Full text of "The Politics of Aristotle"

THE

NEWMAN

VOI. I.

HENRY FROWDE

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE
AMEN CORNER, E.G.

PREFACE.

THE first of the two volumes which I now publish is
an introductory volume designed to throw light on the
political teaching of Aristotle. I have sought to view his
political teaching in connexion not only with the central
principles of his philosophical system, but also with the
results of earlier speculation. I have endeavoured to
discover how it came to be what it is, and especially to
trace its relation to the political teaching of Plato, and
to ask how far the paths followed by the two inquirers
lay together, how far and at what points they diverged.
It is only thus that we can learn how much came to
Aristotle by inheritance and how much is in a more es
pecial sense his own. If the investigation of these ques
tions has often carried me beyond the limits of the Politics,
I have sought in recapitulating and illustrating Aristotle s
political teaching to follow as far as possible in the track
of its inquiries. It will be seen, however, that I have dealt
in my First Volume with some books of the Politics at far
greater length than with others. Thus, while I have
analysed with some fulness the contents of the Third,
Fourth, and Fifth Books (in the order which I have
adopted) and have also had much to say with regard to
the inquiries of the First, I have dwelt but little on the
Second Book and have given only a short summary of
the contents of the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth. My plan
has been in my First Volume to devote most space to
the books in which the Political Theory of Aristotle is
more especially embodied, particularly as they are books

VOL. I. b

vi PREFACE.

the full significance of which is easily missed, and which
are perhaps better dealt with in a continuous exposition
than in notes on the text, so far at least as their substance
is concerned. Other books seemed to be best studied in a
commentary : thus, while I have said but little in my First
Volume with regard to the Second Book, I have dealt with
it at some length in the Notes contained in the Second
Volume. The two volumes are, in fact, designed to com
plete each other. I shall have much to add in a subsequent
volume on the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Books.

In both volumes I have sought to keep in view the
links which connect the Politics with Greek literature
generally. It is the work of a widely read man who writes
for readers hardly less familiar with Greek literature than
himself, and light is often thrown not only on the origin
of a doctrine, but also on the meaning of a sentence or the
turn of a phrase, when we can recall some kindred passage
from the poets or prose-writers of Greece. Aristotle s
contemporaries were probably far more aware than any
modern reader of the Politics can be, how often he tacitly
repeats or amends or controverts the opinions of others.
He is especially fond of tacitly echoing or impugning the
opinions of Plato, and in a less degree of Xenophon and
Isocrates. But not a few works are lost to us which
Aristotle had before him in writing the Politics. Among
these is the historical work of Ephorus, of which we possess
only fragments. We have no doubt lost much by losing
all but the fragments of Aristotle s own Polities.

My inquiries have carried me over a wide field, and the
conclusions at which I have arrived cannot fail to be often
open to correction. I would gladly have made my two vol
umes shorter than they are, but I have not found it easy to
do so. The length of my explanatory notes is mainly due
to the frequent indeed, almost incessant occurrence of
ambiguities of language in the Greek of the Politics, which

PREFACE. vii

cannot be cleared up without discussion, and which often
need all the light that can be thrown on them from parallel
passages. The style of the Politics is of an easy, half-
conversational character and readily lends itself to am
biguities of this kind. My notes, however, would have
been shorter if I had not often thought it well to print
in full passages referred to in them. I hope to be less
lengthy in my notes on the Third, Fourth, and Fifth
Books, with which I have already dealt pretty fully in
my Introduction. I fear that I shall frequently be found
to try the patience of my readers, and not least in some
of the opening pages of the First Volume, which treat of
matters of a somewhat technical nature. I trust, however,
that this volume may sometimes serve to smooth the path
of thoughtful readers of the Politics, though I am well
aware that no single student of the treatise can hope to
exhaust its meaning. The volume, or volumes, completing
the work will, I hope, follow after a not too long interval.

Since my remarks on the MSS. of the Politics (vol. 2.
p. xli sqq.) were in type, the general preference which I
have expressed in them for the authority of the second
family of MSS. has received welcome confirmation from
the discovery, or rediscovery, in the Vatican Library of
twelve palimpsest leaves forming part of .the second
volume of a Vatican MS. of Aristides (gr. 1298), which
contain fragmentary portions of the Third and Sixth
Books of the Politics and are said to belong to the tenth
century. These fragments were already known to Mai, who
gives a short notice of them in Script, vet. nova collectio
2. 584 without, however, enabling his readers to identify
the MS. in which they occur ; hence they were lost sight
of till the winter of 1886, when they were brought to the
knowledge of Dr. G. Heylbut, who has published a
collation of them in the Rheinisches Museum for 1887
(p. 102 sqq.), to which I may refer my readers. The

t VOL. I. b 2

viii PREFACE.

twelve leaves are stated by him to comprise the following
passages of the Politics :

3. i. 1275 a 133. 2. 1275 b 33,

3. 4. i2/6b 17 i277b i,

3. 5. 1278 a 24 3. 10. 1281 a 37,

3. 15. 1286 b 16 6 (4). i. 1288 b 37,

6 (4). 4. 1290 a 36 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 20.
According to a short notice of Dr. Heylbut s article
contributed by Mr. R. D. Hicks to the Classical Review,
No. i, p. 20 sq.. Professor Susemihl finds that these
Palimpsest Fragments agree with the readings of the
second family of MSS. in sixty-two cases and with those
of the first family in twenty-seven only. Mr. Hicks
suggests that the codex of which these are the fragments,
or its original, belongs to a period anterior to any sharp
distinction between the manuscripts of the two families :
be that, however, as it may, it is clear that the fragments
lend the support of whatever authority they possess rather
to the second family than to the first. Dr. Heylbut, in
fact, holds (p. 107), that any future recension of the text
of the Politics should be based primarily on the manu
scripts of the second family (eine kunftige Textrecension
in erster Linie auf Grund von n 2 herzustellen ist). He
here anticipates the conclusion at which I had myself
already in the main arrived.

My indebtedness to the writings of others may be
measured by the frequency with which I refer to them.
To no one do I owe more than to Professor Susemihl.
His editions of the Politics, and especially that of 1872,
have been invaluable to me, though I have never been able
to follow him in his preference for the first family of MSS.
and have often arrived at conclusions respecting the text
at variance with his. I need not repeat here what I have
said elsewhere (vol. 2. pp. xlii, 57 sqq.) of my indebted
ness to his apparatus criticiis. My debt to the Index

PREFACE. ix

Aristotelicus of Bonitz is only second to that which I owe
to Susemihl. The concise but important comments on pas
sages of the Politics which it contains are but too likely to
escape notice from their brevity, and I have done my
best to draw attention to them. Among the works which
I have found especially useful I may mention Zeller s
Philosophic der Griechen ; C. F. Hermann s Lehrbuch
der griechischen Antiquitaten ; several of the writings of
Vahlen, Bernays, Teichmiiller, and Eucken ; Leopold
Schmidt s Ethik der alten Griechen ; Buchsenschtitz Besitz
und Erwerb im griechischen Alterthume, and Henkel s
Studien zur Geschichte der griechischen Lehre vom Staat.
Dittenberger s valuable review of Susemihl s first edition
of the Politics has long been known to me. To my many
predecessors in the task of editing and commenting on the
Politics from Victorius downwards, and to the numerous
translators of the work, beginning with Sepulveda, I owe
not a little. Mr. Welldon s careful and thoughtful version
has constantly been consulted by me and often with profit,
and I have made as much use of Professor Jowett s in
teresting work on the Politics as the comparative lateness
of its appearance allowed. For a mention of other works
which have been used by me I may refer my readers to
the citations scattered over my two volumes.

My best thanks are due to the President and Fellows of
Corpus Christi College, Oxford, for twice allowing me the
use at the Bodleian Library of the MS. of the Politics
(No. 112) belonging to the College ; to the authorities of
Balliol and New College for the loan of their MSS. 112
and 228 ; and to the authorities of the Bodleian and
Phillipps Libraries for the courtesy they have shown me.
I have mentioned elsewhere (vol. 2. p. 60) how much I am
indebted to Mr. E. Maunde Thompson, Keeper of the MSS.
in the British Museum, and to Mr. F. Madan, Sub-Librarian
of the Bodleian Library, for important assistance in the

x PREFACE.

interpretation of an inscription in MS. Phillipps 891. To
the friends who have done me the service of criticising
my proof-sheets as they have passed through the press
I am under the greatest obligations, and especially to
Mr. Alfred Robinson of New College, who has kindly
found time in the midst of his many engagements patiently
to peruse the whole of them, and whose criticisms and
suggestions have been of much value to me, to the Warden
of Wadham College, to whom I owe a similar acknowledg
ment, and to Mr. Ingram Bywater, who has perused many
of my proofs. The comments of Mr. R. L. Nettleship and
Mr. Evelyn Abbott of Balliol College, and of Professor
Andrew Bradley, on portions of my proof-sheets have also
been of much use to me. I have profited much by the
criticisms of friends, but for the shortcomings of this
work I am alone responsible. I should add that Mr.
Bywater has kindly lent me the late Mr. Mark Pattison s
copy of Stahr s edition of the Politics, containing a few
annotations from his hand, from which I have been glad to
have the opportunity of quoting now and then.

In referring to the works of Aristotle, I give, in addition
to the book and chapter of the treatise cited, the page,
column, and line of Bekker s edition of 1 831. My references
to the work of Zeller are to the last edition, except where
another is specified ; those to C. F. Hermann s Lehrbuch
are to K. B. Stark s edition of it, unless the contrary is
specified, the latest edition being still incomplete. The
abbreviation Sus. 1 refers to Susemihl s first edition of the
Politics published in 1872, Sus. 2 and Sus. 3 to the two
editions subsequently published by him. I have thought
it better, especially in my First Volume, to translate the
quotations which I have occasionally made from German
books ; I have, however, usually left German renderings of
passages in the Politics untranslated.
AUGUST, 1887.

CONTENTS.

PAGE

, THE Politics linked to the Nicomachean Ethics the transition from

the latter treatise to the former examined I **"

Nature of the distinction drawn by Aristotle between Theoretic, Prac-
*" tical, and Productive Science : the iro\iriKr) firiffTrj^tj falls under the

second head ............ 4 **

How far does the method actually followed by Aristotle in the
Politics agree with that which he ascribes to TTO\ITIKT] ? . . . . 1 1

Powers acting within the domain of iro\iTiKrj Necessity, Nature,

Spontaneity, Fortune, Man 15

Necessity 17

Nature 18

Spontaneity and Fortune . . . . . . ... . 21

Man 23

The State only imperfectly amenable to human control . . . 24*^ "
The necessity of the State, its value to man and its authority over the
| individual reasserted by Aristotle. Human society and the State
\ originate in Nature : the State is prior to the individual and the house-

1 hold, and is the whole of which they are parts 24 a/ 4 ""

/Remarks on Aristotle s argument . 33

Aristotle s account of the origin of the State ..... 36 *. .
The iro\is the culmination of human society and therefore the true

subjgdUo! political study 39

7 The 7ro\ti~ a Koivcavia, and a compound Whole, a awOtrov ... 41 ^

To understand a thing, however, it is necessary to trace it to its four
causes, and especially to discover its matter and its end . . . 44 ^ ^

. The Matter of the State . . 50 A

*** The End of the State 50 A

i The method of inquiry in Politics to which Plato s philosophical

principles point 50

V How far is this method followed by Plato ? . .... 54

J The method to which Aristotle s philosophical principles point
ascertainment of the specific end ........ 55

The teleological method in Politics, and the use made of it by Aris
totle ... 61

The end assigned by Aristotle to the v6\ts examined . . . . 68 ^ .
Three propositions implied in Aristotle s account of the end of the

77-oA.JS .............69

Examination of these propositions the first 70

The second 78

The third 79

xii CONTENTS.

A definition of the iro\is has now been arrived at : it is a icoivuvia.
issuing in a Whole and formed for the end of perfect and self-complete
life. How must the iro\ts be organized to attain its end ? The answer
given in the portraiture of a best constitution merits and defects of
^_, this mode of dealing with the subject ....... 83

How, then, is the best State to be constituted ? We must first ask fit

Matter of Nature and Fortune 89

^ Conditions of the formation of this Matter into a State : i . Common
locality ; common life ; common aim ; common ethical creed expressed

in a constitution 90 _

2. Differentiation. A State implies a distribution of functions and an
exchange of service ............... 9~

The distribution of advantages and functions within a State is regu
lated by its constitution, which should be just i.e. should distribute
them with a view to the true end of the State, and should take account
of all elements which contribute to that end ...... 94

List of functions to be distributed ....... 96

Are the lower functions to be committed to the same hands as the

higher? 98

^^- Social estimate of agriculture, trade, and industry current in ancient

y Greece 99 &gt;

\/ Opinions of Socrates, Xenophon, and Plato . . . . . 107

of Aristotle in-

Aristotle marks off necessary from noble functions . . . 113
Necessary and noble functions to be placed in different hands . . 115
Position in the State assigned by Aristotle to the classes concerned
with necessary functions . . . . . . . . .118

Remarks on Aristotle s view and the considerations which led him to

adopt it ,.._ii 9

Exclusion of women from political functions in the best State taken ,.

for granted ..........^.124

The economic substructure of Aristotle s State to be largely formed

}f non-Hellenic materials |. . 125.1*

It is not, however, enough to sever the citizens of the State from

necessary work : the Science of Supply (xprjfiaTiffTiKTj) must be purged,

and recalled to a sense of its true limits and methods : it must bo marked

off from the Science of Household Management (oLroco/tunt) al d placed

f\ under its control . . . . . . . . ) .126

Aristotle s theory of the Science of Supply : its sound and unsound
-* forms ............. 128

^t- Comments on this theory 1 30

The Science of Supply to be subordinated to Household Science . 133

Aristotle s aims in this inquiry 134

, Status of those concerned with necessary work some to be free, some

\to be slaves ............ 138

I Slavery its naturalness and justice impugned by some inquirers . 139

t Reinvestigation of the basis of slavery by Aristotle . . . .143

CONTENTS. xiti

PAGE

Aristotle defends, but reforms slavery 144

Slow decadence of slavery

Plato s scheme of a community in women and children, and also in
property, rejected by Aristotle : his grounds for rejecting it considered .

Sketch of the Greek household as Plato and Aristotle found it .
yPlato abolishes the household in the Republic and reconstructs it in
^ihe Laws, leaving it even there only a somewhat shadowy existence
" Aristotle s view of the household and its true organization
^Aristotle, like Plato before him, requires the State to fix limits of age
/for marriage y .

Considerations kept in view by Aristotle in relation to this matter

TeKVoiroii a to cease after 1 7 years of married life ....

Only a certain number of children to be begotten during the 1 7 years :
means by which this rule is to be enforced . . . . . .187

Aims of Aristotle in relation to these matters 188

The head of the ideal household of Aristotle in his relation to his
wife, children, and slaves 189

The ideal household of Aristotle contrasted with the average Athenian
household ............ 194

Aristotle intends the household to be a reality . . . . .195

Divorce 195

Aristotle and the clan, phratry, and tribe 196 .

Contrast between the Aristotelian conception of the household and
modern conceptions of it ip7

Aristotle s teaching as to Property its due amount and the true mode
of acquiring and using it . . . . . . . . .198

Transition from the industrial and household life of the State to its
political life 203

Preliminary lessons learnt in the Second Book 204

-/Third Book of the Politics distribution of rights of citizenship and
of rule

Importance attached by the Greeks to the constitution : the constitu
tion the mode of life chosen by the State influence ascribed to it
over the life and character of those living under it 209

The popular classification of constitutions 211

y Principles of Socrates and Plato 2 1 2 /C

Views of Aristotle as to the classification of constitutions : they de-
velope progressively as we advance in the Third Book, and as we pass
from the Third to the Sixth 214

Aristotle s account of the causes of constitutional diversity . . . 220 -

Aristotle the first clearly to recognize the truth that the constitution
of a State reflects to some extent its social conditions . . . 2 2_

What is the value of Aristotle s classification ? 224

The Third Book an introduction both to the inquiry as to the best
constitution and to the study of constitutions generally. It traces the
conditions of sound or normal government as a preliminary step to both
these investigations 225

xiv CONTENTS.

The State consisting of citizens, the first question to be asked is What
is a citizen? 226

A citizen is one on whom the State has conferred rights of access to
e, judicial or deliberative 229

Are we then to say, when a turn of the political wheel has conferred
these rights on slaves and aliens, persons presumably unfit to possess
them, that the State has conferred them and that these men are citizens? 230

This question leads to an inquiry as to the identity of the State, which
is found to reside mainly in the constitution, the answer implied (but
not given) being that these men are citizens by the act of the State,
though hardly perhaps the same State as existed before . . . . 232

What is the virtue of the citizen ? Is it the same as the virtue of the
good man? Significance of this discussion . . . . . .234

Are Pavavaoi (who do not share in office) citizens? .... 240

They are so in some constitutions, but not in others .... 241

The nature of citizenship proving to depend on the constitution, we

naturally pass on to the constitution 242

Distinction between normal constitutions and deviation-forms : Aris-
yj totle shows by a reference to the end of the State and by an inquiry as
to the kind of rule which should be exercised over free persons, that
normally government is for the common good ..... 243

Six constitutions three normal, three the reverse .... 246

Nature of Democracy and Oligarchy their claims to be just constitu- .

tions analyzed, and rejected by a reference to the end of the State . . 2 47

Aristotle s account of the principle on which political power is to be
distributed not always quite the same . . . . . . .249

.ummary of the conclusions so far arrived at as to the nature of a State 251

The question as to the place of Law in the State has so far not
emerged : it emerges in connexion with the inquiry, what is to be the
supreme authority of the State ? 253

The answer to this inquiry is laws normally constituted . . .254

Parenthetical recognition of the claims of the many, if not below a
certain level of excellence, to a share in certain political rights which
they can exercise collectively 254

What are normally constituted laws ? Laws adjusted to the normal
constitutions. Transition to the question, what the just is what

ributes confer a just claim to a share in political power . . .259

The normal constitution will recognize all elements which contribute
to the being and well-being of the State, not one of them only. A bare
superiority in one only does not confer an exclusive right to supremacy . 260

Unless the virtue of the Good is so transcendent as to outweigh the
collective merit of the Many, the Good, the Rich, and the Many must
divide power between them in the way most conducive to the common
good ............. 261

If, however, one man, or a small group of men not numerous enough
to constitute a city, is forthcoming, possessing this transcendent amount
of virtue, then a case for the Absolute Kingship arises .... 262

CONTENTS. xv

PAGE

The case, we observe, in which the good are sufficient in number to
constitute a city is not here considered : this is the case assumed to exist
in the Fourth Book, where all citizens are men of virtue . . . 263

General conclusion the normal constitution is not one and the same
everywhere : it varies with the circumstances of the given case . . 264 -r

Justice and the common good the twofold clue to the normal consti
tution 266

Is Aristotle s account of the principle on which political power should
be distributed correct ? 267 Xf

Transition to Kingship, which is examined first as being one of the
normal constitutions. Its true form, the Absolute Kingship, distinguished
from the rest 268

Question of the expediency of Kingship discussed is the rule of thg___^^ \
best man or the rule of the best laws the more expedient ? . .270

Provisional conclusion arrived at in favour of a Lawgiver- King, who
makes laws, but reserves to himself the power to break them, where
they deviate from the right 272

But the subject which Aristotle intended to investigate was the King
who is supreme over everything and may act as he pleases, not he who
is in part checked by law. Is a King of this type an expedient institution ? 272

The Absolute Kingship is in place under given circumstances i. e. if
the King s virtue is so transcendent as to exceed the collective virtue of

all the rest 274

In one case then (that of the Absolute Kingship) the conclusion
arrived at in the earlier part of the book that normally constituted laws
are the true supreme authority, does not hold good . . . .275

Aristotle s object in making this reservation in favour of the Absolute
Kingship is to prevent the claims of Law clashing with those of justice
and reason ~ v 276

His doctrine of the Absolute Kingship, however, also implies that it
is not in place in the absence of transcendent virtue. Salutary tendency
of this teaching . _ . . . . . . . . . 277

Naturalness of the idea that men should be ruled by beings higher _
than themselves .......... .279

Aristotle s view that the Absolute Kingship is the only real form of
Kingship criticised . . . . . . . . . .281

Retrospective summary of the conclusions of the Third Book as to the
nature of the State 283

Conflict of the Absolute Kingship with Aristotle s general account of
the State . . . . . . 288

Under what circumstances are Kingship, Aristocracy, and Polity
respectively in place ? 289

The Third Book has mainly concerned itself with the normal consti
tutions, but we gain from it occasional glimpses of the best constitution 290

Closing chapter of the Tjiird^gojik how far is it in harmony with
the opening of the Fourth (old Seventh) Book and with the Fourth
Book generally ? 292

xvi CONTENTS.

In constructing a best constitution the task to which we now pass
the first step to be taken is to ascertain what is the most desirable life,
for the best constitution must realize the most desirable life. What
then is the most desirable life ? ........ 298

A life of virtue fully furnished with external means the external
means being adjusted in amount to the requirements of virtuous action
is the most desirable both for individuals and for States . . . 300

The further question, however, arises, in what activities such a life
should be spent. Is a political and practical life the best or a life
detached from affairs a contemplative life, for example ? An examina
tion of conflicting views on this subject results in a conclusion in favour
of a life of practical activity, but then this term must be understood to
include not only political but also speculative activity .... 303

Who were the disputants between whom Aristotle here adjudi
cates? 306

Aristotle seeks as usual to mediate between the rival doctrines and to
arrive at a conclusion embodying all the truth contained in them without
the error. He is for a many-sided life ....... 308

^ A passage in Plato s Laws compared 309

Thucydides sets more store by empire than Aristotle . . . . 310

Remarks on this discussion . . . . . . . .311

, The preliminary conditions of the State: i. a people neither too

i scanty nor too numerous 313

2. A territory of a given character 315

3. A people of a given character . . . . . . .318

Distribution of social functions (npa^ets) 322

List of necessary -yfvrj : deliberative and judicial functions not to be

given to artisans, traders, or cultivators, nor even to those who serve the

State in war 323

T6 eviropov to be the citizen-class ....... 324

Priestly functions to be given to ex-rulers 324

The distinction between some classes permanent, between others tem
porary. Advantages of this arrangement . . . . . 325
Remarks on Aristotle s singular arrangement with respect to the

priesthood 329

Principle underlying Aristotle s distribution of functions in his best

State 330

Arrangements for the division of the territory and its cultivation . 331
The institution of syssitia adopted by Aristotle in its complete form

its recommendations 333

\ - Picture of Aristotle s ideal city 335

So far we have been dealing with matters in respect of which the
favour of Fortune counts for almost everything: now we come to a
matter in which more depends on the legislator what is the citizen-body
of the best State to be in character and circumstances ? . . . . 340

The citizens must be happy, and if they are to be happy in the fullest
sense, their exercise of virtue must be complete i.e. it must be in
&lt;\

CONTENTS. xvii

PAGE

relation to things absolutely good, not to things conditionally good
(that is, good under given circumstances, like punishment) . . . 341

Two things then are necessary for the realization of a happy State
absolute goods and virtue. The first we must ask of Fortune : for the
second the legislator is responsible. How then are men made virtuous?
We return here to the question with which the Third Book closed. By ^

nature, habit, and reason, acting in harmony 343

But is our education to be such as to produce men fitted only for
ruling, or such as to produce men fitted first to be ruled and then to
rule ? We must aim at the latter result 344

But since he who is first to be a good subject and then a good ruler
must, as we have seen, be a good man, we must seek to produce good
men 344

Our education must develope the whole man, physical, moral, and
intellectual, but the development of the lower element in man is to be
adjusted to the ultimate development of that which is highest in him
the virtues, moral and intellectual, which are essential to a right use of
leisure 345

A remark of Lotze s quoted ........ 347

How then are men such as we have described to be produced ? We
must follow the order of development train the body first, then the
appetites, then the reason : but the body must be trained as is best for
the correct development of the appetites, and the appetites as is best for
the development of reason . . . . . . . . . 34*

The first step in education is the regulation of marriage. The rearing
of infancy ............ 3?

The management of children up to the age of five and from five to seven 350

At seven direct instruction is to begin. Education from seven to
puberty and from puberty to twenty-one 35 2

Commencement of the Fifth Book. Recurrence to the aporetic method.
Three questions asked : i. Should any systematic arrangements be
adopted with respect to the education of the young ? 2. Should educa
tion be managed by the State ? 3. What scheme of education should be
adopted ? The two former questions are answered in the affirmative :
the discussion of the third extends over the whole of the Fifth Book and
is not completed in it . . . . . . . . . . \ 352

Conflict of opinion as to the true aim of education and the subjects to
be taught 354

Things necessary for life must be taught, but not so as to produce
fiavavaia. Four subjects commonly accepted ypdft/MTa, fvpyaaTiKr],
HovatKr), fpa&lt;piKrj. Aristotle learns from an inquiry why ftovcriKr) was
made a part of education by the ancients, that it is legitimate to employ
studies in education which are not strictly necessary, but conduce to a
right use of leisure . ......... 3-5

Tvfuvaa-riK-fi, however, must come first, for training must begin with
the body : hence the boys of seven must be handed over first to fvnva-
ariKT] and n-aiSor/x.fit/cij. Tv^vaariKr], however, must be reformed . . 35^

xviii CONTENTS.

PAGE

Aristotle passes on to Music (novancf) ). What is its exact value, and
why should we concern ourselves with it ? . . . . . . 359

It is pleasant and a source of refreshment and recreation : it is both
noble and pleasant, hence suitable for a rational use of leisure. It would
be well, therefore, to teach the young music, if only for the sake of its
future use in recreation and leisure . . . . . . .361

Its use, however, as a source of pleasure and recreation is, perhaps,
subordinate and accidental : its essential value lies rather in its power to
influence the character .......... 362

As to learning to sing and play, it is not easy to become a good judge
of music without having done so, but the practice of music and singing
must be confined to the years of youth, and must not be carried beyond
a certain point : the instruments used must also be the right ones . . 364

The melodies (/j.e\Tj} used in education must also be correctly chosen.
Melodies are ethical, connected with action, or enthusiastic, each sort
having an appropriate harmony of its own. With a view to education
those harmonies which are most ethical are to be preferred, such as the
Doric, though for the other purposes for which Music is useful the
purging of the emotions, the intellectual use of leisure, and recreation
the other kinds of harmony may be used ...... 366

On Aristotle s view of Music and its uses ...... 367

On Aristotle s scheme of education ....... 369

Sketch of the history of Greek political philosophy : . . . 374
The aims of early Greek legislators and political inquirers . . . 374
Pythagoras and 1 ythagoreanism ....... 376

Hippodamus of Miletus ......... 380

The eulogists and critics of the Athenian and Lacedaemonian States . 384

The Sophists 386

The myth of Protagoras (Plato, Protag. 320 C sqq.) . . . .387

Other sophists 388

~~ Socrates 392

Plato 398

Sketch of the political teaching of the Republic. .... 401^

Remarks 416

Influence of the Republic on the political philosophy of Aristotle . 421
. Points in which the political teaching of Aristotle diverged from that

. of the Republic 423

J V A broad resemblance, however, exists between the political ideal of

Aristotle and that of Plato 428

The Politicus 430

Sketch of the State described in the Laws * . 433

Remarks 449

Looking back, we see how much the study of Politics in Greece had
gained from the increased earnestness of ethical inquiry .... 454
v Plato entered on the study of Politics with an ethical aim . . . 455
v Plato had done much for Political Science, but had also left much for
a successor to do 457

CONTENTS. xix

PAGE

Something to be gained by greater closeness of investigation . . 458

Plato s successor, Aristotle 461

Sketch of Aristotle s life 462

Aristotle s relation to Hellas and to Macedon 475

^Contrast of form between Plato s writings and those in which Aris
totle s philosophical teaching is embodied 478

Style of Aristotle 481

vContrast of substance between the political teaching of Plato and that

of Aristotle , 482

Contrast between the three concluding books of the Politics and the

earlier ones 489

Questions arising as to the programme of the contents of the last three

books which seems to be given us in 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 12 sqq. . . . 492
_^JSketch of the contents of the Sixth Bjjok: r. Many varieties both of
oligarchy and democracy : strong dissimilarity between the moderate

and extreme forms of each ......... 494

2. Mixed constitutions : A. the apiffroicparia improperly so called . 497
B. the Polity 498

3. Tyranny 499

What is the best constitution for most States ? 499,

What constitution is best under given circumstances (ris rifftv alperri) ?

If the circumstances favour oligarchy or democracy, how should the law
giver proceed ? If they favour polity, how should the polity be con
stituted? 500

Reasons which led Aristotle to advocate the Polity. Nature of the

extreme democracy . . 504

The Polity 507

The Polity, however, is not applicable everywhere . . . .512

Contents of the remainder of the Sixth Book 512

The deliberative element . . . . . . . . .512

The magistracies 514

The judiciary 518

.) Sketch of the contents of the Seventh Book: i. Plato s account of

the causes of change in constitutions criticised 518

2. Purpose and subject of the Seventh Book . . . . .521

3. Aristotle s account of the causes of constitutional change . . 523

4. Causes of change in oligarchy, democracy, aristocracy, and polity, w
taken separately . . . . . . . . . . .528

5. Means of preserving constitutions 530

Special delicacy of the political balance in Greek City-States . . 530
Defects in the working of Greek constitutions indicated in the Eighth /

and Ninth Chapters 532

Means by which, according to Aristotle, constitutions may be pre
served 534

Aristotle s views on this subject contrasted with those of the writer of
the paper on the Athenian Constitution which is included among the

writings of Xenophon 538

xx CONTENTS.

Causes of the fall of monarchies and means of preserving them .
Sketch of the contents of the Eighth Book
\ Aristotle s conception of the problem of Political Science .
Relation of Stoics and Epicureans to Politics and Political Science
The Politics the closing word in a long debate .....
H Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle
Concluding remarks .

547
549-

549

552
552
558

Appendices :
Appendix A. On the Third and Fourth Chapters of the Sixth
Book .

Appendix B ..........
Appendix C. On the Twelfth and Thirteenth Chapters of the
Third Book
Appendix D
Appendix E
Appendix F ......... .
Appendix G .

569

57
573
573
575
576

THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE.

INTRODUCTION.

ARISTOTLE S treatment of the science of TroAmK?? falls, The Poli-
unlike Plato s, into two distinct parts, and extends over to the Ni-
two treatises, the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics, eomachean
The fact is significant, and we are not surprised to find the transi-
that the two sections show, as we shall see hereafter,

a certain tendency to draw away from each other. They treatise to
stand, however, in the closest mutual relation : the Ethics examined^
comes first in order, the Politics second. The Ethics
naturally precedes, as it mainly analyses happiness in
the individual, and Aristotle s principle is that the ^study
of the part (TO ^d^Lo-Tov, TO acrivQeTov) should precede 1
the study of the whole. Other reasons for the prece
dence of the Ethics will be pointed out elsewhere.

The transition from the one treatise to the other, how
ever, is by no means as smooth and easy as we might
expect. We are told in the last chapter of the Ethics that
it is not enough for the student of Practical Philosophy to
know what happiness and virtue and pleasure are without
seeking their realization in practice, and that they can
hardly be realized in practice without the aid of Law.
The State, Aristotle continues, should use Law with a view
to their realization, but the Lacedaemonian State is almost
the only one which does this systematically, and which ex
ercises a supervision over the rearing and life of its members.
The head of the household is almost everywhere left to him
self by the State and allowed to rule his household as he

VOL. i. B

2 TRANSITION TO THE POLITICS

pleases. He is, in fact, a lawgiver on a small scale, and
hence it is desirable that he should learn to use Law
scientifically for the purpose of making those he rules
better, or in other words, that he should acquire the art of
Legislation. He will hardly learn this art from persons
versed in political life ; still less will he learn it from the
Sophists : Aristotle will therefore himself take in hand the
subject of legislation, and indeed the whole topic of consti
tutional organization, in order that, as far as may be, his
philosophy of things human 1 may be brought to comple
tion.

First, then, he proceeds, let us try to notice anything
of value on the subject, which has been said by those who
have gone before us, and then to learn from a comparison of
constitutions what things are preservative of, or destructive
to, States, and what are so to each separate constitution 2 ,
and for what reasons some constitutions are good and
others bad : for when we have considered all these matters,
we shall perhaps be better able to discern both what form
of constitution is the best, and how each form must be
ordered, and with what laws and customs, to be what we
should desire it to be V

When Aristotle wrote these, the concluding sentences
of the Ethics, he evidently intended to deduce the true
structure of the best and other States from a study of
various constitutions and from a study of the causes which
tend to the preservation or decay of States and of each con
stitution. This is. in fact, to some extent the plan followed
by Plato in the Laws, though he does not go on to draw
conclusions as to the true form of every constitution,

1 This expression is apparently on the authenticity of many of the
inherited from Socrates (Xen. references, backwards or forwards,
Mem. i. i). to be found in the writings which

2 This inquiry would seem to bear the name of Aristotle, it may
involve a study of the history of be as well to remark that this
the States themselves a matter, programme would hardly have
however, into which Aristotle been forged by any one who had
does not propose to enter. the Politics before him either in its

3 As much doubt has been traditional order or perhaps in any
thrown, not without good ground, conceivable order.

FROM THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS. 3

but confines himself to tracing the outline of one ideal
community. He reviews in the Third Book the Lacedae
monian, Persian, and Athenian constitutions, noting the
causes of the failure or success of each, and then proceeds
to construct his State. The Politics, however, is arranged
on a different plan. The Second Book, which contains
the review of constitutions, does not commence the work,
nor does it include or introduce an inquiry into the things
which preserve or destroy States or constitutions. This
is reserved for a book which, wherever we place it, must
come much later. The first book of the Politics deals
with a subject not marked out for consideration in the
last chapter of the Ethics : it seeks to establish and
emphasize a distinction between the householder and the
statesman, the household and the State. We hear no more
of the notion that the individual householder can, by
acquiring the legislative art, in some degree make up for
the State s neglect of education.

In some respects, no doubt, the close of the Ethics and
the opening of the Politics are in harmony. The one
implies what the other emphatically asserts the natural
supremacy of the State over the household and the indi
vidual. So again, the programme in the Ethics correctly
foreshadows the scope of the inquiries of the Politics. It
prepares us for an inquiry, not merely into the best con
stitution, but into every constitution. Both treatises agree
that the true lawgiver will be capable of organizing all
constitutions aright, and not merely of devising a best
constitution. Still the fact remains that a track is marked
out in the Ethics for the investigations of the Politics
which they certainly do not follow. There is no need
to imagine any other cause for Aristotle s departure from
his programme than a simple change of plan on his part.
The Politics was probably not only not written, but also
not fully conceived, when the paragraph in the Ethics
was drawn up, and the paragraph had not been amended
when Aristotle died.

B 2

4 PLACE OF nOAITIKH

Nature of Our first step must be to discuss as briefly as we may
tiondrawn ^ e somew hat thorny question, what is the nature of the

by Aristo- science of TroAiTiKj} and its relation to other sciences. Is it

tie between . , . . . _. . ,

Theoretic, a science in the sense in which Physics is a science, and

Practical, } low f ar j s jj- re lated to sciences such as Physics ?

and Pro

ductive If we follow the division of Science which we find in

Ae e A t : . the Metaphysics (E. i. 1025 b 18 sqq., E. 2. 1026 b 4)
TiKp em- into theoretic, practical, and productive Science, n-oXm/cr? as
under 7 the 5 i a whole appears to fall within, or to be identical with,
second Practical Science, the kind of Science which serves as a

head. .

guide to right action.

The groundwork of this classification of the Sciences
seems to have been laid by Plato. Plato had already
classified sciences by their subject-matter. In the Philebus
(55 C sqq.) we find sciences contrasted in respect of the
degree of truth attained by them, and this proves to vary
according to their subject-matter, as does also the method
employed. Sciences concerned with sensible things (ra
yiyvopfva KCU yfvr}(r6^va KCU yeyot-ora, $8 E sqq.) ask the
aid of Opinion and attain only a low degree of truth :
whereas the science dealing with Being and that which
really is and that which is unchangeable is far the truest
(58 A). This is Dialectic, which is thus distinguished
from Physics (59 A). noAtrt/c^ is not here mentioned, but
would no doubt be distinguished by Plato from both,
though we know not whether he conceived it as less or
more exact than Physics : he describes it in the Gorgias
(464) as ministering to the soul for its highest good,
and as comprising two parts, the art of legislation, which
does for the soul what gymnastic does for the body, and
justice, which does for the soul what medicine does for the
body.

The distinction between Theoretic and Practical Science,
again, is inherited by Aristotle from Plato, who dis
tinguishes in the Politicus (258 E) between Cognitive
(ywooTiKcu) and Practical (Trpajeritcal) Sciences, but the
Practical Sciences of Plato correspond more nearly to the
Productive Sciences of Aristotle, and the Political or

AMONG THE SCIENCES. 5

Kingly Science is classed by him among Cognitive Sciences :
it is said to belong to that species of Cognitive Science
which does not stop short at judging, but also rules (260
A-D). Plato seems to merge Ethical Science in TroAtriKTj 1 ,for
he has no separate name for it, and as his Political Science
always has an ethical aim, he is quite consistent in closely
connecting the two sciences of Ethics and Politics. Indeed,
he not only relates Ethics more closely to Politics than
Aristotle, but also makes the link between Dialectic and
the less exact sciences a closer one than that which exists
between the Theoretic Science of Aristotle and the other
sciences. He seems usually to treat Political Science, at
all events, as inseparably bound up with philosophy (Rep.
473 C, 501). A knowledge of the Ideas is as much a
condition of true virtue and true statesmanship as it is of
true knowledge 2 .

Aristotle, on the other hand, though he describes the
First Philosophy in a remarkable passage of the Meta
physics (A. 2. 982 b 4 sqq.) as the most sovereign of the
sciences, determining for what end everything is to be
done/ appears in the Ethics to derive the first principles of
Ethical, and probably also of Political, Science, not from
the First Philosophy, but from Experience. He commonly
speaks in the Ethics as if Practical Science sprang from a
different root from Theoretic Science. It is to Opinion
that he appeals in the First Book, not to the First Philo
sophy, when he seeks to discover what is the good for
man (TO avdpa-nivov ayadov) 3 . It is from correct minor
premisses furnished by experience that the end of moral
action is obtained (Eth. Nic. 6. 12. 1 143 b 4), or, as we read

1 Cp. Euthyd. 291 C-D, where in Political Science : all he ap-
iroXiriKT] is called fj atria TOV opd&s pears to do in this direction is to
TrpuTTeii/ ev TT\ TrdXfi. give them fifteen years practical

2 See Zeller, Plato E. T., pp. experience in military command

152, 218 ; and cp. Rep. 517 C, del and in offices suited to young men ^^

TUVTTJV (rf]v TOV ayadov Idtav) I8flv (Rep. 537 D sqq.). X ""^*/

TOV fJie\\ovTa e^povms irptigfiv rj 3 Cp. Eth. Nic.I-5. IO97a 28, TO 8 /

I8ia fj 8rjuo(riq. Plato does not apio~TOv TeXeiov TI (frail/frail 3O,TXet- I

seem even to arrange for any orepov 8e \eyop.fv : 34, TOIOVTOV 8 I

special training of his guardians f) (v8ainovia ^aXioV elvai 8oKe

6 CONTRAST OF THEORETIC

elsewhere, in somewhat different language, from virtue
rooted in the character by habituation.

Theoretic and Practical Science are regarded by him as
differing (i) in subject-matter, (2) in aim, (3) in the faculty
employed, and (4) in method l .

i. The subject-matter of Theoretic Science is either
things self-existent, unchangeable, and separable from
matter (this is the subject-matter of the First Philosophy),
or things unchangeable and separable from matter only
in logical conception (the subject-matter of Mathematics),
or things inseparable from matter and subject to change 5
(the subject-matter of Physics): see Metaph. E. i. 10263.
13 2 . The subject-matter of Physics is in close contact
with that of Practical Science, though it is marked off from
the latter by the fact that its principle is within and not
outside itself (eu avrw, not fv aAAco). Man is a subject of
Physics, so far as he has a soul which is the source of
nutrition and growth (de Part. An. i. i. 641 a 32 sqq. :
Metaph. E. i. 1026 a 5), but at the point at which he com
mences to act, he ceases to be a subject of Physics and
becomes the subject of Practical Science. So suddenly
does the field of Physics break off and that of Practical
Science begin. Both things done (ra -nym/cra), which are
the subject of TroAm/c?;, and things produced (TO. Trotrjra)
have their originating principle (apxn) outside themselves
in an agent or producer (Eth. Nic. 6. 4. 1140 a i, TOV 8
fv^exl j -^ vov AAo)? fX. LV * a " ri Tl Ka ^OLTITOV KOL trpaKrov : cp.
Metaph. E. I. 1025 b 22, ruiy ^v yap TTOUJTIKWI; kv rw TTOLOVVTL
fj ap^ri, rj vovs 7) Ttyjvr) rj bvvafJiCs ris, r&v Se TrpaKTiK&v fv r&lt;o
TTpaTTovTi ?/ TTpocupecns). It is thus that things done lie
as it were passively at the disposition of the agent, just as
things produced do at the disposition of the producer.
They are therefore said to be in our power (e$ rjfj.lv, Eth. Nic.
3. 5. 1 112 a 31), and we are said to deliberate about things

1 In dealing with this subject I Ke/&lt;r$o&gt; Suo ra \6yov e
have found more than one of w 6f&lt;apov\KV ra rotaOra raw
Teichmiiller s works useful. o&lt;ra&gt;ir al apxal ^17 evdexovrai aXXcoy

2 Cp. Eth. Nic. 6.2. 1 1 39 a 6, vno- *x flv i * v * V T

AND PRACTICAL SCIENCE. 7

which come to pass by our agency, but not always
uniformly (1112 b 3). The defective exactness ((kpt /Seta)
of practical science is perhaps regarded by Aristotle as
partly due to this subjection of things done (ra TrpaKra) to
human arbitriimi, but it is still more due to the fact that
practical science, being concerned with action, is concerned
with particulars. The Universal of Practical Science is
only roughly exact. It cannot supply the place of a keen
insight into particulars.

2. It follows from the modifiability both of the subject-
matter of action and of the agent that the purpose of
practical science is different from that of theoretic science.
However much it may inquire, it never loses sight of the
aim of promoting right action (Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1 103 b 26 sqq.).
This need not, indeed, be its sole aim : cp. Pol. 3. 8. 1279 b
12, TO) 8e Trepi e/cacrnjz; pedobov &lt;iAo&lt;ro$oi;i&gt;Ti KCU /xr) y^ovov

aTTofihtTTOl TI, TTpOS TO TTpCLTTflV OlKtloV COTl TO /XTJ TTCLpOpCLV fJ.r]b^

TI KaTaAeiTreiy, dAAa grjAoCz; TTJI&gt; Ttepl eKaoTOv dAr]0eiay: and
Eth. Eud. I. I. 1 214 a IO, Ta juez&gt; avrutv (sc. T&V flecoprj/jicmoy)
irpos TO yvG&gt;vai JJLOVOV, TO. 8e KCU Trept Tas KTr^crets xai
TCLS irpd^tis TOV Trpayp-aTos. Nor should it be forgotten
that even in the interest of right action it is desirable to
arrive at conclusions as scientifically accurate as possible
(Eth. Nic. IO. I. II72b 3, eoucao-ty ovv ol dXrj^ets T&V Ao ycoy
ov iJiovov Trpbs TO et8e yat ^rjcrL^utTaTOL flvai, dAAa /cat Trpos TOV
fiiov crvvtoftol yap 6Vre? TOI? Ipyots Tua-TevovTai, 8to TrpOTpeTro^Tat
TOVS vvievTas ijv KCIT CLVTOVS).

3. Non-theoretic science differs from theoretic also in
respect of the faculty employed in it. The rational part of
the soul (TO \6yov *xov) is divided into two parts, the
scientific and the calculative : AeyeVfloo Se TOVTU&gt;V TO /xey f-ni-
a-Trj^oviKOV TO bf \oyi&lt;TTLK.6v TO yap j3ov\V(rdaL KCU Aoyt(,W0cu
TCLVTOV, ovftzls oe (BovXeveTaL irepl TCOV fj.r) ev$e\ofj.V(i)i&gt; aAAco? ^X eLV
(Eth. Nic. 6. i. 1 1 39 a u). Both TC X^, the faculty which
operates in productive science, and (frpovrja-Ls, the chief virtue
of the Practical Reason (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 655. i), belong
to the calculative part. In strictness (j)p6vr](n$ deals with
the individual and his welfare, TroAm/o/ with that of the

8 CONTRAST OF THEORETIC

State (Eth. Nic. 6. 7. 1141 b 23 sqq.), but they are so nearly
the same that we need not attend to this distinction. The
faculty concerned in moral action would seem to be in
Aristotle s opinion the same as that which deals with the
science of moral action. The deliberation which precedes
a moral act and which is expressed in the practical syllo
gism is apparently regarded by him as a repetition on a
small scale of the process which ends in the construction of
practical science. In both operations the act of delibera
tion, as we shall see, is conceived to follow the same path 1 .
The ends, or at all events the ultimate ends, of action
are held by Aristotle to be given by the character, the
true end by moral virtue: it remains for (frpovrjo-is to
determine the means, under which term we must pro
bably include the intermediate ends. 3&gt;p6vr](ris conducts
the whole process of deliberation, till it lights on the
actual step which must be taken in order that the end
may be attained : this is the last point reached in the
deliberation, and the point at which action begins (Zeller,
ibid. 650. 2). As these means must be morally correct, or
in other words, as &lt;ppovri&lt;ri.s has to adjust its choice of means
to the end suggested by moral virtue, (frpovrjo-is needs to be
completed by moral virtue, just as moral virtue is incom
plete without ^poVrjcrt?. Its close connexion with moral
virtue relates it to the passions and even to man s physical
nature, and separates it from speculative virtue (Eth. Nic.
10. 8. 1178 a 9 sqq.). It belongs to the more human part of
man s nature, as that to the more divine. Its genesis is also
different. Moral virtue, from which it is inseparable, is the
outcome of correct habituation : the germ of it only, an
undeveloped perception of the good and the bad, the just

1 We note, however, in Eth. Nic. seem that the (ppovrja-is of the

6.8. 1141 b 22 sqq. the recognition vop.od(rr]s is to some extent dififer-

of two forms of (frpovrjo-isTrfplTroXtv. ent from that of the practical

one apxiTWToviKT), the other more statesman and less characteris-

distinctly irpaKTtKfj KOI jBovXevriKfj, tically (ppovrja-is. We should have

and therefore more impressed been glad of some further treat-

with the characteristics of (pp6i&gt;r)&lt;ns, ment of the subject, but we do not

for (f&gt;p6vr)(ris is essentially irpaKTiKf] seem to learn anything more about

Kal pov\fvnKr). Thus it would it from Aristotle.

AND PRACTICAL SCIENCE. 9

and the unjust (Pol. i. 2. 1253 a 15), is born with us and comes
by nature. &lt;bp6vt}(ns, again, is mainly, though not exclusively
(Eth. Nic. 6. 7. 1 141 b 14), concerned with particulars (ra Ka0
ecao-ra). Its particular judgments need to be correct, and this
they can hardly be without experience : experience, though
it arrives at a sort of Universal, never wanders far from par
ticulars. It is evident, then, that the faculty which is con
cerned with practical science, is to be developed in life and in
life only. Its beginning lies in habituation, its growth in
experience. The young fall short in both respects. It is a
faculty which cannot be passed from hand to hand. Hence,
though the sphere of Contingency (and this is the sphere of
Practical and Productive Science) is that which is most amen
able to human influence, the faculty which is concerned with
it can only be produced by a circuitous and indirect process
beginning in infancy a slower process than that by which
speculative virtue comes into being, though intellectual
virtue generally, which includes speculative virtue no less
than &lt;/&gt;po zn7&lt;ns and rex^rj, is said to stand in need of
experience and time (Eth. Nic. 2. i. 1103 a 15). Thus the
faculty which presides over conduct was once for all parted
off by Aristotle from the speculative faculty. The two
faculties might be and should be possessed by the same
person, but they were different. The Greek language already
distinguished between yv&^r] and o-otyia, and Aristotle
reasserted the important truth embodied in this distinc
tion.

4. Lastly, non-theoretic science differs from theoretic in
method, ecopta finds a place in the methods of both ;
but the 0ecopi ct of the one is not the same as the 0eco/na
of the other. In theoretic science, the object is simply
to analyse : in practical and productive science, to bring
into being. To ov is to the former what TO ea-o^fvov is to
the latter (de Part. An. i. i. 640 a 3). Theoretic Science
takes a given fact or thing and inquires into its cause.
Thus the plan of Aristotle s biological treatise on the Parts
of Animals is to take the parts in succession and inquire
what share Necessity and the Final Cause respectively have

10 METHOD OF ARISTOTLE

in their formation 1 . Practical science, on the other hand
(and productive science also), starts from an end to be
attained, and inquires into the means of attaining it, till it
arrives at a means which it lies within the power of the
inquirer to set in action. Cp. Metaph. Z. 7. 1033 b 6, ytyrercu
8?) TO vyies vorja-avros OVTOJS eTret^T) ro8t v-yieia, avdyKfj, el vyies
lorat, ro8t i/7rapai, olov o/jtaAorrjra, et 8e TOVTO, Oep/jLorrfTa /cat
OVTCOS aei voti ecos ay ayayr; ets roCro o avros fivvaraL ta-yjarov
Trotety. Elra 7)877 f) airo. TOVTOV KLvrjcris TTOL^CTLS KaAeircu fj 7rl
TO vyiatvtiv. (The illustration here is taken from productive
science, not practical, but in this point there is no difference
between the two: cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 5. iiiab 12 sqq.) In
practical and productive science the analysis is pressed
forward till we reach that which we have it in our power to
do. The man of practical science who wishes to produce
happiness inquires into its cause, which he finds to be
mainly virtue, then he inquires into the cause of virtue and
finds it to be law ; the framing of law, however, is a thing
which lies in his power ; hence here his analysis stops, and
the question which he has to solve is, how should laws
be framed so as to produce virtue ? Thus, while both in
theoretic and non-theoretic science there is a search for the
cause, in the former we search for the cause which will
explain a given thing or fact, in the latter for the cause with
the aid of which we can attain a given end.

It is easy to see how different the plan of the Politics
would have been if Aristotle had identified the methods
of physical and political study. We should have had the
actual phenomena presented by the life of States accepted
as normal, and the problem would have been to refer them
to the Material or the Final Cause. As it is, happiness is
the starting-point of Political Science, and the object of
the inquiry is to discover some line of action lying within
the power of the inquirer the correct way of framing laws,
in fact which will bring it into being to the utmost extent
possible in each particular case.

The difference which exists between the problem of
1 Ogle s translation, p. xxxv.

IN THE POLITICS. 1 1

Practical Science and that of Theoretic Science is not,
however, the only cause of the difference between their
methods of inquiry. The subject-matter of Practical Science
is more variable and less universal, and the faculty which
operates in it, though scientific in its nature, ripens only
with the help of Experience and correct habituation : it can
not hope to achieve the same exactness as is attained in
Theoretic Science, and leans more largely on Opinion, and
especially the opinion of ^poVijuot.

We might almost expect, looking to the language which How far
Aristotle holds, to find him constructing Practical Science m e e t hod e
from the judgments of experienced and well-habituated actually
Greeks, and accepting in its fulness the principle that in Aristotle in

this sphere the &lt;hpdviuos is the standard. the Politics

agree with

But this he is far from doing. If he consults Opinion, that which
as he constantly does, the opinion he consults is not ex- heas c lbes

J to iroAm-

clusively the opinion of this small class, but that of*?;?
Philosophers or even of the Many. The opinions of the
Many are valuable as expressions of Experience 1 . But he
does not accept Opinion as conclusive without verification : \
he subjects it to a variety of tests. First, that of observed \
fact (ra epya, ra yivo^va). 2vjj,&lt;pu&gt;velv brj rots Ao yots eoucacrty *
at T&gt;V cr6(f)(tiv 6oai wCfTTtv fJ.ev ovv Kat ra rotairra ex. 61 TLVCL, TO
8 ahrjOes tv rots TrpaKrot? e/c T&V epycoy KOI TOV /3t ou Kpt^erat V
TOVTOLS yap ro Kvpiov. 2,K.oi&gt;flv 8?; ra Trpoetpry/^eVa \pri eTrt ra
epya Kat TOV /3iov eTri^epoyras, Kat (rvvabovrcav //ey rot? epyots
aTTobeKTtov, bt.a(f)(i)vovvTu&gt;v 8e Ao yous v7roAr]7rreoy (Eth. Nic. 10.
9. 1179 a 1 6 sqq.). Thus, for instance, questions as to the
true nature of happiness are to be settled by observing
what sort of persons are, as a matter of fact, happy, and
how they come to be so. We see that the happy in
dividual is he who has much virtue and a not more than
adequate amount of external goods (Pol. 4 (7). i. 1323 a
38 sqq.) ; that a State, if it is to be well ordered, must not
exceed a certain size (Pol. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 25 sqq.). We
learn best from the lives men lead what their real opinions
are (Eth. Nic. 10. i. 1172 a 27 sqq.). It is true, that even
1 See the authorities in Zelier, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 243. 3.

12 METHOD OF ARISTOTLE

when Aristotle appeals to observed fact, he often means by
this not so much facts as men s impressions about them.
This is not always so, however : see for instance the well-
known passage, de Gen. An. 3. 10. 760 b 27 sqq.

Next, he controls Opinion by reasoning (Ao yo?). That
which is reasonable and probable (TO ev\o-yov) has a certain
prima facie weight with him : of this the arguments in de
Gen. An. 3. n. 760 a 3i-b 27 afford an instance. These
are arguments from our reasonable anticipations, looking
to the principles which prevail generally in Nature. He
has, indeed, more confidence in deductions from less general
principles : still we shall find that his conception of Nature
and the natural is constantly present to him in his political
inquiries, and the conception of Nature is one which falls
within the province of Theoretic Science.

Aristotle s own account in the Ethics of the method of
TToAmK?? leads us, in fact, to expect in his treatment of the
subject a larger use of unproved Opinion and a slighter
reference to the results of Theoretic Science than we
actually discover in it. Practical Science turns out to be
more a matter of reasoning and less a matter of insight
than we were prepared to find it. The interval which parts
man as an agent the subject of Practical Science from
man as possessing a nutritive and perceptive soul the
subject of Physics cannot, after all, be insuperably great.
The study of the passions falls within the province of
Ethics, yet they are closely related to man s physical
nature (Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 a 9 sqq.), with which Physics
has to do. The principle which enables Aristotle to explain
the subject-matter of Physics is also that which enables
him to explain moral action and the State : the movement
from Potentiality to Actuality is common to both. The
end of Man and of Society living nobly and well (TO eu
rjv) is an end which appears also in the field of Physics 1 .
The truth that man lives for this end, and that the State
should be constructed for its attainment, is one which
Aristotle does not need to rest on Opinion, for his physical
1 De Part. An. 2. 10. 656 a 3 sqq.

IN THE POLITICS. 13

studies have proved to him that the end of every individual
thing, according to the design of Nature, is the best of
which it is capable (TO IKCIOTO) evbe-^onevov /3eArtoror). And
if it be urged that without the aid of Opinion we cannot
tell what is the best which is possible to man, we may reply
that when Aristotle seeks to discover the highest element
in happiness (Eth. Nic. 10. 7), or to illustrate its depen
dence on character rather than on external goods (Pol. 4 (7).
i. 1323 b 23), he refers us to his conception of God a chief
topic of the First Philosophy, or, as it is otherwise called, the
Theologic Science. Teichmuller has pointed out in reference
to the Ethics, how much the actual method of Aristotle in
Practical Science differs from that which he lays down for
himself in theory. The philosophy of Aristotle, he re
marks, with its fondness for sharp distinctions cannot
possibly preserve its logical consistency. It is as a com*,
plete man (als ganzer Mensch), in full possession of all
practical, technical, and theoretic powers and perceptions,
that Aristotle everywhere speaks : he forgets that he has
only the right to speak as a good and wise man or States
man (0poviju,os)V

Aristotle does not probably intend, even in theory, to
ignore the links between Theoretic and Practical Science,
or the elements which are common to both. He traces, as
we have said, in things done (ra TrpaKra) no less than in the
subject-matter of Physics the operation of the Four Causes
the movement of matter to an end, an advance from
Potentiality to Actuality. If this could not be done, there
would be no Science of Practice. He is less clear on the
question whether Practical Science derives any of its prin
ciples from Theoretic. But even if he answered this ques
tion in the affirmative, it would still be open to him to assert
the distinctness of Practical and Theoretic Science, as he
unquestionably does. He not only holds that Practical
Science aims at Practice in addition to knowledge, but
that neither the end of man nor the means to its attain
ment can be ascertained, at all events in detail, except by
1 Neue Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe, 3. 354-7.

14 METHOD OF ARISTOTLE

an appeal to the judgment of the $po zn/xo?, and also to the
collective experience of men, sifted and corrected as we
have seen that he sifts and corrects it. Even Plato does
not think that a knowledge of the Ideas will suffice to
make his guardians good rulers without fifteen years of
practical experience. Perhaps, if Aristotle s treatment of
Ethical and Political Science had been more abstract and
had concerned itself less with concrete detail, and if, again,
he had not construed its aim to be the promotion of
correct Practice, he might have been better able to dispense
with the aid of Opinion : but, after all, do not all inquirers
on these subjects to this day tacitly follow the method
which Aristotle avowedly adopts? Where is the inquirer
who does not tacitly refer to the best Opinion of his own
epoch in framing his account of virtue? What European
philosopher ever doubts that European institutions are the
best?

The alleged difference between the aims of Practical and
Theoretic Science, which seems more than anything else to
lead Aristotle to distinguish between the two, appears,
indeed, to be an unreal ground of distinction between them.
May not moral and political science speculate about moral
action without any aim beyond the attainment of truth ?
Is not Aristotle himself led by his view that the aim of
Political Science is to promote right action to make his
study of social facts, patient and comprehensive though
it is, less the central feature of the Politics than the study
of Society as it ought to be ? Should not the careful
analysis of social tendencies, which we find, for instance,
in the book on Revolutions, have preceded and prepared
the way for the attempt to depict a best state * ? Might
we not have been gainers, if he had addressed himself even
more closely than he has done to understanding social
phenomena and less to modifying them ? Political Science

1 We have already noticed investigations, when he penned

that this would seem to have the concluding sentences of the

been the plan which Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics,
intended to adopt in his political

IN THE POLITICS. 15

begins for him in History, no less than in Ethics: but
might not History have filled with advantage an even
greater place in his investigations ?

It is possible, again, to overrate the value of the verdict
of the (f)povt,ij.os, both in ethical and political questions. In
politics, the wise and good man often clings overmuch
to the Good at the very moment when the Better is about
to take its place. Even on ethical questions, the (frpovipos
perhaps has no monopoly of insight. There is some truth
in one of the many shrewd remarks which are scattered
over the Laws of Plato ov -yap oa-ov ova-las aperr}? a-nevfyaX-
fjievoi, Tvyyjcivovcnv ol TroAAot, TOOTOVTOV KCU TOV Kpivew TOVS
aAAou? ol TTovypol KOI axp^arot, Beiov 8e n /cat eva-ro-^ov

Vf(TTL KOL Tols KttKOl?, OJOTe TTa/XTToAAot KOI TU)V (T(p6bpa Kd/CCOZ/

fv Tols Ao yois feat rais 8o^ats oiaipovvTai TOVS a^tCvovs T&V
avOptoiTtov Kal TOVS x f tpovas (Laws, 950 B-C). With this
we may compare a remarkable saying of Niebuhr : I am
bold enough not to shrink from the admission that I can
picture to myself as the inspired preacher of a wisdom at
once elevated and profound, I won t exactly say Satan
himself, but a possessed person over whom the evil spirit
often comes and whom he often pervades ; and looking to
the risk that denouncers of heresy may lay hold of what I
say, I will not speak hypothetically, but name Rousseau
and Mirabeau 1 .

We need not wonder that the science of TTO\LTLK^ is one Powersact-
which is hardly meet to be called a science, and that JJf Jomdn
it demands maturity both of mind and character, if we of iro

bear in mind the sphere in which it works and the diffi- s j tyi
culties with which it has to grapple. Its sphere is, as ture&gt; . s P n "

taneity,

we have seen, that of the Contingent one in* which the Fortune,
tendencies to Good, that here, as elsewhere, exist, are met, n
and often baffled, by the irregularities which attach to
matter and, above all, to human agency. It possesses

1 Kleine Schriften, I. 472, fectly I have rendered this ener-
quoted by Bernays, Phokion, p. getic and highly characteristic
104. I am well aware how imper- utterance.

16 POWERS ACTING IN THE DOMAIN

not only all the variability which characterises Matter, but
also that which characterises Man.

The first rude analysis of the subject-matter with which
it has to deal we now confine our attention to the political
branch of TroAiri/cTj reveals to us the working of powers
well known to Greek literature and speculation Necessity,
Nature, Chance, and Man ; and if, as we gain a clearer
view of things, these agencies tend to fade away and to
be replaced by less familiar and less personal entities
the four causes, or again, Potentiality and Actuality it
will still be worth while to cast a hasty glance over these
more popular conceptions before they disappear.

The poets had spoken in well - known utterances of
Chance, Art, Necessity and Nature, as supreme in human
things. Agathon (Fr. 8) had said

Kai fj.r)V ra fitv ye rfj Ttx v l) 7rpd&lt;rcreij&gt;, TO. 8e
i]p^v dvayicr] Kai Tv%r] npocryiyverai.

Euripides had connected Necessity and Nature

Ti raCra Sei

OTtvtut airep Sti Kara (pvcriv difKTrepav
dfivov yap ov8ev raw avayKaicav /Sporoiy.

Fr. 757, from the Hypsipyle :

and had elsewhere doubted whether Zeus is the necessity
which reigns in nature, or the intelligence of man

"Ocmy TTOT ei (TV, SvaToiracrTos ei SeVai,
Zeus, eir dvdyKrj (pvcrtos, eire vovs /3porcoi .

Troad. 847-8 : cp. Fragm. 1007.

There were philosophers who traced back the universe of
things to Nature and Chance, Art supervening upon them
but not adding much to their work (Plato, Laws, 889 A sqq. :
cp. 967 A) ; and Plato himself finds it easy to understand
how everything in the State, at all events, looks like the
outcome of Chance (Laws, 709 A) ; but he adds at once
that this is not the fact ; on the contrary, God and Art
co-operate with Chance to shape its destinies. More
scientifically, Plato finds Matter, or Necessity, and Mind,
or the Idea, at the root of things 1 . He is unable, owing

1 Cp. Tim. 68E-69A.

OF POLITICAL SCIENCE .-NECESSITY. 17

to his Dualism, to merge these two causes in one, or to
recognize in Necessity the work of Reason and the positive
intermediary, not merely the limitation and negative con
dition, of her working (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. i. 489 sq., ed. 2).

It is the tendency of Aristotle to soften this sharp Necessity,
antithesis, and to view the Necessary as the friend, if often
the inconstant friend, of the Good. He distinguishes three
kinds of the Necessary, two of which have no place in
the State (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 331. i) : cp. Metaph. A. 7.
1072 b II, ro yap atayKalov rocraurax&lt;3?, ro /xez; /3ia on
Trapa TTJV op/n/z;, TO 8e ov OVK avev TO fv, TO 8e /XT/ efo exo /xe-
vov aAXcos dAA czTiAco? : de Part. An. i. i. 642 a i, dcrlv apa
bv amai avTai, TO ov evena Kal TO e dyay/cr/s iroAAa
yap yivtTai on avayKi] ICTUS 8 av TIS aTropr/creie TTOIOLV A.e-
yovviv avayKrjv ol Aeyoires e avdyKr]$ T&V ^V yap bvo
rpoTrcoy ovbtTepov olov re inrdp^fiv, T&V biu&gt;pL(riJ.V(tiv ev rots
Kara (juXoa-ofyiav ecrrt 8 ev ye rots c^ovcri yevecnv f] rptrr/
Aeyo/xev yap TI]V Tpo&lt;pi]i&gt; avayKalov rt /car o{/5e repoz&gt; TOVTO&gt;V
TWV rpoTrcov, dAA on o^x olov re avev ravr?]? flvai, TOVTO
8 eo-rti wo-Trep e^ vTro^eVeco?. The State falls so far under
the sway of Necessity, as it begins in Matter l and needs
instruments (opyava) 2 : its matter and its provision of instru
ments are necessary pre-requisites, if it is to attain the
Good : they are conditionally necessary (e v-n-ofleVeoK
dmy/cata). But these indispensable conditions may assume
two very different characters. They may, if favourably
present, be positive contributors to the End, almost rising
to the level of its efficient cause (de Gen. An. 2. 6. 742 a
19 sqq.). Necessity, if only we have to do with favourable
Matter, may be the fore-runner, the first or nascent form
of the Best : it may be Nature in disguise. On the other
hand, there may lurk in it an element of unfitness for the
Best, which will mar the whole evolution : the indispensable
condition, which may be the friend of the Best, may also
be its worst foe. The State must have a territory; yet

1 Phys. 2. 9. 200 a 30 sqq. : cp. 2 Zeller, ibid. : cp. de Gen. An.
200 a 14, (v yap T?7 v\r) TO avay- 2. 6. 742 a 22 sqq.
Kaiov.

VOL. I. C

]&lt;S NATURE.

the characteristics of this territory may be unfavourable to
its political wellbeing (Pol. 7 (5). 3. 1303 b 7 sqq.). It must
start with a population, and here again the same thing
may occur (Pol. 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 23 sqq.). It must have a
due supply of external goods ; yet the pursuit of them
may draw men away from higher things. Thus the indis
pensable condition may prove a fetter and even a stumbling-
block, for men may mistake the jT^c^ssaiy^fo^thebest, _the
means for the end. In any case, as the statesman, unlike
th~e t carpeiTEer~m builder^ is seldom free to select the mate
rial for his State, this element is likely, whether for weal
or for woe, to play a considerable part in shaping its
destiny. It might be better away, were this possible : but
there is a power capable of giving it a new direction and
making it a positive aid to the Best. Many things come
into existence for one end, marked out by Necessity ;
and then Nature adroitly gives them a new turn, directing
them to the Best. The State itself came into existence,
in the hands of Necessity, for the sake of mere life ; but
Nature carries it on to the higher end of good life. Slavery,
which originates in necessity (Pol. i. 3. I253b 25), becomes
eventually a source of virtue : the household in general
undergoes a similar re-adaptation. But indeed things
that are necessary may often be also expedient : thus the
relation of ruling and being ruled is not only a necessary
condition of unity, but also expedient (Pol. i. 5. 1254 a 21) ;
and if Necessity forges the link which binds together man
and wife, father and child, master and slave (Pol. i. 2.
1 252 a 26 sqq.), and so calls into existence the Household
and State, Necessity and Expediency here coincide.

Nature. Closely allied with the conditionally necessary is one

side of the conception which Aristotle terms Nature. "Eva
pev ovv rpoTiov OVTU&gt;S ?} (Averts Aeyerai, ?; Trpwrij
p.evr] vXt] TU&gt;V f)^6i&gt;TU)v ev avrois o.p\^v Kiz^o-ea)?
aAAoy 8e rpo-nov 17 ^op^rj KCU TO eTSo? TO Kara TOV Koyov (Phys.
2. i. 193 a 28). It is in the former of these two senses that
Nature borders closely on Necessity. Nature is also spoken

NATURE. 19

of as the end (r\ oe (frvvis reAo? KCU o\&gt; eVeKa, Phys. 2. 2. 194 a
28) ; and even as the path which leads from the one point
to the other (en 8e ^ (pv&LS i] Xeyo^fvr] o&gt;9 yeWcri? oSoj eoriv
eis (f)V(TLi&gt;, Phys. 2. i. i93b is) 1 . Nature is thus a principle
of motion and rest implanted and essentially inherent in
things, whether that motion be locomotion, increase, decay,
"or alteration (Phys. 2. i. 192 b 13). For though Aristotle
in countless passages speaks of Nature as a person, seeking
to realize aims and giving evidence of wisdom and virtue,
we soon learn to seek its agency rather in things them
selves. Its working seems hardly distinguishable from
that of God 2 , except that it is more ubiquitous, more im
manent in things, more Protean and multiform ; evidencing
itself, as we see in the Politics, not only in that which is
best, but also in that which is necessary, that which is
coeval with birth (ro evdvs e yei-err/s), that which obtains
for the most part (ro ws CTTI TO 7roA.i&lt;). If we know the
State to be the work of Nature from the fact that it brings
what is best, we learn this also by tracing it back to its
beginnings in Necessity, by investigating its origin in the
Household and Village. The real being, however, of
Nature is rather to be found in the end than in the process,
and rather in the process than its starting-point.

With Aristotle s conception of Nature as bringing the
Best we may contrast the less cheerful Epicurean view,
which Lucretius adopts (5. I95sqq.):

Quod superest arvi, tamen id natura sua vi
Sentibus obducat, ni vis humana resistat
Vitai causa valido consueta bidenti
Ingemere et terrain pressis proscindere aratris :

and Virgil in his train (Georg. i. 197 sqq.):

Vidi lecta diu et multo spectata labore
Degenerare tamen, ni vis humana quotannis
Maxima quaeque manu legeret : sic omnia fatis
In peius ruere, ac retro sublapsa referri.

Aristotle, on the contrary, finds in things a tendency to

1 Sir A. Grant, Ethics, I. 278-9. and cp. de Gen. An. 731 b 24

2 See. Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 387-9, sqq.

C 2

20 NATURE.

evolve themselves right. Men sometimes can hardly choose
but do or say the right thing (de Part. An. I. i. 642 a 19,
27 : Metaph. A. 3. 984 a 18 : Teichmuller, Kunst, p. 383) :
and if the State needs human contrivance to bring it into
existence (cp. 6 TTP&TOS o-uorTjo-a?, Pol. i. 2. 1253 a 30), its
contriver perhaps only followed the guidance of things
themselves, for we hear of a growth in things (ra irpay-
jj.ara (f)vop.fva) in connexion with the rise of the State
(Pol. i. 2. 1252 a 24). Nature often gives us clear intima
tions of the true course : she seeks, for instance, to mark
off the natural slave by a special physical aspect and
bearing (i. 5. i254b 2/sqq.); she creates in men a differ
ence of age, and so suggests the true basis for distinctions
of political privilege within the citizen body (4 (7). 14.
1332 b 35). Yet she is often baffled (i. 5. 1254 b 32 sqq.),
and needs the aid of Art to bring things right. Thus it is
that Art jjartly completes what Nature is unable to carry
to completion, partly imitates Nature (Phys. 2. 8. 199 a 15).
" "Aristotle, as we shall see, is at even more pains to show
that the State is a product of Nature than Plato 1 had
been before him. His direct object in so doing is to
strengthen and consecrate its authority and to exhibit
its true relation to the individual. An incidental con
sequence of his arguments, however, is that whatever holds
good of compounds formed by Nature (ra &lt;wrei (rvvea-T&Ta)
holds good of the State. Thus, as Nature does everything
either from considerations of that which is necessary or
from considerations of that which is better 2 , the structure
of the State must satisfy one or other of these tests. So
again, in all things that exist by nature, and not by acci
dent, whose essence is disorder (drata) 3 , we look to find
order (ra^s) and proportion (cp. Phys. 8. i. 252 an, dAAd
juTJy ovbtv ye aranrov rG&gt;v $^&lt;rei /cat Kara tyvcnv f) yap (fivcris
atrta TtO.cn raea&gt;s TO 8 aTteipov Trpbs TO a7reipoz&gt; ovbeva \6yov
rdis be TTa.cra Xoyos : Phys. 8. 6. 259 a JO, ev yap

1 Laws, 889 sq. .cp. Plato, Tim. 75 D.

2 De Gen. An. i. 4. 7173 15, j 3 De Part. An. I. I. 641 b 23.
ia TO avnyKaiov TJ 8tn TO ftf\riov .

SPONTANEITY AND FORTUNE. 21

Tots (pvcret Set ro TTeirepacr[Atvov Kal TO /3e A.rioy, h
virdpx^fiv //SAAoz;). Consequently, Aristotle insists on order (
and proportion in the State : he cannot accept the hap
hazard organization of actual communities (Pol. 4 (7).
2. 1324 b 5), the social anarchy of democracies (8 (6). 4.
1319 b 27 sqq.), or even the indefinite and varying mag
nitude of Greek cities (4 (7). 4. 1326 a 8 sqq. : cp. de An. 2.
4. 416 a 16, T&gt;V oe (fivcret, &lt;jvvi(rro.^v(^v tiavrutv e&lt;rri Tre pas ai
Ao yo? /xeye flous re KOL at^a-ecos). So again, Nature always
gives things to those who can use them, either exclusively
or more largely than to others (de Part. An. 4. 8. 684 a 28).
The State, therefore, must follow the same rule in dis
tributing the advantages at its disposal wealth, office,
political power, and the like. So again, in all products
of Nature we find elements of two kinds $&gt;v OVK avcv and
/xe pTj : the former necessary conditions of the thing but not
parts of it, the latter its parts. This nolds also of the
State (Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1338 a 21 sqq.), and thus we find
Aristotle breaking the population of his State into two
sections, the one merely a necessary condition of the State
and not a part of it, the other concentrating in itself the
substance and true life of the State.

We have already seen that Matter, while indispensable as Sponta-

a condition of the things into which it enters, is also so ~ elt 7

r ortune.

variable that it may prove either the firsfc step in the
process of Nature which ends in Actuality, or a distorting
and enfeebling influence. It is in this variability, of Matter
that Spontaneity (TO avTo^arov] and Fortune (TVX^) take
their rise (Metaph. E. 2. 1027 a 13, oWe fj v\r] eorat atrta fj
eySexo/jteVrj Trapa ro a&gt;s eTrt ro TTO\V aAAcos TOV (ru/x/3e/3rjKo ros).
The accidental, says Zeller 1 , arises when a free or
unfree activity directed to an end is brought by the
influence of external circumstances to produce a result
other than that end. Spontaneity is predicated in the
case of such a disturbance generally, whether the activity
disturbed and impeded is that of a being exercising Moral
1 Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 335.

22 SPONTANEITY AND FORTUNE.

Choice or not ; Fortune, only when the agent whose activity
is thus modified is a being exercising Moral Choice. A third
form of the Accidental is the a-v^-nr^^a e. g. the occurrence

of an eclipse while one is taking a walk; and here the
Accidental appears in its purest form 1 . It here takes the
shape of a mere co-existence in Space or Time of two
events standing in no causal relation to each other. As
Torstrik points out 2 , Accident is not always a marring
influence : the movement to an end may be satisfactorily
accomplished, and yet incidentally set going the aimless
activity of Chance. Chance plays round the ordered
process of Nature, careless whether it mars or aids it 3
or does neither. Its essential characteristic is to be with-
! out design and irregular ; it is the negation of Intelli
gence and Nature a power which acts without reason and
without that approach to regularity (ro o&gt;? l-nl TO TTO\.V)
which Nature exhibits. Aristotle evidently holds that if
everything happened by accident, nothing would be cal
culable beforehand. This is not really the case. Chance
itself is in some degree reducible to uniformities.

The popular Greek vie\v set down the Accidental to the
Gods : thus Herodotus speaks frequently of Qdr\ rvyj) r
Thucydides of 77 rv^rj CK TOV Otiov 4 ; Timoleon, according
to Plutarch 5 , having built a temple to Automatia close
to his house, sacrificed to her and consecrated the house
itself to the lepos Aat^toy. Euripides, however, distin
guished between Fortune and the hand of the Deity 6 , and
we find Philemon 7 placing in the mouth of one of his
characters the utterance

1 Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 335. 3. tus, 180), was perhaps present to

2 Hermes, 9. 425. Timoleon s mind.

3 It sometimes aids Art at all 6 L. Schmidt, Ethik der alten
events: cp. rex vr l T ^X J l l&gt; forep^e Griechen, i. 56, who refers to
KOI TI&gt;XT} Tfxvrjv (Eth. Nic. 6. 4. Cycl. 606 (582 Bothe), Hecub. 491
1140 a I9y (465 Bothe) to which references

* Thuc. 5. 104, 112. maybe added Here, furens, 1205

5 Timol. c. 36. The fate of the sqq., where gods no less than

Athenian Timotheus, who had men are viewed as the sport of

said that his success was due to fortune.

himself more than to Fortune 7 Inc. Fab. Fragm. 48 Didot.

(Scholiast on Aristophanes, Plu-

MAN. 23

OVK earns fjpiv ovBefjiia TU^JJ deos,
OVK fffTiv, dXXa TavTOfj.aToi&gt;, 6 yiWrai
coy ervx eKuorcp, TTpooayopeverai

Menander makes a near approach to Aristotle in the lines

*Q,S aSiKov, orav r) fiev &lt;j)v&lt;ns
ciTroScp TI af}iv6vj TOVTO 8" TJ Tu^ KctKoi 1 ,

and

Ov8ei&gt; Kara \6yov ylviff u&gt;v

To Aristotle, at any rate when he speaks scientifically,
Accident is an influence arising at the opposite pole of
things to the Deity, and inasmuch as it is not directed
to an end, bordering closely on the non-existent 2 .

The domain of Politics is exposed to the action of
Accident in all its forms. It was a o-v/rTrroo/xa that brought
the extreme democracy of Athens into being (Pol. 2. 12.
1274 a 12). It rests with Fortune whether the State
possesses the adequate supply of accessories (&lt;rvp.p,frpos
Xoprjyt a) with which it should start, or not (Pol. 4 (7). 13.
1332 a 29 : cp. c. 4. 1325 b 37 sq.).

To these powers Aristotle apparently adds as a fourth Man.
that of human agency, for though we might conceive it
as already included under the heads of Nature, Necessity,
and Accident, inasmuch as human beings form, as we
shall see, the Matter of the State, he clearly marks off
the agency of biavoia from that of (fivcris (e.g. Phys. 2. 5.
196 b 2i) 3 .

He does not trace the gradual ripening of political
wisdom in man, as he traces in the Poetics the dawn of
Poetry. We do not learn whether Chance played the same
part in the growth of the State as it did in the develop
ment of the Poetic Art (Poet. 4. 1448 b 22 : 14. 1454 a 10).
Was the State the outcome of Trial and Failure (impa, Poet.
24. 1459 b 3 2 )^ We are not told, but we may probably

1 O\vv6ia, Fragm. I Didot. KU\ TTOV TO 8C ai&gt;$pco7rov, may also be

2 Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 336. referred to, though it loses weight

3 The enumeration in Eth. Nic. owing to the employment of the
3. 5- 1 1 12 a 31, atrta doKovcriv dvai word 8oKov&lt;nv,

(pva-is /cat avdyKT] Kai TV^T], eri d( vovs

THE STATE EXISTS

The State
only im
perfectly
amenable
to human
control.

assume that in this, as in other fields, Experience long
preceded Science.

But even when human agency approaches the subject-
matter of Politics with all the resources both of Experience
and Science, it finds the State only imperfectly amenable
to its control. The reason of this will be readily inferred
from our review of the agencies at work in this sphere.
Science has to steer her way among the potent influences
of Necessity, Nature, and Accident, not to speak of human
aberrations. Nature, indeed, is her ally and guide, but with
the rest she has to do the best she can.

The State is to Aristotle neither an organism which
it is beyond man s power to influence, nor a creation of
man which man can mould as he likes. It is in part, though
only in part, beyond his control. The Matter out of
which the State issues the population with which it starts
may be untowardly ; the territory may be other than
it should be ; and even if, as in the best State, both
population and territory are all that can be wished, Acci
dent may still mar its development. The lawgiver often

["has to deal with adverse conditions which he cannot alter,
and it is the business of Political Science to point out

/not only what is to be done when wind and tide are
/ favourable, but also how the best may be made of adverse
circumstances l .

Theneces- In entering on his subject, Aristotle s first care is to
State its 6 reassert the authority of the State, nominally in opposi-
value to ti on to those who had drawn only a quantitative distinc-

manandits . . 111, -

authority tion between it and the household, but really in correction
of more serious errors the error of those who had asserted

over the

1 Cp. 6 (4). I. 1289 a 5 sqq. It
is hardly necessary to remark that
in asserting the existence of a
Science of Society Aristotle is
far from claiming that it enables
us to ascertain the fundamental
laws of social evolution or to
forecast the future of society.

History hardly groups itself to
him as an evolution. Accident
plays a large part in it. All he
asserts is that it is possible to
determine more or less scientifi
cally ho\\* the State should be
organized and administered under
varying social conditions.

BY NATURE. 35

it to exist, not &lt;/&gt;vo-ei, but vo^a, and the error of those individual
who, like the Cynics, regarded it as a non-essential. by Aristo-

The distinction between ra &lt;/&gt;wo-et and ra vo^ arose in tie. Human

, . ,. , , . society and

connexion with the question as to the reality of things the State
a question which presented itself early in the history o f ? n S| nate
Greek philosophy. Gorgias appears to have denied exist- the State is
ence in toto. Others distinguished between things which [JJ^dual
exist (j)v&lt;TL and things which exist vo^y. Some inquirers and the
found that which exists by nature mainly in sensible anc i i s t h e
things in the elements, earth, air, fire, and water, and wj 1 ? 1 , 6 f

which they
their compounds (Plato, Laws, 889 A sqq.) ; others denied are parts.

existence by nature to the heaven, but allowed it to the
world of animal life 1 . More commonly, the natural was
identified with the necessary, as in the already quoted (
fragment of Euripides : or with that which is fixed and
invariable (cp. Eth. Nic. i. T. iO94b 14, ra 8e /caAa Kai ra
8ucata . . . TO&lt;raiiTt]v )(ei btatyopav KCU irAavr/y, wore SoKeif vofj-ca
}ji6vov tlvau, (jfwcra Se /zi?) : or the immemorial, not made
with hands ; as in Diog. Laert. 9. 45, Trotrjra 8e yo /xi/xa
elvai (sc. (f)a&lt;TKv 6 Arj//oKptroy), tyvcrei 8e arojma KOL KCVOV, and
in the famous lines of the Antigone of Sophocles, which
Aristotle quotes (Rhet. i. 13. 1373 b 9 sqq. : cp. 15. 1375 a
32 sqq.), and understands as asserting existence by nature :

Ou yap TI vvv ye Kox$e y, aXX det Trore
rj TOUTO, Kov8els oidtv e OTOV (pdvij ,

or the true, as distinguished from that which seems true
to the many (Aristot. Soph. Elench. 12. 173 a 15): or that
which is universally or generally recognized : thus the
sophist Hippias refused to recognize any laws as divinely
authorized, except those which are everywhere accepted
(Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 19 ; cp. the passages from Aristotle s
Rhetoric just quoted).

Plato would probably find the natural, above all, in that
which participates in the Idea of Good ; and Aristotle,

1 Cp. Aristot. de Part. An. I. I. aurojuurov TOIOVTOV avcrr^vat, eV G&gt;

641 b 2O sqq., 01 Se TO&gt;V p.ev (pu&gt;v O.TTO rvxys &lt;ul ara^ias ovd OTIOVV

fKacrrov (ftixTfi &lt;$&gt;a(T\v civai Kai yei&gt;- (fraiverai.
adai, TOV 8 ovpavov ano TVX^S *a roD

26 THE STATE EXISTS

following in the same path, finds the natural in that which
is either a necessary condition of, or a direct contri
butor to, that which is best for the species the specific,
not the universal, end. The tests of primitiveness (TO ev9vs
I e/c yei-erJ/?, Pol. I. 5- l-54 a 2 3 : apvcuoi-, Pol. 4 (7). 10.
1329 a 40 sqq.) and of generality of occurrence (ro ws e-nl
TO 7To\vJ are also accepted by him. To ascertain what is
natural, we are taught to ask what obtains in normal
instances, what holds good of healthy and well-constituted
subjects (Pol. i. 5. 1 254 a 36 sqq.). It is not from bar
barians, but from Greeks that we learn the natural type of
the State and household (Pol. i. 2. 1252 a 34 sqq., (frvo-et.
fj.ev ovv . . . cv 8c rot? (3ap(3apoi$ : cp. 6. 1255 a 33 sq.).

It is by showing that the State satisfies these tests that
Aristotle is enabled to reassert its naturalness and its
authority over the individual. Both had been impugned.
The assertion that Right is not ^wet but VOJJLU* led almost
inevitably to a similar assertion with respect to the State,
which represents a distribution of rights ; and the effect of
this view was to weaken the authority of the State over
the individual. Some, indeed, like Callicles in the Gorgias
of Plato, by implication allowed the State to be natural
if it were in the hands of a man of transcendent ability
and force of character, but this condition of things was the
exception, not the rule.

Those who claimed that the State is not fyva-ei but vopu
did not necessarily imply that it owes its existence to a
compact, though the two ideas do not lie far apart : they
might mean only that its claims rest on general acceptance
that it is the traditional, received thing that its authority
is artificial, not based on Nature, but of man s devising,
and that it need not have existed, if men had not chosen
that it should. The phrase brought its origin, however,
perilously near that of money (vo/uu0&gt;ia) or of law (TO /IOS),
both of them things commonly conceived to rest on compact
and to depend on it for acceptance and authority 1 ; and we

1 Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 11333 28 1st Hippias (Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 13)
sqq. : Pol. 1.9. 12573 35. The soph- treated law as a kind of compact,

BY NATURE. 27

are not surprised to find Glaucon, who undertakes in the
Republic to state the views of Thrasymachus, tracing the
origin of law and justice to compact. His language implies
that not only law but anything like legally regulated society
originates in compact. There are, indeed, passages even in
the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle in which social relations
seem to be rested on contract : thus we read in Eth. Nic. 8.
14. 1161 b 13, al Se TroAtriKat KCU &lt;u\eriKat KCU o-vp.TTXoiK.al KOL
otrai Totaurat (&lt;iA.tai) K.oi,vu&gt;viK.ais ((^lA-icus-) eoifcacri jj.aX\ov olov
yap Ka6 opoXoyiav riva fyaivovrai etVcu (cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 1. 1 163 b
32sqq. : JPol. 2. 2. 1261 a 3osqq., passages on which some
light is thrown by Rhet. i. 15. 1376 b TI sqq.). In the Poli
tics, however, Aristotle not only contrasts law with compact
(Pol. 3. 9. i28ob 10), but seems everywhere to imply that I
the State neither came into being by way of compact nor
is dependent on compact for its authority. It began in
the blind impulses which first formed the household and
broadened there into wider aims which nothing but the State
could satisfy. It glided imperceptibly into existence, as
men became successively aware of the various needs bound
up with their nature. Men could not choose but form it, or
some imperfect substitute for it. It is as much a necessity
of human existence as food or fire. Its authority rests on
the same basis as the authority of the father, not on consent,
but on the constitution of human nature. Epicurus, on the
contrary, insisted on an original compact between the
individual members of society as the origin of its establish
ment 1 , and in so doing reasserted the doctrine ascribed by
Glaucon to Thrasymachus in a slightly more unequivocal
form 2 .

in agreement with popular opinion curus at last distinctly put it

(Aristot. Rhet. i. 15. 1376 b 9), forth, was put forth, not with the

and asked, POPOVS, & ScuKparer, iras comparatively restricted aim of

av TIS 777170-017-0 o-novSa iov irpayna limiting monarchical authority,

elvai YI TO ireideadai. avTois, ovs ye with which it has often been up-

TroXXaKif avrol 01 Qt^evoi dnoSoKi- held in modern times, but with

nairavTts /zerart tfcfrai ; the far more revolutionary aim of

1 Prof. Wallace, Epicureanism, throwing the State further into the
p. 158. background of human life by

2 The doctrine of the origin of representing it as a thing of man s
society in contract, when Epi- devising, not an imperious die-

28 THE STATE EXISTS

As the teaching of some of the Sophists had tended to
impair the authority of the State, or to limit its functions to
the protection of the individual from wrong, so the teaching
of the Cynics led up to a denial that the wise man needs a
State of his own other than the whole world. The doctrines
of the Cynics, no less than those of these Sophists, are con
troverted in the opening chapters of the Politics. Even Plato,
in one of his dialogues at all events, had failed, in Aristotle s
opinion, to do full justice to the State and its claims. He
had treated the City-State as a mere enlarged household,
and had spoken as if the master of slaves, the head of a
household, and the King or citizen-ruler of a State only
differed in the number of those they ruled. &gt; It is primarily
in correction of this doctrine, which is not indeed much in
harmony with Plato s ordinary view of the comparative
claims of State and household, and is perhaps rather Socratic
than Platonic, that Aristotle traces, first the beginnings of
the household, and then the rise of the household into the
City-State. The inquiry, however, offers a convenient op
portunity of refuting other and more serious errors those
of the Sophists and Cynics.

The genetic method which Aristotle follows in this
inquiry may surprise those who remember that he lays
down the principle elsewhere 1 , that the genesis of a thing is
I to be explained by its nature or essence (ova-La), not the
nature of it by its genesis. It is, he says, because the thing
is what it is, that it came into being as it did. If we want,
therefore, to know what the State is, we must ask, it would
seem, not the mode of its genesis, but rather its end. Yet
he invites us, at the very outset of the Politics, to study the
growth of the State ab ovo (ra itpay^ara (j)v6p,fvaj. His
object, however, in this is not so much to ascertain what
the State is as to prove that it exists by nature, and to show

tate of his nature. Epicurus, in They struck down the traditional

fact, trod in the footsteps of the guide of human life without having

Sophists referred to in the text. anything to substitute for it.
But then he had a philosophical * De Part. An. i. 1.640 a I3sqq.

discipline to set in the place of (especially a 33-b 4) : 642331.
the State, which they had not.

BY NATURE. 29

that it stands to the household as a whole stands to its part
or as a full-grown plant stands to the seed from which it
sprang.

In correction of the errors of Plato and others to which
reference has been made, Aristotle first traces back the "f
household to necessity and nature, and then shows that the
State is a derivative of the household. It differs in species
from the household, but yet it is akin to it and issues from
it. He takes the two relations which make up the earliest
form of the household, before, with the birth of children, a
third is added, that of father and child, and he shows how
they issue, not from deliberate choice, but from impulse
and necessity the relation of husband and wife from an
impulse common to man with animals and plants, that of
master and slave from the instinct of self-preservation. The
household thus arises ; and probably some of those who
were most earnest in impugning the naturalness of the
State accepted the household as natural. The sophist
Hippias, at all events, regarded the law which enjoins
reverence to parents as a law universally accepted and
imposed by the .gods (Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 20). But the State
rises out of the household through the intermediate institu
tion of the Village, which is properly a Clan-Village, and
thus betrays its relation to the household. Already the
Village supplies a wider range of wants than the house
hold ministers to some wants which are not mere daily
wants ; and the State does no more than proceed a little
farther in the same path. The State itself originally exists
for the sake of ministering to life, and only by degrees goes )
on to minister to noble living. Thus there is no traceable
break in the rise of the State out of the household ; the
early State, like the household, is under kingly rule ; and
if the one is self-complete, while the other is not, if the one
is the culmination, or full-grown form, of the other, there
is but one movement, one aim that of supplying human
needs underlying the whole process. The household can
not be natural and the State other than natural : what holds
of the former must hold of the latter : if the household is

30 THE STATE EXISTS

natural, a fortiori the State is so, for it is the completion
of the household. We need not, however, trace the State
back to the household, in order to prove that it is natural.
It is by nature, because its end is the end of all natural
things that which is best (1252 b 34 sq.).

These facts already justify the assertion that man is a
naturally political being, for we find that man is, as it were,
started by nature on an inclined plane which carries him in
the direction of the Best, and that thus a movement is
initiated which cannot pause till it closes in the State : but
he is a naturally political being for another reason also ; he
possesses the gift of language, which reflects a consciousness,
of the just and the unjust, the good and the bad, and it is!
this consciousness that serves as a basis for household ancO
State ; whereas even the most naturally social of the lower
animals only possess voice, and voice expresses no more
than a sense of pleasure and pain. In drawing this marked
distinction between the sociality of man and that of gre
garious animals, Aristotle probably aims at correcting the
mistake, as he conceives it to be, of Plato, who had pro
tested in the Politicus (262 A sqq.) against an abrupt distinc
tion of ayeA.cuorpo(/HK?j in relation to man from ayeAcuorpot/uKTy
in relation to other animals, explaining that one might just
as well divide mankind into Hellenes and barbarians, or
into Lydians and non-Lydians 1 . If, then, at the outset we
found Society traced to impulses shared by the lower
i animals, we now learn to regard the household and State as
exclusively human institutions 2 . We see also that the State

1 He may possibly also have in ist among the lower animals, if its
his mind a passage of the Laws end were TO fr}j&gt; p.6vov. Animals
(680 E) of? e7r6p.fvoi KaduTrep opvi- are said (Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 b 4
6es dyf\Tjvp.iav TTOirjcrovtrt, Trarpovo- sqq. : Cp.Eth.Nic.y. 1. 1 145 a 2 5) t
fj.ovp.evoL KOL fta&lt;Ti\fiav 7rao-$&gt;v diKOL- possess (pvcriKr) dpert] (see also Hist.
oTarrjv fla(n\ev6p.fvoi, which occurs An. 8. I. 589 a I sqq.). Some echo
in Plato s sketch of the origin of of Pol. i. 2. 1253 a 9 sqq. is pos-
society. Plato strangely enough sibly traceable in Plutarch de
seems more inclined than Aristotle Amore Prolis, c. 3, a passage which
to reason from the lower animals may be based on, or contain ex-
to man (cp. Pol. 2. 5. 1264 b 4 : tracts from, some composition of
and Laws, 7130). the great physician Erasistratus,

2 It is indeed implied, Pol. 3. 9. who was a pupil of Theophrastus.
1 280 a 32, that the rro Ais might ex-

BY NATURE. 31

is not merely forced on man by his needs, but foreshadowed
by his nature, and requisite to give full play to his faculties ;
that man bears marks of being intended for life in the State.
The enrols, if a man and not above or below humanity, is
not only a man whose needs are incompletely satisfied, but
also one whose faculties are without an adequate field for
their exercise.

We might imagine that Aristotle would stop at this point,
having now come to the end of the argument by which he
seeks to establish that the State is by nature and that man
is intended by nature for life in the State ; but he goes on
to assert that the State is prior in nature to the household
and the individual. He argues that the individual, being
incomplete without the State, is related to it as a part to a I
whole, and that the whole is prior in nature to its part. He
makes no subsequent use of this principle 1 ; so that we can
only conjecture why he lays stress upon it. He does so
probably, partly because if the State and individual were
both pronounced to be by nature and therefore to stand so
far on an equality, the authority of the State over the
individual would still be imperfectly restored, and its relative
dignity imperfectly vindicated ; partly in order to place in
the strongest light the disparity of the household and the
State, and therefore the contrast of the householder and
the statesman. He goes on further to enforce the claims
of the State by showing from what a depth of degradation
the State saves man, and how great are the benefits it has
conferred upon him. Without the State and the virtue it
developes in man, man would be the worst of animals :
with it he rises far above their level.

In Aristotle s view, the State is as essential to man s
existence as the act of birth. For existence means com
plete existence, and without the State a man is a mere
bundle of capacities for good or evil without the faculty
KOL dperrj), for whose hand they were intended :

1 It is not on the priority of the bling that of a whole to its part
State.to the individual, but on the that he dwells in 5 (8). i. 1337 a 27.
fact of its relation to him resem-

32 THE STATE EXISTS

he is, as it were, a helm without a helmsman nave senza
nocchiero in gran tempesta. Existence also means real
living existence, not such an existence as that of the part
after the whole is destroyed as that of the hand or eye
after life has left the body. The State is a condition of
complete and real human existence of existence in the full
sense of the word : its place in the process of man s life is
thus as assured as that of the act of birth, or of the taking
of food. It matters not that whole races of men are
doomed to remain half-grown and never to realize the
City-State : we judge of what is natural for man by that
which holds good of well-constituted natures. Man is a
being marked out by nature for the gradual attainment of
a definite limit of growth, and the State is the means of
enabling him to do so. Man s duty to the State is no
more a matter of compact than his duty to be virtuous.
Compact is not needed as a basis for the authority of a
State which fulfils the end of the State, nor can it lend
authority to a State which does not do so.

The State does not come into being, in Aristotle s view,
in derogation from, or limitation of, man s natural rights :
on the contrary, it calls them into existence. It enunciates

What is jUSt (Pol. I. 2. 1253 a 37s *l ^ blKaiOO-VVt] TTO\LTLKOV

f] yap SIKTJ TroAirtKTjs KOivavias rat? eoriV f] be 81*07 TOV biKatov
KptVts) : it is in the State, and with reference to its end, that
men s rights are to be determined (Pol. 3. 12. 1282 b I4sqq.).
If persons outside a given State are recognized by those
belonging to it as possessing rights for example, rights to
freedom or to be ruled not despotically but as freemen
should be ruled, Aristotle would probably nevertheless say
that rights in their origin are traceable to the internal
relations of the State. Contrast Chrysippus, Tlepl 0eo&gt;i&gt; (ap.
Plutarch, de Stoicorum Repugn, c. 9) ov yap ko-nv evpelv rrjs
biKaiocrvvrjs aAArjy apx^ y ^ a\Xr]v yeyecrtz; 77 rr)y ex TOV AIDS
KCU rrjv K rfjs Koivfjs &lt;^&lt;rea&gt;?. Finding the natural in the best
form of the State, Aristotle has no call to imagine a state
of nature antecedent to society, and involving risks which
compel the formation of the State as a pis aller. The State

BY NATURE. 33

exists, according to him, because of the better elements in
human nature, rather than because human nature is a
compound of good and bad. The love of society and the
perception of right and wrong implanted by nature in man, &gt;
the impulse of self-perpetuation, the need of protection and I
sustenance, the higher needs that gradually assert them
selves : these are the things to which the State owes its
existence. Man is a being the satisfaction of whose material
needs suggests and leads on to the satisfaction of higher
needs. The rise of the State merely reflects man s destin
ation to moral development. Kant, on the contrary, in his
Idee zu einer allgemeiner Geschichte in weltbtirgerlicher
Absicht, traces the State to antagonisms resulting from
the fact that men have both tendencies to social union
and tendencies disruptive of it, both general sympathies
and private interests 1 .

The argument of Aristotle must probably have failed to Remarks
convince the partisans of the opposite doctrine. Some of t^tle "^^-
his opponents would reject his account of the functions of gument.
the State, and would confine them to the protection of
men s rights : others might say that the picture he draws of
the State is a picture of an ideal State very different from
the State as it is, and that his defence of the State is con
sequently a defence of a State which is nowhere to be
found : others would perhaps dispute the genesis of the
State from the household, and make it out to be rather a
thing of man s devising, and to be designed less for man s
improvement, than his convenience.

For ourselves, the close historical connexion between the
family relation and the State has been placed beyond
doubt, though the intrinsic difference between the two
institutions is more evident to us than to the Greeks, whose
State was in many respects more like a household than our
own. Aristotle indeed himself rightly rests the claims of
the State rather on its adaptation to human nature and its
incalculable services than on its succession to the household.

1 Kant, Werke, 7. 321 sq. See Flint, Philosophy of History, I. 391*

VOL. I. D

34 CIC. DE REP. i. 24. 38.

Its authority, however, may be vindicated without seeking
to prove that it is everything to man ; or even that it is a
product of nature. The word nature means less to us
than it did to the Greeks. On the other hand, so far as
Aristotle s argument goes to show that the authority of the
State is not based on consent, it possesses permanent im
portance.

Cicero (de Rep. i. 24. 38) is sarcastic at the expense of
some inquirers who had begun their political speculations
in a similar fashion to Aristotle, though one or two of his
expressions (e. g. quot modis quidque dicatur ) make it
doubtful whether he is thinking of Aristotle: Nee vero,
inquit Africanus, ita disseram de re tarn illustri tamque nota,
ut ad ilia elementa revolvar, quibus uti docti homines his in
rebus solent, ut a prima congressione maris et feminae,
deinde a progenie et cognatione ordiar, verbisque quid sit
et quot modis quidque dicatur definiam saepius : apud pru-
dentes enim homines et in maxima re publica summa cum
gloria belli domique versatos quum loquar, non commit-
tam ut sit illustrior ilia ipsa res, de qua disputem, quam
oratio mea. He so states the primary cause of the forma
tion of the State, as to give a greater prominence to man s
natural sociality than to his needs : Coetus autem prima
causa coeundi est non tarn imbecillitas quam naturalis quae-
dam hominum quasi congregatio : non est enim singulare
nee solivagum genus hoc (Cic. de Rep. i. 25. 39). Else
where, however, neglecting Aristotle s distinction between
the cause of the original formation of the State a nd the
cause of its existence 1 , he makes TO ev i]v the cause of its
formation : Considerate nunc cetera quam sint provisa
sapienter ad illam civium beate et honeste vivendi societa-
tem : ea est enim prima causa coeundi et id hominibus
effici ex re publica debet partim institutis, alia legibus
(de Rep. 4. 3. 3).

Bacon s account of the origin of society 2 is noticeable,

1 Something not altogether un- friend has pointed out to me, in

like Cicero s statement appears, Eth. Nic. 8. II. u6oa II sqq.

however, to be implied in Pol. 3. 2 Argument of Sir F. Bacon,

6. 1278 b 21 sqq., and also, as a His Majesty s Solicitor- General,

BACON. 35

both because it is obviously influenced by Aristotle s
views, and because it does not trace society to a primitive
compact. The first platform of monarchy, he says, is
that of a father, who governing over his wife by prerogative
of sex, over his children by prerogative of age and because
he is author unto them of being, and over his servants by
prerogative of virtue and providence (for he that is able of
body and improvident of mind is natura serviis), is the very
model of a king. On this pattern the earliest society was
constructed. The first original submission is paternity or
patriarchy, which was, when a family growing so great, as
it could not contain itself within one habitation, some
branches of the descendants were forced to plant them
selves into new families, which second-families could not by
a natural instinct and inclination, but bear a reverence and
yield an obeisance to the eldest line of the ancient family
from which they were derived. Bacon adds, as secondary
and later sources of monarchy, admiration of virtue or
gratitude towards merit, gratitude for salvation in war, or
enforced submission to a conqueror. All these four sub
missions are evident to be natural and more ancient than
law. All other commonwealths, monarchies only ex-
cepted, do subsist by a law precedent . . . but in monarchies,
especially hereditary . . . the submission is more natural
and simple, which afterwards by laws subsequent is per
fected and made more formal, but it is grounded upon
nature V Nulla apud Baconem, Friedlander remarks,

in the case of the Postnati of same position with respect to his

Scotland ; quoted by C. Fried- King as that which the child holds

lander, De Francisci Baconis to the father whom he has had no

Verulamii doctrina politica, p. 15. part in selecting while again

*t Bacon evidently intends to they firmly assert the inde-

suggest that the claims of Mon- feasible Majesty of the Head of

archy are superior to those of the State, the Jesuit writers on

other constitutions an inference the subject take a diametrically

which Aristotle is far from draw- opposite view. They insist in

ing from its priority in point of the interest of the Church on the

time. While the Protestant human origin of the State, on its

writers on Natural Law persist- origin in a primitive social com-

ently maintain that the State is a pact, and infer from this that

divine ordinance while they in- where the Prince shows himself

cline to place the subject in the unworthy of the power committed

D 3

36 ARISTOTLE S ACCOUNT

vestigia ficti illius, quern Hobbesius profert, status natura-
lis, qui bellum fuisse cogitatur omnium contra omnes ;
nulla vestigia pactorum illorum quibus homines se invicem
obstrinxissent, occurrunt.

Aristotle s It will be observed that, if Aristotle deals with the

the origin question of the origin of the State, he deals with it only

of the incidentally, and in course of proving that the State exists

by nature. We must not, therefore, expect from him more

than a cursory treatment of the question.

Plato had twice sketched the origin of society first in
the Republic and again in the Laws ; and his two accounts
do not altogether coincide. He had traced its origin in
the Republic l to man s need of the services of .his fellows :
he here starts with the single individual and shows how
unable he would be to supply his own needs without the
aid of at least four or five others, and how the efforts of
this group of individuals would fail of full efficiency in the
absence of a scheme for distributing and combining their
labour. The interchange of the products of their industry
is thus, according to this passage, the first and most cha
racteristic fact of social life. In the Laws 2 , however, while
tracing the succession of constitutions from its starting-
point, he incidentally developes another view of the origin
of society. He had apparently noticed that the sites of
ancient cities were often close under the slopes of high
hills, still more ancient traces of habitation being found
on the summits of these hills 3 ; and these facts seemed

to him, the mandate he holds may more ideal and less historical than
be withdrawn from him (J. E. in the Laws. Perhaps indeed we
Erdmann, Geschichte der Phil- could hardly expect him to trace
osophie, I. 574). A Solicitor- the State back to the household
General s argument in the time of in a dialogue in which the house-
James I, and especially an argu- hold was about to be abolished,
ment of Bacon as Solicitor-Gen- 2 B. 3, 676 A-682 B.
eral, was, however, certain to be 3 Or, very probably, he was
sufficiently monarchical in tone. merely building on Homer s de-
1 Rep. 369 A sqq., yiyvoufvrjv scription of the Cyclopes, which
7r6\iv0faa-ainf6a \6ya /c.T.A. Plato s both Plato and Aristotle take as
treatment of the subject in the a picture of the earliest human
Republic is no doubt, .however, society :

OF THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE. 37

to him to point to the further fact of a primitive deluge,
the survivors of which began society afresh on the hill
tops, each household being ruled by the father and exist
ing either independently or in combination with a few
others. Why the survivors of the deluge should be found,
when the curtain draws up, grouped in such small bodies,
Plato does not explain. The next phase of society is
a larger agglomeration of households, accompanied with a
change of the site of the settlement to the foot of the
hill-slope.

It is evident both from the general tenour of Aristotle s
account of the origin of society, and from the repetition
in it of incidental expressions used in this passage of the
Laws 1 , that he has this sketch before him in his own
treatment of the subject. The deluge, indeed, is dropped
out, and all the picturesque features of Plato s story : we
lose also some instructive hints, such as the aperqu that
the earliest men were hunters and herdsmen (Laws, 679 A) ;
and the series of societies household, clan-village, and
city-State is marshalled before us, stripped of historical
detail and reduced to a somewhat bald outline. But Aris
totle has seized the idea that society begins with the house- j
hold, not with the group of producers to which the Re-
public traces it back, and he holds firmly to it. He adds,
however, an account of the origin of the household a
subject which Plato had not touched. As we have seen,
he traces this, not, like Locke, to the long infancy and
long minority of the human being, which, but for wedlock,
would impose an overwhelming burden on the mother, but

aXX oiy i^T)\S&gt;v opeW vaiovvi 2. 1252 b 18 : and Laws, 680 D-E,

Kaprjva, fjLu&gt;v ovv OVK eK TOVTOIV (sc. 8viftur-

iv &lt;nr&lt;r&lt;ri y\a(pvpo icri. Tf iat yiyvovTai) TO&gt;V Kara p.iav OIKTJCTIV

Cp. Laws, 677 B. Kal Kara ytvos 8ifcr7rapp.fvcov vno

1 e.g. Laws, 68 1 A, TCOV oiK.ri&lt;Ttu&gt;v mropias TTJS fv rais (pdopals, tv als

ToiiTotv p.ei6v&lt;t)v av^avopevaiv e (c TWV TO nptcrfivTaTov ap^ti 8ta TO TTJV

ehaTToiHov KOI Trpa&gt;Ta&gt;v cp, Pol. 1.2. &lt;*PXn v ovrols fK naTpos Kal pr)Tp6?

1252 b 15, )? 8 fK ir\ei6i&gt;a&gt;v oiKicav ytyovtvai, ols firopfvoi KaQanep opvi-

Koivatvia irpwTTj xprjcrecos ZveKtv /iij 0S aytXrjv p,iav Troi r/crotxn, miTpo-

&lt;f)r)Hfpov KtafjiT) : Laws, 68l B, Trai- vopovfjievoi Kal fiaviXfiav naaatv

8as Kal Traiba&gt;v jralftas cp. Pol. I. 8iKaiOTaTr]v

38 ARISTOTLE S ACCOUNT

to certain powerful instincts, which hardly, perhaps, account
for the permanence of the conjugal relation.

We see that, in Aristotle s view, the State so far treads
in the steps of the Household and Village, that it never
ceases to be a common life, for this is implied in the term
KoivcDvia. A sundered and scattered citizen-body, like that
of Rome, would not be to Aristotle a citizen-body at all.
Mutual personal acquaintance (4 (7). 4. 1326 b 14 sqq.) was
essential to the citizens for the discharge of their political
duties ; and besides, a common life (ro &lt;rv(r\v], though not
enough of itself to constitute a State (3. 9. I28ob 29 sqq.),
is, in his opinion, a necessary condition of State-life. But
though the State resembles the household and village in
this particular, it developes virtues unknown or imperfectly
known to them. Justice, in the true sense, first appears in
the State.

We have already seen that too much must not be
expected from a sketch of the origin of society, which
is introduced mainly to prove its naturalness, and does
not profess to aim at exhaustiveness. It is, evidently,
largely ideal. Each of the successive Koivaviai is repre
sented in its correct and normal form. The confusion,
common among barbarians, of the wife with the slave
(i. 2. 1252 b 5 sq.) is just noticed and no more. No time
is spent on such deviation-forms of the Household as that
mentioned as prevalent in Persia (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. n6ob 27),
where the father uses his sons as slaves. The relation
between master and slave is conceived as a relation in which
each side finds its advantage. The retrospect thus acquires
rather an ideal. aspect. It is an historical retrospect, but
the many erroneous types of each Koivavta which have pre
sented themselves are thrown on one side, and we take
note only of the normal evolution. The gradual expan
sion of the solitary household into the clan-village and
the city-State is an ideal picture, rather than an historically
traceable fact. If Aristotle intends to imply that the
household is coeval with the first origin of society, he
omits to notice that society occasionally exists, as Hero-

OF THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE. 39

dotus already knew, without the institution of marriage,
even in its rudest polyandric form. Aristotle, again, traces
the development of society without reference either to
religion or to war, each of which has probably exercised
a powerful influence upon it, even if they have not been
the main factors in the movement.

If we doubt whether the household finds a place in the
most rudimentary form of society, and therefore whether
the starting-point of Aristotle s evolution is really the true
starting-point, we need not hesitate to deny that the cul
mination of the process, as he conceives it, is really its
culmination. He seems to close the social evolution long
before its real termination. The city-State, as he depicts
it, without a Church, without fully developed professions,
with an imperfectly organized industrial and agricultural
system and a merely parochial extent of territory, cannot
be considered self-complete, as he asserts it to be :
perhaps, indeed, no single State can be held to be so.
The edvos, again, finds no place in this sketch of social
development : Aristotle s view of it, indeed, does not seem
to be wholly self-consistent. For though not only fia&lt;n-
Aet a, which is one of the normal constitutions, but even
7ra/A/3ao-iA.eia, the most divine of them all, might exist in
an eOvos or group of ZQvr] (Pol. 3. 14. 1285 b 31 sq.), the
&lt;i6vos is pronounced to be self-complete only in respect of
things necessary (avrdpKris kv rois avayKaiois, 4 (7). 4. 1326 b
4), and also deficient in the differentiation which marks
the State (2. 2. 1261 a 27).

Two conclusions, especially, result from this inquiry : The irdxu
the one, that the TTO AIS is the true subject of the investi- natiSn 1 ^/"

gations of Political Science ; the other, that the Tro Ats, human so-
i i .L-.L / ~ \ / / \ ciety and

being a natural entity (TWV Kara yvcnv o-weo-rcorawj, is not therefore

a thing to take any and every shape that the convenience th f . true ,

........ subject of

of the individual may dictate, but, on the contrary, has political
a physiology of its own, and a natural structure of its own, study&lt;
which must be ascertained.

The Greek language left Aristotle no alternative, save

40 THE WORD DO A IE.

to identify the TTO AIS with the State. The term, which was
thus placed before him for analysis, was not a term like our
word State, vague in etymology and meaning and thus
susceptible of any connotation. It came to him fresh from
popular use and full of associations of a definite kind.
Evidently it implied, in the first place, that a State with
out a city at its centre was not a State at all. It is true
that the word TTO AIS is occasionally used in the sense of
a country 1 ; but it has nothing of the vagueness in this
respect of the Latin word respublica.

Another obvious inference from the word TTO AIS was that
the State was something inclusive and all- comprehending.
The word respublica, on the contrary, implies a distinction
between res publica and res privata. The Greek word
made it easy to regard the State as the whole of which the
individual was a part. It led to a view of human society
as a whole : no line was drawn between the social and the
) political system : production, trade, science, religion were as
much phenomena of the State as government. noAm*??
was held to regulate all human activities and to provide
for their harmonious co-operation for a common end.

The word TTO AI?, again, tended to suggest a limit to the
size of the State. The city, it would be felt, could not be
indefinitely large, and therefore, as the State was a city,
neither could the State. It implied, further, that the State
involved a common social life (TO &lt;rvCr)v) ; that a mere
participation in a common government was not enough. It
perhaps suggested the idea that the State was not an
abstraction, existing apart from the human beings and the
territory which made it up, but that it was a concrete thing
hardly separable from its walls, its soil, its inhabitants, and,
above all, its citizens. Aristotle, indeed, uses the word
TTO AIS in conflicting senses. He often seems to use it so as
to include all who exchange services of whatever kind
within the State (e.g. Pol. i. 3. i253b 2 sqq. : 2. 2. 1261 a
23: 3. 4. 1 277 a 5 sqq., a passage which is perhaps only
aporetic) : more strictly, the TroAtrat are the TTO AIS (6 (4).
J See Liddell and Scott, s. v.

THE ROMS A KOIN&NIA. 41

ii. 1295 b 25: 3. 6. 1 279 a 21 ); and this appears to be his
prevailing view (3. i. 1274 b 41).

Lastly, the word implied, by its antithesis to the House
hold and the Village, that the State, though the highest,
was not the only form of Society. To Hobbes the State
is the earliest social unity. It was not so to Aristotle.

Aristotle assumes, in the very first sentence of the Politics, The TTO

, _ , . /itTT a KOlV

that the State is a Koiz/owa 1 . But what is a Koiroma? We an d a
search in vain in Aristotle s writings for any systematic ac-
count of Koivtovla. As in the case of many other terms, we
are left to""rnaKe out the meaning he attaches to the word
from a number of scattered passages which rather imply
than state it. The subject of Koivavia is touched upon by
Aristotle, partly in the Nicomachean Ethics, partly in the
Politics. The household, for instance, so far as it is a form
of Friendship (&lt;/uAia), is treated in the Ethics. The virtues
which go to the maintenance of a Koivavia are described in
the Ethics. In the Politics we have mostly to do with
Koivu&gt;viai composed of rulers and ruled, and with the prin
ciples which determine the nature of the rule exercised.
For there are Koivaviat which are not composed of rulers
and ruled, as will shortly be seen. We seem to gather from
the scattered data we possess that every Koivavla must

i. Consist of at least two human beings diverse from
each other (Eth. Nic. 5-8. 1133 a 16 sqq.) : and these human
beings must not stand to each other in the relation of
instrument and end, for in that case there will not be
enough in common between them. At least, this is the
teaching of Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq., and Eth. Nic. 8. 13.
n6ia32sqq. : yet the first book of the Politics asserts
a KOLvcavia between master and slave, which is a case of
precisely that disparity. Perhaps the very unequal Kowwvia,
like the unequal form of friendship, is to be regarded as
a lower form of the thing, though not so low as wholly
to forfeit the name.

1 The word noivavla is hardly will be seen from the text, a far
translatable in English. It is, as wider term than association.

42 THE IIOA12 A KOINflNIA

2. These human beings are regarded as possessing ayada
and exchanging them : thus a Kotycorta is formed by a
buyer and a seller, or by husband and wife. Beings who
do not stand in need of anything or anybody do not form
Koivutviai. : thus the gods, whom the Stoics conceived as being
in Koivtovta with men, cannot be so in Aristotle s view.
The ayada exchanged, even if in truth so diverse as to be
incommensurable, must be commensurable in relation to
demand (Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 b 18): their ratio will in a fully
developed society be measured by money.

3. The two parties unite in a common action (-pafts): see
for illustrations Eth. Nic. 9. 12. 1172 a 3 sqq. Buyer and
seller unite in exchanging. The KOIVMVOI of a State unite
in the best life of which they are capable (Pol. 4 (7). 8.
1328 a 36): those of the best State in the actualization
and perfect exercise of virtue (38). This is the KOLVOV rt,
which the existence of the KoivavLa implies a common aim
(Eth. Nic. 8. ii. 1 1 60 a 8 sqq.) and common action.

4. A passage here and there in the Ethics seems to imply
a compact, tacit or other, between the parties to the Koivavia.
So in Eth. Nic. 8. 1 4. 1 1 6 1 b 1 3 sq. we are told that Political
Friendship appears to rest on compact (at TroAirt/cat *at
(f)v\fTLKal /cat (Tu/xTrAotKai Kat ocrat rotaurat ((iA.tai) KOIVMVI-
Kals (&lt;iAtats) eotKao-t p.a\\ov olov yap Ka0 6/xoA.oytap nva
tfxUpOVTtU tlvac fls ravras 8e raster av TLS Kat ryv ^CVLK^V),
while the friendship of relatives and comrades is held, on
the contrary, not to rest on any such basis. There is
nothing, however, to this effect in the Politics, where the
State is distinctly traced to a root in the family relation.

If we examine the dAXa/crt/crj Kowavla, or union for
exchange, we shall find all these features present. Buyer
and seller combine to exchange certain commodities on
certain terms with a view to their own advantage.

In a Koivavia of this simple kind, however, we notice the
absence of one feature which is conspicuously present in the
Koivavtai which pass before us in the opening chapters of
the Politics the household, village, and State. In Trade
no relation of rule and subjection is established between

AND A COMPOUND WHOLE. 43

the Koivavoi l . The parties to an union for exchange stand,
as such, on one and the same level.

The State is thus not only a Kotroma, but a KOIVCDVLO.
consisting of rulers and ruled. It is a Whole composed of
parts (i. 2. 1253 a 20: 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sq.), not a fj.tis
or a Kpaa-is in which the mingled elements vanish, replaced
by a new entity, the result of the mixture ; still less is
it a o-v Havens (Pol. 2. 4. 1262 b iosq.): it is, on the con
trary, a aijvOeo-is (3. 3. 1276 b 6), an union in a compound
form of uncompounded elements (a&lt;rw0era), which continue
to suEsIst as elements or parts within the compound Whole.
Being a Whole, the State is composed of dissimilars (2. 2.
1 261 a 29), and includes within itself a ruling element and
a ruled (i. 5. 1254 a 28 sq.). Its parts and here its parts
are taken to be the individuals composing it stand to it in
just the same relation as the parts of any other Whole do
to that Whole (i. 2. 1253 a 2 ^)- The fact that the State is
a Whole thus leads to various important inferences as to
its nature.

Plato had drawn a close parallel between the State and
the soul of the individual human being, but had not ex
plained how this resemblance comes to exist. Aristotle
finds a parallel between the structure of the State and that
of all &lt;rvvdcTa ; so that it resembles, according to him, not
one single exceptional entity, but nine-tenths of existent
things, and the analogy becomes more comprehensible.
If Aristotle seems, in one passage (Pol. i. 2. 1252 a 24),
to speak of the State as the outcome of a process of
growth, he does not apparently entertain the idea that this
creates a special resemblance between it and a plant or
animal an organism, as we term it. Still all Wholes,

1 By using the expression ovS see Metaph. A. 6. ioi6a 24 sqq. :

nXXrjy Koivu&gt;vias oiSf/iid? rjs fv n ioi6b 31 sqq. Just as men, horses,

TO yfvos (Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 25 : and dogs are one in kind, for they

cp. I. 5. 1254 a 28), Aristotle seems are all animals, so the members

to imply that there are Koivuviai of a State are one in kind, for they

which do not issue, like the State, are all Koivtavoi. One in kind, not

in a Generic Unity, but if so, it is merely one ava\oyia: cp. Eth. Nic.

doubtful to what Koivcovim he refers. i . 4. 1096 b 27.
For the meaning of this term,

44 TO UNDERSTAND A THING IS

and animals among them, are used occasionally to throw
light on the structure of the State (e. g. i. 5. 1254 a 2 sqq.).
The individual man, composed of soul and body, beyond
all other members of the class not, as Plato thought, the
soul of the individual affords an instructive analogy to
the State, for he is, like it, a moral agent (4 (7). i. 1323 b
33 sq.). Still, even here the parallel is not complete ; for
the State is essentially a plurality of human beings (2. 5.
1 263 b 36), and far more self-complete than the individual
(2. 2. 1261 b n). The State, however, as we have seen,
resembles the individual in being a Whole constituted by
nature.

To under- We have thus ascertained the genus of things to which
thin^ how- ^ e State belongs, but we must ascertain much more than
ever, it is this about it, before we can claim to understand what the
"(TtraceTt State is. Aristotle knew more clearly than any of his
. to its four predecessors how much an answer to the old Socratic

causes, and . .... ., ,-,,,

especially inquiry, what this or that thing is, involved. The definition
to discover Q f a ^^Q- j s tn e statement of its causes : it involves the

its matter

and its end. tracing out of all the causes which make it what it is:
but, above all, it involves a knowledge of its end. To
fc understand a thing is not to understand what it is made

of, or what it looks like l , but to understand its living
operation ; and if we are to understand this, we must,
above all, know its end. It is thus and thus only
that we penetrate into its inmost being. This holds of
the State, as of other things, though, as we have already
seen, Political Science does not speculate about the State
with a purely speculative aim, but with the aim of regulating
human action.

In every object not devoid of Matter, the source of its
being, or cause, which first attracts attention, is the mate-

1 Cp. de Part. An. I. I. 640 b 29 rrjv popiprjv (anv 6 avOpatros, o&gt;f

sqq., (I fjitv ovv rw axfjuan xai ovros avrov TU re &lt;r^^art KCU TW

TO) xpa&gt;fj.ari fKatrrov e crrt rStv Tf fwcov \pu&gt;fiari -yvrnpifiov KCUTOI KOI 6

KOI T&gt;V /zopuai/, op0&gt;s av ArjfjLOKptros TfQvfias e^f t rf/v avrrjv rov (T\r)iJ.aTos

Xe yoi (fraivfrai yap ovra&gt;s viro\a@elv. fjLop^v, dXX o/j.&lt;t&gt;s OVK f(mv av-

&lt;f)t](r\ yovv iravrl Sr/Xov flvai olov TI Opanros.

TO KNOW ITS FOUR CAUSES. 45

rial out of which it is made. Ex nihilo nihil fit. How
this material came to exist, how the Potential was brought
into being, Aristotle does not attempt to explain. It is
evident that his account of Becoming leaves Matter un
explained : it deals only with the later stage of the process,
not with its earliest moments. He held Matter, in fact,
to be eternal. Starting, however, from this point, we see
that, if we wish to refer a statue to its causes, the bronze or
marble of which it is made takes a first place among them.
Apart from this, it would not be in existence at all. "Eva
fj.tv ovv Tpoirov aiTiov Ae ycTai TO e ov yivtral TL (vvirdp-
XOVTOS, olov o yjaXnos TOV dvbpidvTos /cat 6 apyvpos rijs c/&gt;tdA?]s,
Phys. 2. 3. 194 b 23. In this case the material is material
in our sense of the word it is body : in other cases it is
not so in fact not sensible, but intelligible : cp. Metaph.
Z. 10. 1036 a 8, T] 8 vXri ayyoooros /ca0 avTrjv vAry 8 57 /xey
at(r0i]T?7 (TTIV f) 8e yorjrrj, alor6r]Ti] i&v olov \aXKos /cat
/cat our] /ctinjTTj v\t], vorjTrj 8e f) cv TOLS aicr^rjrois V
/XTJ fi al&lt;rdr)Td, olov TO. /xa^rj/xartKa l . But whether body or
not, matter is always a substratum in things susceptible
of change; cp. Metaph. H. I. 1042 a 32, ert 8 eoriy owi a
/cat T] v\r\, bijXov kv Trdcrat? yap rats dzn-iKet/ieWis /u,era/3o-
AaTs eort rt TO VTro/cet/xefoi; rats /uera/3oAats. Thus cold air
becomes warm air or warm air becomes cold air : there is
a transition from one contrary affection to another : but
this, and any other change, implies the existence of a
tertiiim quid in addition to cold and warm, a thing
neither cold nor warm in itself, but capable of becoming
cold or warm this is air. Air, then, is in this example
the matter and substratum (tfArj and v-noK^i^vov). AydyxT/
VTretuat rt TO fj.tr afidXkov ets rqv kvavrLuxriv ov yap TO.
fvavria jixeTa/SdAAet, Metaph. A. i. 1069 b 6. The characte
ristic, then, of matter is its capability of becoming this or
that its potentiality (TO bvvdp.fi. ov), in a word. Matter
is the potential, imperfect, inchoate, which the supervening
Form actualizes into the perfect and complete, a transition
from half-reality to entire reality or act. The Potential is
1 Quoted byGrote, Aristotle 3 2. 185.

46 THE MATERIAL AND FORMAL CAUSES.

the undefined or indeterminate what may be or what may
not be what is not yet actual, and may perhaps never
become so, but is prepared to pass into actuality when the
energizing principle comes to aid (Grote, Aristotle, 2. 184).
Aristotle s account of Matter varies from time to time,
according as he finds himself obliged to read more or fewer
attributes into the primitive ov OVK avev or e t&gt;7ro0eVecos
avaynalov. Taken at the lowest, this must possess a certain
amount of spontaneous power a capability of favouring
by its suitability or marring by its defects the process from
Potentiality to Actuality. Aristotle, however, as we have
seen 1 , occasionally treats it as almost an efficient cause.
Indeed, as the irp^rr] V\TI and the ta-yjarr] tfArj are both of
them Matter, its nature must inevitably vary greatly.

Evidently, then, though Matter is for certain things an
indispensable condition of their being, it is nevertheless
insufficient by itself fully to account for their existence.
E/c yap xaA/coiS avbpiavTa yiyvearOai (f)ajj.V, ov TOV ^a\Kov av~
bpidvTa, Phys. i. 7. 190 a 25. If bronze is to become a
statue, the form of a statue must be impressed upon it.
Thus (Phys. 2. 3. 194 b 26) aXXov [rpoirov curia Ae yerai] TO
eicGs KOL TO TrapdofLyfj-a TOVTO 8 fcrrlv 6 Ao yos 6 rou TL TJV
elvai KOL TO. TOVTOV ytvt] (the kinds or genera under which
the species and specific form falls). If a saw is to be a saw,
it must not only have a correct Material Cause (be made of
iron), but also assume a correct Form (have teeth). It is
then that the Potential passes into Actuality. In this
way of putting the antithesis, the Potential is not so much
implicated with the Actual as merged and suppressed to
make room for the Actual ; it is as a half-grown passing into
a full-grown ; being itself essential as a preliminary stage in
the order of logical generation. The three logical divisions :
Matter, Form, and the resulting Compound or Concrete
(TO (TuvoXov, TO a-vvfihTiiJ.iJ.evov) are here compressed into
two, the Potential and the Actualization thereof. Actuality
(epe pyeta, ei&gt;TeAe xeta) coincides in meaning partly with the
Form, partly with the resulting Compound ; the Form being
1 P. 17, where de Gen. An. 2. 6. 7423 19 sqq. was referred to.

THE EFFICIENT CAUSE. 47

so much exalted, that the distinction between the two is
almost effaced (Grote, Aristotle, ibid.).

But, however we conceive the process by which Matter
receives Form whether as a growth of one into the other
or as a combination of the two (a~vv9e(ns) in either case
a further power is necessary, whether to assist the growth
or to effect the combination. This is the source of change (
(odev fj KLur](TLs) the efficient cause (Phys. 2. 3. iQ4b 29 sqq.,
odev rj dpx?J TTJS jJ.Ta(3o\rj$ rj Trpcorr; 77 rr;? Tjpe/xTjo-eo)?, olov 6
fiovXevcras curioy KOL 6 irarr/p TOV TZKVOV KCU oAcos TO TTOLOVV
TOV Totov/xe rou /cat TO jueTa/3aAAoy TOV jueTa/3aAAojuez;ov). But
what is the efficient cause of a thing ? A house is built by
a man : but then it is built by the man qua builder ; and
he is a builder so far as he is possessed of the art of
building. "Avdpcairos ot/co8ojuet on olK.ob6fj.os, 6 be otKo8o juoy
Kara TT)Z&gt; olKobofjuKriv TOVTO TOIVVV irpoTepov TO amoi&gt; (Phys.
2. 3- T 95b 2 3)- The art of building, then, we find, is the
efficient cause of the house. But then still observing the
same rule of following the chain of causation up to the
highest cause (8ei del TO alnov ftdaTov TO aKpoTdTov (jjTetv,
Phys. 2. 3. i95b 21) the art of building a house is insight
into the Form of a house, possession of the Form (^ yap
Te^rrj TO flbos, Metaph. Z. q. 1034 a 24) : it is the presence
in the mind of the conception, the type (TO irapaSetyjua,
Phys. 2. 3. I94b 26) : thus both in Nature and in Art like/
produces like, a man produces a man, a house a house, and
so forth. We might even expect that Aristotle, like Plato
(Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. i. 439. 3, 2nd edit.), would absorb the
Efficient Cause wholly in the Formal, but this he does
not do : a place is left by him for the efficient cause and
a part for it to play (cp. de Gen. et Corr. 2. 9. 335 b
7 sqq., 8ei be Trpocretycu /cat n)y Tpmjy, r)v airavTes fJ.ev ovei-
pcoTTOucrt, Aeyei 8 ovbeis (the efficient cause) . . . . et //ey
yap ecrTly ama Ta etSrj, 8ia rl OVK del yevva (rvve^&s, dAAa
TTOTC /xey TTOTC 8 ou, OVTU&gt;V *cat T&V clb&v del Kal TU&gt;V
jue^e/cTtKcay ;). Thus with him the art of building or the
builder remains the efficient cause of the house, though
we see that the Form must not only be ultimately im-

48 THE FINAL CAUSE.

pressed on the Matter, but must be pre-existent to the
whole operation.

Nor yet is it sufficient that the Form of the thing should
be complete if it cannot fulfil the end for which it is
designed. A hand is not a hand if it does not fulfil
the end of a hand : a stone hand, for instance, is not a
hand at all, except in name. Hd^ra ra&gt; epya&gt; (Sptorat /cat
rr\ bvvd^fi, wore p-rj/cert rotaura ovra ov Ae/crecy ra avra
tlvai. dAA o/xaW/xa (Pol. I. 2. 1253 a 2 3)- ft 1S i n tne
end, and the end alone, that the whole evolution finds
rest and completion. This is its term, and it is, if we
look well into the matter, the deepest and most deter
mining cause throughout the movement. "O/xotoy 8 eot/ce
TO Aeyeu&gt; ra atria e avdyKrjs KO.V et rts bia ro p,a^aCpiov
OLOLTO TO vbu&gt;p e^eAjjAtifleVat p.6vov rot? vSpcoTrtwcrii , aAA ov
bia TO vyi.aivfi.v ov fveKa TO /jtaxatptoy Ire/ie^ (de Gen. An.
5. 8. 789 b 12). The End masters, as it were, every
other agency Form, Efficient Cause, Matter and bends
it to its service. It determines the Form the thing
must assume : the saw is intended to saw therefore it
must have teeth (its Form). It sets in motion the effi
cient cause, the worker in iron and his tools. It also
produces, or chooses, or adapts for its purpose, the
material out of which the saw is to be made. It must
be made of iron : why ? Because its end is to saw. The
End is thus, in truth, the Beginning. It is a fixed point at
the commencement and termination of a process (eort ro ov
VKa fv roT? aKtvTjrois, Metaph. A. 7- -1072 b i). To seize
and determine this fixed point is always possible, and till
this has been done, the cause of the thing cannot be said
to have been ascertained. ETret TrAetous 6p&lt;S//,ey ahias

yv $u(riK?ji&gt;, otoz&gt; TT\V re ov tvena Kai TT]
Kivri&lt;r&lt;i)s, Stoptcrre oi /cat Trept TOVTUIV Trota irpuiTr) /cat
tyvKev. $au&gt;erai Se Trpwr^, rfv Aeyo/xey (-vend TWOS
Ao yo? yap OVTOS, apx^ Ao yos 6/x.otcos cv re rols Kara
Ttx vr 1 v Ka * v T0 ^ &lt;j&gt;vcri. o-uyeo-TTjKoVtz; 17 yap rr; biavoiq
7] TTJ ala6r](rei opia-a^vos 6 fjitv tarpos TTJV vyUiav, 6 b OLKO-
bopos Tj)v outay, a7ro8t8oacrt roi/y Aoyovy /cat TO.S atrtas ov

THE POTENTIAL AND THE ACTUAL. 49

eKaorou, KCU 8ton TrotTjreov ovrcos (de Part. An. I.
I. 639 b ii sqq.) 1 .

In the foregoing statement of a familiar doctrine Teich-
muller s clear and concise exposition (Kunst } pp. 63-78) has
been especially followed.

So nearly related, in Aristotle s view, are the formal,
efficient, and final causes, that the four causes are often
treated by him as, in fact, two only: e.g. de Part. An.
I. I. 642 a I, flarlv apa hi? atrtat avrai TO 6 ov eW/ca at TO t
avdyKr]s : Phys. 2. 8. 199 a 30, tirel fj Averts 8irr?7, f] jjJtv &&amp;gt;s
v\ri f) 8 o&gt;s /x,op$?7, reAos 6 avrrj, TOV re Aous 8 VKa raAA.a,
avTr] av fit] f) atrta f) ov eW/ca. We come back, then, to
the Dualism of influences Matter, and the Good or the
End which our examination of Necessity, Spontaneity,
Nature, and Human Agency disclosed to us 2 .

This doctrine, it will be observed, does more than merely
enumerate and classify the agencies, whose operation makes
a thing what it is : it asserts that everything into the com
position of which matter enters, bears traces of a process,
and it announces the law of this process or motion, in the
wide Aristotelian signification of the word which is, that
it begins in the Potential and ends in the Actual. The
most diverse things can all of them be traced back to an
e ov, or material cause : not only the statue to the metal
of which it is formed, but the tree to seed, the conclusion
to its premisses, moral virtue to desires implanted by nature,
the octave to its component notes, these notes to the
instrument which gives them utterance, words to syllables
or sounds 3 : and the e ov is always the Potential.

1 This does not exclude OCCa- ov8e TCIVTTJS TTJS alriat rjv &lt;f)afj.(v

sional assertions that scientiae tivai /j.iav ratv ap^Snv, ov8ev aTrrerai ra

natura ac virtus in formali potius eidij.

quam in finali causa cognoscenda 2 Aristotle s theory of the four

ponitur (Bonitz), such as that in causes did not long remain un-

Metaph. Z. 6. 1031 b 6, eVno-Tij/x?; challenged, for the Stoics recog-

yap e/cdcrrou ecrriv orav TO TL qv tlvai nized only two, the material and

fKfivm yv&gt;p.fv (cp. 20). Contrast the efficient causes (Zeller, Stoics

Metaph. A. 9. 992 a 29, oiSe 8r) orrep Epicureans and Sceptics, p. 136).

Tats eVicmjjuais 6pu&gt;fieif oi&gt; aiTiov, 816 3 J. E. Erdmann, Geschichte der

Kal Teas vovs KOI naa-a tfyixns Troift, Philosophic, I. 125.

VOL. I. E

50 MATTER AND END OF THE STATE.

TheMatter If we now turn to the TTo Xts or City-State, we shall find
State? ^ at ft a ^ so originates in an appropriate e ov, or material
cause (Pol. 4 (7). 4. 1325 b 40 sqq.). It is not quite clear
whether we are to reckon as part of its Matter, in addition
to a population suitable in numbers and quality, a territory
suitable in character and extent : but perhaps this may
be Aristotle s meaning. The Matter of the State com
prises not only things tangible and material (in our sense
of the word), such as the soil of the territory and the
physical frames of the population, but also, as we see from
a subsequent chapter (4 (7). 7), those gifts of mind and
character (TO ZvdviJ.ov, TO biavoriTLKov), which are there held
to be characteristic of the Hellenic race, in contradistinction
to other European races and to the races of Asia.
The End of But to understand what the State normally is, we must
ascertain its true End. Without a knowledge of the End of
the State, we cannot decide what Matter it must start with,
what external goods must be at its command and how they
are to be distributed, what activities it presupposes and
to whom they are to be assigned we cannot, in fact, take
a single step in the exploration of the field of Political
Science.

We see that to Aristotle the two central questions of
Political Science were : i . What is the end of the State
not the universal end of things, but the end of the thing we
call a State ? 2. What Matter and organization will enable
it to realize this end ?

The The aim of Plato 1 had been less to explain the actual
inquiry in world, than to find a region of realities which would afford
Politics to a fi rm foothold to Science. His whole philosophy is from

which .

Plato s phi- the outset directed far less to the explanation of Becoming
losophical t han to t k e consideration of Being : the concepts hyposta-

pnnciples

point. sized in the Ideas represent to us primarily that which is
permanent in the vicissitude of phenomena, not the causes

1 I have followed Zeller mainly that the subject is still under in-
in this brief reference to the Pla- vestigation.
tonic metaphysics, but I am aware

PLATO. 51

of that vicissitude. If Plato conceives them as living powers,
this is only a concession forced from him by the facts of
natural and spiritual life. But it is antagonistic to the main
current of his system, and cannot be harmonized with his
other theories respecting Ideas V He is thus led, in theory
at all events 2 , to throw aside much as unworthy of his
study and greatly to contract the field to which he directs
his scrutiny 3 . The phenomenon is merely a shadow (Rep.
515) : it is to be used merely as a starting-point (Rep. 511
B, 508 D) : Dialectic must keep as far as possible on the
level of the Ideas and must limit to the utmost its contact
with the sensible world (Rep. 511 B, 532 A : Phileb. 58 A).
His effort is to reach what is purest (TO KaOap^rarov) in
each thing (Phileb. 55 C), to arrive at the abstract (Phileb.
56 D-E) : thus the study of matters relating to the sen
sible world, its origin, its affections, and its action on other
things will be eschewed as concerned with things involved
in a process of change (ra yiyvoptva KCU yeznjo-o^eya /cat
yeyoydra, Phileb. 59 A) ; or else tolerated as a source of
recreation not involving repentance (Tim. 59 C, raAAa 8e
T&V TOLovTtov ovbev noiK.LKov ert StaAoyuracrflcu rrjy rwy ei/corcoy
fjiiid(av /xeraSt&JKOira i8eaz&gt; fjv orav TLS avairavcreas evena TOVS
frepl T&V OVTWV del /carari0e/xeyos Aoyou?, TOVS yevecreco? irept
Siaflewjueyo? eucoras d/xera//,eA7jroi fjbovriv Krarai, ptrpiov av ev
r&lt;f /3UO TratSiay KOL (ppovi/Aov TTOIOITO: cp. Tim. 29 C D : Rep.
508 D). Plato seems even to regard this department of
physical study as possessing less exactness (d/cpt/3eta) than
Ethics and Politics : we may contrast, at least, his hesi
tating, almost apologetic, tone in the Timaeus (e. g. 29 C,
59 C) with his positiveness in the Republic and the Laws.

But to this view he could not adhere. He could not turn
away from the phenomenal world, just at the moment when
he had, as he thought, obtained a clue to its comprehension.
He subjects the sphere of sensible things to examina-

1 Zeller, Plato, E. T. p. 269. attempted it only in special in-

2 Aristotle does not employ that stances and incompletely (Zeller,
purely conceptual method, which Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 173).

Plato inculcates on the philoso- 3 See Zeller, Plato, E. T., p. 147.
pher, although he himself has

E 2

52 METHOD OF POLITICAL INQUIRY

tion, and finds that the Ideas stand related to it as causes.
Thus, in the Meno (98 A, cp. Tim. 51 D-E), the cogni
tion of cause (amas Aoytoyxo?) is made the characteristic
of Science : in the Phaedo the Ideas are viewed as
the proper and only efficient causes of things (Zeller,
Plato, Eng. Tr. p. 262 sq.) : and further, the Idea of Good
is to Plato the highest efficient and the highest final
cause (Rep. 508 C, 517 C : Tim. 28 C sq. : and Phaedo 97
B sqq., 100 B : Rep. 54)- ^ n Plato s mind the concep
tion of knowledge and truth, the conception of objective
reality or essence, and the conception of a systematic
order or cosmos, alike implied the conception of a
good, which cannot be identified with any of them, but is
the condition or logical prius of them all V Aristotle
asserts, in a well-known passage (Metaph. A. 6. 988 a 8 sqq. :
cp. A. 9. 991 a 20 : 992 a 29), that Plato employed only two
kinds of cause, the formal and the material, but, as Zeller
has pointed out (Plato, p. 76), this does not appear to be
altogether true. His treatment, however, of the efficient
and final causes seems to leave much to be desired in
respect of clearness and completeness. It was a difficult
problem to conceive classes as self-existent substances ; but it
was far more difficult to endow these unchangeable entities
with motion, life, and thought (as appears to be done in
Soph. 248 E) ; to conceive them as moved, and yet as invari
able and not subject to Becoming; as powers, in spite of
their absoluteness, operating in things (Zeller, Plato, p. 268).
So again, side by side with the Universal End, the Idea of
Good, though far below it, we discern specific ends, or epya, of
individual things (e.g. Rep. 352 D sqq.) : and if the connexion
between the two is traceable 2 , it hardly seems sufficiently

1 Mr. R. L. Nettleship in larger whole of the State each
Hellenica, p. 176. member only preserves his true

2 A thing is what it is in virtue individuality, so long as he takes
of its position in such an order. his proper place in the organization
As in the physical organism the of labour, and loses it when he
character of each organ depends ceases to do so (Rep. 420 -421
upon its relation to the whole, and A : cp. 417 B, 466 B) ; so in the
has no existence apart from that universal order of existence each
relation (Rep. 420 D); as in the constituent not only is understood,

TO WHICH PLATO S PHILOSOPHY POINTS. 53

worked out. The teleology of Plato preserves in the
main the external character of the Socratic view of Nature,
though the end of Nature is no longer exclusively the
welfare of men, but the Good, Beauty, Proportion, and
Order. The natural world and the forces of Nature are
thus referred to an end external to themselves (Zeller,
Plato, p. 340). Thus to him the causes of things were not
their immanent tendencies, but entities external to them
the Ideas and, above all, the Idea of Good which alone I
can be said fully to exist, and whose uncongenial union with
Matter generated a world of secondary and derivative
reality. Plato s view, in fact, is found to involve the ex
istence of a third power a World-Soul or a brj^ovp-yos to
wed Ideas with Matter. It is, indeed, true that Matter
itself is not, with Plato, wholly passive ; for he recognizes
in things a kind of existence that cannot be derived from
the Idea (Zeller, Plato, p. 333) ; a power which the Idea
cannot wholly master, the power of Necessity immanent in
Matter, which may co-operate with or thwart the Idea.
Still, on the whole, the one cause stands to the other as the
indispensable condition stands to the actual and operative
cause, for such is the Idea. The true Atlas which holds
the world together is the Idea (Phaedo, 99 C).

It is for this reason that the genuine lawgiver and ruler
is the philosopher, whose gaze is fixed on ordered and
unchanging things, neither wronging nor wronged by each
other, but all keeping order and obedient to Reason, and
who has learnt from them lessons of a godlike orderliness
and freedom from change. His business will be to look at
that which is naturally just and noble and temperate and
then at the corresponding elements in man 1 , to glance
repeatedly from one to the other, and, mingling the two, to
create by appropriate modes of life the true human image 2

but subsists, only so far as it re- x Stallbaum compares Rep.

mains true to its place in the order, 597 B, 17 ev TT) (frva-fi ov&lt;ra K^ivrj and

and as that place is determined by ffv 6 reKrcav elpyaa-arQ : and Phaedo

the ruling principle, end, or "good" 103 B, oi/Ye TO eV TJU IV fvavriov

of the order, it is to this ultimately oflre TO ev rfj (pvcrei.

that it owes what it is (Mr. R. L. 2 Prof. Jowett s Translation, 2.

Nettleship, Hellenica, pp. 176-7). 335 (edit. i).

54 ACTUAL METHOD OF PLATO IN POLITICS.

How far
is this
method
followed
by Plato ?

(midway between the two ?), taking a hint from that which
Homer called divine and godlike in man : he will erase
one feature and paint another in, till,_ he has made human
character as far as possible agreeable to God 1 .

The method to which Plato s philosophical principles
point would seem to be open to objection on the following
grounds :

1. it gives less prominence than Aristotle s to the neces
sity of a careful and minute study of the concrete thing :

2. it affords less of definite guidance to the investigator.
It fails to point out with equal clearness the path he is to
follow : it is also less easy to say what contributes to the
realization of the Idea of Good than what contributes to the
realization of the specific end of a given thing, always sup
posing that that end can be determined :

3. it supplies no philosophical reason for allowing weight
to the opinions of men possessing experience but devoid of
philosophy :

4. in Politics, it points to the absolute rule of the few
who know (i.e. have vision of the Ideas).

How far does the method thus indicated appear to be
employed in the political investigations of Plato? It is
possible, with Zeller (Plato, p. 466), to find the central fact
which determines the structure of the Republic in the
principle that philosophers (or those who are conversant
with the Ideas) are to rule : yet it is on a review of men s
varied wants, and on a distribution of the task of supply
ing them in conformity with the principle of Division of
Labour, that the organization of the State in three great
classes a point of critical importance is made to rest
(Rep. 369376). The parallel of the soul of the individual
human being also counts for much ; nor is the example of

Traira ra Totaura Kai irpbs fKfivo av

TO fV TOtS dvdpWTTOlS, e/JLTTOlOlfV ^VfJi-

fuynoTfe re Kai nepavvvvres fK ru&gt;v

f7TlTT]8fVfJ.dTa&gt;V TO dl&gt;8pftK\OV, aiT*
fKfLVOV TeKfJLaipOfJLfVOl, O OTJ Kd

fKaXeaev ev TOIS dvdpotTrois
6fO(i8es Tf Kai

1 See Rep. 500 6-501 C, esp. 501
B-C. I add the Greek, not feel
ing confident of the correctness of
my own interpretation : enetra,
oifiat, drrfpya^o/jifvoi TTVKVO av e/care-
pcoere dnopXenoifv Tvpos re TO (pvcrd
KOI Ka\6v KOI o-&gt;(ppov KOI

METHOD OF ARISTOTLE. 55

the Lacedaemonian State without influence. The method
actually followed in the Republic seems, therefore, to cor
respond only imperfectly with that announced by Plato x . If
this is true of the Republic, it is still more conspicuously
true of the Laws. The State of the Laws evidences a closer
attention to the facts of human nature, a fuller consciousness
of its weaker side. The rulers must be less trusted and less
autocratic the ruled must be flattered with a semblance of
political power. The specific end of the State the pro
duction of virtue in its citizens is more largely taken into
account : institutions must tend to produce virtue, or they
have no raison d etre (Laws, 770 D, 771 A). The best Hel
lenic experience is more fully drawn upon.

The method actually followed by Aristotle stands in a The
closer relation to his philosophical principles. To him the
world is to be explained, not by the fact of a mysterious Aristotle s
intermingling 2 of two strongly contrasted things, the non-

existent and the existent, but by the rise of the semi- principles
existent into the existent. What the world evidences is not| as certain-
a conjunction, but an universal process of growth. The men t fthe
lowest and earliest term of the process contains the potenti- end.
ality of the highest and last : the evolution is homogeneous
from beginning to end, and must be studied as a whole. In
place of the non-existent and the existent, we have the
Potential and the Actual, means and an end ; and it is no
longer possible to say that the one term of the process
must be studied to the exclusion of the other. The end,
again, being to Aristotle the specific end of the concrete
thing, not an universal and extrinsic Idea, could only be
ascertained, and its working traced, by means of a careful
study of the concrete thing. When once identified, how-

1 In the view of Mr. H. Jackson tion of an intermingling (Kp5&lt;m)
(Journal of Philology, No. 19, p. evidenced in the relation of the
149), the true, or highest, method soul to the body, of property to
is confessed by Plato both in the subject-matter, of $t criy to $&gt;VTOV,
Phaedo (100 A sq.) and in the Re- of God to the world (Zeller, Stoics,
public (509 D sqq.) to be an un- E. T., p. 133, note 2), but to them
realized aspiration. the things intermingled were alike

2 The Stoics returned to the no- material.

56 METHOD OF

ever, it afforded real guidance to the investigator 1 . The
process, further, was one which had been striving to realize
itself in the past with imperfect success, no doubt, in the
sphere of things human (jroXXal yap (f)6opal Kal A.{5/xcu avOpw-
irctiv yivovrai, Eth. Nic. 10. 5. 1 1 76 a 20), but still the world, or
at all events the Hellenic world, had not gone altogether
astray. The Household had passed into the Village, and
the Village into the City-State ; and now it only remained
to make the City-State all that it should be. It was not
reserved for philosophy in the fourth century before Christ
to impress for the first time the Idea on the phenomena of
politics : what was needed was to assist Nature in achieving
her own already half-executed design 2 . Political Science is

not called upon, as a deus ex mackina, to bring passive
matter to intermingle with the Ideas : on the contrary, it
finds a natural process already in action, and its business is

- to study this process, to assist it and amend it. Aristotle s
principle, in its application to Political Science, did not,
indeed, amount to a metaphysical justification of History in
general, or even of the History of the best-endowed race or
races, but it suggested an acceptance of the best Greek
experience, whether recorded in institutions or opinion, as
the rough ore of truth, needing to be sifted and purged
from dross, but capable of yielding, in skilful hands, much
that was of permanent value.

To Aristotle the world of concrete existence was not

1 Cp.AristOt.Eth.Nic. I. 4. log/a roioio-Se (roOro uev yap

8 sqq., "nropov8e Kal TI a&gt;(f)f\T]8r]O fTai 8e Kdd fnaarov anfipov Kal oi/K em-

il(f)a.l&gt;Tr)S T! TtKTOW TTpOS TT]V aVTOV (TTTjTOv).

Tfxisrjv fl8u&gt;s avrb TO.ya.66v, fj ira&gt;s 2 Cp. 4 (7). IO. 1329 b 25-35?

tarpi/ccorepor rj aTpaTrjyiKOjTtpos eorai where the argument is that the

6 rf/p loeav avTrjv Ttdfapevos (pal- world and mankind have existed

vfTai. (Mfv yap ovde TTJV vyinav OVTWS from everlasting, and that the

{mo-Koirelv 6 laTpos, dXXa TTJV dvdpta- business of the philosopher is not

TJ-OV, /naXXoi/ S" icras Tt]v Tov8e Kad so much to discover something

fKavTov yap laTpevfi. On this, how- wholly new, as to accept what

ever, see Ramsauer s note on Eth. men have been obliged by ne-

Nic. I. 4. 1097 a 12, who contrasts cessity or enabled by leisure long

Rhet. I. 2. 1356 b 28, ovdffj.ia 8e ago to discover, and to add the

Tfx vr l o-KOTTfl TO Kad fKacTToi&gt; y olov f) finishing touch where anything

InrpiKf] TI Soxcpdrei TO vyifivov ecrTiv has been overlooked. See also

TJ KaXXia, dXXa ri rw rotwSe fj TO IS 2. 5. 1264 a I sqq.

ARISTOTLE.

a mere world of copies, or, at best, of derivative reality, X
from which one should escape and pass on as rapidly as
possible to the world of complete reality ; it was thoroughly
real 1 , if not the only reality 2 , and deserved the closest study.
That which Plato, starting from the Ideas, had viewed as
a gratuitous or unexplained decadence, Aristotle, starting
from the opposite pole, regards as an upward movement,
an 68os ets &lt;j&gt;vonv. Where Plato had traced a dilution or
obscuration of real existence, Aristotle finds the process
by which real existence is achieved. The world of change,
which Plato approached with half-averted eyes, was exactly
the subject to which Aristotle was most drawn, for he
claimed to have discovered the law of all change. It was
not to him in itself the most knowable of subjects, but it
was perhaps that of which we know most. Physical study,
for example, which Plato had been inclined to eschew, and
which, in fact, occupies only a subordinate position in his
writings, claimed a larger share of Aristotle s attention than
any other subject ; and the greater part of his works as
we possess them has to do with this subject (Zeller,
Plato, p. 146). It is not to him, as it had been to Plato,
in comparison with the study of things eternally existent,
a pastime or recreation, or a source of pleasure not invol
ving repentance (Tim. 59 C) ; it is a part of Theoretic
Science, linked by this common title to Mathematics and
the First Philosophy.

Aristotle had already taken an important step in extend
ing and accentuating the recognition previously given by
Plato to the Material Cause. Matter to him is something
more than a subordinate power which may assist or impede,

1 Cp. Categ. 5. 2 a n, ovala de

t(TTiv 7] Kvpiatrard re Kal Trpcorco? (cat
/uaXiorra \fyop.evr), fj /HTjre Kad imo-
KfLfjievov TWOS Xeyerai IJLTJT ev VTTO-
Keip,(va&gt; TIV I fcrriv, oiov 6 T\S avdpcoTros
TJ o T\S imros, and see Zeller, Gr.
Ph. 2. 2. 305 sqq.

2 Cp. Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 339 :
In addition to corporeal entities,
Aristotle recognizes in the Deity,

the spirits of the spheres (as to
these, see Zeller, ibid. p. 455), and
the rational part of the human soul
incorporeal entities not encum
bered with Matter, which we must
likewise regard as individual enti
ties. See also Heyder, Vergleich-
ung der Aristot. und Hegel schen
Dialektik, i. p. 186, n.

58 THE SPECIFIC END

something more than a mere e ov, or ov OVK avev, or a mere
Potential in a passive sense ; it is the source not only of the
accidental concomitants of a thing, but also of some which
enter deeply into its essence and help to constitute its
specific form, such as the difference of sex, the contrast
of man and brute, the distinction of the transitory and
variable from the eternal and invariable. It is, apparently,
even the source of individuality in things falling under one
and the same infima species, for it marks off Socrates
from Callias. It is, above all, the source of the evolution,
which, wherever change and movement find a place, carries
the particular thing on to the realization of its specific end 1 .
It is susceptible of affection, and, it would seem, of affec
tion for the highest of objects (for God causes motion as
an object of love /arei a&gt;s epa&gt;[j.tvov, Metaph. A. 7. 1072 b
3), though it reaches the highest only by realizing, as part
of a Compound Whole ((rvvoXov), the specific end of that
Compound Whole. Even the First Matter (-Trpwrij v\rj)
the furthest point to which we .penetrate in stripping off
attributes, the substratum in its most naked form has
something active in its Potentiality. Trace things back as
far as we may, we come to nothing purely passive. Any
defect in the composition of the Material Cause distorts the
outcome of the evolution, without, however, depriving it of
the reality which always attaches to the concrete thing,
or justifying its neglect by the inquirer. In the Politics,
as we have seen, the defective forms of the TTOA.IS, if only
the TTO AIS type is attained, are held to deserve most careful
study.

It was, however, a far more important step to make the
specific end the key to Science. But in what sense are
things said to have a specific end? In the broadest and
most general interpretation of the term, the specific end
is that for the sake of which the species exists to which the
thing belongs (TO ov eWa). But this phrase is susceptible
of many meanings. We are told, for instance, in the
Politics, that the worse exists always for the sake of the
1 On the foregoing, see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 336-344.

THE KEY TO SCIENCE. 59

better (alel ro x fy v ro ^ fiekrlovAs eoriz&gt; t-veKtv, 4 (7). 14.
1333 a 21). This implies, not only that the worse elements
in the individual thing exist for the sake of the better,
but also that the thing itself exists for the sake of that
which is better than it. So plants and animals exist for
the sake of man (Pol. i. 8. 1356 b 15 sqq.) ; and we seem
to be on the high road to a purely external teleology 1 , like
that of Socrates, a creed which adds this to its other dis
advantages, that the end it assumes throws no light on the
nature of the thing. For how do we leara the nature of
animals by learning that they exist for the sake of man ?
The prevailing view of Aristotle, however, is very different
from this. He does not hold that man exists for the sake
of the State, though the State is better than man, or for
the sake of the heavenly bodies, though these are far
diviner than man (Eth. Nic. 6. 7. 1141 a 34 sqq.), nor even
for the sake of God. And so again, man is only in a sense
the end of the things to which he is an end (mo? re Aos,
Phys. 2. 2. 1 94 a 35).

We obtain a clearer view of the true nature of the
specific end, when we conceive it as the term of a move
ment. Movement exists and needs explanation : it be
comes explainable if it has a term. There are four kinds 1
of movement, or change change in essence (generation and
destruction), change in quantity (increase and diminution),
change in quality (alteration), change in place (motion).
Aristotle s theory implies a likeness between the terminal
point of a movement and the aim of a change ; and indeed
a likeness between movement and the act of striving after
(rb tyieardai ayaOov TWOS, Eth. Nic. ]. I. 1094 a 2). Both
analogies seem somewhat strained. If we ask, what is this
terminal point to which each thing is supposed to move
which appears as the goal of movement, the aim in
change, the object of desire the answer is Actuality.
The Actualization of the Potential is always the end. In
what does this consist? That is always most desirable

1 See Eucken, Methode der for the traces in Aristotle s writ-
Aristot. Forschung, pp. 83-7 : p. 98, ings of this point of view.

60 TELEOLOGY.

for every one which is the highest attainable by him (Pol.
,4(7). 14. 1333 a 29): or, as we are elsewhere told, that
I which is special to each thing (tStoi;) is the end for which
it came into being (de Gen. An. 2. 3. 736 b 4). The Poten
tial becomes actualized, when the given thing is found to
discharge its highest attainable function, or the function
which is specially its own. Thus the end of the natural
slave is to do the best thing he can do (Pol. i. 5. i254b
17 sqq., Sid/cetyTcu 8e TOVTOV TOV Tpoirov ocrutv eo-Tiv cpyov ff
TOV o-Gj/xaros xprjcris, KOL TOUT ear d?r avT&v /SeATicrroz;) ; and
the same thing is true of the State. Aristotle, in fact,
identifies that which is best for each thing with the best
which it can do (TO OTT avTov /3eAnoro/&gt;, or, as it is usually
expressed, TO cvb^o^vov /3eATioroy). The relation of the
specific end to the Supreme End God is left obscure,
but we gather that the true way to the latter lies through
the realization of the former.

In this immense generalization, which views everything
as having a single raison d etre, and this assignable by
man, a thousand minor distinctions between things seem
to vanish. The law holds of things inanimate and things
animate of movement (or change), of growth, of the action
of brutes, of moral action, of thought. An end is viewed
as equally an end, whether pursued unconsciously or
consciously, by an inanimate object or by man, with an
exercise of Moral Choice or without it. Moral action
(irpai.s) and movement (KIPTJO-IS), though usually distin
guished (e.g. Metaph. 0. 6. 1048 b 21), agree in obeying
/ this law.

We need not wonder that Aristotle himself feels the
principle to be more applicable to some things than to
others. As we go upward in Nature, the end discloses
itself more distinctly (det 8e p,a\Xov brjXov CTU TWV ixrTfpMv
KCU 6 Acos ocra olov opyava &lt;al eWxd TOV . . . TJTTOV 8 eir! crapKos
Kal OCTTOV Ta ToiavTa S?/Aa. !TI 8 e77t Trvpbs /cat vbaTos [*at] yfjs
TfTTW TO yap ov eWa rJKicrTa tvTav9a ST/AOV OTTOU TrAetaTov TJ/S
vArjs, Meteor. 4. 12. 389 b 29 : Kal lv TOIS QvTols e^eon TO
fvcKa. TOV, TJTTOV 8e 8t7/p0pcoTat, Phys. 2. 8. 199 b 9 : both pas-

TELEOLOGY IN POLITICS. 6 1

sages are referred to by Eucken, Op. tit., p. 70). Compare the
noble passage in the Metaphysics (A. 10. 1075 a n sqq.),
TiavTa 8e (rwrfroKTai TTCOS, dAA ov^ 6/xoto&gt;s, KOI TrAcord /cat
7TTr]va /cat (frvrd /cat ov^ oi rcos ^X et wore JU,T) etVat 0arep6&gt;
darepov fj.r]?&gt;v, dAA eort rf irpos /x,ez/ yap ev a. navra
rat, dAA aj&lt;r7rep ei&gt; ot/cta rots eAeutfepots Tj/ciora e^fomv o Tt
!ru)(e TroieTy, dAAa Travra ry ra TrAeTora rera/crat, rot? 8e avbpa-
7708019 Kat rots Oripiois //.t/cpoy ro ets ro KOLVOV, TO 8e TroAu o rt
fTV\fV rotavrrj yap eKao-rou dp^^ atr&lt;3z&gt; 17 (frvais (crriv. Even
in organic life preferences of Nature can be traced not
contributing to the end (Eucken, p. 79. 2) ; nor yet to the
preservation of the particular animal or species (ibid. p. 83.
i, 3). If the end eludes us at the lower pole of the scale
of being, can we trace it at the opposite pole? Has the
Supreme End an end? And where the teleological rela
tion most clearly manifests itself, we ask how it is that
each object exists for only one, or one chief, end? Why
has it not twenty ends, all on a level? Is it true, again,
that the end of a thing is not the sum of the functions
it fulfils, or ought to fulfil, but the highest of them only ?
And how is the highest to be identified ?

We are here, however, concerned with Practical Science, The tele-
and in Practical Science the teleological method may be

more applicable than in relation to other subjects.
obvious that the question, what a thing is for, may be a

far more fruitful question in relation to some things than to o f it by

T i-i-it ..... Aristotle.

others. It may result in little when we raise it in relation
to a plant or an animal, and be full of instruction when we
raise it in relation to a State. In purely physical science
there is not much temptation to assume the ulterior office
of deciding whether the ends pursued are such as ought to
be pursued, and, if so, in what cases and to how great a
length ; but those who treat of human nature and society
invariably claim it ; they always undertake to say, not
merely what is, but what ought to be. To entitle them to
do this, a complete doctrine of Teleology is indispensable 1 .

1 J. S. Mill, System of Logic, Herbert Spencer s remarks in
2. 524 (ed. 3). See also Mr. Mind for Jan. 1 88 1, p. 82 sqq.

62 THE TELEOLOG1CAL METHOD

It is necessary to know what the State is . to do before we
can decide what it ought to be.

Yet is it possible to prescribe a single end to the State
one invariable end at all times and in all places or even
one chief end ? The difficulty is increased when Aristotle
^identifies the end of the State with the end of social exist-
ence, and that withjthe end of human action ; for the vast
question of the end of human life is thus cast like a barrier
across the threshold of Politics. The method, again, by
which he seeks to determine the end of the State seems
hardly adequate to such a problem. We Igojk in_yajn for a
careful historical investigation into what the State can do :
what it tends to do, is indirectly considered in the chapter
(Pol. i. 2) which treats of the origin of society; but even
this question can hardly be said to receive sufficient con
sideration. Yet these are points which should be investi
gated before we inquire what the State ought to do.
Aristotle seems to rest his solution of this latter problem on
Opinion (that of ot d/cpt/Sw? 0ecopowre?, Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 28), so
far as he does not rest it on a rather ideal historical retro
spect (Pol. i. 2). He himself sees that the true end of
society only discloses itself after the State has existed a
certain time, for at its first appearance its end is mere life,
not good life ; yet he believes that in his day experience
was sufficiently complete to justify an absolute conclusion
on the subject. In reality, however, his view of the end of
the State stands in close connexion with his general concep
tion of the end of organic life. Good life is the end of man
in a higher degree than of animals and plants 1 , and as the
State is a collection of human beings, it must be the end of
the State.

Even, however, when the end is ascertained, we are not
in possession of a means of determining once for all the true
structure of the State. The concrete interpretation of the

1 Cp. de Part. An. 2. 10. 656 a p.6vov TOU (fiv dXXu KOI rov ev fjv

3 sqq., TO. 8e irpbs rc5 TJV aicrOrjcnv TJ (pv&lt;n.s p.fTti\rj&lt;^fv TOIOVTO 8 earl

e^ovra TTO\vfj.op&lt;f)OTfpav e ^ei rrjv TO ru&gt;v av6pa&gt;TTa)V ytvos rj yap fj.6vov

I8eav, Kal TOVTOW erf pa trpo erepaiv /zeTe^et rov Qfiov T&gt;V rjfJ.lv yva&gt;pifj.(av

p.a\\ov KOI jrciXv^oviTTepav, ocrav pr) &lt;pu&gt;i&gt; r) puXicrra TVUVTCOV.

AS EMPLOYED IN THE POLITICS, 63

end may vary 1 . One and the same end, again, may be
reached by different paths under different circumstances.
Aristotle, it is true, does not recognize this, for he conceives
that the end which he assigns to the State can only be
fully realized by a single type of social and political organi
zation. But he allows that the instances are few in which
the best State can come into being (6 (4). n. 1295 a 25
sqq.), and he seems to make but little use of the end of
the State in his inquiries respecting the imperfect consti
tutions -, under which, nevertheless, nine- tenths of those who
reach the TTO AIS stage of society must expect to live. The
durability of the constitution, rather than its favourableness
to good life, seems here to be the aim he keeps in view.
Nor can the institutions of even the best State be nakedly
deduced from its end. The means of realizing the end (ra
trpos TO re Ao?) in other words, the organization of the State
have to be otherwise ascertained. For this purpose, the
social functions (e pya) necessary to the -TO/US are enume
rated, and as it proves on inquiry that they ought not to
be indiscriminately opened to all the denizens of the State,
the creation of ye zn? a term under which classes, trades, and
departments of the State are included without distinction
follows of necessity 3 . In the whole inquiry it is evident that
the institutions of actually existing societies, and especially
of Hellenic societies, are present to Aristotle s mind, the End
being used as a standard by which to correct the data thus
gained. The End is kept in view in selecting the Matter of
the State and in improving it by education and law: it
serves as a measure of rights within the State, for the just
is relative to the End (3. 9: 3. 12-13): it helps us to
determine the true size of the State, and the limits within
which the participation in ayada it implies is to be confined :

1 Compare, for instance, Aris- concerned, for the true end of the
totle s interpretation of TO ev frji/ State is evidently often present to
with Cicero s (de Rep. 4. 3. 3 : 5. Aristotle s mind in his criticisms
6. 8). of the Lacedaemonian, Cretan,

2 So far at least as the Sixth, and Carthaginian constitutions.
Seventh, and Eighth Books (the 3 Pol. 4 (7). 8-io.

old Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth) are

64 THE TELEOLOGICAL METHOD

it regulates the creation and accumulation of wealth ; but
| it will not supply the place of a knowledge of human nature,
or of political experience, or of historical information.

The application of the teleological method by Aristotle
is further qualified by an occasional resort to principles not
special to Political, or even to Practical, Science. He not
unfrequently accepts a kind of evidence which he terms
the evidence of reasoning (f\ T&V Xoycov TTIOTIS), and which
is distinguished by him from proof based on principles special
to a given science (e/r r&v oZ/cetW apx&v) l , and from proof
based on detailed knowledge and experience 2 . He recog
nizes, in fact, more roads than one to the truth ; and thus,
when in the Politics (4 (7). 4) he investigates the true size of
the State, he finds that the evidence of reasoning broad
reasoning from the universal conditions of order (rats)
leads him to a true conclusion ; and indeed, not only the
evidence of reasoning, but that of observed facts, and in
particular, the fact that no reputedly well-constituted State
is indefinitely large.

It is thus evident that the teleological method is not
applied by Aristotle in its purity. He could not approach
the problem, how best to adjust the State to its end, with
out a consciousness that the State is not an unique thing,
or a thing capable of being severed from other things, and
dealt with by itself. On the contrary, it belongs, in his
\ view, to a whole class of things the class of things into
\ which Matter enters ; it is, consequently, subject to the play
of Potentiality and Actuality : it is, further, a Koivuvia and
a Koivaovia issuing in a Natural Whole. We are not, there
fore, at liberty to determine the mode in which it is to
achieve the end for which it exists, without reference to the

1 e.g. de Gen. An. 2. 8. 747 b 28, dvvavrai viroTidetrQai roiavras dpxas
Xeyco 8( XoyiKTjv (dnodet^iv) 8ia ai enl rroXv Siivavrai trvvtipetv ol 3*
roOro, on oaa&gt; KadoXov /iaXXoi/, wop- e /c TCOV TroXXajj/ \oya&gt;v adetoprjToi TWV
pwre pco rci)v MKtittV eVriv ap^utv. vrrapxovTuiv ovrfs, npos oXt ya /3Xe-

2 e. g. de Gen. et Corr. I. 2. \l/avres, dnofpaivovrai paov 1801 8
316 a 5 S( W-&gt; om/Of 8e TOV eV uv TIS Kal fK TOVTCOV o&lt;rov 8ia(pt-
fXarTOV 8vi&gt;aa-6ai. ra 6p.o\oyovp.(i&gt;a povcriv ol &lt;pvcm&lt;S&gt;s Kal \oyiKus CTKO-
(Tvvopav f) anfipla 816 otrot tvcoKrj- Trovvres. See on this subject Zeller,
KCHTI pa\\ov ev rotr (pv&lt;riKols, /xaXXov Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 171. 2.

AS EMPLOYED IN THE POLITICS. 65

general laws which govern all cases of genesis. We cannot
deal with Political Science apart from the Science of Being
and Becoming. Nor can we deal with it without the
guidance of the best attainable Experience and Opinion. In
well-constituted individuals and races, things tend to work
themselves out right, and we must take the history and
institutions of such races into account.

We see, therefore, that Aristotle approached the subject
of Politics with some prepossessions : on the one hand, he
brought to its study a metaphysical creed, which led him to
expect the State to conform to the laws of structure and
working which he traced in things in general ; on the other,
he was biassed in favour of Hellenic institutions. He was
thus led on from the assertion of a single and invariable end
for the State to the far more questionable doctrine, that the
State can only achieve this end by the adoption of one
unvarying type of structure, which it is possible to map out
in considerable detail 1 . Nor was the end which he assigned
to the State one that was likely to suggest a satisfactory
structure. The end of a thing^is, in his vigw^jisjias been
said, not the sum of the functions discharffedby it, butTtKe \
If that highest funVtinn rap nr HP

of th Q WhHe^then that part becomes,
in fact, the Whole. To it all other parts become mere
means ; they exist for it and are merely subsidiary to it.
The State thus came to be, as we shall hereafter see, not
only an union of unequals, which may very well be its
character, but an union of classes which are mere means
with a class which is related to them as their end, The
mutual relation of the component elements of the State was
thus distorted and denaturalised. Aristotle s best State
is exactly the kind of State to which a Teleology such as
his pointed. The classes of which it is composed are re
morselessly distributed into means and ends. Two thirds

1 Cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1 1 06 b 28, TO x s - We need not here pause to

p.v a/jLaprdveiv TroXXa^ws iariv (TO consider, how far Aristotle s error,

yap KCIKOV TOV dneipov, is ot IIu#a- if such it is, has been repeated,

ydpeioi fiKafrv, TO 8 ayaQbv TUV even down to our own day.
TTfnepaafievov), TO Sf KaToptfovv fj.ova-

VOL. I. F

66 THE TELEOLOGICAL METHOD

of them fall under the former head, one third under the
latter. Since, further, the particular type of social and
political organization, which Aristotle held to be the only
true one, was nowhere even approximately realized, a
shadow of illegitimacy was cast on the actual State ; it
did not, perhaps it could not, fulfil the true end, or dis
tribute social functions and social advantages in accordance
with true justice or true expediency ; and a doubt might
well arise whether it possessed any real claim to the
obedience of the citizen, or, at all events, to his active
participation in its concerns. Its authority was weakened,
and a sanction indirectly given to that detachment from
politics, which Aristotle probably desired to combat 1 , but
which was the growing tendency of the age ; and not only
to detachment from politics, but to political indifference
and disaffection.

On the other hand, his emphatic reference of the State to
an end had its advantages. There had been a time when
the State itself had been viewed as the end of human life 2 ;
and if Socrates, Xenophon, and Plato had already taught
the existence of a virtue of man as man, not limited in its
exercise to action on behalf of the State, and had treated the
State only as a means for the realization of virtue, not as the
ultimate moral end 3 , Aristotle s more systematic reference
of the State to an end was a welcome confirmation of
their view. It seemed to provide a definite standard, the
application of which would rob political inquiry of its
arbitrariness and uncertainty, would supply it with a
criterion of right and wrong, and raise men above those
media axiomata. among which in these subjects they

1 We may perhaps infer this the improvement of actual consti-

from the general tenour of the tutions on the attention of political

Politics. Aristotle not only insists inquirers, and declares that this is

that the individual is a part of the as much the business of Political

State (i. 2. 1253 a 18 sq.) and be- Science as the portraiture of an

longs to the State, not to himself ideal State (6 (4). i. 1289 a i sqq.).

(5 (8). i. 1337 a 27 sq.), and that 2 Zeller, Gr. Ph. i. 61 (4th

the active virtues contribute to the edit.) : cp. Plato, Meno 73 A :

enjoyment of leisure (4 (7). 15. 73 C.

1334 a 1 6 sq.), but he also presses 3 Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. i. 33 (ed. 2).

AS EMPLOYED IN THE POLITICS. 6j

usually move. If a knowledge of the End was useful in
departments of science where we cannot hope to modify
phenomena but only to understand them, it was likely to
be doubly so in Practical Science a field in which imper
fection seemed to arise more easily, and almost more
legitimately, than elsewhere ; where the material cause was
more commonly defective or treacherous, where error or
oversight was more fatal, and deviation from the true
path (-Trape/c/iJao-is) was especially frequent 1 ; and where,
at the same time, we might hope to effect amendment,
for though the best State might lie beyond the reach
of almost all, there were (so Aristotle held) fairly satis
factory forms of social and political organization, of which
this could not be said. For one important lesson, at all
events, we may probably thank Aristotle s teleological treat
ment of Politics. It tended to negative in advance the
many theories, which, from century to century, down to our
own day, have claimed for some one social element whether
King, people, or Pope an indefeasible right of sovereignty
irrespective of contribution to the general welfare. Power
falls of right, in Aristotle s view, to those who, be they many
or few, are qualified by intrinsic merit and command of
material resources to contribute effectually to the end for
which the State exists.

Aristotle s error lay, not in seeking to discover the end
of the State, for he was right in accounting this to be the
first step in Political Science, but in imposing on it one
unvarying end, in giving too narrow an interpretation to
that end, and in holding that it could only be fully attained
through one type of society.

1 Communities are liable to easily the constitution may slip

aKpaala no less than individuals from one form to another : the

(Pol. 7 (5). 9. 13ioa 18) ; and Politi- configuration of its territory, acci-

cal Science, in. Aristotle s hands, is dent, as at Athens (Pol. 2. 12.

evidently far more tolerant of the 1274 a 12), a want of vigilance on

faultier constitutions than Ethical the part of the holders of power,

Science is of the faultier types of facts in the past history of the

character. We have only to read State, may all avail to bring about

the book of the Politics which a change,
treats of Revolutions, to see how

F 2

68 ARISTOTLE S ACCOUNT

The end If we pass on to examine the end assigned by Aristotle
Aristotle to to t ^ le 7ro ^ ts &gt; we shall find that here he diverges to a certain
the TToAis extent from the Socratic tradition, to which both Xenophon
and Plato adhered. The office of the Statesman, according
to Socrates, was to make the citizens better (Xen. Mem.
i. 2. 32 : 2. 6. 13 sq.). Xenophon contrasts the ideal
Persians of his romance, who seek to secure that the
citizens of their State shall be as good as possible (Cyrop.
i. 2. 5), with the Assyrians, whose State aimed at the
production of wealth (ibid. 5. 2. 20). So again, Plato
holds that the end of the TTO AIS is to make the citizens
happy by making them virtuous l . Aristotle describes the
end of the Tro At? somewhat differently : its end is not
merely the production of virtue in its citizens, but the
production of virtuous action ; it noLojily. makes men good
and happy, but gives the action of men already good and
happy its full natural scope and character. It produces
virtue and developes virtuous action in those who are not
yet virtuous, but its end is to afford the virtuous and happy
a field for the exercise of their virtue and happiness. _!t)
comes into being; for the sake of life, but exists for the

O 3

sake of good life ; or, if this is an end common to it with
other things, it exists for the sake of noble action (TU&gt;V
Ka\&gt;v Trpa^euv), or still more definitely, for the sake of
( life pf&gt;rf&gt;rt and complete in itself^ (Pol. 3. 9. 1281 a i)A
As the Christian is said to be complete in Christ 2 , so the
individual is said by Aristotle to be complete in the TTO AIS.
Not completeness as a whole (for this includes complete
ness in respect of necessaries as well as completeness in
respect of good life ), but completeness in respect of good
life is the end of the TTO /U?. Its end is, however, some
times stated to be noble action (xaAat 7rpaeis) under
which term, in the Politics (4 (7). 3. 1325 b 16 sqq.); though
not in the Ethics (10. 7. 1177 a 21), the exercise of the,
speculative faculty is included. Aristotle, in fact, though
he still stands firmly in the Politics by his view of the

1 Gorg. 5156: Laws 631 B : Zeller, Plato, E. T. p. 464, n. 12.
and other passages referred to by 2 Coloss. 2. 10.

OF THE END OF THE HO A 12. 69

superiority of the virtues exercised in leisure, which include
those concerned in speculation, shows nevertheless an incli
nation which he had not shown in the Ethics, to dwell
on the features common to speculative and practical activity.
In the Ethics they are parted by the interval which separates
the divine in man from the human, and o-o^ta from (f)povr]&lt;ns.
Aristotle is there, perhaps, still under the impressions which
were present to his mind when he described the creative
reason (vovs TTOIIJTIK^S) in the De Anima : he may have seen
the matter in another light when he looked at it from the
more social, less psychological point of view which prevails
in the Politics.

It should be observed, however, that the end of the
u-o Ai? is not to promote good life in mankind generally^ but
only in those within its own pale who are capable of it ;
and also that the TTO AI? must not only set itself to foster
good life, but all that is contributory thereto. The TroOu?,
Tf~may "be added, will not achieve good life or happiness,
unless some or all of its members achieve it. The happiness
of the Whole will be achieved through the happiness of its
parts, and thus we find the happiness and even the pleasure
of the individual more considered by Aristotle than by
Plato. See (e.g.) Pol. 2. 5. 1263 b 5 : 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 1 7 sqq. :
2. 5. 1264 b 17 sqq. The sense must further be noticed
which Aristotle attaches to good life. He construes it as
bound up with the pursuit of politics and philosophy. As
we shall see, not all ages nor both sexes are held by him
to be capable of rising to this kind of life ; nor are all
callings compatible with it.

Aristotle s account of the end of the TTOA.IS, or City-State, Three pro-
involves three separate assertions : Fm S HecHn

(1) That the State is, or rather may be and should be, Aristotle s
not only the negative condition, but the positive source of theend of
virtuous action in individuals : the 7rcSA - ts -

(2) That it is an all-sufficient source of virtuous action
(avrapKrjs Trpos ro eS ffiv) in them :

(3) That virtuous action is its end.

70 THE HO AT 2 A POSITIVE SOURCE

Examina- (i) So far as the first of these assertions is implied in
these f ro- *" s view, Aristotle would not probably feel that he was
positions departing in any degree from the best opinion current
among his countrymen. The Hellenic State began in a
group of tribes and clans, and was itself, like a tribe or clan,
an unity based on common worship and consecrated by
common festivals. It was thus a common life, as much
as an union for protection against foes, or the redress of
injuries, or the making of laws. The State was the centre
and guide of social existence : Delphi early taught the
citizen to worship the gods which the State directed him
to worship and in the manner which the State prescribed :
the institutions and the laws, written and unwritten, which
every Greek felt had made him what he was, were traced
back by popular belief to some lawgiver commissioned by
the State. Even in barbarous communities, the laws,
whether written or unwritten, were observed to be com
monly directed to the production of military virtue 1 ;
and the end to which their rude legislation was addressed
was sought more scientifically and successfully by the
laws of the Lacedaemonian State. The devotion of the
Three Hundred at Thermopylae was an homage to law :

O eij/ , ayy(\\(iv A.aK(8aifj.ot&gt;iois, on T[}8e
KeifjLfda, Tols Kfivwv pij/^acri 7Tfi66fj.fvoi 2 .

Each little community, like Israel, drew its moral inspiration
and its moral atmosphere from its laws. The State was
the rock whence each man was hewn and the hole of
the pit whence he was digged 3 . Lysias had said : eyw plv
yap ot^ai 7rd&lt;ras ras Tro Aets 8ta TOVTO TOVS VOJJLOVS TiOecrOaL, tva,
av Trpay/xdrcoy aTropw/u.ez , Trapa TOVTOVS . eA^oVres a-Kf-
o TL ijp.lv TroirjTeov tcrriv 4 : and Aristotle takes it

1 Pol. 4 (7). -z. 1324 b 5 sqq. of its prerogatives. Rude early

2 Prjpao-i is here explained as communities do not trouble them-
= vofj.ifj.ois. If this is the meaning, selves over-much to draw sharp
cp. Thuc. i. 84. 3. distinctions between sin and crime.

3 Probably the same thing * Lys. I. 35, quoted by L.
might be traced in the early Schmidt, Ethik der alten Grie-
Teutonic community, and would chen, i. p. 199, who also refers to
have been still more easily trace- Demosth. 23. 141 (p. 202). See
able in it, if the Christian Church L. Schmidt s remarks on the above
had not relieved the State of many subject, pp. 198-203.

OF VIRTUOUS ACTION. 71

for granted that the aim of every lawgiver is to make
men good : juapru/aei 8e /ecu TO yivopevov fv rals TroXecriv ol
yap vo^oQirai TOVS TroArra? $8(oVTS TTOLOV&lt;TLV ayadovs, /cat TO
IJLCV /3ov\rnj.a TTO.VTOS vopoOtTov TOUT kcrriv, ocroi be ^77 v avro
TTOiovaiv, afJLapTavovcnv KCU 8iac/&gt;epei TOVT& TroAireta TroAireta?
ayaOrj ^avArjs (Eth. Nic. 2. I. 1103 b 2sqq.) 1 . But the in
fluence of the Hellenic State asserted itself through other
channels than that of the law, written or unwritten : both
Isocrates and Aristotle dwell on the influence exercised by
the example of the rulers of the State 2 , and Plato (Rep.
492 A) contrasts the small effect produced by a few sophists
in comparison with the influence on the individual of a
whole people gathered in its assemblies or law-courts or
theatres. The distinctive characteristic of a TTO AIS accord
ing to Aristotle that which marks it off from an alliance
is to be found in the benevolent care of each citizen for
the virtue of all belonging to the State (Pol. 3. 9. I28ob
i sqq.). In every way the saying of Simonides IloAi? avbpa
8i8ao-Ket 3 held good. It is true that another view of the
State had been put forward by the sophist Lycophron, who
treated it as merely a security to the citizens against mutual
wrong (eyyu?]n)? aAAiyAois 1 T&gt;V SIKCUCOV, Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 10) ;
and that the sophist Hippias, as has been said, acknow
ledged only those laws which are universally accepted
to be divinely authorized : but we note in other sophists a
tendency to accept as just whatever the strongest element
in each State held to be for its own interest (Plato, Rep.
343), and thus to assert the ethical authority, not merely
of a well-ordered State, but of any and every State in
which the strongest element ruled.

No doubt, the Hellenic State had not always, or even
generally, made full use of the position thus accorded to it :
it failed, we are told, even to give its members a training

1 The peculiarity of the Lacedae- others, though his methods were

monian lawgiver lay in this, that more effectual,

he sought to regulate the rearing 2 Aristot. Pol. 2. n. 12733 39:

and habits of his citizens (Eth. Nic. Isocr. ad Nicocl. 31: Areopag.

10. 10. n8oa 24 sqq.), not in his 22 : Nicocl. 37.

seeking to produce virtue. His 3 Plutarch, An seni sit gerenda

aim was the same as that of respublica, c. I.

72 THE IIOAIS A POSITIVE SOURCE

appropriate to the constitution (Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12 sqq.);
and if it failed in this, we need not wonder that it failed,
except in one or two places, to train them systematically
to virtue (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 24 sqq.). Its laws were
a chaos, directed to no special aim, or, if to any, to success
in war (Pol. 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 5): its guidance of religion
was imperfect, its chastisement of heresy fitful : it allowed
education to fall into the hands of men who travelled from
State to State, detached from State-allegiance, or who
sought inspiration from sources other than the laws and
traditions of the State l . Its authority was still further
impaired, or even made harmful, by falling into the hands
first of one faction, and then of another (3. 3. 1276 a 8 sqq.).
Yet those who questioned it were probably the few, rather
than the many ; and even Isocrates (de Antid. 295-6)
could claim that culture at Athens was virtually the
product of the State. It was easy to forget how much
in the Athenian character, for instance, was due to other
than indigenous influences ; how the philosophy of Athens,
its metres and its music, its rhetoric and its triremes, and,
above all, its Homer, came to it from outside. The springs
that fed the moral and intellectual life of an Athenian were
gathered from a wider area than that of the Athenian
State.

It was on this foundation of common sentiment that the
philosophers built up their conception of the office of the
State. Plato, indeed, was not unaware that the State could
not afford to rely exclusively on its own spiritual resources
(Laws 950 A sq. : 951 A sqq.), though he subjects com
munications with other States to strict regulation : and if
Aristotle speaks more emphatically of the self-completeness
of the single State (e. g. Pol. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 23 sq.), he can
hardly have intended to go beyond Plato in this matter.
Still both seem inclined to recur to the long-past time, if
indeed there ever was such a time, when each Hellenic

1 To Plato men seem to speak real legislator of the State (Laws
not without plausibility when they 709 A).
make out Circumstance to be the

OF VIRTUOUS ACTION,

State was its own spiritual counsellor and oracle, not
drawing life from the central stem of Hellas, but finding the
light of the city in its own law. The self-contained Lace
daemonian State was, notwithstanding Leuctra, the model
constantly before the eyes of both. Why should not a
nobler State of this kind be possible ? They seem to have
thought that moral influence was not a thing which could
be expected to travel far from its source ; the conception
of a world-wide Church was alien to their ideas ; men could
not be spiritual guides to each other without knowing each
other, without belonging to, and living in, one and the same
city ; nor could spiritual authority be effectual without
coercive power behind it. Everything, in their view,
pointed to the City-State. They forgot that it may be
~nrore withTn the power of the State to communicate what
the Lacedaemonian State had communicated to its citizens
than what they wished to be communicated to theirs.
They did not ask themselves whether a State can make
men philosophers, or give them moral wisdom, as easily as
it can inspire a readiness to die for it.

We must remember that the moral life of a Greek
community would not seem beyond the control of its
authorities and its law: not only was it small, and its
life passed mainly in public, but the popular mind had
hardly perhaps as yet been stirred

stirred by the rise of Christianity under the Roman
Empire, and by the Reformation and the French Revolu
tion in later days. The forces with which the State-has
to deal seemed far more docile than they really are. Even
Aristotle fails to comprehend the possibilities of popular
enthusiasm. In his view, the masses are well content to be
left to their daily struggle for a livelihood, and are little
inclined to press for office, unless they are wronged or out
raged, or unless they see that office is made a source of gain
(7 (5)- 8. 1308 b 34): their aim is rather profit than honour
(8 (6). 4. 1318 b 16 sqq.). Passionate loyalty, or patriotism,
or religious feeling, passionate ~~enthusias"nT for an ideaJbf
any kind, find no place in his notion of the popular mind.

74 THE riOAIS A POSITIVE SOURCE

The world had not yet drunk deep of the creeds which,
more than aught else, have made men fanatics and robbed
the lawgiver and the statesman of their command over
things ; nor did it then know much even of those non-
religious popular movements ( national movements, for
example), which have so often proved beyond the control
of statesmanship.

Aristotle, like Plato before him, thought he saw his way
to making the influence of the State more of a reality. Let
it ^e so organized as to become to the individual all that
the popular voice assumed it to be already. Let it regulate
man s existence from the cradle to the grave regulate
marriage and education, property, production and trade, art,
poetry and religion. Statesmanship was not statesmanship
unless it was equal to this overwhelming mission : the states
man must be capable of guiding, and indeed of leading, the
whole culture of the community. It is thus that iroAmKr? is
described as supreme over the sciences, as determining
which are to exist within the State and which are not, as
adjusting to her end the arts of war, of household manage
ment, of rhetoric, and prescribing through legislation what
men ought to do and to abstain from doing (Eth. Nic./\
i. i. 1 094 a 28-b 7).

The whole action of the State in relation to the indi
vidual is apparently conceived by Aristotle (except in the
case of a 7raju/3a(riA.eia) to be governed by law. He seems
to be aware that there are some things which law is too
general to regulate aright or indeed at all (Pol. 3. 15. 1286 a
24 sqq.) 1 : but its limitations are hardly so present to him as
they are to Plato in the Laws (e. g. 788 B : 807 E : 822 D),
though it is true, on the other hand, that he looks to the
educational influence of Law for much that Plato had sought
in the Republic to achieve by laws abolishing the House
hold and Several Property (2. 5. i263b 37 sqq.). Law-
is a means not only of protecting men s rights, or of
preventing or punishing criminal acts, but of promoting

1 The writer of the Eudemian law our relations to friends (Eth.
Ethics excepts from the sphere of Eud. 7. I. 1235 a 2).

OF VIRTUOUS ACTION. 75

right action and developing virtue of developing the right
motive of action. We must not measure the operation of
Law in the State by the operation of the law-court : law
finds its true function in distributive rather than in corrective
justice: itf assigns to each individual his true position and
work : it speaks through the constitution : it regulates the
relation of the lower vocations to the higher : it regulates
education, property, the household, citizenship, the daily
life of the individual in the syssitia and festivals of the
State. Institutions, to use a modern word, are the pro
duct and creature of Law, and whatever they achieve
whatever, for example, such an institution as that of the
monogamic household achieves is the achievement of Law.
In full accord with the popular view, Aristotle includes
even unwritten laws under Law and ascribes them to a
legislator 1 . Much, therefore, of what we term the influence" &gt;,
of Public Opinion, so far at least as it rests on tradition and
custom, would apparently be brought under the head of
Law. Armed with this powerful weapon, TroAm/o/ need nor
fear to undertake the immense mission assigned to her.

Aristotle s conception of the office of the State un
questionably possesses elements of truth. It is true that the
State exercises a vast moral influence on the individual,
however narrowly it may construe its functions. The
society of which a man forms a part contributes largely to
the formation of his character. Mere temporary residence,
for instance, in the United States is sufficient, as we say, to
Americanize the German or Irish immigrant, and the
active discharge of a citizen s duties must greatly deepen

1 Cp. Pol. 8 (6). 5. 1319 b 38, Chrysostom, Or. 76. p. 648 M
e&lt; Tovrcav Treipdadai KaraaKfva^fiv (quoted by C. F. Hermann, Gr.
(v\a.j3ovfj.(i&gt;ovs fjifi&gt; Antiqq. 2. I. 9)? eari 8e TO e6os

rd (pdeipovra, n6ffj.evovs 8f TOIOV- yva&gt;/j.r) fj,ev T&gt;V

rovs vofjinvs Kal TOVS dypdcpovs Kql 8e aypa(pos fdvovs ij TroXeoo? . . .

TOVS y(ypa/jLfj.evovs K. r. X. Herein ewpj;/xa 8e dv6pu&gt;na&gt;v ovSevos, dXXa

he follows Plato (Polit. 295 A, /3i ou Kal xpovov, Aristotle himself

298 D, Laws 793 B-C, referred to occasionally uses expressions

by L. Schmidt, Ethik d. alten which distinguish (0rj from i/d/iot

Griechen, I. 202). Contrast the (e.g. Pol. 2. 5. 1263 b 39, rois

language of Plato and Aristotle edea-i xat rfj (pi\oa-o&lt;pta KUI TOIS

on this subject with that of Dio v6p.ois).

76 THE nOAIS A POSITIVE SOURCE

the impression. The small mass gravitates to the large
mass : the individual accepts the point of view, the moral
estimate of men and things, which he finds prevailing around
him. This is the general rule, though Plato himself notices
that the divine men whose acquaintance is beyond all price
(Laws 951 B : cp. Meno 99) spring up as much in ill-con
stituted States as in well-constituted ones, and it is evident
that character cannot always be traceable to Society or the
State, for otherwise how could a Socrates arise in the de
fective society of Athens ? Even, however, if we admit to
the fullest extent that the character of the individual in
nine cases out of ten takes its impress from that of the
society of which he is a part, the question still remains, how
far, where that is so, the laws of the society have contributed
to the character thus communicated. If it is possible to
exaggerate the influence of the State on character, it is
still more possible to exaggerate the influence of law and
Statesmanship on character ; and Aristotle s doctrine is not
merely that morality insensibly adjusts itself to the State
as the whole which it has to sustain and keep in healthy
working, but that it is in a more positive way its product as,A
being the offspring of its Law.

To a certain extent constitutions for example, the
democratic constitution of the United States do reflect
themselves in character. De Tocqueville and others have
sufficiently proved this. Law does far more than protect
men s persons and property, or even the whole sum of their
rights : it would do so even if it designedly confined its
aims within this limit. Even then it would incidentally
develope a type of character (?]0os), or at all events would
modify in some degree the predominant motives of action.
Laws such as that which enforces monogamy, or those
which regulate the devolution of property, whatever the
motive with which they may be imposed, exercise a power
ful influence on character ; they not only enforce certain
outward acts, but they createdisgositiojis. The members
of a polygamic household^areethically different from the
members of a monogamic household. If, again, as Aris-

OF VIRTUOUS ACTION. 77

totle holds, the State can devise and* work a system of
education which will not only develop^Qthe intelligence, but
train the moral sympathies, the law by which it effects this
will prove itself a moral influence of no ordinary kind.

But the influence of the lawgiver may be overrated. He
contributes something to the character of the society for
which he legislates, but does not circumstance orjace, con
tribute more ? are not a thousand nameless influences more
potent than he ? It is the rarest thing in the world when
some lawgiver Mahomet, for example subdues society to
his will. Aristotle himself sees that the character of a
community depends to a large extent on matters beyond
the control of the legislator the nature and situation of
the territory, the initial qualities of the population, the turn
fortune gives to its history. He did not, however, recognize
all the causes which tend to limit the legislator s influence :
he did not know how little religion, or science, or the dis
tribution of wealth, or the relative prominence of particular
occupations in a State can be controlled by law. However
favourable the initial Matter of the State may be, it is only
in the world s best moments, when some great Teacher has
won men to him, that Law can assume the position which
Aristotle assigns to it ; and it is precisely at these moments
that law and organization are least needed and least in
place. When an idea is in the air as a pervading influence,
it does not need to be embodied in institutions ; these arise
later, and seek, usually in vain, to preserve for posterity
something of its fugitive greatness. Aristotle 1 ascribes an
extent of authority and influence to the Statesman which is
hardly ever his, and also invests him with attributes of
spiritual leadership which he hardly ever possesses. He is
in part misled by the notion of a best State immobile and
exempt from change, or at all events travelling in a groove
traced for it by its founder. He did not see that society
lives by incessant renewal, and that the fresh ideas which
reinvigorate it will seldom owe their birth to the statesmen

1 Plato no doubt in the Republic went even further in this direction
than Aristotle.

78 THE IIOAIS ALL-SUFFICIENT

at its head. It is not to them that we look for the first
word of Progress : we are content if they adopt and protect
a movement in advance, when already originated by others.
Still more is this true of Law. Law is usually the last to
register an accomplished advance 1 . Nor again must we set
down to Law all that it regulates. It regulates the house
hold ; it may regulate the Church : but we need not assume
that either of these institutions owes its existence, or its
influence, to Law. There are beliefs (the belief in God, for
example) which are not traceable with certainty to the in
fluence of social life, much less to Law they seem rather
to be, as it were, self-sown yet which have done as much,
or more, for civilization than any others. Certainly, the
Law cannot prescribe what men ought to do and abstain
from doing. Even in the best State, the lawgiver can
hardly be the source of unwritten law. To us Aristotle
seems to call the State to functions too spiritual for it.
We know what law is and what statesmen are : we see
the State constantly doing, not that which it holds to be
right, but that which is dictated by political necessity
constantly studying in its policy its own security rather than
the broad interests of morality, and while we quite agree
that the State is in some sense a spiritual power, we hesitate
to recognize in it the true and only adequate guide to right
action or the appointed nursing-mother of science and
philosophy.

The Still, to whatever extent we may conceive that Aristotle

second. overrated the influence of the State, and especially of its

Law, as positive sources of virtuous action, it seems clear

that his view contains an element of truth. He was on

less solid ground when he asserted that the State is all-

1 Or indeed a decline. Plato inroppe i irpbs ra fj0r) re KOI ra

sees this, as we shall find if we eVn-^&eu^ara e /c 8e rovraiv ds TO.

read his picture of the way in irpos d\\f]\ovs u/x/3oXaia fj.fia&gt;i&gt;

which a change in novaiKfjs rponot (KfiaivtC fK 8e Si; TU&gt;V ^vnftoKaiav

gradually affects society (Rep. ep^erai eirl TOVS vofiovy KOI no\t-

424 sqq.) T] Trapavofiia avrrj . . . re/as.
Kara piKpov earoiKicra/xe i j; &gt;?PV a

FOR GOOD LIFE. 79

sufficient for good life (avrdpKi]s Trpos ro ev rjv) l . Perhaps
in making this assertion he is thinking only of the best
State ; still, as has been said, he seems to forget that the
citizen of a Greek State was not a product of that State
alone, but in part of influences originating in other States.
The influence of the common festivals of Greece, of its
poets, philosophers, and historians, overleapt the barriers
between State and State, and Greece would not have
been what it was, if civilizing influences originating outside
the State had not, for the most part, been allowed full
play. It is very probable that, notwithstanding his ex
pressions with regard to the self-completeness of the State,
Aristotle would willingly admit all salutary influences from
outside, but he seems hardly as alive to the value of such
influences as we should expect.

We next come to the question, is good life, in the The third,
sense which Aristotle attaches to it of perfect and self-
complete life, not only a thing which the State is capable
of producing, but the end for which it exists ?

If we take it for granted that one unvarying end is to
be set before every State, whatever its environment or
circumstances, there is much to be said in favour of Aris
totle s conclusion. We may wish that he had construed
the end of the State as the production not only in those
within the State, but also in those outside it, of the maxi
mum amount of virtuous activity attainable by them : ye.t
the view that the State does not exist for the indefinite
increase of its wealth or population or trade, or for con
quest and empire, but that these aims are to be subordi
nated to considerations of moral and intellectual wellbeing,
is one which has by no means lost its value or applicability
at the present day.

Some may hold it to be too comfortable a doctrine, that
the State* .whose development often seems to us to follow
laws of its own, not always, apparently, conducive to the

1 He adds &lt;ay error flirt iv, Pol. I. 2. 1252 b 28.

8o IS GOOD LIFE

welfare or happiness of men, is really a thing to be shaped
as may best suit men s moral and intellectual interests ; and
may think that if it subserves this aim, it does so in its
ultimate tendencies and in the long run, rather than directly.
We seem often to notice that institutions and classes, to
which every statesman wishes well, disappear in the torrent
of social change, unable for some reason or other to main
tain their footing. We see the State half the champion,
half the victim of some over-mastering idea which drives
it onward, often to its own destruction. We see it existing,
not for its own happiness, but to play some critical part in
history to wander in the gloomy walks of Fate. Others,
again, may feel that ends which Aristotle hardly notices
such as that of self-preservation more largely influence
the structure and action of the State, than the nobler end
to which he subordinates them the end of good life : and
it may be true that this_latter aim, though never lost sight
of by the State, is commonly^^oTriTowrrTTito the back
ground by the difficulties which beset every "Slate, as to
be unable to assert itself with persistency and effect. "Here,
as elsewhere, he may have been misled by the mirage of
an ideal State, exempt (ex hypothesi] from the embarrass
ments from which no State is in reality exempt. Others
may insist that the chief duty of a State the duty it can
least afford to neglect is the protection of men s life and
property and freedom of action ; or may urge that the
moral and intellectual advancement of the members of a
State is an end to the attainment of which the Statesman
can directly contribute but little, and that, consequently,
it can hardly be the end of the State. Others, again, may
plead that different States may legitimately have different
ends. The end which Aristotle sets before the State may
be the highest, and yet a given State may be right in
adjusting its organization to another end. The individual
State and this Aristotle forgets is usually a member of
a group, and should address itself to the work for which
the characteristics of its territory and population fit it,
leaving that which others can do better to be done by

THE END? 8 1

them l . It is not necessary that the civilization of each
separate State should be absolutely complete. Occasion
ally, indeed, the circumstances of a State leave it no choice
but to be predominantly military or commercial or indus
trial. Even in these cases, however, the spirit of Aristotle s
teaching, if not its letter, may be observed. The State may
do its utmost to secure that its legislation and its action
shall be in the interest of civilization, rightly understood.

It is. when Aristotle descends into detail and interprets
good life as inseparable from the pursuit of politics or
philosophy that we feel least inclined to agree with him.
This doctrine of his forces him to view the less noble
vocations as existing only for the sake of the highest. Good
life is not, in his view, capable of realization in various
degrees by all men ; it is the appanage of certain vocations.
There was nothing in his formula which compelled him to
interpret it thus. He was misled, partly by the general
sentiment of his race and age, which exaggerated the con
trast of vocations ; partly by his own Teleology, always
too ready to classify things as means and ends.

We must not, however, forget that the conception of the
office of the State which Plato and Aristotle were led to
form was the expression of a profound social need. There
was pressing need of a power capable of taking the spiri
tual direction of Greek society. In practice, the poets had
long held spiritual sway, and Plato with perfect justice
objected to them as religious and moral guides (e. g. Laws
801 B : 941 B) : to such guides as he held many of the
sophists to be, he objected still more : he longed, as is
evident from page after page of the Laws 2 , for an autho
ritative religious and moral revelation, such as that which
the modern world possesses, and Greece and Rome did
not : the City-State was to be the depositary of this reve
lation, and to do what the City-State alone could do ; by

1 If Great Britain has turned 2 e. g. Laws 887 sq. The re-

itself into a coal-shed and black- mark is one which I owe to Mr.

smith s forge, it is for the behoof Shadworth Hodgson, to whom it

of mankind as well as its own was suggested by a perusal of the

(Times, August 27, 1885). Laws.

VOL. I. G

82 AIMS OF PLATO AND ARISTOTLE.

the regulation of marriage and education, by law, written
and unwritten, coercive and suasory, it was to build up
a people with whose very being the revelation would be
interwoven and who would find in it the principle of their
life. The distinction of Church and State, if the thought
of it could ever have occurred to him, would probably
have struck him as likely to imperil the spiritual influence
for which he sought to find a place in society. It would
do so, even if the Church were made supreme over the
State the only relation of the two powers which we can
imagine him approving for the Church even then would
not have in its own hands the means of enforcing its teach
ing : and besides, the very distinction of matters spiritual
from matters temporal would seem to him to imply forget-
fulness of the fact that even the most temporal of temporal
matters has spiritual issues of its own, and is in some sense
a spiritual matter, to be dealt with on spiritual grounds.

Aristotle, with some variations, followed in Plato s foot
steps. Their conception of the State interests us because
it forms one of the earliest indications (outside Jewish
history) of a feeling that society needs a spiritual authority :
the subsequent rise of a Christian Church within the State
is sure evidence that they did not err when they craved
something more of organized spiritual influence than the
actual Greek State offered. So far Plato and Aristotle
were moving in the right direction. But when they sought
to make the City-State an oracle of spiritual truth, and
seemed to aim at providing every man with a kind of
parochial Sinai, they greatly erred. If we are to have
a Pope, we instinctively wish him to be Oecumenical.
Men s conceptions of the office of the State may possibly
have come to be somewhat more contracted than they
should be, since it has been able to devolve a part of its
burden on the Christian Church ; and it may be true
that if we were to imagine Christianity absent from the
scene, it might be necessary for the State, its law and its
authorities to play a different part : but even then it would
hardly be to the City-State of Plato and Aristotle that

ORGANIZATION OF THE DOA12. 83

the world would entrust its spiritual fortunes. Its well-
proportioned minuteness and Hellenic delicateness of arti
culation would alone suffice to rob it of its authority over
modern minds, which ask for somewhat more of vastness
and mystery.

One remark, however, applies to all attempts to deter
mine the abstract end of the State. The thing which it
is important that every State and nation should make
perfectly clear to itself, is, not what the office of the State
in general is, but what is the work which it is individually
called to do. There can be little doubt that the work
marked out by circumstances for the Greek race and for
every Greek State was not only the realization of the
maximum of good life, but also the diffusion of Hellenic
civilization among the barbarians round about Hellas, and
especially among those who bordered on its Northern
frontier. The two aims were quite reconcileable, and the
latter of them deserved recognition at Aristotle s hands.
It seems, however, to have been little, if at all, present
to his mind ; and even in Alexander s it was probably an
afterthought.

We have now arrived at our definition of the 770X1?, for A defini-
we have ascertained the genus to which it belongs, and have li ? n ^ the

iroAij has

discovered its differentia in its end. It is a KOiwovfa issuing now been
in a Whole, and formed for the end of perfect and self- ^" s v ^ a - t:
complete life. Koivuvia

The next question evidently will be and here we face a whole"
the central problem of Political Science, as understood by ^ nd f rmed

J for the end
Aristotle how must this KoivavLa be organized in order to of perfect

fulfil this end? This is substantially the question that c

Aristotle puts to himself, though it frequently appears in life.
other forms. He asks, for instance, in the First Book of the the ^T" 3
Politics, what organization of Slavery or of Supply is in ^ e organ-
accordance with Nature ; and in the Third he discusses the attain its
question of the Supreme Authority from the point of view a"swer- Tile
of Justice. These inquiries, however, ultimately pass into given in the

G 2,

PLAN OF PORTRAYING

portraiture

constim-
tion -
merits and

defects of

the other : the natural is that which contributes to the End,
an d the just cannot be determined without reference to the

with the

The answer is given in the portraiture of a best consti-
tution1 - Aristotle tacitly implies, that it is possible for the
inquirer to discover once for all the form of Kowcavia best
adapted for the attainment of the end, and, under certain
not hopelessly unrealizable conditions, to bring it into
existence.

It was not his view that the office of Political Science is
simply to register the phenomena of society, and to refer
them to their laws to watch and to understand a process
which defies modification or to inquire what are the con
ditions which tend to predominate in the future, and to
adjust society to them : it must work hand in hand with
Ethics ask of Ethics what type of character it should aim
at producing, and then construct the State, if possible, in
such a way as to produce it. The path of Political Science
lies, in his view, rather through Ethics than through History.
It is not enough to watch the tendencies of History and to
accept what it brings. History is the record of a process
which is partly for the best, and partly not partly the work
of Nature, partly of causes, such as Fortune, which may
bring the opposite of the best. There is nothing fixed or
infallibly beneficent about the historical process. When
the City- State evolves itself out of the Household and
Village, we trace the hand of Nature in History ; but even
in well- constituted races, the dominant tendency of things
may be quite other than Natural. The tendency of con
stitutional development in Greece, for instance, so far from
being in the direction of the best constitution, was in the
direction of democracy 2 . History, therefore, must be
brought to the bar of Ethics, and its natural tendencies
discriminated from the rest. Its outcome has a legitimate

1 Plato had done more : he
had thought himself called on to
display in the Critias and the
projected Hermocrates the actual
working and manifestation of

the political scheme of which
the Republic had described the
constituent elements (Grote, Plato
3. 302).
2 Pol. 3. 15. I286b 2osqq.

A BEST CONSTITUTION. 85

claim on our acceptance, only so far as it satisfies a teleo-
logical test. The ethical point of view must be our guiding
light in the historical wilderness : it alone can enable us to
choose the right path.

Holding, again, the belief that it is possible to assign one
legitimate end to the State, whatever its circumstances,
Aristotle also held that this end could be fully realized only
through one form of social organization. He had not asked
himself the question which Cicero was perhaps the first to
ask 1 , whether it is not beyond the power of any single
inquirer to discover this one form. Cicero (de Rep. 2. i.
1-3) ascribes to Cato the Censor the striking view, that
the construction of a best State is beyond the power not
only of any single individual, however able, but even
of the united wisdom of humanity at any single moment
of time, and can be accomplished only by the combined
wisdom and good fortune (de Rep. 2. 16. 30) of a number
of individuals spread over a series of generations and
centuries, so that, according to him, a State glides (de
Rep. 2. 16. 30: cp. 18. 33) into its perfect form (optimus
status) naturali quodam itinere et cursu. In one respect,
however, Aristotle is wiser than Cicero. Cicero apparently
hopes to have an optimus status civitatis revealed to him
in this way, which will be suitable to all possible commu
nities. Aristotle is aware that his best constitution can
only be suitable to a few.

The quest of a best constitution was a tradition of
political inquiry in Greece, and Aristotle fully accepts it.
The question, what constitution is the best, was apparently
first raised in Greece by practical statesmen (Aristot. Pol.
2. 8. i26jb 29): it was thus, perhaps, that Herodotus
came to imagine a group of Persian grandees discussing the
claims of monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy to be the
best (Hdt. 3. 80 sqq.). It was a later idea that a combina-

1 Cp. de Rep. 2. 11.21 : nos vero however, is no doubt to be found

videmus et te quidem ingressum in the Greek conception of Time

ratione ad disputandum nova, as the Discoverer, which Aristotle

quae nusquam est in Graecorum fully adopts (Eth. Nic. i. 7. 1098 a

libris. The germ of Cicero s view, 23 : Pol. 2. 5. 12643. i sqq.).

86 PLAN OF PORTRA YING

tion of all three, such as some thought they found in the Lace
daemonian constitution, was the best ( Aristot. Pol. 2. 6. 1 265 b
33 sq.). When the question was taken up by men unversed
in political life, like Hippodamus, fancy went farther afield.
Plato was the first to find out that one may discover a best
constitution without in so doing discovering a generally
available remedy for political ills. He saw, at all events in
the later years of his life 1 , that his earlier ideal of the
Republic had been pitched too high for men, and was only
suitable for gods or the sons of gods. Aristotle went
further in this direction, and studied the question why a
given constitution is applicable to one community and not
to another. Not only moral causes, but social or economi
cal circumstances, or the character of the territory, may place
a particular constitution beyond the reach of a particular
community. The best constitution, for example, is un
realizable without exceptional virtue and exceptionally
favourable circumstances (6 (4). 1 1. 1295 a 26). In sketching
it, therefore, Aristotle is aware that he is doing what will
be useful only to a few.

We may wonder that under these circumstances he made
the portraiture of an ideal State the chief task of the Politics.
He has not stated the reasons which led him to do so, and
we can only guess what they were. Perhaps he found it
hard to break with a well-established tradition of political
inquiry. Apart from this, however, he would probably feel,
that if the Politics was to complete the Ethics, it must
contain a sketch of the best constitution the constitution
most favourable to virtue and happiness. He would also feel
that if the best constitution were only for the few, those
few were the best. The Tra/x/Sao-iXeta was the rarest, if the
divinest, of possible forms ; yet he describes it with the
rest. To omit to tell the Statesman what sort of State he
should construct when everything was in his favour would
be to leave the best moments of Statesmanship without
guidance. The main object of Political Science is to con-

1 See Laws 739 D : 853 C : 691 C, collected by Susemihl (Sus. 2 , Note
and other passages from the Laws 191).

A BEST CONSTITUTION. 87

struct a State which will develope, not mar, man s nature
which will call forth virtuous action and form a fit home for
virtue. The best State is the State ; it is the only form which
can in strictness be said to be the State as Nature willed it
to be, the normal product undistorted by defects of character
or fortune or legislative skill.

We can see that the practice of depicting a best State was
not without its advantages. It taught the political inquirer
not to rest content with suggesting isolated reforms, but to
view them in relation to Society as a whole. It obliged
him to construct a more or less consistent and coherent
whole, in which each element should match the rest.
Territory, national character, the economical and social
system, the political organization, must all be such as to
work together harmoniously for the common good. Nor
could we in any other way have obtained so full a revela
tion in so small a compass of the political views of Plato and
Aristotle.

Yet this practice was a misleading one. It accustomed
the student of politics to imagine the legislator in a position
which he practically never occupies to imagine him with a
tabula rasa before him, free to write on it whatever he
pleases. It implied that the supreme task of Political
Science is to construct a State in the air without a given
historical past, without given environing circumstances. We
can better understand Plato depicting a best State than
Aristotle, for Plato believed that in sketching the States of
the Republic 1 and Laws he was sketching States not
hopelessly beyond the reach of the actual States around
him, but Aristotle knows that his best State is realizable
only by a very few. His ideal is pitched too high for most
States. His citizen-body is to consist of men of full virtue |
(o-TrouSaiot a7rA&lt;Ss) 2 , and they are to possess exactly the right

1 No doubt, when he wrote the have Aristotle s ideal State in view
Laws, he had come to see that when he says (Or. 36. 443 M)
the State of the Republic made dyadt]i&gt; jueV yap e a-nav-rav dyadatv
too great demands on human na- 770X11; ovre ns yevo^ev^v irporepov
ture to be suitable to men. oiSe 6vi}rr]v ovre nore cos eaofj.evr]v

2 Pol. 4 (7)- 13- !33 2 a 3 2 S( VI- vcrTfpov (i^iov ftiavorjSrjvai, irXrjv fl
Dio Chrysostom would seem to ^r] Bevv paKapwv /car ovpavav.

88 THE BEST STATE OF ARISTOTLE.

measure of external and bodily goods. Nor is his best
State apparently conceived as likely to be of use as a guide
to reformers of actual societies. When Aristotle turns to
the task of making actual constitutions as tolerable as
possible, we do not find that he makes much use of his
sketch of a best constitution 1 . Its value seems to be this,
that it shows how much the State may be to men. It is
the new garment, not intended to be used for patching
an old one, but rather as a foil to it and to show what the
State ought to be and naturally is.

The Cynics and Stoics were apparently the first to hit on
the notion of an ideal State which might be superadded to
the actual State, and which a man might regard as his true
home, though he belonged also to an actual State 2 ; and
in a somewhat similar spirit Christianity taught men to
look up to a kingdom of heaven, to which the kingdoms
of the world were to be as far as possible approximated by
the Church. Aristotle s conception of the relation of the
ideal State to the actual State is wholly different : the
actual State seems to profit but little by the projection of
the ideal State, which is apparently of use only to the fortu
nate few who are in a position to realize it.

The attempt to portray a best State, again, led Aristotle
to encumber the broad outlines of his political teaching with
much transitory detail. Lessons of permanent value come
thus to be mixed up in the Politics with recommendations
of institutions like that of common meals, which the world
has long outgrown. Every philosophy, and still more every
political philosophy, is the child of its time, and bears
unmistakable marks of its origin, but the Greek method of
portraying a best State made the ephemeral element in
political inquiry larger than it need have been.

1 In criticising the Lacedae- Seventh and Eighth Books,
monian, Cretan, and Carthagi- 2 To Marcus Aurelius, at all

nian constitutions he is careful events, the actual State is as it

to note any points in which they were a household within the true

deviate from the dpiVrr; rat-is. or universal State (Comm. 3. n.

But we hear little or nothing of TroXirrjv ovra TroXeoK T^S di/cora-r^r, rjy

the dpiaTtj rdis in the Sixth, ai Xoirrat noXtis Sxnrtp olxiai eicrtV).

CONDITIONS OF THE STATE. 89

One thing, however, is evident : the vision of an ideal
State did not make Aristotle indifferent to the problems
and difficulties of the actual State. The age which dreams
of ideal States is often on the point of losing its interest in
politics ; but this was far from being the case with Aristotle,
who is perhaps all the more unwearied in suggesting prac
ticable amendments of the actual State 1 , because he has
learnt from the study of the best State how rarely it can
be realized. We even seem to gather from his language in
the Politics that the main service which Political Science
can practically render to the world is that of limited
amelioration. It cannot make things right, but it can make
them bearable.

How, then, is the best State to be constituted ? HOW, then,

is the best
State to

The beginnings of the State are in the hands of Nature be consti-
and Fortune (4 (7). 13. 133 ib 41). These powers must n l ^ u e st ^ rst e

supply the founder of the State with appropriate raw ask fit

i ^ -u- i u -11 u TV- Matter of

material ; otherwise his labour will be in vain. 1 his raw Nature and
material (v\t], 4 (7). 4. 1325 b 40 sq. : yjoprjyla TroAtriK??, Fortune -

1326 a 5 : X/ )r ?y t/a TV XnP^ 6 (4)- IJ - I2 95 a 2 ^) must be such
as may be fashioned into a community seeking happiness
rather in virtue than in external or even bodily goods.
Place in the founder s hands the potentiality of a noble
society a population and a territory possessing the fit
initial qualities and he will call one forth in act. We
shall later on study more closely the characteristics for
which we must look in the primitive nucleus of the State,
but a few of them may be at once noticed. The human
beings composing it must, first, be neither too many nor
too few : next, they must possess aptitudes not always
found in combination the spirited nature which gives
warmth of heart and the will to be free, intelligence which
gives organizing power. Singly, these qualities will not
generate the best State. The territory must be just large
enough to sustain them in a mode of life removed alike
1 Pol. 6 (4). i. 1289 a 5 sqq.

CONDITIONS

Conditions
of the
formation
of this
Matter into
a State :
I. Common
locality ;
common
life ; com
mon aim ;
common
ethical
creed ex
pressed in
a constitu
tion.

2. Diffe
rentiation.
A State
implies a
distribu
tion of
functions
and an ex
change of
service.

from meanness and luxury ; and it must be of such a nature
as to aid the healthy development of the State to favour,
in fact, both freedom and organization, and make the com
munity independent of foreign commerce.

The next thing is to vitalise this Matter into a State.

We have already seen that a KOLvavla is composed of
dissimilar members united by a common aim and by
common action. The same holds good of the State.
The members of the State must participate in something, for
otherwise the State would not be a Kowuvia : they must, to
begin with, participate in locality ; they must inhabit one
and the same spot *. But they must have more in common
than this. They must unite in common gatherings and
live a common life (3. 9. 1280 b 13 sqq.). But, above all,
they must have a common aim (4 (7). 8. 1328 a 25 sqq.,
esp. 35-37 : 3- 13. 1284 a 2), and a common ethical creed
a common view as to what gives happiness (4 (7). 8. 1328
a 40, cp. 4 (7). 13. 1331 b 26 sqq.), whatever this view may
be. As the constitution is regarded as embodying the life
preferred by the State (6 (4). n. 1295 a 40), the KOLVOV n
which constitutes the Koivcwia is, in one passage, said to be
the constitution (3. 3. I276b 2).

This is one characteristic of State-life : another is diffe
rentiation. The mere fact that the State begins in need
implies differentiation even at its outset. That which
brings the slave into society is not the need of another
slave, but of a master. He is in quest, not of his like, but
of his complement or correlative. Some things, again,
cannot be enjoyed by all the members of the State at the
same moment political authority (apx^), for instance (2. 2.
1261 a 32) and hence arises the inevitable contrast of
rulers and ruled. On the other hand, there are things
which may or may not be left to common enjoyment.
Plato had proposed in the Republic, that women, children,
and property should be held in common (2. i. 1261 a 2
sqq.). The same question of several allotment, or the reverse,
may be raised as to the various activities (fyya, 4 (7).

1 Pol. 2. I. I26ob 40, Kai 7rp)TOV avdyKt] roO TOTTOV Kowowelv.

OF THE STATE. 91

8, or :rpaeis), of which the State is a co-ordination. There
is the work of the .cultivator, the artisan, the soldier, the
man of capital, the priest, the judge, the statesman. Here,
again, the question arises, whether every one is to share in all
these functions (4 (7). 9. 1328 b 24) : that is to say, whether
every individual is to be cultivator, artisan, soldier, judge,
and statesman at once, or whether we are to allow some of
these vocations to be united in the hands of one and the
same individual, and not the whole, or what arrangement is
to be adopted. Democracy, which in its extreme form
(8 (6). 4. 1319 b 2) drew no line between the artisan and
the statesman 1 , solved this question in one way: other
constitutions in another. But if in some communities there
will be less differentiation than in others, it will exist to
some extent in all. It is not only the secret of efficient
work, but in every whole the indispensable condition of its
unity. Aristotle finds differentiation even in a bee-hive
(de Gen. An. 3. 10. 760 b 7 sqq.). Not indeed that any
and every scheme of differentiation will secure unity : to do
so, it must be based on principles of justice ; and, as has
been said, the differentiated members, or the chief of them,
must be animated by a common aim, must be men of full
virtue (o-TrouSaun) 2 . We may compare the words of Milton
in his Areopagitica 3 : Neither can every piece of the
building be of one form ; nay rather, the perfection consists
in this, that out of many moderate varieties and brotherly
dissimilitudes that are not vastly disproportional, arises the
goodly and the graceful symmetry that commends the
whole pile and structure. Milton, however, has diiiorences
of opinion here mainly in view, and these, if on vital points,
would hardly be welcome in the Aristotelian, any more
than in the Platonic State.

In adopting the principle that the unity of the State
rests on differentiation, Aristotle returns in a measure to
the conception of Pythagoras and Heraclitus of a harmony

1 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 32, ev fjifv rais * Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1 167 b 4 sqq.
brjfj,oKpaTLais /iere^ovcri TfdvTfS irdv- 3 Prose Works 2. 92, ed. Bohn.

rcov.

92 CONDITIONS OF THE STATE.

resting on contrast, if not on seeming or actual conflict 1 .
Plato had not expressly done so, though the distinction of
classes in his ideal Republic is apparently viewed by him
as a condition of its unity. His conception of the world,
indeed, often seems at variance with the idea of contrasted
elements working in combination for the best : the element
of Matter is in his view at best passive, and sometimes
unruly and disturbing. Aristotle could adopt the idea
with less of metaphysical inconsistency.

The Stoics, on the other hand, often speak as if the
resemblance between men as rational beings were an
adequate guarantee of political unity, and rest on this
basis their great conception of a World-State 2 . They were
led, in fact, even to include the gods as citizens of the
World-State. Aristotle rests the State both on the re
semblances between its members and on their dissimi
larities. But for the latter, they would be unable to
satisfy each other s needs. The State implies an exchange
of service by dissimilars. Aristotle, says Auguste Comte 3 ,
laid down the true principle of every collective organism,
when he described it as the distribution of functions and
the combination (rather the exchange) of labour. With
out exchange of service, mere similarity forms no basis
for a State. There are, no doubt, other conditions of the
existence of a State besides differentiation and resemblance
for instance, a care on the part of the citizens for
each other s moral well-being 4 but these are among its
primary conditions.

Another remark of Comte s 5 deserves to be mentioned
here. The institution of Capital, he says, forms the
necessary basis of the Division of Labour, which in the
dawn of true science was considered by Aristotle to be the

1 Heraclitus, however, had reav, fj pf], \6yos KOIVOS fl TOVTO, KOI
spoken of ivavria (Eth. Eud. 7.1. 6 va^os KOIVOS fl TOVTO, TroXrrat
1235 a 25 sqq.) where Aristotle fcr^ev el TOVTO, TroXtreu/zaroy TIVOS
speaks of 8&lt;.a(^&gt;fpnvTn. p.fT^o^.(v el roCro, 6 Koo-fj.os wtrai/et

2 Marcus Aurelius, Comm. 4. 4, TrdXtj eWt.

el TO voepov rjfji iv KOIVOV, Knl 6 Xdyof 3 Social Statics, E. T. p. 234.

Kad ov \oyiKoi eV/xei/ KOIVOS fl * Pol. 3. 9. I28ob I sqq.

TOVTO, Koi 6 Trpoo-TaKTiKos TO&gt;V TTOITJ- 5 Social Statics, E. T. p. I35&gt;

THE STATE A DISTRIBUTOR. 93

great practical characteristic of social union. In order
to allow each worker to devote himself to the exclusive
production of one of the various indispensable materials
of human life, the other necessary productions must first
be independently accumulated, so as to allow the simul
taneous satisfaction of all the personal wants by means
of gift or exchange. A closer examination, therefore,
shows that it is the formation of Capital which is the true
source of the great moral and mental results which the
greatest of philosophers attributed to the distribution of
industrial tasks.

We see then that while a certain amount of social
differentiation is incidental to the State, it rests with the
State to say how far it is to be carried. One State, for
instance, will place the work of an artisan and that of a
statesman in the same hands, while another will not.

The State is, in fact, a distributor. It distributes
advantages (ayaQa) l : it distributes functions (e pya
or -rrpa^eis) 2 : it makes possible by its distribution of
advantages that exchange of services (-7rpaeis) which is
the initial fact of society. Aristotle seldom, if ever, goes
behind the services, the exchange of which constitutes
society, to the rights which are implied in that exchange :
still less has he realized the importance of such questions
as what is a right ? or how do rights come into exis
tence, and why? But if we follow his ideal sketch of the
creation of the best State in the Fourth (old Seventh)
Book, we shall find him allotting functions (c. 9) and pos
sessions (Kr?/o-ei?, c. 9. 1329 a 17 sqq.) as the first step in
its construction.

The principle on which the State makes this allot-

1 Eth. Nic. 5. 5. II3ob 30, r^y Se bution of Ki)Aa&lt;Tiy and Ttjuapta
Kara /xepos 8iKaioa-uvr)s KOI TOV /car seems to be implied. The boun
ding SIKO/OU ev fj-c v f ariv eidos TO daries of distributive and cor-
(i&gt; Tais 8iavofj.als rifj.rjs TJ xprjudrutv rective justice, and indeed also of
f) rciv aXXcov 6 cra fj.eptffra rols Koivca- justice in exchange, seem hardly
vova-i T?IS TroXtreias. Cp. Pol. 4 (7). to be definitely fixed.
13. 13323 15 sq. where a distri- 2 4 (7). 9^

94 THE CONSTITUTION

The distri- ment is expressed in its TroAtreia 1 or constitution, for this
advantages em bodies the end which the community sets before
and func- itself as the end of its common life (Pol. 6 (4). i. 1289 a 15,

tions within , v ,, ,.. , , \ &lt; i /

a State is TToAtreta ^ev yap ecrrt rais rai? TroAecriv rj Tre/n ras ap^as, TWO.

regulated rpo-nov veveunvrat. /cat ri TO KVOLOV rrjs TroAireias /cat TL TO re Aos

by its con- . ,

stitution, fKa&lt;TTr)s r?;s noivavias eon) . thus the constitution is said to

which j-jg the course O f life w hich the State marks out for itself

should be

just i.e. (cp. 6 (4). II. 1 295 a 40, f) TroAtreia /3ios ris eon Tro Aecos,

distribute w ^ich is explained by Plutarch, de Monarchia, Demo-

them with^cratia, et Oligarchia, c. i, KaOcnrep yap avOpunrov /3ioi

the true res ? ^ TTL K H V&gt; llJ-&lt;&gt;v TToAtreta /^ioy). This course of life may

end of the -^jg that which is really most preferable (4 (7). i. 1323 a
should take 14 sq.), or it may be in a mean in a sense other than

alTelemenL that in whkh the beSt life is SO ( 6 (4 " "95 a 37),

which con- or it may be still lower in the scale, a life in extremes

tribute to / /,, c . v * rf , . . N
that end. ( Ka6; *pj8o\^ r/ eAAet^tyj.

When the constitution wins its rule of distribution from
a correct appreciation of the end of the State and from a
correct estimate of the relative contributions of different
individuals to that end, it is said by Aristotle to be just.
It must place both the functions and the advantages it has
to distribute in the hands in which it is most conducive to
the end of the State that they should be placed. Nature
entrusts the instruments she has at her disposal to those
who are capable of using them (de Part. An. 4. 10. 687 a 10,

1 The TroXi? is hardly a TroXir, if and e pya (Areopag. 20-23) : his
it is too large to have a iroXirela Busiris, as the author of a consti-
(4 (7). 4. 1326 b 3), though it may tution and laws, distributes the
have a TroXiTem for instance, a population into distinct vocations
dwa&lt;TTfia or an extreme democracy (Isocr. Busir. 15). He twice calls
or a tyranny which scarcely the 7roXtret athe\^u^f)7rf)Xea)y(Areo-
deserves the name. This passage pag. 14: Panath. 138). Like
of the Fourth Book seems to treat Prudence in the individual, it is
the edvas as hardly susceptible of the deliberative element in the
a noXirfla, though we gather from State, guarding and preserving all
other passages that Kingship, and good things and warding off ill :
even 7ra^/3ao-tXe/a (3. 14. 1285 b it is the model into accordance
32), may find a place in the fdvns. with which all laws, all advisers

2 See Sus.", Note 466. Aristotle of the State (ot proper), and all
inherits his view of the nature of private men must be brought.
a TroXireta from Plato and also Compare with this Aristot. Pol.
from Isocrates. I socrates regards 3. 4. 1276 b 30: 3. n. 1282 b
the TroXireta as distributing

SHOULD BE JUST. 95

f) be (f)V(ris aei dtaW/X() KaOaTrep avOpMiros (f)pdvifJ.os, e
SvvaiJLfVti) \prjvOai), and the State should do the same.

Distributive justice the term itself is not used in the
Politics is the primary virtue of a State and Constitution 1 .
A correct distribution of duties and advantages, and, above
all, of political authority is essential, and no distribution can
be correct which is not just. Cicero went even farther than
Aristotle and brought justice into the very definition of the
State (de Rep. i. 25. 39, cp. Augustin. de Civ. Dei, 19. 21).
In his view, the deviation-forms of State, being unjust, are
not respublicae at all. A constitution may, indeed, be
just without being the best constitution. The conditions
of the best constitution are seldom present. It presup
poses the rule of virtue fully furnished with the means of
virtuous action (aperr) KexP r ?y T 7/ jte/i;7 ?s 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32).

It is thus in justice, and particularly in distributive
justice, that Aristotle finds the true basis of the State.
Distributive justice needs, indeed, to be completed by other
kinds of justice: (i) by justice in exchange, which is
occasionally conceived by Aristotle as not merely confined
to the commercial relation (aAAaxriKr) Koiz/ama) and the
exchange of commodities, but as regulating even the inter
change of offices between free and equal citizens 2 , whereas
elsewhere 3 the distribution of offices is viewed as the sphere
of distributive justice. It is especially in its more com
prehensive sense that justice in exchange is said to be the
secret of safety and union in States 4 .

(2) By corrective justice (Siop0amKr/), the justice of the
judge or juror, remedying a faulty exchange, and thus
incidentally redressing crime, which Aristotle brings under
this head 5 .

1 Cp. Eth. Eud. 7- 9- I2 4I b 13, iroifiv avd\oyov crv/j.p.fi&gt;ti rj 7ro\is.

at 8e TToXireiai -navai StKaiov n eldos 5 Is the function of the law--

Koivavia yap, TO Se KOIV ov irav Sia TOV court conceived by Aristotle to

diKaiov awfCTTriKev. be summed up in this? Is its

2 Pol. 2. 2. 1261 a 30 sqq. task completed, when an unjust
8 Eth. Nic. 5. 5. H3ob 31. withdrawal of advantages allotted
* Pol. 2. 2. 1261 a 30, ro luov TO to an individual by Distributive

avrmen-ofdos crcofei ras TroAets : Eth. Justice has been made good by a
Nic. 5. 8. H32b 33, TW avn- restoration at the expense of the

96 LIST OF FUNCTIONS

But both these forms of justice presuppose a correct
original award to individuals, which must be maintained
intact through all processes of exchange. It is the task of
distributive justice to make this original award.

Distributive justice is not, indeed, the sole security for
the cohesion and equilibrium of the State, for the natural
passiveness of the masses will be a sufficient support for
an oligarchy which abstains from insulting or plundering
them (6 (4). 13. 1297 b 6 sq.) and from robbing the State
(7 (5)- 8- 1308 b 34sqq.) 1 , and democracies are made durable
by mere populousness (8 (6). 6. 1321 a i, TO.S nev ovv STJ/XO-
KpaTias 6 Aw? 57 TtoXvavdpteTsla trco^ef rouro yap azmKeirat irpbs
TO biKcuov TO WTO. TT]v agiav). But it is the best security :
for if a constitution is to last, it should take its stand on
equality proportioned to desert and on giving men their
due (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 26). A just constitution realizes the
main condition of durability, which is that none of the
parts of the State even desires a change in the constitution
(6 (4). 9. i294b 38 sqq.).

An attempt to effect an equipoise between contribution
and requital is thus imposed on the State and its founder.
It must, however, be borne in mind that, in the best State
at all events, the motive by which the citizens are actuated
is love of ro KaXov ; and that if requital is secured to them,
they do what they do irrespectively of the requital they
receive.

List of Before we proceed to consider what distribution of

functions f unc ti O ns is correct, we must first obtain a list of the

to be dis
tributed, functions which have to be allotted, or, which is the same

thing, of the ykvr\ which are to discharge them.

offender ? If so, the law-court of plated (Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a n) :

Aristotle seems hardly adjusted and the corrective justice of the

to his conception of the end of Fifth Book of the Ethics is not

the State, which is the promotion probably intended as a complete

of good life. We look for a spiritual representation of the action of the

court from him, and find only a law-court.

temporal court somewhat nar- 1 The same thought is ex-

rowly conceived. KoAacms and pressed by Isocrates, ad Nicocl.

Ti/*a&gt;piai are, however, contem- 16.

TO BE DISTRIBUTED.

Aristotle supplies us with
set side by side :

A. Pol. 4(7). 8. 1 328 b 2 sqq.

1. y(a&gt;pyoi

2. Tf\VLTai

3. TO paxipov

4- TO fVTTOpOV

5. Ifpels

6. Kpirai Tatv avayKaluiv Kal

7. TO 6t]TiKov (not enum
erated in its place,
but incidentally men
tioned as necessary
in c. 9. 1329 a 36) \

two lists, which we will here

B. Pol. 6 (4). 4. I29ob 40 sqq.

1. y(opyoi

2. TO (iavavcrov

3. TO ayopalov

4- TO dl]TlKOV

5. TO TrpoTToXe/jLtjcrov

6. TO 8lKa&lt;TTlKOV

7. TO Taiy oiKriais XetTOt p-

yoCi&gt; 2

8. TO Srjp.LovpyiKov (official

class)

9. TO (3ov\ev6[j.(vov Kal xpl-

VflV TTfpl TU)V StKCnCOJ/ TOlff

d/LKpto-jSj/Touo-i (where
TO SucacTTiKov is again
mentioned by an evi
dent slip).

The above are called fiepr] rrjs
TTo\fu&gt;s, I29ob 38-40 : p.6pia TJjf
TroAeojy, 1291 a 32.

Of these lists, list A is drawn up for use in the con
struction of the best State : list B is intended to account
for the variety of constitutions by exhibiting the full variety
of classes in a State. The latter is thus the more cornjglete.
In list A ro ayopaiov and also TO brjuiovpyiKov are omitted :
list B omits the class of priests. Both lists reflect the very
imperfect industrial and professional development of Greek
society : perhaps indeed they fail to do justice even to it.
Ijj^tn^orsjol^ both

lists. We hear nothing of fishermen, though fishing is
included in the First Book among the natural modes of
obtaining food. Sailors, it is true, are expressly denied a
place among the parts of the State (4 (7). 6. 1327 b /sqq.),
and fishermen perhaps among them. The oarsmen of the
triremes are to be recruited among the serfs or slaves who
till the soil, and the crews of the trading vessels employed
in bringing the produce of the territory to the port (4 (7).

1 We are surprised to find re%-
vlrai and dijres existing in the best
State, when in the First Book we
find these vocations reckoned
with the unnatural sort of XP1~
f. The views there ex-
VOL. I. H

pressed on this subject seem, how
ever, to be more uncompromising
than those expressed elsewhere.

2 Cp. Isocr. de Antid. 145,
TOVS 8taKo&lt;riovs Kal ^iXious TOVS eto~-
(pepovras Kal \fiTOvpyoiivras,

98 LOWER

5. 1327 a 7 sqq.) are probably to be obtained from the same
source.

The lists recognize no distinction between trades (i.e.
groups formed by similarity of occupation) and classes, or
between either of these and organs of State-authority (e. g.
the deliberative or judicial authority). All are brought
under the comprehensive head of parts of the State 1
(Mf p 7 ? rrjs Tro Aeo)?), a term inherited by Aristotle from Plato,
who includes under it (Rep. 552 A) horsemen, hoplites,
traders, and artisans. Terms to express the distinctions
referred to had hardly as yet been developed, though we
find the judicial, administrative, and deliberative organs of
the State described (6 (4). 14) as /xopto. rrjs TroAtreias. We
learn from the same passage that it is on the constitution
of these organs that the character of the TroAireto. depends
(&v z\ovT(v KaA&lt;2s avayKT] TI\V TroAtretar fX ety KaA&lt;3? KCU ras
77oAiretas aAArjAooy biatyepeiv ey rw 8ta0e peti&gt; e/caorozj TOVTOIV,
1297 b 38 sq.) 2 .

The problem is to organize these diverse elements in
such a way as will accord with justice and prove conducive
to the end of the State.

Are the The first question for consideration is whether those who

functions practise the lower social functions husbandmen, artisans,
to be com- day-labourers, and the like are to be admitted to the
the same higher social functions of legislation, administration, justice,

hands as an( j wan Most Greek States did admit them to these

the higher? ~---~_

functions. Even in oligarchies, artisans were freely admitted

to military service they formed, it would seem, a large
element in the forces of the allies of the Lacedaemonians 3
and in all but the extremer forms of oligarchy, in which
power went by birth 4 , the rich artisan 5 or trader would be
admitted to office. Many of the most famous early oli
garchies of Greece those of Aegina, Corinth, and Corcyra,
for instance were, like the Venetian, oligarchies of trade.

1 This is so at least in Pol. 6 the Politics, see Appendix A.
(4). 4. 1290 b 38-40 : contrast 3 Plutarch, Ages. c. 26.
however 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq. * 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 26 sqq.

2 With regard to Aristotle s use 3. 5. 1278 a 21 sqq.
of the phrase ^tpos TJJS TroXews in

AND HIGHER FUNCTIONS. 99

Democracy went further it tended to give these classes
political supremacy ; and democracy was coming more and
more to prevail in Greece, for cities were growing larger and
large cities tended to democracy. No doubt, even in the
extreme form of democracy the first form, apparently,
in many cases to admit artisans and day-labourers to
office 1 persons directly concerned with what Aristotle
terms necessary functions 2 would not commonly, in all
probability, be either State-orators (gropes) or great
executive officers of State ; they would not often be
strategi, for instance, at Athens : their power would rather
be exercised collectively through the popular assembly
and dicasteries. Still neither democracy nor oligarchy
made a principle of interposing a barrier between the exer
cise of the minor social functions and the major. Even in
the military city of Thebes the practice of the so-called
sordid arts or of retail trade only involved exclusion from
office for ten years after retirement from business 3 .

The Lacedaemonian State and the States of Crete stood
almost alone 4 in ordering these matters differently. They
set an example in relation to them which Plato and
Aristotle held to be sound, but from which Greece tended
every day to depart more widely. They sorted the
elements of the State, and forbade those who discharged
the nobler social functions to meddle with the less noble.

Even in States which admitted the industrial and com- Social
mercial classes to power, popular sentiment held trade agriculture
and industry cheap. Nowhere in Homer, says Biich- trade, and

r r . industry

senschiitz J , is contempt for any useful occupation ex- current in

ancient

1 3.4. I277b2: cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 3 3. 5. 1278 a 25 : 8 (6). 7. 1321 a Greece -

1 8. This is not wonderful, con- 26 sqq.

sidering that at one time those of 4 In some military States the citi-

the fidvuvo-oi re\viTai who were zens were forbidden to practise the

not slaves were mostly of alien fidvawoi rexvai (Xen. Oecon. 4. 3).

origin, and that even in Aristotle s 5 Besitzund Erwerb, p. 258. It

day a majority of them continued is doubtful, however, how far the

to be either slaves or aliens, 3. 5. Homeric pictures reflect the early

1278 a 6. social life of Greece Proper, at all

a Wealthy employers of slaves events as a whole. Plato says in

in manufacture, like Cleon, are of the Laws (680 C) that the mode

course not here referred to. of life Homer depicts is Ionic.

II 2

100 VIEWS CURRENT IN GREECE

pressed. But a change of feeling came, he thinks, at the
epoch of the great migrations. The ruling class, in pos
session of wide domains and disposing freely of the labour
of the subject populations and of the purchased slaves whose
numbers begin from this time forward to increase, withdrew
from all occupations connected with the supply of daily
wants, and by leaving labour of this kind exclusively to
the subject races stamped it as unworthy of a freeman.
Accordingly, it is in States which maintained in some
degree intact the traditions of that epoch in the Lacedae
monian State and that of Thespiae, for instance that we
find these occupations forbidden to the citizen. It was, on
the other hand, in maritime and commercial cities like
Corinth the first, according to Thucydides, to cleave to
the sea that handicrafts were least despised 1 . The
oligarchies of early Greece, however, were less often oli
garchies of trade than oligarchies of knights and warriors,
and the prejudices of the oligarchs may well have spread
to the average citizen. The attempts of the tyrants to
relegate their subjects from the city to the country 2 , to
make peasants of them, and to divert their attention from
politics to the useful arts may have had a contrary effect to
that intended. But the prevailing scorn for trade and in
dustry was probably more largely due to the wide diffusion
of military aptitude and efficiency which came with the rise
of the hoplite system of warfare, and which was so important
, factor in the successful resistance of Greece to Persia.

Agriculttrre^tood at the head of the lower occupations.
In this, the ITealthiest, if not the oldest, of them, the draw
backs were absent which told against so many others.
The work of the cultivator was not work merely for the
body, like that of the day-labourer : it called for alert
intelligence, for foresight and knowledge ; it did not impair
the physique like the sedentary arts ; the keenness for gain,
which was held to be incidental to the occupation of the

1 Thuc. i. 13: Hdt. 2. 167. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 3. 41.

2 Pol. 7(5). 10. 1311 a 13: 7(5). 14.
il. 1313 b 20 sqq. : and see C. F.

AS TO AGRICULTURE TRADE AND INDUSTRY. 101

merchant and retail tradesman, was thought to be less
marked here ; above all, agriculture produced no inaptitude
for arms. Thus the Peloponnesians tilled the soil with
their own hands 1 : the avrovpyos was to Euripides the true
safeguard of the State 2 : Philopoemen combined farming
with politics 3 . Yet there were two opinions even about
agriculture, for while Tanagra was a town of cultivators 4 ,
Thespiae held agriculture, no less than handicraft, to be
a pursuit unworthy of freemen 5 . So one of Menander s
characters says :

E.V TOIS Tro\fp.iois [noXefjuKols ?] \nrfpf\fiv TOV av8pa 8el,
TO yap yeuipyelv epyov ecrrlv olxfrov 6 .

Other pursuits, which demanded far more skill, capacity,
and capital, but which were less favourable to military
aptitude, were held in much lower estimation. The
merchant (e^-n-opos) who purchased in the cheapest market
a cargo which he conveyed, in a hired vessel or his own,
for sale in the dearest, needed a thorough knowledge of
the varying requirements of the different ports of the
Greek world : yet, whatever may have been his position
in trading cities such as Corcyra, Byzantium, Corinth, or
the Pontic colonies, his vocation was for the most part
abandoned at Athens to metoeci 7 , citizens of good position

Thuc. I. 141. f&lt;*&gt;v, &" vvv f pWV KadefrTrjKty -a

Eurip. Orest. 892 (Bothe). bassage which mentions e/j.rrnpoi

Plut. Philop. c. 4, Trpcoi dvaa-ras in connexion with aliens, and also

epyov TOIS a/*rre\- indicates that even at Athens the

ovpyovaiv f) j3or]\aTov(nv avdis tls Cumbers of these classes varied

no\iv diTTJfi Kal irepl ra &r)fj.6&lt;ria rols from time to time considerably.

&lt;j)i\ois Kal rols ap^ovcn (rv^cr^oX- Jn its judgment of e/x7ropot Greek

tro. feeling would probably some-

4 Biichsenschutz, p. 297. jivhat differ from Roman. While

5 Ibid. p. 258. jthe Romans disdained retail trade

6 Inc. Fab. Frag. xcvi. ed. and manual labour, they had not
Didot, quoted by Biichsenschiitz, ! ,the same dislike for commercial
p. 258 n. 4. enterprise upon a larger scale

7 Thus Aristotle assumes that (Capes, Early Empire, p. 194).
merchants will be ev a\\ois redpap.- Still it is evident from Rhet. ad
p.evoi i&gt;6p.ois, 4 (7). 6. 1327 a 14: cp. Alex. 3. 1424 a 28 sq. that the
Isocr. de Pace, 2i,o\l/6p.f0a 8e rf)v tavicXrjpoi, a section of the class of

TroXii/ SiTrXacna? p.ev fj vvv ras TTpocr-

, were more favoured by

68ovs Xa/z/3ui&gt;ou&lt;raf , /ietrTiji/ 8e yiyvo- the writer than the ayopruoi.
/J.TOI-

102 VIEWS CURRENT IN GREECE

preferring not to embark in commerce themselves, but only
to lend money to merchants 1 .

The body of T^virai, again, included in its upper ranks
sculptors^ painters, architects, musicians, and singers of
genius 2 , some of whom, at all events, would possess a wide
acquaintance with men and things in Greece, might be the
favoured companions of tyrants (Pol. 7 (5). n. I3i4b 3), or
might even aspire to make a figure as philosophers (Plato,
Rep. 495 C). Of the latter Hippodamus of Miletus was
perhaps an instance 3 . Yet, according to Plutarch (Pericl.
c. 2), no well-constituted (et&gt;$t ?js) Greek youth after view
ing the Zeus at Olympia or the Hera of Argos would wish
to be Phidias or Polycletus, their authors ; and Lucian
(Somn. c. 9) puts the same remark in the mouth of Culture
(FTatSeta), adding that no one would desire to be accounted
a sordid craftsman living by manual labour. The stigma,
indeed, might be escaped, if the work was done, not for
pay, but out of patriotism : so Polygnotus, we are told,
was no mere ordinary craftsman, nor -did he paint the
portico for hire: he worked without reward, emulous to
add to the splendour of the city 4 .

1 Biichsenschiitz, p. 510. mann, Gr. Antiqq. 3. 41. 15.

2 Phidias is called a rexvirijf, We shall all approve the alleged
Strabo, p. 353 : Praxiteles, ibid. reply of Albert Diirer to the Em-
p. 410: Parrhasius the painter peror Maximilian. The Em-
is classed among ol ras re^vas peror, in the attempt to draw
i xovTfs, Xen. Mem. 3. 10. i. Aris- something himself, found the
totle, however, in one passage, chalk perpetually break in his
recognizes a distinction between hands, while Diirer had no such
arts which must exist of necessity interruption ; on which Maxim-
and arts which contribute to ilian asked Albert Du rer how it
luxury or TO KU\WS (fiv (Pol. 6 (4). came that his chalk did not break,
4. 129132). and the painter answered, smiling,

3 Socrates himself was said by " Most gracious Emperor, I should
some to have worked at his craft be sorry your Majesty were as
of sculpture before he became a skilled in this respect as I "(Quart.
philosopher, far as the thought of Rev. Oct. 1879, p. 404). The story,
Socrates is from the mind of however, like many other good
Plato in the passage referred to. ones, is an adaptation from the
A group on the Acropolis (three Greek, for a similar anecdote is
draped Graces) was imagined to told of Philip of Macedon (Plut.
be from his hand (see Zeller, Gr. Reg. et Imperat. Apophtheg-
Ph. 2. i. 44. 4, ed. 2). mata Philippi patris Alexandri

4 Plut. Cim. c. 4: the passages 29, I79B). Cp. also Plato, Laws
quoted are given by C. F. Her- 769 B.

AS TO AGRICULTURE TRADE AND INDUSTRY. 103

If occupations of this kind were held to be so little
honourable, we need not ask what was the position of the
useful arts. The handicrafts which fall under this head
are very dissimilar to each other in character. Not all
of them would be either sedentary or prejudicial to health.
If the smith, working at a forge in a hot climate, suffered in
health, the same could not be said of the mason or brick
layer, who wrought in the open air : yet no distinction
seems to have been made between these trades and those
of the carpenter, cook, shoemaker, dyer, and weaver, which
might fairly be accounted sedentary 1 . Sedentary or not s
those who practised them (and agriculturists no less, Pol.
4 (7). 9. 1328 b 41) were held to be forced by the necessity
of the case to devote their whole time to their craft, and
thus to lose that leisure which Socrates said was the sister
of eAeuflepta (Ael. V. H. 10. 14). Their work also involved that
living at the disposal of another, which was a mark of
slavery (cp. Rhet. I. 9. 1367 a 31, KCU TO /u?j8e/Aicu&gt; epyd&a-Oai
fiavavo-QV ryvr]v \cm]^lov T&V kTraivov^.ivu&gt;v\ eA.et&gt;0epou yap TO
/xr/ TTpbs a\\ov (ijv : Pol. 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 1 7 : I. 13. 1260 a 33).

Still public sentiment at Athens favoured the artisan
class more than the trading class (TO ayopaiov) or the day-
labourers (TO OriTLKov). Many more citizens would be found
among the former than among the latter (Buchsenschiitz,
p. 344-5, p. 511)- A retail tradesman was often a resident-
alien (Demosth. c. Eubulid. 30-34, referred to by Biichsen
schutz, p. 511: yet see Xen. Mem. 3. 7. 6). The artisans
probably sold their own manufactures to a large extent ;
and this must have contracted the dealings of the trading
class strictly so called. The Peiraeus was perhaps their
headquarters : at Athens much selling seems to have been
done in temporary booths in the agora, probably in part by
persons who came in from the country with their produce.
The shops even at Pompeii indicate that the tribe of shop
keepers was very inferior in wealth and comfort to that of
our own time and country (Dyer s Pompeii, p. 302).

1 See Xen. Oecon. 4. 2 : cp. Plato, Rep. 495 D : Eurip. fragm. 636,

Nauck.

104 VIEWS CURRENT IN GREECE

The position of the 0/?s, or hired day-labourer
on the other hand, was all that extreme poverty could make
it. If the most slave-like of occupations were those in which
the bodily powers were most called into play (Pol. i. n.
1258 b 38), then there was little to choose between the life
of a day-labourer and that of a slave. The class of day-
labourers was, however, one in which impoverished freemen
often took refuge (Buchsenschiitz, p. 344 sq.), mainly no
doubt because the work done by this class required no
previous training.

It is worthy of notice that the Greek estimate of these
occupations passed with their civilization to the Jews, as we
learn from the remarkable passage in Ecclesiasticus on
the subject (38. 24-34). Here it is the want of leisure
which is held to unfit these classes for high positions, and
agriculture fares no better than the trades of the smith,
potter, and carpenter 1 .

There is little need to seek far for the origin of a feeling
which has existed more or less in most ages and countries,
occasionally indeed in an even less discriminating form and
with less excuse than in Greece, and considerable traces of
which, to say the least, are observable among ourselves. If
Schiller has said 2 ,

Euch, ihr Gotter, gehort der Kaufmann : Giiter zu suchen
Geht er, doch an sein Schiff kniipfet das Gute sich an,

1 A kindlier feeling for labour boris ). The feeling survived in
appears in connexion with the old-fashioned regions like Area-
worship of Saturn and Ops, or dia, where slaves and masters
rather their Greek equivalents gathered at entertainments round
(seePhilochor.Fr. 13 Miiller, Fr. one table (Theopomp. Fr. 243).
Hist. Gr. I. p. 386 : Philochorus Seneca commends this kindly be-
Saturno et Opi primum in Attica haviour in his 47th Epistle, and
statuisse aram Cecropem dicit, advises a discreet observance of
eosque deos pro Jove Terraque it. It is interesting to notice that
coluisse, instituisseque ut patres the sceptic Pyrrho, who prided
familiarum et frugibus et fructibus himself on his indifference (ddta-
jam coactis passim cum servis &lt;j&gt;opia), drove pigs to market and
vescerentur, cum quibus patien- sold them, or swept out his house
tiam laboris in colendo rure toler- with his own hands (Diog. Laert.
averant : delectari enim deum 9. 66).
honore servorum contemplatu la- 2 In his poem, Der Kaufmann.

AS TO AGRICULTURE TRADE AND INDUSTRY. 105-

Hobbes is credited with the saying that the only glory
of a tradesman is to grow exceedingly rich by the wisdom
of buying and selling 1 ; and Bacon, who holds that seden
tary and within-door arts and delicate manufactures that
require rather the finger than the arm have in their nature
a contrariety to a military disposition, advises States to
leave those arts chiefly to strangers, which for that purpose
are the more easily to be received 2 .

In ancient Greece, it is significant to observe, the feeling
was strongest in the more military States 3 ; but slavery, no
doubt, contributed to lower the dignity of work performed
to the order and for the convenience of another. To do
manual work*, even if the work were not sedentary and
unfavourable to health or bodily strength, and especially to
do manual work for pay, was to put oneself in a subservient
relation 5 , not only unfavourable to the independence and
incompatible with the leisure of a freeman, but also the
probable source of a mean and sordid spirit. Industrial
and commercial life was thus held to begin by robbing the
physique of strength or grace, and to end by degrading the
character. We must remember that in the social life of
Greece the spirit of trade was probably often presented to
view in its narrowest and least attractive form and in sharp
contrast to striking examples of public virtue. The incul
pated occupations were mostly occupations engrafted on
the primitive pursuits of Greek life, and were to a large
extent, as they had been from the first, practised by aliens

1 I cannot give the reference t* Bacn^ hf wever, dfes nit feal the
Hobbes Works : the passage AS sarrie /Ibjdction t rhe crafts if the
quoted in a note in Pope s Works, smith, masjn, I and carpenter,
vol. 2. p. 243 (ed. 1767) on the which he here terms strcng and
well-known couplet (Moral Es- manly arts.

says, Epist. i) 3 Xen. Oecon. 4. 3.

Boastful and rough, your first * So closely was the idea of

son is a squire ; f3avava-ia connected with x fl P v py&lt;- a

The next a tradesman, meek that even learning to play on a

and much a liar. musical instrument was accounted

2 Essay 29, Of the true great- fiavav&lt;ria an exaggeration cor-
ness of Kingdoms and Estates rected by Aristotle, Pol. 5 (8). 6.
(Works, 6. 448-9), referred to by I34ob 40 sqq.

C. Friedlander, de Fiancisci Ba- 5 Cp. diaKoviav, Plato, Laws
conis Doctrina Politica, p. 78. 919 D.

106 VIEWS OF PHILOSOPHERS.

and even Asiatics 1 . The mixture, or rather the inter
mingling, of races had already gone far, at Athens at all
events ; indeed, the more unchanging were men s ways and
aptitudes in antiquity, the more necessary was the aid of
some extraneous race or races to do what the indigenous
population could not, or would not do 2 . Not only
foreigners, but also slaves were largely employed on work
of this kind, and free industrial labour was both lowered in
estimation and cheapened by the competition of slave-
labour. The autochthonous Athenian, or the descendant
of immigrant Dorian conquerors looked down with not
always ill-grounded contempt on the foreign and perhaps
Asiatic artisan or trader, who would often differ but little
in external appearance from a slave 3 , and would be engaged
on work often done by slaves.

So far, indeed, as this prepossession against industry and
trade kept in check the eagerness for gain, which was one
element in the Greek character, it exerted a favourable
influence. A time came when the Greeks ranked the
handicrafts higher, but it was at the expense of nobler,
though less lucrative, vocations 4 . There is a real difference
of ethical level between some vocations and others, though
amidst the growing industrialism of our own day we may
sometimes be tempted to forget this.

If the popular estimate of the industrial and trading

1 Cp. Xen. de Vectig. 2. 3, AuSol appears to think that these immi-
KO\ &pvyes KOI Supoi Kal aXXoi irav- grants often undertake rough work
rodairol /3ap/3apoi* rroXXol yap TOIOU- which French workmen gladly
TOI TG&gt;V p.eToiKO)i&gt;. leave to others. In England and

2 The same tendency to call in the United States the increase of
extraneous aid in some depart- the Irish population serves the
ments of industry is noticeable same end.

in modern Europe. Since 1850, 3 [Xen.] Rep. Ath. I. 10, fa-d^rn

according to a paper by M. Leroy- yap ovSev fte\ria&gt; e^ei 6 8fi/j.os avTodi

Reaulieu mL Econotm s/eF ranfazs rj of fioCXot : and see C. F. Her-

(referred to in the Times of Feb. mann, Gr. Antiqq. 3. 13. 1 9.

8, 1883), the number of foreigners * Cp. Athen. Deipn. I. 34, p.

resident in France has grown at 19 b (quoted by Hermann. Gr.

an increasing rate. It increased Antiqq. 3. 42. 15), ras yap ftavav-

between 1851 and 1861 at the crovs rf\vas "E\\rjvfs vartpov Trepl

rate of 12,000 annually, but be- TrXfiomv /^aXXoi/ eVotoDi/ro 77 ras

tween 1876 and 1881 at the annual Kara TratSaW ywopevas tTrivoias.
rate of 40,000. M. Leroy-Beaulieu

SOCRATES, XENOPHON. 107

classes did not everywhere rise with their elevation in the Opinions
political scale, and if, as not {infrequently happens, the ^Socrates,
political change was not accompanied by a corresponding and Plato.
change in social sentiment, a correction of the general
feeling on the subject was hardly to be looked for from
the philosophers. Already in the apologue of Protagoras
(Plato, Protag. 321) the contrast of the wisdom necessary
for the support of life and political wisdom appears,
and we learn how insufficient is the former for the well-
being of a State without the latter. Dionysodorus and
Euthydemus, indeed, in the Euthydemus of Plato claim
that a money-making life is quite compatible with the
acquisition of the kind of wisdom they imparted l ; but
then this kind of wisdom was not worth much.

Socrates, though, in conformity with Athenian opinion 2 ,
he seems to have held that in case of need there was
nothing unbefitting in the practice of a trade 3 , is repre
sented in a conversation with Euthydemus, whom possibly
he did not care to shock, as acquiescing in the ordinary
Greek assumption that craftsmen such as smiths and shoe
makers are, as a rule, slavish (cbSpa7ro8w5eis), and know
nothing of things noble and good and just (Xen. Mem. 4.
2. 22). He probably felt that leisure was more conducive
to the indescribable characteristic which the Greeks called
eXevdepia (Ael. V. H. 10. 14), as it certainly was more con
ducive to the pursuit of knowledge in the colloquial
Socratic fashion.

Xenophon drew a marked distinction between agriculture,
which he panegyrizes (Oecon. cc. 5-6 : cp. c. 15), and the
handicrafts, which he condemns (Oecon. 4. 2). His praises

1 Euthydem. 34 C, oi re (frvcrtv epyov 8 ovdev oi/eidor, dtpytli) 8e r
ovd fjXiKiav f^tipyeiv oi/8ffi,iav o Svei8of,

8f KOI (Tol /xdXtcrra npo(rr]K(i aKovaai, in the sense that they should do

on ov8e TOV xpr]p.aTL^fcrQai (f)arov anything, however unjust or dis-

8iaK(o\vftv ov8fv /ni) ou napd\a(3fiv graceful, for gain (Xen. Mem. i.

6vTivovvV7rer5&gt;sTriV(T(f)fTepai&gt;a-o(piai&gt;. 2. 56 sqq.). This is corrected by

2 Thuc. 2. 40. Xenophon (ibid.), and by Critias

3 Xen. Mem. 2. 7. 3 sqq. He himself, who was supposed to be
was, indeed, charged with im- a product of this kind of teaching,-
pressing on his disciples the les- in the Charmides of Plato (Charm,
son of Hesiod 163 B-C).

io8 PLATO.

of the former include both the actual tilling of the soil and
the management of a farm (Oecon. 5). In this enthusiasm
for agriculture he departs to some extent, we may notice,
from his model the Lacedaemonian State, which forbade it
to its citizens (Plato, Rep. 547 D) 1 .

Plato has glimpses of a more favourable view of handi
craft and even of retail trade. Thus, in Symp. 209 A,
Phileb. 55 C sqq. (cited by Zeller, Plato, E. T. p. 222), he
finds in the handicraft arts an early stage of philosophy, and
is led, in fact, to range carpentering above music as more
largely partaking in number and more exact (Phileb. 56 C).
So again in the Laws he holds that retail trade has nothing
intrinsically harmful about it (9186); the retailer is a
benefactor to his species, in so far as he measures by means
of coin the comparative value of different commodities
and sets them in a proportionate relation to each other ;
the hired labourer, the innkeeper do the same ; indeed
(918 D-E), if, which Heaven forbid, some one were to
compel the very best men or women to act for a while as
retail traders, we should learn to regard retail trade and
kindred pursuits in the light of a mother or a nurse, and
recognize how deserving they are of love and acceptance 2 .
It is a relation of this kind that he designs in the Republic
between his third class (TO xP r ll JLaTLa " riK v ) anc ^ the two
higher classes. The third class, no less than the remaining
two, were to be citizens, and not only so, but the source of
pay and sustenance (juto-^oSorat KCU rpo^eis) to the rest ; they
were to be their brothers (Rep. 415 A) ; they are joined
with the military class in a common obedience to the first
or ruling class, and thus the two lower classes are together
called TO) apyov-tva* in contradistinction to TO ap\ov (Rep.
442 D). In the same way, though each of the two upper
classes has a virtue of its own, temperance and justice are
possessed by the third class, and apparently in a complete
form ; the possible transference of members from one class

1 The same contrast of feeling 2 Cp. Menand. Fragm. Inc.

appears between Cicero (de Offic. Fab. 279 (p. 80 Didot) :

I. 42. 151) and Sallust (de Conj. e\fv6ep&lt;os dov\evt, Sov\os OVK eo-et.
Catil. 4 : see Jacobs ad loc.).

PLATO. 109

to another, in itself, softens the contrast between them.
Moreover, the third class were, it would seem, to own the
lands they tilled subject to a contribution for the main
tenance of the other classes. The first sign, in fact, of the
decline of the ideal Republic is said to appear in a conflict
between its classes or races, the result of which is that
severalty of property is introduced within its upper section,
and the gold and silver races enslave their friends and
maintainers whose freedom they had before respected, and
make of them subjects and servants (Rep. 547 B-C). It is
probably by design that Plato (Rep. 552 A) allows the
title of part of the State, the application of which was
afterwards narrowed by Aristotle, to the commercial and
artisan classes (xp^Mcirto-rat, brmiovpyoi) no less than to
horsemen and hoplites. In the view of the former, in fact,
the third class answered to a part of the soul 1 , while in
that of Aristotle the natural slave stands to the citizen as
the body to the soul, and the whole class which has to
do with necessary work, whether free or slave, is related
to the citizen-body merely as an instrument, or means, is
related to the end it subserves ; it stands outside the State,
forming in strictness no part of it. It is true, however, that
the title of citizen, which Plato concedes to the members of
his third class (xp^artfrriKot ), carries with it no share in
political power, for he excludes this class from office, both
military and civil. Indeed, in one passage of the Ninth
book of the Republic (590 C-D), perhaps the source from
which Aristotle derived his theory of natural slavery, he
admits, notwithstanding what he has said in the passage
from the Eighth (547 B-C) referred to above, that when
the Best is weak within a man, so that he is unable to
control the creatures within him and has to court them
when he has not the divine principle of wisdom abiding in
him, but needs a ruling principle outside himself, then in
order that he may be under the same rule as the best of
men, we say that he ought to be the slave of that best of
men, inasmuch as the latter has the divine ruling principle
1 To tnfivu/riKov,

no PLATO.

indwelling in him ; so that in a case like this slavery is
expedient and just, and may find a place even within the
ideal Republic. It may be doubted, however, whether he
would have held with Aristotle that all those whose function
is the use of the body, and this is the best that they can do
(Pol. i. 5. 1254 b 17), are in need of an extraneous ruling
principle whether, in fact, to Plato the natural slave is not
the morally weak or bad man, rather than the man of thews
and sinews who is only fit for manual work l .

In the Laws, perhaps because the type of society is
lower, the relation between the governing class and the
classes concerned with these lower occupations is other
wise conceived. They lose even the name of citizen, and
become a dependent in some cases, an enslaved body.
Those of them who are slaves have not the consolation of
being slaves to the best of men as in the Republic, for the
citizens of the State described in the Laws are not an ideal
or heroic class, like the guardians of the Republic, or the
citizens of Aristotle s best State. Even agriculture, except
perhaps in the sense of superintendence (Laws 842 D : cp.
806 D-E) is forbidden to the citizens ; much more other
occupations of an industrial or commercial nature (Laws
806 D-E: 741 E: 8460.- 9190: 8420). Plato s reason
for these prohibitions is partly that the citizen has quite
enough to do without practising any other art than his
own (Laws 846 D-E, 807 C) ; partly, that pavavo-ia warps
the character of the freeman (Laws 741 E) ; even the very
best men (ot Travraxf? apioroi, Laws 918 E), though in their
hands vocations like that of the retail trader would assume
a helpful and kindly aspect, suffer profanation by having
to do with them (9180). In the Laws, unlike the
Republic, the industrial and commercial classes exist for
the sake of the ruling class, stand wholly outside the State,
and are adjusted in number and position to the needs of
their social superiors. In this respect the society sketched
in the Laws serves as a model for the best State of

1 Cp. Plato Polit. 309 A, rovs 8 Kv\ii&gt;8ovp.evovs els TO 8ov\iKoi&gt; ino-
tv a^aQia T av KOI raTTfivoTrjTi. iroXXfj fvyj&gt;vcri yivos.

VIEW OF ARISTOTLE. Ill

Aristotle ; there is, however, this important difference, that
the citizens of Aristotle s State are not only men of ideal
excellence living an ideal life, dependence on whom might
be a source of pride and moral advantage, but also are
charged with the duty of caring for the virtue of their
slaves at any rate, if not of other members of the sub
ordinate classes ; while the citizens in the Laws are not
conceived as attaining to the same ethical level, nor have
they apparently a similar duty imposed upon them. But
then the Laws is admittedly a sketch of a second-rate
society.

Throughout Aristotle s treatment of this subject and also View of
of slavery, it must be borne in mind that he has in view an Anstotle -
ideal State, in which the citizen-body is composed of men
of full virtue (a-irovSaioL aTr\a&gt;s). If it is well for the artisan
to accept a lowly position and for the slave to be even
enslaved, it is so because the men on whom they are thus
made dependent are men of noble character and high
capacity, spending their lives in an arduous exercise of
virtue, through serving whom they rise to an ethical level
they could not otherwise attain. It is the best State
(or, at all events an aristocratic State, Pol. 3. 5. 1278 a
1 8), that will not make the artisan a citizen (3. 5.
1278 a 8): the less elevated and more attainable con
stitution described in the Eleventh Chapter of the Sixth
(the old Fourth) Book (f) Kotyorarrj TroAireta f] Sia T&gt;V
p.e&lt;T(av) would not probably refuse a share of power to
artisans (3. 5. 1278 a 24) or other well-to-do members of
the industrial and commercial classes.

Aristotle fully accepts the traditional estimate of the
sordid occupations (fBavava-a epya), and perhaps his account
of them gives additional definiteness to the conception of
fiavavo-ia. We must set down as sordid, he says (Pol.
5 (8). 2. 1337 b 8sqq.), any work or art or study which
makes freemen unfit for the active exercise of virtue either
in body or character or intelligence : the sordid arts
deteriorate the body, and trades plied for hire

112 VIEW

fpyaa-iai a term of uncertain comprehension) make the
mind unfree (aa-^oXov] and abject (rcr/rett 1 ?^). Bavawria, how
ever, he adds, is not confined to the practice of sordid occu
pations, for an over-exact study of some sciences not in them
selves unworthy of a freeman according to Susemihl (Sus. 2 ,
Note 982), Gymnastic, Music, Drawing, and Painting are
among the sciences meant produces the same effect and
deserves the same name 1 . But again, work of an unfree
nature may be relieved of this stigma, if it is done not in
the service of another, but for one s own sake or for the
sake of friends or for the sake of virtue (8t 5 aper?^) 2 . So
in the Rhetoric (i. 9. 1367 a 31) it is implied that the
/Sdmuo-os, unlike the freeman, lives for the convenience of
another (irpbs aAAov) 3 . The freeman (Metaph. A. 2~. 982 b
25) is he who exists for his own sake and not that of
another 4 . Both the life of the artisan and the life of the
shopkeeper are forbidden to the citizens of Aristotle s best
State (Pol. 4(7). 9- 1328 b 37 sqq.), for those lives are
ignoble and unfavourable to virtue V This is not said of
agriculture, which is, however, excluded on the ground that
leisure is necessary both for the development of virtue and
for political activity (1329 a i). The life of a farmer is a life
of incessant occupation in the country, which forbids even
frequent attendance at the meetings of the popular assembly

1 Thus the Indians of the terri- those of the slave, 3. 4. 1277 a 36

tory of Musicanus were praised sqq., with whom he is here for

by the Cynic Onesicritus for not the moment identified,

carrying the sciences (except me- * Thus it is the characteristic

dicine) to a high point of minute of the p.eya\(tyvxos, irpbs a AAoj/ p.rj

accuracy (Strabo 701, p.t) aKptfiovv Swaadai fiji/aXX fj npbs $i\ov (Eth.

8e ras eni.a TTjp.as 77X171 uirpixJjs). Nic. 4. 8. 1124 b 31).

* Cp. 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 10, tv TOUT* 5 Their very friendship was of

(sc. rfi npbs TOVS dyavas naideia) the interested kind which rests

yap 6 nparTcav ov TTJS avrov p.era- on utility (Eth. Nic. 8. 7. 1 158 a 21,

Yipt&lt;rai X ( P tJ/ operrjS) dXXa TTJS TU&gt;V f) 8f Sia TO xprjcri/jiov (pihia ayopaicav).

CLKOVOVTW rjdovrjs, KOI ravrrjs (popn- Aristotle does not mention, though

KTJS Sionep ov T&V fXevdepw Kpivopfv the fact may well have been pre-

eivai rrjv fpyaa-iav dXXa 6rjTiK&lt;oTfpai&gt; sent to his mind, that it was the

Kal fiavava-ovs 8&gt;i crv/u/3mVi yivtvdai. determination with which these

See also the story told of Antis- classes pressed their claims to

thenes by Plutarch, Reipubl. Ge- complete political equality that

rend. Praecepta, c. 15, and Plut- was fast making democracy the

arch s addition to it. prevailing constitution in Greece.

3 His actions are 8iaKcviKai, like

OF ARISTOTLE. 113

(8 (6). 4. I3i8bn sqq.), much more anything like systematic
political action. Aristotle s view of agriculture differs, in fact,
so much from that put forward by Xenophon in the Oecono-
micus, that he praises the States which marked off the
military class from the cultivating class (4(7)- 10. 1329 a
40 sqq.), whereas Xenophon, like the Romans later, viewed
the work of the peasant as an excellent preparation for
the life of a soldier. Aristotle, with whom Plato appears
to concur, may have held that the peasant would have but
little leisure, except in winter, for the constant gymnastic
practice on which the efficiency of a hoplite must have
depended far more than that of a modern soldier, or he
may have desired to reserve the military service of the
State for those who would in after years be its rulers ; but
he does not explain the grounds of his view, in which he
had been anticipated, not only, as has been said, by Plato,
but also by Hippodamus (Pol. 2. 8. 1267 b 32).

It is from a different point of view that the various voca
tions falling under the Science of Supply are classified in
the First Book, as natural or the contrary. They are here
distinguished, not according to their effect on the agent,
but according to their intrinsic conformity to the design of
Nature. Measured by this standard, agriculture, the tending
of animals, hunting, fishing, and the like stand on a very
different level to the vocations of the artisan, day-labourer,
merchant, and retail dealer. Even in the First Book, how
ever, we are told (c. n. I258b 10), that the practice of the
very best of them is unworthy of a freeman l . Necessary
functions as a whole, whether natural or otherwise, appear
so far to be liable to objection on two grounds : (i) they
are unfavourable to the development of virtue and stand in
the way of higher things : (2) they are practised for the
convenience of another. Aristotle has, however, other
reasons for his low estimate of them. They are necessary Aristotle
(avaynalai}, not noble (/cot/Yea). Necessary, in the first arks off t
place, because concerned with things necessary for life, from
for that which provides things necessary is itself necessary.

1 If I am right in thus interpreting this passage.
VOL. I. I

114 NECESSARY

Necessary, again, as being an indispensable condition of
noble action action which is desirable for its own sake
and not for the sake of something else (TO Ka0 avrb cuperoV).
Thus the word ava.yK.alov is used in contradistinction to
aiperbv KaO avro, Eth. Nic. 7- 6. 1 147 b 24, 29 : it is used in
connexion with TOVTOV ZVCKCV and in contrast to ov HVCKCV KCU
^e Anof, de Part. An. 3. 10. 672 b 23, and so in Pol. 5 (8). 3.
1338 a 13 we find some subjects of study marked off as
desirable for their own sake from others which are
described as necessary, and desirable for the sake of
something else. Thus, just as the fiavava-os is held to exist
for the sake of another man, all necessary functions not
those of the fiavavo-os only are for the sake of other forms
of activity which are desirable for their own sake. Hence
the frequent contrast of the necessary and the noble, which
indeed Aristotle inherited from Plato 1 , though Plato is not
perhaps equally faithful to this distinction as a standard
for measuring the relative excellence of various paths in
life.

It is not that, in Aristotle s view, these pursuits are not
compatible with a certain type and level of virtue. They
are, indeed, unfavourable to virtue of the higher kind
(virevavTLoi irpbs dper?? 71328 b 40), but the slave, at all events,
must possess some of the homelier virtues (industry and
temperance, for instance, Pol. i. 13. 1260 a 34), if he is to
do his work well. Still the fraction of moral virtue which
falls to the lot of the slave is not enough to give him any
share in happiness (et8cu/xoi&gt;ta), which presupposes a certain
complex of attributes quite beyond his reach (cp. 4 (7). 9.
i328b 33 sqq.). This view of happiness, if held by Plato,
is not pressed by him to the same extent : he nowhere says
that the third class in his Republic will not share in the
general happiness of the State, whereas to Aristotle the
free artisan or day-labourer seems to be still further
removed from happiness than the slave, who shares the

1 Cp. Plato, Rep. 493 C, ravay- Sitxfiepfi rw OVTI, fir/re ittpaxits fit]
Kola diKaia KaXol KOI KaAa, rrjv 8e /* ;Te a XXco dvvarbs dflt-ai,
roii dvayKaiov /cat dyadov (fiiHTiv, o&ov

AND NOBLE FUNCTIONS. 115

society of a master able to raise him to the level of virtue
which he is capable of attaining.

Over against the large group of vocations concerned with
necessary work, Aristotle ranges those concerned with
noble work/ What pursuits exactly fall under the latter
head, we fail to learn in any detail. Politics and philosophy,
if not practised for gain, evidently do so (Pol. i. 7. 1255 b
36). A soldier s life does so too, though it is abandoned to
those who are still under the age which qualifies for offices
of State (4 (7). 9. 1329 a 2 sqq.) : it is noble, but it is not
the supreme end (4 (7). 2. 1325 a 6). The management of
a household, also, ranks as noble work, though there are
perhaps relations in life higher than the relation to wife
or child, just as the care of wife or child is a higher thing
than the care of slaves, which again is higher than the care
of property (i. 13. 1259 b l fy- The duties of a guardian or
of an executor would rank, probably, with those of a house
holder. The cases of the poet, historian, and biographer, and
generally of the writer, seem to escape consideration ; but
Aristotle can hardly intend an unfavourable judgment.
Comedy, however, stands at a far lower level than tragedy
or epic poetry ; to witness a tragedy or to listen to music
is a noble use of leisure (8taycoyrj). The composition of
music and even the writing of a tragedy are tasks which
would hardly fall within the province of a true citizen, if
done for pay. Instruction in noble work, not rendered for
pay, appears to rank among the chief duties of the father
and the citizen. The work of the professional sculptor,
painter, architect, musician, or physician, if done for pay,
would probably be accounted unworthy of the citizen ;
indeed, the acquisition of skill of this kind, apart altogether
from the terms of its exercise, would entail a closeness of
application unbefitting a freeman (5 (8). 2. 1337 b 15 sqq.). i

Aristotle s first step, then, was to distinguish necessary Necessary
from noble work. His next was to insist that, in the best ^ ndn . ob1 ^

functions to

State at all events, they must be placed in different hands, be placed
Necessary functions must not be assigned to natures capable

I 2

Il6 NECESSARY AND NOBLE FUNCTIONS

of noble functions, nor must the latter be assigned to
natures only capable of the former.

It is easy to see why the higher functions should not
be entrusted to the lower natures 1 , but why should not
necessary functions be shared in by those capable of noble
ones ? If this arrangement were adopted, the State would
not need the presence of lower natures within its borders,
while the higher need only be called on to give up a part
of their time to necessary work. The reasons which weigh
with Aristotle seem to be that

1. The principle of entrusting one function only to one
agent (ev vpos &lt;iv) should be observed, except where the
functions are such as can be discharged without reciprocal
embarrassment, which does not hold of necessary and noble
functions.

2. Happiness does not lie wholly in the motive : a man
is not happy, if he does necessary work even from the
highest motive (row KaAou e^e/ca): happiness lies partly in
motive, partly in the character of the action, which must
itself belong to the class of noble actions (7rpaeis aiperal
Ka0 avras). It may be said that if eating, drinking, and
sleeping are necessary functions, it is not possible alto
gether to release the higher natures from functions of
this kind, but this is not present to Aristotle s mind.
Aristotle defined happiness not as a habit (e is), like Plato
and the Platonists 2 , but as an activity (eWpyeta or xp?? " 1 ?}
Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 9), and the more he insisted on this,
the more important the subject-matter of the activity
became. A life spent even in the distribution of things
good under special circumstances (ra e vT

1 On the principle expressed in n. 62) : ^nevanrnos rr\v fv8aifioviav
de Part. An. 4. 10. 687 a 10, rjtyvo-is (pr]&lt;rlv eiv di&gt;ai TeXetW ev rois
aei8iavfp.fi,Kada.Trepav6p(aTTOs(pp6vi- Kara (pvaiv f \OVITIV f) (iv ayaQuiv.
pas, fKaa-rov ro&gt; Swopcm xPW@ al Contrast the emphatic statement
The same illustration from niXoi (Pol. 4 (7). 13. 13323 7) : &lt;a/iei&gt;
is used in this passage as in the 8e *ai eV rols rjdiKols, ei raw \6ya&gt;v
discussion on the distribution of (Ktivcov o^tXoy, evtpyeiav eivai (sc.
power in the State, Pol. 3. 12. rrjv tv&alfuma*) Kal XP 1 &lt;TIV
I282D 31 sq. reXeiav, Kal Tavrrjv OVK. e vno

2 Cp. Clem. Strom. 418 D (quo- dXX
ted by Zeller, Plato, E. T. p. 579,

TO BE PLACED IN DIFFERENT HANDS. 117

in the infliction, for instance, of just punishment beneficial
to the offender would not be a life of full happiness
(4 (7). 13. 1332 a 10 sqq.) ; much less would a life spent
in necessary work be so.

3. Even Plato, though he held that in the hands of the
best men retail trade would assume a new aspect, and be
recognized as a work of charity and beneficence, shrank
from the idea of allowing them to meddle with such
work 1 ; and Aristotle holds that most functions of a neces
sary kind are per se enfeebling in their effect on the charac
ter. Even the learning of some arts, not in themselves
unbefitting freemen, to the full professional limit of ex
actness made a man pavavvos in Aristotle s opinion.

4. That which is appropriate (ro -nptiiov} is always kept
in view in the Politics (e.g. Pol. 5 (#) 7- J 342 b 33); and
it would be a solecism to give any share in the lower
functions to the higher natures.

It follows that a separate class or classes must exist in the
State devoted to the discharge of the lower functions, and
that the human beings employed for this purpose must be
capable of nothing higher otherwise there, will be an
infraction of justice, both wrong in itself and fatal to the
harmony of the State. Aristotle does not appear to point
out, in what we have of the Politics, the measures by which
he proposes to secure that natures shall not be pronounced
to be fit only for necessary work, which better rearing or
training, or more favourable circumstances might possibly
raise to the higher level. HfLgeems akoJTarHJy

of the sadness of the view that the existence in adequate
numbers of natures fit only for the lower functions is
essential to the realization of the highest type of human
society. If all men were capable of becoming men of full
excellence ((nrovbaloi a7rA.&lt;3s), the best State could not
exist. The attainment by the higher natures of their true
level has its accompanying shadow ; it involves and implies
the existence of lower natures who must remain beneath

1 Laws 918 D, 6 prjiroTe yiyvoiro ouS eorcu.

THE CLASSES CONCERNED

cessary
functions.

them. The State at its best breaks society into two
sharply contrasted grades those who can live for the
highest ends and those who cannot ; the parting of the
one from the other is the first and most indispensable
step towards its realization. It is of course true that the
lower grade would, ex hypotJiesi, gain nothing by being
called to the discharge of noble functions, and that it rises
Uo a higher level of virtue and pleasure, when linked to the
higher grade, than it could otherwise achieve.

Position in The relation of the classes discharging necessary functions
assigned * those discharging noble functions, as will readily be fore-
by Aris- seen, can only be a dependent one. The latter fulfil the end
classes of the State ; they consequently are the State. The former
concerned ex j s ^ within the State, because otherwise the latter could

with ne-

not exist ; their existence is an unwelcome necessity. What
numerical proportion these classes are to bear to the classes
which form the State, we do not distinctly learn ; but no
more of them must find a place in the State than is necessary
for the purposes of the higher grade. Those of them who
are slaves must be recruited from populations submissive
enough to accept a dependent position without giving
trouble. It may be asked why all are not made slaves,
public or private. The answer is .twofold. The slave by
nature is conceived as one whose intelligence is of the lowest
type and whose value lies in his thews and sinews, whereas
the merchant or the artisan needs intellectual qualifications
of a higher kind. The slave is also viewed, especially in the
chapters where the naturalness of slavery is discussed, as in
the main an instrument of the household 1 , whereas the
artisan or the merchant could hardly be treated as an
appendage of the household.

The position of the classes concerned with necessary work,
except indeed the slaves, seems to be but little. studied in

1 Though Aristotle provides for
the existence of public slaves in
his best State (4 (7). 10. 1330 a
30: cp. 2. 7. 1267 b 16), and in-
. eludes in his definition of wealth
pjjtrt/ia els Koivavtav TTO-
j, i. 8. 1256 b 29, he, at first at

all events, treats the slave as an
animate instrument of the house
hold and the chattel of a ^eoTrorjjs
(i. 3. 1253 b I sqq.). Aristotle re
fuses to follow Phaleas in making
the Texvirai public slaves (2. 7.
i267b 13 sqq.).

WITH NECESSARY FUNCTIONS. 119

what we possess of the Politics. We hear nothing of any
provision for tHeir education. In the picture of household
life which is given us, the householder is conceived as
belonging to the superior grade to which alone citizenship
is accorded. No non-citizen is to own land in the best
State. Not only are the classes in question excluded from
office and from membership of the assembly and the
dicasteries, but they are assigned a separate market-place,
distinct from that of the citizens, while those of them who
are merchants reside at the port. Unlike the slaves, who
are brought within the household and consequently within
the range of the ideal householder s influence, they are
apparently abandoned to the deteriorating influences of
necessary work without any counteracting safeguard.

Aristotle regards the State at its best as an union of men Remarks
who are heart and soul purposed and qualified to live the tle sview
highest life, and whose co-operation rests, not on force or and the
fear, but on that temper of mind as its condition. The tionswhich
State is not fully a State whose members do right with any led him to

* adopt it.
after-thought or secondary aim ; they must love virtue and

practise it for its own sake, not for the sake of the external
goods it brings. It is useless and wrong to admit those to
membership who cannot fulfil these conditions, and this
is the case with those whose initial unfitness is increased
by the practice of the lower kind of work. They cannot
share in the common aim of living the highest life, or in
the capacity for common action of the highest kind, both
of which the best State presupposes. Not only, indeed,
are they not to share in ruling, but the State is not to
be ruled in their interest, except so far as this cannot be
neglected without injury to the citizens 1 .

Aristotle s conception. jof liappiness and. his conception of

1 The common advantage (TO rwi/ TroXtrwi/), and that of other

Koivfj trvpiptpop) which a State classes, only so far as their advan-

should study is the common ad- tage is bound up with that of the

vantage of the citizens (cp. 3. 13. citizens (3.6. 1278 b 32 sqq.). This

1283 b 40, TO d opQbv \rjnTfov i crcos is here said expressly of the slave ;

TO 8 icroas updov Trpos TO Trjs 7roXeeo? whether it holds also of the re^vi-

6X779 (TVfttfttpow Kai irpos TO KOIVOV TO TTjs, 6r)s, etc., we are not told.

130 REMARKS

forced him to find in the classes which live for noble

work the sole sharers in the true life of the State : what
then could he say but that these were the State, and that
if the Statesman is to rule for the benefit of the State, he
must rule for their benefit ? It must, however, be borne in
mind that this holds good only of the best constitution ; it
is only where the citizens are men of full human excellence
(o-TTovbaiot. a-nXus), and actually living the highest human
life, that the doctrine applies. If the Few inherit the earth,
the Few, it must be remembered, are to live an arduous life
of moral and intellectual greatness, toilsome though happy.
Not a life of self-sacrifice for the sake of others, like that of
Plato s guardians, for they live for themselves, and no other
life would be so full for them of happiness and pleasure ;
nor an ascetic life, for besides the happiness and pleasure
of the highest life, they are to possess its due external con
ditions and to share in the occasional recreation and relaxa
tion which human nature demands ; but ajifejriaking great
demands on human energy, self-mastery, and intellect.
Would the supply of the material necessities of men living
a life of this kind be indeed a vocation unworthy of the
lower natures ? Is it an unsatisfactory destiny for such
natures to be caught into the train of some heroic character
and to be raised by his aid to the highest "level- attainable
by them 1 ? Perhaps not : but we feel that their subordinate
position in the State should be the result of their original
inferiority rather than of their participation in necessary
functions. It is one thing, too, to follow the lead of a heroic
class as freemen, though subordinate, and quite another to
accept a relation of absolute dependence and even slavery.
It is, besides, true that Aristotle provides no means for
making the most that can be made of these classes, or
Indeed of any individuals belonging to them who are equal
to higher things ; so far as we can judge from what remains

1 I can see my dear father s Reminiscences (r. 65) ; and Aris-

life in some measure as the sunk totle designs the life of these

pillar on which mine was to rise subordinated classes to serve a

and be built, says Carlyle in his somewhat similar purpose.

ON ARISTOTLE S VIEW. 121

to us of the Politics, he drops the arrangements which
Plato had devised for the purpose of raising those who
deserve it to a higher place in the State, and removing
to a lower place natures ill-adapted to the higher.

The contrast of necessary and noble work is too sharply
drawn by Aristotle : it is, besides, incorrectly drawn ; and
the effect of men s vocation on their character is also over
rated. What a man is, cannot always be measured by the
social functions which he is fit to discharge. To exclude
the hardy peasant from the military service of the State was
surely a mistake ; and it can hardly have been necessary to
forbid his access to all official functions, however humble.
Aristotle will not allow him even to be a Warden of the
Woods (vAcopos). His best State reminds us of Menander s
lines :

T&gt;V %opa&gt;v
ou TrdvTfs aSouff , aXX a0wj/oi 8110 rives
r] rpfts napfcrTTjKacri ireamtv err^aTOi
els TOV dpidfj.6v Kal rovff ofjioicas TTOIS fX.fi
\(apav Kare^ovcrij cocri 8 ols e&lt;TTiv /3/oy 1 .

The individuals excluded by Aristotle, indeed, are not idle,
or, in his view, cumberers of the ground, but essential con
ditions of the existence of the State.

Modern inquirers, while still drawing a distinction between
the one class of vocations and the other, draw it in a less
unqualified way. Thus to Hegel the activities which fall
under the head of social life (Gesellschaft) are marked
off from those of political life by their primary aim being
private, if their result is the general advantage. In industry
or trade the individual acts for his own interest, and if at
the same moment he in effect acts for the general advan
tage, this is no part of his aim 2 . In this sphere the Whole
and its interest asserts itself as a Necessity or Compelling
Force. Yet it does assert itself. For with the development
of trade and industry comes the Division of Labour, which

1 Menand. ErnxXj/poy, Fr. i (p. and governmental organization
17, ed. Didot). (Fortnightly Review, Dec. 1. 1880,

2 Compare Mr. Herbert Spen- p. 683).
cer s contrast between industrial

122 REMARKS

while it facilitates supply and increases skill, also binds men
closer to their fellows and makes each individual more de
pendent on the rest. Classes spring up, which gather men
into large unities based on similarity of vocation, and im
press on them the interest of the Whole. From this point of
view the supposed antagonism of trade and industry to the
higher life is softened down. These vocations present them
selves rather as a not uncongenial preparatory stage. Our
common life in the State ceases to seem marred and spoilt
by the unwelcome participation of classes, alien in function
to the general purpose of the State, but yet indispensable
to its existence. The State comes to present the aspect of
a self-consistent unity ; its higher and lower elements no
longer stand to each other in a relation of strong antithesis ;
one end and purpose is supreme throughout the whole. The
bisected State of Aristotle is replaced by a city at unity
with itself.

It was not, however, entirely by considerations special
to the TroAiriK?) eTrtorTjpj that Aristotle was led to his
conception of the true social structure of the perfect
State. More passages than one in the Politics imply that
the phenomena of the State do but repeat the phenomena
of the whole class of things to which the State belongs.
If we find in the State the contrast of ruler and ruled,
it is in part because this contrast is a constant pheno
menon in every Whole composed of a plurality of members,
whether continuous or discrete (i. 5. 1254 a 28 sq.). So
again, the State belongs to the class of natural compounds
(ra Kara (frva-Lv crweo-rwra, 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21), and Aristotle s
study of this class p f things prepared him to find a decided
inequality to be the law of the State. Not only in the
State, but in all natural compounds, the Whole is depend
ent for its existence on things which nevertheless are no
part of it, and which stand to it in the relation of means
to end. Thus, a house (for Aristotle takes his example
from an object which does not strictly belong to the class
of natural compounds) cannot exist without a builder and

ON ARISTOTLE S VIEW. 133

instruments of building ; yet these are no part of the
house. And so the State cannot exist without property,
and property is both animate and inanimate ; yet even
animate property is not a part of the State. In an animal,
again (de Gen. An. 2. 6. 742 a 28 sqq.), we can distinguish
three things : (i) the Whole (TO oXov], which is here con
ceived as the end or ov eVe/ca : (2) the moving and gene
rating principle, which is both part of the end, being a
part of the Whole, and also a means to the existence of
the Whole (or the attainment of the end) : (3) parts which
are useful to the Whole as instruments for certain pur
poses (ra opyaviKa TOVTOLS /^eprj Trpo? evias XP 7 / " 6 ?)* So in
the human body (742 b 16 sqq.), the lower half exists
for the sake of the upper half, and is neither a part of
the End nor its generating source. It is for the sake of
the flesh that all the other homogeneous parts of an
animal (bone, skin, sinew, bloodvessels, hair, etc.) exist (de
Part. An. 2. 8. 653 b 30 sqq.). In any object into which
Matter enters there is the fashioning element (TO g^juioup-
yovv), and there is Matter (de Gen. An. I. 18. 723 b 29:

2. 4. 738 b 20). In the soul as in everything else there
are two contrasted parts the passive reason (vovs -nadr]-
TIKO S), answering to Matter, and the creative reason (vovs
TTotrjrt/co?, 6 TTavra TTOI&V, de An. 3. 5- 43 a 10 sqq.). This
duality runs through the entire universe of things (430 a
10). In an egg no less than in an animal or a State,
two contrasted parts can be discerned that which is
the principle of growth (oOtv fj dpx??), and that which
supplies nutriment (oQev 77 rpo0?j, de Gen. An. 3. I. 751 b
22). The same thing appears in a beehive (de Gen. An.

3. IO. 760 b 7 sqq., ev 8e KCU TO TOVS /3a&lt;nA.ei? uxnrep

fJ.VOVS 67TI TeKVUHTlV (TU&gt; fJ.tVLV, O(j)LfJiVOVS T&V

&lt;!p-y(DV, KOL jue yeflos 8e t\W, uxnrfp em TfKVOltodav (TVO-TCIVTOS
TOV oxo/^ctTO? O.VT&V TOVS TC Kr](f)f)vas apyovs ar ovbev (-^ovTas
irpos TO 6"ia/x,a)(eo-0ai irept rrjs Tpotyrjs /cat Sia TT)I; /3pa-
. Tr\v TOV o-w/^aTo? at 8e /xeAtTTat /^lecrai TO /xeye^os tl(riv
ajj.(f)olv (xpTjo-t/jtot yap OVTCO Trpos TTJV epyacriav), KOL ZpydTibes,
ws /cat TCKVCL Tpe 0oua-ai Kat TraTepas). Steps and gradations

124 POSITION OF WOMEN.

within the State reflect the universal tendency to order
(rais) in things which conform to Nature (de Gen. An. 3.
10. 760 a 31).

^ To Aristotle the study of nature meant the discrimi-
- nation between the Conditionally Necessary and the Good
Vbetween the operation of the Material and the operation
6f the Final Cause. To distinguish what is necessary from
what is noble to mark off, for instance, the rule of a
master over slaves from the rule of a citizen over his
fellow-citizens, or of a king over his subjects was as
incumbent on the statesman as on the philosopher. If the
State is not to exalt means into .eacls^jt must know what
vocations are necessary and what are noble.

Exclusion The exclusion of women (and of course children) from
from poll- political functions in the best State, unlike that of the
tical func- classes concerned with necessary work, is taken for granted

tions in the J

best State by Aristotle without discussion, notwithstanding that Plato
nac ^ come to a different conclusion with respect to women.
His silence on the subject is the more noticeable, inasmuch
as he argues at length against Plato s abrogation (in the
Republic) of the household and several property. The true
place for women is tacitly taken to be the household, where
indeed their service is indispensable (2. 5- 1264 b i). Women
possess the faculty of moral deliberation, but in a form in
which it is not always capable of making itself obeyed 1 ;
it is therefore in subordinate co-operation with the ideal
head of the household, that the female character best
realizes the type of virtue which belongs to it (i. 13. 1260 a
20 sq.). This being the view of Aristotle, we might have
expected that in his argument against Plato in defence
of the household (Pol. 2. 1-4), the interest of women in
its preservation and the loss they would incur through its
abolition would be more conspicuously noticed. They are
probably included among those who would be less cared
for in the absence of the institution (2. 3. 1261 b 33), but
no express reference is made to their interest in its main-

1 Pol. I. 13. 1 260 a 13, TO 8e 6fj\v e^ei fJ.fi&gt; [TO /SouXevTi/coi ], aXX aKvpov.

NON-HELLENIC ELEMENT IN THE STATE. 125

tenance. The exclusion of women from citizenship in the
best State follows necessarily from the hypothesis that in
it all citizens will be possessed of full virtue and happiness.
Women have their share of virtue and enjoyment, but they
are not held to possess the full virtue of a good man, which
is required of all citizens there, nor consequently happiness

If we ask to whom, if not to citizens, necessary functions The eco-
are to be assigned, the answer is that a separate popula- nomic sub t ~

structure

tion, distinct from that which we sought at starting from of Aristo-
Nature and Fortune (p. 89) to serve as the raw material to e {j e
of the State, must be called in for the discharge of these largely
functions. The cultivators of the soil will either be slaves, non-Hel-
and consequently men of that low degree of intelligence len . ic ma ~
which slavery, as Aristotle conceives it, presupposes, or
else a dependent class non-Hellenic by extraction and not
dissimilar from slaves (4(7). 10. 1330 a 25 sqq.). The 1 same
class will serve as oarsmen in the triremes of the State (4 (7).
6. 1327 b ii sqq.). There will thus be a considerable non-
Hellenic element in the best State of Aristotle ; its econo
mic substructure, if so we may term it, will be formed to
a large extent of non-Hellenic materials. In this Aristotle
departs, no doubt designedly, from Lacedaemonian prece
dents, for the subordinate working and trading populations
of the Lacedaemonian State were Hellenic. The model he
follows seems to be rather that of the more commercial
States of Greece, the lower places in whose social systems
were filled with aliens and imported slaves. Here the de
pendent classes were more under control and less formid
able, and the infraction of justice was less 1 . An interchange
of population had long been going forward on the coasts of
the Aegean and the Euxine, resulting in the introduction
of a non-Hellenic element within Hellenic communities for
purposes of trade and labour, while Hellenes settled in the

1 Cp. Levit. 25. 44 : Both thy the heathen that are round about
bondmen and thy bondmaids you ; of them shall ye buy bond-
which thou shalt have shall be of men and bondmaids.

126 THE SCIENCE OF SUPPLY

wild regions round about Greece, and implanted the first
germs of civilization l . The scheme of Aristotle s best
State involves a similar division of functions between the
Hellene and the non-Hellene, though the alien element
in it would be far more carefully controlled, kept apart, and
limited in amount.

We see that the lowjer. .section of society which in
modern States includes perhaps four-fifths of the total
population, though its relative numbers would no doubt
be far less in the best State of Aristotle is to form in
extraction and character the strongest possible contrast
to the upper section. It is designed to be submissive and
serviceable; its vocation is to obey, rather than to co
operate with its superiors. Aristotle has apparently for
gotten how often war, or disease, or famine made great
gaps in the ranks of the citizens of Greek States, which
could only be filled by drafts from the dependent classes,
free or slave, for certainly the lower section of his State
wotfid be quite unsuited to recruit the ranks of the higher.

It is not, Aristotle s commission of necessary work 2 to a class
enou^lTto thus constituted is, however, only a first step to a purgation
sever the o f the commercial and industrial life of the State. The
the state Science of Supply 3 , which had degenerated into a Science
from neces- o f p ro fit, must be recalled to a sense of its true limits and

sary work :

1 Thus the low estimate of a matter of course (4 (7). 4. 1 326 a

trade and industry, which pre- 18, avayKalov yap tv rats Trd\e&lt;riv

vailed among Greeks and Romans, la-ws imap^eiv Kal 8ov\o&gt;v api6p.bv

helped in some degree to mingle TroXAaw KOI fj.froiiav KOI eva&gt;).
races which might otherwise have 2 Aristotle, we note, includes

held apart. Nothing would pro- the work of the Texvirifs and 6f]s

bably strike a modern observer under the term dvayitaiai irpagas,

more, if he could be transported though not under the sound form

to the streets of ancient Athens of xP r ll J arL(rTlK ^- A-vayicalos, how-

or to those of any other Greek ever, as thus used, is little more

city where resident aliens and im- than a negative of Ka\6s.
ported slaves were numerous, than 3 I use the term Science in

the magnitude of the Oriental and relation both to xp J iv aTl JTlK *l an( ^

barbarian element of its popula- to olK.nvop.iKri, but the former is

tion. In many parts of the Pelo- probably in strictness an Art or

ponnese, no doubt, the case was Productive Science, the latter a

very different. Observe Aristotle s Practical Science, like
acceptance of this state of things as

TO BE REFORMED. 127

methods : measures must be taken to ensure that the lower the Science
social activities shall not overgrow and stifle the higher, f ^PP 1 ?
and to still the unquiet and inventive spirit of gain, which TTT/^)
springs from a misconception of the end of human life. purged, and
Aristotle s wish is that as little c necessary activity as pos- recalled to
sible, and as much noble activity as possible, shall find its true
a place in his State. It is one of the functions of the lin " s ^ nd

methods :

Science of Household Management (olKOvopta or ot/coyo^t/c7J) it must be
to effect this by exercising a control over the Science f 1 ,^ ^
of Supply. The household must be placed under the Science of

1 r 1 r Household

authority of a head who knows that the quest of com- Manage-

modities should be kept within the limits which the in- ment , ( \" f0 j

1 f ^ VO^UKTI) and

terests of virtue and happiness (TO cv (ftp] impose. placed

He arrives at this conclusion by a long discussion of the
question, how the Science of Supply (xpr^arto-rtKTj) stands
to the Science of Household Management (i. 3. 1253 b 12r
8. 1256 a i sqq.) a question, at first sight, of purely
scientific interest, but which is made the starting-point
of a sweeping social reform. Some had held the Science
of Supply to be the main element in Household Science
(i. 3. 1253 b I 3) while others had gone so far as to identify
the two (i253b 12), thus merging the head of the house
hold in the provider of commodities. Who these were who
went so far as to forget the husband and parent in the
bread-winner, we do not know.

Aristotle, on the other hand, feels bound to ask whether
the Science of Supply is a part of Household Science at all.
He had, indeed, incidentally taken this for granted in an
early chapter of the Politics (i. 3. 1253 k I2 ) but later on
(i. 8. 1256 a 3 sq.), he seems inclined to recede from this
hasty admission, for he suggests the question whether, after
all, the former is not merely auxiliary (vTnjperiK??) to the
latter. He asks, further, whether it is not the business of
Household Science to use rather than to acquire. If this is
so, it cannot be identical with the Science of Supply, whose
object is to acquire; and we may doubt whether the latter
science is not too distinct from the former to be even a part
of it.

128

SOUND AND UNSOUND FORMS

Aristotle s
theory of
the Science
of Supply :
its sound
and

unsound
forms.

The first thing, however, is to ask what the Science of
Supply is. Its business is to consider whence property
may be acquired. But then there are more kinds than one
of property. One of them is food : is agriculture, then, or
any other science connected with the acquisition of food,
a part of the Science of Supply? Aristotle reviews the
various modes of acquiring food the pastoral, that of
hunting, and that of agriculture and the combinations of
them to which men resort. These methods of acquiring
food, he continues, have recourse (for the purpose of sus
tenance^ to objects designed by nature to be so used
designed for the purpose just as much as milk is designed
for the sustenance of the newborn animal, or as other
provisions of a similar nature are designed to serve the
same end. Plants and animals are to the adult what milk
is to the infant the provision of Nature for his support.
We know them to be so designed, for otherwise they would
exist for no purpose whatever (^drr]v, 1256 b 21), and this is
never the case with products of Nature. Nature has made
plants for the use of animals, and the lower animals for
the use of man, not merely indeed as food, but also to
supply him with raiment and other commodities. We may
even go farther and say that not only the capture of ani
mals by hunting, but also the capture of men who, though
designed by nature for slavery, are unwilling to be slaves,
is a natural mode of acquiring commodities, and that
consequently war, the means by which this is effected, falls,
in one of its forms, within the natural form of the Science
of Supply. But plants and animals cannot exist except
on, or in, earth and water (i. 10. 1258 a 23); therefore
Nature must provide earth and water, and from these man
must obtain the commodities he needs 1 . Here Aristotle
falls back on the teaching of Socrates, as recorded by
Xenophon (Mem. 4. 3. 5-6) 2 .

1 Aristotle seems to forget that totle, seems in his sketch of the
slaves, though Kr^ara, can hardly development of human society to
be said to be obtained from earth have gone back, like Plato (Polit.
and water. 271 C sqq.), to an age of Cronus,

2 Dicaearchus, the pupil of Aris- quum viverent homines ex illis

OF THE SCIENCE OF SUPPLY. 129

One form of the Science of Supply, then, is naturally a
part 1 of the Science of Household Management, for either
it must exist, or the latter Science must itself provide that
commodities shall be forthcoming necessary for life and
useful for human society in household and State. Com
modities of this nature constitute true wealth, for this kind
of wealth is not open to the charge which has been pre
ferred against wealth, that it does not belong to the class of
things subject to a limit (ra Tre-Trepao-jueW).

There is, however, another form of the Science of Supply,
which is not natural. It arises thus : Every article of
property may be employed in one or other of two ways ;
it may be used or it may be exchanged. Both uses are
natural. Exchange is perfectly natural, so far as it is used
for the supply of the wants of the two parties to the
exchange. The- articles exchanged must, however, be used
by the parties, or be intended to be used by them. This
seems to be implied in Aristotle s language, and his
principle evidently excludes an intermediary who buys to
sell again. A perfectly legitimate step was taken when
money was invented to facilitate exchange between distant
or comparatively distant parties. It was, however, the
invention of money a commodity which invited by its

rebus quae inviolata ultro ferret also represented by Homer as

terra. This mode of existence pastoral).

was to him alone natural, the We see that Dicaearchus, like

pastoral life coming next in order Theophrastus, had come to enter-

of time and marking a decline, tain objections to the slaughter of

inasmuch as it brought with it harmless animals for food which

the slaughter of animals for food, are quite strange to Aristotle (see

and also war : last of all, men as to Theophrastus, Bernays,

took to agriculture (Dicaearch. Theophrastos iiber Frommigkeit).

Fragm. 1-5 : Mu ller, Fr. Hist. Gr. Some Indian races were be-

2. 230 sqq.). To Aristotle, on the lieved by Herodotus to subsist

contrary, the earliest age of the after a. fashion which even Dicae-

world is an age of Cyclopes, not archus would admit to be natural

an age of Cronus, and the pastoral (Hdt. 3. 100).

and agricultural modes of life are l Later on, this conclusion turns

equally natural. He would pro- out to be only provisional, for we

bably agree that the pastoral life are taught to regard even the

is historically prior to the agricul- sound form of the Science of Sup-

tural (cp. Pol. 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 14, ply as in strictness rather subsi-

ifthis passage is from Aristotle s diary to, than a part of, Household

pen : the life of the Cyclopes is Science.

VOL. I. K

130 COMMENTS

compactness its own indefinite increase, that carried ex
change beyond the natural function of its earlier days the
provision for man s needs and developed the other form
of the Science of Supply, the mercantile form (TO Ka-nrjXiKov).
This form errs in two ways: (i) it wins produce, not from
earth and water, but from the process of exchange, or in
other words, from fellow-men (a-n- dAArjAcou) : (2) its aim is
not the supply of men s needs, but the acquisition of an
indefinite amount of money ; consequently, wealth loses for
it the limited character which makes it natural. In fact, its
procedure, if we analyse this still further, betrays a wrong
conception of the end of life, which it conceives either as
the mere preservation of existence (TO (T)V], or if as good
* -life, good life in the mistaken sense of bodily enjoyment 1 .
This is the form assumed by the Science of Supply, when
it is abandoned to itself and not controlled by Household
Science, which knows the true end of life and should
impress it on the Science of Supply.

Comments Aristotle apparently objects not merely to commercial
theory. dealing conducted with a view to unlimited gain, but to all
commercial dealing in which the parties do not come
together in order to provide themselves with articles for
their own use. His principle might, indeed, be construed
to involve an objection to commercial dealing in which the
parties seek to provide themselves with articles not really
necessary to life or to good life ; but into this further ques
tion he does not go. The use of things for purposes for
which nature did not intend them the error as to the end
of life which makes the indefinite heaping up of money an
object of desire : these are the main grounds on which

1 Aristotle tinds it hard to un- neither any irrational anxiety as

derstand the x/^aTio-nKor Pins to subsistence nor any craving

(cp. Eth. Nic. I. 3. 1096 a 5): and for sensual pleasure. Plato has

Plutarch speaks in the sarfie way, a good passage (Rep. 330 C) on

Vita Catonis Censoris, c. 1 8, OVTCOS 6 the love of money in men who have

rov irXovrov {rjXos oiidtvl irddei (frv- not inherited but acquired wealth.

(TiKia (TwrjiJifjitvos (K TTJS 6\\u&gt;8ovs They love it not only for its use-

Kni dvpaiov S6r)s fn-fiffoSios ftrriv. fulness, but also as a man loves

Obviously a desire for unlimited his child as being their own cre-

gain may exist where there is ation.

ON ARISTOTLE S THEORY. 131

he censures the unsound form of the Science of Supply.
The first objection applies especially to usury ; for it
is even more unnatural to make the barren metal breed
money, than to win it from the process of exchange.
Aristotle, it should be added, is conscious that other
social functions besides that of exchange may be exercised
with a view to unlimited gain those, for example, of the
general or the physician (i. 9. 1258 a 8 sqq.). The same
thing might of course be said of agriculture.

He misinterprets the work of the intermediary between
producers who purchases, not because he needs the thing
for his own consumption or use, but in order to resell, and
whose profit is in reality payment for a social service, not
something filched from his neighbour l . It may well be
true that there are elements in the organization of commerce
and modes of commercial operation which represent no
social service 2 ; it might also be a gain to the world if com
merce were confined within the limits which considerations
of good life impose ; but as to this Aristotle does not
observe that some States may with advantage to them
selves and to other States extend their production and
exchange of products beyond the limit of their own needs,
or, in other words, may trade and manufacture for other
communities which are less favourably situated for carrying
on trade and manufactures 3 .

His principle that land and water are the true sources of
wealth leads him a step further in c. n 4 , where he ranges
among unsound sources of Supply labour rendered for

1 Plato had, as we have seen, 3 He, in fact, forbids his best
construed the social function of State to trade for others (4 (7). 6.
K&lt;nnj\fia in a truer way (Laws 918 1327 a 27, uvrfj yap fftgropucqp, dXX.
B-E). ov rols XXotr, Set flvai TIJV TrdXti/).

2 E.g. the practice of cornering, * In this chapter also he places
which consists in buying up so the cutting of timber and quarrying
much of a commodity as gives or mining in a class apart as par-
the buyers command over the taking both of the natural and the
market for that particular com- unnatural Science of Supply
modity (Tzmes, June 26, 1883). which is strange, as he recognizes
Aristotle seems to regard Kanrj\iKf) the use of Nature s products not
Xpr)(jLa.Tio-TiKT] as being little else only for food, but for other ser-
than systematic cornering. vices to man.

K 3

132 COMMENTS

wages (uKrOapvia) in other words, the acquisition of
money through placing at the service of others for pay
(i. e. exchanging) bodily or mental aptitudes. It is not
easy to see why a man should not be allowed to exchange
his labour, just as much as the produce of his vines, for
any commodities he requires, even on Aristotle s own
principle (ocrov yap l&lt;avov avrols, avaynalov i]v TToielvdai ri]v
a\\ayi]v, i. 9. 1257 a x ^)- There need not be in labouring
for hire any such desire for an indefinite amount of coin as
Aristotle connects with the unsound form of the Science of
Supply. In the Ninth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics
(9. i. 1164 a 22 sqq.) the receipt of money from pupils
appears to be contemplated and not objected to 1 . In the
Fourth (the old Seventh) Book of the Politics (4 (7). 8.i328b
20 sq. : cp. 9. 1329 a 35) artisans and day-labourers (who
are said to practise working for hire, i. n. 1258 b 25)
are held to be necessary to the State. He seems to have
been lured back for the moment in the First Book of
the Politics to an old doctrine of Socrates, which Plato
had also accepted, though only in a cursory way and with
a slight modification 2 . Aristotle, we must remember, has

1 Compare the doctrine of the quod ex agricolatione contingit.

Epicurean Philodemus as to the 2 Cp. Laws 842 C, yrjs yap KOI

best source of KTTJTIKT] (Philodem. e /c 6a\u.TTT)s rols TrXeiorois TU&gt;I&gt; EXXjj-

de VirtUtibus et Vitiis, lib. ix. : vasv earl Karea-Ktvacrfieva TO. Trep) rfjv

see Schomann, Opusc. 3. 240, rpo^i/ TOUT-CIS 8e ( but for my citi-

whose completion of the text is zens ) pdvov tn yrjs. Except in this

followed) : jrpa&gt;Tov 8e KOI KaXXicr- respect, Plato approves of much

TOV OTTO Xoyo&gt;i&gt; &lt;j)i\ocr6(f)a&gt;v avdpdcriv the same sources of supply as

8eKTiKols p.eTadtoofj.fvoi (fj.eTadi.do- Aristotle. His citizens in the

fifvo)i&gt; ?) dvTififTaXap.^dvfii (V)(a- Laws are to be yeuipyol KOL voxels

picrrdfrara, ota] fjLera tre/Sacr/ioC KOI /xfXirroupyot (842 D, a passage

TravT(\a)s tyevero EmKovpco \6ya&gt;v which perhaps suggested Pol. I.

8e a\r)6i.va&gt;v KOI d$ti\ovtiKu&gt;v Km II. 1258 b I2-2O), and to have

(rv\hrjl38r)v (Ine iv drapu^v [end] nothing to do with vavK\riptKa KOI

TO ye 5ia cro0toTtK&jy Kai dya&gt;vi(rTiK.a&gt;v f[j.TropiKa KOL KanrjXevTiKa KOI iravdo-

ou8fi&gt; eort /3eXrtoj/ TOV 8ia 8np.oKOTTL- Kevirfis KOI T(\coviKa Kai /j.(Ta\\fi(is

K&gt;V KOI crvK.o&lt;j)avTiKu&gt;v. For the (contrast Pol. I. 11. 1258 b 27 sq.)

views of the Stoics as to the legi- Kai Samo-pn /cat eVtVoKot TOKOI. Cp.

timate forms of KTTJTIKI ], see Zeller, also Menexen. 237 E sqq. Theo-

Stoics, E. T. p. 269 n. Columella phrastus held similar language

(de Re Rustica, praefatio, 10) about the earth, if Bernays is

comes to the conclusion super- right (Theophrastos iiber From-

est unum genus liberale et inge- migkeit, p. 92) in ascribing Por-

nuum rei familiaris augendae phyr. de Abstin. 2. 32 to him. We

ON ARISTOTLE S THEORY. 133

here the ideal State in view ; he does not seem in the
Ethics to impose these limits on getting. There is no
hint, at any rate, in the account of the liberal man
there given, that his getting (Ar/\/as) will conform to the
standard here laid down. He will not be, like the man
who lives only for gain (6 ctio-xpoKepS^s), a lender of small
sums at usurious interest, or the keeper of a house of ill-
fame, nor will he be a gambler, or a thief, or a robber
(Eth. Nic. 4. 3. H2ib 31 sqq. : 1122 a 7): on the contrary,
he.. will win an income from legitimate sources, such as
property of his own, and will regard the winning of an
income, not as a noble thing, but as a necessity, if he is
to have the means of giving (1130 a 34). Not a word is
said of his abstaining from lending money at moderate
interest. Aristotle s language, in fact, implies that it is
not illiberal to do this.

We now know what the Science of Supply properly is, TheSci-
and are in a position to settle its relation to Household "

Science. Even its sound form is not in strictness a part of be subor-
Household Science : it is rather its condition one of those Household
&v OVK avev which form no part of the thing whose existence Science.
they make possible l . What it provides, Household Science
uses. If the Science of Supply does much for Household
Science, this in its turn does much for it imposes a limit
on its efforts and adjusts them to the true end. Household
Science has higher functions to discharge in regulating the
relations of husband and wife, father and child, but one of
its functions is to act as the intermediary by whose agency
the end of the State is impressed on the business of Supply.
But for it, the Science of Supply might resort to false
sources and false methods of supply, and fail to pause when
the amount has been obtained which is most favourable to
good life. Household Science is possessed of the true end
of human life is an ethical science, which the other is not.

find similar expressions in Oecon. Supply provides instruments

I. 2. 1343 b I. (opyava) or Matter (v\rj), or both,

1 The question raised in 1.8. is not distinctly settled.
1256 a 5, whether the Science of

134 ATMS

It is subordinate to 75-0X17-1*77 (Eth. Nic. T. i. 1094 b 2), if it
is not, indeed, a part of the political section of TroAm/cTj
(Eth. Nic. 6. 8. 1141 b 31) ; in any case, its principles are
in accord with those of TroAtrtK??, from which it differs in
the sphere of its action, not in aim.

One might, indeed, ask seeing that the State, no less than
the household, may mistake the true nature of the Science
of Supply and obtain commodities from improper sources
and to an unlimited extent why the so-called Household
Science is viewed as connected especially, if not exclu
sively, with the household ; why it is not the concern of
the statesman at least as much as the householder ; why
economy is not public as well as private. If the eleventh
chapter of the First Book of the Politics is genuine, this
question had already occurred to Aristotle (see 1259 a 2I
sqq.). It is clear, however, from the so-called Second Book
of the Oeconomics, that the side of Household Science
which relates to the State had come to receive more atten
tion by the time it was written.

Aristotle s Aristotle s aim evidently is, in the first place, to lead back
inquiry. the Science of Supply to nature. He had not, however,
fully worked out his conception of nature, or freed it from
inconsistency and obscurity. He reckons as natural, on the
one hand, whatever contributes to that which is best for the
given species in the case of man, whatever contributes to
good life ; and if he had held to this point of view, he might
have arrived at the broad and sound conclusion that trade and
the other modes of Supply whose legitimacy is in question
are natural, if and so far as they contribute to the end of
the State (i.e. to civilization rightly understood). But then
he also regards as natural that which is coeval with birth
(i. 5. 1254 a 23), primitive, ancient (cp. 4 (7). 10. 1329 a
40 sqq.); that which is given by nature herself (i. 8.
I256b 7); that which conforms to the primordial law of
zoological sustenance, which prescribes that sustenance is
to be won from the residue of the substance from which
the creature springs (i. 10. 1258 a 36) in the case of man,
from earth and water; and again the necessary. From

OF ARISTOTLE. 135

these points of view, commerce in its more developed form
and labouring for hire are both of them regarded as con
trary to nature.

If Aristotle had consistently adhered to the view that the
primitive is the natural, we might have found him denying the
naturalness of the City-State in comparison with the house
hold 1 , and of the pursuit of good life in comparison with that
of mere life. But this he fortunately does not do. His
examination of the relative justifiability of the various
methods by which human wants are supplied is an excep
tion to his general treatment of political and social questions;
a standard is applied which is quite other than the standard
usually applied the end of the State. The attempt to trace
in the mode by which the nascent or infant animal is
sustained the type of all natural sustenance seems especially
fanciful 2 .

He has, however, a further aim to show that even the
sound and natural form of the Science of Supply is not in
strictness a part of Household Science 3 , but a dependent
science which accepts its guidance. It is true that just as
the householder has to see that the members of his house
hold enjoy health, so it is his business to see that they
possess a due supply of necessary and useful commodities ;
but it is the business of the physician to produce health in
them, and it is the business of the Science of Supply in
league with nature, not of Household Science, to produce
those commodities. Not only did the current view of
householding, with which Aristotle himself seems occa
sionally to fall in (e.g. Pol. 3. 4. 1377 b 24 : Eth. Nic. i. i.
1094 a 9 : cp. Oecon. i. i. 1343 a 8), teach a different lesson,

1 He seems to approach this was extremely scarce and dear
view in Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 16 at Athens. But popular feeling
sqq. always ran high against the corn-

2 It is just possible that this dealers, as we see from Lysias
censure of KcmrjXiKr) xprjjuaTioriKq oration against them,
waspennedduringthe period (330- 3 The Stoics appear to have
326 B.C. : Schafer, Demosthenes distinguished between oiKovofjuKT)
3- 2 - 339) when, owing, as was and xpq/zaTtoTiKj? no ^ ess than
thought, to the arts of the corn- Aristotle (Stob. Eel. Eth. 2. 6. 6 :
merchants or the devices of huck- p. 51 Meineke).

stering officials in Egypt, corn

136 AIMS

but writers like Xenophon had put the contrary opinion in
the mouth of Socrates (Xen. Oecon. c. 6. 4 : cp. c. 7. 15,
and c. n. 9) and others (Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 23, ov TOVS
TrAeTcrrct tyjovras KCU (/wAarroyray TrAeTcrra et^ai/zoyeo-rarous
aAA bs av Krao-0ai re irAeio-ra Swrjrai crvv ra&gt;
w ra&gt; KaA&lt;, roSroy eya&gt;
Plato, however, had already
declared against the unlimited pursuit of wealth (Rep.
591 D E) : OVKOVV, enroi;, Kal Tr]v v rrj rS&gt;v xprffjiaTcov Kr??(m
re Kal ^v^&lt;pu&gt;viav ; KCU TOV O-/KOV TOV 7rArj0ous OVK
rov TU&gt;V TTO\\U&gt;V fjLaKapLa-p,ov aireipov av^r/crei,
OVK oto/juu, e 0?]. AAA d7TOj8Ae 7ra)i; ye,
Trpos rr)f ey awrw TroAtretay Kat ^uAarrcoy /xry rt TrapaKivfj
avrov r&v eKet 8ta TtXijOos oiucrta? 17 5t dAtyor^ra, ov ra) Kvfiepv&v
Tipoa-Oijcrei KCU avaAcotret r?j? ovartas K.a.6 ocrov av olos r ^ 2 .
With this Aristotle would agree, but he adds that acquiring
lies, in strictness, altogether outside the province of the
head of the household, as such, and that his function is
to use the commodities, for the provision of which the
Science of Supply is responsible, though even this is not his
highest function, which lies . rather in the government of
persons, and especially of free persona, than in the care for,
or use of things. Xenophon had already made it one of the
duties of the head of the household to seek to teach his
slaves justice (Oecon. c. 14. 4): Aristotle makes -it his
main duty to develope in all the members of the household
all the virtue of which they are capable.

The householder, as Aristotle conceives him, is by no
means to be indifferent whether the household under his
charge does or does not possess an adequate supply of
things useful and necessary for good life : on the con
trary, he is to see that this is forthcoming ; but further
than this he is not to go in quest of commodities. He
certainly will not hold, with Cato the Censor, whose ideas

1 It should be noticed, however, (c. 7).

that in the short treatise on the 2 Cp. Laws 870 A, 17 r5&gt;v xprj-

Lacedaemonian constitution Xe- pdrcav rfjs aTrXr/orou Kal

nophon praises Lycurgus for his KTTJO-CQJS epatras pvpiovs e

discouragement of money-making 8vvafj,is.

OF ARISTOTLE. 137

on household management were as clearly pronounced as
on public affairs, that the man truly wonderful and godlike
and fit to be registered in the lists of glory, was he, by
whose accounts it should at last appear that he had more
than doubled what he had received from his ancestors 1 ;
nor would he labour with his domestics, and afterwards sit
down with them, and eat the same kind of bread and drink
of the same wine 2 ; nor would it be said of him with truth,
that he amassed a great deal and used but little 3 .
Aristotle would have found more to praise in Cato s untiring
care for his son s due nurture and education, though he
himself would commit the education of boys, when past a
certain age, to the common schools of the State.

The limitations which Aristotle imposes on the Science
of Supply remind us of a reflection of Wordsworth s in the
Eighth Book of the Excursion :

I rejoice,

Measuring the force of those gigantic powers,
That by the thinking mind have been compelled
To serve the will of feeble-bodied man ;
For with the sense of admiration blends
The animating hope that time may come
When, strengthened, yet not dazzled, by the might
Of this dominion over nature gained,
Men of all lands shall exercise the same
In due proportion to their country s need ;
Learning, though late, that all true glory rests,
All praise, all safety, and all happiness,
Upon the moral law.

Aristotle, however, goes far beyond Wordsworth, though
the latter forgets no less than the former that the accumu
lation of capital in one country beyond its needs may well be
useful in aiding the material and moral development of other
communities. It can hardly have been true of commerce
even in Aristotle s day, that it had passed far beyond its
sound original function of supplying men s needs into an
ingenious artificial contrivance which served only the pur-

1 Plutarch, Cato Censor c. 21 s Ibid. , Comparison of Cato and
(Langhorne s translation). Aristides, c. 4.

2 Ibid. c. 3.

138 SLAVES.

pose of enriching its practitioners indefinitely at the expense
of each other or of other men ; but, at any rate, his censure
of labour for hire and of lending money at interest is wholly
mistaken. So far as he asserts the principle that commo
dities are made for man, not man for the multiplication of
commodities that the pursuit of wealth, which so easily
masters and moulds society to its purpose, is to be governed
by the true interests of civilization, or, as Wordsworth says,
the moral law, he is on solid ground ; but in his applica
tion of this principle, and indeed in his combination of it with
others of more doubtful authority, he has been led into error.
We may trace, perhaps, in the background the influence
of prejudices which he shared with his age and nation,
and which made a dispassionate examination of this subject
unusually difficult for him. He appears to understand
better the true nature of Wealth than the laws of its pro
duction or the office of Capital. Political Economy almost
originated with him, and the clearness of his economical
vision in some directions is balanced by blindness in others.
He is besides too much inclined to cut all societies after the
same pattern. Some States seem marked out by nature for
industry and commerce, others for agriculture ; and the
world would be a loser if one and the same career were
enforced on all.

Status of So far we have studied the classes concerned with trade
cerned " an ^ production in the best State of Aristotle rather with
with neces- respect to the source from which they are to be recruited,

sary work J . ......

some to the services they are to render, and the limitations under
someto be w ^^ c ^ they are to act, than with respect to their place in
slaves. the State-system, or the connexion between them and
the other agencies of the State. We possess, indeed, but
few data as to a large section of these classes that which
comprises the merchant (ejuTropo?), the artisan, the day-
labourer, the shopkeeper 1 . On the other hand, the
cultivator of the soil and the domestic attendant have their

1 How near all x e P v ^ Tff i ar &gt;d come to slaves, we see from 3. 4.
among them the ftavawos Te^virrjs, 1277 a 37 sqq.

SLAVERY. 139

lot pretty clearly marked out. They are to be slaves not
all of them, indeed, private slaves, for the territory of the
State is to be divided into two parts whether equal or not,
we are not told the one to be retained in the hands of the
State, and itself subdivided into two sections, devoted respec
tively to the maintenance of the worship of the gods and to
the supply of the public meal-tables ; the other to be allotted
to individuals in several ownership. Both parts are to be
cultivated by slaves ; the public land by public, the private
by private slaves. Dependent serfs (TreptotKot) of barbarian
origin might be employed in the cultivation of the soil ;
but it was better to give this function to slaves (4 (7). 10.
1330 a 25 sqq.).

We observe, when we turn to the examination of the
legitimacy of slavery contained in tfrelMrst Book, that
it is treated as entirely a domestic institution. The case
of public slaves is left wholly out of consideration. It is
not till the chapter on Phaleas in the Second Book (2. 7.
1267 b 1 6 sq.) that we get any hint of the arrangement
adopted in the Fourth (the old Seventh) Book.

We do not know with certainty who were the impugners Slavery
of the naturalness and justice of the institution of slavery j^^i* 1
referred to by Aristotle (i. 3. I253b 20 sq.) 1 . The distinc- justice
tion between nature and convention, which their view pre- byname
supposes, is one recognized by many schools. A Sophist inquirers.
may well have struck the first blow. Some Sophists, indeed,
denied that the Naturally Just exists ; for them all right was
based on convention only; but those who held this view,
cannot be referred to here, for in this passage we evidently
have to do with men who accepted the existence of a Natural
Justice, which slavery contravened. Others, however,-
did not go so far ; and it may well be that in the general
reference of existing institutions, and indeed of social order

1 Were they the same as those neighbours involves the greatest

who are mentioned in 4 (7). 2. injustice, while the exercise of no-

13243 35, as maintaining that the Airt/o) apx 7 ? over others interferes

exercise of despotic rule over with the ruler s felicity ?

140 THE JUSTICE OF SLAVERY

as a whole, to custom and tradition, or even compact, as
opposed to nature, which marks the Sophistic epoch, the
institution of slavery did not escape without challenge.
The Sophist Lycophron denied the reality of the distinc
tion between the noble and the ill-born l , a distinction
nearly related to that between slave and free (Pol. i. 6.
1255 a 32 sqq.). Gorgias praised Rhetoric as the best of
all arts in words that remind us of Aristotle s language
here because it made all other things its slaves, not by
compulsion, but of their own free will (Plato, Phileb. 58
A-B). The Cynics, again, might be referred to, were it not
that they were more given to asserting the indifference
of positive institutions than to attacking them 2 . We can
trace among the followers of the Cynic Diogenes, however,
one opponent of slavery Onesicritus, who accompanied the
Oriental expedition of Alexander ; for Strabo (15. p. 710),
in mentioning an authority who affirmed that the Indians
had no slaves, adds but Onesicritus alleges that this was
the case only in the territory of Musicanus, and regards
the absence of slavery as an excellent thing : he finds, m
fact, many other excellent institutions in that region and
describes it as especially well-ordered. It appears from
Strabo, p. 701, that in the part of India referred to, it was
the custom for the young to render similar services to
those elsewhere rendered by serfs, such as the Cretan
Aphamiotae and the Helots of the Lacedaemonian State.

Apart, however, from the movement of philosophical
opinion, much had happened, and was happening every
day in Greece, to suggest doubts in the minds of men re
specting the institution. Dio Chrysostom (Or. 15. 239 M)
refers to the many Athenians who, in consequence of the
defeat at Syracuse, had to serve as slaves in Sicily and the

1 Aristot. Fragm. 82. 1490 a 10. Diogenes, we are told, was es-

2 Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. i. 230 (2nd pecially given to distinguishing
edit.) : cp. 208. 8 : 238. 5, where between ra Kara VO/JLOV and TO KOTO.
the language of Antisthenes and (frvo-iv (Diog. Laert. 6. 71) : so far
Diogenes seems to imply that the as this goes, therefore, he might
wise man is not only not a natural be referred to here.

slave, but not a slave at all.

IMPUGNED. 141

Peloponnese, and to the case of the Messenians (242 M), who
after long years of slavery became again free citizens ; and
he notices how narrowly the whole body of slaves at Athens
missed enfranchisement, when the Athenians offered them
freedom after Chaeroneia on condition of their serving
against Macedon, and would have given it if the war had
continued (240 M). It was just the facility of the transi
tion from slavery to freedom, and from freedom to slavery,
and the dependence of men s status on accident and supe
rior force and the will of men (cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 a 30 :
Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 14), that would give rise to the view that
it was based on convention, not nature. A fragment from
the Ayx/o-?;? of Anaxandrides* (Meineke, Fragm. Com.
Graec. 3. 162) gives expression to what must have been a
common feeling :

OVK ecm 8ov\a&gt;v, u&gt; yaff, ovfta.fj.ov n6\is, &gt;

TVXIJ ^ it&ora /zera0epe&lt;. ra &lt;ra&gt;/*ara,
TroXXot Se vvv fj.fi&gt; dcriv OVK fXevdepoi,
fls ravpiov fie Soimety, ei r els Tpirrjv
ijf dyopa Ke\pr]i&gt;raC rbv yap oia/ca crrpe cpet

&lt;5ai /ia&gt;j&gt; eKucrru.

So again Philemon, Fr. 39 (Meineke. Fragm. Com. Graec.
4- 47) :-

Kav 8ov\os 1) TIS, o~dpKa TTJV UVTTJV fx.fi,
(pvo fi yap ovdfis 8ov\os eyfvrjdr) wore
f] 8 av TVXI TO aco/xa KareSovXcicraro.

According, again, to the Scholiast on Aristot. Rhet. i.
13, the saying God made all men free : nature has made
no man a slave (eAeufle pou? d^Ke iravTas 0eoV ovoeva SoCAoy
fj &lt;J)v(TLs TTfTrotrjKfv) occurred in the Messenian Oration of
the orator Alcidamas. It is, perhaps, to these words of
Alcidamas that Aristotle refers in the passage we are con
sidering (1.3. 1253 b 2O ) 3 - It is certain, at all events, that

1 So think Henkel (Studien, p. that though Alcidamas may well

124, n. 11) and SusemihL Zeller, have used in this oration the ex-

however, thinks (Gr. Ph. i. 1007. pression ascribed to him by the

2) that Aristotle is not referring Scholiast, he can hardly have

to Alcidamas specially in this gone so far as to assail the insti-

passage of the Politics : he holds tution of slavery, when seeking to

142 THE JUSTICE OF SLAVERY

the restoration of Messenia to independence must have
brought the question prominently before men s minds.
Many who did not go so far as to impugn the naturalness
of the institution as a whole, appear to have contested the
justice of enslavement through war. Thus Callicratidas,
when pressed on the capture of Methymna to sell the
citizens as slaves, declared that, while he was in command,
no Greek should be enslaved if he could help it, though
he nevertheless sold the Athenian garrison as slaves the
day after (Xen. Hell. i. 6. 14-15). Agesilaus gave utter
ance to similar sentiments (Xen. Ages. 7. 6) 1 . Epaminon-
das and Pelopidas are said by Plutarch to have enslaved
no captured cities (Pelop. et Marcell. Inter se Compar. c. i,
Mdp/ceAAos juey ev TroAAcu? Tro Aecriy iTro^etptots yeyo/xeWi?
tTroirja-fv, E?ra/ J ieti a)Z 8a? 8e /cat rie/\.o7u8as ovbtlva
KparrjcravTts a.TTKTivav ovbe TroAeis i7Z&gt;8pa7To8iVayro).
The severities of this nature practised by Philip of Mace-
don indicate, therefore, a decided retrogression in inter
national policy.

Even those who defended enslavement through war
did so only in a qualified way, for they condemned the
enslavement of Greeks through war (i. 6. 1255 a 2I SQ^-)*
Enslavement for debt had been abolished at Athens by
Solon 2 , though elsewhere it may have been legal 3 . The
law itself both at Athens and in other States drew a tacit
distinction between the slave by birth (6 (pvo-et bovXos
yeuo /xei os) and the slave not descended from slave-parents
by making the former incapable of becoming a citizen (Dio
Chrys. Or. 15. 239 M) 4 . Dio Chrysostom, in his Fifteenth
Oration, mentions a general feeling that the slave by birth
was a slave in the truest sense, but then he goes on to reason

win from the Lacedaemonians the 2 It survived in a single case

recognition of Messenian inde- only (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq.

pendence. As to the oration in 3. 58. 15).

question, see Vahlen, der Rhetor 3 Ibid. 58. 20.

Alkidamas, p. I4sqq. * There seems to have been a

1 Plato declares against the special name for the slave by

enslavement of Greeks in wars birth, or dov\fi&lt;8ov\os. He was

between one Greek State and called crivSpav (Athen. Deipn. 267

another (Rep. 471 A). C).

IMPUGNED. 143

that slaves by birth are descended from those who have
been enslaved through war, and that this form of slavery,
the oldest and that which has given birth to all the rest V
is very weak in point of justice (243 M) ; and thus he
arrives at the conclusion (243 M) that the true slave is
the man who is unfree and servile in soul a conclusion
possibly suggested by Aristotle s examination of the
subject, though arrived at in a different way.

If we add that the form which slavery assumed In the
Lacedaemonian State gave rise to an especial amount of de
bate (Plato, Laws 776 C), we shall see that the institution
was undergoing a rigorous examination, in the course of
which one form of it after another was being weighed in the
balance and found wanting, and that first enslavement for
debt, then the enslavement of Greeks 2 , then enslavement
through war, were successively being eliminated, so that a
total condemnation of the institution might well seem to
be at hand. Hence a careful investigation of its true basis,
such as that which Aristotle made, was especially timely.

Both Xenophon and Plato furnished him with some hints Reinvesti-
on the subject. Xenophon had insisted that rule should, g ^ ltl n ; f
if possible, be so exercised as to win willing obedience from slavery by
the ruled, and had shown how the master might be a means n
of developing virtue in his slaves. Plato had, in one and
the same dialogue (the Republic), made it a distinguishing
feature of the ideal State not to enslave the class which
provided it with necessary or useful commodities (TO
Xprnj.aTHTTLK.6v) 3 , and also pointed to the man in whom
there is a natural weakness of the higher principle as a

1 He overlooks the fact that for another purpose.

slavery originating in voluntary 3 Rep. 547 C. This class (the

surrender and slavery for debt third) is probably conceived as

could not be said to have de- Hellenic, like the two higher

veloped out of war. classes, and the fact that it is not

2 Cp. Levit. 25. 44 : Both thy a slave-class in the ideal State of
bondmen and thy bondmaids the Republic does not necessarily
which thou shall have shall be imply the non-existence of slavery
of the heathen that are round in this State : on the contrary,
about you ; of them shall ye buy slavery is here and there tacitly
bondmen and bondmaids. I implied to exist in it (e.g. Rep.
have already quoted this passage 549 A).

144 ARISTOTLE DEFENDS

being designed by nature to be enslaved to another who
can supply that deficiency (Rep. 590 C-D : cp. Polit,
309 A). This view of the institution, which, as has been
remarked, probably suggested Aristotle s doctrine of natural
slavery, seems, however, to be lost sight of in the Laws,
where little, if any, attention appears to be paid to the
ethical interests of the slave.

Aristotle It is on these foundations that Aristotle builds. He con-
but reforms sents to retain the institution in his best State on condition
slavery. o f a complete reform, which would restore the willingness
of the relation by making it advantageous both to master
and slave. Natural slavery presupposed, according to him,
not only a low intellectual level in the slave, but high
moral and intellectual excellence in the master. The
raison d etre of slavery was to make a noble life possible
for the master, and if the master could not, or did not, live
such a life, slavery failed to achieve the end of its existence.
Aristotle would not have been satisfied to incorporate in
his best State a relation which, though necessary, was not
advantageous to both the parties to it. Indeed, it is less
on the social necessity of slavery than on the benefits
which it confers on master and slave, that he insists. Thus,
while he argues in the First Book (1.4. 1253 b 23 sqq.)
that the slave is a necessity to Household Science, he allows
in the Fourth (the old Seventh) the substitution of serfs for
slaves, so far as the cultivation of the soil is concerned
(4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sqq.). The necessity of slavery to
^ ancient society has perhaps been somewhat overrated.
Coloni seem to have served its purpose in the later
days of the Roman Empire as well as slaves. The sub-
missiveness of the hewers of wood and drawers of water
was the important thing, and this was rather a matter of
nationality than of civil status. If they were not sub
missive, we know from a variety of instances that the
status of slavery was but a poor security for their obedience
or tranquillity.

Aristotle has already in the Second Chapter of the First

BUT REFORMS SLAVERY. 145

Book recognized as the constituent elements of the house
hold the relations of husband and wife and master and
slave, and treated the one relation as equally necessary and
natural with the other, the master s intelligence and the
slave s bodily strength being mutually complementary and
indispensable, just as the union of male and female is
necessary for the purpose of reproduction. The naturalness
of slavery is thus already established, and it may be asked
why the question should be again taken up in c. 3. The
answer probably is, that in c. 2 Aristotle deals with the
question of slavery only in course of proving the natural
ness of the State, and that in conformity with his usual
practice he is not content to dispense with a special ex
amination of this particular question apart from all others,
which he conducts wholly without reference to the result
already hastily reached.

In tracing the course of the investigation respecting
slavery in c. 3 (1253 b J 4 s^-) ^ must be borne in mind that
Aristotle is testing not one opinion but two not alone the
view of those who asserted that slavery is contrary to nature
(which is the more interesting of the two contentions to us),
but also the view of the Platonic Socrates, who had said
that rule over slaves is a science and identical with the rule
of the householder, statesman, and king. It is thus as
much his purpose to show that the rule over slaves is
nothing exalted and this he shows by his definition of
the slave (c. 4. 1253 b 2 3~ 12 54 a 17) and by occasional
hints later on (1254 a 24 sqq. : 1255 b 33 sqq.)^a_s,_that
there is a natural kind of slavery.

His first inquiry is, what is the nature and function of the
slave? his next, is such a being forthcoming? He deals with
the former question first, and starts from two propositions,
which for the moment he assumes as true, though he will
later on see reason to modify them i. that Property is
a part of the Household : 2. that the Science of acquiring
property (in the sense of things necessary for living and living
well) is a part of the Science of Household Management
(otKovojuta). He then proceeds to say that just as arts with

VOL. I. L

146 THE NATURAL SLAVE

some single definite end stand in need of instruments for
the accomplishment of that end, so does Household Science,
though it is not, strictly speaking, an Art, and its end is
broader. The slave, he goes on to show, is one of the
animate instruments which Household Science needs and
an article of household property, but he is an exceptional
kind of instrument, an instrument prior to other instruments,
and an instrument of action, not of production ; and being
an article of property, he stands to his master in a peculiarly
close relation he is a part of him and wholly his.

The next question is is any human being so constituted
by nature? As nature always does that which is best for
each thing and that which is just, this question resolves
itself into another is any human being in existence for
whom it is best and also just that he should be placed in
this position ? We have here a question of fact, and one
would have expected it to be answered by a direct appeal
to facts, and by that alone. But Aristotle says (5. 1254 a
20), that it is one which it is not difficult to answer, whether
by process of reasoning (rw Ao yw), or by noting actual facts
(ra yt^o/xeva). The thing both must be, if something quite
contrary to analogy is not to take place, and it also, as a
matter of fact, is.

Ruling and being ruled is not only a necessary but an
advantageous thing ; and in some cases a destination for
the one position or the other appears immediately on birth.
A ruling element and a ruled appears wherever a Whole
proceeds from the union of a plurality of elements ; and
thus it is not surprising that there are many different kinds
of ruling and ruled elements, varying in excellence according
to the function which ruler and ruled unite to discharge.
We need not reject slavery as unnatural, because we do
not rank the relation of master and slave with the rule
of the householder, or the statesman, or the king. We can
trace a kind of rule even in things inanimate ; we can
trace ruling and ruled elements in an animal ; here we find
both the despotic and the political form of rule, the rule
of the soul over the body being of the former kind, that of

DOES SUCH A BEING EXIST? 147

the rational over the appetitive part being of the latter ; and
in both cases, the relation is natural and advantageous.
The same thing appears in the relation of man to the
other animals. The tame are better than the wild, and
it is advantageous to them to be ruled by man ; what holds
of the better, however, is natural. So again, the male sex
is naturally stronger than the female ; consequently, the
male rules, the female is ruled. The same thing holds
between one human being and another, irrespective of sex.
The naturalness of rule does not depend on its being of the
highest type, but on its adjustment to the interval between
ruler and ruled. If there are human beings who are as
far inferior to others as the body is to the soul, or as the
lower animals are to man, then the relation of rule which
obtains between soul and body, and man and other animals,
will be properly applicable to them and will be natural
and for their good. This is the case with human beings
whose best function is the use of the body. They are fit
only to belong to another ; they are but little above the
lower animals : the only psychological difference between
them and the lower animals is that they can listen to reason,
though they have it not, whereas animals follow passion.
In use and, where Nature succeeds in her aim, in bodily
aspect, they differ little from tame animals; their strength,
and their stoop are points of resemblance. In their case
slavery is advantageous to the slave and just.

The question then arises, how it is that so many deny
the justice and therefore the naturalness of slavery. The
reason is that there is a kind of slavery which rests only on
convention. A law exists, not based on Nature, but only
on agreement, which confers on victors in war a property
in the vanquished and all they possess. The justice of this
law is impugned by many who occupy themselves with law ;
and it is true that it cannot be seriously defended except
on the ground that superiority in force implies superiority
in virtue. This is the common premiss from which the
disputants on either side must start, if their arguments are
to have any weight ; and it is on superiority of virtue that

L 1

148 ARISTOTLE S DEFENCE

Aristotle bases natural slavery. His view is confirmed by the
tacit agreement of the disputants on this point and on this
- point only. But there is another view put forward. Some
claim that this kind of slavery is just, simply because it is
allowed by law. To them the legal is the just. But then the
particular application of the law may not be just, for the war
may have been begun unjustly, or again persons may be
enslaved in this way : who are incapable of becoming slaves,
like the heaven-descended Hecuba. And this would be
admitted by these inquirers. Thus, by this path also we
arrive at the conclusion that the true test of just freedom
and just slavery is to be found in relative goodness and
badness. Aristotle, in fact, finds his view of slavery con
firmed by Common Opinion ; but instead of basing Natural
Slavery, as most did, on the extraction of the persons
enslaved, or the circumstances of their enslavement, he
bases it on their nature and the nature of their enslavers.

We see that the objections to slavery current in Aris
totle s day were objections based on its alleged unfairness to
the slave rather than on the interest of the community.
That the captive taken in war should be enslaved seemed
hard to many, especially if he were a Greek : the right to
enslave was too exorbitant a privilege to be granted to
those who could only boast a superiority of force ; if this
was the basis of the right, it had no more to say for itself
than tyranny 1 , which met with universal condemnation.
Others passed the same criticism on the whole institution
of slavery, however it originated. Force and injustice lay
at its root. Thus slavery was attacked, not on the ground
of its social or economical inexpediency, but on the ground
of justice and the right of human beings to have their
interests considered, and not to be forced to be parties to
an one-sided bargain 2 .

Aristotle s defence of slavery and his reform of it are

1 Cp. Pol. 7 (5). 10. I3l3a 9, av 2 Compare the use of SovXda,
e 81 drraTr)s aprj TIS 77 pias, fjdt) Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1 133 a l an d
8oKei TOVTO (ivai rvpavvis. SouXor, Pol. 2. 12. 1274 a l8.

AND REFORM OF SLAVERY. 149

designed to meet objections of this nature. He is too fully
convinced of the expediency of the remodelled institution
in the interest of the slave to make any point of its indispensa-
bility to society ; on this he touches only incidentally while
seeking to ascertain the definition of the slave. To learn
what a slave is and then to ask whether there are those to
whom such a position brings advantage, is all that is
necessary for the full treatment of the question of the
naturalness of slavery. If the slave is a gainer, society, it is
taken for granted, cannot be a loser. Aristotle s object is to
show that slavery, rightly constituted, is not an one-sided
bargain for the slave at all. The natural slave has not that
part of the soul (TO /SovAeuriKo v), which is necessary to make
moral virtue complete. He gains, therefore, by being - j
linked to some controlling force possessing that which he
lacks. Aristotle does not pause to examine whether this
defect of nature could be mended by education ; he implies,
however, that it could not. The human being designed
by nature for slavery, unlike the brute, can apprehend
and listen to reason, but he does not possess reason
(i. 5. 1254 b 22) 1 . Yet he possesses a kind of moral
virtue the kind which enables him to do his work in
subordination to his master the moral virtue, in fact, of a J
subordinate confined to humble functions, and itself of a
humble type. How any form of moral virtue can subsist
in the absence of the deliberative faculty, Aristotle does not
explain, nor how the use of the body is the best that conies
of the slave (TO cbr aiirov /SeAnorof, I. 5. I254b 1 8), if vir
tuous action is not beyond him. There are, indeed, other
indications that it was not possible for Aristotle wholly to
reconcile the two aspects of the slave, as a man and as an
instrument or article of property. In the First Book of the

1 Though Aristotle s tone in what he has said there. He had

this passage in regard to the there allowed to men in contrast

distance between man and brute with brutes a perception of the

differs much from his tone in a good and bad, the just and unjust,

previous chapter of the same book and here he allows even to the

(i. 2. 12533 9 sqq.), he says natural slave a perception of

nothing here that conflicts with reason.

150 ARISTOTLE S DEFENCE

Politics the slave, though the mere animate chattel of his
master, is nevertheless conceived as forming "a. KOIVWVLO. with
him (cp. i. 2. 12520 9, TOVTU&gt;V T&gt;V Svo KOIV&V iG&gt;v : 1.5- !254a.
29, evri KOIVOV: i. 13. 1 260 a 40, KOIVMVOS o?/s), and as united
to him by a dependent friendship (i. 6. 1255 b 13) ; but in
the Fourth (the old Seventh) Property, and consequently, it
would seem, the slave, is implied to be no part of the house
hold (4 (7). 8. 1328 a 28 sqq.) 1 , and KOLvuvia appears to be
pronounced impossible between those whose aim is the best
life and those who have no such aim, unless indeed the
Koivavia of the State is alone here referred to. The dis
tinction between the slave qua slave and the slave, qua
human being, which, whether it be a satisfactory distinction
or not, serves in the Nicomachean Ethics to make the con
tradictions inherent in the position of the slave a little less
glaring, does not appear to be used in the Politics. The same
inconsistency is evident, if we examine Aristotle s conception
of the office of the master in relation to his slave. He is
charged in the First Book with the task of developing in
the slave all the moral virtue of which he is capable, and
thus the relation between them is adjusted to the aim of
good life, and becomes a relation not unworthy of the
husband and father or unfit to find a place in the household
and the State ; but then we find in the Third Book that
the aim of the master in his rule over the slave is primarily
his own advantage and only accidentally that of the slave.
If this is so, and the slave feels it to be so, one may doubt
whether the affectionate reverence and sense of common
interest, which Aristotle hopes to create in the mind of the
slave, would be found in reality to exist, however high the
character of the master might be, and however great the
moral benefits conferred by him. Aristotle s arguments
may perhaps prove that a human being of the stamp of his
natural slave should be subjected to a strict rule; they
do not prove that he should be made an article of property.

1 Aristotle is here insisting on whereas in the First Book he is
the contrast between the higher making the most he can of the
and lower elements of the State, position of the slave.

AND REFORM OF SLAVERY. 151

The ambiguity of the word/_Sor77o(iiAj which was usecLto-.
denote both the relation of an absolute ruler to his subjects
and that of a proprietor to his property, concealed from his
view the vast difference between the two propositions.
From absolute rule (Seo-TroriKr) apyrf) to ownership (8e &lt;m or (to)
is a great and momentous step. We may feel that his
natural slave would be all the better for being ruled by a
man of full virtue (o-novbaios u7rA&lt;2?), but not for being his
chattel l .

Aristotle approached the subject under the influence of
a scientific reaction both against the views of those who,
like some of the Sophists, were inclined to challenge the
claims of every existing institution, and against the views
of those who, like Plato, had dealt very freely with some
institutions of great importance. His bias was in favour
of accepting and amending the institutions to which the
collective experience of his race had given birth, rather
than sweeping them away. He pleaded against Plato for
the continued existence of the parental and conjugal
relations, and he was led on to find good in the relation
of master and slave.

He deserves, however, to be remembered rather as the
authoToT a suggestion for the reformation of slavery than
as the defender of the institution. The slavery he defends
is an ideal slavery which can exist only where the master
is intellectually and morally as high as the slave is low.
Aristotle would find in the Greek society of his own day
as many slave-owners who had no business to own slaves as
slaves who had no business to be enslaved. His theory of
slavery implies, if followed out to its results, the illegitimacy
of the relation of master and slave in a large proportion of
the cases in which it existed. In how many instances

1 The Stoics appear to have vtraratu ?/ orrtrt ^erai fj

distinguished slavery in the sense (fravXr) ova-a Kal avrfj. Aristotle re-

of subjection from slavery in the gards the fieo-TroTiKi} eTriorij/zi; as

sense of possession and subjection q&gt;av\Tj, but hardly Sfmrorfia, when

Diog. Laert. 7. 122, dvai 8e Kal exercised over natural slaves. It

ii\\rjv dov\fiai&gt; (besides the ipso is natural and a means of virtue

facto slavery of the bad) rr\v iv dno- to the slave, and would hardly

Tfi, Kal TplTrjv rfjv fv KTTjcrft Tf KOI be said by him to be q^n/Aij.

152 ARISTOTLE S DEFENCE

would not the master, if judged by his rules, be found unfit
to be a master and the slave unfit to be a slave ! This
would be so even in Greece ; among the barbarians, if we may
judge from a passage in the First Book (i. 2. i252b 6),
natural slavery could not exist, for there that which is
marked out by nature for rule (TO $wo-ei apy^ov) is wanting.
The limitations Aristotle imposed on slavery would pro
bably attract more attention and comment from most of
his contemporaries than his recognition of slavery subject
to those limitations. He confined it to a relatively small
class of human beings to those whose vocation was rude
physical labour, the exercise of mere muscle and sinew.
Human beings fit for no higher work than that whether
Greek or barbarian, and they would commonly be bar
barians were to be slaves. His plan seems to be to
limit the incidence of slavery rather than to lighten its
yoke. He allows, though reluctantly, the substitution of
serfs (irepLOLKOi) for slaves in agriculture. He recommends
that all slaves shall have the hope of freedom held out to
them, as a reward for good conduct 1 (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 32
sq.), but we are not distinctly told whether the master is to
have the right of manumission, nor do we learn whether he
is to have the right to sell, or bequeath, or give away the
slave. There is no indication, however, that Aristotle was
inclined to depart greatly from the general practice of Greece
in relation to the rights of the master over the slave.

All the economical objections to slavery would apply
to the reorganization of it which Aristotle designed.
Agriculture would not prosper in the hands of slaves.
Indeed, in recommending that the cultivators of the soil
in his best State should be slaves, Aristotle extended
slavery to a class which in contemporary Greece was
frequently free. On the other hand, we must bear in mind
that he proposes to limit the number of the slaves in a
State to that which is imperatively requisite for its well-

1 Yet obviously a natural slave natural slave can be fitted by

would ex hypothesi lose by being slavery for the enjoyment of

set free : we infer, therefore, but freedom.
are not distinctly told, that a

AND REFORM OF SLAVERY. 153

being, just as he applies the same limit to Property and
instruments and necessary work generally ; that he
brings even the slaves of the farm within the household
(except of course such as are public slaves), herein true
to the old-fashioned conception of the slave as ot/ceYrjs l ;
and that he is against the employment as slaves, not
merely of those who are not natural slaves, but also of
members of courageous and high-spirited races, like those
which inhabited the barbarous portions of Europe. Thrace,
for instance, would probably be no longer drawn upon
for slaves, and many fine races would escape degradation 2 .
The free population would thus have no cause to feel that
they were oppressing a body of men who deserved, or at
least wished, to be free. They would have been saved the
consciousness of injustice, the terror, suspicion, and conse
quent tendency to cruelty which comes of such a situation
results with which Greece was familiar in the instance of the
Lacedaemonian State. The adoption of Aristotle s reform
would have left but few Hellenic slaves, no slaves possessed
of capacity, none certainly of that gifted or learned sort of
which we hear much in Greece and still more in the
Roman Empire 3 . It is curious, indeed, to notice that
Theophrastus, the disciple of Aristotle, had a slave of
philosophical capacity : sed et Theophrasti Peripatetic!
servus Pompylus, et Zenonis Stoici servus qui Persaeus
vocatus est, et Epicuri cui nomen Mys fuit, philosophi non
incelebres vixerunt (Gell. 2. 18, quoted by Menage on
Diog. Laert. 10. 3). But, if this Pompylus is the Pompylus

1 Cp. Seneca, Epist. 47 : ne brutishness (TO dqpiatftes Km ro
illud quidem videtis quam omnem /3oa-*a//xrtT&&amp;gt;8f?) was no security for
invidiam majores nostri dominis, willing slavery.

omnem contumeliam servis de- 3 Some of these learned slaves

traxerint ? Dominum patrem discharged an useful function in

familiae appellaverunt ; servos Roman society, for they were

(quod etiam in mimis adhuc largely employed in copying MSS.

durat) familiares. The place of the press in our

2 There is a striking descrip- literature was taken by the slaves

tion in Strabo (p. 224) of the
conduct of some refractory Cor-
sican slaves, which shows that
in these European races mere

(Schmidt, Denk- und Glaubens-
freiheit, p. 119, quoted by Guhl
and Koner, Life of the Greeks and
Romans, E. T., p. 529).

154 ARISTOTLE S DEFENCE

mentioned in Theophrastus will (Diog. Laert. 5. 54), he is
there referred to as for a long time past free. Theo
phrastus had not retained as a slave one who was in no
sense a natural slave. The system of keeping skilled slaves
for the profit to be got from their work (C. F. Hermann,
Gr. Antiqq. 3. 13) would vanish with the unsound form
of the Science of Supply. The class of slaves, by losing
all its intelligent members, would well nigh lose all chance
of influencing or corrupting the free population. The
position of the free labourer or artisan would still be lower,
as it always is, than in a society where slavery does not
exist ; but slavery would do far less harm in a community
like the best State of Aristotle, sound in tone and studiously
secured against its influence, than it did in most Greek
States.

Aristotle was probably not aware how much evil and
misery would be caused in the slave-producing regions of
Asia and Africa by the wars which he sanctions for the
purpose of capturing natural slaves *. Nothing can have
tended more to demoralize barbarian society in the
countries round about Greece than the demand for slaves
in Greece itself, and it may well be doubted whether the
moral influence even of Aristotle s ideal householder on the
slave would have been an adequate compensation for the
perennial disturbance and degradation of the races from
which slaves were to be sought. On the other hand,
Aristotle s reform would have done much to soften the
customs of war waged between Hellenes, or between Hel
lenes and civilized non-Hellenes. The indiscriminate
enslavement of the population of cities taken by storm
would cease. Only those who were natural slaves would
be enslaved ; the rest would be ransomed. Wars of one
Greek State with another, or of Greeks with some non-
Hellenic States would have entailed hardly any enslavement.
The many Greek cities which after the time of Aristotle
experienced this fate would have escaped. The decrease
of population in Greece, which became more and more
1 i. 8. 1256 b 23 sqq. : 4 (7). 14. 13343 2.

AND REFORM .OF SLAVERY. 155

marked as time went on 1 , had probably already begun
in Aristotle s day ; and one of its causes, at all events,
would have been removed if enslavement through war
had been abandoned in the case of those who were not
slaves by nature. The ransom of captives in war was,
it is true, already permitted in most cases ; it was not,
however, in all, and the lesson which Aristotle taught was
one which none needed to learn more than Philip of
Macedon. Potidaea and Olynthus with the neighbouring
Chalcidian cities endured enslavement at his hands 2 . If
Stageira was destroyed by Philip and its inhabitants
sold as slaves (Plutarch, Alexander c. 7), its fate may
well have been present to Aristotle s mind in this dis
cussion. Epirus was permanently ruined by the enslave
ment of 150,000 of its population after the subjugation
of Perseus by Rome. It is evident that in his investiga
tion of the subject of slavery Aristotle raised questions
of vital importance to the future of Greece.

We may wish that he had dispensed altogether with
slavery in his State. If he does not do so, the reason
is that while he sees rude manual labour to be necessary to
society, and holds such labour cheap, he also holds that the
worker must not "be too good Fof his work, on pain of being
deteriorated by it, and that the humble type of worker _
appropriate to work of this kind must find a suitable social
niche ready for his reception, in which whatever good
there is in him may be developed. That Aristotle s
premisses did not logically compel him to make a worker
of this type the property of a master, we have already
seen.

In the result, slavery long escaped both abolition and Slow de-
reform. There was much in Stoicism that might have led slavery.
to a condemnation of slavery. The idea of the natural

1 See Thirlwall, History of the greatest man Greece had ever
Greece, 8. 460-7. produced, went onto depict him

2 See A. Schafer, Demosth. 2. as most vicious, and as having
40. See also Polyb. 8. 11, where enslaved and captured through
Polybius complains that Theo- treason with fraud and violence
pompus, after praising Philip as more cities than any other man.

156 SLOW DECADENCE

equality of men was familiar to many adherents of the
school. The Stoics drew a stronger line of demarcation than
Aristotle had drawn between man and the lower animals.
They did not probably rate the influence of a man s vocation
on his character, or its importance as a source of happiness,
as high as Aristotle. Cleanthes was not the less a wise
man for his labours as a drawer of water. Slaves were,
therefore, no longer necessary to save the higher natures
from deterioration ; and slavery lost its Aristotelian raison
d etre. The wise man s virtue and happiness were not at
the mercy of social conditions ; they were the fruit of
conviction and self-discipline rather than of social arrange
ments. The Stoics did not absolutely teach that the
structure of society was an indifferent matter, for they had
their preferences on the subject their favourite constitu
tions and the like ; but the general tendency of their teach
ing, was, in contrast to that of Plato, to trace virtue, which,
like Socrates, they identified with knowledge, to philoso
phical training apart from social habituation and State
guidance l . Epicureanism ranked slavery, with wealth and
poverty, among the things

Quorum

Adventu manet incolumis natura abituque :
Haec solitei sumus, ut par est, eventa vocare 2 .

Christianity itself, whatever its ultimate tendency, long
made it its aim rather to mitigate, than to put an end to, the
institution. Its earliest view is expressed in the words
Let every man abide in the same calling, wherein he was
called. Art thou called being a servant ? care not for it ;
but if thou mayest be made free, use it rather. For he that
is called in the Lord, being a servant, is the Lord s freedman :
likewise also, he that is called being free is Christ s servant.
Ye are bought with a price ; be not ye the servants of
men 3 . Servants, obey in all things your masters according

1 Cp. Cic. Acad. Post. I. 10. 38 natura aut more perfectas, hie

(quoted by Zeller, Stoics, E.T., (Zeno) omnes in ratione pone-

p. 238) : cumque superiores non bat.

omnem virtutem in ratione esse - Lucr. i. 456.

dicerent, sed quasdam virtutes 3 i Cor. 7. 20-23.

OF SLAVERY. 157

to the flesh, not with eye-service as men-pleasers, but in
singleness of heart, fearing God ; and whatsoever ye do, do
it heartily as to the Lord and not unto men ; knowing that
of the Lord ye shall receive the reward of the inheritance,
for ye serve the Lord Jesus Christ. But he that doeth
wrong shall receive for the wrong which he hath done ; and
there is no respect of persons 1 . The master and the slave
were thus alike required to do their duty the master,
inasmuch as he also had a Master in heaven (Col. 4. i .) :
the slave, inasmuch as he was the servant of Christ. Be
tween the slave, who was the Lord s freedman, and the
master, who was Christ s servant, a spiritual, though not a
social, equality was thus established, and if this did not apply
to slaves who were not Christians, at all events a door of
approach was thrown open to all. As time went on, how
ever, and slave after slave was admitted to Orders in the
Christian Church, the whole class of slaves probably gained
somewhat in general estimation ; and though sees and
monasteries felt no scruple in exercising proprietary rights
over slaves, they did much, in conformity with St. Paul s
injunction, to set the example of a milder treatment of
them ; till the abbot Theodore Studita, who died in 826,
condemned in his will the owning of slaves by monks or
monasteries on the ground that the slave no less than the
freeman is made in the image of God, and the synod of
Enham in 1009 forbade the sale of Christians as slaves
because Christ had redeemed slaves as well as freemen by
the shedding of His blood 2 . Long ere this, serfage had,
for secular reasons, taken the place of predial slavery
in the Roman Empire : still the institution has lingered
on into modern times. So recently as the reign of James
the Second, political prisoners of our own kith and kin
were sold as slaves to toil and die in the tropics of the

1 Col. 3. 22-5. be found in Wallon, Histoire de

2 See on this subject Schiller, l Esclavage,tome 3: see especially
Lehre des Aristoteles von der p. 409 sqq. As to this provision
Sklaverei, pp. 1-3, from whom of Theodore Studita s will, see
the above facts are taken. A Finlay, Byzantine Empire, I. 261
fuller treatment of the subject will (ed. 2).

158 ARISTOTLE

West Indies. The maids of honour of the Court of James
the Second (not 200 years ago) received presents of
Englishmen condemned for treasonable offences 1 . Locke
would seem to accept slavery in his Treatise on Civil
Government 2 . There is another sort of servants, he says,
which by a peculiar name we call slaves, who being
captives taken in a just war, are by the right of nature sub
jected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their
masters. These men, having, as I say, forfeited their lives
and with it their liberties, and lost their estates, and being,
in the state of slavery, not capable of any property, cannot
in that state be considered as any part of civil society,
the chief end whereof is the preservation of property. In
this view he goes beyond Aristotle, who is far from account
ing as natural slaves all captives taken in a just war.

Plato s The slave is a member of the household and also an

acommu- t&gt;ject of property; and the transition is natural from the
nity iii part to the whole, from the slave to the Household and

women and _^ AII /- A i i

children, Property. And here we find Aristotle overtly impugning
and also m j-j ie teaching of Plato without the preliminary apologies of

property, . f ;

rejected by the well-known chapter in the Nicomachean Ethics. It

Wsgrounds was P ei ~haps impossible for him even nominally to father

for reject- the Theory of Ideas on Socrates as here he does the Platonic

sifered. ~ Communism 3 . His rehabilitation of the Household and of

the right of Several Property is certainly more successful

than his attempted rehabilitation of Slavery.

Plato had sought in the Republic, for the sake of unity
of feeling among the members of his State, to extend the
sphere of the common to the utmost possible limit. He
had noticed that when some piece of good or ill fortune
befel individual members of an ordinarily constituted State,

1 Sir S. Baker, Rede Lecture on part of c. 12 of the same book
Slavery and the Slave Trade, nXarwos 5 fj rt ra&gt;v ywaiK^v &lt;a\
Macmillaris Magazine, July, 1874, irai8a&gt;v KCU T^S ova-ias KOIVOTTJS K.r.X.
p. 187. (1274 b 9). In 2. 7. 1266 b 5 sq.

2 2. 85. certain provisions in the Laws

3 Pol. 2. cc. 1-6 passim. Con- are ascribed to Plato, and not to
trast the most doubtfully authentic the Athenian Stranger.

AND THE COMMUNISM OF PLATO. 159

some of their fellows sympathized with them, while others
did not ; and he seems to have ascribed this disharmony
of feeling to the existence of separate households and
separate rights of property 1 . Carry the element of com
munity further till the distinction of meuni and tuum
ceased to exist in relation to women, children, and property,
and the whole society would feel as one man. This was
the end he had in view. If in the Republic he appears to
confine his communistic scheme to the upper section of his
State 2 , he affirms in the Laws with the utmost emphasis
that the best form of the State is that in which the saying,
Friends have all things in common, holds of the entire
State in the highest possible degree ; in which women,
children, and property are common, and the private and
individual is altogether banished from life, and things
which are by nature private such as eyes, and ears, and
hands, have become common, and in some way see and
hear and act in common, and all men express praise and
blame, and feel joy and sorrow, on the same occasions/
and the laws do their best to make the State as much one
as possible 3 . It is evident from this passage that to Plato
the society in which the household and several property do
not exist offers the true type of social organization, though
for some reason he applies his principle in the Republic
only to the upper section of the State. His view apparently
is that if the upper section of the State is so organized as
to be at one with itself, then the whole State will be so too
(cp. Rep. 545 -^5 *) ro8e /xey airXovv on Tracra TroAtreia
/3dAAet e avrov TOV !)(oz&gt;ros ras ap^as, orav ev aurw rot/ra)
; OIJ.OVOOVVTOS 8e, nav Ttdvv oXlyov ?), abvvarov

1 Rep. 462-3. Seivov p.T] 7TOT6 17 a\\r) TTciXt? npos

2 His aim is, in the Third Book TOVTOVS fj -rrpbs d\\fj\ovs SI^OCTTU-
of the Republic, to secure that Trjarrj). The latter aim is far more
the guardians shall be as good prominently put forward than the
as possible and shall not wrong other, and it is that with which
the other citizens (3. 416 C) : in Aristotle is pre-occupied. It is
the Fifth it is rather to secure the clearly implied in Tim. 18 B that
harmony of the whole State by the plan of Communism applies
securing the internal harmony of only to the upper section.

the guardians (5. 465 B, TOVTO&gt;I&gt; 3 Laws 739 B-D (Prof. Jowett s

fj.i}v (v eavTols pr] crraata^ oj/rcoj , ovdfv translation 4. 258).

160 ARISTOTLE S CRITICISM

Oijvat. ;). Throughout the Republic, in fact, he seems to
avoid spending time over the arrangements respecting the
third class, and to treat this class as of little moment (Rep.
421 A).

Most modern forms of communism those in which there
is community of property without community of women
and children would in no way satisfy Plato. It is the
existence of the household to which he especially objects ;
he would object to it, even if the household were supported
out of a common stock 1 . My wife my children my
relatives my clan, phratry, or tribe to these terms used
in any exclusive sense he objects. He retains the words
father, son, brother/ but expands their application, so
that all exclusiveness of meaning would practically pass
from them. He seems to hope that relationship would
thus be rendered powerless for harm. The guardians, he
claims (Rep. 464 D), will be free from those quarrels of
which property, or children, or relations are the occasion.
His language here evidently betrays a consciousness that
all causes of disharmony would not be removed, and it is
obvious that even in the ideal State of Plato a guardian
would feel the misfortunes of a friend far more than those
of one who was not a friend.

Aristotle, however, does not pause, as he might have
done, to point out that Plato s remedy for sectional feeling
is after all only a partial one, even from his own point of
view. He argues the question on its merits, which is, no
doubt, the most instructive way of treating it.

His objections to the scheme of a community in women
and children seem to be, in the main, the following :

(i) He questions the end which Plato set before the
State ; and this on two grounds

A. The State cannot be made as completely one as
the individual, or it can be so, only at the cost of its own
existence. The State is held together, not by contrivances

1 This is the tenour of his as among, not indeed the divine,

language in the Republic ; in the but the human guarantees of

Politicus, however, he speaks of union for States (310 B).
marriage and common offspring,

OF PLA TO S SCHEME. \ 6 1

for impressing on it the sort of unity which obtains in
the individual, but by justice and virtue in its members
(2. 2. 1261 a 30: cp. 2. 5. 1263 b 36 sq.), which must be
called into existence by the lawgiver. Whether Aristotle
quite appreciates the meaning with which Plato used the
expression, the maximum unity of the State whether he
is right in conceiving Plato to use it in a sense conflicting
with the inevitable plurality in number and diversity in.
kind of the individuals composing the State, is another
question. A little later on, as we shall see, he rightly con
strues Plato s unity as equivalent to unanimity.

B. Not the maximum of unity, but the maximum of
self-completeness is the true end of the State. Here, again,
we feel that unanimity in no way conflicts with self-com
pleteness, though we also feel that Aristotle s dictum is
a profound one, and more far-reaching than he was perhaps
himself aware. It explains how the large national State
of modern times has come to take the place of the small
city-State of antiquity.

(2) He questions the means which Plato adopts to secure
his end. Plato s citizens will indeed say mine and not
mine of the same thing (a/xa), but they will so speak
collectively, not individually. When, for instance, all say
of the same child this is my child, they will only mean
this is my child in a collective sense, not this is my own
child. That is all that the scheme will secure, and that in
no way contributes to unanimity (oiibev o/xoyoTjriKou). We
note that here Aristotle understands the unity spoken of
by Plato as equivalent to unanimity (ojuoVom), whereas in
the preceding argument he had treated it as equivalent to
mathematical unity 1 .

(3) Leaving on one side the question of end and means,
Aristotle goes on to advance other objections 2 to the

1 We also note that Aristotle s rather of events, joyful or the

only illustration of all saying reverse, occurring to members of

" mine " and " not mine " of the the community,

same thing is taken from child- 2 See Cicero s apparent repro-

ren, whereas it would seem from duction of them in de Rep. 4. 5. 5-
Rep. 462-3 that Plato is thinking

VOL, I. M

1 62 ARISTOTLE S CRITICISM

scheme of a community in women and children. It will
diminish the amount of care and attention given to them *,
for things held in common receive less attention than things
held in severalty, and here too the very number of common
children, and the citizen s uncertainty what individuals
really stand in this relation to him, will add to the diffi
culty. It will also diminish closeness of connexion
(ot/cetoVrjs) within the State, and make affection ($iAta) weak
and watery ; it will relieve relatives of their duties to each
other and lessen the chance of their getting help from
each other ; it will leave no room for the exercise of tem
perance (aoMfrpoa-vvr)), in relation at least to women (Pol. 2.
5. 1263 b 9). Certain religious and moral difficulties are
also raised such as the probability of incest, parricide, etc.,
occurring between relatives not known by each other to
be relatives 2 , and no expiations (Aweis) being forthcoming,
as in similar cases at present 3 . Nor will Aristotle admit
the practicability of effectually concealing relationship,
which will be betrayed by likeness, and also by the revela
tions of those who are charged by the State with the
transfer of children from one class to another.

Aristotle does not apply to the proposal of a community
in women and children one criticism which he passes on
that of a community in property that it will take away
a source of pleasure though this argument might certainly
be here too urged with truth, and no one would feel its
truth more than Aristotle 4 . In many of the criticisms
which he does make there is much weight. It is probably
true that warmth of affection would be impaired in a
society which, though nominally united by ties of relation
ship, would practically be an unitized society. It is of
course also true that things held in common receive less

1 Cp. Eth. Nic. 10. io. ii8ob already : cp. Clem. Alex. Paed. 3.
II sq. 3. p. 265 Potter (quoted by Mar-

2 Plato probably hopes to pre- quardt, Rom. Alterth. 7. I. 81. 6),
vent this by the regulations as to TratSl Tropz/euo-airi *ai /
relationship, Rep. 461 D, which, Qvyarpaa-iv ayvoria-avres
however, would fail of their effect piyvwrai Trartpes, o

where the exact age was unknown. TOW (Kredevrcov naiSiav.

3 The thing was known to occur 4 Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 24.

OF PLATO S SCHEME. 163

attention than things not so held. Yet Aristotle himself
proposes that the State shall own land and slaves, and that
the education of boys shall be managed by State-officers
as a matter of common concern. He does not explain
how it is that in these matters he has no fear of neglect
occurring. l

It is remarkable that the defence of the Household

against Plato in the Second Book contains no reference to

the statement of the First Book that the Household exists
by nature, though one would have thought that if this is
a fact, it ought to be decisive. The claims of the House
hold are rested in the First Book partly on its necessity,
partly on its value as a source of virtue and good life in
women, children, and slaves. If in the Second Book Aris
totle adds a reference to its services in promoting affection
in the State, the new point of view is suggested to him by
Plato s error in considering it a source of discord. The
value of Relationship apart from the Household is a topic
that emerges only in the Second Book 1 .

Aristotle s criticisms on the plan of a community of
property are not very dissimilar from his criticisms on the
plan of a community in women and children. He evi
dently feels, however, that there is more to be said for the
former than the latter 2 . He wholly rejects the one, while
he allows that the other has certain advantages 3 . But

1 Aristotle approaches very 2 Cp. Cic. de Rep. 4. 5. 5: de
near to, but does not perhaps patrimoniis tolerabile est, licet
actually use, an argument used sit injustum ; nee enim aut obesse
by Burke in his Reflections on cuiquam debet, si sua industria
the Revolution in France (Works, plus habet, aut prodesse, si sua
2. 467 Bohn). We begin our culpa minus. Sed, ut dixi, potest
public affections in our families. aliquo modo ferri. Etiamne con-
No cold relation is a zealous juges, etiamne liberi communes
citizen. We pass on to our erunt ?

neighbourhoods and our habitual 3 2. 5. 1263 a 24, eet yap TO e

provincial connexions. These d^oTeputv d-ya^oV Ae-yco 8e TO eg

are inns and resting-places. . . apfyortpav TO en TOV Kinvas fiVai ras

The love to the whole is not /or/jo-ft? KOI TO &lt; TOV loiat. He

extinguished by this subordinate probably means that community

partiality. Perhaps it is a sort of property would exclude the

of elemental training to those possibility of absolute want,
higher and more large regards.

M 2

1 64 ARISTOTLE S CRITICISM

then these advantages can be secured in a less objection
able way. For there are many objections to a community
of property. First, it involves that community in all things
human (av6pu&gt;-niKa Traz/ra), down to the smallest matters
and matters of everyday recurrence, which more than any
thing else tries men s temper and leads to quarrels l ; next,
it sacrifices that increase of efficiency, which results when
men are set to work at that which is their own (jrpbs i8tou
fKavTov TrpoarebpevovTos, 1263 a 28) 2 . It thus effects at
a great cost what can be effected at no cost at all ; for the
legislator, as the example of the Lacedaemonian and other
States proves, can produce in the minds of his citizens
a readiness to make that which is severally owj^ed avail
able in use to others ; and if he does this, he has done
all that community of property can do. A third dis
advantage is that there is a loss of pleasure when men
are deprived of the right of calling something their own 3 ;
the pleasure is lost that results from the gratification of
that natural and universal love of self which is only cen
sured when it is excessive, and also the pleasure that
results from aiding and gratifying friends.

At this point (1263 b 7) Aristotle passes from criticisms
applicable to community of property only to others which
apply to both forms of communism, and we see from his
language (1263 b 7, rots Atay %v tioiovcn TTJV 7ro Au&gt;), how
closely his objections to communism are connected with
the attempt to intensify overmuch the unity of the State.
The State is a KOIV&lt;I&gt;VLO., but it should not be a Kowavia in
all things human, in everything that can possibly be shared
(2. i. 1261 a 2 sq.) : the common element in a State, we
learn elsewhere, is, above all, a constitution (3. 3. 1276 b

1 It is thus that small matters development (Letter of B. in

are often the occasion of civil Times, Jan. 23, 1884).

disturbance (7 (5). 4. 1303 b 17). 3 Est aliquid quocunque loco,

* Sir W. Siemens said that if quocunque recessu,

any invention lay in the gutter, it Unius sese dominum fecisse

should be given to a separate lacertae.

owner, that he might have an Juv. 3. 230.
interest in its furtherance and

OF PLATO S SCHEME. 165

i sq.), and a common constitution means a common plan
of life (6 (4). ii. 1295 a 40 : cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 35).

A few remarks, applicable to communism in both its
forms, wind up Aristotle s discussion of the subject. Its
superficial promise of peace is an illusion. If much that
is evil would disappear with severalty of property, much
that is good would also be lost. Life would not be worth
living in Plato s State (1263 b 29). It was the choice of
a false end for the State the utmost possible unity that
led Socrates astray. The State must not be made one
at the cost of its essential characteristic of plurality
(7T\TJdos) ; the unifying agency must be education. After
an appeal to the evidence of history 1 against Plato s
scheme, Aristotle adds that Plato would find, if he made
the experiment, that a State cannot be brought into exist
ence without tribal and other divisions incompatible with
a too strictly constituted unity. The State, it is implied,
is not a mathematical unit, but a Whole consisting of differ
entiated parts held together by virtue. Not the maximum
of unity in the sense of community in everything, but
virtue, is the end at which the legislator should aim. Unity
will come with virtue, not otherwise. This is the burden of
the chapters on Communism. It is evident that Aristotle s
argument against Communism is primarily an argument
against Unitarian Communism, though many of his objec
tions apply to the Communism with which we are familiar.

Some of them would be more in place if Aristotle
himself recognized no common property in his State. His
shrewd anticipation of social discord in societies where
property is held in common, seems hardly to be borne
out by experience, if we may judge by recorded or existing
cases of common ownership. To his argument that pro-

1 Though Aristotle takes notice Communism of the Village Com-

of various forms of Communism, munity has played in the history

or approximate Communism, in of mankind ; still less is he

relation to land and its produce, acquainted with the story of its

prevailing among certain bar- general, though gradual, rejection

barian races, he is not aware how and abandonment,
important a part the modified

166 ARISTOTLE S CRITICISM

prietary right ( the magic of property, as we say) increases
the care devoted to things, it may be added that it stimu
lates industry by the hope which it holds forth of an
assured reward. A communistic society could not appeal
to hope to the same extent. The argument that some
pleasures, and opportunities for the exercise of some virtues,
would cease to exist in a communistic society, is deserving
of notice. The test of the satisfactoriness of institutions
in the Laws of Plato had been their favourableness to
virtue (705 E : 770 C-77i A: 836 D) : it is interesting
to observe that Aristotle takes pleasure also into account a .
The question, indeed, may be raised, whether the mere
fact that an institution is productive of pleasure, or of par
ticular kinds of virtue, is decisive in its favour. May we
not fairly ask for proof that it is productive of more plea
sure or more virtue, than of the opposites to pleasure and
virtue, or of more pleasure or virtue than would exist
without it? Bull-fighting is no doubt productive of some
kinds of virtue ; yet is this a decisive argument in its
favour 2 ? We discern, however, in the background of
Aristotle s reasoning a principle of importance that the
institutions of the State should satisfy the permanent and
universal tendencies of human nature : it seems to be im
plied that these tendencies are sure to be sound, if kept
within due bounds (1263 a 41 sq.). The legislator must
recognize and accept them, and find a place for them in
his scheme ; he must not try to eradicate them. The State
is intended to fulfil man s nature, not to do violence to it ;
and just as the nature of the individual must be respected,
so must the nature of the State. No attempt must be
made to impress on it an uncongenial degree of unity.
The industrial value of the institution of several property
the part it has played and is playing in the subjugation
of Nature by man is, of course, not dwelt on by Aristotle.

1 In the same spirit he makes though certain forms of virtue
the pleasurableness of music an might disappear under a Corn-
argument in its favour (5 (8). 5. munistic regime, they might be
1339 b 25 sqq.). replaced by others of equal or

* It may also be argued that greater worth.

OF PLATO S SCHEME. 167

What is present to his mind is the influence of the insti
tution on the individual, not on the fortunes of the race.
The same defect appears in his view of the State, which
he holds to exist, not in any degree for the benefit of
mankind, but solely for the benefit of its members. So
again, it is less the industrial, than the political and ethical,
bearings of Communism that are present to his mind.
Workers in modern societies sigh for some relief from
crushing industrial competition and often seek it in Com
munism, but excessive competition is a social ailment of
which Aristotle is altogether unconscious.

Nor does he anywhere recognize the undoubted element
of truth contained in Plato s rejection of the Household and
Several Property. He seems to hold that there are no
drawbacks connected with either institution, which a cor
rect system of rearing and education, acting on well-
constituted natures, is not fully capable of obviating. His
arguments against community of property, again, though
directed against its fitness to form the base of an entire
social system, are so unqualified that they might be em
ployed against its use in minor societies within a State.
It may well be, however, that Plato s error lay, not so
much in his belief in the possibility and advantageousness
of an union in which the individual life should be lost and
merged in that of the whole, but rather in his setting it
forth as the standard to which political society ought to
conform, if possible, everywhere. The regime which is out
of place in a State may be salutary in a monastic com
munity.

It should be noticed also that the proprietary right which
Aristotle defends is the bare right of several property, apart
from the right of inheritance, which stands equally in need of
explanation and defence. And then again, while he defends
the institution of several property, he is apparently in favour
of limiting the amount held by individuals, and he marks
out with some care the ways in which property is to be
acquired and used. We note, further, that in his best
State the right of owning land is confined to the citizens

1 68 THE GREEK HOUSEHQLD

men who have received a careful moral training and are
likely to use it aright. Aristotle is as little an unqualified
defender of the right of several property as he is of
Slavery.

The question of Communism has never been discussed
with a closer reference to the end for which human society
exists. Communism is held by Aristotle to spoil and
impoverish human life, to rob men of opportunities of
virtuous activity and harmless enjoyment, and thus to
diminish happiness : this is his main reason for rejecting
it. In effect, he rests the institutions of the Household and
Several Property on their true basis their value to man as
a means to perfect life, or, in modern language, as a means
of civilization.

Sketch of Aristotle, then, declares in favour of the Household. The
household Greek household does not, however, escape without some
as Plato modification at his hands. It will be best first to cast a hasty
totle found glance at the Greek household as Aristotle found it, before
we go on to study his conception of wnat it ought to be.

In the view of the Greeks, a man s first duty to his house
hold was to perpetuate it by marriage. The gods of the family
must not lose their worship ; the ranks of the clan (-yevos),
phratry, tribe, and State must not be thinned. Indeed, the
begetting of offspring was, for the father himself, a means of
immortal existence 1 . Views of this kind may often have
been a source of over-population, and thus of pauperism and
even of political danger, in ancient Greece, for the prejudices
of the Greeks made the practice of many branches of in
dustry and trade distasteful to them, while emigration
involved the loss of the valuable rights of a citizen. It
is easy to understand how the poorer citizens, in States in
which they were the masters, often came to quarter them
selves on the public revenues to a considerable extent. It
is easy, again, to understand how the exposure of children,

1 Cp. Plato, Laws 721 B-C : baum s note on the first named
773 E : and Aristot. de Gen. An. passage.
2. 2. 731 b 31 sqq. See Stall-

AS PLATO. AND ARISTOTLE FOUND IT. 169

and especially of female children, was not uncommon ; and
how at length, at Athens, Antipater found that out of
21,000 citizens only 9000 possessed property in excess of
the value of 2000 drachmas 1 . The first problem, then, in
reference to the household was how to adjust its rate of
reproduction to the interests of the community.

Another common view as to the household made the main.

function of its head the increase of its substance. Many,
as we have seen, almost or altogether identified the Science
of Supply with the Science of Household Management, and
Xenophon in the Oeconomicus had gone so far as to put
this view into the mouth of Socrates. OVKOVV, e &lt;rj 6 2o&gt;-
KpaTr/s, eTTtoT^/xrjs /xe y TWOS e8oey rjp.lv ovo^a tlvai f)
77 8e e7riaT77/x77 atfrr/ e&lt;patz;ero, 77 OLKOVS bvvavrai av^iv
OLKOS 8e r/jMiy ec^atyero OTrep fcrr/tri? 77 0T;p,7ra(ra (Xen. Oecon.

6. 4). It is true that Xenophon is here rather interpreting
the word oiKovo^ia than attempting to determine which of
the functions of the head of the household is the highest
and most truly characteristic ; elsewhere he fully recog
nizes the educational responsibilities of the parent (Oecon.

7. 12). Still he not only tolerates but commends that un
limited quest of wealth which Aristotle condemns at any
rate he does so, when an unselfish and liberal use is made of
what is acquired. His Cyrus says in the Cyropaedia (8. 2.
2O sqq.) : dAA etp-t 077X770-70? /cdya&gt; wcrTrep ol aAAot

rrySe ye \iivroi 6ta^&gt;e petv//ot OKW TU&gt;I&gt; TT A furrow, &lt;m ot

bav T&V apKovvTutv Treptrra KTr/crcavTai,

Ta 8e Karao-7/Trouo-t, ra 8e . . . c^uAarroyres Trpayjuara

yw 8 VTTrjpeTw pep rols deots KCU opeyo/xat ael

8e Kr7ja-a&gt;p,at, av 1800 Treptrra ovra rutv ep,ot dp/cowrcoy, TOVTOLS rds

T eySeta? T&V &lt;pi\a)v ^anov^ai, /cat TrAoDrt^coy /cat evepyerwy

avOptoTTovs tvvoiav e^ avrutv Krw/xat Ka! &lt;^&gt;tAtay, Kat ex TOVTWV

/capTTov/xat acr^dAetaj; Kat

1 Diod. 1 8. 1 8. object in acquiring is to give

s See L. Schmidt, Ethik der away ; some of his friends, in fact,

alten Griechen, 2. 380, who com- say of him (Cyrop. 8. 4. 31) 01)^

pares Xen. Oecon. u. 9. The 6 Kupou rpairos TOMVTOS oios ^pr;/na-

passage quoted in the text makes ri&a-Oai, a\\a 8i8ovs p.a\Xov ff

it abundantly clear that Cyrus xrw/nei/oj ?jSerai : and Cyrus says

170 THE GREEK HOUSEHOLD

Apart, however, from prepossessions as to the main func
tion of the household, its constituent relations, those of
husband and wife, father and child, master and slave,
tended to vary considerably. It was only, indeed, in bar
barian communities that the wife was commonly the slave
(Pol. i. 2. 1252 b 5), or else the tyrant (2. 9. 1269 b 24 sq.),
of her husband, or that the father s authority over his son
became a despotism (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. n6ob 27, ev riepoms
f] TOV Trarpbs rvpavviK-r] \pu&gt;vrai yap a&gt;s 8ouAots rols vteVtr); yet
even in Greek States these relations were far from being the
same under different constitutions or even in different classes
of society. In oligarchies the sons and wives of the ruling
class were greatly over-indulged (7 (5). 9. 1310 a 22 : 6 (4).
15. 1300 a 7); in the tyranny and extreme democracy the
domination of women and over-indulgence of slaves (yvvai-
Ko/cpcma KCU bovXav averts, 7 (5). II. 1313 b 32 sq.) are said
to prevail 1 : at Sparta also, though for quite other reasons,
women were over-powerful (2. 9. 1269 b 31), and the large
dowries which were the natural concomitant of this state of
things added in their turn to the evil. In households of
the poorer class, again, the wife and children were neces
sarily employed as attendants (a/&lt;oAou^ot), no slaves being
kept (8 (6). 8. 1323 a 5); and here the wife could not
possibly be confined to the house (6 (4). 15. 1300 a 6).
The whole aspect of the household consequently altered.

In the average household of the better class at Athens,
the wife was often married at the age of fourteen or fifteen
(Xen. Oecon. 7. 5), after a maidenhood spent in the recesses
of her father s house, from which, in the city at all events,
she only rarely emerged 2 ; robbed as a girl of her due
share of air and exercise, white-complexioned beside her
sunburnt father and brothers who spent their lives in the
open air, or even beside women and girls of the poorer
class, delicate in comparison with the strong-limbed maidens

himself to his friends (ibid. 8. 4. 2 In Lysias c. Sim. c. 6, the

36) Tavra, W uvbpfs, airavra 8tl daughters of the speaker s sister

{jfj.as ov&ev /LidXXoi/ (fj.a fjytla-dai r) had been so quietly and decorously

not infTtpa K.r.X. brought up that they blushed even

1 Cp. Plato, Rep. 563 B. to be seen by their relations !

AS PLATO AND ARISTOTLE FOUND IT. 171

of Sparta ; taught to weave and to command her appetite 1 ,
and perhaps also to read, write, and cipher 2 , but necessarily
relying much on her husband (as we see from Xenophon s
Oeconomicus) for any real assistance in the development
of her character and intelligence. The natural quickness
of the race, however, would make a little experience go
a long way.

In matters of property, the Attic law was not unkind
to females, for though the sons alone inherited where sons
there were, daughters often received liberal portions or
dowers, and these remained available for their support 3 , if
on the death of the husband the widow preferred to leave
his house, which she sometimes did even when there were
children of the marriage 4 , while, if she did not, she had a
claim for alimony on her sons 5 . The dower was also re
turned by the husband, if he put away his wife. The
husband, on receiving it at the time of the marriage, gave
the family of his bride some tangible security for it 6 , the re
venues of which he continued to receive, though he must no
doubt have been unable to alienate it without their consent.
As the husband could divorce his wife at a moment s notice

1 Xen. Oecon. 7. 6. these subjects, though not beyond

2 Xenophon makes no mention the limit of household exigencies
of Ischomachus wife having been (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 864. 3).
taught these things, but Oecon. 3 The dower in this case re-
9. 10 (a passage to which Mr. verted to the nvpios of the wife,
Evelyn Abbott has drawn my at- and he was bound to support
tention) seems to imply that she her.

could at any rate read an inven- 4 Demosth.in Boeot. de Dote p.

tory. G611 (Kulturbilder 3. 328) 1010. The remarriage of widows

holds that girls education did just appears to have been common at

reach this point. Kept out of the Athens. Plato recommends, on

way of all public instruction, and the contrary, that when a man

pent within doors which seldom dies leaving a sufficient number

opened for them, the girls learnt of children, the mother of his

from their mothers and nurses the children shall remain with them

arts of spinning, weaving, and sew- and bring them up, unless she

ing, and that of cookery in its appears to be too young to remain

higher forms, adding to these ac- fitly unmarried (Laws 930 C).

complishments at the utmost a 5 [Demosth.] in Phaenipp. p.

rudimentary knowledge of reading 1047.

and writing. Perhaps they were 6 Where the dowry was large,

not always taught reading and this cannot have been possible

writing, for we find Theophrastus unless the bridegroom had at

insistingthatgirls should betaught least equal means.

173 THE GREEK HOUSEHOLD

by simply turning her out of the house, dowers were almost
a necessity of married life at Athens. The position of a
dowerless wife was so precarious that it was little better
than that of a concubine. But then the system of dowers,
no doubt, gave additional facilities to divorce, and when the
dowry was considerable, the wife was commonly thought
to be likely to be overbearing and the husband to be
unduly subservient (Plato, Laws 774 C). For this and other
reasons Plato thinks it best to abolish dowries (Laws
742 C : 774Csq.), and to reserve the right of divorce
for the State (Laws 929 E sqq.).

The dowry system, as practised at Athens, and very
probably in Greece generally 1 , evidently tended to main
tain a connexion between the wife and her father s family ;
her entrance into her husband s house was not irrevocable,
and Dionysius of Halicarnassus has good ground for the
contrast which he draws 2 between Greek wedlock and
wedlock as he describes it in the earlier days of Rome,
when both dower and wife passed irrevocably to the hus
band, marriage being indissoluble, and the dower not-
reclaimable by action at law. The wife, in fact, in early-
Rome became once for all a member of her husband s
family, a complete participant both in property and sacred
rites (/cotfcoi 6? cnravTutv xprj^dro)! re KCU tepwy), and inherited
from her husband just as a daughter would.

After marriage, the care of the children, the supervision
of the slaves, and the general management of a household
in which much that we buy was probably made at home,
would leave but little spare time to the wife. She would
now be freer to pass the threshold of the house, accom
panied, no doubt, by one or more female slaves would
appear at marriage feasts and the family gatherings which
answered to our christenings, take part in funeral proces
sions, and be present at some State festivals, especially at
festivals confined to her sex. But the husband would be

1 Dionysius of Halicarnassus generally, and not to be thinking
(Ant. Rom. 2. 25) seems to have of the Attic household only,
the Greek household in view 2 Ant. Rom. 2. 25.

AS PLATO AND ARISTOTLE FOUND IT. 173

much away from home during the day 1 , and both for this
reason and because the only servants were slaves, it was
well that the wife should leave the house but little indeed,
apart from this, the proper place for the wife was felt to be
the home. Many women seem to have hugged their
fetters ; Plato speaks of the sex in the Laws (781 A, C)
as loving darkness and seclusion, and anticipates some
difficulty in prevailing on women to come forth into the
light of day. The poorer sort of women were comparatively
free from these disabilities, and it was a social distinction
to be subject to them. The men, with their heads full of
politics and war, would feel that if they were themselves
not domestic in their tastes, others must be so for
them, and that the indoor life of Greek women was the
natural complement of the outdoor life of Greek husbands
and fathers ; but the race was too aspiring to do full justice
to a woman s life, especially after the improvement in male
education and the increase in the interest of Greek politics
which mark the fifth century before Christ. It was seldom
that Greek wives, elsewhere than in the Lacedaemonian
State (Pol. 2. 9. i26gb 31), invaded the men s domain and
made their influence felt in the political field, though tyrannies
and extreme democracies seem sometimes to have found it
worth their while to court their good will (7 (5). n. 1313 b
32 sqq.) ; more often they consoled themselves by indulg
ing in religious enthusiasm 2 , to the dismay of men like Me-
nander s Misogynist, who complains (Misog. fr. 4 and 5):

riv f]p.ds oi deal

fj.u\i(TTa TOVS yr]p.avTas del yap Tiva
ayuv eoprr/v ear dvdyKrj,

1 Xen. Oecon. 3. 12, evrtv 6Vo&gt; Trpdo-o-oi/ras eSei yap (vdvf
rtXXwTooi/ aTTov8aia&gt;i&gt;Tr\f[a&gt;fTTiTpTTfiy eiVat yvvaiKas di&gt;8pa&gt;v, oiKovpia TO.
TI TT] yvvaiKij Ov8evi, e(pi], EOT* 8e TroXXa &lt;rvvov&lt;Tas win 8f 6 p.fv jSopeas
OTW tXdcro ova SiaXtyrj tj TJJ yumuetj dia TrapdeviKijs ajra\6xpoos ov
Et 8e p.rj, ov TroXXoly yf, f(f)T). Sidrjcriv,

2 Cp. Plato, Laws 909 E; Plu- &lt;? (prja-tv Ho-t oSoj XvTrat 8e *at
tarch, Praecept. Conjug. c. 19. rapa^nl KO.I Ka.Kodvp.iai 8ia frXorv-
Plutarch s picture of the interior Tr/ay KO.\ Seio-iSai/xoi /as KO! (pi\orip.ias
of a yvvaiKotvlris is not a very cal KSVWV So^wi/, ocras OVK av e inot rtr,
cheerful one eneira KOI v^eCSd? is Tr/v yvvaiKuv triv vnoppeovyw (De
e ari TO fvdvfj.fli&gt; TOVS prj TroXXa Tranq. Animi, c. 2).

174 THE GREEK HOUSEHOLD

and again :

fv 8e -rrf.VTa.Kis rrjs rjfj-epas,
fKVfJif3a.\iov 8 fJTTa depdnaivai KvK\cp
at 8" ci&gt;X6Xvbj/.

On the other hand, the wife had often to complain of her
husband s unfaithfulness, which escaped with little censure
in a society based on slavery 1 . If we may judge, however,
from Aristotle s testimony to the prevalence of feminine
ascendency and the over - indulgence of women in
extreme democracies, which is borne out by that of Plato
(Rep. 563 B : cp. Laws 774 C), the Athenian wife was as
often the oppressor as the oppressed. It was the fashion
to give considerable dowries 2 , and consequently the wife
had her husband a good deal in her power, for a
divorce entailed the withdrawal, not only from him, but
also apparently from the children, of revenues which
they could in many cases ill afford to lose. A change in
the position of the wife may well have come about, as
L. Schmidt points out 3 , in the period which commences
with Alexander, when the loss of political freedom con
tributed with other causes to divert men s minds in some
degree from politics and to give increased prominence to
family life. The old traditions would also be less powerful
in the great new cities, which now became the most con
spicuous centres of Greek life 4 .

As to the relation of parent and child, Dionysius of
Halicarnassus tells us that in Greece children were often
guilty of unseemly conduct to their fathers 5 ; he is not
satisfied with the temporary authority which was all that
Greek custom conceded to the father, ceasing with the
second year after puberty or at marriage or with enrolment

1 See L. Schmidt, 2. 194 sqq. Praxinoe, in the 1 5th Idyll of
Even Plutarch s language on this Theocritus, find their way about
point is not quite what we should Alexandria, with Athenian custom
expect (Conj. Praec. c. 16). (2. 427).

2 See Boeckh, Public Economy 5 Ant. Rom. 2. 26, TroXXa tv
of Athens, E. T. pp. 483 and 514. "EXX^cru/ vno TCKMV els rrarepas

3 2. 426. ao-xwovfiTai. Compare Plato, Rep.
* L. Schmidt contrasts the 562 E.

freedom with which Gorgo and

AS PLATO AND ARISTOTLE FOUND IT. 175

in the public registers, nor again with the comparatively
moderate penalties for disobedience which Greek law
permitted the father to inflict, such as expulsion from
the home or disinheritance. He prefers a fuller paternal
authority, more nearly resembling the Roman patria
potestas. Greek law, it is true, regarded the father rather
as the natural guardian and administrator of the common
property of the household Y than as its absolute owner,
but the powers it conferred on him were not perhaps
insufficient, and the remedy was probably to be sought
in an improvement of the training of the parents, and
especially of the mother, and in making her more of a
spiritual force in the household. Loved and honoured she
was already :

OVK f(TTii&gt; ovdev p.T]Tpos ijS/oi/ TfKvois
(pare prjTpos, Traifie?, coy OVK ear* tpats
TOI.OVTOS aXXo?, oios ij&uoi/ epai&gt;,

says one of Euripides characters in a fragment of the
Erechtheus preserved by Stobaeus (Floril. 79. 4) ; but
another says,

*AXX itrr , e /nol yueV OVTOS OVK carat vop.os
TO pr/ oil ere, fjLUTep, Trpo(r&lt;pi\ij vep.ni&gt; ael
(cat TOV BtKaiov Kal roKatv TU&gt;V auiv ^apiv
OT/pyw e TOV &lt;$&gt;v&lt;TavTa T&lt;av ndvT&lt;ov ftpoTovv
fidXiad oplfa TOVTO, KOI crv /zi) (pdovei,
Kfivov yap ff-eftXcKTTov ovd ai&gt; fls avfjp
yvvaiKOS avftrjcrfiev, dXXa TOV Trarpos 2 .

And thus, while Xenophon, in his kindly Oeconomicus,
fully recognizes her as the colleague of the father in the
education of the children 3 , the writer of the (so-called) first

1 C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. renunciation anticipates in some

3. II. The Attic father had, how- degree the change in the law,

ever, the right to renounce his son which, in Lucian : s day, permitted

by proclamation through a herald the renounced son to appeal

and so to disinherit him a right against his father s decision to

which Plato in the Laws makes a dicastery (see Lucian s ATTO/OJ-

over to the whole kith and kin on pvTTo/jievos, c. 8).

the father s proposition (928-9) ; 2 Stob. Floril. 79. 27.

and his unchecked power of gift 3 Oecon. 7. 12. Plato in the

would be an additional security Laws is for adding to the powers

for his authority over his children. of the mother : see Stallbaum s

Plato s reform of the paternal note on Laws 774 E.

176 THE GREEK HOUSEHOLD

book of the Oeconomics falsely attributed to Aristotle,
thoughtful as he is, appears to leave her only the function
of rearing the child, and to claim for the father the task of
educating it (Oecon. i. 3. 1344 a 7). On the whole, she was
hardly one" of the heads of the household (except when the
accident of a great dowry made her too potent), and its only
real head was for a large part of the day an absentee. The
gentler influence for good in the household is often not the
least powerful, but it had no proper place made for it
in Greece. Greek civilization did not give women an
adequate training, or call for enough from them : these
were more serious faults than its contraction of their rights
or of their freedom. The most glaring defects of the actual
Greek household, in Aristotle s view, were, however,
probably the insufficient preparation of its head for his
functions and its Cyclopic freedom from State-guidance
(Eth. Nic. 10. 10. n8oa 24 sqq.). Each household was
allowed to make of itself exactly what it liked, and to train
its subordinate members in its own way, as if it did not
matter to the State what training they received.

It was unfortunate that in the Lacedaemonian State, in
which women appear to have been least controlled and
most powerful, they were, in the view of Aristotle at all
events, worst. Lycurgus was believed to have tried to
train the Lacedaemonian women in the same hardy habits
as the men, but to have been foiled by their resistance l :
at any rate, their life was in complete contrast to that
of the men luxurious and abandoned to every kind of
vice (Pol. 2. 9. 1269 b 22). Aristotle does not distinctly
mention the fact that they shared in youth the gymnastic
training of the boys, but he may well be referring to it
when he implies that they were trained to be fearless

1 Pol. 2. 9. 1270 a 6 sq. : cp. (povo-iKT]) but this does not pre-

Plato, Laws 781 A, d^avros TOV vent the latter from regarding the

vopoOerov. Both Xenophon (de women (with Aristotle) as unre-

Rep. Lac. I. 3-4) and Plato (Laws gulated by law, the result being

806 A) speak of the girls of this that many laxities had crept in

State as receiving a gymnastic (TroXXa Trapeppei) which law might

training Plato, indeed, adds that have mended (Laws 781 A).
they were also trained in music

AS PLATO AND ARISTOTLE FOUND IT. 177

, 1 369 b 35) ; their fearlessness, however, he says,
was of no use in household life, and broke down in war,
as their conduct during the Theban invasion of Laconia
showed. On the other hand, the Lacedaemonians, like
many other military races, were very submissive to feminine
influence ; they gave their daughters large dowries, which
the law left it in their power to do ; nor did the State
retain any control over the disposal of orphan heiresses
in marriage. The result was that wealth came to be con
centrated in a few hands, that the number of proprietors
and also of citizens dwindled, and that the greed for wealth,
which was a feature of the Lacedaemonian character,
was intensified in the few remaining citizens by the desire
to provide the women with the means of lavish living.
So great, in fact, w3s the power of the women that their
influence made itself felt even in the administration of
the shortlived Lacedaemonian empire.

Aristotle s criticism of the institutions of this State in re
lation to women illustrates his remark (i. 13. 1260 b 15 sq.)
as to the importance of training women to virtue, and to
the kind of virtue most in accordance with the given con
stitution, for in this instance the defects of the women were
among the causes which led to the deterioration of the
men and the enfeeblement of the State. He seems to
imply that the women should have been trained to tem
perance, and their habits of life better regulated. Whether
he wished that women should have any further intellectual
training than Greek women usually enjoyed in his day, we
do not know ; but he seems to have been in favour of giving
them, probably through the medium of their fathers and
husbands, some sort of moral education and also of regu
lating their habits of life within the household. The
Lacedaemonian household, he evidently feels, was more
actively prejudicial than any other form of the household
known to Greece l .

1 Plutarch s lives of Agis and Aristotle speaks, but they show
Cleomenes refer to a generation that the wealth and power of the
a century later than that of which Lacedaemonian women remained

VOL. I. N

178 PLATO

Plato We may now turn to the question, how Plato and Aris-

abolishes . -111-11 i, -r

the house- tot l e respectively deal with the Household. In the
hold m the Republic, as we have already seen, Plato abolished the

Republic J

and recon- household. In the Laws he retains it, but makes consider-

tnLaws m a kl e cnan g es m i ts arrangements, some of which are im-

leaving it provements, while others, such as the institution of public

only a meal-tables for women and girls no less than for men and

s me what boys, would have impaired its intimacy and probably its

existence, influence. His plan, stated briefly, is to set not only women

but also girls free from their enforced seclusion, and to

call them forth into the light of day ; to educate girls in

much the same way as boys, though after six years of age

apart from them l ; to open office in the State to women,

or, at all events, any offices for which they have a special

fitness ; to admit them in some degree even to military

service ; to postpone the age of marriage in the case of

girls, so that they may be the fitter to be mothers ; to

forbid dowries, both as tending to place wife and husband

in a false relation to each other and as leading to the union

of fortunes and the over-enrichment of a few ; to treat

marriage as instituted less for the comfort or pleasure of the

individuals composing the household, than for the end of

providing the State with offspring fit in mind and body to

become its citizens; and to make succession to the citizens

unbroken up to that time, and so far in the following studies, taken
bear out Aristotle s account ; they successively : Riding, military
reveal to us, however, some noble exercises, and the use of warlike
characters among them, not un- weapons ; wrestling, dancing un
worthy of the influence they pos- der arms, recitation, and singing ;
sessed, and spiritual forces in reading and writing, the use of
the fullest sense of the word. the lyre, the rudiments of arith-
These lives are probably based metic, geometry, and astronomy,
on the history of Phylarchus, Plato knows, however, that the
who took the side of Cleomenes male and female character are
and the Lacedaemonians against not the same (802 D-E), and
Aratus and the Achaeans (Polyb. he will have different songs com-
2. 56), and was perhaps somewhat posed for the two sexes : males
given to writing for effect ; but are to learn songs expressive of
there may well have been women TO ^eyaXoTrpeTre? KOI TO irpbs rfjv
at Sparta to whom Aristotle s ge- av8ptlav peirov, females songs in
neral judgment would not apply, which TO Koa-fuov KM a-Sxppov pre-
both in his days and later. dominates.
1 Both sexes are to be trained

AND THE GREEK HOUSEHOLD. 179

lots of land follow the rule of Unigeniture, in order that these
may remain undivided, permission being given to the father
to choose the son who is to succeed him, and care being
taken that the other sons shall not want 1 . Plato s language
in Laws 909 D sqq. is wide enough to include the abolition
of the domestic worship of Hestia at the household hearth
and of other household gods : iepa \vr$\ ets ey iStats OIKWHS
fKTr](rdu&gt; 6vtiv 8 orav Ttl vovv trj TIVL, Trpos ra 8rj//oo-ta Ira&gt;
Ovcratv, KOL TOLS tepeOcri re Kal lepeuu? eyxetpirco ra dv^-ara, ots
ay^eia TOVTU&gt;V e7ri//eX?js (TVVfvd(rd( 8e acre s re Kal os av efle Arj
fj.T avTov wew xe0-0ai. He appears to make the public
places for sacrifice the only places for sacrifice, and the
public priests and priestesses the only sacrificers. But this
is not probably his intention, for in other passages of the
Laws he evidently contemplates the continued existence of
private rites (7176: 785 A) : his wish is to prevent the
household becoming what it seems often to have been, the
secret nursery of superstitious worships (909 E : 910 B) ; he
probably does not mean to meddle with old-established
cults, like those of Hestia and Zeus epxeios or e&lt;e &lt;rrios.

Plato is eager to flood the recesses of the Greek house
hold with the light of day, and partly with this end in view
institutes public meals not only for the men and boys but
also for the women and girls (vo-o-tTia Se -

fv ra r&lt;3i&gt; avbp&v, eyyi/s 8 tyjan-tva ra TU&gt;V avrols
re a//a 0T]Aet&lt;y Kal TU&gt;V /xrjre pcoy avrals, 806 E) 2 . The
members of the household described in the Laws would
apparently be but little alone with each other, and not
probably often at home except at night, for their meals
would be taken in the public halls, the women and girls
sitting apart from the men and boys 3 . The household

1 Plutarch (Comment, in Hesiod. no notice of the architectural

c. 20) attributes a similar pre- arrangements of the Greek dwel-

ference for Unigeniture to Ly- ling-house, which reflected so

curgus fir/TTOTe 8e, $T)&lt;T\V 6 nXou- conspicuously the contrast be-

Tap^osj/calnXarcoi/eTreraiTw Ho-ioSQ) tween male and female life. One

Kal SevoKpdrrjs Kal Avuovpyos npo would have expected him to

rovTvv ot jrdvTfs (Sov-ro 8elv eva insist on its reconstruction.

K\r]pov6iJ.ov KnToXinflv. s Sir T. More adopts in his

* It is curious that Plato takes Utopia the plan of common

N 2

l8o ARISTOTLE S CONCEPTION

would thus cease to be a body of persons supplied from
a common store of their own (o/xcxriTruot), and the relations
of husband and wife and of parent and child would pro
bably suffer some relaxation. Plato s pretty ideal picture
(Laws 931 A) of the parents seated by the hearth like
sacred statues among children wh~o half worship them
would perhaps hardly be realized in so scattered an unity
as the household of the Laws. The State appears to take
upon itself not only the physical and intellectual, but also
the moral training of young and old, and to leave little for
the household to do, except indeed to bring fools into
the world and suckle them l . It would seem to escape
abolition only to be condemned to a somewhat shadowy
existence.

Aristotle s With Aristotle s views as to the true organization of the
household 6 household we are only imperfectly acquainted. We get
and its true many separate glimpses of them, but no continuous and

organiza- TT . . ., . .

tion. systematic statement. He glances at its structure in the

Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, and again in the
Eighth Book ; but Justice is the subject with which he is
more immediately concerned in the former book, and
Friendship in the latter. In the First Book of the Politics
the question before him is not so much what is the true
constitution of the household as who is the true house
holder; and we penetrate into the subject only far enough
to ascertain the true relation of the head of the house
hold to wife, child, and slave. Even this topic is not fully
treated, and cannot be so till the constitution is dealt with
(i. 13. I26ob 8 sqq.). In the Second Book we are as much

meals, but ranges men and women 794 A). They are not even to

along opposite sides of the same play in families or under their

table (Utopia, lib. ii. p. 90, ed. mother s eye, when once over

Bas. 1518). three. In fact, as mothers in

1 Even mere babies of three the State of the Laws were to

years old, girls and boys alike, engage in the same pursuits as

are to gather at the village-temples, men and to take their meals at

and to be formed into dye\m for public meal-tables, some arrange-

games, under the control of women ment of this kind was almost

appointed by the State (Laws necessary.

OF THE HOUSEHOLD. 181

concerned with the family relation as with the household,
and the whole question is approached from a different point
of view. Then there is a chapter or two in the Fourth Book
on the age of marriage and the management of young
children. We have also the so-called First Book of the
Oeconomics, which can hardly have been written by Aristotle,
and the VOJJ.OL avbpos KCU ya/xer?)? preserved only in a Latin
translation (Val. Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, p. 644
sqq.), of the Greek original of which the same thing may
be said. On the two latter documents, therefore, we can
not venture to rely. It is not, however, difficult to trace
the general tendency of Aristotle s views.

According to him, the household, like the State, comes
into being for one end and exists for another. It begins in
the impulses of reproduction and self-preservation, perhaps
also in the impulse of sociality (avdpairos yap 777 &lt;ua-ei o-vvbva-
O-TLKOV fjLa\\ov 17 TToAirtKoV, Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 17); but,
when thus brought into existence, it rises above these aims
and exists for better things. It is not a mere means of recruit
ing the population ; still less is it a mere means of heaping
up wealth. If in the De Generatione Animalium (2. i. 731 b
31 sqq.) Aristotle regards reproduction as the path, for men
no less than other animals, to immortality, this point of
view disappears in the Politics. The household is, in its
definitive form, a sort of younger sister of the State ; good
life is its aim, no less than it is that of the State ; it is,
like the State, a KOivavia, though a less comprehensive and
less noble noivavia ; it is at once a group of friends, a body
of rulers and ruled, and a school of moral training. It is a
group of friends, ruled by the head of the household for
their good, and especially for their growth in virtue ; vary
ing in the degree of their inequality, but all unequal, and
some not even proportionately equal. For the child and
the slave are hardly subjects of right, and the latter is in
strictness no member of the KOLvavia. This varying in
equality among the components of the household this
variation of the distance at which they respectively stand
from the head is a characteristic feature of the society,

l8a THE HOUSEHOLD.

and Aristotle insists on nothing so much as that these
differences must be respected in its organization. The
wife is not to be ruled as the child, nor the child as the
slave.

The tendency of the household is to inequality, that of
the State to equality, absolute or proportionate (Pol. 6 (4).
II. I295b 25, /3ovA.erai Se ye f] TTO\IS e urav elvai KOL 6/xoiW
on juaAiora). The household is ruled by a king, whereas
the rule of a king is of rare occurrence in the fully developed
State 1 . The household is at once a less self-complete
(2. 2. 1261 b 12), and a more intimate, society than the
State. In it everything is common (i. 9. 1257 a 21): not
so in the State. On the other hand, the household
resembles the State in not existing for some narrow or
transitory end, but as an aid to human life (Eth. Nic. 8. 14.
n62a 20 sq. : cp. 8. n. n6oa 14-25). It is in the
household that the future citizens of the State first see the
light (Pol. i. 13. 1260 b 19) and receive their earliest train
ing, which often exercises a decisive influence on their
subsequent life 2 ; it is here that women and slaves find
the moral guidance they need. Obedience here is rendered
all the more willingly for being rendered to a relative and
a benefactor (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. n8ob 5); and persons and
things are all the better attended to for being attended to
individually (u8ob 7). The household lightens the burden
of the State by taking off its hands, to some extent at
all events, the care of women, children, and slaves ; and
if on the principle that the better the persons ruled, the
better is the rule exercised (Pol. i. 5. 1254 a 25), the rule

1 Marquardt (Handbuch der a TroXm/ci) ap^fi which cannot be

Romischen Alterthiimer, 7. I. i) said of the rule over children or

attributes to the Romans the feel- slaves differs in some respects

ing that not only is the Family a from most types of no^iriKf] dp%r)

condition of the State, but the (Pol. I. 12. 1259 b 4).
constitution of the Family is also 2 The sixteenth and seventeenth

the basis and the prototype of the chapters of the "Fourth Book of

constitution of the State. Aris- the Politics show what importance

totle would admit this of the early Aristotle, following in the steps of

State, but not of the State in its Plato (Laws 765 E), attached to

definitive form. Even the rule of the earliest epoch of human exist-

the husband over the wife, though ence and even to its embryo stage.

MARRIAGE. 183

of the household stands on a lower level than that of the
State, in which rule is exercised over citizens, it is never- &gt;
theless fit work, in Aristotle s opinion, for the man of full j
virtue (&lt;rjrou8cuo?).

Aristotle omits to treat of some important questions in
relation to marriage. He does not pause to prove that the
household should be a monogamic household, but takes this
for granted. We do not learn his views as to divorce ; he does
not mention the subject of prohibited degrees of relationship.
We must remember that we are not in possession of his
whole mind. On the other hand, he raises questions which
seem rather startling to us. Are men and women of any Aristotle,
and every age, if only of adult years, to be allowed to marry, llk f e P1 * to
and, again, to become parents 1 ? Greek inquirers, with their requires
characteristic combination of logic and audacity, insisted that L^ x ii m ita
the interests of the State made a negative answer neces- of age for
sary 2 . The Lacedaemonian State required that marriage
should take place in the prime of physical vigour on both
sides (Xen. Rep. Lac. i. 6), and both Plato and Aristotle
fix an age for marriage. The former, in the Republic,
allows unions (marriage does not exist) to take place
between men from 25 to 55 years of age and women from
20 to 40 (Rep. 460 E). In the Laws the arrangement is
that a man is to marry not earlier than 25 (772 D) or 30
(721 A : 785 B), and not later than 35 a woman not

1 The question does not seem better education of public opinion
to have been raised whether a to enable men to advance to the
hereditary disease or predisposi- position that the physical and
tion to disease should be a bar to mental vigour of the resulting
marriage. children is a motive to be con-

2 Mr. Mahaffy observes, with sciousiy considered in the selec-
much truth (Old Greek Educa- tion. Plato and Aristotle, it is
tion, p. 117 sq.), that there is no true, went a step farther : they
valid reason why the physical were not content with advising
production of the race should not their citizens to keep these con-
receive infinitely more attention siderations in view, but recom-
than it does, within the bounds mended that the State should see
of our present social arrange- that they did so. See on this sub-
ments. ... If even now there ject Prof. Jowett s interesting re-
are civilized countries and classes marks in his Introduction to Plato s
of people who openly profess pru- Republic (Translation of Plato,
dential reasons as the best for 3. 168, ed. 2).

marrying, it will only require a

1 84 MARRIAGE.

earlier than I6 1 or later than 20; and that the begetting

of children is to continue only for 10 years (784 B). This

latter period would thus close at least ten years earlier

than in the Republic ; but the reason of this is that in

the Republic the interests of the State are secured by

giving the magistrates an absolute control over unions (cp.

Rep. 460 A, TO bf 7rAr/0os r&v ya/zcou em TOI? ap\ov&lt;ri 770177-

(ro/xey, iV ws /^laAtcrra Siacrco^cocri TOV avTov apid^ov T&gt;V av$pu&gt;v).

Considera- Plato s main aims in dealing with this subject appear to

in view by ^ e ^ save both the family and the State from the evils

Aristotle in connected with over-population and to secure a healthy and

relation to A i i i i

this matter, vigorous progeny. Aristotle thinks that other considerations
also need to be taken into account. He recommends a
difference of 20 years between the ages of husband and
wife, or, more precisely, the difference between the ages of
37 and 18. One of his reasons for this recommendation is
that the procreative powers of women cease at 50, twenty
years before those of men, and that if account is not taken
of this fact, the harmony of the union may be impaired
by inequalities in this respect. The disadvantages which
attend a too great nearness or difference of age between
the father and the child will also be avoided. For the
children, if born, as may naturally be expected, at no long
interval after marriage, will be reaching years of discretion
while their father is still vigorous and able to help them ;
nor will their return for the care taken of them in child
hood come too late to be of any use 2 ; while, on the other
hand, they will not be near enough in age to their father to
lose reverence for him or to embarrass his management
of the household. The father, it is evident, will be just

1 785 B. Susemihl (Note 940) e f/ iiev (Krpo(pf) iroXvirovos, f] 8e
notices that the age of 1 8 is men- avgrjo-ts (Bpadfla rfjs 8e operas
tioned in 833 D. For Hesiod s paKpav ovirrjs, TrpoairodvrjaKova-iv ol
counsel on this subject, see Opp. TrXfio-roi Trarepts OVK eVetSe rr]V
et Dies, 695 sqq. "S,a\ap. iva NfOK\fisTr)vQ(ni&lt;TTOK\eovs,

2 Plutarch (de Amore Prolis, c. ovde TOV Evpvfj.(8ovra MiArtaS^r TOV
4) laments the fate of most fathers Kt/iwi/o?, ovSe fJKova-e nepiK\eovs
in dying before their children have Sdvdimros drj^yopovvrof, ov8e "A-
done great deeds, or even attained piWwi/ nXarwi/os ^uXoor

their full moral stature avdp&nov K.T.\.

MARRIAGE. 185

beginning to need help when his children are ready to
give it, and thus neither mutual helpfulness nor parental
control will be sacrificed. The household will be firmly
knit together by mutual needs and the interchange of
service, and will be a scene of harmony instead of discord,
for it will be based on the common advantage (TO Koivf)
&lt;rv[ji&lt;pfpov). Another gain will be that the father will be
well stricken in years and the sons just at the commence
ment of their prime (30 years of age, Rhet. 2. 14. 1390 b
9 sq.), when the latter take the place of the former (Pol.
4 (7). 1 6. 1335 a 32-35). Above all, these ages give the
best prospect of well-developed offspring, likely to produce
children of the male sex. The physical well-being of
husband and wife is also thus consulted. It seems to have
been a common opinion that, in the case of the male,
over-early marriage was prejudicial to physical growth,
while in that of the female, it added to the perils of labour
and involved some moral risks besides (1335 a 22) 1 .

We see that Aristotle, in dealing with this subject, keeps
other aims in view, besides those which were present to the
mind of Plato the well-being of husband and wife, their
full harmony, the establishment of a due relation of help
fulness and respect between the father and the child. His
remarks are fresh and interesting ; they call attention to
points which often escape notice, and evidence a thought
ful study of the facts of household life. Montaigne says
(Essais, Livre 2. ch. 8 : vol. 2. p. 179, Charpentier) : je me
mariay a trente-trois ans, et loue 1 opinion de trente-cinq,
qu on diet estre d Aristote : and a little further on (p. 180),
un gentilhomme qui a trente-cinq ans, il n est pas temps
qu il face place a son fils qui en a vingt : and again, il ne
nous fauldroit pas marier si jeunes, que nostre aage vienne
quasi a se confondre avecques 1 aage de nos enfants (p. 1 78).
We see that difficulties as to the succession (SiaSox??) of
the children were familiar enough to him. All will approve

1 We know from Aristoxenus ascribed to Pythagoras in the
(Fr. 20: Muller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. Pythagorean school.
278), that this was an opinion

1 86 MARRIAGE.

Aristotle s postponement of the female age of marriage to
1 8 ; but we shall hardly admit that the disparity of years
between husband and wife need be as great as he thinks :
obviously a man does not require to be nearly 40 years older
than his eldest child to possess a due authority over his chil
dren. Lasaulx (Ehe bei den Griechen, p. 60, n. 190) quotes
a vigorous utterance of W. von Humboldt to the effect that
an ideal union begins for both husband and wife in com
parative youth ; that husband and wife should pass the
days of their youth together and have common memories
of the most enjoyable period of human life 1 . Still, even
if we think that Aristotle has not hit upon the ideally best
age for the husband and father, it remains true that he
should neither be too near in age to his children nor too
far removed from them. It was natural, that, resting as he
does far the larger part of the weight of the household on
the father s shoulders, Aristotle should attach special im
portance to his maturity in mind and body. According to
him, the acme of man s physical development is reached
between 30 and 35, the acme of mental development not
till 49 2 . This accounts for his choosing a somewhat late
age ; but he may also have remembered that, till about the
time he names, his citizens would be much occupied with
military duties hardly perhaps compatible with married life.
He is not, however, content with merely fixing an age
after iT ^ or marriage. Like Plato, he sees that parents may be too
years of o ld to give birth to a vigorous offspring 3 , and he requires

married
life.

1 The freshness of youth is of sentiment which is altogether

the true foundation of happy wed- modern.

lock (die wahre Grundlage der 2 Aristot. Rhet. 2. 14. I39ob

Ehe). I do not for a moment 9 sqq. : cp. Solon, Fragm. 27.

say that the happiness of wedlock Solon places marriage in the fifth

ceases with youth ; what I say is septennial period of man s life

that husband and wife should (act. 28-35), tne physical acme

carry into later life the memory in the fourth, the mental in the

of a youth enjoyed together, if seventh and eighth (aet. 42-56).

their happiness is to be perfect, Plato (Rep. 460 -461 A) makes

and not to lose the distinguishing the years between 25 and 55 the

characteristic of wedded bliss a/c/nr) rra&gt;/iaT&lt;&gt;y rf Knl &lt;ppovr;a-u&gt;s.

(Briefe aneineFreundin,2.p. 176). , 3 We are little accustomed to

We are conscious here of a touch look at these things from Aris-

MARRIAGE. 187

that after seventeen years of married life (when the husband
is 54 years old and the wife 35), the married couple shall
cease to become parents (4 (7). 16. 1335 b 26 sqq.). Plato
had named in the Laws an even shorter term ten years.
Aristotle thus divides the period of marriage into two
epochs the epoch of reKvoTroda and that in which no
children are to be brought into the world.

Nor does he stop even here. He names, in conformity Only a cer-
with Greek custom 1 , the winter-season as the best for con- ^J 1 ^ 1 ^.
tracting marriage, and insists that a limit must be set to dren to be
the begetting of children even during the seventeen years a^g the
term (1335 b 21 sq.), so that the begetting of more than 1 7 years:
a certain number shall be prohibited (2. 6. 1265 b 6 sq.). which this
It may be thought, he hints (1335 b 2t sq.), that infractions
of this rule will occur, and that the only possible remedy
for them will be the exposure of the surplus children ; but
this is not so 2 : he apparently regards the exposure of
living children as not holy (o&lt;noz&gt;) :! , and suggests in prefer
ence abortion at an early stage of pregnancy. The practice
of abortion had already been sanctioned by Plato in the
Republic (461 C) without this limitation, in the event of
unions outside the legal limits of age proving fruitful ; and
in case of its failure, exposure. Aristotle appears to be
more opposed to exposure and to abortion in advanced

totle s point of view, and I know I335b 21 sqq. given by C. F.

not whether any physiologist has Hermann (Gr. Antiqq. 3. II.

inquired statistically, what limits 8) : but not, on the ground of

of age in the parents seem most an over-great number of children,

favourable to vigorous offspring. if there is a regulation against an

1 Not Attic only, apparently, over-great number, to expose
for he refers to the practice of ot children.

TToXXoi (1335 a 37;. The month 3 Except in the case ofdefec-
Gamelion (January-February) tive offspring (irfmnjaipevov, 1335 b
was the marriage - month at 20). Compare with 1335 b 23-26,
Athens. See Hist. An. 5. 8. de Gen. An. 5. 1.778 b 32 sqq. :
542a26-bi. Plutarch is pleased Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1 170 a 16. See
with animals for pairing at one Thonissen, Droit Penal de la re-
particular season only, and that publique athenienne, p. 258, on
the most favourable (de Amore the question whether abortion was
Prolis c. 2). Pythagoras had a crime by Attic law. It seems
prescribed the winter (Diog. to have been common among
Laert. 8, 9 : Diod. 10. 9. 3). slave-mothers (Dio Chrys. Or.

2 I follow the interpretation of 15. 237 M).

1 88 AIMS OF ARISTOTLE.

stages of pregnancy than Plato. On the other hand, Plato
-does not appear to authorize abortion, as Aristotle does, in
the case of unions within the prescribed limits of age.
It is also to be remarked that he drops these provisions
in the Laws.

Aristotle s object evidently is to avoid both exposure and
abortion, but he regards the latter, if effected at an early
period of pregnancy, as unobjectionable in comparison with
the former, which he prohibits in all cases but one, that of
an imperfect growth. It would have been a great gain to
the ancient world to be rid of infanticide, which Polybius
specifies among the causes of the dwindling numbers of
the Greeks 1 , but whether this result was not too dearly
purchased at the cost of permitting abortion may well be
doubted. It may easily be imagined how often the pro
cess prescribed by Aristotle would probably be resorted to
in a State which delayed the marriage of all males till the
age of 37, and which confined the begetting of children to
a period of seventeen or eighteen years.
Aims of Aristotle evidently feels, even more strongly than Plato,

Aristotle , ... ...

in relation the necessity of preventing the household from becoming
to these a source o f over-population and pauperism. He is not

matters. x r r

satisfied with the arrangements in the Laws on the subject
of population (Pol. 2. 6. 1265 a 38 sqq.). Plato s plan
of Unigeniture makes it more than ever essential that
there shall not be too many sons in a household ; and yet
he takes insufficient means to secure this result. Hence the
extraordinary strictness of Aristotle s regulations on the
subject. He will not even trust to the remedy of founding
a colony, which Plato keeps in view (Laws 74 E) : the
prevention of over-population is better than its cure. Yet
the world has gained much by the foundation of Greek
colonies, and these could not have existed if there had
not been a surplus population to people them. Aristotle
seems to forget, in his care for the internal harmony
of his best State, that a large part even of the then
known surface of the earth was unoccupied, and that, if
1 Capes, Early Roman Empire, p. 205. See Polyb. 37. 9. 7.

THE HEAD OF THE HOUSEHOLD. 189

it was not peopled in time from the civilized world, it
might, as it afterwards did, receive immigrants likely to be
formidable to civilization. He is familiar enough with the
view that the State should be constituted for the advantage,
not of a section of its citizens, but of the whole ; that the
Greek State and the Greek race had a duty to fulfil to the
world outside, he is no more aware than any of his contem
poraries.

Another aim which Aristotle has before him in dealing
with the household, is that of making it the nursery of
a race healthy and vigorous in mind and body. Much
can be done within it to make or mar the physique of
the future citizen (1334^ 29), and to render it what for
the sake of the character (1334 b 25 sqq.) we should desire
it to be, or the reverse. We know from the Nicomachean
Ethics how closely moral virtue is connected with the
passions, and these with the body (Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 a
14). He also makes it his object (and here, as we have
seen, he was in a less degree anticipated by Plato) to
secure order, harmony, and mutual helpfulness within the
household. But he no doubt also remembers that the city-
State must not exceed a certain size, and desires to prevent
its population outgrowing the limits imposed by him in the
Fourth Book.

We have already noticed some of the arrangements which The head
he adopts with a view to the well-being of the household, household* 1
but he evidently finds the main security for its well-being of Aristotle
in the character of its head. The husband and father, in t j on to his
Aristotle s ideal household, is not only of mature age, but Wlfe &gt; cllil -

dren, and

one whose happy natural endowment of an Bunion of slaves,
intelligence, spirit, and affectionateness (4 (7). 7. 1327 b
29 sqq.) has had full justice done to it by rearing and
education, whose childhood and youth have been spent
amid ennobling influences, and who has undergone both the
rude discipline of a military life and the full scientific
training of a philosopher. His wife will not have received
the varied education which Plato designed for girls no less
than boys, but she will have been trained in the virtues

190 THE HEAD OF THE HOUSEHOLD.

which fit her to be his help-mate and right hand for
household matters (Pol. i. 13. 1260 a 21 sq.), and he will
Vnake of her a not unequal comrade : to his children he
will be a kind of god, a full head and shoulders above
them, and rightly so, for the father is a king, not the elder
brother of his children 1 (Pol. I. 12. 1259 b I - I 7)- His
life will not be what Montaigne calls une vie questuaire.
He will have learnt to obtain the commodities necessary
for the use of his household from natural sources and in
natural ways, and to rest content with just that amount of
them which is the essential condition of a satisfactory life,
counting the provision of inanimate property and the care
for it a matter of less moment than the care of slaves, and
this again a small matter in comparison with the rule over
wife and children and the development of their virtue.
He will entrust the education of his boys after the age
of seven to the officers of the State, and will leave the full
command of the internal affairs of the house to his wife,
making this her province in which she is to be supreme,
except so far as the moral training of children and slaves is
concerned, for this is to be his own affair. We may doubt
whether his frequent absence on public business and at the
syssitia, where he will take his meals, would not make it
difficult for him to watch over his family whether it
would not interfere with that closeness of the household
relation, on which Aristotle himself remarks (i. 2. 1252 b 14,
OIKO? . . . ovs Xctpwz^as (jifv /caAet O^OO-LTTVOVS, E.TTiiJ.fvibr)$ Se 6

1 Contrast the relation of History of C. J. Fox, p. 289). The

Charles James Fox to his father. household as Carlyle knew it in

As long as Charles would treat his early years (Reminiscences, p.

him like an elder brother (a point 55) comes nearer to the Aristote-

on which the lad indulged him lian type, but is still very different.

without infringing on the strictest It is noticeable that Aristotle

filial respect, or abating an atom describes his nap.da&lt;ri\fia, in which

of that eager and minute dutiful- the king is of transcendent virtue

ness which he exhibited in all and greatness in comparison with

his personal relations) he Was his willing subjects, as reray^vr]

welcome to do as he pleased Kara rrjv oiKovofj.iicr)v (Pol. 3. 14.

with his own time and his father s 1285 b 31).
money (G. O. Trevelyan, Early

HUSBAND AND WIFE. 191

His relation to his wife is the best relation in the
household, and, except that between brothers and sisters,
the least unequal one the relation in which justice fills the
largest place (Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b I5^sq.); for it is a
weak point in the household that its relations are mostly
so unequal as to rest less on right than on love. The head
of the household will discriminate his relation to his wife
from his relation to his children, and that again from his
relation to his slaves. There are some things which the
wife can do better than he can (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. n6ob
32 sqq. : cp. 8. 14. 1162 a 22 sq.), and which he will be wise
to hand over to her : the advantage of wedlock lies in its
making a common stock of contrasted aptitudes (1162 a
23) : at least this is its utilitarian side, for it has another ;
it may become not only a friendship for utility and for
pleasure, but also a friendship of the highest type a
friendship for virtue (Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 24 sqq.) 1 . It
may not perhaps attain to the moral level of a friendship
between two men of full virtue ((nrovbaloi) Aristotle would
hardly be a Greek if he thought it did but then it is a
form of friendship and something more a co-operative
union of especial closeness and permanence for the highest
ends. Man and wife are not only friends/ but sharers
in a common work.

The wife, however, will be silent before her husband,
no less than the children before their father (Pol. i. 13.
1 260 a 28 sq.) ; in other words, will refrain from opposing
him, so long, we conclude, as he does not encroach upon
her domain. Plutarch, in whose time the wife counted
for more in the household, still retains in his Conjugal
Precepts the doctrine of conjugal silence (cc. 31, 32 : c. 37),
but makes it rather a silence to strangers, and a readiness
to allow the husband to speak for her, than a silence before
him. Adultery on the part of either husband or wife is

1 There is nothingin the Politics imply a general and not a partial

inconsistent with this, though the subordination on her part. The

use of the word virrjprriKj] of the division of spheres between hus-

virtue of the wife (Pol. i. 13. band and wife is, however, implied

12603 21 sq.) might seem to in Pol. 2. 5. 1264 b 2.

192 FATHER AND CHILD.

to be visited with condign punishment during the period
of TfKvo-noda, and to be treated as disgraceful throughout
the whole term of marriage (4 (7). 16. 1335 b 38 sqq.).
If the authenticity of the fragment on the relations of
husband and wife, which we possess in a Latin translation,
were less doubtful a , a few touches might be added from
that source. It makes the wife supreme over all that
passes within the house, reserving to the husband the right
of deciding who are to be allowed to cross its threshold,
and even the right of conducting all negotiations for the
marriage of the children 2 : it draws largely on Homer to
show with what reverence and respect the husband should
treat his wife ; they will be rivals in working for the good
of the household, each in a special sphere, and this will be
the only rivalry between them.

The relation of a father to his child that of mother and
child is not counted among the three constituent relations of
the household enumerated in Pol. i. 3. 1253 b 5 sc l ls &gt; as
has been said, regarded by Aristotle as resembling that of
a king to his subjects. The language of Eth. Nic. 5. 10.
U34b 8 sqq., indeed, treats the child up to a certain age
eojy av y Ti^kLnov Kal pri ^(i)pi(rdfi as part and parcel of
his father, and, one would think, hardly distinct enough
from him to be even his subject ; yet we learn in Eth.
Nic. 8. 8. ii58b 21 sqq. that not only is their relation
one of friendship, but that the friendship between them,

1 Quid quod hunc ipsum altered form of Aristotle s work

librumabAristotele quidem quam on this subject (Ethik d. alten

maxime alienum, Perictionae Griechen, 2. 187). The compo-

autem libro nepl yvvaiKos appovlas sition of the treatise from which

(Stob. flor. 85, 19, cui similes sunt this translation was made may

Phintys et Pempelus, Platonis hie well have been suggested to some

leges exscribens, cf. Ocellus c. 4) follower of Aristotle by Eth. Nic.

et methodo qui praeceptoris est 8. 14. 1162 a 29 sq., and Pol. i. 13.

et sententiis et ut credo aetate 1260 b 8 sqq., just as that of the

similem, latina versione servatum so - called Second Book of the

Aretinus videtur recepisse (Val. Oeconomics was probably sug-

Rose, de Aristot. librorum ordine gested by Pol. i. 11. 12593 3.
et auctoritate,p.6i ). L.Schmidt, a They are conducted by the

on the other hand, accepts the two fathers in Terence s Andria,

Latin fragment as embodying 3. 3. 6-42.
important remains in a greatly

MASTER AND SLAVE. 193

though unequal, may be durable and based on virtue,
when the children render to their parents what is due
to those who gave them being, and parents to sons
what is due to children. Aristotle s whole conception
of youth perhaps accentuates its contrast with man
hood ; he does not follow out in detail the variations
of the filial relation at different ages ; he probably con
ceived it as ceasing to exist when the child attained years
of discretion (cp. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2. 26). In
describing the relation of father and child as a kingly
relation, his object is to contrast it, on the one hand,
with the rule of the husband over the wife, which is like
that of one citizen over another, except that there is no
interchange of rule (Pol. i. 12. i259b i sqq.) 1 , and on the
other with the despotic rule of the master over the slave.
In the two former relations rule is exercised for the
advantage of the ruled or of both parties, whereas in the J.
last it is exercised primarily for the advantage of the ruler
and accidentally only for the advantage of the ruled
(Pol. 3. 6. 1278 b 32-1279 a 8). The master is, however
(Pol. i. 13), to make his rule over the slave a source of
moral improvement to him a means of placing him in
contact with that rationality which he does not himself
possess (Pol. i. 13. i26ob 5: i. 5. I254b 22). He must
not, therefore, in his relations with his slaves, confine
himself, as Plato would have him do, to the language
of blank command, but must also use that of admonition.
Slaves should be encouraged to behave well by the pro
spect of receiving their freedom as a reward for good
conduct (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 31 sq.). Aristotle intended to
deal fully with the subject of the treatment of slaves, but
does not do so in what we have of the Politics (4 (7). 10.

The differences between Aristotle s ideal household and

1 Eth. Nic. 8. 12. Il6ob 32, yap 6 avfjp apxei Kal nepl ravra a
av&pbs 8e Kal ywaiKos (nottKavia) 8el TOV avdpa ocra 8e yvvaiKi appofci,
apicrroKpuTiKi] fyaivtrai KQT diav eKeivrj uTro8i8o)iTti&gt;.

VOL. I. O

194 THE IDEAL HOUSEHOLD

The ideal the average Athenian household seem to be mainly these,
of Aristotle ^ would be endowed with an adequate, and not more than

contrasted adequate, measure of worldly goods, and thus be equally
with the *

average removed from the over-wealthy type in which obedience

houseSi was unknown ( Po1 - 6 (4)- IZ - J 295b 13-18), and from the
over-poor type in which the wife and children had to supply
the place of slaves (8 (6). 8. 1323 a 5) ; its predominant aim
would be the increase of virtue, not the increase of wealth ;
its head would be older and better prepared for his duties ;
his supremacy would not be usurped by his wife, while, on
the other hand, his relation to her would be more equal
and friendly than was often the case at Athens, and
adultery on his part would be more severely dealt with ;
his married life would be largely controlled by the law in
his own interest and in that of his wife and children, no
less than in that of the State ; his functions as head of the
household would be exercised more or less under the
control of the yvvaiK.ovoiJ.oi and TraiSovo/xoi appointed by the
State, just as they were probably exercised in the early
days of Athens under some control from the Council of the
Areopagus 1 ; he would not be allowed to choose for himself
what kind of education should be given to his sons, but
would have to send them to the public schools of the State
from the age of seven onwards. Lastly, he would be even
more of an absentee from the home during the day-time
than the average Attic husband, for he would take his meals
at the public meal-tables 2 .

1 Gynaeconomi existed at sit censor qui viros doceat

Athens, their existence, how- moderari uxoribus (Cic. de Rep.

ever, dating in Boeckh s opinion 4. 6. 6). Dionysius of Halicar-

from the administration of De- nassus claims that the authority

metrius Phalereus (Diet, of An- of the Roman censor, unlike that

tiquities s. v. : Gilbert, Griech. of any magistrate at Athens or

Staatsalterth. i. 154) : if this Sparta, penetrated within the

was so, their introduction may household. See the striking

have been due to Aristotle s com- fragment from the Antiquitates

mendation of the institution, like Romanae (20. 13), where he

other points in the regime of depicts the way in which the

Demetrius Phalereus. Cicero household was controlled by this

disapproves of it : nee vero mu- great office of State. Aristotle

lieribus praefectus praeponatur could not have asked more,

qui apud Graecos creari solet, sed 2 Aristotle s remark at the close

OF ARISTOTLE. 195

Aristotle is evidently strongly impressed with the
importance of the household. The children it brings into
the world are the future citizens of the State, and it may
easily saddle the State with an over-numerous or unsatis
factory progeny. It has to do with the future citizen in
the earliest and most impressible years of life, years during
which the character receives its permanent bent. Hence it
is that Aristotle commits it to the charge of a head of
mature age, worth, and capacity, and not content with that,
subjects his rule to the supervision of State-officers. It is
impossible to say that the course he takes is not a logical
course, even if we may think that it would be better to
leave the head of the household more freedom and
responsibility.

The household, however, as he conceives it, is far from Aristotle
being a mere shadow, like that of the Laws ; it is a real househol
home, for though its head will often be absent, and though to be a
his action is in part regulated by the State, he is charged re
with the moral guidance of wife, child, and slave, and is
evidently credited with the power to do much for their
growth in virtue. The mere fact that the household needs
to be adjusted to the constitution of the State shows that
it is to be a reality.

On one important subject connected with the organi- Divorce,
zation of the household, that of divorce, we have no
express intimation of Aristotle s views. Plato in the Laws
(929 E sqq.) allows of divorce for incompatibility of tem
per, though not without the intervention of the State, but
his whole conception of the household implies the view
that wedlock is normally a life-long union. This is still
more true of Aristotle. Locke thinks that there is reason
to inquire why the compact of marriage, where pro
of the First Book that the virtue connexion with the various politi-
of husband and wife and father cal constitutions to which the
and child, and the way in which household must be adjusted, pre-
they should consort with each pares us for a systematic study of
other, cannot be definitively de- the organization of the household
picted, nor the right standard relations under each constitution,
in these things indicated, until which we do not find undertaken
they have been considered in in the Politics.

O 2

196 THE CLAN, PHRATRY, AND TRIBE.

creation and education are secured and inheritance taken
care for, may not be made determinable either by consent
or at a certain time, or upon certain conditions, as well
as any other voluntary compacts, there being no necessity
in the nature of the thing nor to the ends of it, that it
should always be for life 1 . Aristotle would probably
reply, that the wife needs her husband s protecting care
and affection to the last, that the relation of husband and
wife is a relation of friendship, which deserves to be kept
in being whether the interests of the children require its
continuance or not, and that the husband and wife in their
old age might, if parted, lose the aid of their grown-up
children. The dissolution of an ill-matched or unsatis
factory union would, nevertheless, be probably recognized
by him as occasionally necessary.

Aristotle In modern communities the household has long come to

, c&gt;

recognized society based on the tie of blood.

try, and Among ourselves even the conseil de famille is unknown
to the law. But there was once a time when the house
hold was only one of a number of similar societies. The
clan, the phratry, and the tribe stood at its side, larger,
though less intimate, unities of the same type. It might
be thought to rest on no surer basis than they. History
has taught us otherwise. Time has spared the household,
but the clan, tribe, and phratry have long passed away.
They found themselves assailed both from within and from
without. The individual outgrew them and shook himself
free from them ; armed with adoptive and testamentary
power, men were able, if they chose, to defeat the succes
sion-rights of the clan ; the rise of classes and parties in
the State tended to break them up ; religious change was
fatal to their religious basis. Nor was the State probably
sorry to substitute purely local unions for societies
which cherished immemorial traditions of independence
and hierarchical pride 2 . Assailed by the individual and

1 Civil Government, 2. 81. (5). 4. i3O4a 35) that the tribe

2 We learn from Aristotle (7 was sometimes a prime mover in

CONTRAST OF MODERN CONCEPTIONS. 197

the State at the same time, it is no wonder that these
societies succumbed, while the household, which went
counter to neither, survived.

To Aristotle, however, the clan (yevos), phratry, and tribe
were still indispensable elements in the State l , though he
says but little about them. The clan, indeed, with him
assumes the local form of the village (Pol. i. 2. 1252 b 16
sq.), just as at Athens it had passed into the deme in many
cases ; but in that form it is treated as existing by nature
and as a permanent element in the State. If the house
hold aids in the maintenance of good feeling and good
fellowship among the members of the community, so do
the tribe, phratry, and clan (2. 4. 1262 a 12 : cp. 3. 9. 1280 b
33, 40). What other social functions these unities were to
fulfil in Aristotle s State, we do not learn in what we have
of the Politics.

We need not dwell on the many points of contrast Contrast
which distinguish the household as Aristotle conceives j^g^is-
it from the household of modern times. One remark, totelian
however, may be made on this subject. To Aristotle the oHhe
head of the household is the one source from which all its household

. and mo-

spintual influences appear to proceed. The wife contn- dem con-
butes services which she is better fitted to render than c ^ lons

of it.

any one else, but there is no sign that her husband is
to derive any moral stimulus or guidance from her 2 .

a-rdo-is. He notices (8 (6). 4. for instance, would tell, and was
I3i9b iQsqq.) the bold and doubtless intended by Epaminon-
remarkable steps by which Cleis- das to tell, in favour of democracy
thenes at Athens put an end to and against the Lacedaemonians,
the previously existing associa- l Pol. 2. 5. ia64a6sq.
tions, and sought to bring men * Even in Eth. Nic. 8. 14. n62a
together and to break down the 25 sq. all that is said is that a
distinctions of worship and group- friendship for virtue the highest
ing which held them apart. In type of friendship may exist
the Peloponnesus the clans between husband and wife, if
seem to have been long the main- they are good, for each has virtue
stay of oligarchy, and the only and the husband may feel plea-
way to diminish their power sure in the wife s virtue. But
was to gather a number of villages then we are told in the Politics
(i.e. clans) into a considerable (i. 13. 1260 a 21) that the wife s
city. The creation of Megalopolis, virtue is subordinate and minis-

198

TEACHING OF ARISTOTLE

Aristotle s
teaching
as to Pro
perty
its due
amount
and the
true mode
of acquir
ing and
using it.

Aristotle would hardly say with Trendelenburg l that the
two parties (husband and wife) stand in need of each other,
in order by their union to elevate and ennoble their indi
vidual lives. The view of Comte that the function of the
household is to cultivate to the highest point the influence
of woman over man 2 , would of course be utterly incom
prehensible to him.

Just as, after defending the household, Aristotle sketches
an ideal household which differs much from the household
as it actually existed, so after defending the right of seve
ral property, he lays down principles as to the acquisition
and use of property which leave proprietary right and
proprietary duty, so far at least as the citizens of the State
are concerned 3 , a very different thing from what he found
them.

The ideal household, as we have already seen, is not to
be maintained in communistic fashion out of a public stock,
but is to have a definite area of land assigned to it from
which the householder is to win the means of subsistence
for his household, or rather to have them won for him.
Its extent will be such as to favour a mode of life at once
temperate and liberal. A due supply of the goods of
fortune for Aristotle follows the traditional use of the
Greek language in treating fortune as the source of wealth
(e. g. 4 (7). i. 1323 b 27)* is a condition of some kinds of
virtuous action and a condition of happiness (4 (7). 13. 1332
a 10-29). Virtue must be possessed of an adequate supply

(7). 9. 13293 I7sqq.); but the
artisans and day-labourers who
are to find a place in the best
State, must be intended to hold
property, though we hear no
more of their proprietary rights
than we do of the organization of
the households in which we must
suppose them to live.

* Contrast the language used jn
4 (7). I. 13233 40, opaVTas on
KT&gt;VTCII Kal (pv\aTTOV(nv, ov ras
apfras rois fVroy, dXX eu/a rav-
ratr.

terial (uTnj/aerjKij), and that the
deliberative element in her nature
is unable to assert itself with
effect (1260 a 13). Aristotle
was well aware of the contrast
of character in men and women
(see, for instance, Hist. An. 9. I.
608 a 35-b 16), whether we think
that he draws the contrast cor
rectly or not.

1 Naturrecht, 123.

2 Social Statics, E.T., p. 171.

3 The ownership of land is to
be confined to citizens (Pol. 4

AS TO PROPERTY. 199

of external and bodily goods, if it is to rise into happiness ;
it needs instruments (opyava) just as a harpist needs a good
lyre (1332 a 25). Plato had designed for his citizens in the
Laws a simply temperate life (737 D) : Aristotle objects to
this description as rather vague and open to misinterpre
tation (2. 6. 1 265 a 28 sqq.) ; it might, he thinks, be construed
to point to a pinched, hard existence, which is not what he
would himself approve. He is not, like Milton, an enco
miast of that spare Fast, which, according to the poet,

Oft with gods doth diet,
And hears the Muses in a ring
Aye round about God s altar sing :

but he is still less in sympathy with those who found in
luxury a school of valour and greatness of mind 1 . Aris
totle connected v/ith extreme wealth and luxury unwilling
ness to submit to be ruled, or to rest content with anything
short of absolute rule, just as he connected incapacity
for ruling and for aught but servile subjection with extreme
poverty (Pol. 6 (4). n. 1295 b 13)^. The life of his citizens
is to strike a happy mean between the two extremes. The
ideal distribution of property is thus, in Aristotle s view,
that in which every citizen has enough for virtue and happi
ness, and none have more 3 . His acceptance of the institu-

1 Heracleides Ponticus appears Greeks than it means to us ; it
to have said in his popular work was in their view closely allied
on Pleasure anavres yovv oi rf/v with vfipis and not unconnected
f)8oviiv TijjLtoVTfs &lt;a\ rpvffiav nporjprj- with political untrustworthiness :
p.evoi p.(ya\6\}rvxoi Ka\ nfyaXoirpeTrels cp. Plutarch, Lycurg. C. 13, ontp
flcriVy ws Hepcrat KOL Mr^Sot ^idXtora -yap vcrrtpov K7ra.fj.fii&gt;a&gt;v8ai&gt; flirelv
yap T(av a\\a&gt;v dvdpatiratv TTJV f]8ovf]i&gt; Xe-youcrti/ firl rrjs euvrov rpairefljf,
OVTOI (cat TO rpv(pav Tt/xaKTij/, av8pf 16- o)s TO TOIOVTOV apivrov ov ^oopet
rarot Kat /ne-yaXo^u^drnrot ra&gt;v /3np- Trpofiocr/ai/, roiiro rrpwroy evor/cre
fjiipnv wTfs (Miiller, Fr. Hist. Gr. h.vKovpyos. The Greeks always
2. 200 n.). The paradox is repro- conceived the tyrant to be not
duced by Agatharchides, a Peri- only fond of unlimited power, but
patetic of the second century generally unlimited in his desires
before Christ, who says of the (Plato, Rep. 573 A sqq. : Theo-
Aetolians AtVcoXol TOO-OUTW TWI/ pomp. Fr. 129,204).

Xoi7reoi&gt; troi^orepov e^ovo-i npos 3 Compare the saying of Gibbon

6dvarov, o&urrrep KU\ ^fji TroXwreX&jf (Decline and Fall, C. 2) : It might

[KOI] fKreveanpov ^roucrt ra&gt;v a\\cai&gt; perhaps be more conducive to the

(ap. Athen. Deipn. 12. 33. 527 b). virtue as well as happiness of

2 Luxury meant more to the mankind, if all possessed the ne-

200 TEACHING OF ARISTOTLE

tion of several property is not indeed expressly coupled
with this limitation and equalization of its amount ; still
we note that he deprecates those extremes of wealth and
poverty which have in practice proved the almost insepar
able concomitants of this institution. When he allows a
place to wealth among the necessary elements of the State
(4 (7). 8. 1328 b 22 : cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 33), we must sup
pose that he has in his mind moderate, not great, wealth.

The virtues connected with property have to do both
with its acquisition and with its use, but with the latter
more than with the former (Eth. Nic. 4. i. 1120 a 8 sqq.). As
we have seen, Aristotle accentuates the distinction between
Household Science and the Science of Supply : it is the
householder s duty rather to see that the commodities ne-
ces-sary or useful to the household are forthcoming, than
himself to take part in acquiring them, just as it is his business
to see that the members of his household enjoy health,
though he leaves it to the physician to produce it. His
householder is to be neither improvident nor a lover of gain.
Aristotle seems, as we have noticed, scarcely to admit that
the love of money is as primary an instinct of human nature
as the love of pleasure ; he sometimes resolves the former
into the latter. He desires that the landowners of his
ideal State shall be men whose main pre-occupation it
will be to rule over their households, to rule and be ruled
as citizens of the State, and to engage in philosophical
speculation, and who will gladly delegate to others the
task of acquiring the commodities necessary for the support
of their households men who, without forgetting to secure
that these commodities shall be forthcoming, will count
the care of property less noble than the exercise of rule
over the members of the household, and who will make
it in use available for others. Plato had already said in
his Laws (740 A) that the possessors of the various lots
are to feel that their lots are each of them the common

cessaries and none the super- and allows them a good deal
fluitiesoflife. Aristotle, however, more than the bare necessaries
speaks only of his ideal citizens, of life.

AS TO PROPERTY. 2OI

property of the whole State (KOLVJJV rrjs TroXeco? 17*7700-17?) ;
but the expression KOIZJTJ XP*/ " 15 ls apparently adopted by
Aristotle from Isocrates ideal picture of Athens under the
sway of the Areopagus (Areopag. 35), and it gives in
creased defmiteness to the doctrine l . Aristotle had in his
mind the open-handed fellowship of Pythagorean friends,
and, still more, the Communistic ideal of Plato, and he
seeks while retaining in his State the right of several
property, to ensure that it shall not imperil the c public-
heartedness of his citizens or the sense of brotherhood in
the community. The Xenophontic Cyrus, who recom
mends the acquisition by just means of as much as pos
sible in order that the acquirer may have the more to use
nobly 2 , took a different view ; but the stress which Xeno-
phon, no less than Plato and Aristotle, lays on the duty
of using property aright, deserves especial attention in
these days, in which, as L. Schmidt says, one of the most
important tasks the peoples of Europe have before them
is to moralize in an increasing degree the institution of
private property (Ethik der alten Griechen, 2. 390) 3 .
Gorgias had said of Cimon that he acquired in order
to use and used in order to be honoured (Plutarch, Cimon,
c. 10) : Aristotle s ideal householder is to value property
for this, that it makes possible a life of virtuous activity
and happiness, and to desire no more than contributes to
this end ; and he is to use it, not with the view of reaping
honour, but in such a way as to give full expression to his
virtue and friendliness of heart.

1 Xenophon himself had, as property of all citizens,

we have seen, put into the 2 See L. Schmidt, 2. 380, who

mouth of his hero Cyrus words refers to Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 20-23.

which express the Pythagorean Cp. also Plutarch, Cimon c. 10,

doctrine Koiva TCI &lt;f)i\a&gt;v ravra, Kpirias 8f T&gt;V rpiaKovra yevopevos

f(f)T], 3&gt; civdpfs, cmavra 8el V/JLO.S fi&gt; rals e\fyeiais fv^erat

ovdev /jLa\\ov efia rjyflcrdai. fj Kal TiXovrov p.ev^KO7Ta8S}i&gt;,fJi.eya\o(f)po-

v/jLtrepa (Cyrop. 8. 4. 36). He is o-vvrjv de Kifimvos,

addressing his friends. But to vinas 8 "ApKeo-i Xa TOV AaKe-

make what one has the com- Sainoviov.

mon property of oneself and 3 The readers of Comte s Pos-

one s friends is not the same itive Polity will be familiar with

thing as making it the common language to the same effect.

202 PROPERTY.

The Greeks were probably far more open-handed in their
use of property than the Romans of the Republic. Poly-
bius, at any rate, after describing the munificence of Scipio,
adds (32. 12) now an act of this kind would be not un
reasonably thought noble everywhere, but at Rome it was
positively marvellous, for there no one of his free will gives
any one anything whatever belonging to him. Not every
rich Athenian, indeed, like Cimon, threw his fields and gar
dens open to the passer-by, and allowed all men freely to
take of their produce, or kept open house, or gave the gar
ments from the backs of his slaves to poor men whom he
met in the streets far from it but many gave dowries to
the daughters of impoverished citizens, or paid funeral ex
penses, or ransomed captives, or subscribed to Upavoi for the
relief of friends in distress 1 . Aristotle would probably
find as much to amend in the methods of the private
charity of his day as he did in those of its public charity
(8 (6). 5. 1320 a 29 sqq.) : still he gives high praise to the
liberality with which the Spartans treated each other,
and the rich of Tarentum treated the poor (1320 b
9 sqq.: 2. 5. 1263 a 30 sqq.). He demands, however, of
his ideal proprietor far more than this. He expects him
not only to be free-handed in giving, but also to allow
others much freedom in using that which he does not give
away 2 .

We do not know even in outline what powers of dealing
with his property were to be possessed by the proprietor
in Aristotle s State. The lot of land, indeed, as Susemihl
points out 3 , he apparently intends to be inalienable and

1 See Schmidt, 2. 387-8, from their reach advantages and grati-
whom I take these facts. fications of all kinds, from which

2 Friedlander points out (Sit- they are for the most part excluded
tengeschichte Roms 3. 98) that in the modern world. It is not,
the rich and great of the Roman however, the munificence and
Empire were expected not only to open-handedness of a grand seig-
use their surplus revenues for the neur that Aristotle asks of his
relief of poverty a purpose es- ideal proprietor, but a readiness
pecially served by the institution to place whatever he possesses at
of clientship but also to allow the disposal of others, whether
the poor to share freely in their equals or inferiors,
enjoyments, and to place within 3 Sus. 2 , Einleitung, p. 26.

POLITICAL LIFE OF THE STATE. 203

indivisible 1 , and to descend to one son only. Would he
allow the father to choose this son, as Plato did ? Does he
intend, again, like Plato, to abolish dowries? It would
seem from 2. 9. 1270 a 25, that he would either abolish
them or limit their amount. In default of children, is the
proprietor to be allowed to adopt an heir ? What powers,
again, is he to possess over property other than the lot ?
Is the law, that property is to pass by inheritance and not
by gift, which Aristotle recommends to oligarchies (7 (5).
8. 1 309 a 23) as the best means of diffusing and equalizing
property, to be adopted in the best State also ? It would
be easy to mention other points, as to which we are not
fully informed.

So far we have had to do with preliminary matters. We Transition
have been sketching the organization of Supply and of the industrial

Household under the best constitution ; we have not yet
studied the central subject of Political Science, the political the State
as distinguished from the industrial and household life of
the best State. The constitution of the State, we started
by saying, allots advantages and functions, and we have
seen to whom the best constitution will allot the functions
connected with the supply of necessaries and also those
connected with the Household : we have not yet seen to
whom it will allot the higher functions, and among them
political functions.

The investigations of the First Book of the Politics have
hitherto been our main guide, and the First Book treats
the subjects with which it deals from the point of view of
Nature, which cannot be far from that of the best constitu
tion. It asks, who is the natural slave, what is the natural
form of the Science of Supply, who is the true householder ;
and it is precisely under the guidance of Nature that Aris
totle constructs the best constitution (see e. g. 4 (7). 14.

1 We may probably infer this of the discouragement by Lycur-

from the arrangements respecting gus of the sale of land, and regrets

the land made in 4 (7). 10. 1330 a that he did not impose sojne

14 sqq. We also find that Aris- checks on gift and bequest.
totle approves (2. 9. 1270 a 19)

204 THE SECOND BOOK

1332 b 35 sq.). It is true of Political Science, as it is true
of Art, that it partly brings the work of Nature to com
pletion, partly imitates Nature (Phys. 2. 8. 199 a 15).

Prelimin- ^he Second Book still keeps the ideal point of view in
learnt in sight (cp. 2. T. 1260 b 27 sqq.), though, like the First Book
the Second anc j j nc j ee( j ^g w hole treatise, it seeks to draw attention,
not only to that which is normal and correct, but also to
that which is useful (cp. i. 3. 1253 b J 5 sc l-)- Apparently
critical and negative, it really is something more : it so
conducts its review of constitutions as to suggest by its
indication of their defects the true principles on which
society should be organized. It thus forms a good intro
duction to the sketch of the best constitution in the Fourth
Book, and its teaching is in full harmony with the teaching
of that part of the Politics. A brief reference to its main
conclusions will illustrate this.

;The State, we learn, though a Koivavla, is not a Koivavia
n everything that can be shared, but only in those
hings which can be shared with advantage to virtue and
:o friendship ; self-completeness, not the maximum of
unity, is the aim which should be kept in view in construct
ing it ; its institutions should satisfy, not run counter to,
that moderate and reasonable love of self which nature has
implanted in man ; education is the truest and most whole
some means of promoting harmony in the State, for it
does not lessen, like some other specifics, the opportunities
of virtuous action, but on the contrary produces virtue,
which is the secret of concord ; and again, if a State is to
be happy, some part at any rate of its population must be
in possession of happiness, for if no part of it is happy, it
cannot be happy as a whole. Aristotle keeps this last
principle in view in constituting his ideal citizen-body. He
surrounds its members with the means of virtuous and
happy activity, and makes their happiness give happiness
to the State.

From the criticism on Phaleas of Chalcedon we learn not
to expect too much from legislation equalizing landed
property, apart from an improvement in the moral tone of

OF THE POLITICS. 205

the community. The equalization of landed property, or
even of property in general, which Phaleas forgot to equalize,
is an insufficient preventive by itself of civil discord (o-rdo-t?).
To make it effective for this purpose, a limit must be
imposed on reproduction, properties must not only be equal
ized but made of that amount which is most favourable to
virtue, and the laws of the State must secure to each man
an education which will moderate his desires. Equality of
property will not do much to prevent civil disturbance
originating among the Many, but it will wholly fail to touch
movements caused by a desire for superior distinction on
the part of the Few. It will, at the utmost, only remove
one cause for the commission of wrong (dSt/aa) absolute
want of the necessaries of life ; but men commit wrong
even when their immediate necessities are fully supplied,
for the sake of the gratification which they derive from
superfluities, and it is thus that the greatest wrongs come
to be committed. If these wrongs are to be prevented,
men must be taught to be temperate, and to seek even
painless pleasure, not in forms which presuppose power
over their fellows, but in philosophy, which derives the
pleasure it confers from sources lying wholly within our
selves. Nor must the amount of wealth which it is desir
able that the members of- the State should possess, be
settled without reference to the security of the State from
external perils. Phaleas confines his attention to dangers
arising within the State. On the whole it is thus that
Aristotle sums up one of the most successful of his criti
cisms equality of property will be of some avail in pre
venting civil discord, but not of much, for it will not pacify
the more aspiring spirits, nor will it in the long run satisfy
the Many, for these live for the satisfaction of desire, which
is in its nature unlimited, and soon tire of the two obols,
which were enough for them at first. The only real
security against internal perils is to make the better natures
indisposed to commit injustice, and to see that the worse
are at once too weak in numbers to do so, and are not
provoked to it by wrong. The criticism on Phaleas, then.

206 THE SECOND BOOK

like that on Plato, arrives at the conclusion that education
is the best guarantee for concord in the State ; and it
points to an education favourable at once to morality and
philosophical aptitude, coinciding fully with the fourteenth
and fifteenth chapters of the Fourth Book (compare, for
instance, 1334 a 28-34).

Aristotle s division of the land of his ideal State into
public and private land was perhaps suggested by a pro
vision in the constitution of Hippodamus, though Aristotle
does not use the public land for the maintenance of the
soldiers of the State. He anticipated Aristotle also in the
distinction of the military from the agricultural class.

From the Lacedaemonian State Aristotle learnt much,
though rather in the way of warning than of example. He
learnt the necessity of organizing the slave-system of his
State with care ; he learnt not to leave the life of the
women unregulated, nor property very unequally distri
buted ; the citizen s lot of land should be inalienable by
sale or gift, and indivisible, and a check should be placed
on the increase of population. The syssitia should be
put on an improved footing, so that no citizen need
cease to be a citizen for want of the means of paying
his contribution to them. It was a good point in the
Lacedaemonian constitution, that all elements of the State
kings, upper classes, and people found something in it to
satisfy them, and Aristotle would not disturb the popular
basis of the ephorate, but he would reform the mode by
which ephors were elected, so as to get better men, would
not allow them to act as judges in important trials without
any laws to guide them, and would make the supreme
control which they exercised over other magistracies some
thing different from what it was. Membership of the
senate, again, should not be for life, for the mind grows old
as well as the body. The arrangements respecting the
senate are designedly such as to stimulate a love of distinc
tion, which is unwise, for it is one of the main sources of
wrong-doing. The way in which senators are selected is
unsatisfactory, and the same thing may also be said of the

OF THE POLITICS. 207

kings. The Lacedaemonian lawgiver aims at producing
one kind of virtue only, military virtue, which finds no
employment in leisure, and therefore was of little use to
the community when victory had been won, and its wars
were over (cp. 4 (?) 14- 1333 a I 5~^5- 1334 b 5); and,
which is worse, he teaches his citizens to value virtue as
a means to external goods, or in other words, to value
these more than virtue.

The upshot of the whole chapter is, that in the Lace
daemonian State we find a small and dwindling body of
citizens, surrounded by hostile Hellenic slaves ; trained
only for war, not for pacific rule, and taught to count
wealth and distinction greater goods than even the mili
tary virtue they prize ; organized ill both in State and in
household, for not only are their rulers selected by an un
satisfactory method, and often superannuated or inferior,
though charged with great responsibilities, but the hard life
imposed on the citizens stands in strong contrast to the
disorderly lives of their wives. We shall find that Aristotle
takes pains in constructing his- State to avoid every tme of
the defects which he here signalizes.

From Crete he learns less, but he learns the true use of
the public land (2. 10. 1 272 a 1 7 sq. : cp. 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 1 1
sq.), a better organization of the syssitia than the Lace
daemonian, and the necessity that law and not human
caprice shall be supreme, if a real constitution, or indeed
a real State, is to exist. In the Carthaginian as in the
Lacedaemonian State he finds that all classes of society
are content with their position a rare circumstance in
Greece but that the contentment of the Carthaginian
people with their political lot is based, not, like that of the
Lacedaemonian, on a participation in one of the great
offices of state, but on their share in the advantages de
rivable from the imperial position of Carthage, and conse
quently rests on a less secure basis. The Carthaginian
constitution also was too ready to admit wealth to a share
of the homage which is due to virtue, and thus tended to
mislead the popular judgment and to teach it to give m^e

208 THIRD BOOK OF THE POLITICS.

honour to external goods than they deserve. Besides, to
make the two greatest magistracies purchaseable was to
imperil the good government of the State.

We see, however, that under both the Carthaginian and
the Lacedaemonian constitutions virtue tended to fill a
larger place in the government and life of the State than
under most others, and that it will be Aristotle s aim so to
organize his best State and its education as completely to
realize the ideal which these two constitutions vaguely and
not very successfully felt after.

Third We pass at this point from the Second to the Third

the Poli- Book of the Politics, from the criticism of certain pro-
tics dis- posed or existing constitutions to an attempt to determine

tribution

of rights of now the riprhf,^ of citizenship and of rule in other words,

citizenship thejiipfher sociaJ-aettvities should be distributed by the

and of rule. ~ --- ^ J

coftstitulionr ; and Aristotle s plan appears to be, first to
discuss how a formal (6p&n), or just, constitution will distri
bute them, next to set forth how they will be distributed
in the best State 1 . The distribution of these functions, as
distinguished from the lower or necessary ones, is, in fact,
usually stated to be not merely the chief, but the only
problem which the constitution has to solve. So we read
(Pol. 6 (4). i . 1 289 a 15 sqq. : cp. 3. 6. 1 278 b 8 sqq.) TroXtreta
p.i&gt; -yap ecrri rat? rals 7roAeo-iy f] Trept ras ap\ds, riva rpoirov
VVffj.r]vTaL, KOL ri TO Kvpiov rrjs TroAtretas /cat rt ro re A.os e/caorrj?
rrjs Koiv(ovia$ tvTiv. It is the course taken by the constitution
in this matter that determines its character : constitutions
differ because they allot the right^ of ruling, or in other
, words supreme authority in the State, to different persons
or groups of persons. It is evident, however, if we refer to
passages such as 2. 6. I264b 31 sqq., that the constitution

1 We seem to observe a similar iroKireiav KOI opdfjv aXa&gt; *eal

transition in Plato s Republic, for rbv TOIOVTOV, KUKUS de ray a\Aa?

at the beginning of the fifth book, rjfiaprrjfjifvas, K.T.\. In the fifth

Socrates, looking back at the and later books, on the other

State sketched in the second, hand, we are conscious of some

third, and fourth, says : ayadr]v heightening of the ideal.
fjLfv Toivvv rrjv roiuvTrjn noXiv re KOI

THE CONSTITUTION.

also regulates, or may regulate, the whole position of the
classes concerned with necessary functions, the position of
women, and the educational organization of the State. It
is thus that the little treatise of Xenophon which bears the
title AaKebaip.ovioi)v TroAcreta, concerns itself as much with
the pursuits of the Spartans (c. i. init.), their mode of
life (c. 5), their enforced abstinence from money-making
(c. 7), as with the political organization of the State. Still
the policy which a constitution follows in all these matters
will be determined by the course it takes with regard to
the central subject of its competence.

Here we commence that which was to a Greek the import-
central inquiry of Political Science. The Greeks ascribed f nc , e **

* J tached by

to the constitution a far-reaching ethical influence. Demos- the Greeks
thenes repeats the saying of an earlier orator 1 , that the

laws are regarded by all good men as the mind and will the . consti-
of the State 3 (rpo -nm rrjs TroAeco?), and we have already seen &lt; mo de of
(above, p. 94, note 2), how Isocrates speaks of the con- ^ ife Chosen
stitution. To Plato and Aristotle the constitution is a State
powerful influence for good or evil : it is only in the best

State, says -the latter, that the virtue of the good man it over the
and the virtue of the citizen coincide, whence it follows that character
constitutions other than the best require for their mainten- of those
ance some other kind of virtue than that of the good man. under it.
In the vaster States of to-day opinion and manners are
slower to reflect the tendency of the constitution : in the
small city-States of . ancient Greece they readily took its
colour 2 . It was thus that in the view of the Greeks every

1 O yap elnflv nva (j)acriv eV VU LV, a remarkable passage of the Poli-
a\r)6es flvai juoi So/cel, oTt TOVS VO/J.QVS tics (6 (4). 5. 1292 b tl-2l); but
airavres vTrfiXifyaa-iv, oa-ot o-co0po- the language of Aristotle implies
vovai, rponovs rfjs TroXetoy eivai (De- that this disharmony was com-
mosth. adv. Timocr. c. 2 10, quoted monly only temporary, and oc-
by A. Schaefer, Demosthenes i. curred for the most part when
293. i). Cp. Aeschin. adv. Tim- the authors of a revolution after
arch. 4, and Plato, Rep. 544 D. effecting a constitutional change

2 Cases no doubt occurred in did not at once proceed to alter
which the sentiments and habits the pre-existing laws, but con-
of society were not adjusted to tented themselves for a time (ra
the constitution, as we learn from Trptbra) with the bare possession

VOL. I. P

210 IMPORTANCE OF THE CONSTITUTION.

constitution had an accompanying rjOos, which made itself
felt in all the relations of life. JEach^constitutional jorm
j-*vfM-rjj;prl a rQcmlding influence on virtue ; the good citizen
was a different being inlm oligarchy, a democracy, and an
aristocracy. Each constitution embodied a scheme of life,
and tended, consciously or not, to bring the lives of those
living under it into harmony with its particular scheme. If
^the law provides that the highest offices in the State shall
be purchaseable or confines them to wealthy men, it in
spires ipso facto a respect for wealth in the citizens (2. u.
1273 a 35 sqq.). Thus Plato and Aristotle are true to Greek
feeling when they speak of the constitution as a life (/3ios),
or the imitation of a life (nu/xr?&lt;ns /Sow) 1 . Expressions not
very dissimilar have been used by modern writers who have
studied the change produced in France and in Europe by
the French, JR^volution. The plain fact is, says a writer in
the Saturday Review (July 8, 1882, p. 57), that the ideas
of 89 involved not so much a new departure in politics
like (e. g.) the English Revolution of a century earlier, or
the almost contemporary American one as a new method
of interpreting life altogether, or, as De Maistre expressed
-ft-" a new religion 2 ." Aristotle would trace a similar change

of power. Contrast the prompt- yevcov KOI KutfjLtav Kotvtttna Ca&gt;f)s re-

ness with which Timoleon after \eias Kal avrapKovs. Plato is made

his victory over the tyrants pro- to say in Epist. 5. 321 D, eo-ri yap

ceeded to recast the laws, even 817 TIS (pcavf/ T&V noXirtiatv eVao-r^s,

those relating to contracts, in a KaQcmfpti nvav q&gt;a&gt;i&gt;, K.T.\.
democratic sense (Diod. 16. 70). 2 Compare Burke, Thoughts on

1 Cp. Plato, Laws 817 B, n-ao-a French Affairs (Works 3. 350,

. . . TIIUV f) TroXiTfta ^wecrTTjKe nipr)- Bohn) : the present Revolution

air TOU KaXXiVrou Kal ap/orou ftiov : in France seems to me ... to

Aristot. Pol. 6 (4). n- 1 295 a 40, 7771-0- bear little resemblance or analogy

Xirei a #t os rtr e crri TroXeco? : 4(7). to any of those which have been

I. 1323 a 14, TTfpi no\iTfias apiorrjs brought about in Europe upon

TOV peXXovra Troir)(ra&lt;T0ai rf]v irpoarj- principles merely political. It is

Kovaav r)TTj(Tiv avayK-q 8n&gt;pi&lt;racrdai a revolution of doctrine and theo-

7rp&&amp;gt;Toz&gt;, n y aiptTwraros /St oy : 4(7). retic dogma. It has a much greater

8. 1328 a 41, nXXoi/ -yap rponov Kal resemblance to those changes

fit a\\&lt;oi&gt; (Knaroi rovro (sc. fi&gt;8ai- which have been made upon re-

fioviav) drjpevovres rovs re /3tov? erf- ligious grounds, in which a spirit

povs Ttoiovmai KOI ras 7rn\irfins. of proselytism makes an essential

Thus too the State, which is said part. The last revolution of doc-

to be a Koiv&via of citizens in a con- trine and theory which has hap-

stitution in 3. 3. 1276 b I sq., is pened in Europe, is the Reforma-

described in 3. 9. I28ob 40 as } tion.

CLASSIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONS. 211

in every transition from one constitution to another. We
are familiar enough with the fact that some homogeneity of
opinion and character is essential in those who are to work
harmoniously together as fellow-citizens of the same State.
Our ideal of life is not the Irish ideal, our standard of
duty is not theirs (Times, Dec. 25, 1883) ; to this in part
the friction between the two sections of the United King
dom is sometimes set down. The mischief to be dealt
with is that a nation united under one government and
living on a narrow and strictly limited area is at this
moment dangerously heterogeneous in its tastes, habits, and
general ways of regarding life (Times, May 29, 1884).

It is not surprising that Aristotle found the identity of
the State in its constitution (3. 3. 1276 b 9). It was per
haps in part because changes of constitution meant so
much, that they were so frequent in ancient Greece and
so keenly fought over. To be an oligarch living under a
democratic constitution, or vice versa&gt; must have been a
painful experience and one from which most men were
glad to escape as soon as possible.

Plato and Aristotle may perhaps rate the influence oT
the constitution too high, but it is a merit irx them, that they
never lose sight, as many modern inquirers have done, of
the full significance of the State and its organization. They
see it to be an ethical influence for good or ill.

The question how many different ways there are of The popu-
allotting supreme authority was one which popular opinion

in Greece found no difficulty in answering. According to constitu-
the prevailing view, there were only three possible con
stitutions monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy the rule
of one man, or a few, or the many 1 . Under monarchy

1 So Herodotus (3. 80-82) ; each, a better and a worse ; ot

Aeschines (adv. Timarch. 4), TroXXoi, according to Plato, Laws

who reckons Tvpawis in the place 714 B ; Plutarch, de Monarchia

of monarchy ; the eulogists of the et Democratia et Oligarchia, c. 3.

Lacedaemonian constitution in Kingship and Tyranny were pro-

Aristot. Pol. 2. 6. 1265 b 33 sqq. ; bably often confounded in com-

Isocrates (Panath. 132), who, mon parlance : cp. Philochor.

however, admits two forms of fragm. 5 (Miiller, Fragm. Hist.

P 2

212 SOCRATES.

would fall the two forms, Kingship and Tyranny:
aristocracy, or the government of the best, would either be
considered as identical with oligarchy (Thuc. 6. 39 : cp.
Aristot. Pol. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 36 sqq.), or as a species of it
(Isocr. Panath. 132: Aristot. Pol. 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 16).
Some, however, made aristocracy a constitution by itself,
thus counting four (Pol. 6 (4). 7. 1293 a 35 sqq. : Rhet. I. 8.
1365 b 29), while others brought all constitutions under two
heads, oligarchy and democracy. Others, again, made up
four constitutions by adding to monarchy, oligarchy, and
democracy a form compounded of all three, which they also
held to be the best (Pol. 2. 6. 1265 b 33 sqq.). This was an
idea which had a great future before it.

Principles The philosophers were not content with a classification

f Q.

and Plat&lt;r ^ constitutions resting on this numerical basis. A consti
tution was to them an ethical force, and it was by their
ethical consequences that constitutions were to be classi
fied. Thus the classification which Xenophon ascribes to
Socrates implied that constitutions should be distinguished,
not by the number of the depositaries of power, but by
their attributes and by the character of their rule. He
marked off Kingship from Tyranny, rule being exercised
in the former constitution over willing subjects and in
accordance with law, not so in the latter ; he distinguished
aristocracy as the form in which offices are filled from the
ranks of those who fulfil the behests of the law (e T&V TO,
vo/zijua TTiTf\ovvT(av : cp. Aristot. Rhet. I. 8. 1365 b 34 sq.),
plutocracy as that in which there is a property qualification
for office, democracy as that in which office is open to all
(Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 12). He also held that the true king or
statesman is marked off from the counterfeit by the posses
sion of knowledge, but he does not appear to have adjusted
his classification of constitutions to this view.

Plato adopts different classifications in different dia-

Gr. I. 385), 01 ovv AdfjvTjcri pijropes, f^oucrt TOVS ^acrtXe ay rvpavvovs Ka
on ev drjiJiOKpariu TroKiTtvo/jLtvoi, (6os \dv.

PLATO. 213

logues. He seems in the Politicus, as Susemihl remarks 1 ,
to be building on a Socratic foundation ; his best State,
according to this dialogue, is that in which a single
sovereign possessed of Science rules : next below this
come Monarchy governed by Law, Aristocracy (in other
words, Oligarchy governed by Law), and Democracy
governed by Law : below (in order of merit) stand Demo
cracy unrestrained by Law, the corresponding Oligarchy,
and Tyranny (Polit. 302 B sqq.).

In the Republic the Kingship and Aristocracy of philo
sophers ruling uncontrolled by Law stand together at the
summit : next in order, we have a timocracy, such as the
Lacedaemonian or Cretan constitution : next come, ranged
in order of demerit, Oligarchy, Democracy 2 , and Tyranny :
the intermediate stratum of constitutions governed by Law,
which is so prominent in the Politicus, here disappears 3 .

In the Laws, however, it reappears in the shape of the
constitution of that dialogue, which takes its place next to
the ideal State of the Republic and above the Lacedaemonian
and Cretan forms. But in this constitution we trace not
merely the element of legality, but the equally important
principle of mixture. Restraint is exercised not only by law,
but by the simultaneous representation in the government
of various principles, which check each other and give law
a chance of holding its own. It will be observed that
Plato applies the term Aristocracy both to the ideal rule
of philosophers and to the Oligarchy governed by Law
an use of the term which leaves traces of itself, as we
shall see, in Aristotle s account of constitutions.

Plato, it is evident, worked out the view implied in
Socrates classification of constitutions, that they are to be
distinguished, not so much by the number as by the

1 Sus. 2 , Note 533. 6 (4). 7. 1293 b i), Plato in the

2 Thus while in the Republic Republic recognizes only four con-
Democracy is ranked below OH- stitutions monarchy, oligarchy,
garchy, in the Politicus, when democracy, and aristocracy. Does
without law, it stands above Oli- Aristotle reckon Plato s timo-
garchy without law. cracy under the head of aris-

3 According to Aristotle (Pol. tocracy?

214

ARISTOTLE S CLASSIFICATION

character of the depositaries of power, or by the nature of
their rule. Each constitution thus represents a different
view with regard to the attributes which the ruler should
possess : this was perhaps suggested to him by the analogy
that he holds to exist between the soul of the individual
and the State, which leads him to imagine five types of
human character running parallel with the five con
stitutions. As each constitution corresponded, in his
view, to a character, it was natural to conclude that the
difference between constitutions is a moral difference,
like the difference between characters.

Views of No subject is more frequently discussed by Aristotle

Aristotle , . , . . ,

as to the than the question how it is that there are more constitu-
classifica- tions than one and how many there are ; and the views

tion oi con

stitutions: he expresses on this subject are by no means entirely self-

gressively

vance in
the Third

Book, and

as we pass

the Sixth,

Plato had not distinctly asked himself what are the
causes which determine the constitution of a State, but
h e would appear to hold that the main cause is a variation

in the character of the citizens. The descent from the
ideal Republic, at all events, down the scale of imperfect
forms keeps pace with and is brought about by a deterio
ration of character. In the Politics this view survives side
by side with others with which it is not explicitly re
conciled.

We will take first the discussion of the question which
we find in the Third Book. Aristotle begins by accepting
provisionally the popular distinction between constitutions
which give supreme authority to the One, the Few, or the
Many ; but each of these, we learn, may study the com
mon good or the good of the depositary or depositaries of
power only. We have thus six constitutions Kingship,
Aristocracy, Polity, in which the One, Few, or Many

1 See Pol. 3. 7. 1279 a 22 sqq. :
4 (7). 8. 1328 a 40 sq. : 4 (7). 9.
1328 b 29 sq. : 6 (4). 3-4: 7(5).
I. 1301 a 25 sqq. On Aristotle s
classification of constitutions the

interesting essay of Teichmiiller,
Die Aristotelische Eintheilung
der Verfassungsformen (St. Pe-
tersburg, 1859), is well worth
reading.

OF CONSTITUTIONS. 215

govern for the general advantage, and Tyranny, Oligarchy,
and Democracy 1 , in which the One, Few, or Many govern
for their own advantage. The three former are normal
(dpOai) constitutions : the three latter are deviation-forms
(7rapeK/3ao-et?). The deviation-forms contravene the aim with
which the State was originally formed and for which it
exists the aim of the common advantage (3. 6. I278b
21). The kind of rule which obtains in all of them is
similar to that which a master exercises over his slaves
(SecrTroTiKT; apx 7 ?) in other words, rule is exercised in them,
primarily at all events, for the good of the ruler.

The distinction thus drawn between normal constitutions
and deviation-forms w^s not invented by Aristotle. It is
evident from Pol. 3. 3. 1276 a 10-13 that the contrast
between constitutions for the common good and consti
tutions not for the common good, but based on force was
familiar enough to the Greeks, though the tendency (no
doubt Athens is referred to) was to confine the latter
designation to oligarchies and tyrannies, whereas Aristotle
holds that democracies should also be brought under this
head. Plato uses the very same term normal con
stitution (opOi] TToAtreia) in the Republic, Politicus, and
Laws. In the Republic, he claims that the ideal State
there described, whether it appears in the form of a
Kingship or an Aristocracy, is the only truly normal consti
tution (Rep. 449 A) 5 an d so again in the Politicus he makes
the possession of Science by the ruling authority the test of
a normal constitution (292 A sqq.) 2 . In the Laws, how
ever, we find the germ of the distinction drawn by Aristotle

1 Aristotle, as a writer in the designate constitutions which were

Guardian (Jan. 27, 1886) points at one time known as democra-

out, always regards S^/iOKparia as cies (Pol. 6 (4.) 13. 12975 24).
a 7rape&lt;c/3a&lt;ny, and calls the normal 2 The question is here asked,

constitution of which it is the TI oZv ; owpedd -riva TUVTVV TU&gt;V

deviation-form by the name of TroXireiwj/ opdrjv ctVat TOVTOIS rols

TroXtrei a, while Polybius, on the opoir 6pxrdflcrai&gt;, tvl K&lt;U 6\iyois KOI

Contrary, uses 8ijfj.oKparia in a TroXXots KOI TrXoirra) KOL -nevia Kal r&lt;a

favourable sense and calls its jSiat w *cat e/cot;&lt;ri &lt; KOI /^fra ypa/n/nd-

perversion o^XoKparta. Aristotle TO&gt;V K&lt;U avev
seems to have found the term
ia used in his own day to

^ ^

ARISTOTLE S CLASSIFICATION

&gt;etween the two kinds of constitution : cp. Laws 715 B,
TavTO-s br/TTov (pa^ev ^juteis vvv OVT eiVai TroXtret as OVT opdovs
vop.ovs, OCTOL /XT) u/XTrao-7]s r?}? Tro Aea)? ve&lt;a TOV KOLVOV ei

v^^

^JJ /cat ra TOVTUIV 8taia a (pacriv elvai jixar^y elpfjrrOcu. But Aris-

&lt;( | totle does not deny to the deviation-forms the name of con-
*&gt;J 1 stitutioris, so far as they are governed by law (6 (4). 4. 1 292 a
1^3 sqq-) an d he allows a rjartial validity to the notion of
^-. justice on which they rest (3. 9. 1280 a 9). Nor does he
-^"agree with the view ot Tlato in the Politicus (293 A) that
-^ normal rule (opdrj apx 7 /) can only be looked for from one
vw man or two, or at all events a very few. Thus he re-
^4 cognizes the Polity as a normal constitution. Plato s
.; two tests of that which is normal science hi the
ruler and the aim of the common good do not, we notice,
lie far apart (cp. Polit. 296 E sqq., and especially the
words &(nTp 6 KvfiepvriTYjs TO ?T)S yew? KCU VO.VT&V ae6 j^vn-fytpov
7rapa(pv\dTT(ov), and thus Aristotle himself treats the rule
exercised by science as exercised, in fact, for the advan
tage of the ruled (Pol. 3. 6. i278b 40 sqq.). The distinc
tion between governments which rule for the common good
and governments which rule for the advantage of the
rulers appears also in the De Pace of Isocrates ( 91).

The principle involved in this distinction, however com
monplace it may seem to us, was rightly made by these
inquirers a cardinal point of Political Science 2 . Political

ciple when he confines the con&gt;
mon advantage which the conl-

1 Cicero goes perhaps a little
further, and not only denies these
constitutions the name of con
stitutions, but denies the name
of respublica to States which
do not aim at the common good,
for his definition of respublica
(De Rep. i. 25. 39) is res populi,
populus autem non omnis homi-
num coetus quoquo modo congre-
gatus, sed coetus multitudinis juris
consensu et utilitatis communione
sociatus. But what name would
he give to the States, if such there
are, which are not respublicae ?

- It must be confessed that
Aristotle goes far to mar the prin

inon advantage which the com
stitution is to study to the common
advantage of the citizens (3. 131
1283 b 40), for he thus makes
his requirement one which any
oligarchy that chose to limit the
number of the citizens might
satisfy. He probably, however,
had a democracy in view, and
there the principle even in this
form would be valuable. We note
that Xenophon makes Cambyses
charge Cyrus not to rule his
Persians enl TrXeoi/e^ior, as the
nations dependent on .Persia are
ruled (Cyrop. 8. 5. 24).

OF CONSTITUTIONS. 21 7

controversialists have spent their efforts for centuries in
the search for some indefeasible sovereign Emperor, Pope,
or People. Aristotle s doctrine is, that the true supreme
authority is the One, the Few, or the Many, who can rule
for the common good.

So far we have only the beginnings of a classification
of constitutions : we have marked off the normal consti
tutions from the deviation-forms, but how are the three
former, or again the three latter, to be distinguished from
each other ? As to the deviation-forms, Aristotle corrects
at once the definitions of oligarchy and democracy which
he has given : oligarchy is not the constitution in which
the few rule for their own advantage, but that in which
the rich rule for their own advantage ; and so again in
democracy it is not the many, but the poor, that hold
sway and rule for their own advantage. The contrast
between the holders of power in the two constitutions
thus becomes, not a numerical, but a qualitative contrast. l
The account given of the remaining deviation-form
(tyranny), however, remains unaltered ; and as to the
normal constitutions, we are allowed for the mome"nF"to
conclude that the distinction between them is only a
numerical one, except that we are warned (3. 7. 12790^39
sqq.) that the many who rule in a polity will not possess
full virtue. But the succeeding discussions of the Third
Book add a new point of contrast between the two classes
of constitution. That which is for the common good is
identified by Aristotle at the commencement of the Twelfth
Chapter (i282b 17) with that which is just, and thus we
find that the deviation-forms are not only wrong in the
aim of their rule, but are the outcome of injustice, for they
mistake that which is partially just for the absolutely just
(3. 13. 1 283 a 26 sqq.). They ^sinjiot only against the
_common^gQod but also against justice. We learn more
clearly than ever^a.^e^Iifference between the two classes
of constitution is a^noral difference^. Even, indeed, within

1 InEth.Nic.8. 13. 1 i6ia3osqq., opdai TroXiTtlai and TrapfK/Sdo-ety is
another point of contrast between noticed : in the latter there is

218 ARISTOTLE S CLASSIFICATION

the normal constitutions a moral difference discloses itself:
the Absolute Kingship (n-a///3ao-tAeia) and the ideal Aris
tocracy are found to represent the rule of virtue fully
provided with external means with a view to the most
perfect and desirable life (3. 18. 1288 a 32-37 : cp. 6 (4). 2.
1 289 a 32), and to be, in reality, a single form (6 (4). 3.
1 290 a 24), standing at the head of the list of constitutions
as the most normal constitution (opOoTart] TroAireia, 6 (4).
8. 1293 b 25), while the Polity is a deviation from this,
and the deviation-forms hitherto so termed are deviations
twice removed from the ideal original. This at least is
the teaching of the Sixth Book. In that book the six
constitutions are no longer ranged three against three, as
in the Third : or/ the contrary, they succeed each other
on a descending scale arranged on an ethical basis, very
much like the descending scale in the Republic. Aristotle
has here, in fact, apparently almost come round to the
view of Plato, that the only really normal constitution
is the Ideal Kingship or Aristocracy.

The best State in its two forms is thus not merely the
best, but the most normal of the normal States : it is the
State as Nature designed it to be. The others are failures.
The earlier classification of constitutions into twocontrasted
groups of three has been reconsidered, with the result of
clearing our views of the nature of each constitution,
and also of placing the two ideal forms on a pinnacle by
themselves.

We have gained fresh light as to the nature of the
various constitutions as we have advanced from one chapter
to another of the Third Book, and still more on passing
from the Third to the Sixth.

As to Kingship, we learn that it is not enough to con
stitute a true Kingship that the single ruler should rule for
the common good : he must possess a great superiority
over those he rules in virtue and resources (dper?/

nothing common between ruler good : cp. Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 25
and ruled; they are not united sqq.
by a common aim for the common

OF CONSTITUTIONS. 219

This is, in fact, the case in the Absolute Kingship
), and the Kingship which is subject to law is
not really a separate constitution, for it may find a place
in any and every constitution (3. 16. 1287 a 3 sqq.).

So again, Aristocracy is not simply a form in which
a few rule for the common good, but one in which these
few are men of full virtue (a-jrAw? o-n-ovSatot), and possessed
of a full complement of external means (6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32:
4 (7). 13. 1332 a 32), or in which the virtue of man and
citizen coincide (6 (4). 7. I293b 5). The name, however,
is also applied to constitutions which combine a recognition
of the claims of the people and of the rich (6 (4). 8. 1294 a
24), or of the people only (6 (4). 7. 1293 b J 6)&gt; with a
recognition of the claims of virtue ; or even, if the
text is not corrupt or interpolated, to constitutions which,
resembling a Polity, approach Oligarchy more nearly than
the polity does (6 (4). 7. 1293 k 2O )- ^ should be observed
that in these less genuine Aristocracies the virtue recognized
is not that recognized by the true Aristocracy (the virtue
of the good man), but virtue relative to the constitution
(6 (4). 7. 1 293 b 5 sqq.).

So again, the Polity is not marked off merely by the
aim with which its rulers rule : we learn, in fact, at the
outset that the citizen-body in it will possess an imperfect
type of virtue military virtue 2 : the class which \yill be
supreme in the Polity will be the hoplite class (3. 7. 1279 b
2), or, as we are told later, a mixture of the well-to-do and
the poor (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 22), in which the moderately
wealthy (jueVoi) are strong (6 (4). n). "*

We have already seen how much modification the original
account of Democracy and Oligarchy receives immediately
after it is given.

Thus the first description and classification of constitu-

1 Cp. Pol. 3. 15. 1286 a 5 : Eth. in the Polity seems occasionally
Nic. 8. 12. u6ob 3 (where for to be lost sight of, as for instance
KXrjpmros fin(ri\evs, cp. Plato, Polit. in 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 10, where it is
290 E, T(O Xn^oi/rt /3nertX). implied that in a Polity virtue will

2 The fact that virtue, though of not be the deciding consideration
an imperfect kind, is recognized in elections to office.

220 CAUSES

tions (3. 7) is not only a mere outline, but it is tentative
and provisional. A closer study of them reveals to us that
they differ among themselves, not only in the aim and
nature of the rule exercised in them, but in the qualities of
the rulers, or in other words, the attributes to which they
award supreme power. When once we apply this stan
dard, the ideal Kingship and Aristocracy present the
aspect of a single constitution, for they both award power
to virtue fully furnished with external means ; and
below them, the so-called Aristocracies, the Polity,
Democracy, Oligarchy, and Tyranny are readily dis
tinguishable from each other.

We arrive, in fact, at the following list of constitutions,
each finding the characteristic by which it is defined (Spos)
in the attribute, or group of attributes, to which it awards
power :

7ra/i/3acriXeia, true apio-TOKparia opos open) Kf^opr^yrjuevrj
so-called apicrroKparia apery, TT\OVTOS, f\evdfpia,

or aperrj, 8rj[j.os

irdXiTfia irXovros, (\evdepia

a f\ev6epia

,, TrXoCroj.

What the opos of Tyranny is, we do not learn, though its
end is said to be, like that of oligarchy, wealth (7 (5). 10.
1311 a 10) : it is, indeed, hardly a constitution,

Aristotle s We naturally ask how it happens that all actually exist-

account of . . . .. ,. ,

the causes m g constitutions diverge more or less irom the true type

of consti- h ow it j s t h at t h e b est constitution in its two forms is not

rational

diversity, also the only existing constitution. This is a question

which Aristotle answers in more ways than one.

His first answer is that the character and ethical level of
.3. community determine its constitution. Thus the best
constitution presupposes a certain degree and kind of
virtue : the life lived in it is one for which most men are
not adapted (6 (4). n. 1295 a 25 sqq.). Plato had already
traced constitutions to character (Rep. 544 D), and Aristotle
echoes this view (Pol. 5 (8). I. I337a 14, TO yOos rrjs

OF CONSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY.

221

Kttl &lt;j)V\aTTlV L(tiOe TJ]V TTOAlTeiaV Kttl

olov TO jj.i&gt; ornj.OKpaTiK.ov brnJ.OKpa.Tiav, TO 5
1 d^iyap^jiav ael 8e TO /3eArt0Toy i]6o&lt;s [Be\Tiovo$ OITLOV
The constitution expresses the creed of the com
munity with regard to the life it should live, or, in other
words, with regard to the sources of happiness (4 (7)- 8.
1328 a 40 sq.). The laws embody the rule of life accepted
by the State a rule to which it may be unfaithful under _
pressure of temptation, just as the individual may (eforep /yi

ft !|&gt;C\1 /V &gt;1\ \ / r- \

yap (TTIV e&lt;p evos aKpacna, ecrrt Kat ewt TroAeco?, 7 (5)- 9
3 310 a 18). Some constitutions admit to power classes (
which seek happiness in things not really productive of it &lt;
(4(7). 8. 1328 a 40 sq. : cp. 4 (7). 9. I328b 29 sq. : 6 (4). ^
3. 1 290 a 3 sq.) 1 . This view, however, seems not to be fully ^^
worked out, and tlie^existence of more constitutions than (j 1 ^
one is eemmonly traced"l3y r ^A;ristotteTo a mistake, not ^
as to the sources jf~rTa:pplTie^grbut as t
The"

less satisfactory cc^sttrrrtrcm^^fe^rega^rded on either
hypothesis as the result of error (ajuaprr^a, 7 (5). i. 1301 a
25 sqq. : cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 9 sqq.), whether this error relates to ^ _&lt;-fi&lt;i
the sources of happiness or to that which is just. If we
the latter view, the error is that of men, who, being judges
in their own case (1280 a 14), not unnaturally err as to the
extent of their claims : indeed, there is really some basis of
justice for the claims they make. The claim of democracy
is that those who are on an equality with the rest in one
thing (eAeutfepuz) shall be accounted equal in all (i.e. shall
receive an equal amount of the advantages distributable
by the State) 2 : that of oligarchy is that those who are
unequal in one respect (wealth) shall receive an unequal
amount in the distribution.

So far the diversity of constitutions has been referred by

1 The democratic classes would
seek it in freedom, which they
interpret as government by a
majority and absence of control
(8 (6). 2. 1317 a 40 sqq.) : the oli-
garchical classes in wealth and
birth.

2 It does not seem to be quite

true that Greek democracy ex-
pected absolute equality in all
advantages distributable by the
State ; we do not find, for in-
stance, that all offices were filled
by lot even in the extreme de-
mocracy.

222 CAUSES

Aristotle to differences of ethical creed or varying versions
of justice. But already in the foregoing, differences of
creed have been connected with differences of class : some
classes, we have been told, seek happiness in things "not"
really productive of it, and their admission to power varies
and vitiates the constitution.

In the Sixth and Eighth Books of the Politics consti
tutional variation is referred, not_to ethical, Jmt to social
diffjexe_nce_s. It is referred to the preponderance in the
community of a given social element (TTOO-OZ; or TTOLOV, 6 (4).
12. 1296 b 17 sqq.), or of particular classes or occupations,
:or to the distribution of property, or again to variations
in the parts of the State (//eprj TroAecos) and the combi
nations formed out of them. A populous city swarming
with artisans and traders, and still more a populous seaport,
full of fishermen like Tarentum and Byzantium, or of
trireme-oarsmen like the Peiraeus, or of merchant-sailors
like Aegina and Chios, was the natural home of democratic
feeling (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 20 sqq.). The extreme oligarchy,
on the other hand, found its natural home in communities
seated in great levels suitable for the action of cavalry
(like those of Thessaly), whose safety depended on their
cavalry, and where the richest class were consequently
held in especial honour, while the more moderate type
of oligarchy would exist where the safety of the State
depended on the hoplites, and where the moderately well-
to-do class, to which the hoplites mostly belonged, was
strong (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 8 sqq.). The cause which ultimately
determines the political organization of a community may
thus often be the character of the territory, and we under
stand how it happens that much care is taken to secure
a satisfactory territory for the best Stajte (4 (7). cc. 5-6).

We see then that two distinct views of the causes of
constitutional diversity find expression^ in different parts
of the Politics, which Aristotle does not attempt to recon
cile. They are not, however, perhaps ir\econcileable, if
we bear in mind the hints which we have already gathered
from the Fourth Book that ethical and social differences

OF CONSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY. 223

do not lie far apart. We can readily understand that in
Aristotle s view the predominance in a society of a defec
tive ethical creed or a wrong conception of justice is due
to the predominance of classes which in the best State
either do not exist or are relegated to obscurity.

Still the Sixth and Eighth Books place the sources of
constitutional imperfection in a light in which they are not
placed in other Books of the Politics. We learn from them
that the excellence of a State may depend in the long
run on accidents of its geography or history, or in other
words, on the favour of Nature and Fortune, and that
its ethical character does not depend wholly on itself,
but in part on the social organization which circum
stances dictate to it.

In tracing the constitution to social conditions, Aristotle Aristotle
gives explicit recognition to an important truth, which

Plato had certainly not recognized with equal clearness, recognize
though the facts which pointed to it were familiar enough. tnat t he
The Agenesis of the constitution of a State was perhaps cpnstitu-
studied by~A~ristotle more closelyjand more successfuIly-Than state re-

it- fias_been^studied till recent times, for the social "con-
tract theory, so longliominant in political science, tended tent its
to disguise the circumstances under which a State comes
by its constitution. The pictures drawn under its influence
of a people meeting together and selecting its government,
as a man might select a house or an article of furniture,
were of course consciously ideal, but they obscure ^5T
recognition of the fact which Aristotle had long ago
pointed out, that the constitution of a State has itsjroots in
what moderns term its social system.

The question may, however, be asked does a change
of constitution, then, always imply a profound ethical or
social change? Aristotle does not seem to have thought
so. The book on Constitutional Change illustrates in
every page, how misconduct on the part of the holders
of power, or want of vigilance, or conduct arousing feelings
of envy, panic, or contempt in the minds of those excluded

224 WHAT IS THE VALUE

from power, or the presence of heterogeneous and inco-
hesive elements in the citizen body, or even mere accident 1
may cause a change of constitution. Still these are only
the occasions of change. They would be powerless for
-hjarm, if social contrasts, involving ethical ones, did not
exist within the ranks of the community.

A conflict between the ideas of different classes of men
as to what makes for happiness and is just this is, in
brief, Aristotle s account of the causes which have brought
more constitutions than one into being. Each constitution
has an rjOos of its own and embodies a distinct view of life.
The difference between them is not a mere numerical
difference, but a difference of faith, a difference of cha
racter.

What is the If we ask what is the value of Aristotle s classification
Aristotle s f constitutions, it must of course be at once conceded
classifica- that its significance for us is impaired by the changes
which have occurred since his day. He classifies the
constitutions which he found existing in Greece and among
the neighbouring barbarian peoples. He never ventures
to imagine that other forms of Kingship or Oligarchy or
Democracy than those he knows are possible, though of
course this was the case. With the constitution of Rome
he was, unfortunately, not acquainted. It is true that the
cities of the Hellenic world, stretching as they did from
Massalia to the Palus Maeotis, offered an immense variety
of constitutions to the investigations of the political in
quirer a far greater variety, probably, than could be found
in contemporary Italy and that a distinct stimulus was
thus imparted to the study of politics ; but we feel that
Plato and Aristotle deserved better constitutions to review
and analyse than those of Greece.

And then again, the plan of classifying constitutions by
their o/sos in other words, by the attribute or attributes
which confer supreme power in each stands and falls with

1 Athens came to be an extreme democracy dnb a-u/JTrroyiaToy (2. 12.
1274 a 12).

OF ARISTOTLE S CLASSIFICATION? 22$

the conception of the constitution as a life ((Bios) as an
ethical influence for good or evil. Aristotle s principle
is things are made what they are by their function
and their capability (Pol. i. 2. 1253 a 2 3)- How can it
be right, he would ask, to class Kingship and Tyranny
together, because one man rules in each, when they differ
so greatly in opos and ethical influence, or to distinguish
between the Absolute Kingship and the true Aristocracy,
both of which rest on fully equipped virtue ? We hardly,
indeed, understand how he was able to bring under the
common head of Democracy or Oligarchy the strongly
contrasted sub-forms of each which he enumerates in the
Sixth Book.

The old classification of constitutions by the number of
the rulers in each has, however, held its ground down to
our own day, partly, no doubt, because the ethical signi
ficance of constitutions is no longer as prominent to us as
it was to Plato and Aristotle, partly because the numerical
difference is at once a conspicuous, and a really important
and instructive, difference between constitutions. Still the
principle of classification adopted by Plato and Aristotle
has the merit of directing attention to the rjOos and aim of
constitutions as distinguished from their letter : we learn
from it to read the character of a State, not in the number
of its rulers, but in its dominant principle, in the attribute
be it wealth, birth, virtue, or numbers, or a combination of
two or more of these to which it awards supreme autho
rity, and ultimately in the structure of its social system^
and the mutual relation of its various social elements. If
they erred in their principle of classification, it was from
a wish to get to the heart of the matter 1 .

We now pass to Aristotle s treatment of the question The Third
what a State should be, and especially what its

1 Heracleides Ponticus seems to constitutions (e.g. Pol. 6 (4). 3.

have applied the same principle 1290 a 19 sqq.). Heracleides held

to the classification of &pp.ovim, that harmonies should be classified

which Aristotle himself often re- by rjOos (Athen. Deipn. 624 c sqq.,

gard j as offering a parallel to an interesting passage).

VOL. I. O

226 THE THIRD BOOK OF THE POLITICS.

tion both should be ; for this will determine^ what its citizen-body
l ts supreme authority will be.--Ihis is the main subject)

the best , of the Third Book of the Politics (cp. 3. i. 1274 b 32-41 :
constitu- ^T" _,, u .i

tionandtoO. 1278 b 6 sq. : io. I2oi a 11). There is much in the
the study l an cmage of the First and Second Books to lead us to

of consti

tutions expect an immediate transition at the close of the Second

^traces 7 to ^ e subject of the best State and constitution, but
the con- Aristotle prefers to rise, gradually to this subject through
sound or a^series of discussions, which form, like the araplat respect-

normal in?^mrsic~ln~tHe^Fifth Book, a kind

govern- _

ment as a 5 (8). 5. 1 339 a 13) striking the keynote of what is to

anc ^ which gradually conduct the inquirer from the
both these study of the simplest element of the State, the citizen,
lions/ 2 *" ^upward to the study of the constitution, and through a
_variety of constitutions, first to theqftormal forms - of
constitution, and th&lt;n to the best. The special task of the
Third Book is thus to exhibit the broad conditions jwhjch \,- y
every sound government must satisfy, and which the best
constitution satisfies while it rises above"_them ; to build
a satisfactory platform, or pedestal, on which to rear the
structure of the best State, and to depict at once the con
trast of the normal constitutions and the deviation-forms,
and the transition from the^ normal constitutions to the best.
It includes, in fact, something more than this, for its closing
chapters bring the best constitution before us in one of

its two forms, the Absolute Kingship&gt; The Thjrd Book
/ stands at the parting of the ways, where the ideal and the
more practicable forms of political organization separate}
it serves as an introduction to the study both of the~rriore
generally attainable constitutions described in the Sixth
and Eighth Books and of the form of the best constitution
described in the Fourth and Fifth.

? The State To learn what the State is, Aristotle resolves it into its

\ of citizen!, component elements. He had done the same thing at the

the first outset of the First Book, in order to discover the differ-

v question to ...

\be asked is ence between the householder and the statesman. This time,

What is h owever the component elements of the State are taken
: a citizen ? r . ~

to be, not households, but citizens : the State is a definite

. ^-^ i ^^ j

WHAT IS A CITIZEN ? 227

\.~f ^^* ^"""""^^

number of citizens x (7j-oAir&lt;3i; TL rtXijdos, 3. i. 1274 b 41, ex
plained in I275b 2O as TrAr/flos iroAircoy LKCLVOV Trpbs avTa.pK.eiav
^cor/s ). The State proper is here meant to be defined ;
not that broader State which includes women, children,
non-citizens, and slaves all, in fact, who exchange within
its borders any sort of service the TTO\LS referred to in
2. 9. 1269 b 14 sq., and said in that passage to fall into
two sections, men and women.

What, then, is a citizen* 1 ? 1 An Athenian would probably
answer by pointing to the enactment carried by Aristophon
in the famous year of Eucleides archonship, which confined
Athenian citizenship, in full conformity with the traditions
of Solon and Pericles, to the children of Athenian parents
an enactment deprived of its retrospective operation by
a decree moved shortly after by Nicomenes, but otherwise
undisturbed, so that the law ran to this effect w^tva T&V
/uer Ev/cAeiSrjy ap^ovra fxere ^etv rr?? iro Aecos, av jj.r] aju,(a&gt; rovs
yoye as aarovs eTTiSe&fijrai, TOWS 8e 77/30 Ev/cAetSou dye^eraorov?
a&lt;eur0a(, 2 . Others went further, and denied the name of
citizen to any one who could not prove descent from more
generations than one of citizens. It was thus that citizen
descent for three generations, both on the father s side and
on that of the mother, was required in the case of archons
and priests 3 , and that in many colonies the descendants of

1 One of the reasons which led to be traditional in the old fami-
Aristotle to make this question lies, but also thought that the
the starting-point of the inquiry humiliations endured by non-citi-
as to the best constitution may zens in consequence of the exclu-
well have been the fact that Plato siveness of the Attic law of citizen-
had in the Republic made the xp*)" ship could hardly fail to produce
pmo-moicitizens of his ideal State. in their minds a bitter feeling,
If he had studied the nature of which was only too likely to be
the ideal citizen more closely, he inherited by their descendants ;
might not have done so. we find, in fact, in an oration of
2 See A. Schaefer, Demosthenes Aeschines (3. 169) some expres-
I. 122 sqq., who thus reconciles sions which are full of instruction
the data as to Aristophon and on this subject (L.Schmidt, Ethik
Nicomenes. See also C. F. d. alten Griechen, 2. 228). The
Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. I. 118. origin of the regulation, indeed,

3 See C. F. Hermann, Gr. may perhaps be sought in religious

Antiqq. i. 149. 6. Men not sentiment. It is worthy of notice

only felt confidence in the devo- that in [Xen.] Rep. Ath. I. 2. the

tion to the State which they held reading of the MSS. is o!

228 THIRD BOOK.

the earliest immigrants formed a class apart and long
monopolized power (6 (4). 4. 1290 b IT sqq.) 1 . As the
Greek citizen often found himself for a long time together
resident in States to which he did not belong, and whose
members did not possess rights of inter-marriage in his own
whether as a cleruch, or an exile, or a mercenary soldier,
or for purposes of trade or business and might contract
marriage during these periods of absence from home,
or indeed while a resident in his native State, with one
who was neither a fellow-citizen nor possessed of rights
of inter-marriage, it is easy to see how a class would
arise not of full citizen descent (TO /XT) e d^orfpoov iroAir&lt;3z&gt;
f\fv6fpov, 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 26) a class to which even ex
treme democracies, like that of Athens, were not always
kind, and which sometimes did not possess full rights
of succession to property, even when citizenship was ac
corded to it 2 . No doubt, a distinction would be drawn, in
feeling, if not in law, between an union with an alien
citizen and an union with a barbarian or slave 3 . Antis-
thenes, the founder of the Cynic School, which was the
first to lay stress on the unity of the human race and to
start the doctrine of a World-State, was, like several other
great Athenians, the son of a barbarian mother, and there
are indications in Diogenes Laertius biography of him
that he was conscious of the slight put on his birth. It
was thus that the ideas of eA.eu0epia (free, or perhaps
citizen, birth) and evyeveia (noble birth) came to lie so near
together in the view of the Greeks. The free-born citizen

Ka\ 01 yewaioi KOI ol xpjjcrToi, incomers into the village, who had

though the editors commonly since settled round it and been

(ex coniectura) read ot oTrXtrai admitted to a share in the land

K.r.X. and freedom of the community

1 It is possible that in the (Green, Making of England, p.

original formation of German 178).

society the eorl represented the 2 C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq.

first settler in the waste, while the I. 118: 3. 57. 2 : i. 52.

ceorls sprang from descendants 5. They are called {-evot in

of the early settler who had in Pol. 3. 5. 1 278 a 26-28, but are dis-

various ways forfeited their claim tinguished in that passage from

to a share in the original home- vodoi.
stead, or more probably from 3 Cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 32.

DEFINITION OF A CITIZEN. 229

and the noble were alike in this, that the circumstances
of their birth made them what they were.

These strict views of citizenship were disposed of by
the simple inquiry, how the citizen from whom descent
was traced could be a citizen, if he was not descended
from citizen ancestors ; and a sharp saying of Gorgias was
remembered, that the Demiurgi, or chief magistrates, of
Larissa were demiurgi (handicraftsmen) in every sense,
for that they manufactured citizens of Larissa ^ Aristotle,
himself a resident alien, makes short work of these old-
fashioned fancies, and defines citizenship by the possession
-"of certain, rights, not by "extraction.

A~ citizen, according to him, is one on whom the State A citizen -j
has conferred a right to share in office, deliberative Ofc^om^Jy
judicial (apx^s fiovXevTiKfjs T) KptTiK???, 3. I. 1275 D 1 8), State haS^
whether he exercises this right singly as a magistrate of r i g ht s of
the State, or collectively as a member of a political body access to \

. office, ju-

an assembly, for example, or a dicastery. In popular par- dicial or
lance, probably, citizenship was not thus limited : see 4 (7).
13. 1332 a 33, where citizens who share in the consTT^
tution are referred to, as though all citizens did not
necessarily do so, and the passage continues and in our
State all the citizens share in the constitution. ^PJato* had
given the name of citizens to all comprised in the three
classes of the Republic, though only the first of these
classes possessed political authority 2 ; but Aristotle s in
tention evidently is to connect citizenship, not with merely
social functions, such as the supply of necessary com-

1 See Sus. 2 , Note 450, which fivai: cp. Aristot. Pol. 2. 12. 12743.
explains the full proportions of 15-18, where much the same
the bon mot, unless, with Mr. thing is said of TO ras apxns
Ridgeway (Camb. Philol. Trans., alpela-dai Kal fvdvvfiv, though,
2. 135 sqq.), we deny it to be according to 8 (6). 4. 1318 b
double-barrelled. The aim of 21 sqq., something less than this
Gorgias, in any case, was to make sufficed the people in many States
out that the citizen is the handi- indeed, if let alone and allowed
work, not of nature, but of man. to drudge and save, they would

2 He sees, however, in the Laws seem to have been commonly
(768 B), that 6 nKOLvtavrjTos &v content with a merely nominal
eov(Tias rot) &lt;Tvv8u(dfiv ijyf irai share of power (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 1 1
TO irapdnav rrjs ir6\fa&gt;s ov /neVo^os sqq.).

230 THIRD BOOK.

modities, nor even with military functions, apart from
political, but with ^office, deliberative or judicial *?

To Aristotle, then, what makes a citizen i^ nol the right
to own land or to sue and be sued^ or the right of inter
marriage, or other similar rights, the possession of which
sufficed, in the view of the Greeks 2 , to constitute a citizen,
butjthe right to share, and opportunities of sharing, in the **\
"exercise of official authority. He who did not participate
in the life of the State did not seem to him to deserve the
/S\ name of a citizen, and &lt;0i_life of the State was political __

S ^-*^, -. _ A -

f andjjpecukjtiy^ activity _ nnhlfv not necessary, functions.

^Spinoza defines citizens as homines qui ex jure civili
omnibus civitatis commodis gaudent (Tractat. Pol. 3. i).
Aristotle defines them rather by their functions than
iheir commoda.

His principle that the State is a body of citizens, taken
with his account of citizenship, evidently points to a more or
less popular., form of State. In an absolute monarchy, as
Schomann remarks 3 , the king would be the only person
possessing an underived .jight to rule, and therefore, if we
construe Aristotle s view strictly, the only citizen ; and
a narrow oligarchy^ in which a body (TTA^OS) of men
possessed of v the" right "torrulgy could hardly be said to
exist, would also offend against his account of the State:
Are we But then Aristotle goes on to ask, after rapidly dis-

missing the account of citizenship which bases it on birth,

turn of the anc j no t on t ne grant of certain rights by the State is it

political

wheel has not an objection to this definition of it, that it obliges us

1 The meaning of xplo-is (3. I. and in 2. u. 1273 a TI f the po-

1275 a 23 : cp. KpiTiKtjs, 1275 b 19), pular assembly. Bernays, in fact,

as Schomann has pointed out (Gr. translates apxfjs /SouXeimKTjs fi Kpi-

Alterth. I. 107. 3, ed. 2), must not TtK/jy in 3. I. 1275 b 18, ein bera-

be too strictly confined to judicial thendes oder entscheidendes Amt

work, for not only does TO Kpiveiv (see also Schomann. ubi supra).

include the review of the official Perhaps, however, the work of the

conduct of magistrates (3. n. judge (cp. 1275 a 26: b 13-17) is

1281 b3i sqq.), but it seems some- mainly referred to in the phrase

times to be used in a still wider apx?is KpiriKrjs, as here used,

cense, as in the phrase /cpiTiis r&gt;v - Schomann, Gr. Alterth. I.

avajKaiutv KOI (TvfJL(pep6vTu&gt;v (4 (7). 1078.

o. 1328 b 22) : indeed in 6 (4). 15. 3 Gr. Alterth. I. 107.
it is used of magistracies,

DEFINITION OF A CITIZEN. 231

Jt0 .admit any one to be a citizen, on whom some momen- conferred]
tary turn of the political wheel may confer citizenship ? o n e si a r v !f s ts
Are the aliens and slave metoeci l , whom Cleisthenes intro- and aliens,
duced into the tribes after the expulsion of the Pisistra- presuma-

tidae, to be accounted citizens ? His first answer is that bl y unfit to

possess
this d-nopia raises a question, not of fact, but of justice : them, that

he sees, however, that a further question may be raised, ^ ^ te
whether one who is not justly a citizen is a citizen at all. ferred them
But he insists that these persons must be accounted citi- ^hese men

zens, if they have the rights of citizens, and as to the are citi ~

, , , zens?

question of justice, that runs up into the question already

raised (3. i. 1274 b 34), whether they owe their citizenship
to an act of the State or not. For democrats would not
always allow the act of a preceding oligarchy or tyranny
to bind a democracy coming after it, or to be taken as
an act of the State. Aristotle is probably referring, as
Thirlwall has remarked (Hist, of Greece, 4. 235: cp. 204),
to a well-known case of this at Athens, referred to also
by Isocrates (Areopag. 68) and Demosthenes (in Leptin.

1 AoCXoi fieroiKoi, 1275 b 37. I citizenship to slaves of any kind

take yueVoiKoi to be the substantive, stamped a man either as a tyrant

8ov\oi the adjective. If I am (Xen. Hell. 7. 3. 8), or an extreme

right in this, Aristotle appears to democrat (ibid. 2. 3. 48). If the

intend to distinguish between free true reading were, as has been

metoeci and slave metoeci that suggested, gevovs Km SovXovs &lt;al

is, metoeci of servile status or /ueroiVovy, one would have expected

origin. There would probably be the three substantives (as Thirl-

many such in the class of metoeci, wall remarks, Hist, of Greece, 2.

and no doubt it would be felt to be 74 n.) to be arranged in a different

a far stronger measure to admit order (cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 19).

metoeci of this type to citizenship It is just possible that here, as

than free metoeci like Aristotle elsewhere, two alternative read-

himself (cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 32 sq.). ings (8ov\ovs and /^eroucovs) have

The word SoCXos, according to together found their way into the

Chrysippus (Athen. Deipn. 267 b), text, but probably 8ov\ovs ^eroi-

was sometimes used in a sense KOVS is correct. (Since the fore-

inclusive of freedmen, and some going note was in print, I have

of these slave metoeci may observed that Bernays translates

possibly have been freedmen : TroXXoiy . . . evovs KM dovXovs pf-

runaway slaves or slaves attached TOIKOVS many aliens and freed-

to a foreign master may, however, men (viele Insassen und Freige-

also be referred to. It would have lassene). See his Translation,

been a stronger measure still to p. 135, and his note in Heraklit.

give citizenship to slaves of Briefe, p. 155, where he explains

Athenian masters. But to give his view of the passage.)

233 THIRD BOOK.

c. ii sq.), in which money had been lent by the Lace

daemonians to the oligarchical College of Ten to aid it in

its struggle against the democrats under Thrasybulus, and

the question was raised in the popular assembly, whether its

repayment could be claimed from the restored democracy

whether, in fact, the State of Athens had contracted the

This ques- loan. In this instance the sum was repaid by the State.

to an in- Many, however, were disposed to contend, that oligarchies

quiryasto an( j tyrannies rested on force, and were not, like de-

the iden- -. -

tityofthe mocracy, governments for the common good, and thus
St ^. te . that their acts were not the acts of the State. Aristotle

\vnicn. is

found to (1276 a 13) hints that the acts of a democracy would be
mainly in J ust as impeachable on that score; but he passes on to
the consti- consider a cognate question, what are the grounds on

tution, the , .

answer im- which we are to pronounce a TroAis to be the same or to
phed (but h" ave changed its identity. It will be noticed that the

not given) ,^ ,... & -..*/

being that democrats just referred to did not claim that democrati-
ca lly governed Athens was a different State from oligar-

zens by the chically governed Athens : it was not on that ground
State, that they repudiated the debt contracted by the oligarchy,
though but on the ground that the oligarchy was not the State.

hardly per/ -^S- . fc

haps the Aristotle does not accept this contention, and therefore

to ar g ue tne matter on a new basis. Is the
before. the same, he asks, when its inhabitants have moved from
the old site, and some of them live on one site, and
,i-j others on another? This, he says, is a question of lan
guage : the word TTO AIS is used in more senses than one.
Is a Tro Ats the same, so long as it is surrounded by the same
walls ? Why, a space surrounded by walls may be. as we
see in the case of Babylon, so large as to be the abode of
an e0ros, rather than a Tro Ats. Or is it the same so long as
the stock of its inhabitants remains the same? No, the very
same inhabitants, if differently combined, may become a
different State, just as the same individuals may be succes
sively formed into two or more different choruses. It is to
the .snthesis, not the individuals that we

rntrst-mafrrry look when ^we pronounce on the identity of
the Tro A.1?. But it does not follow, that when one constitu-

THE IDENTITY OF THE STATE. 233

tion takes the place of another, or, in other words, when
one TTO AIS is replaced by another, the new TTO AI? should
refuse to fulfil the contracts of the old : whether it should
do so, is a matter for separate consideration.

The conclusion suggested, though not drawn, for Aris
totle has lost sight of the origin of the discussion in the
nice investigation to which it has led him, .is that the aliens
made citizens by Cleisthenes are citizens by the act of the

*- : &gt;y """ \; J G&^^-*" n *"^"-~ "" T -__^

State, though perhaps not the same State as existed
before the change of constitution : whether the State acted
rightly in making them citizens or not, is a question on
which further light is thrown in the succeeding chapters,
and especially in c. 5-

When Aristotle finds the^ identity of the State mainly
in the ^roAireia, hfs vie\tf is " quite in harmony with his
general conception of the importance of the TroAtreia as
the expression of the end for which the State lives (6 (4).
i. 1289 a 15-18). Isocrates had said that the State is
immortal (De Pace 120, at Se -rro Aeis &lt;5ia ri]v aQavacriav
Kal ras Trapa rS&gt;v av9p&lt;airu&gt;v Kal ras Trapa T&V dt&v
Cicero s view is not very different : itaque nullus
interitus est reipublicae naturalis, ut hominis, in quo mors
non modo necessaria est, verum etiam optanda persaepe :
civitas autem, quum tollitur, deletur, exstinguitur, simile
est quodam modo, ut parva magnis conferamus, ac si
omnis hie mundus intereat et concidat (de Rep. 3. 23.
34). Spinoza in his mortuo rege, obiit quodam modo
civitas 1 , seems to go farther than Aristotle. Locke (on
Civil Government, 2. 211) distinguishes between the
dissolution of the society and the dissolution of the govern
ment. The usual and almost the only way whereby this
union in one politic society is dissolved, is the inroad of
foreign force making a conquest upon them ; for in that
case, not being able to maintain and support themselves as
one entire and independent body, the union belonging to
that body, which consisted therein, must necessarily cease,
and so every one return to the state he was in before, with
1 Tractat. Pol. 7. 25.

234 THIRD BOOK.

a liberty to shift for himself and provide for his own safety,
as he thinks fit, in some other society. According to this,
the Norman Conquest of England was the beginning of a
new society. The question is more familiar to us in rela
tion to the Church of England and the question of its
continuity. A recent writer, whose book is reviewed in
the Saturday Review for Dec. 9, 1882, holds that it is not
either from Christ and his Apostles, nor yet from the
period of the Reformation, but from the passing of the
Act of Uniformity in the reign of Charles the Second, that
we must date the foundation of the present Established
Church of England. His reviewer dissents : the National
Church no more ceased to exist when its bishops were
expelled and its liturgy disused, a parochial church no
more ceased to exist when a Presbyterian or an Anabaptist
preacher was thrust upon it as its pastor, than the State or
nation itself ceased to exist, when it was ruled by a Council
of State or a Protector, instead of a King. Whatever
may be the merits of this controversy, we see that the
question raised by Aristotle is still one on which debate is

possible l .

^^^ p- *""^^

What is Aristotle, however, passes on to discuss a more impor-

the virtue ...

oftheciti- tant question, to which the inquiries we have just noticed
the same as ^ eac ^ U P Thq-Trtrestion whether slaves and aliens are

the virtue legitimate Citizens natur^ly snggf^f-q the fnrthpr question,

^^^s^.jwhat js_the_virtu^f a citizen, and is it identical with the
nificance of virtue of a good man ? Aristotle will not deny the name

this discus- "7 T~I , ,-,

sion. of a citizen to any one whom the State has invested with
certain powers, but he thinks it worth while to inquire what
qualities the citizen ought to possess, and whether he is
bound to possess all those which go to the making of a good
man. The investigation as to the virtue of a citizen reminds
us of the investigation in the First Book as to the virtue
of women, children, and slaves ;Cfiere"as there the Socraticf}
doctrine of the unity of virtue comes up for discussion.

1 See De Witt s Jefferson, E. T. Jefferson s works bearing on ques-
p. 1 54, where various passages of tions of this kind are referred to.

VIRTUE OF THE CITIZEN AND THE GOOD MAN. 235

There were many probably who thought that to be a
good citizen (that is, an useful member _o_the State, what- ^
ever its constitution) was to be a good man (cp. Thuc. 2.
42. 2 so.}. On the other hand A Socrates had said that it i/0 c

J- / !.... ^n-.^i mff ._ ^ \ U&gt;/&gt;/

was impossible to be a good citizen without moral goodness ^
(Xen. Mem. 4. 2. II, ovv olov re ye avev StKcuocrwris ayaQov

JL* y

TTo\LTt]v yevta-Oai. : cp. 4. 6. 14). Teaching as he did the
unity of the various virtues *, it was natural that he should

also identify the virtue of the good citizen and the good
man, and thus we find Plato in the Gorgias (517 B-C)
merp;ino; political in moral virtue, for he makes the virtue of v ^

*w^M^^^^^^B^BM^^B^S59MH^ Ea| M^^^^^MM

a citizen consist in the moral improvement of his fellows,
not in adding to the material defences of the State 2 .
Aristotle s- object is to show that neither of these views_ uuf^

(Js correct,^and also to put forth avhird view, which com- J^vtf
bines all that is of value in them. He accepts the first of
them to this extent, that he allows a kind of .virtue even to
the citizen of a deviation-form ; on the other hand, he
agrees with Socrates that the virtue of the good citizen is
in one case (that of the ruling citizen (-rroAmKo s) in the
best constitution) identical with that of the good, man.
His wish is to do justice to all forms and degrees of citizen-
virtue, and at the same time to show that its highest form
is alone to be identified with that of the good man. .Here,

r _as_elsewhere, he seeks to mediate betw^en_jappQStftg^v4evvs,
and to extract frnmThpfn^vhatpvpr plf-merit nf

contain.

He begins by asking in what the .virtue of a citizen con
sists, and finds it, not in that in which it had commonly

1 He was followed in this view this school in Aristotle s time, see
by the Megarians (Zeller, Gr. Ph. A.Schaefer, Demosthenes 1.295-6,
2. i. 184. 4, ed. 2), the Cynics (ibid. who refers to Menage s note on
2. i. 221. 3-4), and the Eretrian Diog. Laert. 2. 109.
school (ibid. 2. i. 200. 5). There 2 Thucydides finds the charac-
was a standing feud between the teristic of a good citizen in a desire
Megarian school and Aristotle. to benefit his State (6. 9. 2 : 6. 14.
This school struck at the root of i). Demosthenes speaks to some-
Aristotle s system by disputing what the same effect (De Chers.
the distinction of Swa/Lit? and eVep- cc. 68-72). Plato would quite
yeia (Grote, Plato 3. 490 : Zeller, approve, but then he would pro-
Gr. Ph. 2. i. 183. 2, ed. 2). On bably interpret this expression dif-
Eubulides, one of the leaders of ferently.

236 THIRD BOOK.

been taken to consist 1 the qualities which win success or
advantage for the State = b~u t" iiT1dTOS-w4trcrrTolYtribirte^t:o
the maintenance of the existing consTitution,7\vHatever it
may^eT Just as the virtue ofTKechild is relative to his
father (Trpbs TOV rj-yov^evov), and that of the slave to his
master (-rrpbs TOV bea-TTOTrjv ), so the virtue of the citizen is
relative to the constitution (-rrpos rijv iroXirei av). It follows

that there must be many forms of the virtue of a citizen,
^ V* V- ^

for there are many constitutions, and the virtue which

upholds oneTwiti not be the same as that which upholds
another ; but the virtue of a good man is always one and
the same, for it is complete virtue. . The virtue of a citizen
cannot, therefore, in all constitutions be identical with the
virtue of a good man.

Is it so even in the best constitution ? No : for (i) the
State even there cannot ; be wholly composed of men
entirely alike ; hence not of good men 2 . But it must be
" composed of good citizen^ : hence the virtue of the citizen
and the good man are not identical. (2) The State is com
posed of unequals, and the virtue of the leader of a chorus
^ AC is not identical with that of the member who stands beside
him. (The first of these arguments appears to be based
on considerations of what is possible, and to be designed to
show that the identity of the virtue of the citizen and the
good man is impossible : the second appears to be designed
to show that as a matter of fact, looking to the nature of
the State, this identity does not exist.)

We see then that the absolute identity of the virtue of
the citizen with that of the good man, which Socrates
asserted to exist, does not exist, even in the best constitu
tion. Even there the virtue of all citizens will not be
identical with the virtue of the good man. But will the
virtue of some citizens be so ?

We commonly call the good ruler good and morally

1 Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 14 : 4. 2. 11. in the passage of the Third Book

a Aristotle seems to think other- before us as merely dialectical or

wise in 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 36 sqq. : aporetic, and not Aristotle s defi-

see feller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 683. 4, nitive view.

who regards the view expressed

VIRTUE OF THE CITIZEN AND THE GOOD MAN. 237

wise, and the man capable of ruling (TTOXLTLKOS) must needs
be morally wise [for moral wisdom (^poVrjo-i?) and political
wisdom ("TroAmKT]) are identical]. Then again, it is a
common view that the very education of the ruler must
be altogether different from that of the ruled. Are

"we to say then that the virtue of the ruler is the same
as that of the good man ? In that case we should have
found what we have been seeking some citizens whose
virtue is the same as that of the good man. Perhaps
Jason felt that the virtue of a ruler is one thing and
the virtue of a citizen (who is both ruler and ruled)
another, for he said that it was starvation to him not
to be a tyrant, implying that he did not know how to

Tbe a private individual 1 . But then we praise a man
who is capable both of ruling and of being ruled, and
the virtue of a citizen of reputeis said to consist in n
a.^capacity "for" filling and being^ruled well. If then the
virtue ot the~good man is fha"t~"ofa ruler only, and the
virtue of a citizen includes both that of a ruler and that of
one who is ruled, the two aptitudes which the citizen unites
must be different in point of praiseworthiness (Aristotle
hints that the citizen must in fact possess two different

- ^., ,. &lt;M *^^BB^M^^ NWMMM ^^pW^"*B^M^V*^ B * l * VV * IMI&gt; *^ ^ 6VV" | M*IMMlWMM^i^* Ml ^^ l ^~^^ MB ^" HI *^ BaHM *

kinds of virtue). Since then we sometimes hold that a
ruler and a person ruled should learn two distinct things
and not the same thing, but that the citizen should know
both what the ruler knows and what he who is ruled
knows, and share both in ruling and being ruled, what
follows from that is plain enough. We must first make
it clear what kind of rule it is that the citizen should
learn through being ruled to exercise. It is not the kind
of rule which is exercised over slaves, or that which is
concerned with necessaries, but that which is exercised over

1 It was Jason, probably, who noble acts (cp. Rhet. I. 12. 1373

used the argument referred to a 25, and Plutarch, Praec. Reip.

in 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 35, that a man Gerend. c. 24 : De Sanitate Tu-

ought to make himself supreme enda, c. 22). Anacreon had sung

master of his State at any cost of of a queen Callicrete as eVio-ra-

evildoing, inasmuch as it is only pevr) rvpavvKa ([Plato], Theages

in that position that it is possible 125 E).
to perform the greatest number of

238 THIRD BOOK.

men like the ruler and free (TroAm/oj apx 7 ?) * Having
made this clear, we may draw the conclusion that the
good citizen will possess two forms of virtue the virtue
which fits a mail _to_j-ule as a citizen rules his fellow-
citizens, and the virtue which fits a man to be ruled as
citizens are ruled by their fellow-citizens. And we may
go on and say the same of the virtue of the good man.
This also will have two forms the one that of the ruler,
the other that of the ruled. The former is the complete
form, for it alone includes (jypovrja-^.

Thus the virtue of the citizen in its fulness is identical
with the virtue of the man in its fulness : so far Socrates
was right in identifying the two, but he wajLJiofe-jigkt in
dejiying-tfraT there is such a thing-^*4lie^virtue_of a citizen
apartjrom that of ar-rnan. On the contrary, the virtue of
ne citizen in many constitutions is distinct from that of
the man, and even in the best it is only in some of the
citizens those who are capable of ruling that the two
coincide. How far the subordinate forms of the virtue of a
citizen and of a man coincide in the best constitution, Aris
totle does not say. In other constitutions they evidently
will not coincide.

Aristotle perhaps has before him in this inquiry a passage
in the Laws (643 0-644 B), where Plato asks what is the
true aim of education, and finds that it is to produce a
desire to become a perfect citizen, knowing how both to
rule and to be ruled with justice, or, in other words, to
produce good men, for those who are rightly educated
may be said to become good men (644 A : compare also
Laws 942 C). Aristotle quite agrees that this is the aim
of education in the best State; but then he allows the
existence of a form of citizen-virtue in the deviation-forms

1 Aristotle perhaps wishes tacitly XeCo-m p.aX\ov t) TW Ka\5&gt;s apgm

to correct the strong expressions K.r.X. Plutarch repeats Plato s lan-

of Plato, Laws 762 E, Set 8/7 navr guage in Praecepta Reip. Gerend.

tiv$pa 8iavofl(rdai TTfpl aniivTuiv av- c. 12, a&gt;s ovS" npai KaXcor TOVS p.rj

V) coy 6 fj.f) 8ov\v(ras ov8 av Trporfpov opdais SouXet crai ras , f/ &lt;pr]-

yfvoiro aio9 eVatVov, Kal (nv o H\U.TU&gt;V } Sura/xeVous.

VIRTUE OF THE CITIZEN AND THE GOOD MAN. 239

of State : thus he frequently insists that in them the
citizens should receive an education suitable to the con
stitution.

These are the central lessons of the chapter, but its
incidental teaching also is important. There were evi
dently those who regarded the virtue of the good man
as concerned only with ruling. Themistocles had said, in
his haughty letter of defence to the people of Athens, that
he neither wished nor was fitted by nature to be ruled * ;
and Gorgias is made in the Meno of Plato to identify
virtue with the ability to rule 2 . But Aristotle insists
that one form, though not the highest, of the virtue of
the good man is concerned with being ruled, and that it is
by learning how to be ruled (after the fashion of freemen)
that the good man learns how to rule. Aristotle s concep
tion of a good man is thus quite different from that of
Gorgias. To obey is the beginning of virtue. Aristotle
is here preparing the ground for the institutions of his best
State, where this rule is followed (cp. 4 (7). 14. 1333 a
ii sq.).

On the other hand, there were those to whom political
activity, and even political capacity, seemed no essential
elements of virtue (4 (7). 3. 1325 a 18). This view also is
tacitly corrected by Aristotle. He will not allctw full
virtue to^exist where there is no capacity for rule. Thus
the man of full virtue (o-xovbalos^ and the true statesman
or king (TTO^LTIKOS KCU /3ao-iAiKo s) are identified (3. 18. i288b
i). ^povrjcrts is a virtue peculiar to the ruler 3 . Already
the Cynics and Cyrenaics later on, other schools 4 refused

1 Plutarch, Themist. c. 23, Sia- olov T tivai TO&gt;I&gt; av6pu&gt;ira&gt;v ; cp. ibid.
^a\\6fj.fi&gt;os yap VTTO reof e ^paii , "]\ E, avrrj tcrrlv dv8pos dperr], l&lt;avbv
Trpbs TOVS TToXi ras eypacpfv, wy ap^tiv aval TO. rrjs TroXews 1 TrparTfiJ (the
p.ei&gt; dei r)TG)i&gt;, apxeo-6ai 8e pf] netpv- answer of Meno), and 73 A,

KUS fJ.T)8e /3ouAo/ii&gt;o?, OVK av Trore s Cp. I. 13. 1260 a 17, 810 TOV

Papfidpois Kal TroXtpiois avrbv OTTO- /j.ev apxovTa Tf\eai&gt; (x. fiv ^ e * T( 7"

docrdai fitTO. TTJS EXXdSos. TjdiKrjv dpfrrjv (TO yap epyov ecrrlv

2 Meno 73 C : 2QKP. ETTeibfj anXcos TOV dpxiTfKrovos, 6 8e \6yos
roivvv T) avTTj dpfTT) Travrav e crn , ap^LTenTaiv), TO&gt;I&gt; 8 a\\a&gt;v {Kacrrov,
Treipoj elnelv Kal dva(i,VT)a 6fivai ) ri. otrov eVi^dXXei avrois.

aiiro (pr)cn Topyias elvai KOI crv per * The Stoics held that a philo-

MEN. Tt a XXo y fj a/^eiy sopher who teaches and improves

240 THIRD BOOK.

to make governing or the capacity, for governing a con
dition of virtue. Aristotle so far disconnects the two
things as to allow the existence of a lower form of virtue
in the case of persons who neither govern nor are capable
of governing, but he makes typovrivis, which includes a
capacity for governing, essential to full virtue. Thus while
he declines to deny all virtue whatever to those who are
capable only of being ruled, he places the virtue of the
good ruler on a pinnacle, as the characteristic excellence of
the good man.

The whole inquiryL-illustrates_the_dependence of virtue
on_ thp rnnstitution. The deviation-forms presuppose~in
their citizens a type of citizen-virtue, but an inferior type,
and it is only in the best constitution that citizen-virtue
rises into the full virtue of the good man. Here the ruling
citizen, or statesman (TTO\LTLKOS), is identical with the man
of full virtue (arirovbalos}. The Fourth and Fifth Books of
the Politics take this identification as the starting-point of
their inquiries on the subject of education (4 (7). 14. 1333 a
11-16), and ask what education will produce men of full
virtue, as the best way of discovering how to produce true
statesmen.

Thus this chapter of the Third Book forms an important
link in the inquiries of the Politics. It prepares us for the
arrangement in the Fourth by which the younger men of
the best State are not allowed to rule till they have learnt
to obey, and have acquired the virtues of rulers through
such subordination as befits freemen. How far its teaching
agrees with that of 4 (7). 3, where it seems to be implied
that a purely speculative life is an ideally complete one, is
another question 1 .

Are/sdi/au- Aristotle has now nearly done with the subject of the
not share citizen, but before he leaves it )x Jie-ftotiees and discusses

in office) one other droplet with regard to it, arising out of the
citizens?

his fellow-men benefits the State reans and Sceptics, E. T. p. 305).

quite as much as a warrior, an 1 See Appendix B as to some

administrator, or a civil func- further points connected with this

tionary (Zeller, Stoics Epicu- chapter.

LOWER TYPES OF CITIZEN. 241

account just given of the virtue of the citizen partly, in They are
all probability, because its discussion enables him to show constitu
that there are more forms of the citizen than one, and that tion s, but
the varieties of the citizen point to varieties of constitution, ot hers.
and thus leads up to the inquiries that follow : partly
because he desires to draw attention to the fact that his
definition of the citizen and of citizen-virtue does not hold
good universally.

The cnropuz is thus stated (3. 5- I2 77 b 34) TroVepoy
ta"T\v to KOivoivelv (&lt;rTi.v ap^fjs, r] KCU rovs (Bavavcrovs
Oertov ; The fiavavaoi have been said in the pre
ceding chapter to be persons ruled as slaves are ruled,
and here it is assumed that they do not share in office *.
Hence they will not possess the virtue of a citizen, which
consists of being capable both of ruling and being ruled
as citizens rule citizens. Are they then citizens ?

An inquiry on this subject discloses that some consti
tutions admit those concerned with necessary work to
citizenship, while others do not. The ftdvavaos is so far
a citizen that he is a citizen under particular forms of con
stitution (ev TLVL TroAireta) 2 . He is often a citizen in oligar
chies ; and in many democracies not only is the pdvavcros
a citizen, but even the alien and the bastard. This, how
ever, occurs only in States in which genuine citizens have
run short, and then only for a time, so that even these
democracies recognize that some types of citizen are less
authentic than others 3 .

The "wirele^discussion makes it manifest that there are
various types oF Citizen, and that the truest citizen (6
HxaA.iora TroAirr/s) is~~h~e~~wliu shares in office. TTEe account
given in c. 4 T^TtKeTvirtue of a citizen is thus shown to be
maintainable, even if it does not hold good of all who are
anywhere made citizens, and the close connexion of cc. 4

1 Cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 21, TO 8e Tf- nerto distinguish between different
raprov 6r)TiK.6v, o is ovdefuas dpxrjs kinds of citizens ; he distinguishes
fj.Tr)v. in the First Book (l. 7. 1255 b 27

2 Cp. ev TIVI jSacriXei a, 3. 14. sqq.) between different kinds of
1285 a 9. slaves.

3 It is quite in Aristotle s man-

VOL. I. R

242 THIRD BOOK.

and 5 is evidenced by a recapitulation of the result of c. 4
added at the end of c. 5, the inquiries of the latter chapter
having confirmed the conclusions of the former.

Aristotle had stated at the outset of the whole discussion
(3. i. 1275 a 34 sq.), that things which have to do with (or
stand in relation to) objects differing in kind and in priority
have little or nothing in common, and that constitutions,
the object-matter to which the citizen is related, differ in
kind and in priority; whence it follows that the citizen
under one constitution is different from the citizen under
another, and that we must not expect to find the various
types of citizen possessing much in common l . Wherever
this is the case, no definition can be made to suit all the
types of the thing equally well (1275 a 33).

The nature Throughout the inquiry as to the nature of the citizen,

of citizen- * ,

ship prov- our attention has constantly been drawn to the importance
mg to de- f t ^ constitution : the citizen, we are told, varies with

pcnd on the

constitu- the constitution the identity of the State is mainly to be
naturalfy sought in the constitution ; and the transition is natural
pass on to from the subject of the citizen to that of the constitution.

the consti- ..... , .

tution. Aristotle, who is seldom content with incidental solutions

1 Bernays (Aristoteles Politik, comachean Ethics (i. I. 1094 b

p. 132) and Bonitz (Ind. 799 a 15 19 sqq.). But indeed in dealing

sqq.) differ as to the interpreta- with all subjects Aristotle has

tion of the passage, 3. i. 1275 a little confidence in broad gene-

34 sqq. The interpretation of the ral definitions: cp. De An. 2. I.

latter, who explains TO. vnoKei^tva 412 b 4, (I 8/7 TI KOIVOV eVt Trao^j

(35) as singulae TroAiTfiai, ad quas ^u^s fiei Ae yeii/, (tr) av evTf\f\(ia

refertur TroAtTou notio, would seem 17 npoorrj cru&gt;/j.aTos (pvaiKov opya-

to be in all probability the correct VIKOV : 2. 3. 414 b 22, yevoiTo 6 av

one, and has been followed in the /cat Vi r&v a^pira)? Aoyoy KOIVOS,

text. What is said here of con- os e0a/5/zd(rei ^v traa-iv, ifiios 8

stitutions, is also, apparently, true ov8ev(&gt;s evrai o-^/.iaros o^oicas 8e

of xpr)fj.aTt&lt;TTi.Ki) and its forms (cp. KOI rt TOLS eiprj^fvais ^u^ats 810

I. II. 1258 b 2O, TTJS fj.et&gt; ovv olneio- yekoiov fore iv TOV KOIVOV \6yov Kai

rarrjs ^prjfj.aTi(TTiK&gt;]s ruvra fj.opta Kal eVt rovrcor Kai f(f&gt; ertpatv, os ovdtvos

Trpairn), and of /SdfrtXei a (3. 14. carat TU&gt;V oWcov i Stoy \6yos, ov8e

I284b 40 sqq.), and also of the Kara TO olniiov KOI UTO^OV eldos,

apcri/ TToXi rou Kai avSpos (3. 4- ^^77 aCpfVTas TOV TOIOVTOV . . . ware xad

b 1 8). We must bear in mind (KUO-TOV r)TrjT(oi&gt;, TIS fuda-Tov ^/vx^i,

the caution given to the reader olov T LS &lt;^)uroD KOI ris av6p&gt;irov r\

of treatises dealing with nokiriKT) dijptov.
at the commencement of the Ni-

NORMAL AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONS. 243

of important questions, raises for discussion (c. 6) the
question whether there are more constitutions than one,
though in every one of the preceding chapters of the Third
Book an affirmative answer had been implied. We must
inquire, he says, whether there are more than one, and if
there are, how many and what they are, and what distinc
tions exist between them (c. 6. 1278 b 6). A constitution,
he goes on to say, is an ordering of the magistracies of
a State, and especially of the supreme authority - 1 ; for in
every State the governing individual or class (7
supreme, and the constitution varies as this&gt;ajies

The first broad distinction between constitutions that Distinction
b etween normal constitutions and deviation-forms comes norma i
into view, when we ask what is the purpose for which the cpnstitu-
State exists, and what is the kind of rule which should be deviation-
exercised in a State. In answering the first of these two (o^s^"^
questions, Aristotle though he repeats his previous asser- by a refer-
tion (i. 2. 1253 a 7\ th at man i s a social being and seeks to e

live in society with his fellows 3 , even if he stands in no need State and
of help from them holds nevertheless that the ^Sfeate is q ui ry a s to
formed to secure the^ejiefal-adyjintage, and to win for each th ^ kil j^ f

individual a*4arge a share of goodJdfclas he~ts~capable of should be
3 . -- i = .

enjoying : not that men will not hold together in political

society even if they gain from it less than this if, for persons,
instance, they merely secure the continuance of a life not m ally go-
overladen with suffering and annoyances. The State, we vemment

, . - is for the

see, is a Koroma not only or chiefly designed for social common

good.

1 This seems to be the meaning
of the words eon 8f noXiTfia TTO-

Kd\ nO\lTfVfid (TT)fJLdlVfl TdVTUV, TToAl-

TfVfMd 8 earl TO Kvpiov TO&gt;V no)

Xews T(iis TU&gt;V T a XXcDi/ dp^utv Ka\ dvdyKij 8 fivai Kvpiov fj ?va rj oXiyovs
fjuiXicrra TTJS Kvpids TTdVTwv (3. 6. j TOVS TroXXous from which pas-
1278 b 8) : cp. rd^is Tois TrdXecrti 17
irepi TCLS upxds (6 (4). I. 1289 a 15) :
T) TG&gt;v apx^ v Tais (6 (4). 3. 1 290 a

7) I TOJC TTJV TTO\IV OLKOVVTWV TU^IS

Ttr n (3. I. I274b 38).

" 3. 6. 1278 b IO, Kvpiov p,ev yap
TrdVTd^ov TO 77oXtrev/na rfjs TroXecor,
noXiTfvfjid 8 (O~T\V TJ TToXiTfia . cp.
3. 7. 1279 a 25, eVfi 8e TroXtreui pev

sage it would seem that the TroXi-
Tfvp.a may be a single individual
as wefr as a class, such as the Few
or the Many;

3 See Cic. de Amicitia 23. 87 ;
but Aristotle claims that man is
not only a o~vvdvao~TiK6v but a TroXt-

TtKOV CtoOV,

R 2

244

THIRD BOOK.

\vf

r
sT

pleasure, like such unions as those of 6iavS&gt;Tai or fpaviaraL
(Eth. Nic. 8. ii. 1160 a 19 : cp. Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 35-1281 a
4), but if in some degree for pleasure, in a higher degree
for advantage, and advantage not of a passing kind but
extending over the whole life (Eth. Nic. 8. IT. u6oa
21 sqq.). It combines in itself, like the conjugal relation,
but in a higher degree, pleasure and advantage (Eth. Nic.
8. 14. 1 162 a 24).

Aristotle answers the second question what kind of
rule should be exercised in a State by distinguishing,
as he had already done in c. 4 (1277 a 33 sqq.), the
rule exercised over slaves from the rule exercised over
free persons. Of the latter he takes as types the rule of
the head of a household over wife and children, or that
of the master of an art a gymnastic-master or a ship-
captain over those whom he directs 1 . This kind of rule
^fsTxercised primarily for the good of the ruled, for if the
ruler has a share of the advantage, this comes to him acci
dentally (Kara (rvp-jSeft-qKos) ; whereas the rule exercised by
a master of slaves (Seo-jrort/c?) apyj]} is exercised primarily
for the good of the ruler, and accidentally only for the
good of the ruled 2 . That the rule exercised in a State
belongs of right to the former category, may be inferred
from the fact that when rulers and ruled are placed on a
level, the former deriving no special benefit from ruling, men
regard office as a public burden (Aetroupyta, 1279 an) and
claim to pass it from one to the other 3 . The mere fact of
an interchange of rule being looked for under these circum-
starTces shows tHaT the State is normally for the common
advantage, forjf-no interchange took place, and the rulers
the same and ruled for the good of the ruled,
they woulcUbe losers 4 . The general feeling that an inter-
ing that Aristotle has here Isocr.
Areopag. 24 sqq. in view.

4 Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1 1 34 a 35
sqq., 810 OVK (S)fJLfv ap^eiv avdpconov,
dXXd TOV \6yov, on e aurw TOVTO Troiel
Ka\ yivfTCit Tvpavvos eo~Tl 8 6 (ip\u&gt;v
&lt;pv\aj; TOV diKaiov, el tie TOV 8iKaiov,

KOI TOV ItTOV (TTfi 8 Ov8fl&gt; flVTCO

1 Compare the reasoning in
Plato, Rep. 342 C.

2 Plato, Rep. 343 B. Plato
seems hardly to make this dis
tinction as to 8tcnroTiKr] apx*], Rep.
345 D-E (navav apxrjv, Kad ocrov
dpvij).

s Susemihl seems right in think-

THE STATE EXISTS FOR THE COMMON GOOD. 245

change of rule is just where government is for the benefit
of the governed, implies that the State exists for the
common good.

The parallel between politics and the arts which Aris
totle inherited from Socrates and Plato here suggests the
inference that the relation between rulers and ruled so
far resembles that between the master of an art and his
pupils or assistants, as to be a relation primarily for. the
benefit of the side which receives, not that which gives,
direction (cp. 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 29 sq., aAAa Mr/y ovb Iv TCUS
a\\ais eTnar^/jiais TOVTO 6p&lt;S/xeV ovre yap TOV larpov ovre TOV
tpyov eort TO r) Tretcrat 77 (Biaa-acrdai TOV fjifv rows
TOV be TOVS TrAooTT/pa?) ; it serves here, therefore,
as it also does in 6 (4). i. 1288 b 10 sqq. and 3. 12. 1282 b
30, as the basis of an important doctrine, notwithstanding
that elsewhere Aristotle is careful to point out some differ
ences between politics and the arts ; he holds TTO^LTLK^, in
fact, to be a Practical Science, not a Productive Science or
Art. Thus he recognizes that written rule, or law, is more
in place in the practice of Politics than in the practice of
an art (3. 16. 1287 a 33 sqq.), and that the parallel of the arts
must not be used to justify a frequent change of laws (2. 8.
i 269 a 19 sqq.). Nor is government to him a mere matter
of scientific knowledge ; it presupposes virtue and correct
moral choice (3. 13. 1284 a i sq.).

Both of the questions raised have thus been answered
in a way to show that rule such as that exercised by a
master over his slaves (eo-7roriK?) apyj]} is out of place in
relation to the citizens of a State ; it offends against the

7rAe oi&gt; (Ivai doKf i, e intp StVaios 1 ou the shape of a period of private

yap j&gt;f/j.(i irXeov TOV 077X00? dyadov life, during which some one else

avTui, el fj.fi npos avrov avd\oy6v governs for the quondam ruler s

f&lt;TTiv 810 erepw noiei Kal 8ia TOVTO advantage. It should be noticed

&lt;i\\orpioi&gt; flvai (fraaiv. ayaQbv TTJV that Aristotle does not necessarily

diKaioo-vvTjv . . . nio-Qbs (ipa TIS 80- accept as correct the popular im-

reoy, TOVTO de Tifj-r/ KO.\ yepas orw pression that one who rules for

St prj iKavii TO TOMIITO, OVTOI yivov- the benefit of the ruled is a loser

Tat Tvpawoi. This agrees with and needs compensation. The

Plato, Rep. 345 E. In the passage popular view is not his own, but

of the Politics before us, however, it serves the purpose of his argu-

the io-dos is conceived to come in ment.

246 THIRD BOOK.

aim with which the State was instituted, and against the
nature of all rule which rests on knowledge. Rule in the
State should be for the common advantage of all the
citizens, whether rulers or ruled; and thus we arrive at
the conclusion that those constitutions which aim at the
common advantage are normal (dpOafy, and those which
aim at the advantage of the rulers only are deviation-
forms. The State is a noiv^via of freemen, and must
be governed as such. It does not necessarily follow that
in all normal forms of it there will be an interchange of
rule, the ruled becoming rulers, and the rulers becoming
the ruled, from time to time : this is so in most forms of
the rule which citizens exercise over citizens (cp. i. 12.
1259 k 4)5 an d particularly in the like and equal type of
society which was becoming increasingly common in the
Greece of Aristotle s day, but not in the Kingship. Demo
cratic opinion held this interchange to be essential to free
dom (8 (6). 2. 1317 a 4O-b 3), but -^-cistotlc s -^iew-Ja^that
the gpjvernejd-areJxjee when the government is exercised for
their--bte1it7 A freeman, according to him, is one who
exists for his own sake and not for that of another (Metaph.
A. 2. 982 b 25 : cp. Pol. 3. 4. 1277 b 5 : 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 17
sqq.). A man may thus be a freeman without having a
share in ruling. The true characteristic of a freeman is that
his interest counts as a thing to be studied that his life is
lived for himself, not for another. He who is the instru
ment (opyavov] of another and fit for nothing better, and
yet a man, is a slave (i. 4. 1254 a 14, 6 yap JUT) O.VTOV
v9u&gt;7ios 8e, OVTOS

Six consti- Aristotle thus obtains the broad classification of constitu-
tions into normal forms and deviation-forms, and taking

mal, three a i so i n to account the fact that the supreme authority in a

the reverse.

State must needs be a single individual, or a few, or many 1 ,

1 Aristotle is not careful at the 5. 3. 1129!) 15. So here he does

outset of a discussion, when every- not pause to remember that he

thing he says is tentative and means eventually to decide for

provisional, to study absolute accu- the supremacy, not of any person

racy. See Ramsauer on Eth. Nic. or persons, but of vo^oi

DEMOCRACY AND OLIGARCHY CRITICISED. 247

he arrives at the conclusion that there are six constitutions,
three for the common advantage (6p6ai) and three for the
advantage of the rulers (-apeK/3dcrei?). It will be noticed, Nature of

Demo-

however, that at the end of the chapter (c. 7), the Few and cracyand

Many in whose interest the oligarchy and democracy are

said respectively to be ruled are identified with the rich claims to

and the poor (3. 7. 1 279 b 7-9) ; and a chapter, the Eighth,

necessarily follows, dealing with objections that may fairly tions ana -
be made to the definition given of oligarchy and demo- rejected by

cracy. The first is that if we take the numerical difference a reference
J to the end

to be the essential thing, it follows that States in which O f the
many rich rule a few poor are democracies, and that States
in which a few poor rule many rich are oligarchies, which
is not a satisfactory conclusion. Then, if we make both
differences essential, and refuse to consider that an oligarchy
exists anywhere except where a few rich rule many poor,
or a democracy except where many poor rule a few rich,
we leave the forms of State to which reference has just
been made altogether undescribed and unclassified. This
is the second objection. It follows that the qualitative,
not the numerical, difference is the essential one. The*
numerical difference between oligarchy and democracy ia.
only accidental and may be reversed. It is the rule of
the rich in their own interest that makes an oligarchy, and
the rule of the poor in their own interest that makes a ;
democracy.

It was necessary to ascertain correctly what democracy
and oligarchy are, before taking the next step, which is to ~)
state and examine the claims put forward on behalf of
either constitution, and thus to win for the first time (c. 9)
a closer view of what constitutes a State, and of the end
for which the State exists.

Both oligarchs and democrats allege a basis in justice
for the forms of constitution which they respectively favour,
and not untruly; they take their stand on a principle which
is in a degree just (biKaiov rt) ; but then they forget that it

opdSts (3. ii. 1282 b I : cp. 3. premacy of Law is a possible
10. 1281 a 34), and that the su- alternative.

248

THIRD BOOK.

falls short of absolute justice (TO KU/OUOS IKCUOI&gt;). They
know in part and prophesy in part (1281 a 8). There is,
indeed, a difference between them, for while they agree in
claiming that the things awarded by the State shall be
awarded equally, they differ as to the persons to whom
this equal award is to be made the one side wishing to
confine the benefit of it to those who are equal in wealth,
the other claiming it for all who are equal in respect of
free birth (eA.eu0epia) *.

It has been already said (c. 6. 1278 b 17 sqq.) that the
deviation-forms go counter to the end for which the State
was originally formed, and this is now (1280 a 25) again
brought up against them. Their advocates leave the de
cisive point untouched they do not inquire for what end
the State exists, yet this inquiry is really decisive of the
whole matter. Aristotle proceeds to investigate this ques
tion, and here, as everywhere else, we must bear in mind
that the subject of his investigations is the TTO AI?, or City-

1 This appears to be the mean
ing of c. 9. 1280 a 9-25. In 3. 12.
I282b 1 8 sqq. every one is said
to agree that the just is the equal
for the equal, but no one remem
bers to inquire, in what things men
must be equal and unequal, if they
are justly to claim equality and
inequality in a distribution of
power. In 7 (5). i. 1301 b 28 sqq.
both sides are said to agree that
TO Kar" a^itiv "icrov is an\S&gt;s Sixaiov,
but to differ as to what constitutes
TO KOT diav icrov democrats hold
ing that equality in a single thing
constitutes absolute equality, and
oligarchs, that inequality in a sin
gle thing constitutes absolute in
equality. The three passages are
not absolutely accordant, but they
agree in laying stress on the im
portance of the question whether
the claimants are really equal and
unequal as they_claim to be.

The wordf^Aeu&y^i*Lcornrnonly
translated freed 5m r m~3. 9. 1 280 a
24, but Bernays perhaps comes
nearer to its meaning in his trans

lation free birth. E\evdepos and
(\fv6fpla seem often to be used in
relation to the circumstances of
birth; cp. 3. 9. 1281 a 6, KUTU ptv
(Xfvdfpiav Kal ytvos icrois : 3- "3 1
1283 a 33, ol 8 (\tv0epoi Kal tvye-
vels a&gt;S eyyvs d\Xrj\u&gt;i/: 6 (4). 4-
!29ob 9 sqq. E\tv6(pia may in
deed occasionally mean something
more than free birth in fact
citizen birth ; cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 b
26, TO P.TI ( aufporeptov TroXirwi
eXfudfpov, and 1290!:) 9, OVT av
ol (\fv6epoi oXtyot ovrer irXfiovcav
Kal p.r) f\fv6tpcav ap\uxri (where
01 (\ev6epoi are explained a little
later to be ot 8ia(pepoi&gt;Tes KUT
(vyeveiav Kal TrpS&gt;Toi Karacrxovres
ras anoiKias). EXfvdepos is some
times used in contradistinction to
evos (Plato Com., Yn-e /j/SoXo?, fr.
3, 4 : Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2.
670). Antisthenes is said by
Diogenes Laertius in one pas
sage not to have been e&lt; bvoiv
AtitivaioLv (6. i), and in another
not to have been EK 8vo &lt;
(6. 4).

THE TRUE END OF THE STATE. 249

State. The TTO AIS exists not for the sake of the property of
the participants, nor for the sake of bare life, nor, like an
alliance, for protection from wrong, nor for protection in
traffic and mutual dealings, but for the sake of good life (TO
fv (ijvj. Our use of-la"g"qg*\ Arigt-oHp n^ges, impHgs that a
State j^istsonly wherp__h|iprp is a rmit-nal rar^ for vt rtup^

where the character of each individual is no indifferent
matter to the rest, or, in words used elsewhere, where men
live with a view to the common advantage. The State,
he implies, means a society where the individual lives for
the whole. It involves something more than relations of
exchange, or alliance, or co-operation against outrage ;
something more than residence in one and the same spot ;
something more than the links of marriage, of the phratry,
of common sacrifices and gatherings for social intercourse 2 ;
it involves that to which these latter things are merely a
means, an associated participation in a fully developed and /
complete existence, in a happy and noble life. r

The farther inference is drawn, to clinch the case against
oligarchy and democracy, that those who contribute more
to a life of this nature have a better claim to political power
than the representatives of wealth or free birth, the partisans,
that is to say, of oligarchy and democracy (cp. 3. 13. 1283 a
23 sq. : 7 (5). i. 1301 a 39 sq. : Plato, Laws 757 C). A
comparative conclusion only, be it observed, for we shall
find in the sequel that Aristotle does not concede even
to a superiority in virtue, unless it is combined with an
adequate provision of external goods, a right to predomin
ance in the State.

We note here the first use of an expression that of Aristotle s

, ., ,. /&gt;/./ r&gt;&gt;\\ \ &lt;- ? account of

contributing to a K.OLVU&gt;VIO. (ocroi cru/xpaAAovrcu TrAeifrror et? t h e p r i n .

TTjy ToiavTinv Koivcoviav, 1281 a 4) which somewhat varies the C1 p] e on

which

account elsewhere given of the procedure of the State in political

1 Cp. Plato, Gorgias 517 B, aXXa offep p.ovov f pyov e crrli/ aya$ou TTO-

yap pfTatfiftu&iv ras enidv^ilns Kai \ITOV : Protag. 327 A sq.
/n)j 7TiTpfTTfiv, TtfidovTfs Kal /3iao- 2 Plato is perhaps not really

p,tvoi eVt ToCro, o0et&gt; ffif\\ov a/Ltet- quite content with the life of his

vovs forffrdai ol TniAn-at, a&gt;? fWo? healthy State (Rep. 372 B,

etTTfii , ovSeV TovTatv ie(j)(poi&gt; (KfivoC i]Sfd)s t^vvovres a

250

THIRD BOOK.

power is to
be distri
buted not
always
quite the
same.

**V

distributing political power. Sometimes we gather that the
State will give instruments in proportion to capacity fc. 1 2.
1282 b 33, r&lt;5 Kara ro lpyoz&gt; vTrepe xoi ri : cp. de Part. An. 4. 10.
687 a IO, 17 Se &lt;v(ri? del &iaW/i6l, Ka6a~ep av6p(j)~os (f&gt;povifJ.os,
Ka&lt;rTov rw bvvaij.ev&lt;a \pija-6ai) ; sometimes that it gives them
in proportion to the contribution made to . the. Kou^ofia.
The two principles do not lie far apart, but from the one
point of view the grant of power is the payment of a debt,
or rather resembles the distribution of a commercial com
pany s dividend, the amount of which in the case of each
recipient is proportionate to the funds contributed 1 , so that
power comes as a reward rather than as a burden, while
from the other point of view power is given, like a tool,
to him who can use it best. Aristotle seems sometimes
to__rjass almost uncojiasiously from the one view^Tg the
other. His" paramount doctrine, notwithstanding occasional
(deviations (e.g. 3. 6. 1279 a ^ SQQ-) probably is, that to the
good man political power, just like any other external good,
is a good (cp. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 21 sqq.), and affords great
opportunities of noble action, if only it is fairly won and
earned by adequate desert (4 (7). 3-_j 3 25 b S^sc^)" We
naturally infer that he will confine political power to the
good, to whom it is alone a good, and give it to them
in the degree which makes best for virtue ; and, in fact,
we find power in the hands of the good in both the forms
of the best State (cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32, /3ovAerat yap exarepa
Kar aperl/y (rvvfardvaL K.tyopr]yr\\j.tvr\v}. But then the question
arose are wealth and free birth, which, as we shall see, he
allows to be, as well as virtue, elements contributing to the
end of the State, to be denied any share of power, if their pos
sessors do not also possess virtue ? This is the question dis
cussed in 3. 13. 1 283 a 42 sqq. Considerations of j usticeJJQLrce
from Aristotle the admission that a share of power must be
conceded to them even under those circumstances.~T?utwha
if "the possession of power be detrimental to its holders
in the absence of virtue? This difficulty seems not to have

r~~*~~~

1 This view of the State, it had been put forward, as was

_apj&gt;ears from c. 9. 1280 a 27 sqq., natural, by partisans of oligarchy.

NATURE OF A STATE. 251

occurred to Aristotle. He usually approaches the question
of the award of political power rather from the side of
justice than from that of the ethical interest of the State
or tlie^individual, though, as has been said, the best State
satisfies all these criteria l . At all^yents, the point of view
of justice is far .the mQr^ramjnent in the Third Book,
In the book on Revolutions it is also especially prominent,
for justice is the best security against revolution (\j.6vov
yap /xozn/xoz&gt; TO K.OLT a^iav l&lt;rov &lt;al TO e x etz; Ta carwr, 7 (o)-
7. 1307 a 26). Even in the Fourth Book, where the
other point of view naturally comes more to the front, it
is not absent. For instance, the assignment of military
functions to the younger men and of political functions to
the elder, rests in some degree on considerations of justice
(cp. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 1 6, OVKOVV OVTCOS apfpolv veveprja-daL avfj.-
&lt;ptpei Kal OLKaiov flvai lj(i yap avrr] rj Staipetn? TO KCLT a^iav).
The just, in fact, and that which is for the common good
are said to be identical (3. 12. 1282 b 17). Butthen, is the
State^sketched inj^^g, ii%-^|?. ^-[ ^44^4^4-^my .Stair.
but the best, truly JustPX-for the common good? This
question receives an answer, when we are told (6 (4). 8.
1293 b 25) that all constitutions but the best are deviations
from the most normal constitution (Strj/xapT^/cao-i TJJS dpfloTa-

If we now gather together the conclusions with regard Summary
to the nature of the State to which the preceding inquiries ciusionTso
have led us, they seem to be the following : the State is far arrived

at as to the
a body of men, not too large or small (TTO\LTWV n Tr\ri6os, nature of a

3. i. 12/4 b 4 1 )) collected in one spot (1280 b 30-1), pos- Statc -
sessing and exercising rights of trade and inter-marriage,
joining in common festivals 2 and other forms of sociability
(TO O~V(T)V], but above all, able and purposed to rule and be

1 Cp. 4 (7)- 2. 13243. 23, on fj.(i&gt; naff f^v r] TTOAIS tiv ( irj /^oXtcrr eii-

ovv dvayxalov elvai Tro\iTfiai&gt; aplorqv Saluwv.

ravrijv Kad f)v raiv Kav OITTHTOVV 2 This recognition of festivals as

Hpurra Trparroi Kal U&gt;TI fj.aKapla&gt;s, an essential element in the State

(bavtp6v icmv : 4. (7). 9. 1328!) 33, is characteristic enough. Perhaps

eVet Se rvyxuvofj-fv &lt;TK.OTTOVVT(S nepl the modern State has lost some-

TIJS apurrijs TToXtretuj, aur^ S eVrl thing in losing this bond of union.

THIRD BOOK.

ruled as freemen should rule and be ruled, i. e. with a view
to the common advantage l or, in other words, so as to
aid each other in the realization of a life, as Aristotle puts
it, complete in every way 2 and held together by parti
cipation in a constitution (3. 3. 1276 b 1-2) devised to make
possible and promote an existence of this kind.

It is evidently no easy thing, in Aristotle s view, to be
in a true sense a member of a State. Society truly"*so-
called makes a great demand on human nature. The
instinct of sociability, which man shares with some other
animals, rises in him to a higher level than in them, for
it rests on a perception of the good and bad, the just and
unjust, the advantageous and disadvantageous (i. 2. 1253 a
15), but, even in the form in which man has it, it goes only
a little way towards the making of a State. An aim for
the common good must be added, then an intelligent com
prehension of what is noble developed by a long course of
training from childhood upward (4 (7). 15. 1334 b 25 sq.),
then a steady purpose to live for this oneself and to
promote a similar life in others ; above all, the Capacity,
under which term is included not only-adequate skill H5uf
adequate externaL_meau^(YopT?y6a) 1 to rule and be ruled, as
freemen should rule and be ruled, fortnTattainment of these
ends. It is plain that to be a true citizen one must be a
man of full virtue (o-n-ouSatos).

We see also that Aristotle s account of the State implies
that there must exist within it a body (-xXfjOos) of men

competent to take, and taking, an active part in its govern

ment. Mere administres are not citizens : the State is
VL ___

1 Aristotle does not appear to number of citizens for both these
i\ notice that rule must be exercised ends (cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 2 sqq.,

not merely for the common ad- esp. 1326 b 7, though jivxafuteia

vantage of the existing generation, &&amp;gt;#r-is the expression used in 4 (7).

but for the advantage also of the 4. i^26b 24: 3. 1. 12j^_bjg). Even

unborn of future generations. virtue will not make up for inade-

2 Aristotle, as has been noticed quate numbers, unless it is of a
already, distinguishes between ai- transcendent kind: cp-3- 13. 1283b
nipKeta TU&gt;V dvayKaicoc, which even II, fj TO oXiyoi irpbs TO ipyov Pel
an fdvos possesses (4 (7). 4. 1326b o-KOTmz , et dwciTol SioiKflv TTJV TroXiv
4), and twTapKfia TOV eu TJV. A fj TOO~OVTOI TO TrX^dos U&gt;VT eivat

must possess an adequate TTO\IV e alnuv.

THE SUPREME AUTHORITY OF THE STATE. 253

a scene of collective effort, it is an union of co-operating
equals, whose numbers must not, indeed, be over-great,
but yet also must not be too small. It is only later that
he reminds us that the appearance of a 7ra,u/3ao-tAev? on the
scene, though most unlikely, is nevertheless possible, and
that he finds a place in his theory for the 7ra/x/3a(nA.eia,
without, however, altering his original account of the State,
which is not strictly wide enough to admit it. It was,
indeed, hardly necessary for him to do so, for though, as we
shall see, he holds that the best form of the State is that
in which virtue fully provided with external means is
possessed in an overwhelming degree by one or a few
persons, and rule always remains in his or their hands, the
conditions of this form were wholly unlikely to occur.

His account of the State also implies that it consists of
those who can live its full life. Outside the citizen-body
we find a fringe of dependents, necessary, indeed, to the
existence of the State, but not brought within its inner
circle, some free (women, children, artisans, labourers for
hire) and others slaves. These are not, in strictness, a part
of the State.

As yet the further characteristic of the State, that in The ques-

... , . tion as to

every case save one and this so rare as to be merely t h e p i ace O f
hypothetical its working will be governed by Law, has Law in the

* State has

not been added ; the discussion of the next question, how- so far not

ever, brings it under our notice. This question is, what f " ierged :

it emerges

is to be the supreme authority of the community (TO xvpiov inconnex-
rijs Tro Aeo)?) ? Aristotle does not mean by TO^KV^LOV^ what

Austin means by sovereign, for the supreme authority what is to

1 ...... " be the

may, in the view of the former, be vested in law, not in supreme

any given persons ; he does not go behind law to the men a " t ^ o
who make _it.__To answer this question, he rapidly discusses State?
(c. 10) the claims of a number of competitors for power,
with the result that the supreme authority must be just 1 ,
if only because otherwise the community will perish ; yet

1 Compare the saying of St. Augustine quid civitates sine iustitia
nisi magna latrocinia ?

254 THIRD BOOK.

if supremacy is given to men of worth, who are usually but

a few, or to one man of supreme worth, we are still met

by the difficulty of reconciling the rest to their exclusion

The an- from power ; and Aristotle falls back on the supremacy of

thisln^uir ^ aw as distinguished from that of a person or persons, who

is laws cannot be expected to be free, like law, from infirmities of

constf- y character. But then, if the law be that of a deviation-

tuted. form, an oligarchy or a democracy, its rule may be as bad

as that of any person. Bad laws, says Burke, are the

worst sort of tyranny.

Parenthe- At this point Aristotle pauses to draw a lesson from
nitioiTof S ~ ^ e mc l u i r y5 before the moment for insisting on it has
the claims passed. He has already (c. 9) laid stress on the claims of
many if virtue to power in the State, as against those of wealth
not below or free birth, and his readers may well have gathered that
level of ex- he must favour a rule of the few Good (e-jrietKets). It is
cellence, to p rec j se i v this imoression that he now wishes to correct.

a share in r

certain Even on the score of virtue the many, if they are not too
nehts Ca degraded, have something to say for themselves. Plato
which they had severely censured in the Laws (700 A-yoi B) the
cfse collec- tendency to what he terms a theatrocracy (tfearpoKpcma).
lively. j was&gt; he says, in the theatre

When all its throats the gallery extends,
And all the thunder of the pit ascends

that the people first learnt to believe itself infallible, and
to despise the judgment of the wise few (rots yeyovovi vepl
TTai$6V(nv, 700 C) a lesson which they soon applied in
matters of State. He rejects this popular supremacy both
in the sphere of music and poetry 1 and in that of politics 2 .
It is evident from 1281 b 7 sq. and from the whole course
of c. n, that Aristotle does not agree with Plato in this.

1 See Laws 670 B and the conscribendis Politicis videturme-
references given in Stallbaum s mor fuisse, p. 1 5 : orav irepl larpStv
note. alpecrfois y ri] TroAct crv\\oyos f) Ttfpl

2 Plato s principle, in the Gor- vavnrjy&v fj nep\ aXAov TWOS SJJ/LU-
gias at all events, is cuique in ovpyiKov Zdvovs, oAAo ri r/ rare 6
sua arte credendum. Cp. Gorg. prjTopiKos ov &lt;ru/i/3oiAei;(m ; dfj\ov
455 B, quoted by Engelhardt, Loci -yap on ev (tcdo-Ty alpta-fi TOV rexvi-
Platonici quorum Aristoteles in KwraTov Set aipfiwdai K.T.\.

THE CLAIMS OF THE MANY. 255

He did not hold that the rise of the drama or of Rhetoric *
was to be deplored, or that neither deserved a place in
a well-ordered State : tragedy is to him the highest form
of poetry, and a boon to man ; Rhetoric is necessary
because the minds of the many are less easily influenced
by strict philosophical reasoning than by arguments
drawn from common opinion. In this matter, as in others,
things had not gone so completely wrong as Plato thought.
On the contrary, the__yiews of men have a tendency to
gravitate to the .truthJ_(Rhet. I. I. 1355 a 15 sq. : Zeller,
Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 243. 3). The wiser advocates of democracy
had not claimed for popular gatherings an equal aptitude
for all kinds of work. This is true, for instance, of Athena-
goras, the leader of the popular party in the polity (7 (5).
4. 1304 a 27) or aristocracy (7 (5). 10.. 1312 b 6-9), which
existed at Syracuse till the defeat and capture of the
Athenian armament led to its conversion into a democracy
(1304 a 27). The utterance of Athenagoras on this subject
(Thuc. 6. 39) apparently set the keynote of this Eleventh
Chapter. ( J&gt;7jcret ns (he says) brj^oKpariav ovre t^vvtTov OVT*
Icrov elvai, TOVS 8e H\OVTO.S TO. xprj/iara KCU apy^tiv a/nora /3eA-
TLCTTOVS. eyw 8e (prim TrpcSra p.\v brjfj.ov vfj.av o)vofj.d(r9ai,
oXiyapyJiav bf p.pos, eTmra (frvXaKas ^\v d/ncrrous elvcu \prnj.a.TU&gt;v
TOVS TT\OV(TLOVS, (3ov\v&lt;raL 8 ay /3eArt(rra TOVS ^VVZTOVS, npivai 8*
av aKovcravTas apiora TOVS TTO\\OVS, /cat TaCra 6/zouos Kai /cara
fte prj KOI ^v^Ttavra ev Sjj/^o/cparta laro^oipeiv. Aristotle is
inclined to agree with the view here taken of the capabili
ties of the many, so far at all events as some subjects are
concerned. It is interesting to find him expressing the
view that the many are better judges of music and poetry
than the few (1281 b 7) 2 ; he is not, however, here speaking
of an audience of artisans and day-labourers, whose defects
of taste he recognizes (5 (8). 7. 1342 aiSso^ but of one

1 As to Rhetoric, contrast Plato, 1340 b 23) he says that it is out of \
Laws 937 D sqq. with Aristot. the~qCestion, or at all events not \
Rhet. I. i. 1355 a 20-07. easy, for those who have not learnt |

2 It should be noticed, however, to play and sing to become good
that in the Fifth Book (5 (8). 6. judges of music.

THIRD BOOK.

not below a certain social level 1 . Whether he would
praise the judgment of tBe Athenian people in these
matters, many of whom were artisans and day-labourers,
we do not know. Nowhere else were audiences so fre
quently gathered together to sit in judgment on dramas
and choruses 2 . When Goethe says 3 , Es bleibt immer
gewiss, dieses so geehrte und verachtete Publikum betrugt
sich iiber das Einzelne fast immer und u ber das Ganze
fast nie, he perhaps has rather the reading public in view
than a theatre audience. Aristotle, however, goes on to
admit that the people always supposing them to be not
below a certain level of merit are capable critics of public
.service, when brought together in a body. A man of full
/ virtue ((rrrovSaTos), he says, may be surpassed by others in
/ respect of each of the excellences whose combination makes
him what he is 4 ; his strength lies in his combination of
V virtues not necessarily singly present in a superlative degree.
And something similar may be said of a large gathering of
men. It is like a single individual possessed of many hands
and feet and organs of sense, and many moral and intel
lectual faculties 5 . A ritfrnH-r friurrl"-, that bad qualities will

1 He guards himself thus, pos
sibly remembering a saying of
Socrates trpos TO OVK di6Xoyov
7T\f)6os f(pa&lt;TKei&gt; OHOLOV el TIS TfTpd-
8pa)(fi.ov (V dnoSoKtfidfav TOV (&lt; TO&gt;V
ToiovTiav acapov o)s 8oKip.ov dnofte-
XOITO (Diog. Laert. 2, 34). We
see from the use of n\fj6os in this
passage what Aristotle probably
means by iruvra dfj^ov . . . ndv TrXr}-
6os in 1281 b 16. He is not think
ing so much of national differences,
like that which existed between
Boeotians and Athenians, as of
differences of occupation (like that
which distinguished the yfvpyiKos
drjpos from the ftdvavaos or dyo-
palos Sij/ioy), or of social position
(cp. 8 (6). 4. 13 19 a 38, TOV Kara rf]v
X&lt;opav ir\r]dovs : I3I9b I, TO xelpov
del 7T\rj6os gp({eur).

2 If the popular judgment in
music prevailed, and was respon
sible for the degeneracy of the art

which Aristoxenus deplores in a
charming passage (Fr. 90 : Miiller,
Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 291), it can hardly
have deserved much credit. Aris
toxenus compares his own con
temporaries, so far as the art of
music is concerned, to the bar
barized Paestans, who met once
a year at a festival to mourn their
loss of Hellenism, and to recall for
a moment their old way of life.

s Quoted by Henkel, Studien, p.
80 n. It is quite certain, that
,the"Public, which we are so ready
[both to honour and to despise, is
almost always under a delusion
in its judgments as to particular
points, but hardly ever as to the
totaLresult.

*""This glimpse of the o-TrouSaTo?
is interesting, and prepares us for
the many-sidedness of the citizens
of Aristotle s ideal State.
5 Aristotle evidently has Geryon

THE CLAIMS OF THE MANY. 257

be thrown Into the common stock no less than good ones; X
he forgets also the special liability of great gatherings of
mn to be mastered by feeling, especially in the discussion
of political questions, which are far more provocative of
feeling than artistic ones. Hisprinciple i ^.gaiiir j w^ 1 iid--iw*tify
the inference that the larger the gathering is, the greater
its capacity will be 1 .

Aristotle is led, partly by these considerations, partly by
considerations of political safety (OVK ao-cjbaAe s, I28ib 26:
(poflepov, 29), to the conclusion that there is good ground
for ^compromise between the rich and the good on the
one hand,__and the many in the sense of ol eAevflepoi
(1281 b 23) on the other. The many are not fit to hold
the highest magistracies ; they are only fit for collective
political functions, such as those of deliberating and judg
ing (TO fiovXevea-Oai KCU Kpiveiv, 1281 b 31). To these they
may be admitted with advantage. Hence it is that some
constitutions, that of Solon for instance, concede to the
people the right of choosing magistrates and reviewing
their official conduct, but not the right of holding office
singly 2 .

There were those, we know for example, Socrates 3
who held the master of an art to be the best hand both at
judging how a work has been done and selecting the man
to do it, but with this view even taking the term master
of an art in its widest sense, so as to include not only
the man of science (6 et8w?) and the practical worker (6
b-qfjiiovpyos), but also the man who has had a general train
ing on the subject (6 TreTrcufku^eyos) Aristotle does not
agree. He feels, however, that the case of the many need
not be wholly rested on the broad ground which he has

in his mind : cp. Plutarch x _ J KeJ. OVK iSxriv, where Bonitz (Ind. 472

Gerend.Prac^4i_2^_ovra) yap yv b 42) compares Hist. An. 9. 43.

6 Trjpvovrjs f^Xwroy, fx&lt;av &K\T) 629 a 33, \ixyov 8" bv Ka\ Ttpbs TO,

TroXXa Kai xelpay KOI ofpdaXfiovs, ft payetpela Kat TOVS Ix6vas KOI TTJV

Travra p.ia ^v\f] 8ia&gt;Kfi. TOiavrrjV arroXavaiv Kara novas Trpocr-

1 See as to Aristotle s view on Tre rarai.

this subject Henkel,p. Son.: Sus. 2 , 3 Xen. Mem. i. 2. 49-50 : 3. 5.
Note 565 b . 21 sqq. : 3. 9. 10 sqq. Creden-

2 1281 b 34, apxeiv 8e Kara novas dum cuique in sua arte.

VOL. I. S

258 THIRD BOOK.

taken up ; they have another ground of claim, for they are
the wearers of the shoe 3 and know best where it pinches.
There are subjects on which the man who uses the product
(6 xp(ap.vos) has more claim to be a good judge than the
master of an art subjects on which a mastery of the art
is not essential to a right decision : the best critic of a
banquet, for instance, is not the cook, but the guest 1 . It
is implied that the decision as to the merits of a statesman
is one of these.

After this objection has been dealt with, however,
another remains. Plato had insisted in the Laws (9456
sqq.) that the reviewing authority must be better than the
magistracy reviewed 2 , and had accordingly given the right
of review in the State of the Laws to a specially constituted
body, the priests of Apollo, not to the people. Aristotle
probably has this arrangement in view in his defence
(1382 a 32 sqq.) of the Solonian distribution of power.
His reply is that under it the reviewing authority is better
than the magistracy reviewed, for the reviewing authority
is the collective whole, not the individuals, mostly of little
worth, of whom it is composed, and this, if in the given
instance the people is not below a certain level, will be
better, and indeed richer, than the One or Few to whom
high offices are entrusted.

Having followed this line of inquiry thus far, Aristotle
recurs to the discussion from which he had diverged, and
recognizes that it had led to the result that law must be
supreme law not conceived in the interest of_a_section, but
normal and correcT(yo //ot optJojg Kefytcyot, 3. u.J282b I sqq.),

aoding that where owing to its necessary generality it
cannot give detailed guidance, the ruler, whether one or
many, must in these matters be supreme. The question,
however, what laws normal and correct are, still remains

1 This saying, which was per- 2 Cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 13. H43b

haps already proverbial, is echoed 33, irpbs 8e TOVTOIS OTOTTOV av ei-

by Martial, Epigr. 9. 81, as is vai Soeiei/, ei x e l P &lt;ov T *) s v4&gt;ias

noticed by Sir G. C. Lewis (Autho- ova-a [17 (fxbf &lt;rtc] Kvpiarepa
rity in Matters of Opinion, pp.
184-5).

NATURE OF POLITICAL JUSTICE. 259

for solution. To answer it, Aristotle calls to mind that
good and just laws and good and just constitutions go
together, but that the laws must be adjusted to the con
stitution, not the constitution to the laws 1 : hence we may
say that laws adjusted to the normal constitutions will be
just, and those adjusted to the deviation-forms unjust.
With these words c. 1 1 closes.

Arrived at this point, we expect that the next question What are
for discussion will be, what laws adjusted to the normal Constituted
constitutions are, but instead of distinctly raising this laws?
question, Aristotle proceeds to discuss a question which, j uste( j to
as he says, affords an opportunity for aporetic inquiry, and the normal

. : , i M i &gt; constitu-

is not without mstructiveness for the political philosopher, tions.
The question he refers to is one relating to the nature of ^he ques-
Political Justice 2 . V^The^JIjKelfth Chapter, in fact, begins tion, what

as follows but since in all sciences and arts the end is a _Vhat 1S
good, and in the most sovereign of sciences the Political attributes

7, . r . . . confer a

Science the greatest of goods is in an especial degree j us t claim
made the end, and since the just is the political good, and *
the just is no other than that which is for the common power?
advantage 3 [we shall do well to inquire what the just is].
Now all say that the just is the equal : yes, and all agree
up to a certain point with the conclusion arrived at in the
philosophical discussions in which ethical questions have
been treated in detail, that justice implies not only a thing
awarded, but also persons to whom it is awarded, and say
that justice means the award of that which is equal to
equals. But then comes the question equals in what ?
Equals in respect of any good thing we may chance to
select complexion, for instance/ or size of body ? The
Ethiopians, according to Herodotus (3. 20), made the
biggest and strongest man among them their king, and
Plato had seemed to imply in a hasty sentence that such

1 Cp. 6 (4). i. 1289 a 13 sq. we find them, not by the hand of

2 Bernays (Aristoteles Politik, Aristotle, but by that of some
p. 172 n.) has expressed the later editor. On this question,
opinion that the contents of cc. see Appendix C.

12 and 13 were placed where 3 Cp. Isocr. Archid. 35.

S 2

260 THIRD BOOK.

things might be taken into consideration 1 . Aristotle, on
the contrary, says that in any distribution of instru
ments (opyava) the work to be done must be kept in
view that in a distribution of flutes, for instance, the best
flute must be given not to the best-born or the hand
somest, but to the most skilful flute-player. The contrary
view, he says, would imply that all things which we call
good are sufficiently one in kind to be reducible to a
common measure and comparable the one with the other 2 .
Goods are really only comparable in respect of their con
tribution to a given work (epyov), and only goods which
contribute to the same work can be compared with each
other. The competitors for power must base their claims
on the possession of things which really go to the making
of a State (1283 a 14). So that, if we draw up a rough list
of competitors for political power, we shall find on it the
well-born, the free-born, and the wealthy 3 , and to these we
shall have to add those possessed of justice and of military
excellence. All these possess attributes contributing either
to the being or well-being of the State. Each of these
groups has a certain claim, none of them an absolutely just
The nor- O r exclusive claim, to power. Even a constitution which

mal consti- . . . . 11.1

tution will gave exclusive supremacy to the virtuous would not be

recognize just, for it would give exclusive supremacy to one only of
ments the elements which contribute to the work of the State 4 .

1 Cp. Laws 744 B, where Plato Trpbs 8e rfjv \peiav IpdcWnu iKav&s :

enumerates not only open) fj re and Eth. Nic. 9. I. 11640 2 sqq.

Trpoyovcov Kal rj avrov and nXovrov 3 In Eth. Nic.4- 8. H24a 2osqq.

XPWis * a Trfvias, but also crw/idrcoj/ there is an account of the com-

io-xves Knl evfj.op(piai, as entitling to peting claimants for honour,

a larger share of honours and which reminds us of this passage

offices. In Laws 757 B-C, how- of the Politics. We jather_ihat

ever, true, or geometrical, justice _ tbes wbs cnn-Thinp

is said to take account only of d^s&i^wealth, nnhi1ity ? and vir-

virtue in its distribution of honours. tue have the best claim. Cp.

But then we must remember that "Eth. Nic. 8.12. Ii6ob 37"Wh"eTelhe

the State of the Laws is avowedly j3a&lt;nAeuy is said to be 6 ira&lt;ri rots

a second-best State, and not con- dyadois vnepexaiv.
structed wholly on ideal prin- * Plato s language, Laws 757 C,

ciples. is far more favourable to the

2 Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 8. H33b 18, rfj claims of virtue. Geometrical (or i

p.fv ovv dXrjdeia dSiivarov TO. rocrov- true) justice, he says, rifj.as

TOV 8ia(j)epoi Ta &lt;rvp.p.(Tpa yeveadai, p.ev Trpbs dpfrf]v del /xet ^ovs 1 ,

ALL CONTRIBUTIONS TO BE RECOGNIZED. 261

The same would have to be said of one which gave ex- which con
clusive supremacy to the many (ot TrXetous) on the grounds the being
developed in the Eleventh Chapter. f n ? we } 1 -

r being of the

What then must be done, supposing all these elements State, not
the good, the rich, the noble, the many to co-exist in one ^en^only
and the same community ? Are we to give power to the A bare su-
good, supposing only that they are sufficient in number to one only
form, or at least to govern, a State 1 ? But then there is a doe ^ not
difficulty which affects all exclusive awards on the ground exclusive
of superiority in this or that attribute. Each of the nght to

* supremacy.

elements before us the rich, the noble, the good, the
many is liable to have its claims defeated by those of a
single individual richer or nobler or better than all the
rest, or indeed by those of a mass of men of which this can
be said. Our review of facts shows that none of these
exclusive claims to supremacy on the ground of a bare
superiority in one of the elements which contribute to the
life of the State deserve to be accounted normal (6p66s),
or to find recognition in a normal constitution. We thus
obtain an answer to the question raised at the end of
c. ii (1282 b 6), what are normally constituted laws, and
whether they will be conceived in the interest of the better
sort or the many (1283 b 35). They are, we find, laws
designed for the common good of both ; though there is
one case in which all laws are out of place that of the
appearance of a 7rafi/3a&lt;nA.us. When the good are not so Unless the
superior as to outweigh in virtue the collective merit a^rjodi
of the mass (OTO.V a-v^aivrj TO Xe^O^v, 1283 b 39), then so tran-

they must share power with the many. Some mixed j^ to out-
constitution must be adopted, which will give to the good wei g h th e

collective

and to the many a proportionate share of power ; and in merit of
.determining the proportion which is to fall to the lot of

Tovvavriov fxova-iv dpfrr/s re *ai cient superiority in virtue, no

TratSf ias TO irpeirov eKarepois curovtfut deficiency in the numbers of the

Kara \dyov. virtuous is a bar to their claims :

1 This question is left unan- even a single individual, if more

swered, but the answer intended virtuous than all the rest of the

to be given to it may probably be community, has an irresistible

gathered from the sentences which claim to rule.
succeed. It is that, given a suffi-

262

THIRD BOOK.

the Rich,
and the
Many must
divide
power be
tween them
in the way
most con
ducive to
the com
mon good.

If, how
ever, one
man, or a
small
group of
men not
numerous
enough to
constitute
a city, is
forthcom
ing, pos
sessing this
transcend
ent amount
of virtue,
then a case
for the Ab
solute
Kingship
arises.

each, regard must be ha d to the advantage of the whole
State and the common advantage of the citizens l ; and a
citizen is, broadly, one who shares in ruling and being
ruled, but he differs according to the particular constitu
tion ; under the best constitution he is one who is able and
purposed to rule and be ruled with a view to a life of
virtue (i283b 42 sqq.). We infer, then, that the best
constitution will be so designed as to favour his pursuit of
this end, and this we find to be the case if we compare the
Fourth Book (4 (7). 2. 1324 a 23, on ptv ovv ava.yK.alov elvat
TroAtretay apia-Trjv TavTt]v naff rjv ra^iv K.O.V OOTKTOUJ a/Kara
77parrot KCU 0)77 ^afcapuo?, (fravepov eariy).

But if, Aristotle continues, there is in the community
some one man, or some group of men not numerous enough
to constitute a city, so pre-eminent in virtue that the virtue
and political capacity of all the rest put together is not
commensurable with theirs in other words, OTO.V i^rj O-VIJL-
jScuz Tj ro Aex^ y this man or men, notwithstanding their
numerical paucity, must not be treated as a mere part of
the State, or called upon to share power with the rest and
to submit to law, for to do so would be to do them in
justice, and indeed would be ridiculous. This is shown to
be the case by an appeal to the practice of the deviation-
forms, which either put to death or ostracize any citizen
who by reason of disproportionate wealth, or a dispro
portionate number of friends and adherents, or for any
other cause, is formidable to the State. They do not
expect such persons to obey the law ; they get rid of
them in one way or another. The normal constitutions
have to face the same difficulty, and though they will
try to prevent the case for the ostracism arising 2 , they
also may nevertheless be forced to resort to it; but
then they will use the ostracism for the common good,

1 1283 b 40, TO 8 opdbv \rjTTTtov
uro&gt;? TO 8 l(T(i)S opdov Trpos TO rrjt
TrdXeo)? oX;;? crv^tpov Kal irpos TO
KOIVOV TO ra&gt;v iro\iTa&gt;v. It is not
clear whether Aristotle conceives
any difference to exist between

the advantage of the whole State
and the common advantage of
the citizens.

2 Cp. 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 19: and
Aristoph. Ran. 1357 sqq. as to
Alcibiades.

THE ABSOLUTE KINGSHIP. 263

not for the good of a section 1 . But what is the best
constitution to do, if an individual makes his appear
ance, transcendent, not in respect of wealth or the number
of his friends, but in respect of virtue? Virtue is every
thing to the best constitution, and as it cannot expel such
a being 2 or exercise rule over him, the only possible
course, and also the natural course, is to make him a
life-long king. This is extended (3. 17. 1288 a 15) to
the case of a whole family (yeVo?) of such persons
appearing in a State. The whole family will then become
royal.

It will be noticed that the alternatives considered in this The case,
chapter do not exhaust the list of possible alternatives,

The cases considered are only those in which a Few Good the g 0(i

i 1 n/r 1 are Sllffi-

and the Many, or one pre-eminently good man and the c i en t in
Many, coexist in the same community, and the purpose of num ^ erto

J constitute a

the inquiry is to show how in such cases power must be city is not
allotted. The One and the Few have an exclusive right dered ""his
to supremacy only when their excess of virtue is very is the case
great ; in all other cases power must be shared. The case ex i st j n tne
in which the good are sufficient in number to form a full F urttl

r -11 Book,

complement of citizens is not considered ; and this is the case where all
which is assumed to exist in that form of the best State Cltlzens are

men of

which is described in the Fourth Book. In this the good, virtue.
the well-to-do, and the free-born are the same persons
in other words, the citizen-body is composed of men

1 Cp. Plato Polit. 293 D, Kal tdv the Ephesians for their expulsion
re ye dtroKTivvvvres rivdy fj ical of Hermodorus : cp. Diog. Laert.
eicjSaXXojTer Kadaipaxriv eV dya$&lt; 9- 2 &gt; KaBdirreTai 8e Kal TO&gt;V Efacriutv
TTJV TToXiV) fire Kal diroiKias oiov eVi ra&gt; rov fraipov (KftaXelv EpfjLO-

(TfJ.TjVr) fJL\lTTO&gt;V (KITep-TTOVTCS 7TOI 8(OpOV, fV OLS (pTJCTlV " AlOl&gt; E&lt;e&lt;rl otS

OfiiKpoTtpav ITtUWTlVf rj TIVCLS firficra- rjfirj&bv dnoQaveiv Tracri KOL TOIS dvr)-

y6^fvoiiro6f.va\\ovsf^u&gt;6fVjTfo\iTas fiois TTJV TroXiv KnTaXimlv, oinvfg

trUOWTtt) avrrjv av^(aa iv ) faxnrep *Epn68u&gt;pov fO&gt;VT&gt;v OVTJKTTOV e^e/3a-

av iwirrripfl Kal TO&gt; 8ucai&lt;a irpo&lt;rxp&lt;^~ Xo \f-yovrfs ijp.ea&gt;v p.rj8e els ovfjicrros

[i.evot, (T&lt;aovTfs, fK ^ei poi/oy /SiXrtfl ecrro) ft Se TIS TOLOVTOS, a\\rj re Kal

Troiwcri Kara bvvn^iv, Ttivrrjv rorf Kal /xer* aXXcor, and Cicero s transla-

Kara TOVS TOIOVTOVS opovs yp.lv p.ovrjv tion of the passage, Tusc. Disp.

opdrjv noXtTfiav rlvai prjreov. 5. 36. 105. See Bywater, Heracliti

2 Aristotle evidently remembers Ephesii Reliquiae, fragm. cxiv.
Heraclitus indignant censure of

264 THIRD BOOK.

possessing virtue fully furnished with external means (aperr;

Genera] / The conclusion, however, to which the whole discussion
thVnorl leads us is, Trrat the decision what is the just or normal
mal consti- constitution in any given case must depend on the circum-
notoneand stances of that case on the distribution of attributes con-
the same ducive to the life of the State, and especially on the

every-

where : it distribution of virtue but that whatever allotment of power

makes will be for the common good, and that it will not
stances of give exclusive supremacy to One individual or a Few,

the given . . A , r t ,

caseT except in the very rare case of their possessing an over
whelming superiority in virtue.

/ Far more often we shall find a small body of the better
sort (/3eArtous) confronted by a large body of the free-born,
the former individually, the latter collectively superior, and
in this case the normal constitution will be one which recog
nizes and rallies round it all elements conducive to the life
of the State wealth, free birth, virtue and finds a place

for each. All of them have claims : the State has need of all.

Already then we find a firm logical basis laid for that
mixed constitution whose organization and nature will
be more fully depicted in the Sixth Book. The mention
of wealth, free birth, and virtue as the elements to be
combined points perhaps rather to an aristocracy of the
kind described in 6 (4). 7. 1293 D I 4 than to a polity, for
in a polity only wealth and free birth find recognition
(6 (4). 8. 1 294 a 19 sqq.). The mixed constitution of
Aristotle, it is interesting to notice, is not necessarily
a combination of all constitutions, like that men
tioned in 2. 6. i26jb 33 sqq., or that which his disciple
Dicaearchus 1 and the Stoics of the third century before
Christ 2 , followed by Cicero and a host of others down to
our own day, have agreed in extolling. It is not an union
of Kingship, Aristocracy, and Democracy, for a King
has no necessary place in it ; it isyrather a combination

1 See Dicaearch. fragm. 23 242): Zeller, Gr.Th. 2. 2. 892.
(Mliller, Fragm. Hist. Graec. 2. * Diog. Laert. 7. 131.

GENERAL CONCLUSION. 265

of social elements virtue, wealth, free birth than a
combination of constitutions; it _js_a,_con_stitution which
finds Hi place in the State for the good, the wealthy, and
the, many, and which rallies them all round it. It does
justice to everything that contributes to the life of the
State. Under its shadow the good, the wealthy, and the
free-born work happily together, ruling and being ruled for
the common good l .

This is Aristotle s conception of the normal (not the
best) State in the form which it most commonly assumes,
and the pattern was one which Greece in his day especially
needed to have held up for imitation. It has its value,
however, even in our own times.

Plato had said in the Politicus (2Q7 B), that no large
body of persons, whoever they may be, can acquire the
political science and govern a State with reason (ju,era vov),
and that it is in connexion with a small and scanty body,
or even a single individual, that we must look for the one
normal constitution. Even in the Laws, where he concedes
a certain share of power to the people, he constantly sur
rounds his concession with safeguards which greatly reduce
its value. The classes in which he places most faith are
evidently those comprised in the first and second property-
classes. Aristotle has somewhat more confidence in the
judgment, on some political subjects at all events, of some,
though not all, kinds of demos 2 .

^ We notice that Aristotle does believe in the divine right of the

not rest the" "claims of mixed One or the Few, neither would he

government on the ground that a accept the doctrine of the sove-

system ojLLcJiecks and balances reigntyofthe people, even in the

; necessary, but on grounds of limited sense of the sovereignty

__ istice : all elements contributing of the tXn&epo*. Sovereignty

to the being and well-being of the rightfully rests with those who,

State should receive due recogni- contributing elements of import-

tion in the award of supreme ance to the life of the State, can

authority. Considerations of ex- and will rule for the general good.

pe.(jigncy, however, reinforce moae 2 He strongly deprecates a pau-

Qfjustice. A~constitution of this per demos (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 32), and

kirioi^Ttre safest, inasmuch as he much prefers an agricultural

all elements of the State gladly or pastoral demos to a demos of

combine to give it support. We artisans or day-labourers or

see also that if Aristotle does not dyopaloi (8 (6). 4).

06 THIRD BOOK.

We see how great a part justice, and its equivalent the
common good, play in determining the structure of the
Aristotelian State. If the slave is a slave, it is because
it is just and well for him and every one else, that he should
be so. The same principle governs the assignment of
citizen-rights and of supreme authority in the State. A
State in which the best should rule by force would not
satisfy Aristotle, even if they ruled for the best ends ;
there must be a willing co-operation of all, whether rulers
or ruled, and this can only be secured through an universal
conviction that an adequate place is found for everybody,
and that no one s just claims are overlooked. Aristotle s
principle is a salutary one, whatever we may think of his
application of it. It is let every element that contributes
to the being and well-being of the State receive due recog
nition in its award of rights. The permanent value of
this principle will best be seen if we study some instance
of its infraction for example, the ancien regime in France.
Justice and We note also that the just being, in Aristotle s view,
identical with that which is for the common good, he has

the two- both these clues to guide him in the construction of the

fold clue to c ^ , v . , v s &gt; v &gt; \ v \

the normal OWlC. lo opUov M]T:Tf.ov tcrco? TO tcrcos opoov TTpos TO r?;s

constitu- TroAeco? oXr/s (rv/x^epoi; /cat Trpos ro K.OIVOV TO T&V

(1283 b 40). Rights, it would seem, are to be measured
by the common good.

It is, however, mainly by considerations of justice that
Aristotle is guided in his construction of the State.
Justice was to him the key to all constitutional problems ;
varying views of justice lay at the root of constitutional
diversity and constitutional change. He saw that all the
competing claimants for political power democrats no
less than oligarchs appealed to justice in support of their
claims. The champions of oligarchy seem occasionally to
have used the argument that those who contribute ninety-
nine hundredths of a common fund should not be placed
on the same footing as those who contribute the remaining
hundredth (3. 9. i28ob 27 sqq.), and it was apparently
from them that Aristotle learnt the view that political

JUSTICE AND THE COMMON* GOOD. 267

power should be distributed among the members of a
State in proportion to contribution. He holds, indeed,
that account should be taken in the distribution of power,
not of property only, but of everything that contributes to
the being and well-being of a State* The free-born and
the virtuous have as good a claim to a share of power as
the wealthy. Still, though he amends the contention of
the champions of oligarchy, he adopts it in the amended
form.

It is art interesting question, whether his account of the Is Aris-
principle on which political power should be distributed account of

is correct. It places the matter at any rate in a distinct tj ? e P rin

j.i 1 i -i cl P le on

light, whereas, when similar questions arise among our- which

selves, and an appeal is made to considerations of justice, p ^ al
there is often a good deal of vagueness about the argu- should be
ments used. Aristotle s view is that those who contribute C0 r rect u ?
to the common stock the attributes, material moral and
intellectual, which are essential tothe being and well-Being
of the StaTe whether (like tKedtizens of the best State)
they individually possess the whole of them, or whether
some possess one of them and others another, the rich, the
free-born, and the virtuous forming distinct classes ought
in fairness, as a requital for their contribution, to be the
citizens and rulers of the State. It is evident, however,
that the award of supreme power to men thus endowed
may be rested on another ground. The State may give it
to them, not in requital for their contribution, but because
it is for the common good that the tools should be in the
hands of those who can use them. It may well be that
the Common Good is a safer standard in questions of this
kind than the Distributive Justice of Aristotle, and that the
State is more likely to be successful in attaining the ends
for which it exists, if it abstains from attempting to
balance contribution and recompense, and is guided in
its distribution of power simply by considerations of the
Common Good. We may test the soundness of Aristotle s
theory in some degree by the view which it leads him
to take of Kingship. He finds himself, as we shall shortly

268 THIRD BOOK.

see, obliged to deny the legitimacy of Absolute Kingship
in all cases but one the case in which the Absolute King
is an overwhelmingly important contributor to the State.
Would it not have been better to say that the Absolute
Kingship is only in place where it is essential to the well-
being of the community?

We may, indeed, go further and ask whether the recog
nition of contribution, or even of capacity, is really justice
whether justice is not rather the recognition of desert.
On this point some remarks of Mr. J. S. Mill (Political
Economy, Book ii. c. i. 4) deserve to be quoted. The
proportioning of remuneration to work done, he says, is
really just, only in so far as the more or less of the work is
a matter of choice : when it depends on natural difference
of strength or capacity, this principle of remuneration is in
itself an injustice : it is giving to those who have as
signing most to those who are already most favoured by
nature. But is it possible for the State to sound the
depths of human desert ? And if it were possible, would
it be well that the State should award the advantages at its
disposal in accordance with desert ? A man s extraction,
his training, or other circumstances beyond his control may
be so bad that he deserves more credit for being only a
thief and not a murderer, than another man deserves for
being an useful member of society. Yet would not the
State be acting a suicidal part, if it gave power to a man of
this kind? It would seem that the only sort of justice
which is. .capable of affording a basis to society is that.
which is recognized by Aristotle ; yet is this really
justice ?

Transition Aristotle has now answered the question raised at the
shin wh ich commencement of c. 10 what ought to be the supreme
is ex- authority of the State and he passes on in c. 14 to
first as be- examine the subject of Kingship, for we say that this is
ing one of one o f ^g norrna i constitutions. His plan seems to be to

the normal ...

constitu- study the normal constitutions first, perhaps on the principle
true S fbrm S mentioned in c. 7. 1279 a a 3 where he says that when

KINGSHIP. 269

these have been described, the deviation-forms will be the Abso-
evident. He reserves An examination of the polity, how-
ever, till he has analysed democracy and oligarchy, for its guished
nature^will__be more evident, after these constitutions have r g
ben described (6 (4). 8. 1293 k 22 ~33)- There is no such
reason for postponing the study of Kingship and the true
Aristocracy.

The question is asked whether a State and country
(/cat Tro Aei KOI x^P?&gt; c - I 4 &gt; !284b 38) which is to be well
constituted may be placed with advantage under a King
ship, or whether some other constitution will be better
for it, or whether again in some cases a Kingship will be in
place and in others not. It is evident from 3. 16. 1287 a
10 sq. (cp. 3. 17. 1287 b 37 sqq.), that the question of the
naturalness of Kingship had given rise to discussion.
Isocrates, for instance, had spoken of it in one passage
{Philip. 107) as an institution uncongenial to Greeks, but
indispensable to barbarians.

Aristotle evidently feels that this question cannot be
discussed till the various forms of Kingship have been dis
tinguished, and those which do not really come into con
sideration eliminated. He accordingly distinguishes five
forms of Kingship, the extreme form at one end of the
scale being the Laconian (77 AaKoozn/c?;) a mere Generalship
for life and that at the other being the form in which one
man is supreme over everything, just as a nation (tOvos)
or City-State is supreme over all public affairs a form
which agrees in type with household rule 1 , for as household
rule is a sort of Kingship over a household, so this type of
Kingship is household rule over a City-State or over one or
more nations. We observe that the Absolute Kingship
(Tra/ji/Sao-tXeta) is evidently conceived by Aristotle as ap
plicable not only to a City-State but also to an Zdvos or a
collection of f6vr]. Of these two forms he dismisses the
first-named as being rather an institution which may exist in

1 3. 14. 1285 b 3I,Teray/LteVfj Kara afiiia a : Pol. J (5). IO. I3Iob 32,

TTJV olKovofjuKrjV : cp. Eth. Nic. 5- ? |3a(F*Al reranrat Kara rrjV apicr-

5. 1130 b 18, T) pev ovi&gt; Kara rt]v TOKpariav : and other references

dpeTTjv TfTaynevr) 8iKaioa~vprj KOI given in Bon. Ind. 748 b 18 sqq.

a;o THIRD BOOK.

connexion with a variety of constitutions, than a distinct
form of constitution. The other form, accordingly, remains
for consideration.

Question of As to this, the first question to be considered is, he says,
edl whether it is more advantageous to be ruled by the best

Kingship man or the best laws. This question had been already
is the discussed by Plato in the Politicus (294A-296A) and
rule of the i n the Laws (874 -875 D) 1 . In the former passage

best man . .

or the rule Plato thus states his doctrine : the legislative art is
of th e best , certa j n jy j n some se nse an element in the art of kingly rule

laws the V J J

more ex- [and legislation is therefore a function of the king], but the
best thing is that supreme authority should rest, not with
the laws, but with the man who having wisdom is capable
of kingly rule (294 A). No art (he urges) can lay down
anything simple and universal (a-nXovv] as to things so
shifting as men and their doings, at all events if it is to
ordain what is best ; yet this is what law tries to do, like a
stupid and wilful man, resolved not to allow anything to be
done contrary to his appointment or any question to be
asked, even if some fresh thing different from what he
commanded should happen to be better for some indi
vidual V Then why (Plato asks) make laws at all ? For
just the same reason for which gymnastic trainers draw
up a general rule for the exercises of those whom they
are training. They do this, because they cannot possibly
be at everybody s elbow at every moment, ready to indi
cate the best thing to do. Imagine, for instance, a trainer
going abroad and expecting to be a long time away he
will leave behind him written instructions for his pupils ;
but if he should happen to come back sooner than he

1 This is pointed out by Mr. rpoiros eori

Jackson in his note on Eth. Nic. 5. rtpos vop.ov

6. 5. The comparative merits of with 3. 16. 1287 b 6, &lt;ore T&gt;I&gt; Kara

the rule of law and the rule of an ypd^ara \y6p.a&gt;v\ avdpumos ap-^asv

autocrat are discussed in a well- ao-$aXecrrepo?, aXA. ov ru&gt;v KOTO. TO

known passage of the Supplices of edos.

Euripides (389 sqq.) with an ob- 2 See Prof. Campbell, Sophistes

vious intention to give the victory and Politicus of Plato, p. 137-8,

to Theseus, the representative of whose renderings I have mainly

the former. Compare also Eurip. followed here.
fr. 600 (Nauck),

THE BEST MAN AND THE BEST LAWS. 271

intended, would he feel bound to follow those written
instructions in his management of them, supposing some
change were desirable ? Undoubtedly not. The moral
is that law is only a make-shift, that the best thing is the
unceasing guidance and supervision of a true King, and
that if law exists, it is essential that the King should be
free to depart from it, wherever he can do so with ad
vantage.

In the Laws (874 E sqq.) the same view is implied, but
Plato is here more conscious how impossible it is for any
mortal man to see that it is to his own interest, no less
than to that of others, to study the common advantage
rather than his own private advantage, or if he did so, to
abide by this principle and to act on it throughout his
life. Of genuine Reason, designed by nature to be free,
there is not a particle anywhere, or, at least, not much
(875 D) ; hence it is that we have to call on law to rule,
though it looks only to that which is for the most part
and cannot discern that which holds universally. Mankind
must have laws and live in accordance with them other
wise they will be no better than the most savage beasts
(874 E) but Law is only the second-best thing.

Aristotle evidently has the teaching of the Politicus in
view in the aporetic analysis which he brings to bear on the
question (1286 a 9 sqq.). Those who are for Kingship, he
says, will object to law that it gives merely a general rule,
and does not adjust its directions to the circumstances of
the particular case. To exercise any art by written rule is
foolish : even in Egypt, where the physicians are expected to
treat their patients by stereotyped written rules, they are
allowed to change the treatment after four days, if desirable.
But then, if it is made an objection to law that it embodies
a general principle, we must remember that the ruler also
must possess the general principle, so that he is open to
the same objection ; indeed, in him it is exposed to the
disturbing influence of emotion and passion, from which no
human breast is free ; it will consequently be less pure
aricTIess potent. It may, however, be rejoined that in

272 THIRD BOOK.

compensation for this the individual ruler will be able to
deal better with the particular case than law could do.
Provisional These considerations evidently point to the advisability

conclusion .... , . . , _ _. , ,

arrived at of adopting some arrangement, by which the One Best Man
in favour of w ^ promulgate laws which will be supreme except where
giver-King, they deviate from what is right 1 . But then comes the
laws "but 6 " question, is it better that these cases with which the law
reserves to fails to deal aright should be dealt with by a single indi-
power to vidual of surpassing excellence, and not by the whole body
break o f citizens or by a less numerous body of men of full virtue
where they ((nrovSaun) ? The subject is discussed with a leaning to a
deviate conclusion in favour of these a-novbaioi. The reason why

from the J

right. Kingship prevailed in early times was perhaps merely this,

that in those days only a very few possessed virtue ; when

more came to do so, Aristocracy took its place 2 . Besides,

there is a special difficulty connected with the probability

of the King, who is assumed to possess supreme power,

passing his Kingship on to an unworthy child. There is also

the difficulty that the King, being, not a body of men, but

a solitary individual, and therefore needing to be supplied

with the means of enforcing his will, must of necessity be

supplied with a guard. This, however, may be got over.

But the But Aristotle now awakes to the consciousness, or makes

whfdf believe to do so, that in all this discussion of the rule of a

Aristotle Lawgiver-King he has been treating of a Kingship gov-

investigate erned by Law a /3ao-t\eia Kara vo^iov for he has been

was the criticising a Kingship in which law is supreme, at all events

is supreme till it deviates from right (1286 a 23). The subject to

considered, however, is in reality the King who { js
may act as supreme over everything and may act as he pleases (c. 16.

not P he a who I28 7 al ^&gt; not he who is in P art checked by law. Whatjs
is in part to be said of his claims ?

checked by ^

1 Compare the provisional con- represent Aristotle s definitive view
elusion as to the relation of law to on the subject. In 6 (4). 13.
the ruler thrown out in c. n. 1297 b i6sqq. the changes in
I282bisqq. constitutions are connected less

2 The theory of the succession with changes in the distribution of
of constitutions put forward here virtue than with changes in the
occurs in an entirely aporetic art of war.

passage and does not necessarily

THE BEST MAN AND THE BEST LAWS. 373

To this subject Aristotle addresses himself afresh, and law. Is a
the polemic against the rule of the One Best Man begins Jyjjfan -
again with increased intensity, and in such a way as to pedient in-

- c , r ^1 stitution?

disturb some arguments in favour of a ruler of this type,
which had passed without objection in the previous discus
sion. Among men who are like each other it is contrary to
nature and unjust to make one man supreme over every
thing ; the proper arrangement in such a case is inter
change of rule, which involves the existence of law. Then,
again, no human being would be able to take cognisance of
the details which the law is unable to regulate ; hence the
objection commonly made to the rule of the law applies
also to the rule of the One Best Man : the law, however,
does all that can be done to meet this difficulty, for it
pjurposely trains the rulers to deal fairly and justly with
these matters 1 . The law has this merit, that it not only
regulates ) but educates educates men to supply its own
inevitable defects 2 . Besides, it permits and makes pos
sible its own amendment. The rule of law is the rule
of God and reason 3 : the rule of a man involves a part-
rule of the brute which is present in every man, inasmuch
as desire and anger are present in him. The parallel of
the arts (which had been accepted before) does not hold.
The master of an art a physician, for instance is seldom
drawn by passion or partiality in a direction contrary to
that which reason dictates, whereas the ruler has to deal
with matters in which he may have a personal interest,

1 In 1287 a 25, aXX* eVtVqSfs a human being (Svffpoanos), even
iraideiKras 6 vop.os ((pitrrrjcn TO. AoiTra if he be the best of men (cp. av-
rrj diKaioTaTTj yi&gt;o)fj.rj Kpiveiv KOI 6panoi&gt;, 30). Some high authorities,
SioiKtlv TOVS apxopras, the terms however, and Bernays among
of the Athenian juror s oath (nepl them, take it as introducing an
fj,f v o&gt;o VOJJLOI ettri, ^r/tpifla-dai Kara objection to the rule of law made
TOV? vop.ovs, 7Tfp\ 8f &&amp;gt;v /my ela-t, by the advocate of the rule of an
yv&lt;ap.r) rfj SixmoTa-Ty, Poll. 8. 122, apiarros avrjp, to the effect that
quoted by C. F. Hermann, Gr. magistrates are of no use in sup-
Antiqq. i. 134. 10) are evidently plying the deficiencies of law.
present to Aristotle s recollection. Tne point is doubtful.

2 AAXa P.TJV (1287 a 23: cp. 3 Aristotle probably has in his
1287 a 41, b 8) appears to intro- mind Plato s language, Laws
duce a fresh objection made by 713 -714 A.

the advocate of law to the rule of

VOL. I. T

274 THIRD BOOK.

and about which he is not dispassionate ; to him, there
fore, the law may be useful as a standard representing
the mean, by which he can shape his course. The^argu-
ment against curing men by written rule and governing by
written rule also applies only to one sort of law written
law ; unwritten law, which is the more authoritative sort,
remains untouched by it. Then, again, the One Man can
not supervise everything ; he must therefore employ others ;
and if he does so, why should not supreme authority be
given to the whole number at once ? Besides, several
heads are better than one, especially after they have had
the training of intellect and character which only law can
give. Lastly, a king must govern with the help of friends 1 ,
but friends are like and equal to each other ; supreme
authority should therefore be given to the whole body.

Throughout this prolonged series of arguments against
the rule of the One Best Man, Aristotle has remained quietly
in the background. He has perhaps been not unwilling to
have the considerations fully stated, which from a popular
point of view (for this is naturally the prevailing point of view
in an aporetic discussion) make against the absolute rule of
the best man, unchecked fey law partly because the argu
ments of the Politicus needed to be met, though abandoned,
or apparently abandoned, by Plato in the Laws, partly
because he holds, unlike Plato, that one form of the best
The Abso- State is a State governed by law ; but now he steps in
ship is in and closes the discussion by saying that all these arguments
place under a pr a inst the substitution of the rule of the One Best Man

given cir- ~ " - &lt;f " "~^^.

cumstances for that of law only hold good in certain cases ; they do not
the King s ^^ gd where he is a man of transcendent excellence,
virtue is so and one whose excellence outweighs that of all the other
ait as to " persons in the State put together. It is clear from what
exceed the has been said, he remarks (2. 17. i287b 41 sqq.), that,

collective 1*1 / _ ^

virtue of among those at any rate who are alike and equal, it is
all the rest.

1 As to the $i Aoi or eralpoi of donum regno condicione, who

the Macedonian Kings an im- refers among other passages to

portant and recognized body of the following in Diodorus 16.

men see P. Spitta, De Ami- 54.4: 17.2.5: 17.16.1: 17.52.

corum qui vocantur in Mace- 7: 17.54.3: 17.57.1: 17.112.3.

AIMS OF ARISTOTLE. 275

neither expedient nor just that a single individual should be
supreme over all, whether laws do not exist and he him
self is supreme, as being a law, or whether they do (the
hypothesis dealt with in 1286 a 2i-b4o), and whether he
is a good man ruling over good men, or a man not good
ruling over not good men aye, and even if he is superior
to his subjects in virtue (cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. i. 37), unless
indeed he is superior in a certain degree (i.e. to such an
extent, that his virtue exceeds the virtue of all the rest put
together, 1288 a 17).

Aristotle s first object in this long inquiry is to show that In one case,
the normal constitution, though always just and for the O f^
common advantage, is not in all cases the same, but varies Absolute

i ........ . ,- Kingship)

according to the distribution in the given society of the the conciu-
elements which contribute to the being of the State, and slonar [ lve(i

at in the

especially of virtue. We learn from it that the principle earlier part
provisionally laid down in c. n (1282 b i) that supreme ^ t e no
authority in the State should be given to laws normally mally con-
constituted, or, in other words, to laws adjusted to the i aws are
normal constitutions is subject to one important ex- the true
ception ; it only holds good when the State consists of men authority,
alike and equal or of those who are approximately alike
and equal. It does not hold in cases where its observance
would work injustice, and would be hostile to the general
good, and indeed impossible and ridiculous. If a man
of transcendent excellence 1 should appear in a State, one

1 In 3. 13. 1284 a 6 the trans- endowments is added to the pic-

cendent superiority referred to is ture a characteristically Greek

said to be in virtue and TroXmjc^ thought inherited from Plato

Svvapis (cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 10-14) 5 (Polit. 301 D-E) for otherwise

but in 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32 Kingship men s doubts of the transcendent

and the true Aristocracy are said qualities of the One Man might

fiov\f&lt;r6ai KUT dpfrfjv vvvfa-ravai not be silenced and overpowered

K f X W}"7M e/I "? l &gt; and in Eth. Nic. 8. (cp. Pol. I. 5. 1254 b 34 sqq.). It

12. Ii6ob 3 we find a superiority was the custom of the Ethiopian

not only in virtue but in all race, which the Greeks loved to

goods ascribed to the king (ou yap imagine as especially noble (Mas-

f cm jSaviXevs 6 p.f) avrapier]! KOI pero, Hist, ancienne des peuples

Trao-t rot? dyadols vTrepe^coi ). In de 1 Orient, p. 535, ed. 2) to make

Pol. 4 (7). 14. 1332 bl8 a trans- the biggest and strongest man

cendent superiority in bodily among them king (Hdt. 3. 20,

T 2

276 THIRD BOOK.

whose excellence outweighs that of all the rest put to

gether, then the only thing that is right or expedient or

possible is that his will should be gladly obeyed and that all

other law should disappear. He must be the living law of

the State ; he must be what a father is in a household or

Zeus in the universe. For the moment the State becomes

all that the most ardent of hero-worshippers could wish it to

be, only that Aristotle requires his Absolute King to possess,

not merely transcendent capacity, but transcendent moral

excellence. He does not seem to hold, with Plato in the

Laws, that no mortal nature is fit to be invested with these

immense powers; nor does he concede them to a man

possessed of true knowledge and virtue, irrespectively of the

extent of his superiority to his fellows : the Absolute King

must not only be a man of transcendent virtue, but there

must be an immense disparity between his virtue and that

of his subjects. Plato had not dwelt with equal emphasis

in the Politicus on the extent of this necessary disparity,

though he undoubtedly implies that it will be great.

Aristotle s It is evident from the Fourth Book 1 that if Aristotle

making" makes an exception to the supremacy of law in favour

this reser- o f the Absolute King, it is rather because his account of

favour of the State would otherwise be incomplete and open to

the Abso- objection, than because the appearance on the scene of

ship is to such a being is at all probable. To have said that the

su P reme authority in every community must always be
of Law laws normally constituted would have exposed him to a
with those fatzl rejoinder from the followers of Antisthenes 2 . What/

of justice they would have asked, do you really mean to claim obedi-

and reason.

ence to law from a Heracles ? A scene or two from the

Bacchae of Euripides would have been at once quoted, in

TOV av rS)v darStv Kpivaxn neyiarov the circumstance that no new

re elvai. Kal Kara TO ptyados fx flv ^ v kingships arose in his own day

IffX^f, TOVTOV dioC&lt;rt /3ao-tXvt). accounts for it by remarking that

* C. 14. 1332 b 23, Vei 8e TOVT men were rarely then forthcoming

ov pabiov \aftflv, ovS fcmv Sxnrfp tv who towered above their fellows

Iv8otj (pTjffl 2/o)Aa e ti/ai TOVS fiaa-i- sufficiently to deserve an office

\tas ToaovTov Siafpepovras ra&gt;v so great and exalted.

apxoyi(va&gt;v : cp. 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 2 Cp. 3. 13. 12843.
3 sqq., where Aristotle in noticing

AIMS OF ARISTOTLE. 277

which the fruitless attempt of the misguided King Pentheus
to control and imprison the god Dionysus, and the fate
which his folly brought upon him, are described in glorious
verse.

But the object of Aristotle, or at all events the effect of His doc-
his teaching on this subject, was not perhaps solely to Absolute G
prevent the infringement of the claims of a hypothetical Kingship,
or Absolute King. The rights of the natural a lscTim-

Trau.8a&lt;n\evs were to be respected, but no one was a natural P 1 . 65 that

it is not m

7ra/z/3ao-tAev? who did not possess transcendent virtue and place in the

an immense superiority to everyone else belonging to the

State. Only a man of this type could claim to be above law. ent virtue.

The age of Aristotle was one which needed this lesson, tendency of
Kingship had grown in credit during the fourth century t his teach-
before Christ, in proportion as the defects of the free con
stitutions of Greece had become more apparent. Both
Xenophon and Isocrates had sketched an ideal King as
well as an ideal constitution 1 . Xenophon describes with
enthusiasm the born King whom men instinctively and
willingly follow, as bees follow the queen-bee who rules to
make his subjects as virtuous as possible, and makes them
so partly by example, partly by rewarding virtue and
stimulating emulation, partly by close personal super
intendence, like a seeing Law 2 ; and we derive the im
pression from his writings, that though he had learnt from
the Lacedaemonian State how much Law could do, espe
cially in maintaining and enforcing a public system of
education, not ending with youth but carried on to maturer
years, he is, nevertheless, still more interested in the personal
agencies which make for virtue, as indeed a disciple of
Socrates might naturally be. Xenophon seems, in fact,

1 Isocrates, like Xenophon, 2 See the references in Henkel,

depicted not only a perfect con- Studien, p. 142 sqq., and cp.

stitution, but also a perfect Prince, Cyrop. 8. I. 22, altrdavtotiat pi?

and described the qualities of a yap tdoKet Kal 8ia TOVS ypaipo-

true ruler and king in his address p-evovs v6p.ovs j3f\Tiovs yiyvopevovs

to Nicocles and in his Evagoras, avdpatnovs TOV 8e dyaObv up^ovra

partly in a hortatory form, partly /3AeVoi/T vopov dvdpuirois tvopiaev,

in the form of an encomium on KOI TaTTtw IKQVOS ta-Ti KOI opav

(Henkel, Studien, p. 155). rbv draKTovvTa KO\ KoXafeii/.

278 THIRD BOOK.

to be divided between the respect for law which he in
herited from Socrates and his enthusiasm for born rulers
of men.

Isocrates, again, though he recognizes the educating
influence of law 1 , and allows it to be the source of the
greatest benefits to human life 2 , yet holds that there are
other things better Rhetoric, for example, which does not,
like law, concern itself only with the internal condition of
a State, but teaches men how to deal with problems affect
ing Greece as a whole 3 . In this spirit he tells Philip of
Macedon 4 , that while other descendants of Heracles, men
fast bound in the fetters of a constitution and of laws he
probably refers to the Lacedaemonian kings will love
only the city to which they belong, Philip should count
the whole of Hellas as his country, and work for its
advantage no less than for that of Macedon.

The Macedonian kingship under Philip, and still more
under Alexander, was tending to outgrow its old con
stitutional limits 5 , and to pass into a form in which the
king possessed almost divine prerogatives. A saying is
ascribed to Philip by Stobaeus 6 , which shows how high
a view he took of the rights of the throne. The king,
he said, ought to remember that he is at once a man
and the depositary of power godlike in extent, in order
that he may aim at all things noble and divine, and
yet speak with the voice of a human being/ So again,
Anaxarchus, the follower of Democritus, in the famous
words which he addressed to Alexander after the murder
of Cleitus, told him that the Great King could no more do
wrong than Zeus himself 7 we know not whether before
or after the composition of the Politics. Aristotle felt quite
differently. He had perhaps already, in his dialogue
entitled AAeay8po? 77 virep a-noiK^v (or d-Trot/awy), advised
Alexander to exercise despotic sway only over the bar-

1 Ad Nicocl. 2-3. 6 See O. Abel, Makedonien vor

2 De Antid. 79. Konig Philipp, p. 123 sqq.
8 De Antid. 79: cp. 271- b Floril. 48. 21.

280. 7 Arrian, Exped. Alex. 4. 9. 7.

* Philip. 127.

THE ABSOLUTE KINGSHIP OF ARISTOTLE. 279

barians, and to deal with the Greeks as freemen deserving
to be led (^ye/xoiUKais) 1 . and his advice was echoed in
Alexander s presence by his imprudent relative and disciple
Callisthenes 2 . His effort to inculcate moderation of rule
in relation to Greeks on the omnipotent Macedonian
Monarchy is quite in harmony with the general tendency
of his political teaching 3 , and was a real service to man
kind. It was a time when the intoxication of empire and
power, which seems to have mastered men s minds in
antiquity more often than in modern days, and always
with fatal results, was especially strong, and needed to be
firmly checked 4 .

The thought which underlay both the conception of the Natural-
Single Ruler in the Politicus and Aristotle s conception of " d e e s j J e
the Tra^/Sao-tAcvs was a natural one. It was this was not the men should

true type of human society that in which men surrender by beings
themselves to the guidance of some being or beings of higher than
superior racer We do not, says Plato (Laws, 713 D),
set oxen to rule over oxen, or goats over goats ; a
superior race rules them, that of men ; and so in the
golden age of the reign of Cronus, demigods (8ai/^oves) were
set by him to rule over man, and they with great ease and
pleasure to themselves, and no less to us, taking care of us

1 Fragm. Aristot. 81. 1489 b to find a irnfjL^aa-i\evs in Alexander.
27 sqq. * Cp. Pol. 4 (7). 2. 1325 a II,

2 Arrian, Exped. Alex. 4- U- 8. Kal TOVTO rrjs vocoder IKTJS ecrrlv t&eif,
The whole of this eleventh chapter edv rives virdpxaxrt yem/toii/rey, Trola
shows how little Callisthenes (and irpbs iroiovs dcrKrjTfov rj Trcas rols
Aristotle also in all probability) KadrjKovan Trpbs ficda-rovs xP r } (TT ^ ov -
was prepared to concede divine 4 Demetrius of Phalerum is
honours to Alexander ; and in said, not on very good authority
Aristotle s conception the ira^aa-i- however, to have advised Ptolemy
\evs is little less than a god (3. 13. King of Egypt to purchase and
1284 a 10). Theophrastus spoke of read the books written on the
Callisthenes as having fallen in the subject of Kingship and Govern-
way of a man of colossal power and ment (irfpl paaiXeias Kal jjye^oi/i ar) :
good fortune, but one who knew a yap ot &lt;pi\ot rols pacriXfvcriv ov
not how to use prosperity aright dappovvt. trapaivtlv, ravra tv ro ts
(Cic. Tusc. Disp. 3. 10. 21). There /3i/3Xi ois ye ypnrrrai (Plutarch (?),
is no sign that Aristotle was at all Reg. et Imperat. Apophthegmata
more prepared than Theophrastus Demetr. Phaler., p. 189 D).

S8o THIRD BOOK.

and giving us peace and reverence and order and justice
never failing V secured a life of concord and happiness to
the tribes of men. This tradition, he continues, tells
us, and tells us truly, that for cities of which some mortal
and not God is the ruler, there is no escape from evils and
toils (Laws, 713 E).

How natural this thought is, appears from its perhaps
unconscious repetition in modern literature. Here, says a
reviewer, speaking of a work by Sir H. Holland 2 , we find
the remark that whereas some of the lower animals are
tamed and educated by man, man himself has no higher
animal to educate him. " He alone is submitted to no
superior being on the earth capable of thus controlling or
perfecting his natural instincts, of cultivating his reason, or
of creating new capacities or modes of action." This is
strictly true ; yet in all organized communities the indivi
dual man is submitted to a superior control namely, that
of society and of social, as distinct from individual, ends of
action ; and the education of man in his individual character
by man in his corporate or political character is really a
far greater and more wonderful thing than the development
of the half-human intelligence, wonderful as that is, of a
well-bred and well-trained dog 3 . It is to this education
by society that Plato points, when he goes on, in the same
passage, to say that man must imitate the life which is said
to have existed in the days of Cronus, and hearken to what
we have of immortality within us, to the voice of Reason
expressed in law (Laws, 714 A), seeing that the demigod
rulers of Cronus are no longer forthcoming.

Aristotle, however, declines to say that the appearance
on the scene of a ruler of this kind, or even of a family
of such rulers, is impossible. Nay more, he holds that

1 Prof. Jowett s translation, 4. 3 Compare the saying homo
234. homini deus. It should be

2 Fragmentary Papers on noticed, however, that one race of
Science and other subjects, by men educates another, and that
Sir H. Holland, Bart. (Longmans, mankind owes at least as much
1875), reviewed in the Saturday to this source of civilization as to
Review for March 20, 1875. The the action of a society on its mem-
book itself is not known to me. bers.

THE ABSOLUTE KINGSHIP OF ARISTOTLE. 281

if this event happened, the truest and most divine form
of the State would be realized 1 . But he also holds that
its occurrence is in the highest degree improbable, and
thus the best State which we find depicted in the Fourth
Book is a State consisting of equal citizens. Occa
sionally, indeed, he speaks as if the State of free and
equal citizens, whose relations are regulated not by the
will of men but by law, were the true form of the
State 2 ; and in all probability his mind was under the
influence of two conflicting views, that which he inherited
from the Politicus and the Republic of Plato, and that
which was more especially his own the view that there is
nothing in the supremacy of law which should make it
out of place even in the best constitution.

It is questionable whether Aristotle is right in holding Aristotle s
that there is but one form of real Kingship the Absolute JJJ^JjJ,
Kingship and that Kingship governed by law is not, as lute King-
Plato had made it in the Politicus, a separate form of * or $y ^ai C
constitution, but merely a great magistracy, such as might form of

f i i r / f Kingship

find a place in a variety of constitutions (3. 10. 1287 a criticised.

Some non-hereditary forms of Kingship according to law
noticed by him among them, that of the aesymnete 3
may have in some degree resembled great offices like that
to which Aristotle refers, when he speaks of a single
individual being often made supreme over the adminis
tration (nvpios Trjs StoiKTjo-ecos, 1287 a 6), and may perhaps

1 Cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 40, TTJS is hardly an institution for men : cp.

TrpcoT^f Kal StiordTTjs. The same Eth. Nic. 7. I. 1145 a 19, Trjv virep

view is expressed in 2. 2. 1261 a rjp.as dperrfv, f]pa&gt;iKrjv rivn Kal Bflav.
29 sqq., where the State of free and 2 Cp. 6 (4). il. 1295 b 25, /Sou-

equal citizens, interchanging rule, Xerai 8e yt TJ n6\ts e io-wv tlvai KOI

is said to reproduce approximately opoiwv 6V i /ndXio-ra : 6 (4). 4. 1292 a

in its temporary distinction of 32, QTTOV yap ^ i/d/xot apxov&lt;rii&gt;,

rulers and ruled the deeper and OVK eort iroXircia. : 2. 10. 1272 b 5,

permanent distinction of nature ravra 817 irdvra fifXriov yivfcrdai

which prevails where, as is better, Kara vopov 77 Kar avdpa&gt;na&gt;v QovXrja-iV

the same men constantly rule : ov yap ao-^aXi}? 6 Kavatv.
cp. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 21. Perhaps 3 3. 14. 1285 b 25: cp. 7 (5).

the epithet dfioTarr) conveys a IO. 1313 a IO, eV Se rals Kara yevos

delicate hint that the nafj.^aa-i\fia jSao-tXctai?.

282 THIRD BOOK.

have been not absolutely incompatible with democracy, in
some at least of its forms, though it is hard to imagine
their co-existence. But this cannot have been true t of
hereditary Kingships. Aristotle himself does not distinctly
assert the contrary, but his attempt to confine the inquiry
to two representative forms only, the Lacedaemonian and
the Absolute Kingship (c. 15. I285b 33 sq.), evidently
misleads him 1 .

A King, and especially a hereditary King, even if he rules
according to law, is a very different being from a magis
trate with a wide competence. Our modern terminology,
which counts as a Monarchy any government in which a
King exists, however limited his powers, would seem to
be more correct. The mere fact that a King finds a place
in a constitution is sufficient to give it a special colour and
to make it quite different from what it would otherwise
have been. In the Lacedaemonian constitution, indeed,
the powers of the King were so limited that it was perhaps
rightly classed, not as a Kingship, but as an Aristocracy;
and the so-called Kings at Carthage were hardly Kings in
any real sense. But Kingship in accordance with law, in
many of the forms in which it existed in Aristotle s day,
fully deserved to be accounted a distinct form of Kingship
and to find a place among varieties of constitution.

Aristotle s real feeling about Kingship apparently is, that
in the absence of an immense disparity in excellence
between the King and his subjects, it is not a just insti
tution, nor can the willing obedience, which is its characte
ristic, exist. TOVTO jj.fv ovv dArj^ois tcrcos Aeyoutnv, tiTrep
TCHS aTrooTepouo-i KCU /Sia^b/ze yois TO T&V OVTMV alpe-
ciAA. tcrco? ov% olov re vTrap^fiv, dAA
TOVTO \jsfvbos ov yap en KaAas ra? 7r/&gt;aeis
TO) /IT) biatyepovTt. TOVOVTOV ocrov avrjp yvvaLKos T] 7rarr/p TCK-
Vftjy T/ 8eo-7roVrjs 8ovAcor (4 (7). 3. 1325 a 41 sqq. : cp. 7 (5).
10. 1 3 13 a 3-10). But if this immense disparity exists,

1 In calling the Lacedaemonian life may exist in all forms of con-
Kingship a generalship for life stitution, he seems to forget the
(o-rparrjyi a dtQios) and arguing hereditariness of the Lacedae-
(1287 a 4) that a generalship for monian Kingship.

THE ABSOLUTE KINGSHIP OF ARISTOTLE. 283

then law cannot exist. Aristotle, in fact, approaches
the question of the structure of the State from the point
of view of justice. Power must be proportioned to con
tribution.

Kingship, says Henkel l , was in the whole Political[/
Theory of antiquity only a form of Aristocracy, resting on
no separate and independent basis of its own. Erdmann
expresses the modern view of the subject, when he says 2 :
When men expect talent in a King, they forget that a
King is not a high official : a high official, no doubt, cannot
discharge his functions without the particular kind of
talent required for their discharge. The things which a
King chiefly needs to possess are love for his people, and
the conscientiousness which will beget in him doubts of
his own omniscience, and lead him to choose virtuous and
capable ministers. When, as in the instance of Frederick
the Second, these two characteristics are combined with a
great mental superiority a thing which occurs only once
in a century the highest standard is unquestionably
attained. Expediency, interpreted by experience, is a
better guide in questions of constitutional organization
than justice, as Aristotle understands it. Not a few Kings
have received enthusiastic support from their subjects, and
have made their rule a blessing to mankind, though they
could claim no such transcendent superiority to those over
whom they ruled as that which Aristotle requires in a
King.

When we put together the various data as to the nature Retrospec-
of the State with which the Third Book furnishes us, we ^ v a e ry s "~ he

shall find them somewhat contradictory. The State is conclu-

../-... 1 . .. .. j sionsofthe

a community of citizens sharing in a common constitution Third

(Koivavta TToAirwy TroXtretas, 3. 3. 1276 b i): it is also &lt;a Bookasto

\7* I the nature

certain number of citizens (7roA.ir&lt;2z&gt; n irX-rjOos, 3. I. I274b fthe

41): is then the KOIVOJVIO. identical with the nowavol ? Then State -
again, its identity is especially to be sought in the consti
tution (3. 3. 1276 b 10): this seems to imply that the State
1 Studien, p. 57. 2 Vorlesungen iiber den Staat, p. 167.

284 THIRD BOOK

is rather to be sought in the o-vv9e&lt;ris than in the citizens,
the &lt;rvv0cTa ; so that if the constitution lasts for centuries,
the life of the State will far outlast that of the body of
citizens (irXr)6os TroAtrwu) with which it is occasionally
identified 1 , and if it lasts only a few months, the reverse
will be the case. Elsewhere again (4 (7). j. 1323 b 29-2.
1324 a 13), the State is described as a moral agent capable
of virtue and happiness. Must it not, then, be a Person, as
well as an aggregate or a o-vvtito-is of persons 2 ?

Still further, as we have already seen, the State is occa
sionally described as including not only citizens, but also
women, children, and slaves (e.g. i. 13. 1260 b 13 sqq. : 2. 9.
1269 b 14 sqq. : cp. 3. 4. 1277 a 5 sq^-) &gt; but here the term
is used in a broader and more inclusive sense than else
where. Thus in the Fourth Book (c. 8. 1328 a 21 sqq.)
only those are allowed to be parts of the State who
can live its full life and be KOWMVOI, and these are its
citizens ; so that we come back to the view that the State
is to be identified with its citizens, or rather with the
Kowtovla which they form, and does not include those who
are not citizens, or (to use the words of the Fourth Book)
that it is a Koivuvia of men like each other, existing for the
sake of the best life to which they can attain (4 (7). 8.
1328 a 35).

v The State at its best is thus, in Aristotle s view, under
ordinary conditions, a company or brotherhood of equal
comrades, enjoying that leisure from the quest of neces
saries (cr^oA.?) TU&gt;V a^ayKcuW) without which full virtue
cannot exist, able and purposed to rule and be ruled
with a view to the life in accordance with virtue ;
not necessarily equal absolutely, but proportionally
equal sufficiently equal to be commensurable, to live

1 Unless indeed the word ir\r)Qos subject, see Heyder s remarks
contains the notion of perpetual (Vergleichung der Aristotelischen
renewal. undHegel schenDialektik, p. 179),

2 As to these unreconciled con- quoted by Eucken, Methode der
tradictions, a plentiful crop of Aristotelischen Forschung, p. 43 n.
which usually comes to light They arise in part from Aristotle s
whenever we make a careful study desire to do justice to all points of
of Aristotle s teaching on any view.

ITS ACCOUNT OF THE STATE. 385

for the same end, and to accept the control of a common
body of law. At first sight the State, as Aristotle
conceives it, presents the aspect of a body of friends,
exceptionally numerous indeed, but tending as friends
do, to be like and equal, and engaged in one and the
same scheme of life one equal temper of heroic hearts.
Virtue, which is the secret of unity in friendship, is also the
secret of unity in the State (Eth. Nic. 9. 6. n67b 2 sqq.).
A body of friends, however, is not an unity in the same
degree as a State ; it need not, like the State, be composed
of diverse elements ; its members are not, like those of
the State, divided into rulers and ruled, nor are their
relations regulated by law ; the essential characteristic
of State-life is exchange of service, that of friendship com
mon life and accordant feeling ; the aim of friendship is
especially living together (TO a-vtfv), an aim which, though
presupposed in the State, is less its aim than advantage
(TO (TVfjitylpov) l ; above all, in the case of the State, a Whole
is formed which reacts upon its members and imparts
completeness to them, and which is itself a moral agent,
a Person, dealing with those outside it as well as with
those within. The State, we see, is something more than v
a body of friends. It is also to be distinguished from a
school, if only because in a school there is no interchange
of service. It is not a Church, again, for its aims are
more varied than those of a Church ; it does not exist
for the worship of God alone, or for the promotion of
spiritual, as distinguished from intellectual, growth ; its
objects range from the provision of commodities to the full
development of the whole man ; it has a military force at
its disposal ; its ultimate aim is not, as Socrates, Xeno-
phon, and Plato had said, the production of virtue, but
rather the efflux of virtue in virtuous action, unimpeded
and happy. So far from the State ceasing to be necessary,
as the view of these inquirers might be construed to imply,
when full virtue is already possessed by the citizens, it is not

1 Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 b 2 : and Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 35-40. Cp. also
compare Eth. Nic. 9. 12. with Eth. Nic. 8. n. n6oa 8-30.

286 THIRD BOOK

at its best except when all of them are men of full virtue.
If it is itself the source of their virtue, partly through the
material conditions with which it surrounds them, partly
through the training and guidance which it imparts, it must
nevertheless go further and develope their virtue in action ;
it must set on foot an exchange of mutual service rendered
with a view to the common good ; it must offer its citizens
a Whole in which they can merge themselves as parts,
rising thus to a nobler level and type of action than they
could singly realize ; it must be to them a sort of God \
less remote, more helpful, more akin to them than the God
of Aristotle a Being in whom they lose themselves only to
j find themselves again.

Aristotle has not learnt that the State does not exist
exclusively for the advantage of its members, but in part
for that of the world outside it. To him it is a natural
Whole, which in all normal cases grows up, as it were, round
the individual, raising him to the full level of humanity and
satisfying all his wants from the lowest to the highest ; it
exists for the sake of those within it, not for the sake of
those outside. Its task is especially to satisfy man s
highest -needs, and we expect him to say that supreme
power in it must be allotted to those who can so rule as
to secure this result. He is led, however, by considerations
of justice to award supreme power to those who contribute
to its life in proportion to their contributions, and espe
cially to those who possess virtue fully furnished with
external means.

It is because the State is so high a thing, that there are
many who, in their own interest no less than in that of the
whole, had better have nothing to do with its manage
ment. They cannot live its full life, and are rather in it
than of it.

If Aristotle had said that the State exists not only for

1 Aristotle, it is true, nowhere the State as that "mortal god,"

says this : still there is much in to whom we owe under the

the Politics to suggest the idea "immortal God" our peace and

to which Hobbes gave definite defence (Leviathan, part 2, c.

expression, when he spoke of 17).

ITS ACCOUNT OF THE STATE. 287

the realization of the highest quality of life, but also for the
development in all within it of the best type of life of
which they are capable, he would have made the elevation
of the mass of men one of its ends. But this he hardly
seems to do. It is true that the head of the household is
charged with the moral improvement of the slave, but then
we are elsewhere told that the slave is ruled for his own
good only accidentally primarily for that of his master.
Still less is the State expected to concern itself with the
of the artisan and day-labourer : this class

seems to be wholly uncared for. If Aristotle s view of the
office of the State is defective in this respect, it has, how
ever, the merit, that it brings into prominence a truth
which in our own day is often forgotten that one of the
aims of the State should be to aid in the realization of
the highest type of life, and that this should be fully as
much its aim as to help those who cannot attain to the
highest type to advance as far towards it as they can.
Civilization should grow in height as well as in breadth.

It is evident that to Aristotle the State is far less than it
is to us an abstraction apart from, and distinguishable from,
the individuals who belong to it 1 ; it is not a system of ^
institutions", which, however it may change, retains its
identity, while one generation after another finds shelter
under it and passes away ; it is not the house, but the
human beings who live in it 2 . From the modern point of

1 Compare Lucian, Anacharsis OTTCO? ol n-oXtrai dyadol p.tv TO.S

C. 2O, TTO\IV yap TjfjLds ov TO. oiKodo- ^fv\ds, lo~xvpol 8e TCI crwjuaTa yiy-

fj.T)p.ara fjyovp.eda etvat, oioi Tci^r) Kal VOIVTO K.r.X.

iepa Kl vtaxro iKovs, dXXa ravra pfv 2 The nineteenth Article of the

axTTrep o-S&gt;p.d n edpalov Kal aKLvrjTov Church of England defines the

virdpx eiv * s vwodojffjv Kal do-&lt;dXecay visible Church of Christ as a

TU&gt;V TTo\iTevop.fva&gt;v, TO 8e TTUV Kvpos congregation of faithful men, in the

ev TO IS TtoXirais Ti6euc6a TOVTOVS which the pure Word of God is

yap elvat TOVS dvaTr\rjpovvTas Kal preached and the Sacraments duly

fiiardrroiray Kal oriTeXoOi/Tar eKa&lt;na ministered. With regard to all

Kal (pvXdrTovTas, olov TI tv f/fuv definitions of a State or a Church

Kao-T(o faT\v f) ^fv)(r]. TOVTO 8f/ as a number of individuals, it may

Toivw Karavor]o-ai&gt;T(s e7rifj.f\ovp.fda be asked whether the notion of a

pep, as opas, Kal TOV o-co^aros TTJS succession of individuals does not

TroXeoo? KaTaKoo-/j,ovvTfs avTo, &lt;os enter into our conception of a

KaXXio-rov rjij.lv efy . . . /idXiora 8e State or Church. Would a mere

Kai e ^ uTravros TOVTO Trpopoof ^ei , aggregate of individuals, even

288 THIRD BOOK

view it is rather a fabric, and to a large extent an inherited
fabric. Aristotle regards it as a Whole consisting of its
citizens as parts, and if in one passage he finds its identity
mainly in the constitution, he follows this thought no
further. The view of Isocrates that the State is immortal
he evidently does not hold. The notion of the historic
continuity of the State belongs to a later time, though
Aristotle is aware that the past of a State influences its
present 1 . The constitution of a State is to him less an
outcome of its past than a reflection of contemporary facts
of the moral level and social composition of the com
munity. In reality it is both.

Conflict of To one form, indeed, of the best State of Aristotle the
Me King- foregoing account of the State does not apply. In the
ship with Absolute Kingship, the highest but also the least realizable
general of its for.ns, many of its usual features seem to disappear.

account of The State in this form seems to fall into two sections, the
the State. .

Absolute King, and those he rules, one of which, the

Absolute King, is not a part of the State at all (3. 13.
1284 a 8). Is he then outside the State, and is the State
constituted by his subjects alone? Or is he rather to be
regarded as himself the State ? But then the State will
apparently cease to be a Koivavia, for there will be only
one Koivtovos. And on that hypothesis, what becomes of
the principle that the State consists of persons differing
in kind ? or of the principle that it is an aggregate of
individuals ? If, on the other hand, the State is composed
of the Absolute King and his subjects 2 , what is his or their

though animated by a common time empire of Athens was origin-
aim, possessed of a common creed, ally won by the demos,
and living the same kind of life, a This would seem to be Aris-
constitute a State or a Church, if totle s view, if we examine the
some provision were not made reasoning in 2. 2. 1261 a 29 sqq.,
for the perpetuation of the society where the State is said to be corn-
by the admission of fresh mem- posed of persons differing in kind
bers ? i.e. rulers and ruled both when
1 Cp. Pol. 2. 12. 1 274 a 12 sqq., the same persons always rule and
where the existence of an extreme when, in consequence of the
democracy at Athens is traced to equality of the members of the
the circumstance that the mari- State, rule is interchanged.

ITS ACCOUNT OF THE STATE. 289

relation to it, if he is not a part of the State ? Aristotle s
admission of the Absolute Kingship as a possible form of
the State seems altogether to conflict with his general
account of the State. We do not learn why, if he is
complete in himself (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. n6ob 3 sq.), the
Absolute King should trouble himself to rule or to live in
society at all.

Strongly, however, as the Absolute Kingship contrasts
with what we may call the typical form of the State, one
paramount feature of the latter still survives in it. It is a
means of placing the individual in constant contact and
connexion with Reason, here indeed represented not by
Law but by the Absolute King a means of realizing the
highest and most complete human life. Thus, however
altered the structure of the State may be, its end remains
the same ; and this would seem to be enough for Aristotle.
The State may exist without Law 1 , if only it Secures to
its members the highest quality of life. Plato had already
allowed the ideal State sketched in his Republic freely
to assume the form either of a Kingship or of an Aristo
cracy 2 , but then in neither form were the rulers to be
fettered by Law. Aristotle finds room for the Absolute
Kingship at some cost of consistency. He makes room for
it, as he tells us (3. 13. 1284 b 32 : 3. 17. 1288 a 19 sqq.),
because he has no choice : not only would no other course
be just, but no other course is possible.

Aristotle had said towards the close of the discussion on Under
Kingship (3. 17. 1287 b 37), that there are those who are what cir

cumstances

marked out by nature and by considerations of justice are King-
and advantage to be ruled as a master rules his slaves,

and others marked out for subjection to a king, and others and Polity
for membership of a polity; and even in the midst of his i y j n p i ace ?

1 The view that a constitution riav ov jroXtrclov oirov yap /xi) i/o/xot

implies the rule of Law is perhaps apxova-iv, OVK eon TroXtreia.
only said to be evXoyos, and not 2 Rep. 445 D, eVoi/o^ao-tfen; 8 av

absolutely adopted, in 6 (4). 4. KOI 8i^jj* tyyevop.fvov p.(v yap dvdpbs

1 292 a 30 sqq. The words are tvbs ev TOIS ap^ouo-i

fvXoyas Se av 86(KV JmnftOV 6 /3ao~iXei a av K\r]dfir]

$d&lt;TKa&gt;v rfjv Totavrrjv fivai drj/jLOKpa- aptaroKparia.

VOL. I. U

390 THIRD BOOK.

anxiety to establish the necessity and justice of the Abso
lute Kingship under certain circumstances, he pauses to seize
the opportunity of explaining (1288 a 6 sqq.) under what
circumstances each of the normal constitutions is in place.

A people is a fit subject for Kingship, if it is so con
stituted as to produce (-rre ^uKe $e peif *, 1288 a 8) a family
excelling in virtue and in capacity for political leadership.
This is shortly after amended to the effect that if even
a single individual of this character makes his appearance,
he isvdeserving of Kingship.

A people is a fit subject for Aristocracy, if it is so con
stituted as to produce a body of individuals capable of
being ruled as freemen should be ruled by men qualified
for political leadership by virtue. It appears from c. 18.
1 288 a 35, that under this form both rulers and ruled will
be men excelling in virtue, the former having the virtue
which qualifies for rule tending to the highest quality of
life, the latter having the virtue which qualifies for being
ruled to that end.

A people is a fit subject for Polity, in which a body of
individuals naturally springs up (TT^VKCV tyylvevBai 2 ), pos
sessed of military excellence and capable of ruling and
being ruled in accordance with a law distributing offices
among the well-to-do in accordance with desert 3 .

The Third So far that is to say, down to the end of its last
S chapter but one the Third Book has concerned itself

concerned mainly with the varieties of the normal constitution.
the nor- The normal constitution, we gather from it, is in all cases
mai consti- j us |- anc j f or t ^ e common advantage, and precisely because

tutions,but J r _ 7

we gain it is so, it is not in all cases the same. It varies as the

social conditions vary ; it awards supreme power accord-

1 For &lt;ptpfiv in this sense, cp. 536)

Plutarch, Dion c. 58, aXX* toiKtv Kwor" 6eovs yap (paiv(d f) vr/a-os

d\T)6a&gt;s Aeyfcr$ai TO rfjv TroXiv tuflvrfv (frtpfiv.

(Athens) (peptiv Mpas dpfrf/ re 2 For this expression, cp. Aris-

TOV? dyadovs apiffrovs xai KaKta rovs tot. Fragm. 85. 149 1 a * cnrovdalov

&lt;pav\ovs TrovrjporaTovs . Plato, Tim. & ear! ytvos (V (a no\\ol anovdalot

24 C-D : Damox. Inc. Fab. Fragm. -nefyvKacriv tyyiixadai.

(Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 3 See Appendix D.

GLIMPSES OF THE BEST CONSTITUTION. 291

ing to the distribution in the given community of the occasional

elements which contribute to the life of the State; here gJeTest 8 f ^
it will be a Kingship, there an Aristocracy, there a Polity, constim-

But though the normal constitution is the main subject
of the book, we catch, as it advances, clearer and clearer
glimpses of the best constitution also. It may be well to
note these indications and to bring them together.

The best State, we are told (c. 5. 1278 a 8), will not give
citizenship to the fiavavvos- In the best State, again, a
part at all events of the citizens those of them who are
statesmen and who are charged, or fit to be charged, with
the management of public affairs will possess the full
virtue of the good man (o-TrouScuos avr/p, c. 5. I2;8b 2 sqq. :
cp. c. 1 8. 1288 a 37 sq.) ; and thus the best State is appa
rently referred to as a State in the hands of men of full
virtue (8ta T&V a-novaiu&gt;v avbp&v, c. 13. 1283 b 6), and in the
same chapter the citizen of the best State is defined as
he who is able and purposed to rule and be ruled with ^
a view to the life of virtue (1284 a i). So far all the
indications given us of the nature of the best State point
to a State of equal o-TrouScuoi ruling and ruled by turns, but
later in this chapter (the thirteenth) we learn that under
certain circumstances the best State may be forced to
assume the form of an Absolute Kingship, and the suc
ceeding chapters even go on to inquire whether the Abso
lute Kingship is not really the best form of constitution
(c. 15. 1286 a 7 sqq.: cp. 1286 b 22, d 8e 877 ns apia-rov
0etTj TO /3acnAeve&lt;r0ai rats 77oAe&lt;rii&gt;). The answer is that the
best constitution will assume the form of an Absolute
Kingship or the more equal form of an Aristocracy of
o-7rou5atot, according to circumstances. It will be the former,
if an individual or a family of surpassing excellence exists
in the State ; it will be the latter, if this surpassing excel
lence is possessed by a body of citizens capable of ruling
or being ruled with a view to the most desirable life (c. 18.
1 288 a 33 sqq.) 1 .

1 Not simply npbs rov ftiov rbv c. 13. 1284 a i sqq.: however,
we had been told in even as far back as the ninth

U 2

293 TRANSITION FROM THE THIRD

We are thus gradually led in the Third Book to form a
conception in outline of the nature of the best constitution
in its two forms, Kingship and Aristocracy ; it remains for
the Fourth Book to work this out in detail, and to show
how the best State is to be brought into being and insti
tuted (riva. TTf(pvKe yivecrdai rpoTiov KCU Ka0urrao-0ai 77a&gt;?, 3. 1 8.
I288b 4). The Third Book forms an introduction to the
study of all constitutions, but especially to the study of
the best l . The broad principles which it lays down with
regard to the recognition of all elements contributing to
the being and well-being of the State prepare us to find the
books on the best State placing supremacy in the hands of
a citizen-body possessing not only the intellectual and
moral qualities necessary for rule, but also an adequate
provision of external goods.

This book of the Politics, however, would have lost much
of its interest and importance, if it had thrown light only
on the best constitution. Eerhaps its most marked charac
teristic is the prominence which it gives to the conception
of justice. A sound constitution, it insists, is one which
makes those supreme in the State whose supremacy is in
the particular case just and for the common good.

Closing It is time, however, to examine the last chapter of the

the Thircf Tmrd Book (c. 1 8), in which a transition is made from the
Book normal constitutions to the best constitution and to the
itin bar- question, how the latter is to be brought into existence.

chapter (i28ob 34), the life of the there is a close connexion between
true State is described as 017 the Second and the old Seventh
Tf\fia teal avrdpKrjs, a phrase which Book, but the contents of the
includes avrapKaa tv rols dvaynaiois Third Book have also a real bear-
as well as in higher things. ing on the old Seventh. The
1 Krohn remarks (Zur Kritik fourth chapter of the Third Book,
Aristotelischer Schriften i. p. 30 which establishes the fact that in
n.) : If one sought to bring what the best State the virtue of the
is cognate together, the Seventh citizen and the man coincide, is,
and Eighth Books (old order) indeed, expressly recognized as
would have to follow the Second : the starting-point of the inquiry
the contents of the Third Book respecting the best State in the
have no bearing on the fragmen- old Seventh (see 3. 18. 1288 a 37
tary sketches which find a place in and 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 1 1).
the Seventh. It is quite true that

TO THE FOURTH BOOK. 293

e The normal constitutions so it begins are three in monywith
number, but which is the best of them ? The best is that ^ e t ~ e
which is absolutely in the hands of the best men (OLKOVO- Fonrth(pld

/ oo c p i_ Seventh)

p.QVfJ.fvri VTTO T&v api(TTO)V, I2o8a 33: Cp. 3. 14. I2o5 b 31, Book and

Kara TT)Z; olKovo/JUKriv) : it will therefore be either ^ lth
an Absolute Kingship, in which an individual or a family Book
exists of surpassing virtue, or an Aristocracy, in which a ger
body (T&gt;X.r)6os) of men of surpassing virtue exists, some of
whom are capable of ruling and others of being ruled with
a view to the most desirable life (T^V cuperarrdrTji/ &TIV, 1288
a 37). And how are these two forms, Absolute Kingship
and Aristocracy, to be brought into existence? Aris
totle appears to treat this question as identical with the
question how men are to be produced fit for kingship or
for the rule of citizens over fellow-citizens (iroAiriKoi). He
recalls the fact that he has shown that the citizen of the
best State is identical with the good man ; hence the
education and habits which produce a good man will
produce a man equal to these positions. (It is hardly
necessary to interpose the remark, that the term good
man is an altogether inadequate equivalent for the Greek
(nrovbalos avrip, by which is meant a man possessing that
many-sided excellence, practical, speculative, and aesthetic,
on which Aristotle has already dwelt in the Third Book
(c. ii. 1281 b 10 sqq.) above all, possessing &lt;j)p6vri&lt;ris and
the virtues of leisure (4 (7). cc. 14. 15). Not an impeccable
man, but a man mature and happily developed in character,
mind, and body 1 .)

We might expect that Aristotle would pass on at once
to the question what institutions and education produce a
(nrovbaios avrip, but this question is not actually entered on
till the Thirteenth Chapter of the Fourth Book (1332 a 28
sqq.). He perhaps remembers that he has just said that
the best State is that in which an Absolute King rules, or
a body of men of surpassing virtue rules and is ruled,

1 Cp. Cic. Tusc. Disp. 5. 10. 28 : structos et ornatos turn sapientes
quos dicam bonos, perspicuum turn viros bonos dicimus.
est ; omnibus enim virtutibus in-

294 TRANSITION FROM THE THIRD

TTJI&gt; alperwrcim]i luty (3. 1 8. 1 288 a 37), and that he must
not leave the problem of the most desirable life unsolved
behind him. To this question, at any rate, he passes in
the sentences with which the Third Book closes and the
Fourth begins, and in the following way :

The education and habits which produce a good man
and those which produce a citizen-ruler and a king will be
the same. And now that we have treated in detail of these
matters (8uopi&lt;r0eyra)i; 8e rovrcoy, I288b 2), we must attempt to
speak about the best constitution, in what way it comes into
being and how it is instituted l . It is necessary, then, for
any one who is to investigate the subject of the best con
stitution in an adequate way first to determine, what is the
most desirable life (aiperajraro? /3to?, 4 (7). i. 1323 a 15 :
cp. cuperooranjz; C 607 ?^ 3- Io&gt; . 1288 a 37). For, he continues,
while this is unknown to us, the best constitution must
also be unknown to us, since those who enjoy the best con
stitution their circumstances enable them to attain will
naturally fare best, unless things turn out quite contrary to
expectation 2 .

Now, however we may explain it, there is certainly a
want of callida junctura here, to say the least. The
reason which we expect to be given for the treatment of
the question, what is the most desirable life, is that the best
constitution has already been said to exist for the reali
zation of the most desirable life (1288 a 37), but no re
ference is made to this ; on the contrary, a fresh reason is
given and the continuity of the investigation seems need-

1 This is the question with which handling, the fact that in the Sixth

the Fourth and Fifth Books are to Book the nature of the polity is

deal, and the answer they give first sketched, and then the ques-

to it is, that some of the condi- tion is asked TWO. rpairov yivtrai 17

tions of the best constitution must KdXovjifri} rroXim a, KCU Tt5&gt;s avrrjv del

be asked of Fortune and Nature, Kadia-rdvai (6 (4). 9. 1294 a 30).

but that for others the lawgiver is 2 The English language cannot

responsible (4 (7). 13. 1332 a 28 fully express the reasoning latent

sqq.)- It is especially the lawgiver s") in the Greek words aptara yap

business to see that the education ( rrpdrTeiv irpo&lt;rf)Kfi rov? 8pum 770X1-

and institutions of the State are! revopfvovs K.T.X. It is a short step

such as to produce ajrovSalou in the Greek from no\irfvf&lt;rdat to

(1332 a 31 sqq.). We may note, irpdrreiv,
as showing a certain similarity of

TO THE FOURTH BOOK. 295

lessly broken. We notice also that the last chapter of the
Third Book prepares us for an inquiry not only into the
mode in which a man fit to be a citizen-ruler over citizens
(TToXtrt/co s) is to be produced, but also into the mode in
which a man capable of Kingship (/3ao-iA.iKos) is to be pro
duced, whereas in 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 12 sqq. true kings are
said to be no longer obtainable, and in default of them an
arrangement is adopted by which the ruled become rulers
after a certain age, the education of the State being
expressly so planned as to be suitable for men who are to
be for the first part of their lives ruled and afterwards
rulers, not for kings or men capable of Kingship who do
nothing but rule. The Third Book also seems to imply
that the education which produces the one type of ruler
is the same as that which produces the other. If so, the
Fourth Book appears to speak differently (cp. 4 (7). 14.
1332 b 15).

In addition to these discrepancies l , of which it would be
easy to make too much, we are undoubtedly conscious in
entering on the Fourth Book of a certain change of tone,
however we may account for it. Not only do expressions
occur, such as ^/j,eis 8e avrots ^pov^cv (c. I. 1323 a 38)
Ae/creW fifj.lv Trpos dju,&lt;ore/3ou? avrovs (c. 3. 1325 a 17), for which
we should vainly look in the Third Book 2 , but the whole

1 Another is, that while we are rather to the citizens ; the inter-
promised in the Third Book (c. 3. esting discussion of the subject in
1276 a 32) a discussion not only Plato s Laws (707 -708 D) was
of the question of the proper size no doubt present to his mind,
of the State, but also of the ques- Plato had there decided that not
tion whether it should be com- only Cretans, but also Pelopon-
posed of one race (tdvos) or more nesians (some of whom had once
than one, the latter subject ap- settled in Crete), would be wel-
pears to escape treatment in the come as settlers in the new Cretan
Fourth Book, where we might city which he is founding. What
naturally expect to find it dealt Aristotle thinks on the subject
with, unless indeed we consider may perhaps be gathered from
the promise to be fulfilled, or ful- Pol. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 25 sqq.
filled in part, in the recommenda- 2 Similar expressions, however,
tions with respect to the slaves or occur here and there in the Poli-
serfs who are to till the soil (4 (7). tics (e.g. 2. 9. 1270 a 9, oAA 17/^4?
9. I32ga 25 sq. : 4 (7). 10. 13303 ov TOVTO a-KOTrovfjLfv) : cp. also de
25 sqq.). Aristotle, however, pro- An. I. 3. 406 b 22,
bably refers in the Third Book /xei/.

296 THE FOURTH

conduct of the inquiry is different. This results, no doubt,
in part from the temporary abandonment of the ajporetic -
method of investigation which prevails throughout the
Third Book ; we have to do now, not with an inquirer on
a level with others and joining with them in a tedious and
circuitous search for truth, but with one who has sought
and found, and if he still inquires, is never, even in
appearance, far from a solution. The questions succes
sively raised in the Fourth Book are discussed with a
promptness and conciseness which carries us over a good
deal of ground in a short space ; digressions are fre
quently avoided by the postponement to another oppor
tunity of discussions which might have led to them (e. g.
4 (7)- 5- I3 26 b 32 sqq. : 10. 1330 a 4, 1330 a 31 sq. .- 16.
1335 b 2 sqq. : 17. 1336 b 24 sqq.). The object evidently
is to carry on the construction of the best State rapidly
and without interruption. Perhaps, however, there is
nothing in this change of handling, which need create
any difficulty, nor need we again make too much of certain
apparent novelties of doctrine which attract our attention
in the Fourth and Fifth Books. The most important of
these is the account of &tu&gt;pia as a kind of irpafi? (4 (7).-
3. 1325 b 16 sqq.), for the recognition of the four cardinal
virtues, which we seem to trace in 4 (7). i. 1323 a 28 sq.
and in 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 22 sqq., may perhaps be paralleled
from other books of the Politics (see, for instance, 3. 4.
1277 b I 6-27), while the account of evdcu/Ltovla as a com
bination of TO KoXov and pleasure in 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 19 is
supported by more passages than one of the Politics and
the Nicomachean Ethics l . The view of the Third Book
that a good man, and therefore a full citizen of the
best State, must be capable of ruling (3. 5. 1278 b 3 sq.)
can also perhaps be reconciled with the permission appa-

1 Cp. Eth. Nic. I. 9. 1098 b pleasure in Eth. Nic. 7. 12. 1152 b

23 sqq. We find the two aims of 6:7. 14. Ii53b 14 sqq.: Pol. 5

TO KaXov and r]8ovr] ascribed to- (8). 3. 1338 a 5. See also the

gether to the oTrovSaios in Eth. Nic. quotation from the comic poet

9. 8. 1 169 a 20-25, an d evdaipovia Hegesippus in Athen. Deipn.

is said to be accompanied with 279 d.

AND FIFTH BOOKS. 297

rently given him in the Fourth Book (c. 3) to live a con
templative life, but Aristotle does not notice the discre
pancy, and we are left to harmonize the two doctrines as
best we can.

A high authority, Dr. F. Blass 1 , has remarked on the
rarity of hiatus in the Fifth Book. He observes that it is
also of rare occurrence in the scanty fragments we possess
of the dialogues of Aristotle, which were in all probability
composed with a view to publication, and not merely for
use within the School, and he argues that wherever we
note this avoidance of hiatus in conjunction with a style of
writing somewhat more popular and less technical than that
of the extant productions of Aristotle usually is, we may
reasonably suspect that we have to do with a composition
intended for publication, or with one which includes matter
derived from a work of that nature. He does not extend
his remark to the Fourth Book, and we notice, in fact, more
frequent instances of hiatus in it than in the Fifth. Hiatus,
however, would appear to be rarer in the Fourth Book than
in some other books of the Politics 2 , and it may certainly
be said that this book and the Fifth deal with subjects of
especial interest to Aristotle s contemporaries, and deal

1 See Rhein. Mus. 30, p. 481. sages in this book of the Politics,
Hiatus is avoided in the Eighth in order to make its conformity
(i.e. Fifth) Book of the Politics to these rules complete. It de-
with a strictness almost worthy of serves notice that there is a
Isocrates. For though Aristotle difference between the two families
allows of its occurrence, not only of the MSS. of the Politics in
after KM, #, and , but also after this matter of hiatus, the second
/ni7 and after the article in its family occasionally avoiding it
various forms the latter being a where the first do not ; but the
laxity which is altogether at vari- avoidance of hiatus in the Fifth
ance with the practice of Isocrates Book is perhaps too general
he scarcely ever allows hiatus to be accounted for by the sup-
to occur in respect of short and position that it is due to trans-
elisible vowels, except in the case cribers.

of pronouns, conjunctions, prepo- 2 I am indebted to an unpub-

sitions, and other small and fre- lished essay by Mr. R. Shute of

quently used words (herein fol- Christ Church, Oxford, for this

lowing the very same rule as the remark, and for the suggestion

moststudied orations of Isocrates), that the Fourth and Fifth Books

nor does he regard a pause as a may well have been an indepen-

justification for hiatus. We need dent treatise designed for publi-

hardly alter more than six pas- cation.

298 FOURTH BOOK.

with them in a not over-technical way. It is very possible
that materials derived from works intended for publication
have been used more freely in these two books than in
others ; it is also possible, though less likely, that they were
themselves written with a view to publication. The facts
to which attention has been drawn may be accounted for
in various ways, and some will attach more importance to
them than others, but in any case there seems to be little
reason for doubting that the two books were intended by
Aristotle to form a part of the Politics. The relation in
which they stand to the Second and Third Books appears
to be too close to allow of any other supposition.

In con- The opening words of the Fourth Book announce, in

a best con- effect, that the end of the State good life, or happiness,
stitution or (as j n this passage) the most desirable life is the clue to

the task .

to which its structure. Aristotle, we see, is a teleologist in politics.
we now j^ e adds tna t- nothing less than the most desirable life must

pass the

first step to be realized by the best State. Aristotle insists on this, be

ta ascertain Cause he held that Plat had failed in the Republic to

what is the realize the most desirable life (2. 5. 1264 b 15 sqq.) nay,
sirableiife, failed even to realize a life liveable by man (2. 5. 1263 b
for the best 3 n). Yet. in Aristotle s view, the test of a constitution is

constitu- "

tion must to be found in the life which it secures to its citizens. A
mostde- 1 * constitution which does not secure them the most desirable
sirableiife. life is not the best.

is the most The first problem, therefore, to be solved is, what is the
desirable mO st desirable life. The opening chapters of the Fourth
Book deal with this problem, and the solution here given
serves as a guide throughout the whole process of con
structing the best State. It is a life spent in the exercise
of virtue fully furnished with the external conditions of
virtuous action (aperr) /cexoprjyrj/Me inj). Xoprjyia and dper??
are the two pillars on which the best State rests. Fortune,
Nature, and a good lawgiver these are the conditions of
its realization (cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 25-31).

If we ask, says Aristotle, what is the most desirable life,
the first step to an answer is obvious enough. No one

WHAT IS THE MOST DESIRABLE LIFE? 299

would say that external goods and goods of the body are
sufficient in the entire absence of goods of the soul 1 . A
man so devoid of courage that he fears the flies that pass
him in the air, or so fond of eating and drinking as to be
ready to eat and drink anything whatsoever, or so fond of
money that he will kill his dearest friend for a farthing,
or endowed with no more intelligence than a child or a
lunatic, would not be pronounced happy by anybody. It
is only when the question is raised, how much virtue, or
how much wealth, or power, or renown is desirable,
that a difference of opinion arises. Some will affirm that
any quantity of virtue, however small, is sufficient. But
we will tell them that mere observation of the facts of
human life will lead them to a different view. We see that
men acquire and retain external goods by virtue, not virtue
by external goods, and that those who are as well en
dowed as possible in respect of mind and character, and
have only a moderate share of external goods 2 , live a hap-

1 This classification of goods
was inherited by Aristotle from
Plato, whether it originated with
him or not (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. i.
618. i,ed. 2). I socrates refers to ra
tv rij v/ i Xfl ayada in de Pace, 32.
It is evidently open to much criti
cism, as a classification. Friends,
we remark, are included among
external goods (Eth. Nic. 9. 9.
11690 9) ; yet external goods
are the product of Accident and
Fortune (Pol. 4 (7). i. 1323 b 27).

When Aristotle indicates that
he uses ea&gt;reptKoi Xo yot in giving
the account which he here gives of
the most desirable life, he may be
referring to some non-scientific
writings or teachings either of his
own (cp. Eth. Eud. 2. I. 1218 b 33)
or of others. In the latter case, he
may be referring to Plato, Laws
726-9 : 743 E sqq. : 697 B : Rep.
591 C sqq. : or to I socrates de
Pace, 31-35 : or even to Sappho,
Fragm. 80 Bergk. Perhaps, how
ever, it is more likely that he is
referring to teaching of his own,

possibly to the teaching of the
irepl irXovTov, which seems to have
been somewhat similar (see Fragm.
89. 1491 b 35 sqq.). We have
already seen that in 1323 a 28 the
virtues referred to are the four
cardinal virtues, which, according
to Zeller (Gr. Ph. 2. I. 567, ed. 2),
seem first to have been definitely
marked out by Plato and by him
only in his later years ; but this
also holds of a later passage of
the Fourth Book (c. 15. 1334 a 22
sqq.). It is not clear where the use
of the e wrepiKoi Xoym ceases ; it
may possibly do so in 1323 b 29,
with the words 8ia rf]v rv^-qv fyriv.
On this opening chapter of the
Fourth Book the remarks of Ber-
nays in his Dialoge des Aristo-
teles (p. 69 sqq.) should be
consulted, and also Vahlen, Aris-
totelische Aufsatze, 2.

a Aristotle probably has exter
nal goods such as wealth and
power and renown (1323 a 37)
mainly in view, but TO. turos dyada
T?]S ^vx^s (i323b 27) include

300 FOURTH BOOK.

pier life than those who are in the opposite case. And
reasoning leads us to the same conclusion ; for the goods
of the soul, unlike external goods, increase in utility with
every increase in their amount which shows that they are
not means, but ends ; then again, virtue, which is the ex
cellence of the soul, is as much more precious than wealth,
which is the excellence of property (cp. i. 13. 1259 b 20),
as the soul is more precious than property ; lastly, external
goods are desirable for the sake of the soul, not the soul for
the sake of external goods. Hence, the more a man has
of virtue and of virtuous action, the larger is his share of
the highest and most perfect goods, and the greater is his
happiness. These arguments receive a final confirmation
from a reference to the Divine Nature : God is happy be
cause he is so constituted as to be happy; his happiness
does not flow from external goods. It is in this that
happiness differs from prosperity ; the latter is the gift of
fortune, but not the former, so far at least as it springs from
virtue.

A life of So far we have been concerned with the individual, and
furnished ^ ^ ave proved that his happiness is proportioned to the
with exter-^ amount of his virtue and virtuous action. Similar argu-
thcT ex- ments show that the same thing is true of a State. A State
temal cannot fare well unless it acts well, and it cannot act well

means be- .

ing ad- without virtue and moral prudence, and its courage and
justed in j us ti c e and prudence will be the same as those of the indi-

amount to &gt;

the require- vidual^-- So that we may state the result of our inquiry
virtuous thus the best life both for individual and State is one
action o f virtue conjoined with a sufficient amount of external and

is the most/ . . ,

desirable l hr&gt;dily goods to make virtuous action possible. 11 any one

c l uest ^ ons this conclusion and does not agree with what has
and for been said, Aristotle will go into the matter afterwards ; he
cannot stay to do so now.

But though we have said that virtue Is a necessary ingre
dient of the best life in the case both of the individual and

bodily goods also, and to him, no a man may be too handsome or
less than to Plato (Laws 728 too strong (6 (4). 11.
E sqq.), the latter may be in excess: 6sqq.).

WHAT IS THE MOST DESIRABLE LIFE? 301

of the State, we have not yet determined whether happi
ness is the same in the two cases, or in other words, springs
from the same source. The happiness of the individual, we
have seen, springs from virtue, but is this true also of that
of the State ? This is an easily answered question, for
however various may be men s views as to what constitutes
happiness, all agree that its source is the same for State
and individual.

The most desirable life, says Aristotle, is not that of a
morally and intellectually feeble race living in the un
limited enjoyment of external and bodily goods, but that
of a wise and understanding people/ endowed with them
adequately for the practice of virtue, but not with more
than is necessary for that end l . The passage is interest
ing, if only from its evident sincerity; its vigour of expres
sion is probably in part due to the fact that in that out
spoken age and race there were many who not only
practised but preached a life of pleasure or of money-
getting, in addition to those who lived for power and
distinction. In one of the tragedies which were ascribed
to Diogenes the Cynic, the line

was put into the mouth of a votary of wealth, the other
interlocutor, it would seem, rejoining

rj fivdbs

and Aristoxenus brings home to us the intolerant strength
of conviction, with which an advocate of luxury from the
court of Dionysius the Younger of Syracuse, admitted
into the re /ze^os or garden-precinct used by the Pytha-

1 Compare the expression as- teles, p. 159). The teaching of

cribed to him in Rutilius Lupus Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a I sqq. is

abridged translation of a work by substantially the same as that of

the later Gorgias ^xn^ Swoias this passage of the Politics, and

KOI Aeecos item Aristoteles corrects the somewhat different

dicitur dixisse : eius esse vitam language of Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 b

beatissimam, cuius et fortunae I.

sapientia et sapientiae fortuna 2 Nauck, Trag. Grace. Fragm.

suppeditet (quoted by Heitz, die pp. 628-9.
verlorenen Schriften des Aristo-

302 FOURTH BOOK.

gorean Archytas and his disciples for their philosophic
perambulations, insisted that a life of bodily pleasure was
the only natural one, and that the virtues, from justice
onward, were mere artificial conventions, conjured-up pro
ducts of legislative skill. The King of Persia in his palace
was to him the type of felicity l .

We observe that Aristotle takes no notice here of those
who, like the Cynics, held that external goods were not
necessary to happiness 2 . The antagonists whom he seeks
to confute are evidently those who found happiness mainly
in external and bodily goods. It should also be noted
that, as the inquiry into the best State advances, the
supply of external and bodily goods which it is held to
need seems hardly to be limited to the bare amount
necessary for a share in virtuous action : its citizens are
spoken of, at all events, later on, as living in the enjoy
ment of every blessing, and spending their leisure amidst
an abundance of goods, not otherwise than those who
dwell, if the poets speak truly, in the islands of the Blest
(4 (7)- 1 5- 1 334 a 30, 33) 3 .

So far, the inquiry proceeds, we see our way without
difficulty, but now two questions arise which call for con
sideration. One is whether for the individual a citizen s
life spent in political relations with others, or the life of a
non-citizen forming no active part of a State, is the more
desirable. The other is, what constitution and organiza
tion of the State is the best, whether it is desirable for all,
or only for most men, to take an active part in the State.
The former question is beside the purpose of a political
treatise, inasmuch as it relates to what is best for the in
dividual : with the latter, on the contrary, we are directly
concerned. Taking up this question, then, for consideration,

1 Aristox. Fragm. 15 (Miiller, divined from Cic. de Senect. c.

Fragm. Hist. Grace. 2. 276). 12.

Men of his feather were common 2 Compare also the view of

enough in the luxurious cities of Aristotle s contemporary, Xeno-

Italy and Sicily (Plato, Rep. 404 D: crates (Xenocr. Fragm. 60-63:

Ep. 7. 326 B sq.)- Archytas Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 3. 127).

answer is not given, but may be s Cp. 6 (4). II. 1295 a 25 sqq.

WHAT IS THE MOST DESIRABLE LIFE? 303

we see at once that the best constitution is that under which
anyone, be he who he may, would act and fare best and live
happily that it is, in fact, the constitution under which a
life accompanied with virtue can best be lived ; but then a The further
question arises as to the concrete activities in which such a however!
life should be spent. Thus the question which we have just arises, in

, .... , . what ac-

discarded as ethical rather than political comes back upon tivitiessuch
us as one which the political inquirer cannot really avoid g h ^ e ld be
answering. , spent.

Is the political and practical life the more desirable, or Jf ca \^d~
one which is quit of all concern with external things (1324 practical

life the best
a 27 : cp. 6 rou eAeutfepou /3tos, 1325 a 19) a contemplative ora jif e

life, for instance, which some say is the only philosophic detached

J l r from affairs

life? Our answer to this question is of importance, mas- a con-
much as it must determine not only the direction we give

to the life of the individual, but also the nature of the con- ample?
stitution. If we prefer the contemplative life, we may have nat j on O f
to adjust the constitution to that end. Two views, as has conflicting

... 11- o views on

been said, exist on the subject, borne object to the exer- this subject
cise of any rule over others as being, if despotic 1 , unjust, results in
and, if such as one citizen may exercise over another, in- elusion in
volving hindrances to the ruler s felicity 2 . Others hold ^\^ T f
that the political and practical life is alone worthy of a practical
man, and that it gives scope to the exercise of all the Dut t hen
virtues in an equal degree with the other. So far we have this term

1 It must be remembered that happiness (e.g. 10. 7. U77b 14).
SfcrrroriKii apx*i properly means, Aristotle s object in the passage
not merely despotic rule, but the of the Politics before us seems to
kind of rule which a master exer- be to represent the political and
cises over his slaves. It is not, the contemplative life as akin,
however, always possible to ex- both being rich in /aiXat -rrpd^eis,
press this double meaning in whereas in the Nicomachean
English. Ethics he had sharply distinguished

2 Aristotle takes no account al Kara ras operas irpat-eis from ^
here of the view of the political rov vov eWpyeia or dfccprjTiKr) (10.
life referred to in the Nicomachean 7. 1177 b 19 sqq.). In both dis-
Ethics (i. 3. 1095 b 23), according cussions, however, the contem-
to which its aim was honour. plative life is viewed as avToreXrjs
Even in the Nicomachean Ethics, in comparison with the political.
indeed, he tacitly dismisses this The nature of the contemplative
view and frequently implies that life at its best is depicted in the
the statesman exists for the pro- tenth book of the Nicomachean
motion of virtuous action and Ethics (c. 7).

304 FOURTH BOOK.

must be to do with men who accept a life of virtue as the true life ;

to include ^ ut t ^ ien ^ ere are those w ^o say that a constitution ad-

not only justed to a career of despotic and tyrannical sway over

but also others, whether with their good will or not, is the only

speculative happy one ; and they can plead that many States and
activity. V /

nations in practice take their view. It is, however, assail
able on many grounds, on that of legality, on the ground
that it does not agree with the principles which govern the
practice of other arts than that of politics, and on the
ground that its supporters are for applying the principle
only to others, not to themselves. Despotic sway should be
exercised only over those who are destined by nature to
be so ruled ; and it is possible for a State, if well consti
tuted, to be perfectly happy which occupies an isolated
situation, and whose constitution consequently cannot be
designed for war or empire. War is noble (xaAoV), but it is
not the ultimate end ; the ultimate end is good life, to
which war is but a means. The business of a lawgiver is
to secure good life to his citizens, not empire, though the
means by which he secures it will no doubt differ in
different cases. If a State has neighbours, it will have to
be constituted otherwise than if it has none (e.g. it will
possess a fleet, c. 6. 1327 b 3 sqq.). Again, it may have
neighbours who are fit subjects for despotic rule (like most
States in Asia) ; or it may have neighbours who are fit
subjects for hegemony (the usual case in Greece) 1 .

Having disposed of this contention, Aristotle reverts to
the two conflicting views previously mentioned, and says
that each side is partially right. The life spent apart from
politics is better than the despotic life, but it is an error to
suppose that all rule is despotic, or to set inaction above
action. Happiness is action, and the active exercise of justice
and temperance is noble (/caAoV). To infer from this that

1 Cp. Isocr. Philip. 5, ef av p.v TCT pants r) irevTUKts airo\(i)\eKa&lt;rt roiis

ireto-dfiris Tr\eiovos diav fcreadni crot ffj.no\iTfv6fvras, r)Tftv 8 tKtivovs

Trivrr/STToXfcas (pi\iav rj rasirpocroSovs TOVS ronovs TOVS noppa p.tv Ketfj.ei&gt;ovs

TOS f Afj,(f)tn6\f(t)s ytyvofjLfvas, 17 8e T&gt;V ap^tiv bwaiifvav, eyyvs 8e TCOJ/

rroXtf 8vvr)6(ii] Karap-adttv ens XPV Ta s 8ov\evci.v tldtcrfjifVQiv, (Is oiov irep

fitv TOiavras (pevydv dnoiKius at riffs AaKfdaipovioi, K.vpr]vaiovs aT

WHAT IS THE MOST DESIRABLE LIFE? 305

any one and every one should set to work to get possession
of supreme power in the State would, however, be alto
gether mistaken. The exercise of supreme power is only
noble in the hands of those who have a just claim to rule,
both on the ground of virtue and on that of political capa
city. The best life, then, both for State and individual is
the practical life ; but the practical life need not be in
relation to others. Mental processes, which are complete
in themselves, and an end in themselves (ai avroreXei? Kal
at OLVT&V cvfKfv Oecapiai. KCU biavoi]&lt;reis } 1325 b 20), are more
truly practical (Trpa/crticai) than those which aim at some
thing beyond, for well-doing (et&gt;irpaia) is the end 1 , whence
it follows that action of some kind is the end, and even in
the case of action directed to a result external to itself, we
commonly say that those act in the truest and fullest sense
whose mental processes are those of a directing authority,
and therefore most purely mental 2 . Nay further, States
situated by themselves and purposed to live in isolation
need not live an inactive life (cnrpaKrelv^ even in the ordi
nary sense of the word, for there will be a mutual inter
action of their parts ; and the same thing holds good of
the individual 4 . Neither God nor the Universe, indeed,
exercise any activities external to themselves (ecorepi)cat

If we ask who were the disputants, between whom Aris-

1 This was a Socratic tradition They place before his hand that
(Xen. Mem. 3. g. 14-15). made the engine,

2 Contrast the language of Or those that with the fineness of
Plato, Polit. 259 C-E ; and com- their souls

pare the comments of Ulysses in By reason guide his execution.

Shakspeare s Troilus and Cres- 3 To airpanT^lv 8ia ftiov is said in

sida (Act i, Scene 3) on those Eth. Nic. I. 3. 1095 b 33 to be in-

who esteem no act, but that of compatible with happiness.

hand, and undervalue * Compare Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 a

the still and mental parts, 5, P.OV&TT) fjifv ovv ^aXen-os 6 fiios ov

That do contrive how many hands yap pq8iov icad avrov tvepyelv

shall Strike, on/e^co?, p.ed erepu&gt;v 8f KOI vpos

When fitness calls them on . . . aXXous paov : and 10. 7. 1177 a

So that the ram that batters down 32 sqq., where the ao(p6s is said to

the wall, be better able to energise by him-

For the great swing and rudeness self than the just or temperate or

of his poise, brave man.
VOL. I. X

306 FOURTH BOOK.

Who were totle arbitrates in the passage of which we have just stated
putants the drift, we shall find it easy to identify the eulogists of
bt . twee . the despotic and tyrannical type of constitution 1 . Many of
totle here that tribe were to be found throughout Greece. The advo
cates ?" cates of a life spent in constitutional rule, such as citizens
may exercise over fellow-citizens, would also be numerous 2 .
But who were those who praised a life detached from all
concern with external things a contemplative life, which
some say is the only philosophic life (1324 a 27 sq.) ? They
seem to be the same with those mentioned in 1324 a 35 sq.
as holding any rule exercised over others to be unjust, if
despotic, and unfavourable to felicity, if constitutional, and
also with those mentioned in 1325 a 18 sq. as pronouncing
against the holding of political offices, and distinguishing the
life of the free man (c \evOf pas ) from the political life. The
description would in some respects apply to Aristippus, who
made a point of withdrawal from political life, and this for
the sake of evi7//epta a word used by the school (Diog.
Laert. 2. 89) or as he expressed it, because he wished to
live as easily and pleasantly as possible (Xen. Mem. 2. i.
9) 3 ; but we do not know that he condemned all despotic
rule as unjust 4 . Aristotle probably refers, among others,
to Isocrates, who had not only discussed in the Ad Nicoclem
( 4 sq.), whether the life of one who, though occupying a
private station, acts like a man of worth, or the life of a

1 Cp. Plato, Laws 890 A, raCr Pericles, and Cimon possessed,
e oriV, o&gt; (piXoi, anavTa dv8pG&gt;v (ro&lt;p&gt;v who ruled their fellow-citizens not
irapa veois dvdpmnois, tSiwrcov rt KOI by force, like tyrants, but with their
Troir]Tcav,(f&gt;a(TK6i Ta)v dvai ToStxatoVa- willing consent (125 E sq.).

rov 5 TI TIS av vucq jBia6p.ei&gt;os odev 3 Cp. Xen. Mem. 2. I. II, aXX

dtrefifiai re dvdpanrois ep.n /TTTODO-I tya&gt; rot, c(pr] 6 ApicrTtniros, ov8e els

veois, a&gt;s OVK OVTOIV 0f5&gt;v dlovs 6 vop.os TTJV 8ov\eiav fpavTov rarra), aXX

irpoGTCLTTfi Stavoficrdai 6 eiy, crrdcrds tival ris p.oi 8oKfl pecrr) rovratv 686s,

re 8ia raCra, f\KovT(t&gt;i&gt; trpos TOV Kara fjv 7TfipS&gt;fj.ai /3a8i eii/, ovrf 81 dp^rjs

&lt;pv(riv opQov ^t oJ/, os f ari rfj dXrjdeia ovre 8ia 8ov\flas, aXXa fit t\ev&-

KparovvTa ?)v ra&gt;v aXXcoi Kat /ii) pias, fjnep p-dXicrra rrpbs fvdaifj.oviav

8ov\fvoi&gt;Ta (Tfpoi(TL Kara VO^JLOV. oyet.

2 Theages, in the dialogue of * We hear of Democritus also
that name ascribed to Plato, would that he withdrew from magistra-
wish (fvaifj,T)v av) to be a tyrant cies to private life (Cic. de Oratore
as he would wish to be a god, 3. 15. 56), but did he condemn
but all he seriously desires is despotic rule over others as un-
the wisdom which Themistocles, just?

THE RIVAL VIEWS AND THEIR UPHOLDERS. 307

tyrant is to be preferred/ but had, in his Letter to the sons
of the tyrant Jason ( n), declared for the former against
the latter *, and for office in states possessing constitutions
(ev rats Tj-oAireiats) rather than in monarchies, just as in the
De Antidosi ( 145, 150) he admits and explains his own
abstinence from office : raCra yap cruz;eraap.?]i&gt; ov 8ta TT\OVTOV
ovbe 8t vireprityavLav ovbe KdTa(f)povu&gt;v T&gt;V /AT) TOV O.VTOV Tpoirov
e/xot $U&gt;VTU&gt;V, dAAd rr)v p.eu ^o-v^iav /cat TVJV aTrpa-y^ocnivriv
aycLTTutv, p-dAiora 8 6pu&gt;v TOVS TOLOVTOVS nal Trap v\uv /cat Trapa
rots aAAots eiSo/a/xoDyras, ejretra TOV fllov 17810) vop-icras elvai
TOVTOV 17 TOV T&V 7roAAa TTpaTTovTu&gt;v, TL 8e rat? 8tarpt/3aiy
rats ffj-ais TTpttroobea-Tfpov, at? e^ apxys KaTf(TTY]crdfj.r]v ( 151 :
cp. 327-9). W G see from the charming sketch in the
Republic (Rep. 549 B sqq.), how much a head of a house
hold who took this view of life was usually despised for his
want of ambition by his wife and slaves, and the speech of
Callicles in the Gorgias (485 C sq.) expresses the same
opinion in a more aggressive way oraz; 8e 8r) 7rpea-/3vrepoi/
t8ft) ert (f)LXocro(f)ovvTa /cat fJ.ii a7TaAAarro//ei o^, TrArjywy /xot 8o/&lt;et
?/87/ 5eur0ai, a&gt; 2&&amp;gt;Kpares, OVTOS 6 avrjp o yap vvv 8?) eAeyov,
TOVT&lt;P rco dv^pcoTrw, KCLV Ttaw fixjivrjs tf, avavbpto ye-
vyovTi. ra p-eVa rrj? iroAetos Kat ras dyopas, tv als
0rj 6 Trotryrr)? TOVS avbpas dptTrpeTreis yiyvfcrdai, Kara8e8uKort
8e TOV AotTroy /3toy fiiGtvai p.era /AetpaKtcoy ev yatviq rptaif T)
rerrdpcof ^nQvpi^ovTa, eXev6(pov 8e Kat /xe ya /cat inavov p,T]8e7rore
&lt;p6tyacr6at.. A recent editor of Euripides remarks that he
uses the word rja-v^alos to denote the character of a man of
learning, and almost as equivalent to o-o^o s 2 ; and thus
in the Supplices of the same poet we find the soft life of
a follower of the Muses contrasted with the hard out
door life of riding and hunting, which makes men physi
cally capable of doing good service to the State (Suppl.
855 sqq.: cp. Plato, Rep. 410 D). The fact that Pericles
is represented by Thucydides as praising the Athenians
for being seekers after knowledge without softness shows
that the two characteristics were commonly thought to go

1 Cp. 4 (7)- 3- 1 325 a 24.

2 See Mr. Verrall s notes on Eurip. Med. 304, 808.

X 3

308 FOURTH BOOK.

together. We might have expected that the careers of
Epaminondas, Archytas, and Dion would have taught a
different lesson, and have proved that an active life of
political service was quite compatible with philosophical
study ; but the popular mind noted the general rule with
out taking sufficient account of these brilliant exceptions.

Aristotle The rival views had this in common, that they each
usual to declared in favour of one kind of existence as the most
mediate desirable, and were for adjusting the institutions of the

between . . . 111

the rival State exclusively to it. Aristotle is always glad, when

doctrines j^ can n( j something to accept in all the opinions be-

arriveat fore him, and it is in this spirit that he does justice
elusion em- between the views which he examines here. Despotic

bodying empire is not to be made the aim of the constitution ; but

truth con- it is not, as Isocrates had implied in the De Pace l , always

tamed m out o f pj ace anc j b ac j . on the contrary, there are those who

them with- J

out the are designed by nature to be so ruled. There is, however,

e notm ng great or glorious in thus ruling over them, and the
many-sided indiscriminate exercise of despotic rule is simply wicked.

life

To hold aloof from office and political activity and to
spend one s life in pure contemplation is not the only
course worthy of a philosopher, nor is it, on the other
hand, to devote oneself to an inactive life. For those
whose minds are busy with thoughts that are an end in
themselves are active in the truest sense, and besides
a life of this kind involves an internal inter-action of
parts, which is in itself sufficient to exclude the idea of
inactivity. We may therefore come to the conclusion
, -that the best life is the practical life the life of activity
in accordance with virtue and the capacity for the highest
kind of action (17 Tipa/cn/cr) 8wa/xjs T&V dpioraw, 1325 b n)
and yet hold that the truest form of it is the life which
is spent in mental activity of the kind that is an end in
itself such a life, for instance, as the life of contemplation.
It is in a life of this kind that the State finds its culmi
nation indeed, we infer that a speculative life suffices for

1 142 sqq.

THE SOLUTION OF ARISTOTLE. 309

happiness without any admixture of political activity (1325
b 27) but not a word is said by Aristotle against an union
of the two lives. On the contrary, we gather later on that
if a fit use of leisure is the supreme end of the State, the
virtues which a fit use of leisure presupposes are not only
those which find employment in leisure, but also those
which find employment in periods of activity 1 , so that
both, it would seem, should be possessed by the citizens of
the ideal State.

We see already that the life which Aristotle designs
for his State is more many-sided than that life of arms
and military exercise, the inadequacy of which had been
proved by the successive failures of the Lacedaemonian
and Theban States 2 , and better ordered and more philo
sophic than that lived by the higher classes at Athens.

If we compare the passage in Plato s Laws on which A passage
Aristotle has modelled his own enumeration of the aims
pursued by different States, we shall find both resemblances pared.
and differences. It is as follows (Laws 962 0-963 A) :

A0. Nvv 8?j /xa^rjo-o /xe^a, ort davp-acrrov ovoev TtXavaa-Qai ra
rooy TroAeo)! ro /xt/xa, on Trpbs aAAo aAArj /SAeVei r&lt;3y vo[j.o9f(ri,&v
tv rfl TroAet e/caoT??. KCU TO. jj,fv TroAAa ovbev Bav^aa-Tov TO rot?
fjifv TOV opov eu&gt;at T&V StKauoy, OTTCOJ apoucri rtres tv TT\ Tro Aei,
etr ovv /SeArtou? etre xetpous Tvyy^avovviv ovres rots 8 OTTCO?
TrAoi rr/o-oucrty, etr ovv SoCAot TIVU&gt;V ovres etre /cat /xr/ T&V 8 77
xpodvjj.ia Tipbs TOV ehfvdepov 87) (3lov wp^ri^vi] ot 8e Kat vvbvo
vo[j.odTovvTai. Trpos a[j.(pa&gt; /SAeTroyrcs, eAev^epot re OTTCO? aAAcoy
re TroAecov eo-oyrat SecrTro raf ot 8e o-o^wrarot ws otoyrat

1 Cp. 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 16, XPW l ~ e Ka 1 7rore KarmpQcoa-av, eVt

P.OI 8e TO&gt;V dpT&gt;v elal irpus rrjv TOV xpovov crvfj.fj.fli ai Kaddrrep

(r^oXjjf Kai Siaycayrjv, u&gt;v re ev TTJ EnaiJ.eiva&gt;v8as e8eie TeXevrrja avTos

tr^oX^ TO tpyov nal S)v ev rfj dtr^o- -yap fMUttv TTJV f]yffj.oviav dnoftaXelv

Ata. tvdvs TOVS Qrjfimovs crvvffir], yevcra-

2 A striking passage quoted by fifvovs aiirfjs povov ainov 5e eivai TO
Strabo from Ephorus (Ephor. \6ya&gt;VKal6pi\ias TriSTrposdvdpdinovs
Fragm. 67 : Miiller, Fr. Hist. Gr. oXfywpfjo-ai, (JLOVTJS S* fTTtfj.e\rj6rivat
I. 254) will illustrate this : TTJV TTJS /cara TroXf/jiov nper/)f. The
fiiv ovv x &lt; ^P av (Boeotia) enaivd histoiy of the Ottoman Turks
(*E(f)opos) dta raura, Kai (prja-i irpos explains what Ephorus and Aris-
fjyfp.oviav (v&lt;f)vo)s x et " uyayfj 8e totle mean, though both Lacedae-
Kal Trai8fia P.TI %pr] (ra/ne vovs, tirel monians and Thebans were very
fj.r)8e TOVS dtl irpoifTTaufvovs avrijy, different from Turks.

310 FOURTH BOOK.

ravrd re KCU ra rotavra ^v^-navra, els tv be ovbtv
Ten^ri^vov H^ovTes &lt;ppaeiv, els 6 raAA avrols 8ei /3A.e7reii&gt;.
KA. OVKOVV TO y fjfUftpOf, & eVe, opO&s av flrj TraAat
Trpos yap ez; e^ajney Seii; dei Trayfl $flp ra r&lt;3y
QXt-novT flvai, TQVTO 8 aperrjv TTOV ^vvf\(povp.V TTO.VV

Aristotle, we see, takes no notice of the view according to
which wealth was the end of the State, to be secured even
at the cost of freedom, if necessary, nor of that which saw
everything in freedom 2 , nor again of that which aimed at a
combination of wealth, freedom, and empire ; and his solution
differs from that of Plato in substituting for virtue as the
true aim of the State virtuous action and happiness. It is
not surprising that in reference to a second-best State like
that of the Laws, the question between the political life and
the speculative life does not come up for solution : Plato
had already dealt with this question in the Gorgias (500
sqq.) and the Republic. In the latter dialogue he asserts
even more strongly than Aristotle the inferiority of the
political to the philosophical life (5 [9 D) he seems almost
to speak of the former as a necessary rather than a noble
life (540 B) but he will not hear of his philosophic
guardians abjuring politics for philosophy (540 B). On this
point he speaks more clearly than Aristotle.
Thucy- Aristotle s indifference to empire and hegemony contrasts

dides sets significantly with the language of Thucydides in his Intro-
more store J

by empire duction. To Thucydides the interest and the greatness of
totle " Greek History increase pari passu with the rise of great

1 Isocrates had said (De Pace, learning and science within the

19) op ovv av eapKt&lt;T(ifi&gt; r]plv, circumference of ten miles from

TJjf n iroKiv d&lt;nu\a&gt;y oiKolptv where we sit, than in all the rest

Kai ra 7re/jt TOV fiiov fiiropwrepoi of the kingdom." Such was the

yiyvoL^ifda *ai TO -re npos f)/j.as dictum of Dr. Johnson, when he

avrovs opovoo ifjiev Km Trapa rols was seated with Boswell in the

"E\\T](TIV iidoKifio ifi.v ; -y&) fj.fv yap Mitre Tavern near Temple Bar

movfttu rovTtov vnap^avTODv rfXeco? (Hare s Walks in London, i.

TTJV noXivfvSaifjiovrjcreiv. Dr. John- xiii).

son seems rather to have felt with a Plato appears to use the words

Aristotle. "Sir, the happiness of 6 eXevdepos &ios in this passage in

London is not to be conceived but a different sense from that in

by those who have been in it. I which Aristotle uses the phrase

will venture to say there is more 6 TOV (Xtvdfpov /3t or (1325 a 19).

REMARKS ON THE DISCUSSION. 31!

hegemonies in Greece. One would almost say that it seems
to him to be the mission of the State to stand at the head
of a league and to be the mistress of the seas ; at all
events, States interest him most when they are massed in
great groups and set huge armaments afloat. To Aristotle,
on the contrary, a State without a dependent ally may be
as fully all that a State should be as a State with a thou
sand (Pol. 4 (7). 2. I324b 41 sqq. : 3. J325b 23 sqq.).
If the life ^ .^ch a State lives is of the due quality, it
matters not whether it has relations with a single other
State. It is obvious that the teaching of Aristotle on this
point had a special applicability, whether he intended it
or not, to the circumstances of Athens after the Social
War, and especially after Chaeroneia. Her loss of depend
ent allies was no reason why she should cease to be a great
State.

Aristotle s treatment of the subject would have been Remarks
more satisfactory if he had not mixed together the ques-
tions, what is the best life for the individual and what is
the best life for the State. The quest of empire by a State
is hardly the same thing as the quest of tyrannical autho
rity by an individual, and it is one thing for an individual
to abstain from active political life and quite another for
a State to stand aloof from all relations with other com
munities. Even if we hold his conclusions to be right,
they are reached in a wrong way. But his object was to
insist on the parallel between the State and the individual :
both are moral agents and the rule of duty is the same for
both. He even goes so far as to say that the virtues of
both are the same, though it is obviously impossible that
the account given in the Nicomachean Ethics of the
temperance (o-ox^poo-wrj) of the individual can hold in all
respects of that of the State.

This is, however, a less important matter than the
assertion that the State is no less bound than the indi
vidual human being to the exercise of moral and intel
lectual virtue. Aristotle s view is that, though the State

312 FOURTH BOOK.

is a greater and nobler and completer thing than the
individual, it is, like him, a subject of virtue and happiness,
and marked out by the facts of its nature for a life devoted
to the attainment of both; it must be brave, just, tem
perate, prudent, and philosophic, because otherwise it will
not fulfil its nature or its appointed end. Its obligation
to practise virtue in all its forms is based, not on its
duty to its members or to mankind, but rather on its
intrinsic nature and destination to be happy.

No difference between the circumstances of the indivi
dual and the State is taken into consideration. The State
is not to Aristotle, as to some later inquirers, under natural
right, while the individual is under civil right. Civil right
at its best is, on the contrary, in his view, identical with
natural right. He does not even consider whether the fact
that the State is the Whole, the individual a part of that
Whole, affects the moral obligations under which they
respectively rest whether the Whole, having no larger
unity to protect and care for it, and being a thing less easy
to replace than the individuals composing it, may not
reasonably take more account of its own preservation. We
must bear in mind that Aristotle held the State bound to
express in its constitution an ethical creed, and to bring the
convictions of each of its members as far as possible into
harmony with that creed. In fact, though he tacitly
abandons the parallel which Plato draws in the Republic
between the State and the soul of the individual human
being, he still believes firmly in an analogy between indi
vidual and State and presses it too far. r v .

We have now clearly before us the life which the best
State is to live a varied life of arms, politics, and philo
sophy and the next question is, what preliminary equip
ment must be asked of Fortune on its behalf, in order that
the efforts of the legislator in his special work, the pro
duction of virtue by laws and education (4 (7). 13. 1332 a
28-32), may not be wasted on ungenial soil or nullified by
defects in the population and territory. For the States-

SIZE OF THE STATE. 313

man, like the weaver or the shipbuilder or the master of any
other art, must be furnished at the outset with appropriate
material to work upon (4 (7). 4. 1325 b 40 sqq.). Under
the head of the preliminary equipment of the State, we
come first to the question, what should be the number and
character of the individuals constituting it, and what should
be the extent and character of the territory (1326 a

5 sqq.)-

We must ask of Fortune in the first place a people The pre-
neither too scanty nor too numerous. Many will say c ^t[ons
that a State to be happy must be large, but, if so, it of the
must be large in respect not of the merely instrumental t a C people
and subsidiary classes those concerned with necessary neither too

* ,- scanty nor

work but in respect of those which are true parts of too nu-
the State. It must be short in the stalk and full in merous -
the ear, to put Aristotle s meaning briefly, if it is to be
really a large State, and not merely a populous one.
And then again, experience tells us that exceedingly
populous States can hardly be well-governed States, and
this is confirmed by reasoning, for the ordering of an
overwhelming multitude is work for God, not man, and
what cannot be ordered well and beautifully cannot be
so governed : beauty, in fact, is seldom found apart
from a definite size and number. The most beautiful
State is that which, while possessing magnitude, is not
too large to be susceptible of order. Nay more, in
dependently of all considerations of beauty, the very
nature and function of the State imposes on it certain
maximum and minimum limits of size l . It needs to be
self-complete, not only in respect of necessaries, as is a
nation (eflvos-), but also in respect of things which contri
bute to the higher life ; it needs to have a constitution ;

1 Cp. Eth. Nic. 9- 1 H7 O b torn/ iVcos tv rt, dXXa Trav TO p.Tai&gt;

29 sqq., TOVS 8t (nrov8aiovs irorepov rivcav copi(rp.eva&gt;v. Kal &lt;pi\a&gt;i&gt; dr)

Tr\fi(TTOvs (car npi^/idi/, ij ecrrt n etrrt Tr\ijdos a&gt;picrp.(vov, Kal iirats ol

fjLfrpof Kal &lt;f)i\iKov nXrjdovS) axrirfp TrXeltrroi pfff &lt;av av 8vt&gt;aiTo TIS (Tvffiv.

rroXfuis ; oijTf yap f&lt; 8t&lt;a avdpunruiv The size of the State also, we

yevoir av noXis, OVT e K 8fKa /j.vpid8&lt;i&gt;v note, is settled by fixing certain

en TTtiXir e oriV. TO 8e TTOVOV OVK maximum and minimum limits.

FOURTH BOOK.

and yet, if its population is excessively great, where will a
general be found capable of acting as its commander 1 , or a
herald capable of reaching it with his voice ? Thus, while
the name of State is deserved by any community numerous
enough for good life 2 , and a State which transcends this
limit may deserve to be called a larger State, there is
a maximum which it must not overpass, on pain of ceasing
to be a State altogether. This maximum is fixed by con
siderations of good government. The citizens must not be
too numerous to be acquainted with each other, or how will
they be able to fill the magistracies aright or to arrive at
correct judicial decisions 3 ? Besides, in an over-large citizen-
body it is easy for the names of aliens to slip unobserved
into the list of citizens. Aristotle accordingly fixes the
ideal size of the State thus : the number of its citizens
should be the largest possible with a view to completeness
of life, provided only that it is not too large to be easily
taken in at a view. The phrase reminds us of the
well-known passage in the Poetics, in which the plot
of a tragedy is required to conform to certain limits of
length, just as a beautiful animal must neither be too small
nor too large wore Se? /ca0a7rep em rGtv croo/zdrcoi /cat evrt
rS&gt;v C&lt;?u&gt;v *x fLV P* v /^ e y e ^ 0? &gt; TOUTO 8e CVO-VVOTTTOV elvai, oi/rco
Kai CTU T&gt;V fj-vdcav ex LV ^ v W K s&gt; TOVTO 8 fVfj.vr]fj.6vfVTOv etvai
(Poet. 7. 1450 b 34-1451 a 15) ; and the same requirement
of magnitude that can be taken in at a view is made with
respect to a period in composition (Rhet. 3. 9. 1409 a 36).
Plato had already said that the many would expect the
happy State to be as large and rich as possible, and to
possess as great an extent of empire as possible, but would
also desire it to be as good as possible herein demanding
things mutually incompatible, for a State cannot be at
once exceedingly rich and exceedingly good (Laws 742 D-

1 Epaminondas, however, ac- ei t; 5 av rj ye ava-yKatordTrj iroXis
cording to one account commanded eV Terrapwv r\ ntvTe avdpav. This
in the Peloponnesus an army of Aristotle intends tacitly to correct,
70,000 men (Plutarch, Ages. c. 31 : 3 A similar idea underlay the
Thirlwall, 5. 95). early conception of jury-trial (see

2 Plato had said (Rep. 369 D) Hallam, Middle Ages, c. 8, note 8).

NATURE OF THE TERRITORY. 315

743 A) ; he had also said that there is nothing better for
a State than that its citizens should be known to one
another, for otherwise men will not get their due either in
respect of offices or justice (738 D-E) ; he had said, further,
that the citizens must not be too numerous for the terri
tory, or too few to repel the attacks of neighbouring States,
and to help them when wronged (737 C-D). These passages
contain the germ, though only the germ, of Aristotle s
chapter ; he has, however, also before him two passages from
orations of Isocrates ; one in which the Lacedaemonian king
Archidamus recalls that the greatness of his State rests not
on the size of the city or its populousness, but on the strict
obedience rendered by the citizens to their rulers (Archid.
81); the other, in which after allowing the vast services
rendered by Athens both to its own citizens and to the
Greeks generally, and the manifold pleasures of which it
is the source, he dwells on one great drawback 8ia yap
TO n/.eye0os /cat TO TrXrjOos rStv VOLK.OVVTU&gt;V OVK CVO-VVOTTTOS
f(mv ovb aKpi/3?;?, dAA Sxnrep ^ei^appovs, OTTCO? av e/cacrrov
i Ka ^ T v o.v9p&lt;air&lt;av KOL T&V Trpay/xarcoi;,
e, KOL boav ezu oi? TTJV fvavriav rrjs Trpo(rrjKov(rr]s
(De Antid. 171-2). Phocylides had already
said, not without wisdom :

Km roSf 3?a&gt;Kv\i8ov TTO\IS tv crKOTreXw Kara Kocrfiou
oiKfvcra trfUKpr) Kpfvcraiv NiVou a^paivoixrrj^.

In selecting an ideal territory, again, no less than ins. Aten-i-
determining the size of the State, Aristotle keeps Plato s Lvencha-
views before him (Laws 704 sqq.). racter.

He asks for a territory, not rugged indeed, like that of
Plato, but, like his, of varied character, capable of raising
produce of all kinds z , and thus complete in itself, so that

1 Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr. fr. 5. best be seen if we read in the Anti-

2 Cp. Plato, Laws 704 C, and quitates Romanae of Dionysius of
the description of Egypt in the Halicarnassus (i. 36-37) the
Busiris of Isocrates ( 12-14), interesting passage in which he
which may well have suggested to enumerates the immense variety of
Aristotle many of the characteris- advantages possessed by the soil
tics he desires the territory of his of Italy and the manifold services
best State to possess. How much which itwas capable of rendering to
the word navTofaipos implies will man. Dionysius, like Aristotle,

FOURTH BOOK.

there shall be as little need as possible of imports or ex
ports or of the classes occupied in importing or exporting.
We may imagine it to comprise sunny slopes for the
cultivation of the vine and olive, and rich levels for the
production of corn. It must be sufficient in extent to
support the citizen-population in a liberal, yet temperate
mode of life, without their needing to sacrifice the leisure
designed for them a mode of life as far removed from the
wassailing ways of many Greek cities 1 as from the ascetic
severity of Sparta. The territory must also be compact
and well under the eye of the authorities, hard of entrance
to foes 2 , though easy of exit for the forces of the State ;
and the city, which, unlike that of Plato s Laws 3 , is to be
situated not very far from the sea-coast, must be placed so

prefers this variety of aptitude to
the more monotonous merits of
Egypt, Libya, and the Babylonian
plain. Whether he was acquainted
with this chapter of the Politics,
we can hardly say. As to Italy,
cp. Columella de Re Rustica 3. 8. 5.
(quoted by Hehn, Kulturpflanzen,
p. 394) : his tamen exemplis nimi-
rum admonemur curae mortalium
obsequentissimam esse Italiam,
quae paene totius orbis fruges
adhibito studio colonorum ferre
didicerit. It was precisely because
most of the regions occupied by
the Greek race were better suited
for certain crops than for others,
that it came to be the sea-faring
and commercial race which it to a
large extent was. Aristotle and
Plato, wishing to make their ideal
communities as little commercial
as possible, asked for a territory
capable of raising produce of all
kinds.

1 See Theopompus descriptions
of life in the Chalcidian cities of
the Thrace- ward region (Fr. 149) :
at Tarentum (Fr. 259, 260) : at
Athens (Fr. 238). Theopompus,
however, is perhaps somewhat
prejudiced. The reference in the
seventh of the letters ascribed to
Plato to the luxury of Italian and

Sicilian life has already been noted.
Philip of Macedon, according to
Theopompus, won his hold of
Thessaly by nothing so much as
by his readiness to fall in with the
taste of the race for loose jovial
revels and coarse riotous fun
(Fr. 178). See also Timaeus
description of life at Sybaris
(Fr. 60 : Miiller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i.
205).

2 Compare Strabo s account of

Egypt (p. 8l9, Cp. p. 803, TCLVTT] 8e

Kai dv(reicrl3o\6s eaTiv f) Aiywroy
tK ra&gt;v (utdivuiv TOtrtov TO&gt;V Kara
QOIVIKTIV Kai TTJV lov8aiav). The
same merit is ascribed by Socrates
to Attica (Xen. Mem. 3. 5. 25,
TOVTO d\ (pT),(j) n.fpiK\eis, KaTavevorj-
Kar, OTL TrpoKeirai rrjs %&lt;apas rjfjicav oprj
fj.fyd\a Ka6!]Kovra eVrl rr)V Eoicoriav,
81* utv (Is rr)V x&pav tiaoSoi orei/ai
re Kai Trpocravreis elcri, /cat on fUtrn
Buftamu opecriv ipVfivoif ; Kai /uiXa,
f(ptj). As to Laconia, see Xen.
Hell. 6. 5. 24.

3 The central city of the State
founded by Plato in the Laws was
to be ten miles from the sea.
More than one of the chief cities
of Crete, in which island this
State is supposed to be founded,
were situate at about this distance
from the sea (Strabo, p. 476).

THE CITY TO BE NOT FAR FROM THE SEA. 317

favourably in relation both to the sea and to the territory \
and also to the continent (1330 a 34) on or near which it
lies, that the State will at once be well supplied with
necessaries, and also have all parts of its territory within
easy reach of its forces. Security and plenty are the two
objects to be kept in view (acr$aAeia not evTropia TU&gt;V avay-
/catW, 1327 a 19). Plato had withdrawn his city from the
sea and set it down in the centre of the territory (Laws
745 B), because, though not unaware that a fleet is of
value as a protection from foreign attack, he deliberately
preferred that his State should take its chance of destruc
tion, rather than that it should incur the moral degeneracy
and constitutional deterioration which he held to be in
separable from strength at sea (Laws 707 A-D). Isocrates
also had traced how maritime empire had corrupted and
ruined not only the Athenian but also the Lacedaemonian
State (De Pace, 75-105), and had helped to set afloat
the famous saying apxj&gt;] da^d&lt;rcrr]s apxr] KaK&v 2 . Aristotle,
on the contrary, desires to be near the sea. He feels
strongly more strongly than Plato the value of a mari
time position both for the supply of commodities and for
military strength, defensive and offensive the fate of
Plataea, Orchomenus, and Thebes, inland cities, and the
narrow escape of Sparta (1330 b 34) were perhaps present
to his mind, contrasted with the successful resistance of
Byzantium and Perinthus to Philip 3 and he also holds
that the moral and constitutional drawbacks of nearness
to the sea can be readily obviated. His city is to be
placed at a short distance from the coast, like Athens, and
to possess, not indeed a Peiraeus, an emporium for all

1 Strabo notices the excellence Wilamowitz, Philolog. Untersuch-
of the communications of Alex- ungen 4. 222, who refers to Athen.
andria with the interior of Egypt Deipn. 8. 334.

as well as with other countries ; 3 Compare also the remark of

the Mareotic lake behind it Dercyllidas to the partisans of the

brought it a far larger mass of Lacedaemonians at Sestos (Xen.

imports than the sea in its front Hell. 4. 8. 5) KOITOI, tyr), irolov

(p. 793)* M*" - v i(fX v P^ Tf P ov SIJOTOU XdjSoire

2 De Pace, lOI. On the )(a&gt;piov,7roiov8e8vcrTro hiopKr)T6Tepov t
other side of the question the 6 neat veu&gt;v KOI -irtfav Setrat, ei p.(X\ft
value of a daXacra-oKparia see iro\iopKr)8r]&lt;rf&lt;rdai.

31 8 FOURTH BOOK.

surrounding States, swarming with alien traffickers, but
a modest port, adequate for the transmission of commo
dities from the territory or from other States, well guarded
by walls to prevent its being seized by foes and used
against the capital, and serving as a residence for the few
alien merchants needed by the community, who might be, if
necessary, strictly prohibited from entering the city 1 . His
State was to have, indeed, not only a port but a fleet,
whose magnitude would depend on the nature of its policy;
it would not, however, need on this account to have a mob
of sailor-citizens (VO.VTIKOS oxAos), as Plato supposed, to
dominate and ruin its constitutional life (Laws 707 A),
for the fleet could be manned by slaves or serfs, like
that of Heracleia on the Euxine 2 . Aristotle is evidently
quite willing, on this understanding, to allow of even a
large fleet.

3. A people As to the character which those who are to be the

ttareter* citizens ( r \LTLKOV ir\fj6os, 1327 b 1 8) of the best State

should inherit from Nature, he asks, not for a population

resembling in character the barbarous races of Europe 3

and those of chilly regions generally 4 full of spirit

1 We may perhaps gather from 3 A distinction appears to be

.Theopompus" account of Byzan- drawn in the passage referred to

tium (Fr. 65), what democracy in the text (c. 7. 1327 b 20 sqq.)

was like in a busy Greek seaport, between ra nepl rfjv Evpu-rrrjv t Gvrj

thronged with traders, though we and r6 T&gt;V EXA^i/cav ytvos, which

must bear in mind that his sym- would seem to imply that Hellas

pathies were the reverse of demo- was not regarded by its author as

cratic. Rhodes, though a seaport. forming part of Europe. In Phys.

seems to have been a well-ordered 5. I. 224 b 21, Kal ds rf)t&gt; Evpanrrjv,

State, and Massalia also. But on pepos nl A^i/oi rfjs Evpcanrjs,

Aristotle is probably thinking of we find the contrary view ex-

the Peiraeus, the home of many pressed, but Prantl is inclined to

foreign worships and the channel consider these words as an inter-

through which they found their polation, for reasons connected

way into Attica (Haussoullier, Vie with the interpretation of the pas-

Municipale en Attique, p. 189). sage (see his critical note on it,

a According to I socrates, indeed p. 236 of his edition of the Phy-

(De Pace, 48, 79), the Athenian sics).

fleet at the time of the Peloponne- * So Plato (Rep. 435 E) ascribes

sian War was manned by aliens the spirited type of character to

gathered from the whole of Greece the inhabitants of Thrace and

and by slaves. The idea of Aris- Scythia, and generally to those

totle had already occurred to Ja- who live in the Northward re-

son of Pherae (Xen. Hell. 6. I. 1 1). gions.

CHARACTER OF THE PEOPLE.

3*9

and courage, but defective in intelligence and contriving
skill (biavoias nal re x^s, 1327 b 24 *), and hence though
free, for spirit is the source of independence (ap^iKov nal
ariTT-nrov, 4 (7). 7. 1328 a 7 : cp. Eth. Nic. 4. n. 1126 b i),
destitute of constitutional organization (a-n-oAireura), and
unequal to the exercise of supremacy over their neigh
bours 2 ; nor again for an Asiatic population possessed
of intelligence and ingenuity but wanting in spirit, and
therefore tending to lose their freedom 3 ; but for a
Greek population with qualities answering to the mid
way geographical position of Greece, on the edge of
Europe, yet bordering on Asia, and combining the two
essential characteristics, spirit and intelligence. For though
all Greek stocks did not possess this completeness of
endowment, some falling short in the one direction and
others in the other, it was, so Aristotle held, a general
characteristic of the race to be strong in both ways 4 , with

1 Grote (History of Greece, 12.
358 n.) explains the word re^vr]?
by powers of political com
bination, but perhaps its mean
ing is wider (cp. rexfLKwrepov, Pol.
I. 9. 1257 b 4). Still the political
art (3. 12. 1282 b 14-16) is one of
the many which these races do
not possess, and it is probably
present among others to Aristotle s
mind in this passage. The view is
put forward in Probl. 14. 15. 910 a
26 sqq. that timid natures are
more given to investigate, and
therefore are wiser, than those of
an opposite character (dia -ri oi t v
rols t)epp.ols TOTTOIS crotputTepoL daiv
fj fv TOLS \l/vxpols ; . . . iravra^ov 8e
oi (poftovfJ-fvoi TUIV dappovvTO}j&gt;[j.a\\ov
eVt^etpoiJcri ^rj-relv, uxrrf Kai fvp/cr-
Kovcri paKXov : cp. also Probl. 14.
8. 909 b 9 sqq. : and 14. 16. 910 a
38). We learn from the De Par-
tibus Animalium, that the same
thinness and wateriness of the
blood, which in moderation was
thought to produce intelligence, in
excess produces cowardice (De
Part. An. 2. 4. 650 b 1 8 sqq.).

2 For it is intelligence

that confers the right to rule and
the capacity to rule aright (Pol. I.
2. 1252 a 31 sq.).

3 Plato s view of the Egyptian
and Phoenician character is much
the same (Laws 747 C). Com
pare also Plutarch, De Vitioso
Pudore, c. lo, irdvTfs oi rfjv Ao-iW

TTO) 8ia TO fjif) 8vva(r6ai p.iav
rrjn Ov (TvXXa^rjv. Strabo repeats
Nearchus praises of the ^tXorr^*a
of the Indians (p. 717) and, follow
ing Homer, ascribes a similar apti
tude to the Phoenicians (p. 757).
The Greek conception of the bar
barians of the North, on the other
hand, is illustrated by statues such
as that of the dying Gaul (mis
called the dying Gladiator), and
by heads of barbarians such as
the well-known one in the British
Museum. See also Seneca de
Ira, I. ii : 3. 3.

* A similar eviepaa-ia is traced
by Aristotle in man as compared
with the lower animals (De Gen.
An. 2. 6. 744 a 30). So the west
wind is pleasantest, partly because
it is well-tempered (evKparos) : cp.

320 FOURTH BOOK.

the result that it was not only free but under better
political institutions than any other, and would even be
competent to rule all other races, if amalgamated under
one constitution. Unlike Plato, who had allowed spirit to
find expression in one class of his Republic and intelli
gence in another, and had trusted for success to the
co-operation of three classes, each possessed of only partial
excellence 1 , Aristotle holds that spirit and intelligence
must meet in each individual citizen, if the State is to
be the best State. To make this requirement is indeed,
in Aristotle s view, merely to insist on a type of character
already realized by the Hellenic race.

We note, first, in reference to this interesting review of
the varieties of national character as they broadly presented
themselves to the mind of Aristotle, the fixity he ascribes
to the main outlines of European and Asiatic character.
This is quite in harmony with his general impression that
the future has few new developments in store. In just the
same way he is convinced that the hexameter is the only
metre for an epic or any long poem (Poet. 24. 1459 b 31-
1460 a 5). Isocrates, who had said in his Panegyric
Oration ( 50) that the name of Hellene had come to
indicate a form of culture rather than extraction, could
have taught him better. Aristotle s language appears,
on the contrary, to imply that no race but the Hellenic
has any chance of realizing the best State. We see, how
ever, that if the division of mankind into Greeks and bar-

Probl. 26. 31. 943 b 23, r\ TrpS&gt;roi&gt; fiev from the second (or soldier) class,

on fx fl r 7 J/ r v depos Kpaaiv ; ovre till they have attained the age

yap 6fp/j.6s . . . o*Tf TJrvxpos ... of twenty, and have shown them-

dAX V p.{6opiq&gt; enl r&v -fyvxpvv selves worthy of further edu-

Kal Qfp^wv Trvfvfj.aToti -yfiTvi&v Se cation and of advancement to

afji&lt;poiv rrjs 8vvdp.fa&gt;s a\n&gt;v Koivu&gt;vf~t, the highest class (see Plato, Rep.

dio KCU evKparos tari KOI nvd. enpos 537 A sqq., and Sus. 2 , Note 182).

ndXiara (Probl. 26. 31. 943 b They also, like Aristotle s citizens,

21 sqq.). The pear) ap^ovLa (the will have begun by being ^D/iOftSetf

Dorian) is Greek (Pol. 5 (8). 7. and have left that stage behind.

1342 b 14 sqq.). Still they commence their special

1 It should be noticed, how- education at the early age of

ever, that the highest class in the twenty, and therefore are severed

Republic consists of men who are from the soldier-class much sooner

not singled out and distinguished than the citizens of Aristotle.

THE GREEK RACE IN CONTRAST WITH OTHERS. 321

barians still holds its ground, notwithstanding Plato s
censure of it in the Politicus (263 C sqq.), the barbarian
world is falling apart (cp. Plato, Rep. 435 E) into two
strongly contrasted halves the barbarians of Europe and
those of Asia, or perhaps more exactly, those of cold
and those of hot climates marked off from each other
by profound differences of character. Something, there
fore, has been gained, though justice has hardly been
done to nations of Asiatic origin, such as the Carthaginian,
which were certainly not wanting in spirit and love of
independence, and whose form of government is praised
by Aristotle, or again to European races like the Itali of
the tenth chapter, which possessed at least one institution
valued by Aristotle (c. 10. 1329 b 5 sqq.) to say nothing
of the Romans and the Jews, with whom Aristotle was
probably only imperfectly acquainted, if at all. The con
trast of Europe and Asia still exists, though, thanks, in
part, to Greece, we should no longer be correct in drawing
it as Aristotle draws it. Europe has become the chief
home of ! thought and contriving skill, and, if Asia has
fallen into the rear, the element of spirit in its character
has certainly been strengthened by Mahometanism.

Aristotle, knowing little of Rome and perhaps under
rating Carthage, overestimated the strength of the Greek
race in comparison with that of others. Could the Greek
race, united in one State, have conquered even Italy and
Carthage, to say nothing of ruling them? Aristotle
thought that it was equal to this task (1327 b 32) 1 ; and

1 Mr. Eaton compares Hdt. 9. 2, the earlier days of Philip of Mace-

where the Thebans advise Mar- don as etiam nunc et viribus et

donius to create disunion in dignitate orbis terrarum princi-

Greece by bribing its leading men pern (Hist. Phil. Epit. 8. 4. 7)

Kara p.ev yap TO la"xypbv "EXXjj- an expression less strong than

vas opoippovfovras, olntp Kal irapos Aristotle s, but in the same vein.

TO.VTO. iyivaxTKov, xaXfTra eu/ni Trept- Aristotle may have derived the

yivfa-dai KOI airavt dvdpuiroio-i. idea of the union of Greece under

Justin, epitomising Trogus Pom- one constitution from the policy

peius, who here, no doubt, re- of Philip at the Congress of Corinth,

produced some Greek historian of which Justin thus speaks : ibi

Ephorus or Theopompus, very pacis legem universae Graeciae

probably speaks of Greece in pro meritis singularum civitatium

VOL. i. y

322

FOURTH BOOK.

Distribu
tion of
social
functions

as to Macedon, he probably shared the opinion which his
relative and disciple, Callisthenes, was imprudent enough
to express, when, at a banquet of Macedonian leaders
and in the presence of Alexander, he ascribed the victory
of Macedon to the discords of Greece (Hermipp. Fragm.
49 : Miiller, Fr. Hist. Grace. 3. 47). Aristotle may have
overestimated the strength of the Greek race, yet we must
not forget that it was a great thing once for all to break,
as he did, with the traditions of the popular ethnology
of the day 1 , which tended to idealize the races lying at
the extreme limits of the known world Hyperboreans,
Scythians, Indians, Ethiopians, and the like and boldly
to say that the central race, the Greek, was in reality the
noblest.

Aristotle has now determined what initial equipment
(xP r iy^ a ) or Matter (v\t]} to ask of Fortune for the best
State, and his next step is (c. 8) to enumerate and place
in the right hands the various 77pdets, or activities, the
due discharge and exchange of which is essential to the life
of a State.

He begins by drawing a strong distinction between
what we may call the nucleus and the appendages of the
State. In all natural wholes (ra Kara fyva-Lv o-weorwra), and
therefore in the State, not all those things without which
the whole cannot exist are parts of it. Parts must have
some one thing in common, and so must Koivavoi, whether
their shares are equal or not. But when one element is
the means and another the end as, for instance, the art
of the builder is the means, and the house the end
they cannot have the one thing in common which is
necessary to make them parts of a single Whole. The
house cannot exist without the art of the builder, but the
house and the art of the builder do not form parts of
a single Whole ; they have nothing in common except that

statuit, consiliumque omnium veluti
unum senatum ex omnibus legit
(Hist. Phil. Epit. 9. 5. 2).

1 See Ephor. Fragm. 76 sub Jin. :
Muller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 257.

DISTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL FUNCTIONS. 323

the builder makes and the house is made ; they are only
so far related to each other as that which acts upon a.
thing is related to the thing upon which it acts 1 . So
property, animate or inanimate, is necessary to the State,,
but no part of it, for the State is a society of men like
to each other, and the one thing in common which holds
them together is a common pursuit of the best attainable
life. But as the best attainable life is the life of happiness,
and happiness is an actualization and complete exercise
of virtue, and as many cannot fully share in this life and
others cannot share in it at all, we see how varieties
of constitution necessarily arise. Aristotle perhaps re
members that some constitutions admitted to power not
only those who could live the life of happiness, but in
larger or smaller numbers those who could not live it.
We infer, though Aristotle does not go on to draw
this moral, that the best State will be careful not to
admit to power any but those who can attain to virtue
and happiness. A human being, for instance, who is
fit for nothing higher than to be an animate article of
property, must not be made a part of the best State.

After these introductory remarks, Aristotle proceeds to List of
obtain (1328 b 2 sqq.) by a rapid review of society the n ^ es . sary
list of elements or yeVrj necessary to a State to which deliber-

reference has already been made (above, p. 97). 1

includes in his enumeration cultivators, handicraftsmen, functions
a fighting class, a well-to-do class, priests, and men capable given to
of deciding questions relating to things necessary and artisans &gt;
expedient for the State (/cptrcu TK&gt;V ai&gt;ayKauoi&gt; KOL crv^epov- cultivators,
. We have already seen that he refuses to adopt the

1 How far this is, may be cp. Pol. I. 5. 1254 a 22 : 4 (7). 14. State in
gathered from De Gen. et Corr. 1333 a 32: Polyb. 5.49.6, 86{-avTos -war.

* 7- 3 2 3 b 29 sqq., aXX eVet ov TO fie TO IS TroXXoty Emyevovs uvayKaio-

rv^ov nt(f)VKe ndo-^eiv Kal TTOK IV, aXX repa Kal avufpopcuTepa \tytiv. Com-

ocra r) tvavria tariv rj fvavTiaxnv pare also Xen. Mem. 3. 6. 13, aXX

e^et, ava.yK.ri KOI TO iroiovv Kal TO fKfivov ye Toi,f(pri, oiS on OVK rj/jif\T]--

Ttdcrxov rw yevei p.ev op.oiov etVai Kal Kas,a\\ e&lt;TKc^raL,7r6crovxpovovlKav6s

ravTo, TO&gt; 8 ei Sei dv6fj.oi.ov Kal evav- i&lt;mv 6 (K Trjs \capas yiyvo/jifvos OTTO?

T LOV K.T.\. 8iaTpe(f)eiv TTJV iroXiv, Kal TTOCTOU (Is

2 For the distinction between rbv tviavr&v 7rpoo-8eiTa, iva (J.TJ TOV-
things necessary and expedient, TOV ye Xa ^.v ere irore f) TTO^

Y 2

324 FOURTH BOOK.

democratic plan of allowing cultivators, traders, and handi
craftsmen a share in deliberative and judicial functions. We
pass, then, to the next class, the fighting class (TO /xax 1 / 101 )-
Are soldiers to be accorded these functions, or, in other
words, are the functions of soldiering, on the one hand,
and of deliberating and judging, on the other, to be placed
in the same hands? Not at the same time: the same
persons are to discharge both sets of functions, but
successively. This is the course which justice and
expediency and a regard for the safety of the State
dictate. It would seem, however, from c. 9. 1329 a 30
8e Su/prjTcu TO TTO\ITIKOV eis bvo ^fprj, TOUT eort TO Te
ol TO fiovXtvTiKov that the military order is
accounted part of the citizen-body \ not quite consistently
with the definition of citizenship in the Third Book, which
makes a share in deliberative and judicial office the note of
the citizen.

TO tviropov Then we come to the well-to-do class (TO einropov). Wealth

citizen- is f r the citizens, so that this class and the citizen-body must

class. coincide. Plato in the Republic had not only included his

third, or business, class (TO ^p^aTio-TLKov) in the citizen-body,

but had made this section of the citizen-body the owners

of all the land. Aristotle insists that the citizens must be

owners of the land, and that none must be citizens, or

consequently own land, save those who possess virtue 2 .

Pnestly Lastly, as to the priests. We must employ citizens to

to be given pay honour to the gods, and if we assign the priesthoods

rulers ^ t ^ ie State to citizens who are too old for political service,

j, dXX eiSw? fxns vnip T&gt;V best State of Aristotle all the

avayKuiaiv 0vpf3ov\fva&gt;v rfj TroXet citizens share in the constitution,

f3oT)6eli&gt; re KOI cra&gt;eiv avTrjv : and which the soldiers can hardly be

Strabo, p. 235, ot rraXmnl fj.fi&gt; TOV said to do.

ou? TT)S Pa&gt;fj.rjs toXiytopow, Trpos * It was a common saying in

/iei foo-i /cat avayKatorepots Greece that Plutus was blind, and

forts. Demetrius the Phalerean had

1 Yet we are told in c. 12. 1331 b added that his guide Fortune was

4, that the body of individuals blind also (Diog. Laert. 5. 82).

composing the State (TO TrXfjdos In Aristotle s best State this would

rijs TroXecos) is divided into priests not be the case, for wealth would

and magistrates, and in c. 13. go to those who would use it

1 332 a 34 it is said that in the aright.

DISTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL FUNCTIONS. 325

we shall fitly provide both for the worship of the gods and
for the repose of the aged.

Aristotle, then, decides in favour of dividing the State The dis-
into yeVrj, and not only gives the functions of cultivators, Between
handicraftsmen, and Say-labourers to a class marked off some
from the military and governing classes, but also marks off

the last-named class from the military class and the tween

, . . others tern-

holders Of priesthoods. porary.

In all this he intentionally departs from the practice of Advan r" th -
the Athenian and other democracies, which made over arrange-
deliberative and judicial functions not only to men con- ment
cerned with necessary work, but also to men whose age,
he held, unfitted them for their proper discharge. Aris
totle s desire, on the contrary, is to reserve these functions
for those who are unfitted for them neither by occupation
nor by age for men in the prime of their powers, neither
too old nor too young. He has before him, on the one
hand, the examples of Egypt and Crete (c. 10), where the
tillers of the soil were marked off from the soldiers of the
State ; on the other, such utterances of popular wisdom as
the line

"Epya vtciiv, jSovXal 8e p-fcrnv, et^al 8e

or the verses of Ion of Chios in praise of the Laconian
State :

Ou yap Xrryot? Aa.Ka.iva Trvpyovrai TroXtr,
ciXX etrr " Apr;? veo^fios fp.TTfcrr) orparo),
fiov\r) fjLfv dpxei, \fip d e

The powers of the popular assembly at Athens, it must
be remembered, were not confined, like those of the people
in most modern democracies, to the selection of the legis
lators and rulers of the State ; it held in its hands the
whole administration of affairs. It was no doubt largely
made up of the persons whom Aristotle would disqualify

1 See Leutsch and Schneidewin, 2 Ion Chius, Fragm. 1 1 (Miiller,
Paroemiogr. Gr. i..j&gt;. 436 : 2. pp. Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 49).
167, 419 : and cp. S,trabo, p. 675.

326 FOURTH BOOK.

on grounds of occupation or of age. The contrast of the
older and younger citizens, again, is one that often comes
to the surface in Greek history l .

Aristotle, who holds with Plato (Laws, 653 A) that
(j)povi](Tis comes only with years 2 , wishes to reserve deliber
ative and judicial work for mature minds. Even, indeed,
at Athens, though men became members of the assembly
at the age of 20, they could not be elected to the Boule
or placed on dicasteries till they were 30, nor could they
act as public arbitrators (8icur?]rai) if they were under 50.
At Sparta membership of the assembly was withheld till 30
years of age were attained. On the other hand, the tenure
of office by men in extreme old age, to which Aristotle and
Plato both object, probably seldom occurred in demo
cracies ; it would be far more frequent in oligarchies, or
in constitutions like the Lacedaemonian, under which many
important positions were held for life.

To expect the military class a class which has the
power to maintain or overthrow at will the institutions
of the State (1329 a n) to accept a position of permanent
subjection, as Plato in the Republic expects it to do, is
in Aristotle s opinion to expect too much : he provides,
therefore, that it shall be transferred to the work of
governing, when years and experience of being ruled
have developed the virtues of the ruler. We shall thus,
he holds, not only content a formidable class, but also
secure good soldiers and good rulers. Youth is the age
for war, deliberation is work for mature men 3 . In saying

1 See the interesting story of Florence in 1530 we find the

the conflict between the older and giovani and vecchi taking opposite

younger citizens of Termessus in sides referring to Varchi, Storia

Pisidia (Diod. 18. 45-47: Thirl- Fiorentina, 1. xii. princ. The same

wall, 7. 233 sq.). The younger division of opinion appears at

men forgot the interest of their Sparta (Thirlwall, 8. 142, 226).
city in their generous devotion to 2 Cp. Eth.Nic.2. 1.no3ai5sqq.

their leader, Alexander s general 3 Charicles, one of the Thirty

Alcetas ; Aristotle would say that Tyrants, in reply to an inquiry of

they showed 6vn6s, not (frpovrjo-is. Socrates, up to what age men

Thirlwall refers to a similar feud were to be accounted young, said

at Gortyna in Crete between the "Oo-ovrrfp xp vov ftooktvtaf &lt;&gt;VK ecr-

Trpeo-ftvTfpoi and vecanpoi. (Polyb. 4- TIV, cos OVTTCO (frpovip-ois ovaC fir/be

53), and adds In the siege of &lt;ru SiaXeyov vewrfpois

RELATION OF SOLDIERS AND RULERS. 327

this, Aristotle does not, like those whom Ulysses criticises
in the passage of Shakspeare s Troilus and Cressida to
which we have already referred (above, p. 305, note), count
wisdom as no member of the war, if we understand by
wisdom military skill : what he denies to his younger
men is ^poVrjo-ts, a totally different thing. He wishes the
citizen-rulers of his State to have been soldiers, but to
be so no longer. Rule is not for the soldier. Cedant
arma togae. The capacity for ruling is a totally different
thing from the capacity for fighting. On the other
hand, the State must place its soldiers in a position that
will content them ; otherwise its peace will be in peril.

The military organization of Aristotle s State would,
however, apparently, be on a small scale. The number
of his citizens cannot, it would seem from his language
in 2. 6. 1 265 a 13 sqq., be intended nearly to reach that of
the citizens in the State of the Laws (5040) ; yet even if
we take their number to be 5000 and allow two sons
to each, we should hardly obtain more than a moderate
number within the military age. Plato and Aristotle,
however, agree in this, that they desire their citizens to
possess military aptitude and experience, and yet refuse
to make military service the crowning pursuit of their
life. They neither approve a State whose citizens shrink
from military service and hand it over to mercenaries, like
some States of the day (Isocr. de Pace, 43 sqq.), nor yet
a State like the Lacedaemonian, where military prowess
was everything.

The employment of this force is subject to the limi
tations imposed by Aristotle on War. War, he says 1 ,
adopting the view expressed by Plato in the Laws
(628 E), is for the sake of peace ; but a little later,

erS&gt;v (Xen. Mem. I. 2. 35). But 50), and it is true that in the Re-
Plato counts men of 40 among veot public (539E) men seem to be
(Laws 951 E) ; and Aristotle accounted veoi up to that age.
speaks not of vfoi but vfatrtpoi. According to a writer in the Times
Susemihl, indeed, seems to think (June 26, 1882) the age of 50
that Aristotle intended military in a Turk is not far removed from
service to be rendered up to the dotage.
fiftieth year (Sus. 2 , Einleitung, p. 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 35.

328 FOURTH BOOK.

consciously or not, he seems somewhat to relax this
limitation (4 (7). 14. 1333 b 38-1334 a 2), for he
now allows of three aims in war: i. self-defence
against subjugation by others ; 2. hegemony exercised
for the benefit of the ruled, not indiscriminate despotic
empire exercised over others, whether deservedly or not ;
3. despotic authority over those who deserve to be so
ruled 1 . This enumeration omits wars waged in defence
of allies, but it is wide enough to be accepted by any
conqueror, however ambitious, who might be willing to
adjust his methods of rule to the claims of the States
subjugated by him.

As to the financial organization of his State, Aristotle
says nothing in what we have of the Politics, though it is
evident that the maintenance of a fleet would be impossible
without a considerable revenue. A large revenue, indeed,
was becoming every day more essential for military
strength of any kind. States depending, as the Athenian
and Lacedaemonian States had done and as Aristotle s
State was to do, on purely citizen troops were coming to
be out of date. Syracuse fought Carthage, and Carthage
Syracuse, with forces partly citizen and partly mercenary.
Macedon employed mercenaries as well as Macedonians.
But the employment of mercenaries was costly. The
relations of the leading States of Greece Proper with Persia
in the fourth century B.C. illustrate the financial weakness
of these States, but neither Plato nor Aristotle seem quite
to have recognized their significance, though Aristotle
shows by his remarks in the eleventh chapter of the First
Book of the Politics that he was not unaware of the im
portance of the subject.

1 Compare Cicero s account of give a somewhat wider scope to

the just causes of war (de Rep. war. As the remark immediately

3. 23. 34-5) : nullum bellum follows noster autem populus

suscipi a civitate optima nisi aut sociis defendendis terrarum iam

pro fide aut pro salute. A little omnium potitus est he is appa-

further on, he adds extra ulci- rently ready to justify the wars

scendi aut propulsandorum hos- which resulted in the world-wide

tium causam bellum geri iustum rule of Rome.
nullum potest, which seems to

THE PRIESTHOOD. 329

The control of the State, we see, will rest in the hands
of the citizens of mature age. These will also for the most
part own the land and rule the households of the State,
for the male citizen is not to marry till 37 years of age.
They will be qualified to rule over freemen, for they
will have had a long experience of being ruled. Their
education and their period of military service will also
have prepared them to fill their position aright. They
will pass their years of maturity in political activity and
philosophical speculation, after the fashion of Archytas
at Tarentum ; and when the vigour of their years is over,
they will be withdrawn from these occupations, for the
State might suffer from their infirmities, and they will then
be eligible for the priesthood. Thus in Aristotle s scheme,
one and the same individual is to take on himself suc
cessively the functions of soldier, statesman, and priest.
We observe that both Plato and Aristotle fear to trust
very old men with political power. The history of the
Papacy may be quoted against them, perhaps not alto
gether conclusively ; at any rate they are right as to the
general rule.

The selection of superannuated citizens to serve as priests Remarks
will be less surprising to us, if we bear in mind not only o t i e "si n .
that priesthoods were commonly regarded in Greece in the g ular ar -
light of dignified sinecures \ but also that advanced age ^iti re-
was held to be a recommendation for the office. The s P? ct | th . e

priesthood.

service of the gods was supposed to demand clean hands
and in some degree a pure heart . . . Even celibacy was
frequently required ; but in many instances the same
end was more wisely pursued by the selection either of
the age in which the passions are yet dormant, or that in
which they have subsided 2 . Aristotle chose the latter,

1 Cp. Isocr. ad Nicocl. 6, ship of the gods with relaxation

TO.VTTJS 8e rfjs dveapaXias KOI TIJS (avdiravvis, Pol. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a

Tapaxijs airiov ecr-riv on TrjV /3acri- 32: Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. II. Il6oa

XeiW axjTTep iepao-vvjjv TTUVTOS dvdpbs 24), and none have a better right

eiVat vofufavffiv, o raif avdpanrivaiv to repose and relaxation than

irpayp.a.TU)v p.fyi&lt;rrov can KOI irXeia- those whom he makes priests.

Tr}s irpovoias Sedjuei/oi/. Aristotle 2 Thirlwall, History of Greece,

also connects the sacrificial wor- i. 204.

33 FOURTH BOOK.

herein following the example of Plato in the Laws (759),
where priests and priestesses are required to be not less
than sixty years of age l . Plutarch, on the other hand,
wrote a treatise (An Seni sit gerenda respublica) in favour
of old statesmen dying in harness, like Cato the Censor,
one reason which weighs with him being the fear of their
needing to descend from politics to less noble employ
ments. He does not seem to be aware of Aristotle s
suggestion, which would at all events have met this
particular difficulty. Aristotle had perhaps noticed that
in many cases the heroic kingship of Greece had subsided
into a priesthood (Pol. 3. 14. 1285 b 16), and thought
that the life of his magistrates might well close in the
same way. His plan appears to imply a priesthood dedi
cated to priestly duties exclusively, not one adding to
them, as was often the case in Greece 2 , other occupations
and interests. He did not probably intend to abolish
priestesses : in Greece there were commonly as many
female as male ministers of religion 3 . Priests would not
in Aristotle s State possess as great an influence or occupy
as paramount a position as that which Plato gives in the
Laws to some members of the order (especially the priests
of Apollo) : in the Politicus, on the contrary, he is very
decided in marking off their functions from those of states
men (Polit. 290 C sqq.).

Principle It must be remembered that in all this Aristotle has
Aristotle s ^ e ideal State in view. The principle which underlies his
distribution scheme of social and political organization is the adjust-

of functions . , ,

in his best ment of function to capacity 4 and of instruments to both.
State. jj. jg a soun d one, whatever we may think of his application
of it.

1 Compare Uionysius of Hali- ger strength for political activity,

carnassus commendation of the * ThirhvaJ], i. 203.

regulations of Romulus with 3 ThirlwaJl, I. 204.

respect to the Roman priesthood 4 In the Fourth Book functions

(Antiqq. Rom. 2. 21). In the Re- appear to be distributed rather

public (498 C) Plato recommends according to capacity than accor-

that men should make philosophy ding to contribution (4 (7). 9.

the main occupation of the last 1329 a 8 sq.). The two things,

years of life, when there is no Ion- however, do not lie far apart.

THE BEST STATE OF ARISTOTLE. 331

The happiest State, he holds, is that in which the.
highest things are willingly left to the highest and best
prepared natures, in which a body of men exists in a
position to live, and living, for all that is best and noblest
in human life, and in which natures unable to live that
life ask nothing better than to grow in virtue by aiding
others to live it and accepting their rule 1 . A body
of citizens living the highest life that man can live, the
source to those around them who cannot live that life
of all the virtue of which they are capable this is
Aristotle s ideal of human society. It cannot, in his
view, be realized unless Fortune and Nature second the
efforts of the lawgiver, but the essential condition of the
ideal State is a wise and understanding people, and
the best means of producing such a people is, subject
to the favour of Fortune and Nature, a correct regulation
of marriage, of the rearing of children, of education and
social habits generally. The office of law and institutions
and organization is to breed a virtuous people, not to
supply its place, which indeed these agencies cannot do 2 .

The tenth chapter falls into two parts (1329 a 4o-b 35 and Arrange-
b 36-1330 a 33), the former of which will be considered in [hedTvidon
an Appendix 3 . The latter completes the subject of the of the tern-
territory and need not detain us long. That the land is to its cuhiva-
belong to the citizens, but that they are not to be its culti- tion -
vators, we know already ; we also know what should be its

1 Some points of resemblance be my Ruler, whose will is to be

are traceable between this view, higher than my will, was chosen

which is however put forward by for me in Heaven. Neither

Aristotle only as an ideal, and except in such Obedience to the

Carlyle s far more absolutely Heaven-chosen is Freedom so

stated doctrine. " Well also," much as conceivable " (Sartor

says Teufelsdrockh, " was it Resartus, book 3, c. 7). But the

written by Theologians : a King differences between the two views

rules by divine right. He carries far out-number the resemblances,

in him an authority from God, or 2 Cp. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 33, O-TTOV-

man will never give it him. Can Sain TroXty eWi T ruvs woXtras TOVS

I choose my own King ? I can p.ere ^ovras rijs TroXirem? flvai arrov-

choose my own King Popinjay, Saiovs : and Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom.

and play what farce or tragedy I 2. 24.

may with him : but he who is to 3 See Appendix E.

332 FOURTH BOOK.

extent and character : it remains to settle how it is to be
divided and what is to be the character of those who are to
cultivate it.

Before any award of land is made to individuals, two
public objects must be provided for the due support of
the worship of the gods \ and the supply of the syssitia or
common meals. There was nothing new in the assignment
of land in a newly founded State for the former object, but
it was only in Crete, so far as we know, that public land
was employed for the support of the syssitia (2. 10. 1272 a
12-21). In the Lacedaemonian State each citizen was
compelled to pay a contribution to the syssitia, on pain of
ceasing to be a citizen, and this arrangement was fo.und to
thin the numbers of the citizen-body. For this reason,
and perhaps for others, Aristotle prefers to employ public
land for the purpose.

The remainder of the territory Is to be made the pro
perty of individuals. Plato had already provided in the
Laws that the lot assigned to each citizen should be in
part on the frontier of the State, in part near its centre,
and that each part of the lot should have a house upon it 2 ;
Aristotle takes up the suggestion, except as to the two
houses (2. 6. 1265 b 24 sq.), and gives each of his citizens a

1 Aristotle s full provision for 9. 1280 b 37 : cp. Athen. Deipn.

the worship of the gods in his best 36 c, 40 c-d), and means by which

State is deserving of notice. His the citizens become known to each

own theology was far removed other. Even expiatory rites for

from the popular theology of homicide seem to be recognized

Greece, and as Bernays thinks by Aristotle (Pol. 2. 4. 1262 a 31);

(Theophrastos Schrift iiber From- and the scoffs and jeers (TCD&KT-

migkeit, p. 12), barely left room pos) traditional in certain wor-

for the practice of sacrifice ; but ships are not interfered with (4

the Politics takes for granted the (7). 17. 1336 b 16). On all this

maintenance even in the best see the remarks of Zeller (Gr.

State of the popular faith and the Ph. 2. 2. 796-7). No interpreta-

traditional worship. The temples tion, indeed, of the Aristotelian

are not only well endowed, but theology, however rigid it might

placed in a conspicuous position be, need exclude the kind of

at the centre of the city; the priests sacrifice in which honour is

who officiate in them are men who rendered to the Deity, whatever

have grown old in the service of fate might befal those of prayer,

the State ; the sacrifices they offer thanksgiving, or expiation,

form rallying-points for the social 2 Laws 745 E : 775 E.
life of the State (TO a-vfiv, Pol. 3.

ARRANGEMENTS AS TO THE TERRITORY. 333

piece of land on the frontier together with another piece
nearer the city, in order that there may neither be those in
his State who will hold the hostility of neighbouring States
too cheap nor those who will dread it overmuch.

The cultivators are to be, if possible, slaves submissive in
character and belonging to more than one stock 1 , or else
non-Hellenic serfs resembling them in nature. The danger
arising from Hellenic serfs had been made evident by the
experience of the Lacedaemonians, and it would seem that
in Aristotle s opinion serfs should be sought elsewhere than
among the barbarians of Europe, who are said to be full
of spirit (c. 7. 1327 b 24).

Aristotle, we note, though he is strongly in favour of the The insti-
household, is also strongly in favour of syssitia or public tU gs t a
meal-tables 2 , perhaps a somewhat antagonistic institution, adopted by
His syssitia are not merely syssitia of magistrates such as it s n CO in- e
existed commonly throughout Greece 3 , but syssitia of citi- P lete form

r . . , its re-

zens and the sons of citizens, from an early age upward commend-
how early, we are not distinctly told syssitia of the Lace- atlons -
daemonian and Cretan type. We hear of syssitia of
priests (1331 b 5), syssitia of the most important magis-

1 Like the Callicyrii, who at specially Attic, but one which
one time formed the slave-class at existed in all Greek States.
Syracuse, and whose name, accord- Athens retained this custom down
ing to Aristotle, signified the to a late period of the Empire,
variety of their extraction (cp. though her citizens always re-
Timaeus, Fragm. 56 : Muller, Fr. mained strangers to the stiff and
Hist. Gr. i. 204). one-sided exaggeration of it, fatal

2 Cp. c. 10. 1330 a 3 sq., irep\ in its tendencies to the household

re awSoKtl Tracri xpijai- relation, which is exemplified in

dvai rais (5 KarfffKfvav^evaLs the syssitia of Dorian States

pxfiV Si f)i&gt; fi alriav (R. Schoell, die Speisung im Pry-

a-vvSoKfl KOI rjviv, vartpov epovpev. taneion zu Athen, Hermes 6. 14

The reasons for his view would sqq.). Syssitia in this latter form,

have been interesting, but they however, were not apparently

are not given in what we possess confined to Doric States, for even

of the Politics. if the Cretan syssitia were of Doric

3 The practice of bringing the origin, which hardly seems to be
highest magistrates of the State Aristotle s opinion (2. 10. 1271 b
together at a common meal in the 28 sq.), we hear of syssitia also in
Prytaneum, and of inviting also Boeotia (Plato, Laws 636 B : C.
any guest whom the community F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. I. 180.
might desire to honour is not 10).

334 FOURTH BOOK.

trades (1331 a 25), syssitia of the soldiers or of the
younger men (1331 a 22). It is not impossible that in
Aristotle s State, unlike the Lacedaemonian, men of dif
ferent ages were to belong to different syssitia, just as the
gymnasia of the older men were to be distinct from those of
the younger men (1331 a 37 sqq.). Some evils connected
with the syssitia as organized at Sparta and elsewhere (Plato,
Laws 636 A-B) would thus be avoided, but something
also would be lost, for the young would lose an oppor
tunity of learning from their elders. Still the main out
lines of the Cretan and Lacedaemonian institution would
be retained. A Lacedaemonian mess-table ($i8inoz;) con
sisted of fifteen 1 messmates, who filled vacancies in their
number by choice. Each of these groups of fifteen,
was, as may easily be conceived, a group of close friends,
especially as they not only gathered at the same board,
but fought side by side in war, so that their friendship
was often tested, and its value proved, on the battle
field. They formed, in fact, a kind of military brother
hood, or household, and, as Aristotle points out (2. 5.
1264 a 6 sqq.), it was of little use for Plato to abolish
the household and retain the syssition, as he does in the
Republic (416 E: 458 C), if he wished to make all the
citizens of his State equally dear to each other. The
Spartan Megillus claims in the Laws (636 A) that the insti
tution of syssitia was favourable both to courage and tem
perance. It must have given men a knowledge of one
another and a confidence in one another which would
hardly have existed without it ; a generous rivalry no
doubt sprang up both within the mess and between one
mess and another ; the State was better served, and there
was a gain of pleasure to the individual. The mess-system
also enabled the authorities to enforce frugality and sim-

1 When Agis IV in his scheme very probably have subdivided

of reform made the 0i8iY&lt;a created these large unities into small

by him large bodies comprising messes. See Schb mann, Antiqui-

on an average 300 members, he tates luris Publici Graecorum, p.

would seem to have departed from 140. 10.
the ancient model, though he may

SYSSITIA. THE IDEAL CITY. 335

plicity at table, and it would be equally useful in maintaining
Aristotle s more liberal standard of living.

Ancient societies were far richer in these minor organized
groups than modern. Amongst ourselves, a man belongs to
his family, his town, his party, his State ; but a Greek be
longed not only to these, but to a clan, a phratry, a deme, and
in many States to a O-VO-O-LTLOV, to say nothing of voluntary
associations such as a diaa-os or a philosophical school. The
Greek race was more social, and social in a simpler and less
elaborate way, than most modern races, and this was at
"once the cause and the effect of its defective development
of the household. Greek States were full of enjoyable
little gatherings, which tyrants feared and sought to put
down (7 (5). ii. 1313 a 41 sqq.), thus earning the undying
hatred of a race which found the main charm of life rather
in friendship than in the household relations.

Aristotle has now done with the territory and its cultiva- Picture of
tors, and his next step is to complete his picture of the city
in the same way. His city is, we know already (p. 316 sq.),
to be situate not too far from the sea, yet within easy reach
of its territory and the continent generally ; but these are not
the only matters to be attended to in the choice of its site
and its laying out. Health, military strength, suitability
for the purposes of political life, and beauty l , must all
be kept in view. The secret of health is to be well cir
cumstanced in respect of those things to whose influence
we are most constantly exposed water and air ; and thus
the city must not only be situate in a healthy region, but
have a healthy aspect, and it must be well supplied
with water 2 . A good and unfailing supply of water is also

1 Aristotle mentions (4 (7). n. towns was probably often scanty
1 330 a 36 sqq.) four points to be enough (Mahaffy, Old Greek
kept in view with respect to the Education, p. 31), so that this was
internal arrangements of the city, an important suggestion. How far
but, characteristically enough, it was acted on, we know not ;
in his eager haste omits to specify but Strabo tells us that Rome was
the fourth, which would, however, the first city to set the example of
seem to be beauty (/condor). a profuse provision of water (Strabo,

2 The water-supply of Greek p. 235, rSiv yap E\X^wi/ mpl ras

336 FOURTH BOOK.

a condition of military strength, and Aristotle evidently
holds that military strength is to be studied as much as
anything. His city reminds us in some respects of Athens,
but Athens, though strong and defensible, can hardly be
said to have been difficult of approach for foes (bvo-rrpoo-obos,
1330 b 3). It is to possess walls as skilfully built and as
impregnable as the science of the day could make them 1 ,
and within them the city is to be only in certain parts laid
out with broad straight streets : parts of it are to be an
intricate tangle of lanes, so that it may be defensible even
after its walls have been penetrated 2 , or else the houses
are to be disposed in the fashion of a quincunx. The
younger citizens will also be required to hold their syssitia,
or some of them, on the walls.

Still Aristotle asks for something more than a c maiden
city, impregnably strong. His city must be so laid out as
to favour a rational political life, and to enable the ruling
citizens to gather for work or converse without being
jostled by an uncongenial throng of traffickers and artisans,
or even coming into too close contact with the youth, whose
place, as soldiers, will be upon the walls. Beauty again
must not be lost sight of, and Aristotle s city will not fail
in this respect. The houses must be disposed with suffi
cient regularity to satisfy the Greek idea of beauty in
architecture, and the taste both of ancients and moderns
would be gratified by the choice of a site near the citizens
agora for the foliage and shade and flowing streams of a
gymnasium 3 . Aristotle s idea, in fact, seems to be to bring

KTI&lt;T(IS (v&lt;TToxf)&lt;rai fj.d\t(TTa Sogdv- 2 Aristotle here probably has in

TO&gt;V, OTI xdXXovy eVro^a^oiro /cat view the experience of Perinthus,

epvp.voTr)Tos KOI \ifjLfvav KOI xa&gt;pas when besieged by Philip of Mace-

(v(pvovs, OVTOI (the Romans) npov- don. Philip after a hard struggle

vorja-av /xaXio-ra &v wXrycopj/a-ai made himself master of the city-

TpoHTfus 68o&gt;i/ KOI v&drwv wall, but only to find himself in

s Kal ITTOVO^OIV ruiv bwapt- face of a close array of houses

(KK\vfiv TO. Xv/iara rfjs TroXews rising tier over tier up the slope

(Is rov Ti&epiv). As to the water- of the hill, and parted by narrow

supply of Antioch, see Mommsen, lanes, across which the besieged

Rom. Geschichte, 5. 458. carried walls from house to house

1 Aristotle discusses and rejects (Diod. 16. 76).

the opposite advice of Plato, Laws 3 A statue of Eros near the

778 D sqq. Academy was thus inscribed

THE IDEAL CITY.

337

agora and gymnasium together, the haunts of politics and
those of philosophy 1 .

We must imagine, then, a city at about the same
distance from the sea as Athens, and perhaps (though
this we are not distinctly told 2 ) linked like Athens by
long walls to its port, a miniature Peiraeus ; the city itself
facing eastward like the centres of the worship of Aescula
pius, Epidaurus and Cos, and like Croton, whose healthi
ness was proverbial 3 , for the sake, we are surprised to read,
of a full exposure to the easterly winds 4 , or else sheltered
from the north wind, so that it may have a mild climate in,
winter 5 ; not placed by the side of a river, like Sparta and
many Roman cities, but including in its site one or more
strong positions (1330 b 21), and especially a conspicuous
hill, perhaps scarped or precipitous like the Acropolis at

(Athen. Deipn. 609 d) :
7roiKiXo/ii]^ai "Epcoy, trot rot s I8pv-
(TCITO fiaifjibv

Xap/Mos eVt (TKifpois reppacrt -yvp.-

vacriov.

We are reminded of Waller s lines
in his poem on St. James Park :
In such green palaces the first

Kings reigned,
Slept in their shades and angels

entertained ;
With such old counsellors they

did advise,
And by frequenting sacred groves

grew wise.

1 For in Aristotle s day the
philosophic schools were com
monly situated in or near gymna
sia : cp. Ouintil. 12. 2. 8 (quoted
by C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq.
3. 36. 22) : studia sapientiae . . .
in porticus et gymnasia primum,
mox in conventus scholarum seces-
serunt.

2 Cp. c. 6. 1327 a 32-35- Ac
cording to von Wilamowitz (Phi-
lolog. Untersuchungen, Heft 4.
p. 200), the long walls between
Athens and Peiraeus had wholly
lost their defensive value by the
time of Demetrius Poliorcetes,
owing to the improvements in
siege-artillery.

VOL. I.

8 Aristotle, indeed, appears to
desire his city not only to face,
but to slope Eastward (4 (7). n.
1330 a 38 sq.) : how far the cities
referred to in the text did so, I
will not undertake to say. Strabo
(p. 374) describes Epidaurus as
facing the point at which the
sun rises in summer : vyuartpov
KpoTcavos was a familiar proverb
(Strabo, p. 262). Syracuse, though
it also faced east, was more famous
for wealth than health (Strabo, p.
269), probably because there were
marshes near it. Alexandria was
happily circumstanced in both
respects (Strabo, p. 793).

4 See Sus. 2 , Note 845, and the
references there given, to which
may be added Plutarch de Curio-
sitate C. I, uxjirep TTJV f pfjv irarpida
jrpos t(f)vpov civffj.ov KfKXifjLfvrjv Kal
rbv rjXiov fpeidovra 8fi\rjs drro rov
Hapvacrov 8 f\o [ikvt]v^ eVi ras dvaro-
Act? Tpcnrfjvai, \eyovtriv \mb TOV
Xaipcofo?. The east wind is
spoken of as warm in Probl. 26.
31. 943 b 24.

5 Athens lay Trpo? /if&lt;T77/x/3pi a
(Dio Chrys. Or. 6. 198 R). So
did Gortyna in Crete (Bursian,
Geographic von Griechenland 2.
564).

338 FOURTH BOOK.

Athens, on which such temples as the law of the State or the
Delphic oracle did not relegate elsewhere might be grouped,
so as to be visible from afar l , and beside them the halls for
the common meals of the priests and the chief magistrates.
Like every Greek city, it was to have a central open-air
gathering-place for converse and discussion a kind of
sensorium, the like of which does not exist in modern
cities. Immediately beneath the hill just described will
lie an agora for the use of citizens only, kept sacred not
only from all buying and selling, but from the very
presence of cultivators, traders, and artisans ; and close
beside it, as has already been noticed, not, as in the Athens
of Aristotle s day, in the outskirts of the city 2 , a gymnasium
the gymnasium of the older men, which is to be distinct
and separate from the gymnasium for the younger men.
Aristotle evidently felt that it was necessary to place the
gymnasia under strict supervision, for while magistrates are
to be present in the gymnasium for the younger men, the
gymnasium for the older men is to be situate in the very
heart of the city, close beneath its central temples. It is
interesting to notice that the gymnasium, which was a
public playground combined with public baths indeed,
something more than this, for it was a place of preparation
for the military service of the State is viewed both by
Plato and Aristotle as an indispensable adjunct to a city.
Neither makes mention of a public library, an institution

1 Cp. Paus. 9. 22, fv Be poi Tarn- and the conspicuous positions of

ypaioi 1/ofj.ia-cu TO. es TOVS deovs the church-towers. They answer

fj.d\i(TTa SOKOVCTIV EAXr^vcoj/, x^P^ one another, so to speak, from hill

ptv jap al oiidai acpia-i, ^copiy 8e TO. to hill (Letter in Times, Oct. 13,

If pa vrrep avras ev Kadapu* re eari Kal l88l).

fKTos av6pa)TTu&gt;v : and Vitruv. i. 7. 2 This important change is

(both quoted by C. F. Hermann, adopted from Plato, Laws 804 C.

Gr. Antiqq. 2. 15. 3-4). See also In Nicaea, built by Antigonus

Xen. Mem. 3. 8. 10, and note the in B.C. 316, the gymnasium ap-

epithet dn6\j/iov in the encomium pears to have been situated in the

on the Parthenon at Athens in centre of the city (Strabo, pp. 565-

Dicaearch. (?) de Graeciae Urbi- 6). It seems to be within the

bus (Miiller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 254). walls in the city described by Dio

1 A visitor to the counties of Nor- Chrysostom in Or. 7. 233 R. See

folk and Suffolk must be struck also 2 Mace. 4. 12.
alike by the number, the beauty,

THE IDEAL CITY. 339

reserved for the next generation. In a quite distinct
situation, selected for its easiness of access both from the
sea and from the territory, a market for buying and selling
should be laid out, and here should be gathered the minor
magistracies those which have to do with men s business
relations with one another and with certain formal matters
in relation to law-suits, and also those of the agoranomi
and astynomi. Thus, even in their leisure-hours, by a
plan adopted from Thessaly and already recommended
by Xenophon (Cyrop. i. 2. 3 : 7.5. 85 1 ), the citizens
would be kept as much as possible apart from the classes
concerned with production and trade. Each class would
have, in fact, its appointed region : the citizens of full
age would haunt the neighbourhood of the Acropolis,
and the region near it ; the younger men would keep
watch and ward upon the walls, where many of them
would even take their meals, or else be in their own
gymnasium, which would not, probably, be far from the
walls ; the women would be at home, secluded somewhat
more strictly than in democracies ; the boys would be at
school or in their gymnasia, the peasants on their farms,
the traders and artisans at their places of business in the
port or in the commercial quarter of the city. The various
classes of society were each of them to have room to live
their own life ; the higher ones especially were not to be
mixed up with or jostled by the lower. Aristotle s State
is like his Kosmos, in which every element is assigned a
place of its own, earth at the bottom, fire at the top, and
water and air between them, as the relatively heavy and the
relatively light 2 . We are sensible of a reaction from the con
fusion of ranks, sexes, and ages, which is vividly described

1 The Romans had two kinds which were sometimes called fora
of fora : some were exclusively judicialia (Smith, Diet, of Antiqui-
devoted to commercial purposes ties, art. Forum). Henkel (Studien
and were real market-places, while 141. 22), following E. Curtius,
others were places of meeting for remarks that the gathering-place
the popular assembly and for the (Versammlungsraum) of the Spar-
courts of justice : mercantile tans was from the first quite
business, however, was not alto- distinct from the market,
gether excluded from the latter, a Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 908.

Z 2

FOURTH BOOK.

So far we
have been
dealing
with

matters in
respect of
which the
favour of
Fortune
counts for
almost
everything :
now we
come to a
matter in
which more
depends on
the legis
lator
what is the
citizen-
body of
the best
State to be
in cha
racter and
circum
stances ?

by Plato (Rep. 562-3) as characteristic of an extreme demo
cracy, where boys, he says, are prematurely old, and old
men affect to be young. The people of Aristotle s State
would be like the Spaniards of Clarendon, a people of
honour and punctuality, bred up in the observation of
distances and order 1 . Similar arrangements, Aristotle
continues, are to be made throughout the territory. Just
as the towers on the city-wall are to be places of watch
and ward for the protection of the city, so there must be
places of watch and ward for the Wardens of the Woods
(i&gt;A.a&gt;poi) and the Overseers of the country districts (aypovo-
/xot), where they may hold their common meals ; and there
must also be temples dedicated to gods and heroes.

At this point (end of c. 12. 1331 b 18) Aristotle turns
with some impatience from details, the realization of which
he feels after all depends on Fortune, to the constitution 2 ,
and asks what should be the character of those who are to
form the citizen-body of a happy and well-constituted
State, just as he had already asked and answered (c. 10.
1329 b 39 sqq.) the same question as to the cultivators of
the soil. It is here that the inquiry as to education begins,
which extends to the close of the Fifth Book, and is not
indeed completed in that book, as it has come down
to us. No direct and immediate answer is given to the
question now raised as to the citizen-body, but we gather
from what follows that they must be men who are not
debarred by any defect of nature or fortune from attaining
happiness and who have received a correct training both
of habit and of reason. It is best, however, to follow
Aristotle s own treatment of the question he raises.

To win success in any enterprise, he says, it is necessary

1 History of the Rebellion, Book
xiii (vol. 6, p. 443, ed. 1839).

2 C. 13. 1331 b 24, irepl 8f -rfis
TroXiTfias avrf)s, (K rivatv Kal e *c
iroliav Sei (rvvfardvai rrjv peXXovcrav
ecrfcrdai 7r6\iv [j.aKapiav Km TroXtreu-
tcrOai KaXcor, AeKreoy. Here TTO\I-

Tfia is probably used in its usual
sense of constitution (cp. 1332 a
4), and not in the sense which it
sometimes bears of universitas
civium (Bon. Ind. 612 b 10 sqq.),
but the passage shows that the
two meanings do not lie far apart.

CONDITIONS AND NATURE OF HAPPINESS. 341

both to aim at the true end, and to have at one s command The citi-
the means to its attainment, for men fail of success by Cha

missing the one or the other or both ; and this holds of the and i

1111 11 are t be

arts and sciences, for in practising them both the end and happy in
the course of action which leads to its attainment must be the full est

sense, their
grasped (Kparet&lt;r#cu) l . All agree in making happiness the exercise of

end, but some are incapacitated for attaining it by defects of ^ Tom-
nature or fortune 2 , and others, not being thus incapacitated, plete i.e.

, T ... i r -it m ust be

do not seek it aright. Now, as the business before us is j n re ktion

to discover the best constitution, and the best constitution l things

absolutely

is that under which the State is as happy as possible, we good, not
are bound to understand what happiness is. In tracing Condition-
its nature we are not in the least diverging from the path ally good
which a political treatise should follow. It is, as we have g OOC j un d e r
already said in the Ethics (tv rots ri6i.K.ols) 3 , eWpyeta /cat \PW L $ g . iven

, . , circum-

apcTrjs reA.eta a complete actualization and exercise of stances,
virtue and this not conditionally (e uTrofleVeco?), but ^ k e e n fj nish ~
absolutely (a-n-Aws) : it is not an exercise of virtue under
pressure of necessity, like that of the judge when he
inflicts just punishment, for such an exercise of virtue is
conversant with what is in itself an evil, though in the
particular case and to the criminal it becomes a good, and
it is only conditionally noble or noble in a necessary
way : the criminal who is punished and the State which
punishes would be happier if nothing of the kind was
necessary. Nor, again, is it such an exercise of virtue
as occurs when a man of full virtue ((nrovbalos) has to

1 There is some ambiguity about have been better if the word

the word Kpareltrdai, which is pro- Kpareiv had been used in place of

bably designed to mean something evpia-Keiv in 1331 b 29.

more than is expressed by evpia-Kfiv 2 Cp. Plato, Laws 747 C, ei Se

(133! b 29) not merely known, fir/, rfjv Ka\ovp.evr)v av TIS -navovpyiav

but possessed ; so that the dvrl cro&lt;pias aTTepya.crdfj.fvos \ddoi,

transition may be easy to a recog- icaddnep AlyvTrriovs tail QoiviKas Kal

nition of the fact that defects of TroXXa erepa dneipyacry-eva yevrj vvv

nature or fortune, no less than an ecrnv I8e iv VTTO rrjs TO&gt;V n XAwi/ eVtr^-

ignorance of the end and the means devfj-dratv Kal Krijp.dTa&gt;v dve\fvdfpias,

of attaining it, may make the etre TIS J/O/HO&T^S avro ts (^uCAo? av

attainment of happiness impos- yev6fj.fvos f^ftpydcraro TO. rotaura,

sible. This fact is recognized in eiVe \a\fTrfj TV^TJ wpoa-necrovcra eire

1331 b 40 sq. The logical sequence Kal (pvcris aXAq TIS

of this part of the chapter would 3 See Appendix F.

342 FOURTH BOOK.

deal with poverty or disease or ill-fortune of any kind :
on the contrary, it is an exercise of virtue in relation to
things absolutely good (ra cbrAa)? ayada) the goods of
fortune 1 . The actions by which happiness is secured
those which are absolutely virtuous and noble are
such as are conversant with absolute goods ; they are
actions which create and generate goods V

We now therefore know both the end and the course of
action by which it is secured. The end is e&Jaijuoja a a word
very imperfectly rendered by happiness and the actions by
which it is secured 3 are virtuous actions conversant with
absolute goods, and therefore absolutely virtuous and noble.
^ /The citizens of Aristotle s best State are to be at once
actively virtuous and in the enjoyment of the goods of
I fortune. We had been told at the beginning of the book
that a certain quantum of external and bodily goods, not
a large one, is essential to happiness, because essential to
the exercise of virtue : we learn now the further lesson
that virtuous action does not become happy action, or
even become ( absolutely virtuous and noble (a-novbaia KCU
KaAr) otTrAw?), unless it is exercised on a certain object-
matter, external and bodily goods in other words, the
goods of fortune. Fortune, therefore, is doubly a source
of happiness, making virtuous action possible, and being
the condition of its attaining its highest level, that of
happy action. Both in the earlier part of the book and
here Aristotle insists that there are two factors of happi
ness virtuous action, and \oprjyia which is the gift of
fortune ; but while in the earlier passage his aim is to

1 This seems to be the mean- happiness to the good man en-
ing of the term here : cp. Eth. Nic. during tortures. Academici vete-
5.2. 1129 b i sqq. In Eth. Nic. i. res beatum quidem esse etiam
i. 1094 b 16 sqq., however, the inter hos cruciatus fatentur, sed
virtue of di/Spfi a seems to be in- non ad perfectum nee ad ple-
cluded among dnXus dyadd. Other num : quod nullo modo potest
passages will be found referred to, recipi. Nisi beatus est, in summo
together with these, in Bon. Ind. bono non est. Aristotle declines
4 a 2 sqq. to say that he is happy at all.

2 It appears from Seneca s 3 At npos TO re Xos (fxpowrai npd-
Seventy-first Epistle, that even e (1331 b 28).

the followers of Plato denied full

HOW ARE MEN MADE VIRTUOUS? 343

magnify the share of virtue and virtuous action in the
result at the expense of that of fortune, here he acknow
ledges more fully the importance of the other factor.
Later on, indeed, he finds in the fact that happiness implies
the exercise of virtue in relation to things absolutely good,
the strongest ground for making the education of the
citizens of the best State such as to call forth in them all
the virtues, especially the highest, and to develope the
whole man. IloAArjs ovv et StKaicxruznj? /cat TroXXijs a-uxppo-
(n&gt;vri$ TOVS aptora SoKovvras irpaTTtiv /cat TtavTav TU&gt;V jj.aK.api-
crtToXavovTas, olov ei riz/e? elcriv, &(nrep ol Trotrjrat
jjiaKaptoV vrjcrois fJ.aXi&lt;TTa yap OVTOL berjcrovraL &lt;piXo-
0-0910? Kol (TCtMppcxrvvris Kal oiKaiooT;z r7?, 6V(p p.aXXov (r^oXa-
tv a(pdoviq T&V ToiovTwv cnyaQSiv (c. 15- 1334 3- 2834).

Two things, then, are necessary for the attainment of Two things
happiness the aid of fortune, and the science and correct necessary
moral judgment (en-tor??/^ /cat Trpoatpeo-ts) of a lawgiver who for the
knows how virtue is produced. It is by making the citi- of a happy
zens who share in the constitution in our case, all the State

- -: , ^ i A absolute

citizens virtuous, that the State is made virtuous. And, goods
if we take up again the question on the threshold of which ^ ^7
we stood at the close of the Third Book (3. 18. 1288 a 39 we must
sqq.) and ask how men are made virtuous, the answer is, F ort ne .
by nature, habit, and reason 1 . A man must be born ((pvvai, for the

i / \ , ... second the

whence 91/0-1?) as a man and not any other animal, and legislator is
with certain bodily and psychical qualities. What these are, r fspon-
Aristotle has described elsewhere. But nature often counts How then
for little, for in the case of some animals it may easily be

made better or worse by habit. Of the lower animals, tuous? We
indeed, most live as nature made them to live ; a very few to t h e
live by habit also ; only man lives by reason in addition, question

r , , J , with which

for he alone possesses reason. So that in him nature, the Third
habit, and reason must harmonize, for reason is powerful ^g^ d j&gt;
enough to overrule both nature and habit. We see, then, nature,

1 This was a view inherited by (Fr. 8 : Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr.
Aristotle from previous inquirers, 2. 134), Socrates (Xen. Mem. 3. 9.
and especially from Protagoras i), and Plato (Phaedrus 269 D).

344

FOURTH BOOK.

habit, and
reason,
acting in
harmony.

But is our
education
to be such
as to pro
duce men
fitted only
for ruling,
or such as
to produce
men fitted
first to be
ruled and
then to
rule ? We
must aim
at the latter
result.

But since
he who is
first to be
a good
subject and
then a good
ruler must,
as we have
seen, be a
good man,
we must
seek to
produce
good men.

that if a man is to be made virtuous and happy, he must
not only be favoured both by fortune and by nature, but
be educated both through habit and through his reason.

But is our education to be such as will produce men
fitted only to rule, or is it to be such as will produce men
fitted first to be ruled and then to rule ? It is better that
the same men should always rule, but then, if they are to
do so justly and if their supremacy is to be willingly ac
cepted and to last, they must be as different in body and
soul from those they rule as we imagine gods or heroes to
be from men, or as Scylax says that the kings in India are
from their subjects. But such men are not forthcoming.
Hence, we must fall back on an interchange of rule. The
ruled must be quieted by a prospect of ruling some day. It
has been already mentioned how this is to be arranged. The
distinction of rulers and ruled must be based on age : the
ruled must be younger than the rulers, and must be able to
look forward to succeeding them. The education we give
our citizens must, therefore, be adjusted to this arrange
ment ; it must be suitable for men who are first to be ruled
and afterwards to rule. Not indeed to be ruled otherwise
than freemen should be ruled that is, for their benefit for
if it is true that they may probably sometimes be called on
to render service which may seem to be of a humble kind,
such service will be redeemed and made worthy of freemen
by the end for which it is rendered.

But since we affirm that the virtue of him who is at
once citizen and ruler is the same as that of the best man,
and that the same man ought to be ruled first and a ruler
afterwards [so that all our citizens will be rulers sooner or
later], the lawgiver s business is to inquire how they are
to be made good men and by practising what pursuits, and
what is the end of the best life that is, what kind of
action is the end, that connected with which part of the
soul, with work or with leisure, with things necessary and
useful or with things noble? The lawgiver, in fact, must
get a clear view of the true aim (CTKOTTOS, 1333 b 3), to the
attainment of which his legislation is to be directed (cp.

AIM OF AN WEAL EDUCATION. 345

Plato, Laws 962 A sqq.). He must ask what is the life of the
best man, what is the end of the best life, for this is pre
cisely what the framers of the constitutions most in repute
and many writers on the subject of constitutions since their
time have omitted to do, resting content with something
short of the best (1333 b 5 sqq.).

In order to answer this question, Aristotle recalls, first, Our edu-
his accustomed division of the soul, so far as it is the seat develope" 8
of virtues in respect of which a good man is so denomi- the whole
nated l . One part of the soul possesses reason in itself, the ca i ; moral

other does not possess it in itself, but is capable of listening and

f lectual, but
to reason : each has its own appropriate virtues. If we ask the da

rn which part the end is rather to be found, the answer is of^e^wer
easy ; it is to be found in the former. But this part, again, element in

I..,,., ,., , , man is to

is divided into two a part possessing practical, and a part be a dj us ted
possessing speculative reason ; and these two parts must to tlie ulti -
also be held to be of unequal worth, the latter having velopment
more to do with the end than the former : and the of . t . ll ^ t .

which is

activities with which they are respectively concerned stand highest in
in the same relative order of desirability. Next, Aristotle ^

recalls a division of life (/3ios) 2 into work (do^oX^a) and moral and
leisure, war and peace 3 , and of things done (ra Trpa/cra) into tual, which

things necessary and useful and things noble (/caAd). Here, are es "

1 sential to a

again, war is not the end but peace, work not the end right use
but leisure, things necessary and useful not the end but of leisure -
things noble. The legislator must legislate with a view
to call forth the activities of all the parts of the soul, but
especially those which have most of the nature of ends ;
he must encourage the life of work and that of war, but
still more the life of peace and leisure : things necessary
and useful need to be attended to, but things noble still
more. Education must seek to produce all the virtues, to
fit men both for active work and for leisure, and to bring
within their reach all kinds of goods, but the higher vir
tues, the higher life, and the nobler goods are to be made

1 The nutritive part of the soul dperrjs apoipov ive^vnev.

is omitted for the reason for which 2 This is explained by roi/s

it is dismissed in Eth. Nic. I. 13. /3iW, 1333 a 40.

IlO2b 12 fTreidfj TIJS uvdpunriKrjs 3 Cp. I. 5. 1254 b 31.

346 FOURTH BOOK.

its supreme end. It must be broad and must develope the
whole man, but in its breadth it must not lose sight of the
highest things.

It was because the State, which notwithstanding all its
reverses was still held in most repute, followed an entirely
different path, that Aristotle is careful to insist on this
principle. The Lacedaemonian State had lived not for
civilization, but for victory and empire, just as some modern
communities live less for civilization than for wealth. It had
sought happiness in empire, and empire in military virtue,
and had found that it had missed even the path to empire.
It had cultivated only one form of virtue, and that not only
a low and utilitarian form, but one which, according to Aris
totle, needs to be allied with the virtues which fit men to
make a right use of leisure, if it is not to dissolve in time
of peace. Leisure is the true end ; but then the virtues
necessary for a right use of leisure are not only those which
find exercise in leisure, but also those which find exercise
in active work. If necessaries are to be forthcoming and
without them leisure is impossible the qualities which win
them, courage, endurance, temperance, must be forthcom
ing. Leisure, says the proverb, is not for slaves, and with
out these virtues men are no better than slaves. Courage
and endurance, then, are demanded for active work, but
intellectual aptitude (&lt;/uAo(ro$ia) for leisure, and temperance
and justice both for work and leisure ; and the State that
is to be happy must possess all these virtues l the more
so, as it is surrounded with the goods of fortune ; for if

1 If we bear in mind that the the Lacedaemonian training, but
citizens of Aristotle s ideal State it tells just as much against all
are to be dn\o)s cnrovdaloi, and systems which, like Stoicism and
that the &lt;nrov8a ios is one who Puritanism, tend to develope some-
unites in himself many different thing less than the whole man.
gifts and good qualities (3. n. The best test of civilization, how-
1281 b 10 sqq.), we shall see reason .ever, is, in Aristotle s view, the
to conclude, that when he speaks degree in which the capability
of the State possessing all the exists of making a right use of
virtues, he means each citizen to leisure, the leisure of Aristotle
do so as far as possible. This being, it must be remembered,
account of the true aim of educa- distinguished both from work and
tion is intended, of course, to recreation (4 (7). 14. 1333 a 31:
correct the one-sidedness of 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 33 sqq.).

ARISTOTLE S CONCEPTION OF EDUCATION. 347

there is any time when it is especially discreditable not to
be able to make a fit use of the goods of fortune, it is
during leisure : our State, therefore, must, unlike the
Lacedaemonian, seek happiness in the development, not
of one virtue, but of all. A habit of intellectual inquiry,
if so we may translate $iAoo-o$ta, must be present in its
citizens, if only to give them occupation in leisure and to
save them from rusting at such times.

A remark of Lotze s may be quoted to illustrate the A remark
contrast between this conception of education and that of ot [ 1 ze s
our own day. The difference between the principles of
this ancient education and our modern principles of educa
tion is rightly found in this, that to it the development of
the aptitude (Fertigkeit) and the possession of it counted
for more than the work for which it was used and the fruit-
fulness of that work in result. Every individual was to be
made a model example of his species : the species itself
had nothing else to do but to exist (dazusein) and to enjoy
the use of its powers. . . . To this many-sided develop
ment, finding an end in itself (in sich geschlossenen), the
spirit of modern education is no doubt less kind ; it sets a
higher value than it justly should on range of concrete
knowledge in comparison with a general aptitude for
knowing on productive specialized labour in comparison
with the free exercise of all the powers on professional
effort working in a groove (die Enge des bestimmten
Berufs-strebens) in comparison with an interest in human
relations generally 1 . There is much truth in this ; but it
should be borne in mind that if Aristotle insists on this
combination of qualities in his citizens, he does so not so
much for its own sake as because in its absence the State
will suffer. If they have the energy and endurance which
are needed for active work without the intellectual interests
and aptitudes which are the salt of society in days of
peace and leisure, or without the justice and temperance

1 Mikrokosmos, 3. 254, ed. 2. extract translated in the text is
The whole passage from which the taken well deserves perusal.

348

FOURTH BOOK.

which are of use both at the one time and the other, the
State will fail of happiness ; and it will do so no less, if,
while possessing high intellectual qualities, they are
without the minor gifts which are called for in active
work. We hardly, however, hold it necessary, as Aristotle
seems to do, that each citizen should unite in himself
all these qualities, and be totus teres atque rotundus
that the wheel should come full-circle in each indi
vidual. But to Aristotle the o-irovbalos is essentially
a many-sided being. Just as he had demanded a happy
combination of qualities (et&gt;/cpacna) in the raw material of
which his citizens are to be made, so he demands it in the
finished product *.

The question started at the commencement of c. 13 has
now been answered. We know what should be the
character of those who are to form the citizen-body of a
happy and well-constituted State ; and all that remains is
to discover how men of this type are to be produced.
They are produced, as has been already said, by nature,
habit, and reason. We have already sketched in outline,
what nature must do for us, and the next question is,
should education by habit precede or follow education by
reason ? The first process of human life, that of generation,
is merely introductory to a further process, the develop
ment of mind and reason 2 . Both generation and education
through habit must therefore be adjusted to the develop
ment of reason. We notice further that the body developes

1 This many-sidedness and
versatility was perhaps more often
realized in antiquity than among
ourselves. Roman generals of
the best time were often lawyers,
orators, and statesmen also :
occasionally they were writers :
sometimes they belonged to a
philosophical school. On the
other hand, poets seem to have
been less often prose-writers also
in antiquity than in modern times.

2 Much light is thrown on the

difficult passage 4 (7). 15. 1334 b
12-15 by de Part. An. 2. i. 646 a
30, niiv yap TO yiv6fj.fi/ov (K TIVOS
KOI els TI noiflrai TTJV yevfatv, Km
djr* dpxijs eV apxyv, ano TTJS TrpMTtjs
Kivovarjs Kal e^outTTj? fjdrj Tiva (pv&lt;ni&gt;
fni Tiva fiopfpTjv rj TOIOVTOV aXXo
reXos. Cp. also de Anima I. 3.
407 a 26, aj 8 drrodfi^eis Kal an
dpxijs, Kal e%ovfTt TTCOJ reXof TOV
o-v\\oyi&lt;rfj.ov rj TO o~vp.irepa(TiJ.a : and

Eth. Nic. 10. 7. ii77b 18.

SCHEME OF EDUCATION. 349

before the soul, and the irrational part of the soul before the the correct
rational part: spirit (dv^os), the power to will (/So^A^o-i?), nferrVaf the
and desire (^idv^ia) exist in the infant as soon as it is appetites,

/ / \ i / \ r an d the

born, but deliberation (Aoyio&gt;tos) and reason (vovs) are ot appetites

later growth. Education must follow the order of develop- } s is best

for the de
ment : we must train the body first ; then the appetites velopment

(opfgets), that is, the irrational part of the soul; then the of reason "
rational part. But our training of the body must be
adjusted to the development of correct appetites, and our
training of the appetites to the development of reason
(1334 b 27: cp. 15 sq.).

To train the whole nature, but to train each part of
it successively and in the order of its emergence, and
to train each part with a view to the higher element
which emerges next, and all with a view to the develop
ment of reason this is the broad scheme of education
which Aristotle lays down here. The lesson that in
training the body our aims should be to develope the
soul (that is, the likings and the reason), is still of value l ;
and so is the lesson that the education of boyhood should
be addressed rather to the likings and character than to
the reason. Aristotle seems to hold that what can reason
ably be expected of a boy is that he shall love and admire
what is good and feel a distaste for what is bad that
is, that he shall feel rightly about persons and things.
He sees that right feeling is not permanently an adequate
guide in life, but he holds it to be the beginning of good
ness. It needs to become reasoned, but this further step

1 The athletic training given to form a bad preparation for the

boys in many Greek States was hardships of war, but would also

unfavourable to physical growth enfeeble the character and give a

and beauty of form, while the Lace- wrong direction to the likings,

daemonian training, though not Plato had already spoken to the

open to this objection, was so severe same effect as to the true aim of

and laborious as to be brutalizing yvfj.vaffTi.Kr) (Rep. 410 B-D : 591

(5 (8). 4. 1338 b gsqq.). Aristotle C-D). Greece turned a deaf ear

hopes to avoid both these errors. to the teaching of Plato and Aris-

He forbids all laborious gymnas- totle on this subject, and became

tic exercise till three, years after eventually a land in which athletes

puberty (1339 a 4 sqq.). It is were everywhere to be found and

easy to imagine a sort of physical soldiers nowhere (Mommsen,

training which would not only Rom. Gesch. 5. 264-6, 324).

350 FOURTH BOOK.

is only possible later on. Some germ of the deliberative
faculty (TO /3ot&gt;AeurtKo y) is to be found in boys (i. 13. 1260 a
13), but it is imperfect, and in education we should appeal
to taste and feeling long before we appeal to reason. It
is perhaps true, as has been said already, that Aristotle
draws too sharp a contrast between boyhood and maturity;
in this view, however, of the true aim of boyish education
he is following Plato (Laws 653 A-C), who did not like
the precocious boys and the juvenile old men of a demo
cracy (Rep. 563 A).

The first Quite in harmony with the principles just laid down,

cation is U Aristotle s scheme of education begins with marriage.

the regu- The regulation of marriage by the State is to him, as

marriage, to Plato, the first step in education l . He pays close

1 he rearing attention to the management of pregnancy, to the rearing

of the child, and to the earliest years of life, for he holds

with Plato 2 that these earliest years go far to fix the

character of the human being. The food of the infant,

the movements which it is to be encouraged to make, the

importance, on grounds both of health and of future

military efficiency, of gently and gradually habituating

it from the very first to bear cold these are matters

which can be attended to even during the earliest period

The of life. During the ensuing period closing with the age

ment^Tf ^ ^ ve movemen t ls to be still more encouraged, especially

children by means of games which must not be vulgar (avftevOepovs),

age of five or to laborious, or on the other hand too slack and easy,

and from an( j should be imitative of the pursuits of later life 3 .

five to

seven. i Critias had already said note) views which Aristotle ap-

(Fragm. I : Miiller, Fr. Hist. Gr. patently intends to combat in Pol.

2. 68) up^op-ai de TOI OTTO yeverfjs 4 (7). l6. 1335 b 5 sc C-{-
av0p&lt;anov, Trcby av (3e\Ti(TTos TO o-aj/za 2 Laws 765 E. They perhaps

yevoiro KOI iaxypoTtiTos, el 6 (pvrfvwv set down to faulty training in

yvfj.vdoiTo Kal ea-dioi eppco^eVcor KOI infancy much that was really due

TaXanraipoir] TO crw/Ma, *ai fj p.r]Tr]p to heredity.

TOV iraidiov TOU fjif\Xoi&gt;Tos &lt;re&lt;T0ai 3 Plato had anticipated Aris-

la-^iioi TO &lt;ru&gt;/j.a KOI yu/ni/a^otro. Cri- totle in this (Laws 6433). The

tias would seem to have adopted heroes of Homer are described by

the views which prevailed among Athenaeus (Deipn. loa) as pre-

the Lacedaemonians on this sub- paring themselves in their sports

ject (see the references in Miiller s for serious work.

MARRIAGE AND INFANCY. 3,51

The stories and talk l which children are to hear at this
age are to be such as to lead their thoughts in the direction

o o

of the work of after-years : the TrcuSovo/xot of the State
are charged to see to this. It is a mistake to try, as
some would do, to keep young children from struggling
and crying : these things give them strength and aid
the growth of the body ; they are to infants what physical
exercises are to those of less tender years. In all this,
bodily growth has been a prominent consideration, but
it is not the only one to be kept in view. Children are
to be trained at home till seven years of age, not in
the public infant-schools of Plato s Laws ; but Aristotle
requires his Superintendents of the youth (7rai8o^o/jiot) to
see that they are as little as possible in the company of
slaves 2 . He goes on to eliminate other corrupting influ
ences to which Greek children were often exposed 3 ; he
banishes indecent language from his State, and especially
from the presence of children 4 ; he banishes also indecent
pictures, statues, and tales, and forbids all below a certain
age to witness iambi or comedy. He seeks to make the
young strangers to everything bad, and especially to every
thing that savours of vice or malice. He holds, with Plato
(Rep. 378 E), that both in relation to men and things, we
like that best with which we first come in contact (-navra
(TT^pyo^fv ra Trpwra paXXov} our likes and dislikes are largely
formed in infancy. The first five years of life are those
in which not only the physical health and strength, but

1 Ao ycoi/ KOI fjivdcov, 1 336 a 30. sible that Aristotle intends, with
The latter word suggests a religious Lycurgus (Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. i),
element in infant education, and to prohibit TrmSaycoyoi.
perhaps a revision of the myths 6 Cp. Plato, Laws 729 B, a pas-
used, similar to that which Plato sage which is perhaps the source
undertakes in Rep. 377 A sqq. of the saying maxima debetur

- Aristotle seems to imply pueris reverentia.
(1336 a 41) that, when from seven 4 This was a point on which

onwards they come to be educated Xenocrates, the contemporary

away from the home, they will head of the Academy, especially

run less risk of contact with slaves. insisted. He said that children

Plato regards the slave muSaycoydy, needed ear-protectors more than

who accompanied the Greek youth pugilists did (Plutarch, de Recta

out of doors, as a necessary ap- Ratione Audiendi, c. 2).
pendage (Laws 808 D) : it is pos-

352

FIFTH BOOK.

At seven
direct in
struction is
to begin.
Education
from seven
to puberty
and from
puberty to
twenty-one.

Com
mencement
of the Fifth
Book. Re
currence to
theaporetic
method.
Three ques
tions asked:
I. Should
any syste
matic
arrange
ments be
adopted
with re
spect to

also the tastes and character are apt to be made or marred.
At five a step in advance is taken, and from this age to
seven boys are encouraged to be spectators of the training
of the older boys, and to familiarise themselves with the
look of the exercises which they will shortly have to
practise themselves l .

The age of seven, we see, marked in Aristotle s edu
cational scheme the point at which direct instruction
should begin a view expressed in poems commonly at
tributed to Hesiod, but one which was much disputed
after Aristotle s day 2 and many Greeks, remembering
Solon s division of human life into periods of seven years 3 ,
would expect to find him, in conformity with it, making
the next educational period extend from seven to fourteen.
Aristotle, however, prefers to follow the dividing-line
which nature has drawn, and to make, not any particular
age, but the attainment of puberty 4 , which was commonly
reckoned to fall about the sixteenth year 5 , the term of the
next period, though the period after that is to close at
twenty-one.

Here at the threshold of the subject of education as
distinguished from rearing (rpo^rj), Aristotle, conscious
perhaps of its magnitude and of the need of starting from
the level of popular impressions if he is to carry his readers
with him, reverts to that full use of the aporetic method
which marks the Third Book. He asks, first, whether any
systematic arrangements are to be adopted respecting the
education of the young : next, whether education should be
managed by the State, or, as in most Greek States, left
in private hands : lastly, what scheme of education should
be adopted.

1 Cp. Plato, Rep. 466 E sq.

2 See Quinctilian. Inst. El. I. I,
who mentions that Chrysippus
would begin at three. The great
Eratosthenes, however, agreed
with Aristotle (Quinctil. ibid.).

3 Solon, Fragm. 27.

* So the law of Gortyna dis
tinuished between the aV^of and

the T)$iwv. The distinction be
tween them seems to rest, not on
any fixed limit of age, but on the
physical development of the indi-
. vidual (Biicheler und Zitelmann,
Das Recht von Gortyn, p. 60).

C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq.
I. 121 : Schafer, Demosthenes,
3. 2. 22 sqq.

EDUCATION. 353

The first question is easily answered. The existing the edu-

... i .... c f~&gt; i cation of

absence of system is injurious to the constitutions 01 Greek the young ?
States, for it not only leaves them without the formed 2 - Should

J education

national character (iJ0os) which they need to support them, be man-
but precludes all chance of that improvement of the n

tional character which is the beginning of constitutional 3. What

, . . f scheme of

improvement. Besides, some preparation is necessary tor education
the practice of virtue, no less than for the exercise of an should be

_ adopted ?

art. As to the second question, if the end 91 the State The two
is one and the same for all its members, their education forme .r

questions

ought to be one and the same l , and if so, both the are an-
management of this education and the pursuit of the

studies it comprises should be public (KOLV^V) ; or, in other ative: the

r i c* discussion

words, the management Should be in the hands of the State, O f t he third
and the studies should be carried on, not privately and in extends

1 over the

independent groups, but in a public fashion and in whole of
common. Nor is it only because the studies will be the 3^,^ and

same that this should be so, but also because thus a public is not com-
aim will be impressed on the education of the individual.
The individual is a part of his State and belongs to his
State, and this fact should be recognized in the organiza
tion of education 2 .

] Aristotle s language both in We are reminded of the aim of the

the Politics (5 (8). I. 1337 a 24) framers of the Book of Common

and in the Nicomachean Ethics Prayer, who say and whereas

do. 10. 1180 a 28) seems to heretofore there hath been great

imply that, notwithstanding the diversity in saying and singing in

general acceptance of three or Churches within this realm, some

four studies, the nature of the following Salisbury use, some

education which a boy received Hereford use, and some the use of

depended to a large extent on his Bangor, some of York, some of Lin-

*-, father s caprice : one father might coin ; now from henceforth all the

be all for utilitarianism in educa- whole realm shall have but one use.
tion, another might be more 2 This argument for placing

ambitious and send his son to education in the hands of the State

some teacher of TO. Trepirrd : one is interesting and not without

might count the development of force, though perhaps education

the character a more important in a large school is sufficient to

thing than that of the intellect, give a boy that sense of being

while another might take the part of a whole which Aristotle

opposite view. Aristotle s object wishes to develope in him. The

is that those who are to work rejoinder, however, is possible

together as members of the same that it would not accustom him to

State should be educated in the the feeling that he is part of the

same way and educated together. State.

VOL. I. A a

354 FIFTH BOBK.

Conflict of The third question is one which will occupy us longer *.
^ the "rue There is no agreement as to the subjects to be taught :
aim of edu- people are not agreed what studies are best either with a

cation and . . ...

the subjects view to virtue or to the best life ; and then there is a further
question whether the aim should be the development of
the character or the intellect 2 . A reference to the actually
prevailing system of education is highly suggestive of
doubts, and it is by no means clear whether things useful
for everyday life should be taught, or that which makes
for virtue, or more out-of-the-way things 3 , for each of these
courses has its advocates ; and then again, there is no
agreement as to what makes for virtue, since different
persons understand virtue differently.

This being the state of opinion, a good opportunity
offered itself for a recourse to the aporetic method, and
Aristotle s first step is to look about him for any firm bit
of ground he can find. Everybody, he says, agrees that, of
things useful for life, all such as are necessary must be
taught, and also whatever does not produce (3avava-ia, or,
in other words, unfit the body or the mind for free pursuits.
He adds, with an evident reference to the limitations which
he intends to place on the study of music and gymnastic,
that the risk of fiavavvia is not incurred only in the study
of useful things : there are also liberal studies which may
produce (Bavava-ia, if pursued in an over-exact way. It is

1 It is one which it is the special s Ta Trepirra, 5 (8). 2. 1337 a 42,
function of n-oAmKiy to settle. Cp. which may include a variety of
Eth. Nic. i. I. 1094 a 28, rivas yap things from the marvels of musical
flvai xpeddi/ TO&gt;V {wumjfi&V ev rals execution (ra dav^iatna Kal Trepirra
TroAeert Kal Trotas e/caorouy fj,avddi&gt;fiv T&gt;V epyu&gt;v, a vvv f\T]\vd(i fls TOVS
Kal /ie xpt rivoSy [17 TroXm/o)] 8iq- dyaivas, e&lt; 8e TG&gt;V dyatvatv els TTJV
Tao-crei. Ttaideiav, 5 (8). 6. 1341 a II) to the

2 Aristotle has already settled Kop/m referred to by Euripides (3.
that the ultimate aim in education 4. 1277 a 19), among which phi-
is to be the development of the losophy was perhaps included,
reason (4 (7). 15. 1334 b 15), but Socrates had imposed limits on
the point he wishes to bring out is the study of geometry (Xen. Mem.
the unsettled state of common 4. 7. 2, yeut^erpiav pexpi pev TOVTOV
opinion on the subject of educa- 8f iv pavQavfiv efyr), etas IKUVOS ns
tion, and he does not pause to yevoiro, ei Trore Serjo-fie, yfjv /ierpo&gt;
remember that he has already opd&s fj irapaXalBflv ff irapadovvai
done something towards the solu- ^ 8iavflfj,ai rj epyov anode i ao-$ai).
tion of the problem.

WHAT SUBJECTS SHOULD BE STUDIED? 355

the aim with which things are done, rather than the things
themselves, that makes the difference. To do work not in
itself liberal for one s own sake, or for the sake of friends,
or with a view to virtue 1 brings no jSavavo-ta with it. We
have got then as far as this, that whatever is necessary
for life must be studied, and that we must steer clear of
fiavavcria.

At this point Aristotle recalls to remembrance the studies Things
generally accepted in Greece in the hope of gaining some

further guidance in the construction of a scheme of educa- mus t be

_,, . - . . taught, but

tion. 1 here are, he says, three or tour of them ypa/^uzra no t so as
(reading and writing Plato, Laws 810 B), yujumariK^ t P rod , uce
lj.ova-LK.ri : to these some would add drawing 2 . The study Four sub-
of the first and last of these may easily be defended on j^f ^
the ground of usefulness : reading, writing, and drawing cepted

r i c i 1 Ypd/t/iara,

are useful for many purposes; yvjj.vaa-TLK.ri, again, helps to y V ^ va .
make men brave. """^ t* v -

ffLKTJ. YpCt-

But what are we to say of jj.ova-LK.ri ? Nowadays most

who study it do so for pleasure, but the aim of those who
originally made it a part of education was to satisfy the an inquiry
striving of nature to find a means of spending leisure-time L J&gt; w s~
nobly 3 . And in this they were right, for if men should made a
know both how to work and how to enjoy leisure aright, education
and leisure is closely connected with the end of life, while b ? * he

----------- ancients,

work is only a means to the end so that leisure is that it is
more desirable than work and if again it is easy to

1 At aperfo S (8). 2. 1337 b 19: later on (5 (8). 4. 1338 b 13) a
cp. c. 6. 1341 b 10, ev Tavrr] yap view current among the Lace-
(i.e. lv rfj Trpos TOVS dyuvas TratSet a) daemonians as to the best way
6 TrpaTTtov ov rrjs avTov /^era^etpt^e- of developing courage which Epho-
rcti x^P lv operas, dXXa rfjs TCOJ/ rus had commended (cp. Ephor.
anou6vTov T)8oi&gt;rjs K.r.X. ap. Strab. p. 480, npos 8f TO pf)

2 The Athenian Stranger in the 8ei\iav dXX avSpeiav Kpareiv e&lt;
Laws is indifferent to the study of iraidmv 077X01? KOI ITOVOIS a-vvrpe-
drawing (769 B). tpeiv). That the motive with which

3 Ephorus had said in the the authors of the current scheme
introduction to his history, that of Greek education had included
P.OVO-IKTJ had been introduced eV p-ovaiKr] in it was much discussed,
dndrr) KOL yorjTfia (Fragm. I : Mill- we see from Athen. Deipn. 14.
ler, Fr. Hist. Gr. I. 234). Aris- 626fsqq. : Plutarch de Musica, c.
totle tacitly controverts this view 26 : Polyb. 4. 20 sqq. : Plato, Rep.
here, just as he tacitly controverts 410 B sqq.

356 FIFTH BOOK.

studies in spend leisure-time in the wrong pleasures, then it is evident
which are ^h&t education tending to a right use of leisure is even

not strictly more requisite than education preparatory to work, and
necessary. . . ..... .... ......

but con- that education of the tormer kind is an end m itself, while

education of the latter kind is merely necessary and a
leisure. means to something further. We have, then, the authority
of these ancient and venerated sages for the conclusion that
it is legitimate to go beyond the limit of mere necessity in
the choice of subjects of education. One, at all events, of
the recognized subjects was introduced, not because it was
necessary or useful l , but because it was liberal and noble
(eAevflepia KOL KaAr?) 2 . We shall see later on, Aristotle
adds, whether there are others on the same footing, and
what they are, and how they are to be studied. He points
out, however, at once, that even the more strictly useful
studies, such as reading, writing, and drawing, deserve to
be pursued on other grounds than those of mere utility.

The subject of yv^vaa-riKr] naturally comes up next, and
now Aristotle reverts to the boys of seven, the settlement

come first, o f whose fate has been thrust aside pending the new in-

for training . ......

must begin quiry. As the education oi habit must precede that 01
with the reason, and the education of the body that of the mind,

body :

hence the they must be handed over to yvfj-vao-TiKri and the sister art
se v y e s n must 7nzi8orpi/3iK?7 to the former, in order that a certain habit of
be handed body may be developed in them ; to the latter, in order that

1 Democritus (Philodem. de 2 It is easy to see how a reader,

Musica, 4. col. 36 : Kemke, p. 108) starting from the average level of

had insisted that music did not Greek prejudice, would find him-

owe its origin to necessity, but self gradually led on by this

came in as a superfluity (eK rov inquiry to more enlightened views

irepifvvros, cp. Pol. 4 (7). 10. 1329 of education, and how much of

b 27 sqq.), and argued from this the traditional skill of a Socratic

that it was of recent origin, things dialogue, though not its grace, has

necessary being discovered first. passed into Aristotle s handling of

The Cynics rejected the study of aporetic discussion. Antipater

music as not only unnecessary praised him for his persuasiveness

but useless (Diog. Laert. 6. 73: ( Plutarch, Alcib. et Coriol. compar.

6. 104) : good musicians, they said, c. 3, npbs rols a AXoi? u dvt]p KOI TO

often had souls out of tune (Diog. irdQeiv ei^fv). To a Greek the

Laert. 6. 27). Aristotle agrees that appeal to oi dp^alot would be as

it is not necessary, but holds that convincing as it is the reverse to

it is useful (5 (8). 5. I339b 30). ourselves.

FTMNASTKH TO BE REFORMED. 357

they may learn the needful physical exercises and accom- over first to

Foments. ST.^

Aristotle would, however, reform yv^vaa-TiKi ]. Some, he rprf^.

says, of the States which paid most attention to the educa- ^^how-
tion of the young gave them a physical training fit rather ever must
for professional athletes than for future citizens, fatal to formed.
beauty of form 1 and physical growth fatal also, if we look
back to another passage (4 (7). 16. 1335 b 5 sqq.), to fitness
for political activity and to health and vigour 2 . The
Lacedaemonians also erred, though in a different way:
their system produced, not gluttonous, sleepy athletes, but
fierce, wild, wolf-like men, for courage, they held, went
with this temper, which Aristotle denies 3 : the bravest
men are not, he says, fierce but gentle ; true courage, we
learn in the Nicomachean Ethics (3. u), goes with that
love of TO KaAoy, which marks the best type of manhood.
Thus, even if the production of this one virtue, courage,
were fit to be made the sole or chief end of yujufaoriK?;,
the Lacedaemonian State did not practise yv^vaarTiKri in the
right way to produce it. In fact, by giving its sons an
excessive gymnastic training and adding no sufficient in
struction in necessary attainments, this State did that
which it least wished to do it made them jSdvava-oi 4 , for

1 De Gen. An. 4. 3. 768 b 29- chares). Thebes was as fa-

33. mous for its devotion to yvfivaa--

a Euripides had said the same 1-1*17 as Athens was the reverse

thing in the well-known fragment (Diod. 17. 11. 4: Xen. Mem. 3.

of his Autolycus (Fr. 284 Nauck), 5. 15), and it is perhaps to it

and Plato (Rep. 404 A): Epami- that Aristotle here refers. The

nondas also (Plutarch, Reg. et Thebahs, however, were splendid

Imperat. Apophth. p. 192 C-D, soldiers, as may be seen from

TO&gt;V de 6ir\iTo)v 8flv dir((f)MVfv elvai Diodorus striking narrative of

TO crSifjia yeyv/jLvacrfj-fvov OVK dOXrjri- their ill-advised and fatal, but

KWS novov dXXd Kal orpaTiom/cwj noble resistance to Alexander

810 Kal rols iroXvcrdpKois eVo- (Diod. IJ. CC. 9-14).
AeVft)- Philip of Macedon is 3 Cp. Eth. Nic. 3. n. ni6b 24,

reported to have compared the where the courage of a wounded

speeches of Demosthenes to sol- animal is distinguished from true

diers and those of Isocrates to courage, and Plato, Rep. 430 B.
athletes ([Plutarch], Decem Ora- 4 Cp. [Plato], Erastae, 136

torum Vitae, p. 845 D : see A. A-B. There was a proverb,

Schafer s note, Demosthenes i. c\evOfpiu&gt;Tepns Sndprrjs (Leutsch

293, and Diet, of Greek and and Schneidewin, Paroemiographi

Roman Biography, art. Cleo- Graeci, I. 246 : 2. 393).

35 8 FIFTH BOOK.

it fitted them for the discharge of only one political func
tion, and for that less well than other States, if we may
judge by the defeats which the Lacedaemonians have suf
fered in the field, since they have had to contend with
antagonists equally devoted to gymnastic training.

Thus Aristotle accepts yujuyao-ri/c?/ on condition of being-
allowed to reform it. It must learn to take a truer view of
its social function ; it must increase men s physical strength
without unfitting them for the public labours of a citizen or
injuring the health ; it must be so regulated as to be pro
ductive, not of mere fierceness, but of true courage, and
not of courage only, for it must lay the foundation of a
generalized excellence culminating in reason.

With this aim Aristotle refuses to impose on boys who
have not yet arrived at puberty any but light and easy
forms of physical training \ and postpones apparently all
other studies till after this epoch, at which yu/xyao-riK?/ is to
be abandoned for three years, and the studies of reading
and writing, drawing and music to be begun 2 . These
studies are to be dropped in their turn at the expiration
of the three years term, and now for the first time
yvp-vaa-TiKii is to be studied in its sterner form with its
accompaniments of severe labour and a special diet. As

1 Contrast the view of Plato, boys are to be trained in gymnas-
Rep. 536 E : 01 pev yap rov aw/ua- tic in the period preceding puberty,
TOS TTOVOI /3t a irovov/jLevoi xf ipov and Aristotle s principle is that
ovdev TO ampa dn-fpyd^ovTai, ^l/vxij the simultaneous exaction of men-
Be ftlaiov ovSev ep.p.ovov fj.udr]fj.a. tal and bodily labour is a mistake
*AA77$?/, ffprj. Mi) Toivvv /3/g, elnov, (1339 a 7 sqq.). ZelJer (Gr. Ph. 2.
&&amp;gt; fipiare, TOVS TraiSa? tv rols padr]- 2. 737. 4) thinks that philosophical
Hao-iv,d\\aTrai(ovTasTpe(pf. Aris- (wissenschaftlich) teaching is in-
totle says on the contrary (5. (8). eluded among the studies referred
4. 1338 b 40) pexP 1 M e " 7P $ty* to in 1339 a 5, but perhaps we
KovfpoTfpa yvpvdaia Tr/joo-oicrreoi , can hardly infer so much from
rrjv ftiaiov rpofprjv nai roiis irpbs avny- the use of the word Siavoia in
icr]v TTOVOVS dnfipyovras, Iva prjdfv 1 339 a 7, and Aristotle s principle
e /LwroSioi/ 77 Trpos rrjv av^rjcriv. seems rather to be to postpone

2 Cp. 5 (8). 4. 1 339 a 4, Srav 8 the education of the reason, and
d&lt; ^/ity? fry rpLa irpos rols &lt;i\\ois to devote the years of youth to
p.(idr]p.a&lt;Tl yei&gt;a&gt;i&gt;Tai. It is not dis- physical training and the training
tinctly said in this passage that of the opegfis, though, no doubt,
other studies than that of gymnas- the ope |ei? are to be trained with
tic are to be delayed till puberty, a view to the ultimate development
but we learn in 1338 b 40 that of reason.

WHY IS MUSIC TO BE STUDIED f 359

before, so now, it is to be studied by itself, for the simul
taneous exaction of mental and physical effort must be
studiously avoided (5 (8). 4. 1339 a 7 sqq.) 1 .
v We note in Aristotle s reform of yv^vaa-riK-/] the same
aim as we shall trace in his reform of the musical education
of the citizen. Neither yu/iyaort/cTj nor juoim/oj should be
cultivated with a view to the attainment of technical skill
or an one-sided excellence ; the aim should rather be to
lay the foundations of the broad excellence of the (nrovbalos,
a many-sided and evenly developed being, healthy and
undistorted in body and mind.

At this point Aristotle recurs to the subject of music, Aristotle
with respect to which all that he has discovered is that ^Music*
those who first made a place for it in education did so (^o&lt;"^).

. 1.1 What is its

to supply the evident need of mankind to possess a means exact value,
of using leisure nobly (1337 b 29 sqq.). He will now push a " d hy
his inquiries about it a little farther, and the first question concern
that arises is, what is its exact function or value, and with
what view should we concern ourselves with it ? It natur
ally occurs to us that he has already answered this question,
and that it is with a view to occupation in leisure that music
should be studied ; but in fact all that he has said is that
this was the aim of those who first introduced its study ;
we shall find as we go on that this is far from being the
only purpose answered by music.

Is it, he asks, to be studied as a source of relaxation
and recreation ? Is it, like sleep or the convivial use of
wine (/^e^rj), a thing not in itself connected with virtue 2
(T&V cnrovbaiuv), but pleasant and a balm for care? Or

1 Cp. Plato, Rep. 537 B. Yet a Aristot. Fragm. 83. 1490 a 40 : cp.
different view seems to be ascribed also Eth. Nic. I. 13. no2b 7,
to Plato by Plutarch (de Tuenda apyia yap eariv 6 vnvos rijs ^vx^l s &gt;
Sanitate Praecepta, C. 25) op6&gt;s y Xeyerat anovSaia Kal &lt;pav\rj.
ovv 6 HXdrav irapr/vea-f, MTJTC ao&gt;fj.a The tests of TO (TTrovSalov, however,
Kivf iv avev ^vx^s pyre ^fv\r]v avev appear best from Eth. Nic. 7. 15.
oro)/naror, aXX oiov riva &lt;rvva&gt;pidos 1 1 54 a 31 sqq. : 10. 6. 1177 a 3.
la-op poiriav diafpuXdrreiv. In Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 14 the word

2 STTovSma are connected with is used in a broader and less

a in Eth. Nic. 7.2. 1 145 b 8 : technical sense.

360 FIFTH BOOK.

does it act on the character, and contribute to virtue by
creating through habituation the power of finding pleasure
in the things in which we ought to find pleasure? Or is
it good for the rational use of leisure and for intellectual
aptitude (StayooyTyy KCU (f&gt;p6inj&lt;nv)?

Its use in education can hardly be justified on the first
and third grounds, for learning music is not recreation to
boys, and the rational use of leisure is not for them. But
it may be said that they learn in youth, in order to pro
vide a recreation for themselves in manhood. But then
why should they learn to sing and play themselves, for
there is more recreation to be gained from following the
king of Persia s example, and listening to first-rate pro
fessional players, than from playing and singing oneself,
necessarily in a less excellent manner? If we can only
get recreation from music by learning to play and sing in
youth, must we not learn to cook in youth, in order to
enjoy cookery in after-years? The same difficulty arises,
if we take the view that music improves the character and
tends to virtue, for the Lacedaemonians claim to be able to
distinguish noble music from music of an opposite kind
without having learned to sing or play in youth. And so
again, if we account music a liberal occupation for leisure,
we fail to discover why boys should be taught to sing or
play, for Zeus, we know, finds employment in leisure in
listening to music ; he is never made by the poets to sing
or play himself 1 . In fact, we call men who sing and play
fiavava-oi, and hold that the performance of music is un
worthy of a man, unless he is in his cups or in sport.

Later on, we shall find that Aristotle sees a way of
escape from these perplexities, and is able to clear away
the doubts which he has started with regard to the Greek
custom of learning in youth to sing and to play on some
musical instrument 2 . Boys, he will discover, are to learn

1 An early poet, however, seems /ieo-o-oio-ii/ ft top^elro TTOTJJP avSpcav
to have represented him as danc- re 6fS&gt;v re.

ing : cp. Athen. Deipn. 22 C, E*- 2 It was not universal. As we

/j.rj\os be 6 KopivOios fj ApKTtvos TOV see, the Spartans did not common-

At a op^ovfj.fv 6v TTOV napayfi, \eycav ly learn in youth to sing or play.

WHY IS MUSIC TO BE STUDIED? 361

singing and playing, not in order to sing and play when
they are men, but in order that, as boys, they may ex
perience the full educating power of music which cannot
be experienced without practice in youth (1340 b 23), let
the Lacedaemonians say what they may and as men, may
get all the good from music that it is capable of giving,
by using it not only for recreation, but also for the pur
gation of the emotions (/cdtfa/xris) and for the employment
of leisure (Siaytoy?;).

But, for all that appears at present, Aristotle s discussion
of the question whether boys should be taught to sing and
play has led only to the negative conclusion, that whatever
the function of music may be, the practice seems hard of
defence ; and he drops the subject he had slipped, indeed,
into a discussion of it unawares foreseeing that he will be
in a better position to deal with it, when he has considered
another question, started at the beginning of the fifth
chapter (1339 a 14), whai the function of music exactly
is, and whether it is a means of education or recreation, or
an intellectual occupation for leisure (Staycoy?;).

There are plausible grounds, he says, for assigning to it all It is plea-
three functions. It is pleasure-giving, and therefore suitable SOU rce of

both for recreation and for the rational use of leisure, for such

. ment and

an use of leisure should have in it something of pleasure, if recreation :

The sons of kings were taught rid- Cynics discountenanced all the

ing and the art of war (3. 4. 1277 a generally accepted studies: cp.

1 8), and in this spirit Themistocles Diog. Laert. 6. 103-4, TrapaiTovvrai.

prided himself on his ignorance of fie KOI ra eyKvuXia p-aOrjuara ypdfj.-

the lyre (Plutarch, Themist. c. 2 : para yovv /xi) pavQavtiv ((paa-Ktv 6

Cic. Tusc. Disp. I. 2. 4), and had Avri(r6evT]s TOVS a-a&gt;&lt;ppovas ytvope-

his son Cleophantus made a vovs, tva fjirj 8iaaTpe(poivTo TO IS dXXo-

famous horseman (Plato, Meno rpiois ntpiaipovcri 8e KCU yeu&gt;iJ.fTpiav

93 D). Pericles, on the contrary, KO.I iiova-iitrjv KOI navra TO. roiavra . . .

learnt music of Damon (Plutarch, TIpos rov firiSeiKvvvTa ai&gt;ro&gt; /j.ova-iKr]v

Pericl. c. 4). The Arcadians, as f(py (6 Aioyevrjs},

Polybius tells us in an interesting yixapais yap dvdpa&gt;i&gt; fv pei* OIKOVV-

passage of his history (4. 20 sqq.), rai Tro Xeir,

almost universally learnt to sing, eu 8 OIKOS, ol ^aX/^oTo-i /cal repe-

which probably implies that they Ticr^aa-iv.

learnt also to play. The Thebans Aristotle also wishes to develope

generally were devoted to the av\os yvwpTj, but he holds that in youth

(Plutarch, Pelop. c. 19), but this is best accomplished indi-

Epaminondas used the harp rectly through a training in p.ov-

(Cic. Tusc. Disp. I. 2. 4). The CTIKJJ.

FIFTH BOOK.

it is both
noble and
pleasant,
hence suit
able for a
rational use
of leisure.
It would
be well,
therefore,
to teach
the young
music, if
only for the
sake of its
future use
in recrea
tion and
leisure.

Its use,
however,
as a source
of pleasure
and recrea
tion is,
perhaps,
subor
dinate and
accidental :
its essential
value lies
rather in
its power
to influence
the cha
racter.

also something of nobility. So that one might find in its
pleasurableness alone without going any further, a reason
for teaching music to the young. For it is one of those
harmlessly pleasurable things which not only contribute to
the end of life ((vbai.fji.ovia), but also afford recreation after
labour. And as men take recreation often, but are rarely
in fruition of the end, there is utility in having the pleasures
of music at our command for recreation. Indeed, men
often make recreation the end of life, for the end has a
kind of pleasure connected with it and so has recreation,
and men in their quest of the pleasure of the end mistake
the pleasure of recreation for it : there is, in fact, really a
resemblance between the pleasure of recreation and the
end, for both are desirable for nothing subsequent and
beyond them ; the pleasures of recreation are desirable by
reason of past toil 1 . Music then, may be resorted to as
affording the pleasures of recreation, and also for its utility
as a means of refreshment after toil, but may it not be
merely an accident of music to be serviceable in these
ways? May not its essential nature be something higher 2 ,
and ought we not to look for something more from it than
that widely shared kind of pleasure, oT which human beings
of all ages and characters are susceptible? Is it not
capable of acting on the character ($60$) and the soul ? This
would clearly be the case, if unoier its influence we assume
this or that variety of character. That we do so, may be
proved by pointing to the effect of the melodies of Olympus,
the (perhaps mythical) Phrygian musician, in producing
enthusiasm (e^ouo-tao-fio s), or even to the effect of mere
imitative sounds without tune or rhythm 3 . That music

1 See Sus. 2 , Note 1038, who
notices that in Eth. Nic. 10. 6.
11760 27 sqq., as Doring had re
marked, a somewhat different view
is expressed, and offers a recon
ciliation of the two passages.

2 Just as in the Nicomachean
Ethics the true nature of Friend
ship is found neither in its
pleasurableness nor in its utility,

but in the fact that it stands in a
close relation to virtue, so here the
same thing is shown to be true of
Music.

3 Ut si quis voce etiam sine
cantu et rythmis iratum, exempli
gratia, aut miserescentem imite-
tur, audientes solent eisdem affec-
tibus commoveri (Sepulveda,
P- 253)-

MORAL INFLUENCE OF MUSIC. 363

possesses the accidental quality of being pleasurable, is an
additional argument in favour of its use in education, for
virtue has to do with taking pleasure in the right things,
and hence the very thing the youthful mind needs to be
taught and habituated to do is to distinguish, and take
pleasure in, noble characters and action l . Now music
brings before us in its melodies and rhythms more vividly
than anything else can, images (6//otw/xara) of anger and
gentleness, of courage and temperance and their opposites,
and of every ethical state. To learn to feel pain and plea
sure in reference to the musical image is to learn to feel in
the same way about the original of which it is a reproduc
tion. In things which appeal to other senses than the ear
ethical suggestion is either entirely absent, as in the case
of things we touch or taste 2 , or it is not largely present, as
in the case of objects of sight I say not largely (Aristotle
continues), for figures and colours are suggestive in this
way, but not to any great extent, and all men possess a
perception of their significance, whatever their age or worth
or character 3 . They are also rather indications than images
of ethical states, and indeed they are not so much indi
cations of ethical states (T&V rjd&gt;v} or of anything connected
with the soul, as indications given by the bodily frame
under the influenc^ of emotion (tv rots TrdOea-iv} 4 . Still we
.need not deny statues and pictures all ethical influence 5 ,

1 Plato had said the same thing, meaning of 1340 a 34, KOI TUVT
as Aristotle remarks in the Nico- eVrii/ eVi (or OTTO) rov o-w/Liaroy eV
machean Ethics (2. 2. 11040 rots iraOfo-iv, but these words have
1 1 sq.). Ramsauer refers to Laws been interpreted in many different
653 A: Rep. 401, adding nee ways.

tamen ideo negandum brevius 5 Plato probably agreed with

eiusdem dictum fortasse e scholis Aristotle in estimating the prac-

eius inter discipulos notum fuisse. tical influence of sculptors and

2 This solves the difficulty architects upon the national cha-
raised in 1339 a 39, why cookery racter as less important than that
has not just as good a claim to of poets and musicians (Mr. R.
be studied in youth as music. L. Nettleship, Hellenica, p. 117).

3 It is implied that a perception He had, however, in the Republic
shared by slaves and children and (400 D-4OI D)found images (M A?-
worthless men cannot be one of a /xara) of ethical characteristics,
very elevated character (cp. c. 5. not only in music, but in the pro-
1340 a 2sqq. : c. 6. 1341 a 15 sqq.). ducts of painting, weaving, build-

4 This would seem to be the ing, and other arts. Aristotle

364 FIFTH BOOK.

and so far as they possess any, it will be well for the young
to be brought into contact rather with the works of artists
who express moral character in their productions, such as
Polygnotus, than with those of Pauson. But melodies need
no help from anything else to reproduce, not merely to
indicate, varieties of character, and this is clear from the
impression they make on us, for melodies are connected
with harmonies, and one harmony makes us feel quite
differently from another : the mixo-Lydian harmony winds
us up to a high-strung mood of lamentation, the more
relaxed ones let us down to an easier state of mind,
while the Doric harmony stands midway between these
two extremes, and the Phrygian produces strong excitation
of feeling. So too as to rhythms : some are quiet, others
are suggestive of movement, and of the latter some are
suggestive of vulgar, others of more noble movement. If
music has this power, it must be used in the education of
youth. It is indeed especially suitable for youth, for at
that age we take willingly to nothing that has not sweet
ness. The soul seems also to have some kinship with
harmonies and rhythms : many wise men call the soul
a harmony, and others say that it possesses harmony.
As to learn- But should music be learnt by learning oneself to play
airplay" 2 an d sing ? It is not easy, whatever the Lacedaemonians
it is not ma y sa y (1330.0 2), to become a good judge of music 1
become a in any other way. The study of music will not make men
good judge n& vava . 0i on the contrary, it will be an aid to virtue

of music J

without if the) practise it only up to a certain point and up
donefo to a certam a g e &gt; an d use the right kind of instruments.

perhaps intends tacitly to correct eye, and perhaps he is right in

this view in the passage analysed this, but ethical influence, in Aris-

in the text. He seems to us hardly totle s view, finds its way rather

to do full justice to the capabilities through the channel of the ear.

of formative art, or indeed of l Aristotle means by a good

stage-acting, to say nothing of judge of music a man who adds

gestures, looks, and the like, in to technical knowledge, or at ail

respect of ethical influence. L. events the knowledge of the TreiTni-

Schmidt holds (Ethik der alten dfvpevos, a capability of recogniz-

Griechen, i. 207), that the Greek ing ennobling music and of distin-

mind and heart received its guishing it from music of an

strongest impressions through the opposite kind.

THE PRACTICE OF MUSIC AND SINGING. 365

Anything like a professional study of music (T^VIKJ] but the
TraiSeta) must be avoided by those who are to become j
fit soldiers and citizens of the best State. They must si

. s be

carry the practice of music far enough to get above the confined to
level of that undeveloped musical taste which is common &eyearsof
to all men and even to some of the lower animals l ; far must not
enough to learn to take pleasure in noble by which Aris-

totle means ennobling music, but yet not to the point certain

.... . . , c point : the

attained in professional competitions or to that ot attempt- instruments
ing the mechanical achievements, the fashion of which has "fed must

.,&gt;r a l so be the

passed from those competitions to education" . We can right ones.
have nothing to do with any form of musical study that
will interfere with the military and political activity which
is to come later in the lives of our citizens, or that will
make the physique unfit for such work. As to the instru
ments to be used, pipes (avA.cn) and all instruments suitable
to professional virtuosi, such as the cithara, are to be pro
hibited. The avAo s is not an ethical agent for the develop
ment of the character, but orgiastic for the excitation and
purgation of emotion; it excludes the use of the voice 3 ,
and thus involves the loss of an element of education.

1 Stags, mares, dolphins (Plu- Diogenes had spoken of the con-
tarch, Symposiaca, 7. 5. 2. 704 F). tests at the festivals of Dionysus
When Aristotle is said in this as /xeyriAa dav^ara pvpols (Diog.
passage of Plutarch to have Laert. 6. 24).

regarded the pleasures of sight 3 This was one of Alcibiades

and hearing as peculiar to man objections to the use of the av\6s ;

(ftoKei fie fj.oL fj.r]8e Api&lt;TTOT(Xrjs atria he objected to it also on account

Kaia ras irepl 6eav /cat aKpodcrii/ of its distortion of the face and its

drroXvtiv aKpcurtas, o&gt;? consequent unsuitableness for a

dvdpcaniKas ova-as rals 8 man of breeding. Cp. Plut. Alcib.

/cat ra 6f]pin (pvaiv e%ovra C. 2, eri de rfjv fjtev \vpai&gt; TU&gt; XP M ~

Xprjaai Kai K.oiva&gt;vtlv\ we must p.eva&gt; ffv^deyytcrdai KOI (rwadetv,

suppose that, if his opinion is TOV 8 av\6v nrtoro/ufcu Kai aTro-

correctly stated, he is speaking of (ppdrreiv fKacrrov TTJV re &lt;pa&gt;vfjv Kai

their higher forms. TOV \6yov dcpaipov/jLevnv. "AwXetT-

2 This resembles the view ex- &lt;rav ovv," ecprj, " QrjQaivv iral8fs, ov
pressed by one of the interlocutors yap urao-t &iaXcyc&lt;r&u r^tlv Se rots
in the Erastae ascribed to Plato Aflgnpotr, &&amp;gt;y ot irartpes \f-yovo-iv,
(135 C 136 B). Here also we apxriyeris Adr)va Kai Tirarpcpo? A7ro \-
find how much reluctance there Ao&gt;i/ ecrrtV, S)t/ fj p.fi&gt; tppitye rbv av\6v,
was to connect liberal education 6 St Kai rw aiX^r^j ffeSeipe"
with anything approaching x- Aristotle hints that the objection
povpyia (135 B). The Cynic of Athene to the av\6s was based

366 FIFTH BOOK.

We have not yet, however, said (Aristotle continues, c. 7.
1341 b 19) whether all harmonies and rhythms should be
used with a view to education or only some of them, nor
whether the answer we give to this question will hold also
for those who are learning to sing and play with an educa
tional object, or, on the other hand, whether in their case
the further question will not have to be considered, what is
the relative educational value of rhythm and of melody,
and whether music good in rhythm or good in melody
should be preferred 1 . Those who desire a full treatment
of these questions must be referred to the works of those
musicians and philosophical inquirers on the subject of
musical education who have dealt with them : we can only
treat of them in outline.

The melo- Philosophers have divided melodies into three classes
- ethical melodies (ridiKa), those connected with action

cauonmust TLK d\ anc ] those which stir enthusiasm (hdovcnaa-TiKd) and
also be cor-

rectly have allotted a particular kind of harmony to each ; and
MhxHes we ^ ave recognized that music should be used for many
are ethical, purposes for education, for the purging of the emotions
with action (i&lt;a0ap&lt;rLs}, for the intellectual use of leisure (Siaycoyj/), and for
or enthusi- recreation. We shall accordingly find an use for all three
sort having kinds of harmonies, but we shall use with a view to educa-

an appro- t j on on jy th ose w hich are most ethical, and reserve the

pnate nar- J

mony of two other kinds for occasions when we listen to the per-

WhrTa formances of others, instead of playing ourselves. For

view to though it might be thought that harmonies which arouse

those har- feelings of enthusiasm or fear or pity, and purge these

monies emotions, are useful only to a few over-fraught spirits, this

which are .

most ethi- is not really so : all are more or less in need of music of
C rer e red bethis kind and relieved b 7 it 2 . The melodies also which

on graver grounds than its inci- valuable for their educational

dental distortion of a handsome effect, so that the educational

face (1341 b 4sqq.). value of a harmony is not the

1 It would seem, in fact, from only thing to be considered in the

the close of c. 7 (i342b 29 sqq.), choice of music to be practised

that boys learning to sing and by those learning to sing and

play should practise harmonies play.

like the Lydian, which are at once 2 Contrast Plato s view of the

suitable to their tender age and effect of poetry which calls forth

MANIFOLD USES OF MUSIC. 367

purge emotion are similarly productive of innocent pleasure, such as the
Melodies and harmonies of this nature may therefore be ^^ for
allowed to professional show-performers. Nay more, we the other
must make provision for the inferior type of auditor which forChkh
cannot fail to be found in a State in which artisans and Music is

11 i useful

day-labourers will have to exist ; we must not leave these the purging
classes without musical entertainments and competitions f the e , mo "

tions, the

suitable for their moments of recreation. For audiences of intellectual
this kind the use of an inferior kind of music is allowable,

but only for them. With a view to education the Doric and r cre-
harmony is to be used, and any other which those who ot her kinds
have studied both philosophy and music may recommend, of harmony

may be

The Doric harmony is at once the quietest and the most used.
expressive of manliness ; it is also a mean between ex
tremes, neither too high-strung in feeling nor too relaxed.
The Phrygian harmony, which had met with approval from
Plato in the Republic, is held by Aristotle to be unfit for
use in education, as being nearly akin to the av\6s and the
dithyramb, and expressive of Bacchic excitement.

A few other remarks follow, and then the Fifth Book
breaks off without entering on the subject of rhythms,
which had been announced for treatment.

The whole discussion shows how powerful was the On Aris-
influence of music on the Greek mind, and how closely onvfus
its influence had been studied ; ethical melodies had and its
been parted off from those which stimulated to action 1
and from those again which at once excited and purged

strong emotion (Rep. 605 C sqq.)- speaks. If we may trust Aris-

He regards it as simply weaken- toxenus, the notion of tcddapais

ing to the character, whereas by music originated with the

Aristotle sees that both it (Poet. 6. Pythagoreans (Aristox. Fr. 24 :

1449 b 27) and music of a similar Miiller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 280, ot

kind have their use. On the other HvQayopmoi, &&amp;gt;y $77 Apto-ro|ei/oy,

hand, in Laws 790 C-79I B, Plato Kaddpa-et expmvro TOV p.tv o-w^aro?

goes far to anticipate the view of Sta rfjs larpiKrjs, rrjs 8e ^svxrjs Sta

Aristotle, though it is rather to rfjs /^ouou/cf/s).
physical movement, or physical l Oarsmen, reapers, and vine-

movement accompanied by music, dressers (Philodem. de Musica, 4.

than to music alone, that he ap- 8. 6 sqq.) found encouragement,

pears to ascribe the soothing and when at work, in music, no doubt

calming influences of which he of this kind.

368 FIFTH BOOK.

emotion, with a distinctness quite unfamiliar to ourselves.
We only want a closer analysis to detect the same
qualities in our own composers. Much of the best music
we now hear is unduly exciting ; it feeds vain long
ings, indefinite desires, sensuous regrets V Aristotle, we
see, is careful to keep the minds of the young out of
the way of exciting or enervating music, and to use in
their education quiet airs expressive of manly feeling.
Not all the tunes, perhaps not all the hymn-tunes we
use in the education of the young, would be approved
by him.

He differs from Plato in recognizing a variety of
legitimate uses for music. Plato had tolerated it in the
Republic only so far as it contributes to virtue. Aristotle
tries to see it in its whole relation to human life. It is a
source of harmless pleasure and has legitimate claims to
recognition on this ground 2 . It is sweet after toil a plea
surable and restful recreation for the wearied. It is, like
tragedy (Poet. 6. 1449 b 2 7)&gt; a means of freeing the o er-
fraught heart from an excessive accumulation of emotion.
In it, again, we have a means of making an intellectual use
of leisure. It is, lastly, of use in forming the character. It
brings before us, more vividly than the hints (o-rj/xaa) of
painting and sculpture, images (ojuoicoyiara) of character and
action, and if care is taken in the early years of life that
the character and action reproduced in the music practised
are good, it habituates the mind to the love of that which
is good and noble and to a distaste for that which is not
so. In order fully to understand the importance of the
part assigned by Aristotle to music in the development
of the a-7Tou8cuos, we must bear in mind that to him, unlike i
some modern moralists, a man is not really virtuous unless |
he finds pleasure in the exercise of virtue. It is precisely
this identification of the good and the pleasurable that
music is the earliest means of producing.

1 See Mr. Mahaffy, Old Greek of the institution of several pro-
Education, p. 73. perty (2. 5. 1263 a 4osqq.)-

2 He had said the same thing

ARISTOTLE S SCHEME OF EDUCATION. 369

For each of these purposes Music has appropriate
melodies, harmonies, and instruments. For education we
must use only the most ethical melodies, the Dorian har
mony J , and the lyre. But it does not follow that we must
with Plato expel from the State all melodies, harmonies,
and instruments, that are not fit for educational use.
Aristotle goes so far as to allow, even in his best State, of
the use, in public entertainments and competitions, of
music suitable to the taste of auditors of an inferior type,
feeling quite secure that his citizens will not be corrupted
by it, for they will find it repulsive and not attractive to
their well-trained taste. The music that will please them
will be ennobling music ; they will not need to be
guarded as if they were children from every possibility
of harm (cp. 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 21-23). Aristotle desires to
give music, as he also desires to give tragedy and even
comedy, its full natural verge and scope. He is more
careful than Plato had been not to impoverish the life
of his State, or to curtail its opportunities of making
a rational use of leisure ; he wishes its enjoyment of the
goods of civilized existence to be full and complete.

Aristotle s scheme of education, in the form in which it On Aris-
has come down to us, closes abruptly without even com- ^Ime of
pleting the subject of music, for as to the rhythms which education.
are to be used and as to the relative educational value
of rhythm and tune we are left altogether in the dark,
though we look for some treatment of both these subjects
(cp. c. 7. 1341 b 24 sqq.). We hear nothing with regard
to the use of poetry or dancing in education subjects
which Plato had considered at length nor is anything
said with regard to the use of prose-recitation, which
Plato had recommended in the Laws. When the subject
of Poetry comes to be treated in the Poetics, we find it
treated not from a social or educational, but from a

1 This rule appears to be so far commended in the case of boys
modified in c. 7. 1342 b 29 sqq., learning to sing and play,
that the Lydian harmony is re-

VOL. I. B b

370 FIFTH BOOK.

literary point of view. Above all, the inquiry breaks off
before the culminating epoch of education is reached
that in which the reason is developed, not indirectly
through the likings, but directly. Our latest glimpse
of the youthful object of Aristotle s care is obtained at
the moment when at the age of 19 or thereabouts he
is committed for the first time to the tender mercies of
the sterner form of yuywaoriKTj, and left, we do not exactly
know for what period, but probably till the age of 21, in
the hands of the gymnastic trainer. We cannot tell
whether Aristotle was about to follow the example of
Plato l and to crown his scheme of early education with
a long course of philosophical study, but some direct
training of the reason was probably intended to begin
at 21 2 .

The main novelty in Aristotle s treatment of the subject
of education, if we compare it with Plato s, seems to be his
fuller and more reasoned adoption of the principle that its
successive stages are to be adjusted to those of the physical
and psychological development of the individual 3 that the
body, the appetites, and the reason are to be successively
taken in hand as they successively develope, but that the
training of the body should be such as to develope healthy
appetites, and the training of the appetites such as to
develope the reason. His scheme consequently differs from
those of Plato 4 in making gymnastic training of the right
kind the main business of the earlier years of life, in

1 Rep. 537 sqq. to the principle laid down in the

2 As Aristotle does not, like Nicomachean Ethics.

Plato, find the root of right con- 3 Plato had already said (Laws

duct in speculative insight, but 653) that the tastes and disposi-

distinguishes the sources of ^pdi/r/- tion of boys must be trained before

&lt;TIS and o-ocpia, it would have been their reason is trained,
interesting to know by what train- * See Sus. 2 , Note 970, for a

ing of the reason he proposed to sketch of the schemes of education

develope (frpovrja-is. Perhaps, if set forth by Plato in the Republic

we were in possession of his views and Laws. Plato s scheme of

on this subject, we might find that education in the Republic is, it

in relation to it, no less than in should be observed, intended for

his treatment of practical philoso- (frvXcuces and ap^ovres Aristotle s

phy generally, he would adhere for citizens generally,
less closely than we might expect

ARISTOTLE S SCHEME OF EDUCATION. 371

beginning other training later at puberty instead of the
age of 10, as in the State of the Laws (809 E) and in
devoting only three years instead of six or more to studies
other than that of gymnastics (rot? aAAois /ixa^/zcuri, 5 (8).
4. i339E4sqq.).

They both, however, agree in the important view that
school is a place for forming the tastes and giving a right
direction to the appetites and likings, -for inspiring a love
of all that is noble and a distaste for that which is the
reverse, rather than for pouring in knowledge or directly
developing the reason, though Plato finds room before
the age of 18 (which Aristotle cannot positively be said
to do) for the beginnings of mathematical education.
Hence it is that gymnastic and music are accepted by
them as the main means of education in youth. Looking
forward as they both perhaps did to a long course of
education carried on till middle life \ they did not need to
make youth a time for the rapid acquisition of a mass of
positive knowledge. They held that the main business of
school-education is the formation of the tastes and cha
racter, and that the studies which are in place at school are
studies adapted to this end 2 . Music was pre-eminently
such a study 3 . The Greek youth was evidently unused to

1 This cannot be proved as to in the case of boys were to secure
Aristotle, but it is very probable. a sound and healthy body ^fi-
If we feel instinctively inclined to paKia ynei/ 6Wa Kal Tra tdas ptipaKiadr]
reject the idea of an education nai&tiav Kal &lt;fii\oo-o(piai&gt; [8e&lt;] /xera-
such as that designed by Plato, xfipi&crdai, ru&gt;v re o-co/ndrcoi Iv w
which did not close, at any rate ^Xaa-rdvet re Km a^Spotirai ev judAn
for the elite, till 35, we must bear eTrijueAetcr&u, vnrjpea-iav &lt;piAoo-o0ia
in mind that the ancients not un- KTm^evovs Trpoiovarjs fie rffs f]\iKias,
frequently became the pupils of ev y fj \lsv\ri reKtovcrQai apxtrai,
instructors in rhetoric and philo- eirirfivfiv TU eKttvrjs yv^vayia. Plu-
sophy at a ripe age, that Plato and tarch, unlike Aristotle, would
Aristotle held years and experience have children accustomed from
to be needed for the study of some their earliest years to receive their
of the sciences, and that oral in- lessons and instruction mingled
struction came more naturally to with philosophic reason, that so
many Greeks than the reading of they may come at last as kind and
books, all the more so that it was familiar friends to philosophy (de
usually conjoined with conversa- Recta Ratione Audiendi, c. 2).
tional discussion. 3 The argument is occasionally

2 Plato speaks in one passage used at the present day, that
(Rep. 498 B) as if the main thing literature is preferable to physical

B b 2

372 FIFTH BOOK,

the hard intellectual efforts, which later ages with more or
less success have sought to impose upon boys, and the
attractiveness of music was a fact in its favour. It was
attractive, and yet powerful as a means of imperceptibly
winning the mind to virtue. A boy needs to be won to the
side of virtue long before his reason can be appealed to,
and this can be done through music. Music reproduces
character, and one who has learnt in youth to love noble
music will have learnt with the help of the musical image
(o/xouo^a) to love all that is noble in character and action.
Premature attempts to make a boy understand why this
or that is right are out of place : let him learn to love
what is right first and wait till later to learn why it is so.
Enough will have been done, if at twenty-one years of age
he turns out to possess a robust, agile, and healthy
physique, correct likings, and a disposition to which all
that is ignoble is distasteful.

Aristotle s scheme of youthful education stands in marked
contrast to that plan of encyclopaedic study which Milton
sketches in his treatise on Education, and still more to the
training which the late Mr. J. S. Mill appears to have re
ceived from his father. As its outcome at the age of twenty-
one, we may imagine a bronzed and hardy youth, healthy in
body and mind, lithe and active, able to bear hunger and hard
physical labour, skilled in wrestling, running, and leaping,
but also able to sing and play the lyre, not untouched by
studies which awake in men the interests of civilized beings
and prepare them for a right use of leisure in after-years,
and though burdened with little knowledge, possessed of
an educated sense of beauty and an ingrained love of what
is noble and hatred of all that is the reverse. He would
be more cultured and human than the best type of young
Spartan, more physically vigorous and more reverential,
though less intellectually developed, than the best type of
young Athenian a nascent soldier and servant of the State,

science and mathematics as a sub- Plato and Aristotle use this argu-
ject of youthful education, because ment in favour of music,
of its influence on the character.

ARISTOTLE S SCHEME OF EDUCATION. 373

not, like most young Athenians of ability, a nascent orator.
And as he would only be half-way through his education at
an age at which many Greeks had finished theirs, he would
be more conscious of his own immaturity. We feel at
once how different he would be from the clever lads who
swarmed at Athens, youths with an infinite capacity for
picking holes and capable of saying something plausible
on every subject under the sun.

The aim of Aristotle is to produce a man who will be
capable of playing successively a number of different parts
of being first a soldier, and then a ruler or judge or
philosopher, in his best State. He does not educate with a
view to private life, or in the way most likely to develope
one-sided genius, but rather with the aim of building up an
ensemble of character suited to the ideal society and to the
duties which it successively imposes on the citizen.

Education with us is so inseparable from instruction and
the communication of knowledge, that we can hardly enter
into a scheme which finds so little time in youth for
serious intellectual study, and makes its main aim till
the age of twenty-one the formation of the tastes and
character a matter which we deal with only indirectly.
Aristotle declines to give a direct training to the intellect,
till he has first laid a solid foundation of character. In his
view the object of youthful education is to produce a being
who will find his happiness in the exercise of the moral
and intellectual virtues to whom not only vice, but an
over-estimate of external and bodily goods, will be dis
tastefulwho will live for the noblest things that men can
live for, simply because to do otherwise would be painful to
him. No higher conception of the aim of education could
well be formed, and we see every day how much character
has to do even with purely intellectual achievements. Yet
perhaps Aristotle delays unduly the cultivation of the in
tellect. We may doubt whether the youths who gathered
round Socrates would have been content with a diet of
yvpvavTinri and /xotxriK??, till they reached the due official age
content to postpone all deeper problems and to silence

374 THE BEGINNINGS OF POLITICAL INQUIRY

for a time the stirrings of reason. It has already been
remarked that Aristotle seems occasionally to overrate the
immaturity of youth and its contrast with manhood. But
if he postpones the appeal to reason, it is in order that it
may be all the more effectual when it is made. His view
that no education is good which does not culminate in
rationality in a reasoned perception of truth, goodness,
and beauty that to be educated is to be in the best sense
rational, is one which possesses permanent value.

To him as to Plato, the production of a fully and har
moniously developed man (cnrovbalos) is the work of years,
and the final result of a laborious and long-continued
system of habituation \ commencing in the regulation of
marriage, and culminating in the development of the reason.
Hence his sense of the importance of the social and po
litical environment of the individual.

Sketch of

political
sophy.

The aims

Greek 7
legislators

political
inquirers.

Our attempt to sketch the ideal State of Aristotle, so
*" ar as ^ s known to us, is now complete, but it remains to
trace its genesis, and to view it in relation to previous ideals
an d to the results of earlier inquiry.

The actual State, whether Greek or barbarian, Aristotle
te ^ s US was little conscious of a distinct aim, but so far
as an a j m was impressed on its institutions, it was corn-
monly that of supremacy and empire (ro Kpareu&gt;, 4 (7). 2.
1334 b 5 sqq.). He traced written laws or unwritten
customs tending to this end at Carthage no less than in
the Lacedaemonian and Cretan States among the Persians
of Asia no less than the Thracians, Macedonians, Scy
thians, Celts, and Iberians of Europe. We hear of writers
on politics who took the same view, and glorified Lycurgus
because he had taught those for whom he legislated to win
empire over many by teaching them how to face perils
- J 4- 1333 b 16-21).

1 Cp. Eth. Nic. 2. I. IIO3b 23, ov
ovv dia&lt;pfpfi TO ovra&gt;s r) OVTWS

tvdvs eV vtoav edie&lt;r6ai, dAAu
TroAv, ^ciXXoj/ 8e TO nav.

IN GREECE. 375

Most authors of best constitutions, however, appear to
have followed a different path. They concerned them
selves especially with questions relating to the distribution
of property, holding that civil discord always arose in
relation to property (2. 7. 12663. 36 sqq.). They thus
seem to have made the avoidance of civil discord (ordcrt?)
their aim. It is true, of course, that internal harmony is a
main condition of success in war, so that the two aims did
not lie far apart 1 .

They probably inherited their view of the importance of
a due regulation of property from some of the earliest
legislators of Greece men, for instance, like Pheidon of
Corinth (2. 6. i265b 12 sqq.). One main object of early
legislation seems to have been the maintenance of the
original number of lots of land. It is probable that the
citizen-body in many early States, and especially in colonies
and States founded on conquest, consisted only of those
who owned one or more of the lots into which the territory
was at the outset divided. We gather, at all events, that
the plan followed at Aphytis, a city of the Thrace-ward
region (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 14 sqq.), by which the owner of a
fraction of one of the original lots was accounted a citizen,
was an exceptional one. It is easy to see that a citizen-
body thus composed was in a somewhat dangerous position.
A large body of non-citizens was likely to grow up around
this nucleus of privileged persons, and if, as no doubt
frequently happened, the numbers of the privileged dwindled
through the union of more lots than one in the same hands,
the state of things which we find existing at an early date
in many Greek States could hardly fail to arise. Power
would be in the hands of a few families, girt round by a
hungry people creeping ever nigher. To keep power in
their hands it was essential to maintain their numbers, and
with this aim the owners of the lots were often forbidden to

1 Another characteristic of ov yap av (naa-ros fv xpei a yiyvrj-rm,

ordinary speculation about law TOVTO fjjrel vvv 7rapadf/j.(i&gt;os, 6 pen

was its fragmentary character ra nepl TU&gt;V K\rjpa&gt;v KOI ejrt/cA^pcoj/,

(Plato, Laws 630 E, ov8 anfp ot 6 8e rrjs midas iff pi, a AXoi fie r/AAa

TO&gt;V viv t idr) TrpnTidffJ.fi oi {iJTOWTllf cirra pvpia Toiavra).

3/6 PYTHAGORAS

alienate or mortgage them l , the giving of dowries and the
marriage of heiresses were strictly regulated, the possession
of land in excess of a certain amount was made illegal, and
power to adopt a son was often conceded. If war and
famine and pestilence did not sufficiently reduce the
numbers of the unenfranchised population, it was usually
possible to fall back on the resource of founding a colony,
or perhaps the perils of the governing class might be
opportunely lessened by the growth of commerce and
manufactures. We can readily understand how it happened
that many States were glad to have a number of colonies
connected with them, which served as outlets not only
for their produce and their manufactures, but also for their
surplus population. A further danger arose from the
circumstance that the lots do not seem to have been
necessarily, or perhaps even commonly, equal. Phaleas of
Chalcedon is said to have been the first to propose legis
lation for the purpose of making them equal (2. 7. 12663. 39).
His views were apparently put forth in the form of a
best constitution, but he trod in the steps of the early
legislators to whom we have referred ; at all events he
hoped everything from the plan of giving every one the
same amount of land.
Pythagoras Pythagoras 2 saw deeper and devised a remedy which
. proved, for a time at least, effectual. He seems to have
been a citizen of Samos in the days when Samos was
mistress of the seas, and is said, not improbably, to have
emigrated to escape from the rule of Polycrates. Tyrants
were foes to eratptat (7 (5)- u I 3 I 3 SL 4 1 )) an d an eraipia
was precisely what Pythagoras aimed at founding 3 . He

1 According to Plato (Rep. the Lacedaemonian, which, as we

552 A sq. : cp. 556 A), this whole- know from Aristotle (Pol. 2. 9.

some measure, as he considers it, 1270 a 19), put a stigma both on

was not commonly adopted in oli- the sale and on the purchase of

garchies, for the rich oligarchs in patrimonies.

power would be unwilling to lose 2 It is not intended to suggest

the chance of stripping spend- that Phaleas was prior in date to

thrifts of their possessions and Pythagoras, which is far from

thus growing richer themselves. likely. Nothing is known of the

He seems to regard it rather as date of Phaleas.

congenial to a constitution like 3 Besides, the rule of a tyrant

AND PYTHAGOREANISM. 377

carried his ascetic aims to a region which lived for material
enjoyments. Among the Achaeans of South Italy, says
Mommsen 1 , the spit was for ever turning on the hearth V
He appears to have found Croton in the hands of a limited
body of citizens, whose power was waning, and to have
given a new lease of life to the oligarchical constitution,
not by methods such as those we have noticed, but by
breathing a new and more ethical spirit into the rule of the
Few. He sought out the best of the young nobles of
Croton and other cities, taught them to live an ascetic life
of temperance and friendship, and formed them into a
brotherhood which ultimately brought not only Croton
but several other cities of South Italy under its direction.

His originality consisted in this, that he was at once a
philosopher, the founder of a religion, and the head of a
brotherhood. No one quite like him appears ever to
have existed in Greece. More lessons than one were to
be learnt from his career. It proved, in the first place,
that philosophers could be kings, and that the dream of
Plato was a dream that had once come true. Philosophy
had once upon a time established her competence to rule,
and would not easily forget that she had done so, or cease
to make her voice heard in the politics of Greece. Occa
sionally, in fact, we find philosophers actually ruling in
Greece. The saying ran that Thebes never flourished till
it was ruled by philosophers (Rhet. 2. 23. i398b 18). The
careers of Epaminondas, Archytas, Dion, and others showed
that philosophers sometimes made noble rulers. More
usually, however, we find philosophers the advisers of
rulers, and this perhaps was their true function. In the

would be especially hateful to an love of pleasure, a reckless wan-
ascetic like Pythagoras, if only tonness, a licentious frivolity had
because tyrants commonly lived taken possession of Genevan life,
luxurious lives. while the State was the plaything

1 History of Rome, 1. 143 E. T. of intestine and foreign feuds . . .

2 His appearance at Croton may It was a commonwealth torn to
be compared to the appearance of pieces by party spirit, the inde-
Calvin at Geneva. When Calvin pendenceofwhichwasendangered
came to Geneva, it was apparently (Hausser, Period of the Reforma-
in a state of political, ecclesiastical, tion, 1.314 E.T.).

and moral decay . . . An unbridled

378 PYTHAGORAS

one way or the other, Greek philosophers found means of
exercising political influence, and their influence was com
monly an ennobling and moderating influence. It is,
perhaps, because the spheres of philosophy and politics
were so little held apart, that Plato and Aristotle conceive
the problem of political philosophy in the practical way
they do that their aim is to come to the rescue of the
Greek State, and to make it as much as possible what it
ought to be.

The career of Pythagoras also showed how much could
be done by education and by regulating men s habits of
life. A whole group of States had been mastered by
a handful of carefully trained nobles. If a sect could do
so much, what might not a State do, which set to work
in the same way !

Nor was this all. Plato was greatly influenced by the
Pythagorean doctrines 1 , and if Aristoxenus account of
them is not unduly coloured by his Peripateticism 2 , we
can trace their influence even in the Politics of Aristotle.
We do not learn from Aristoxenus how the Pythagoreans
connected their ethical and social teaching with the nume
rical basis of their Ontology, though a connexion may often
be conjectured. They taught that there was no greater
evil than the absence of rule (avap^ia) : the secret of safety
for man is to have somebody over him 3 . Here we are
reminded of a well-known passage of Plato s Laws (942 A
sqq.). Men were to be full of reverence for gods and
ftaifjioues, and, after them, for their parents and the laws
(Aristox. Fragm. 19: cp. Plato, Laws 917 A). It was
right to adhere to the ancestral laws of the State, even if
they were a little inferior to others V Here they went
even beyond Plato, whose desire for fixity of law did not
induce him absolutely to prohibit all change (Laws 769 D :
cp. 772 A-D). Aristotle perhaps has the Pythagorean

1 See Prof. Lewis Campbell, members of the sect (Fragm. 12 :
Introduction to the Politicus of Miiller, Fragm. Hist. Grace. 2.
Plato, p. xx. sqq. 275).

2 He seems to have been ac- 3 Aristox. Fr. 18.
quainted with some still surviving 4 Aristox. Fr. 19.

AND PYTHAGOREANISM. 379

doctrine in his mind in a passage of the Politics (a. 8.
1369 a 14 sqq.). The relation between rulers and ruled
was thus conceived by them : the rulers were not only
to be men of knowledge, but loving to those they ruled,
and the ruled were not only to be obedient but fond of
their rulers V There was, it would seem, to be a har
mony of contraries in the State as in the Universe 2 .
Rulers and ruled were to be friends, and when Aristotle
tells us that some found in good-will the true basis of the
relation between master and slave, he may be referring
to the Pythagoreans. Order and proportion, limit and
measure were to them the life-breath of virtue, and also
of the State : here again was a doctrine which profoundly
influenced later speculation. They had their views as to
the begetting and education of children (Aristox. Fr. 18,
20) ; they commended a sparing diet ; their enthusiasm
for mathematics passed to Plato, their high estimate of
gymnastic, and still higher estimate of music, passed not
only to Plato but to Aristotle ; their ascetic brotherhood
was a brotherhood of close friends who freely shared all
they had with each other, and may have served as the
model for the class of guardians in Plato s Republic,
besides helping to suggest to Aristotle that common use
of property which he recommends (cp. Diod. 10. 3. 5 :
10. 4. i). A saying ascribed by Aristoxenus to Pytha
goras ran : $uya8eureoy Tracrry fj.ri%avfj /cat irepiKOTTTfov Ttvpl
KCU &lt;rt8?7pa&gt; /cat juij^ayai? liavroiais cbro fj.ev rrw/xaros vocrov, O.TTO
8e \l/v)(jis dfiadlaz*, KOtAlas 8e TroAure Aetay, Tro Aeco? 8e orderly,
otKou 8e b^o(f)poa-vvriv, OJJLOV Se Travratv apfTpiav (Fragm. 8 :
Miiller, Fr. Hist. Gr. a. 273). Compare the turn of Plato s
language in Laws 942 C, T?j2&gt; 8 avapyjiav eaipereoi&gt; ex TTCLVTOS
TOV fiiov airavruiv rStv avOpwir&v re /cat rS&gt;v VTT avdpunrovs
(hfpC&V, and 739 C, Kat iraa-p jj.T])(avf} TO Aeyo /ieyoi Ibiov Travra-
\6Qev K TOV jSiov a-nav efrjprjrai. Their dogma of the
metempsychosis seems to be unconnected with the rest
of their tenets, but it supplied a fresh motive for virtue.

1 Aristox. Fr. 18.

2 Cp. Philolaus, Fragm. 3 (Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 2. i).

380 HIPPODAMUS

The ruling brotherhood appears to have been over
thrown by a popular outbreak at Croton ; it is, indeed,
surprising that the ascendency of a philosophical coterie
should have been tolerated at all. But Pythagoreanism
long survived this blow, and gave to Greece, in later days,
two of its noblest statesmen, Epaminondas and Archytas :
no other school could claim to have trained rulers equally
great. In its original form Pythagoreanism was fatal to
the authority of the State, for it set on foot a brotherhood
whose power overrode the local authority of the separate
States ; and we notice that at this point Plato and Aristotle
wholly diverge from Pythagorean traditions, for their prin
ciple always is to make the City-State the source of autho
rity. But it is impossible not to see how much both of
them, and especially Plato, owe to Pythagoreanism.

Hippo- When we pass from Pythagoras to Hippodamus of

Miletus Miletus, we pass from a great personality whose work
stood the test of a stormy time to the mere author of
a shadowy ideal. Before the ideal of Hippodamus took
shape, great events had happened. Persia had been driven
back not only from Greece, but from the Aegean coast :
perhaps the turning-point of Greek history had been passed,
and the policy of Cimon had been vanquished by that of
Pericles. Cimon s gallant attempt to hold together the
two leading powers of the Greek world, the Athenian and
Lacedaemonian States, may have already failed, and the
Periclean scheme of an absolute democracy at Athens, out
spoken antagonism to the Lacedaemonians, and a pro
nounced Imperialism in relation to the allies may have
already triumphed over the policy of friendship among
Greeks and war with the barbarians, with fatal ultimate
results to the unity of Greece and to the internal harmony
of every Greek State. Hippodamus was largely employed
by Pericles ; he laid out the Peiraeus for him in broad
rectangular streets, he built Thurii ; but there are indica
tions in his ideal that he can hardly have sympathised with
the unmixed Periclean democracy.

OF MILETUS. 381

He had one advantage over Pythagoras ; his connexion
with Athens placed him at the very centre of the Greek
world. But he is not treated by Aristotle with much
respect, and we know from the Republic that philosophers
who began by being r^ylrai were not favourably viewed
by Plato (Rep. 495 C sq.). Like the sophist Hippias 1 , he
seems to have had crotchets about dress, and Aristotle,
who takes account of the life of a philosopher in judging
of his claims to authority 2 , evidently thinks the less of
Hippodamus for his eccentric fancies. He belonged to
the brilliant and aspiring generation which immediately
followed the Persian wars a generation which threw itself
with ardour into every department of study (irdcr^s ^-nrovro
/xaflrjo-ecos, 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 31) and we find him described
not only as a physical philosopher 3 , but also as the first
man who without experience as a statesman attempted
to express an opinion with respect to the best constitution.

His aim was not, like that of Phaleas, the mere avoidance
of civil disturbance, but the founding of a well-ordered and
powerful State. Aristotle seems to be struck with his^
threefold divisions of things, and to think him fanciful. The
population, the territory, laws and lawsuits, verdicts of
juries, subjects of administration, all, he thought, fell easily
into three groups or sections. This feature may point to
Pythagorean influences (cp. de Caelo, I. I. 268 a 10 sqq.) 4 ,
or it may reflect the influence of the philosophy of Ion of
Chios 5 , if indeed Ion did not himself derive his triad

1 Plato, Hipp. Min. 368 B sqq. KGU irepl TO&gt;V Kara pepos, old evn,

2 Cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 2. iiy2b 15 o-^eladai (Mullach, Fragm. Philos.
sq.: I. 3. 1095 b 14 sq. Cp. also Gr. I. 564).

Rhet. ad Alex. 39. 1445 b 29 sqq. * The carefulness of Hippoda-

3 The view is expressed in a mus about oaths and his dread of
fragment ascribed to the Pytha- perjury may also be indications of
gorean Archytas, that the nature Pythagoreanism (Diod. 10. 9. 2).
of the Whole must be studied, if 5 The following passage from
any department of it is to be the Tpta-yp-o? of Ion of Chios
studied successfully. KaXaiy /.tot perhaps its opening passage has
SoKoiWi (ot TTtpi Hvdayopav] TO been preserved by Harpocration
Trepi TO. fj.a6rjp.aTa 8iayva&gt;vai, &lt;al (s.v."lo&gt;i&gt;) : dp)(r)8(f]8f corr. Lobeck,
oiiQev aronov 6p6a&gt;s UVTUIS irep\ fKacr- Agl. p. J22) p.oi TOV Xoyou. Yldvra
TOV 6ea&gt;pev. Kept -yap ray TUIV 5\&lt;av rpta (cat n\eoi&gt; Tovfie TrXeoj/ fXaacrov

KaKuis diayvovres, e/zeXXoc (cai ovre TrXeoi/ ovre eXaa croc, corr.

382 H1PPODAMUS

theory from Pythagoras. Ion was a friend of Cimon, and
opposed to Pericles and the extreme democratic party;
he may very well have been a friend of his fellow-Ionian,
Hippodamus. Hippodamus division of the citizens into
three classes warriors, cultivators, and artisans is quite
opposed to democratic sentiment, for in democracies all
men shared in all functions (fxere\ouo-t Travres TTOLVTO^V, 4 (7).
9. 1328 b 32) ; it savours rather of Egypt or the Lace
daemonian State. His laying out of the Peiraeus per
haps already reproduced the straight thoroughfares of
Babylon. The military class was to be maintained from
public land specially assigned to it, like the military
caste in Egypt. He perhaps thought that cultivators
and artisans made bad soldiers ; at all events, he ex
cluded them from the use of arms, though not from
political rights, for they were to have a voice in the
election of magistrates, and apparently, though this is not
distinctly stated, to sit on dicasteries. We do not learn
whether office was to be confined to members of the
military class ; Aristotle himself does not seem to have
known how this was to be (1268 a 20), but, as he says,
the two other classes can hardly have been eligible for
the more important offices (1268 a 23). Aristotle s remark
is evidently correct, that the cultivators, who bear no arms,
and still more the artisans, who have neither arms nor
land, would be at the mercy of the military class. If
Hippodamus was against a popular army, he was also
unfavourable to the democratic institution of the lot, for
which he would in all cases substitute election. His dicas
teries were to be controlled by an elective Supreme Court
of old men, which would not, indeed, possess, as the

Bentl. Ep. ad Mill. p. 67) TOVTVV 9. 46), OTI rpia yiverai e avrf]S

rpttav. Evos eKaorov aptrf) rpnis, (Pallas or Wisdom), a ndvra TO.

&lt;rvt&gt;f&lt;ris KOI Kparos KOI TVY*}, Cp. avdp^mva tftWgci namely, tv Xo-

Isocr. de Antid. 268, "low 8 ov yif(r0ai, Xe yeii/ KaXcos, 6p6a&gt;s irpdr-

TrXfi co rpi&v (sc. TOTr\f)6os e&lt;pr) elvai reiv (see Zeller s note, Gr. Ph. i.

rS&gt;v OVTUV). See Miiller, Fr. Hist. 831.6, and the references he gives).

Gr. 2. 49. Democritus also wrote The fancy seems to have been

a work called Tpiroytveia : TOVTO popular in that age.
de fcrnv (adds Diogenes Laertius,

OF MILETUS. 383

Areopagus would seem at one time to have done at
Athens, the right to supervise the administration of the
State 1 , but was nevertheless to have a power which the
Areopagus had not that of reversing and correcting the
decisions of the dicasteries. It does not appear who
were to say when these decisions were to be submitted
to it for correction : all we are told is that they were to
come before the Court, when they were not thought
correct ; we do not learn who was to judge of this.
Perhaps the Court itself. In that case its position and
power would be almost greater than that of the Areo
pagus. If, on the other hand, the scheme is to be con
strued as allowing an appeal from the dicasteries to the
supreme court, this was an arrangement which found no
parallel in the judicial procedure of Athens. Open appeals
against decisions of dicasteries were not recognized there 2 .
Even Plato in the Laws (767-8 : cp. 956) allows only of
appeals from the judgment of the magistrates (768 A) or
of the judges of the village and the tribe (956 C), not from
the judgment of the people.

If the ideal scheme of Hippodamus was put forth in
the high and palmy days of Athens, the fact is remarkable
and reflects credit on his foresight, for he must have been
already dissatisfied with the extreme democracy, one weak
point in which its dicasteries he seems to have hit. It
is not impossible that his scheme of a Court to control the
dicasteries was suggested by his connexion as a Milesian
with the dependent allies of Athens, whose sentiments as
to the Athenian dicasteries may be gathered not only from
Thucydides, but from the paper on the Athenian Consti
tution which finds a place among the writings of Xenophon.

His proposal that those who placed useful suggestions or
discoveries at the service of the State should be rewarded
was conceived in a more democratic spirit. A readiness
to welcome valuable hints, whencesoever they might come,
counted as a note of democracy (cp. Eurip. Suppl. 424 sqq.).

1 Plutarch, Solon c. 19, tiriarico- - C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq.
77ov 7rdi&gt;r&lt;t&gt;v Kal (f&gt;v\aKa rw vo\i.u&gt;v. I. 145.

THE EULOGISTS OF THE ATHENIAN

The eulo
gists and
critics of
the Athe
nian and
Lacedae
monian
States.

Aristotle evidently fears that it would give a stimulus to
legislative innovation and constitutional change.

Altogether the ideal constitution of Hippodamus bears
traces of compromise and mixture. The possibility of a
mixed government never occurs to Herodotus when he
makes his Persian grandees discuss the comparative merits
of monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy, but the scheme of
Hippodamus is an effort, though perhaps a crude one, in
that direction. His model would seem to be the Lace
daemonian State, if we may judge from his severance of
the soldier-class from the cultivators and artisans, and
from his institution of a Supreme Court of old men ap
pointed by election ; yet he appears to contemplate the
existence of popular dicasteries, and he seeks to estab
lish a more equal relation between his three classes than
that which prevailed between Spartans, Perioeci, and
Helots.

Many men of his generation were, unlike him, unqualified
admirers of the Lacedaemonian State. Ion praised it in
the well-known lines which have been already quoted (p.
325). It was a State, not of talk but of action and wisdom
in action. It was a State whose life-breath was obedience
to law. Law was the source even of the courage of its sons
and of their alertness in battle 1 . Its citizens acquired their
great qualities by submitting to a course of laborious train
ing. Submission to law and to the magistrates lay at the
root of its greatness. Silence, obedience, endurance, the
suppression of self these were the qualities that made
it what it was.

Even the warmest friends of the Lacedaemonian State
at Athens, however, betrayed in their mode of life that they
were far from resembling its citizens. Cimon would hardly
have been at home at Sparta, and Xenophon must have
been conscious that his literary gifts and his interest in
philosophy drew an impassable barrier between him and
the State which he so greatly admired. To measure the

1 Thuc. i. 84. 5 : L. Schmidt, Ethik d. alten Griechen, i. 174.

AND LACEDAEMONIAN STATES. , 385

gulf which parted the Athenian ideal from the Lacedaemo
nian, we have only to read the Funeral Oration of Pericles
in the record of Thucydides. In that eulogy of Athens there
is a constant, though tacit, reference to her rival, and the
feeling expressed is substantially this, that while the Lace
daemonian State purchased its -greatness at an immense
cost of civilization and elasticity of spirit, by keeping oratory
and philosophy at a distance, by excluding aliens, by re
serving politics and the higher interests of human life for the
few, and by insisting on a gloomy and laborious training,
Athens combined greatness as a State with a life rich in
human interest, shared in by all, pleasurable, spontaneous,
and unconstrained l . The view of Aristotle was anticipated
that the ideal State is that which enjoys the most desir
able life that it is of the essence of the State to realize
the highest quality of life. But Pericles held that all men,
even those who toiled for their daily bread, might share
and ought to share in the things that give greatness to
human life. Rich and poor must work together for this
end. Here was an ideal which testified to a far greater
faith in human nature and in the possibilities of social life
than any other Greek ideal known to us ; and Thucydides
perhaps hints a sense that it was too high-pitched and
unsubstantial, when he passes on from it to an account of
the plague 2 .

The time was one rather of sanguine aspiration and
varied genius than of firm faith, or full knowledge, or even
settled opinion. Aristotle would reply to Pericles that if a

1 Pindar would have said of 2 So again his record of the

Pericles eulogy of Athens, that it Melian Controversy immediately

omits to give the glory to God. precedes his history of the Sici-

Cp. Pyth. 8. 73 sqq. : lian disaster. Thucydides keeps

(I yap TIS e(T\a TTfrrarai p.rj avv himself and his point of view,

HaKpcp nroi/w, which was not that of extreme,

TroXXoZ? crofpos SoKet vreS atypoixov but rather of qualified democracy

/3/ov KopvoWjuei/ opdofiovXoia-i fj.a- (8. 97. 2), a good deal in the back-

Xnvals ground, but his own contempora-

TO. 8 OVK eV dv8pd(n Kf trcn Sen - ries were probably far more con-

HQ&gt;V 8e rrapt tr^ei, scious than we are in reading his

a XXor aXXoi/ vrrepde /3aXXcov, aX Xov history, that he was by no means

8 viro xeipwj/. a neutral in politics.

VOL. I. C C

386 THE SOPHISTS.

State was to be all he pictured Athens as being, its citizens
must be men of full virtue (o-TrouSaioi), united by a common
ethical belief, firmly held and followed in practice. Pericles
had spoken of a fear of the laws, but that was not
enough l . And then again, Aristotle would ask, what means
did Athens take to secure the permanence of the spirit
(rpoTros) described by Pericles ? Did Athens develope it
by a well-considered course of education beginning in child
hood ? Nothing of the kind. Aristotle charges the Greek
State with universally neglecting even to give its citizens
an education suitable to the constitution (7 (5). 9. 1310 a
12 sqq.) and such as would contribute to its permanence.
The The early physical philosophy of Greece had now well-

nigh received its death-blow : the philosopher had become
a sceptic and simultaneously a teacher of virtue, or rhetoric,
or both, wandering from city to city and infinitely more
ubiquitous and influential than his more believing prede
cessors. The Protagoras of Plato describes how these
great teachers moved through Greece, each of them fol
lowed in his wanderings by a train of devoted admirers
and winning fresh recruits wherever he went.

The writings of the sophists/ as they are called, have
perished or all but perished, and we are left to gather the
nature of their teaching from the pages of their opponents,
but it seems pretty clear that some of the most conspicuous
men in the group of professional teachers which comes to
the front in the latter half of the fifth century before Christ,
brought the questioning spirit, which now prevailed. in the
treatment of physical and ontological questions, to bear
on morals and politics.

The first effect of their teaching, indeed, was inspiriting
and stimulating. At a time when the good and well-
descended men (e&lt;r0A.ot UTT fardX&v) were still apt to claim
a monopoly of virtue, men listened gladly to the offer
which some of the sophists made to teach it to all 2 ,

1 AnotherweaknessofPericlean from the tribute of the allies, but

Athens was that the resources we cannot be sure that Aristotle

which enabled it to live this was alive to this defect,

glorious life were largely derived 2 See Schmidt, Ethik der alten

THE MYTH OF PROTAGORAS. 387

and to teach it in a few short weeks or months. There
can be no question that they did the world a service by
awakening. intellectual interest and stimulating the natural
eagerness of the Greek race to excel. There was some
thing to be gained, no doubt, by sitting at the feet of a
man of genius like Protagoras, however unsatisfactory his
grasp of dialectic might seem to Socrates.

The teaching of the myth which Plato puts in his mouth The myth
is, indeed, quite in harmony with Greek traditional feeling, ra r s a
for it refers men to the State as the source of their virtue. (Plato,
Men learn to be just by living in a well-ordered Hellenic 320 cf
State and breathing its atmosphere. They learn justice S( W-)-
first from parents and nurses, next from teachers of poetry,
music, and gymnastic, lastly from the voice of the State
speaking through its laws. We do not gather that the
instructions of the sophist or teacher of rhetoric are abso
lutely necessary for its production. Justice is the inheri
tance of all members of a civilized community, and this is
why the knowledge of what is just grows on every hedge 1 .
Here was another comfortable doctrine, too comfortable
perhaps to be true.

Plato agreed with Protagoras that justice (cu 8&&amp;gt;? KCU 8tKr/)
is the uniting principle in the State (yes, he would add, and
in the soul of the individual also), that all members of
a State need to possess a sense of justice, and that in
every society a process of education goes on which in
sensibly communicates to the individual the ideas of right
and wrong current in the society, but then he does not
hold that the ideas thus communicated are necessarily
correct, or that all men living in Hellenic States have
a true notion of justice. The theory of Protagoras not
only pointed to democracy, but implied that a knowledge

Griechen, i. 158-162, whose work ras myth in view in Polit. 2990,

will be found here as elsewhere ovdfv yap 8tlv rS&gt;v i/o/nwi/ eivat aofpca-

instructive. I socrates makes some repov ovbeva yap ayvoelv TO re

comments on this offer in his larpinbv KOI TO vyieivbv ovSe TO

Contra Sophistas, and Plato re- Kv&epvrjTiKov KOL vavrtKov e^elvai

fers to high promises of this kind yap TW /SouXo/xei/w ftavdatHiv yeypap.-

in Rep. 518 B sq. /xeVa KOI Trdrpia edt] Kfipeva.
1 Plato perhaps has Protago-

C C 2

388 THE POLITICAL TEACHING

of what is just comes insensibly to men bred up in a
civilized society, and that no special study or effort is essen
tial for its acquisition. How mistaken this view was, is
shown by the dialectical failure of Protagoras himself in the
dialogue. For he turns out to be unable, notwithstand
ing all that he has said, to give a satisfactory account of
virtue. Without dialectic the just cannot really be known.
This is the point in which he is most at fault, though Plato
would also probably dispute his identification of justice
with the political art, and his assumption that the aim
of human society is the preservation of the species. Still
Protagoras is represented in this dialogue as holding law
to be a source of virtue (334 A sqq.), and not a mere
guarantee for the observance of men s rights, which some
sophists held it to be. The myth, indeed, appears to
imply that whatever any State teaches as justice is sure
to have a tendency to hold society together. The teaching
of the State is always sound. The justice it inculcates
is always absolute or natural justice 1 . A view ascribed
to Protagoras in the Theaetetus (167 C) that whatever
any State holds to be just is just for it, so long as it
holds it to be just, betrays more consciousness of the
possibilities of variation on the part of the State in this
matter, but it still refers the individual to his State as the
arbiter of justice, though only of a relative, not of an
absolute justice.

Other Other sophists are more distinctly credited with opinions

imperilling the authority of the State. They marked off
the naturally just from the conventionally just, and
found but little of the former in existence. It is evident
that the Greeks had been in the habit of tracing the
social arrangements under which they lived to sources
so venerable the will of the Gods or Nature that they
were conscious of a painful and demoralizing shock when

1 Law appears in the myth of and positive law is unknown to
Protagoras as natural law: the the speaker (Zeller, Gr. Ph. i.
later distinction between natural 1001).

OF THE SOPHISTS. 389

they were told that many of them had only a conventional
value. They liked to find the hand of God or Nature
in the laws of their State, yet now they learnt that only
the immutable is natural, and that most laws varied from
State to State and from epoch to epoch. Hippias, as we
have seen, allowed only those laws to be divine which are
accepted everywhere (Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 19). Glaucon in
the Republic, representing the doctrine of Thrasymachus
(Rep. 358 E sqq.), goes further, and traces back all justice
and law to a social compact *, the object of which is to
prevent one man from wronging another. Doing injustice,
according to this view, is by nature good, and suffering in
justice by nature evil, and the evil is greater than the good.
As it is found to be impossible to get the good without the
outbalancing evil, men tolerate justice as the lesser evil, and
frame laws and agreements (vvOr}K.as} to exclude both the
doing and the suffering of wrong. A cognate view is as
cribed to the sophist Lycophron in the Politics (3. 9.
i28ob 10). We see that the theories of a primitive social
compact and of the limitation of the functions of the
State to the protection of men s rights took their origin
at about the same time. To a Greek the authority of
Law and the State would seem greatly impaired when
it could no longer claim to rest on Nature. And then
came the further question, how could a compact of this
kind claim to hold good against the right of Force? If
natural right existed at all, was it not identical with might ?
The State thus became a scramble for power, and the

1 Cp. Laws 889 E, $eouff, & /xaKuptf , hold these views is thus explained

elvai TrpatTov (paaiv OUTOI Tfxvy, ov in the Republic (479) m e n look

(frvvfi, dXXd TICTI i&gt;6fj.ois, KOI TOVTOVS only at the many beautiful and

o XXov? XXou, OTTJ; fKnuToi eavToiai the many just, not at the one

(Tvi&gt;a&gt;fj.o\6yT]o-av vofj.odeTovfj.fvoi. KIU just and beautiful, which they

8rj Kal ra /caXa (pvcrti fj,ev aXXo etVat cannot endure even to hear of,

v6na&gt; 8e fTtpa TO. 8e 817 SiKaia ov8 and they find that every one of

( Ivai TO mipdirav (frvcrei, aXX apfyia- these many beautiful is easily

diareXelv d\\rj\ois Kal made to appear also ugly, and

ovs dfl ravra a 8 tiv each of the many just unjust.

Kal ornv, TOTS Kvpta The remedy for their scepticism

eKao-ra tlvai, yiyvo^eva T(^vr) ical is to become true philosophers

ro is vofjiois, oXX ov 8r) nvi fyvvei. and look to the Idea, which is

The way in which men come to ever the same.

390 THE POLITICAL TEACHING

forcible exercise of authority by the most powerful indi
vidual or group of individuals within it was accepted as
normal and legitimate. In one State Democracy, in another
Oligarchy, in another Tyranny had force on its side, and
therefore the right to rule, so long at least as this was
so. Tyranny was placed on a level with the two other
constitutions, and the forcible empire of one State over
others was justified on the same grounds.

The view that Might is Right is one that needs no
sophist to set it afloat- indeed Pindar had incautiously
used language which was construed as stating it 1 but
now we find it ascribed not only to sophists and their
adherents, but to philosophers like Democritus 2 . The
inquirers who expressed these views deserve the credit
of being the first to recognize the fact that political
supremacy gravitates to the side of superior Force. It
is true, as Aristotle frequently remarks 3 , that the govern
ment of a State must have Force at its back, and it was
well that attention should be drawn to the fact 4 . What
they failed to see was, that while all governments must
have Force behind them, the goodness or badness of a
government, and therefore its claim to rule, depends on
other considerations.

Doctrines of this kind would be especially popular
and especially dangerous in Athens at the time of the
Peloponnesian War. Athens was holding together by
force a recalcitrant empire ; she was engaged in a task
repugnant to Greek feeling, which always favoured local
autonomy ; and here were men who justified what she was
every day doing 5 . But then if they justified the exercise

1 Plato, Laws 6906 : 7HE : TO QovXantvov rrjv 7roXiTtai&gt; Tr

Gorg. 484 B ; and Stallbaum s roO pf] jSouXo/zeVov.

notes. 4 Physical force, it has been

- Stob. Floril. 47. 19, (jtvcrei TO said, however disguised, is the

apxftv ointjiov TO) Kptatron. The ultimate basis and sanction of all

expression, however, is rather law.

vague and may possibly not bear " Isocrates looks back upon the

this meaning. time of the Peloponnesian War as

3 E. g. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 16, Kal TO a time of wide-spread folly and

TroXXam tlptjfiamv /xe yio-roj/ OTOI- lust of tyranny at Athens : this is

TO Tijptlv orrus K/J ITTOI/ eWtu his view, at all events, in the

OF THE SOPHISTS. 391

of sway over unwilling subjects, they also placed all
governments which had Force at their back on one level :
Tyranny and Oligarchy were the same to them as De
mocracy, and had a right to displace it, if they could
prove that they possessed superior force. The new ideas
were a double-edged weapon politically, and morally also
they were very dangerous. For they traced that which
was accounted just in each State to the voice of law, and
law to the will of the stronger, so that the claims of
morality rested only on the claim of the stronger to rule.
To do right was to live like a slave for the advantage
of the stronger : to do wrong, at any rate on a considerable
scale, was evidence of a vigorous and masterful spirit, which
well beseemed a freeman (Rep. 344 C) l .

The questions raised by the sophists were questions
which needed to be raised, and many of the ideas they
set afloat were ideas which had a great future before
them, but it was unfortunate that they were promulgated
at a moment when a social war was shaking society
and morality to their foundations, and when a reign of
force prevailed 2 . The later reign of force which followed
the death of Alexander was in some degree qualified by
the ascendency of great schools and great ethical teachers
Theophrastus, Xenocrates, Zeno of Citium but now
philosophy seemed to be in the anti-social camp. The
advent of Socrates could not have been more timely.

In the view of earlier generations morality rested on law,
and law on nature or the will of the Gods. The voice of

Oration De Pace (see 75-94). ciples which has already been

In later days, he .says, Athens mentioned (Aristox.Fr. 15: MiiUer,

came to the conclusion that it is Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 276: Athen. Deipn.

not just for the stronger to rule 545Asqq.).

over the weaker ( 69). 2 In mediaeval Europe, at the

1 The form which opinions of moment when the customary

this nature assumed in the luxuri- morality of feudal times was losing

ous cities of South Italy and Sicily, its power, the moral vigour of the

to which temptation came in the world was opportunely restored

form of a love of pleasure rather by the Reformation and Puritan-

than power, may be gathered from ism. Greece, on the contrary, at

the language of Polyarchus, sur- a somewhat similar epoch in its

named the luxurious, in the ad- development found itself in the

dress to Archytas and his dis- hands of the sophists.

392 THE POLITICAL TEACHING

the State was the voice of God. But now a new view of
the origin, nature, and functions of the State had been set
forth. The State was the creation of a compact, or the
outcome of Force in either case, it was of purely human
origin. It was too variable to be anything else. So far as
it originated in compact, it was a pis aller the lesser of
two evils. If it was still held to be the fountain-head
of men s conceptions of justice and temperance and other
virtues, it followed that these virtues had no higher origin
or sanction than the authority which gave them currency.
But some held that the function of the State was simply
to protect men s rights, not to make them virtuous.

It is evident that there is much in these views to interest
the modern inquirer. We ask, why did not the defenders of
the claims of morality cut it loose from the State altogether?
Why did they not say the State may be no more than you
allow it to be, and yet the claims of morality may be as
binding as ever ? The theory of Hippias did suggest, as
we have seen, that the common consent of men should take

the place OT the State as that which makes the just to be
just. One thing at any rate was for the future impossible :
no one could now accept the voice of the State to which
he might happen to belong as an unerring oracle in
questions of right and wrong. Was then the individual to
be his own guide, aided only by any competent teachers
whose help he could secure ? Or was the State to be
reformed, so as to serve as a guide to him ? Either view
might be taken. The latter was the one most in harmony
with the traditions of Greek life, which rightly refused to
sunder the individual from the whole to which he belonged.
But the other view also won ground. The teaching of
Socrates has, as we shall see, affinities with both ; it holds
them both, as it were, in solution. It is only in the hands
of his disciples that they become conscious of their own
antagonism. *&gt;

Socrates. Many, no doubt, held that the collapse of belief could
best be healed by an abandonment of philosophical specu
lation altogether, and a recurrence to that unquestioning

OF SOCK A TES. 393

acceptance of the customary and the traditional which
prevailed, or was believed to have prevailed, in earlier days ;
some perhaps envied the Lacedaemonian State for its dead-
ness to thought, which was, however, soon found to have
dangers of its own. Socrates, on the contrary, insisted that
the true remedy lay not in an abandonment, but in an in
creased intensity of inquiry. ^Abandon, he said, any fields
of inquiry in which knowledge is not possible, but bring a
closer scrutiny to bear on those in which it is. Investigate
by question and answer, not by long continuous deliver
ances : search for the definition of the thing you wish to
understand.

In this spirit he asked what the State is and what the
Statesman is (Xen. Mem. i. i. 16). We are not told in
so many words what answer he gave to these questions, but
his answ r er may be gathered from the general tenour of
Xenophon s record. The State, he held, does not exist for
the pleasure of the stronger, or merely for the protection
of men s rights; it exists to- make men better. Socrates
said of the Thirty Tyrants, that it would be surprising if
the herdsman of a herd of cattle, after thinning their
numbers and making them worse in condition, should still
claim to be a good herdsman, but it would be still more
surprising if the ruler of a State under similar circum
stances should claim to be a good ruler (Xen. Mem. i. 2.
32). The mere possession of a sceptre gives no claim to
power, nor does election by chance persons (r&v TV^OVTUV),
nor the lot, nor the exercise of force or cunning, but know
ledge only (ibid. 3. 9. 10). Ruling means directing men
what they ought to do, and being ruled obeying such
direction ; ruling and being ruled is not a thing apart, but
one with which we are familiar in daily life ; when we take
a voyage, or when we are ill, we accept the rule of one who
knows, the captain or the physician ; why should we not
do so in affairs of State (ibid. 3. 9. ]i)?* True, the repre
sentative of Force the tyrant may reject the guidance of
reason, and even kill the wise man, but, if he does so, he
will only ensure his own destruction (-TroVepa yap ay

394 THE POLITICAL TEACHING

otei crco^e cr0cu TOV TOVTO TTOLOVVTO. 77 OVTU&gt; /cat rci^tor a
0cu ; ibid. 3. 9. 12-13). Vis consili expers mole ruit sua.
Yes : but then the consilium which the ruler must needs
f possess for his own preservation is not necessarily the
knowledge how to make men better, and this is, according
to Socrates, the knowledge which makes a man a States
man.

The myth of Protagoras had already implied that men
Jearn virtue of the State, and this was no other than the
traditional and accepted view. To Socrates, however,
virtue is knowledge. The wisdom of the age, as we have
seen, had been affirming it to be folly, and in asserting the
contrary Socrates adopted the simplest means of at once
emphasizing his own dissent, and appealing to an age
which valued cleverness above everything else, in language
which it could understand. Virtue, he said, is wisdom : it
is vice that is folly (Xen. Mem. 3. 9. 4 sqq. : Plato, Rep.
351 A). His antagonists were met on their own ground.
We infer that if the State makes men better, and virtue
is knowledge, the State must communicate knowledge. It
is not, however, clear how the State communicates know
ledge in the Socratic sense knowledge of the definitions
of things, knowledge acquired through Dialectic. Nor does
Socrates explain how it is that habituation is also a means
of acquiring knowledge and virtue, though he clearly recog
nizes the fact (e.g. Xen. Mem. 3. 9. i sqq.). Of course,
the larger the share ascribed to habituation in the produc
tion of virtue, the easier it is to regard virtue as the off
spring of the State. If, on the other hand, Dialectic is the
path to knowledge and virtue, virtue would seem to be
due to agencies not necessarily presupposing the co-opera
tion of the State. The Stoics, in fact, who reverted to the
Socratic view of virtue as knowledge, denied that virtue
acquired by exercise is virtue at all (Zeller, Stoics Epicu
reans and Sceptics, E. T. pp. 238-9), and consistently
enough regarded the State rather as a field for the exercise
of virtue than as its source.

The doctrine that the right to rule is conferred by know-

OF SOCRATES. 395

ledge was not likely to bring Socrates popularity. Its
meaning, to begin with, was misconceived. He was
credited, for instance, by his accuser with the view that
any son to whom he had taught wisdom had the right to
treat an untrained father as a lunatic and put him in
bonds ; nay, replies Xenophon, he taught that a lunatic
father should be thus treated, but that an ignorant father
should receive the instruction he needed (Xen. Mem. i. 2.
49 sqq.). He was further charged with depreciating men s
relatives in comparison with teachers of wisdom like him
self: what he really taught, however, was that relatives
whose claims to respect rested simply on relationship and
not on service to their kin, deserved but little consideration
(ibid. i. 2. 5 1 sqq-) It is clear that the new doctrine
brought Socrates into collision not only with democratic
sentiment, but also with the ties of kinship. It is in order f
to correct erroneous impressions on this subject, that Xeno-
phon describes how earnestly he insisted on the claims of
the parental and fraternal relations (Mem. 2. 2-3). The
Memorabilia is, in fact, an apologetic work, intended to re
commend Socrates to ordinary Athenian opinion, and to
show how false was the charge on which he was put to death,
and this must be borne in mind in estimating the weight of
its testimony. It remains true that the central principle of
Socrates teaching the authority of the wise might easily
be misinterpreted as setting up the authority of the wise
teacher against that of the wise parent, and even when
interpreted aright, did tend to invalidate the authority of
unwise parents, unwise rulers, and unwise laws. It was
also easy for the outer world to confound the Socratic
wisdom, which was not only wisdom but virtue, with mere
cleverness, and to suppose that Socrates meant to justify
the claims of men like Critias to rule. In reality, the wise
ruler, as Socrates conceives him, is a man of a wholly
opposite type. He is no self-seeker, nor does he live for
his own pleasure. Aristippus anticipates Adeimantus (Rep.
419 sqq.) when he asks Socrates in the Memorabilia of
Xenophon (2. 1. 17) aAAa yap, u&gt; ScoKpares, ot ets rr)y

396 THE POLITICAL TEACHING

/3acri\i/&lt;T)y Ttyj)r]v TrcuSevo jueyot TJV SOKCI? JUCH cry voptfaut
liov iav tlvai, ri ta(Jbepovcrt r&lt;Sy e amyKrjs KaKOTraOovvru&gt;v, et ye
"neivr)&lt;Tov(n KOI 8t\^?;(rou(n KCU piycocrou(rt KCU aypvirvr) (rover i KOL
rcjAAa Trcwra fj-o^drja-ovcnv eKoWes ;

* It is true, however, that this doctrine of the right of
wisdom to rule did make in favour of the Few. The
political art was not, as the myth of Protagoras alleged,
given to all men belonging to civilized States, but like
any other art, to those who set themselves to learn it.
The reasoning of Socrates pointed directly to the rule
of the few who know. Indeed, as knowledge meant to
Socrates knowledge of the definition of a thing, a dia
lectical education was apparently essential to the ruler.
One step more, and Socrates, we feel, would have found
himself depicting an ideal in some respects similar to
that which Plato depicts in the Politicus. This step he
did not take. On the contrary, he identified the legal
and the just, and explained that he meant by law what
ever the citizens of a State agree to enact as embodying
their views of what ought and ought not to be done

o o

(Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 12-13). He thus apparently treated
the laws of all States as just, and his strict perform
ance of his duties as a citizen of Athens shows that he
did not regard any defects of the Athenian constitution
as releasing him from his obligations to his State. If he
permitted himself to dream of an ideal, his fancy wandered
no farther afield than to the Athens of Solon (Xen. Mem.
3. 5. 14) and to the Lacedaemonian State (ibid. 4. 4. 15
sqq.: Xen. Symp. 8. 35, with which Henkel compares Plato,
Crito 52 E). He praised the latter State for its obedience
to law, which gave it a happy life in peace and irresistible
strength in war, and for the unanimity of its citizens, which
rose far above the level of a mere similarity of taste, and
expressed itself in conformity to law (Xen. Mem. 4. 4.
15-16).

He was, in fact, too good a citizen to push his own theory
to its consequences. His aim was twofold, like that of Aris
totle after him ; he wished to show the State what it might

OF SOCRATES. 397

and ought to be, and he wished to restore the authority of the
actual State. The State, he held, ought to be in the hands
of those who know, if only for the reason that when men
reject the rule of the wise, they suffer for so doing. F9r
the true test of that which is right was not, in his view*
universal consent, or immutability, or universal observance,
but the fact that men lose by not practising it (Xen. Mem.
4. 4. 24: cp. 3. 9. 12-13). It was one thing, however, to
claim authority for a State ruled by the wise, and another
to re-establish the authority of the actual State. The
Sophists had dealt the actual State a fatal blow. Even
Aristotle s patient efforts to reform it failed to replace it in
its primitive position as the guide of life. If Socrates in
reasserting the claims of the State reasserted only the
claims of a non-existent State, much the same thing may
be said of Aristotle.

Socrates impaired rather than restored the authority of
the actual State. He did not even show how the actual
State could be improved. Where were those who know
to be found, and how could they be placed in power ? His
political teaching threw little light on the pressing question,
how the State was to be made better 1 , and yet at the same
time it was irritating. Plato tells us (Rep. 488 B) that it
was as much as a man s life was worth, in a society like that
of Athens, merely to assert that the art of politics is com
municable by teaching, and Socrates not only insisted on
this, but held that what a man could not communicate to
others, he did not know himself (Xen. Mem. 4. 6. i).
We need not wonder that he paid the penalty 2 . Yet
Socrates seems, unlike others after him, to have treated
the art of politics as one which men of all classes and
occupations might acquire. He is credited, indeed, with
the saying that idleness is the sister of freedom, but there
is no indication that he held knowledge to be incom
patible with the practice of the lower occupations. Unlike
Pythagoras and the Sophists, who had addressed them-

1 It is true, however, that he education (e.g. Xen. Mem. 4. i. 3).
laid stress on the importance of 2 Cp. Plato, Polit. 299 B sq.

398 PLATO.

selves to rich and noble youths, Socrates appealed to men
of every grade. He practised his dialectic not only in
the houses of rich men like Cephalus, but in the open
market-place and in the workshop of the leather-cutter
Simon. In doing so, he acted in the spirit of the Periclean
ideal, according to which the highest interests of life were
to be open to the poor as much as to the rich. Antisthenes,
who belonged to the despised class of half-breeds (TO
\i.r[ t apfyoTtpiav TioXirStv eA.ev0epoy), was as fully his disciple
as the patrician Plato. Even if Socrates held that Dialectic
is a condition of political knowledge and of the right to
rule and this we are not distinctly told he apparently
held that skill in Dialectic is accessible to all. Plato and
Aristotle, on the contrary, tend to detach the philosopher
from necessary work. The rule of the wise conse
quently assumes a new aspect in their hands. If Plato
in the Republic opens, as he does in a way open, philoso
phical training and the rule of the State to all ranks, he
does so on the condition that no attempt shall be made
to combine the higher with the lower occupations.

Plato. While Socrates belongs to the age of the Peloponnesian

War, and Aristotle to the disorganized epoch at which
Macedon rose to greatness, after the Athenian, Lacedae
monian, and Theban States had successively failed to
retain the supremacy which they had successively won,
Plato belongs to the intermediate period of Lacedaemonian
supremacy. He outlived Leuctra, it is true, by upwards of
twenty years, but during the best years of his life he beheld
the Lacedaemonian State either on the eve of its triumph
over Athens or in full fruition of empire. He was probably
about fourteen 3^ears of age when the disaster at Syracuse
happened, and about fifty-six in the year of Leuctra. He
may perhaps have been acquainted with Socrates for about
seven years the last seven years of Socrates life, when
he himself was between twenty-one and twenty-eight.
He witnessed in youth the rise and fall of the Four Hundred
at Athens, and saw the worst side of oligarchy under

PLATO. 399

the regime of the Thirty Tyrants. A little later, his
great teacher was put to death by the restored democracy,
and Plato is said to have left Athens with others of the
school for ten or twelve years. Few men have lived
through such experiences before the age of thirty. His
alienation from all actual forms of government could not
fail to be far greater than that of Socrates. Where was a
satisfactory government to be found ? Not in Democracy,
or Oligarchy, or Tyranny. Not even in the Lacedaemonian
State, for Plato s absorbing interest in philosophy and
literature made it impossible for him to find his ideal
there. Besides, the Sparta of Archidamus, which had won
the admiration of Socrates, was now a thing of the past,
and the less noble Sparta of Lysander had taken its place.
Plato s sketch of the timocratical man (Rep. 548 D sqq.)
perhaps gives us a clue to his conception of the Spartan
character :

He is not wholly unlike Glaucon, but more unyielding
and less a votary of the Muses, though still their votary ;
fond of listening to talk or song, but no orator ; he is gentle
to freemen, though harsh and severe to slaves ; very
obedient to magistrates ; fond of office and honour, but
one who holds that a title to power is won by military and
political achievements, not by oratory; fond of athletic
exercise and hunting ; a scorner of money in youth, but
growing far otherwise as he becomes older, because he is
without the surest safeguard of virtue reason mingled
with the study of JAOIKTIKT} (A.oyos /zoucriKr; Ke/cpa/xeyos).

The picture here drawn is the picture of a Hellene,
though a Hellene of an exceptional type farther removed,
perhaps, from the Roman than from the Athenian, for
he is a votary of the Muses, and the love of personal
distinction and pre-eminence has not been subdued in him
to the same extent as in the Roman of the best days of the
Republic ; nor has he the Roman genius for law and legal
government. He is, in fact, rather a soldier than a ruler;
not sterner than the Roman, but wilder and fiercer, though
also more Hellenic lacking at once the patient skill which

400 PLATO.

laid the world at the feet of Rome and the wisdom to govern
a conquered world aright.

The Spartan nature was harsh, narrow, imperfectly
cultured, self-seeking, and Plato must have turned from it
with pleasure to the recollection of Socrates, himself a
Spartan in his powers of endurance, his simplicity of life, his
scorn of ease and comfort, his devotion to his country, yet
wholly unlike a Spartan in his intellectual greatness, his
dialectical enthusiasm, his contempt for wealth and power,
and his kindly zeal for the good of others. He became
acquainted in his wanderings with another type of
character the Pythagorean resembling the Socratic in its
simplicity and self-mastery, but ascetic and fanciful, which
Socrates never was, the musical and mathematical culture
of the school passing, by a transition not infrequent in
Greece, into religious mysticism. He would find the
Pythagoreans full of faith in the power of education and
the ordered life of a brotherhood of friends, convinced
that States are made to be ruled by the wise, and not with
out recollections of a lost political ascendency.

But if the Spartan type of character was defective, there
was much to be learnt from the institutions of the Lacedae
monian State. Sqcrates, as we have seen, had not asked
how his ideal man of knowledge was to be produced
or placed in a position to rule, but Lacedaemonian experi
ence threw some light on this subject. The example of
the Lacedaemonian State showed how much the State
could do for virtue by systematic training from the earliest
years and by the regulation of adult life, by freeing the
best minds from ignoble cares and adjusting social func
tions to capacity, and by inculcating obedience to law
and authority. Imagine a State that should set itself to
produce, not a body of soldier-citizens, but a Pythagorean
brotherhood of wise men ; or, better still, a brotherhood
of men possessing knowledge in the fullest sense of the
word men who have learnt to know things as they really
are, to study, not shadows, but the reality, and to rule by
the light of this better knowledge. In a State ruled by

THE REPUBLIC. 401

such men, the Many would no longer snatch greedily at
power ; they would be well satisfied to confine themselves
to the functions for which they are fitted and to surrender
office into the hands of their betters ; they would no longer
need to be excluded from the State and enslaved, like the
Helots ; on the contrary, they would be the fellow-citizens
of their rulers, linked to them by membership of a common
State. Plato inherited from Socrates and from Pytha
goras the conception of the State as an union of unequals,
of protectors and protected, the wise and the ignorant.
Let the protectors, Plato said, be what they should be,
and the protected will know their own place, and the ideal
of the State will be realized. It was thus that the concep
tion of the ideal State of the Republic grew up in Plato s
mind./

The opening conversations of the Republic reveal to us sketch of
that the aim of the dialogue is fully as much ethical as , ? olit i!~

* cal teach-

political. They relate to the nature of justice, and place ing of the

before us certain popular impressions on this subject, which epu

it will be the object of the dialogue to correct. We see

that in the view of many to be just was to live for the

advantage of another and for the advantage of the stronger

a poor-spirited and slavish thing to do while from a

second point of view justice was a. pis alter \ not a good thing

in itself, but merely the least of two evils. Plato seeks, on

the contrary, to show that justice is in itself a good, and the

most essential of goods, for it is the condition of unity and

happiness, both in the soul of the individual human being

and in the State 1 . It also enables all the other virtues to

exist and to accomplish their work (Rep. 433 B). It

means, in fact, the execution by a part of a Whole of the

work for which it is fit 2 . In the just soul and State the

1 Cp. Rep. 423 D, TOVTQ 6 e /3ou- 2 Socrates had already com-

XTO drjXoiiv, on KUI TOVS SXXovs mended the quality which he terms

TToXi ras irpos 5 TIS netyvKe, irptis finrpugia, and the justice of the

TOVTO tva TTpoy ev tKturrov tpyov 8el Republic is not far removed from

Kop feiv, OTTWS ai&gt; ev TO avrov em.Tr)- the SocratlC fvirpagla : Cp. Xen.

Sevan/ fKacrTOS fi.r) TroXXot, dXXa fis Mem. 3. 9. 14, TO Sf (j.a66t&gt;Ta re nai.

yiyvrjrai, Kal ovrw 8f] vp.Tra(ra f] fj.e\fri](rai&gt;Ta. TI fv Troielv evrrpatai&gt;

TroXiy fjiia (pvrjrai, aXXa IJLTJ TroXXcu. j/ojaifco, /cat ot TOVTO

VOL. I. D d

402 PLA TO.

lower elements do not usurp the work of the higher, the
higher elements accept the co-operation of the lower.

The mode in which Plato arrives at this conclusion is
altogether novel and significant. No one had yet employed
the Science of Politics to throw light on the dark places of
Ethics, but this is what Plato in effect does. He constructs
an ideal State, in order to show what the true nature of
justice is. Justice, he says (Rep. 434 E), can only be
detected in a good State, and existing States are not good.
The portraiture of a good State, according to him, will
convey, not only political, but also ethical instruction, and
dispel the ethical errors which were exercising so fatal an
influence. A new importance was thus lent to political
inquiry.

In constructing the good State from which he
hopes to learn so much, Plato follows out his favourite
principle of specialization l with much persistence. There
must be a class to till the soil, another to build, another
to weave, and on similar grounds there must be a class
to fight and a class to govern. The principle is Socratic,
though Socrates does not seem to have pushed it to
its consequences. Plato, on the contrary, does so, and
finds himself led on to exclude the mass of men from
the functions of defending and governing the State, and
to reserve these functions for two separate and compara
tively small classes. His reasoning is plausible, and it is
not at first sight obvious why the work of governing should
not. like that of house-building, be made over to a special
class. There is no doubt that in the Greek State of Plato s
time the soldier, the judge, and the statesman were all of
them insufficiently professional. The interests of the State
were then, to a far greater extent than they have ever
been since, confided to persons neither specially trained nor
specially excellent. Democracy gave power to every free-

SoKovcri fj.oi (v irpciTTtiv KOI apicr- KU, ev 8e TroXireta TOVS ra noXiriKd.
TOVS 8e Kal 6to(f)L\f(TTdTovs (&lt;prj tivcu J Rep. 397 E, OVK eort dnr\ovs

tv fifv yecopyia TOVS TO. ytutpyiKa fv dvrjp nap rjfJ.iv ovde TroXXaTrXoCs,

Trpa.TTOVTas,(t&gt; 5 larpfia TOVS ra larpi- eVeiSi) fKaaros tv Trparra.

THE REPUBLIC, 403

man, oligarchy gave power to the rich. Plato claimed that
governing must be made over absolutely to a class which
should do nothing but govern. Here we have the germ of
the Republic. He learnt before he died that only the sons
of Gods could be trusted with the powers which he gave to
the rulers of the Republic. In the Laws he does not give
up the assimilation of the work of women and men, but he
does give up the unchecked rule of a governing class.
Aristotle allows unchecked power only to his 7ra/x/3ao-iA.evs,
a hypothetical being of superhuman excellence and capa
city. He and he alone is emancipated from the restraints
of law : even the ideal citizens of the Fourth Book of the
Politics are subject to them.

The State, or rather city (770X1?), which comes into exist
ence before our eyes in the Second Book of the dialogue,
originates in men s needs, for Plato does not, like Aris
totle, conceive of man as a naturally social being, or
recognize (in the Republic at all events) the priority of
ties of blood, such as those of the household. It begins
in men s need to live 1 , their need of food, lodging, and
clothing. Its earliest members are the cultivator, the
house-builder, the weaver, shoemaker, smith, and car
penter : four or five men of this stamp suffice to constitute
a city, though a city of the barest kind (369 D). Here
again Aristotle disagrees. The judge and the soldier are
as essential ingredients in a city as the cultivator or artisan
(Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 6 sqq.). Each man, Plato continues,
follows a vocation of his own, both because he does his
work better and more easily thus, and because men are
born with different aptitudes (370 A-C). Herdsmen, mer
chants, retailers, day-labourers swell the population, and
now our society is apparently complete (reXea, 371 E). Plato
dwells for a moment on the happy social life 2 of this baby
State a State too undeveloped to be the home of either
virtue or vice, yet, if he is in earnest in 372 E, the State in its

1 Rep. 369 D : cp. Aristot. Pol. 2 372 B, f]8ea&gt;s ^vvovres aXXij-
I. 2. 1252 b 29, yivop.evr) p.ev ovv Xot9.
rov rjv (VfKfv.

D d 3

404 PLATO.

most genuine and healthy form ; he dwells on its simple
luxuries, its beds of leaves, its mainly vegetable diet 1 , its
praises of the Gods, its freedom from poverty and war,
its innocence of soldiers and law-courts.

But he knows that men s desires are not easily confined
within these healthy limits ; they will ask for something
more : new classes will be added huntsmen (for Plato
does not apparently, like Aristotle, regard hunting as one of
the most primitive and natural pursuits), painters, sculptors,
poets, actors, dancers, milliners, barbers, nurses, cooks, and
finally swineherds. Then physicians will be necessary, and
men s unlimited striving for wealth will give birth to war 2 ,
the territory proving too small to satisfy the desires of its
now numerous occupants. Then, and not till then, soldiers
will be necessary, and they will have to be a separate class,
if we are to be faithful- to the principle which we adopted
at the outset. Thus -a bddy of guardians ((f&gt;v\aKes, 374 D)
becomes essential.

To Aristotle the Republic must have seemed to start
with a false conception of the State. It is, in his view,
precisely the life of the classes which are wanting in the
genuine and healthy State of Plato soldiers, judges,
statesmen that gives the State its value. They are to
the rest what the soul is to the body (6 (4). 4. 1291 a 24
sqq.). Without them the State is not really a State.
They do not exist to restore health to a feverish society,
but to live their own life, which is the true ideal of human
life. The State should not be composed of a mass of traders
and producers (xpij/xarioriKot), protected and schooled by a
handful of noble men, but of an adequately numerous

1 Oxen will be used for plough- animals to serve as food for man,

ing and drawing, and their hides as well as to supply him with

will serve together with the wool clothing (Pol. i. 8. 12565 15 sqq.).
of sheep for raiment (370 D-E). 2 Aristotle, on the contrary, holds

Neither sheep nor oxen will ap- that one kind of war at all events

parently be used for food. Cheese, falls within the natural form of

however, is an article of diet (372 the Science of Supply, which does

C). Swine will not be kept (373 C). not make an unlimited amount of

With all this Aristotle does not wealth its aim (Pol. i. 8. 1256 b

agree. Nature designed the other 23 sqq.).

THE REPUBLIC. 405

body of persons capable of living and purposed to live
the best life.

The class of guardians are to be to the rest of the State
what dogs are to a flock of sheep l , at once protectors and
guides. They must be philosophic and spirited and
swift and strong (376 C) ; they must be brave, truthful,
temperate, not fond of money (386-391); and in order
that they may possess all these qualities, they must re
ceive a correct musical and gymnastic training. Plato,
like Aristotle after him, undertakes a reform of P-OVCTLK^ and
yvnvacrTiKri, but his treatment of the subject is in many
respects different from that of Aristotle. We notice, in
the first place, that while Aristotle concerns himself in the
Fifth Book of the Politics only with the musical side of
P.OVO-IKYI, Plato treats it as including poetry, tune, and
rhythm, and pays fully as much attention to the substance
and form of its poetic element, as he does to its accom
paniment of tune and rhythm (ubrjs rpoTro? KCU /^eXcSy, 398 C :
pvd^oi, 399 E), and to the question of the instruments which
are to be used (399 C sqq.). Then again, we observe that
the two inquirers approach the subject with different aims.
The aim of Plato is to devise a scheme of education which
will fit his guardians for the position assigned to them in
his State : the aim of Aristotle is to produce a class of
citizens capable of living the highest and most complete
life. Thus Plato is naturally concerned for the most part
with the value of ^OVO-LKTI as an ethical influence, whereas
Aristotle is careful to point out in how many different
ways it enriches human life. Plato admits /XOUO-IKT? without
debate to a prominent place in his scheme of education :
Aristotle debates its claims at some length, and learns
by debating them how varied are its services to man.
When the musical and gymnastic training of the guardians
has been fully discussed, the further question arises, how are
the rulers to be selected from the ranks of the guardians
(412 B) ? They must be older than the other guardians,

1 Ultimately it is the class of dogs : the rulers are shepherds
auxiliaries who are likened to (440 D).

406 PLATO.

they must be wise and capable men (4&gt;/Kwtpo(, bvvaroC), men
who feel their interests to be bound up with those of the
rest, and whose minds are therefore immovably set on
doing that which is best for the whole State ; they must
be lovers of their State and vigilant in their care for it
($iA.o77oAtes, 52 E : Krj8e/Ao ve9 TT/S iroAeo)?, 41 2 C) 1 . The
ruler must be proof against illusion, must keep a strict
guard over himself, and never forget the lessons of his
"musical" training, but always bear himself well (evtrx^/xcoi;),
and, whatever happens to him, prove himself rhythmical
and harmonious (fvpvdjjios, cvdpnoo-Tos, 3. 413 E) 2 . He will
be wise (crowds) in the sense of prudent in. deliberation
(efySouAos), we learn in the Fourth Book (428) he will
possess that kind of science which deliberates with a view
to the well-being, not of some particular thing in the State,
but of the State as a whole, and considers how it should
conduct itself, both in its internal relations and in its
relations to other States (428 C) 3 . Such will be the
character of the complete guardians (414 B); the younger
guardians will be the auxiliaries (eTri/coiyxn) carrying their
decrees into execution. Below these two classes, the
traders and producers (xpr/^arioTuot) form a third, and the
three classes together make up the State.

In order that there may be nothing to render the rulers
and their auxiliaries otherwise than as good as possible,
or to incline them to act wrongfully (KaKovpytlv) by the
other citizens (3. 416 C), they must not possess any property
of their own, not even a house or a treasury

1 We are reminded of the tive grace of character (fvpvdfiin,

Pythagorean dictum already re- (vap^oaria, 522 A). This is said

ferred to (above, p. 379), that of povcnxri.

rulers must not only be men of 3 Compare Ephor. Fragm. 67

knowledge, but loving to those (Miiller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. I. 254),

they rule (cp. Rep. 412 D). where Ephorus, after noticing the

a If we turn to the Seventh shortness of the period during

Book (522 A), we shall find the which the Thebans retained their

training here prescribed treated ascendency in Greece, adds

as inadequate and other than that a iriov 8e elvai TO \6ytav Kal 6fj.i\las

which produces philosophers. It TJJS npos avdpcanovs oXiycop^crcu,

is a mere training through habit p.6vr)s 8 firifjLf\r)6i]vai rfjs Kara TTO-

and produces, not a knowledge Xf^oi/ operas-.
of principles, but only an instinc-

THE REPUBLIC. 407

treasuries, we learn in the Eighth Book (550 D), are
the ruin of timocratic States like the Lacedaemonian and
they must receive year by year only just that amount of
necessaries which they need for their own use (416 D sqq.);
they must not possess or even use gold and silver, in the
form of coin or in any other form. Once let them be
owners of land, and houses, and coin, and they will pass
their lives hating and hated by their fellow-citizens and
in daily fear of violence (417 A sq.) 1 . Later on, in the
Fourth Book (423 E), a hint is dropped that, so far as
these two classes are concerned, not only property but
also women and children will be as far as possible, like
the goods of friends, in common.

When Adeimantus remarks that the guardians will be
more like a garrison of hired auxiliaries than citizens
pauper protectors of happy householders rather than them
selves happy men, the Platonic Socrates in effect replies
that if they live up to their position, there is no reason
why they should not be the happiest members of the
community. Their duties will be to keep both wealth
and poverty 2 away from the State ; to preserve the unity
of the State without unduly contracting its dimensions, so
that it shall be neither over-small nor yet, like many large
States, two States in one ; to make such transfers from
the trading and producing class to the class of guardians
and vice versa as will secure that every one shall have the
work to do for which he is fit, and thus that the State

1 It has been already noticed 2 Similarly in the soul the
(above, p. 159 note), that while rational and spirited elements
here in the Third Book the reason are to take charge of the appeti-
why the two higher classes are to tive element and to prevent its
hold everything in common is that growing over-large and over-
otherwise they may be tempted strong on a diet of bodily plea-
to wrong the rest of the citizens sure (4. 442 A) ; or rather (9.
and to earn their hatred by so 571 E), to lull it to sleep by taking
doing, Plato assigns another care that it has neither more nor
reason in the Fifth Book (464) less than its due share of nutri-
the prevention of disharmony in ment, so that it may not trouble
the ranks of the two higher classes : the best element of the soul by
if the members of these classes are its joy or grief, but leave it to
at one, he says (465 B), the other pursue its investigations in peace,
citizens are sure to be so too.

408 PLATO.

shall be one (423 D) ; but, above all, to attend to the
rearing and education of the young the children of the
two upper classes are apparently referred to and to see
that this undergoes no change.

The State which has now been constructed is pronounced
to be good and normal, and all others to be bad and
aberrant from the normal type (5. 449 A) : it is the best
possible (4. 434 E), perfectly good (reAecos ayadrj, 4. 427 E).
Justice must consequently exist within it ; and after a short
search it is identified, and found to be both in the soul of
the individual human being and in the State the fulfil
ment by each part of its appropriate function (ra

So far the first four books of the Republic carry AIS, and
even in them we seem to rise from time to time above the
plane of Socratic thought. We are not, indeed, far from the
Socratic point of view, when the wisdom which the rulers are
required to possess is explained to be wisdom in delibera
tion (eti/3ouA.ta, 428 B), or a knowledge how the State should
behave to itself and other States (428 C-D), though Socrates
would have described the art of governing rather as a know
ledge how to make men better. We feel ourselves further
from the Socratic stand-point, however, when the ruler is re
quired to know how to act so as to preserve the harmony of
the parts of the State (443 E : cp. 442 C), for the conception
of the State as a Whole composed of parts which need to
work harmoniously together is rather Platonic or Pytha
gorean than Socratic. Right action, in Plato s view, is not
the outcome simply of knowledge, but springs, in the case
of an individual, from the co-operation of the parts of the
soul in the case of a State, from the co-operation of its
elements. Not only must the ruling element of the soul
possess knowledge, but it must be seconded by the spirited
element, and even the lowest section must have virtue of a
certain kind. And so in the State the virtue of the rulers
must be supported by virtue in the second class and virtue
in the third. There are irrational elements present both
in the soul and in the State, which may be so constituted

THE REPUBLIC. 409

as to refuse obedience to reason, and their co-operation is
essential to a satisfactory result. In the State the third
class as in the soul the appetitive nature is fully a mem
ber of the K.oiva&gt;via, though a subordinate member. The
traders and producers (xp^arioriKoi) are citizens and parts
of the Whole, so long as they do their part and refrain
from meddling with the work of others. When they insist
on ruling, as in an oligarchy or democracy, it is as if the
appetitive element claimed supremacy in the soul.
o The aspiration of Plato in the first four books of the
Republic is for a State in which the mass of the citizens
are content to live the life of production and trade for
which alone they are fit, and look for protection and
guidance to a comparatively small soldier-class specially
trained to find in an educated sense of proportion and
harmony the secret of courage and temperance, and
saved from temptations to misrule by holding women,
children, and property in common a class which in its
turn accepts the rule of its wisest members, men who
consecrate their lives to the good of the State as a whole,
and rule in such a way as to maintain the co-operation of
the three classes, and yet, notwithstanding their pre
eminence in wisdom, regard the two other classes ( as fellow-
citizens and brothers.

The interruption of Polemarchus and Adeimantus at the
beginning of the Fifth Book forms, however, as has often
been noticed, a turning-point in the course of the dialogue.
Some l hold that the three books which intervene between
the Fourth and Eighth, whatever the date of their com
position, found no place in the original scheme of the
dialogue, and are a subsequent addition. It is difficult, how
ever, to suppose that the bold communistic proposals of the
Republic were adopted without more discussion than they
receive in the Third and Fourth Books, or that the assimila
tion of the occupations of men and women formed no part
of the earlier draft ; and we gather from a passing expres-

1 Krohn has argued elaborately book, Der Platonische Staat
for this view in his instructive (Halle, 1876).

410 PLATO.

sion in the Third Book (4166, TOVTO ^ev OVK aiov
Oai . . . TTJS opOijs TrcuSetas, rjrty Trore ecrri^), that the Platonic So
crates is even then not absolutely certain that the whole truth
has been uttered as to the best education for a guardian *.
So again, we find at the close of the same book, that the
question of the selection of rulers and guardians (77 exXoy?)
K.al Kardorao-is TUIV ap^ovTav re KCU (f)v\a.KO)v] has as yet been
dealt with only in outline (&&amp;gt;s ez&gt; TV-ITM, fj.rj &lt;U aKpt/3eias,3. 414 A).
Perhaps the interruption of Polemarchus and Adeimantus
assures Socrates for the first time of the keen interest they
take in the discussion or perhaps it was necessary to
avoid mixing up the search for justice with highly debat
able matter, and to bring it to a close without unreasonable
delay ; at any rate, in the Fifth Book Socrates gives utter
ance to three great paradoxes in succession, of only one of
which the proposal of a communistic plan of life for the
guardians have we had even a hint before. The two others

the identification of the pursuits of the men and women
of the guardian class, and the choice of carefully trained
philosophers as rulers are altogether new. The question
how the constitution already described can be realized

how it is to be brought into existence furnishes the
occasion for the utterance of the last and greatest of the
three paradoxes. It cannot be brought into being, till philo
sophers are kings, or kings become philosophers (5. 471 C:
472 E sqq.) 2 . These are the lowest terms on which it can

1 It should also be noticed that dXXa *cat e^TroScbr, TO 8e (f)i\oaro(f)ov-
the Third Book (402) allows no o-iv a\T)6tvws (VTvy\aveiv fimeidfj KOI
man to be truly /J.OVO-LKOS, who has fvfjKoov (Aristot. Fragm. 79. I489b
not learnt from his study of povcri- 8 sqq.). In the Fourth Book of
KTJ to discern the essential forms the Politics, however, he seems to
(ftS^) of temperance, courage, and regard philosophy as the best
other virtues, so that there would security, in the case of citizen-
seem to be a philosophical ele- rulers at all events, for the right
ment even in the study of /iotio-noy, use of leisure (4 (7). 15). He
notwithstanding what we are told appears also to have recom-
in 7. 522 A. mended the study of philosophy

2 If Themistius may be trusted, in the UporpcTrriKos which he ad-
Aristotle dissented from Plato s dressed to Themison, King of the
doctrine that kings should be phi- Cyprians (Aristot. Fragm. 47.
losophers &lt;iAoo-o$eu/ /j.ev TW (3a&lt;n- 1 483 a 39: Heitz, die verlorenen
\el ov% onus avayKalov elvai &lt;a&lt;rKo&gt;i , Schriften des Aristoteles, p. 208).

THE REPUBLIC. 411

be realized (cp. 473 B, ru&gt;os av o-jutKporurou //.era/Sot AoVro? e A.0oi
(Is TOVTOV TOV TpoTtov Tr}s TToAireios TToXts). The subject of
the choice of rulers is now taken up again and considered
afresh (ro 8e T&V ap-^ovrcov uxrirep ef &lt;*PX*? ? jUTeA.0eiv Set, 6.
502 E). It now appears that it is not enough for the ruler
to have acquired an unerring sense of proportion and har
mony in feeling and action (e-upufyua, evap//ooria), an un-
shakeable devotion to the good of the State : he must be
tested not only in labours and fears and pleasures, but in
studies (503 D) ; the perfect guardian is a philosopher
(503 B), and we must take care that ours becomes one.
He cannot do so unless he starts with great natural gifts
a tenacious memory, quickness to learn, breadth and eleva
tion of mind, a gracious and measured nature (e^erpos
KCU fv^apis, 486 D), an instinctive love of truth, justice,
courage, and temperance (487 A). His keenness to get
to the heart of things (ctA.?/0eia, 490 A) is the central
feature of his character and the source from which his
moral excellence flows. Eager to pass beyond the shows
of things to their inner reality, he presses on from the
varying and manifold forms of the just (ra TroAAa 8i/caia) to
its unmixed and unchanging essence or idea ; he traces the
just up to its source in the Idea of Good, which is also the
source of all existence, and acquires from contact with that
which truly exists (ro OVTCOS ov) the only sure source a
healthy and orderly character, temperance, courage, and
the rest of the virtues (490 A-C). His virtue, unlike that
of those who are only virtuous through habit (522 A :
619 C), has a firm foundation in knowledge. He has seen
that which is just and beautiful and temperate both as it
exists by nature and as it exists among men (501 B), and
has a divine pattern in his soul to guide him in fashioning
the State over which he rules and the characters of its
citizens (500 C sqq.) ; no hand but his can make the State
happy and dear to God (500 E sqq.). He is the true
guardian, the true designer of constitutions ((coypa&lt;/&gt;o?

Not a few Romans probably held for a future ruler (Suet. Nero, c.
that philosophy was hardly a study 52 : Tac. Agric. c. 4).

412 PLATO.

500 E), the true saviour of the constitution
(502 D). Plato evidently has hopes that some son of a
king or potentate (bvi do-Trjs) may arise, fit to be made
a philosopher, at whose hands citizens would be willing
to accept the constitution which he has described (502
A-B) 1 . He feels, indeed, that the permanent presence of
an element of this kind in the State is essential (497 C).

Thus rule is now given, not, as before, to men possessed
of mere deliberative wisdom (e#/3ouAoi), knowing how the
State should behave to itself and to other States, but to
men of high natural excellence trained in a long series of
studies calculated to evoke thought and draw it in the
direction of true Being. The creation of a class of this
kind is not only the Open, Sesame of the Republic the
condition of its being brought into existence but also, it
would seem, the condition of its satisfactory working, for
Plato appears to hold that the permanent rulers of the
State must be men of this type.

As early as the age of 20 (537 B), at the close of the
period of pure gymnastic training, the youths who have
shone most in their musical and gymnastic studies are
parted from the rest and treated with special distinction,
and have their attention called to the inter-connexion of the
various branches of science and their relation to true Being.
From this select body a further selection is made on the
completion of the thirtieth year, and those are picked out
and surrounded with especial honour who successfully
undergo a dialectical test, and prove most capable of leaving
sight and sense behind, and penetrating with sureness to
that which truly exists. Five years are to be devoted by
them to the exclusive study of Dialectic ; fifteen more are to
be given to the acquisition of practical experience in military
commands and posts suitable for young men (vtav o-p\ai,
539 E) ; and then at the age of 50 those who have survived
all these tests and come out best both in practical work
and in scientific study (tv epyots re KCU e-TrioTTy/xcu?, 54 A)

1 Dion, according to Plutarch bold constitutional innovations at
(Dion, c. 53), attempted some Syracuse.

THE REPUBLIC. 413

are to be bidden to lift up their eyes and look on that
which is the source of light to all, the Idea of Good, and
using it as a pattern, to order for the rest of their lives the
State and private men and themselves, each ruling in turn 1 .
They will pass most of their time in philosophic pursuits,
but when the proper season comes, they will not shrink
from the disagreeables of a political life, but consent to
govern from a feeling of duty to the State and as a thing
rather necessary than noble or glorious (540 A-B).

It is under their auspices, and theirs only, that our ideal
State can come into existence. Let men of this type, once
in power, send off into the country all those who are over
ten years of age and train the remainder in their own ways
of life, being those which we have described 2 . Brought
into being in this, the shortest and easiest, manner, our
State will both itself enjoy happiness and be a blessing to
the race in which it arises (541 A). These are among the
closing words of the Seventh Book.

Throughout the dialogue the question how the State is
to be made at one with itself and happy seems to be even
more prominent than the question how it is to be made to
produce virtue. True, Plato asks (Rep. 456 E) Is there
anything better for a State than that women and men as
excellent as possible should be produced in it ? but
shortly after (462, A) he also asks : Can we name any
greater evil for a State than that which tears it asunder
and makes it many States in place of one, or any greater
good than that which binds it together and makes it one?
Perhaps, indeed, the two things are hardly separable ; it is
virtue that gives unity to the State, unity that gives it virtue.
But we feel that nothing comes home more to Plato than
the disunion of all existing States (for even in the Lace-

1 Plato speaks of his ideal State pevr) noXis (576 D).
as assuming the form of a King- 2 This is evidently a softened

ship or an Aristocracy, according version of the sentence which

as one of the rulers, or more, pos- Heraclitus passed on the Ephe-

sesses transcendent excellence sians for expelling Hermodorus

(4. 445 D) : in the Ninth Book, (see Diog. Laert. 9. 2 : and above,

however, it is called a /Sao-iXeuo- p. 263 note).

414 PLATO.

daemonian State (547 C) the two upper classes are at enmity
with the third, which they have conquered in war), and that
he has nothing more at heart than to make his State not
two States but one (423 D). He shows infinite ingenuity
in devising means for securing this end. His main reliance
is placed on justice, or, in other words, the correct distinc
tion of social function, but no care in the selection and edu
cation of the two upper classes will suffice, if they are not
set free from the temptations which come with the posses
sion of households and several property. Then the original
sketch of the education of the rulers is revised : it is not
enough that they should be trained to rhythm and har
mony they must have learnt virtue from contact with that
which really exists. They must have learnt that there is a
life which is better than the life of a ruler, and come to the
task of ruling with reluctance 1 . No such class exists at
present in any State; a wholly new class needs to be
created. When it exists, men will not hesitate to accept
its authority. If at present illegitimate claimants grasp at
power, it is because the true rulers do not exist.

Plato holds up his ideal constitution not only as the best
which is all that Aristotle claims for his but as the only
normal form (449 A), realizable whenever and wherever a
class of this kind can be brought into existence. The Eighth
and Ninth Books illustrate the consequences of its deprava
tion or absence 2 . Power falls into worse and worse hands.
The review of actual constitutions given in these books is

1 Rep. 520 E, el p.fv fiiov eeupjj- trary, the decline from the ideal
&lt;Tis afjifivoi TOV (ipxetv rols p.f\- State begins with the rule of apov-
\ovcriv upl-fiv, fcrTi (rot 8vvarr] yeve- trorepoi (fovXaKes (54^ -D), and reason
uOai TroXiy (v oiKovpevr), mingled with /j.ov(riKT) (\6yos fj.ov(riKfj

2 There is much in them which Kexpapevos, 549 B : cp. 560 B) is
carries our thoughts back rather declared to be the true preserva-
to the Second, Third, and Fourth tive of virtue, the true qualification
Books than to the Seventh. Mow- for rule. On the other hand, there
(TIKI) to our surprise regains the are passages in the Ninth Book
credit which it had lost in the (e. g. 585 B sqq. : 586 A, npbs rb
Seventh Book (522 A), where it is d\r)OS&gt;s civa&gt; ovre dve&Xc^av c.r.X.,
treated as a mere education of cp. 7. 525 D) which are more in
habit, not communicating science. the spirit of the Fifth, Sixth, and
In the Eighth Book, on the con- Seventh Books.