, he replied that 
pj ' his memory not sure enough to attempt answer without having records 

available. He agreed without much enthusiasm to revert to this 

C later. In the meantime all he could recall was that contact In 

Algiers began about August 1965^ ^t tiJiie when many people looked 
toward MLP as perhaps authoritative source for bringing war to 
end- (Under circumstances I did not challenge this to me strange 

C statement.) i^^ow hovrever it was more apparent that Hanoi was 

focal point and so there was less interest in WLF contacts. 
Wachtmeisterj new Ambassador in Algiers j had seen ULF repre- 
sentative^ but not with any prescribed mission- 



"5- Given frequent de facto contacts in Hanoi and need 
for channel to handle Swedish medical and other relief assistance 
to Worth Viet-Wamj Bergstrom 'would be tenpted' to recommend 
establishment consular relations were it not for 'German prob- 
lem'.* I said if this happened^ he might also have an 'American 
problem* on his hands. He then backtracked^ saying that he had 
no thought of recommending this to Minister 



• • « • 



PARSONS 



ih TS - NODIS 



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February 7^ I967 



C Still not having parsed on the substance of exchanges In. Hanoi and 

WarsaWj the Swedes suddenly asked "if appropriate Anerican could be 
available at Stockholm or possibly Warsav in utmost secrecy to talk with 
Hanoi representative daring TET talks while bombing suspended." 

L • STOCHIOIM 926 to SecStatG (TOP SECKET^ KODIS, ASPEN), 

February 7^ 19^7- Ref: Stockholm 91O. 



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"1. After having met with Foreign Minister Nilsson on 
reports from Petri in Peking and Oberg again in Warsaif Bel f rage 
and Eergstrom sent for me ten p.m. Stockholm tliae Seventh. 
V/hile emphasizing their information vas difficult to evaluate 
perhaps insubstantial; they inclined to believe Hanoi had moved 
quite a bit towards real dev^ire for 'contact' (as distinct from 
negotiations) with American official qualified to talk. 

"2. As possibility of 'contact' apparently linked to TEf 
truce which litiiitedj so they uiiderstoodj to four days beginning 
February 8^ it was of utmost urgency to know If appropriate 
American could be available Stockiiolm or possibly Warsaw in utmost 
secrecy to tali: with Hanoi representative during TSI truce while 
bombing suspended. Bergstrom Is proceeding Warsaw Thursday the 
ninth to explore situation further and also so as to be in posi- 
tion relay any /imerican reaction to infoimation which he and 
Belfrage gave me tonight and which I am reporting in message 
to follow this one. 

"3. I can not evaluate how seriously we should take this 
but there is no doubt Swedes privy to Petri and Oberg reports 
think Hanoi may be in earnest provided there is face saving 
formula. V/hether Hanoi is in earnest about (l) seeking peace, 
(2) prolonging TKT bomb pause or (3) searching for basis on 
wiiich to negotiate, S^^edes could not say. However, they pre^ 
pared send Bergstrom to Warsaw anyway and first point on which 
they hope to have imniediate answer is whether we can get some- 
one here or to Warsaw during TST truce. If so.. they think they 
will be in position to find out if Hanoi could and would also 
authorize someone (probably their Warsaw Ambassador) to be 
available for contact during truce.. . ." 

PARSONS 

That same evening^ the Sv.'^edes finally passed on Petri's report and 
the report of Oberg ^s recent and unreported crash mission to Vfarsaw. 

Vmile admitting that the Petri-Trinh talks "did not yield much, " the 
Swedes felt there were some encoui^aging signs. Most important in their 



15 TS - NOD IS 



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minds was the indication frcm the Warsaw contact tliat the North Vietnainese 
^Vas apparently willing to have a direct contact with U.S. even without 
luiowing how long hambing was suspended (so long as this not announced)." 
The Swedes apparently felt that this position in Hanoi was a sux'ficieht 
response to the President's policy of talking "whenever we can get other 
side to do so* " 

Petri's contacts with Trinh in Hanoi did not yield much by way of 
clarifying the four State queries (the four queries in State 88l28 of 
2B Hoveniber 1966) . Trinh talked about the JNL being "a spokesman" or "the 
spokesman." 

STOCKHOIM 927 to SecState (TOP SEOREff, IffiDIS^ ASPEN); 
February Tj I967- Ref ; Stockholm 926. 

"2, In Hanoi; Petri-Trinh talks 'did not yield much.' 
Trinh tras bitter about alleged intensification of war sijice 
October and emphasized unconditional bomb stop was prerequisite 
to anything else. There could be no preconditions to bombntop. 
This was closest Petri got to answer to point 1 set forth in 
State 88128 for clarification of meaning Trinh 's cryptic remark 
Ve know wtiat we will have to do. ' 



"3. Trinh encouraged Petri to think Swedish effort for" peace 
L, was laudable- He did so with apparent but not explicit recog- 

nition Swedes had been in touch with Washington- On Point 2 
p Trinh said merely Fill could be 'a spokesman* or 'the spokesman' 

[2 for South Vietnamese people- Petri did not raise Point 3 on 

reunification. He thought answer to query in final sentence 

Cwas 'yes* but that it would have been useless to press Trinh 
on this. Point k on UAZ which contingent on mention by Trinh 
did not come up. 



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"4. After Petri returned to Peking about Januaiy 25th Hanoi 
charge there sought him out and drew his attention to Trinh 's 
statement to Australian journalist Burchett th^t talks could take 
place as soon as bombing stopped. Petri told Charge's US wanted 
scane indication fii^st that Vietnamese willing deescalate war. 
Hanoi Charge replied .such request from Americans would appear to 
make bomb stop conditional and would therefore be unacceptable. 

"5. When this word reached Ministry seme days ago Foreign 
Minister decided send Oberg back to Warsaw- On taking contact 
Ob erg was received not by subordinate as before but by North 
Vietnamese Ambassador; a change which Swedes though significant. 
Oberg told his superiors on returning to Stockholm this evening 
that it was clear I/arsaw Ambassador >ras fully briefed on Petri's 
recent visit to Hanoi as he had been en earlier one. He said he 
told Ambassador that since he had been received at higher level 
his principals would be willing to send Bergstrcm to Warsaw. 
Ambassador replied in French this would be "suitable-' Accordingly 
Foreign Minister has told Bex-gstrom proceed (as reported Stockliolm 
926) . 

16 TS - KODIS 



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'^6. Crux of Oberg^s taXk In Varsav was possibility that TET 
stand dovm in military opei^tions might provide opportunity for 
contacts between Hanoi and USA organized by and in presence of 
Swedes, Place not mentioned but Swedes assumed VJarsaw, Stoc'KiioInij 
even third capital possible. Ob erg got iinpreesion that if bombing 
was in suspense even fox- an unspecified period, Hanoi v/ould want 
to have contact with us* However^ if we annoimced bombing would 
stop for four days only^ Hanoi would not agree to contact. (Thus 
possibility if any may be foreclosed). It was clear to Oberg tl:iat 
it was intended that this message should reach us. 



"T» 3^ thinking foregoing oyer Si^edes said they irjpressed . 
that (l) Hanoi has moved Warsaw contact to a higher level and (2) ^ 
j Hanoi Warsaw Embassador evidently interested in i^^ierican contact 

L if fGce can be saved all. around* Wlien I reiiaai'ked it did not appear 

Hanoi had met our view that some signal must first be given as to 
what Hanoi wouJ,d do if we stopped bombing Swedes replied that was 
true but on other hand' Hanoi was apparently willing to have a 
direct contact with us even without knowing how long bombing was 
suspended (so long as this not announced). Maybe^ Swedes conceded^ 
Hanoi only maneuvering to get bombing stopped by diplomatic maneuver 
but they thought Hanoi's situation might have become such^ especially 
given China situation^ that their desire for contact with us was 
genuine. This is what led Swedes to ask If when Bergstrom met 
L- Hanoi Ambassador in Warsaw he could say US vras also prepared to 

send representative to make contact in utmost secrecy. 



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"8* In this context Belfrage cautiously observed Hanoi has 
never told Swedes it would be willing to talk v^ith us if bomb stop 
not explicitly unconditional; it has merely shown some signs of 
interest in talking if we did not put an explicit date on resumption - 
of bombing, Belfrage concluded that he understood President had 
said that our policy was to talk whenever we could get other side 
to do so. I reminded him of distinction between 'unconditional 
discussions' on one hand and some prior private or public indication 
of v^hat Hanoi would do if we stopped bombing on other hand (State 
130520 Circular)." 

PAESOJVS 

February 8^ 1967 

State wanted clarification on statement frcai Warsaw contact suggesting ^ 
a desire for preliminary contact during TET and the statement to Petri that 
unconditional bombing was a prerequisite to anything else. State also 
wished Bergstrom to explore military reciprocity* On the point of the 
readiness of the U.S. representative, State said that the U.S. would be 
prepared to respond to "talks without conditions,'* 

STATE 133671 to Amembassy STOCKHOIM (TOP S:ECHHTj NODIS^ ASPffl), 
February 8^ 1967' Eef; Stockholm 926^ 9^7- 



17 TS - NOBIS 



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"1. It is not clear on the basis of information reported 
reft els precisely what DRV i\aibassador in Warsaw told Swedes which 
gave them impression that Hanoi loight have real desire for 
contact vith American official qualified to talk: dui*ing Tet truce 
period. As reported by Swedes j Ifenol would not agree to contact 
if we announced bombing would stop for four days only^ and ve have 
already announced (and presi^me Hanoi aware of it) that duration of 
Tet truce would be for ^^ hours j with implication bombing could 
rcGume thereafter. Nevertheless we certainly wish to leave no 
poi^sibility unexplored and^ while recognising domestic political 
pressures which may lead Swedes to grasp at straws^ we accept as 
you do their good faith in passing this information along. Vfe 
therefore suggest you convey following to Foreign Ministry^ bearing 
in mind we are not sanguine anylihing can in fact be worked out in ' 
connection Tet truce and we do not wish to seem to be urging 
Warsaw trip on Bergstrom: 

a. ¥e are most grateful for these recent reports of 
Swedish conversations with DHV representatives in Hanoi and 
Warsaw. We think Bergstrom visit and talk with DRV Ambassador 
could be useful in clarifying ^DHV position- Among points on wliich 
he could seek further precision are relationship between DRV 
Ambassador's stai;ements to Oberg suggesting desire for preliininai-y 
contact with US representatives during foiir-day Tet truce and DRV 
Foreign Minister's statement to Ambassador Petri that unconditional 
bombing halt was prereq^uisite to anything else, Bergstrom could 
emphasize his conviction that US remains prepared for secret 
discussions at any time^ without conditions^ and such discussions 
might cover whole range to topics relevant to peaceful settlement- 

b. In connection with finding mutually acceptable 
basis for initiating preliminary talks^ Eergstroni could express 
opinion that some reciprocal restraint to indicate that neither 
side intended to use the occasion of the talks for military 
advantage would provide tangible evidence of good faith of all 
parties in prospects for negotiated settlement, 

c. As to Swede's specific question whether appro- 
priate Ajnerican official could be available Stockholm or possibly 
Warsaw in utmost secrecy to talk with Ifenoi representative during 
Tet" truce^ US would be prepared to respond immediately and posi- 
tively to any serious indication of Hanoi interest in having 
talks without conditions - 

d. Bergstrom should know that decision on duration of 
Tet truce and arrangements for carrying it out were made some 
time ago. If press stories refer to 96 hour period because of 
information given out earlier pui^suant to these decisions and 
arrangements J Hanoi would have no basis for charging that US 
had disregarded suggestion made February 8 to Swedes in Warsaw, 
That suggestion was known in Washington well after our position 



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on duration truce had been made public in Saigon. \{e trust 
Eergstrom will bear this fully in mind 1q case DRV Ambassador 
takes that' line," 

RUSK 



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^ebrusry 9j 19 67 

The Swedes indicated that although they had nothing tangible to go 
on^ they v^ished to pursue the contacts. They were pegging what optiraism 
they had on the DRV statenient to the effect that Hanoi will talk if the 
bombing stopped unconditionally • 

STOCKIIOM 93^^ to SecState (TOP SECREIj WDIS^ ASPEN), 
Februaxy 9, I96T- Kef: State I33671. 

"2. Bergstrom had time only to say that Swedish impression 
based on admittedly tenuous evidence but^ as described 927, 
sufficiently impressive to lead them to actions which they have j 

taken, namely, report to me and sending Oberg back to Warsaw 
eight to make appointment for Bergstrom there ninth (which is 
to be at 9 P-M, Feb 9), Warsav^time, presumably to allow , 

Ambassador time obtain further instructions from Hanoi). He , 

added possibly there has been wishful thinking by Petri and 
Oberg, but nevertheless Swedes felt they should act as they have. 

*^3' Belfrage in^accordance his usual caution began by saying 
that only fortnal statement DRV Reps have made to S^-zedes on talks 
is to stress their willingness if unconditional bomb stop- He 
too said evidence tenuous, but they were encouraged by progression 
from Trinh's opening attitude in p:fenoi Jan 23 which^was harsh 
and terse to point reached in l^arsaw sixth when Amb 'jumped at' 
proposal meet with Bergstrom. Belfrage said initially on 23rd 
Trinh said in effect 'since our Oct talk whatever you said to 
Americans led them to intensify bombing and war' - feter he wa;:; 
somevhat mollified and in end Petri was launched by Vice Minister 
and urged to come back again. Then came North Vietnamese Chargers 
innsolicited approach to Petri in Peking which struck vSv/edes 
as possibly more a Bign of interest in talks than in propagandizing 
them with Burchett article- Fina2_ly, as Petri's contacts incon- 
clusive, the decided send Oberg to Warsaw where higher level and 
interest in pursuing subject brought Swedes to present position* 

^'h, Belfrage asked if Bergstrom definitely could say American ; 

could come during Tet truce or after and I referred him text para C 
REFIEL adding that trouble to get talks vas not repeat not with US 
but Hanoi, I also reiterated per para B Bei^gstrom could emphasize 
his conviction U.S. prepared for secret discussion at anytime i/ith- 
out conditions* We then had some discussion of mechanics and agreed 
that if Bergstrom receives impression tonight tliat leads him to take 
responsibility of urging an American should come at once, Bergstrom 






19 TS - r:0DE 



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should via Ministry send me flash report to this effect. I 
added that If he vere to to urge without firni assurance that 
a DRV Bep would duly be made available to talkj I personally 
thought Washington wou.ldj if willing at allj have to opt for 
StocMiolm where American visitors presence could probably be 
kept secret - 



tt 



* • 



PARSONS 



I 



Belfrage indicated that v/e should he prepared for sudden contact* 

STOCKEOM 935 to SecState (TOP SECRET, IIODIS, ASPEN), 
February 9^ ±967. Ref: Stockholjii 93^- 

**1. Belfrage telephoned me In guarded terms message 
received six P.M. local time Feb, 9 frcm V/arsaw where 
Bergstrcm has already had meeting with DRV representative. 

'^2, He said message said DRV shovmd Interest and 
expected give reaction February 10. Oberg will remain to 
receive reply while Bergstrom returns here morning of 10th- 
It obvious DRV rep is consulting Hanoi. 

"3- Umpression gained was that if reply is affiimative, 
Warsaw is likely be favored over Stockholm as locale- How- 
ever ^ this J like natui^e of reply its elf j 'very doubtful' and 
Belfrage cautioned agaaaist optimism. Koweverj he thought we 
would be well-advised have 'someone on starting line' as idea 
had been certainly not repeat not turned down." 



February 11^ 19 67 

Bergstrom ret turned from Warsaw^ leaving Cfl^erg in case a folJIox^'-up was 
needed. Parsons got the itapression that Bergstrom had not fully communicated 
the U,S* position* 

STOCKHOIM 9^0 to SecState (TOP SECRET^ KODIS, ASPElOj 
Februaxy 11, 1967- Ref: Stockholm 935; State 133671^ 

"2. Bergstrcm confirmed DRV ambassador took his 
approach seriously and said he would communicate at once 
to Hanoi- Ambassador had Deputy with him vfho intervened 
from time to time with usual -ifenoi line but Ajnbassador 
himself did not indulge in arguments and was matter-of-fact. 

"3, Bergstrom said he stressed point set forth in 
para C State reft el and also closely related point in last 

sentence Para A* Thus he believes it entirely clear to 
Hanoi reps that US would respond positively at once if 



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there vere Hanoi desire for 'contact.' Bergstrom said he 
stressed idea of 'contact' rather than negotiation..*-" 

"5' Bergstrom said that while he had well in mind sub-^ 
stance Para D State reftelj question of charge of had faith 
did not come up and so this never seemed germane to his dis- 
cussion with DRV /^bassador* As Bergstroni also remarked that 
he did not emplmsize all the other points in reference message^ 
I suspect he touched only lightly on substance Para B State 
reft el on recipx^ocal restraints during truce which must have been 
over kO hours old^ by time of his talk. ..." 

PAESONS 



February I2j 19&J 



STOCKPIOIM 9kl to SecState (TOP SECRET^ BODIS^ ASPEN)^ 
Pebruary 12^ 1967- Vi^^t: Stockholm 9^0. 



[ "1. Oberg called Bergstrom from Warsaw February 12 to 

report that when he went to say goodbye at DRV embassy he 
was urged to stay although apparently with no promise of an 
answer. Bergstrom on own authority authorised Oberg remain 

^- V/arsaw until February 13- 

P "2. Bergstrom also authorized Oberg to tell DRV Embassy 

D that Americans had asked 'if there was any news.' Bergstrom 

had cleared this gambit with Nils son but not repeat not with me 



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Warsaw but he believes caution plus pre-ari'anged signals have 
masked game - " 

PAI^ONS 



February: 13; 19^7 



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STOCKIiOIM 9hh to SecState (TOP SECRET, NODISj ASPEI^)^ 
February 13^ 1967- Ref: Stockholm 9^1, 

"1. About noon 13th Bergstrom told me Oberg in Vfersaw 
has had no reply yet from DR7. 

"2* COS has authorized Oberg remain over Tuesday. 

"3, FonMinister has also authorized h.tm to tell DRV 
Ambassador tliat should latter wish to see Bergstrom again^ 
Minister would be willing to make him available*" 



PAHSODIS 



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STOCKHOIM $hQ to Sec State (TOP SECRET, KODIS, ASPEN), 
February 13, 19&[' Ref: Stockholm 9^^; State I3367I. 

"1, In talks vitli Bergstrom over week end snd again 
today we went over several points connected with his Warsaw 
visit reported Stoekhoim 9^0 » 

A. He showed me his record of briefing he had 
received from jne before leaving for Warsaw early 9"^^ (Stock- 
holm 93^) which was based on State reft el. Prom this I am 
satisfied there could have been no misunderstanding of US 
posiulon by Swedes on this first occasion when^ as Bergstrom 
pointed out^ Swedes could acknowledge they were £ .thorized 
transmit our views. 

B* Bergstrom thought it best in Warsaw not to 
emphasize 9^ hour Tet tiTice period in connection Para C 
State reftel* 

I C- Contrary to my earlier understanding he didj 

however J remind DEV ambassador in accordance Para D that 
sequence of events was such that press references to already 
settled 96 hour period could provide no basis for any Hanoi 

Lj charges of bad faith in regard to February 6 suggestions to 

Swedes in Warsaw* I am quite sure he did this on his own 

p Initiative rather than because DBV ii-aibassador took any such 

[^ line. 



D* As I suspected^ Bergstrom did not discuss Para B 
State Reft el (reciprocal military restraint during any pre- 
liminary US- DRV tall^s) because he felt it would merely touch 
off staixdard DRV recriminations • " 



• • 



PARSONS 



February 15, 196T 



STOCKHOm 961 to SecState (TOP SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN), * 
Februaiy 15^ 1967- Hef: Stockholm 9^3. 

"1. Belfrage and Bergstrom remained behind vrhen Eonl'Iin 
Hilsson left after lunch at residence Feb 15 to discuss possible 
future contacts between Swedes and DRV Mbassy Warsaw. 

"2. &vedish position is now that Oberg instructed remain 
Warsaw until morning Feb 17 when he is to tell DHV Eiibassy he 
must return Stockholfn for personal reasons but that Bergstrom 
or he available return Warsaw on short notice should WV ask. 



22 TS -• NODIS 



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"3* After probing without success for any infoimation 
frcm us on Kosygln- Wilson activity re Viet-Nam^ Eergstrom then 
outlined Swedes' estimate present situation: 

a) Swedish contacts with DKV apparently independent 
of other channels US may have available; 

B) Because Bergstrom did not repeat not mention 
'bomb stop' or 'boLiib pause' at any time in his taH^s with DJHj 
Swedes do not consider that either end Tet cease-fire .or 
resumption US booibing DRV has estopped their channel from 
further possible use; 

C) Swedes therefore feel free make offer availability 
set forth para 2 above; 

D) In addition^ Swedes would want feel free at some 
time in future to return to DHV in Warsaw saying that Swedish 
appreciation US position such that Swedes on own initiative (not 
on our behair) would ask If DRV lias anything to say^ and 

E) Swedes would at that time ask if DRV still Interested 
preliiiiinaTy contact with us on general lines originally set forth 
Stockholm 926. 

^%. I replied that 3 D and 3 E went beyond my current 
instructions in so far as availability US official is concerned, 

"5. In giving detailed account atmospherics of his talk: 
with DRV Ambassador^ Bergstrom raised point of whether or not 
DRV were under necessity checking with FKL before replying to 
Swedes. Questioning of Bergstrom elicited that Swedes see 
problem that DRV may be interested in US-DHV contact without 
prejudice to ML political position or FNL political and military 
activity South Viet-Nam* Belfrage at this point offered that 
he would think such contact v;ould be 'of interest' to us. 

"6- I replied that Secretary's statements seemed clear that 
we want to talk to Hanoi and added we considered FNL not inde- 
pendent Hanoi. 



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''7' Only other operational problem arose earlier in lunch 

rwhen Nils son pointed out that he must face foreign affairs council 
Feb 16 when he expects to be asked specifically what GOS has done 
to get peace in Viet-Nam and when question may well be put in 
texTTis of what Petri has done in Hanoi, Despite seme constitutional 
T risks in not being frank^ Nilsson proposes disclose nothing of 

ti; Aspen operation- I reiterated our position that strict secrecy 

has been and continues essential in order not damage any possible 
r prospective channel for peace." 

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February l6j 196j _ 

State indicated no objection to the Swedes renewing their of f er of 
availability to return to Warsaw on short notice should the DRV ask. - 
State J hoveverj had a number of problems on substance - 

SOIATE 138786 to Amembassy STOCKEOm (TOP SECRETj NODlSj ASPEN)^ 
February I6, 1967- Kef: Stockholm 961. 



L".,-.In connection with question raised paragraph 1- b. 
State reftel (reciprocal restraint during prelidinary talis 
as tangible evidence of good faith)^ you should explain to Eergstran 
tliat this obsei'vation was not restricted to effort to arrange talfes 
during Tet truce^ but has general applicability b3 means of 
creating favorable atniosphere for holding of talks* On the other 
hand agreement on reciprocal restraints is not intended by us 
/ to be a precondition to talks. 

L 

"(c) We vish to avoid linking any US/dRV contacts with 

C explicit or implicit understandingj as suggested by Swede s^ 

that DKV would be speaking for itself ^ not for NLF* As you 
correctly pointed out^^ it is our position that ifenoi is ultliaate 
center of power and dec is ion -ma king relative to settleraent; should 
Hanoi decide to have unconditional bilateral talks with USj 
^ including discussions of niatters which noiriinally fall within 

purview of Front j this would be problem for Hanoi to handle- 
It should be noted that B^noi in its campaign to exchange 
peznanent banblng halt for indication of vague bilateral talks 
has Itself not mentioned participation or role of Front* We 
see no reason to introduce this subject gratuitously. 






^^(d) We remain interested In keeping Swedish channel open 
and are grateful for efforts of Swedes thus far in probing Hanoi's 
intentions. Continued secrecy is of course niandatoiy if this 
channel is to have continued usefulness. We trust Swedes will ' 
not jeopardise their potential role as mediators by any considera- 
tions of teiiiporaiy political advantage." 

-* 
KATZENBAGH 



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February i B, 19 67 



STOCKEOM 970 to SecState (TOP SECRET^ NODIS^ ASPM)^ 
February l8, 1967. Ref: State I38786. 

■ 

"1* At JToon 17th I briefed Bergstran on contents reftel. 

"2, Ori Para C^ . Eergstrom seemed at first to interpret this 
as indicating we would not object to Swedes volimteering to DRV 
Ambassador that IJIF could come independently to talks with us. 



2k TS - NODIS 



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^ I said that from final two sentences of Para C^ it was guite 

clear S^vedes should not do so on our behalT* He then asked 

C if we would object in event Hanoi Amb should take initiative 

L„ in seeking to bring FI'JL rep with hi^ii to any talks which it 

might be possible to arrange. I replied that in my opinion we 

^ . would not object should DRV in effect sponsor F^IL rep as 

j paxiiicipant. "' 



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PAESOHS 



February 22 thru March 8j 196T 



Estate (state 1^2081 ) approved the line the American Bnbassy vras taking 
in Gtockholm on clarifying I^LF participation and on discouraging another 
Sv^edish effort to ca^amunicate with the DBV in l^arsaw. State believed that 
the DRV was stalling. On February 23 j in Stocltholca 99^^ Parsons reported 
r that on leaving Warsaw on the ITth Ober^ had already made a firm appoint- 

La meat for himself for March 1- If the DRV representative at the March 1 

meeting raised the subject of a Bergstrom visits Ob erg was to be non-cormittal. 
On Mai'ch 8, in Stockholm 10^5^ Parsons repoz-ted that Cberg was returning 
i^ frcm VJarsaw and that ^^nothing ±mpoxi:ant transpired" in the contact* 



[- March 11 j I967 



STOCKIIOIM 1069 to SecState (TOP SECHET^ WDIS, ASFEN); 
March 11^ 196?. Ref: Stockholm 10^5. 

"1* late Tenth Bergstrom reported: 

A. Oberg's trip Warsaw March 1-3 had been under- 
taken despite seme doubts as to wisdom of going at all and 
with strict instructions to listen and not exert any Swedish 
pressure at all- 

B. Cberg gained impression Hanoi Rep under 
similar wraps. Xn any event no real dialogue developed. 

C. Honoi rep asked if Bergstrom was in Warsaw. 

D- Both Hanoi rep and Oberg were reluctant to 
refer to contacts during Tet truce. 



d 



E- Hanoi rep asked for briefing on Swedish 
internal political situation on which he showed Jiimself 
knowledgeable. He also asked especially about Riksdag 
discussion on possible recognition of DRV* (Nilsson dis- 
couraged this), ^ ' 



25 TS - ^JODIS 



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f 

|_ G- Hanoi rep e^xtremely bitter in word and 

manner at resuniption US Tbtaiibing plus mining coastal waters^ 

C naval and trans WiZ shelling- He said this prime example 

us bad faith just whon Trinh through Burchett had payed 
way for entering on talks with US, 



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H* It was agreed keep channel open for future 
and Hanoi rep professed great gratitude for Swedish efforts 



"h* Bergstrcm cocnmented bit ruefully on report Italian 
Foreign Minister had publicly claimed he had had private 
channel to Hanoi too* He added that when he visits Rome 
next week he would be careful in any discussion with Italians 
if Vietnam came up. He wondered if Italians had had valid 
channel, 1 said I didn't know/^ 



* ■ 



PARSOMS 



a 



March l8, I96T 

STATE 1^58220 to Amembassy STOCKHOLM (TOP SECRET, NOBIS, 
p' aspen), March 18, I9ST. Ref: Stockholm IO69). 

"1. At next appropriate occasion you should express 
our appreciation for latest word on S^^'edes V/ar^aw talks^ 
noting continuing jjiiportance of keeping contact secret 
notwithstanding sterility of latest phase since one can 
never foretell when this channel might usefully be 
reactivated 



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RUSK (drafted by Isham) . 



April 13, 1967 



ST0CKH0.U4 118 T to SecState (TOP SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN ), 
April 13, 1967- 

r 

"1. During call on SecGen Belfrage 13thj I asked if 
there had been any ASPEN developments. He said no^ but 
he has accepted invitation Polish Vice Minister Winiewicz 
to visit Warsaw May 8-13 • Ministry now considering whether 
Belfrage should attempt contact Hanoi ambassador Just to 
see if latter has an^hing to say and how he says it. 



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J'2, later FoiiI^Iin Hilsson voliinteGred that if US has 
any 'proposal to make through Swedish channel^ GOS remains 
ready to pass it along to Hanoi representative.'* 



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April .]A, 1967 



STOCKHOm 1199 to SecSbate (TOP SECRETj KODIS, ASPEW), 
r . April ^h, 1967. Ref: Stockholm II87. 



> 



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"2. Bergstrom said that it now probably that Belf rage 
vould be asked to contact Hanoi representative In Warsaw 
next month andj if so^ It vould be useful to liave 'Bomethlng 
tangible in his baggage' , . • . 



& 



"3* Eergstrcm said GOS would probably send Petri to 
Eanoi again in May or June to leax^n what he could, 

'%, Continuing in speculative veinj Bergstrom said 
that Nilsson thought there vas only one card left for 
Swedes to play. On own responsibility they might say 
privately to Hanoi they vere convinced frcm their contacts 
with Americans that -^if Hanoi vould do thus and so^ S^/edes 
confident such and such vould happen on American side'* 
GOSj however J could not come up with any vSpecifics on 
'thus and so' and 'such and such'. They therefore uncer- 
tain if or hov they could proceed^ but they did feel 
Hanoi had ^<j^^ confidence their good faith. Minister 
himself might find it possible to seek meeting witli Trinh. 
Bergstrom then said it vould be useful to know if we saw 
any possible opening or had any ideas on such a give-and- 
take process for which Swedes vould in effect be guarantors 
of genuineness of proposals." 



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April 18, 1967 

«•- mO:iY:^£>}M 1219 to Sec State (TOP SECRET, JX^ODIS, ASPEff), 

April 18, 1967. Ref: Stockholm II99. 



PARSONS 



[ 



'^1* During discussion at residence April l6 about 
Foreign Minister's annoimced intention reduce level Swedish 



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diplomatic representation in Saigon^ Bergstrom cominented 
on anomalj^ of fact that this anno one ement made only 2^ hours 
after he had talked April 1^ with Ambassador Parsons about 
possible next steps in Swedish V/arsaw initiative on Foreign 
Minister's instructions. He left Impression that foreign 
Minister's statement or at least its timing had taken pro- 
fessionals in Ministry by surprise. 

"2, In foliow-up talk April 17^ Bergstron speculated 
that one possible effect of Swedish action might be to 
increase Hanoi's receptivity to S!-?edish efforts promote 
peace negotiations^ Bergs troia coinraented that now 'Hanoi may 
listen to us more' (StockhoJjn 1207). In this connection^ 
Foreign Minister quoted in Svenska Dagbladet April l8 as 
saying in reply question: 'Ue have not offered to appear 
as mediator but rather to negotiate contacts which could 
lead to mediation J" 



CMEHON. 



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J. , April 22, 1967 



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With some Swedish pressure for a new U-S- move on negotiations^ 
State responded to the effect that the U.S. stands on the President's letter 
to HOj the President's Nashville speech and Secretary Rusk's 9 February 
press conference. 

State also showed dismay at the fact that the GOS could not renew; 
accreditation of its ambassador to the GVIfl. 

STATE 180598 to Ajnerabassy STOCKHOm (TOP SECREPj NODIS^ ASPEN)^ 
April 22^ 1967, Eef: Stockholm II87, 3.I99. 

"1< We are not sanguine about possibility of giving 
Belfrage something 'tangible in his baggage' for his visit 
to Warsaw next month- Hanoi does not nu'i^ seem interested 
in discussing tangibles j as witness its treatment of offer 
contained in President's February 8 letter to Ho, and seems 
unwilling to consider any offer short of US acceptance of 
the Trinh-Biu-chett f ortnula . Swedes are of course familiar 
with our position on that formula (president's Nashville 
speech^ Rusk February 9 press conference). 



• * 



"3' In meantime, we cannot refrain from expressing 
our disappointment over apparent GOS decision not to renew 
accreditation to GVM of Swedish /^nbassador Thailand after 



tL. 



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f^ present inouiabent departs- Our views on this development 

[_ are contained in separate message but in your discretion may 

be drawn upon in tills channel. In particular, considering 

tStockholin's 1219 just received^ you should convey our skepticism 
Over Bergstrcm's remark that nov *Hanoi may listen to us more*' 
Any increased Hanoi receptivity to Svedes as a result of this 
' action in our judgment is likely to be marginal. In fact, if 

I ' Sv,''edes should appear over-eager to sell GYK short, Hanoi's 

L most likely reaction would be to toughen its position regarding 

Swedish mediatory efforts, not to moderate it." 



Excerpts from HUSK NSVfS COKPEBEiilCE on Vietnam^ Februazy 9, 
1967, as recorded by The Nev York Times, 

"There's been a good deal of discussion in recent days 
about the prospects for peace in Yietnam, 

"President Johnson has pressed for peace in Southeast 
Asia in capitals all over the world, over and over again - 

"We've made it clear that we want no bases in Southeast 
Asia J and do not wish to retain United States troops in Viet 
nam after pence is assured- 



"V/e have affirmed our full support for free elections in 
South Vietnam, to give the South Vietnam^ese a government of 
P their own choice, and have stated that the question of reunl- 

t3 fication should he detei^nined by the Vietnamese through their 

own free decision. 



"We have emphasized that we would much prefer to use 
our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast 
Asia rather than war and that peace could permit I^oi'th Viet 
nam to participate in a regional effort to which we would 
be prepared to contribute at leasl; one billion dollars. 

"On the military side, we have on two occasions stopped 
the bombing of North Vietnam* 

"lii May, 1965 J ^ pause was limited to five and a half 
days, because it was rejected by the principal Communist 
capitals during the first three days. 

"At the beginning of I966, there was a cessation for 
37 days --a period m.uch longer than had been indicated might 
produce sane constructive results^ 



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"Our objective in Yietnam is and always has been a 
r I limited one* A South Vietnam able to deteimine its own 
L. j future without external interrerence. I need hardly repeat 

that this and this alone is our object iTe^ but for the 
r"' benefit of members of the press who may not be fully faeiiliar 

with all our statement s^ I am today making available points 

we made last year under l^i- different headings annotated to 

reflect developments in 1966* 



"it elicited no response other than the continuation 
of the movement of men and arms into the souths and an 
assertion^ that Vietnam m-ust be settled on Conmiimist terms, 

"¥e must know the military consequences of such a military 
action on our part. They must not expect us to st-op our mili- 
tary action by bombing ifhile they continue their military 
action by invasion* Ho one has been able or willing to give 
us any information on this subject - 

'VeWe been trying in erery vray kno^m to us to invite 
and to engage in such talks - 

"Unf ortunately^ I cannot report to you today any tangible 
forward movement in this direction. 

"But all channels remain open and are being utilized. 



"These are^ and remain^ not in any sense preconditions 
for discussions but rather statements of the elements which 
we believe could produce peace in Vietnam - 

"Let me say guietly and sincerely to all capitals on the 
other S3.de^ let good sense take charge for all of us in 
this situation- Recognize the necessity for elementary 
reciprocity. " 

QUESTIONS 

"Q. Mr, Secretary^ you mentioned the ih points that were 
put put a year ago- Would you say that the atmosphere or the 
climate for peace negotiations has improved in any way since 
that time J particularly since the conflict in China has become 
so intense? 

"a* It's hard to judge atmosphere^ because what we really 
must count upon is specific^ tangible indications of a readi- 
ness to move toward peace- 

"So what the atmosphere really will amount to turns upon 
whether we can in fact engage the other side at points where 



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we and they^ together^ can move this matter toward the 
conference table or toward a peaceful settlement, 

"Q- Mr. Secretary^ you have talked al^out the need 
to, recognize the principle of elementary reciprocity* Since 
so much of the current discussion seems to hang on thiSj 
sir^ could you give us some idea of whether by this you 
mean a specific promise to negotiate if we stop the bombing 
or specific military action? 

"A. WeUj I have pointed out in my statement that we 
cannot stop our military actions involving the bombing while 
they continue their military actions of Invasion- 

"l think some elementary reciprocity is required and 
common fairness would require that if there is an interest 
towaz^d peace that both' sides help move toward it because 
you can^t stop this war simply by stopping a half of it< 

"Q, Here's another question^ Mr* Secretaiy. Are there 
Bx^ contacts or discussions of any kind going on to extend 
that four-day cease-fire in the seven-day cease-fire they 
say they're going to honor? 

"a* Wellj Prime Minister Ky has indicated some time ago 
that he would be prepared to discuss with the j}forth Vietnam 
authorities the question of that cease-fire. 

"This is something which can be discussed^ which can be 
looked intOj but I could not give you any details today as 
to whether or not there are discussions pointing in that 
direction. There ai^e some difficult operational questions 
about that- 

^*Q. Mr. Secretary^ a year ago^ you recall^ we offered 
to maintain our bombing pause if the other side would only 
come to talk. In fact we sent convoys around the world 
looking for some signal frcon Hanoi of a willingness to talk. 
Why is it that now we are unwilling to make such an offer 
during the current pause? 

"A. Well let me point out that the other side is not 
talking about a pause* The other side is demanding an uncon- 
ditional and permanent cessation of the bombing. 

"Now that is a very significant military step for us to 
take; and unless It is accompanied by military action on 
their part^ dt would create a situation in v/hich they would 
be safe and secure add comfortable while sitting there 



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sending their men and their arms doxm. the Ho Chi Minh Trail 
and across the ITth parallel to attack South Vietnam* 

* 

"Q, Is it the shift in position on Hanoi's side in the 
terms for the bonibing cessation that has caused the shift in 
our position? 

"a. Wellj there's no shift in our position. In the sense 
that ve are prepared to take up political questions through 
political channels. We are prepared to deal with military 
matters as militazy matters. And ve are prepared to discuss 
with the other side what action each side might take of a 
military character that would move this matter toward peace-*' 



Secretary Rusk said that the Coiiniiunist side Is waging a "systematic 
canrpaign" to bring about a permanent cessation of U.S. bonibing "without 
any corresponding military action on their side." He rejected the 
Januai'y 28 Trinh fonaulatlon that stopping the b'H::^blng could lead to 
talks. The U.S.j he decJ^redj is not prepared to end the bombing in 
exchange for some "formless" possibility of talks. Before the U.S. will 
take such a step,, he emphasizedj ^'we must knov the military consequences-'^ 



March 15, I9SI 
^ President Johnson's Nashville Speech- 



The central element of this speech was the President's statement 
that "reciprocity must be the fundamental principle of any reduction in 
hostilities. " 

"Our Position Today^ " by Lyndon B. Johnson, President 
of the United States, Delivered before the Tennessee 
Legislature J Nashville, Tennessee, March I5, l^^T- 



. * • • 



'*Now this brings me to final point; the peaceful and Just 
world that we all seek. 

^^■7e have just lived through another flurry of rumors of 
'peace feelers.' Our years of dealing with this problem have 
taught us that peace will not come easily. 

"The problem is a very simple one: It takes two to nego- 
tiate at a ppace table, and Hanoi has just simply refused to 
consider coming to a peace table. 



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"I don't believe that our cmn position on peace negoti- 
ations can be stated any more clearly than I have stated it 
many times in the past — or that the distinguished Secretary 
of State^ Mr. Rusk^ or Ambassador Goldberg^ or any number 
of other officials have stated it in every forum that ve could 
find. But I do want to repeat to you this afternoon and 
through you to the people of Merica the essentials now lest 
there be any doubts: 

"The United States represent at i-ves are ready at any tiiae 
for discussions of the Vietnam problem or any related matter^ 
with any government or governrEientSj if there is any reason 
to believe that these discussions will in any way seriously 
advance the cause of peace, 

"We are prepared to go more than halfv/ay and to use any 
avenue possible to encourage such discuss ions j and we have done 
that at every opportunity. 

'Ve believe that the Geneva accords of 195^ and 1962 
could serve as the central e lenient s of a peaceful settlement* 
These accords provide in essence that both South and ITorth 
Vietnam should be free from external Interference^ while at 
the same time they would be free independently to determine 
their positions on the guest ion of reunification* 



"We also stand ready to advance tov/ard a reduction of 
hostilities without prior agreement, The road to ^eace 
^ could go from deeds to discussions j or it could start with 

discussions and go to deeds. 



"We are ready to take either route. We are ready to move 
on both of them, 

"Eut reciprocity must be the fundamental principle of any 
reduction in hostilities. The United States cannot and will 
not reduce its activities unless and until there is stxie reduc- 
tion on the other side. To follow any other rule would be to 
violate the trust tliat we undertake when we ask a man to risk 
his life for his country. 

"V7e will negotiate a reduction of the bombing whenever the 
Government of Nox^h Vietnam is ready^ and there are almost 
innumerable avenues of commxmication by which the Government 
of North Vietnam can make their readiness known* 

"To this date and this hour there has been no sign of 
that readiness* Yet we must and ve will k.eej> on trying. 



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. "As I speak to you today ^ Secret azy Riisk and our repre- 
sentativec tliroughout the vorld are on a constant alert. 
Hundreds and hundreds of quiet diplomatic conversations free 
from the glare of front-page headlines, of the klieg lights— 
these conversations are being held and they will be held on 
the possibilities of bringing peace to Vietnam. 

"Governor Averell Harriman^ with 25 years of experience 
in trouble- shooting on the most difficult international prob- i 

lems that America has ever hadj is carrying out my instructions 
that every possible lead^ however slight it may first appear^ frcm 
any source, public or pri-</ate^ shall be followed up. 

"So let me conclude by saying this: I so much wish that 
it were within my power to assure tliat all those in Hanoi 
could hear one simple message — America is caraaitted to the 
defense of South Vietnam until an honorable peace can be 
negotiated." 



& 



April 25-26, 1967 



In Stockholm 1266, Cameron cabled that he had given Bergs tram 
the text of the Secretary's press conference and the President's Nashville 
P» speech* On April 26^ Cameron cabled (Stockholm 1273) that Bergstrom 
^^ and Oberg "seem more inclined than earlier to accept possibility that 

Swedish action on its representation in Saigon now followed by lack of 

L effective action on 'Russell tribunal^ would cause Hanoi totighen its 
position and make their efforts establish useful contacts more difficult-" 
Ihe Sv/^edes, nevertheless^ placed increased importance on JBelfrage's May 
r visit to Warsaw and said that "it now even more essential for Sweden to 
t make evexy effort explore possibilities 'on other side,'" 



[ . 
[ 

_ STOGKEOIM 1358 (CG) to SecState (TOP SECiSa?, NODIS, ASPEN), 

f May 9) 196T- 

V 



MQy 9> 1967 

Hilsson-Quang Tliu (NVN Ajnbassador, Bucharest) Conversation- 

Nothing new in this contact. Thu merely reemphasized the January 
Trinh position and Ho's letter to the President. The Swedes, however, 
showed a strong disposition^^ as they have done before, to playing very 
active role in bringing the two sides together. 



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"3* Thu said he had read encoui'^agirtg reports of Rassell 
Tribunal meeting Stockholm and that he appreciated GOS atti- 
tude toward Viet-Nam issue • This attitude not only expressed 
in press but had been sho^/m by Petri talk in Hanoi with Trinh 
and Bergstroia's talks in Warsaw. 

■ 

^%* liTilsson explained Swedish desii^e explore if in some 
\m^ Sweden could help produce contact between warring parties. 



' "5- Thu stated ITOJ position is based on Trinh- Bur chett 

four points and Ho Chi Minh correspondence with President, 
j It would be^ he said^ simple to organize a contact if US 

would without conditions finally and definitely stop its 
bombing of North Viet-rfeui. US would gain prestige in ^y^s of 
-' world. (At this pointy Bergstrom said his notes were not 

\ clear^ but he believed Thu said *Ve don't want the Chinese"* ) 

In any event, Thu concluded that West must understand that after 
centuries of fight Jng invader Sj such as Chinese and French^ 
^ Vietnamese people will in the end win however big militaiT' 

i effort US makes . ... 



''6- Mlsson said he did not believe in militai^ solution 
X^ but in a political solution which must start somewhere. Thu 

said it must start with boriibing stop- Nilsson said he under- 
I stood this J but asked was a contact or a dialogue in present 

situation at all 'thinMble' if Horth Viet-Nam did not give any 
sign J even the smallest ^ which US could seize upon? If Sweden 
could be of any use^ Nilsson concluded^ it v;ould be at disposal 
r both parties. 



"7- Hilsson then explained that theoretically speaking he 
could conceive of situation under certain circumstances where 
Sweden might even take responsibility for a position which it 
felt convinced about . For instance^ if &/eden were convinced 
of it J GOS might say that if the South would do one thlngj the 
North would do another. 

"8, Thu concluded that he appreciated Nilsson good will 
and he would carefully and immediately report talk. 

"9* Bergs tram also told us that Belfrage trip Warsaw 
put off for another ten days or so." 

CAMERON 



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[ 



On 10 Mayj in StockhoM 1372^ Cameron cabled that there may be a serious 
problem of maintaining the secrecy of the Swedish contacts in V^arsaw. &-fedes 

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public position on this was to be that the "GOS wanted to be informed of 
Hanoi^s position on war in Vietnam/' The Worth Vietnamese Esibassy in 
Warsaw was evincing seme alann about putilicity. The reporter who bad the 
story was told that publication "would severely lajnlt possibility for 
Sweden to be helpful in contributing to peace 



« m 



As an interest aside^ Bergstrom ask^d Cameron^ without pressing Itj 
what he could tell him about the Lewandowski affair. The Higlitower 
story had recently broken. 

I 

On 12 May (Stockholm 1382)^ Cameron reported that &^edes had been 
successful in at least temporarily halting the publication of the story. 

On 17 Mayj in Stockholm 1^05 j Oberg rex)orted that the only matter 
of substance raised in his talk with his North Vietnam contact on May 9^11 
was with respect to the 20 April U.S. bombing of Haiphong. The North 
Vietnamese contact said this represented a "new stage in war." According 
to Oberg^ Eelfrage planned to follow up his Bucharest talk when he arrived 
In Warsaw, On l8 May^ State responded (SOIATE 19753^) that the S^v^edes should 
continue these contacts, divorced from domestic political considerations, 
and that they should continue to explore and clarify Hanoi *s attitudes. 

my 27. 1967 ' - 

Eelfrage -North Vietnam Ambassador, Warsaw Conversation, May 18, 1967- 

Nothing new emerged from this contact. The Nox^th Vietnamese Ambassador 
resisted any thought of reciprocal action from Hanoi. The Swedes warned 
of an intensification of the war, 

STOCKIIOIM l463 to SecState (TOP SECRET, KODIS, ASPEN), 
May 27, 1967. 

"1* Foreign Ministry Secretary General Eelfrage asked 
DCM to come see him late afternoon May 26- Bergstron also 
present most of talk. 

"2, Eelfrage said he wanted give us run-down on his talk 
with NVN Ajiibassador in Warsaw May 2.8 which Eelfrage said had 
taken place in friendly, quiet atmosphere. Because nothing new 
had come out of this conversation he had not called us earlier- 

"3, Eelfrage said he told NVN Ambassador that he came with 
no message. He explained that COS appreciated opportunity main- 
tain contacts with Ifenoi through MN Ambassador. 

^%* According Belfrage, KVIJ Ambassador had repeated well 
known Hanoi position. NVN Ambassador said U.S* bombing in noi*th 
must cease before there could be 'contacts, taUcs or negotiations 
NW Ambassador commented that U.S, talks peace but intensifies 
the war. He alleged U*S, not sincere about negotiations and 



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cited President's letter to Ho as evidence- NVN Ambsssador 
asserted it not reasonatile for U.S, to ask reciprocal action 
from Koiioi; aggressor and victim could not be treated alike. 
He told Belfrage NVIJ would resist ail aggression. 

"5- Belfrage said W^ Ambassador seemed particularly 
interested in possible effect of increasingly critical inter- 
national opinion on U.S» policy in Viet-Nam. Belfrage 
acknowledged to him that perhaps international opinion was ■ 
becoming more critical of U.S* Viet-Nam policy. However j he 
said it was Sv/edish assessment that effect of this development 
on U.S. policy determination should not be overemphasized- 
Belfrage said he made this x^oi^t several times. He told NVH 
AmbasGador Swedes thought that very large U*S, majority was 
behind President Johnson's policy* He also told i^VK AJnba£;sador 
that since there seemed to be a deadlock in UcS, and WN posi- 
tions on negotiations^ it was Swedish impression that intensi- 
fication of the war could be expected." 



"10. Belfrage said he had also discussed the Viet-I^am v/ar 
with Rapacki and Winiewici&, Poles emphasized necessity for 

[_ U.S. to stop bombing in Korth before talJ^s could take place. 

Poles also specu]_ated that Hanoi did not understand realities 

|— U.S. political situation. Ac cordir^ Belfrage ^ Poles said they 

feared that escalation of war might bring in Chinese. Bergs trom 
injected at this point that Yugoslav Foreign MJ-tiister currently 
on visit to Sweden had doubted Chinese intervention unless China 

Y itself was touched." 



HEATH. 



June 20, I96T 



STOCKHOBl 1518 to SecState (TOP SECREJ!, A^ODIS, ASFElOj 
June 20, I96T. Ref: StockhoLn IU63 

"1'. Oberg (l^ar East Desk Font^inistry) informed us 
June 20 that Petri departing Peking for Hanoi June 21 or 
22. He will remain Hanoi until June 27j probably then 
returning directly to Peking prior to hoGEie leave in 
Sweden from early JiHy until September. 

'^2. Petri had originally requested WT^ visa May 29^ 
explaining he wanted be able bring back latest information 



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to Stockholm. He was told Jvine 15 that ne could not 
be received until 'late July. ' On June 19 he was told 
"by IHVW EiTibassy Peking that he vas 'welcoae at any tlmej 
in fact right now.* 

"3. Fonllinistry instructed Petri June 20 that there 
was nothing new to say to NVT-I after Warsaw and Bucharest 
conversations^ but Petri was to listen to anything ITOJ 
wished to say or to have him i-eport. These instructions 
in accord Petri's own estimate that present time not ripe 
for any Initiativej according Oberg*" 



HE^\TH 



Jime 23, 1967 



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STATE 21575^1- to Amembassy STOCKHOm (TOP SECRET^ NODIS^ AGPEN)j 
June 23 J 1967- Ref: Stockholm I518, 

"2* FYI* HVW Ambassador in Peking recently approached 
Norwegian Ambassador stressing Planoi's readiness for 'com- 
promises' if negotiations began on basis bombing halt* WVW 
Ambassador said he would be making similar approach to 
Swedish and Danish colleagues. Without revealing source you 
might have opportunity to ascertain whether Petri was in 
fact approached along these lines 

KATZEHBACH 



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Jiay 6, 1967 



PAEIS 2i|U to Sec State (SECRKP;, NOBIS, MARIA THREE )j 
July 6, 1967- 

"3- Z?^^^i7 ^^^ ^^^ Soviet ABibassador to Hanoi^ Mr. 
Tcherbakovj with v/houi he has some personal ties. He said 
that he obtained from him soLzie interesting revelations 
regard3-ng the respective influence of the Soviet Union and 
China in North Vietnam, ^'/hile carefully maintaining a 
balance between the two coimrLunist giants^ North Vietnam 
relies above all on the Soviet Union. Since Mr- Kosygin's 
visit in 1965^ the Soviet Union has promised and fni^nished 
±nportant, massive assistance on a steady basis. The increased 
prestige gained by the Soviet Union because of this assistance 
has, according to Mr. Icherbakov, even helped the USSR to 
gain the support of the North Korean Communist Party which hasj 
since then^ drawn progressively further avray from China. This 



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prestige continues to exist araong the North Vietnamese 
leaders despite the ^Chinese Clan' within the Workers' 
party. Sooner or later the Soviet Union vants to elim- 
inate an^ kind of North Vietnamese dependence on China^ 
even If this can only he achieved at the price of estab- 
lishing a 'national commi^ism' (in North Vietnam)* I trans- 
mit these statements with the usual reservations. 

"^. l-/liatever influence the Soviet Union and China 
might have J the DRV vv^ill under no condition accept the 
dictation of decisions hy these countries in its present 
conflict with the US, Mr, Petri drew this conclusion as 
result of his contacts with North Vietnamese learners-" 



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July .1.2, 19 6t 






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STOGKHOnvI 063 to SecStete (TOP SECEETT^ T^^ODIS^ i\SPEEOj 
July I2j 1967. Ref : . State 21575^^ 

^*1, Oberg (Far Ifestern Desk Fonlviinlstry and currently 
aide to FonMinister) gave Plocouns run-down on four Petri 
dispatches from Peking on evening JuJ,y 11 at meeting set 
hy Oberg- Despatches dated between June 28 and July 1 and 
received in Stockholm morning July 10 



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"2, First despatch covered visit to Hanoi which ended 
June 27. Petri met DRV Fonlviinister Trinh and Deputy Huang 
Van Lo (phonetic). At separate interviews both told Petri 
that January statement to Burchett remained DRV position 
on negotiation 3 J i.e.j bcnibing of North and 'other acts of 
war' must be stopped before talks could begin. Trinh added 
tliat Ho letter to President remained 'road to peace,' 

"3. Trinh expressed appreciation of Bucharest talks 
(Stockholm I358} and of Belfrage's 'good' talk in Warsaw 
(Stockholm Xh6^)* Trinh also said Eussell proceedings in 
Stockholm were 'appreciated' by DRV; Petri repoi^ted he made 
no comment on this last- 

"1;, Petri told Trinh that he understood that January 
statement to Burchett was still valid^ and Petri added 
that when bombing stopped^ it was important that DRV take 
some 'practical step' which could be 'noticed in Vfashington- 
Trinh did not coisiment but said he 'understood this way of 



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thinking* ' Trlnh concluded that DEV interested in keeping 
open channel to &^edes. Petri who was midex instructions 
to "keep a formal line* reciprocated COS interest in con- 
versations with DRV. 

"5. Petri's evaluation of foregoing is ^ there is no change. 



« A 



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STATE 63 T5 to Amembassy STOCKHOM (COWFIDSIWIAL, LBTOIS), 
_ J-uly 13j 1967. Ref: Stockholm 065. 

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"1. Would appreciate your clarifying as soon as possi- 
ble with Oherg following points on his conversation with 
North Vietnamese representatiyes at StockholirL Viet-Nam 
Conference; 






a • Did Hgiiyen Minh Vy employ term hombing 
'pause' rather than ' cessation % and if so was his use of 
this term consistent throughout conversation? If he blurred 
distinction between teniporaiy pause and permanent uncon^ 
dltional cessation as stipulated by DRV Foreign Minister 
^ Trinh January 28^ does Oberg think this \i^b by accident 

or dealRn? 



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b . nil saying that unconditional bombing stop 

is not necessary and all that was needed was 'proof of good 
faith% did Vy in Oberg 's jud^ent mean to imply that proof 
of good faith could take forms other than unconditional 
bombing stop? 

c. IrThat was date of Oberg 's conversations^ and 
did he see two reps separately or together? Wl'iy did he 
discount significance of their comments? 

d. Does Oherg know whether DRV or Front delegates 
took similar line with other foreign contacts in Stockholm 
inasmuch as our reports indicate uniformly hard line charac- 
terized their statements? 

e. Does Oberg have any conflnpj3tion of reports he 
cited that conference had been threatened with a split between 
KLF and DRV reps on conditions for negotiations?" 



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J^jly li^, 196T 



STATE T393 to Amembassy STOCKHOM (TOP SECRET^ WDIS, ASPM)j 
July 1^^ 1967. Ref: Stockholin 063, 



r"l, V^e note th3t Petri makes no particular mention 
in his recent dispatches of having had conversations with 
North Vietnamese Ambassaaor Loan, From other sources 
^ ve understand loan was anxious to talk with all Scandinavian 

L; representatives in Peking. •. .Knowing Petri's reputation for 
I thorough and meticulous reporting and his good contacts with 
many Coinmunist representatives in Peking^ we are somewhat 
p j surprised that by now we have not had some reports frcm him 
i^ i on Loan - " 






RUSK (drafted by Isham) 



July Ig, I96T 

Oberg-Vy Conversation. 



[ 

Oberg clarified Yy's remark to the effect that the word "pause" 
^ . was used intentionally ttiroughout the conversation- The Korth Vietnamese 

also told Oberg that negotiations could begin **very soon after a bombing 
pause" and that the dui^ation of the pause need not be announced by the 
^,- U.S. in advance, Oberg also reported that rumors of differences between 
^ -the NLF and the DRV were being bandied about town. 



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STOCKIiOIM 071 to SecState (SECRST, EXDIS)^ July 15, I967. 
Ref: State 6375- 

"1. Oberg gave us July 1^ following clarification his 
July U remarks: 

a) Vy began by quoting Trinh-Burchett January 28 
conversation using term 'permanent unconditional cessation'. 
Then Vy switched to term 'pause' and used latter term thi'ough- 
out conversation- Oberg thinks term 'pause' intentionali 
Oanh said negotiatione could begin 'very soon after 
bombing pause ^ and dui^ation of pause need not be announced in 
advance* 

b) Oberg has no indication that say 'US act of 
good faith' other then bombing stop would be acceptable to DRV* 

C) Itete of interview July 11, Vy and Oanh were 
together- Oberg feels that their comments were not e:Kpresslng 
a change in policy but in 'nuance' (his word) which might be 
more personal than official. He does not take their statements 



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to be a signal* 

d) Oberg 'knovs of no siinilar conTersation with other 
foreign contacts. 

E) Oberg has no confirmation of split but heard around 
town of disagreement between IffiP and DVIS oyer preconditions 
for negotiations with FITL talcing harder line.*' 



"3» Vy and Oanh expressed fear US will bomb Red River 
Delta dams during rainy season causing 1 to 1,5 laillion dead 
plus additional 5C^0 thousand refugees. Bombing T"Ould be 
blamed on mistake but vould really be by design because US 
has run out of military targets in m^U Even such losses 
would not >reaken liW resolve. Oberg said he had spoken to 
General 'Big' Minh a fev years ago who had cited same figures - 
Oberg passed Vy-Oanh prediction to Swedish Foreign Minister 
Nilsson who made no comment," 

HEATH 



i July 18, I96T 



STOCKHOIM 083 to SecState (TOP SECRET, ilODIS, ASPEN), 
July 18, 1967- Ref: State 7393- 

''Oberg told E^ibassy officer July 18 that he was not 
aifare any recent conversations between DRV Ambassador Loan 
and Swedish Ambassador Petri. In ne:Kt few days Oberg wiJ.l 
have opportunity check this point with Petri who is in 
S^'/eden on leave. Oberg will then get in touch with us." 

HEATH 



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STOCKHOIM C9h to SecState (TOP SECRST, KODIS, ASPEN), 
Jxily 20, 1967. Ref: Stockholm O83. 

"Oberg told us July 19 that DRV Ambassador Loan made 
a courtesy call on Petri on June Ij but according Petri 
nothing repeat nothing of interest was discussed. Petri 
told Oberg that Loan called upon Norisregian and Danish 
Ambassadors about the same time." 

HEATH. 



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August Ij 1967 

The Svedes began to push two lines of thought: (l) that the DR7 
had softened its position on talks and was not now demanding a public 
TJ*S, statement that the bombing cessation be unconditional; (2) that 
Hanoi was no longer using intractible language on the issue of reciprocityj 
but was stating that they '^understand" the U.S. position* 

STOCKIiOM 116 to SecState (TOP SECRET, KODIS, ASPEN), 
August Ij 1967* Kef: Stockholm 09^. 

"1p In a call August 1 on Oberg at Foreign Ministry 
about another matter, Oberg raised subject of Viet -Nam, 
He said that in recent talks with Petri (who is in Sweden 
on leave) an attempt had been made to assess significance 
Petri's last talks in Hanoi. Oberg said Swedes think they 
have detected that North Vietnamese may have shifted their 
position somevhat concerning preconditions for 'talks' which 
might lead to negobiations, Oberg was ajsipreclse in explaining 
this shift and he turned aside^ repeated efforts to clarify 
his language* 

''2. Oberg said that Swedes do not believe that DRV demands 
public statement by U.S. that a bombing stop is unconditional 
for such a stop to lead to 'talks.* The U^S- could let Hanoi 
know this privately* 

''3. In respect to U.S. demand for W^J reciprocity for 
boaibing stop, the DRV position has softened somewliat, he 
said, \ftienever Swedes explained U.S. demand for reciprocity from 
DRV in the past, Hanoi answered 'why should we reciprocate, 
we are not bombing Wasliington- ^ In recent talks, however. North 
Vietnamese told Petri they 'understand' U.S. position on recip- 
rocity. Oberg said Svredes interpret this to mean that DRV 
might be prepared take reciprocal action in a way U.So would 
understand but not in a way which would cause DRV lose face 
publicly." 



HEATH 



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September 27^ 19 67 



LRusk-Nilsson Conversation. Mcmiorandum of Conversation (Sent 
[ USUi^ 10V6)j Subject: The Secretary and .Swedish Foreign Minister 

' Nils son's Discussion Regarding Vietnam^ Wednesdayj September 27^ 

1967^ 3:30 F*M. usury. Participants: U.S. : The Secretary^ 

CMr, Glitman (notetaker)^ Vir. Clement ( Intei^reter); Foreign ; 
Foreign Minister NilssoD;, Ambassador deBesche^ Mr, Bergstrom 
(Director General for Political Affairs^ MFA)^ Mr. Ob erg 
r (Ciief de Cabinet) 



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Mr. Nilsson called at his request. He said he preferred 
to open the conversation by reading the attached paper con- 
cerning recent Svedish contacts with Hanoi^ because the sub- ' 
t ject vas important and required precision. 



r I AOTACHMENT QU05E. 

L ^ ' I* Since ve last met a year agOj the S^/edish 

Government has been in contact with the North 

CI Vietnamese Governmerit through new visits to 

! Hanoi made by the Swedish Ambassador in Peking^ 

Mr. Lennart Petri^ as well as through frequent 
meetings in V/arsaw between vSwedish diplomats 
sent from Stockholm and representatives of the 
^ North Vietnamese Embassy there. Earlier this 

year J in connection with an official visit to 
I Romania J I myselS had a conversation with the 

O North Vietnamese Ambassador in Bucharest about 

the whole Vietnam issue. These contacts have been 

Cof an infoimative character and have mainly aimed 
at keeping the Swedish Government continuously 
informed about lianoi's views on the conflict in 
Vietnam. 



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II, In I^noij as well as in Warsaw^ representatives 
of the North Vietnamese Government have referred 
to the interview of January 28 this year^ granted 
hy the North Vietnamese Minister for Foreign 
Affairs^ Mr. Nguyen Duy Trinhj to the Australian 
journalist Wilfred Burchettj where Mr. Trinh said 
that talks could take place between North Vietnam 
and the United States provided the bombing of Noii^h 
Vietnamese territory and all other acts of war 
against North Vietnam ai^e ended unconditionally 
and definitely. 

In Warsaw^ on September 7, the North Viet- 
namese Ambassador told a Swedish diplomat that 
"North Vietnam desired to start talks with the 
United States/' He added "that such contact could 
take place as soon as the bombing of the North had 



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stopped and the North Vietnamese Government 
had been convinced that the cessation of the 
bombing was unconditional and definite/^ The 
Ambassador added that '^thls he could assure with- 
out consulting his Government-" 

During AmbaGsador Petri's latest visit to 
Hanoi in June this year^ the North Vietnamese 
Foreign Minister Mr. Trinh confirmed that "North 
Vietnam was prepared to begin talks with the 
United States IT the bombing and other acts of 
var against North Vietnam were stopped^ but not 
previously- " 

On his return to Peking a few weeks ago^ 
Ambassador Petri got in touch with the North 
Vietnamese Cbarse' d'Affaires there. Yesterday^ 
the North Vietnamese Charge d' Affaires in Peking 
said to Ambassador Petrij acting upon instruction^ 
that the declaration of Foreign Minister Trinh 
of January 28 was still valid: preparedness for 
talks but only after unconditional and definite 
cessation of i^erican acts of war against North 
Vietnam • He added that the United States claimed 
they desired peace and negotiations but were, 
insteadj increasing the escalation of the var. 

Ill* Alt hough J of course J there can be no certainty 
In matters of this kind^ it is my feeling that 
the North Vietnamese Government iSj in fact, 
seriously interested to engage in talks with 
the U-S. Government. Thereforej a cessation of 
the bombing might be a decisive step towards a 
negotiated solution of the conflict in Vietnam. 
I am fully aware that the U*S. Government has 
always requested some fomi of assui^ance that a 
cessation of the bcmbing be followed by scane 
reciprocal move from the other side" Mr- Trinh 
said in Hanoi to our A-mbassador that he under- 
stood the importance the U,S- Government attaches 
to the question of reciprocity- Even if no 
precise reciprocal step has been indicated during 
Ambassador Petri's talks in Hanoi^ his view is 
that some concrete act of reciprocity can be 
expected after the cessation of the bombing- 

IV. After his last visit to Hanoi^ Ambassador Petri 
has a general iiiipression tliat Hanoi is expecting 
an intensification of the war fraai the American 
side and prepares for a lengthy var* 



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V- It is my Intexitlon to instruct Ambassador Petri 
to make a new visit to Hanoi. I would^ of eoursej 
higlily appreciate any information or clarification as 
regards the situation in Vietnam that you would care 
to give me* 
ATSAClMEm Eim QUOTE 

"Following Nilsson^s presentation the Secretary said 
he had been particularly irrterested in the sentence which 
stated that North VietHamese Foreign Minister Trinh had 
told Swedish Ambassador Petri that Hanoi understood the 
iiiiportance the U,S. attaches to reciprocal action on the 
part of North VietTIam in connection with a halt in the 
bombing. He asked whether Mr. Wilsson could provide any 
further details on this point. 

"Mr. Nils son said he had already asked Mbassador Petri 
for more details but Petri had replied he did not believe 
he could obtain specific details. However^ Petri said he 
-was absolutely convinced Hanoi would take reciprocal steps 
if the US stopped the bombing. 



—1 

"The Secretary said the US also has contacts with i^noi 
and it is the U.S. impression that reciprocal action would 
not follow upon a cessation of the boabing. Indeed^ the 
p U.S. has never succeeded in obtaining a specific statement 

1^ regarding what steps S^noi would take if the U.S. stopped 

the baTibing. More over ^ captured North VietNamese docu/aents 

rtalk of a fighting/negotiating strategy. The U.S. could 
not accept an arrangement under which it stopped the bombing 
and negotiated while North Viet Nam negotiated and continued 
fighting. 



"'Ihe question of reciprocity is vital. The U,S. had 
said it would take the first step but It could not accept 
a permanent and unconditional cessation of the bombing 
without knowing what steps Hanoi would take. Hanoi^ he 
addedj in response to Mr, Nilsson's queBtionj had indi- 
cated a halt in the bombing must be accompanied by a clear 
statement that it v/as pennanent. 

"No oncj the Secretary saidj has been able to tell 
us what Hanoi would do if we stopped bombing. Indeed^ 
the U.S. has not found anyone who can even tell us if 
their view would change should we take this step. Would 
Sweden^ he asked support us if we stopped bombing and 
I^noi continued the war? 

"Sweden is a small country Mr. Nllsson replied. How- 
ever^ Sweden would ask Hanoi to begin negotiations and to 



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take i^eclprocal action of the U.S, stopped b cubing. Sweden 
wants to see the vbt ended because it is disturbed that the 
U.S. has,surrered a loss of good will in Scandanavla and 
because it is concerned over the deterioration in relations 
between the UtS. and the USSR caused b^ the war- 

"Hd one wants peace more than President Johnson the 
Secretary replied^ but the U»S* cannot purchase a temporary 
improvement in relations by abandoning its coiiimitments. 
The issue involves more than Viet Nam for it also embraces 
Australia^ NewSealand^ Thailand and Korea • The fundainental 
point in the jnatter^ he continued is that the U.S. maintains 
the same standard of fidelity in the Pacific as it does in 
MTO. 1/e have no inaster race theory which permits us to 
be loyal in Europe and disloyal in Asia, 

"The alternative to the maintenance of our coinmitmezitj 
the Secretary said^ is isolationism. The same senators who 
oppose U-S. involvement in Viet Nam also oppose U.S, presence 
in Europe and interest in the ^Middle East. 

^*The Secretary said he appreciated Sweden's interest 
in attempting to bring an end to the Viet Nam war* The 
Swedish paper merited a considered written reply. His 
comment during the discussion regarding the points raised 
in the paper should notj thez^efore^ be taken as definitive 
and repeated to Hanoi* The Secretary said he would have to 
consult with the President but he hoped he could respond 
before Mr. Nilsson returned to Sweden on October 7- 

"The Secretary also suggested the S^v^edish Government 
provide the U.S. with three or four days advance notifica- 
tion of Arabassador Petri's next trip to Hanoi^ since the 
U,S. might be able to provide the Ambassador with some 
useful information. 14t> Nilsson said Ambassador Petri's 
next visit to Hanoi would probably take place in October 
or November. The Svredish Government would give the e:xact 
date to the U.S. Eiabassy in Stocklioljn. Mr. Nilsson noted 
that Pl^noi had shown an interest in using the Swedish 
channel for coimnunlcating with the U.S. and said he hoped 
Sweden could continue to play a useful role in this regard. 

"The conversation ended on the same note of cordiality 
which had marked its entire course/' 



October 12, 19^7 

On 6 October,; Secretary Rusk approved a response to the conversation 
in the form of a written message delivered to Nilsson before his departure 
on 7 October. The key elauent in this written message was an elaboration 



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and explanation of the meaning of the San Antonio formula- The message 
made clear that "no advantage'* has "not been posed as a 'condition^ ' but 
rather as a self-evident description of the state of affairs that vould 
evidence good faith in both sides /^ "No advantage. - -would require 
restraint from Kanoij but this might fall short of total cessation of 
arms dispatch and infiltration into South Vietnam*" It should be noted 
that this Interpretation of ^^no advantage" was not the same as the one 
given to the Rumanians on 1 November- This latter ti^an&misslon talked 
about "not ihc^reasingj ^* and added the no "attack /of/ forces from north 
of the DMZ»" The "no advantage** message to the Swedes was one in a series 



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STATE 5^^361 to Ajn^aaibassy Stockholm (SECRET^ KODIS^ ASPEN)^ 
12 October 1967. 



P 

I of many different explanations of the San Antonio speech- 

[ 

"if. During this conversation the Secretary made a 

C number of observations on the main points raised by the 

Foreign Minister's p^per- We would have nothing to add 
to his comments at this time beyond reaff inning the impor- 
tance of eliciting any additional details on Foreign 
L Minister Trinh's remark to Ambassador Petri in J-une that 

Hanoi 'understood* the importance the United States 
attaches to reciprocal action on the part of North Yiet- 
namese in connection with a halt in the bombing. We 
J nofe Ambassador Petri's view that some concrete act of 

reciprocity can be expected after the cessation of the 
P booibing^ even if Foreign Minister Trinh gave no precise 

indication that Hanoi was considering taking such a stepj and 
we would of course always be keenly interested in any new 
evidence which Ambassador Petri might obtain from North 
r ' Vietnamese officials which would bear out his view* 

"5* Since the Secretary's conversation with Foreign 
Minister Nllsson^ president JohJison in his speech of 
September 29 has set forth our willingness imraediately to 
stop aerial and r^val bombardment of North Viet-J^Iam when this 
will lead promptly to productive discussions* As the Foreign 
Minister will have seen from this speechj as well as frou 
Ambassador Goldberg's September 21 speech at^the United 
Nat ions J we are interested in two points -- whether there 
would be productive discussions^ and whether we could 
reasonably assume that Hanoi w^ould not take advantage of a 
bombing stoppage. The latter point has not been posed as 
a 'condition^' but rather as a self-evident description of 
a state of affairs that would evidence good faith on both 
sides* Foreign Minister Nilsson may note that the desired 
'no advantage' situation would require restraint from Hanolj 
but this might fall short of total cessation of anas dispatch 
and infiltration to South Vlet-Namt If Hanoi were prepared 
to consider such a ties sat ionj a balanced arrangement^ not only 



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stopping the bombing but also cessation of reinforcement 
by United States and othersj would be possible. But 
there remains the possibility that Hanoi might be pre- 
pared to agree to some lesser restraint^ in return for 
stopping the bombing only^ that could comprise an 
effective 'no disadvantage' situation. 

"6- If Ambassador Petri could elicit any precise 
inforniatlon on Hanoi's position concerning these points 
dui'lng his forthcoming visit to Hanoij this could be of 
the greatest importance. As the Secretary remarked at the 
conclusion of the conversation^ ve would hope that ve could 
be Infornied in advance of the timing of Anibassador Petri* s 
next visit to Hanoi so that \-re might consider whether we could 
submit any additional points to make during his discussions 
vith Uorth Vietnamese officials*" 

HJSK (drafted by Isham) 

October 26, I967 

Sa?OCKHOm ^123 to SecState (SECEET^ NOBIS-, ASPEN) ^ 
October 26^ 1967- Hef: State 5^1^361. 

"1, At lunch at n^ residence October 26 Nilsson 
and Bergstrom told me that latter had returned from 
V7arsaw October 23. In Warsaw Bergstrom had seen North 
Vietn^amese Ambassador and had conveyed to him summary of 
Swedish presentation to Secretary Husk (State 5^36l) and 
summary substantive points of Secretary's reply (state 
5^lS^). In addition Bergstrom gave summary Swedish 
impressions US attitudes. 

"2. Bergstrom said dominant impression he got froin. 
North Vietnamese in Warsaw was that they wanted to find 
face saving formula which will allow them to come to 
negotiating table. 



j^- 



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I showed definite interest in clarification of 'no disadvan^ 

tage situation. In one and a half hour conversation North 
Vietnamese Ambassador returned continually to this point. 



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Bergstrom said he felt diffident about attempting an 
explication of this point and therefore did' not go very far." 

*'6, Nilsson said Petri would probably be going to 
Hanoi this ;fall- Foreign Minister promised let us know 
In advance*" 

ILEATH 



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November 4j 1967 

A Be rgstrom- Heath conversation on three successive days did much 
to cloud the Swedish role. Bergstrom tried to argue that recent Swedish 
goverrmient denunciations of US policy in Vietnam did not impair the 
Swedish negotiating rolej but^ in factj strengthened it- He tried to 
explain recent GOS actions as S^-/eden's way of extricating sinking U,S» 
prestige in the vorld over Vietnam and avoiding further U.S. escalation 
along the Chinese border- He added that his government ^^are convinced 
MVK interested in negotiations or at least talks preliminary to negoti- 
ations.*' On instructions^ Bergstrom pressed very hard for a Nilsson 
interview with President Johnson, He warded this effort off strongly - 

STOCKIiOM \% to SecState (SECRET, NODIS^ ASPEN), 3 Sections, 
November 3, I967 (rec'd 0332 h Nov 67). Ref: Stockholm 423. 

Section 1 

"3- Eergstrcm then repeated his impression of keen 
North Vietnamese interest in clarification ^uo disadvantage' 
situation as evidenced NVN Ambassador in Warsaw (Stockliolm 
423)* Eergstrcm said PonI4in Nilsson would therefore like to 
discuss clarification with Secretary - 



L; 



"J+, Nilsson was thinking in terms of going back to UN 
— soon for week or ten days, ostensibly for UN reasons but 

\^ really to go fran there to Ifeshington, if appointment could 

be arranged with Secretary " 



b 



T ^*6. At November 1 meeting, .- -Bergstrom then said that 

L he, Fonl^in and PriMin had reviewed November 1 histoiy of 

their contacts with NVN (i.e* Aspen history) and agreed latest 
p Warsaw conversation most hopeful- They are convinced NVN 

I interested in negotiations or at least talks preliminary to 

negotiations. Therefore Nilsson was requesting appointment 
with Secretary (tlurough de Besche) and he repeatedly said 

LPriE^iin would like^ me to personally arrange for Nilsson an 
appointment with President for two reasons: 



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a) This would convince North Vietnamese th^t they were 
receiving latest US position fran highest authority; 

B) The president might make a more liberal clarification 
of US conditions than Secretary Rusk- 

^'7, Upon inquiry as to timing of proposed visit, he 
insisted it must be prior to their Poland and Moscow visits. 
I replied I must be frank — while the decision obviously was 
not mine, I pex'sonally felt that for President Johnson so 
soon after PriMin, PonMin and party's bitter denunciations 



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of USA and Pril^in's public association of Swedish Govern- 
meot vith ITorth Viet-iVam (NLF) seemed to me inconipatible 
and possibly could be used either for their political 
advantage and our resulting disadvantage in their ^balancing 
act' of on the one hand catering to our enemies by abusing 
us and jjmnediate];/ thereafter proving to our friends in 
Sweden and the world that they must be all right after all 
because their FonMin had been .received by our President 
at PHiite House..*/' 

Section 2 

"11. Next morning Hoveniber 2 Bergstrom called and said 
be had just reported our latest convei^sation and they decided 
not to rush things but would now have de Besche see if Secre- 
tary were available in 'next several weeks' for discussion 
with Nilsson. On other matter (i.e.j Presidential appointment) 
they thought 1 should wait and they would call me when they 
had appointment with Secretary. He indicated concern Secre- 
tary not think Hhey were trying to go round State to 
President. ' j* 

'*12. This morningj Nov 3> Bergstrom telephoned again 
and said 'they' had talked with de Besche again last nighty 
that Secretary Rusk had kindly agreed to see Ponllin Nilsson 
on date not yet detei-mined probably around Nov 13 or ikj that 
Bergstrom and Nilsson were leaving for UN Tuesday j Nov 7j 
ret mining in time for the Polish and Moscow trips j that upon 
reflection they had concluded it best for Fonl^lln to request 
directly of Secretary Rusk that he arrange appointment with 
President Johnson^ and that therefore my further helpfulness 
in that regard would not be needed 



11 



* * * 



Section 3 

"13- Coaiment: A) I have strong doubts about meaningful 
response from North Vietnamese through i^ubassador in Vfarsaw* 

(b) I am also aware that whi3_e Swedes profess to want to keep 
(l) their criticism of us on Viet^Nam and (2) their negoti- 
ation efforts in separate watertight compartment s^ this would 
not. be possible in case of high level Washington visits, -,. 

(c) I am also somewhat concerned over vagueness of exact NVN 
'interest^ in these 'clarifications/" 

"l6. However J I assume Department does not want to 
allow any possibility for peace in Viet -Kara to go \xnexplored 
and therefore I recommend that if possible the Secretary agree 
to see Nilsson and offer him such clarifications as may be 
possible. - - * 

'^17 • I think we shoiild not seek to involve the President 
in this exercise at this time.../' 



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JN^ovember Tj 1967 



STATE 6&l2k to Amembassy Stockholni (SECRET^ KODIS^ ASFEN)^ 
November J^ 19&f - Eef: StockhoLa ^^-23^ k^G. 

"!• We think that you took exactly right line in 
speaking frankly to Bergstrom-,. ► .You should know that de 
Beschej under instructions^ told us and l-Jhite House that 
you had recommended to KiJ.sson that he call on the Presi- 
dent. This distortion your views did not succeed. 
Appointment will not rpt not be made- However^ Secretaiy 
will receive Minister at 12: 15^ rfovember 15-" 

HJSK (drafted by Isham) 



November 21. I96T 



STOCKHOIM 511 to SecState (SECBET, NODISj ASPEN)^ 
November 21j 1967* ^ 

"1- Oberg reports he is going to Warsaw I^ovember 24^ 
as Bergstrcm apparently told Assistant Secretary Bundy 
November 18- 



1) 



2. Oberg^ Bei-gstraa and Nils son due in Moscow November 26*" 



HEATH 



Novemb e r 23., I967 

FonMin Nils son met with Secretaiy Risk on I6 NovGanber. He recapi- 
tulated recent contacts in Warsaw^ adding that the North Vietnam 
Ambassador had remarked that a "new element" may liaye been introduced if 
the President's "no advantage" formula Indicated that the U»S. was dropping 
its demand for reciprocity. 

In this cable, which is a response to the Nilsson memorandum, U*S, 
set out three basic elements for getting ta.Ucs started: (l) '^^ny contact 
at any time without any conditions-^; (2) "contacts accompanied only by 
a modest and unpublicized reduction in the level of areas of bombing"; 
(3) the San Antonio formula 

In this message. State also inquired into three general areas of 
Hanoi's position: (l) the public description of a bombing cessation; 
(2) the nature of the talks that would follow; (3) Hanoi's understanding 
of "no advantage-" Illustrative examples of "no advantage" were given, 
and special emphasis was addressed to the K^IZ situation. It seemed clear 



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L. 

that State was asking two things: (l) Did Hanoi understand what the U.3 
meant by "no advantage?" and (2) V/hat would Hanoi do to demonstrate that 



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understanding? 



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SaiATE 73^3 to Anembassy Stockholm (SECFETj NOBISj ASPEN), 
November 23 j. 1967- 

"1» During Hoyember l6 meeting with Secretary, 
Mlsson presented memoranduTii recapitulating what Swedes 
had already told you about October £2 discussions in 
Warsaw between Bergstron and North Vietnamese jSmbassador- 
Nilsson added no new details except for North Vietnamese 
Ambassador's rer^ark that 'new element' might have been 
introduced if formulation on ^no advantage* indicated 
elimination of reciprocity. In addition^ Nils son passed 
on subsequent coDiment by North Vietnamese Embassy Warsaw 
official on October 28 who said intensification of bombing 
in Hanoi area had affected general atmosphere in negative way^ 
while at same time stating that wliat was said dui^ing October 22 
conversation 'continued to be relevant-'" 

^*3' Please convey following message to Nilsson from 
Secretary: BEGIN TEXT.... The observations which follow 
win summarise what Mr. Bundy, with my approval, told 
Ambassador Eergstron on November l8- 

"hn There are tliree bo sic elements in our position with 
respect to getting talks started. Consistent with the 
prissident's statement of April 7, 19^5^ ^e are prepared to 
have any contact at any time without any conditions* Second, 
we are prepared to consider at any time possible contacts 
accompanied only by a modest and impublicized reduction in 
the level or areas of bombing- We would be impressed by some 
corresponding action on the other side^ but this Is not to be 
understood as imposing a condition. Third, there is the 
President's San Antonio proposal to which I referred in my 
message of October 6. In additionj there are three points 
which call for clarification. 

"5- First, how is a cessation of bombing to be described 
publicly, and what is to be the private understanding of this 
tenn? On the basis of Hanoi's' position as formulated in the 
January 28, 19 67 interview of Foreign Minister Trinh with 
Wilfred Burchett, we are bound to interpret Hanoi's teims as 
requiring that the cessation be permanent and be characterized 
as permanent. It would be useful to know whether this is 
what Hanoi means or whether there is some other condition 
attached. 



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i- "6, The second point- turns on the nature of any talks 

that might take place following such a cessation^ however defined. 
f~ What degree of assurance would there he that talks would actu- 

L I ally take place? IIov soon would they take place following a 

bombing cessation? How serious or productive would they be? 
Our own viewpoint on these questions is clear: We would expect 
our representatives to sit down somewhere for hard discussions 
of the main Issues covering dll points the other side wished 
to discuss. 



J "7- The third point relates to the understanding of a 

^no advantage' situation^ as described in the President's San 
Antonio speech and in my October 6 message to you in connection^ 
j with a bombing cessation and the start of talis. One way to, 
* clarify this is in terms of questions that I emphasize are 

■ illustrative of examples only* Ifnat would happen with respect 
^' to the flow of supplies and men into South Viet-Nem and to 

positions directly threatening South Viet-Wam? For example^ 
if following a cessation or limitation of borabing> there was 
a marked increase in the flow of trucks southward: if a new 
I North Vietnamese regiment were to appear; or if we saw a 

massive increase in the flow of supplies Just to the north of 
the LlMZj we would be negatively impressed* Similarly^ to take 
another example^ we would want to know what would happen with 
respect tp the three North Vietnamese Divisions now in the area 
^ , of the Demilitarized Zone which have been employed as part of 

! offensive operations against our forces south of the fflZ. 

U Would artillery located north of the demarcation line \>e employed 

against our forces? And^ if so^ would we be expected not to 
bomb these artillery positions? 



"8, These questions are^ of course^ not easy ones to 
answer. Never fchelessj we believe they are central to an 
accurate understanding of what Is Involved on both sides- We 
would be grateful for any clarification that you might be able 
to obtain through your contacts with North Vietnamese repre- 
entatives on these matters," 



s 



(Drafted by Isham) 
December o igSj 

m . ■ I ■ 

Oberg indicated to Cameron that the "Swedes would probably back us 
if Hanoi failed respond bombing halt^ although Oberg talked in temais 6-8 
weeks grace period for Hanoi response." Oberg told us thiSj and that he 
would be going to Warsaw to meet the DRV Afnbasssdor in a week's time. 



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STOCKHOLM 585 to SecState (SECa^^ NODISj ASPEN)j 
December 9j 1967* 

* 
^'1. Oberg (FonMin's aide) told EnbOff Dec, 8 he leaving 
for Paris Dec. 10 Council Europe Mijaisterial Meeting and fxom 
there going Warsaw Dec- 15 or l6 to meet DRV Ambassador who is 
now in Hanoi- 

"2. Cberg plans give TM<! Ambassador verbatim exanrples 
no-advantage situations outlined Secretary's reply to 
Mlsson paper (state 73693)- 

"3* Oberg suromed up Swedish view DRV attitudes: 

a) DRV expects levelling Hjsnoi^ Ilaiphong; bombing ■ 
dikes and invasion W^i plans made Xov movement governrtient 
frou Hanoi, 

B) DRV really has no expectations US elections will 
change anything; 

C) Swedes still see split between DHV and W^a^ with 
speqlTic point being absenct^ reunification plank in NFL^s nGvf 
programs first phase. 

^%. In Moscow (reported Stockholm 58O and being amplified 
in follow-up telegram) Soviets were persistent in stressing 
Hanoi ' s independence 4 

"5* Oberg repeated point made para 2 d) Stockholm 58O that 
S^fedes would publicly back us if Hanoi failed respond bombing 
haltj although Oberg talked in ternis of 6-8 weeks grace period 
for Hanoi response; 

"6< Petri not rpt not planning go Hanoi in immediate 
future unless something worthwhile develops..,." . 

CAMERON 



December 11^ 19^7 



STOCKIiOM 590 to SecState (SECRET^ Iv^ODIS, ASPEN)^ 
Ref: Stockholm 5^1* 

"To complete record^ Oberg (PonMin's aide) told RnbOff 
Dec 8 that his meeting with DRV Ambassador in Warsaw Nov 2lf 
vas 'routine contact.' DRV Ambassador did re-state bis 
interest In 'no advantage situation.' Oberg did not have 
Secretary's reply to Nilsson's paper (State 73693) giving 
examples of 'no advantage situation' at that time-" 

CAMERON 



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4 

January 3^ 1968 

Bundy-de Besche Conversation- 

■■ 

I De Besche indicated to Bundy that the North Vietnamese Qharge said 
he would promptly pass the illustrative examples of "no advantage" to 
Hanoi- He also asked for Buiidy^s interpretation of the 29 December 19^7 
Trinh statement. Bundy indicated there was in fact a change from "could" 
f^ "willj " that there might be a change in talking about the bombing 
_ iuse as unconditional rather than peimanentj but that this was not clear j 
and that Trinh was still silent on "no advantage^ " and Trinh *s emphasis 
on the k points and the NLF progi^am still indicated hard line* 

STATE 931^0 to ^ijnembassy Stockholm (SECRET^ KODIS^ ASPEN) , 
January 3> 1967- 

"2. --..Nilsson has instructed Oherg to travel to 
Warsaw (probably January i^) to obtaiji exact text of statement 
from North Vietnamese. Foreign Office queried whether US 
desired to transmit any questions at this time or otherwise 
seek clarification of Trinh statement. 



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"3* In reply Bundy said that while ve vere obviously 
Interested in obtaining any clarification of what might 
underly Trinh statejiientj choice of available channels and 
timing of their use required greatest possible care and 
precision in order to avoid creating confusion- Moreoverj 
' it would in any event be difficult to frame careful and 

Q precise questions in short time remaining before Oberg's 

departure for Warsav# At this jmicturej Bundy saidj we 

p would not therefore there be inclined to ask GOS to put 

[ any specific questions to North Vietnamese which could be 

construed as coming frau us. Bundy said he would check this 
with Secretary and be in touch with de Eesche; this position 
was later confirmed and de Besche infoiioed, Bundy noted that 

^ the Swedish Government could of course seek any clarification 

on its own behalf, De Besche accepted this and promised to 
keep us Informed- 



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"if. In response to de Besche 's request for interpretation of 
latest Trinh statement^ Bundy commented: 

■ 

(a) use of verb Vill' in context of talks was plainly 
a change from previous Trinh foi^uulation of 'could*; 

(b) use of term * unconditionally' rather than 
'permanently' or ^definitively' could be construed as a more 
gentle fonuulation^ although it was not yet possible to draw 
any clear conclusions on this pointy particularly because of 
the reference In the latest statement to the January 28; 19^7 
Trinh Interview which with accompanying Hanoi commentary posed 

condition of permanent cessation; 



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(c) Trinh remained silent on issue of mutual 
restraint or 'no advantage 'j although Eundy noted one 
would not necessarily expect this to be covered by public 
statement; and 



p (d) Hanoi's basic hard line reflected in Trinh' s 

[ eanphasis on Hanoi* s Four Points and NLF political program 

"^ as the basis for Viet -Nam solution. 



"5» 1^ shortj Bundy cooKaented that questions qontained 
in Secretary's memorandum to Mlsson rar^ained highly relevant - 



r* * "6, Foregoing drafted before receipt of Stockhoija 662* 

L Oberg's detailed report of conversation with North Vietnamese 

Charge is most useful and it appears clear that Foreign Office 

Lis not yet providing de Besche with as much detail as Ob erg 
is conveying directly to us in Stockholm - 

''7. We would in any event prefer that Oberg or his 
f7 superiors be authoritative source of such reporting." 



KUGK (drafted by Isham) 



Januaiy h^ igffl 

Report on Oberg-Warsaw Talk of December 21-22^ 1967 



Before describing his conversation in Warsa\7j Oberg said that 
(' verbatim examples of **no advantage^' situations as outlined in State T3693 

U. have bcea given to the DRV Ambassador without catmaent* Oberg also noted 

that during Nilsson's recent visit to Moscow^ the Soviets were no longer 
r" ux^ging the Swedes to play an intermediary role. The Swedes inferred from 

^ this that the Soviets were pessimistic about chances for peace- 



In response to i3.1ustrative examples of "no advantage" the DRV 
Charge made three points. . (l) How would the bombing pause be described? 
(2) "¥e cannot leave our brothers In the South mii:>rotected; '* (3) V.Qiat 
would productivity and seriousness of negotiations mean? His second 
point indicated that either he had not understood the "no advantage" 
formiLla or that he was referring to the MLF rather than W^ troops, 

STOGKHOffl 662 to SecState (SECRET, NODIS^ ASPEN), 

JanuaiT ^^ I968* Ref: Stockholm Qx^. 

» 

"3* Oberg saw Charge Vu Each Mai ( Ob erg's spelling) 
Dec 21 and handed over paper described Fara 2A* Paper had been 
translated into French; illustrative e:xamples Para 7 State ^'iSS^ 
were also given in. English. 



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"4. WN Charge raised three points which Ob erg on 
instructions refused to discuss saying that S\/edes had 
this paper from US aide and ttet Swedes not competent 
go beyond what was in paper. 



c 

"5* ynree points I^/IT Charge raised were: 

r 

i A. Did Swedes have any suggestions on how to 

describe bombing pause? 



B- On question of flow of material in no-advantage 
situation Charge said 'we cannot leave our brothers in the South 
unprotected, ' It was not clear to Ob erg whether he was referring 
to NIiP in South Vietnam or to supplies to NVN troops north of 
n^. ( Ob erg coHimented that in his contacts WP^ representatives 
never referred presence NW troops in South Vietnam.) 

C- On question seriousness of negotiations Charge 
said this was unclear to him. In any negotiation both sides 
started from positions widely apart and with quite different 
aims. In such cases there vmuld be different interpretation 
of 'serious or productive- ' "& 



"7. Oberg's general Impression ^side from fact tliiat paper 
had been well received was ttet Charge seemed much more relaxed 
than Mbassador and much less dogmatic. He also seemed much 
better inforraed on conditions in US and seems to have no illusions 
that election year 'would make btx^ difference or that American 

n domestic differences over Vietnam would seriously influence 

policy. 

C"8. In Jan 2 conversation Oberg did not mention any 
fui^ther Swedish move at this time presumably because Foreign 
Ministry thinks KVN may ccmment on paper » However^ Oberg 
J IT caJJ_ed Jan 3 to say he v/as returning to Warsaw Jan h on Foreign 

. f Minister's instructions to attempt to get clarification and 

text Trinh statement on lianoi radio, De Besche being instructed 

Einfonn Department of this and to say that Swedes do not consider 
it connected to Aspen operation." 

CAMERON. 

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February l6, 1968 



CThe Sv;'edes informed Heath that they were expecting a yiisit from 
the Worth Vietnamese Ambassador in Moscow, The IVorth Vietnamese 
Ambassador ims scheduled to arrive in Stockholm on February 20, 
p (STOCKIIOM 877) 

^ ibruary 17. 3-968 

1 The Sv/edes were given the same private statement of the U.S. position 

*^ as had been given to the Nor^^egians to U£e in their talks with the PTorth 

^'letnameee Ambassador to Moscow* 

r 

L ! '*The U*S,j consistent with President Johnson's statement 

of April 7 J 1965 J remains willing to enter into talks without 
preconditions at any time- 



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"[Ehe U*S< position on the cessation of the bombardment of 
North Viet-Nam is set forth in President Jolinson's September 29 j 
1967 speech in San Antonio, As the President said: 



'The U.S, is willing to stop all aerial and naval . 

bombardment of North Viet- Nam when this will lead promptly 
^ to productive discussions, We^ of course, assume that 

while discussions proceed j North Viet-Nam would not take 
f advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation- ' 



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"The U,S, is not assuming that North Viet-Nam will cease its 
support to its forces in the South, On the contrary^ as Secretary 
of Defense designate Clark Clifford testified before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Comjnittee^ we assume that until a cease fire 
is agreed on^ Hanoi 'will continue to transport the normal amount 
of goods ^ men and munitions - ' 

"in setting forth Its assumption^ the U-S* is not setting a 
condition but attempting to make clear to North Viet -Nam that 
any cessation of U,S» bombing followed by actions by Hanoi taking 
advantage of the cessation (such as an increase by Hanoi of its 
infiltration of men and supplies or attacks in the area of the 
DMZ) would constitute such bad faith on. Hanoi's part as to make 
continued U.S< forebearance impossible. If Hanoi^ by taking 
advantage, forces the U.S. to resume bombing the possibilities of 
a negotiated solution would drastically recede. Under such 
circumstances calls for intensified U.S. military action would 
increase and the possibility of another halt in the bombing would 
be low. The U.S. is trying to ascertain whether Hanoi appreciates 
this vital fact and fiLlJLy understands the impoi"tance the U,S, 
attaches to the no- advantage assumption. 



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"At San Antonio the President ^ in addition to setting forth 
his assu2uption> stated his readiness to stop the bombing when such 
action would lead 'promptly to productive discussions.^ * Productive 
discussions' are serious exchanges in \Aich either side will be 
able to put fon-rard for roll consideration in good faith its posi- 
tion on any matter* 'Prompt' of course refers to a willingness by 
Hanoi to begin discussions with the U,S, iiiimediately after cessation 
of bombing. 

"it is worth noting that Hanoi is unwi3_ling to give a clear 
response to g^uestions as to the length of time between a U.S. 
bombing cessation and the beginning of talks* If Hanoi were 
serious in desiring talks then surely its response v;ould have 
been one of uneq^ui vocal readiness to begin immediately - 

"The U.S* evaluation of Hanoi's current position takes into 
accoimt Hanoi's actions as well as its words- The unprecedented 
offensive against most of South Viet-I^am*s urban centers^ v/hich 
Hanoi treacherously launched in the midst of the traditional Tet 
holidays^ causing widespread civllia,n casualties and suffering^ 
was made notwithstanding the fact that we were still exploring with 
Hanoi its position through diplomat ic channels ^ and that we had 
exercised restraint in bombing ta^rgets in the iamnediate vicinity 
of Hanoi and Haiphong- In this context ^ we cannot but vfeigh 
Hanoi's words with great skepticism and caution, Tliese actions 
carry a harsh political message, 

"The U,S- favors every effort to obtain clarification of Hanoi's 
position- V/e shall continue to evaluate all information and to 
pursue every possible avenue which promises to bring us closer to 
the resolution of this conflict through serious negotiations-" 

(State 117383) 
February SO ^ I968 

Petri suggested that he visit Hanoi on February 22 and his Foreign 
Ministry had given approval- The Swedes said there v:as nothing special 
about the date or the visits merely that "it was tiiae for him to go to 
Hanoi again." Cameron suggested that the S\^edes defer the Petri/Oberg 
trip to Hanoi until after the North Vietnamese Stockholm visit* 
(STOCKHOLM O83)* 

February 23 ^ I968 

Foreign Office Political Director Wachtmeister told Heath that he " 
believed the Korth Vietnamese Ambassador's "main purpose for Stockholm 
visit was to impress S^-redes with North Vietnam's 'self-confidence' in its 
position-" (SIOCICHOIM 896) ^ 



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Foreign Minister Nils son sent Heath a '^short account" of his talks 
with the ^[orth Vietnamese Ambassador. The Ambassador > Mr* Chan j elab- 
orated on the Trinh statement of December 29. 



"Mr. Clian repeated the statement of his Foreign Minister 
of January I967 and of the 29th of December I967. He thus 

r repeated that negotiations would begin as soon as the United 

States had proved that it has stopped all bonibardments and 

all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of 

Vietnam. He specified 'all other acts of V7ar* to mean that 
I no airplanes vjere permitted to fly over DRV territory and no 

u. naval vessels were to have their guns or other weapons directed 

against DHV territory after that had been done^ the Democx-atic 
f ■ Republic of Vietnam would negotiate vfith the United States 

[^ about relevant q.uestions. The Ambassador in this connection 

also referred to Foreign Minister Trinh 's statement of the 8th 

Cof Februaz^y 1968^ to the effect that the Vietnam conflict had 
to be solved on the basis of the i95U Geneva Agreements arid that 
negotiations could begin as soon as the United States had shown 
that it would stop the bombardments of Worth Vietnam and all 
other actions of war against the DRV. He mentioned a delay of 
some three weeks 'or less' ." 

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DEPAP/r\rEXT OF ?TATE 

. ' Office nf 
Ambassvduk At L.utnii 



August 2, 1967 



MEMORANDUM FOP. XtiE NEGOTIATIONS CO^:^aTTEE 

EYE S ONLY PARTICIPANTS 

FROM: S/AH - Chester L. Cooper 



SUBJECT: Visit to Hanoi by Two Unofficial 
p French Representatives 



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Early in June a sraall group of Pugwash participants 
met in Paris to discuss the situation in the Middle East and 
Vietnam. Representatives of the group came from die Soviet I 
Union J the UK^ France and the US ^ The American participants 
were Kissinger^ Doty (Harvard) , ^and Feld (MIT). As an 
outgrowth of this discussion, one of the Franch participants , 
Marcovich of the Pas teur Ins titute ^ and Kissinger (with the 
knowledge and endorsement of the Soviet participant) agreed 
that it would be useful for Marcovich to proceed to Hanoi for- 
the purpose cf sounding out the North Vietnamese on their 
views toward negotiations j and to' present unofficially the 
Phase A - Phase B formula which had been discussed in general 
terms at the Pugwash session, Marcovich was to be joined by 
a M. Aubrac, an official of FAQ who knew Ho Chi Minh 
personally (Ho had stayed in Aubrac ' s home during the 1946 
negotiations with the French). De Gaulle was made aware of 
the trip and interposed no objection on the condition that 
the tv7o Frenchmen were acting "unofficially''. 

■■ 

Marcovich and Aubrac arrived in Hanoi -by way of Phnom 
Penh on July 21, They left Hanoi on July 26 and returned to 
Paris via Phnom Penh. Kissinger saw them '/within hours of ' 
their return to Paris". 

Duri.ng their stay in Hanoi Marcovich and Aubrac had 
two conversations with Pham Van Dong and one with Ho Chi Minh. 
They were also shown a hospital ^ some damaged dikes and other 
evidence of American"aggression". They were given a bamboo 
surgical kit (which they said was developed to meet the 



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shortage of steel surgical instruments)^ a propaganda film 
on American bombing and some pellets from "anit-personnel 
bombs". (Arrangements are being made to get these to us.) 

Attached are Kissinger's notes describing the sessions 
between the two Frenchraea and the Vietnamese officials. 
The material preceding the notes of the conversations ( pages 
1 - 11 of Kissinger's notes) is a lengthy background dis- 
cussion and a chronology of the trip. 

Several interesting points emerge from the conversation 
with Pham Van Dong. 

* 

1. Bong's reiteration of the offer to negotiate soon 
after a bombing cessation and, in particular ^ his statement 
that the cessation need only be a ^'de facto", one. (pp 12 and IS) 



2. Dong's statement -to the effect that they v;ould be 
prepared to negotiate secretly with the U.S. on matters directly 
affecting North Vietnam and that the NLF need not be present. 

(p 17). In subsequent sessions in V7hich the political 
problems of South Vietnam were to be discussed the NLF would 
have to be present, (p. 13). 

3. Pong's recognition that^ "some U.S. forces would have 
to stay until the end of the process of political settlement", 
(p. 16). 

4. Dong's statement that the NLF envisaged a "broad 
coalition government" which would include members of the 
present GVN. (p. 17) 

5.' Dong's statement that Hanoi would not "push things 
toward unification" until after there was a political settle- 
ment, (p. 17) 

6. Dongas sense of optimism about the eventual outcome^ (p. 15) 

The conversation with Kq is more interesting in terms of 
color and n^od than in terms of substance. 



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An analysis of these conversations and some possible 
follow-up actions VJill be the principal matter for discussion 
on Thursday^. August 3, la Governor Harriman's office. It 
Is hoped that participants will have an opportunity to read 



the attached before the meeting. 



ATTACH>iENT: As stated 



Chester L, Cooper 



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Mr - Rostow 
Gov, Harriman 
Mr. Sisco 
Mr, Warnke 
Mr. Habib 
Mr, Read 



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IIX. CONVERSATION'S V7ITH PHAI^I VAN DONG A>n) HO 



A- Meeting v.'ith Pham Van Dong^ July 24^ 9 a.m. 

B. Meeting v/ith President Ro, Afternoon^ July 24, 

C. S^ecorrd Meeting v;ith Pham Van Donq. 



Y >TE: These conversations are dravm from reports by 
Aubrac and Marcovich v/ithin hours of their return to 
Paris, Quotations are direct quotes as they appeared 
in Aubrac's notes mads during the ir.eeting. The conver- 
e ^tions are reported in the order in v;hich they occurred 



^» Meeting v/ith __Phan Van Don g^ July 24 ^ 9 a.m . Present . 

Aubrac^ Marcovich^ Phaui Van Dong, Tach (Minister of 
Health} , note-taker. 

\ • PhauL Van Dong opened the rnsating 1:>y saying that 
he v/as happy to see A.ubrac and Marcovich. The visas 
had been given on the basis of Aubrac's reputation^ 
therefore^ it v;as up to Aubrac to present his ideas. ' 
Aubrac then describad the background of the trip to 
Hanoi as sketched in Part I. Ke said that he v;ould 
report to .T.a and I v/ould report to the U.S. governuient. 
Marcovich continued by outlining -as a private idea the 
tv/0"part proposal: 1) an end to U.S. borribing^ 2] coupled 
v/ith an assurance by North Vietnarii that "le tau:< das 
approvisionTLent ne sarait pas accru a la faveur de. cette 
arrete." Aubrac interruoted to say that the control 
problern v/ould have to be solved and Hanoi should make 
proposals. Pham Van Dong replied that he had been 
v/ondering v/hen that issue v/ould be raised. Marcovich 
said that part of the control might be through overflights 
for reconnaissance purposes, Pham Van Dong said: "This 
is our country. ■ V7e cannot discuss the problem in this 
manner." Pham Van Dong added: "vre want an unconditional 
end of bombing and if that happens, there will be no 
further obstacle to negotiations." A.ubrac asked v;hat he 
meant by unconditional. Pham Van Dong replied that 
North Vietnam could not negotiate v;hile being bombed. 
Aubrac asked v;h ether Pham Van Dong wanted an official 
declaration that the bombing had stopped, or would he 
ba satisfied with a de facto end of bombing. Pham Van 
Dong replied that a de facto cessation v/ould be acceptable. 
Aubrac asked v;hether there should be some delay between 
the end of borpbing and the beginning of negotiations. 






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Phara Van Dong replied: *'Tnis is not a probleni,'* 
AujDrac asked v;hat channels should be used, Pha-n Van 
Dong replied; ''This is not a problem but it should be 
soineone authorized by both parties," He then v^ant on 
to say init,lal negotiations could be on those natters 
affecting the U.S. and North Vietnan^. as principals, 
vrnen issues affecting South Vietna:a v;are raised^ the >7LF 
v/ould have to be present. /Aubrac and Marcovich had the 
impression that the scenario anvisaged by Pharri Van Dong 
involved B.n end of U.S. bontbing to be follovrad v;ithin 
a matter of days by the opening of negotiations under 
acceptable auspices^ 

* 

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Pham Van Dong then said that he thought that the 
next escalatory step v;ould be a bor:>bing of the di'kes ,. 
All preparations had heen made to mitigate the consequences, 
but the human suffering v;ould be severe. He as'-ced Marcovich 
and Aubrac to help influence svorld opinion against 
such a step. Aubrac replied that their usefulness depended 
on hot joining any propaganda effort. Hov^'ever^ they 
might talk to the pacal mission in Paris about the 

problem. - ^ * ^ -^ ^ 

** 

Pham Van Dona then closed the meetinc: v/ith a 
little speech; "You sea, dear fr lends ^ that the problem 
is very iromplicated. You may thinX your 'travels are 
useless. In fact you have given us much to thinT< about. 
I will see you again and v;e will tai:< again." 




mention Communist China, 



Tach remained behind. He joined Aubrac and Marcovich 
at lunch and told them that the two-step bombltig proposal 
should be discussed officially rather than informally - 



B. Meeting v;ith President Ho, Afternoon- July 24 . 

Present; Ho- Aubrac, Pham Van Dong, Tach and not 
taker . 



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Aubrac said that what struck hiiri iii'_med lately was . 
how old Ho had become. He v/as dressed in a Chinese go-.vn 
and walked with the aid of a cane. Hovrever, his 
intelligence was unimpaired; his eyes still had their 



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old sparkle. He seamed to enjoy pla.ying the role of a 
grandfather-'figurej not concerned v/ith details. Aubrac 
had brought as a gift a little colored stone egg. Ho 
gave three presents in return; silk for Aubrac 's daughter^ 
sorae books and a ring made of metal from the 2000th 
U.S. plane claLTied to have been shot dov,Ti over Vietnam- - 
He remembered the first names of all of Aubrac 's three 
children. After speaking about Avforac's family for about 
15 minutes, Aubrac said: ">Ir. President do you knov; 
V7hy I have come?" Ho ansv;ered "Yes." Aubrac asked 
v/hether he had any comments* Ho replied by saying, that 
he did not like the phrase "peace in Vietnam, " It gave 
an impression of moral equivalence bet\v-een the United 
States and North Vietnam; in fact the U.S. is the aggressor 
and must be condemned. Ho praised De Gaulle for under- 
standing this distinction. Moreover the details of 
negotiations v/ere in the hands of Pham Van Dong, Ho 
then added: "Rememberj many people have tried to fool 
me and have failed. I knov/ you don't v;ant to fool ma." 
He then turned the conversation back to fam.ily matters* 
He expressed regret that Aubrac had sold the house 
v/here he had stayed t\venty-ons years ago, "^vhere shall 
I live v/hen I next coma to Paris?" He then asked v/hether 
he would be v/elccme in Paris j but- avoided the question 
of v/hether he wanted an invitatioh. 

He terminated the conversation after fifty minutes 
and wa,s escorted from the room by Tach. Pham Van Dong 
v/alked v;ith Aubrac to his car. He 'said that "we try to 
spare President Ho as many details as we can. He is an 
old man; we v;ant him to live to see his country unified." 
He told Aubrac that he was thinking about their conversation 
of the m.orning* He moved up the next day's appointment 
by an hour to allow mare time before Aubrac *s and 
I-larcovich * 3 deoarture in the evening. 



C. Second Meeting with Pham Van D ong. Present : AubraCj 
Marcovich, Pham Van Dong, Tach^ note-taker. 

The meeting consisted of a talk by Pham. Van Dong 
speaking from notes. Aubrac reported that the talk went 
something like this: "Dear friends. Our conversation 
yesterday v;as very useful. If you v/ant to understand 
the problem in Vietnam., I advise you to r^aad the book 
by Morris vrest called The ?rp.bassador . ^^"either Aubrac 



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nor Marcovich l^nev; of the existence of this "book_*y We 

rare facing a pr-oblem v/hicii is at the same time very 
simple J very complex and of great irrtportance for the 
world. It is simple because it concerns tha freedom 
of a people. It is complex because many considerations 
are involved. It is of great importance because it has 

nvolved so many peoples, vfe have co:ae to the opinion ■ 
that the U.S. government is trying to solve the problem 
within its present limits. /^Aubrac and Marcovich too)c 
this to mean that Pham Van Dong v/as convinced that the 
T .S. was not in Vietnam as a prelude to an attaGl< on 
China^ We also thin"I< that the U.S, government is trying - 
to get a clear picture of the present position. Our 
view is this: U.S. pav;er is enormous and the U,S.' 
government v.-ants to win the v;ar* President Johnson is 
suffering from a pain and this pain is called South 
Vietnam, V'e agree that the situation on the battlefield 

L'is decisive; the game is being played in South Vietnam. 
From the nev;spaoers we see that seme oeople want to confine 
the war to the South. Kov/ever^ the Vfnite House and 
Pentaaon seam determined to continue the war acrainst the 
North, Therefore v/e think that attacks on the North are 
likely to increase. V7e have made provisions for attacks 
On our dikes; v^e are ready to accept v;ar on our soil* 
^ Our military potential is growing_ because of aid from 
^ \ the USSIi and other Socialist counrtries, /Aubrac and 

' Marcovich pointed out that this v;as the only tim.e a 

C Communist country v/as mentioned ^oy i^-eme in the tv/o 
conversations extending over five hours, Aubrac and 
Marcovich also felt that Pham Van pong v;as eager to 
r . give the impression that the situation v/as under control_J7 

As for the situation on the battlefield, it is 
r improving all the time. The dry season was good and the 
I - wet season v/ill be better. The Marines are in difficulty. 

The United States is forced to replace its well-trained 
^ ■ ' troops by ever-younger soldiers, We fight only \^fnaTL we 
[ choose; we economize on our resources; we fight only for 

political ' purposes . 



* 






For example, nev/s from Saigon suggests that Ky 
,is considering" moving his capital because it is no longer 
safe. Tnis is true. Tve could easily step up our actions 
inside the city. But v/e take only those actions which 
have political meaning and v/hich economize human lives. • 



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"Nov;' I shall talk to you about negotiations and 
solutions. We have been fighting for our independence 
for four thousand years. We have defeated the Mongols 
three times-. The United States Army, strong as it is, 
is not as terrifying as Genghis Khan- We fight to have 
peace at home; v/e have no v;ider aims. We have mads 
clear our position in our four points and in the interviev/ 
of January 28, 1967 • /Pham Van Dong did not explain 
v;hat this interyiav/ was; Aubrac arid Marcovich did not 
knov/j nor do I^ We are ready to talk at any time 
provided that actions against the North are unccnditionally 
ended, I v;ant to repeat v/hat I said yesterday; v;e are 
willing to settle for a de facto stoppage^" Marcovich 
interrupted to ask v/hether he correctly understood that 
no public acknov;ledgjient of an end of bomZ^ing v/as needed. 
Pham Van Dong replied that he vrould prefer a public 
statement, but v/ould settle for a de facto cessation. 
/There v;as disagreerr.ent betv;een Aubrac and Marcovich 
about the meaning of de facto cessation, Aubrac thought 
that a bo.-iibing pause could be follovred v.-ithin a fev/ days 
by an invitation to negotiate; Marcovich v;a5 of the viev; 
that Hanoi miaht v/ant a more forrnal — 
assurance. 



hiougn secret — 



Pham Van Dong resumed, "Ending the v;ar for us 
has tv/o m.eanings: 1) An end of bombing v;hich is 
permanent- and unconditional; 2) A withdrav/al of United 
States forces. We like the formula of President de Gaulle 
Marcovich interrupted to say that it v;as not realistic, 
Pham Van Dong agreed and said that he realized that some 
U.S. troops would have to stay until the end of the 
process of political settlement. He added: "We do not 
want to humiliate the U.S. Lenin did not like war but 
fought v;hen necessary. As Lenin we are Communists," 

"Nov/ let me spaal^ of U.S. policy and the NLF. V.'a 
should have had unification in 1955. Tae period 1955-59 
was a political fight. It sav; the nutual assistance 
pact betv;esn the U.S. and Saigon and the introduction 
of U.S. staffs. This led to the formation of the NL?. 
The second period, 1950-54, sav^ a disintegration of the 
U.S. pos^ition to v;hich the U.S. responded by 'soecial* 
war. "/I suppose he meant "special forces" v/ar_^ In 
1955,' the United States started a 'limited' war which 
lasts until today 1 At the sa:r:e time the tTLF has expanded 
its activities from the count rv into the cities and' fro.-a 
inside Vietnam 



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Vietnam is socialist and v.'^nts to remain so. As for the 

South J our goals are national independence* de:i\ocracyj 

peace and neutrality. Soma pecp^le think vre v;ant to 

impose Socialism on the South. l\\e ara convinced that the 

NTjF v/ill not make such an error *-^ The NLF envisages a 

' road coalition government, including _ all significant 

grouns and religions v;ithout consideration of oast activities 

including mervoers du gouvernement fantoche et cadres 

6 ' armee fantoch e , /He repeated the underlined v;ords^ 

"j ae essential thing is to forget the past, 

"As for unification^ v/e recognize that the important 
first step is a political settlement of the South, V,'e 
agree not to push things tovrard unification. Once the 
v/ar in the South is settled; v;e shall discuss v.'ith the 
South and find the best means. Our people are m.agnii 

■ ; "Peace v;ould have been easy for the U.S. three 
years ago. But v;ith every year the political situation 
v/prsens . Qre do not like secret negotiati^ons^ but v;e 
recognize their necessity in this situation,^ As long 



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the issues do not concern South Vietnam^ the 

not participate. Kowevsr, v;e do not believe that 

United States is ready for a settlement." Then turning 



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"Que veulent les J-jmericains?" 



Aubrac ansv/ered that he had been convinced by me 
that the U,S, v/anted an honorable ^ettlem.ent end that 
an end to bombing could be envisage'd provided it v/as 
not used as a breathing space to step up the v/ar in the 
South, -'This led to a discussion of the m.eaning of the 
term reinforcement. 7 -'^-^^i^ Van Dong again stressed that 
an end of bombing v;ould lead to negotiations. Marcovich 
said that if negotiations go on any length of time, the 
problem of reinforcem.ent is serious. Pham Van Dong replied 
"If the Americans stop bombing and we understand that 
they arev/illing to talk there is no question of delay," 

Pham Van Dong then told Aiibrac and Marcovich that . 
they could comm.unicate v;ith him through 3o or Sung in 
Paris. Aubrac and Marcovich said that they vrould inform 
him of the U.S. reaction. 



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On August 11 J 1967 J L-he President approved the following message 
and asked that Dr. Henry Kissinger use M and A to convey it to Phara 
Van Dons: 



"The United States is willing to stop the aerial and 

C naval bombardment of North Vietnam if this will lead 

promptly to productive discussions between representatives 
of the U.S* and the DHV looking toward a resolution of the 

U issues between them* We v^ould assume that^ while discussions 

proceed either with public knowledge or secretly^ the DRV 
would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limita- 
tion^ Any such move on their part would obviously be incon- 
^ si stent with the movement tov/ard resolution of the issues 

L between the U_S. and the DRV which the negotiations are intended 

to achieve. " 



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Dr- Kissinger was given the follow^ing additional instructions: 

"You should say further to Messrs. Marcovich and Aubrac 
that the United States is prepared to negotiate either openly 
or secretly- It would seem^ however ;, that a total cessation 
of the bombing is inconsistent v;ith keeping secret the fact 
that negotiations are taking place. Accordingly 3 the DHV may 
prefer to consider the alternative of a cutback in the magni- 
tude or scope of the bombing while secret negotiations are. in 
progress, 

"The U,S* is ready. to have immediate private contact 
with the DRV to explore the above approach or any suggestions 
the DRV might wish to propose in the same direction." 



I 
TOP S ECRET - NODIS ' 

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DecJassifiiMl per Executive Order 13526, Section 3J 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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TOP SECRET /NOBIS /PE-M>;SYLVAKIA 



AuR List 17, 1967 •■ 



'-* J7i 



Revised and supplemcated after 
revlev; by ICissinger SepCembsr 8, 
1967". - ' \ 

Pursuant to USG instructions, Henry Kissinger 
met for 5 hours v:ith Messrs. Aubrac and l-Iarcovich 
(hereinafter A and M_) in Paris at the latter 's 
house. Kissinger repeated Washington's under- 
standing of M and A's conversations in Hanoi 
on July 24 and 25, and M and A confirmed these 
interpretations Tvitiithe already reported differon 
betv7een theui that A thought that an end to borribing 
v?ould be enough to start US/DPvV talks, v;hile^M 
thought some secret comir-unications betvjeea 
US and DRV might be necessary before talks 
started. Mr* Kissinger follov?ed his instructions 
and handed A and M tha Tnessage v;hich he request 
them to take to Hanoi, In ansvjer to a question 
Kissinger stated that the message reflected the 
viev7S of the Secretaries of State and Defense 
and' had been approved by Piesident Johnson- - 
During the discussion Kiss inner made the 
£ollov;ing points ; 



* 



i 



'Ci 



(1) The phrase ''take advantage" refers to '^any 
increase in the movement of men and supplies 
into the south"* 

(2) The phrase "productive" discussions indicated 
the determination to avoid extended Korean-type 
negotiations during unabated military operations; 

■ 

(3) The bombing pause might make it impossible 
to keep the fact of negotiations secret for 
more than three v;Geks at the outside ^ though 
we could of course guarantee secrecy as to 
their substance. Therefore it might be desirable 
to conduct preliminary talks v;hile tonnage, 
geographic or sorty limitations or reductions 

in the bombing occurred, ^^^ith a complete end 
of the bombing \;hen final negotiations took 
place. But the choicG of secret or open 
talks I'jns up to Hanoi; and 



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(4) The decision to add nevj^ targets v;as made 
before iuforGiation of A and M's Pianoi discussions 
had i^eached V7a?hington and in the absence of 

TOP BSCBiS/mDZS/^EJ^mSyLYAmA —.. 



1 T 



Decbssified per Executive Order 13526, Secnon 33 
NND ProjecL Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 U 






August 17, 1967 



August 17 J 1967 



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August 18, 1967 



TOP SEGKET/NODIS/PEITOSyLVANIA 

meaningful negotiations the intensity of 
violence vas likely to continue to rise. 
Debate of specific escalation vas futile since 
the offer included stopping bombing all together. 



A and M suggested substituting another plurase 
for the word ''if^' in the first sentence of 
the message- They said that they vere persuaded 
that a trip to Hanoi >j-ould be useful and proceeded 
to discuss mechanics of travel. At the end 
of the conversation A and M asked whether some 
restriction would he placed on the bombing of 
Hanoi for reasons of personal safety and to 
show good faith. See Kissinger memcon. 

Kissinger cabled the Department suggesting 
elimination of the vord "if" in the first 
paragraph of the message and its replacement 
by "with the understanding that" and this 
authority was granted Paris 1997 ^ 2017 and 
203^, 207^; State 2312 and 22969, Other minor 
changes in French text were agreed to in the 
same messages. 

M and A requested an appointment with DRV Rep 
Sung J which was granted on 20 minutes notice* 
Sung was cordial and said he had been instructed 
to transmit messages fi^om A and M to Hanoi. 
When M and A requested visas for Hanoi ^ hov7everj 
SuxLg said he had no instructions concerning 
visas and would refer the requests to Hanoi. 

Mr, Kissinger met with M and A at M's house in 
the morning^ and the latter reported on their 
meeting with Sung on the evening of August 17 . 
Kissinger told A and M that Washington accepted 
their language change and a further minor 
modification was suggested. The rest of 
the conversation concerned technical problems of 
visas J travel costs and A's scheduled two-weeks 
leave, A code was agreed to between lAr* Kissinger 
and A and M to cover certain likely requests 
for clarification or debriefing, A and M, stated 
they had not talked to the Elyses or to 



'JOP segret/nodis/pemsylvama 



12 



Decbssified per Executive Order 13526> Secnon 33 
NND ProjecL Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



6^f 



TOP SEnRET/NODIS/PETmSYLVANIA 



August 18, 1967 



August 18, 1967 



August 19 J 1967 



August 19 > 1967 



anyone else and, Mr. Kissinger urged contiauing 
secrecy, 

Mr. Kissinger met with M and A in the afternoon 
to introduce Mr. Chester Cooper in case he should 
have to pick up the contact in the future and 
to give a greater formality to the message. 
See Kissinger memcon, 

M and A sent their first message to Hanoi 
requesting visas to travel to the DRV during the 
veek of August 20. • 

I'ir. Kissinger met Messrs M and A for the fourth 
time the morning of August I9 at the Pont Royal 
Hotel, 1-lr. Cooper ^^as present part of the 
time. As instructed by Secretary Mcljajnara 
Mr, Kissinger told M and A "that effective 
Augui^t 24' there vould he a noticeable change 
in the bombing pattern in the vicinity of 
Hanoi to guarantee their personal safety and as 
a token of our good will/* There was no mention 
of exact distances. Mr, Kissinger said these 
orders were ^'generally good for 10 days*" I^Hien 
M and A asked whether this was an ultimatum^ 
Kissinger replied that we would hardly talk 
of an ultimatum when we had offered to end 
bombing altogether. 

During the early evening of August I9 
Mr. Kissinger met again with Messrs, M and A at 
the Pont Royal Hotel, After fui^ther discussion 
between Mr. Kissinger and. Secretary McNamara^ 
Mr, Kissinger said that he wished to make 
clear that the restrictions on bombing in the 
imiriediate vicinity of Hanoi would end 
September 4., M and A indicated that they were 
well impressed mth US seriousness and considered 
the US offer very meaningful, Tliey stated 
they thought it essential to take * the text of 
the message to Hanoi themselves and present it 
with background inforjiiation. They reviewed 
a cable which they had prepared to send to 
Hanoi through the DHV Mission in Paris if Hanoi 
rejected their visa applications or if no answer 
had been received by August 22. 



TOP SECBET/NODlS/HimSYLYA^nA 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Seel ion 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By; NWD Date: 2011 



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TOP S E CRET /KODIS / PE^TPSY LVAl^ .^ 



August 21, 



19 57 " M phoned Kissinger in Paris on the evening of 

August 21 to tell him of Hanoi's refusal of their 
visa application. Mr, Kissinger told them to 
pass the message v:hich he had discussed v:ith them 
on August 19 to Ranoi through the Paris DRV 
Mission if the ansv;er to their first tele^^ram 



jj 



remains negative. See Kissinger mem con. 



AuRUSt 21 , 1 967 - Messrs. M and A gave the DRV mission the second 

message urgently requesting visas to travel to 
Hanoi V7ith an important message. See Kissinger 
conversations v/ith Messrs M and A. . ^ 



on 



Augus t 22, 19 57 - Mr. Cooper informed the Department that A and M 

got a turn dov?a on their initial visa request 
and had sent an urgent 3-p"peal by telegram. 



August 2 5, 1967 



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Messrs A and Mjnet with Bo in Paris to inquire 
why their visas had not been received. Bo 
told them it v?as too dangerous to visit Hanoi 
due to the bombing. H and A then informed Bo 
they had assurances in that respect, without 
identifying the nature of the assurances ^ which 
would be effective until September 4. 

Messrs M and A then presented the US massage 
as set forth below to Lo for the first time. 
He read it v;ith interest and observed that it 
was '^clearly significant"* Bo queried them 
about the significance of para, 2 of the message. 
He V7^ inforLLied that it exnressed US doubt that 
the existence of US/DRV discussloris could be 
kept -secret if bombing ended ^ and Eo recognised ' 
that this would be a problem. Bo was impressed 
and v/as told that the message v;as authorised by 
top levels of the USG. M and A gave Eo a 
written description of their contacts v?ith 
Kissinger. Eo agreed to cable the m.essage to 
Hanoi and to report their desires to visit Hanoi 
to discuss the message. Eo believed a reply 

should be available by August 29. 

» 

The English text of the message given to Eo. 
in both French and English is as follows: 



TOP SECRET /KODTS/p::>liV?YLVAKIA^ 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
MND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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TOP SECRET /MODIS /PEIiNSYLVAllIA 



The United States is v;illing to stop the aerial and naval be-.- : 

^ bardment of North Viet-Narn i;ith the uaders banding that this \iiXX lead 
promptly to productive discussions bctvreen representatives of the Mv^6^. 

L ''^States and the Democratic Republic of Viet-^I^am looking tov;ard a j 

resolution of the issues between them. VJhile discussions proceed i 

r 'either V7ith public knoTjledge or secretly^ the United States . \ 

L i7Duld asGurae that the Eerr.ocratic Republic of Viet-*Nam would not 

- j 

take advantage of the bombing cessation. Any such raove on the : 
P part of the Derr.ocratic Pvepublic of Viet'-Nam \?ould obviously be ; 
L inconsistent v;ith the rrioven^ent tov?ard resolution of the issues ■ 

bev?eeen the United States and the Deraoc ratio Pvepublic of Viet-lTam 

which the discussions are intended to achieve* 

The United States is prepared to enter into discvtssions 
r either openly or secretly. It v;ould seem, hovrever, that a 
^ .. total cessation of the bombing Is inconsistent with keeping 

C secret the fact that discussions -a^re taking place. Accordingly, 
the Democratic PvCpublic of Viet-Nain may prefer to consider the 
alternative of a cutback in the ir^^agnitude or scope of the bombing 
vhile secret discussions are in progress. 

The United States is ready to have immediate private contact 
%^xth the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to explore the above 
Q approach or any suggestions the" Democratic Republic of Viet^Nam, 
might v7ish to propose in the same direction," 

[According to M and A^Bo's cable to H^noi, after transmitting the . I 

above message in English and French texts ^ noted that texts were 
[confirmed by Cooper and that both Kissinger' and Cooper had stated 
i they were prepared at a very high level of the USG and approved by, 
the President* A mressao:e sent to Hanoi also included the follo^jin^ 



■<3 

v 






> .:;- > 



.[ 



points which had been made by ^Kissinger according to M and A; 

(a) The US is handling this problem confidentially and requests 
J^rlanoi to do likewise; --- ■ "" "^ ^ ■ 

(b) The US is particulax^ly interested in ,the possibility that 

i ::he DRV envisages direct secret discussions; '- , , ^ 

(c) The attacks oil the dikes vera accidental; ,| 



# - ■ 

(d) The US requested massage " to" be. brought to the attention of 
'^nam Van Dong as soon as possible; 



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TO? SEcni:T/f-: oDis /p^;:::qYLVANXA 



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Declussifii'd per Executive Order ]3526> Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Dale: 201 1 



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TOP SECRET /InOD IS /P£NKSYI.V A>IIA 



1 

I or Paris "vrere suggestod as possible sites; and 



(c) The US is read}' to submit the information in the nessage 
directly and secretly by special representative. Vientiane^ Moscov; 



(f ) The US v7oald contiaue ^to utilise the Ki s singer -A /M channel 
if Hanoi wished. • -• 

■9 
■■ * 

In addition 3 M and A said that the August 25 message stated that 
"for personal assurances of safety and to establish authenticity^ 
bombing attacks in the immediate vicinit}^ of Hanoi*' would stop for 
ten da^s^ beginning August 24. Finally ^ M and A urged that they 
be permitted to come to Ifenoi as requested by Kissinger,, to provide 
additional information. 



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TOP SECR ET/NQDIS /P EyjSY LVANIA 

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DeclassiHed per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Nmnber: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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TOP SECRET /KODIS - PERNSYLVANIA 



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B-ta^^4- -bP J * J 



August 29. 1967 



Bo told Messrs* M and A that he had not 
recGived a response but expected a reply_ 



on August 30* 



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Au .q :ust 30> ig &7^-- Bo told M and. A that there hnd been a ''technica 

break in coiinnunications v;ith Hanoi" but Bo 
expected a reply by COB August 30 and he 
assured M and A that their raessage \-;as bein.^ 
taken very seriously. 



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Au^u$t 31* 1967 - Aubrac visited Bo* ivho told him that he still 

had no ans^cer to the August 25 message, but he 
had heard fro^ii Kanoi rejecting II and A's August 21 
appeal of the turn dovjn o£ thr^ir visa applications* 
Bo stated that his government noted unfavorably 
that the receipt of the August 21 paessage coincided 
with the escalation of borabing of the North v;ith 
. • Hanoi as^ its objective. Under these conditions 

it is impossible for the DRV to grant visas to 
permit M and A to carry the August 25 message to " 
■ ' Hanoi. VJhen Aubrac told Bo of his intent to 

return to Rome on September 2, Bo asked him to 
stay in Paris until Septenber 5, particularly 
since M i;as out of to\m for a short ^v^hile* 



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September 1, 1967- M returned to" Paris. 



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September 2, 1967- M and A visited Bo ^.vho repeated his comments 

of August 31 o A indicated that M's return 
. . should permit A to leave for Roma on September 3 
but Bo asked him to stay until September 5 since 
a message fx*om Hanoi could arrive at any time*, 
Bo asked M to make sure that nothing "happened 
to Hanoi in the next few days*". Bo said he '^ 
wjould talk to M and A again on September 4. 



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NKD Projeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 U 



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■ ■■■-.. •■- . TOP SECItET/ITODIS/PEKNSYLV/iHTA ■■ • ■• . 

Scptcinber 3. 1957 - K and A sav: Bo after recGivinf; infoririatioa 

from Mr. Kissinger that the bombing pattern 
around Kanoi voald remain in effect three 
days longer^ They told Bo that the bombing 
.■ - .T- -- pattern around Hanoi V7as extended for another 

72 hours through September 7* Bo received j 
this information "icily'' but asked H and i^. 
A again not to leave tov/n because Bo still ' 
had not received an answer. |; 

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^?£l;emJiej^^^_196X " Bo told M and k that he st^Ml had no answer* || 

from Hanoi. Bo indicated that an ansver V70uld 
have been simple if it hadn't been for US 
^ bombing actions on August 21^ 22 and 23. Bo U 
told M and A to come back on September &. A j| 
told Eo that he planned to go to Rome and Bo 
raised no objections. 

■ a' . 

■I 

S e J) t ember _ 5 ^ . 19 6 7^ - Aubrac returned to Rorae- 

■■ 

"" Septemb er 6, 1967 - Bo told M he still had no ansvrer and again 

■ referred to the fact that M and A's second 

■ 

cable urgently requesting visas arrived in 

Hanoi on a day V7hen the city v?as hit particularly 

hard. 

I 



mb er 7... 1967 - After conversations mth Kr. Kissinger and A 

and a phone call from A v;ith Bo^ M called on 
Bo after receiving an appointment 15 minutes \ 
after it \vas requested. M told Eo the USG . | 
was "standing by - waiting for an answer,";. 
M said the atmospheiti during the convers' tion 
-■> "'■■-*'-■>'-:;: was friendly and relaxed and Eo said several 

times that he hoped M and A's efforts would 
work out better than past efforts by others . 
VThen Bo was informed (incorrectly) that 
Kissinger would be la Paris on the V7eekend 
of September 16 ^ Bo said on his own initiative 
that he VJould ask the DPvV immediately for 
authority to see Kissinger^. VHien M said he 
did not know ; whether Kissinger would be author iz.ec 
"to see Bo and suggested that Bo might want to see 
s.omeoae ^ less izlose to the USGj such as Bernie 
Feldj Bo rejected the suggestion and said he 

TOP SECR KT/irODIS/TSK^iSYT.yAsTA 

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Dcila^isifled per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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TOP S E GRET /KODI S / PERNS^T.VANIA 



Sep temb e r 7 , 1967 
'(cont'd) 



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Granted to have authority to see Kissinger 
so that a diroct conversation between Bo 
and ICis singer V70uld be possible. Bo said 
he still had no answer from the DRV to the 
USG message; Bb again cautioned "strictest 
secrecy'' regarding 'the contact and M gave him 
this assurance. 

l^Jhen N told Kissinger of the preceding 
conversation^ Kissinger asked M to call 
Bo to inform hira that Kissinger would be 
in Paris on September 9 to correct the 
information he had given him. earlier o M 
reported back tlia t he had called Bo later 
on the afternoon of September 7 to correct 
[ ^ the dates of Kissinger 's Paris visit ^ 

Septem,ber 7-8, 1967 ^ Klsa nger came to Washinf^ton to discuss 

B I 'iff i'lj riB ri m ii - i i n r i ii ■ ' ' ^^-^ ^^ 

his raeetlag V7ith M this coming v;eekend at 
Paris and possible meetings with Boo 
I ' Mr. Kissinger left Boston on evening flight 

for Paris on September S. 

At 11:00 a.m. EDT on September S, Kissinger 
phoned k in Rome from Washington to ask k to 
return to Paris vvhile K was there. 

m 

« 4- 

W _a 

M visited Bo and told Bo of Kissinger's request 
today that A return to Paris- M told 3o that 
A and N vouched for K^ but if Bo v;anted 
additional reassurances Klllionshikov (Vice 
Chairman of the Soviet Academ.y of Science and 
Pres indent of the Supreme Soviet of the 
Russian Soviet Republic) could coiTie to Paris 
to vex-ify the origin of the m-ission. Bo 
rejected this proposal and said the existing 
M/A-*K channel V7as satisfactory. Bo cautioned 
about the great need for secrecy o In response 
to Bo's question J M said K planned to be in 
Paris for about 10 days. Bo said if there vrere 



Septe mber 8 . 1967 - 



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' . ► ^ I ■ 'ii ■ » " 



September 8, 1967 
(Cont'd) 



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no bonibing of Hanoi "something could v:ell 
happan'' during that period (Paris 3070). 

Kissinger arrived in Paris in the morning, 
just before Aabrac \dio returned fropi Pome 
at K's request. After a conversation beti;een 
.K, M and A (Paris^ 3070) A called Bo to 
arrange ran appointmsnt for k and I-I^ which v:as 
set for 4:00 p.Di, Paris tin:e. At the meeting 
%vith Bo J the latter told A and M he had been 
instructed by Hanoi to keep in close touch 
vjith A and M^ and Eo was available to A and 
M at any tirrEe, M told Eo that Kissinger had 
been in touch Xvith senior USG officials , 
later identified as the President, Secretary 
Rusk and Seer-etary MciTaiiiara, v/no were "grov:ing 
impatient with the absence of any response frora 
Hanoi". Bo asked if Ualt Pvostow had cleared 
the message, and A and K had not heard his 
name mentioned by Kissinger. M reported that 
Washington did not know v;h ether the (August 25) 
message had ever been received in Hanoi. To 
this J Bo replied that his government accepted 
the message as "absolutely authentic" and "it 
was .being studied aov; in the light of developing 
conditions". -Bo added that A and M must 
recognize the DRV situation is quite complex. 
M urged Bo to meet Kissinger and Bo replied 
that he had not yet received authorization to 
talk to Kissinger J but that he was in effect 
talking to Kissinger now through A and M* In 
response to a question, A told Bo that Kissinger 
had indicated a desire to"*discuss some matters 
with Bo privately vjithout the presence of A 
and M, and A recoirirnended private meeting, 

although M urged that M and A be present* Bo 



TOP SECRET/K0t)IS/PEi\^7SYLVANTi^ 



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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 \ 






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TOP SECRET/KODIS /PIcNNS YLVANIA 



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Septei^i'oer ,9 ^ , 1 967" -^ vi^s noncommittal but said if a ifiecting 
(Cont'd) . . _ %';ith Kissinger iras arranged thrca^/n any 

other channal he V70uld let M arid A knov;- 
' Bo then said "v7hat I really want to know 
is v^hetber the (August 25) message is still 
valid''* A and M assured him that It v;as bat 
repeated Kissinger's statement about US 
restiveness with respect to the long delay 
in Hanoi's responsec M and A told Bo ' .- 
they were personally convinced by Kissinger 
that the August 21-23 bombings were un-- 



related to the August 25 message* Bo asked 

^ . .^ *■ ^ " ^hnnt tha ^^McNamara line'' (barrier) and said 

/Hanoi viewed it as "political ■ action to make , 

P ' the separation of brothers permanent*'* M viewed 

1 , it as "an alternative to bombing" • Bo hoped 

'- ' A would not return to Rome and again stressed " 

secrecy, (After checfking V7ith K. A re*- 

-turned' to Rom^ to be on call*) - ■ -"" .:.;., 

* ' September 11^ 1967 - In response to a phone request from Bo at 
^^ ■ 6:00 p.m. (Paris time) , Sunday, September 10^ 

[2 . \ Narcovich called on Bo at 9:30 a.m^ After 

an exchange of pleasantries Bo handed to N the 
follov.'ing text of Hanoi's official reply to the 



c 



August 25 message: 



4 

f~ - "The essence of the Arr.erican propositions 

L ' ': is the stopping of the bombing under conditions. 

' ^ The American bombing of the Democratic Republic 
r ^ * of Viet-Nam is illegal. The United States an) 

L ^ ■ . should put an end to the bombing and cannot pose / 

conditions* - * 

*" ^ ' "The American m_essage has been cona^iunicated 

after an escalation of the attacks against Hanoi 

f ■ , and under the threat (menance) of continuation 

of the attacks against Hanoi. It is clear 
that this constitutes an ultimatum to the 

f ■ ■ " Vietnamese people. 

\ ' ' "■' *' ' "TOP SECRET/KODIS/PEKNSYT.VANIA • ' 



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NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Dale: 20! 1 



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Septetrtber 1,1 , . 1967, - 
"^^^ (Cont'd) " ' ' 



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/'The GoveraTient of the Democratize * '' \ " '■' ' 
Republic of Viet-^Kam energeticcflly rejects 
the /imericaa propositions. 

/-"The .posit 3,on of the Government of the ■ . ■ ■■ 
Democratic Republic of Viet**Nani is that the 
United States should ce^se definitely and 
i^?ithout conditions the bombing and all 
other acts of v?ar against the Democratic 
Republic of Viet-Kanio It should vjithdraw .- 
American troops and satellites from South" 
Viet "Nam ^. recognize the National Liberation 
Front of South Viet "Nam and let the 
Vietnamese people themselves regulate their 
internal affairs • It is only after the un- 
conditional stopping by the United States of 
the bombing and all other acts of v?ar against 
the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, that it 

Tvould be possible to engage in conversations » " 

* 

" (uno f f ic ia 1 trans la t ion) 

Bo told M to give the text to Kissinger and 
added 'that "as soon as there is a reply" M 
should communicate ^';ith Bo at any time of day 
or night • V/!ien M urged Bo to meet Kissinger^ 
Bo said "give the message to Kissinger and 
when the reply is here x-;e shall see about 
meeting"* In comi^ienting on the text of the 
DRV message Bo made the following, statement: 



» 'w'' 



,^A. ^t*.-, 



t *■ * 



- * . 



"The bombing of Hanoi at the same time as the 
sending of the (August 21) message constitutes 
a pressure. Stopping of the bombing along v;ith 
the threat of a renewal has the character of an 
ultimatum^."^ . X^^.^i^ 3097).^^ . , ■ . 



« 



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TO P SECRET /NOD IS /PE>rj 3 rLVAHIA 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: N WD Date: 201 1 



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\ODIS/TO? SECRET/PEK-SYLV. ."A 



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Sppt Grr-ber, 1,3, 1,967 - M mst for 35 minutes with Eo oa short 

Pursuant to revised 



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no Lice at noon. 
Departmental instructions to Kissinger 
(State 35567 and 36554) v:hich K discussed 
v;ith M in part at bre^ikirast on September 13 
(Paris 3242)^ M handed Bo the follov:ing 
message from K in a sealed envelope: 

"I have a reply frora the USG to the 
Hanoi message x^7hich v?as received on Monday 
(Septem^bor 11). I have also been given 
a'cbmnientary on this message. Because o£ 
the importance of the United States reply and 
because the coiLmentary refers to other 
discussions v?ith Hr.noi which we have promised 
not to reveal I have been instructed to deliver 
it personally. I am available for a meeting at 
any time and any place v/hich is convenient 
to Mr, Mai Van Eo/* 

Bo asked M v/aether he had seen the message 
from K, N said he had not^ and Bo did not 
show the message to M. In response to M's 
urging that Bo see K^ Bo said '^because of 
the continued threat of bombing Hanoi which 
has' the character of an ultimatum, a direct 
meeting with Kissinger cannot take place." 
M asked what assurances Hanoi wanted. Bo 
replied that this V7as a US problem* M asked 
whether contacts through the M/A channel 
should continue and Bo replied "definitely 
yes. We consider that we wish to continue 
talkiQg through this channel." Bo said he 
would accept aviy comjnunication open or 
sealed through this channel^ specifically 
includiag any such message from Kissinger- 
Bo ^' ^ ""reiterated "We 
want to keep this channel open". In reply to 
a question Bo said that as long as M was in 
Paris he saw no need for A to return from Rome- 



NODIS / TOP S ECRET/FEM^-lSyLVANIA 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526> Section 33 
NND ProjecL Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 U 



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Bo then turned to the (September 11) bombing 
of Haiphong* He said thst bombing within 
one kilometer of the center of tov7n in effect 
meant attacking populated areas i He did not 
establish atiy relationship betv;een the borribing 
of Haiphong and the sending of any message in 
the M/A channel. Bo emphasized to M Pham Van 
Dong's view that the DRV xcould continue 
fighting no matter how badly it was bombed - 
even if Hanoi v.^as totally destroyed* He 
referred M to the Schoenbrun September 10 
television program as evidence of Hanoi ^s 
determination to continue fighting (Paris 
and 325 7). 



3288 



M saw Bo at noono In accordance V7ith in- 
structions to Kissinger (State 36927 approving 
Paris 3257) \vhich Kissinger discussed with him 
on the niorniag of September 14 (Paris 3329)^ M - 
handed Bo the . following messa^^e from K in a 
sealed envelope : 

"Hanoi^s attitude with respect to the 
kind of restraint we have employed in this 
channel is baffling • . If we bomb near Hanoi 
we are accused of bringing pressure- If vje 
voluntarily and without any suggestion from 
Hanoi impose a restraint on our actions and 
keep this up without time limit we are accused 
of an ultimatum- In fact^ the American proposal 
contained neither threats nor conditions and 
should not be rejected oa these grounds". 



did not open it but said he would study it 
later. He asked whether it contained the 
principal message^ and M said K had asked for 
instructions about whether the principal 
message could be transmitted through A and Mo 
Bo asked vjhether Vi vjas sure there was a message 
and Bo said he was certain there was and that 
K would receive instructions soon- M then read 
to Bo from his handv/ritten notes containing 
the follox^;ing official explanation: 



NOir-lS / nr S ECRr :T / hE>T>:5 YLVA N T_a 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 \ 






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'The enclosed paper contains VJashington's 
r view about the significance of the restraint 

L ' in the Hanoi area and the unconditional 

nature of our message of August 25." 

r ■ ■ ■ 

L- ' M then gave Bo Kissinger's "personal" 

explanation as follows: 



"The enclosed declaration in ray judgnient 
erases the possibility^ of any charge that x-je.- 
are proceeding by ultimatum." 

i 

Thenas arranged v?ith Kissinger (Paris 3329), 
M gave Bo the follovjiug "official" coranient 
from Kissinger: 

Washington does not consider the attacks 
of September 11 as escalation- The attacks 
closest to the center of Haiphong vjei'e in an 
area V7hich had been attacked three times 
previously J most recently on June 26. 
Mro Kissinger is prepared to give more detailed 
clarifications". 

M then added Kissinger's "personal" comiiient: 

"(A) Bo should remember that the number 
of officials av/are of the current exchange of 
viev7s is very small. This makes it very 
difficult to reverse decisions taken prior 
repeat prior to the decision to send the 
message of August 25 and maintain secrecy. 
(B) It seems m.ore useful to seek a solution 
to the present situation than to debate about 
how we got there. Hanoi should remLember that 
Che U.S. message of August 25 offered to end 
the bombing and all other acts of war against the 
DRV in circumstances which the United States 
Government considers not to involve conditions 
but which rather repeat statements m.ade by Hanoi. 
If Bo v.-anLs clarification, I staid ready to 
grve It. ' ' 

NO DIS /TOP SEC RET/? EI\-MSYLVA NLA 

25 



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Dfdassinfd per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. Byr NWD Date; 201 1 



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M also gave Bo Kissinger's concluding 
"personal" comraent: 



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NOD IS /TO P S E GP.ET / P EN' NS YL VA NIA 



1 



"The present exchanges can be useful if 
they enable both sides to gain a clearer 
undor standing of the issues before them. I 
must point out, however, the concern expressed 
to me by high officials in Washington that too 
often these coinmunications are one~v?ay streets." 

M agreed to Bo's request that he leave his 
notes containing the above conm^nts for Bo 
to study and Bo v;ould return them on the 
morning of September 15. 

ft 

M mentioned that at sonie point the Elysee v;ould 

have to be informed but Bo replied ''The fewer 

people knov7 about this the better." M again 

said he hoped Bo and Kissinger would be in ^ 

direct contact soon (Paris 3333; -3329; and 

(French text)'- 3415). 

Q Sept emb e r 16 , 19 67 - Kissinger met for about tv;o hours V7ith M and A, 

iiiiniediately after A's return frcni Rome on the ,f 

C morning of September 16* K told M and A he was 

authorized to give them the sealed message from 
Washington for delivery later in the day to Bo 

Cand turned over the message to them. K 
cautioned M and A not to tie the continuation 
of their channel to K's presence in Paris but 
suggested that they ask Bo about Bo's views on 
how to continue the channel thereafter. K 
reminded N and A that the US 'Is prepared to talk 

Eon an official level at any rautually convenient 
place- M and A indicated their viLlingness to 
continue on the present basis and reluctantly 
f" agreed to hand sealed envelopes for delivery to 



26 



^ DecLissilled per Executive Order 13526, Section 33 

NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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NOBIS /TOP SE CRET/P ENNS YL VMIA 



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Kissinger to an Embassy officer (later 
specified as Hallner) af'cer K left Paris, 
although they indicated a preference for 
communicating with K by ordinary mail or 
telephone* 

K urged M and A not to permit Bo to gain 
any mis impress ion that he had a future 
assurance from the USG against bombing in 
the Hanoi area and M and A promised to leave 
- 'no ambiguity on this point. . Kissitiger asked 
M and A to make the points with Bo that (a) the 
US has consistently attempted to phrase its 
" proposals in conciliatory and realistic 
language, but the repli^es from Hanoi have 
not been responsive and have not addressed 
key elements of the US proposals; and (b) the 
failure of Hanoi to deal vjith US proposals 
and the interjection of outside elements ^ such 
as specific military actions ^ have raised 
doubts in the minds of US officials about the 
willingness of Hanoi to enter into productive 
discussions (Paris 3492)*, 

September 16 , 1 . 967 - M and A met with Bo for over an hour, starting 

at noono A, who did Qiost of the talking at the 
meeting with Bo and kept the notes, reported 
on the meeting. Bo greeted A and M affably and 
offered them drinks <. Bo said Ho had charged 
him with inquix-ing about the health of A's 
family. A then handed to Eo in a sealed 
envelope French and English texts of the 
follov/iag US message: 

September 13, 1967 

"The USG believes that the September 11 ' 
raessage from the DRV may be based on a mis- 
understanding of the American proposal of 



L, . NODIS/ ,TOP SEG^I^T/PKIn^^SY LVANI A 

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3,3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



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NODis/TOP secret/pe>:nsylvanla 



August 25 • The American proposal contained 
neither conditions nor threats and should 
not be rejected on these grounds* 

■1 

IT 

It has been the understanding of the 
USG that the DRV would be willing promptly 
to engage in productive discussions leading to 
peace when there was a cessation of aerial and 
naval bombardment* The USG sought to confirm 
this fact in itS" proposal which the DRV has -in 
.front of it* 



'*As a demonstration of its j:ood faith and 
in order to create the best attr.osphere for 
the coQsideratlon of its proposal the US 
voluntarily undertook tiot to bomb Hanoi from 
August 25 onward - the day on which its proposal 
was submitted to Hanoi* This restraint has been 
maintained without time limit even though 
activities by opposing forces in the south have 
.in fact been stepped up since August 25. 



It 



Q The August 25 proposal of the USG remains 

open."- (END OF MESSAGE) 



A told Bo he did not know the content of the 
message but described it as "conciliatory", 
a v7ord which Bo made him v/rite down. Bo did 
not open the envelope in M and A's presence. 

A asked Bo about the significance of the AEP 
September 14 Hanoi story (State 33031)^ quoting 
"reliable sources" as indicating that talks would 
start three or four weeks after a bombing 
cessation^ and A showed Bo Paris press stories 
based on the APP report* Bo replied that the ^ 

three-to four^week interval between the end 
of bombing and the beginning of negotiations 
was "an invention of journalists"o He noted 
that Pham Van Dong's statement had given no 
ground for the time period m.entioned in the 
neV7Spapers. . 



NQDIS/Tu^ SE CRET/PE?<WSYL VANIA 



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DecJassifiiMl per Executive Order 13526, Section 3J 
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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TOP__SE_C_RET/igO D I S / P E1\KS YL . . . [\^ lA 



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A asked Bo x^^iether thare was any utility 
in the coatinuation of the M and A channel 
and \7ondGred whether they should nov? ' 
withdraw* Bo replied that M and A had been 
received as friends and they were "not at 
the end of the tether" because of the 
continued validity of the channel. Bo 
said: ''We trust you and you trust Kissinger. 
IJhat you have bean doing is useful ..^ You 
see you have produced t*esults. There was a 
'message to us from the USG V7hich we 
accepted c. We replied^ to be sure^ negatively. 
This X\?eek we have had tv/o brief conuiumicritions 
and today n formal message ^ so you are being 
useful." Bo again referred back to the fact 
that their visa request had been turned down 
because it had been made concurrent with the 
bombardmeQt of Hanoi and to live let them come 
to Hanoi at that tiaxe "would have discredited 
us and ultimately you". 

M again urged Bo to see K^ and Bo asked a 
number of questions about K*s plans for the 
comiLig wee'k, VJhen M suggested he could 
arrange coffee for K and Bo at a private 
residence^ Bo said "Let me think about how 
best to arrange a meeting and I v^ill let you 
know* I w^ill call you as I called you last 
week. " 

Xslien M mentioned reporting to the Ely see if 
the present effort failed. Bo said again that 
the M and A channel is "not at the end of its 
usefulness- I see no need to bring anyone 
else in. Complicated matters may take some 
time to mature and become more complicated if . 
too many people intervene 



fi 



4 

\^en M asked whether Dzu^ runner-up in the 
SVN Presidential campaign, would be acceptable 
to the NLF in a more broadly based government. 
Bo said that Dzu v;as a "heel", how^ever, and 
there were many reasonable' people in the south. 



TO P_S ?;CR v7 /N^^ 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Seciion ^3 
MND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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1* 

including high-ranking military officers/' 
When A asked about Thieu^ Bo replied that he 
did not under.stand a man who got hiraself 
elected "on the basis of inviting foreigners 
to borab his compatriats''^ but A -^^jas struck 
by the relative mildness of his connment- 

When asked about the political situation in 
the US J M and A said that the main lines of 
American foreign policy would not change no 
matter who won in 1968, unless it was Reagan - 
in which case "there would be a greater 
possibility of escalation than of peace 
overtures." ^Bo seemed surprised^ 

Bo returned M's handv/rittcn notes of a meeting 
of SeptGQiber 14 and said they had been useful 
but he had studied thera sufficiently. 
(Paris 3501) 



TOP SECRET /NODlS/PE>^MS^n.VANIA 



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DLxJassiHed per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
N^fD Ptojeci Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date; 201 1 



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Tl . S E CRIf.T / KOD I S / P ENS S YLVA N B. 



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S optembe r l.S._1.9_67. 



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•sotember 20, 1967 



^^Dtemter 21j 1967 



Aubrac called on Bo for fi,ve mlautes 
on the >7ay to the airport on the 
Eiorning of September 18* (A is leaving 
for Rorae and v:ill be back on Septeraber 20.) 
At K's request J A told Bo that Hanoi's 
response need not be confined to any one 
particular channels A suggested the 
follovjing possibilities: (a) a persotial 
meeting between Bo and K; (b) a message 
in a sealed envelope via A and M to K; 
'(c) an open message via A and M^as Hanoi's - 
note of September 11; (d) a message to be 
given to a US official in Paris or elsewhere; 
(e) any other channel that seemed appropriate 
to Hanoi* Bo replied: '^There ivill be (sic) . 
ansvjere' Things may seem to move slov^ly. 
In fact^ they .are moving at their 'normal 
speed for exchanges of this kind"- (Paris 
3536) 



George Brown received message dated September 19 
from Secretary Rusk informing him of the texts 
of the US raessages of August 25 and Septetiiber 13 
and the DRV message of September 11- Brown will 
pass on information to Prime Ministeir Wilson 
only. (State 39656; London 2126) 

A returned to Paris from Rome and phoned Bo 
to suggest jokingly that Bo have dinner with 
K. Bo laughed and said he V7as still without 
instructions. (Paris 3765) ' % . , 

F 

A and M met with Bo for an^'hour -and-a^half 
starting at noon, M read to Bo the following 
message from K, which he left with Bo at Bo's 
request: 

"I am leaving Friday evening to give 
a speech in Hannover Sunday- I plan ^ 
to return to the US on Sunday. If before 
Saturday evening you know that there will 
be' a reply from Hanoi either Sunday or 
TOP SECRET /NODIS/PENMSYLVAMIA 



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TOP secre t/ KODI S/ PEmJ SYT^VAlgA 

.^^^ ■■ i-J. .—— — r I . 1 . II ^1 



Monday, please inforia M and I shall 
retura via Paris- 

^'Washit^gton is still standing by 
for an ansv;er to its message of 
Septembei^ 13. 

'*We have noted your interest in the 
A & M channel and we are ready to'* 
continue it, 

'*! remain available at Caaib ridge 
to receive message either directly 
or through A & M. If desirable, I 
could come to Paris to receive messages 
directly or through A & M either in 
sealed envelope or openly. 

"-Alternatively, Washington is ready 
to send an official to receive any 
message either directly or through 
A & M in a sealed envelope or not." 

In response to a question M told Bo that 
the text of the message had been agreed 
by K. Bo replied, according to A's notes: 
"This channel is very convenieri: for us* 
If I have a reply before Saturday evening 
(9/21) I shall call you (M) . ' I shall- also 
be in touch vith you afterwards as soon as 
I hear something but you should be av;are of 
the mood Hanoi has expressed in our Foreign 
Ministry statement of September 19''. (Ed.: 
the DRV ForMin statement was a detailed 
complaint about US bombing in the area 
immediately above the 17th parallel.) Bo 
also mentioned the bombardment of Haiphong, 
but briefly and without conviction according 
to A. * 



TOP SECRET/MODIS/PEMySYLVANIA 






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'^OP SFXRET/KODIS/PE>:t:SYLVi-..^jTA 



When M argod Bo to see K^ Bo replied that 
he could see private Americans at his 
discretion^ but he could not see any 1 

American v;ho spoke for the USG or reported \ 



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M showed Bo the text of the draft report 

(3?aris 3804) he intended to give the Ely see 
I ^ ~ ' if the channel failed or V7as publicised and 

told Bo of K^s desire to delete the text of 
I I , the US and DRV messages; a point Tvhich Bo 

n agreed upon. Bo said if the report was given 

to the Elysee^ it should be made clear that 

Cit was not done at Bo's request or instigation. 
(Paris 3803; Paris 3765) 



S eptember 22, 1967 , - M saw Bo and gave him the following message: 



[ 
[ 



"Washington is still waiting for an 
answer to its message of September IJ. 
The offer of August 25 as farther explained 
in the message of September 13^ remains 
open. 'At present Washington has nothing 
further to say." (Paris 3908) 

J Waen M delivered this note. Bo saw him only 

^ briefly because he was tied up with Columnist 

Jog Krafts Bo said that he still had no 
j „ instructions and if he had something he would 

^ get back in touch with M. (Kissinger /Read 

■ . TO P SECRt-: r/ M OD IS /PElv^-TS YLVAt HA - 

T - ' ■ • .■■ 



directly to the USG without Hanoi authori- t 

zation^ which he had not received* _. " { 

Bo added that Hanoi is reluctant to talk [ 

under duress vjith any officially connected ■ 

American. Bo said "the Americans are playing a 
double gam.e-on the one hand they are offering 
us peace; on the other they increase their 
bombing." At the same time Bo repeated 'his 
desire to keep the Pennsylvania channel open ] 

and said "he will accept a communication at 
any time. ^ He will be in touch as soon as ] 

he has anything to say-.-vre v^ant you (A and M) 
and Kissinger to continue/' 



Dedassiikd per Executive Order 13526. Section 33 
NND Project Nmnber: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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September 23 > 1967 - 

1967 OCT 10 ]0 53 






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Bo called M at 1300 and asked H to come over 
M met v;ith Bo for more than an hour starting 
at 1800, Bo read the following message to 
Mj which M took dov;n in his own notes- aid 
read back to Bo to check for accuracy: 

''1» The vjhole world knov?s that the US has 
pursued a constant policy of escalation 
against North Vietnam. 

I 

''2* After Hanoi was hombad, US planes hit 
Campha and Haiphong. As regards 
Haiphong^ US planes have bjrfjed it 
several times in a rov? and very violently 
attacked the DMZ and Vinh Linh Province. , 

''3. As a result every one agrees that 
the bombing has been intensified in recent 
weeks ." 

^'4.. Washington's explanation about the 
bombing of Haiphong cannot be received, 

IT 

"5. These are the circumstances under 
which you have suggested contacts V7ith 
Kissinger. I accept your expression 
of confidence in Kissinger , but at the - 
moment v/hen US is increasing its es- 
calation ^ it was not possible for me 
to see him. 



''6. Turning to more general topics, 
I have spoken to you of the two-faced 
policy of the US , - ' ^ 

"7. What has happened has confirmed me 
in that opinion ^ for the attitude of the 
US exhibits all kinds of contradictions. 
It is possible to highlight this by a 
few examples; 

(a) Together with the message of 
August 25j Kissinger has let me 

TOP secret/kodis/?el;>.'Sylvai<;ia 






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DLxJassiHed per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
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.know thz^ough you as intermediaries 
that the US has stopped bombing of 
Hanoi for 10 days; then for 72 hours^ 
and now the US tells us that the 
bombing of Hanoi is suspended %^jithout 
time limit, vrnat do you think of 
the assertion that the USG of its own 
free will has suspended the bombing 
without setting a time limit? 

(b) In fact what has happened is the 
stopping of bombing of Hanoi but the 
intensification of bombing elsewhere ^ 
as in Campha^ Haiphong and Vinh Linh 
Province^ where the bombing has the 
character of extermination and system.atic 
destruction, 

(c) To say that by stopping of bonibing 
of Hanoi the UG has wanted to create 
better atmosphere is not true, 

+ 

''8. With respect to the August 25 message ^ the 
essence of the US position is to offer to 
stop bombing v;ith conditions » In a message 
delivered by sealed envelope the US has 
replied that the offer is without conditions 
while asserting that the m^essa^e of 
August 25 is still valid. 



o 



"9, As far as you and A are concerned^ I 
have received you any time "you have requested, 
I listen to you. I accept messages from you, 
I transmit them, I report fully to Hanoi » 
I call you v;hen I' have something to say. 
I believe that this demonstrates our good will 
sufficiently. However^ as I have pointed 
out earlier^ we have no illusions about 
^American policy. What do you think of all 
this?'^ (end of message) 



TOP SECRET /NODIS/PEK^^SYLVANIA 



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TOP S E CR ET /NOD I S / P ENKS YL VAN I A 



When Bo asked M for his reactions, M said that: 

(a) M would state his own personal view that 
each US message had been accompaniGd by 
' deescalatlon. With respect to Haiphong, M said 
he knew only v;hat K had told him, which was 
confirmed by the press reports^-that US attacks 
had concentrated on communication links, not on 
t e ma t i e ^ 5 *^ -oi" \1{^I^ t o v7n itself. N e v er 1 1 1 ■ 



syste 



he less , 



agreed that American actions had made discussions 



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m.ore complicated, 

(b) M thought that the US suspension of 
bombing of Hanoi, first for ten days ^ then 
72 hours J then vjithout time limit ^ reflected 
contradictions i-n American approach to the 
channel . 



^ 



(c) M asked vjhether a reversion by the US to 
the ^' level of bombing in early August" \vOuld 
permit initiation of discussions. On the last 
point ,Bo replied that his Prime Minister had 
"already ansv7ered that question". 

Finally J. M. asked Bo to ascertain from Hanoi v;hether 
M and A had correctly understood Pham Van Dong's 
remark to M and A in July^ \;hich M read to Bo from 
A*s notes. (The portion of the exchange is fouad 
on pages 12-13 ana 16 of the Kissinger memorandum 
.-O.f, August Ij 1967 ' " ' ' . in v?hich 

Dong is reported to have indicated that delay 
following a ds facto cessation v:ould not be a 
problem- and that talks should be conducted by 
Dersons authorized by both sides.) Bo said that 
bong's reported statements to A and R differed from 
the public position-' of his government: ,/^i3o would 
send the exchange to Hanoi to ask if it were a 
true representation ot Dong's position. 



J 






Bo again enjoined them to use greatest secrec}'. 
(Source: Kissinger/Road 9/24 telecon) 



TO? SECRET /KOD IS /-PEML^YLVAiaA 



36 



Dct'Iassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
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called on Bo at 8:30 a.m. and read to Bo the 
follovjiag five point message from Kissinger: 

*Xl) I will transmit to the appropriate 
VJastiington officials later today ttie message 

* you (Bo) gave M yesterday, (2) I see no point 
in trading charges and countercharges about 
past activities. In fact Washington Ihs offered 
to stop tombing based on the assumption it 
would lead to prompt j» productive talks * That 
offer remains open. It v?as made sincerely. ' 
If accepted^ there will be no need to discuss 
escalation or bombing problems, (3) The 
exchange indicates that Washington and Hanoi 
have great difficulty understanding each 
other's thought processes. This makes direct 
US/DPvV contact essential. Intermediaries ^ no 
matter hosi? trustworthy^ are not satisfactory 
substitutes. (4) American military actions 
during the past month reflect in part the 
extrem.3 secrecy with which VJashington has 
handled this excha^nge. The USG has considered 
it unwise to change decisions made prior to the 
report of M and A's trip to Hanoi^ except in 
regard to bombing Hanoi itself ^ because it' 
wanted to keep the circle of av;'areness of this 
exchange as sm.all as possible to avoid premature 
public debate. (5) The difference in the posi* | 
tions of the two governm.ents could be suiiLmarij^ed . 
as £ollov:s ; Washington has indicated its \ 
readiness to stop bombing and has only asKod 
to confirm its understanding ot Hanoi's 
view that this would lead promptly to pro- 
ductive negotiations . Hanoi has implied that 
an end of bombing would in fact have this result' 
If this is Indeed the view or both governments ^ 
the remaining obstacles to direct talks can be ^ 
overcome. I am certain that the above correctlj^= 
reflects US views. Gould Bb confirm that it 

. also reflects the view of Hanoi/' 



M said Bo's response to the foregoing m.essage 
^^as favorable. M then questioned Bo about 

TOP SECRET/^iODIS/PEHsSYLYANIA ' 



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Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3 
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\^?hat: Eo had mean I: in their conversation of 
September 23 when Bo had said that his Prime 
Minister had already ans^-jered M's question 
about v^hether US/DPvV talks v?ould be possible 
if the US cut baci:c to the level of bombing 
of early Augusts Bo replied that the DRV 
Prime Minister had made clear publicly that 
there could be no formal discussions betv^een 
the US and the DRV as lotig as any level of 
bombing continued in the North. Eo added ^ 
hov7Gver, that pxeliminary discussions betueen 
Bo and Kissinger might not fall under such 
prohibit ion J and Bo said that he v;ould let 
M knov7 in a few days whether such prelininary 
dis cuss ions v;oiild be possible, 
(Sortrce; Kis singer /Pvead 9/25 telecon) 

m 

M and A called, on Bo at 9:00 a.m. on September 30 
and spent two hours with him. The atmosphere 
v?as friendly and cordial throughout and Bo gave 
them tea, 

M and A told Bo that they had been in touch with 
K, and K had had further discussions with his 
Washington friends, M and A noted thar K and the 
USG had put a proposal and questions to the DRV 
through the Bo channel to v.^hich. there had been 
no substantive responses. The US August 25th- 
offer without conditions remained open, M and 
A noted than K's W^shin^ton friends vjere 



in teas ted in learning whether Bo had received 

an answer to liie point Bo had raised on September 25 

about the possibility of '^preliminary discussions/^ 

Bo replied that he had an answer to the latter 
point. Bo said that he could not talk directly 
to a US validatied individual even in a preliminary 
v?ay because ^'too much had happened since July.'' 
(M and A got the im.pressioa from Bo tnat he 
feared that ''preliminary discussions'' v;ould sim.ply 
be a ruse on our part to get into substantive talks 
V7ith the DPA'' vjhile the bombing continued.) 

TO? SECRET/l:10DIS/?E:^NSYLVA>rrA 



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NND Project Number: NND 03316, By: NWD Dale: 20! 1 



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When Bo referred again to the 'Conditions'' 
contained in the US position ^ M and A asked 
him to point out what conditions he ^cas' 
referring to. Bo said in the first paragraph 
of the US August 25 proposal the vjords 'Sjith 
the understanding that" really amounted to a 
condition on our part, as did the \:ords 
''productive'^ and "prompt" o He indicated there 
^^ere other complications vjith the proposal. 



M and A referred to the forthcoming sentences 
in President Johnson's September 29 speech which 
repeated iJS v;illiaigness to stop the bombing 
"when this will lead promptly to product 5.ve 
discussions"oa the assumption tnat the DP^V V7ould 
"not take advantage of the bombing cessation- 
or limitation" during the discussions. Eo said 
he had not had a chance to study the President's 
speech, but he v;as glad that they had brought this 
portion of the speech to his attention , because . 
the French press headlines made the US position 
sound conditional. 

They discussed the Viet-Nam statements in the 
U.N, debate to date, and Bo said the DRV was 
highly displeased V7ith George Brovni's speech 
but pleased v7ith the French and Canadian stacement5.=, 
in New Yorko Bo added jocularly that he 
"claimed some credit" for the French position. 
Since H and A did not know the content of the 
French or Canadian positions and Bo did not 
elaborate, there vjas no discussion about v;hat 
features of the GOC or GOF positions Bo was 
referring to^ 

Bo expressed the thought that the"present political 
trend" in the US V7as favorable to the DRV, 

At one stage of the discussion M and A found the 
opportunity to underscore the point that the US 
had made no commitments regarding its future 
'actions., 

TOP SECRET /iCODIS /PEi^NSYLVANlA 



39 




Dedassffied per Executive Order 13526. Sectio. 3.3 
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A asked whether Bo had received an answer to the 
September 23 inquiry regarding the accuracy of 
A's notes of hts discuss ion in Hanoi with Pham 
Van DoQg on the point that there would be "no 
question of a delay" betv;een the end of bombing 
and talks both sides "knew hov? to meet each 
other o" A again vouched for the care and accuracy- 
of the notes of his conversation with Dong. Bo 
said he had not had an answer to this inquiry 
whi,ch he had made on September 23, but he 
expected 'an answer early next week. Bo did say 
that if tiiere v;as a halt in the bombing "Kissinger 
should put Oil his hat and come to Paris imraediato- 
ly." When A and M asked for clarificad.on of the 
conflicting reports of the DRV position regarding 
the delay between a borabing halt and talks as 
reflected in September 26 AFP coUimn and a 
September 28 Le Moada article. Bo said he hoped 
that the answer he woiild geL from Hanoi to the 
question regardirig the Dong/M and A July exchange . 
would clarify this issue, 

M and Bo arranged to meet again on Wednesday ^ 
October 4^ Bo repeated the point he had made 
before: he \^7as availatlB at any time to M and A 
to talk to them, meet V7ith them, discuss matters 
v/ith them 3 and report to Hanoi on their, dis- 
cussions. He said he uould advise them as soon 
as he had received anything from his government. 

On his ov;n initiative H v;ent to see Bo on the 
afternoon of October 2 and spent an hour and a 
half with himo M said that he ha.d sought the 
appointment to pass on inform.ation received 
from K that morning that indicated growing 
impatience in Washington and the feeling on the 
part of K's VJashington colleagues that they had 
received almiost nothing from Hanoi through the 
M and A channel. It V7a3 decided that a message 
should be sent to Kissinger, and M staued that 
he took elaborate notes on v:hich to base the j 
message, which v?as put together in final form 



i 



TOP secrelVnodis /feitnsylvania 



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NND ProjecL Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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by M following the meeting and after a 'flight 
to Rome where he discussed the ices sage in 
detail V7ith A froLr.lbrae they mailed it by 
special delivery air-post to Kissinger in 
Boston late on October 2, The text of the 
note received hy Kissinger follows: 

« 

"The position of the RD\1\^ remains always 
the same. If the United States really 
wished to talk, let them. stop first without 
conditions the bombardirient of the territory 
ot the RDTOo 

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A. 

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"Starting from that position there are 
several eventualities: 

(a) A public declaration ty the Goverament 
of the Uniced States about the cessation. 
. This declaration could take place either 
before or after the cessation* 



a 



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(b) An official declaration but non^-public 
preceding the cessation of the bombardir.ent , 
This declaration could be conimunicated, by 
the channel K/A**M (of ficieusemant)-not 
quite officially^ and after this indication 
it can be transmitted officially by an 
accredited person, 

(c) An end of bombardment V7ithcut preceding 
« .-official declaration follov7ed by an official 

but not public communication of the Govern- 
Bient of the- United States, 

"Eventuality (a) v;oald represent a public 
declaration replying to that tnade on the 28th^ 
of January by >!= Trlnh^ Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the EDWI^ vjhich constitutes a 
solemn en^^agement to talK after the uncon- 
ditional end of bombing. This public declara- 
tion v:oald be followed by the transniission of 

an official text by an accredited person, 
1 

TOP SECilET/KODIS/PEMI^iSYLVAMIA 



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''Eventualities (b) and (c) reflect the 
propositions of M and A as they result £mm 
their understanding of their conversation 
in July in Hanoi with the Prime Minister. 
A confirmation is expected soon/' (End of 
message) 



As explained by letter from M^ point (a) in the 
above message was written entirely hy Bo as v^ell 
as the preao/ible^ Points (b) and (c) vjere v;ritten 
on M^s suggestion but practically controlled anct 
re-read phrase by phrase by Bo. The point about 
the non-public declaration v?af also discussed 
at length'o M and Bo also discussed the v;ord 
'*of ficieusG^' and agreed that it v;as a term 
applying to -a person m.andated by the Government 
of the United States » According to M ^ Bo 
said "on several occasions" that Trinh s 
February 28 speech constituted a "solemn engage- 
ment" by the DRV be3xE world opinion ;j and a public 
declaration by the US vjould be a reply having the 
same character of coriunitment . 



told M to be sure to report to Eo immediately 
by phone what Kissinger's reactions to the mes- 
sage were, (Sources: M's October 2 letter to 
K; Kissinger/Read 10/4^ 1 p.m.^ telecon.) 



i October 4^ 1967 (p^m,) _ - At K*s request M took the m.essage received in 

the m-ail by Kissinger to Bo on the afteoioon 
of October 4 to seek confirmation of paragraph 
(b) . Bo read the document and then said that 
he had still no t received word from Hanoi about 
the accuracy of M and A's understanding of his 
July talk v;ith Fham Van Dong^ so Bo could not 
comitient at this time on the formulation of 
eventualities (b) and (c) , 



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Bo did confirra the accuracy of the opening 

paragraph of the coiraminicatJ-onj the for-mulatioii 

of eventuality (a) and the paragraph of 

description of eventuality (a) , excep t Bo said 

he had not used the v7ords *'solenm engagement". 

M took strong exception vjith Bo^ saying that 

M's own notes and clear recollection ot their 

October 3 conversation on this point v?ere very 

• clear, M said to Eo that if he (M) \cas capable 

of such uii sunders tanding M's usefulness v;as at 

an end* Bo energetically denied that M^s utility 

was at an end and expressed the view that the 

channel \7rs of definite continuing utility. Bo 

and M discussed what phrase should be used in 

place of "solemn engagement" without reaching 

a firm conclusion, (Source: Kissinger /Read 10/4, 
1:00 p.m. telecon) 

October 4. 1967 (later - After a full discussion V7ith K, M called Bo 

pom^ ) to say that K's reaction to the last M/Bo 

conversation was that Bo^s backing away from 
the phrase "solemn engagement" v,''ould be viewed 
in Washington as a serious substantive change » -" 
He also passed on K's viev; that it would have 
been better' to receive no communication then 
one in which a key point had been retracted. 
Bo instructed M to come over and see Bo 
immediately. (Source: Kissinger/Read 10/4, 
■ 4:00 p.m., telecon) 
October 4. 1 967 (late - , , ; ■ 

' ~~ evenin^T ^^ visrted Bo and spent an hour and a halx wxtn 

' "^ him at approximately 2230-2400 Paris time. M 

told Bo of K*s views of the serious reactions 
' " ' in Washington to the change of the text vjhich 

K had received this morning ^ and he asked Bo 
to revievj that text again with him* Again 
Bo confirmed the accuracy of the opening 
paragraph of the earlier text and the accuracy 
of the statement of the first eventuality ("A 
public declaratzion by the Cover niTLent of the 
United States about the cessation* This 
declaration could take place either before 
or after the cessation/') Bo said since ha 
had not heard from Hanoi about the N and A 
conversation there in July^ he could not 
coiTJuent on the other two eventualities which 
were mentioned in the niessas^ K received this 

TOF_ S E C RET /I-:0 D IS / PEFyS_g. VANIA„ 



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TOP ^ECRET/NODIS/PEKNSYLV/^NIA 



morning • Bo \joul d not d isca s s f u r t h?! r 
his renegging on the \vords '^solemn 
engagement" or the paragraph in v:hich 
those V70rds appear^ 

w 

Eo then said that he wanted M to send a 
message to K i?hich would come as close as 
possible to eventuality (b) in the conLmuni" 
cation K received in the mail. K vncote out 
the text in French and read it through with 
Bo three times to assure its accuracy <. M 
also did an English translation for Bo. 



p Message fraaM to K: 



After having discussed with Bo and 
after having obtained confirmation of his ] 
country's position regarding the e\;entuality = 
of talks you should know that if the US 
really wants to talk it is necessary first 
to stop without conditions the bombing and all , 
other acts of war against the DRV. I have come ^ 
to the conclusion^ recalling also a previous 
conversation in the presence of A^ that the 
scenario could be the following; The Cover ntnent 
of the United States would send a first message 
through our channel (K/M-A) announcing 
unequivocally the unconditional cessation of 
bombing. Once this has been effectively ' 

realized, a second message still through our I 
channel might suggest the opening of the 
dialogue at a date and site proposed by you. 
If you and your friends agree on such a 
scenario, let Bo know this agreement through 
a written message w^hich I will then transmit 
to Eog I do not; know if what I say is appropriate 
you knox'^ this better than I/' 



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I M said the last sentence of the message v;as 

added X'7hen Bo told M to end with something 
"friendly and conciliatory''^ Bo told M he would 
stand by to get K's reaction (Source: Kissinger/ 
f Read 10/4, 8:30 p.m^ telecou) 

*■ , TOP SECRET/NODTS/PE^NSYLVANIA . ! ■ • 



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DISPATCHED 



October 8, 1967 ~ 



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M and A called on Bo at 9:00 a^m 
time and spent 1% hoars with him 



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Paris 
As in 



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throughout the meeting 

M and A handed the vjritten portion of the 
message from Kissinger to Bo, which Bo read 
closelyo M and A then read to Bo Kissinger's 
four ''oral points*' 3 and Bo vjrote them down 
carefully in his own notes* (M and A did 
not leave with Bo the "oral" part of the 
message c) The v;ritten message and oral points 
are as follows : 

"M should tell B that K would be authorized 
to deliver to B in v/riting the following message 
whenever B is prepared to meet with him 
officially or unofficially: 

^The United States Government under- 

■I 

stands the position of the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam to be as follows: 
That upon the cessation by the United 
States of all forms of bombardment of 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam^ 
without expression of condition^ the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam would enter 
promptly into productive discussions with 
the United States & The purpose of these 
discussions would be to resolve the issues - 
betv;een the United States and the Democratic 
. . R^epublic of Viet nam » 

'Assuming the correctness of this 
understanding of the position of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the 
United States Government is prepared^ 
in accordance V7ith its proposal of 
August 25 J to transmit in advance to 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam the 
precise date upon which bombardment of 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam %';ould - 
cease and to suggest a date and a place 

for the coizmencement of discussions q 

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TOP SECRET / X OD IS /PEN^TSYLVAMIA 

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"In addition M should convey to B the 
follovjing oral points" from K: 



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1, K believes that this understanding 
is consistent vjith B^s statements of 
October 4^ as reported by M^ and with the 
proposal of the United States Government 



of August 25 . 






''2r Wnen B meets with K, K would also ' 
be prepared to state the precise date on 
which the . cessatiOQ of bombardment V70uld occur 
and to give the suggestions of the United States 
tflith respect to the date and site of the dis- 
cussions following the cessation of bombardment, 
and K would be authorised to receive the views 
of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam with respect 
to these and other modalities* 

"3, K noted that the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam had not commented on observations by 
the United States Government on August 25 with 
respect to secrecy of the fact of discussions 
bGtV7eea the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and 
the United States GovGrnmenCg 

* 

*'4. K observed that officials of the United 
States Governmeat had taken note of a reduction 
of military activities in the vicinity of the 
demilitarized zone*. Undoubtedly, the Dem.ocratic 
Republic of Vietnam had noted the absence in 
recent weeks of aerial bombardraent in the 
imiuediate vicinity of Hanoi"'/' 



Bo told M to tell Kissinger hox^ much Bo 
appreciated K's personal efforts- Bo then 
dictated to M and A the following short 
message of acknowledgr^ient to K; 

"M and A have passed the note from K to 
B. In case B will have a reply to make, 
he "Will make it through this channels" 

M suggested that Bo add a seatence saying that 

TO P S E C RET /NO D I S / P ENMS YL\^^\ N LA 

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Bo'^-^as stady5-ng the message but Bo refused* 

Bo then said on first reading of the xvritten' 
note from K^ it seemed to him that all that 
appeared after the opening phrase stating 
US ^willingness to stop the bombing without 
conditions did in fact constitute conditions*, 
la particular B characterized as "conditions" 
the words ''prompt*' ^ "productive" and "in 
accordance with the proposal of August 25/' 

M and A said that the latter phrase really 
meant that neither side should take advantage 
of a standdovjn of bombing while US /DRV dis** 
cuss ions w^ere in process, as stated in the 
August 25 proposal and the President's San 
Antonio speech <» In this regard M and A 
mentioned specifically that serious hostilities 
in the DMZ vJOUld make productive talks impossible 
(M and A noted that Bo made no 



TOP SECRET/NODIS/PENNSYLVANIA 



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rejoinder to the point about the DMZ 
in the oral message from K or when thay re- 
ferred to the Di-IZ at di is place in the 
conver sa tion • ) 

a " 

M asked 'ivhat Bo s response i^jould be if the 
words ''proiBpt'^ and "productive" were taken 
out. Bo replied that if this happened he 
V70uld have to refer back to his governjnent 
before ans^^eringo 

Bo read the third oral point in K's message 
as referring back to the portion of the 
August 25 message which referred to the 
possibility of partial limitations of actions 
against the DRV because of the dijSculty 
of keeping discussions secret after bombing 
stopped altogether. Bo said thiij V7as 
"clearly unacceptable ". 

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Bo also referred to the "usual American 

double game" ^that on September 29 or 30 ^ 

US planes hit a school in Flaiphongj killing 
■ • 30 children^ ' ' . 

F- 

M and A underscored to B the nev7 features ■ 

in the Kissinger message^ (Sources: State 
49772 and Kissinger/Read 10/8 telecon) 

Oc tober 9 , 19 67 - On his owui initiative M called on Bo for an 

hour early on the afternoon of October 9^ 
1967* M told Bo that K had made three 
principal points in his phone discussions 
with M and A following the latter 's October 8 
meeting with Bo: 

(1) Tlie message given to Bo from K 
on October -8 had been prepared v^ith great 
care. It represented an important and 
detailed suggestion about bringing about 
discussions to resolve US/DRV differences 
follovving a cessation of bombiaga 

(2) As K's Washington colleagues con- 
tinued to notGj there had been a virtual 

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absence of considered responses from 
Hanoi to US proposals in this channel 
to date. 

(3) K i-S holding open the possibility 
of coming to Paris next v.^eekend (as A and 
M had urged him to do) but K's decision on 
making the trip V7ill be influonced by tvhat 
we get: back through this channel during 
this v/eeko 



* « 



Bo professed surprise that K or M and A saw 
anyti^ing nev; in the October S message, and M 
pointed out to Bo that for the first time 
in the October 8 message the US was offering 
to provide a specific date for the 
cessatloQ of bombings 

M pressed Bo for an answer to the inquiry 
Bo had informed M and A earlier he v?a3 
sending to Hanoi regarding confirmation of 
the July conversations with Pham Van Dong 
regarding the delay between a stopping of 
the bombing and talks ^ Bo replied with a 
French idiom which translates as follows: 
'^Jhp does not say 'no', agrees"* 

Bo mentioned unidentified ' French reports 
charging new US air attacks on Hanoi and 
other reports about the concern on the part 
of the diplomatic community in Hanoi of 
possible strikes against dikes • 

Bo took careful notes of the points made by 
M and said that if K came^- to Paris next 
weekend he (Bo) would be available all day 
Saturday and Sunday to see M and A, (Source: 
Kissinger/Read 10/9 telecon) 



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October 10-11 ., I967 

Kissinger received a phone caU ftrom "m" who pleaded with "K" 
to come to Paris this weekend • "K" advised against his returning 
to Paris at this tiJiie in order to continue to raaximiae pressures 
on Bo to get something back through the channel. (Kissinger/ Read 
telecon. ) 

"K" phoned ^'M" on 11 October to say that he would i^eturn to 
Ib.ris as soon as it becomes clear that Hanoi will not respond to 
the channel, "k" made three points to "m'': (l) that he would 
not come to Paris this weekend; (2) that the past U,S, messages 
* to Bo are clear and speak for themselves; and (3) V7ashington has 
nothing further to say* (Kissinger /Read telecon^ U October)- 

October 17, 196? 

"M" saw Bo J expressed hope to keep the channel open> and handed 
"M" the following message: 

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"Actually the U*S. has been follo^-^ing a policy of 
escalation of an extremely serious nature. In these 
conditions the U.S. proposals of peace are double-faced. 
At a time when the U.S. is pursuing a policy of escalation 
we cannot receive Kissinger^ nor comment on the American 
proposals tx-ansmitted through this channel - 

^'The position of the Governiuent of the DRV is perfectly 
clear: it is only when the U.S. has ended without condition 
the bombardment that discussions can take place." 

"M and Bo discussed \fbB.t ^the conditions' were in the U.S. pro- 
posal. M said he thought tliat the U.S. meant that we wanted a 
guarantee of serious discussions when we used the word 'productive,' 
Bo said the DRV thought that by use of the word 'productive' we 
meant that we wanted to talk about objectives in the South also^ 
since discussions could not be fully productive without this subject 
beixig considered. 

^^Bo asked M if K was coming to P^ris this weekend ^ and when 
M informed him that K and A would both be in Paris, Bo said that 
these were 'positive factors' and indicated satisfaction." 

(Kissinger/Read Telecon, October 17, 1967)* 



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October 19j 196? 

*'K'' was giyen guidance for his discussion with "M" and "A". 
Tliese were viewed as talking points exclusively for use with 
"M" and "A"- 

"1, Rrom the time of your opening discussions with M. 
tonight J you should make it entirely clear to him that 
Washington considers that the DRV has rejected the forth- 
coming USG proposals to bring about an en3 to the bombing 
and prompt and productive US/dRV discussions with no advantage 
being taken by the DRV on the ground. You should indicate 
that we base this conclusion not only on the negative DRV 
message of Oct* 17 but also upon Hanoi's negative public 
statements 5 and^ most iinportantly, upon renewed DRV hostile 
actions in the vicinity of the DMZ..*.but it should be your 
objective from the start to indicate that the patience of 
your Washington friends is running out and that they feel 
that Hanoi has been xmwilllng to respond on any significant 
point," 

"2 



'*g. You should emphasize that when the DRV messages 
I in this channel of September 11^ September 23 ^nd October 1? 

\ p are analyzed they shcAsr that the DRV has been unwilling at 

. any tiijie (l) to indicate in this channel or othen^ise that 

"* for its part it will engap.e in discussions with the US even 

if the bombing had stopped in accordance with US proposals; 
or (2) to make any substantive counter proposal on how to 
proceed to discussions leading to peaceful settlement of 
differences p 



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'^h. DTote that on this date^ October 19^ a Reuters 
dispatch from liong Kong Indicates that 'North Vietnam today 
rejected the American offer for a conditional bombing pause 
in return for peace talks' as offered by President Jotason 
on September 29 and repeated by Secretary Rusk at his October 12 
press conference ....'' 

"3- In reviewing this channel with M, and A. you are 
author i^^ed to show to them the text of the September 13 USa 
message and other messages which you sent during your last 
visit in I^ris v/hich they have not yet seen. 

"i^■. Without requesting M- and A* to see Bo^ which we 

C assume they will promptly do to report your mood of discourage- 

ment and concern, you should indicate interest in learning 



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what essential differences Bo (not M- and A.) could find, 
if any 5 vith the main points in your review of the channel - 

"5' If pressed^ you are authorized to state that the 
US proposals do remain open at this time "but that you are 
not empowered to speak about future US views or actions-" 

(state 56516 to Ajnembassy Paris^ 1$ Oct 67}. 

October 20, 1967 

"K" had the foUowxng conversations vrith M, & A. on this date^ 
They added up to a stalemate in the channel* 



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C"M, met me at the airport in a state of adva.nced 
euphoria- According to him, the last message from Bo 
roade all the frustrations worthwhile, Wlien I asked 

Chim for the cause of his optimism -> he called attention to 
the distinction betiveen escalation ajid bombing and the 
change of tense in the last sentence, I q_uickly disillu- 
sioned him, I said that the issue was really q.uite simple* 
If Hanoi v/anted to negotiate it should be able to find some 
way of expressing this fact by means other than subtle 
changes in tense and elliptical references full of double 
fr meanings/* (Amembassy Paris 5^+72 to State-) 

"A, replied that he did not think it was quite fair 
to charge Hanoi with failing to respond completely- They 
had given up the demand for a public declaration that 
bombing would stop. Their last message was much soberer 
I j than the first and said nothing about the withdravml of 

L American forces from SVN. J^fevertheless he thought it 

urgent that he and M see Bo as soon as possible. I said 
that the decision was up to him as long as it was clear 

Cthat the USG had nothing to say* If they met Bo they 
should understand, that four points were of particular 
concern to VJashington; (a) that a bombing stop be fol- 
lowed by prompt negotiations^ (b) that these negotiations 
Cnot be indefinitely delayed ^ (c) that no advantage would 
be taken on the ground j (b) the special situation alon^ the 
DMZ." (Amembassy Paris 550? to State-) 



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" • . - -A then wrote down the following phrases and asked 
me about my reaction: *The bombardment and other acts of 
war against the territory of the DRV are the sole obstacle 
to meaningful negotiations. As soon as the l>ombing ceases^ 
negotiations can begin,' A, said that he was prepai^ed to 
put his personal position vfith Ho behind these phrases - 
I replied tliat while I could not speak for the US Government 



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these phrases v7ould be a big step fonfard- The DMZ problem 
woiild still have to be dealt with. (l had not seen the 
Burchett interview reported in your 57^198 then), 

"l left H's house at 203O and returned to my hotel to 
avait word about the appointment with Bo< At 213O A* 
called in great distress that Bo had refused to see them, 
We agreed to meet at 223O, The following is their report 
of the conversation, A did the talking and M* listened on 
the extension and took notes. 



^*A: V/e would like to see you ur^gently, 

"Bo: There is nothing new to say. The situation is 
worsening. There is no reason to talk again - 

"A: There is repeat is sometliing new and ybty important. 

''Bo: Repeated word for ijord the same phrase as before. 

^^A: Theire is something very important - perhaps the 
most important junctui'e of our exchanges. 

"Bo: Repeated word for vrord the same phrase but then 
added: Vfliat is the Important matter. 

■ 

"A: It has to do with the meaning of the last sentence 
of your last message and the seq.uence with v;hich steps have 
to be taken. 

"Bo: CXir position is perfectly clea-r. We stand on the 
Trinli interview with Burchett of January 28. Bo then repeated 
word for word the original phrase." 

(Amembassy Paris 55^5 to State.) 



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October 20, I967 

The following article by Wilfred Burchett was read in Washington 
on this date: 

"Hanoi 5 North Vietnajn AP - There is no possibility of any talks 
or even contacts between Ha.noi and the U,S. government unless 
the bombardment and other acts of vrar against North Vietnam 
are definitively halted. 

"Tliis is the position stated to me during conversations 
in the last few days with Premier Pham Van Dong^ [Tguyen Duy 
Trinh^ foreign minister and deputy premier ^ and other high- 
ranking governinent and party leaders. 



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"Hanoi is in no mood for concessions or l^argaining 
and there is an absolute refU-sal to offer anything -t 
except talks — for a cessation of the bombardment. The 
word stressed is 'talks j' not negotiations. 

'^During an inforinal talk> however > Trinh repeated 
that his statement to this correspondent last January 28 — 
that talks could start if the bombing vjas halted — still 
held good. He said there could be 'meaningful' talks. 
IVliether they vrould be 'fruitful' or 'productive' depended 
on the United States. 

"The mood of Hanoi is one of toughness and confidence. 
Although leaders expect Hanoi and Haiphong will probably 
be destroyed and that the war may last many more years ^ 
they feel the worst is behind them.^ that the dally bombings 
are absorbed into the country's organism. 

"Despite the air assault on Haiphong and intensified 
attacks on bridges along the rail linl^ with China^ traffic 
continues to move out of Haiphong almost normally over 
pontoon bridges J and the rail link with China is still 
functioning J although occasionally halted for a day or two. 
Many tens of thousands df Chinese are working along this 
line and elsewhere > keeping rail and road communications 
open and repairing bridges." 



C"It is repeated at every level tliat total independence 
with complete American withdrawal from South Vietnam is the 
unalterable aim of the Hanoi government and the Liberation 
p Zront for South Vietnam. They are prepared to fight 10 or 

(^ 20 years to achieve this^ and life is being reorganized on 

this basis. 



"Hanoi denies that this means export of communism to the 
South and insists it agrees with the Liberation Front that the 
South should remain a separate entity with a neutral, non- 
Socialist regime as advocated in the recently published new 
political progi^am of the fronts having its independent entity^ 
with reunification a ^reT■^ long-ran^e^ step by step process." 

October gP, 196? 

Bunker was informed by Bundy that the FEI^^T^^'SYLVAWIA track "came 
to a negative conclusion on I^iday^ with opposing party refusing even 
to accept further contact with intermediaties. We ourselves read 
this J in conjunction with concurrent publication of Burchett article 



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from Hanoi (sent to you septel) as clear indication that Hanoi 
rejects the San Antonio/UH formula and appears to be thoroughly 
dug in at least for the time being*" (State 5807O to Amembassy 
Saigon*) 



October 23, I967 

Ambassador fiohlen reviewed PEMSYLVAJNIA and made the following 
suggestion: 

"*..-For example to the commimist mind for us to insist 
that talks must be 'productive' means that we would already 
have determined how the talks should come out and would 
amount to the acceptance of an American solution to the talks 
before they have even begun. Since no one can possibly tell 
whether the talks would be productive^ I would recommend that 
this and any other q^ualification be dropped- A simple state- 
ment to the effect that as soon as a date and place have 
been agreed upon for a meeting we would cease all aerial and 
naval bombardment of Horth Vietnam should be sufficient." 






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ROMANIAN- NORTH VIETI^yJESE CONTACTS, QCTOBEB I966 - NQVElvTBER 1967 

October 22, 1966 

Ambassaclor Goldberg had a series of conversations with Romanian 
Foreign Minister Manescu in late Octoher, The thrust of Manescu's re- 
marks was that a U.S. bombing cessation was necessary to create a better 
climate^* for negotiations. Goldberg responded with a new bombing formula 
to the effect that. Hanoi only needed to give "an indicaticn as to what 
fltj would do in response to a prior cessation of bombing by the U.S/^ 
Goldberg emphasized the importance of the words "indication" and "prior-" 

USQN New York 1777 to SecState (BECEET-NODIS), 

22 October I966, Refs: USUirs I76J4 and Deptel 69^1^0: 



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"if. Said (reft el) *We woiild vrelcome from Hanoi 

r through your good offices — if that is their desire j 

as it is ours -- or^ if notj through any other cha.nnel 
of their choosing^ an indication as to what North 
Vietnam would do in response to a prior cessation 
n ' of bombing by the US. ' Goldberg then repeated this 
i-j statem^ent, Manescu then inquired what Goldberg con- 

f sidered new in this statement compared to past posi- 

tions. Goldberg said words chosen carefully^ that 
he did not want to assert anything was new but that 
J he presiimed most important word is ^indication.' 

Manescu, stating he needed to understand precise mean- 
ingj then inquired 'are you ready, then, to cease 
bombing in return for an indica.tion? ' Goldberg replied 
that significance V7as that w^e not asking for advance 
agreement but rather a statement through a trusted 
intermediary as to what North Vietnam would do if 
US following suggestions h^ tfe^nescu and others to 

C cease bombing. Manescu remarked Hhis means that 

QUOTE indication OTIQUOTE has to liave a certain con- 
tent, ' Goldberg replied 'we do not believe we can 
C specify the contents in advance ^ as that would sug- 

gest we imposing conditions^ We merely say we will- 
ing consider suspending bombing if we receive encour- 
aging indication. Of course, if nothing is going to 
C follow, and the war is continued by North Vietnam 

as noT^, US will not suspend bombing.* Manescu then 
stated; 'Vietnam question very important, very sensi- 

Ltive, Smallest mismiderstanding in this regard could 
have consequences no one desires* VJar in Vietnam 
does not cause victims only in Vietnam- No mi sunder - 
r standing or misplaced words can be allowed. It may ; 

not be possible to have another mtg prior to rr^ de- 
parture since I am leaving Oct 26 or 27 ^ so this 
^ 'may be final talk. V/hen I said that cessation of 

bombing can create better climate for solution, I 



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did not put that forward as a personal opinion. The 
answer I am taking to .Bucharest is the follo^-^ing- 
QUOTE On the basis of an indication by North Vietnaia, 
you would consider cessation bombing. In answer my 
question as to what indication should consist of you 
said It they go on with v/ar, you vrould not cease 
bombing UNQUOTE . ' Goldberg clarified this by empha- 
sizing : 'If they go on with the war as they are going 
on with it now.' He added *an indication of value to 
US would have to demonstrate a desire to move toward 
peaceful settement. I cannot define it further- I 
would rather say QUOTE We are willing to take a step 
toward peace if they are willing to take a step toward 
peace UlTQUOTE. We understand you think cessation 
bombing by US would create better climate- V7e v/ant 
to know what step by them would create better climate. 
We do not say what this step should be because we 
feel this would be badly received. Steps can be 
later discussed.' Manescu observed that when Eomani- 
ans discuss problem of Vietnam among tbemseJ-ves, they 
realize US has its honor and prestige to consider in 
approaching a solution. 'Please take into account 
that other party has same consideration.' Goldberg 
replied that we had chosen words to take that into 
account. He emphasized the word 'prior' stating we 
were not asking for 'prior' move by Ha^noi^ such as 
removing its 19 regiments from South Vietnaj3i prior to 
US suspension of bombing. We had deliberately indi- 
cated US wo\ild make 'prior' move if we got indica- 
tion as to what would follow from North Vietnam 
after prior suspension of bombing by US. Manescu 
then concluded by making special appeal for discre- 
tion and agreeing that any inquiries about meeting 
would be met with statement that discussion concerned 
matters on agenda of UN of common concern to both 
parties. Goldberg assured Manescu that as far as 
US concerned he would share Contents of discussion 
only with Secretary and President — " 

GOLDBERG 

On the same day^ Acting Secretary Katzenbach saw Italian Ambassador 
Fenoaltea at the latter 's request. The Ambassador repeated the Romanian 
message. It should be noted that Katzenbach 's e>rplanation of the response 
which the U.S. desired from Hanoi differed from the Goldberg explanation. 
Katzenbach said that the U.S. would want to know "in specific terms ^ 
publicly or privately^ what response would be forthcoming." 



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S[EATE 71^^60 to AinEinbassy Manila ^ Manila TOSEG 52 ^ 
22 October I967; 

"1- .. -RoBianian Ambassador had informed Italians 
that, after careful analysis of Vietnam situation and 
on basis of their various contacts, RcHianian govt had 
concluded that if US were to suspend boinbing of IWN 
-without any time limit or conditions 'appropriate 
and positive reaction would not be lacking. * < . . . 

■I 

"2. Acting Secretary said that" US position 
on bombing cessation is as stated by Goldberg, Act- 
ing Secretary noted that it vas difficult to knovr 
who was speaking for Hanoi, if they were actually 
able to speak for Hanoi , ajid furthermore what speci- 
fic response to bombing cessation would be. Acting 
Secretary expressed some skepticism regarding Bomanian 
approach and suggested that Italian Foreign Minister 
might push Romanian Ambassador hard on v^'^hat specific 
response US bombing suspension likely to be- Acting 
Secretary pointed out that USG could not turn bomb- 
ing of IWIT on and off lightly and that we had to 
know in specific terms , publicly or privately, what 
response would be f orthcoinlng * ,,•" 

KATZENBACH (Drafted by R.H. Miller, YZ/w) 



\^' 



January 23, 196? 



Returning by train from the "annual hunt," Ambassador Davis was called 
in for a late night conversation by the Eomanian President , Council of 
State, Chivu Stoica, and Foreign Minister Manescu, They told Davis that 
they were now giving him the "signal" which the Americans had long awaited 
from Hanoi. Davis req.uested permission to follow up this conversation. 



I 

BUCHAREST 892 to SecState (SECRET-NODIS 
23 January 196?: 

i- "5- Discussion then turned to Vietnam, and we 

v;ent over familiar ground with difference this time, 
which may be important that Manes cu (Stoica let Manescu 
conduct almost all conversation on Vietnam). In con- 
text of referring to necessity of cessation bombing 
C North Vietnam in order that peace talks could begin 

said 'yo^ always say you must have signal as to what 
would happen, Vifhat I tell you is the signal.' I 
^ probed as deeply as I could asking specifically whether 

this was based on recent contact with North Vietnamese. 
Manescu refused to be drax^n out insisting that Romanians 
had continuous contact with them and that Romanians 

L convinced information or 'signal' he had given me 

was accurate. He specifically requested I convey 



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this Information to Washington, At orv^ point during 
this dialogue Stoica intervened to emphasize that 
I should note Homania did not seek to blame either 
party for Vietnam situation; they were interested only 
in peaceful settlement of problem. Romanians realized 
US prestige involved but Vietnamese haa problem with 
'face^ too. At another point both Stoica and Manescu 
responded .in negative to my question whether import 
of what they telling ne meant Romania offering to 
mediate, , . ." 

DAVIS 



January 25. 1967 

State gave Davis authorization to follow; up his conversation. 
Davis' instructions stressed the need for "concrete" reciprocity 
from Hanoi* Exaiijples of reciprocity were also given: infiltra-^ 
tiou and reduction of incidents in South Vietnam, Goldberg's UN 
speech of 22 September was stressed as authoritative. 



h 



STATE 125269 to AmEmbassy Bucharest (SECRET-NODIS)^ 
25 January 1967^ Ref : Bucharest 892: 



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"3- However J it must be made clear to the Romani- 
ans that the United States could in no event stop the 
bombing in return' for mere agreement to ta]k since the 
stopping of our bombing would improve Hanoi's military 
Q position and expose our troops to the dangers of in- 

creased DRV infiltration and military action. The 
C Secretary's conversation with Manescu on October 5, 

1966 emphasized this lack of reciprocity in an exchange 
of no bombing for talks. Therefore j the reciprocal 
response required from Hanoi must be concrete and one 
that gave promise of setting in motion a true process 
of de-escalation* Actions relating to infiltration 
appear to be those which would have greatest promise. 

CA significant reduction in the number of Viet Cong 
attacks and incidents of terror while important and 
to be considered, would be somewhat less satisfactory 

C since such actions could be resumed easily whereas 

reduction or stoppage of infiltration automatically 
reduces Viet Cong capability. 



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"!+• You should also state that the US is not 
thinking in terms of a written and categorical state- 
ment by Hanoi of what it will do if ve stop bombing. 
We appreciate the difficulty Ilejaoi might find in ad- 
mitting openly or even in an indirect message to us 
what they are doing. Eut^ particularly after the 
failure of last January's bombing pause^ we cannot 

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accept simple statements that ^sometliing* would happen. 
We must have some sub^stantial information from a relia- 
ble soiirce of Hanoi's position. Vie >rould want to have, 
"in advance J a reasonably accurate picture of what Hanoi's 
meaningful, dlscemablej responsive action would be- 

"5. You should also point cut the possibility 
raised in Ambassador Goldberg's UDJ speech of September 22 
of a stopping of bombing 'prior* to the other side's tak- 
ing 'timely' responsive action providing we had received 
assurances J private or othen^lse;, that the other side 
will take such action- That speech remains an authori- 
tative statement of the US position- 

^6- You should assure the Romanians of the serious- 
ness of the US undertaking, spelled out in the Manila 
Comuiunique , to withdraw its troops from STO within six 
months after the fulfillment of the stated conditions, 

"7. You should try to find out whether the 'signal' 
relates to Hanoi's willingness to begin negotiations if 
the bombing stops , or whether it relates to responsive 
reciprocal actions as described above. You should also 
continue your efforts to determine the extent to which 
the 'signal' comes from Hanoi as well as the precise 
details of the 'signal.' 

"8. If the Romanians are at all forthcoming, you 
should ask them to tell Hanoi that the US is prepared 
at any time to hold direct and discreet talks with Hanoi 

BUSK (Drafted by D,I, Davidson, EA) 



January 28, I967 

Davis met with Manescu to emphasize Washington's feelings on reciprocity 
and to inquire further about the "signal.^' Manescu admitted that he had 
ho specific knowledge for this signal • 

BUCHAiffiST 913 to SecState ( SECRET -NODIS), 28 January 1967> 
Ref: State 12 5 269 : 

"2* . »,I wanted to mention two ijiiportant points: 
(a) United States could in no event stop bombing in 
return for a mere agreement to talk. Secretary Rusk 
emphasised in his conversation with the FonMin on 
October 5 the lack of reciprocity in an exchange of 
no bombing for talks; (b) the reciprocal response 
req.uested from Hanoi must be concrete and one that 



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gave promise of setting in motion true process of 
de-escalation, I then asked if Manescu's statement 
concerning the 'signal' related onJ-y to Hanoi's 
willingness to talk if bombing stops or whether it 
related to some responsive reciprocal actions by 
Hanoi* 

"U. I then asked if Manescu could tell me whether 
his statement to me on train had been based on any new 
information or recent contact with Hanoi^ i.e-^ some- 
thing new, say in the period between his October talk 
with the Secretary and now. Correctly speaking^ he 
replied 5 no^ but it was based on all information and 
developments which Ronanian government had noted." 

DAVIS 



Ja,nuary 31. 19^7 

w 

Davis met with Deputy Foreign Minister Kacovescu and Secretary General 
Ceausescu- Ceausescu said he was not clear on what guarantees U.S* wanted. 
The DRVj he said, "wants ^.S. bombing cessatiori/ as a deliberate decision 
of U.S. itself." Cessation of bombing , Ceausescu concluded, had to be 
the first step. The second. step, according to Ceausescu> was recognition 
of the IWF^ for "it not possible for DRV to speak on behalf of I^ILF/' In 
an important addition^ Ceausescu said that "leaders of DRV do not wish to 
have inteimediaries but would like to talk directly with you." 

^ BUCMREST 925 to SecState ( SECRET -MODIS)^ 3I January 1967, 

Ref: Bucharest's 913: 



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"5. I then went beyond these points made with 
Manescu on January 28 and in accordance with State 
125269 said US not thinking in terms of written and 
categorical statement by Hanoi but we must have some 
substantial information from reliable source of Hanoi's 
position and reasonable accurate picture of what 
Hanoi's responsive action would be to cessation bomb- 
ing. 

"8. Ceausescu said US referred to wanting guar- 
antees or assurances but he was not clear what guar- 
antees US wanted. DRV does not rea^iire cessation 
of bombing as something forced on US but wants this 
as deliberate decision of US itself. This would in 
no way affect prestige of US but on contrary strengthen 
that prestige. Must also think of Hanoi's prestige. 
If US looking for honorable solution why not give 
other side opportunity for honorable way out. In 

6 ' TS - EODIS 



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summary J Ceausescu concluded , his view was first step 
must be unconditional cessation of bombing, 

"9- Second was problem recognition of NLF. 
Negotiations with Hanoi not alone sufficient and it 
not possible for DKV to speak on behal.f on NLF. 
Romania believed political solution must be found.-- 

"11. Ceausescu replied he could not foresee but 
under present circumstances 'I cannot obtain* assur- 
ances which US seeks. He not do so but It was his 
firm belief that cessation bombing would smooth way 
to negotiations* ..At this point he made only remark 
which I would consider of possibly new significance, 
Ceausescu said 'insofar as I knowj leaders of DRV 
do not wish to have intermediaries but would like 
to talk directly with you- Intermediaries tend to 
get things mixed up and DRV does not like intermedi- 
aries* ' 

^'12. * . .In accordance with paragraph 8 State 
Tel 125269 I said US is prepared at any time to hold 
direct and discreet talks with Hanoi and if Romanian 
government felt it possible we would appreciate their 
telling Hanoi this.. -They would tell Hanoi this-*." 

MVIS 



O February 1, I967 



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Davis summarized the current status of the Roimnian track 

BUCHAREST 932 to SecState ( SECRET -NODIS), 1 February 
1967> Ref: Bucharest's 925: 

"2, He neither expected nor received any hint 
of change in Romanian position^ i*e.j first step 
toward peaceful^ settlement should be unconditional 
cessation of bombing of North. But it is perhaps 
noteworthy that his references to recognition and 
negotiations with NLF and withdrawal of US troops 
were not as categorical as expressed in Warsaw Kict 
declaration on Vietnam of last July to which Romania 
had affixed its signature. Moreover ^ though declin- 
ing in any respect to act as intermediary^ he did 
tell us on his own initiative Hanoi preferred to 
talk directly to US and he assented to convey to 
Hanoi that US prepared to have direct and discreet 
talks . " 

DAVIS 



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October 2^, I967 



On no ^notice and several weeks after his i;eturn from llanoij Prime 
Minister Maurer called in Davis for a Vietnam discussion- Maurer began 

rby recalling bis, conversations v^ith Secretary Eusk and President Jolinson 
during the time of the extraordinai-y General Assembly session. He stressed 
the President's central point — the South Vietnamese being able to decide 

C their ovm destiny^ i*e.^ "if they want to adopt coiTMunisnij let them or 
vice versa; if they wish to unify with NVj let them or vice versa." The 
'':hrust of Maurer 's position was contained in a two-point proposal: (l) "US 
^ mst stop^ immediately^ unconditionally, and once for all bombing MVI^; 
I and (2) "r]VN must declare its agreement to start negotiations.-,." Maurer 

*- assumed that "talks vrould start with armed action in SVW continuing," He 

.dded that "military actions can cease only when both sides find satisfac- 
r uory political solution." Maurer explained that Hanoi's willingness to ' 

'I L ^ start negotiations was tied to l^esident Johnson* s acceptance of the Geneva 
i ■ Agreements of 195^ 3,s a "real basis for discussions." Davis asked Maurer 

r whether Hanoi accepted the principle of the South Vietnamese deciding their 
. own destiny J and Maurer responeded in the affirmative. 



Ambassador Davis asked Maurer whether the President's San Antonio 
I speech made any impact on his discussion in Hanoi, and Maurer replied that 
I the speech was available but that the official text v^as not received by 
Hanoi at that time. Arguing that NVI^ did not really have many troops in 
the South, as the whole US approach to MI^ infiltration asserted, Maurer 
said that the President's no advantage formula is "not based on reality 
and cannot be followed by NWI," Diet fully understanding the formula, 
Maurer said that Hanoi could not stop supporting v/hatever troops it had 
- in the South. 

Maurer stressed that this was, indeed, a propitious time to get nego- 
tiations started, that the Soviet Union and Hanoi were in agreement with 
the information he had just passed on to Davis, Maurer concluded with a 
very interesting approach to the problem, saying that the two sides were 
indeed far apart, but once both sides were at the table, "then the other 
nations desirous of seeing an end to conflict would try to push two sides 
together." 

BUCHAREST 60^ to SecState (SECRET-EXDIB), 25 October, 
1967 

1 r ^*3, , . , He summarized these vievrs, which he pre- 

^ t- sented to Hanoi, as follows: world wants to see end of 

j Vm war, not only public opinion but governments. 

\ r- There was unity in USG on Vietnam (Question* V/itness 

I 1 his separate conversations with President and Secretary 

i Rusk, and he described to North Vietnamese USG position 

t' as outlined by them, Romanians believed that under 

present circumstances prospects were opening up for ^ 
i discussions with possibility discussions leading to 



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peaceful solution. Certainly solution would not come 
immediately after sitting down at negotiating table. 
But if talks conducted in constructive and realistic 
fashion with aim to provide Vietnajnese people right 
to decide their own destiny: to take Into account dig-* 
nity and prestige of each state and to create conditions 
for establishment of normal relations and stability 
between VI^ and US^ then possibility solution existed---- 

"^, Maurer then said that after this e:cposition 
to Hanoi leaders, they discussed possibilities of 
starting negotiations- Maurer had explained Romanian 
position as follows: US must stop immediately^ un- 
conditionally^ and once for all bombing MN; JWXT must 
declare its agreement to start negotiations ' ith US 
on elimination of conflict. Certainly at this time 
armed action in SVIJ would not cease. It is one thing 
to mobilize and demobilize a force such as US has in 
STO* US could leave within three days and come back 
a,gain within three days. But if popular forces in 
SVIif demobilized J then remobilizatlon would require 
much more time. So talks would start with armed action 
in SVJ)f continuing. Aim of negotiations would be to 
put an end to these armed actions. They would cease 
effectively when discussion would lead to aiutually 
acceptable decisions and details could be discussed 
further. 

"5. At this point, 1 broke in to ask whether 
Maurer was saying that initial discussions would 
center on cessation of military actions to be followed 
by political discussions, 

^*6, PrimeMin replied he did not separate these 
01 q.uestions then or now- Military actions can cease 

/ j only when both sides find satisfactory political 

solution. As long as no guarantees existed that 
SVN could decide its own destiny^ there was no reason 
n for them to put aside weapons. So, Maurer continued^ 

wi he had regimes ted Worth Vietnamese friends "to declare 

categorically that, in case bombardment ceased uncon- 
ditionally and forever, they would be willing to 
start negotiations because US position as explained 
to him by President Johnson and Rusk for a solution 
p- within framework Geneva Agreements of 195^ provided 

!" z^eal basis for discussions, 

"7. According to Maurer, Vietnamese replied 
P in a sense which essentially agreed with Romanians, 

L' i.e,, if bombardment ceased, they would be prepared 

to enter negotiations. To my question whether Vietnamese 
would state readiness to negotiate before or after 



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bombardment ceased , Maurer replied he did not dis- 
I j cuss details: it was possible Vietnamese could make 

^ this statement before or after; this was up to them. 



"8, Maui^er commented that his discussions with 
Iforth Vietnamese had covered many aspects , but he 
would emphasize only those of interest for US to 
know. 

"a. Tliey had reviewed capacity of North 
Vietnamese resistance in case war goes on. From 
all points of view^ military economic, political and 
socia.lj 'I can tell you KVW can carry on long- term 
struggle*' This affirmative WN assertion well known 
throughout world. 

"B- Worth Vietnamese leaders are aware they 
cannot and could not try to humiliate US. Discussions 
should be conducted in such way so that actual recog- 
nition of South Vietnamese people to decide on destiny 
should have agreement and support of US, Besides, 
■ Worth Vietnamese do not look upon settlement of SVM 
problem as necessarily leading to immediate reunifi- 
cation. It would depend upon what SVN would decide, 

''D. In sum J Maurer asserted that he found 
in HVff 'position much more rational than we found 
year ago in talks of much same content,* lie asserted 

^ this position ^^/as not determined by diminuition KVN 

military capacity; it was no secret fighting capacity 
of MHa growing and would continue to grow because of 

Pj more Important aid from socialist countries. 

"9. Matirer then said he would like to add some 
other aspects as he saw them in conjimctlon his desire 
to put at disposal of US the most complete information 
possible to help USG with its judgment. Remarking 
he was not telling US a secret, he said that to a 
great extent the hard stand of Hanoi was influenced 
by the hard line of China. In Romanian view, this 
Chinese influence in Vietnam at present moment 'from 
war viewpoint' is diminishing 



"12. At this point, X asked whether WN had 
accepted this principle of full liberty SVM people decide ^ 
own destiny. Maurer replied 'jes «- absolutely yea,* i 

He asserted that from their common discussions there ■ 

emerged quite clearly acceptance principle SVI^ should 
decide own destiny and indeed there emerged possi-- 
bility of diplomatic relations and special ties be- 
tween US and SVN state as result of talks ending 
conflict . i 

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"13- This shows TWH leaders do not see aim of 
solution as reunification < < . . 

"15. ' At this pointy I asked v/hether President's 
San Antonio speech on Vietnam had been available to 
him d\iring course his discussion in Banol* Maurer 
replied in affirmative > saying it had conie over radio 
during course their discussions last day- I then had 
interpreter read President's two sentences in regard 
cessation bombardment HVH as q^uoted in Secretary Husk's 
opening statement his news conference October 12 and 
asked whether North Vietnamese had reacted to this 
to PrimeMin. Maurer replied negatively j saying Presi- 
dent's statement came by radio on eve bis departure 
and north Vietnamese had no definitive text. 



C; "16 • Ma,urer then said that he wished to make 

^ clear his view on a central problem which in his 

I . opinion is looked upon in an erroneous way in bSA- 

He said he did not^ of course , discuss with North 

CI Vietnamese leadership WK i^ifiltration into SV^, 

} However^ he would like convey his ovm impressions, 

U OTNj of course J denied sending men into SVIJ. Accord- 

^ ing to Maurer 's impressions^ this is not quite true 

though we might be wrong. He knows they're sending 
to SVK supplies^ weapons^ munitions ^ medicine, food 
^ .- and possibly specialists and teclmicians for training* 

f His impression is that IiIVN troops even if they are 

to be found are few- So when Pi^esident Johnson speaks 
about obligation not to take advantage 

Cof cessation of bombardment^ he is referring to things 
which are not based on reality and cannot be followed 
by NVN. For example^ KVN could not cease to support 

C' struggle in SVPT because struggle is going on. At 
any rate, US doing same thing for SVII armed forces* 
Maurer repeated, according his view, KVN troops as 

Csuch are few if any and that during cessation of 
bombing, ITTIT vrould continue to supply SVN struggle 
with food and munitions and indeed some of the aid 
socialist countries give to NVW. He concluded 

C President Johnson's formulation does not seem satis- 

factory as it proposes a unilateral condition. 



"17* I explained our point of view and the 
necessity of some indication from Hanoi of reciprocity 
if we should cease bombardment, I cited our experi- 
ence when on past occasions we had ceased bombardment 
HWr. l^urer showed himself well aware of our position, 
but said he thought more than that could be done. US 
a great and powerful nation and could do more with 

11 TS - NOBIS 



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their possibilities without risking failure- 'Possible 
military disadvantage would be compensated by political 
advantage.' In Maurer's opinion^ there had never 
before existed so many favorable conditions for reach- 
ing political settlement, 

'^18, •* -Soviets had expressed agreement vith 
Romanian position saying they looked at things in 
same way^ but emphasized decision must remain with 
Hanoi, Maurer added that moreover he had stressed to 
Soviet leaders that increase in economic and military 
aid by socialist countries to MVN is apt to assure 
greater liberty to Hanoi* According to Hordanian 
judgment^ this would make Hanoi less dependent on 
Chinese* 

"19' I-faurer summed up by saying his thoughts 
were very clear: negotiations would start; US would 
put forward list of' proposals unacceptable to NVN 
ajid Hanoi would do likewise- Then the other nations 
desirous of seeing bai end to conflict wo\ild try to 
push two sides together* 'lliis is our hope and our 
desire*^ Friends of both sides would compel each 
t6 give a little here and there and both sides would 
be compelled to listen to them. Tliusj in end a solu-- 



I / tlon could be found." 



DAVIS 



November 1, I967 

State responded with interest and a good many precise and exploratory 
questions to the Maurer interview. State also indicated that Governor 
Harriman^ on his way back from Pakistan^ could pursue the matter should 
Bucharest desire. The questions State was interested in focused on: 

(1) v/hether the bombing stop had to be permanent as well as unconditional; 

(2) the distinction among contacts, talks and negotiations; and (3) the 
authorization for the Maurer statements. 

State also instructed Ambassador Davis to pursue the B^esident's 
San Antonio speech and clarify its meaning. Daris was told to say that 
the speech was *'not assuming North Vietnam would cut off its support to 
its forces in the South while the armed struggle was continuing. At the 
same time USG would feel if KVN sought to take advantage of the bombing 
cessation or limitation to increase its support of its forces in the South , 
to attack our forces from north of IMZ or to maintain large-scale visible 
resupply efforts now impossible..." 

STATE 63057 to AmEmbas sy Bucharest ( SECRET- NODIS)^ 
1 November 1967j Ref: Richarest 60ki 



I "U. . . -Por example^ as reporte;d reftel, Maurer 

^ explained Romanian position as requesting North Vietnam 

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to declare categorically that in case bombarlment ceased 
unconditionally and Tor ever North Vietnam would be 
willing to start negotiations for a solution within 
the framework of the 195^ Geneva Accords* According 
to Maurer the NVll replied in a sense which essentially 
agreed with Rortta^nia, i.e., if bombardEient ceased they 
would be prepared to enter negotiations* The precise 
wording of the reply is obviously of great significance 
to the USO, Did Hanoi ask for cessation of bombard- 
ment? Did Hanoi use the words permanently or uncondi- 
tionally? Did Hanoi differentiate (as it has in the 
past) among contacts ^ talks and negotia^tions and which 
word did they use to describe the discussions that would 
take place after the stopping of the bombing? Was it 
clear that the stopping of bombing would be foliated 
by talks within a short ti:ne? What indications were 
there of the matters that would be taken up at the 
talks? What was Tianoi's reaction to Maurer's req.uest 
that it ^categorically' declare its readiness to be- 
gin talks after the stopping of the bombing? FXX 
Usual DRV formulation Is that talk 'could' follow 
bombing halt. End FYI. ^ 

"5- Other specific points on which we hope Maurer 
will be willing to furnish farther information include: 



"a) ^-niether the expectation that fighting 
f^- will continue in South Vietnam concurrently with nego- 

tiations is Romanian or North Vietnamese andj if NVHj 
the reasoning behind their expectation* 



%) T-aiether iWB" agreed with Romania that 
basic provisions of ^^k Geneva Accords provided real 
basis for discussions. If so^ can Kaurer provide 
any specific indication of how North Vietnamese view 
basic provisions? 

'*c) What did Hanoi indicate as its conception 
of conditions under which South Vietnamese people could 
decide their own destiny? 

"d) V;hat ^special ties' between South Viet- 
nam and the US did North Vietnam see as possibly emerg- 
ing as result of talks ending conflict? 

"e) 1-fhat is the basis for Maurer' s distinc- 
tion between the ITVN leaders who use their own brains 
and those who make judgments under Chinese influence? 
What underlies his judgment that Chinese influence 
on North , Vietnam 'from war viev.^oint' is diminishing? 
Wliat 'elasticity' in position of USG does Maurer suggest 
would strengthen independent elements in North Vietnam? 

13 TS " NODIS 



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"f ) Ifhat further information can Maurer 
provide as to North Vietnam's views on reunification 
of Vietnam? 

"g) To what extent did North Vietnam leaders 
authorize Maurer to give report to USG? 

"6- You should enq.uire whether j since Maurer 's 
conversations in iianoij Romanians have received any 
indication of Hanoi *s reaction to the President's 
September 29 San Antonio formulation. In connection 
with this enquiry you should state that the President 
has instructed you to ioform Maurer of two important 
points : 



"a) There can he no doubt as to the magnitude 
of IVm infiltration into South Vietnam. Through the 

C capture of hundreds of prisoners^ thousands of docu- 

ments ^ the interrogation of nmnerous defectors from 
the Wl] army and other means of intelligence collec- 

Ction the USG can state categorically that there are 
now in South Vietnam at least 5*^,000 regular soldiers 
of the Iforth Vietnamese Army foz^med into at least 80 
battalions. Furthermore^ the USG estimates on the 
basis of reliable evidence that MN infiltration has 
averaged approximately 5jOOO men per month over the 
last two years* Finally you should note that continued 
artillery and other attacks upon US positions In South 
Q Vietnam just below the K'iZ are being made solely by 

regular units of the ITOi army which are not included 
in the figures given above. 



"b) The President > in making his assump- 
tion that the North Vletnamf^se would not take ad van - 
P tage of the bombing cessation or limitation vrhile 

L. discussions proceed ^ i-ras not assuming Worth Vietnam 

I would cut off entirely its support to its forces in 

Cthe South while the areed struggle was continuing • 
At the same time USG would feel if IWn sought to take 
advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation to 
increase its support of its forces in the South, to 

L at tack our forces from north of J)MZ or to mount large- 

scale visible resupply efforts now impossible it would 
not be acting in good faith/' 

[ RUSK (Drafted by s/aH: David son/l sham 



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r in Moscow^ he had sought an appointment with Macovescu and conveyed contents 

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of paragraph 3^ State 63057- Macovescu said that he would handle the 
matter with dispatch. On h November in State 64852^ State indicated that 
Governor Harrloian could be in Bucharest anytime from November 27 to Novem* 
her 30- On 3 November^ in Bucharest S?!? Davis requests permission to 
give Macovescu q^uestions and information contained in State reftel in order 
to facilitate Maurer's discussions in Moscow. State concurred (State 
65068} with this course of action on k November- On 6 November j, as stated 
,in Bucharest 668^ Davis handed the paper to Kacovescu. Cabling on 6 Novem- 
ber in Bucharest 66^^ Davis reported that the Eomania^n government agreed 
:o the Harriman visit at the end of November. On ik November in Bucharest 
^12 J Davis reported that Maurer had granted him an appointment for the 
fo3J_owing day. 

November lg> 196? 



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; Maurer accompanied by Macovescu had a long and very careful session 

C. with Ambassador Davis in which Matirer responded in detail to the questions 
. contained in State 63O57, While the cable is more revealing of Romanian 
thinking on Vietnam than on Hanoi's positions^ Maurer 's presentation seemed 
to clarify a nuniber of points- It should be noted^ hcwever, that many 

Cof these ^'clarifications" were out of- whack with other signals and read- 
i Ings the USG was taking at the same time. Maurer 's key responses were: 
1 (1) that the bombing cessation had to be permanent and unconditional be- 

' fore talks can start j (2) that the Romanian objective was to get negotia- 

t J r tions started "without interrupting armed actions in SVTf^J (3) that a 

real basis for reaching a solution existed "because essential points of 
^ ^ NVN position are based on 195^ Geneva Accords Just as essential points 
»» ' President Johnson's position based on Geneva"; (k) that Hanoi made "no 
^ differentiation, . ^between contacts ^ talks and negotiations," aiid that "only 

reference was to discussions which would lead to solution of conflict..."; 

C(5) that Hanoi believes there should be a "certain lapse of time" between 
cessation of bombardment and start of negotiations; (6) that Hanoi "under- 
stood necessity of assertion of clear stand in regard to negotiations," 



Maurer made clear that Hanoi in no way authorized this report 



BUCJiAJffiST 718 to SecState (SECRET-NODIS), I5 November 
1967^ Refs: State 63O57 and Bucharest 668: 

"l, ErimeMin Maurer received me for two hoiU'S 
this morning Nov I5 accompanied by Acting FonMin 
Macovescu and same interpreter as at first meeting. 
Today Maurer had before him paper which contained 
Romanian translation of questions embodied in paper 
which I had handed Macovescu on Sunday Nov 5 (Romanian 
translation was in script which indicates strict secur- 
ity control these conversations by Romania,ns about 
which Pi^imeMin Maurer aga.in made special point several 
times during ensuing discussion), 

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"2. Beginning with para k State 630>7, Maurer 
proceeded to read and answer questions seriatira. 



C"3' To question did I^noi ask for cessation of 
boBibardment;, Maurer answered ^yes and no,' In eicplana- 
tion^ he went on to say that both in his talks with 
Hanoi and on other occasions ^ Hanoi has said that per- 

Cmanent and unconditional cessation of bombardment is 
necessary before talks can start- This is also the 
EOEianian vlex-rpcint. He left Vietnam convinced that 

Lthis was Hanoi's view. Hanoi more or less xsresented 
this view in the statement by their Fonl^in in January 
1966 although it was 'more hazily^ expressed in this 
statement and more linked with other things. Maurer 
I continued that objective his discussions was ^hat 

I- cessation of boiobardiiient must lead to negotiations with- 

out interrupting amed actions in SVH. Obvious there 
C existed possibil-ity of reaching solution because essen- 

tial points of KVtJ position are based on 195^ Geneva 
Accords Just as essential points President Johnson's 

C posit ion based on Geneva, Thus there is a basis for 

discussions. Certainly there may be certain nuances 
how one side or the other understand provisions of 
J Geneva Accords ^ but this is why talks should be held 

to bring to common" denominator all aspects. 



"^, Maurer said this justified his first asser- 
tion that reply v;as 'yes,' *But why^ * Maurer asked, 
'did I also say no.' Beceaise during these discussions 
there was not one single moment when the people to whom 
we talked referred to this as their desire -- only a 
necessity resulting from respect for international 
norms j for sovereignty of WH and it was presented 
as practical possibility to bring inatters to discus- 
sion, ' Maurer concluded this is why his reply was 
made in such 'circumstantial manner because I want 
my reply to be clear and definite-' 

"5. Did Hanoi use words 'permanently'^ or 'un- 
conditionally'? Maurer replied;, 'yes,' saying French 
word 'definitivement' had been used for 'permanent.' 

'^6- Did Hanoi differentiate among contacts^ 
talks and negotiations and which word did they use 
to describe discussions after stopping of bombing? 
Maurer replied this was not toviched upon in Hanoi, 
He only touched upon subject of discussions which would 
lead J, if possible, to cessation of war and settlement 
of conflict in Vietnam* No differentiation was made 
between these words. Only reference was to discus- 
sions which would lead to solution of conflict and 

li 

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'I did not notice- any nuances' in position IIVN, Goal 
is political settlement "based on essential point of 
Vietnamese and 'as I understand it President Johnson's 
viewpoint' that right of South Vietnamese people to 
determine freely and of their own accord their destiny 
must be re cognized - 

"7- ^as it clear stopping of bombing would be 
follo\';ed ty talks in short time? Mauxer replied that 
there was a rather longer discussion on this point 
because NVH viewpoint was that 'certain lapse of time' * 
should pass between cessation of bombardment and start 
of discussions, tfeurer said^ S,^e tried to show them 
that it was not g.uite necessary for this lapse of 
time, 1 should like to say in this xegoxd. that my 
impression is that at end our talks KVN adhered to 
theii' original viewpoint , i.e.^ a certain lapse of 
time should ensue. We talked quite a lot auDut this. 
Perhaps they have certain reasons better understood 
by them than by us, ' 

"8, Here Maurer said he would like to interject 
his oifn opinion. Should liVW adhere to this position, 
nevertheless cessation of bombing would constitute 
a start of friendly actions upon NVN in order to make 
this interval as short as possible. 'I think there 
would be many states^ not only Romania and not only 
socialist countries ^ who would be ready to exert pres- 
sure by friendly advice on NVI^ to follov/ cessation of 
bombing by something to shorten interval between this 
and start of discussion.' Maurer concluded that though 
this was personal reflection he wished to emphasize 
that there were iriany socialist and other countries 
who could have a certain influence on NW. 

"9- l^liat indications were there of matters that 
would be taken up at talks? Maurer answered cryptically, 
'none* I avoided discussing such subjects and I con- 
tinue to do so. I am not mandatary of either INN or 
USA. In doing what I did^ I did not defend either 
USA, (vjhich doesn't need it) or MH (though I wish to 
defend it). Tfttat made us go to Planoi? Our friendly 
relations with Hanoi are quite obvious and our friend- 
ship grows greater so long as those events go on and 
on. So we decided to go to Hanoi to discuss these 
events as I described to you last time* V7e agreed 
we should meet from time to time to consult each other. 
Moreover, I had advantage of talks with President 
Johnson and Secretary Rusk, I thought I noted some- 
thing very positive in these discussions which led 
me to folowing absurd conclusion.' 



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"12. To question Vfhat i^as Hanoi's reaction to 
Prime l-linister's request that it 'categorically* declare 
its readiness begin talks after stopping of bombing j 
Maurer replied their discussions on tbis topic vere 
rather long and they ended with North Vietnajnese state- 
ment that it seemed to them 'Roinanian point of view 
as presented logical one and they would think about 
it and how it could be practically implemented*' 
Maurer said they had not been so punctilious about 
certain words, but his idea as presented to Hanoi 
was that it should state clearly that if bombing ceases 
then talks v;ould start, ^ Since it and Wm said QUOTE 
your stand logical one^ UMQUOTE 1 can only understand 
that such a statement must be made from HVH ovm fjords. 
I did not think of formulation for such a declaration 
because of nature of our discussions. Moreover^ there 
was no evidence that WN had thought of formulation. 
We discussed certain ideas and result is tliat WJl^ 
understood necessity of assertion of clear stand In 
regard to negotiations-' 

**13, Ee questions. A through G in paragraph 5 
State 63057, Maurer answered as follows: 



*^A- Both Romanian and IJVN point of view 
is tliat fighting will continue in SVTJ concurrently 
with negotiations, Maurer asserted he did not discuss 
I j^ reasoning for common acceptance this expectation but 

i ^ ' remarked INN standpoint might have some different 

nuances as compared with his own. His own viewpoint 

Cis that while easy for US to mobilize or disband great 
military force in Vietnam on side IWI^f is completely 
different. They need more than 1^8 hours to mobilize 
or disband their forces. This was no secret. This was 
i r not first time 'strategy' of popular war is being dis- 

L. ' cussed, J^laurer asserted it was quite logical that 

i military actions would be ended only when discussions 

L created for both sides certainly of mutua3J.y accepta- 

ble conditions. ^ 'This is reason why 1 believe military 
J . actions and political discussions will continue in 

parallel. ' 



"B. Maurer stated that NVN has always 
asserted that I95U Geneva Accords provide real basis 
for negotiations- This is something which constantly 
appears in statements issued by leaders of NTO and 
EOF* 'Deliberately we did not discuss any subject 
which night be the subject of negotiations between 
the two sides. This is for the Vietnamese and Ameri- 



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* "C- To question what did lianoi indicate 
as its conception of conditions which SVN people could 
decide their own destiny^ Maurer said he did not ask 
as he did not ask President Johnson a'bout US concep- 
tions. * (Comment: Here for first and last time he 
mentioned the name of NW Prime Minister Phan Van Dong 
as ^ participant in talks • ) 

"5. As to ^special ties' between SVK and 
US emerging as result of talks ^ Maurer said if SVN 
decided to remain separate state this would mean it 
could establish not only diplomatic hut econoiEiCj 
cultural^ etc, J ties with many states of its own choos- 
ing j including USA. 



"E. To question what is basis for Maurer 's 
; distinction between NVN leaders who use their own 

El brains and those who make judgments under Chinese in- 
\ fluence^ Maiirer replied simply^ 'I am basing myself 

on 65 years experience of life-' He continued there 

Cj was complete unity of IWN leadership concerning secur- 

J ing for SVI^ people right to -decide their own destiny 

i but he thought It logical there would be nuances in 

their way of thirxking which would be determined by 
fact that 'some of them have wider liberty in their 
thinking while others have a more influenced pattern 
of thinking p' Here Maurer paused and said he would like 
to say something v^xj important though he was s.ware 
z^ ^ of the risk in imparting to US his view; *My firm 

Impression is that at present in ITO)f there are men in 
the leadership holding the most responsible positions 
who enjoy great liberty in their thinking.' At this 
juncture^ Maurer with a somewhat wry smile rema^rked^ 
'what would Chou En Lai say if he knew what 1 told 
you? ^jfhat would tlie North Vietnamese leadership say? 
What would happen to relations between Eomania, China, 
and North Vietnam if they knew? As regards what under- 
lies Maurer 's judgment that Chinese Influence on MVIJ 
'from war viewpoint' is diminishing;, Maurer said he 
would prefer not to answer; there was great risk for 
Romanian government policy here and exclaimed 'think 
what would happen if China or !WN knew I admitted this 
affirmation. But I said this and I stick to it. 
V/liy did 1 tell you this? Because I think this is 
a QUOTE conmiandlng UNQUOTE thing on part of he who 
wishes to obtain certain results. For this reason I 
said it was logical US should heed this fact; that 

C policy shduld be flexible enough in order to allow 

free thinking people to develop wiJJLingness to adhere 
to such v^ays of thinking.' To question of what 'elas- 
ticity' in position of USG does Maurer suggest would 



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strengthen Independent elements ITTO^ Maurer replied 
cessation of "bombing is cried out every^-^here . It 
vould constitute an act of great political wisdom, 
Maurer said lie was not taking liberty of trying give 
lesson to leaders USA but he thought it was good to 
say what he had told US frankly and openly. He be- 
lieved leaders USG have wisdom and insight to see what 
in his thinking might contribute to peace and inter- 
ests of US itself - 

"F, To q^uestion re further inforniation as 
to NVI^ views on reunification Vietnam^ Maurer simply 
replied he had nothing to add to what he had already 
said on this :5ubject» 

"G- To what extent did KVDI leader" authorize 
Maurer to give report to USG? Maurer replied ^ 'absolutely 
none. It vras my own exclusive responsibility. ' Maurer 
then explained at some length why he had done this. 
Essentially because he believed there exist conditions 
which can lead to political solution. Existence of 
conflict, troubles 3 many important things in which 
Romania is interested. Especially after ffew York 
and Washington discussions, Maurer was confident USG 
was ^garbl^ solution. He went to Hanoi to explain 
that a coiTimoii basis existed for discussions to end 
hostilities. lie was far from thinking in Hanoi that 
he would inform USG of his discussion there^ but in 
the end and upon further reflection he thought it 
important to move this unhappy situation tov^ard more 
reasonable solution- He was not pushed by WF but 
acted solely on own initiative* It might be that 
NVN would reproach him greatly for this but objectively 
he believes a reasonable solution is near* 

"1^. Maurer stated that subseq^uent to his visit 
in Hanoi Homanian government has not repeat not re- 
ceived any indication of Hanoi's reaction to Presi- 
dent's September 29 San Antonio formulation. In 
answer to my question^ he stated flatly that Roman i- 
ajis had not participated in discussions on'Vietnajn 
during their recent visit to Moscow." 

MVIS 



November 17, I967 

^ F 1 1 1 * "I K — ^^^^^^ 

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In Bucharest 729, Ambassador Davis cabled his impressions from the 
Maurer conversation- He believed that feurer was frank and forthcoming, 
but that the only new elem.ent which Maurer introduced was ''his intimation 



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that there are divided councils in Hanoi and that dairies e hard stand 
influence is diminishing." Davis accepted Maurer's statement of basic 
Romanian policy -- "existence of conflict troubles many important things 
in vhich Romania is interested/' 



November £9, 1967 

' In Bucharest 802j Davis reported on a discussion with Ceausescu* 
^eausescu took a very hard line in this conversation and argued ^ in effect^ 

hat the ^'DHV and rffiF represented South Vietnamese people p" He farther 
stated that US was repeating the mistake of great povrers in the past by 
ignoring the opinion of others and carrying out an imperialist policy, 
' s to why Hanoi refused to accept the San Antonio formula ^ Ceausescu main- 
^ained that the formula imposed conditions > and that a formal declaration' 
l}y the US was in order. 

r 

; BUCH/IBEST 802 to SecState (SECRET- NOBIS ), 29 JTovember 

; 1967: 

"5' Ceausescu referred to my morning conversation 
with PrimeMin and in particuJ_ar to request that PriineMin 
try and help br.ing US and Vietnam together* Ceausescu 's 
opinion any such attempt now would not lead to very 
'spectacular' results until cessation of bombing* 
VJlaile Ceausescu agreed tliat reunification of divided 
countries should not be achieved through force ^ yet 
blandly argued that riLF had put forth program for re- 
unification only as long-time and peacei*ul development 
with which DKV agreed. He asserted that DRV could 
not wage war in Sduth which did not have support of 
people there and suggested US policy based on incomplete 
information and incorrect assumptions. To my repeated 
questions why Hanoi had slammed door in face President's 
generous San Antonio offer and wliy Hanoi refused to 
say either publicly or privately what would happen 
after permanent cessation of bombing, Ceausescu took 
line we were imposing conditions; that a bombing pause 
w^ouJ.d be only another form of ultimatum j that absence 
of formal declaration of war raised problems in inter- 
national law (i.e.^ bombing) not in favor of US and 
that if US would only cease bombing permanently and 
unconditionally other countries would exercise pres- 
sure on both sides to bring them to negotiating table, 
Ceausescu also argued that cessation bombing would 
be act of political wisdom." 

DAVIS 



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I?ove!nber 29, 1967 -^ Harriman-Maurer Conversations 

Maurer cairied on a monologue in ^-rhich he reviewed the points he had 
previously mde in Bucharest 60k of 25 October, Kaurer again focused on 
only one objective — getting negotiations started "and nothing more-" 
In this respect J *he repeated that world opinion would push the two powers 
toward a settlement once negotiations began- 

,' Maurer was told a very Interesting story about Hanoi *s view on getting 
r* is cuss ions started. In his first nee ting with Phara Tan Dong, it v:as his 

nrpression that Hanoi did not wish to enter discussions • During the next 
day's talk with Dongj Hanoi's position softened. Dong took the position 
[that T^orth Vietnam "should enter discussions while continuing the struggle 
*^n the South as long as there is uncertainty as to the right of the SVN 

.^eople to decide their destiny/* Dong^ expressing what Maurer considered- 
I to be the leadership position in Hanoi ^ desired a "rather more circumstan- 
tial" statement on Hanoi's part. "IWN was to declare that it was ready to 
start discussions with the US if the US declared and ceased unconditionally 
and permanently for ail time bombardment over IWK DMZ^ if US declared that 
'it would 'never resuiae*'" Even in this event , Hanoi "wou3.d allow certain 
time to pass to enable it to test sincerity of such declaration and action," 

Maurer^ as hefore, continued to stress that a very serious part of 
the problem was China, Although he believed that the Chinese faction in 
Hanoi was losing some influence ^ it was still quite strong. 

HarrimaUj, in response, said that what was missing from this dialogue 
was "any indication that Hanoi wants serious negotiations, that Hanoi says 
that US should stop bombing, but does not even say that they will talk." 
Harriman gave the impression that all. we were waiting for was a message 
from Hanoi that they would enter "meaningful talks*" Harriman also noted 
Hanoi* s demand for a "r^ermanent cessation." 

BUCHAREST 8O3 to SecState (SECHET-NODIS), 29 November, 
19671 



"1- After briefly touching on Middle East and 
l-lanescu's election and performance at UH^ I brought 
Up Vietnam and conveyed the President's gratitude 
^ for the complete account Kaurer had given Ambassador 

Davis- I asked Maurer if he had given full attention 

Cto the President's San Antonio speech. I told him this 
was as sweeping a statement as had ever been made 
during war and showed the President's desire for nego- 
tiated peace. I informed him that the interpretation 
of the 'no advantage' formula-tion which we had pre- 
viously given him had been conveyed to Hanoi through 
channels then open. I told him of our disappointment 
at Hanoi's having turned down the offer so coldly and 
asked for his judgment as to why Hanoi had done so. 



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p "2, MaiJirer then launched into what was virtually 

I a tvfo-hour monologue out of a three hour discussion. 

He said he did not know directly why San Antonio offer 
had been turned down since speech was given on last 

Cday of his talk with Iham Van Dong and neither of them 
had text available. 



"3- His talks with the President and the Secretary 
had convinced him that primary and overriding American 
goal was to guarantee right of South Vietnamese people 
to determine their own destiny and only secondarily to 
fulfill commitment to GVtT, Based on this belief ^ he 
advised Hiam Van Dong that without ceasing military 
action in Souths IIVM should enter into discussions 
with US, He told Dong that the struggle in the South 
should conclude only when US and W^ both agree on 
how SVN people can define freely their own destiny. 
Then as President Johnson told him categorically Ameri- 
can troops will go -home. 



C"J|. Maurer deliberately focused on only one thing; 
'The starting of negotiations and nothing more.' Maurer 
believes that once discussions begun the nations of the 
world will throw their influence behind reaching a suc- 
cessful conclusion and would put pressure both on Hanoi 
and the US that would push them towards solution accepta- 
ble to both sides. US and WN both agree that SVK people 
p- should decide their own destiny and discussions could 

work out different understandings each side may have of 
this principle. 



"5. At the end of the first day of conversations 
with Pham Van Dong (interrupted once or twice by having 
to go down to air raid shelter) j Maurer concluded from 
the hazy and contradictory answers he received that 
Hanoi did not wish to enter discussions. Maurer decided 
not to pursue the matter further. The next day Kaurer 
suggested that they discuss bilateral relations but 
a.fter a short morning devoted to bilateral matters 
Dong brought the talks back to negotiations-, Dong then 
asked Maurer to allow him to present Hanoi's sta,nd- 
poiat on the statement Maurer had asked Hanoi to ma.ke 
to the effect that if bombardment would cease ^ they 
would enter into discussions with the US, 

"6. I questioned his use of 'would/ saying that 
Hanoi usually uses 'could-' Kaurer replied that it 
is difficult for him to recall precise word but that 
it didn't matter since they were talking in French^ 
and Dong'.s French is so poor that no such nuances 
could be retained; 

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C"7' Maurer continued that this time Dong's position 
was very clear and logical, Dong asserted that you 
(>Iaurer) arc right. The DRV must make such a state- 
ment. It should enter discussions while continuing the 
V struggle in the South as long as there is uncertainty 

L as to the right of the SVTT people to decide their des- 

tiny. 



"8, l!aurer and Dong then discussed details on 
how such discussions could begin, Dong thought that 
Hanoi's statement must be ^rather more circumstantial^ 
that is to mean NW was to declare that It was ready 
to start discussions with the US if US declared and 
ceased unconditionally and permanently for all time 
bombardment over IWf Dl-iZ if US declared that it would 
'never resume ^j' Hanoi would allow certain time to 
pass to enable it to test sincerity of such delcara- 
tlon and action, Maurer asked why these conditions^ 
when one condition could be enough ^^ tliat the US 
declare that it ceases imcondltlonaHy and for a3_l time 
and that it would not resume the bombing. Vfliy^ Maurer 
asked 3 should there be an Interval between end of 
bombing and start of negotiations? 



^^9* Maurer apparently did not receive an answer 
to his question- He indicated his personal belief 
that there exists within the North Vietnamese leader- 
; p ship some with points of view more reserved towards 

j \ _^^ negotiations than one with which Dong finally agreed* 

He thought such reserve might be the result of the 
Chiiiese viewpoint. Maurer told me that the US should 
exercise flexible judgment meant to strengthen the 
Vietnajnese (as opposed to Chinese) way of thinking, 



"10, Maurer emphasized that the Important thing 
was that on the second day Pham Van Dong was express- 
ing the opinion of the North Vietnamese leadership - 
While Maurer did not see Ho^ Maurer believes that 
at every intermission Ho was told of the discussion* 
Maurer believes that on the night of the first day^ 
Ho was consulted and that there might even have been 
a meeting of the North Vietnamese leadership. 

"11. Maurer then turned his monologue to what he 
described as the 'serious angle to problem': China- 
He said that if the Chinese leadership know of today's 
discussion^ Romanian and Chinese relations 'would be 
burled* * . 



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*^12- . Maurer said that the Clainese reply ^was 'dis- 
concertingly short.' They said that they agreed partially 
with Maurer 's judgment, that they thought that the US 
had only two choices j either leaving VN, or expanding 
the wa:^p If the US extended the war, then it was 
inevitable that it would e>rpand over China. The Chi- 
nese said that 've are ready for this and are waiting 
for it.^ ..- I asked whether he thought the Chinese 
did want war, Maurer said that he wouldn't say they 
wanted it, hut he wouldn't say they don't want war. - - 
Maurer said he knew the evolution of the position of 
the socialist states on VTr, At the beginning they 
furnished less support to W^ than they do now. Con- 
tinuation of the situation would bring them closer 
together. 

"lU. I told him that what is missing is any indi- 
cation that Hanoi wants serious negotiations, that 
Hanoi says that the US should stop bombing, but does 
not even say that they will talk. They ask not only 
for unconditional but permanent cessation of bombing. 
I pointed out that Hanoi is, now attacking US forces 
just below the DMZ, and that since the President will 
not permit the invasion of HVll, the only way we can 
slow down their attack is to hit their positions in 
KVIT. I mentioned the Canadian suggestion of the re- 
establishment of a demilitarized IMZ and Hanoi's re- 
jection. I said there seems to be a strange idea that 
the bombing of the North is not part of the military 
action of the war, but is somehow disconnected. Hanoi 
is asking the US to commit itself not to resmie bombing 
while leaving itself free to do anything It wants. I 
said it was our impression that Hanoi has no serious 
intention of entering meaningful talks ^ for if they had^ 
they would send US a message either through Maurer 
or other channels . If they sent US a message privately 
or talked with US privately on conditions necessary 
prior to beginning of negotiations^ or if they told 
US what they intended to do, this would be another 
matter. I pointed out that we have no intention of 
destroying the regime in NVW, but Just want to stop 
it from taking over the South 'b^ force. I told him 
that I would have thought the socialist states would 
be putting pressure for negotiation on Banoi, rather 
than encouraging it by escalating aid, and that I thought 
the socialist countries should recognize that we are 
not threatening the regime in NW^ but that we are 
under treaty obligation to defend SVlf against aggres- 
sion from NVN. I said it was my impression that the 
Soviet Union and the Eastern European states, but 
not Peking, want the fighting stopped, and that if 



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f^ concern exists d.bout major confrontation, we should 

|_ get together to agree upon ending of conflict* 



"15, I said we thought that the San Antonio state 
ment^ supplemented by the e^lanation given Kaurer, 
made clear a possible way to end conflict. 



c- 

r~ * ' "16. I said I was sure that Kaurer agreed that 

(_ above all the President wanted negotiations for a 

peaceful settlement ^ and asked him if he had any doubt 

C about this- He replied that he had none, that if he 

had any he wouldn't have talked to jNW as he did- 
I asked him if he thought KVU had a right to enter 

CSW, and whether he thought ¥est Genra^ny had a right 
to enter East Germany, I recalled that we fought 
in Korea because the ETorth entered the South- 1 said 
divided countries were unhappy situations^ but the 
r' us has agreed, and we consider that the socialist 

L countries have agreed, that there will be no unifi- 

cation by force* I told him that perhaps he hoped 
C reunification of Germany would never come, bvit that 

while we hope that it will^ we do not want it to come 
through force, 1 referred to our SEATO commitment 
undertaken in 195^ during the Elsenhower Administ ra- 
ti on> and said that the socialist states should real* 
ise the seriousness with which we consider our obliga- 
tion and should try to induce Hanoi to terminate its 
^ aggression. 

"17. I asked Matirer how he thought the President 

C could contribute to a change in Hanoi's attitude • 

I said a pause miglit be considered, though unless 
Hanoi acted differently than last time, it would be 
of a short duiration and create a more difficult situ- 

Cation. 1 explained how Hanoi had taken advantage of 
the Tet pause* I said I hoped the Soviet Union, Eomianiaj 
and other Eastern European countries would use their 
r influence to get talks started imder conditions which 

{^ would give some hope of a successful conclusion- I 

said that asking for a permanent cessation without 
any indication of what might result — perhaps nothing -- 
is like asking us to tie our right hand behind our 
back while fighting continues* It wou.ld be different 
if they said stop bombing for two weeks or a month 

t while we talk^ but they ask for a permanent stop, 

I asked how this could be taken seriously. 



"18. Kaurer said he ^absolutely agreed' that 
bombing is a part of general military action, and said 
he would go further, by saying that from the mj.litary 
point of view not only could bombing be recommended, 

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\^Mt that the occux:ation of IJYN as a way of destroying 
the 'backyard' of SVTT could be recommeiided- After 
NW was temporarily occupied and the war in the Iforth 
became a guerrilla one^ the same military recommenda- 
tion could be n^de concerning China, which would become 
the new backyard, But^ said Maurer, it would not be 
Justified from the political viev;point. War is nothing 
but politics conducted by other means* It is waged 
to bring one side in a political conflict a decisive 
advantage* This is why political considerations should 
be dominant and it is why President Johnson does not 
permit his troops to cross the DMZ» From the military 
point of view he said the President was wrong in not 
ordering the crossing of the DMZ^ but from the politi- 
cal point of view he is correct, and that is why he 
/garble/not justified on military grounds* 

"19- Maurer admitted that the cessation of bombard 
ment involved risks that talks n^y not start for some 
time> that negotiations may start but be unduly pro- 
longed, or that they may not result in a solution. 
But he thought that with all countries (except possi- 
bly China) exerting their influence^ there would be 
a settlement. 



"20, I commented that the President is using limited 
means beca^use of the limited character of our objectives* 
r, He did not want to ' inva.de IWN because he had no inten- 

]^2 tion of interfering with a solialist regime which he 

knows socialist states will defend. He ordered attacks 
*- on supply routes 8,nd military targets but against the 

[ advice of the military he has not ordered mining of 

Haiphong harbor and interference with its shipping, ^ 
We have not attacked the dikes or engaged in area 

C bombing of population centers as v^as done in World 

War II. The President's military advisors say the 
situation in the south would become substantially 
r more difficult if NVN were permitted to freely move 

[ men and supplies South. I appealed to Maurer as a 

man in a strategic position who has the ear of Presi- 
dent Johnson^ of the Soviet Union, of China and Hanoi, 
to advise us as to how we can bring about negotiations* 
I repeated that it was impossible for the President 
to stop bombing permanently ^ without some indication 
from Hanoi as to what would happen, I said the Presi- 
dent had made his proposal in San Antonio, and that 
he would be willing to receive any other reasonable 
r proposal from Maurer, Ma\irer replied that the Presi- 

I dent might put more hope in Romanian action that was 

justified, Maurer said that he believed there was 
now a consensus between the US and OTN that people 

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of SVN should have right to decide their ovm destiny, 
lCno\-^ing that^ said Kaurerj we will see what we can 
do. 'There is no doubt that we will try to do some- 
thing about it - ' 

"21. l»5aurer did not think it was necessary to 
involve SoTiet Union yet. ^^en that time camSj he 
thought US was in a better position to do so than 
Romania, 

'*22* The discussion continued after lunch. I 
then asked Maurer whether he had any steps in mind 
now. He replied affirmative ly^ but said he could 
not name them yet, that the subject must be thought 
over and studied, I asked hiia to keep Ambassador 
Davis informed . '* 

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PAC KERS (RUyiAMAN-WN TRACK): NQVEI^ER 196? - FEBRUAR Y 1968 



It was only after the Harriman-Maurer discussions in Bucharest 
on Noveniber £8j I967 that the Rum^anian track began to receive high level 
attention and priority in Washington* Maurer had recently returned from 
North Vietnam in an attempt to convince the DRV, so he said> to malie a 
statement about entering discussions with the U.S. v/hile continuing the 
struggle in the south. Maurer said that he stressed to Pham Van Dong that 
self-determination was the essence of the U.S. position- 

* 

Harriman explained the San Antoaio formula to Maurer. -"The North 
could, ^^ Harriman indicated, ^* continue supplying its force, to the extent 
it does now but that it must not increase-" Harriman expressed the hope 
that GOR would take appropriate steps with Hanoi to explain this- Maurer 
said that he would take such steps under consideration. Harriman concluded 
that V/hat was lacking was any ^Vindication" or '^impression" or "message" 
that Hanoi wanted serious negotiations. 

On December 12, ^9^ Xi^ First Deputy Foreign Minister Macovescu and 
First Secretary of the GOR Enibassy Iliescu (hereafter ^^ l) left Bucharest, 
They arrived in Hanoi on December lU'and stayed until the l8th. They arrived 
a few hours after a U.S, strike on the Doumer Bridge, v;hich was restruck 
on December 17- 



Their schedule of meetings was as follovrs; (a) dinner on Friday, 
the 15th, with Foi:eign Minister Trii*., (b) a meeting with Ti^inJi in the 
morning of December I6, (c) Sunday afternoon meeting with Pham Van Dong, 
r (d) on the morning of the l8th there was a DRV Politbm^o meeting, (e) another 
{-. meeting with Trinh after the Politburo session la which Trinli spoke to 

M & I from a written text. Rumanians left Hanoi on the evening of the l8th. 



The Rumanian discussions with the DRV leadership v^ere not revealed 
to the U.S. until M & I visited Iv^ashington on January 5j I968. (Substance 
will be treated at that point in the chronology.) In other words, the 
Trinh statement of the DRV position made on December 29 was already public 
knowledge . 

From December ik through I8 , while M & I were in Hanoi, Ceaucescu and 
Maurer visited Moscov;, informed the Soviets of the Harriman talks and the 
M & I mission. They reported that the Soviets vrish success to the GOR mission 
in Hanoi, 

On December 19 , M £c I visited Peking and saw Deputy Foreign Minister 
Gua. Gua said "it is the Vietnamese people who will have to decide," 



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On DeCGmber 2^^ M ^ I returned to Bucharest • 

On December 26 , Ambassador Eogdan advised that Ceaueescu and Maurer 
had a message and ^-/anted to send an emissary to the U.S. Harriman advised 
Bogdan that he would be glad to receive the envoy. 

On December 29, Trinh spoke at a Mongolian reception. The substance 
of his talk was broadcast by Hanoi YM. in English on January 1- He stated, 
in part: 

"The stand of the Vietnamese people is quite clear- That 
is the four-point stand of the DRV Govermnent and the political 
program of the NFLSV* That is the basis for the settlement of 
the Vietnam q_uestion. 

"The U.S. Government has unceasingly claimed that it x^ants 
to talk with Hanoi but has received no response. If the U.S. 
Government truly wants to talk^ it must^ as vjas made clear in 
our statement on 28 January 196? j first of all stop unconditionally 
the bombing and all other acts of v;ar against the DRV. After 
the United States has ended unconditionally the bombing and all 
other acts of war against the DRV, the DRV will hold talks with 
the United States on q.uestions concerned." 



On December 20 . Ambassador Eogdan informed Harriman that M would be 
pj the special envoy. 



On January 3 ^1963^ the U.S. prohibited bombing within five miles of the 
center of l-IanoTTJCST502 DTG O32158Z) until further notice (JCS 67OO DTG 
062l48z)- 

On January g > Ajnbassador Harriman met with Kacovescu, Eogdan j IliescUj 
and Celack (Third Secretary of the Embassy), 



M & I said that they had presented \]SG views as expressed by Harriman. 
^ These views were that the U.S. is ready to cease bombing (l) ifj within a 

^ reasonable period of time^ the DRV would come to serious and productive 

discussions/negotiations J and (2) if the DRV would not- take advantage of 
the bombing halt to increase its inx'iltration. The GOR representatives 

Csaid that they stressed to the BRV that they should m.ake a "gesture" or 
"sign" publicly or privately that Hanoi vranted negotiations* M & I said 
that they repeatedly stressed that the U.S* goal for South Vietnam was 
self-determination. 



Throughout their stay, the North Vietnamese stressed to H & I that the 
military situation was good for them. Hanoi leadership also repeated that 
they did not trust U.S. peace feelers ^ that the Harriman exposition was 
nothing new, that It was essentially as conditional as the San Antonio 
speech. 

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M & I said that they were quite pessimistic atout the success 
of their mission until after the Politbui^o meeting on the morning of 
December l8th. It was only after that meeting that Trinh came to them 
with ^fhat they believed would be a responsive m.essage, Trinh spoke 
from a prepared Vietnamese text and M & I^ when speaking to Harrimanj 
translated the document into French, M explained that Trinh "began in 
even harsher terms than Pham Van Dong had the previous day, M said that 
he was "not going to give a presentation of all /xrinh^s/ exposition, but 
as I proBiised Trinh^ I shall at least give you spirit of his document 

"it is clear that it is equally as difficult for the U,S. 
to put an end to the ^var as to broaden it. The U.S. is bound 
to strive to prevent the situation from getting worse and to 
avoid serious defeats until after the I^ovember election. 

"The U.S. 's aggressive designs against Viet-Nam remain 
tmchanged. 

"The U-S- declares that it will continue its aggressive war 
in Vietnam. In the San Antonio speech and in other statements by 
the President and Rusk it is emphasized that the U.S. will stay 
in Vietnam in the interest of its own security and that it wili 
abide by its coi^imitment and that it wiUL continue the fight. Thie 
U,S, perseveres in its double faced policy of stepping up the 
war while the U.S, administration feels compelled to take peace- 
ful action to deceive and to appease public opinion. 

"It is now clear that conditions are not yet ripe for peaceful 
settlement because the U.S. is unwilling to do so. The U,S. can- 
not intimidate by force the Vietnamese people nor deceive them by 
false maneuvers of peace. As long as the U,S, continues this 
aggression the Vietnamese people will fight to final victory- 
The position of the DRV is clear: 



'Tlie basis for settlement of the Vietnamese issue 
^. is provided by the four points of April 3^ 19^5; the 

I Ministry of Foreign Affairs subseq.uently issued its 

^- January 28, I967 statement* This is our position of 

principles on which no concession Is possible,' 



"Macovescu read the material in quotes twice from the paper 
in front of him- 

"Harrim^an; No concession on the four points or on the January 
statement? 

"Macovescu: 5o concession possible. I would ask you to note 
this for coinment for he also gave me oral comments - 



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"He said the Harriman proposal contains nothing new. Essentially 
the U,S1 continues to clam reciprocity and ^^111 not stop until 
specific conditions are fulfilled* The Vietnamese people will not 
I hold discussions under pressures or the menace of bombs. So far I 
thought this was repetition of their position. But from here on 
there is something which Interested me and precisely because it was 
near the end I paid greater attention to it* 

"Foreign Minister TrirJi continued reading: 

'¥e are not against discussions but any discussions 
should take place according to principle- As soon as dis- 
cussion engaged in^ our attitude \7ill be serious and 
responsible but it depends on attitude of the U,S, whether 
such discussions are fruitful. ' 

"Material in quotation marks was read slowly and carefully by 
Macovescu. 

"Here is the answer to the qtuestion that you asked Mr. Harriman* 
From this point on there is a passage which in the text is in <iuota- 
tlon marks, 

'We affirm the following. If the USG really wants 
discussions with the Government of the DRV it should first 
unconditionally cease bombing and any other act of war 
J against the DRV. After the unconditional cessation of all 

bombing and of any other U.S. act of war against the DRV and 
at the end of an appropriate period of time the government 
of the DHV will entei" into serious discussions with the USG. ' 

"While he was reading this paragraph I stopped him and told him 
comi^ade Minister when I FiCntioned cessation I said final and uncon- 
ditional- Trinh looked at me and reread the sentence, I said I 
mentioned ' final and unconditional cessation, ' He reread the 
sentence again, I interi'upted for the third time- May I under- 
stand you are no longer speaking of final cessation. His answer 
was that publicly vre may continue to mention it but with a view 
to negotiations, VJliat I have said is our position- 

"l asked him whether the Government of Romania is authorized 
to pass this communication to the USG, He said yes. He repeated 
it but he said to retain spirit of the message/' 

Harriman said that the Trlnh public statement was m_uch the same as 
the M & I message J but tlaat the M & I statement placed more emphasis on 
the acceptance of the four points as a basis of negotiations, M said that 
he did not establish any connection between his visit to Washington, 
unknown to Hanoi^ and the Trlnh public statement. Harriman argued that 



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"there must be some connection," -M responded that he did not believe 
there T^as a contradiction between the two messages: 

"in the public statement it says the basis for negotiations 
is the four {joints ^ but in private conversation they say we will 
come with this basis but the U.S. side, we expect , will come 
with its own point of view* They especially said this," 



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Harrliiian then questioned whether it was the DRV view that discussions 
P ■ ►ll be fl-uitful only if we accept their four points, M responded: 

"That is not the impression I gained from my discussions- 
They will coine with their claims but would have to negotiate on 
what the U,S. puts forth. They said this specifically-" 

■ 
With respect to the timing of discussions^ M said that Trinh stated 
there could be no contacts "as long as U.S, acts of war continue,.-* 
but as soon as bombing and other acts of aggression against North Viet- 
namese cease^ we are prepared to receive anybody,..*" Trinh added: "We 
shall consider these contacts as normal diplomatic activities. The 
American representative will be received by our diplomats at their suggestion." 

' Harrimaai questioned further on the timing^ specifically as to the 
meaning of "after a suitable length of time," Here, M retreated to the 
DRV text — "the appropriate and necessary period of time/^ M explained 
tMs as a period in which 

: "they will try to test (I don't know by what means) the 
sincerity of your intentions — your wish to have discussions, 
I could not deduce the period , but I do not think it wiU. be 
too long. If an understanding is reached that you stop, at a 
certain established period, discussions, not negotiations, 
will take pJ^ce." 

■1 

Harriman asked if the NLF had been mentioned,. M responded: "Once, 
by Dong-.*in connection with the program of the TILF and on their points 
which they would like to discuss at negotiations." M reported that there 
was no mention of involving the KI^ in discussions but that this may have 
been a slip. 



C Harriman specifically queried on the w:}J reaction to the San Antonio 

speech* M said that they would not give any assurances on 'no advantage' 
because "they believe it is a condition and consequently cannot be dis- 

L cussed," M and Hari^iman then argued about whether 'no advantage' was 
conditional, Harriman said: "The important thing is that they are on 
notice, that taking advantage could have serious consequences." Harriman 
^- repeated that there was a danger of talks breaking down "for physical 
\ reasons --be cause of difficulty in negotiations." Harriman said that "this 

^ is not a condition but a notice to Hanoi." 



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Harriinan asl^ed if the rJorth Vietnamese thoroughly understood the 
jjnplications of San Antonio- M said that he could not draw conclusions^ 
but 

"They have a political attitude towards it-^no preconditions — 
iDut if you met them and discussed it at your first contact you niay 
well find a solution which will not break down the military sit- 
uation. We must not forget that tlii'ough the other door the U.S. 
is pouring in men and supplies. Furthermore^ you only stop in 
the North and fighting and bombing in the South will go on/* 

In response to a q^uestion by Daniel Davidson > Special Assistant to 
Harriman, M said that the period after the bombing and before talks is 
the same as the period after the bombing and before contacts- 

M^ again responding to Davids on ^ said that it was only his impression 
that military matters could be discussed at the first contacts^ that Hanoi 
had said nothing to him on this matter. 

M concluded that: "We Rumanians believe they have done it — given you 
the sign you wanted." 

0x1 January 6 , there vjas another meeting by the Rumanians and Governor 
Harriman, with Secretary Rusk participating as well. This discussion was 
very geiieral and added only a few points to the substance of the preceding 
day. 

Secretary Rusk said that "some of ^anoi*s leadershij^ thirlc of talks 
as a mea.ns of stopping the bombing while the rest of the war gees on without 
limitation. This is not acceptable/^ He added that: "The problem on our 
side is that the principle o£ reciprocity is rather important to us." 

In a response to a Rusk truest ion j M said that Hanoi would favor "private 
discussions," M said that he had not discussed the secrecy issue in Hanoi. 
M addedj however^ that: 

"There is no doubt that at the present stage ^ the Vietnamese 
side wants ^contactsj kept confidential* But after the cessation 
of bombing a way in which future procedures are directed towards 
starting 'conversations proper' will depend on your discussions 
through a third party-" 

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M then read from a document: 

"As long as the US acts of war go on we camiot have 
any contacts with them. As soon as they cease .the bombings 
and discontinue the acts of aggression we shall be prepared 
to receive any person, even a representative of the United 
States, vrho may wish to make known to us the American point 
of view or to ^et informed on our viewpoint. V?e shall regard 
these future contacts as normal diplomatic activity- The 
American representa,tives will be received by our representa- 
tives at the former's suggestion." 

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"Secretary Husk and Governor Harriman met with Messrs 
Macovesu^ Iliescu and Bodgan from 12:^^5 p.m, - 1:15 P-^-* a,nd 
the Secretary gave Ma cove su two papers containing the 7 written 
parts and k oral points set forth below. At 5:15^7:15 p-m- 
Governor Harriman and Mr. Bundy met with the Romanians to 
explain further our drafts and to give them our French trans- 
lation of our written points. Harriman told Maeovesu we left 
it up to the latter 's judgment as to what part and how to 
convey our points in Hanoi, 

" U.S. Wr itten Points 

'^1. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam has corrimunicated to 
the United States Government this statement of the Democratic 
Eepublic of Vietnam position: 

'If the United States Government really wants dis- 
cussions with the Government of the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam it should first unconditionally cease bombing 
and any other acts of v^ar against the Democratic Eepublic 
of Vietnam- After the unconditional cessation of all 
bombing and of any other United States act of war against 
the Democz^atic Republic of Vietnam and at the end of an 
appropriate period of time the Government of the Dem.ocratic 
Republic of Vietnam will enter into serious discussions with 
the United States Government.' 

The United States Goverimient welcomes this statement. 

"2, VJe understand that Foreign Minister Trinh has stated that 
'as soon as' all bombing ceases ^ the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
'shaU be prepared to receive' a United States representative. The 
United States Government will be prepared to have its representative 
have contacts with a representative of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam as soon as all bombing ceases- (The United States Govern- 
ment believes that the first contacts should take place almost 
immediately, perhaps one or two days^ after the cessation of bombing.) 
The purpose of these contacts, which might be in Vientiane > Rangoon ^ 
Bucharest, or some other suitable third-country location^, would be 
to fix the time and place of the serious discussions referred to by 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Ai^rangemjent of the necessary 
modalities for the serious discussions should take no more than a 
few days, j 

"3, The United States Government takes note of the fact that 
a cessation of aerial and naval bombardment is easily verifiable. 
In fact, the act of cessation would be observed immediately inter- 
nationally and become a matter of public kno^'^ledge and specuJ.ation, ' 
In these circumstances, the United States Government believes that ^ 

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the 'serious discussions' referred to by the Democratic Republic 
of VietnajB should commence immediately on the conclusion of the 
arrangements tlirough the contacts. 



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I "^, Obviously it will be important at an appropriate time^ 

r: in connection with the serious discussions ^ to accommodate the 

interests of all parties directly concerned with the peace of 
Southeast Asia, One such means is -that the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam and the United States Government might suggest to the 
two co-chairmen, and possibly to the tlrt^ee Intez^national Control 
■ Commission members^ that they be available at the site chosen for 
the serious discussions in order to talk to all parties interested 
in the peace of Southeast Asia. This procedure could avoid the 
\^ i problems of a formal conference- 



"5- The United States Goyernment understands through repre- 
sentatives of the Romanian Government tliat the serious discussions 
contemplated by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would be without 
Imitation as to the matters to be raised by either side< The 
attitude of the United States Government toward peace in Southeast 
Asia continues to be reflected in" the lU points and in the Manila 
Com2nunlq.ue , 

"6- The United States Government draws attention to the 
statement of President Johjison in San Antonio on September 29 in 
which he said: 



'The United States Is willing to stop all aerial and 
naval bombardment of I^orth Viet -Nam when this will lead 
J. promptly to productive discussions. We^ of course, assume 

c that v.^hile discussions proceed^ DIorth Viet -Nam would not 

take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation. ' 



The aide memoire handed to the Romanian Goverrmient in IJovembeXy 19&7? 
which we understand was communicated to the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam in mid-December ;, explained this statement in the following 
language: 

'The President J in making his assumption that the North 
Vietnamese woxild not take advantage of the bombing cessation 
or limitation while discussions proceed, was not assuming 
North Viet -Nam would cut off entirely its support of its 
forces in the South while the armed struggle was continuing; 
at the same time the United States Government would feel if 
North Vietnam sought to take advantage of the bombing cessation 
or limitation to Increase its support of its forces in the 
South J to attack our forces from north of the Demilitarized 
Zone or to mount large-scale visible resupply efforts^ now 
impossible, it would not be acting in good faith.' 



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The United States Government wishes to confirm to the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnaj^i that this statement remains the position of 
the United States Goyernment. 

"7- "rhs United States GoYerninent would inform the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam in advance of the exact date of the cessation 
of aeria-1 and naval bomtiardnient in order to enable the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam to have its representative prepared to meet 
the reiDresentative of the United States Government - 

" U.S. ORAL POirJTS i 

III < I 

"(a) Tlie Romanian representative should be thanked for his 
efforts and told that we are confident that he has f^^lly and 
faithfully reported the positions of both sides in these matters, 
Vfc are grateful for this action and have confidence that he will 
continue to do so, 

"(b) He should understand that the first sentence of para- 
graph h in the written message is intended to refer to the Importance 
of the South Vietnajnese Government and other interested parties being 
present at the site of the discussions in order to play an appro- 
prlate role- 

''(c) The United States Government wishes to avoid any misunder- 
standing also with respect to any allegations which may be made 
concerning specific military actions by the United States Government 
against the Democratic Republic of Viet -Nam prior to cessation- 
In deference to the serious intent and sincere objectives of the 
mJ.ssion of the Romanian Government ^ the United States Government 
will refi-ain for a limited period of time fi^om bombing within five 
miles of the center of Hanoi or of Haiphong. This information is 
for the Romanian Government only. The United States Government 
states this as a fact and not as a commitment as to the future^ 
but the United States Government would not wish the Democratic 
Republic of Vlet-Nam to be informed of this fact for fear thatj, as 
in the past, it could be misinterpreted by them. 

"(d) The United States Government awaits with interest the 
report of the Romanians, after consulting Hanoi, on the foregoing 
written and oral points. 



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"(l) US Cessation 
1 , '1(a) Harriman stated that we ^pointed out* or 'took note' 



"lAiring the course of the January 11 , 12:15 and 5 = 15 discussions, 
clarification of the USG position was given as indicated under the 
several headings below: 



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that cessation would be public knowledge, but said 
j ifTe hadn't thought about a public announcement and 

P opined that ^^^e would simply stop* 

"(b) Bundy stated personally that we would probably 
, confirm an answer tp q^uestions that cessation was 
a high-level decision without amplification and 
Harriman agreed ^ adding that we would not mention 
a time limit or condition it. 



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"(2) First Contacts 

^'(a) Timing - Harriman said 'should take place' is merely 
our interpretation of *as soon as' and not an ulti- 
jsiatiim {^Des que' was actual French preposition used 
by DRV) . WAH underscored verb 'believes' as opposed 
to 'insists' in same sentence 'one or two days after 
cessation' • 

'Ihe maximum GOR can get us is that they will meet 
us in 2 or 5 days 'after cessation' - the more you 
can get of this the better but we are not asking for 
those x^recise answers,* 

^'(b) D u-ration - Harriman noted US opinion that modalities 
to be agreed on in contacts should not drag on more 
than a few days^ but invited DKV's different opinion 
on duration. 



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V ^^(3) 'Serious Discussions' 

"(a) Rusk noted it will be difficult to conduct them 

secretly J and if they are public many governments 
and parties -will feel entitled to participate. 
M^e could lose months'. Accordingly we suggest 

L'one such means' in the Para* k that the Co- Chairman 
and 3 ICC members send representatives to the loca- 
tion dnd 'any one else* could be there to discuss 
with the 2 or the 5 or with each other* Peking 
could be present. This procedure could avoid the 
problem of a formal conference- \Je don't anticipate 
a big meeting with 8, 12 or 15 present but the 2 or 5 
could put their heads together on the possibility of 
agreement, 

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"(b) Harriman assumed that 'all parties directly concerned' 

P ■ with peace in SEA' would include any socialist state 

L aiding DRV and SVIT and the TCC's on our side. He 

noted J since the DRV third point covered internal SVDT 

f affairs J that the 'US won't talk about anything 

^ [ ' specifically in SVN without a GVW rep being present.'' 




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GVN should have an opportunity to come into 
talks 'at an early point', 'We donH want to 

C. exclude anyone who has a legitimate right to be 
I ' present at an appropriate time . ' Our para 

f four proposal is 'complicated' and 'quite 

p open to their suggestions,* 



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''(c) NLF - Harriman no'ted validity of our 13th point 

that the VC 'would have no difficulty "being repre- 
sented and having their views presented, ' 



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"(d) O pen Age nda - Eundy said 'we would take very seri- 
ously* DRV confirmation of the wide open agenda of - 
'serious discussions,' Bundy and Harriman confiiraed 
J our view that both sides could discuss their bases 

I for peaces ours would be reflected in the 1^^ pts 

and Ptiras 25-29 of the Manila communiq^ue. We feel 
f . both sides should be prepared to negotiate. 

"(U) Bi>.teral US/PRV Discussions 

"(a) Rusk noted that at the location of the Co-Chairman 
and/or ICC members meeting 'any one else could*-* 
discuss, , -with each other- ' 

*'(b) Rusk said if talks became public^ as he^ thought 
they would 'both sides will have a serious tme' 
holding discussions (beyond contacts) without 
other, parties 'associated'. But 'this does not 
mean there cannot stiUL be bllaterals^ but we 
cannot have a situation where everyone else is 
excluded*' If Hanoi makes that suggestion 'we will 
look at it but it v^ill be difficult.' , 

"(c) Harriman: 'There are many things that we can 
talk to WI? about that relate to us and MM. ' 

"(5) 'Ko advantage' 

"(a) Macovescu said the spirit of our November 'promemoi^ia' 
had been given to Hanoi and he would repeat it there • ' 

"(b) Harriman. said the President used the 'no advantage' 
assximption to inform Hanoi what he would be assuming 
if he stopped bombing* Tlie US does not ask advance 
DRY agreement* 



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98130). 



'*(c) Harriman said ve coiild negotiate under better 
conditions if the level of hostilities were 
reduced. The DMZ would be the easiest place to 
deescalate- The GOR may have other suggestions. 

"(d) Amb. Bogdan said the Homanians understood 'no 
advantage' is 'not a condition but a warning/ 
and Harriman said the US was not requiring Hanoi 
to agree to any conditions in advance- 

"(6) Miscellaneous 

"(a) The GOR intends first to inform Hanoi ^ and then 
if they approve^ to convey the gis^^ of the dis- 
cussions with us to M0SCOV7 and Peking* We would 
be happy to have the Soviets informed. 

''(b) Macovesu said he left Washington, as he had left 
Hanoi 5 with the feeling that 'this is a new step 
towards a peaceful settlement-'" 

On January 12 ^ Ambassador Bunker was given a summary of PACKERS (State 



On January l^ j President Johnson sent a letter of appreciation for the 
Rumanian efforts to President Ceaucescu (State 98J+9O), 

*^^ January l8 j Macovescu^ Iliesco and Celack left Bucharest for Hanoi 
via Moscow and Peking. Ambassador Bogdan informed Harriman of this trip 
on the 18th, 

Also on January l8^ Ambassador Harriman informed Bogdan that the 
President's January 17 State of the Union remarks "confirmed the San 
Antonio formula." Harriman said; "The U.S. has not changed its position." 



*- On January 20 j Bunker gave Thieu a general suimation of U.S. probes 

I of the December 29 Trinh statement — without revealing the PACKERS channel 

(Saigon I65OI). Bunker did so in accord vath his request (Saigon I6081) 
and cable of instruction (State SSQ^Z) ^ Bunker was permitted to tell Thleu 

Lthe ejcplanation of 'no advantage' as given by Governor Harriman to the 
Riimanians, In his talk with Th3.eu he made "a distinction between the 
contacts to explore Hanois position and possibly to set up any 'serious 
p discussions' and the discussions themselves." He assured Thieu that "any 
\ further decision will be a matter of full consultation with you and v/lth 

our Manila allies." Thieu expressed no reservations, about the U,S* approach 

r Thieu expressed the view that the Trinh statement was good propaganda by 
Hanoi. Bunker had urged permission to speak to Thieu on the basis of Bui 
Diem's "implication that U.S. -Hanoi contacts to bring about a negotiation 
would be tolerable "Bo the GW^ provided /rhieuJ ^^^s kept informed of them 

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and giren an opportunity to express his views before a raijidly movliig 
sitxiation becomes a fait accompli ." 

^ J8>nu ary gg ^ Macovescu et al arrived in Hanoi. The U.S, was not 
informed of the results of his visit until February 12. 

On February 12 j Ambassador llarriman was informed of the results of 
the GOS visit to Hajioi by Ambassador Bogdaja. Bogdan reported that Macovescu 
had been in Hanoi from January 22nd to the 28th ^ and Macoyescu talked 
n^inly with Dong and Trinh, 

The GDRV asserted to Macoyescu that "it did not consider the proposals 
of the USG an answer to the Trinh declaration of 29 December^ and that 
San Antonio conditions remain. " 

At this pointy Bogdan dictated the following j^ssage; 

"The position of the Vietnamese people and of the Govern- 
ment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is very clear - 
There are the four points of the Government of the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnaja and the political program of the National 
Liberation Eront of South Vietnam, This is the basis for the 
solution (reglementation) of the Vietnamece problem. We 
stated clearly: if in actuality the United States Government 
desires conversations ^ as it says it does^ it must in the first 
place stop unconditionally the bombardment and all other acts 
of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. After a 
convenient period of time^ following the unconditional cessation 
of bombardment and all other Ajnerican acts of war against the 
Democratic Republic of Vietn8>m^ the Democratic Republic of Viet- 
nam will start conversations with the United States of America 
on the q.uestions of interest to the two parties /The Ambassador -- 
understands this to mean the interest of either side^ not Sl Common 
interest/* Tiie convenient period of time is the time necessai*y 
to prove that the United States has really and without conditions 
stopped bombardment and all other acts of war against the Demo- 
cratic Republic of Vietnam, After the unconditional cessation of 
the bombardment and all other acts of war against the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam a meeting will take place between the two sides 
to reach an agreement on the place ^ the levels and the contents of 
the conversation. The right position and the correct attitude of 
the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam have been 
warmly welcomed and supported by the peoples of the world. Tlie 
attitude of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is serious. If the !- 
conversations are leading or not to results ^ this depends on the I 
United States.'' I 

Bogdan added that the GOR was ready to transmit communications to 
either side and that when Ambassador Davis returns to Bucharest he could 
^ ^ obtain further details from M, Bogdan said that M was in Peking on 

. . January 31 and informed the Chinese Government of the various positions, ■ 

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The Chinese repeated that "it was up to North Vietnam^" 
would soon be fully informed as well. 



Ee said that Moscow 



Governor Harrimaa took note of the continued threat to U.S. forces in 
the DMZ area and said that ''his unofficial reaction is that Hanoi does not 
wish talks, ..." 

On February 2^1 j Ajafoassador Davis spoke to M (State 117922), M told 
D. -is that after his discussions in V^ashington^ Hanoi quickly responded to 
his travel request to Hanoi. M noted that when he reached Hanoi there was 
no U.S. bombing^ but in accord with U,S, wishes he said nothing about this 
U.'^* decision to the North Vietnamese- 



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M conveyed to Trinh the GOR belief that "minimum of conditions now 
created to take stride fonvard on road to negotiations-" 



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KILLY 

ITALIOH - NORTH VIETNAI^IEJSE TRACK, KEBRUAHY -MRCH. I968 

V 

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The following account of Italian-North Vietnamese contacts was 
given on February 2hy I968 (ROM kh^^) . 

January or February, 196? 

Fanfani stated that he had been asked through a channel v.^hich he did 
not reveal whether he vas prepared to receive an unidentified I^orth Viet- 
namese. Secretary Rusk was informed and suggested that Fanfani first 
find out who the contact was and what authority he would have- Fanfani 
asked these questions ^ they were never answered ^ and he heard nothing 
further from this contact. 



July or August lg67 

Fanfani was asked by a different contact (also unspecified) whether 
he would be interested in sending d'Orlandi to get in touch with tlie Ifcrth 
Vietnajnese Ambassador in Erague. The unspecified contact was a\'?'are of the 
January contact- Fanfani said that there was no doubt that the initiative 
for the Pi^ague meeting came from Hanoi, 

September $, 19^7 - First Meetin g 

On instructions from Fanfani^ D'Orlandi flew to Pi^ague and met with 
North Vietnamese Ambassador Su- D'Orlandi asked Su why he had sought this 
meeting J but did not receive an answer- Su did say that he was aware of 
d'Orlandi's role in MRIGOLD. D'Orlandi advised Su that Hanoi should move 
rapidly to seize the opportunity of a trip Fanfani vrould make to Washington 
in mid-September and authorise Fanfani to transmit something new- D'Orlandi 
specifically req^uested that Hanoi set a period after the stopping of the 
bombing for the first contact with the U,S. D'Orlandi told Su that Fanfani 
i^ould carry weight in Washington if he could present a time and place for 
the meeting between the DRV and the U,S* Su replied that he would be unable 
to obtain instructions fl'om Hanoi prior to the Fanfani trip to V7ashington. 

Early November j 196? - Second Meeting 

After a delay of more than 50 days^ d'Orlandi returned to Prague and 
said to Su that he was entitled to a reply to his suggestions of September » 
Su said that the matter v^as being considered in Hanoi ^ but that he had not 
received a reply. D'Orlandi again stressed the importance of the need for 
Hanoi to set a tme and place for negotiations after the cessation of U.S, 
bombing, Su said everytime Hanoi produced something in favor of negotiations 
the Americans backed out and showed bad faith, D'Orlandi stressed to Su a 



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favorite theme of some substantive agreements prior to the first face- 
to-face contacts bet^men Hanoi and Washington. He said the Italians vjould 
be glad to transmit such issues between the two parties. Su said that 
he ?might soon be going back to Hanoi, 

Su stated that if d*Orlandi's trips to Prague became known the Horth 
Vietnamese would deny everything. Su also asked d'Orlandi not to get in 
toTch with the DRV Prague Embassy unless it was most urgent because he would 
hi. leaving for Hanoi within a week, Su would contact d'Orlandi the moment he 
returned to Prague. '' 

* 

Ja-iuary, I968 - _ Thi rd Mee ting 



[ 

^ D'Orlandi flew to Prague- Su said there was general approval in Hanoi 
I p of the idea of starting negotiations < Su said that he had been authorized 
j to talk to Fanfani. It was arranged that Su would come to Rome on February k 



February 17, 1968 



^ 



State sent out to Eom^e some follow-up comments of Fanfani's which had 
been transmitted to Secretary Husk by Ortona on February I6. There were 
two main points: (a) That the Italiazis do not have the ^'impression" that 
San Antonio has been substantially rejected- They do believe ;» hov;everj that 
although reciprocity is xmacceptable to Hanoi ^ Hanoi might consider some 
! "concession" J and (b) That a direct U.S.-JWN meeting was unlikely but that 
" Hanoi may be interested in preliminary soundings and direct channel^ possibly 

the Italians- 

r 

^ The cable also noted the Washington Post story j date of Februa,ry 16^ 

dateline Rome-, which went into considerable detail on Italian- North Vietnamese 
conversations. 



State also indicated reserve with respect to this track. 

The Killy slug began with this cable - 

(State II738U) 

Daniel Davidson , Special Assistant to Governor Harriman^ was dispatched 
to Rome to arrive on February 20- (State II7385) 

February 18, I968 

D'Orlandi was told that Su could receive him in J^^ague on the 21st. 
D'Orlandi told Fanfani that he was expected in Hanoi on the 21st and Fanfani 
expected him to defer his trip. Su had been expecting d'Orlandi for several 
days J and d'Orlandi had not given him any reason for the delay. 



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Februa r y £3? 1968 

Davidson and Melojr met with d'Orlandi and Fanfani* Fanfani, in 
translating his notes from Italian to English, repeatedly Biade a more 
positive translation than was warranted by the Italian- - 

"Major points in his notes were: 

"(a) Su (N^/H Ambassador to Prague) described IffiF as the 
representative of a great number of Southeimers , j 

"(b) Su flatly rejected reciprocity but suggested that 
when contacts had been established after cessation of bombing^ 
North Vietnamese could certainly take favorable measux^es and 
might also suggest some act bf good will to the NLP, Fanfani 
asked if among those measirres Hanoi was thinking of humanitarian 
measures such as liberation of H-fs and received an affirmative 
reply* Fanfani suggested j as example ^ that it would be useful 
in order to ijuprove atmosphere for Hanoi either before or on 
first day of the meetings to free PI*,^s against previously agreed 
upon concessions on part of United States- Su replied that he 
agreed but was not authorized to answer- He did say that much 
will depend on attitude of US representatives at first encounter. 



"(C) It is very apparent from notes that each time I^IAJRIGOLD 
-1 ten points were mentioned, they were dragged in from deep left 

field by Fanfani. For example, initial reference to them came 
when Fanfani rem^arked that freedom of South Yiet-Nam and non- 
intervention which North Vietnamese said should be part of settle- 
ment appeared already in the ten points 'of Trij^rtite Agreement 
of Saigon, ' Fanfani asked whether Su meant to refer to those 
understandings and Su replied that the ten points had been bypassed 

Lby events but perhaps they can be referred to in broad outline. 
The only other reference to I-'IAEIGOLD occui-red when Fanfani recalled 
that the 'three negotiators' to get around problem of reciprocity 

r accepted Fnase A-Hiase B formula- Su replied that he was not 

authorised to discuss Tripartite contacts or cui'rent validity of the 
ten points but that he would submit the question to Hanoi, 

■ 

L"(d) Fanfani pressed Su extremely hard for the specific number 
of days (e-g. t^fo days) between cessation of bombing and initiation 
of a dialogue between Hanoi and US. He said that it would certainly 

Lease his task of assuring V/ashington that Hanoi really wanted to 
establish contact with it if he was given an answer. Su said he 
understood perfectly, would submit the question to Hanoi and might 
be in position to give an answer to d'Orlandi at his next meeting. 
j Fanfani Insisted on at least being assured that a specific period 

already existed in Hanoi's mind. Su spoke very slowly in reply 
/' and d*Orlandi is cex'tain .that following is verbatim record. 'We 

r agree for Foreign Minister Fanfani to let it be known in comjnunica- 

i_ ' tions he will make to the Government of the United States that in 



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case of unconditional cessation of the bombing, the delay of 
"X" days already exists for a first meeting of representatives 
of the two parties, Hanoi and Washington, with a view to 
establish contacts for serious conversation on q,uestions con- 
cerning the two parties <' 



j^ "(e) Faxifani told Worth Vietnamese that they had not been 

forthcoming enough to put Vfeshington under an obligation to 
reply. Panfani asked to be put in a position to tell Washington 

\ something about the date> place^ and subject of the meeting* Su 

*^ was unresponsive - 

r^^(F) Fanfani asked \^hether Hanoi was attempting contacts 
tlirough other channels or had already established a direct 
channel to Washington* Su excluded this possibility, Fanfani 
r commented that he was astonished at flat statement that Hanoi 

||^ had no contacts with Washington. Su again gave categorical denial, 

I He said there were no direct contacts and although Hanoi often 

L received visitors they were not q^ualified nor in the least author- 

ized to talk on behalf of the US Government. 

"(g) IJ"orth Vietnamese had suggested communig^ue but did not 
push idea very hard. Their apparent motive was to demonstrate 
that they were in fact duly authorized representatives of Hanoi 
and therefore in a position to release communique- VJhen Fanfani 
pointed out obvious detriiiiental effects of publicity^ particu- 
j larly predictable reaction of USG, Su quickly backed off. 

"(H) Points H to J come from notes d'Orlandi made after 
\ informal discussion during which no notes were to be kept. The 

^ North Vietnamese took copious notes any^/fay. (This portion of the 

notes was not read to North Vietnamese.) Both parties felt that 
r problem of guaranteeing an agreem.ent was increasing to decisive 

[_ iiflportance. Su seemed to categorically exclude the UN as a 

guaranteeing agency and Fanfani and Su agreed that the ICC was 

not in position to guarantee anything. 



"(l) Fanfani asked* if there would be any objection if he 
informed Tran Van Do or even Thieu of fact that conversations 
f^ with an authorized representative of Hanoi had taken place* Su 

L stated he had no objections* 



^'(j) Su stated that declared and also real aim of Hanoi was 
to have absolutely free general elections* To insure liberty of 
vote, it was necessary to constitute a government with very broadly 
based participant ion excluding only 'war criminals' (undefined). 
There was discussion of various South Vietnamese personalities as 
possible members of a Government. Su would raise a name and 



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d'Orlandi would conoent, Su generally did not reveal his opinion 
but Ky was obviously unacceptable to him. 

"(k) Although not reflected in notes, conversation closed 
¥ith discussion of moda3-ities of next meeting, Su suggested 
that d'Orlandi come to Prague on February 21 but exact date was 
left undetermined. '^ 

Fanfani confirmed that there was no discussion of the San Antonio 
formula and that they were unaware of the Clifford explanation, Dayidson 
gave Fanfani the U,S, position as contained in State II7383. (ROIffi iiUl8 
Sections 1 & 2 of 2) ' 

Also J on February 23 ^ Davidson cabled some additional, points which 
he had made to Fanfani and d'Orlandi- Davidson said; 

^*The Important thing was that there must be no doubt in 
Hanoi's mind that it had coimnitted itself not to take advantage 
of a bombing cessation by such actions as increasing its infil- 
tration of munitions and supplies or attacking U.S. positions in 
the area of the DMZ." 



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.1 suggested that it might repeat might be sufficient 
if Hanoi stated that it recognised that during a period when 
the US was not bombing and v/hile talks wei*e continuing that 
such acts as attacks on US positions in the area of the DMZ^ 
massive terror against the cities such as the Tet campaign or 
increased infiltration, v/ould show bad faith on its part and that 
it;, of course^ would never do anything that smacked of bad faith. 
Hanoi could then discuss vath us at the first meeting more precise 
definition of actions which would constitute bad faith," 

Fanfani and d'Orlandi understood that this was "merely a verbal 
gimmick to permit Hanoi to accept all requirements of the 'not take 
advantage' formulation without having to actually promise 'not to take " 
advantage'." Fanfani said that if the U*S. appx^oves^ he will disi^itch 
d'Orlandi again to Prague. (ROME ifi|19) 

February 2k ^ I968 

Fanfani gave an exposition on the Italian motivation for Vietnam 
negotiations • He said that he was prepared to drop the matter entirely 
if the U.S. desired or if H^noi did not give evidence of seriousness. He 
warned of escalation^ and the conseauences of escalation on the policy of 
detente with the Soviet Union- He said that an intensification of the v/ar 
in Vietnam would help the communist vote in Italy, (ROI^ ^422) 



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Fetiruary; 2 6 ^ 196 8 

Bavidson cabled additional information on the February 22 meeting 
mth Fanfani and d'Orlandi. After he touched on "the terrible consequences" 
of the U, S, stopping bombing and being forced to resume because Hanoi 
took advantage J Fanfani remarked that "l had used almost exactly the 
same expressions in discussing that contingency as Su had used." According 
to Fanfani, "Su told him that if the bombing stopped and then were resumed 
it would be 'the end of the v^orld'*" 

Fanfani also discussed a coalition government-general elections Issue. 



C"ln thinking out loud of an ultimate solution j Fanfani 
discussed the 'hypothesis' of a government which v^ould be 
composed of elements of the existing government and other forces 
p . and would have the task of preparing for free general elections. 
l^ He said that the creation of such a government would avoid 

the problem of which elements are a majority or minority since 

Lthe task of the government would be technical. He recalled 
that it was a non^ elected Italian ^Government which successfully 
prepared the Italian elections of 19^6, Fanfani said he men- 
tioned this idea to the North Vietnamese and they didn't object 
to it, Su said that they thought they would win an election and 
that is why they want one. Fanfani mentioned that Su had asked 
d'Orlandi for his opinion of personalities who were clearly not 
rpt not part of the FtN. ' I asked d^Orlandi who they were and he 
said several professional men^ members of jast goverriment, 
religious personalities ^ all in allj some 20 or 25 names , Su 
P did not rpt not comment after d'Orlandi gave his frank evaluation 

I of each name except to say that Foreign Minister Do was a gentle- 

^ man and a man of international stature vfho had little internal 

influence, D'Orlandi said it was clear that the FLN was thinking 
r of a government that would include people who had not rpt not 

L fought with it but who were nonetheless patriots, I remarked 

that it sounded to me as if these other elements would be largely 
f* the Bogus Committees that were being set up in connection with the 

J Tet offensive- D'Orlandi said he thought I was mistaken." 

Su told Fanfani that he "didn't consider any of the Eastern European 
T channels as serious^'* and "Fanfani had specifically asked Su about P. M. 

L Maurer^ and the two North Vietnamese laughed as if to say that he could not 

rpt not conceivably be a serious channel/' Tliey also flatly ruled out the 

LUN and the ICC in bringing about negotiations or in guaranteeing a settle- 
ment. (ROME kkkO, Sections 1 & 2 of 3) 



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1 Davidson cabled urging continuation of this track. He argued that 

Italy was the first Western European nation to receive authorised repre- 
,%u ' sentatives of Hanoi ^ and that Su had authorised Fanfani to convey his 



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^ comments to the USG;, and that Su had again invited d'Orlandi to Prague 

(d^Orlandl had been e:5rpected there by Su since February 21). 

t Davidson said that the press leak on the North Vietnamese visit to 

Rome was by a communist newspaper and "it appears that the leak did not 
come from the Italian Government/^ Davidson was sympathetic to Fanfani's 
explanation that he had^ for political reasons^ to unilaterally release 
a statement to the press on the visit of the two North Vietnamese repre- 
sentatives to discuss a basis for starting negotiations. 



Davidson concluded that the U.S. had every reason to continue vith 
the track. He noted that there was a ^^danger of letting d'Orlandi go to 
^ Prague" in that "he might succeed and we might face prospect of negoti- 
«- ations at time when the political -military situation iiiakes negotiations 

undesirable*" He added: "However > if Hanoi now wishes to try to force 
r negotiations on USG^ it can create other situations at least as awta-mrd 
1^ as one that might result from telling d'Orlandi that it accepts essence 

of San Antonio •" (ROME kkhl) 



February £7^ 1968 



^ 



State agreed that "we should give a constructive response to the pro- 
posal that d'Orlandi make another visit to Prague as suggested by Ambassador 
Su-" State added: "However^ under existing circumstances j it would be 
unwise to suggest new formulations (as you propose para k Rome U^19) which 
might give Hanoi the idea that we were weakening on the San Antonio position-'^ 

State vrent on to issue guidance for the d'Orlandi«Su talk: 

"However J it appears to us that Hanoi is imdertaking a 
combined diplomatic and propaganda offensive rather than 
shovring a serious intention to negotiate in good faith at the 
moment. It would be useful for the Italians to try to dis- 
cover whether the North Vietnamese look upon contacts with the 
Italians as expressing a serious negotiating position or as part 
of a rather widespread exercise to impress a variety of govern- 
ments, 

"(c) As you suggest in lO-A Reftel M+^fl, it appears useful 
for d'Orlandi to visit Prague in order to tell Su: 

" (l) his statements have been communicated to the US 
and after careful analysis did not seem to US Government to be 
any more forthcoming than public statements of Hanoi. If Hanoi 
has any intention of conveying anything new^ Su should be 
req.uested to point it out. 



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definite on timing and particularly any statements Hanoi would 
be vrilling to BiPvke as to their intentions relating to the mill- 

t^' tary problem of 'no advantage-' D'Orlandi may draw on explanations 

you have provided him as to meaning of Ban Antonio formula. FYl 
' We have "been informed by French and through U Thant on information 

rhe received from French that negotiations would start immediately 
if we announced publicly unconditional cessation of boH^bing and 
other acts of war against INlh Therefore there is no value in 
making an issue of this point through Su. ERD FYI- 

L "(3) In addition*^ d'Orlandi might wish to point out to 

Su that since Hanoi had rejected San Antonio formula^ Americans had 

f^ asked number of questions. For example ^ does this mean that Hanoi 

l^ feels free to move men and supplies to the South as they did during 

the Xet truce last year? Would Hanoi feel free to move troops 

p to the BMZ area in positions to attack US forces south of the DMZ? 

j Would Hanoi consider it has the right to intensify artillery and 

other fire across the DMZ into US positions in South Viet-N"am? 

r"5- If the Italians express disappointment at the lack of 
detail in this message j please tell them that we are understandably 
cautious because of the major military operations now in progress 
f" or being planned by North Viet-Navm in the DMZ and the Laos Pan- 

handle* We cannot ignore Hanoi's actions on the ground in inter- 
preting what Hanoi's intentions may be/' 



(State 120937) 



MarchVj 1967 



Report on d'Orlandi-Su meeting. 



L D'Orlandi met with Meloy and Davidson to report on his March 1 

meeting in Prague with Ajiibassador Su. D*Orlandi asked Su if he were ready 
to answer the (Question concerning the period of delay between the stopping 
p^ of the bombing and the first U.S. -Hanoi meetings? Su responded rather 
II lojnely that he thought this contact had come to an end and^ therefore j he 

^ was not able to supply a precise answer- "He could state that the matter 

of a date wouJ.d be no problem, Hie real problem was San Antonio." 

r 

L, D Orlaiidi said that he had dictated to Su the first portion of the 

I Davidson MemCon of the February 28 meeting to the North Vietnamese ^ but 

r the North Vietnamese did not comment on this . 

I ' The most important point that Su made in these talks was with respect 

to "no advantage." Although he said he was speaking personally^ it is 
[ f highly doubtful that he vjould have said the following without specific 
L L., - instruct ions : 

p ". — D* Or land! then told Su that if bombing stopped and 

talks began J assaulting Khe Sanh, invading or trying to detach f 



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J the ti'/o northern provinces of South Viet-Nam> launching a second 

^ ifave of attacks against one or more cities or creating a sensa- 

tion with something else like an assault on Camp Carrolj would 
Csink the whole thing. Su replied thatj speaking personally and 
not on instructions J such thing would be out^ that from the 
moment the two sides meet it was obvious no such thing could 
;*- . happen, (l q^uestioned d'Orlandi about this remark of Su's and 

I d'Orlandi replied that while he took no notes he is certain this 

is the sense of what Su said*) D'Orlandi told Su that whatever 
he or Su thought of the effect of bombing^ it is a fact that 

Cthe US Government and US public opinion considers bombing of the 
Korth a most important weapon and that no President could give 
away such a weapon while something terrible was happening either 

Ein the DMZ or the South. Su did not respond to this comment* 
D'Orlandi also remarked that it might be necessary fc"^ him to go 
to Hanoi to receive assurances directly from the top and again Su 
did not reply," 



c 



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t 



L 



Su said that he will contact d^Orlandi when he receives a reply and 
arrange another meeting in Home or in Prague. 

(ROME h590) h 

March g, I968 

Davidson cabled another exchange with Fanfani and d'Orlandi* Referring 
to a Hanoi broadcast about the I^Torth Vietnamese visit to Rome **to discuss 
negotiations J " Fanfani argued that this was Hanoi's way of verifying that 
the Italian channel is the one it wishes to use. 



L Fanfani reviewed Su's statements about "no advantage/' and told exactly 

the same story as he had on the previous day. 



I ' [^ (ROME kSzk) 



[ 



March lU, 1958 



[ 



State cabled "a s]j.ght preference for Eragae as slt'e of next meeting." 
State 129885) 



f- March 16, 1968 

r 

(1*^ Lodge arrived in Rome to speak with the Italians. Toothing new was 

added to previous communications- 



[ 



r 



TS - NOBIS