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Full text of "The political aspects of S. Augustine's "City of God""

THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF 
S. AUGUSTINE S < CITY OF GOD 




BY THE SAME AUTHOR 



RELIGION AND ENGLISH SOCIETY. 8vo. 

CHURCHES IN THE MODERN STATE. 
Crown 8vo. 

THE GOSPEL AND HUMAN NEEDS. Being 
the Hulsean Lectures for 1908-9, with Ad 
ditions. Crown 8vo. 

HOPES FOR ENGLISH RELIGION. 
Crown 8vo. 

ANTICHRIST AND OTHER SERMONS. 
Crown 8vo. 

THE WILL TO FREEDOM : OR, THE GOSPEL 
OF NIETZSCHE AND THE GOSPEL OF 
CHRIST. Being the Bross Lectures delivered 
in the Lake Forest College, Illinois, 1915. 
Crown 8vo. 



SELECTIONS FROM THE CORRESPON 
DENCE OF THE FIRST LORD ACTON. 

Edited with an Introduction by JOHN NEVILLE 
FIGGIS, Litt.D., and REGINALD VERE LAUR 
ENCE, M.A. Vol. I.: Correspondence with 
Cardinal Newman, Lady Blennerhassett, 
W. E. Gladstone, and others. 8vo. 



LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. 

LONDON NEW YORK BOMBAY 
CALCUTTA AND MADRAS 



THE POLITICAL ASPECTS 

OF S. AUGUSTINE S 

CITY OF GOD 



BY 

JOHN NEVILLE FIGGIS, Lirr.D. 

LATE OF THE COMMUNITY OF THE RESURRECTION 



LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. 
39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON, E.G. 4 

FOURTH AVENUE & SOTH STREET, NEW YORK 
BOMBAY, CALCUTTA, AND MADRAS 

IQ2I 




PREFACE 

THE delivery of these lectures was one of the last 
pieces of work that Neville Figgis was allowed to carry 
through. He prepared them for the press, leaving them 
in the form of lectures and preserving here and there 
the impress which the anxiety of war-crisis made upon 
them. In that form, therefore, they are published now. 
In place of the final revision which his failing health 
prevented him from making, another hand has tried 
unskilfully to supply what he would have done with 
skill, in order to carry out his wishes and make his last 
complete piece of work accessible to a wider public than 
those who heard the lectures delivered. 

MIRFIELD, A II Saints Day, 1920. 



CONTENTS 

I. GENERAL SCOPE OF THE DE CIVITATE DEI 
THE PHILOSO 
THE STATE . 



II. THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY ... 32 



5I 

IV. THE CHURCH ..... 68 

V. THE DE CIVITATE DEI IN THE MIDDLE AGES . 81 
VI. THE DE CIVITATE DEI IN LATER DAYS . . 101 

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... ng 

APPENDIX ...... I2C , 

NOTES ........ . 125 



Errata 

Page 77, line 12, for Geirke read Gierke 

89, ,, 2 from foot, for Canorum read Canonum 



THE POLITICAL ASPECTS 
OF S. AUGUSTINE S 
4 CITY OF GOD 

i 

GENERAL SCOPE OF THE DE CIVITATE DEI 

As Man amongst creatures and the Church amongst 
men and the Fathers in the Church, and S. Augustine 
amongst the Fathers, so amongst the many pretious volumes 
and in the rich storehouse of his workes, his bookes of the 
City of God have a speciall preheminence/ 

So W. Crashawe began the dedication which he prefixed 
in 1620 to the second edition of J. Healey s translation 
of the text and of the Commentary thereon of J. L. Vives. 
Vives had dedicated his Commentary to Henry VIII, 
dating from Louvain on July 7, 1522. 

This passage of Crashawe we might parallel from 
writers of almost every age ; and from some of widely 
different outlook. Bishop Otto of Freising, the uncle 
and historian of Frederic Barbarossa, sings in unison 
with Niceron, the collector of literary anecdotes in the 
seventeenth century. 

The greatness of the De Civitate Dei is not in dispute. 
No student of the fifth century can afford to overlook 
it. No one can understand the Middle Ages without 
taking it into account. What is true of historians is 
true no less of ecclesiastical politicians and reformers 



2 THE CITY OF GOD 

even down to a leader in the modern socialist movement 
like Sommerlad. 1 In his earlier days Count Hertling 
has written on the book, and he alluded to its principles 
in a recent speech. The book has been more widely 
read than any other of S. Augustine except the Con 
fessions/ It has had commentators from Coquaeus 
down to Scholz. For these reasons it might seem hardly 
a fitting topic for Pringle-Stewart lectures. One 
historian said to me on hearing of the Course : Is 
there anything new to say about that ? Yet another 
said, that the more he tried to comprehend the mind 
of the Middle Ages, the more was he convinced that 
it was necessary to understand S. Augustine. 

That understanding is not easy. There are those 
who are for treating S. Augustine as the typical example 
of the medieval temperament with its heights and depths, 
its glories and splendours of imagination, its dialectical 
ingenuity and its irrational superstitions. Others see 
in S. Augustine essentially a man of the antique world. 
They do not deny to him real influence upon later times. 
Who can ? But they are inclined to minimise this ; 
at least in matters of social and political importance. 
The former is the view of Dorner, still more of Feuerlein. 2 
It became a commonplace with scholars like Gierke and 
Ritschl, and in a less degree with Harnack. It is presented 
in an extreme form in a book, once well known, that 
came from America, the late Dr. A. V. G. Allen s Con 
tinuity of Christian Thought/ Hermann Reuter in 
his Augustinische Studien began a reaction. That 
book is of incalculable value for those who wish to com 
prehend S. Augustine. This reaction reached its limit 
in a book published during the war, by Troeltsch, Die 
christliche An tike und die Mittelalter/ Signs of this 
view are to be found in Dr. Carlyle s valuable work 
on Political Theory in the West although it is more 
through what he does not say than what he does, that 
we gather the views of the writer. Professor Dunning 



GENERAL SCOPE OF DE CIVITATE DEI 3 

in his History of Political Thought is even more 
significant in his omissions. 

Political thought and S. Augustine s influence there 
on are to be the topic of these lectures. That involves 
the whole subject of Church and State. So we are 
carried some way into theology. The De Civitate Dei 
is not a treatise on politics. It is a livre de circonstance 
concerned with apologetic. Most of S. Augustine s 
doctrine alike in theology and philosophy is embedded 
in it. We may regard it as an expansion of the Con 
fessions. The relation of true philosophy to scepticism, 
the idea of creation, the problem of time, the contribu 
tion of Platonism, more especially Neo-Platonism, the 
meaning of miracle and nature, the Incarnation as 
expressing the humility of God, the whole scheme of 
redemption, salvation by grace, long divagations into 
comparative mythology, all these might be made the 
subject of lectures on the De Civitate Dei, and that with 
out leaving the terrain occupied by the author. Another 
lecturer better equipped might give not six but twelve 
lectures concerning the philosophic and theological 
problems suggested by the De Civitate Dei, and not even 
mention those points which I hope to discuss. If that 
had been what was expected, you would not have done 
me the high honour of choosing me to lecture on this 
work. To begin with, a great Augustinian scholar, 
Canon T. A. Lacey, in the first course of Pringle-Stewart 
lectures discussed some of the more important of these 
matters, although without special reference to this book. 
You would not wish them discussed again by one 
who has neither Mr. Lacey s intimate knowledge of 
S. Augustine nor his alertness of critical judgment. So 
I shall limit myself to the political aspects of the book. 

The points which it offers to the student of political 
thought are not few, nor are they unimportant. The 
book has been treated as a philosophy of history finer 
than that of Hegel ; and again as the herald of all that 



4 THE CITY OF GOD 

is significant in the Scienza Nuova of Vico. Can such 
views be sustained ? Or is it the case that S. Augustine 
had no notion of a philosophy of history, that his views 
are self-contradictory, and that only a few passages 
throw more than a faint light on it. That question 
will form the topic of the second lecture. Did S. 
Augustine teach that the State is the organisation of 
sin, or did he believe in its God-given character, and 
desire its development ? Did he teach the political 
supremacy of the hierarchy, and, by implication, that 
of the Pope and the Inquisition ? Or was it of the 
Church as the Communio sanctorum that he was think 
ing ? Does his doctrine of individual election reduce 
to ruins all ecclesiastical theory ? These topics will 
occupy the third and fourth lectures. What was 
S. Augustine s influence on mediaeval life ? Was there 
something almost like a reception of Augustinianism, 
followed by a repudiation at the Renaissance ? Or 
was it that only slightly he affected political ideals in 
the Middle Ages ? Some see the whole controversy be 
tween Popes and Emperors implicit in the De Civitate 
Dei/ Others would trace it to causes quite different. 
What real change came about at the Reformation ? 
Did S. Augustine s social doctrine (apart from the 
theology of grace) lose all influence ? Or did men retain 
unimpaired the idea of the civitas Dei, as it had been 
developed ? These questions will occupy the last two 
lectures. 

To-day let me try to determine certain preliminary 
points. Let us get clear what is the nature and aim 
of the book. Much needs to be said which will seem 
trite to students. I would crave your pardon. These 
matters are needful for evidence of what will later be 
said. Besides, it is a less error to take too little for 
granted than too much. 

Like nearly all of S. Augustine s writings, the De 



GENERAL SCOPE OF DE CIVITATE DEI 5 

Civitate Dei is controversial. It is a pamphlet of large 
scale. Like S. Paul and unlike S. Thomas, Augustine 
wrote only under the pressure of immediate necessity. 
All his writings have an apologetic character. Most 
of them are coloured by his intensely rich personality. 
Trained in rhetoric, Augustine is never abstract or 
impersonal. Sometimes we regret this and the longueurs 
to which his skill in dialectic leads him. Theories abound 
in S. Augustine s works, but the last thing he is is 
a theorist, pure and simple. Augustine became a 
theologian, as he had become a philosopher, driven by 
practical needs. Adversaries might even argue that 
all his emphasis on the external, on the given quality 
of grace, was due to his own experiences just as Luther 
universalised his own inner life into the doctrine of 
justification by faith. We must see the place which 
these controversies, implied in the De Civitate/ occupied 
in S. Augustine s life. After his conversion, he spent 
the first years in assailing the doctrines of which he 
had been an adherent. We have the books Contra 
Academicos/ the Soliloquy and other writings against 
the Manichaeans. In these he is concerned with problems 
mainly speculative, the nature and origin of evil, the 
nature of belief, the possibility of certitude, the sig 
nificance of error, which at least is evidence of the 
personality of the man in error, and so forth. 

To these controversies succeeded his great conflict 
with the Donatists. When he was converted, Augustine 
did not become a merely intellectual adherent of Chris 
tianity. He became a member of a visible, active and 
world-wide Church ; and that in a day of storms. When 
Augustine came home to Africa, after his mother s 
death, he found the Church rent by schism, with the 
Catholics appearing as the weaker party, and the Donatists 
claiming almost a national position. Augustine was 
forced into the position of a champion of the Catholic 
Church. Consequently, more in regard to schism than 



6 THE CITY OF GOD 

to heresy, he developed the idea of the unity and uni 
versality of the Church. He thus marked a difference 
between himself and Greek theologians like Origen. 

Then came the sack of Rome by Alaric. Only in 
our own time can the shock of that world-catastrophe 
be paralleled in its effect on the imagination and thoughts 
of men. The eternity of Rome had been a presupposition 
of the common consciousness. But now the world 
seemed in ruins i.e. the world of imagination and 
mental comfort. Augustine saw that the taking of 
Rome had no great military significance/ In one 
sermon he bids his hearers be calm and recollect that 
Rome really means Romans and that the Roman 
name was not extinguished. The calamity gave its 
last chance to dying paganism. Rome had been a 
stronghold of the ancient worship, and was still largely 
pagan in feeling. Obvious then was its line of counter 
attack. This horror would not have been, had we 
stood by the ancient ways. The mad policy of the 
Emperors in prohibiting sacrifices to the gods has 
produced its inevitable nemesis. The sack of Rome 
is the judgment of Jove/ 

This was the position in which Augustine was placed, 
one somewhat resembling that of a modern Christian 
faced with the charge that Christianity is bankrupt 
because it did not prevent the war. To meet the charge 
Augustine wrote the De Civitate Dei/ He did not write 
it all at once. In the Retractations he admits that 
he was interrupted by the Pelagian controversy. That 
too leaves its traces upon this encyclopedia of his mind. 
Much of the book is but an expansion of Augustine s 
doctrine of grace applied on the scale of world history. 
That is another reason why the book is so hard. Augus 
tine had a discursive mind, and his training in rhetoric 
increased this tendency. He had no great powers of 
construction. The architectonics even of the Con 
fessions leave much to be desired a fact which is less 



GENERAL SCOPE OF DE CIVITATE DEI 7 

patent than it should be to many because they do not 
read the latter books. In his controversial writings he 
does not know when to stop ; nor does he trouble much 
about relevance. We can never understand S. Augus 
tine if we think of him as a system-maker. Systems 
may have come out of him, but before all else he is a 
personality. He is the meeting-place of two worlds. 
All that the training of that day in the West could give 
he knew little or no Greek he had. His mind was a 
mould into which the culture of the world was poured. 
This he had either to assimilate to Christianity, or to 
eliminate from himself. Sometimes he is inclined to 
do the latter. Hence his inconsistencies ; and in 
consequence many different people could justify them 
selves out of his writings. Augustine is not, as some 
think, a pure ascetic without interest in human life, 
careless of the goods of learning but sometimes he 
seems to be that. He is a rich, hot-blooded, highly com 
plex and introspective personality, passionately Christian, 
but exquisitely and delicately human, sensitive and 
courageous, looking with reverence on Rome, possessed, 
with Virgil and Cicero, of a Roman love of authority 
and law, and an African touch of earth, yet ever withal 
having the nostalgia of the infinite. Within Augustine 
there struggle two personalities, a mystic, who could 
forgo all forms, not only of outward but of inward 
mechanism, and fly straight the alone to the Alone 
with a champion of ecclesiastical order, resolute to 
secure the rights of the Church, and a statesman looking 
before and after. 

One constant temptation besets the historian of 
thought in every sphere. He is apt to suppose that 
his subjects are more consistent than they are ; to make 
logical wholes of scattered and often contradictory 
hints ; and sometimes even to rule out, as unauthentic, 
writings which have no other evidence against them 
than that of being hard to reconcile with others of the 



8 THE CITY OF GOD 

same author. In no case could this be a worse error 
than in that of S. Augustine ; in no part of S. Augustine 
could it be worse than in the De Civitate Dei. One 
student has said : It is not a book, it is journalism ; 
whenever S. Augustine had nothing else to do he sat 
down and wrote a bit of it. That may be fancy. But 
it is a fanciful way of conveying a truth. Let us then take 
the work right through, and give an account of it, not 
troubling about its logical consistency or the relevance 
of parts to the main idea. 

In the Retractations Augustine gave his own analy 
sis of it, though a very brief one. The first five books 
are a reply to those who say that the pagan gods are 
to be worshipped for the sake of earthly security and 
peace. The next five are a reply to the contention of 
the philosophic apologists that the worship of old Roman 
gods leads to the real good, eternal life. The pagans 
having been routed, Augustine turned to construction. 
This is divided into three parts. In Books XI-XIV we 
have the origin of the two cities, the Civitas Dei and the 
Civitas tenena ; in the next four he traces their course 
in time, and in the last four their consummation in 
eternity. 

Let us go through the work in further detail. In 
Book I, Augustine states that his object in writing is 
to rebut the charge that Christianity has ruined Rome. 
He shows that temporal felicity had not been the un 
varying condition for the city of Rome. Besides, the 
same gods had failed to protect Troy, or else -5neas 
would never have reached Italy. Even at the time of 
writing, Christianity, he claims, is having its effect, in 
getting better treatment for the vanquished. Pagans 
the very men who attack the Church go running to 
the churches to take sanctuary. There they are safe. 
Augustine does not claim that a complete acceptance 
of Christianity would guarantee the life of a nation 



GENERAL SCOPE OF DE CIVITATE DEI 9 

The laments over a toppling order, he will not meet by 
saying that a Christian commonwealth now or at any 
future date will be stable. What marks this book is 
the final repudiation of the old views, as much Jewish 
as pagan, that temporal felicity follows the service of 
the true God alike for the individual and the nation. 

The wicked, either man or nation, may flourish like 
a green bay tree, says S. Augustine, and often will. 
That will not advantage the wicked in the end, which 
is outside this life. But it will teach the good man 
humility and a due dependence on the eternal values. 
The world may be saved. But it will be saved on 
other-worldly lines. Hermann Reuter is right in saying 
that the whole world turns on the contrast between 
worldly and other-worldly motives. 3 

Augustine replies to the charge against the Christians 
by a doctrine concerning the nature of religion which 
makes the topic of temporal felicity irrelevant. This 
method was a revolution. Like most of S. Augustine s 
thought and some of Christian teaching it was neither 
entirely novel nor exclusively Christian. It rests on 
the philosophic conception of God as the summum 
bonum. IWhat is the chief end of man ? To glorify 
God and taenjpy Him for ever/ This may be a summary 
of the Christian ideal, but it includes within it the Neo- 
Platonist also and many others. Augustine was aware 
of this, and in the second part he will meet and refute 
the argument that eternal goods are to be won by the 
worship of the pagan- deities. Meanwhile he is occupied 
with those who complain of the evil wrought by Chris 
tianity. Against them he points out the luxury and 
corruption of Rome, all the ills predicted by Scipio if 
Carthage should be destroyed and Jeshurun wax fat 
with that lust of sovereignty which among all other 
sins of the world was most appropriate unto the Romans. 
He depicts the tragedies produced by the lust of power 
and describes the hideous sexualities current in the 



io THE CITY OF GOD 

theatre and in certain worships not yet discarded, 
despite all the Gothic peril. He concludes by sketching 
his plan to point out (i) the evils that befel Rome in 
early days ; (2) the uselessness, so proved, of the old gods 
even for temporal ends ; (3) their even greater useless- 
ness for eternal bliss. 

The second book is mainly concerned with the pro 
found moral gulf between paganism and Christianity. 
Therein Augustine makes lavish use of the De Repub- 
lica of Cicero. He describes in detail the decay of 
Roman manners during the last days of the Republic, 
glancing at the moral and political passions which preceded 
and provoked the Imperial regime. This book is designed 
to establish the now familiar thesis of the moral and 
political corruption produced by paganism, and concludes 
with an exhortation to the Romans to renounce it. 

Book III describes the miseries that ushered in and 
accompanied the triumphs of Rome. With these are 
contrasted the golden times of peace under King Numa 
and the wickedness of the attack on Alba Longa. Em 
phasis is thus laid on the miseries inherent in the pagan 
state as an expression of pagan ethics and religion. 

In Book IV Augustine lays down that justice is to 
be set before power, and that alike by nations and indi 
viduals. We come to the maxim on which so much 
more must be said : Remota justitia, quid regna nisi 
magna latrocinia. The Roman Empire he seems on the 
whole to have viewed as a just reward earned partly as 
the due of Roman virtue and partly in compensation 
for unjust attacks ; but he is not always consistent. 
He speaks of the lust of power of Ninus and the Assyrian 
Empire. Here we come in Chapters 3 and 15 to strongly 
anti-imperialist passages. Thence Augustine proceeds 
(C. u) to consider the more refined forms of paganism 
those which take the individual deities as names for the 
attributes of the one supreme God who was often inter 
preted pantheistically. He decides that Jove was at 



GENERAL SCOPE OF DE CIVITATE DEI n 

least no final organiser of victory for his children, and 
in that noteworthy passage (IV, 15) he argues in favour 
of a society of small States, little in quantity and peace 
ful in neighbourly agreement/ as against the aggre 
gations of empire. Once more he makes easy game of 
the puerilities of polytheism, and denounces its obscene 
festivals. Thence he passes to the more serious doctrine 
of Varro, for whom Augustine entertained the greatest 
respect. Acute and learned, with a prodigious memory, 
Varro is Augustine s main authority for mythology 
just as later on Vico, who knew Varro mainly through 
the De Civitate Dei/ is driven at every turn to appeal 
to him. Varro was a Theist or Pantheist of a kind, and 
like Augustine worshipped a Providence, the bestower 
of kingdoms, who grants his boons to bad no less than 
good, like a parent giving toys. The book concludes 
with the assertion that God is the giver of all kingdoms 
and the determiner of their end, and with illustrations 
drawn from the Jewish State. 

Book V enters into the problem of freedom and neces 
sity. Despite his strong predestinarian doctrine Augus-. 
tine was no believer in a blind fate any more than was 
Calvin. Empire, he holds, has been given to the Romans 
as the reward of certain terrestrial virtues. Great 
qualities of courage and self-sacrifice belong or did belong 
to Roman patriots. No pagan could be more eloquent 
than he is on their grandeur. He will even set them 
as an example for the citizens of the heavenly city. 
The argonauts of the ideal are bidden to emulate the 
zeal and sacrifice which Romans had shown for a cause 
so far inferior. The well-known passage from the sixth 
.ZEneid, excudent alii spirantia mollius aera, is used to 
illustrate Roman imperialism (V, 12). Augustine argues 
that ambition may be a vice, but that it acts in restraint 
of worse vices, cowardice and indolence. Even here 
the Christian martyr is superior. He despised earthly 
honours and endured worse torments. The Romans 



12 THE CITY OF GOD 

had not the true end of doing God s will. Hence they 
could have no eternal hope. Their relative goodness 
would have gone unrewarded, and God s justice there 
fore would for ever be assailable, had not an earthly 
sovereignty been their meed. That species of power is 
other in kind than the eternal joy of the children of God. 
Yet once more must Augustine assert that it is the 
true God who gave Rome her Empire and who presides 
over the origin and issue of all wars. There he antici 
pates the argument of Dante. Rhadagaisus, the Gothic 
king, whom they all know, forms a shining example of 
this divine supervision in his sudden and incalculable 
downfall. 

Following this passage is the famous Fiirsten-spiegel, 
the picture of a godly prince (V, 24). Somewhat to our 
surprise, Augustine chooses as an instance Constantine 
the Great. Maybe he knew less ill of him than we do. 
At least this choice shows how entirely Roman was 
Augustine. Theodosius the Great is then made the topic 
of a panegyric, for he grudged not to assist the labouring 
Church by all the wholesome laws which he promulgated 
against heretics. 

Augustine s first part concludes with Book V. He 
is now to be occupied in showing that paganism is wrong 
even as a method of approach to the True God. 

Vulgar paganism is now demolished. We pass in 
Book VI to the philosophic creeds. An interesting 
appreciation of Varro precedes an account of his book 
on Human and Divine Antiquities which indeed we 
know largely through the use Augustine makes of it. 
Varro divides religion into three stages, somewhat after 
the manner of Comte, There is (a) the mythical, followed 
by (b) the natural and (c) the civic. He prefers the 
second. Augustine tries to show the connexion between 
the two, and denies that paganism can be detached from 
its darker side. It is vain to worship pagan deities in 



GENERAL SCOPE OF DE CIVITATE DEI 13 

the hope of eternal bliss. Book VII carries the matter 
a little further, and argues -the inconsistency of Varro. 
Book VIII treats of the Platonic doctrine of God. This 
in the main Augustine accepts ; but he treats as futile 
the attempt to accommodate it with the worship of the 
pagan pantheon. Apuleius, the African representative 
of paganism, is discussed. We have vigorous words 
in abuse of magic. The heathen practice of apotheosis 
is contrasted with the honours given to the Christian 
martyr. This, he says, is high reverence, but in no 
sense do we treat the martyrs as gods. Book IX is 
concerned with a further condemnation of the doctrine 
of mediating spirits and demons. Thence Augustine 
passes to the doctrine of the One Mediator, and argues 
the possibility of the Incarnation. The Book shows* 
that the debate between the Christian apologist and 
his assailants is at bottom a conflict between two 
forms of mediation. 

Book X contains a further analysis of Plotinus, 
whose doctrine Augustine parallels with the Logos 
doctrine of S. John i. He contrasts the one sacrifice, 
once offered, with the offerings to idols ; and the 
Christian with the pagan miracles. In Chapter 25 
he argues that all good men in every age are saved, but 
saved through faith in Christ, e.g. the saints of the Old 
Testament. Then we have more argument for the 
Incarnation. Augustine sees the fundamental difficulty 
in Incarnation, a self-limitation of God which is all 
but intolerable. It is this doctrine of the humility of 
God at which imagination boggles. These proud fellows 
scorn to have God for their Master, because the Word 
became Flesh and dwelt among us/ 

The last words of Book X sum up the first part 
of the whole : 

In these ten books I have spoken by the good assist 
ance of God sufficient in sound judgments (though some 



14 THE CITY OF GOD 

expected more) against the impious contradictors that prefer 
their gods before the founder of the holy city, whereof we 
are to dispute. The first five of the ten opposed them that 
adored their gods for temporal respects ; the five later 
against those that adored them for the life to come. It 
remains now, according as we promised in the first book, 
to proceed in our discourse of the two cities that are con 
fused together in this world, and distinct in the other ; of 
whose original, progress, and consummation I now enter to 
dispute, evermore invoking the assistance of the Almighty/ 

Now at last in Book XI we get to the two cities. 
Augustine begins by proving that the universe and time 
began together. The City of God begins with the creation 
of light, i.e. with the angels ; and the other with the 
sin of Satan. The doctrine of the Trinity is expounded, 
and Augustine emphasises his view that evil is a defect 
of will, not of nature, once more attacking the Manichsean 
dualism. Let there be light signifies the creation 
of the angelic hierarchy. 

Book XII once more discusses the relations of the 
good and evil angels. Augustine meets and denies 
the doctrine of the longevity of the world, of the Anti 
podes, of an eternal recurrence. He goes on to the 
creation of man. Book XIII describes the fall, and 
its consequence in death. He combats the view that 
death was inevitable, not penal. In Book XIV we 
proceed to the ordinary doctrine of the irruption of 
grace. After dilating on the evils of sin, he describes 
the two cities more at large in Chapter 28. 

Two loves therefore have given original to these two 
cities self-love in contempt of God unto the earthly ; love 
of God in contempt of one s self to the heavenly. The first 
seeks the glory of men and the latter desires God only as 
the testimony of conscience, the greatest glory. That glories 
in itself, and this in God. That exalts itself in self-glory ; 
this says to God, " My glory, the lifter of my head." That 
boasts of the ambitious conquerors, led by the lust of 



GENERAL SCOPE OF DE CIVITATE DEI 15 

sovereignty : in this everyone serves the other in charity, 
both the rulers in counselling and the subjects in obeying. 
That loves worldly virtue in the potentates ; this says unto 
God, " I will love thee, O Lord, my strength." And the 
wise men of that follow either the good things of the body 
or mind or both, living according to the flesh, and such as 
might know God honoured him not as God, nor were thankful, 
but all were vain in their own imaginations, and their foolish 
heart was darkened ; for professing themselves to be wise 
that is, extolling themselves proudly in their own wisdom 
they became fools, changing the glory of the incorruptible 
God to the likeness of the image of a corruptible man and 
of birds and fourfooted beasts and serpents : for they were 
the people s guides or followers into all those idolatries, and 
served the creature more than the Creator, who is blessed 
for ever. But in this other the heavenly city, there is no 
wisdom of man, but only the piety that serves the true 
God, and expects a reward in the society of the holy angels 
and men, that God may be all in all. 

Book XV begins with the contrary course of the two 
cities in history. Cain built the first city ; not Abel, 
who was always a pilgrim. 

It is recorded of Cain that he built the city, but Abel 
was a pilgrim and built none. For the city of the saints 
is above, though it have citizens here upon earth, wherein 
it lives as a pilgrim until the time of the kingdom come, 
and then it gathers all the citizens together in the resurrec 
tion of the body and gives them a kingdom to reign in with 
their king for ever and ever. 

Chapter 4 describes the earthly city. Peace is the 
aim of its life. This it can win only by war. Cain s 
effort is compared with the building of Rome by Romulus, 
who also slew his brother. Once more he compares 
them in regard to Seth and Enos. 

In XV, 21 he sums it up : 

Thus the two cities are described to be seated, the one 
in worldly possession, the other in heavenly hopes, both 



16 THE CITY OF GOD 

coming out at the common gate of mortality, which was 
opened in Adam ; out of whose condemned race, as out of a 
putrefied lump, God elected some vessels of mercy and 
some of wrath ; giving due pains unto the one, and undue 
grace unto the other, that the citizens of God upon earth 
may take this lesson from the vessels of wrath, never to 
rely on their own election, but hope to call upon the name 
of the Lord : because the natural will which God made 
(but yet here the Unchangeable made it not changeless) may 
both decline from Him that is good and from all good to 
do evil, and that by freedom of will : and from evil also to 
do good, but that not without God s assistance. 

Book XVI goes on with the history. Augustine 
condemns in parentheses the idea of inhabitants at 
the Antipodes. The supreme type of the earthly city 
is the Tower of Babel. The course continues until the 
second period, that of Abraham, and the third, that 
of the Mosaic Law. From now onwards the city of 
God becomes represented for practical purposes by the 
Hebrew nation. Therefore it takes on some of the 
qualities of an earthly State. This gives occasion to 
S. Augustine to argue that all the promises of permanence 
in the Old Testament could not refer to the Jewish State 
but must have their fulfilment in that city eternal in 
the heavens. This is true in especial of all the promises 
to David (XVII, 16). He is led to argue that peace is 
no enduring condition on earth, but belongs of right 
only to the life beyond. 

In Book XVIII we get to the course of the civitas 
terrena, i.e. the whole topic of Vico. That is represented 
in the Assyrian monarchy ; but certain criticisms of 
Grecian myths and Egypt occur. We may cite here 
the vivid words of Vives on the following chapters : 

In this eighteenth book we were to pass many dark 
ways and oftentimes to feel for our passage, daring not fix 
one foot until we first groped where to place it, as one must 
do in dark and dangerous places., Here we cannot tarry all 



GENERAL SCOPE OF <DE CIVITATE DEI 17 

day at Rome, but must abroad into the world s farthest 
corner, into lineages long since lost, and countries worn 
quite out of memory ; pedigrees long ago laid in the depth 
of oblivion must we fetch out into the light like Cerberus, 
and spread them openly. We must into Assyria, that old 
monarchy scarcely once named by the Greeks ; and Sycionia, 
which the very princes thereof sought to suppress from 
memory themselves, debarring their very fathers from having 
their names set on their tombs, as Pausanias relateth ; and 
thence to Argos, which being held the most antique state 
of Greece is all enfolded in fables ; then Athens, whose 
nimble wits aiming all at their country s honour, have left 
truth sick at the heart, they have so cloyed it with eloquence 
and wrapped it up in cloudes. Nor is Augustine content 
with this, but here and there casteth in hard walnuts and 
almonds for us to crack, which puts us to shrewd trouble 
ere we can get out the kernel of truth, their shells are so 
thick. And then cometh the Latin gests, all hacked in 
pieces by the discord of authors. And thence to the 
Romans ; nor are the Greek wise men omitted. It is 
fruitless to complain lest some should think I do it cause 
less. And here and there the Hebrew, runneth like veins 
in the body, to show the full course of the Two Cities, the 
Heavenly and the Earthly. If any one travelling through 
those countries and learning his way of the cunningest 
should for all that miss his way sometimes, is not he pardon 
able ? If any pass through, will anyone think him less 
diligent in his travel ? None, I think. What then if chance 
or ignorance lead me astray out of the sight of divers mean 
villages that I should have gone by, my way lying through 
deserts and untracked woods and seldom, or never, finding 
any to ask the right way of. Am I not to be borne with ? 
I hope yes. Varro s Antiquities are all lost ; and the life of 
Rome. None but Eusebius helped me in Assyria, but that 
Diodorus Siculus and some others set me in once or twice. 
I had a book by me called Berosus by the booksellers, and 
somewhat I had of Joannes Annius, goodly matters truly, able 
to fright away the reader at first sight. But I let them lie still ; 
I love not to suck the dregs or fetch fables out of frivolous 
pamphlets, the very rackets wherewith Greece bandieth 
ignorant heads about. Had this work been a child of 
Berosus I had used it willingly ; but it looketh like a bastard 



18 THE CITY OF GOD 

of a Greek sire. ... If any man like such stuff, much good 
may it do him. I will be none of his rival. . . . Concern 
ing Athens, Rome, Argos, Latium, and the other fabulous 
subjects, the reader hath heard whatsoever my diversity of 
reading affordeth, and much from the most curious students 
therein that I could be acquainted withall. He that liketh 
not this thing, may find another, by and by, that will please 
his palate better, unless he be so proudly testy that he 
would have these my pains for the public good, of power to 
satisfy him only. The rest, the Commentaries themselves 
will tell you/ (On De Civitate, XVIII, i.) 

Prophecy comes in and the conflicts of philosophers. 
The rise and early progress of Christianity are now 
described. The Civitas Dei is beginning to be identified 
with the Church ; but Augustine emphasises the un 
certainty of its true membership owing to the scarcity 
of the elect. The book thus concludes the history on 
earth : 

Now it is time to set an end to this book, wherein, as 
far as need was, we have run along with the courses of the 
two cities in their confused progress, the one of which, the 
Babylon of the earth, has made her false gods of mortal 
men, serving them and sacrificing to them as she thought 
good ; but the other, the heavenly Jerusalem, she has stuck 
to the only and true God, and is his true and pure sacrifice 
herself. But both of these do feel one touch of good and evil 
fortune, but not with one faith, nor one hope, nor one law : 
and at length at the last judgment they shall be severed for 
ever, and either shall receive the endless reward of their 
works. Of these two ends we are now to discourse. 

Book XIX proceeds to the discussion with which 
we began, the thought of the summum bonum. Augustine 
says that this can be found only in the world beyond. 
After admitting that society is integral to human life, 
he points to some of its inevitable miseries on earth 
war, insecurity and becomes eloquent on the value of 
peace. 



GENERAL SCOPE OF DE CIVITATE DEI 19 

(C. n.) We may therefore say that peace is our final 
good, as we said of life eternal. Because the Psalm says 
unto that city, whereof we write this laborious work : " Praise 
the Lord, O Jerusalem, praise thy Lord, O Sion ; for He hath 
made fast the bars of thy gates and blessed thy children 
within thee ; He giveth peace in thy borders/ When the 
bars of the gates are fast, as none can come in, so none can 
go out. And therefore this peace which we call final is the 
borders and bounds of this city ; for the mystical name here 
of, Jerusalem, signifies a vision of peace. But because the 
name of peace is ordinary in this world where eternity is 
not resident, therefore we choose rather to call the bound, 
wherein the chief good of this city lies, " life eternal." . . 
The good of peace is generally the greatest wish of the 
world, and the most welcome when it comes. Whereof I 
think one may take leave of our reader, to have a word or 
two more, both because of the city s end, whereof we now 
speak, and of the sweetness of peace, which all men do 
love/ 

(C. 12.) Who will not confess this with me, who marks 
man s affairs and the general form of nature ? For joy 
and peace are desired alike of all men. The warrior would 
but conquer ; war s aim is nothing but glorious peace. 
What is victory but a suppression of resistants ; which 
being done, peace follows ? So that peace is war s purpose, 
the scope of all military discipline and the limit at which 
all just contentions level. All men seek peace by war, but 
none seek war by peace. For they that perturb the peace 
they live in, do it not for hate of it, but to show their power 
in alteration of it. They would not disannul it, but they 
would have it as they like ; and though they break into 
seditions from the rest, yet must they hold a peaceful force 
with their fellows that are engaged with them, or else they 
shall never effect what they intend. Even the thieves 
themselves, that molest all the world besides them, are at 
peace amongst themselves. . . . 

What tiger is there that does not purr over her young 
ones and fawn upon them in her tenderness ? What kite 
is there, though he fly solitarily about for his prey, but will 
seek his female, build his nest, sit his eggs, feed his young, 
and assist his mate in her motherly duty, all that in him 
lies ? Far stronger are the bands that bind man unto * 



20 THE CITY OF GOD 

society, and peace with all that are peaceable ; the worst 
men of all do fight for their fellows quietness and would 
(if it lay in their power) reduce all into a distinct form of 
state drawn by themselves, whereof they would be the 
heads, which could never be, but by a coherence either 
through fear or love. For herein is perverse pride an 
imitator of the goodness of God having equality of others 
with itself under Him, and laying a yoke of obedience upon 
its fellows, under itself instead of Him ; thus hates it the 
just peace of God, and builds an unjust one for itself. Yet 
can it not but love peace, for no vice however unnatural 
can pull nature up by the roots. . . . 

(C. 13.) The body s peace therefore is an orderly dis 
posal of the parts thereof ; the unreasonable soul s, a good 
temperature of the appetites thereof ; the reasonable soul s, 
a true harmony between the knowledge and the performance. 
That of body and soul alike, a temperate and undiseased 
habit of nature in the whole creature. The peace of mortal 
man with immortal God is an orderly obedience unto his 
eternal law, performed in faith. Peace of man and man is 
a mutual concord ; peace of a family, an orderly rule and 
subjection amongst the parts thereof ; peace of a city, an 
orderly command and obedience amongst the citizens ; 
peace of God s City, a most orderly coherence in God and 
fruition of God ; peace of all things is a well disposed order. . . . 

(C. 14.) All temporal things are referred unto the 
benefit of the peace which is resident in the terrestrial city, 
by the members thereof ; and unto the use of the eternal 
peace by the citizens of the heavenly society. . . . 

Now God, our good Master, teaching us in the two 
great commandments the love of Him, and the love of our 
neighbour, to love three things, God, our neighbours and 
ourselves, and seeing he that loves God offends not in loving 
himself it follows that he ought to counsel his neighbours 
to love God and to provide for him in the love of God, sur e 
he is commanded to love him as his own self. So must he 
do for his wife, children, family and all men besides, and 
wish likewise that his neighbour would do as much for him, 
in his need ; thus shall he be settled in peace and orderly 
concord with all the world. The order whereof is, first, to 
do no man hurt, and, secondly, to help all that he can. So 
that his own have the first place in his care and those his 



GENERAL SCOPE OF <DE CIVITATE DEI 21 

place and order in human society affords him more con- 
veniency to benefit. Whereupon S. Paul says : " He that 
provideth not for his own and, namely, for them that be 
of his household, denieth the faith and is worse than an 
infidel." For this is the foundation of domestic peace, 
which is an orderly rule and subjection in the parts of the 
family, wherein the provisors are the commanders, as the 
husband over his wife, parents over their children, and 
masters over their servants ; and they that are provided for 
obey, as the wives do their husbands, children their parents, 
and servants their masters. But in the family of the faith 
ful man, the heavenly pilgrim, there the commanders are 
indeed the servants of those they seem to command ; ruling 
not in ambition, but being bound by careful duty ; not in 
proud sovereignty but in nourishing pity/ 

(C. 15.) Thus has nature s order prevailed and man 
by God was thus created/ But sin ruled all. Sin is 
the mother of servitude and the first cause of man s 
subjection to man/ Dominion in the strict sense existed 
only between man and dumb animals. Yet for all that 
obedience is our duty ; and the family is ever a part 
of the city. 

In Chapter 17 we find the two ends described ; one 
is earthly peace alone, the other has its other-worldly 
reference. Yet this heavenly city has members in all 
earthly cities, gives them true peace and the heavenly 
hope. Augustine goes on discussing (Chapter 21) Cicero s 
definition of a republic in which justice is an integral 
element. On that hypothesis Rome never was a common 
wealth, since justice cannot be where the true God is 
not worshipped. But in Chapter 24 he gives another 
definition under which any stable state can be grouped. 
No true virtue exists apart from God, yet earthly peace 
is needed and must be used by the citizens of the heavenly 
state. 

Book XX is concerned with the Last Judgment. In 
Chapter 6 Augustine argues that the first resurrection 
has already taken place in the conversion of sinners to 



22 THE CITY OF GOD 

Christ. The millennial kingdom is not, as the Chiliasts 
say, a future reign of Christ in the world, but is the 
present kingdom of the Church. This is the binding of 
the devil. It began with the spread of the Church out 
side of Judaism. The thrones and they that sat upon 
them are the rulers of the Churches. The souls that 
reign with Christ a thousand years are the martyrs. 
The beast is the society of wicked man, opposed to the 
company of God s servants and fighting against His holy 
city. This society consists not only of open enemies 
but also of tares among the wheat. More apologetic 
discussion concludes the book. 

Book XXI is concerned with the pains of the lost. 
We have an interesting passage on the miseries of 
life. 

The last Book XXII gives an account of the felicity 
of the saved and the eternal bliss of the kingdom of God. 
Here apologetic follows concerning the Incarnation and 
the miraculous, in order to refute contemporary errors. 
After a description of the ills of life comes an eloquent 
passage on the goods of human life. Those passages 
form an interesting contrast : 

(C. 22.) Concerning man s first origin our present life 
(if such a miserable estate can be called a life) does suffi 
ciently prove that all his children were condemned in him. 
What else does that horrid gulf of ignorance confirm, whence 
all error has birth, and wherein all the sons of Adam are so 
deeply drenched, that none can be freed without toil, fear 
and sorrow ? What else does our love of vanities affirm, 
whence there arises such a tempest of cares, sorrows, repin- 
ings, fears, mad exultations, discords, altercations, wars, 
treasons, furies, hates, deceits, flatteries, thefts, rapines, 
perjuries, pride, ambition, envy, murder, parricide, cruelty, 
villainy, luxury, impudence, unchastity, fornications, adul 
teries, incests, several sorts of sins against nature (filthy 
even to be named), sacrilege, . . . false witnesses, false 
judgments, violence, robberies, and suchlike, out of my 
remembrance to reckon, but not excluded from the life of 



GENERAL SCOPE OF DE CIVITATE DEI 23 

man ? All these evils are belonging to man and arise out 
of the root of that error and perverse affection which every 
son of Adam brings into the world with him. 

Augustine points out that the discipline of children 
has no other meaning. What is the end of all these 
but to abolish ignorance and to bridle corruption both 
which we come wrapped into the world withal/ He 
goes on : 

To omit the pains that enforce children to learn the 
(scarcely useful) books that please their parents, how huge 
a band of pains attend the firmer state of man and be not 
peculiarly inflicted on the wicked, but generally impendent 
over us all, through our common estate in misery ! Who 
can recount them, who can conceive them ? What fears, 
what calamities does the loss of children, of goods or of 
credit, the false dealing of others, false suspicion, open 
violence and all other mischiefs inflicted by others, heap 
upon the heart of man ? Being generally accompanied with 
poverty, imprisonment, bands, punishments, tortures, loss of 
limbs or senses, prostitution to beastly lust, and other such 
horrid events ? So are we afflicted on the other side with 
chances ab externo, with cold, heat, storms, showers, deluges, 
lightnings, thunder, earthquakes, falls of houses, fury of 
beasts, poisons of airs, waters, plants and beasts of a thou 
sand sorts, stinging of serpents, biting of mad dogs, a strange 
accident wherein a beast most sociable and familiar with 
man shall sometimes become more to be feared than a lion 
or a dragon, infecting him whom he bites with such a furious 
madness, that he is to be feared by his family worse than 
any wild beast. What misery do navigators now and then 
endure ? Or travellers by land ? What man can walk 
anywhere free from sudden accidents ? One coming home 
from the court (being sound enough on his feet) fell down, 
broke his leg and died of it ; who would have thought this 
that had seen him sitting in the court ? Eli, the priest, 
fell from his chair where he sat, and broke his neck. What 
fears are husbandmen, yea all men, subject unto, that the 
fruits should be hurt by the heavens or earth or caterpillars 
or locusts or such pernicious things ! Yet when they have 



24 THE CITY OF GOD 

gathered them and laid them up they are secured. Not 
withstanding I have known granaries full of corn borne 
quite away with an inundation. 

And so forth. 

Augustine s tone may seem gloomy. But it must be 
borne in mind that the times were not bright. The 
reason of this book was the breaking up of the long 
centuries of Roman prosperity. As it neared its end, 
the storm burst even in Africa. Augustine s life was 
passed in a series of changes like those which divide the 
jubilees of Queen Victoria from the silver wedding of 
her grandson. It may indeed be argued that the habitual 
assumptions of Western civilisation both in Europe and 
America have been too optimistic ; that they assume 
peace and progress as natural and inevitable, and that 
the advance of physical science led to an altogether too 
favourable view of the reduction of pain in human life 
in a state of things rarely realised in history. It may 
be thought that the temper of Augustine, of the Middle 
Ages, and of the present, is more truly universal than 
that of the protected Roman Empire, of China, or of the 
Victorians. Anyhow we can parallel S. Augustine 
from writers in many ages, not only the Book of Job, 
but Richard Baxter, the author of a book curiously 
suggestive of the De Civitate Dei The Saints 
Everlasting Rest. In that incomparable style of the 
seventeenth century he declares : 

(VII,. 12.) Oh, the hourly dangers that we poor sinners here 
below walk in ! Every sense is a snare, every member a snare, 
every creature a snare, every mercy a snare, and every duty 
a snare to us. We can scarce open our eyes but we are in 
danger ; if we behold those above us, we are in danger of 
envy ; if those below us, we are in danger of contempt ; if 
we see sumptuous buildings, pleasant habitations, honour 
and riches, we are in danger to be drawn away with covetous 
desires ; if the rags and beggary of others, we are in danger 



GENERAL SCOPE OF <DE CIVITATE DEI 25 

of self-applauding thoughts and unmercifulness. If we see 
beauty, it is a bait to lust ; if deformity, to loathing and 
disdain. 

(VII, 15.) The Church on earth is a mere hospital ; 
which way ever we go we hear complaining ; and into what 
corner soever we cast our eyes we behold objects of pity and 
grief ; some groaning under a dark understanding, some 
under a senseless heart, some languishing under unfruitful 
weakness, and some bleeding for miscarriages and wilful- 
ness, and some in such a lethargy that they are past com 
plaining ; some crying out of their pining poverty ; some 
groaning under pains and infirmities ; and some bewailing a 
whole catalogue of calamities, especially in days of common 
sufferings when nothing appears to our sight but ruin ; 
families ruined ; congregations ruined ; sumptuous structures 
ruined ; cities ruined ; country ruined ; court ruined ; king 
dom ruined ; who weeps not, when all these bleed ? 

(VII, 16.) Oh, the dying life that we now live ; as full 
of suffering as of days and hours ! We are the carcasses 
that all calamities prey upon ; as various as they are, each 
one will have a snatch at us, and be sure to devour a morsel 
of our comfort. ... As all our senses are the inlets of sin, 
so they are become the inlets of our sorrow. Grief creeps 
in at our eyes, at our ears, and almost everywhere ; it seizes 
upon our heads, our hearts, our flesh, our spirits, and what 
part doth escape it ? Fears do devour us and darken our 
delights, as the frosts do nip the tender buds : cares do 
consume us and feed upon our spirits, as the scorching sun 
doth wither the delicate flowers. Or, if any saint or stoic 
have fortified his inwards against these, yet is he naked still 
without ; and if he be wiser than to create his own sorrows, 
yet shall he be sure to feel his share, he shall produce them 
as the meritorious, if not as the efficient, cause. What 
tender pieces are these dusty bodies ! What brittle glasses 
do we bear about us ; and how many thousand dangers are 
they hurried through ; and how hardly cured, if once cracked ! 
Oh, the multitudes of slender veins, of tender membranes, 
nerves, fibres, muscles, arteries, and all subject to obstruc 
tions, exesions, tensions, contractions, resolutions, every one 
a fit subject for pain, and fit to communicate that pain to 
the whole ; what noble part is there that suffereth its pain 
or ruin alone ? 



26 THE CITY OF GOD 

But Augustine does not stop at this. The Puritan 
ideal with its extreme of otherworldliness could see little 
good in the natural and relative. Not so Augustine. 
In Chapter 24 he almost outdoes his previously cited 
passage in his anxiety to show the reality of earthly 
goods goods distinct from the life of grace. 

Besides the disciplines of good behaviour and the ways 
to eternal happiness (which are called virtues), and besides 
the grace of God which is in Jesus Christ, imparted only to 
the sons of the promise, man s invention has brought forth 
so many and such rare sciences and arts (partly necessary 
and partly voluntary), that the excellency of his capacity 
makes the rare goodness of his creation apparent, even then 
when he goes about things that are either superfluous or 
pernicious, and shows from what an excellent gift he has 
those his inventions and practices. What variety has man 
found out in buildings, attires, husbandry, navigations, 
sculpture, and imagery ! What perfection has he shown in 
the shows of theatres, in taming, killing and catching wild 
beasts ! What millions of inventions has he against others 
and for himself in poisons, arms, engines, stratagems and 
suchlike ! What thousands of medicines for the health, of 
meats for the throat, of means and figures to persuade, of 
eloquent phrases to delight, of verses for pleasure, of musical 
inventions and instruments ! How excellent inventions are 
geography, arithmetic, astrology and the rest ! How large 
is the capacity of man, if we should stand upon particulars ! 
Lastly, how cunningly and with what exquisite wit have the 
philosophers and the heretics defended their very errors, 
it is strange to imagine. For here we speak of the nature of 
man s soul in general, as man is mortal, without any refer 
ence to the way of truth whereby he comes to the life 
eternal. 

After dilating on the marvels of the human body, he 
goes on to natural beauty. 

And then for the beauty and use of other creatures, 
which God has set before the eyes of man (though as yet 
miserable and amongst miseries), what man is liable to 



GENERAL SCOPE OF <DE CIVITATE DEI 27 

recount them ? The universal gracefulness of the heavens, 
the earth and the sea, the brightness of the light in the 
sun, moon and stars, the shades of the woods, the colours 
and smells of flowers, the numbers of birds and their varied 
hues and songs, the many forms of beasts and fishes whereof 
the least are the rarest (for the fabric of the bee or the ant 
is more to be wondered at than the whales), and the strange 
alterations in the colour of the sea (as being in several gar 
ments), now one green, then another, now blue, then purple ? 
How pleasing a sight sometimes it is to see it rough, and 
how more pleasing when it is calm ! And O what a hand 
is that, that gives so many meats to assuage hunger ! So 
many tastes to those meats (without help of cook), and so 
many medicinal powers to those tastes ! How delightful is 
the interchange of day and night ! the temperateness of air 
and the works of nature in the barks of trees and skins of 
beasts ! Oh, who can draw the particulars ? How tedious 
should I be in every peculiar of these few that I have here 
as it were heaped together, if I should stay upon them one 
by one ! Yet are all these but solaces of men s miseries, no 
way pertinent to his glories. 

What then are they that his bliss shall give him, if 
that his misery has such blessings as these ? What will 
God give them whom He has predestinated unto life, having 
given such great things even to them whom He has pre 
destinated unto death ? What will He give them in His 
kingdom, for whom He sent His only Son to suffer all injuries 
even unto death upon earth ? Whereupon S. Paul says 
unto them : " He who spared not His own Son, but gave 
Him for us all unto death, how shall He not with Him give 
us all things also ? " When this promise is fulfilled, O 
what shall we be then ? How glorious shall the soul of 
man be without all stain and sin, that can either subdue or 
oppose it, or against which it need to contend : perfect in 
all virtue and enthroned in all perfection of peace ! 

How great, how delightful, how true shall our know 
ledge of all things be there, without all error, without all 
labour, where we shall drink at the spring-head of God s 
sapience, without all difficulty and in all felicity ! How 
perfect shall our bodies be, being wholly subject unto their 
spirits, and thereby sufficiently quickened and nourished 
without any other sustenance, for they shall now be no more 



28 THE CITY OF GOD 

natural, but spiritual ; they shall have the substance of 
flesh quite exempt from all fleshly corruption. 

In Chapter 25 he points out that as touching the 
good things of the mind which the blessed shall enjoy 
after this life, the philosophers and we are both of one 
mind. Our difference is concerning the resurrection/ 
which he proceeds to argue. Of Porphyry, who has on 
the whole his deepest reverence, of Plato and Varro, 
Augustine speaks here, as always, in terms of honour, 
almost love. In the last chapter he enlarges on the 
visio pads and the eternal felicity of the city of God. 
It is interesting as well as eloquent, for it brings out 
the human and non-abstract quality of Augustine s 
theology : 

(C- 35-) How great shall that felicity be, where there 
shall be no evil thing, where no good thing shall lie hidden ; 
there we shall have leisure to utter forth the praises of God, 
which shall be all things in all ! For what other thing is 
done, where we shall not rest with any slothfulness, nor 
labour for any want, I know not. . . . What the motions 
of those bodies shall be there I dare not rashly define, 
when I am not able to dive into the depth of that mystery. 
Nevertheless both the motion and the state, as the form of 
them, shall be comely and decent, whatsoever it shall be, 
where there shall be nothing which shall not be comely. 
Truly, where the spirit will, there forthwith shall the body 
be ; neither will the spirit will anything, which may not 
beseem the body nor the spirit. There shall be true glory, 
where no man shall be praised for error or flattery. . . . 
There is true peace, where no man suffers anything which 
may molest him, either from himself or from any other. 
He himself shall be the reward of virtue, which has given 
virtue, and has promised Himself unto him, than whom 
nothing can be better and greater. For what other thing 
is that which He has said by the Prophet : " I will be their 
God and they shall be My people " : but I will be whereby 
they shall be satisfied. I will be whatsoever is lawfully 
desired of men, life, health, food, abundance, glory, honour, 



GENERAL SCOPE OF DE CIVITATE DEI 29 

peace and all good things ? For so also is that rightly 
understood which the Apostle says : " That God may be 
all in all." He shall be the end of our desires, who shall be 
seen without end, who shall be loved without any satiety 
and praised without any tediousness. . . . There we shall 
rest and see, we shall see and love, we shall love, and we 
shall praise. Behold what shall be in the end without end ? 
For what other thing is our end but to come to that kingdom 
of which there is no end ? 

I think I have discharged the debt of this great work 
by the help of God. Let them which think I have done 
too little and them which think I have done too much, grant 
me a favourable pardon. But let them not think I have 
performed enough, accepting it with a kind congratulation ; 
give no thanks unto me but " unto the Lord with me." 
Amen. 

This brief outline makes this much clear. The 
De Civitate Dei is apologetic and theological. It is 
not a treatise on polity, whether ecclesiastical or civil. 
All S. Augustine s philosophical reading has left traces 
and every kind of dialectic is displayed. As apologetic 
it is more effective against paganism than against the 
Platonists. Too much is assumed in regard to Jewish 
and Christian history. The book might reassure those 
within the Church whose faith was shaken. It would 
hardly arrest those without. It has the interest and 
also the coruscating irrelevance that comes from a 
great variety of topics. The thread is there, but some 
times it is hard to disentangle. Compare this book 
with such a work of apology as that of Origen against 
Celsus. We note how much larger the Church looms 
in the view of S. Augustine. It is no set of propositions 
which he is defending in a dialectic debate with other 
philosophers ; although he can do this and does it in 
detail. But it is a social life which he sets up against 
another form of social life. The treatment is less 
individualist than that of Origen though the latter 
had to follow the course taken by Celsus. First we may 



30 THE CITY OF GOD 

observe that what impressed Augustine was the witness 
of the vastness of the Church and its triumph. As he 
says in a sermon : 

What do we see which they saw not ? The Church 
throughout all nations. What do we not see which they 
saw ? Christ present in the flesh. As they saw Him and 
believed concerning the Body, so do we see the Body ; let 
us believe concerning the Head. Let what we have respec 
tively seen help us. The sight of Christ helped them to 
believe the future Church ; the sight of the Church helps 
us to believe that Christ has risen. Their faith was made 
complete, and ours is made complete also. Their faith was 
made complete by the sight of the Head, ours is made com 
plete from the sight of the Body. (Sermon Ixvi. (cxi.) 6.) 

Probably those are right who say that in this respect 
also if in nothing else Augustine is epoch-making, 
that all his apologetic rests on the idea of Church. This 
characteristic would be developed in the Donatist con 
troversy. It must be admitted, however, that such a 
view of him is not universally held, and some would put 
the distinctive basis of S. Augustine in the idea not of 
the Church, but of grace. 4 

Secondly we note the aggressive tone of the book. 
Despite his references to Plato and his real debt to 
Plotinus and Porphyry, Augustine is far more in 
transigent than Clement of Alexandria, who would treat 
Christianity as but the coping-stone of Greek thought. 
It is not as a superior gnosis, but it is as a scheme of 
Redemption, that Augustine commends Christianity, 
and values it for himself. The cause of this lies partly 
in that doctrine of original sin which was so strongly 
held by Augustine, and even was in some degree being 
developed while this book was in process. It is the 
point of the whole book. 

Another note is the stress laid on the ethical differ 
ence between Christianity and its competitors though 
that is not a novel feature. Augustine knows that it 



GENERAL SCOPE OF DE CIVITATE DEI 31 

is not speculative truth but conduct that shows the 
greatest difference. Also he is aware that he is dealing 
with a dying interest. Paganism was uttering its death- 
cry (for the time). Clear is his note of triumph in the 
conquering and universal power of the Church. 

History including miracle plays a great part. The 
destruction of Jerusalem following the rejection of Jesus 
by the Jews is an emphatic evidence of the Gospel. 
The argument from miracles he states as many would 
state it now. A miracle is not contrary to nature but 
to what we know of nature. The argument depends 
on our conception of God. Augustine had no notion 
of the distinction between the natural i.e. the physical 
and the supernatural. Nature means the whole world 
of God s order all that happens. The problem is 
whether God s Will be paramount. All this has been 
treated by Mr. Lacey in his earliest Pringle-Stewart 
Lectures, Nature, Miracle and Sin. 

Above all we must bear in mind that the whole 
course of created existence is seen by S. Augustine as 
a conflict between two societies. However little some 
may make use of the figure of Civitas Dei, they have 
no right to deny its implications as against a doctrine 
purely individualist. Sin in Adam has become the 
property of the race, it is needful to show redemption 
in the order of historical development. The apologetic 
rests on a philosophy of history. 

Finally it is of and in the antique world that Augustine 
wrote. The notion of him as medieval in temperament 
may have some evidence, yet it must be understood 
with care. The atmosphere of the book is of the old 
world. It is before Gelasius with his doctrine of the two 
powers, before Justinian. Only a little over a century 
had passed since Diocletian s effort at exterminating 
the Church. Less than that divided S. Augustine from 
the reaction under Julian. 



II 

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 

HAD S. Augustine a philosophy of history ? If so, 
what is it, and what is its value ? These are the 
questions to which I seek the answer to-day. Here is 
a paragraph pertinent enough from Archdeacon Cun 
ningham s Hulsean Lectures on S. Austin and his 
Place in the History of Christian Thought* (p. 114). 

He sets before us a philosophy of history the con 
tinuous evolution of the Divine Purpose in human society : 
he contrasts the earthly polities which change and pass 
with the eternal City of God which is being manifested in 
the world : he shows how these two are intermingled, inter 
acting now, but how different they are in their real nature : 
one is of the earth, centred only in earthly things, while 
the other, because it has its chief regard fixed on that which 
is Eternal, gives us the best rule for the things of time. The 
earthly city, which aimed only at earthly prosperity, failed 
to attain even that, while the Heavenly City, aiming at an 
Eternal Reality, supplies the best conditions for earthly 
good as well. It is in the hope of the final triumph of the 
City of God that the course of the world becomes intelligible, 
for then we may see that the rise and fall of earthly empires, 
the glories of ancient civilisation, the sufferings of men in 
their ruin, have not been unmeaning or in vain ; for they 
have served to prepare for the coming of the kingdom of 
God. 

Thus it is that for S. Austin, faith in the Holy Catholic 
Church serves to render history intelligible. This faith was 
the key of knowledge, for it gave the first philosophy of 
history worthy the name. . . . 



THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 33 

If we examine it more carefully even now we shall 
be amply rewarded. We may find new reasons to admire 
S. Austin the discrimination he occasionally displays in 
the use of evidence, the marvellous power of combining 
many isolated facts into a connected system, even though 
here and there he puts forward opinions which are hard 
to reconcile with his general position. But we may find 
greater merits than these : we may turn from the grandest 
modern account of the evolution of human progress turn 
from Hegel himself to St. Austin and feel that the his 
torical system of the ancient father is more perfect and 
complete ; inasmuch as he had a clearer conception of the 
beginning, and a more definite perception of the final end 
towards which the whole Creation moves/ 

Stronger praise can be found. An Italian scholar, 
Professor Billed, wrote a book on Vico and S. Augustine. 
The object was to show that Augustine was the true 
originator in the field of the philosophy of history, that 
Vico but followed in his steps, although by some he is 
regarded as a pioneer. Dr. Reinkens in his inaugural 
address as Rector of the University of Breslau develops 
the theme of S. Augustine s philosophy of history in 
reference to modern life. He seeks to show that his 
system is an account of the progress of the world to a 
rational freedom. This is one side. 1 

Some modern interpreters of S. Augustine set little 
store by his philosophy of history. H. Schmidt declares 
that he reduces history to a nullity. Others speak as 
though the few remarks he made on the topic are not 
worth considering. 2 They point out how meagre is 
his picture of the course of the terrene state, how he 
overlooks almost all history, except Assyria and Rome 
just glancing at Greece and Egypt. True, Augustine 
mentions the common interpretation of the four 
monarchies in Daniel, implying that the Church is the 
fifth. Still there is no consistent effort to take the 
student through the revolutions of human affairs, and 
to justify the ways of God to man in the rise and fall 



34 THE CITY OF GOD 

of kingdoms such, for instance, as we see in Bossuet s 
Discours sur 1 histoire universelle. To that we may 
retort that this discourse was implicit in the De Civitate 
Dei/ 

What is certain is that S. Augustine was a man 
historically minded. He set out (he was compelled 
by the purpose of his apologetic) to be a spectator of 
all time and all created being. No one who takes the 
Incarnation seriously can avoid some kind of philosophy 
of history. That event if a fact testifies at once to 
the importance of human life on earth, and shows its 
centre. Doubts of Christianity at this moment are 
largely due to the difficulty felt by many in making the 
events in Palestine the pivot of human history. The 
religion of the Incarnation cannot be mere theology 
a system of notions developed from certain metaphysical 
propositions nor can it be mere ethics, a code of laws 
on a theistic basis. It has to do with a life on earth, 
in which Christians hold that in the fulness of time 
i.e. at the due moment in history the eternal reality 
at the heart of things became self-revealed and self- 
limited in a living earthly person. The issue of this was 
the fulfilment of the Jewish theocracy in the Christian 
Church. Augustine moreover approached Christianity 
emphatically by way of the Church. No one who did 
that could ignore the problems which it involved. Take 
a definite historical fact as your centre, take an actual 
visible society as the special sphere of God s operation, 
a society which has a past and must have a future on 
earth ; and then you are compelled to some philosophy 
of history. You cannot, like a sheer Platonist and 
Augustine shows leanings that way treat as of no 
account the whole development in time and space, as 
though this world were the dreams of the Absolute 
in a fit of absence of mind ; and then it is the object of 
the enlightened by some mystical process to get away 
from those dreams into the reality of day, where there 



THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 35 

is no change, no growth and no personality. That was 
the ideal of many. Augustine at one time had it. At 
times, even as a Christian, he uses expressions which 
show how greatly Plato and Plotinus contributed to 
his mental composition. On the whole, his belief in 
the Church and his sense of immediate reality were too 
great. A man who does not give way to the temptation 
of a doctrinaire s system pure and simple, but has so 
much regard to the actual as S. Augustine, is bound to 
rest unsatisfied without some philosophy giving history 
a meaning. Nowadays many seem to think it will be 
all the same if we leave out the facts, content to breathe 
the atmosphere created by a former belief in them, and 
hold that the Christian has to do solely with certain 
principles. 

If the facts of Christ s life on earth be treated as 
of little account, Christian faith will become either a 
set of dogmatic propositions, metaphysically grounded, 
coupled with a not too well-grounded ethical code, 
inelastic and impracticable, or else a name for certain 
states of sentimental brooding or elation. Against this 
danger Augustine fought, as we do now. His sense 
of Christianity being embedded in fact governs his 
apologetic, and that despite his love of dialectic, and 
his acquaintance with current philosophy. 

The Dean of Wells in his Commentary on the 
Epistle to the Ephesians has shown how S. Paul saw 
in the Incarnation a philosophy of history. So did 
S. Athanasius. 

S. Augustine does but draw this out. By the fifth 
century the Church had become a great human institu 
tion. It was not the preacher of an Interims Ethik, but 
an important part of the world historical process. That 
was true, whatever you thought about the Church. 
It was but natural that a mind like S. Augustine s, 
sensitive to every prevailing current, should try to 
look at all history as a great drama, of which the supreme 



36 THE CITY OF GOD 

crises are in Eden and Calvary. This much, however, 
we must concede at the outside to the minimisers. 
Augustine did not set out to compose a philosophy of 
history. His purpose was not to comprehend history, 
but to defend the Catholic Church. Even Hegel was 
moved by something more than a disinterested concern 
for the student who is trying to gather up the threads 
of fact. He wanted to show how his own philosophy 
of the Absolute could be brought into line with the 
development of mankind. History proved to Hegel 
an illustration of the doctrines of the Logic. Inciden 
tally he wanted to justify the Prussian State, in which, 
as we know, with his lack of humour, he contrived to 
discern the self-presentation of the Absolute Idea. 

However it may be with Hegel, the philosophy of 
history arose directly out of the method of Augustine s 
apologetic. It is not individualist. Augustine does 
not proceed on the method, too often deemed adequate, 
of taking separate points and arguing from them, in 
order to affect individual conversions. That is not 
his object. His purpose is this to justify the Christians 
God against the attacks made upon Him, to remove 
from the Church the charge of having brought about 
the ruin of civilisation. Over against the shattered 
world-order, great in its ruin, he sets another order 
even greater. He shows that the security and justice 
and freedom, which pious Romans believed to be 
guaranteed by the Roman Empire, were not guaranteed, 
that they never could be guaranteed on earth, that they 
are a treasure not of the body but of the soul. Not 
dear city of Cecrops, but dear city of God/ the cry of 
the great Stoic Emperor, has the gist of the whole. 
The Stoic lived in independence of temporal vicissitude, 
without help from beyond. The Christian belongs 
to the city which hath foundations whose builder and 
maker is God. I m but a stranger here Heaven is 
my home/ Over against Rome, the eternal city, 



THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 37 

Augustine puts Jerusalem the Golden. This he does 
not do in abstracto. He takes the two ideas incarnate 
in two societies. One modern commentator, Scholz, 
well describes the book as Faith and Unbelief, as 
shown in world-history. Even if this be not a philosophy 
of history, strictly so called, it is at least a justification 
of the Church, historically conceived. This is evident 
in the opening paragraph. ( De Civitate/ I. i.) 

That most glorious society and celestial city of God s 
faithful, which is partly seated in the course of these declin 
ing times, wherein " he that liveth by faith " is a pilgrim 
amongst the wicked ; and partly in that solid estate of 
eternity, which as yet the other part doth patiently expect, 
until " righteousness be turned to judgment " ; being then 
by the proper excellence to obtain the last victory, and 
be crowned in perfection of peace, have I undertaken to 
defend in this work : which I intend unto you (my dearest 
Marcellinus) as being your due by my promise, and exhibit 
it against all those that prefer their false gods before this 
city s founder. The work is great and difficult, but God the 
Master of all difficulties is our helper. For I know well 
what strong arguments are required to make the proud 
know the virtue of humility, by which (not being enhanced 
by human glory, but endowed with divine grace) it sur 
mounts all earthly loftiness, which totters through the one 
transitory instability. For the King, the builder of this 
city, whereof we are now to discourse, hath opened his 
mind to his people in the Divine Law thus : " God resisteth 
the proud, and giveth grace to the humble." Now this 
which is indeed only God s, the swelling pride of an ambitious 
mind affecteth also, and loves to hear this as parcel of his 
praise. 

" Par cere subjectis, et debellare s^tperbos." 

" To spare the lowly, and strike down the proud." 

Wherefore touching the temporal city (which longing after 
domination, though it hold all the other nations under it, 
yet in itself is overruled by the one lust after sovereignty) 
we may not omit to speak whatsoever the quality of our 
proposed subject shall require or permit. 



38 THE CITY OF GOD 

These two cities and societies are vague enough, and 
ill-defined in thought and imagination. Still, however 
much or little Augustine meant by contemplating all 
created history as the conflict of two opposed societies, 
he meant more than some writers such as Reuter and 
Troeltsch would seem to admit. Clearly, this scheme 
affords a framework under which the whole of history 
can be subsumed. You may say that the plan is imper 
fectly executed. Many people have thought that even 
of Hegel s explicit Philosophy of History/ It did not 
require the late war to make it seem an odd performance 
to try and classify all history as a progress towards 
freedom, and to find that freedom for ever embodied 
in the Prussian Absolutism. 

Faults of construction we may admit. The picture 
of the two cities was vague. At times Augustine forgets 
all about it. It seems strange that after stating his 
object he should go off into an elaborate attack on the 
morals of popular idolatry. Yet when we think it out, 
we can see some relevance to the main theme. Augustine 
would, I suppose, have agreed that these earlier books 
demonstrate the inadequacy of the Civitas terrena as an 
ideal. Still it is well to be warned. The reader must 
put up with a great deal of irrelevance and with the 
amplification of all sorts of things which have no obvious 
bearing on the main point. The passage from Vives 
cited in the last lecture illustrates this (p. 16). 

Two presuppositions of any philosophy of history 
are in the mind of S. Augustine throughout, (i) The 
unity of the human race, involving, as its corollary, 
the doctrine of (2) the essential sociability of man. The 
Civitas Dei, he says, can mean nothing less than the 
social life of the children of God. That one principle 
alone, according to Scholz, is a contribution of high 
value to world-history. 3 Even better than Aristotle 
did S. Augustine understand that true history begins 
only with a form of society. Also he emphasises the 



THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 39 

unity of the human race which is derived by its descent 
from Adam. This idea lies behind his doctrine of 
original sin. 

The strong sense of providential government of the 
world which Augustine shares with Vico may be thought 
to be also essential to the philosophy of history. This 
view, however, may be doubted. 4 One who was an 
atheist or a pure agnostic, e.g. Comte, might still have 
a philosophy of history, provided that he held the two 
maxims stated above, without any reference to God. 

Augustine s conception, which was avowedly derived 
from the Republic of Plato, that you can best judge 
of a nation by the analogy of an individual, helped 
him in some ways. In others it was a drawback. Alike 
in Plato and S. Augustine such a view may lead to a 
conception of morals which permits the extremities of 
persecution. All evil clericalism goes back to Plato. 

The De Civitate Dei then is sketchy and incomplete. 
If we are to justify it as a philosophy of history, in spite 
of this, we must go further. Augustine s philosophy of 
history is a philosophy of the time-process as a whole. 
That is why he is able as Scholz (p. 138) complains 
to treat world-history as an episode. History accord 
ing to S. Augustine is not merely terrestrial. It is the 
whole course of social happenings in time, in relation 
to a timeless Deity. No one could be more profoundly 
imbued than was S. Augustine with the doctrine of the 
timeless reality of God. On that ground he felt the 
more need of relating this to the world of successive 
events. Hence his book involves a philosophy of creation 
and a theodicy, no less than an account of the education 
of the human race/ It is history as a whole, history 
from the creation of light until the Last Judgment, 
that is the justification of God. Only on that 
tremendous canvas can he paint a picture that shall 
outmatch the gloomy Velasquez-like portrait of the 
world as set up for men s imagination by the sack of 



40 THE CITY OF GOD 

Rome. On this view much that seems at first sight 
irrelevant falls into place. Augustine begins, he must 
begin, with the Creation. The universe was not created 
in Time. Time and the world are coeval. They are 
the chosen achievement of God the divine symphony 
which not even sin can rob of its beauty. 

God Himself is the best poet 
And the real is His song. 

Augustine s strong aesthetic tendency, his worship 
of beauty, comes out in the doctrine that history is in 
truth a heavenly song that, in some way or other, 
the evil in it is overruled by the beauty of the whole 
just as discords are resolved by a skilful composer 

Why rushed the discords in, but that harmony 
might be prized, Augustine says in his interesting letter 
to Marcellinus ( Epist., 138) : 

God is the unchangeable Governor as He is the un 
changeable Creator of mutable things, ordering all events 
in His providence until the beauty of the completed course 
of time, the component parts of which are the dispensations 
adapted to each successive age, shall be finished, like the 
grand melody of some ineffably rare master of song. 

He lifts creation, before the beginning of earth ; the 
first important event, the true beginning of the two 
societies, is the sin of Satan. The pride of Lucifer 
typifies all evil doing ; it began among the angels that 
dichotomy into the two societies which is to last for 
ever, and as its counterpart set moving the course of 
redemption. 

Augustine seems to have held the view that men 
are created to fill the gaps in the celestial choir caused 
by the exclusion of the fallen angels ; that the elect 
are to fill up that number and no more. The devil s 
first sin was an act of freedom of will like that of Adam. 
God did not cause it, for evil is negative. It cannot 



THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 41 

be created. It is the choice of the lower, instead of 
fidelity to the essential nature of a spiritual being. The 
nature of all things, even of the devil, is good. It is 
the will, not the nature, that goes wrong. 

We need not follow S. Augustine into the account 
of the Fall. It is familiar enough. Once more must 
be emphasised the immense import, in regard to the 
philosophy of history, of S. Augustine s strong doctrine 
of original sin. He can compare the whole course of 
human history to a single individual, and can parallel 
their several stages. It is true that the comparison 
is vague ; he gives different classifications in different 
places. In the De Catechizandis Rudibus there 
are six. Freedom for the race, which was all enclosed 
in the loins of Adam, was lost in the strict sense by the 
Fall. Men still have a choice, but only between different 
kinds of sinful acts. Some are worse than others and 
will meet with worse torments. Manifold is the hierarchy 
of hell. With the Fall begins the human part of the 
Civitas terrena. Yet the coming redemption always 
holds some. The two societies not only now, but in 
all ages, have been intermingled. The heavenly city 
goes back through Shem to Seth ; the earthly to Cain. 
The Hebrew development is treated as the main embodi 
ment of the Civitas Dei. The Civitas terrena develops 
through Assyria and Rome, though I am not sure that 
Augustine ever absolutely identifies even the old Roman 
Empire with the Civitas terrena. 

The Civitas Dei began long ago ; but in its ful 
ness it came with the spread of the Gospel. There 
will be a mystical thousand years of the reign of Christ. 
This is to be followed by the bitterest of all persecu 
tions ; and the devil will once again be loosed. After 
this the establishment of the final goal of the two cities 
is easy. The goal of the Civitas Dei is the pax czterna, 
and the visio del. 

Dr. Reinkens argued that the end which the citizens 



42 THE CITY OF GOD 

of the heavenly city will reach is true freedom. Hence 
he can parallel S. Augustine with Hegel, making them 
both teach that the history of the world is the record 
of the progress towards rational freedom. I cannot 
but think that Reinkens is here misled by the wish to 
make out a historical parallel. It is peace, not freedom, 
that is the goal. Augustine doubtless thought that 
freedom (non posse peccare) would only be reached 
hereafter and would be reached then. But that is not 
to the purpose. The sack of Rome had been the greatest 
dramatic violation of the Pax Romana. The sense of 
security had suffered a shock only to be likened to that 
which we feel now. As compensation for this lost earthly 
peace Augustine gives a new security the peace that 
passes understanding. He does not promise a new 
earthly security under the aegis of the Church. On the 
contrary he agrees that neither religion nor piety can 
guarantee earthly security, although both are in the 
hands of God, who gives power, sometimes to the bad 
in order to teach humility to the good, and sometimes 
by way of reward to those relatively virtuous. The 
only genuine security must be that which is beyond 
the changes and chances of this mortal life. That is 
the saints everlasting rest to be won in the heavenly 
Jerusalem, the happy home, when the triumph is eternal 
and warfare is accomplished. Save in figure it does 
not attach to that partial representative of the Civitas 
Dei which we see here and now in the Church Militant. 
That is no more free from perilous conjuncture than 
is the secular state. 

Clearly the conception of redemption through the 
sacrifice of the Cross, made effective by a visible and 
sacramental Church, set over against the worldly society, 
affords some kind of philosophy of history. It runs 
as a thread through the whole complicated pattern of 
created being. This it could hardly do if religion were 
purely individual. The paramount significance of the 



I 

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 43 

Church, viewed as the depository and dispenser of grace, 
is of the essence of this historical philosophy. True, 
it may be argued, and has been argued, that the pre- 
destinarianism of S. Augustine makes the other way, 
and reduces all to individualism. Augustine is not 
always consistent. The two conceptions of the sacra 
mental visible Church and the communio sanctorum 
cross one another in a way that is often perplexing. 
But this difficulty is not decisive. No one is secure 
of salvation by baptism or even by communion. But 
they are conditions sine qua non. Witness Augustine s 
views on the condition of unbaptised infants. One of 
his grounds of controversy with Julius of Eclanum was, 
that the latter was willing to except infants unbaptised 
from the full penalty to assign them to a sort of lower 
court. 

The sketch of world-history is the weakest thing in 
the book. All, however, goes to emphasise his main 
thesis. History is a unity. No one before or since 
taught more plainly the solidarity of man. That 
renegade Englishman, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, 
in a book once overpraised even in England, condemned 
all notions of humanity. He said that there was no 
human race, only races and preached a new Teutonic 
Christianity. Now we see this in its first flush of hot- 
gospelling. The Foundations of the Nineteenth Cen 
tury gives a reinterpretation in the interests of Deutsch- 
land iiber A lies. All is based on a doctrine of the fun 
damental inequality of races. It is the direct contrary 
of the doctrine of the De Civitate Dei and Augustine s 
frequent assertions that proximus homini est omnis 
homo. 

This unity of history is so set forth as to be a theodicy. 
Augustine thought that the doctrine of original sin, 
with its accompaniment of arbitrary election, could be 
reconciled with Divine Justice. All men are ipso jure 
damned. The few who are saved may rejoice. Those 



44 THE CITY OF GOD 

who suffer the last penalty have nothing of which to 
complain. They go where they naturally belong. Those 
who escape have no merit, not even a turning of the will, 
for that is the work of irresistible grace. Certainly this 
justification may not seem to us satisfactory. Later 
theories, especially that of Molina, went far away from 
this. But the point here is that Augustine gave a view 
of the whole and claimed to justify the ways of God to 
men. 

Also, history is seen as the education of mankind. 
Augustine was the product of the university and an 
academic teacher. Strongly imbued as he was with 
his own sense of experience, he was hardly likely to 
undervalue the progressive education of mankind in the 
arts. So distinctly sociable a being could not really 
despise the social arts. Like all men he was tempted 
at times to think his own course worthless for what it 
left out. But that thought is hardly permanent. In the 
background of his consciousness he was always aware 
of the possession of culture. Still with his conversion 
to Christianity and even the earlier conversion to 
Platonism, the other-worldly doctrine creeps in. All 
the goods of human life have only a relative value. 
No earthly good has excellence save, and in so far, as 
it leads us on. The topic of world-flight is strong in 
S. Augustine in all his later writings. It is plausible to 
argue that of this book it is the main theme. 

Can that be ? Whether he liked it or not and I 
rather think he did Augustine must have known 
himself to be one of the best educated men of the day. 
Like a modern Etonian condemning the public schools, 
yet all the while conscious that they have made him a 
little different from those who were not there this 
attitude, whether social or scientific or religious, has 
always in it an element of pose. The pessimistic view 
of all worldly activities is clear enough in the De 
Civitate Dei/ But it is counteracted by that other 



THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 45 

conception under which he views history as a work of 
art ; in that sublime sense of human power and the 
beauty of things which was cited in the last lecture. 
Nobody who felt that, could treat the sights and sounds 
of earth, the outward beauty of things or even the course 
and revolutions of family and national life, as a thing 
of no account. A famous story of S. Bernard relates 
how he passed by the lake of Geneva and was unaware. 
S. Augustine has pictured for ever the scene at Ostia, 
in which took place the conversation with his mother, 
to which all the ten books of the Confessions are the 
prologue. 

Scholz argues that Augustine s theory of predes 
tination takes all meaning out of history ; since every 
thing is preknown, how can there be any real develop 
ment ? Augustine is aware of this difficulty and tries 
to meet it. [It is, by the way, a difficulty not confined 
to this doctrine, but to any view which gives history as a 
whole a meaning. If the world moves to a predetermined 
end, the real end is in the beginning and it is only an un 
winding of a clock.] In the argument against Fatalism 
Augustine tries to meet this. He denies that the Divine 
fore-knowledge does away with freedom. Here he was 
right. Whether the same can be said of the effects of his 
doctrine of irresistible grace is another matter. It must be 
conceded that, to S. Augustine, history is the sphere of the 
revelation under transitory and earthly symbols of the 
Eternal and Changeless Being. All changes, individual 
and social, are guided to their appointed end by a 
Providence, which though infinitely patient is also infi 
nitely powerful. That does not eviscerate history of 
meaning. Any teleological view of human life is open 
to the same objection. Augustine s view of the way in 
which grace changes the human will may or may not 
be tenable, but it is not determinist. Besides, not only 
does Augustine make God free. Calvin did that. He 
makes man free by nature. He never taught that the 



46 THE CITY OF GOD 

first sin of Adam was predetermined, or that of Satan. 
Luther and Calvin did. Moral evil came into the world 
by the wrong use of a will free from the outset. That 
is the thesis which he is ever laying down against the 
Manichsean doctrine. After the one evil act the will 
is dominated by concupiscence, and that in every member 
of the race. All that it does has the nature of sin. But 
even then its acts are not necessitated ; a man can choose 
between ambition and self-indulgence, between the 
pride of heroism and the meanness of cowardice. Even 
the doctrine of irresistible grace is not mere fatalism. 
It does not make world-history the blind working out 
of a formula like the obedience of a curve to its 
equation. His emphasis on miracles, and the positive 
arguments which he gives for them, form an evidence 
of this. God s world will move to its end. That is 
certain. Yet it moves through the reality of concrete 
and actual persons and societies set in a world of time 
and space. History is a real, not a phenomenal thing. 
It is a drama, not a cinema show. He can appeal to 
history elsewhere (Epist. cxxxvii. Ad Volusianum ) as 
serving in its order as an argument for the truth of the 
Gospel. 

What man might not be moved to faith in the doctrine 
of Christ by such a remarkable chain of events from the 
beginning and by the manner in which the epochs of the 
world are linked together, so that our faith in regard to 
present things is assisted by what happened in the past, 
and the record of earlier and ancient things is attested by 
later and more recent events. 

If we look before and after on this doctrine, we find 
certain other points to note. The doctrine of the two 
cities is not original. Indeed the Apocalypse of S. John 
might well have suggested it. It is almost certain that 
Augustine took it from Tyconius, the Donatist whom 
he respected so greatly. In the edition of the Rules of 



THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 47 

Tyconius by Professor Burkitt we can read all about 
the two societies, the one of God and the other of the 
devil. 5 

To Tyconius also is due the interpretation of the 
millennial kingdom, as exhibited by the Church. Nor 
does Augustine state his doctrine for the first time in 
the De Civitate Dei/ We find it fairly well developed 
in the earlier treatise, De Catechizandis Rudibus, and 
the division of human life into six ages. The main 
outline is all there. It was reserved for this work to 
treat it with a vast sweep of imaginative vision, so as to 
embrace all created existence and to found thereon an 
enduring apologetic. 

Later on Otto of Freising attempted to write a history 
of the world on the framework laid down by S. Augustine, 
concluding in precisely the same way with the Last 
Things. More famous is the work of Bossuet. His 
Discours sur 1 histoire universelle is what it professes 
to be, an attempt to see history in the light of the Incar 
nation. He takes it down to Charlemagne and had 
intended to take it further. The book is not an adapta 
tion of S. Augustine s work. It is primarily historical, 
just as the former is primarily apologetic. It is far more 
detailed and better constructed. But like that of S. 
Augustine, Bossuet s aim was partly practical, and he 
boasted of a conversation with du Gouet which enabled 
him to put the argument from the destruction of Jeru 
salem in a convincing way. Bossuet treats more 
satisfactorily the course both of profane and sacred 
history, ending with the establishment of the definitely 
Catholic Empire in the West. This book, one of its 
author s greatest, owes much to S. Augustine. M. 
Hardy wrote a volume, showing how close was this 
dependence. That is in some degree true of all Bossuet s 
work. Even Jansenism was hardly more deeply soaked 
in S. Augustine than was Bossuet, who rarely preaches a 
sermon without an allusion to him. 



48 THE CITY OF GOD 

Vice s Nuova Scienzia proves a problem. What 
was the influence of the De Civitate Dei in this 
one of the most original and epoch-making books of 
modern times ? Dr. Billeri in Giovanni-Battista Vico 
e S. Agostino claims the mastery and originality all 
for S. Augustine, and boldly transfers to him any honour 
given to Vico. This treatment is extravagant. The 
purpose of the two writers is different. Augustine, 
it cannot be too often repeated, is an apologist. Vico 
is above all an enquirer. He wants to get a generalised 
scheme of historical development, and to destroy what 
may be called the academic superstition. His attitude 
towards the earlier ages of classical history is curiously 
like that of Nietzsche. Above all he is anxious to 
rescue Homer from the imputation of being a teacher 
of philosophy and morals in the later sense, and to 
disabuse the reader of the notion that the virtues 
honoured in the heroic age were those of a settled and 
peaceful age, with the golden rule, at least in words, for 
its motto. He is anxious to show that the original 
development of men started from pure anarchism, 
with the patriarch ruling his family, as in the case of 
Polyphemus, through a ruthless aristocracy to a popular 
government and thence to monarchy (as, e.g. Rome), 
owing to the dissensions and unwillingness of men to 
work together and submit to law. 

With a strong belief in original sin, he claims that 
God as the author of nature makes men s vices, lust, 
cruelty and ambition work together for good, so as to 
establish a stable and law-abiding society. This is a 
universal law all over the world. Feudalism in some 
form or other is the beginning of government, and 
monarchy comes at the close. Thus Vico is certainly 
at variance with writers like Filmer who treat monarchy 
as original, no less than he is with believers in demo 
cracy. It is a scheme entirely different from S. Augustine s 
so different that at first sight one is disinclined to see 



THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 49 

any parallel. But we notice (a) his strong belief in the 
providential ordering of human affairs, (b) his making 
original sin the beginning of all profane history, (c) his 
reiterated assertion of the natural sociability of man as 
the eternal law of his being, (d) his repeated references 
to the De Civitate Dei and his use of it, further, for his 
even more repeated use of Varro (whose work we have 
not in the original). We may compare Vice s belief in 
Providence with S. Augustine s famous passage on the 
distribution of kingdoms. Only Vico goes more deeply, 
for he has the modern scientific spirit and its love of 
comparative method. 

Augustine is mainly concerned with the Church, 
Vico with the world. It is hard to say how far Vico 
was prompted by S. Augustine or whether he intended 
consciously to counter his book. Probably the truer 
view is that S. Augustine appealed to him by the sweep 
of his thought and by his vision of world-history ; but 
that, so far as the main idea is concerned, Augustine 
ranked mainly as one writer among the many whom he 
cited. 6 

What Professor Flint says in his history of the 
Philosophy of History is worth citing : 

It must have strongly confirmed Vico in some of his 
most fundamental convictions in the belief of Providence 
in history, of order and law in human affairs, of particular 
passions and interests being rendered by supreme reason 
subservient to general ends, of the analogy of the growth of 
the individual to that of the race, of the futility of Epicurean 
chance and the Stoic fate, as principles of historical explana 
tion. But his theory of history is by no means a simple 
continuation of that of Augustine ; on the contrary, the 
differences between them are as profound as their resem 
blances. Vico does not, like Augustine, look upon history 
in relation to predestination, the fall, redemption, and the 
end of the world, but as a manifestation of human nature 
and of fixed laws. He conceives of Providence very 
distinctly from St. Augustine. 



5 o THE CITY OF GOD 

Both the De Civitate Dei and the Scienzia Nuova 
are great books ; both suffer from a good deal of bad 
arrangement. Both are things to be felt rather than 
learned. In different ways both have had enormous 
influence on thought. But one is not the child of the 
other. They are complementary, not contrary. 



Ill 

THE STATE 

IN trying to comprehend S. Augustine s thought about 
the State, we must avoid one error, that of translating 
Civitas by State. 1 His thought, as I said, is eminently 
social. He thinks of good and bad as gathered into 
two societies. Only at the last judgment will the 
Civitas terrena be dissolved into its constituent atoms. 
But civitas is not for Augustine a term convertible 
with respublica ; and the Civitas Dei is to be found long 
before a visible Church existed, even before the call of 
Abraham. He speaks of the good and the evil as 
mystically two cities, stressing the word mystical. 
More than once he explains civitas as equivalent to 
society. The primary distinction is always between two 
societies, the body of the reprobate and the communio 
sanctorum ; not between Church and State. With his 
strong doctrine of election, it is natural that he should 
follow Tyconius in his views of the bipartite nature 
of the body of God, i.e. the elect and the merely 
nominal members. On earth these two bodies are inter 
mingled, and always will be. Only partially and for 
certain purposes is the Civitas terrena represented by any 
earthly polity. The Church represents the Civitas Dei 
rather by symbol than by identification. This error 
is often made. Some phrases seem to point that way. 
But first of all the distinction is to be drawn as I have 
stated. Error has arisen by identifying sans phrase the 
Civitas terrena with the State as such; and by taking 






52 THE CITY OF GOD 

every predicate applied to the Civitas Dei as obviously 
intended for the Church Militant. It would be less 
inaccurate to represent it, in the familiar phrase, as the 
conflict between the Church and the World. Yet even 
this would not be right. The real division is one 
which will be made manifest at the Last Judgment, and 
not until then. All earthly distinctions are but the 
symbols, never adequate, of the final grouping into sheep 
and goats. Members of either body are found, and 
always will be found, in the terrene representative of 
the other. It is the superiority of other-worldly 
interests to those of this world which is the gist of 
all. 

Hermann Reuter 2 goes on to remark that, even if we 
were using political terms to translate civitas, we ought 
to use the word city rather than state/ That is 
true. Hardly is it of capital importance, since the 
antique conception of a commonwealth was derived 
from the city-state. I doubt if we gain much by saying 
that Cain was the founder of a city, not the State. What 
we have to try and grasp is what Augustine thought 
about the State ; not what he thought about some 
States. Does he condemn the Respublica ? 

In his deduction of the two cities Augustine uses 
strong words on the effects of the lust of dominion. To 
Augustine it was, as to Nietzsche, the will to power 
that is founded upon the direct opposite of neighbourly 
and Christian motives. Only he draws an opposite 
inference. The original relations of man to man are 
not without organisation. The family is primitive and 
divine, and an association of families is natural. The 
first kings were shepherds. Dominion, i.e. absolute 
despotic dominion in the sense of the Roman Law, the 
power of the pater-familias, of a master over slaves 
that, as applied to man instead of animals, is due to sin. 
Those people who quarrel with this have no right to say 
that slavery is wrong now. Slavery owed its beginning 



THE STATE 53 

to sin. None the less is it God s judgment as a punish 
ment and must be borne. 

In the earlier chapters of the Fourth Book Augustine 
decides on the whole against large Empires, though in 
one place he seems to admit that Rome acquired hers 
justly, on the ground of the iniquity of her enemies. 
But he takes the case of the first invader of the ancient 
hereditary monarchies, Ninus, as the classical instance 
of the foundation of an Empire obtained by force and 
fraud ; and he decides that it is no better than a grande 
latrocinium. ( De Civitate/ IV. 6.) 

To war against one s neighbours and to proceed to the 
hurt of such as hurts not you, for greedy desire of rule and 
sovereignty, what is this but flat thievery, in a greater 
excess and quantity than ordinary ? 

A page or two before he relates a story of Alexander the 
Great and the pirate, which is of a similar tenor. 

Augustine s attitude in regard to slavery, and to 
private property in the sense of absolute dominion, is 
nothing new, although the lesson has not yet been learnt 
by the world. May it not be said that one of the things 
that men have been slowly learning is that rights of 
property are not absolute, and that they must give 
way to the public welfare? This sense of property, as 
of absolute dominion* has dominated modern Europe 
through the Roman Civil Law. Yet the other sense 
lies behind the Civil Law. It is the presupposition 
of Jurists like Ulpian and the Stoics. Their teaching 
pointed ultimately to the end of chattel slavery. It 
may point in the same direction in regard to extreme 
rights of private ownership. The moment you say 
that ownership is the creation of the law, you imply 
the power of revising it. 1 The idea that something else, 
common ownership, is natural, and that legal division 
is conventional, runs throughout history. Augustine 
argues that the source of right must either be divine 



54 THE CITY OF GOD 

constitution or human. Since we hold our property by 
the law of the State, we must hold to the State s laws. 
He does not wish to upset them. This, he says, in reply 
to the Donatists, in a letter to Vincentius ( Epist., 
xciii. 12) : 

J* Since every earthly possession can be rightly retained 
only on the ground either of Divine Right, according to 
which all things belong to the righteous, or of human right, 
which is in the jurisdiction of the Kings of the Earth, you 
are mistaken in calling those things yours which you do 
not possess as righteous persons, and which you have for 
feited by the laws of earthly sovereigns. 

According to Sommerlad, 3 Augustine set out to develop 
a theory of Church and State ; but what as a fact he 
did was to lay down an industrial and economic pro 
gramme for the Middle Ages. I cannot think either 
of these statements to be well-grounded. The last 
thing that he set out to do was to give a theory of the 
relations of the Church and State. Most of the more 
important errors in the interpretation of the De Civitate 
have their origin in this notion. With regard to the 
second point, in the De Opere Monachorum he argues 
strongly for the need of manual labour in bodies of 
religious. 4 He will not have it that study and reciting 
the Divine Office are enough. That dictum may have 
helped to determine the character of Western monas- 
ticism. It may have inspired the Benedictine ideal. 
In so far, it helped to create an important element in 
mediaeval civilisation. But it is surely a wild imagina 
tion to suggest that Augustine anywhere laid down a 
programme on socialistic lines for the Middle Ages ; 
that that programme was for some centuries adopted, 
and was discarded at the Renaissance with the rise of 
modern capitalism. 5 

On the first point, Augustine said a great deal which 
has a bearing on Church and State as polities, and on 



THE STATE 55 

their relations. Most of what he said could be used 
irTmore ways than one. In this and the following 
lecture I shall try to disentangle what he meant himself, 
and then in the last two to see what later times have 
made of the Civitas Dei. 

Once more let us recall the general aim of the book 
an apology for the Church. That purpose does not 
cease with Book X. We can see this by the analysis of 
the last twelve books, how right down to the end he 
lays preponderant stress on the evidence for the faith 
in history and miracle. 

Further, the Church which Augustine was defending 
was now in enjoyment not merely of peace, but of im 
perial patronage. The peace of the Church was a century 
old when he began the book. The era of Julian was 
over. The Council of Constantinople had achieved the 
victory of Catholicism in the Empire. Theodosius 
had stamped Christianity upon the legal system. Doubt 
less the penetration was not so deep as it became later 
in the work of Justinian. Still it was the one officially 
supported religion. Such was not the time for an 
intransigent history of the rights of the Church, or for 
a nullification of the State. The occasion itself of the 
book shows this. Augustine had to argue that the 
legal prohibition of sacrifice was not a calamity. Was 
it likely that at such a moment he would assert that the 
State was a thing in essence evil ? Yet that he is accused 
of doing. Ritschl, who followed Dorner, asserts that 
Augustine regarded civil government as such as being 
the organisation of sin. 6 Eicken, a very recent writer, 
says that with the peace of the Church, the Church 
showed itself more hostile to the State than in the days of 
persecution. 7 The Council of Nicea with its golden throne 
for the Emperor (as yet unbaptised) is an odd phenomenon , 
if that be so. But since this doctrine is set out in all 
earnestness by some of the most learned and acute minds, 
it must be rigidly examined before we are to reject it. 

i 



56 THE CITY OF GOD 

Can we then interpret the De Civitate Dei as 
teaching that civil society is wrong in itself ? Doubt 
less it teaches, as any Christian book would teach, that 
all earthly activities have their value only in the service 
of God. Human life, including the State, has no value 
save as a preparation. The heavenly home is the 
goal. Few thoughtful Platonists would say less. If 
Augustine means no more than that earthly activities 
have a purely relative and provisional value, as compared 
with the enduring realities of the immortal life, we ought 
to beware of attributing to him any violently anti- 
political doctrine. The problem is no easy one. Augus 
tine is too great to be always consistent. Still let us 
bear in mind this. Not only here but in his other works 
Augustine repeatedly quotes with approval the Apostolic 
injunctions about submission to the powers that be. 
He declares the Government of Nero to be God s ordi 
nance, and goes out of his way to say so. He is emphatic 
on the duty of rendering to Caesar what belongs to 
him. He is always full of the glory of Rome, and is 
imbued with the value of social union and family life. 
Beyond all this he is opposed to the Donatists. 

Reuter is right when he says that we cannot arrive 
at Augustine s political views they never amount to a 
theory from reading or studying the De Civitate Dei 
by itself. 8 We must study the treatises written against 
the Donatists ; also his letters and sermons and some 
of the minor works. Now it was the Donatists, not the 
Catholics, who adhered to the old Christian attitude of 
the days of persecution that typified by the Apocalypse, 
in which is pictured a death struggle between the Im 
perial power and the Christian Church. 9 Yet in the 
Apocalypse we note that it is the Emperor as an object 
of worship that is condemned never the idea of State 
authority. Much of S. Augustine s energies were occu 
pied in combating trfe Donatists. Rather reluctantly 
he came to the conclusion that it was right to employ 
\ 

Iten 



THE STATE 57 

against them the forces of the civil government. He 
had thought differently in the days of his controversy 
with the Manichaeans. Now that this policy won success, 
he gave rather reluctantly his adhesion to the views of his 
episcopal colleagues. Was it likely that, writing just 
after this, Augustine should turn round and condemn the 
State and all its works ? It was the Donatists who claimed 
entire freedom from civil obligations. They were, 
in modern phrase, absolutists/ To them the State is 
an institution so profane as to be practically diabolical. 
That was the cry which Augustine had to rrfeeF. We 
can see how he met it in his reply to Petilian (II. 92). 
Petilian asks, What have you to do with kings who 
have never shown anything but envy to Christianity ? 
Augustine replies at length. The most important passage 
is in c. 210. In this he says that kings must serve God 
as kings : for no man as a private individual could 
command that idols should be taken from the earth. 
But that when we take into consideration the social 
condition of the human race, we find that kings, in the 
very fact that they are kings, have a service which they 
can render to our Lord in a manner which is impossible 
for any who have not the power of kings. This is 
assuredly to admit the sacred office of a king as represen 
tative of the State. 

There is another letter (Ad Marcellinum, 138, c. 15), 
one written to meet the charge of the pagans that Chris 
tianity was a civic peril, which affords even stronger 
evidence. After denying that Christianity condemns 
wars of every kind, he goes on : 

Let those who say that the doctrine of Christ is incom 
patible with the State s well-being, give us an army com 
posed of soldiers such as the doctrine of Christ requires 
them to be ; let them give us such subjects, such husbands 
and wives, such parents and children, such masters and 
servants, such kings, such judges in fine, even such tax 
payers and tax-gatherers as the Christian religion has 



5 8 THE CITY OF GOD 

taught that men should be, and then let them dare to say / 
that it is adverse to the State s well-being ; yet rather let j 
them no longer hesitate to confess that this doctrine, if it 
were obeyed, would be the salvation of every commonwealth. 

He points out that some form of State is needful to 
the worst tyrant and that the State is a natural and 
therefore a Divine necessity. 

Still, there is evidence which tells the other way. First 
of all there is the main gist of the book this is to depress 
the Civitas tenena. Of that there is no doubt ; and if the 
Civitas terrena is to be identified with the civil State, as 
such, cadit quaestio. But the Civitas terrena is above all 
the society of the reprobate, a union largely unconscious 
and no less invisible than the invisible body of the elect. 
Only in so far as this society is represented by the State 
does it come in for condemnation. What is condemned 
is the World in Creighton s definition of it : human 
society organising itself apart from God/ 

Then there is to be taken into account the remarkable 
passage, or couple of passages, in which Augustine con 
demns Imperialism (III. 10 and IV. 3, 15). At the most, 
however, this view only condemns great Empires. It 
does not depreciate, it rather exalts, the Commonwealth. 
Augustine sees how greatly the lust of power goes to the 
making of most great Empires. Rome he thinks had 
justice on its side. He dislikes the tyranny of strong 
nations over weak. He hazards the conjecture that the 
world would be most happily governed if it consisted, 
not of a few great aggregations secured by wars of 
conquest, with their accompaniments of despotism and 
tyrannic rule, but of a society of small States living together 
in amity, not transgressing each other s limits, unbroken 
by jealousies. In other words, he favoured a League 
of Nations a condition, as he put it, in which there 
should be as many States in the world as there are families 
in a city. Still it is an organised State that he wants. 
There must be a union of families to create the city, 



THE STATE 59 

and a union of associated governments, only no imperial 
power. Here is doctrine, not only social, but eminently 
political. 

In another passage he contemplates a condition in 
which compulsion will not be needed. There will be 
no more necessity for it than in a well-governed family. 
It is always on the analogy of the family that he thinks. 
But this is not to do away with law and government. 
Against the view that law is the expression of force, 
and no more, he sets out his doctrine that law has its 
true origin in consent. 

On this point Vives makes a comment which is 
worth quoting (X. 4) : 

Oh, what a few laws might serve man s life, how 
small a thing might serve to rule not a true Christian, but 
a true man. Indeed he is no true man that knoweth not 
and worshippeth not Christ. What serveth all these Digests, 
Codes, Glosses, Counsels and Cautels ? In how few words 
doth our great Master show every man his due course. 
Love then Him which is above as well as thou canst, and 
that which is next thee like thyself, which doing thou keepest 
all the lawes and hast them perfect, which others attain 
with such toil, and scarcely keep with so many invitations 
and terrors. Thou shalt then be greater than Plato or 
Pythagoras with all their travels and numbers, than Aristotle 
with all his quirks and syllogisms. 

We may compare also a later passage of Vives on 
XIV. 28 : " 

With how excellent a breviate hath he drawn the great 
discourses of a good commonweal, namely that the rulers 
thereof do not compel or command, but, standing aloft like 
sentinels, only give warnings and counsels ; thence were 
Rome s old magistrates called consuls, and that the subjects 
do not refuse or resist, but obey with alacrity. 

Most, however, turns on another argument 
Augustine s discussion of Cicero s definition of a State, 



60 THE CITY OF GOD 

given in the De Republica. Cicero there makes 
Scipio define a republic as res populi. Populus, how 
ever, must be explained. The words must be cited : 
Populum autem non omnem coetum multitudinis sed 
coetum juris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatum 
esse determinat (II. 21). In discussing this he fixes on 
the word juris , and so makes justice to be of the essence 
of a State. This leads on to the famous tag remota 
justitia quid regna nisi magna latrocinia. But Augustine 
does not allow himself to be balked by this. He argues 
that there is some kind of commonwealth even in a 
robber band. 10 They are bound by the social contract 
among themselves. There must be rules for the division 
of the spoil. In other words, there must be within them 
a relative and internal justice, even though in regard 
to the world at large they are outlaws. In other words, 
any association, if permanent, must have within it the 
nature of a State or part of it. He points out that Rome 
according to the description of Sallust had ceased to 
be a republic owing to the growth of corruption in morals. 
This would be true of many other States. (This argu 
ment is somewhat akin to the notion of Locke, that a 
State ceases ipso facto, if the principles of the original 
contracts are violated.) 

Then later on (II. 21) he goes on to argue that if 
justice in the absolute sense be a sine qua non of a true 
commonwealth, then neither Rome nor any other pagan 
State was one. For you cannot have justice where 
the true God is not worshipped, and the only true 
commonwealth would be that wherein Christ is King. 11 
In XIX. 20 and 21 he says much the same. If this were 
all, it might be held to be decisive, i.e. to prove that 
Augustine condemns the State, though he does not 
really make the Church a State even here. Even 
here I do not see that there would be anything more 
than religious toleration required for the condition to 
be fulfilled, i.e. the position would be that of the Roman 



THE STATE 61 

Empire after the peace of the Church in the time of 
Cohstantine. Perhaps, however, Augustine s doctrine 
assimilating the State to an individual might be held 
by implication to preclude toleration. 

Augustine does not stop here, although some of his 
interpreters, alike critics and disciples, have done so. 
He sees that either you must give the name State to 
Rome in all its changes, to the Greek republics and to 
the world-monarchies, or else you must find some other 
term that will enable you to classify them. Something 
must be wrong with Cicero s definition (or else with the 
Augustinian notion of justice) unless it can be applied 
to such societies as these. So he proceeds to give a 
definition of his own from which the word justice is 
excluded. 12 

Populus est coetus multitudinis rationalis, rerum 
quae diligit concordi communione sociatus. 

This, he says, will include Rome, Babylon, or any 
other settled State. The really governing word here 
is concordi. It is some kind of consent and harmony 
that is necessary. 13 In an earlier passage he had adum 
brated this, and said that this definition, as he would 
show, was probabilior. Augustine is like any modern 
who might argue, that the State, in the nature of things, 
is democratic, because democracy involves the recognition 
of human personality. That is a fact, which no legal 
system can make not to be a fact, merely by the process 
of denying it. You may lay down, for instance, that 
a slave is not a person, but a chattel, a thing. That 
does not make him one. He is a person. Your legal 
system is false to fact if it denies that. But the modern, 
who said that, would be unwise if he were to deny the 
name of State to governments which so acted. He could 
say if he liked that they were no true States. He could 
not say that they were not States. 

The moment you come to consider such a term as 
State/ you are tempted to put into its definition a 



62 THE CITY OF GOD 

description of its ideal form, so that a State comes to 
mean the perfect State. Thereupon, anything, that 
falls short of that, is outside the definition. According 
to Locke s definition, I believe that the English State 
must have disappeared with almost every parliament 
since 1832, because laws were passed interfering with 
the individualist basis. According to an opposite 
definition of sovereignty, that of Austin, it is at least 
plausible to say that there is no such thing, and never 
has been, as a true law in the United States of America.* 
Augustine s use of Cicero s definition, and his enlarge 
ment of the notion of justice so as to include true religion, 
must be treated in the same way. 

That love to one s neighbour and to oneself (Augustine 
is no pure altruist), grounded on a love of God, are the 
greatest bonds of union among men must be the view 
of any Christian. So it is arguable that the Golden 
Rule is the foundation of political righteousness, and 
that the Golden Rule cannot be maintained apart from 
belief in God. 

Meanwhile the world is very evil. So long as the 
heathen in his blindness bows down to wood and stone 
we must have a number of communities that fall short 
of this ideal. They cannot be wholly without justice, 
or there would be no society at all, as Augustine most 
pertinently said even in regard to the robber bands. 
The good at which such societies aim earthly peace 
and security is a real good and no sham. 14 It is not 
to be despised or disturbed, but is to be used by the 
Civitas Dei. So far is it from being true to say that 
Augustine destroys civil authority, that it would be 
fairer to say that he is like Luther. For Luther said, 
on the one hand, that civil government is due to the 

* I do not say more than plausible, because the body which has 
power to change the constitution would be the Austinian sovereign. 
But there are two ways in the U.S.A. of altering the constitution. 
Which makes the sovereign ? 



THE STATE 63 

Fall, but (that being granted) it is a divine ordinance ; 
and on the other, that earthly peace and security are 
of such high value that no amount of civil tyranny 
can justify insurrection. I doubt whether S. Augustine 
could have agreed with Origen that associations of 
men against unjust laws are to be approved, just as 
we all approve associations of men to execute a tyrant 
who sets himself against the liberties of a State/ He 
must have agreed with the first proposition in so far as 
it refers to Christians in a pagan State. 15 But I question 
if he could have supported the second. So far indeed 
is Augustine from saying that injustice destroys the 
being of a commonwealth, that he uses the admitted 
injustice and corruption of Rome in the later days 
of the Republic as a reductio ad absurdum of Scipio s 
definition. 

Observe, once more, that Augustine declared that 
his definition of a State was more probable than that 
of Scipio. His sense of reality led him to prefer a 
definition which would include all existing and historical 
communities, and hamper him as little as possible by 
an abstract ideal. 

What is morally right for a nation to do is one thing. 
It is another thing to say, that if it fails to do it, then it 
ceases to be a nation. You can be human without being 
humane. The whole discussion is akin to that way of 
speaking which judges humanity, not by what it is, but 
by what it should be, in the developed notion of humanitas. 
It is not wise to say, even of our worst enemies, that 
they are not human only that they act in a way that 
is a disgrace to the human race. The worst of men is 
a man for a that/ 

Augustine s second definition goes back beyond Plato. 
It is paralleled by our modern distinction between law 
and (moral) right. What is not just is not law, said 
Algernon Sidney. This saying goes back through 
Bellarmine to S. Thomas, and through S. Thomas to 



64 THE CITY OF GOD 

S. Augustine and further to Ulpian and the Stoics 
with the definition jus est ars aequi et boni. We do not 
now talk like Algernon Sidney. We prefer to say that 
laws may often be unjust, but that they are still laws. 
We have been led to develop another plan, which is 
true to the facts of organised government, and there 
fore distinguishes law sharply from moral right. All 
,of us are familiar with the notion that law is a universal 
command of the governing element in a community, 
although it may be oppressive, immoral and irreligious. 
Augustine did not go so far as this, but he realised the 
distinction which exists between a State permeated 
by justice, and a despotism or democracy which is still 
a State, though far removed from justice. He saw that 
State, reduced to its lowest terms, might be a people 
whose manners are none and their customs beastly 
associated for bad ends, yet still a State, because keeping 
internal peace. Our distinction between legal and 
moral right can be derived out of this definition which 
allows to the community the full rights of a common 
wealth, irrespective of its moral character. 

On what grounds the importance of this passage is 
denied I fail to understand. It was well enough for 
mediaeval writers to take the other side only and argue 
from it. Professedly they were trying to conduct the 
State as a society of baptised persons. It is less compre 
hensible how writers in our modern world should try 
to tie S. Augustine down by his own severe interpretation 
of Scipio s definition, an interpretation which he develops 
only in order to pass to a different definition. So far 
is S. Augustine from giving a clericalist definition of the 
State, that he definitely discards it, and shows us that 
he does so with intention, and gives his grounds. It 
is contrary to the facts of life. 16 

Observe that we are discussing, not what S. Augustine 
ought to have meant, on a view of a certain section of 
his words, nor what those living in a different age might 



THE STATE 65 

get out of his language, nor even what historically was 
the outcome of it, but simply what was the picture of 
the State that Augustine had in his own mind. The 
question is not what he has come to mean for others, 
but what he did mean himself. 

We must do what we have to do in regard to any 
thinker, viz. get behind his words and stated theories, 
and see what were the half-conscious presuppositions 
of his thought. Did Augustine represent to himself 
that civil society is a bad thing ? Is it not truer to say 
that he regarded it as natural although often perverted 
by evil wills ? He is always arguing that every nature, 
even that of the devil, is good as nature, but that the 
will to use it aright has been changed by experience. 
The two societies, the terrene and the divine, are made 
by the two loves, the love of God and the love of self 
apart from God. With all actual States, the latter 
had much to do. Romulus, like Cain, killed his brother. 
Historically, wrongdoing has much to say in politics. 
Does anyone reading the newspapers deny this ? In 
practice a State may have often been ruled by the law 
of the beasts described by Machiavelli but only 
partly is this so, or else the idea of justice could never 
have arisen. Nowhere, however, does he assert that 
human society is a bad thing. One of his most eloquent 
passages describes its value. Things being what they 
are, wars even may be just. Augustine is no pacifist. 
Wars are the result of the will to power, and are evil. 
Yet in the actual world they may be the less of two 
evils. Our Lord condemns not the act of defence but 
the animus of revenge. The earlier wars of Rome were 
acts of defence as against criminal attacks. Her Empire 
was a reward of relative virtue. All governments are 
the will of God. Christianity, he claims, will mitigate 
even war. He looks to the development of moral limita 
tion on war, under definitely Christian ideals. He 
quotes Cicero, and dilates (in the Confessions/ iii. 8) 



66 THE CITY OF GOD 

upon the generate pactum humanae societatis obedire 
regibus, and is frequent in his references to the duty 
of obedience to civil governors as laid down by S. Paul 
and S. Peter. Nor does he interpret this in the 
hierarchical sense a thing which was frequently done 
in the Middle Ages. 

How then is he to be treated as hostile to the State ? 
Felix Dahn wrote that the doctrine of S. Augustine was 
logically false, morally diseased, politically corrupt and 
incompatible with duties to the State. 17 Yet Augustine 
in his tractate De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae, I. xxx., 
has a fine passage on the effects of the love of God and 
our neighbour in teaching every kind of civic duty : 

Tu pueriliter pueros, fortiter juvenes, quiete senes, 
prout cuj usque non corporis tantum, sed et animi aetas 
est, exerces ac doces. . . . 

Tu cives civibus, gentes gentibus, et prorsus homines 
primorum parentum recordatione, non societate tantum, sed 
quadam etiam fraternitate conjungis. Doces reges pros- 
picere populis, mones populos se subdere regibus. 

He did not, as I said earlier, set out to produce a 
theory of the State. There is no discussion about the 
merits of the various forms of government, though there 
is the classical passage known as the Mirror of Princes 
describing the attributes of a good king. The one 
purely political passage is that which I discussed earlier 
in the argument for a family of small States, living in 
amity, with its corollary the condemnation of imperialism. 

His strongest word is that passage (II. 21) in which 
he says, that, in the strictest view of justice, you could 
have only one real kingdom, that in which Christ is 
King. That, however, is little more than the sentiment 
of almost any Christian ; that the best commonwealth 
would be composed of the people who accepted the 
best principles. It can hardly be said even to involve 
a hierarchical control. At any rate he says it, not in 



THE STATE 67 

order to deny the rights of a commonwealth to other 
bodies but to assert the need of a different classification. 
Still this passage would undoubtedly stimulate (as it 
did) the hierarchical interpretation of his doctrine. But 
it really illustrates the thesis of Mausbach and Seidel, 18 
that Augustine did not deny the goods of human life, 
but sought to raise them to a higher power. That may 
be taken as one side. That there is another, the purely 
other-worldly, which treats as null all earthly activities 
including the State, is not to be denied on any fair 
reading. 19 The world-renouncing and the world- 
accepting temper both meet in S. Augustine, as they 
do in the Christian Church and its most eminent repre 
sentatives, S. Paul, S. Anselm, S. Francis de Sales, 
Fenelon, Newman. It must be this latter element 
which gives Reuter the ground to state that for Augustine 
the only true State is a monastic community, and that 
all the rest are condemned ; though I do not know what 
real evidence there is of this statement. The former 
is that which can justify Mausbach 20 in saying that 
nothing that we call kultur is recognised by S. 
Augustine. All this, however, can only be fully dis 
cussed if we consider the place in his system of the 
Christian Church. That must be taken next time. 



IV 

THE CHURCH 

WHAT then is S. Augustine s view of the place of the 
Church in relation to civil society ? This is part of 
the topic of the last lecture. Only to-day we look at 
the matter from a different angle. Here too, a caveat 
must be entered. We must beware of treating anything 
said of the Civitas Dei as though it could be applied to 
the existing ecclesiastical system. Much of it can. Yet 
the Civitas Dei in its strict sense is not the Visible Church. 
It is the communio sanctorum, the body of the elect, 
many of whom are to be found in pre-Christian times or 
in heathen peoples while from this body many among 
the baptised will be excluded. 1 This communio sanctorum 
is the true recipient of the promises to David and of 
the gifts of eternal peace and beatitude, those promises 
which Augustine sets forth with moving eloquence in 
Book XX. The Visible Militant Church is never more 
than a part of either nor does it ever attain. Its peace 
and beatitude are in hope. It is always in via. It is but the 
symbolic and inadequate representative of the Civitas 
Dei, but it uses the peace provided by the earthly State. 2 
Still we must beware of laying too much stress on 
this. Reuter overstrains it. Augustine, it appears to 
be proved, is the first of the fathers to declare that the 
Church is the Kingdom of God on earth. The most 
important of the passages is that in XX. 9. There Augus 
tine is arguing for the identification of the Church with 
the millennial kingdom (as against the Chiliasts) and for 



THE CHURCH 69 

the rulers of the Church sitting on thrones. He says 
explicitly : 

Ergo ecclesia et nunc est regnum Christi regnumque 
caelorum. 3 

Other passages also state this identification of the 
Church with the Civitas Dei. Reuter will have it that 
all these are to be understood of the Church only as 
communio sanctorum* Therefore we must rule out 
every inference that might be drawn from the application 
of the idea of the Kingdom to the actual Church Militant. 
This interpretation cannot be proved. There is little 
doubt, from the context, that Augustine was thinking, 
as Scholz and Seidel say, of the Church as a visible, 
comprehensible body, hierarchically organised. 

Dr. Cunningham s Hulsean Lectures afford us an 
instance of the opposite view (p. 116). 

For S. Austin the Kingdom of God was not a mere 
hope, but a present reality ; not a mere name for a divine 
idea, but an institution, duly organised among men, sub 
sisting from one generation to another ; closely inter-connected 
with earthly rule, with definite guidance to give, and a 
definite part to take, in all the affairs of actual life. To 
him the Kingdom of God was an actual Polity, just as the 
Roman Empire was a Polity too ; it was " visible " in just the 
same way in the earthly State, for it was a real institution 
with a definite organisation, with a recognised constitution, 
with a code of laws and means of enforcing them, with 
property for its uses and officers to direct it. 

Here then are the two opposing views. I take another 
point. Both Reuter and Troeltsch argue that while 
Augustine accepted the authority of the Church and had 
no wish to change it they were the presuppositions of 
his life as a Christian yet he meant little by them : 
that his emphasis upon predestination makes against 
any high view of ecclesiastical order. Repeatedly in 



70 THE CITY OF GOD 

his writings, e.g. in the De Catechizandis Rudibus/ 
Augustine lays stress on the fact that the elect will include 
men of all nations and every age. At the beginning of 
the De Civitate he declares that the Civitas Dei began 
with the beginning of the world. Reuter (who is a 
Protestant) goes so far as to say, that of all early 
Catholic writers hardly any is so little hierarchically 
minded as Augustine. It is true that Augustine takes 
little interest in hierarchical topics. Never, so far as I 
know, does he develop the theory of the episcopate in 
the way in which S. Cyprian did. When he thinks of 
the Church, it is of the whole body of the faithful. It is 
the bigness of it that appeals to him, and to which he 
appeals. Whatever his views in favour of small States, 
in regard to the Church he is imperialist enough ; he is 
opposed to all particularism. It is to this sense of uni 
versality, rather than to that of the episcopate, that he 
appeals. Still, it is of the Church as an organised body, 
hierarchically governed, that he thinks in his controversy 
with the Donatists. His strong views of the predes 
tination of individuals no more upset his scheme of a 
visible Church than did those of Calvin. Calvin threw 
over the ancient system, and rejected both the Papacy 
and the Episcopacy ; but no less strongly than S. Augus 
tine did he hold to a doctrine of a Visible Church and 
its authority. So did the Jansenists. It seems little 
short of ridiculous to deny that the notion of the Church 
loomed large to Augustine s imagination, much larger 
than it did to that of Origen and the earlier apologists ; 
or that, along with the doctrine of original sin, it was 
the pivot of his system. 5 It had been to the Catholic 
Church that he had been converted after trying many 
experiments. 

Rightly has it been pointed out by Schmidt 6 and 
Weinand 7 that it was the Donatist schism that aroused 
the Church as a society to full self-consciousness. All 
the earlier heresies concerned high doctrine. Certain 



THE CHURCH 71 

statements about our Lord or the Trinity were, or were 
alleged to be, false. In opposition to them, the Church 
is primarily a teacher. But the Donatists were not 
heretics in the ordinary sense. Or rather their heresy 
was on the topic of the Church. Augustine was faced 
with (a) a doctrine of the sacraments which reduced 
religion to personal influence and is, in our modern 
phrase, radically Protestant ; and (b) with the claim 
of the Donatist schism to be the true Church of Africa. 
Against these claims he was forced to develop the idea 
of the Church as being something more than a company 
of believers, as the sphere of God s work, the Civitas Dei ; 
and of the sacraments as God s work done by human 
agents, the character of whom no more affected their 
validity than does that of an officer in the army the 
validity of his orders. Further, the Church as a uni 
versal world-wide polity is opposed to all particularist, 
nationalist tendencies. In the early years of the fifth 
century it looked as though Donatism was to be the 
national religion of Africa. This contest was a conflict 
between Catholicity in its very idea, and conceptions 
which were its antithesis. 

These ideas of S. Augustine need not have been new. 
It is not their novelty which makes the difference, but 
the emphasis with which they are stressed. Further, 
the term Civitas Dei is itself significant. This is not 
new. It can be seen in the New Testament, in Hebrews, 
and the Apocalypse. The vogue given to these words 
now caused more and more assimilation of the Church 
to a State. All the qualifications were left out of account. 
This process led to a political habit of treating the Church. 
By the mere use of the terms civitas and regnum in a 
work of such momentous influence, Augustine prepared 
the way for the later development of the doctrine that the 
Church is a societas perfecta, and must have the powers 
necessary to any self-sufficing community. The con 
ception of the Church as a social entity wielding 



72 THE CITY OF GOD 

governing powers owes much to S. Augustine. He did 
much to strengthen the Church as an imperial force. 

If we take two nineteenth-century writers, one in 
the East and one in the West, who thought much about 
the Church, Khomiakoff and Newman, what a wide 
gulf there is between them ! Newman s sermons, in 
the volume of the famous fifteen on the Church as an 
imperial power, show how far the West has gone in this 
political way of thinking about the Church. Augustine 
may be said to have been one of the great forces which 
began this development. Meanwhile the East remained 
as it had been, preserving the view that the laity form a 
real part of the organisation. 

Ritschl thought that Augustine s emphasis on the 
Church was the necessary corollary of the doctrine of 
original sin the setting up of the society of grace. I 
cannot see this. Grace might be conceived as acting 
merely on the individual ; and all importance be denied 
to the Church. Some even have based such a doctrine 
on S. Augustine. 

But he did think that the Church, the Visible Church, 
recruited by baptism, nourished by sacraments, governed 
by bishops, was the one true family of God ; and that 
Christianity meant belonging to that family. The 
actual expression extra ecclesiam nulla salus is not his. 
But the principle he definitely states. When you add 
to this the view that the Church was the regnum Dei, 
and that the millennial kingdom of Christ was exercised 
by the rulers of the Church, you can see how much 
was latent in S. Augustine of the political aspect of 
Christianity. 

More momentous is Augustine s treatment of the 
Church as the apocalyptic kingdom. This doctrine he 
develops against the Chiliasts, scouting their notion of 
an earthly physical reign of our Lord visible on earth. 
The opposing party was important at that time, and 
some alternative interpretation of the biblical passages 



THE CHURCH 73 

was needed. Augustine seems to have taken the doctrine 
from Tyconius. This Tyconius was a Donatist with 
whom Augustine stood on friendly terms. Moreover, 
he had quarrelled with those of the more extreme 
tendencies. Augustine indeed wonders why he did not 
become a Catholic. In the Rules of Tyconius we have 
found (as I said earlier) Augustine s doctrine of the two 
Cities, and the conception of the bipartite character 
of the City of God, i.e. consisting of the elect and the 
foredoomed. Above all, Augustine s interpretation of 
the Apocalypse is found to be derived from Tyconius, 
who wrote a treatise on the Apocalypse, which now 
has been lost, but has been partly restored by 
conjecture. 

The point of this exposition is that the millennial 
kingdom is already in existence. It is a reign, therefore, 
that does not involve the physical presence of Christ. 
In other words, the Second Coming is the Church. The 
First Resurrection has already taken place in the con 
version of sinners and in their baptism. It is a spiritual 
act, not a physical resurrection. In his interpretation 
of Scripture Augustine oscillates between extreme literal 
ism and a remarkable freedom. The martyrs are those 
who reign with Christ. The thrones belong to the rulers 
of the Church. This kingdom has been in existence 
ever since Christianity spread beyond Judaea. It has 
nothing to do with the peace of the Church and the 
cessation of persecution, still less with the legal estab 
lishment of Christianity. Neither persecution nor any 
other earthly act affects this. 

The ground for rejecting Chiliasm is that it postulates 
an absence of earthly trials in this life a thing which 
Augustine declares to be no less impossible for saints 
than anyone else : and for that reason the promises that 
there shall be no more sorrow nor crying can apply only to 
the Church Triumphant. Now this argument cuts two 
ways. If the Church be the Kingdom of God, it may, 



74 THE CITY OF GOD 

it is held, justify claims to paramount supremacy, and 
lead to a great Church- State. A more natural inter 
pretation points the other way. If Christ has been 
reigning on earth, through the Church, ever since the 
days of Antioch, then he was reigning all through the 
period of persecution. Therefore for the Church to 
exercise any political supremacy, or even secure any 
recognition of its existence, are shown to be things 
indifferent. The royalty of the Church, the peculiar 
people, the holy nation, the royal priesthood/ the power 
on earth of the King of Kings and Lord of Lords, is of 
the same nature as that of which Christ spoke when 
He answered Pilate s satirical question Art thou a 
King then ? with My Kingdom is not of this world. 
The Kingdom of God cometh not by observation, and 
its authority is in the souls of men, not in any outward 
political structure. It was regal in her days of security, 
regal when she was a distinct society in the second century, 
regal when she was assailed by the whole might of Rome 
under Diocletian, regal when having conquered by 
stooping she enjoyed a guaranteed security, regal when 
under Julian that security was threatened once more, 
or when under Arians, like Constantius or Valens, it 
was undermined from within, regal no more and no less 
than it had been previously now that after the laws of 
Gratian and Theodosius she had become not merely 
tolerated but established, not merely established but 
the exclusive official religion of the Empire. 

The Church is a kingdom not of this world. Augustine 
goes out of his way to say that kings and princes cannot 
make the City of God, which comes by the calling of souls. 
Once more it must be said that Augustine was not think 
ing how to build Jerusalem in Afric s bright and sunny 
land, but how to wean men from crying " peace, 
peace " when there was no peace/ from seeking in any 
earthly refuge that abiding home which remaineth for 
the people of God. Richard Baxter s great book, The 



THE CHURCH 75 

Saints* Everlasting Rest/ reflects the aim and many of 
the ideas of S. Augustine or the famous pcem of Bernard 
of Murles, from which is taken the hymn Jerusalem the 
Golden. This non-political interpretation of the sym 
bolic kingdom is seen to be that which is in accordance 
with the mind of S. Augustine, if we take the book as a 
whole. It is what he meant to mean ; whether it is 
always what his words did mean, is another question. 

But evidence that tells on the other side is not to 
be neglected. First, it is obviously possible to put a 
clericalist interpretation upon the passages about justice. 
Next, it must be remembered that he speaks of the good 
that has been done to the Church by Christian kings. 
In reply to Petilian he says that he does not give 
unreserved trust to the State, but makes use of it. He 
admits the change which had come over the Empire 
since Constantine. He says that, since ruling is the 
metier of princes, they, if they come over to the Church, 
must forward her interests by laws in her favour. In 
other places he speaks of the duty of the civil governor 
to do what the Church requires in her interests. Now 
one commentator thinks that all this amounts to not 
much less than the comparison of Church and State 
to sun and moon, which was first found, I think, in 
Hildebrand, 8 and became so dear to the Middle Ages. 
But I confess that I can see nothing here that in any 
sense ap preaches to the doctrine of the two swords, or 
even to the famous argument of Gelasius. 

The Church was not yet in a condition even of parity 
with the civil power. Augustine does not think of the 
civil and ecclesiastical authorities as two co-ordinate 
powers occupied in governing. Even in dream he had 
not the great vision of mediaeval imagination, the one 
commonwealth of Catholic Christians, with its twin 
heads of Pope and Emperor ; though he does say that 
there is one respublica of all Christians. It is doubtful 
whether he hoped to convert the heathen by force, 



76 THE CITY OF GOD 

though he asks the Donatists whether they did not 
agree with him in approving the imperial laws against 
heathen sacrifice. Augustine appeals to the unity of 
the Church, the Civitas Dei alike in morals and thought, 
and sets this against the intellectual and moral anarchy 
of the terrene State ; yet he is not at that moment 
thinking of an imperial Christ-state, but pointing to 
actual phenomena as a modern Roman Catholic in 
England or the United States might do. Yet it is not 
doubtful that it was possible in later times, and indeed 
natural, to press all this into the service of the hierarch 
ical organisation of the world. 

Most of Augustine s writing is not in the tone of a 
ruling Church, but rather of a body officially predominant, 
though everywhere attacked. His attitude to Count 
Boniface is not like that of the mediaeval popes. 

It is the other world with which he is concerned. 
He might have called his book The Gospel of the 
Resurrection/ The De Civitate Dei is chargeable 
with whatever plaints can be made against a tendency 
to other-world lines. The strongest passage on this 
point is not to be found there, but in the De Bono 
Conjugali/ Answering the objection that if his views 
were correct, and if enough people became converted 
to the celibate life, the world could not go on being 
peopled, for no children would be born, he replies : 
That would be a blessing. It would mean that the 
number of the elect would be filled up, and the kingdom 
of God accomplished in the language of our Burial 
Service. This presumably alludes to the theory that 
the world need only go on until the number of elect 
required to fill up the vacancies caused by the falling 
of the angels had been made up. That was the object 
of the creation to fill up the gaps in heaven. The rest 
do not matter. God would not keep the factory of 
the world running for the sake of the waste-products. 
You may fairly urge against S. Augustine the kind of 



THE CHURCH 77 

reproaches that figure in the Pagan s Lament in 
Swinburne s poem : 

Thou hast conquered, O pale Galilean, and the world has 

grown grey with Thy breath ; 

We have drunken of things Lethean, and fed on the kisses 
of death. 

But it is a different charge to make him * the only 
begetter of the Bull, Unam sanctam. 

That is not to deny that there are weighty considera 
tions in favour of such a view. Were there not, we could 
never have such strong words as those of Kattenbusch, 
who speaks of him as the Father of the Papacy. Geirke 
holds that the logical development of the Augustinian 
doctrine involves the complete subjection of the State 
to the Church. 9 Similar are the views of Dorner, 
Schmidt, Eicken and many more. 10 Their views are 
stronger evidence of what Augustine meant, than is the 
constant use that was made of him by mediaeval thinkers. 
The mediaeval habit of taking tags as text-proofs, apart 
from the general purpose of the writer, discounts their 
value as evidence. Besides this there was an immediate 
polemical interest at stake. 

For this purpose we must go further. The De 
Civitate Dei needs for its interpretation the writings 
against the Donatists. In that conflict Augustine was led 
to accept the assistance of the civil power. So far as 
I can make out, he was never very happy about this 
proceeding, and felt that it needed apology. Partly, 
this feeling was due to the fact that his action indicated 
a definite change of mind. In early days, and in regard 
to the controversy with the Manichaeans, Augustine had 
forgone all such things, and argued in favour of free 
dom of opinion. This was a change, and one which he 
had to explain. So far as the Donatists were concerned, 
he had an easy task. From them indeed any objection 
to the employment of force was little short of an imper- 



7 8 THE CITY OF GOD 

tinence. They had themselves appealed to the civil 
power. Only when the appeal was rejected had they 
turned round and cried hands off to the State. Besides 
the violence of the Circumcellions, if not precisely 
authorised, was largely used by them. Much of what 
was done on the side of the Church was only an attempt, 
often ineffectual, to secure that the peace should be 
kept. This attempt had been largely frustrated through 
the intimacy between Optatus and the Count Gildo. 

Augustine did not confine his defence to these limits. 
He produced a definite argument in favour of force in 
religious matters. Most of it he bases on the verse 
Compel them to come in/ He does not want opinion 
forced. He thinks that penalty is useful, because it 
makes a man reflect, and often give up his view as 
erroneous. It is, in fact, educational, and, in his view, 
precisely similar to the use of the rod. It is persecution 
for the soul s good. Augustine s conception of the office 
of the State is largely that of an educator. 

Out of this acceptance of persecution it is easy to 
develop a theory of civil domination. The State is to 
use force. That is its duty. It is to extend the province 
of the Kingdom of God on earth. Remember, it is 
not, as it was later on, conceived as being the secular 
arm of the Church. If the civil Governor is to persecute 
heresy, who is to advise him ? He cannot do so on his 
own motion. Obviously, the Church, organised through 
its governors, will advise him. The moment you accept 
persecution as a policy, you tend to a religious tyranny. 
The State may still be conceived as having self-identity 
of its own as it was in the Presbyterian doctrine of the 
two kingdoms. But if it be bound to take orders from 
the Church in regard to religious matters, it will not be 
long before there will be a claim to direct the State in 
regard to any policy that may have a religious, or a 
moral, or an ecclesiastical bearing. How much will 
be left out ? 



THE CHURCH 79 

**, 

Add to this the inferences that may be drawn from 

justice (as Augustine defines it) as being needful to a 
perfect commonwealth. If the only true commonwealth 
be that in which Christ is King, and if that is to mean 
that the worship of God in Christ is not merely to be 
allowed, but to be enjoined by law, then you must have 
a theocratic State. It depends merely on what form 
of organisation the Church has, as to who shall have the 
last word. In a democratic system you might have the 
whole body of the faithful. In a hierarchical Church 
you might have either a General Assembly as in Scot 
land, or a General Council of bishops or the Pope. As 
we saw last time, that notion of justice is not at all 
S. Augustine s own doctrine of the State. But it was 
sufficiently near it for men to take it apart from the rest ; 
and, together with other indications, to make it serve 
the ends of the clericalism of the later Middle Ages. 

Even more is this true with regard to the conception 
of the Church as the apocalyptic kingdom. If the 
Church be, here and now, in enjoyment of its millennial 
glory, then the largest terms of supremacy that can be 
brought out of the Apocalypse may be interpreted 
literally. Its earthly head will be King of Kings and 
Lord of Lords. 

All these elements together (a) the doctrine of a 
religion using the force of a compelle intrare, which must 
give to the Church some claim to dictate what shall be 
persecuted as heresy ; (b) the doctrine of justice as 
necessary to a State, together with S. Augustine s 
glosses, leading to a control of all law for spiritual ends ; 
(c) the doctrine of the Church as a polity, as the millen 
nial Kingdom of Christ, implying a reigning authority 
will tend to develop a state of mind which will picture 
the Civitas Dei as a christianised Church-State, from which 
unbelievers are excluded, and which would claim, directly 
or indirectly, the supreme power in that State for the 
leaders of the hierarchy. If we add to this the effects of 



8o THE CITY OF GOD 

the Church s long continuance in a concentration upon 
earthly activities, the development of vast adminis 
trative machinery, the fact that she became to the 
conquering barbarians the symbol and the source of all 
culture, we are well on our way to such a conception 
of church-power as was represented by Innocent III. 



THE DE CIVITATE DEI IN THE MIDDLE AGES 

So far we have been trying to find out what S. Augustine 
meant to himself. In these two closing lectures I want 
to consider what later ages have made of him. This 
is not easy. Students, and students alone, have sufficient 
data for a judgment concerning the practical influence 
of a book. Yet that often makes them bad judges. 
Living among books they are apt to over-estimate their 
significance. They may attribute to a book results 
which are due to many other causes. If we mean by 
the influence of the De Civitate Dei that it caused 
people to think or to do things which, except for it 
they would not have thought or done, the problem of 
estimating that influence is hard to solve. As a rule 
no single cause is adequate, but many causes combine 
to produce a practical result of any historical importance. 
Commonly a book, however influential, is never more 
than a secondary cause. Rousseau did not produce 
the French Revolution, however highly you rate his 
influence. That was the consequence of forces that 
had been active for a long time. Rousseau may have 
lit the match set fire to the powder magazine. He 
did not make the powder. 

So with the De Civitate Dei. Vast is its influence ; 
still we must beware of the negative proposition, that if 
it had not been written, the course of mediaeval history 
would have been materially different. It might have 
been. But it would be hard to prove this. 



82 THE CITY OF GOD 

There is another way in which the problem is diffi 
cult a way in which the problem about the influence 
of Voltaire or Rousseau is not difficult. Literally 
immeasurable has been the influence of S. Augustine 
in moulding the mind of Western Europe. So deeply 
has it entered into our life, that it is not possible to 
say where his influence begins and where it ends. For 
the medieval world he summed up so much of their 
heritage from the ancient world he was so large a 
conduit-pipe that it is hard to say where the stream 
did not penetrate. His characteristic theological doctrine 
is so universal and of such immense import in the West, 
that it is easy to over-estimate it in comparison with 
others. 

The problem of Augustine s political or semi-political 
influence is a little easier. It is more sharply defined. 
Yet even here it is hard to disentangle the threads : or 
to be sure that what we see at work is the mind of 
S. Augustine, and not other causes. Add to this the 
additional difficulty which is created by the mediaeval 
habit of citing names and stock quotations merely to 
fortify itself, perhaps too with little acquaintance with 
a writer s mind. 

Perhaps it is safer to say that we are examining the 
prevalence of certain ideals, of which S. Augustine was, 
or was believed to be, the exponent ; and that therefore 
presumably had to do with their prevalence. Even 
Troeltsch, who is all for treating S. Augustine as above 
everything an ancient, admits his importance for the 
future as being the founder of the first great Kultur- 
Ethik of Christendom. To-day I shall try and estimate 
his influence in the Middle Ages, and in the last lecture 
I shall deal with later times. All that can be attempted 
is to take certain characteristic illustrations from the 
earlier, the middle and the later period. 

Einhard was the biographer and son-in-law of Charle 
magne. I see no objection to calling him that we need 



<DE CIVITATE DEI IN MIDDLE AGES 83 

not be haunted by Freeman s ghost. In his personal 
description he tells us that Charlemagne was fond of 
reading, and more especially was devoted to the books 
of S. Augustine s De Civitate Dei. We cannot treat 
this statement as being without significance. Doubtless 
Charles felt that the portrait of a Christian prince drawn 
in the Fifth Book and known as The Mirror of Princes/ 
was the portrait of the kind of prince he would like to 
be ( De Civitate/ V. 24) : 

1 The State and Truth of a Christian Emperor s Felicity. 
For we Christians do not say that Christian Emperors are 
happy because they have a long reign, or die leaving their 
sons in quiet possession of their empires, or have been ever 
victorious, or powerful against all their opposers. These are 
but gifts and solaces of this laborious, joyless life ; idolaters 
and such as belong not to God (as these Emperors do) may 
enjoy them ; because God in His mercy will not have these 
that know Him to believe that such things are the best 
goods He gives. But happy they are (say we) if they reign 
justly, free from being puffed up with the glossing exalta- 
"lionS-rbf their attendance or the cringes of their subjects; if 
they know themselves to be but men, and remember that ; 
if they make their power their trumpeter, to divulge the 
true adoration of God s majesty; if they love, fear and 
honour Him ; if they long most for that empire where they 
need not fear to have partners ; if they be slack to avenge, 
quick to forgive ; if they use correction for the public good, 
and not for private hate ; if their pardons promise not 
liberty of offending, but indeed only hope of reformation ; 
if they counterpoise their enforced acts of severity with the 
like weight of bounty and clemency ; if their lusts be the 
lesser, because they have the larger licence ; if they desire 
to rule their own effects, rather than others estates ; and 
if they do all things, not for glory, but for charity, and 
with all, and before all, give God the due sacrifice of prayer 
for their imperfections ; such Christian emperors we call 
happy, here in hope, and hereafter when the time we look 
for comes, indeed. 

We may go further. Charles would not think of 



84 THE CITY OF GOD 

himself as head of a Civitas terrena. He need not. He 
aimed at a realm in which Christ was King, in which the 
true God was worshipped, and none other ; a common 
wealth inspired by justice in the strict sense, including 
all the theological implications of S. Augustine. That 
is to say, the realm of imperial Charlemagne was a 
Christian Empire, the City of God on earth. Certainly 
Charles did not draw from this any doctrine of the 
political power of the Pope rather he deduced the 
rights of imperial oversight. We may be sure that he 
would not classify his realm under the second definition 
of the commonwealth, from which justice and religion 
are excluded. How could he ? He had baptised the 
Saxons at the point of the sword, and had summoned 
the Council of Frankfort. Proud as he may have been 
at being the successor of Augustus, he would regard 
himself yet more proudly as the successor of Constantine 
and Theodosius. Now Augustine (however you interpret 
him) never identified the Civitas Dei with any earthly 
State. But he had prepared the way for other people 
to do this. 

The Holy Roman Empire, as it developed, declared 
by its first title its claim to be the Civitas Dei on earth 
i.e. a true Catholic Commonwealth with two swords 
in all governing departments, the secular and the spiritual. 
Augustine could say Omnium Christianomm una res- 
publica est (XXV. i). 

Charlemagne, and still more the great Otto, would 
feel that they were undertaking to realise that maxim 
in actual life. That is the meaning of the imperial 
claim to be Lord of the World/ Lord Bryce declares 
that it is hardly too much to say that the Holy Roman 
Empire was built upon the foundation of the " De Civitate 
Dei. This statement goes too far, if by it we under 
stand anything that S. Augustine intended. Further, 
it underrates the other-worldly character of S. Augustine s 



DE CIVITATE DEI IN MIDDLE AGES 85 

own conception of the Civitas Dei. But it is no whit 
short of the truth, if we adopt that interpretation of 
the De Civitate Dei, and of the chapters upon justice 
as essential to a true republic, which I discussed in 
Lecture III. Remember too, that this the notion of 
the great State of the Middle Ages as the Civitas 
Dei has nothing to do with the question whether 
Augustine taught a doctrine of hierarchical domination 
or no. It is equally compatible with Caesar o-papism. 
The conception of the Holy Roman Empire as of the 
one Commonwealth of God could claim to realise the 
Augustinian ideal merely by its doctrine of the ecclesi 
astical position of the Emperor, who is a sacred person, 
Canon of S. Peter s, advocate and protector of the Church. 
What is capital for our purpose is the point which Lord 
Bryce emphasises, the religious character of the Holy 
Roman Empire. It is not the religious character of 
one section (the Church so-called) set over against the 
other. It is the whole people, as it is the whole of life, 
which is gathered into one great unity. To quote in 
substance from one authority, Engelbert of Admont, 1 
who will come again into question later on : 

" There is one and one only Commonwealth of the 
whole Christian people. Therefore there must necessarily 
be one and one only king and prince of that Commonwealth, 
ordained and constituted for the expansion and defence of 
that Faith and people." On which grounds Augustine con 
cludes that outside the Church there never was nor ever 
could be a true Empire, although there have been Emperors, 
qualitercunque et secundum quid, non simpliciter, who were 
outside the Catholic Faith and Church. 

The grandiose conception of organised human life, 
which was expressed in the Holy Roman Empire, was 
the origin of the attempts of theorists to secure a 
harmony. The Church and the State might serve as 
names for the two great departments, ecclesiastical 



86 THE CITY OF GOD 

and civil. In that way the word Church came to acquire 
one of its meanings one which has never quite gone 
from it as the equivalent of the clergy. But it is the 
Christian world as a whole, the whole body of Christian 
people throughout the world/ that is the entire Church, 
and makes up the entire Commonwealth. So much so, 
that towards the close of the Middle Ages one great 
and revolutionary scholastic, William of Ockham, could 
go further even than S. Augustine s phrase about all 
Christians making one commonwealth, and boldly declare 
that all men are one society. Omnes homines sunt 
unum corpus et unum collegium. As one writer put 
it, the regnum, the sacerdotium, the studium the State, 
the Church, the University were the rulers of the 
Commonwealth. This point is one which it is important 
to make clear before we proceed to the various con 
troversies between the two sets of officers, civil and 
spiritual. Whether you take the Imperialist or the 
Papalist view, as to which of these is to have the last 
word, whether you are Erastian or clericalist, you are 
equally within the limits and the circle of ideas of the 
De Civitate Dei, as it was interpreted to mean a great 
Church-State. Modern Erastianism is a bastard growth. 
It has nothing to do with the pure milk of the word 
dispersed by Thomas Liiber, who said that he was con 
sidering only a State in which one religion and one only 
was tolerated, and that the true one. But I must not 
linger over this. In earlier papers on Erastus on the 
Respublica Christiana I have tried to work it out 
in detail. 2 

Let us pass to some later illustrations. The con 
cordant government of the world by Pope and Emperor 
was an ideal. In practice there was a struggle for 
preponderance. The Papacy had sunk to its lowest 
in the tenth century. From that degradation the 
Saxon Emperors rescued it. The friendship between 
Otto the Third and Pope Sylvester II (Gerbert) did for 



<DE CIVITATE DEI IN MIDDLE AGES 87 

a moment realise the ideal. They write ecstatically 
to one another : Nostrum, nostrum est imperium 
Romanum. Once more the Papacy drooped. The 
Franconian kings began to lift it from the dust. After 
the Synod of Sutri in 1046 and the deposition of Pope 
Gregory VI at the bidding of Henry III, the Cluniac 
revival spread through Western Europe, and its greatest 
representative assumed the tiara as Gregory VII. The 
conflict that had long been preparing now broke forth. 
After a brief space of amity with the weak and vicious 
Henry IV, Gregory launched the excommunication, 
and the long war began. Nowadays we are bidden 
not to call it the Investiture Controversy, though that 
is no bad name for the first phase, which ended with the 
Concordat of Worms in 1122. Here more than any 
where can we trace the influence of S. Augustine. Dr. 
Mirbt has examined all the literature. 3 In an interesting 
tractate he has shown how on every kind of topic 
S. Augustine s authority was invoked. In the Libelli 
de Lite/ which make up three volumes of the Monu 
ment a Germaniae Historica/ we have an ample pamphlet 
literature. Augustine is used as an authority by both sides. 

It should be said that it is doubtful how far many 
of the disputants had read the De Civitate Dei. Mirbt 
has made it clear that in this as in other matters they 
used collections of passages. One such collection is 
known. Probably there were others. 4 

The use of Augustine by both sides is evidence to 
justify what I said earlier, that the question of the 
influence of the ideal of the De Civitate Dei is irrelevant 
to the topic of its clericalist or regalist interpretation. 
Obviously Augustine can be made use of by clericalists. 
But when we remember that the Empire is regarded 
as the Commonwealth of which Christ is King, and that 
it is by no means certain whether Augustine could set 
Pope above King in any political sense, we need not be 
surprised that some of Hildebrand s adversaries made 



88 THE CITY OF GOD 

as much play with Augustine s name as did his supporters. 
One treatise among many, the De Unitate Ecclesiae/ 5 
written after the death of Gregory VII, we may take 
as an illustration. It is strongly imperialist. A passion 
ate appeal for unity alike in Church and Empire, it is 
an argument in favour of the anti-pope. With arguments 
drawn from the maxim remota justitia quid regna nisi 
magna latrocinia, the Hildebrandine party is condemned 
for the deposition of Henry IV. (The writer appears 
to separate ecclesia from regnum. That may be because 
he takes ecclesia in the narrow sense as equivalent to 
the clergy.) Many and long are the citations from the 
De Civitate Dei. The writer quotes the Mirror of 
Princes at length, and shows that he has no doubt 
about the relevancy of the book to the controversy. 

In Hildebrand himself we find but little use of 
S. Augustine. One of his earlier letters shows that he 
was imbued with a conception of the relations of Pope 
and Emperor, which could preserve the unity of the 
ancient ideal. The most famous letter of all points 
the other way. Hildebrand revives what had fallen 
into disuse the non-Christian way of treating the 
secular State. The famous letter 6 (it is really a tract) 
to Hermann of Metz is akin to Augustine s account of 
the lust of power, as being one of the chief contributary 
causes to the growth of the terrene state. Hackneyed 
as is the quotation, it is needful here : 

Who/ he asks, is ignorant that kings and princes had 
their origin in those who, ignorant of God and covering them 
selves with pride, violence and perfidy, in fact nearly every 
crime, under the inspiration of the devil, the prince of this 
world, claimed to rule over their peers, i.e. men, in blind lust 
and intolerable arrogance. 

It is hard to suppose that Gregory was ignorant of 
the De Civitate Dei/ though the only passage from 
Augustine s writings which he quotes in this letter 
is from the De Doctrina Christiana/ 



<DE CIVITATE DEI IN MIDDLE AGES 89 
Another passage is even more noteworthy : 

It would really be more fitting to speak of good Chris 
tians as Kings, than to call bad princes so. The former in 
seeking the glory of God rule themselves. The latter seeking 
their own lusts are enemies to themselves and tyrants to 
others. The former are the body of that true King, Christ ; 
the latter are the body of their father the devil. 

This suggests Tyconius. 

Hildebrand, thinking of rulers in an ascending feudal 
hierarchy, could not make any special exception for 
royalty, and was justified by the facts of the eleventh 
century. Much that he said was due to his thinking 
of phenomena which were* before his eyes. Yet in these 
two passages there is a very distinctive mark, as of the 
two cities. Also it is one of the rare mediaeval passages 
which speak of civil government as equivalent to nothing 
better than the civitas terrena ; though even here it is 
not civil government itself, but the actual personal 
wickedness of kings and princes that is condemned. 
Moreover, even the letter which was called out by the 
stress of the collision with Henry IV did not represent 
Gregory s whole mind. In an earlier letter he had 
spoken in the usual way of two coordinate and fraternal 
powers. In his letters to William I and other kings 
he seemed ready enough to adopt a high view of secular 
authority, provided that it is always duly subordinate 
to the spiritual. 7 

On the whole the controversial literature of the day 
witnesses to the enormous dependence on S. Augustine ; 
and this dependence is greater in some of the other 
writers than it is in Hildebrand himself. 

Let us pass from this to a different atmosphere, less 
clouded with controversy. The Concordia Discordantium 
Canorum or Decretum of Gratian (1139), although 
it is printed foremost in the Corpus Juris Canonici/ 



9 o THE CITY OF GOD 

is not an authoritative work. Unlike the Decretale 
of Gregory IX a century later, or the Sext of Boni 
face VIII, it is not definitely promulgated law though 
it must be remembered that even these decretals are, 
in the Bulls which promulgated them, merely addressed 
to the University of Bologna, and not promulgated 
to the judges in the Courts Christian. Gratian s work 
is like the Institutes of Coke immense in influence 
but not official. It gives no legal authority to any text 
in it. Yet its importance is little less than if it were 
official. Anyhow it is evidence of the way in which 
the legal mind of that day looked at these matters. 
In this book we are in a different atmosphere. If 
you take the conflict between Popes and Emperors 
as a whole, what establishes itself is the influence of 
S. Augustine upon both sides, owing to the universal 
belief in the Empire as a Christian commonwealth, the 
embodiment of true justice, i.e. to the general repudia 
tion of the second or minimising definition (Augustine s 
own) of a respublica. The mediaeval Church was a 
State is a common saying. Yet more true is it to say 
that the mediaeval State was a Church at least in ideal ; 
for the ideal was the Holy Empire with its twin heads, 
the smaller semi-national states being altogether on a 
lower level, like duchies. 

The Decretum of Gratian is concerned not so 
much with the ideal of a Catholic Commonwealth, as 
with the supremacy of the ecclesiastical element over 
the civil. Gratian s work is more than what it seems 
a compilation, more even than a law book. It is designed 
to make law by declaring it ; it is a politico-ecclesiastical 
pamphlet, and mirrors the life and thought of the day. 
Its fundamental thesis, the subordination of civil to 
ecclesiastical authority, is stated at the outset. In 
Distinction X Gratian lays down in his own words that 
the constitutions of princes do not prevail over ecclesi 
astical constitutions ; that the tribunals of kings are 



DE CIVITATE DEI IN MIDDLE AGES 91 

subject to the sacerdotal power. This statement might 
conceivably be explained to refer only to matters of 
spiritual import, and in emergency could be so explained. 
But Gratian meant more than that. His object was to 
make a law book for the Church that should be parallel 
with the Corpus Juris Civilis/ His work was executed 
at Bologna, the home of the great Romanist revival : it 
emanated from the chair which Professor Galante 
holds to-day. If the Pope were truly sovereign, the 
halting references to spiritual authority in the civil 
law even those conditioned by the maxim that the 
Emperor was the source of all law might have some 
thing set over against them. Justinian might begin 
his code with the title De Summa Trinitate et Fide 
Catholica. That would have been enough, and more 
than enough, to satisfy S. Augustine. But Justinian 
himself had asserted an imperial supremacy in theological 
controversies which the Church in the West would not 
admit. 

Here, however, we are concerned with nothing but 
S. Augustine s political influence. Of the citations 
which make up the Decretum/ 530 come from his 
writings. Only about a dozen are out of the De Civitate 
Dei. Many of them are of no importance. Some 
are of incalculable import. Comparatively little use 
may be made of the De Civitate Dei ; but this lack 
is more than made up by the quotations from the treatises 
against the Donatists. In vulgar journalese, the author 
has gutted the anti-Donatist treatises of S. Augustine 
(c. xxiii. q. iv. 37-44). The section dealing with persecu 
tion is largely made up from them. Skilful but not 
unfair use is made of S. Augustine s concessions. We 
have, it is true, no right to say that Augustine would 
have approved the capital punishment of heretics or of 
the mediaeval inquisition (which was later than Gratian). 
But, as we saw, Augustine admitted the use of com 
pulsion, and argued that the only reason why it was 



92 THE CITY OF GOD 

not employed by the early Christians was their numeri 
cal weakness. Another passage often thought to be 
an anticipation of the original contract occurs in the 
Confessions/ and is given by Augustine from Cicero, 
Generale pactum humanae societatis obedire regibus. It is 
S. Augustine again (in his sermon on the Centurion s son) 
who is cited in justification of lawful war (c. xxiii. i. 2) 
together with three other passages. The Decretum 
of Gratian is one of the most important elements in the 
construction of mediaeval society. The use it makes of 
Augustine s maxims in all political and semi-political 
matters is decisive as to his influence. 

After this it may seem needless to allude to a merely 
literary effort. The Chronicon of Otto of Freisingen, 
the historian of Frederic Barbarossa, was mentioned 
in its place in discussing S. Augustine s philosophy of 
history. It is an interesting illustration of the twelfth 
century. Otto sets himself deliberately to relate the 
history of the world on the line of the De Civitate 
Dei with the help of Augustine and Orosius. The 
most interesting pieces are the prologues. In that 
prefixed to Book III there is a balanced and reflective 
estimate of the Praeparatio Evangelica/ as afforded 
by the universal empire of Rome. The prologue to 
Book IV contains a moderate statement of the imperialist 
position. There are two powers in the Church. Otto 
never puts out the idea of two distinct societies of Church 
and State, as was done in later times. It is with him 
(as always in the Middle Ages) a question of the balance 
of two powers in the same society. Christ desired the 
two swords to be in the hands of two different repre 
sentatives : He uses the render to Caesar to support 
the rights of the crown, and quotes the pertinent passage 
of S. Augustine addressed to the Donatists in which he 
laid down that property can be rightly possessed only 
by human law at the bidding of kings, who are of divine 
appointment. Kings he holds to reign by the ordination 



DE CIVITATE DEI IN MIDDLE AGES 93 

of God and the election of the people, and Constantine 
with the approval of the Church ecclesiae juste regalia 
contulisse. 

In the prologue to Book V he admits that the two 
cities have coalesced into one the Church, with its 
content of tares and wheat. 

Henceforward, since not merely every nation, but the 
princes also with few exceptions, became Catholics, I seem 
to myself to have composed the history no longer of two 
cities, but almost entirely of one i.e. which I call the 
Church. For I should not, as before, speak of these two 
cities, as two (since the elect and the reprobate are now in 
one home), but strictly as one, but of a mixed sort as grain 
together with chaff. 

In the prologue to Book VI, after lamenting the 
arrogance of the hierarchy who seek to strike the kingdom 
with that sword, which they only hold through the 
favour of kings, he goes on to say that he must not be 
taken as intending to separate the Empire from the 
Church, since in the Church of God the two functions, 
the sacerdotal and the regal, are known to exist ; and 
he refers to his previous statement, that the history 
now relates to one society only. In the prologue to 
Book VIII he once more repeats his acknowledgment 
to S. Augustine. This last book is occupied with 
discussion of the last things, like the later books of 
the De Civitate Dei. Following S. Augustine, Otto 
definitely rejects the Chiliastic doctrine, that our Lord 
will return for a terrestrial millennium and reign visibly 
in any sense in which He is not now reigning. This 
work alone is evidence of the way in which the great 
Christian Commonwealth can be regarded alike as 
Empire and Church, and is thought of as Civitas Dei. 

Let us go forward a century. In S. Thomas Aquinas 
the mediaeval world has its most authoritative state- 



94 THE CITY OF GOD 

ment, just as Dante gave it its imaginative symbol. 
The ordered intelligence of S. Thomas was different 
in the extreme from the highly emotional and stormy 
intellect of S. Augustine. In the writings of S. Thomas 
we have a minutely articulated system of mediaeval 
thought as it had come to be in the day of the supreme 
achievements of the Papacy. Born ten years after 
the death of Innocent III, S. Thomas lived through 
most of the latter phases of the Hohenstauffen struggle, 
more especially the Council of Lyons and the despotism 
of the stupor mundi et immutator mirabilis Frederic II. 
We do well to take him as the central point for the 
understanding of mediaeval thought. 

S. Thomas s system of politics is expressed in several 
places. First there is the commentary on Aristotle s 
* Politics. With that we are not concerned in this 
connection. There is the not inconsiderable discussion 
of fundamentals in politics in the Summa Theologica, 
ii. 2, qq. 90-109, and also in certain other passages of 
the same work anent heretics, and so forth. Lastly 
we have the little treatise De Regimine Principum. 
Of this only the first book and four chapters of the 
second are written by S. Thomas. The rest is by Ptolemy 
of Lucca. 

S. Thomas has been called the first Whig. His 
discussion of forms of government follows on Aristotle s. 
Of all that I make abstraction to-day. When you study 
him in detail you see that he develops his system 
in dependence on three main authorities Scripture, 
Aristotle, and Augustine. I do not know how many 
times S. Augustine is cited in the Summa, but I should 
suppose it must be quoted thousands of times. In the 
parts which deal with politics, we find a great deal of 
dependence upon him. We do not hear of the doctrine 
of the two cities, for the obvious reason that it was no 
longer held to fit, now that the kingdom of this world 
had become the kingdom of our God and His Christ : 



DE CIVITATE DEI IN MIDDLE AGES 95 

and the other use of the terms (that maintained by 
Otto), to denote merely the elect and the reprobate, 
does not, strictly speaking, concern politics. 

S. Thomas quotes most from S. Augustine s De 
Libero Arbitrio, but we have important arguments 
drawn from the De Civitate Dei/ He makes much 
use of that definition the Ciceronian which makes 
justice the essence of a Stafe^Jii the passage" which 
justifies war (ii. 2, q. 40, i) no fewer than eight passages 
are adduced. Further on, in article 3, he argues, 
from Augustine s words in the De Civitate Dei/ that 
stratagems in warfare are legitimate. S. Thomas dis 
cusses whether it be right to carry the doctrine of the 
Christianity of the State so far as to make vice equivalent 
to crime. This he decides in the negative. He was too 
wise to want a Puritan tyranny. He does this on grounds 
derived entirely from S. Augustine. At the same time 
he disclaims any idea of treating Augustine as an infallible 
guide. On the treatment of heretics he bases his argu 
ment for persecution upon three passages of S. Augustine. 
Like Augustine also he condemns compulsion of the 
heathen. He even goes so far as to say that a Christian 
governor would be right to tolerate heathen ceremonies. 
A heretic or schismatic is an erring and rebellious child, 
and is therefore to be corrected. Quite other is the 
case of the Jew or the Pagan. His treatment of neigh 
bours lives and property is in line with S. Augustine, 
especially the remarkable passages in which he defends 
the social and industrial legislation of the Mosaic system, 
on the ground that it is all based on the idea of 
fellowship. 

Further evidence is to be found in the De Regimine 
Principum/ In treatment and manner it is unlike 
S. Augustine. But we find more than one reference to 
the De Civitate Dei/ especially the reproduction of the 
Mirror of Princes. Even more,, "relevant is the argu 
ment from ends. The true end ancT reward of a godly 



1 



g6 THE CITY OF GOD 

prince must be beyond this life. We have arguments 
much the same as those of S. Augustine, only applied 
rather to the prince than the respublica. In I, 14, 
there is a long and elaborate argument to show that 
the end of a well-governed commonwealth must be 
virtuous life, which leads to the fruition of God. Since 
the lord of the ultimate end must obviously direct those 
who are concerned only with subordinate ends, the 
Roman pontiff must have the ultimate authority over 
Christian kings, just as among the ancient Gauls the 
Druids held the control. 

It is interesting, and for our purpose not imper 
tinent, to go on with the book and consider the later 
parts written by Ptolemy of Lucca. They are fair 
evidence of the mediaeval ideals and were written not 
much later. Here we have a direct and continuous 
dependence on the De Civitate Dei/ It is not merely 
a question of the influence of ideas, but of the following 
of the book. References to it are numerous. Many 
arguments are drawn from it. S. Augustine is the 
writer s acknowledged authority for the claim that 
the Romans were entrusted with the dominion of the 
world as a reward for their virtue ; and Christians are 
bidden to imitate this self-sacrifice. From S. Augustine 
is cited the interpretation of the words about the image 
and superscription of Caesar ; that the image of Caesar 
was (as it were) the image of God. Ptolemy accepts 
Augustine s account of the difference between despotic 
and properly political power, arguing that the former 
would never have been known but for sin. The writer 
seems to have had the aim of harmonising Aristotle and 
Augustine. We need not follow him in his description 
of the Empire or in his criticism of ancient constitutions. 
All that we need observe is this, that in this book, which 
is a moderate but definite expression of the hierarchical 
theory of the State, we have ample evidence that the 
influence of S. Augustine was not merely an universally 



<DE CIVITATE DEI IN MIDDLE AGES 97 

pervading force in the Middle Ages, but was consciously 
adopted and felt. 

Towards the close of the Middle Ages we can still 
trace the direct influence of S. Augustine in political 
thought. One writer (I think a Frenchman) arguing 
in favour of national States, at a time when the imperial 
authority was no more than a name, at least in France, 
makes free use of the passage in the De Civitate Dei 
which maintains the value of a multitude of small societies. 

Dante s De Monarchia is the best known, as it 
is the most impressive, of the accounts of the Holy 
Roman Empire. It is, as you know, Ghibelline, i.e. 
Imperialist, and is designed to show that the Emperor 
holds his sceptre by grace of God immediately, not 
mediately through the Pope. The claim was not new. 
Henry IV made it against Hildebrand. So also did the 
Hohenstauffen. Dante s grandiose conception is still 
that of the mediaeval unity a great world Church-State. 
I do not think that the book as a whole can be said to 
depend on S. Augustine. But it is hardly possible not 
to suspect that the second book did owe much to the 
De Civitate Dei. In that book Dante proves that 
the Empire of the world was given to the Romans for 
all time, as a reward of virtue. It is noticeable that 
Dante quotes the De Civitate Dei once. 

Very interesting is the book On the Origin and 
Progress of the Roman Empire, from which a quota 
tion has already been made. It is by Engelbert, 
Abbot of Admont, in Austria. 8 The writer founds his 
argument to a large extent on the De Civitate 
Dei. Most of the book is little more than a com 
ment on this. It was written at the time (1310) of 
the last strictly mediaeval revival of the Empire under 
Henry of Luxemburg, and after the final defeat of the 
Hohenstauffen, i.e. about the same time as Dante s 
book. The writer had to face the existing conditions, 



9 8 THE CITY OF GOD 

with the de facto independence of France. Therefore 
he takes into account S. Augustine s view that the world 
would fare better under a number of independent com 
munities, joined in one bond of harmony and respecting 
each other. This he counters in the following argument. 
Such, he says, is the mutual jealousy between nations, 
that no such harmony is to be looked for. The only 
chance of peace is for the world to become one State. 
The argument has reference mainly to Catholic Chris 
tendom in the West. One remarkable passage takes 
into account the existence of non-Christian States. 
They, he says, are equally bound by national law and 
must recognise the principle of justice which is suum 
cuique tribuere. In other words the principle at the 
bottom of international amity is seen to be the maxim 
to love one another, which is supposed to govern the 
human race. This is not far from the maxim of 
William of Ockham, which was a little later, that all 
men compose one society. What for our purpose is 
most noteworthy is the author s view, that Christianity 
has now become the law of the greater part of the 
world, and a Christian Empire is therefore the ideal. 

One most interesting passage is of prophetic import. 
Arguing, as Engelbert did, in favour of the imperial 
ideal at a time when the most progressive States of Europe 
had freed themselves and the national monarchies were 
being consolidated, he declares that the unity of the 
Holy Roman Empire is two-fold, both secular and 
ecclesiastical, and that if the nations withdraw them 
selves from recognition of the Emperor, it will not be 
long before they throw off allegiance to the Pope. 

Even more prophetic are the writings of Wyclif 
Wyclif is enormously dependent on S. Augustine. He 
develops that other side in Augustine s conception of the 
Church which was at times conveniently ignored by the 
clericalists that which insists on its primary application 
to the elect and no one else. He does this with conscious 



<DE CIVITATE DEI IN MIDDLE AGES 99 

use of S. Augustine. This leads straight to the doctrine 
of the Invisible Church. 

Finally, he uses S. Augustine to support his radical 
Erastianism. From him he develops the doctrine that 
the clergy must always be subordinate to the civil power, 
for royalty represents the fatherhood of God and the 
priesthood the sonship. He cites S. Augustine in regard 
to the image and superscription of Caesar. Wyclif was 
the most thoroughgoing Erastian who ever lived. He 
wrote after Marsilius of Padua, and was probably in 
fluenced by the Defensor Pacis with its programme 
of democratic Erastianism. Most of Wyclif s works 
are a plea for the disendowment of the Church. The 
De Dominio Civili is not mainly a treatise on politics, 
as its name might seem to imply. It is concerned with 
property, and especially with corporate property. Wyclif 
wants the Church to be disendowed. Then, he says, 
the lords, having more lands, will have less motive to 
oppress the poor. In the Speculum Militantis Ecclesiae 
he treats of the Church as equivalent to the common 
wealth, and declares that it consists of the lords, the 
clergy and the labouring classes ! 9 His doctrine of 
dominion founded on grace is intended to argue that 
property has duties as well as rights, i.e. that the right 
of private property is not absolute. That indeed was 
the view of S. Thomas and S. Augustine. It was the 
Roman pagan conception of absolute property that 
triumphed at the close of the Middle Ages. This idea, 
which is the foundation of modern capitalism, led at 
the time to further attempts to depress the peasants 
into slavery. It has been fraught with a thousand 
evils, from which even now the world is slowly and with 
many struggles trying to recover. The reception/ as 
it is called, of Roman Law in 1495 in Germany may be 
taken as the date when the Middle Ages came to an end 
and the Roman ideas of property had conquered the 
West. 



ioo THE CITY OF GOD 

The great mediaeval unity was always largely an 
ideal. Still it was the ideal. It was a unity of religion, 
of government, of economics, of morals, of social life 
and of outward culture. This unity, if not determined 
by S. Augustine, owed much to his influence. It was 
not the direct or intended result of his writing. He 
spoke, indeed, of things not being so bad as people 
thought, of a possible revival of the Roman power. 
For this he has been blamed. It is said he showed lack 
of prescience. But was it so ? The actual Roman 
Empire lasted in the West for more than half a century 
after S. Augustine s death. Then came the Ostrogothic 
kingdom of Theodoric. That too vanished. Justinian s 
conquest is not to be ignored. Why should it be ? 

Augustine did not foresee the Holy Roman Empire 
of the German people, or the cry of Gerbert to Otto III, 
Nostrum, nostrum est imperium Romanum. Yet such 
a phrase may be held to have justified his words. For 
it was the Roman ideal that stood for peace and culture 
in those troublous times. 

Easier is it to trace this influence in the doctrine of 
the whole world as the Civitas Dei, connecting this with 
S. Augustine s undoubted belief in the unity and universal 
mission of the Church, and his assimilation of it to a 
society. 

Easier still is it to trace his influence in the other 
worldly reference which lay behind all mediaeval develop 
ments, in the growth of Western monasticism with its 
characteristic qualities, with the widespread acceptance 
of his principle of property. 

Some would trace to S. Augustine the whole develop 
ment of the Papal power. This was hardly a legitimate 
development, but not at all impossible. 

Clearly we cannot understand the Middle Ages on 
this political and social side without Augustine. He it 
is who helped much to make the Western world compact. 



VI 

THE DE CIVITATE DEI IN LATER DAYS 

THE mediaeval unity was the grandest attempt in human 
history to base the structure of institutions upon 
righteousness, political, social and economic, no less than 
religious. When this unity broke up, a new world as 
Luther said came into being. It might seem as though 
the ideals connected with the mediaeval projection of 
the Civitas Dei were gone beyond recall. That is true 
only partially. The break up of the ancient order did 
destroy this idea for Europe as a whole. Take such 
works as the Utopia of Sir Thomas More and the 
* II Principe of Macchiavelli. We can see how men s 
dreams were changed no less than the facts. The 
Renaissance appeared to have put an end to all such 
hopes as those which animated S. Thomas. 

Macchiavelli s remorseless study of the facts of the 
inter-state scramble in Italy is more remarkable for 
what it leaves out than for what it puts in. The con 
ception of natural law has vanished. The passion of 
nationality furnishes the one ideal. In the moving and 
pathetic eloquence of the last chapter he cries for a 
saviour, who shall do for distressed Italy what other 
saviours have done for their people. 

If, as I said, in order to show the valour of Moses it was 
necessary for the people of Israel to be enslaved in Egypt ; 
and, for the magnanimity of Cyrus to be seen, it was needful 
for the Persians to be oppressed by the Medes ; and, to 
illustrate the excellence of Theseus, the Athenians had to 



102 THE CITY OF GOD 

be dispersed : so now, for the virtue of an Italian spirit to 
be seen, it was needful that Italy should be reduced to the 
state in which she now is, and to be more enslaved than 
were the Hebrews, more oppressed than the Persians, more 
scattered than the Athenians, without head, without order, 
beaten, dispirited, lacerated, hunted, and in fact enduring 
every kind of ruin. 

Nothing can be nobler than Macchiavelli s desire for 
a redeemer of his people. But of justice, whether in 
the internal government or in the external relations of 
a people, he took no thought. Everything is reason of 
state. 

Savonarola s ideal for Florence, to be a godfearing 
city with a true democracy, had been given a trial. 
It had failed. With this failure, so far as the Italian 
States were concerned, there disappeared all efforts at 
ideal politics, until in the nineteenth century Macchia 
velli s ideals triumphed by Macchiavelli s own methods. 
Italy became united under the headship of Victor 
Emmanuel and the astute diplomacy of Cavour. There 
was a man after Macchiavelli s heart. He had his 
reward. 

In Europe as a whole the Reformation destroyed 
the last hopes of a united Christendom. The Balance 
of Power became the guiding-star of statesmen. From 
the League of Cambrai to the Partition of Poland was 
a natural development. We too have seen it even go 
further. Acton said Calvin preached, and Bellarmin 
lectured, but Macchiavelli reigned. Here, however, 
a faint shadow of the old ideal can be discerned in the 
ideas and principles which underlay modern International 
Law. 

In regard to both these developments it is possible to 
trace the influence, if not the direct ancestry of ideas, 
to S. Augustine. 

It has been thought that the second definition of a 
commonwealth in the De Civitate Dei, that in which 



THE DE CIVITATE DEI IN LATER DAYS 103 

the ideas of justice and religion do not appear, may 
have had something to do with the development of the 
non-moral doctrine of the State. It is doubtful how 
far this can be proved. This much is clear. Augustine 
emphasised the aim of the terrene State as being earthly 
peace and no more. This limitation has much to do 
with the rapidly developing theory of the secular State. 
That was developed largely by the Jesuits, in order the 
better to exalt the Church, the Respublica Christiana. 
Jesuit writers and others on that side developed frankly 
a doctrine of the civil State as being purely secular and 
having no ends that were not material. It can have to 
do with higher ideals only in so far as it is directed to 
these ends by the supreme religious guide. That is the 
principle of Bellarmin developed frankly and without 
disguise. This is different from the principles of writers 
like Augustinus Triumphus at the end of the Middle 
Ages, or of Bozius in the sixteenth century. These 
definitely make the whole world a single State, of which 
the Pope as King of Kings and Lord of Lords is head. 
Bellarmin s doctrine of the indirect power of the Papacy 
allows to the civil State a being and purpose of its own. 
On one side it is frankly secular. The State of the 
Jesuits, when once it threw off its ecclesiastical tutelage, 
would be rnore, not less, indifferent in matters of 
religion more also than was the old pagan State. 

The distinction on which all this argument depends 
unfortunately comes through S. Augustine. We saw 
that he was not always thinking of politics. Yet it 
remains true that the whole conception of the State as 
Civitas terrena is precisely what enabled the Jesuits to 
set up their doctrine of the civil State. Since also it 
virtually coincided with the doctrine of pure politics, 
which emerged at the Renaissance, it helped to produce 
our general modern notions. 

On the other hand the influence of Augustine on the 
growth of International Law is certain. That he laid 



104 THE CITY OF 

down principles which might prove fruitful, if they were 
needed, cannot be denied. The conception of a world 
of equal States living in harmony and exchanging mutual 
services we owe to his mind, -expressed in the passage 
about a world consisting of small States. We cannot 
say that the founders of International Law depended 
upon S. Augustine. In Albericus Gentilis, De Jure 
Belli/ there are no citations from the De Civitate Dei/ 
In the great work of Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pacis/ 
Augustine is frequently cited. This need not mean 
much. Here and there important arguments are based 
on these quotations. Yet so many authorities are 
adduced that it is hard to attribute priority to any 
single one. The avowed doctrine of Grotius is Natural 
Law. Certainly that is in S. Augustine, but Grotius 
did not take it from him. Still the general conceptions 
which are to be found in the De Civitate Dei/ of the 
mitigation of warfare through Christianity, of the sense 
of a common bond between nations, the insistence upon 
justice, the bitter condemnation of a policy of mere 
conquest all these were among the many influences 
that helped to keep alive some flickering brands of Chris 
tendom, implying something better than the law of 
the beasts/ I am not certain that we can say more. 
The great ideal of a world ruled by justice had gone. 
If, however, the nations, now definitely recognised as 
sovereign and independent, should ever come to concord, 
they might point to the passage of which I have so often 
spoken, as laying down the ideal of world-politics in a 
body of States independent but mutually concordant. 

So much for Christendom and the great State. When 
we come to reduce the scale, the story is different. In 
the narrower field of compact territorial sovereignty, 
governments were not necessarily irresponsive to the 
same ideals that we saw embodied in the Holy Roman 
Empire. Moreover, during the long period of the wars 
of religion until at least 1609, when the Dutch won their 



THE DE CIVITATE DEI IN LATER DAYS 105 

long truce, and in a less degree until 1648, when absolute 
differences of religion were guaranteed at the Peace of 
Westphalia, the idea of some sort of Christendom survived. 
The State, as conceived by the Renaissance, the embodi 
ment of power and nothing but power, did not triumph 
finally, except later on in Prussia. That was prevented 
by the Reformation, with its emphasis on theocratic 
and scriptural ideas of government. 

In the first place, the concentrated territorialism of 
the new States in Germany made the unity of religion 
with them a feasible aim a Lutheran could leave a 
Calvinist State and live elsewhere still under the same 
Kultur/ So much so that one elector could say that 
his subjects consciences belonged to him/ What 
triumphed everywhere was Erastianism the lay power 
in a Christian State ruling over the clerical. Luther 
did not desire a State religiously heterogeneous. He 
did not desire a State founded on power alone. Luther 
and Melanchthon desired to transfer to civic and family 
life all the consecration of aim associated heretofore with 
monastic devotion. Erastus himself declared that he 
was considering the case of a State in which one religion 
and one only was tolerated, and that the true one. The 
control of the inner life of the Church by a Parliament, 
which might be composed of Jews, Turks, infidels and 
heretics/ was the last thing that Erastus contemplated. 
What he desired was to take all coercive authority out 
of the hands of the clergy, and transfer it to the civil 
magistrate. Stubbs says of Henry VIII that he would 
be the Pope, the whole Pope and something more than 
the Pope/ referring to the jurisdiction. The movement 
was a layman s movement, not in itself anti-religious. 
Its ideal is the godly prince/ Its State is a common 
wealth in which Christ is King, no whit less than was 
the mediaeval theocracy. All through the period of the 
Reformation this ideal expresses itself. 

With this expression there grew a more explicit 



106 THE CITY OF GOD 

recognition of the Commonwealth and the Church as 
two aspects of the same society. This doctrine was 
not confined to men of any especial opinion. It is the 
doctrine of Luther and Musculus and of John Knox, 
but also of Whitgift and Laud and the more extreme 
Gallican lawyers in France, but not of Bossuet. We 
in England have this doctrine enshrined for ever by the 
serene and gracious intelligence of Hooker. Nothing 
could be clearer than his statement : 

When we oppose the Church, therefore, and the Com 
monwealth in a Christian society, we mean by the Common 
wealth that society with relation unto all the public affairs 
thereof, only the matter of true religion excepted ; by the 
Church the same society with only reference unto the matter 
of true religion, without any other affairs besides ; when 
that society which is both a Church and a Commonwealth 
doth flourish in these things which belong to it as a Common 
wealth, we then say the Commonwealth doth flourish ; 
when in the things which concern it as a Church, the Church 
doth flourish ; when in both, then the Church and the 
Commonwealth flourish together/ (Hooker, Ecclesiastical 
Polity, viii. 15 ; Works, iii. 420.) 

The opposite doctrine of the two kingdoms, as found 
in Hooker s adversary, Thomas Cartwright, is greeted 
by Whitgift with surprise as a strange monstrous birth. 
This doctrine, that of Church and State as two distinct 
societies, was developed by Huguenots in France, by 
Independents like Robert Browne in his treatise Refor 
mation without tarrying for any (any meaning the civil 
magistrate), but above all by the second generation of 
Presbyterians. It might be alleged by the Presbyterians 
that their doctrine was more akin to S. Augustine than 
that of the Middle Ages. No more than S. Augustine 
did the Presbyterians leave the State free in the interests 
of religion, but demanded that the Prince should use 
force to direct men for their good. The famous words of 



THE DE CIVITATE DEI IN LATER DAYS 107 

Andrew Melville to James I in 1606 are a classical 
expression of it. 

It was, however, the earlier doctrine that long ruled 
the conception of the State as in sort a Church inside 
a compact unitary State. The argument for unity 
which in the Middle Ages had been employed partly 
on behalf of the Emperor, but more effectively on that 
of the Pope, could now be made the ground for treating 
the civil power as over all persons and in all causes 
supreme. This principle of religious unity as a founda 
tion of the Commonwealth and the only possible source 
of justice, was proclaimed by people of widely different 
opinions. In France we have the une loi, un roi, une foi 
of pamphleteers like Louis d Orleans. This cry produced 
the conversion of Henri Quatre, and ultimately the 
revocation of the Edict of Nantes, parallel with the 
assertion of extreme royalism in the Gallican Articles 
of 1682 and the threat to break off from Rome. On the 
other side we have Erastus proclaiming that there could 
be no coercive authority in the spiritual power, hinting 
that if necessary the prince could teach and administer 
the sacraments, developing into the doctrine of the 
Lord s Anointed as a persona mixta, partly lay, partly 
ecclesiastical. A little later we see it expressed in the 
absolutism of Hobbes ; and symbolised on his famous 
frontispiece. On the largest scale we see Hooker apply 
ing it to a nation-state. But it is not confined to that. 
Anabaptists are often treated as mere anarchists. That 
is only one side of them. The constructive governing 
side was shown in the attempt to secure a State inspired 
in every detail by Christian principles. Knipperdolling, 
the King, as he was called, of Minister, put this into 
practice. It is adumbrated in the Restitution of 
Rothmann, who argues against the Chiliasts and in favour 
of a Kingdom of Christ on earth now, thus recalling 
S. Augustine. 

Calvin at Geneva and the Puritan polities illustrate 



io8 THE CITY OF GOD 

the same principle. The reign of the saints, so called, 
was but the counterpart, on the narrower scale, of the 
doctrine of the rule of Christ in a truly just republic 
of that rule which the Canonists and Ultramontanes 
gave to the Pope. 

Let us take a literary expression of this. Nova 
Solyma/ which appeared in 1648, is an attempt to 
imagine the city of God upon earth, to build Jerusalem/ 
as the name implies. It is a work of amazing interest 
both for its educational and political ideals. Despite 
much that was irritating in his manner, Mr. Begley, 
who published a translation in 1902, has done service 
in recalling this didactic romance from limbo. Let me 
quote from an article in the Church Quarterly which I 
wrote on the topic in the following year. 



Puritanism, like nearly all ascetic ideals, had in it a 
strong Manichean bias. We know it chiefly by its enmities. 
It was active for destruction. It destroyed the monarchy, 
the aristocracy, and finally the representative system. It 
abolished the drama, it proscribed the Liturgy, it persecuted 
the bishops, it knocked down statues, overturned altars and 
shattered windows. It first abolished tyranny and then 
destroyed liberty and finally completed its career of devas 
tation by giving the coup de grace to itself. Few movements 
have been to all appearances more uniform in their destruc 
tive tendencies than was English political Puritanism. But 
it is no more right to judge Puritanism by its antipathies 
than it is Christianity. ... It is the constructive side of 
Puritanism that " Nova Solyma " expresses. . . . 

Puritanism at its best was constructive. Starting from 
the conception, made familiar to us all by Mr. James, of 
the twice-born soul, it desired to see a new " city of God " 
upon earth, in which, with whatever latitude for political 
and natural differences, the life of the Christian should be 
properly trained and guarded by a State directed by religious 
principles and acting solely from the highest aims. . . . 

This ideal of a Christian State in accordance with Puritan 
principles is the whole purpose of " Nova Solyma." ... It is 



THE DE CIVITATE DEI IN LATER DAYS 109 

the XVIIth Century Civitas Dei, as indeed its name implies. 
. . . Though Puritanism as a politico-religious party was 
not long in the ascendant, many of its governing ideas found 
their way into the more serious-minded of all classes, and 
have had a profound effect upon the national character. 
These or some of them will be found in " Nova Solyma," where 
we can learn that the Puritan was no Little Englander, no 
mere ascetic, no opponent of war, or hunting, or reading as 
such ; but that his ideal was a State governed on principles 
of righteousness, training its members body, mind, and 
spirit in all the faculties and sentiments which may 
minister to the efficiency and energy appropriate to the con 
duct of a Christian member of an orderly and self-controlling 
society. Religion since the Reformation, said Sir A. F. 
Hort, has been departmental, and given up the aim of 
controlling the whole of human life in the way that mediaeval 
Catholicism attempted. This is unfortunately to a certain 
extent true, but was not so always or in aim ; and such 
books as " Nova Solyma " are the proof of a broader ideal. 
(C.Q.R., Ivii. No. 113, Oct. 1903, 125-130.) 

That work is English. Take one which is not. 
Johann Valentin Andreae in Christianopolis affords 
a similar illustration. 1 Here, too, the main interest 
of the whole is in its ideals of education. But it is on 
a smaller scale and in every way inferior to Nova 
Solyma. Both of them show how deeply men s 
imaginations were affected by the doctrine of an ideal 
Christian Commonwealth. 

Let us now take instances from men of opposite 
political sympathies. The doctrine of the Divine 
Right of Kings/ on its religious as distinct from its 
legal and historical side, is an expression of the notion 
that the civil State ought to be a commonwealth of 
Christians, the Civitas Dei. It is this half-romantic, 
half-sacramental doctrine which consecrated to many 
the cause of the Stuarts. This religious side of the 
doctrine was as a rule stronger in England than in France. 



no THE CITY OF GOD 

Yet Bossuet s Politique Tiree de 1 Ecriture Sainte 
is a good illustration of it. Bossuet prided himself on 
this dull work which looked towards the past, although 
it must be admitted that Bossuet never merged the 
Church in the State, but always regarded them as two 
societies. It is well to take this work as an illustration. 
With the beginning of the eighteenth century the end 
had come, so far as this country was concerned. The 
Nonjuring schism had considerable importance It 
developed strongly in the minds of men like William 
Law (in his letters to Hoadly) the doctrine of the 
Church, as a society in itself distinct from the State, 
though it might be composed of the same persons. Each 
body was, in the later phrase of Leo XIII, a societas 
genere et jure perfecta. The Bangorian controversy 
which was aroused by Hoadly s sermon The Kingdom 
of Christ/ showed the same notion in the religious sphere. 
Hoadly was dominated by the ancient notion which 
made the Church co-extensive with the nation ; and 
therefore desired the comprehension within it of any 
body and everybody. Sherlock and his other opponents 
asserted the distinctness and historic independence of 
the Church, and the incompetence of the civil power 
to control it. This tendency had been increased by 
other causes. The Toleration Act and the Union with 
Scotland destroyed the notion of a uniform religious 
State. True it left some basis, for the Toleration Act 
stopped short of Unitarianism or the Papacy, and the 
Scots refused to tolerate episcopacy. But now the 
Kingdom, united as never before, was not even pro 
fessedly uniform in religion. It boasted two different 
established churches. Naturally, this led to a resuscita 
tion, even among establishment Divines, of the doctrine 
of the two Societies. 

Warburton s Alliance between Church and State 
is a better book than many people think. It lays down 
that the two bodies are entirely distinct in nature* 



THE * DE CIVITATE DEI IN LATER DAYS in 

though they may be composed of the same individuals. 
But the State establishes a Church from a utilitarian, not 
from a religious motive. It is not the business of the State 
to seek the truth, but merely to take the religion of the 
majority of its members and establish that. As the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries proceeded, the old 
Augustinian doctrine of a Christian Church-State pre 
vailing in the Middle Ages, and through the Reformation, 
gradually disappeared. Toleration gave way to complete 
civil rights for Dissenters, Roman Catholics, Jews, and 
finally Atheists. It has been recently decided in the 
Courts that a bequest to a Free Thinking Association 
was legal. Religious heterogeneity is recognised as 
a principle of the modern State. In Mr. Gladstone s 
early book, The State in its Relations with the Church/ 
we find a last echo of the old view. But he does not 
contemplate, like Hooker, a single society. Rather, 
he treats the Church as the conscience of the State, 
and deprecates on that ground the admission of the 
Jews to full political rights. 

The notion of a theocracy has more and more receded 
from discussions on general politics. The notion of 
the principles of Christian ethics i.e. the golden rule, 
which is held by many non-Christians on different grounds 
as the governing doctrine of political and social justice, 
has tended to increase in importance. Not merely 
Christian socialism, but many more general doctrines 
of humanity, are content to argue that (in this sense) 
the world is or ought to be Christian, and its legislation 
ought to be framed according to the Jewish-Christian 
rule of fraternity. This tendency has been enhanced 
by the war. Many who before regarded Christianity 
as an effete system of impossible dogmas awakened to 
find that the real difference between the belligerents 
was nothing less than the prevalence of certain ethical 
ideals, of which the most eminent if not the only ex 
pression was the Christian system. Reconstruction, 



ii2 THE CITY OF GOD 

it is alleged, in order to be stable, must follow these 
lines whether applied to Europe as a whole in the 
relations between States, or to the domestic economy of 
peoples, or to the relations of classes. As the doctrine 
of absolute state-sovereignty is criticised, so also is 
the companion doctrine of absolute rights in private 
property. Neither of these criticisms is new, even in 
modern times. Both have been rendered more acute 
by the war, i.e. the ideal of a State is more and more 
seen to be dependent on justice. 

Only, as S. Augustine failed to see, justice in politics 
and in social economy has reference only to those ideals 
of cuique suum tribuere and the Golden Rule, which 
are not necessarily in fact bound up with religion. Men 
can unite in those, who yet differ in toto on the theological 
foundation. In this sense indeed it may be natural to 
look forward to a Christian State ; but certainly it is 
neither natural nor wise to do so in the sense of a State 
which promulgates the Christian religion and none other. 
Consequently, while legislation or custom may well be 
pressed on the ground of its accordance with Christian 
principles, so far as they are confined to the social doctrine, 
it is impolitic and even wrong to condemn or promote 
legislation on the ground that it conflicts with the law 
of the Christian Church. That is to attempt to make 
what is true only of one society govern the whole. 

To sum up, with" the Renaissance the secular or 
pagan State tended to become the ideal. This effect 
was counteracted by the Reformation. Yet that de 
stroyed the ancient unity of Western Christendom and 
made impossible the ideal of the Holy Roman Empire, 
of a single Catholic Commonwealth of princes and lords 
and peoples, a unity of all culture. Vestiges of this 
lingered on and helped towards the beginning of modern 
International Law. On the smaller scale of the separate 
State, the effect of the Reformation was different. It 
tightened instead of loosening all those ties that made 



THE DE CIVITATE DEI IN LATER DAYS 113 

for a concentrated unitary State. So much so, that it 
is even now but slowly and with infinite reluctance 
that political problems can be discussed on any other 
basis. For the more part within that State it shifted 
the balance of power from the clergy to the laity, the 
Church to the State, the Pope to the King. If we 
recognise that change, we can say that the ideal of a 
uniform Christian commonwealth was as real to Hooker 
as it was to Alfred the Great. This was the aim of the 
great national States like England and France, of the 
smaller territorial sovereignties in Germany, with their 
maxim cujus regio ejus religio, and even of bodies like 
the Anabaptists and Pilgrim Fathers, as soon as they 
obtained rule. We see this expressed on the grand scale 
by Hooker and Whitgift, on the smaller scale by Roth- 
mann and Nova Solyma. In some of the arguments 
adduced in favour of established churches, and in certain 
vague appeals to Christian principles, it can be discerned 
in our own days, and can be traced right back to S. 
Augustine. On the whole, however, religious hetero 
geneity is recognised as a fundamental part of the 
modern State, but in regard to certain fundamental 
ethical principles of neighbourliness, mutual love and 
so forth, Christian morals (as apart from any kind of 
theology) are increasingly recognised as integral to a 
just and even to a stable organisation of life. 

On the other hand, the development of the secular, 
this-worldly theory of the State, whether by Jesuits 
or Presbyterians in their own interest, owes much to 
the other and more commonly neglected side of S. 
Augustine that in which he openly discarded the 
principles of religion in the idea of a commonwealth. 
The sharp distinction between secular and sacred, holy 
and profane, which ruled historical writing until recently, 
though not introduced, was enormously strengthened 
by S. Augustine. 

The problem which S. Augustine discussed in this 



H4 THE CITY OF GOD 

book is fundamental, nor has it ever been finally resolved. 
It is a conflict not primarily between two polities. To 
make it that, is to externalise it and to make it relatively 
superficial, deep down in history though even that 
goes. Rather the conflict is one between two religions 
Christianity and Paganism. That is S. Augustine s 
primary and predominating thought. It never leaves 
him. These two religions are conceived as the binding 
force of two societies, the expression of two opposing 
passions : Fecerunt itaque civitates duas amores duo 
the passion for God and the passion for self. That is 
the direction alike of angelic and human wills, which 
makes the whole time-process since the fall of Lucifer 
a drama of eternal tragedy, and conditions the 
Redemption. If we seek to understand S. Augustine 
mainly by the outcome to which his system led in history, 
we shall do wrong. Rather we must seek to understand 
that by the deeper antagonism between the other 
worldly and the this-worldly reference of all institutions. 
This we shall realise better by a more intimate per 
sonal knowledge of the most intimate and personal of all 
divines until John Henry Newman. In Augustine there 
were struggling two men, like Esau and Jacob in the 
womb of Rebecca. There was Augustine of Thagaste, 
of Madaura, of Carthage, of Rome, of Milan, the brilliant 
boy, the splendid and expansive youthful leader, 
skilled in all the wisdom of the Egyptians/ possessed 
of the antique culture, rhetorical, dialectic, Roman 
the man of the world, the developed humanist with 
enough tincture of Platonism to gild the humanism ; 
and there is the Augustine of the Confessions/ of the 
Sermons/ of the De Civitate/ the monk, the ascetic, 
the other-worldly preacher, the biblical expositor, the 
mortified priest. These two beings struggle for ever 
within him, the natural man filled with the sense of 
beauty and the joy of living, expansive, passionate, 
artful and the supernatural Christian fleeing from 



THE DE CIVITATE DEI IN LATER DAYS 115 

the world, shunning it, burning what he adored, and 
adoring what he burnt, celibate and (at times) almost 
anti-social. 

This book itself is too great to be consistent. We 
can see in it traces of this ceaseless conflict. The other 
worldly aim is predominant, the annihilation of all 
earthly values in comparison with the summum bonnw. 

But evidences, we have noted, remain of the humane, 
social, cultured ideal. The conflict is eternal in human 
life. No change of religion will put a term to it. Not 
even as some think, as I suppose Augustine thought, 
the abolition of all eternal values. On the one hand is 
the world, the present, the course of life, the immediate 
nice things ; and on the other the Eternal, the far- 
off, the spiritual city, the altar of sacrifice, the chalice 
of suffering each calls us, each finds response in our 
nature. How can this problem be resolved ? One way 
is by complete world-flight, the extreme of asceticism, 
i.e. asceticism not as discipline but as self-annihilation, 
or, as seen in the sphere of institutions, in the utter 
subjection of the city of this world to the rule of those 
who speak in the name of the Eternal. On the other 
is the pagan solution, frankly materialistic, developing 
on its better side a grand picture of human society, and 
a high development of all human arts, but ruling out 
as irrelevant all interests that look beyond. Neither 
by itself can satisfy. 

The real change in S. Augustine took place when 
he was converted to Platonism by reading Cicero s 
Hortensius and not in the later well-known scene in 
the garden at Milan. From that first moment related 
in the Confessions he had the nostalgia of the infinite, 
and all earthly goods were annihilated to his restless 
spirit. The charge brought by Nietzsche against Plato 
that he did the real damage, preparatory to Christianity, 
by setting up the doctrine of another world is true, 

12 



n6 THE CITY OF GOD 

Perhaps it is this which makes Augustine s apologetic 
more impressive on the general theistic, than it is on 
its distinctively Christian, side. 

Yet that fact suggests the solution. Plato, and still 
more the Neo-Platonists, showed that a mere human 
istic culture is bankrupt at the last, for man s heart is 
restless until he find God. Even humanism as an ideal 
cannot be carried out without an infusion of the other 
worldly principle present pleasure must be given up 
for future bliss even by an Alexander. 

Augustine calls attention to this. The Romans, he 
said, were moved by earthly motives of ambition, no 
more. To that end they were prodigal of sacrifice. 
Christians for their end, which is so much higher, would 
do well if they were to learn the devotion to the heavenly 
patria which the Romans gave to an earthly one. In 
other words, the Roman State, the earthly aim, could 
not be maintained except by sacrifice. True, the sacrifice 
is for an end of this world alone. Yet it is equally 
sacrifice of the immediate for a far-off end, for an 
individual and even for a community like Saguntum 
it means the surrender of life itself for the good of the 
whole. What makes this possible ? 

Even earthly ambitions apart from the State, even 
sheer individualism, can make no progress without sacri 
fice and what Christians call the Cross. Any successful 
merchant knows that. Even the hardest voluptuary 
must postpone immediate goods in the Christian phrase, 
must die to live and take risks, or he will not fulfil 
the demands of his passions. 

Thus then the edifice of humane culture cannot but 
rest its foundations on the principle of the Cross, and 
also upon social and communal interdependence. Man 
cannot live for himself alone/ Yet this principle has 
in many cases no meaning and no appeal to the individual, 
if there be no world beyond. 

Take the other side. Sheer world-flight is not 



THE DE CIVITATE DEI IN LATER DAYS 117 

possible. The extremes! ascetic S. Simon on his 
pillar must be fed. In the De Opere Monachorum 
S. Augustine points this out. 2 It is all very well, he 
says, for people to say that a man ought to be entirely 
occupied with the things of God, and therefore need 
do no labour. This cannot be. The dinner must be 
cooked. Some manual work is a necessity in any self- 
sufficing society. Therefore it cannot be contrary to 
true monastic life to do some secular work. 

Besides, whether for the selfish end which we con 
sidered above, or for the religious, sheer individualism 
would be the final abutment of either, world-flight or 
world-acceptance, taken by itself. Sheer individualism 
is literally unthinkable. A selfish man of culture needs 
the help of society at every turn. A world-renouncing 
monk cannot do without security. Social and communal 
activities are of the essence of human life, for no one 
can dispense with them. If they are, then sacrifice of 
what we want, even, on occasion, of life itself, becomes 
a necessity at times, a fact of which to-day we have 
lurid evidence. Nor in the long run can such sacrifice 
be justified to the individual apart from an other-worldly 
aim. The goods of human sacrifice are real goods. 
But just as the individual is driven to the larger life 
of the community by the natural fact of the family, 
so human society and all human culture is possible only 
by the ultimate recognition of the eternal goal. Other 
wise there will come the decadence, such as overcame 
Greece and Rome and the Renaissance. That is the 
lesson of the De Civitate Dei. Our ideals of beauty 
must be rooted in the hope of eternal life earthly glories 
are symbols and sacraments if they be not evil ; for 
God created man to be immortal and made him an 
image of his own eternity/ or in his own words : Thou 
t hast made us for thyself, and our heart is restless until 
it find thee. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

THE LITERATURE OF THE DE CIVITATE DEI 

BERNHARD DOMBART has an interesting posthumous 
paper on the text. It is printed in Harnack & Gebhardt s 
Texte und Untersuchungen/ 1908, with the title : 
Zur Textgeschichte der Ci vitas Dei. (Dombart having 
died before the publication, it was produced by Otto 
Stahlin.) 

The first printed edition appeared at Subiaco in 1467. 
Mentelin produced an important edition at Strasburg 
about the year following, which included the earliest 
commentary that of Thomas Valois and Nicholas 
Triveth. This commentary is full in the earlier parts 
but meagre later. In 1522 J. L. Vives published the 
first edition which was made from a collation of the 
MSS., with a commentary of his own in which he attacked 
violently all the scholastic commentators. He makes 
many annotations. Some of them are amusing. We 
have interesting portraits of scholars like Sir Thomas 
More and Bude (Budaeus), shrewd gibes that relieve a 
mass of detail, quips at scholastics, along with a defence 
of traditional religion against the unquiet spirit of Luther. 
With the comments of Vives are sometimes printed 
those of Leonard Coquaeus (1661). 

Of modern editions of the De Civitate Dei/ the 
best is that in the Vienna Corpus Scriptorum by E. 
Hoffmann. A smaller and later one, also in two volumes, 
by Dombart is useful. It lacks that elaborate table of 
contents which closes certain less important editions. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 119 

This table is not authoritative, but it is useful. Scholz 
gives an account of its origin. 

In the late sixteenth century J. Healey made a fine 
translation. The folio edition of it issued in 1610 and 
1620 gives also Vives commentary. This translation (less 
the commentary) was recently reprinted in the Ancient 
and Modern Theological Library/ What purports to be 
the same appeared subsequently in three volumes in the 
Temple Classics. At the end of Vol. Ill we are told that 
Dr. Bussell, its editor, has rearranged and abridged it. He 
has done this without telling the reader where the cuts are 
made. Consequently all the references are useless except 
at the beginning, e.g. it has been compressed into eighteen 
books instead of twenty-two. It is difficult to know 
where we are, although the wording of the translation 
has not been changed. Another modern translation 
is that by Dr. Marcus Dods in the Library of the 
Fathers also there is one by Dr. Gee (London, 1894). 

Literature on the De Civitate Dei is large. 
Heinrich Scholz s Glaube und Unglaube in der Welt- 
geschichte (Leipzig, 1911) is indispensable and every 
where interesting. It takes account of Renter s view, 
but is independent. Bruno Seidel s thesis, Die Lehre 
des heiligen Augustinus vom Staate is the most help 
ful single book. It is printed in Sdralek s Kirchen- 
geschichtliche Abhandlungen/ ix. i (1909). Hermann 
Reuter s Augustinische Studien (Gctha, 1887) is 
illuminating ; but his anti-hierarchical bias must be 
borne in mind. The third essay, that on the Church 
as the Kingdom of God, is the most important for the 
understanding of the De Civitate Dei. But no part 
of it can be ignored. 

Dorner s large book on Augustine ( Augustinus/ 
Berlin, 1873) has about one hundred pages bearing 
on the topics discussed here. It is important as it 
takes the view, followed by Ritschl and others, which 
makes Augustine the father of the Papacy. 



120 THE CITY OF GOD 

Ritschl s Essay, Ueber die Methode der alteren 
Dogmengeschichte, which appeared in the Jahrbucher 
fur Deutsche Theologie, Bd. XVI, 191-214 (Gotha, 1871), 
is reprinted in the first volume of his Gesammelte 
Aufsatze/ pp. 147-169. It contains certain important 
statements about Augustine, which I have discussed. 
So also does the great work of Otto Gierke, Das deutsche 
Genossenschaftsrecht/ These maximise the clericalist 
side (in order to condemn it). The same is true of 
H. von Eicken in his book, Geschichte und System 
der mittelalterlichen Weltanschauung (Stuttgart, 1887). 
Hertling severely, but not unfairly, attacked this in his 
Beitrage zur Philosophic/ Important essays on the 
subjects here discussed are hidden away in journals, 
e.g. Reuter laments the common ignorance of H. 
Schmidt s essays. They are published in the Jahrbucher 
fur Deutsche Theologie. Vol. vi. pp. 197-255 (1861) 
contains that on Des Augustinus Lehre von der Kirche/ 
vols. vii. 237-281 and viii. 261-325 that on Origen and 
Augustine as apologists. Those are important. Ferdi 
nand Kattenbusch is said to be the first to call attention 
to Augustine s identification of the Church with the 
apocalyptic kingdom. His Kritische Studien zur Sym- 
bolik (the second essay) will be found in Theologische 
Studien und Kritiken (Gotha, 1878). Feuerlein, who 
takes Augustine as a typical mediaeval, wrote his essay, 
Ueber die Stellung Augustins in der Kirchen- und 
Culturgeschichte/ in Sybel s Historische Zeitschrift/ 
1869, vol. xxii. 270. It is not otherwise valuable. 

Edmond Boissier s Fin du Paganisme has a good 
many pages bearing on this topic. So also an interesting 
thesis from Columbia University by E. Humphreys, 
Politics and Religion in the Days of Augustine/ On 
the philosophy of history there is Reinkens rectorial 
address at Breslau (1865), to which I alluded in my 
second lecture. He was afterwards an Old Catholic 
bishop. This essay has been over-praised. Others are 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 121 

those of G. S. Seyrich, Die Geschichtsphilosophie 
Augustins nach seiner Schrift de Civitate Dei (1891), and 
A. Niemann, Augustins Geschichtsphilosophie (1895). 

Two books that are indispensable are Joseph Maus- 
bach s Die Ethik desheiligen Augustinus, two volumes 
(Freiburg, 1909), and Ernest Troeltsch, Augustin, die 
christliche Antike und die Mittelalter (1915). The 
latter is written in strong reaction against the view of 
Augustine as essentially mediaeval. Mausbach writes an 
apologetic of S. Augustine against all who, like Ritschl, 
make him hostile to the State and to culture. 

An American, Dr. Anson, wrote on the sources of 
the first ten books, and Dr. Frick has discussed those of 
the eighteenth. 

A good account will be found in Dr. Cunningham s 
Hulsean Lectures (1885), S. Austin and his Place in 
the History of Christian Thought. Dr. Carlyle in his 
History of Political Theories in the West says 
surprisingly little. Professor Dunning says even less 
in his History of Political Thought/ There is an 
unsympathetic dissertation from Geneva by F. Thomas, 
S. Augustin, La Cite de Dieu (1886). Harnack in the 
History of Dogma says some important things on the 
same lines as Ritschl and Gierke. Beard has some pages 
in his book on the Reformation. The former German 
Chancellor, Count Georg von Hertling, has a book on 
Augustine ( Der Untergang der antiken Kultur, Augustin/ 
1902) in the series Weltgeschichte in Karakterbilden ; 
the pp. 98 and sqg. treat of the De Civitate Dei/ He 
declares this to be the most potent in influence of all 
S. Augustine s works. Hertling takes the view which 
I have taken in Lectures III and IV, and refuses to 
identify the two cities sans phrase with Church and 
State. Roundly he declares that of any hostility to 
the State on the part of the Church, Augustine knew 
nothing. A large book on Augustine ( Augustinus/ 
Paderborn, 1898) by Cardinal Rauscher, and published 



122 THE CITY OF GOD 

after his death, may be mentioned. Theo Sommerlad s 
two works, Das Wirtschaftsprogramm der Kirche des 
Mittelalters (Leipzig, 1903) and Die wirtschaftliche 
Thatigkeit der Kirche in Deutschland (Leipzig, 1910), 
carry to the farthest point the notion of Augustine as the 
author of a system of gigantic social reform. Robert 
son s Rejnum Dei may also be consulted. Much use 
therein is made of Reuter. 



APPENDIX 

THE following passages from Vives may interest the reader : 
(II, 7.) Thus farre Lucian. We have rehearsed it in 
the words of Thomas Moore, whom to praise negligently, 
or as if one were otherwise imployed, were grossnes. His 
due commendations are sufficient to exceed great volumes. 
For what is he that can worthily lim forth his sharpness 
of wit, his depth of judgement, his excellence and variety 
of learning, his eloquence of phrase, his plausibility and 
integrity of manners, his judicious foresight, his exact execu 
tion, his gentle modesty and uprightness and his unmoved 
loyalty ? Unlesse in one word he will say that they are 
all perfect, intirely absolute, and exact in all their full pro 
portions ? Unlesse he will call them (as they are indeed) 
the patterns and lusters, each of his kind ? I speake much, 
and many that have not known Moore will wonder at me, 
but such as have, will know I speake but truth : so will such 
as shall either reade his workes or but heare or looke upon his 
actions : but another time shall be more fit to spred our 
sailes in this man s praises as in a spacious ocean, wherein 
we will take this full and prosperous wind and write both 
much in substance and much in value of his worthy honours, 
and that unto favourable readers. 

(VIII, 4.) It is a great question in our schooles whether 
Logic be speculative or practike. A fond question truly I 
thinke, and fellow with most of our philosophicall theames 
of these times, where the dreams of practice and speculation 
do nought but dull young apprehensions. . . . But these 
Schoolemen neyther know how to speculate in nature nor 
action, nor how the life s actions are to be ordered. 

(XI, 10.) Words, I thinke, adde little to religion, yet 
must we have a care to keep the old path and received 
doctrine of the Church ; for, divinity being so farre above 
our reach, how can wee give it the proper explanation ? 



124 THE CITY OF GOD 

All words are man s inventions for humane uses, and no 
man may refuse the old approved words to bring in new 
of his own invention ; for whenas proprieties are not to 
bee found out by man s wit, those are the fittest to declare 
things by, that ancient use hath left us, and they that have 
recorded most part of our religion. This I say for that a 
sort of smattering rash fellowes impiously presume to cast 
the old formes of speech at their heeles, and to set up their 
owne masterships, being grossly ignorant both in the matters, 
and their bare formes, and will have it lawful for them at 
their fond likings to frame or fashion the phrases of the 
Fathers in matter of religion into what forme they list, like 
a nose of waxe. 

(XVIII, 18.) To create is to make something of 
nothing ; this God onely can do ; as all the Divines afnrme : 
but then they dispute whether hee can communicate this 
power unto a creature. Saint Thomas hath much concern 
ing this ; and Scotus seekes to weaken his arguments to 
confirme his owne ; and Occam is against both, and Petrus 
de Aliaco against him : thus each one screweth the celestiall 
power into what forme he please. How can manners be 
amended, how can truth be taught, how can contentions 
be appeased as long as there is this confused obstinate 
jangling, and this haling too and fro in matter of Divinity, 
according as each man stands affected. 

(XIX, 21.) For we may not imagine man s unjust 
decrees to be lawes ; all men defining law to arise out of the 
fountaine of justice. (Cicero, De Leg. i.) 

Vives : It was not the people s command (saith he) 
nor Prince s decrees nor Judge s sentences, but the very 
rule of nature that gave original unto law. And again 
. . . Thus Tully out of Plato, and thus the Stoikes held 
against Epicurus, who held that nature accounted nothing 
just, but feare did. Seneca, Epist. 16. This holy law that 
lyeth recorded in every man s conscience, the civilians call 
right and reason. ... So that Ulpian defmeth law to be ars 
aequi et boni ; an art of right and reason, making him only a 
lawyer"; that can skill of this right and reason : and such that, 
as Tully said of Sulpitius, referre all unto equity, and had 
rather end controversies than procure them, that peace might 
generally be kept amongst men, and each be at peace with 
himself e, which is the chief e joy of nature/ 



NOTES 

NOTES TO LECTURE I 

1 Weinand, H., Die Gottesidee der Grundzug der Weltanschauung 
des hi. Augustins, 1910, in Ehrhard und Kirsch, Forschungen, X. ii. p. i. 
Wie die Geisteswerte der heidnischen Kulturwelt in ihm zusammen- 
fliessen, so hat vom fiinften Jahrhundert ab die christliche Kulturwelt 
in ihm Wurzeln und Fasern. . . . 

Man hat darauf hinangewiesen, wie jede Neuerung bis herab auf 
den Socialismus unserer Tage, ihn zu dem Ihrigen zu machen sich 
bemiiht. 

8 E. Feuerlein, Ueber die Stellung Augustins in der Kirchen- und 
Culturgeschichte in Sybel s Historische Zeitschrift. Bd. 22, 1869, 
p. 300. 

Dieser Eine Mann mit dem brennenden und rur Ruhe gekommenen 
Herzen ist der Typus der mittelalterlichen Christenheit. Sein ziigelloses 
und doch zuletzt geziigeltes Temperament reprasentirt jenen wilden 
Volksgeist, der mit der V61kerwanderung sich erhebt und seiner 
Zahmung durch die Kirche harrt, die ganze Hitze und Heftigkeit des 
Volksthums, das sich gleich ihm in der Versenkung ins Eine, Gottliche, 
in der religiosen Andacht abkiihlen soil. Er der Sohn eines gebildeten 
Naturvolks, topographisch ausserhalb des Gebiets der neueuropaischen 
Menschheit gestellt, sollte den zu erwartenden Naturvolkern Weg 
und Steg ihrer ersten Cultur weisen diirfen. 

3 H. Renter, Augustinische Studien, p. 121 n. Das ganze Werk 
De Civitate bewegt sich auf dem scharf gefassten Gegensatz des Diesseits 
und Jenseits, der Gegenwart und der Zukunft als auf seiner Basis/ 

4 Reuter, Augustinische Studien, p. 45. Nicht indem er "Die 
Heilsbedeutung " der Kirche verteidigte ist er ein Neuerer geworden, 
sondern durch die Art, wie er diese nach Massgabe seines Begriffs der 
gratia erortert. 

Nicht in dem Kirchenbegriff e ist die prinzipale Differenz zwischen 
dem System Augustin s und dem der Jelagianer zuhochst zu suchen, 
sondern in dem Begriffe der Gnade. 

NOTES TO LECTURE II 

1 Reinkens, Die Geschichtsphilosophie des Heiligen Augustinus 
(Schaffhausen, 1866), inaugural address as Rector of Breslau University, 
p. 36. 

Die ganze Verfassung und das ganze Gesetzbuch des himmlischen 
Staates ist in Einem Wort enthalten, und dies Wort heisst : Freiheit. 
Denn die Macht des freien Willens ist in dem Menschen dann wie bei 
den guten Engeln bis zu dem Grade fur das Gute in seiner gottlichen 
Rangordnung gesteigert, dass ihm cine Abweichung von der Ordnung 



126 THE CITY OF GOD 

der Liebe nicht inehr m6glich ist, ebenso wenig wie ein Riickfall aus 
dem verklarten Zustand in den unverklarten. Ein Nothigen in die 
Ordnung der Liebe durch aussere Gesetze und Befehle unter Androhung 
von Strafen ist undenkbar in dem Gottesstaate ; in seinem ewigen 
Sabbate existirt auch der Begriff des knechtischen Dienstes nicht 
mehr. Gott selbst tragt die Krone ; aber die Burger des himmlischen 
Staates sind von Ihm mitgekront : sie herrschen mit Ihm, in dem sie 
Ihm haldigen, und da sie Ihm loben, empfangen sie Ehre, und die 
Geehrten erkennen ohne Ueberhebung, dass sie der Ehre wiirdig 
sind, und Niemand raubt und Niemand neidet sie ihnen. So wird 
es sein am Ende ohne Ende ; denn welches andere Endziel hatten 
wir, als zu gelangen in das Reich ohne Ende ? 

1 H. Schmidt s two articles are to be found in the Jahrbucher fur 
Deutsche Theologie (Gotha, 1861) ; Des Augustinus Lehre von der 
Kirche, vi. 197-255 ; and Origenes und Augustin als Apologeten, vii. 237- 
281 and viii. 261-325. 

8 H. Scholz, Glaube und Unglaube in der Weltgeschichte, p. 47. 
Wenn es richtig ist dass Geschichtsphilosophie und Soziologie 
zusammengehoren, so ist Augustin der erste gewesen, der diesen 
Zusammenhang innerlich erfasst und wirksam ausgesprochen hat. 
Zwar hat schon Aristoteles den Menschen als <oov 7ro\iTi<6v gewiirdigt, 
aber nur um den Staat daraus abzuleiten. . . Augustin hat den 
Fortschritt rur Geschichte gemacht, und die Moglichkeit des geschicht- 
lichen Lebens auf den geselligen Zusammenschluss der Individuen 
gegriindet. Er hat erkannt, dass es Geschichte nur da gibt und dass 
Geschichte erst da beginnt, wo Menschen sind, die sich zu geordnetem 
Mit- und Aufeinander wirken verbinden. Er hat diesen Zusammenhang 
nicht nur geahnt, sondern deutlich ausgesprochen : unde Dei civitas . . 
vel inchoaretur exortu vel progrederetur excursu vel adprehenderet 
debitos fines, si non esset socialis vita sanctorum ? (xix. 5). Es ist 
nicht zuviel, wenn mann behauptet, dass Augustin sich durch diesen 
einen Satz ein bleibendes Verdienst um die Philosophie der Geschichte 
erworben hat ; denn solange es eine Philosophie der Geschichte gibt, 
wird sie mit diesem Satz beginnen und insofern immer auf Augustin 
als ihren geistigen Vater zuriickblicken diirfen/ 

4 Cf. the following passages. There are many more : 

(a) De Civ. Dei, v. i. Divina providentia regna constituuntur 
humana. 

(b) Ibid. v. ii. Sed nee exigui et contemptibilis animantis 
viscera, nee avis pennulam, nee herbae flosculum, nee arboris folium 
sine suarum partium convenientia et quadam veluti pace dereliquit ; 
nullo modo est credendus regna hominum, eorumque dominationes 
et servitutes a suis providentiae legibus alienas esse voluisse. 

(c) Ibid. iv. 33. Deus igitur ille felicitatis auctor et dator, quia 
solus est verus Deus, ipse dat regna terrena et bonis et malis. Neque 
hoc temere et quasi fortuitu, quia Deus est, non fortuna, sed pro rerum 
ordine ac temporum occulto nobis, notissimo sibi, cui tamen ordini 
temporum non subditus servit, sed eum ipse tanquam dominus regit 
moderatorque disponit. Felicitatem vero non dat nisi bonis. Hanc 
enim possunt et non habere et habere servientes, possunt et non habere 
et habere regnantes ; quae tamen plena in ea vita erit, ubi nemo 
jam serviet. Et ideo regna terrena et bonis ab illo dantur et malis 



NOTES 127 

ne eius cultores adhuc in provectu animi parvuli haec ab eo 
munera quasi magnum aliquid concupiscant. Et hoc est sacramentum 
Veteris Testamenti, ubi occultum erat novum, quod illic promissa et 
dona terrena sunt, intelligentibus et tune spiritalibus quamvis nondum 
in manifestatione praedicantibus, et quae illis temporalibus rebus 
significaretur aeternitas, et in quibus Dei donis esset vera felicitas. 

6 The Rules of Tyconius, edited by F. C. Burkitt. This should 
be read to see how close is the parallel. Augustine knew this book 
and made a lengthy summary of it in the third book of De Doctrina 
Christiana. Scholz, Glaube und Unglaube in der Weltgeschichte, has 
much in detail about the dependence of S. Augustine on Tyconius. The 
topic has been worked out by Hahn, Tyconius Studien, in Bonwetsch 
und Seeberg, Studien ; see vi. 2, also Haussleiter, Prot. Real-Encyclopddie, 
xx. 851-5. 

6 Nourisson, Philosophic de S. Augustin, ii. 173. Sa conception 
d une republic eternelle et naturelle, la meilleure possible dans 
chacune de ses especes et ordonnee par la Providence divine, n est 
qu une application ou une transformation savante de 1 idee mere 
de la Cite de Dieu. 

NOTES TO LECTURE III 

1 Seidel, Die Lehre des heiligen Augustinus vom Staate (in Sdralek s 
KirchengeschichtlicheAbhandlungen,igog, IX. i.), p. 4534, d.n, Band 8-10. 

Es ist wohl zu optimistisch, wenn Mausbach meint, es sei allgemein 
anerkannt, dass der Ausdruck civitas terrena meist nicht den Staat 
als solchen bezeichne. Meines Erachtens riihren viele Irrtiimer eben 
gerade daher, dass man immer wieder civitas terrena mit " Staat " 
iibersetzt. 

2 Reuter, p. 131. 

Indessen scheint es mir doch nicht uberniissig zu sein, daran zu 
erinnern, dass das Wort nicht mit Staat, sondern Stadt zu ubersetzen 
sei. 

3 T. Sommerlad, Das Wirtschaftsprogramm der Kirche des Mittel 
alters, p. 216. (This book emphasises his differences from all fore 
runners. They are reactionary, he is communistic.) 

Es liegt in all dem Gesagten begriindet, weshalb Augustin, der 
eine Staats- und Gesellschaftstheorie geben wollte, entgegen seiner 
Absicht ein Staatsprogramm und ein Wirtschaftsprogramm geschaffen 
hat. 

4 Reuter, p. 477. 

In dem Liber de opere monachorum, S. 438-443, vielleicht dei 
bedeutendsten Schrift in der Geschichte der Wirtschaftslehre seit 
Ende des vierten Jahrhunderts, sind Gedanken entwickelt, welche 
praktisch geworden, die auch von Aug. festgehaltene Differenz des 
weltlichen und geistlichen Lebens hatten auflosen, eine soziale Reform 
(Revolution ?) in romische Reiche hatten motivieren mussen. 

8 Somerlad, Wirtschaftsprogramm, p. 210. 

Die Eigentiimlichkeit der Staatstheorie Augustins besteht nun 
darin dass jene teleologische Betrachtung, wie sie das Evangelium 
den wirtschaftlichen Institututionen gegeniiber eingeschlagen hatte, 
auch auf die Institution des Staates angewandt wird. 



128 THE CITY OF GOD 

6 Ritschl, Ueber die Methods der dlteren Dogmengeschichte, in 
Gesammelte Aufsdtze, i. 156. 

Er in ihrer katholischen Gestalt das Reich Gottes selbst erkennt, 
welches seit dem Siindenfalle seine Existenz gegeniiber dem irdischen 
Reiche hat ; dieses aber ist der Weltstaat, wie er in der romischen 
Herrschaft jener Zeit gegenwartig war. Wie nun die Kirche als die 
Civitas Dei der Organismus des Guten aus dem Prinzip der gottgemassen 
Gerechtigkeit ist, so gilt dem Augustin der Staat als die Gemeinschaft 
der Menschen aus dem Princip der Siinde. 1 

7 H. von Eicken, Geschichte und System der Mittelalterlichen Weltan 
schauung, p. 119. So bald die Kirche sich gesetzlich geschiitzt sah, 
gab sie ihrer Geringachtung gegen den Staat einen noch offeneren, 
riickhaltsloseren, Ausdruck als vordem. 

8 Reuter, p. 151. 

Man kann die Staatslehre Augustin s nur mit ausserster Vorsicht 
und selbst dann nicht vollstandig aus den Lib. de Civ. schopfen. Sie 
ist korrekt nur unter Vergleichung anderer Schriften, namentlich der 
anti-donatistischen aufzubauen. 

9 Reuter, p. 143. 

Je schr offer die letzteren [Donatisten] die alte Ansicht von dem 
Staate als einem profanen, dem Christentum fremden Gemeinwesen 
erneuerten und uberspannten, um so mehr wurde der Apologet des 
Katholicismus genotigt, die sittliche Wiirde desselben darzulegen. 

10 De Civitate, xix. 23. 

Quapropter ubi non est ista justitia, ut secundum suam gratiam 
civitati oboedienti Deus imperet unus et summus, ne cuiquam sacrificet 
nisi tantum sibi ; et per hoc in omnibus hominibus ad eandem civitatem 
pertinentibus atque oboedientibus Deo animus etiam corpori, atque 
ratio vitiis, ordine legitimo fideliter imperet ; ut quemadmodum 
Justus unus, ita coetus populusque justorum vivat, ex fide quae opera tur 
per dilectionem, qua homo diligit Deum, sicut diligendus est Deus, et 
proximum sicut seipsum ubi ergo non est ista justitia, profecto 
non est coetus hominum juris consensu, et utilitatis communione 
sociatus. Quod si non est, utique populus non est, si vera est haec 
populi definitio. Ergo nee respublica est, quia res populi non est, ubi 
ipse populus non est. 

11 Seidel, p. 21. 

Wenn also der Staat auch nicht die veritas iustitiae haben muss, 
um Staat zu sein, so muss er doch eine iustitia haben, um nicht als 
Rauberbande zu gelten. Es ist die auf der Vernunft beruhende natiir- 
liche Gerechtigkeit, welche Augustin dem Staate als wesentlich 
zuschreibt. Er findet diese iustitia auchbei den heidnischen Romern. 
C/. Reuter, 137 sqq. 

13 Seidel, p. 20. 

Mit allem Nachdruck ist hervorzuheben, dass der heilige 
Augustinus die Wesensbestimmung, welche Cicero vom Staate gibt, 
als zu eng ablehnt. 

13 Eckstadt, Augustins Anschauung vom Staat (Kirkhain, 1912), 
pp. 27-29, argues that the real importance lies in the word concord. 

Beriicksichtigt man alle diese Stellen, so kann nach meiner 
Meinung gar nicht bezweifelt werden dass die concordia dem Augustin 
unerlasslich ist fur das Wesen des Staates ; und dies bestatigt sich uns 



NOTES 129 

welter, wenn wir auf das hochste Gut sehen, das Augustin fiir den 
Staat fordert : pax. 

14 Mausbach, ii. 364. 

Also handelt es sich nicht um Umwandlung eines Bosen zum 
Guten, sondern um die Vermehrung und Erhohung eines Guten. 

15 Seidel, p. 25. 

Die Begriffe des " christlichen " oder " nichtchristlichen " Staates 
finden sich also nicht bei Augustin, sondern diese Bezeichnungen sind 
von uns gewahlt, um vom Christentum beeinflusste oder nichtbeein- 
flusste Staat en zu unterscheiden. 

1(5 Eckstadt, p. 40. 

So nach Augustins eigenen Urteil, ist der Staat um so besser, 
je besser das ist was er liebt. So ist der christliche Staat nicht dem 
Wesen nach der ideale Staat, wohl aber seinem Inhalte nach der 
Werthvollste. 

17 F. Dahn, Die Konige der Germanen (Leipzig, 1908), xi. 209. 

Die Unterschatzung von Recht und Staat gegeniiber der Kirche 
... ist die notwendige Folge der Lehre Sankt Augustins, einer 
logisch falschen, sittlich krankhaften, politisch verderblichen, mit den 
Pflichten gegen den Staat unvereinbaren. 

18 Seidel, p. 26. 

So wird auch der Staat als naturgemasse und darum berechtigte 
menschliche Ordnung durch das t)bernatiirliche des Christentums 
nicht als unberechtigt aufgehoben, sondern von Mangeln befreit, in 
seinem Wesen vervollkommnet und in seiner Bedeutung erhoht. 

19 H. Weinand, Die Gottesidee der Grundzug der Weltanschauung 
des hi. Augustinus, p. 127. 

Die Welt zu entwerten stellte er sie mit all ihren Giiten neben 
Gott, verglich beide miteinander, wog sie gegeneinander ab ; kein 
Wunder dass sie zu leicht befunden ward und ihm Gott gegeniiber 
als nicht- gut, nicht-schon ; ja als ein Nicht-Sein erschien. 

to Mausbach, i. 350. 

Was aber Augustins Stellung zur Kultur in ganzen angeht, so 
unterliegt es nach unsern Untersuchungen keinem Zweifel, dass er 
alle Werte und Ziele, die wir heute zum Begrifle der Kultur rechnen, 
zur Geltung und zu Ehren kommen lasst. 

NOTES TO LECTURE IV 

1 Reuter, p. 151. 

Die Libri de Civitate Dei haben nicht den direkten Zweck, die 
Frage nach " dem Verhaltnis der christlichen Kirche zum Staate," 
im Sinne des heutigen Sprachgebrauchs zu beantworten, sondern 
sind prinzipiell zum Zwecke der Verteidigung der Christentums (der 
christlichen Kirche) gegen das Heidentum abgefasst. 

Die Civitas terrena bedeutet erstens den heidnischen Staat, 
zweitens, die bis zum Ende der Welt, also auch in der christlichen 
Zeit bestehende societas improborum. 

Die Civitas Dei ist erstens die historische sichtbare Kirche 
zweitens die communio sanctorum (electorum) . 

1 De Civitate, xix. 17. 

Haec ergo coelestis civitas dum peregrinatur in terra, ex omnibus 
gentibus cives evocat, adque in, omnibus linguis peregrinam colligit 



I 3 o THE CITY OF GOD 

societatem, non curans quidquid in moribus legibus institutisque 
diversum est, quibus pax terrena vel conquiritur vel tenetur, nihil 
eorum rescindens vel destruens, immo etiam servans ac sequens ; 
quod licet diversum sit in diversis nationibus, ad unum tamen 
eundemque finem terrenae pacis intenditur, si religionem qua unus 
summus et verus Deus colendus docetur, non impedit. 

Utitur ergo etiam coelestis civitas, in hac sua peregrinatione, 
pace terrena, et de rebus ad mortalem hominum naturam pertinentibus, 
humanarum voluntatum compositionem, quantum salva pietate ac 
religione conceditur, tuetur adque adpetit, eamque terrenam pacem 
refert ad coelestem pacem ; quae vere ita pax est, ut rationalis dumtaxat 
creaturae sola pax habenda adque dicenda sit, ordinatissima scilicet 
et concordissima societas fruendi Deo et invicem in Deo ; quo cum 
ventum fuerit, non erit vita mortalis, sed plane certeque vitalis ; nee 
corpus animale quod dum corrumpitur aggravat animam, sed spiritale 
sine ulla indigentia ex omni parte subditum voluntati. Hanc pacem, 
dum peregrinatur in fide, habet, adque ex hac fide juste vivit, cum 
ad illam pacem adipiscendam refert quidquid bonarum actionum gerit 
erga Deum et proximum, quoniam vita civitatis utique socialis est. 

3 F. Kattenbusch, Kritische Studien zur Symbolik, p. 200. 

In dem Augustinischen Kirchenbegriff wird gewohnlich ein 
Gedanke iibersehen, der aber doch von der hochsten Tragweite ist. 
Das ist der dass die Kirche das tausendjahrige Reich und in so fern 
bereits das Reich Gottes darstellt. 

4 Reuter, p. 150. 

Die Formel, " die Kirche ist das Reich Gottes " ist prinzipiell 
nicht von der verfassungsmassig organisierten, von den Bischofen 
regierten Kirche ausgesagt, sondern von derjenigen, welche als com 
munio sanctorum vorgestellt wird, bestimmter von dem Teile derselben 
denn der Grundbestandtheil gehort dem Himmel an welcher hier 
auf Erden sich befindet. 

Cf. also Schmidt (Jahrbucher, vi. 238) Die Kirche ist in erster Linie 
Leib Christi als Communio Sanctorum. 

Scholz, Glaube und Unglaube, 119. Criticises Reuter s view of 
regnum Dei as equivalent to communio sanctorum, and points to 
Augustine s use of Tyconius. 

* Reuter, p. 499. 

Durch Augustin ist die Idee der Kirche in einer Weise, die dem 
Orient fremd geblieben, die Zentralmacht in der religiosen Stimmung, 
in dem kirchlichen Handeln des Abendlandes geworden. Sein eigenes 
Denken war allerding beherrscht worden durch jene andere, welche 
wir oben (S. 97) nachgewiesen haben ; aber die Formel " die Kirche 
ist das Reich Gottes," schon von ihm nicht immer in dem genuinen 
Sinne gebraucht, friih von anderen in Widerspruch mit der urspriing- 
lichen Intention des Verfassers verstanden, ist thatsachlich wider 
seine Absicht das Fundament der Anspriiche der romischen Hierarchie, 
" das Programm jener romisch-katholischen Weltherrschaft," an 
welche Augustin nie gedacht hatte die Schwungkraft des Gregorian- 
ismus geworden. 

Schmidt, H., Des Augustinus Lehre von der Kirche, in Jahrbuchw 
fiir Deutsche Theologie, vi. p. 198. 



NOTES 131 

Das Selbstbewusstsein der Kirche konnte sich vollstandiger nur 
entwickeln, wenn es sich nicht allein der Harese, sondern auch dem 
Schisma gegeniiber auszusprechen hatte. 

This situation was produced by the Donatist controversy : and 
this helped to mould the Church into a State-religion. 

7 Weinand, pp. 109, no. 

(Augustin hat) den Kreis der Kirche weit iiber den Rahmen 
der sichtbaren Gemeinde erweitert. Wie weitherzig das zeigt die 
Grundauffassung der Civitas Dei, die Kirche sei so alt wie die Welt. 
Res ipsa quae nunc Christiana veligio nuncupatur erat apud antiques, 
nee defuit ab initio generis humani. 

8 Kattenbusch, p. 197. 

In so fern ist doch Augustin der Vater auch des Papsttums, 
p. 201. Wir haben in jenem Gedanken Augustins den eigentlichen 
Rechtstitel und das leitende Motiv fur die Politik, welche die Papste 
bis auf die Gegenwart festhalten. Diese Politik ist eben nichts anderes, 
als die riicksichtslose kiihne, wenn man will, grossartige und imposante 
Durchfiihrung der Idee, dass die Kirche als das Reich Gottes die 
berufene Herrin aller Verhaltnisse sei. 

Ritschl, i. 1 66. 

Daran sind in der Lehre von der obersten Auctoritat der Kirche 
die Ideen nachzuweisen, auf Grund deren der romische Primat sich 
iiber den Episkopat erhob und die Stellvertretung Gottes in sich zu 
concentriren unternahm. Ist auch Augustin kein absichtlicher Urheber 
dieser Entwickelung, so war sie doch durch seine Ansicht, dass die 
Kirche die Civitas Dei sei, veranlasst. Und diesen Primat an Gottes 
Statt haben ja die mittelaltrigen Vertreter desselben in Praxis und 
Theorie an einem Verhaltniss zwischen Kirche und Staat durchzu- 
fiihren gesucht, dessen Bestimmung direkt von den Grundsatzen 
Augustin s abstammt, und, wie die Gegenwart bestatigt, dogmatischen 
Werth hat, also auch in der Dogmengeschichte vorgetragen werden 
muss/ 

9 Gierke, Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht, iii. 124. 

In der konsequenten Ausgestaltung, die sie durch Augustinus 
erfuhr, erkannte diese Theorie ausschliesslich den unmittelbar von 
Gott gestifteten und geleiteten Verband der universellen und einheit- 
lichen Kirche, den " Staat dessen Konig Christus ist," als Ausdruck 
der sittlichen Weltordnung an. Sie liess daher den weltlichen Staat 
mit alien seinen Gliederungen und Einrichtungen nur gelten insofern 
derselbe sich dem in der Kirche realisirten gottlichen Staat, als dienender 
Bestandtheil ein- und unterordnete. Sie postulirte den Christlichen 
Staat und verstand unter dem Christlichen Staat einen Staat, welcher 
ausschliesslich in der Kirche die Quelle und das Ziel seiner Existenz 
erblickte. 

10 Dorner, p. 303. 

Mit einem Worte, nur der der Kirche dienende Staat, welcher 
die wahre Gottesverehrung schutzt, entspricht seinem Begriff, und 
vermag in seiner Sphare etwas Erspriessliches zu leisten. Dass der 
Staat ein eigenes in sich werthvolles Princip, eine gottliche Idee seiner- 
seits vertrete, erkennt Augustin nicht. Seine Ansicht vom Staate 
ist nicht weit von dem Satze entfernt, dass er der Mond sei, welcher 
von der Sonne seinen Glanz empfange. 



132 THE CITY OF GOD 

NOTES TO LECTURE V 

1 De ortu progressu et fine Romani imperil in Goldast, Politico, 
(Frankfurt, 1614), pp. 754~773- 

2 For Erastus see the essay appended to Divine Right of Kings 
(2nd edition, 1914), pp. 293 and ff ; for Respublica Christiana, see 
Churches in the Modern State, Appendix I, pp. 175 and ff. 

3 C. Mirbt, Die Stellung Augustins in der Publicistik des Gregorian- 
ischen Kirchenstreits (Leipzig, 1888), p. in. 

In der Erorterung fast aller Fragen, welche die Controverslitteratur 
zu behandeln hatte, zeigt sich der Einfluss Augustins ; besonders : 
in der Lehre von der Kirche, in der Erorterung des Verhaltnisses 
von Kirche und Staat, in der Besprechung der Excommunication, 
in dem Streit iiber die Objectivitat der Sakramente. 

4 Cj. the following letter of Henry IV in 1073. Jaffe, Bibl. Rer. 
Germ, ii (Monumenta Gregoriana), p. 46. 

Cum enim regnum et sacerdotium ut in Christo rite administrata 
subsistant, vicaria sui ope semper indigeant, oportet nimirum, domine 
mi et pater amantissime, quatinus ab invicem minime dissentiant.verum 
potius Christi glutino conjunctissima indissolubiliter sibi cohaereant. 

6 Walram of Naumburg, De Unitate Ecclesie conseruanda, i. 17, 
in Libelli de lite (Mon. Germ. Hist.), ii. pp. 184 and ff. 

6 Gregory, Reg. viii. 21. Migne, P.L., cxlviii. 596, 598. 

7 Humbertus, Adv. Simoniacos, iii. 29, in Martene, Thes. v. 819 sq. 

Quis fidelium dubitare jam poterit Spiritum sanctum . . . totam 
replere ecclesiam, ut pro qualitate ministrorum et rerum eius singnla 
quae illi connectuntur et debentur sanctificet ? Est enim clericalis 
ordo in ecclesia praecipuus tanquam in capite oculi. . . . Est et laicolis 
potestas tanquam pectus et brachia ad obediendum et defendendum 
ecclesiam valida et exerta. Est deinde vulgus tanquam inferiora 
vel extrema membra ecclesiasticis et saecularibus potestatibus pariter 
subditum et peraecessarium. 

8 See note i . 

9 Compare also Wyclif, De Officio Regis, 58, 59. 

Necesse est esse tres hierarchias in regno quae omnes unam 
personam unicordem constituant, scilicet sacerdotes vel oratores, secu- 
lares dominos vel defensores, et plebeos vel laboratores. 

NOTES TO LECTURE VI 

1 Christianopolis, trs. by Dr. F. E. Held (Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1916). 

2 De opere monachorum, C. xvii. 

Quid enim agant qui operari corporaliter nolunt, cui rei vacent 
scire desidero. Orationibus inquiunt et psalmis et lectioni et verbo 
dei. Sancta plane vita, et Christi suauitate laudabilis. Sed si ab 
his auocandi non sumus, nee manducandum est, nee ipsae escae quotidie 
praeparandae ut possint apponi et adsumi. Si autem ad ista vacare 
seruos dei certis interuallis temporum ipsius infirmitatis necessitas 
cogit, cur non et apostolicis- praeceptis obseruandis aliquas partes 
temporum deputamus ? 

Printed by SPOTTISWOODE, BALLANTYNE &> Co. LTD. 
Colchester, London & Eton, England 



BR 65 .A65F5 1921 

SMC 

FIGGIS, JOHN NEVILLE, 

1866-1919, 
THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF 

S. AUGUSTINE S "CITY OF 
AKA-4964 (MCAB)