iitp ||tofrluati0n
:
THE
SANKHYA KARIKA,
BY
ISWARA KRISHNA;
TRANSLATED FKOM THE SANs(UUI
HY
HENRY THOMAS COLEBROOKE, ESQ.
Af.sO
THE BHAVSHYA, f ";•«, COMMENTARY OF
GAUDAPiDA;
NiSLATKD, AND 1LLU,SIKATK1> BV AU vtiKJLNAt
JJY
HORACE IIAIMAN \VILSON, M.A.i [I
PCBLISHED
?,v
MR. TOOKARAM TATYA,
)30M1UV.
1887.
HUBBELHOEBER
THE
SANKHYA KARIKA,
BY
1SWAKA KRISHNA;
TRANSLATED FROM THE SANSCRIT
BY
HENRY THOMAS COLEBROOKE, ESQ.
ALSO
THE BHA'SHYA, OR, COMMENTARY OF
GAUDAPADA •
TRANSLATED, AND ILLUSTRATED BY AN ORIGINAL COMMENT,
BY
HORACE HAYMAN WILSON, M.A.F.R.S.
PUBLISHED
BY
MB. TOOKARAM TATYA,
BOMBAY.
r 3 2 '
1887.
t
tOMEAY .— PKISTED AT THE SUBOBIIA-PKAKASII FKESS.
SANKHYA KARIKA
OR
THE inquiry is into the means of precluding the three
sorts of pain ; for pain is embarrassment : nor is the
inquiry superfluous because obvious means of allevia
tion exist, for absolute and final relief is not thereby
accomplished*
fax w
: 1 7:
i
f <r ^^imi i
! \
%fir ii
f|-
( 3 )
t T \
B NASHYA.
Salutation to that KAPILA by whom the Sdnkhya philosophy
was compassionately imparted, to serve as a boat for the purpose
of crossing the ocean of ignorance in which the world was
immersed.
I will declare compendiously the doctrine, for the benefit of
students ; a short easy work, resting on authority, and establish
ing certain results.
Three sorts of pain. — The explanation of this Ai*y& stanza
is as follows :
The divine KAPILA,. the son of BEAHMA indeed : as it is said,
" SANAKA, SANANDANA, and SANATANA the third ; ASURI,
KAPILA, BORBU,. and PANCUASIKHA : these seven sons of
Brahma" were termed great sages/' Together with. KAPILA
were born Virtue-, Knowledge,. Dispassion, and. Power : for he
being born, and observing the world plunged in profound dark
ness by the succeeding series of worldly revolutions, was filled,
with compassion ; and to his kinsman, the Brahman ASURI, he
communicated, a knowledge of the TWENTY-FIVE PRINCIPLES ;
from which knowledge the destruction of pain proceeds. As it.
is said; "He who knows the twenty-five principles, whatever
" order of life he imy have entered, and, whether he wear
" braided hair, a top-knot only, or be shaven, he i$ liberated
"(from existence): of this there is no-dpubt."
The inquiry is in consequence of the - embarrassment' of ' the-
three sorts of pain. In this place the three sorts of pain are, 1.
(adhydtniika). natural and inseparable;; 2, (ddhibhautika)
natural and extrinsic; and 3. (fclfiidamka) non-natural or,
superb uiaan,. The first is of t \yp .kinds, corporeal a,nd mental
( 4 )
corporeal is flux, fever, or the like, arising from disorder of the
wind, bile, or phlegm : mental is privation of what is liked,
approximation of what is disliked. * Extrinsic but natural paiu
is fourfold, according to the aggregation or elementary matter
whence it originates; that is, it is produced by any created beings :
whether viviparous, oviparous, generated by heat and moisture,
or springing from the soil ; or in short, by men, beasts, tame or
wild birds, reptiles, gnats, musquitoes, lice, bugs, fish, alligators,
sharks, trees, stones, &c. The third kind of pain may be called
superhuman, daivika meaning either divine or atmospheric : in
the latter case it means pain which proceeds from cold, heat,
wind, rain, thunderbolts, and the like.
Where then, or into what, is inquiry, in consequence of the
embarrassment of three kinds of pain, to be made ? Into the
means of precluding them. This is the inquiry. Nor is the
inquiry superfluous. That is ; if this inquiry be (regarded as)
superfluous, the means of precluding the three sorts of paiu
being obvious (seen) ; as for example ; the internal means of
alleviating the two inseparable kinds of pain are obvious,
through the application of medical science, as by pungent,
bitter, and astringent decoctions, or through the removal of
t/hose objects that are disliked, and accession of those that are
liked ; so the obvious obstruction of pain from natural causes
is protection and the like ; and these means being obvious, any
(farther) inquiry is superfluous ; if you think in this manner, it
is not so ; for absolutej certain, final, permanent, obstruction
(of pain) is not (to be effected) by obvious means. Therefore
inquiry is to be made by the wise elsewhere, or into means of
prevention which are absolute and final
COMMENT,
The first verse of the Kdrikd proposes the subject of the
\vork, and not only of that, but of the system to which it
belongs, and of every philosophical system studied by the
( 5 )
Hindus ; the common end of which is, ascertainment of the
means by which perpetual exemption from the metempsychosis,
or from the necessity of repeated births, may be attained : for
life is uniformly regarded by the Hindus as a condition of pain
and suffering, as a state of bondage and evil; escape from
which finally and for ever is a consummation devoutly to be
wished.
The liberation thus proposed as the object of rational exis
tence cannot be attained as long as man is subject to the
ordinary infirmities of his nature, and the accidents of his
condition: and the primary object of philosophical inquiry
therefore is, the means by which the imperfections flesh is heir
to may be obviated or removed. As preparatory then to their
right determination, it is first shewn in the text what means
are not conducive to this end ; such, namely, as obvious but
temporary expedients, whether physical or moral.
Of this introductory stanza Professor Lassen, in the first
number of his Gymnosophista, containing the translation of
the Ifdrikd, has given a version differing in some respects
from Mr. Colebrooke's, He thus renders it : " E tergeminorum
dolorum impetu oritur-desiderium cognoscendse rationis, qua ii
depellantur. Quod cogrioscendi desiderium licet in visibilibus
rebus infructuose versetur, non est (infructuosum) propter
absentiam absoluti, et omni aevo superstitis rernedii."
In the first member of this sentence, the translation of
abhighdta by ' impetus' is irreconcilable with the context. The
sense required by the doctrine laid down is * impediment,
embarrassment, the prevention of liberation by worldly cares
and sufferings.' So the same word abhighdtaka is immediately
used to mean ' preventing, removing/ ' depellens," Professor
Lassen's text, it is true, reads apagbdtaka, but this is not the
reading followed by Mr. Colebrooke, nor that of the citation of
the text given in the Sdnkhyu Bhdshya or Sdnkhya Kaiimudi ; it
is that of the S. Tat iff a Kaiimudi and 8. Chandrikd&nd although
in itself unobjectionable, yet is not a necessary nor preferable
( 6 )
variation. At any rate there can be no question that the word
abhighdia may be used in the sense of ' depellere/ and that
sense therefore equally attaches to it in the prior, member of
the hemistich. So in the Bhdshya of GAURAPADA we have
ddhibhautikasya raJcshddina abhighdtah; l The prevention of
' extrinsic pain is by protection and the like/ It would not be
possible here to render abhiyhdta by ' impetus.' By VACHAS-
PATI the term abhighdta is denned 'the confinement of the
sentient faculty (explained to mean here c life'), through the
impediment opposed by threefold distress abiding in spirit.'*
NARAYANA interprets it more concisely asahya sambandha,-^
' intolerable restraint.' * Embarrassment' therefore sufficiently
well expresses the purport of these definitions, or the obstruc
tions offered by worldly sufferings to the spirit anxious to
be free.
This variation, however, is of no great consequence : the more
important difference is in the secjorxd portion of the stanza ;
and as Professor Lassen has deviated advisedly from Mr.
Colebrooke, it is necessary to examine the passage more in
detail. The following are his reasons for the version he has
made :
" HaBC posterioris versus (di*is}it6 etc.) interpretatio, sicuti
scholiastarum suffragiis probatur, a grammatica postulatur.
Quod ideo moneo, ne leviter rationem, a Colebrookio, V.
summo, in hoc versu enarrando initam deseruisse censear. Is
enim : 'nor is the inquiry superfluous, because obvious means
of alleviation exist : for absolute and final relief is not thereby
accomplished.' Sed vereover^ ne vir summus constructionem
particu!0e chet sententiam claudentis et a negatione excepta3
male intellexerit. De qua re dixi ad Hitop. procem. d. 28,
Ex interpret. Colebrook. construendum esset : drishte sc.
sati (1. e. yadyapi drishtam vidyate) sd (jijndsd)
( 7 )
aparthd na ekdnt — abhdvdt .* Sed tit omittarn, particulse
chef, nullum omnino relinqui locum in sententia, na inop
portune versus loco collocatum 'esse, non potes quin coricedas.
Male omnino se habet tota sententia et clautlrcat. Equidem
construe : drishte sd ( jijndsd) updrthd (bkavati) diet (tathdpi)
na (apdrthd bhavati) vkantd' — ubhwvdt.t Prorsus siniili-ter
dicitur ndbhdmt infr. v. 8. Ablativum igitur ekdntyatyantoh
abhdvdt, non ad drishte refero cum Colebrookio, sed ad nega-
tionem quse cum supplementis suis aspodosm constituit. N-ain
quse post chemid sequuntur verba, ad apodosin pertinere sem
per observavi. Quam grammatica postulare videtur, patitur
prseterea loci tenor enarrationem, imo melior evadit sententia.
Ad drishte enim rektis istis verbis, id tantum dicitur, rerum
visibilium cognitione non attingi J?osse philosophise finem,
liberationem absolutam «t perpetuam a doloribus ; mea posita
enarratione non id tantum docetur, sed additur etiam hoc :
finern istum posse attingi, licet alio cognitionis genere. Tres
omnino positiones altero hemistichii versu oontineatur •: phi
losophise (id enim valet gigndsd, i. e. cognitionis desiderium)
finem esse emancipationem a doloribus certam et omne tempus
transgredientem ; deinde ad eum non perveniri ea via quae
primum initur, quia obvia quasi sit, i. e. remediorum a sensi-
bilibus rebus petitorum ope ; denique ea remedia cognoscendi
desideriuin posse expleri. Sed aliter atque Colebrookius hasce
sententias inter se conjungit noster, et per conditionem etfert,
quod ille per negationern enuntiat."
In this view of the meaning of the verse, there is a refine
ment that does not belong to it, and which is not Indian :
arguments are often elliptically and obscurely stated in Sanscrit
dialectics, but one position at a time is usually sufficient for
even Brahmanical subtlety. The only position here advanced
t s ^r ( r^mr ) arqr^r ( ^r^ ) ^ ( rmuPr ) * ( ^nnfr
)
( 8 )
is,* that the cure of worldly evil is riot to be effected by such
remedies as are of obvious and ordinary application, as they
can only afford temporary relief. Death itself is no exemption
from calamity, if it involves the obligation of being born again,
The version proposed by Professor Lasseh rests upon his
notion of the grammatical force of the expression chenna or chet,
* if,' na, ' not :' the former he would refer to the prior member
of the sentence, the latter to the subsequent expressions.
But this division of the compound is riot that which is most
usual in argumentative writings. The phrase is an elliptical
negation of a preceding assertion, diet referring to what has
been said, implying, ' if you assert or belive this ;' and no,
meeting it with a negator, ' it is not so :' then follows the
reason or argument of the denial. Thus in the Mtiktdvali :
4 But why should not Darkness be called a tenth thing, for it
is apprehended by perception ? If this be said, it is not so (iti
chdn-na) ; for it is the consequence of the non-existence of
absolute light, and it would be illogical to enumerate it
amongst things.'* So in the Ny&ya Sutra Vritti : ' If by a
disturbance in the assembly there be no subsequent speech,
and through the want of a reply there be defeat ; if this be
urged) it is not so (iti chen-na), because there has been no
opportunity for an answer.'t Again in the Sankhya Pravackana
Bh­a. Sutra : — ' If it be said that Prakrit! is the cause
of bondage, it is not so> from its dependent state.'J Comment :
— ' But bondage may be occasioned by Prakriti. If this be
asserted, it is not so. Why ? Because in the relation of
bondage, Prakriti is dependent upon conjunction, as will be
( 9 )
explained in the following precept.'* Also in the Veddnta
Sara Vivriti : ' If in consequence of such texts of the Ve'das
as " let sacrifice be performed as long as life endures" their
performance is indispensable, and constant and occasional rites
must be celebrated by those engaged in the attainment of
true knowledge ; and if, on the other hand, the attainment of
true knowledge is distinct from the observance of ceremonies ;
then a double duty is incumbent on those wishing to eschew
the world. If this be asserted, it is not so (iti chen^na}, from
the compatibility of several ty with union, as in the case of
articles of khayra or other wood :'~j* that is, where there are
several obligations, that which is most essential may be select
ed from the rest. In the same work we have an analogous
form used affirmatively ; as, ' But how by the efficacy of
knowledge, after the dissipation of ignorance, in regard to the
object (of philosophy), can the true nature of the essentially
happy (being) be attained ? for as he is eternally existent,
knowledge is not necessary to establish his existence. If this
be asserted, it is true (iti chet\ scitycim). Brahme, one
essentially with felicity, is admitted to be eternal* but in a
state of ignorance he is not obtained • like a piece of gold
which is forgotten (and sought for), whilst it is hanging round
the neck.'J Here it would be impossible to refer sati/am to
the succeeding member of the sentence, as the apodosis being
separated from it$ not only by the sense, but by the particle
opi. Passages of this description might be indefinitely
cm: sr-
q?r; i
w ^^^r?^ i rr-
multiplied, but these are sufficient to shew that the con
struction in the sense adopted by Mr. Colebrooke is common
and correct.
Accordingly his version is uniformly supported scholiastarum
suffragiis. Thus in the Sankya Bhdshya, as we have seen, the
passage is explained, dri&hte sd> apdrtha chei evam manyase ncc
ekdnta, &c. ; * If by reason of there being obvious remedies, you
think indeed the inquiry superfluous, no (it is not so), frorpf
their not being absolute and permanent/ So in the Sankyct
Tatica Kauinudt, after stating the objection at length, the com
mentator adds, nirdJcaroti, na iti ; ' (the author) refutes it (by
saying), no, not so :' kutah, ' why' ? ekdntatyantatah abhdrdt*
.The Sankhra Chandrikdis to the same effect, or still more ex
plicit : ' There being obvious means, the inquiry is superfluous,
the conclusion being otherwise attained : if (this be urged) such
is the meaning (of the text), (the author) contradicts it ; no, it is
not so.f This commentator giving the very reading, drishte
sati, which Professor Lassen argues Mr. Colebrooke's version
would erroneously require. The remaining scholiast, RAMA
KRISHNA, adopts the comment of the Chandrikd word for word,
and consequently the commentators are unanimous in support
of the translation of Mr. Colebrooke.
With respect to the passages referred to by Professor Lassen
as establishing the connection of the negative with the latter
member of the sentence, instead of its being absolute, it will
be seen at once that they are not at all analogous to the
passage in our text. They are declaratory, not argumentative ;
and the terms following the negative particle are the parts or
circumstances of the negative, not the reasons on which it is
grounded. Thus in the Hitopadesa : ' What will not be, will
t tfe sfa
( 11 )
not be; if it will be, it will not be otherwise.'* So in v. 8. of
the Rdrikd: ' The non-apprehension of nature is from its
subtlety, not from its nonentity!.' In neither of these is there
any reference to a foregone position which mast be admitted or
denied, nor is the negative followed by the reasons for denial,
as is the case in our text.
These considerations are more than sufficient to vindicate,
what it was scarcely perhaps necessary to .have asserted, Mr
Colebrooke's accuracy ; and they are now also somewhat super
fluous, as I have been given to understand that Professor
Lassen acknowledges the correctness of his interpretation. The
commentary of GAURAPADA distinctly shews that nothing more
is intended by the text, than the unprofitableness of recourse
to visible or worldly expedients for the relief or removal of
worldly pain. In subjoining therefore the gloss of VACHESPATI
MISRA, with a translation, it is intended rather to illustrate the
doctrines of the text, and the mode of their development by
native scholiasts, than further to vindicate the correctness of the
translation.
' j But verily the object of the science may not need inquiry,
1. if there be no pain in the world ; 2. if there be no desire to
# ?K^n =T fr3Ti *?rr3^rr^?pir t
t ?ftwro?TB(fert ci^irer^ i
J ^ ffc =f ^irerfsreqt fasrr^r 3fr ^ *m snnft * &\^ \ s^r *
sraw sg^ti aro^ss^ar ^ l^rr \ i^-
?i5^dft^rn?nrf?irr?rr5r i
i ^frqr?TT-cTr^ ff^rerg i
fcr i
vrr i
( 12 )
£,void it ; 3. if there be no means of extirpating it. The im
possibility of extirpating it is twofold ; either from the eternity
of pain, or from ignorance of the means of alleviation : or,
though it be possible to extirpate pain, yet that knowledge
which philosophy treats of may not be the means of its re
moval ; or again, there may be some other and more ready
means. In the text, however, it is not said that pain does not
exist, nor that there is no wish to avoid it. From the embar
rassment of the three kinds qf pain. — A triad of pain, three
kinds : they are the ddhydtmika, ' Natural ;' ddhibhautika
1 extrinsic ;' and dcfhidaivika, ' superhuman.' The first is of two
kinds, bodily and mental : bodily is caused by disorder of the
)mmours, wind, bile, anc} phlegm ; mental is occasioned by
desire, wrath, coyetousness, fear, e^vy, grief, and want of dis
crimination. These various kinds pf pain are called insepar
able, from their admitting of internal remedies. The pain
that requires external remedies is also twofolcj, &dhib1iautika and
adhidaivika. The first has for its cause, man, beasts, deer,
birds, reptiles, and Jp animate things ; the second arises from
the evil influence of the planets, or possession by impure spirits
(Yakshas, Hdkshasctt, Pwdyakas i&c.). TJiese kinds of pain
depending upon the vicissitudes arising froin the quality of
foulness, are to be experienced by every individual, and cannot,
be prevented. Through the obstruction occasioned by the
three kinds of pain abiding in spirit, arises embarrassment, or
( 13 )
confinement of the sentient faculty. The capability of know
ing the impediment occasioned by such pain, is considered
the cause of the desire to avoid it ; for though pain may not be
prevented, yet it is possible to overcome it, as will be subse
quently explained. Pain then being generated, inquiry is to
be made into the means of its removal. Tad apayhdtake : tad
refers here to the three kinds of pain, tad having the relation
dependent upon its being used as subordinate (relative) term.
The means (hetu) of removing — These are to be derived from
philosophy, not from any other source : this is the position (of
the text). To this a doubt is objected ; As there are obvious
•means, the inquiry is superfluous ; if so — . The sense is this :
"Beit admitted that there are three kinds of pain; that the
rational being wishes to escape from them ; that escape is
practicable ; and that means attainable through philosophy are
adequate to their extirpation ; still any investigation by those
who look into the subject is needless ; for there do exist obvious
(visible) means of extirpation, which are easily attainable,
whilst the knowledge of philosophical principles is. difficult of
attainment, and to be acquired only by long study, aud tradi
tional tuition through many generations. Therefore, acoortlin g
to the popular saying, " Why should a man who may find
honey in the arkka flower, go for it to the mountain ?" so wluvt
wise man will give himself unnecessary trouble, when he has
attained the object of his wishes, Hundreds of remedies for
i mi ^
n w*<\
( 14 )
bodily affections are indicated by eminent physicians. The
pleasures of sense, women, wine, luxuries, unguents, dress,
ornaments, are the easy means of obviating mental distress.
So in regard to extrinsic pain, easy means of obviating it exist
in the skill acquired by acquaintance with moral and politieal
science, and by residing in safe and healthy places, and the
like ; whilst the employment of gems and charms readily
counteracts the evils induced by superhuman agency. This is
the objection. (The author) refutes it ; it is not so. Why ?
From these means not being absolute or final. Ekanta means
the certainty of the cessation of pain ; atyantd, the non-
recurrence of pain that has ceased. (In obvious means of relief
there is) the non-existence of botli these properties ; the affix
tasi, which may be substituted for all inflexions, being here put
for the sixth case dual ; — as it is said ; " From not observing
the (invariable) cessation of pain of various kinds, in conse
quence of the employment of ceremonies, drugs, women, moral
and political studies, charms, and the like, their want of certain
operation (is predicated) ; so is their temporary influence, from
observing the recurrence of pain that had been suppressed.
Although available, therefore, the obvious means of putting a
stop to pain are neither absolute nor final, and consequently
this iuquiry (into other means) is not superfluous." This is
the purport (of the text).'
The Sdnkhya Cliandrika and 8. Kaumudi are both to the same
effect, and it is unnecessary to cite them. The original Sutras
of KAPILA, as collected in the 8. PravacJiana, and commented
on by VIJGNYA'NA BHIKSHU, confirm the view taken by the
scholiasts.
fsrsrrafir u
( 15 )
Sutra : — ' The final cessation of the three kinds of pain is
the final object of soul.*'
Comment : — ' The final cessation of these three kinds of pain,
the total cessation of universal pain, whether gross or subtle
(present or to come), is the final, supreme object of soul f
Sutra : — ' The accomplishment of that cessation is not from
obvious means, from the evident recurrence (of pain) after
suppression. J'
Comment : — ' The accomplishment of the final cessation o£
pain is not (to be effected) by worldly means, as wealth, and
the 4ike. "Whence is this ? Because that pain of which the
cessation is procured by wealth and the like is seen to occur
again, when that wealth and the rest are exhausted. '§
II.
THE revealed mode is like the temporal one, ineffec-
tual> for it is impure ; and it is defective in some
respects, as well as excessive in others. A method
different from both is preferable, consisting in a dis
criminative knowledge of perceptible principles, and
of the imperceptible one, and of the thinking soul.
( 16 )
\
fl
T
r%
*r
( 17 )
: i <rer 5f<Rnfr fatrw*
t I
BHASHYA.
Altliough the inquiry is to be directed to other than to ot)vij
ous remedies, yet iu is not to be directed to such as are deri
vable from revelation, as means of removing the three kinds
of pain. Anusravati, ' what man successively hears ;' anusra-
vika, ' that which is thence produced, revealed mode ;' that is,
established by the Vedas : as it is said ; " "We drank the juice of
the acid asclepias ; we became immortal ; we attained efful
gence ; we know divine things, What harm can a foe inflict
on us ? How can decay affect an immortal ?" (This text of
the Veda refers to) a discussion amongst Indra and other gods,
as to how they became immortal. In explanation it was said,
" we were drinkers of soma juice, and thence became immortal,"
that is, gods * further^ " We ascended to, or attained effulgence,
or heaven; we knew divine, celestial, things. Hence then,
assuredly, what can an enemy do to us ? What decay can
affect an immortal ?" dlmrtti meaning ' decay' or * injury :'
' What can it do to an immortal being ?'
It is also said in the Vedas, that final recompense is obtained
by animal sacrifice : " He who offers the ashwamedha conquers
all worlds, overcomes death, and erpiates all sin, even the
3
( 18 )
murder of a Brahman." As, therefore, final and absolute con
sequence is prescribed in the Vedas, inquiry (elsewhere) should
be superfluous ; but this is not the case. The text says, the!
revealed mode is like the temporal one — drislitavat ; ' like,-
same as the temporal/ drifihtena tiilya,. What is that revealed
mode, and whence is it (ineffectual) ? It is impure, defective
in some respects, and excessive in others. It is impure from
(enjoining) animal sacrifices ; as, " according to tlie ritual of the
ashwamedha, six hundred horses, minus three, are offered at
midday." For though that is virtue which is enjoined by the
Vedas and laws, yet, from its miscellaneous character, it may
be affected by impurity. It is also said ; " Many thousands of
Iiidras and otter gods have passed away in successive ages,
overcome by time ; for time is hard to overcome." Hence
therefore, as even Indra and the gods perish, the revealed mode
involves defective cessation of pain. Excess is also one of its
properties, and pain is produced by observing the superior ad
vantages of others. Here, therefore, by excess, atisayci is under
stood the unequal distribution of temporal rewards, as the
consequence of sacrifice ; the object of the ritual of the Vedas
being in fact in all cases temporal good. Therefore the reveal
ed mode is like the temporal aiie, What then is the preferable
mode ? If this be asked, it is replied, One different from both,
A mode different from both the temporal and revealed is
preferable, being free from impurity, excess, or deficiency. How
is this ? It is explained (in the text :: It consists in a discrltni-
native knowledge &c. Here, by perceptible principles, are in
tended Mahat and the rest, or Intellect, Egotism, the five
subtile rudiments, the eleven organs (of perception and action),
and the five gross elements. The imperceptible one is
Pradhana (the chief or great one). The thinking soitl, Purnsha
(the incorporeal). These twentyfive principles are intended by
the (three) terms ryakla, a-vyakta, and/wa. In discriminative
knowledge of these consists the preferable mode ; and he who
knows them knows the twenty-five principles (he has perfect
knowledge).
( 19 )
The difference between the perceptible, and imperceptible,
and thinking principles, is next explained,
COMMENT.
Having taught that worldly means of overcoming worldly
evil are ineffectual, it is next asserted that devotional remedies,
such as the rites enjoined by the Vedas, are equally unavail
ing ; and knowledge of the three parts or divisions of existence
material and spiritual, is the only mode by which exemption
from the infirmities of corporeal being can be attained.
The Vedas are inefficient, from their inhumanity in pre
scribing the shedding of blood ; the rewards which they propose
are also but temporary, as the gods themselves are finite beings,
perishing in each periodical revolution. The immortality spok
en of in the Vedas is merely a 'long duration, or until a
dissolution of the existent forms of things*. The Vedas also
cause, instead of curing pain, as the blessings they promise to
one man over another are sources of envy and misery to those
who do not possess them. Such is the sense given by GTAUKA-
PADA to dtisaya, and the Sankhya Tatwa Kaumudi understands it
also to imply the unequal apportionment of rewards by the Vedas
themselves : ' The jyotishtoma and other rites secure simply
heaven ; the vajapeya and others confer the sovereignty of hea
ven : this is being possessed of the property of excess (iii-
equality)!.'
In like manner, the original aphorism of KAPIJLA affirms of
these two modes, the temporal and revealed, that there ' is no
diiference between them/]: and that * escape from pain is not
the consequence of the latter/ 1| because ' recurrence is neverthe-
*rrT*ra n
( 20 )
less the result of that immunity which is attainable by acts (of
devotion),'* as * the consequences of acts are not eternal.'f
Here however a dilemma occurs, for the Veda also says, ' There
is no return (regeneration) of one who has attained the sphere
of Brahma by acts (of devotion).'^ This is explained away
by a Sutra of Kapila, which declares that the Veda limits the
non-regeneration of one who has attained the region of Brahma
to him who, when there, acquires discriminative wisdom.§
This discriminative wisdom is the accurate discrimination of
those principles into which all that exists is distributed by the
Sdnkhya philosophy. Vyakta, ' that which is perceived, sensible,
discrete ;' Avyakta, ' that which is unperceived, indiscrete ;' and
Jna, * that which knows, or discriminates :' the first is matter
in its perceptible modifications ; the second is crude, unmodified
matter ; and the third is soul. The object of the S&nkhya
Karika is to define and explain these three things, the correct
knowledge of which is of itself release from worldly bondage,
and exemption from exposure to human ills, by the final sepa
ration of soul from body.
Cs
III,
NATURE, the root (of all), is no production. Seven
principles, the Great or intellectual one, &c., are
productions and productive. Sixteen are productions
(unproductive). Soul is neither a production nor pro
ductive.
f ft
t: fairlp
( 21 )
i
BHASHYA.
^ (the root) prakriti (nature) is pmdhdna (chief), from
Its being the root of the seven principles -which are production*
( 22 )
and productive ; such nature is the root, No production. —
It is not produced from another : on that account nature
(prakritl) is no product of any other thing. Seven principles.
— Mahat and the rest ; from its being the great (mahat) ele
ment ; this is Intellect (Buddhi). Intellect and the rest. — The
f seven principles are, 1. Intellect; 2. Egotism; 3 — 7. The
five subtile rudiments. These seven are productions and pro
ductive : in this manner ; Intellect is produced from the chief
one (nature). That again produces Egotism, whence it is
productive (pmlcriti). Egotism, as derived from intellect, is a
production ; but as it gives origin to the five subtile rudiments,
it is productive, The subtile rudiment of sound is derived from
Egotism, and is therefore a production ; but as causing the pro
duction of ether, it is productive. The subtile rudiment of
touch, as generated from Egotism, is a production ; as giving
origin to air, it is productive, The gubtile rudiment of smell is
derived from Egotism, and is therefore a production ; it gives
origin to earth, and is therefore productive. The subtile rudi
ment of form is a production from Egotism ; as generating light,
it is productive. The subtile rudiment of flavour, as derived
from Egotism, is a production ; it is productive, as giving origin
to water. In this manner the Great principle and the rest are
/ productions and productive, J Sixteen are productions ; that is, \
the five organs of perception, the five organs of action, with
mind, making the eleventh, and the five elements ; these form a
class of sixteen which are productions, the terra vikdra being
the same as vikrvti, Soul is neither a production nor productive.
These (principels) being thus classed, it is next to be considered
by what and how many kinds of proof, and by what proof
severally applied, the demonstration of these three (classes of)
principles, the perceptible, the imperceptible, and the thinking
soul, can be effected. For in this world a probable thing is
established by proof, in the same mode as (a quantity of) grain
by a prastha (a certain measure), and the like, or sandal and
other things by weight. On this account what proof is, is next
to be defined.
COMMENT.
Iii this stanza the three principal categories of the Sankhya
system are briefly defined, chieBy with regard to their relative
characters.
Existent things, according to one classification, are said to be
fourfold : 1. prakriti ; 2. vikriti ; 3; prakriti-vikriti ; and
tinubhaya fupa neither pr&kriti nor vikriti, Prakriti, according
to its ordinary use, and its etymological sense, means that which
is primary, that xvhich precedes what is made ; from pra, prce
and kri,''to make.' This, however, is further distinguished in
the text into the mula prakriti ; the prakriti which is the root
and substance of all things except soul, matter or nature ; and
secondary, special, or relative prakriti, 01* every production that
in its turn becomes primary to some other derived from it. By
prakriti may therefore be understood the matter of which every
substance primarily or secondarily is composed-, and from which
it proceeds, the primary, or, as Mi*. Colebrooke renders it,
* productive' principle of some secondary substance or production.
This subsequent product is termed Vikriti, from the same root,
kri, ' to make,' with vi, implying ' variation,' prefixed. Vikriti
does not mean a product, or thing brought primarily into exis^
tence, but merely a modification of a state of being, a new
development or form of something previously extant. We
might therefore consider it as best rendered by the tertn
' development,' but there is no objection to the equivalent itt
the text, or ' product/ In this way, then, the different sub
stances of the universe are respectively nature, or matter, and
form. ' Crude or radical matter is without form. Intellect is its
first form, and Intellect is the matter of Egotism. Egotism is
a form of Intellect and the matter of which the senses and the
rudimental elements are formed ; the senses are forms of Egotism.
The gross elements are forms of the rudimental elements. We
are not to extend the materiality of the grosser elements to the
forms of visible things, for visible things are compounds, not
( 24 )
simple developments of a simple base. Soul coffles uftder the
fourth class ; it is neither matter nor form, production nor
productive. More particular definitions of each category sub
sequently occur.
PERCEPTION, inference, and right affirmation, are ad
mitted to be threefold proof; for they (are by all
acknowledged, and) comprise every mode of demon
stration. It is from proof that belief of that which is
to be proven results.
( 25 )
^FR
f^rr ^rffr ?r 5%
fftf II ^FW Tir I
I aPTRt ^TUT I
MWH
frM"
( 26 )
BHASHYA.
Perception ; — as, the ear, the skin, the eye, the tongue, the
nose, are the five organs of sense; and their five objects are
respectively, sound, feel, form, flavour, and odour: the ear
apprehends sound ; the skin, feel ; the eye, form ; the tongue
taste ; the nose, smell. This proof is called, (that which is) seen
(or perception). That abject which is not ascertainable either
by its being present, or by reference, is to be apprehended
from right affirmation ; such as, INDRA, the king of the gods ;
the northern Kurus.; the nymphs of heaven; and the like.
That which is not ascertainable by perception or inference, is
derived from apt (or sufficient) authority. It is also said ;
"They call scripture, right affirmation; right, as free from
error. Let not one exempt from fault affirm a falsehood with
out adequate reason. He -who in his appointed office is free
from partiality or enmity, and is ever respected by persons of
the same character, such a man is to be regarded as apt (fit or
worthy)" In these three are comprised all kinds of proof.
JAIMINI describes six sorts of proof. Which of those then are
not proofs ? They are, presumption (arihdpatti), /proportion
(sambhava), privation (abhdva) comprehension (pratibhd), oral
communication (aitthya), and comparison (upamdna).
Thus " Presumption" is twofold, * seen' and ' heard.' * Seen ' is
where in one case the existence of spirit is admitted, and it
is presumed that it exists in another. 'Heard;' DEVADATTA
does not eat by day, and yet grows fat.: it is presumed then
that he eats by night. "Proportion;" By the term one
prastha, four kuravas are .equally designated. "Privation" is
fourfold ; prior, mutual, constant, and total. * Prior ;' as
DEVADATTA in childhood, youth, &c. ' Mutual ;' as, Water jar
in cloth. ' Constant ;' as, The horns of an ass ; the son of
a barren woman; the flowers of the sky, 'Total' priva-
( 27 )
tion, or destruction ; as when cloth is burnt, or as from,
contemplating withered grain, want of. rain is ascertain
ed In this manner privation is manifold. " Comprehen
sion ;" as, The part of the country that lies between the-
Vindhya, mountains on the north and Sahya mountains on
the south^ extending to the sea, is pleasant. By this sentence
it is intended to express that there are many agreeable
circumstances comprehended in that country, the name of
the site indicating its several products. "Oral communication ;"
as, When people report there is a fiend in the fig -tree. " Com
parison ;" The Gravaya is like a cow ; a lake is like a sea.
These are the six kinds of proof; but they are comprised in-
the three; for presumption is included in inference ; and
proportion, privation, comprehension, oral communication, and
comparison, are comprehended in right affirmation. There
fore from the expressions (in the text), they, comprise every-
mode of demonstration, and are admitted to be threefold proof,
it is said, that by these three kinds of proof, proof is esta
blished. Belief of that which is to be proven results from
proof. — The things to be proven are,- Nature, Intellect Egotism,
the five subtile rudiments, the eleven organs, the five gross
elements, and Soul.- These five and twenty principles are-
classed as the perceptible, the imperceptible, and the percipient ;.
and some are verifiable by perception, some by inference, and',
some by authority ; which is the threefold proof.
The definition of each kind (of proof) is next, given..
COMMENT,
The work pauses in its enumeration- of the physical and;
metaphysical principles of the system, to define its dialectical
portion, or the proofs which may be urged in support of its
principles.
The doctrine that there are but three kinds of proof, is said ;
to be supported by a text of the Veda? : ' Soul is either to be
perceived, to be learned from authority, or to be inferred: from*
( 28 )
reasoning*.' It is opposed to the tenets of the Naiydyikas
and Mimdnsakas, the former of whom describe four kinds,
and the. latter six kinds of proof. The proofs of the logicians
are, pratyaksha^ ' perception ;' anumdna,\ 6 inference ;'
upamdna ||, ' comparison ; ' and sabda §, ' verbal authority.'
Of these, comparison and verbal authority are included by
the Sdnkhyas under right affirmation ; the term dpta IF mean
ing ' fit, right,' and being applied either to the Vedas** , or
to inspired teachers ff, as subsequently explained. The
Mimdnsakas do recognise six kinds of proof ; but GAURAPADA
has either stated them incorrectly, or refers to a sj^stem differ
ent from that now found in the best authorities of this school.
KUMARILA BHATTA alludes to the sixfold proof of an older
scholiast or Vrittikdra, but those six proofs are, as Mr. Cole-
brooke states, perception, inference, comparison, presumption,
authority, and privation ; and the author of the Sdstra
dipikd excludes expressly sambhava, pratibhd and aitihya from
the character of proofs. With regard to the terms specified,
it may be doubted if exact equivalents can be devised. Arthd-
patti is literally, ' attainment of meaning ;' conjecture or pre
sumption, < inference ;' from which it differs only in the
absence of the predicate or sign from which the subject is
inferred. The illustrations of the commentator do not very
clearly explain the purport of the two kinds of this proof,
' seen' and ' heard.' In the S'dstra dipikd the first is exem
plified by the sentence, " DEVADATTA is alive, but not in his
house ; it is presumed therefore that he is abroad." ' Heard,'
s'ruta, is referred to the Ve'das, and applies to the interpretation
of receipts by the spirit as well as the letter, as in a direction
to offer any particular article, it may be presumed, that should
that not be procurable, something similar may be substituted.
t SRZ^- i J arrjnr^r i n
IF ^H I "*'* 3n*TO> ' tt
( 29 )
VACHASPATI also considers arthdpatti to be comprised in infer
ence, as well as sambhava, ' identity' or ' proportion.' Privation,
he argues is only a modification of perception ; and aitihya,
or ' report,' is no proof at all, the person with whom it origi
nates being undetermined. Pratibhd he does not mention.
The concluding expressions of GAURAPADA, Pratijdnvdsa
sanyndnam, are of questionable import, and there is possibly
some error in the copy. The ' objects of proof,' prameya, are,
according to the Sankhya, all the principles of existence.
Siddhi, ' accomplishment, determination,' in the last hemistich,
is explained by pratiti, ' trust, belief.'
-I II ^ II
V.
PERCEPTION is ascertainment of particular objects.
Inference, which is of three sorts, premises an argu
ment, and (deduces) that which is argued by it. Right
affirmation is true revelation.
f 5
( 30 )
SIT
ffa wtF^rafr ?SFT HT^nns i t^rror^s u
i
*rar
* i
BHASHYA.
Drishta £ seen,' or pratyaksha, ' perception/ is application or
exertion of the senses in regard to their several objects, as of
the ear, and the rest, to sound, &c. Inference is of three kinds,.
subsequent, antecedent/ analogous. Inference antecedent is
that which has been previously deduced ; as rain is inferred
from the rising of a cloud, because formerly rain had been the
consequence. Subsequent ; as, having found a drop of water
taken from the sea to be salt, the saltness of the rest also is
inferred. Analogous ; as, having observed their change of place,
it is concluded that the moon and stars are locomotive, like
CHAITRA : that is, having seen a person named. CHAITRA trans
fer his position from one place to another, and thence known
that he was locomotive, it is inferred that the moon and stars
also have motion (because it is seen that they change their
places). So observing one mango tree in blossom, it is inferred
that other mango trees also are in flower. This is inference
from analogy.
Again ; premises an argument, and (deduce*) that which is
argued by it. That inference. Premises a prior argument -
that is, the thing which has a predicate, is inferred from the
predicate, as, a mendicant (is known) by his staff; or it
premises the subject of the argument, when the predicate is
( 31 )
deduced from that of which it is predicated as, having seen a
mendicant, you say, this is his triple staff. Right affirmation
is true revelation. — Apia means dchdryas, ' holy teachers,' as
Brahma and the rest. S'ruti means Ve'das,' ' Teachers and
Ve'das' is the import of that compound, and that which is
declared by them is true revelation.
In this manner threefold proof has been described. It is
•next explained by what sort of proof ascertainment is to be
effected, and of what objects.
COMMENT.
The three kinds of proof, perception, inference, and right
affirmation, are here more particularly explained.
The first is defined, ' what severally relates to, or is engaged
in, an object of sense*. Adhyavasdya is explained by
VACHASPATI, ' Knowledge, which is the exercise of the
intellectual facultyf. NARAYANA explains it, ' That by which
certainty is obtained]:.' The organs do not of themselves
apprehend objects, but are merely the instruments by which
they are approximated to the intellect : ' neither does intellect
apprehend them (rationally), being, as derived from (prakriti)
matter, incapable of sense ; but the unconscious impressions or
modifications of intellect, derived through the senses, are
communicated to soul, which, reflecting them whilst they are
present in the intellect, appears by that reflection actually
effected by wisdom, pleasure, and the like §.'
t
fire \ J arttresfaft f^facrs^nr t
^ ft sTOTOT^RRrfaftr fl^sQregnftscsfarF
i ir<j jf^c^r pfMisft Tfr^m^r ^^r. \ 3^3
\ i
( 32 )
The explanation given by GAUKAPADA of the three kinds of
inference is not exactly conformable to the definitions of the
logicians, although the same technical terms are employed.
Thus in the Ny&ya Sutra Vritti, in the comment on the
Sutra of (rautama,* we have the following : ' Threefold infe
rence. Prior, that is, cause ; characterized b}^ or having, that
(cause) ; as inference of rain from the gathering of clouds.
Posterior, effect ; characterized by it, as inference of rain from
the swelling of a river. Analogous (or generic) ; characterized
as distinct from both effect and cause, as the inference of any
thing being a substance from its being earthy)*.' Here then
we, have inference a priori, or of effect from cause ; inference
a posteriori, or of cause from effect ; and inference from
analogy, or community of sensible properties : for sdmdnyato
drishtam is ' that which is recognised from generic properties^
its own specific properties being unnoticed^.' The Sdnkhya
Chandrikd gives a similar, or logical, explanation of the three
kinds of inference.
The definition of inference in general is the subject of the
first member of the second hemistich. The expressions linga §
and lingi \ \ are analogous to ' predicate and subject/ or the
mark, sign, or accident by which any thing is characterized,
and the thing having such characteristic mark and sign.
Thus linga is explained by logicians by the term vydpyd , H and
lingi by vydpakd **; as in the proposition, There is fire, because
there is smoke, the latter is the linga, vydpya, ' major or
predicate ;' and fire the lingi or vy&paka, the ' minor or subject/
or thing of which the presence is denoted by its characteristic.
( 33 )
Inference, then, is a conclusion derived from previous
determination of predicate and subject ; or it is knowledge o^
the points of argument depending on the relation between
subject and predicate ; that is, Unless it were previously
known that smoke indicated fire, the presence of the latter
could not be inferred from the appearance of the former*.'
This is what the logicians term paramersha, ' observation or
experience.' Aptcrf; according to GAURAPADA, means dchar.ya ;
and apt a srutil implies ' holy teachers and holy writ.'
NARAYANA expounds it in a similar manner] |, and adds,
that dpta means Iswara, or ' god,' according to the theistical
Sdnkhya§. VACHASPATI explains the terms similarly, though
more obscurely. Apia is equivalent with him to prdpia,
' obtained/ and yukta, ' proper, right ;' and dp ta sruti is
* both that which is right and traditional, holy know-
ledgelf ;' for sruti is defined to be ' knowledge of the
purport of texts derived from holy writ ; which knowledge is of
itself proof, as obtained from the Ve'das, which are not of human
origin, and fit to exempt from all fear of error**.' The first
term, vdkya is explained to signify, the Ve'da is the teacher of
religiontf ;' and the expression vdkydrtka is equivalent to
dharma, ' religion or virtue.' Religion is heard by it ; as, " Let
one desirous of heaven perform the jyotishtoma sacrifice :" such
is a text (of scripture) JJ.' The texts of the Ve'das and of other
inspired works are authority, as having been handed down
through successive births by the same teachers as JAIGISKAVYA
**
fr i tt
( 34 )
*ays, ' By me living repeatedly in ten different great creations*/
So ' the VeMa was remembered by KAPILA from a former state
of beingf .' The Mimdnsakas distinguish between dpta vdkya
and v<*da vdkya : the former is human, the latter inspired,
authority.
VI.
SENSIBLE objects become known by perception; but
it is by inference (or reasoning) that acquaintance with
things transcending the senses is obtained : and a truth
which is neither to be directly perceived, nor to be
inferred from reasoning, is deduced from revelation.
firaf
(35
BHASHYA.
By inference from analogy ; of things beyond the senses — tha
ascertainment of existing things which transcend the sonsoa.
Nature and soul are not objects of sense, and are to be known
only by reasoning from analogy. For as the predicates Mahat
and the rest have the three qualities, so must that of which
they are effects, the chief one (nature), have the three quali
ties ; and as that which is irrational appears as if it was rational,
it must have a guide and superintendent, which is soul. That
which is perceptible is known by perception ; but that which
is imperceptible, and which is not to be inferred from analogy,
must be learnt from revelation, as, INDRA, the king of the gods ;
the northern Kurus ; the nymphs of heaven : these depend
upon sacred authority. Here some one objects, Nature or
soul is not apprehended, and what is not apprehended in this
world does not exist ; therefore these two are not, any more
than a second head, or a third arm. In reply it is stated, that
there are eight causes which prevent the apprehension of
existing things.
COMMENT.
In this verse, according to the translation followed, the
application of the three kinds of proof to three different objects
is described : according to a different version, only one class
of objects is referred to, those which transcend the senses, and
of which a knowledge is attainable only by inference from
analogy, or revelation.
The Sdnkhya Tativa Kaumudz concurs with the S&nkhy*
Bhdshya in understanding the terms of the text, sdmdnyato-
( 36 )
drishtdt*, to refer to anumdndtf, intending ' inference from
analogy^.' A similar explanation occurs in the Sdnkhya
Pravachana Bhdshya : ' Thence, from reasoning by analogy,
the determination of both, of nature and soul, is effected§/ It
appears therefore that in this place the text does not
refer either to perception or to inference in general, as
evidence of perceptible things, but solely to inference from
analogy, as proof of imperceptible objects. For inference
a priori or a posteriori regards things not necessarily
beyond the cognizance of the senses, like nature and
soul, but those only which are not at the moment per
ceptible, as fire from smoke, rain from floods or clouds, and
the like. It might be preferable, therefore, to render the verse
somewhat differently from the text, or, ' It is by reasoning from
analogy that belief in things beyond the senses is attained ;
and imperceptible things, not thereby determined, are to be
known only from revelation.' The version of Mr. Colebrooke
in which he is followed by Professor Lassen.' (" ^Equalitatis
intellects est per perceptionem : rerum quoe supra sensus
sunt per demonstrationem vel hac non evictum, quod prseter
sensus est, probatur revelatione"), rests apparently upon the
authority of the S&nkhya Chandrikd and Sdnkhya Kaumudi
< Sdmdnyatas has the affix tasi in the sense of the sixth (posses
sive) case. The ascertainment of all objects appreciable by the
senses, whether actually perceived or not, is by perception : there
fore knowledge of earth and the other elements is by sense ; but
knowledge of things beyond the senses, as natnre and the rest,
is from inference!).'
J 3
T faftraft i
§ sr*n«rat
jfir
( 37 )
When inference from analogy fails, then, according to all the
authorities, the remaining proof, or revelation, must be had
recourse to, agreeably to the Sutras ; ' Oral proof is fit instruc
tion/ and ' fit instruction is communication of the proofs by
which the nature of both prakriti and purusha may be
discriminated.*
VII.
FROM various causes things may be imperceptible
(or unperceived); excessive distance, (extreme) nearness,
defect of the organs, inattention, minuteness, interpo
sition of objects, predominance of other matters, and
intermixture with the like.
i
* i
cl1 I ^^TRT^T ^^q^ fqff cf c
( 38 )
BHASHYA.
N on -perception of things here existing may proceed from,,
their remoteness, as of Vishnumitra, Maitra, and Chaitra,
dwelling in different countries ; or their propinquity, as the
eye does not see the collyrium applied to the eyelids ; from
defect of the organs, as sound and form are undiscernible by the
deaf and the blind ; from inattention, as a person whose thoughts
are distracted does not apprehend what is said to him,
however intelligibly ; from minuteness, as the small particles
of frost, vapour, and smoke in the atmosphere are Hot
preceived ; from interposition, as thing is hidden by a wall ;
from predominance of others, as the planets, asterisms, and
stars are invisible when their rays are overpowered by those
of the sun ; from intermixture with the like, as a bean in a heap
of beans, a lotus amongst lotupes, a myrobalan amongst
myrobalans, a pigeon in a flock of pigeons, cannot be perceived,
being confounded in the midst of similar objects. In this way
non-perception of actually existing things is eightfold.
Be it granted, that whatever is to be ascertained (by any
means) is ; by what cause is apprehension of nature and soul
prevented, and how is it to be effected.
COMMENT.
Reasons are here assigned why things may not be perceived,
although they actually exist.
( 39 )
The terms of the text, as illustrated by the comment, are
easily understood : the particle cha, in connexion with the last,
is considered to imply the existence of other impediments
besides those enumerated, such as non-production, as of curds
from milk*. But these circumstances, for the most part,
account for the non-perception of perceptible things, and it is
still to be considered why nature and soul, which are not
amongst things ordinarily perceptible are not perceivedt.
IK ii
VIII.
IT is owing to the subtilty (of nature), not to the
non-existence of this original principle, that it is not
apprehended by the senses, but inferred from its
effects. Intellect and the rest of the derivative prin
ciples are effects; ( whence it is concluded as their
cause) in some respects analogous, but in other
dissimilar.
( 40 )
BKASHYA.
From subtilty the non-perception of that nature. Nature is
not apprehended (by the senses) on account of its subtilty, like
the particles of smoke, vapour, and frost, which are in the
atmosphere, although not perceived there. How then is it to
be apprehended ? Its perception is from its effects. Having
observed the effects, the cause is inferred. Nature is the cause,
of which such is the effect. Intellect, egotism, the five subtile
rudiments, the eleven organs, the five gross elements, are its
effects. That effect may be dissimilar from nature : ' nature/
prakriti ; 'the chief one/ pradhfrna ; dissimilar from it: or it
may be analogous, of similar character ; as in the world a son
may be like or unlike his father. From what cause this simi
larity or dissimilarity proceeds, we shall hereafter explain.
Here a doubt arises, from the conflicting opinions of teachers,
whether intellect and other effect be or be not already in nature.
According to the Sankhya doctrine, the effects are in nature ;
according to the Bauddhas and others, they are not ; for that
which is, cannot cease to be ; and that which is not, can by no
means be : this is a contradiction. Therefore it is said —
( 41 )
COMMENT.
Nature is said to be imperceptible, from its subtilty : it
must be therefore inferred from its effects.
The effects are the products of nature, or intellect, egotism,
and the rest ; some of which are of a similar, and some of a
dissimilar character, as subsequently explained.
Effect, according to the Sankhya system, necessarily implies
cause, as it could not exist without it *: but on this topic
there are different opinions, thus particularized by VACHAS-
PATI : ' 1. Some say, that that which is may proceed from
that which is not. 2. Some say, that effect is not a separate
ly existent thing, but the revolution of an existent thing.
3. Some say, that that which is not may proceed from that
yffiich is. 4. The ancients assert, that that which is comes
from that which is (or ens from ens). By the three first pro
positions the existence of nature would not be proved ; for.
' 1. The materiality of the cause of the world, of which the
qualities goodness, foulness, and darkness are the natural
properties, comprises sound and other changes of its natural
condition, and is diversified by pleasure, pain, and insensibility »
but if that which is, is born from that which is not, how can
that insubstantial cause which is not, comprehend pleasure,
pain, form, sound, and the like ? for there cannot be identity
of nature between what is and what is not.
* 2. If sound, and other diversified existences, were bufc
revolutions of one existent thing, yet that which is could no t
proceed from such a source, for the property of manifold
existence cannot belong to that which is not twofold : the
notion of that which is not manifold through its comprising
manifold existence is an obvious error.
( 42 )
<3. The notion of the Kanabhakshas, Akshachatanas, and
others, that that which is not may proceed from that which is>
excludes the comprehension of effect in cause, as that which
is and that which is not cannot have community : consequently
the existence of nature is not proved ; and in order to
establish its existence, the existence of effect in it must first
be determined*.'
Of the doctrines here alluded to, the first is said to be that
of some of the Buddhists, who deny the existence of prakriti,
or any universal cause, or of any thing which they cannot
verify by perception. The second is that of the Ve'dantis, who
maintain that all that exists is T>ut the vivarttas, literally th«
' revolutions ' — the emanations from, or manifestations of, one
only universal spirit. It might be said that the Sankhya
seems to teach a similar doctrine, in as far as it refers all that
exists, exclusive of spirit, to one common source, and makes
all else identical with prakriti. It differs however in this,
that it regards the substances evolved from the radical prakriti
as substantial existences, as effects or products of a cause
which exists no longer except in its effects. The Ve*dlntis, on
the other hand, maintain that it is cause which is eternal, and
that effects are only its present operations. The popular form
ff[
( 43 )
of Ve'dantism 'asserts, indeed, that nothing exists but cause,
and that its effects, or all that appears to exist, are unreali
ties, illusions, the phantoms of a dream : but the commentator
on the Sdnkhya Pravachana declares, that the doctrine of
mdyd, or ' illusion/ is modern, and is contrary to the V£das,
and that those who advocate it are nothing but disguised
Bauddhas : ' The cause of the bondage of soul asserted, by
those concealed Bauddhas, the modern advocates of may a,
is here refuted'*.' In the third case we have the authors
specified as Kanabhakshas, ' Feeders upon little/ or upoa
atoms, perhaps ; and Ak&hacharanas, ' Followers of contro
versy/ contemptuous terms for the Vaisfahikas, who main
tain the origin of all things from primaeval atoms, or
monads ; and who may therefore be said to deduce what is not
— the insubstantial forma of things — from actual corpuscular
substance.
The fourth or ancient doctrine, that that which is comes
from that which is, em from ens, TO oi/, from TO ov, is the
converse of the celebrated dogma of antiquity, ex nihilo, nihil
fit ; and although in this place it is especially restricted to
the relation of certain effects to a certain cause, yet it comes
to the same thing a& regards the world in general, the things
of which cannot be derived from no primary existent thing ;
agreeably to the Sutra of KAPILA ; ' The production of a thing
cannot be from nothing t / QvSev yivcTai e/c TOV /j.tj QJ/TO? : not
only according to Democritus and Epicurus, but according to
all the ancient philosophers, who, Aristotle states, agreed
universally in the physical doctrine, that it was impossible for
any thing to be produced from nothing : TWrow Se TO /JLCV CK M
OVTWV yive(r6ai advvaTOv' ire pi yap TCIVTW oyuoyyw/xoji'own Ttj?:
aVai/Te? oi Trept ^uo-ewy. Phys. I. 4,
* sritarofo JTw^rsrt frr^r^r^Tt ^^ fMrf *
t
( 44 )
IX.
EFFECT subsists (antecedently to the operation of
cause) ; for what exists not, can by no operation of
cause be brought into existence. Materials, too, are
selected which are fit for the purpose : every thing is
not by every means possible : what is capable, does
that to which it is competent ; and like is produced
from like.
( 45 )
BHASHYA.
From there being no instrumental cause of ivhat exists not —
non-existent, what is not — there is no making what is not :
therefore effect is. In this world there is no making of what
is not ; as, the production of oil from sand : therefore the
instrumental cause produces what is, from its having been
formerly implanted. Hence perceptible principles, which are
effects, exist in nature.
Further, from selection of materials. — Updddna is ' (material)
cause,' from the selection of it : thus, in life, a man who desires
a thing, selects that by which it may be produced ; as he who
wishes for curds, takes milk, not water (for their material
cause). Thence effect is.
Again, every thing is not by every means possible. The
universal possibility of every thing is not ; as of gold in silver,
&c. or in grass, dust, or sand. Therefore, from the non-
universality of every thing in every thing, effect is.
Again, what is capable does that to which it is competent;
as, a potter is the capable agent ; the implements, the lump of
clay, the wheel, rag, rope, water, &c. (are capable), by which
he makes the jar, which is capable of being so made from
earth. Thence effect is.
Lastly, like is produced from like. Such as is the character
of cause, in which effect exists, such also is the character of
effect ; as, barley is produced from barley, rice from rice. If
effect was not (did not pre-exist), then rice might grow from
pease ; but it does not, and therefore effect is.
By these five arguments, then, it is proved that intellect
and the other characteristics do (pre) exist in nature ; and
therefore production is of that which is, and not of that
which is not.
( 46 )
COMMENT.
Arguments are here adduced to shew that the effects or
products pf nature are comprised in, and coexistent with, their
cause or source ; consequently they are proofs of the existence
of that primary cause or source.
It is laid down as a general principle, that cause and effect
are in all cases coexistent, or that effect exists anteriorly to
its manifestation ; sat-Jcdryyam * in the text meaning * existent
effect prior to the exercise of (efficient) cause t ;' or, as the
phrase also of the text asadakarandt \ is explained, ' If effect
prior to the exercise of (efficient) cause does not exist, its
existence cannot by any means be effected ||.' The expression
sat-kdryyam, therefore, is to be understood throughout as
meaning ' existent effect/ not the effect of that which exists :
and the object of the stanza is to establish the existence of
cause from its effects, and not of effects from the existence of
cause, as Professor Lassen has explained it: "Qusenam sint
rationes docetur quibus evincatur mentem ceteraque principia
eftecta esse a TW OVTI" Mons. Pauthier (Traduction de la
Sdnkhya Kdrikd, 105) is more correct in his view of the
general purport of the verse; " Ce qui n'existe pas ne 'peut
arriver & Petat d'effet ;" but he has mistaken the particulars —
the reasons why that which is not can never, be, for the means
which would be fruitlessly exercised for its production ; it is
not that such existence cannot be effected " par la co-operation
d'aucune cause mate'rielle," &c., but became an effect requires
an adequate material cause, and the like.
Not only has the meaning of this verse been misapprehended
by its translators, but the doctrine which it conveys seems to
have been somewhat misconceived by high authority. M.
t
( 47 )
Cousin, referring to this passage, observes, " L'argumentation
de Kapila est, dans 1'histoire de philosophic, 1'antdcedent de
celle d'^En^sideme et Hume. Selon Kapila il n'y a pas de
notion propre de cause, et ce que nous appelons une cause n'est
qu'une cause apparente relativernent a 1'effet qui la suit, mais
c'est aussi un effect relative ment a la cause qui la precede,
laquelle est encore un effet par la meme raison, et to uj ours
de m&me, de maniere que tout est un enchainement necessaire
d'effets sans 'cause veritable et inddpendente." M. Cousin then
supports his view of the doctrine by selecting some of the
arguments contained in the text ; as, " That which does not
exist cannot be made to exist ;" and, " Cause and effect are
of the same nature :" and he adds, as a third, that " il ne faufc
pas s'occuper des causes, mais des effets, car 1'existence de
1'effet 'mesure 1'energie tie la cause ; done I'effet e'quivaut la
cause." In this instance, however, he is scarcely justified by
his authority, whose object is not to dispense with the con
sideration of cause altogether, but to prove its existence from
that of its effects. Kapila, therefore, is far from asserting that
" il n'y a pas de cause," although he may so far agree with
the philosophers referred ^to, in recognising no difference
between 'material cause and material effects : for it must be
remembered, that it is of material effects, of substances, that
he is speaking. His doctrine is, in fact, that on which Brown
enlarges in his lectures on power, cause, and effect — that " the
forms of a body are the body itself ; and that all the substances
which exist in the universe are every thing which truly exists
in the universe, to which nothing can be added which is not
itself a new substance : that there can be nothing in the
events of nature,' therefore, but the antecedents and conse
quents which are present in them ; and that these accordingly,
or nothing, are the very causes and effects which we are desir
ous of investigating." Lect. on the Philosophy of the Human
Mind, p. 175. KAPILA, however, has not asserted a series of
antecedents and consequents without beginning ; and whatever
we may conceive of his mtila-prakriti, his original and un-
( 48 )
originated substance whence all substances proceed, it is a
fixed point from which he starts, and the existence of which
he deduces from its effects : the mutual and correlative
existence of which, with their cause, ho endeavours to establish
by arguments, which, as regarding a curious and not unin
teresting part of the Sankhya philosephy, it may be allowable
to recapitulate a little more in detail.
1. Asadakarandt ; f Because efficient or instrumental cause
cannot make or produce that which is not.* Professor Lassen
renders this, ' E nulla nonentis efficacitate, nonens nil efficit.
A sat in this passage, however, is the object, not the agent ;
and karana is employed technically to denote the efficient or
operative cause, the energy of which would be exerted in vain
unless applied to materials that existed : that which does
not exist cannot be brought into existence by any agent. It
would be useless to grind the sesamum for oil, unless the oil
existed in it : the same force applied to sand or sugar-cane
would not express oil. The appearance or manifestation of
the oil is a proof that it was contained in the sesamum, and
consequently is a proof of the existence of the source whence
it is derived. This dogma, in its most comprehensive appli
cation, is of course the same with that of the Greeks, that
nothing can come from nothing, and makes the creation of
the universe dependent upon pre-existing materials. Here^
however, the application is limited and specific, and as Sir
Graves Haughton, in his vindication of Mr. Colebrooke's ex
position of the Vedanta philosophy, has justly observed, it
means no more than that things proceed from their respective
sources, and from those sources alone ; or that certain sequents
follow certain antecedents, and indicate consequently their
existence.
2. Updddna grahandt ; ' From taking an adequate material
cause : a fit material cause must be selected for any given
effect or product.' There is no difference of opinion as to the
purport of updddna j ' Such as the substance evolved, such is
{ 49 )
that from which it is evolved :' or as illustrated by GAURAPADA.
' He who wishes to make curds will employ milk, not water :' but
this being the case, the effects which we behold, or infer, must
proceed from something similar to themselves, and consequently
prove the existence of that substance. ' The relation between
cause and effect is the generation of effect ; but there can be
no relation (between cause and) a non-existent effect, and there
fore effect is*," and consequently so is cause.
3. * From the unfitness of all causes for every effect ;' sarva,
sambhav&bk&v&t. There must be an identit}' of character be
tween the sequent and its antecedent, and the existence of one
indicates that of the other : a jar is made with clay, cloth with
yarn ; the latter material could not be used to fabricate a water-
pot, nor clay to weave a garment. If this was not the case, all
things would be equally fit for all purposes/
. . . ex omnibus rebus
Orrine genus nasci possit.
It is not, however, here intended to assert, that *' idonea causa
non est ulla quam sad, TO ov" but that the effect must have a
determinate existence in that cause, and can be the only effect
which it can: produce ; as in the commentary on this expression
in the Sankhya Prdvachana Bhdshya : ' If effect prior to pro
duction do not exist in cause, there would be no reason why
cause should not produce one noil-existent effect, and not
another!.'
4. ffaktasya s'akydkarandt ; ' Frorn the execution of that
which the agent is able to do/ Active or efficient causes cart
do only that to which they are competent : the potter and his
implements fabricate a water-jar, not a piece of cloth ; they are
not competent to the latter, they are capable of the former. If
effect did not pre-exist, if it were not inseparable from cause,
( 50 )
power, or the exertions of an agent, and the employment of
means, might derive from any antecedent one consequence as
well as another.
5. Kdranabhdvat ; ' From the nature, of cause ;' that is, from
its being of the same nature or character with effect, and
consequently producing its like ; or, according to VACHASPATI
* from the identity of cause with effect *:' ' Cloth is not differ
ent from the threads of which it is woven, for it is made up
of themf.' Here, then, we have precisely the discovery of
modern philosophy^ " that the form of a body is only another
name for the relative position of the parts that constitute it ;
and that the forms of a body are nothing but the body itself:"
(Brown's Lectures :) a discovery Which, simple as it may
appear to be, dissipated but recently the illusion of substan
tial forms,' which bad prevailed for ages in Europe. It seems,
however, to have been familiar to Hindu speculation from the
remotest periods, as the commentator on the Sankhya Prava-
chana, and the author of the Sdnkhya Chandrika, cite the
Ve'das in its confirmation : * Before production there is no
difference between cause and effect J.' There is good reason,
however, to think that the conclusion drawn from the doctrine
by the Ve'das was very different from that of the Sankhyas,
being the basis of Pantheism, and implying that before
creation the great First Cause comprehended both cause and
effect : the texts illustrating the dogma being such as, ' The
existent TO ov verily was unevolved ||— TL his, the Existent, was
oh pupil, before all things § — The Unborn was verily before
all IF.' The Sankhyas, like some of the old Grecian philoso
phers, choose to understand by tad, idam> TO bvy TO eV, * the
comprehensive, eternal, material cause/
i
: grift
If
( 51 )
From the arguments thus adduced, then, it is concluded that
effect is, sat kdryam * ; that is, that it exists in, and is the same
with, cause ; or, as GAURAPA'DA has it, mahat and the other
characteristics of pradhdna are in pradhdna. Sat kdryam is
therefore neither ' ponendum est existens ( sad) emphatice ita
dictum TO ovrofxs ov, per se ens,' nor * effectus existentis, ah
existente effectum, effectum a TW OVTL\ the question is, whe
ther effect exists or not before production ; and not whether it
is produced ' a ro> ovrt an a TO) /w,*/ ovrt ' It is the production >
or appearance, OF that which is or is not ; not the production
of any thing BY that which is or is not ; agreeably to the Sutra
of &APILA : * There is no production of that which is not, as of
a man's honrf* — The production of that which is not is impossi
ble, as would be that of a human hornj.' Agreeably to the same
doctrine also is the reply made in the Sutras to the objection,
that if effect exists already, existence is superfluously given to
it ; 'It is absurd to produce what is already extant||.' The
answer is, 'It is not so ; for the actual occurrence or non-occur
rence of production depends upon rnanifestation§ :' that is, the
present existence of an effect is not the production of any thing
new, but the actual manifestation of a change of form of that
which previously existed : something like the notions which
Aristotle ascribes to. ancient philosophers, that all things were
together, and that their generation was merely a change of
condition : ^Hi/ 6/xou ra Trdvra KGU TO yivearOai TOiovSe Ka9e<TTt]K€v
a\\oiov(rOai : and it is curious enough to find the doctrine
illustrated almost in the words of Hobbes : " Faciendum est
quod faciunt statuarii, quimateriam exculpentes, supervacaneam
imaginem nan faciunt sed inveniunt ;" or as VIJN YANA BHIKSHU
has it, ' The active exertion of the sculptor produces merely the
manifestation of the image which was in the stonelf.'
( 52 )
Although however, as identical with cause, and regarded as
proofs of its existence ; effects or products, in their separated
or manifested condition regarded as forms only, possess proper
ties different from those of their source or cause : these differ
ences are detailed in the next stanza.
A DISCRETE prinpiple is causable, it, is inconstant,
unperyading, mutable, multitudinous, supporting, mer-
gent, conjunct, governed. The undisorete one is the
reverse.
( 53 )
ii f%^ i%f
: %: ^T n
ii f%
F^^5'?
3RTTT
n
TT
( 54 )
BHASHYA.
Discrete ; intellect and the other effects. Causable ; that of
which there is cause ; the term hetu meaning * cause,' as synony
mous with updddna, kdrana and nimitta. Nature is the cause
of a discrete principle ; therefore discrete principles, as far as
the gross elements inclusive, have cause : thus, the principle
intellect has cause by nature ; egotism by intellect ; the five
rudiments and eleven organs by egotism ; ether by the rudiment
of sound ; air by that of touch : light by that of form ; water by
that of taste ; and earth by that of smell. In this way, to the
gross elements inclusive 3a discrete principle has cause. Again,
it is inconstant, because it is produced from another ; as a water-
jar, which is produced from a lump of clay, is not constant.
Again, it is unpervading, not going every where : a discrete
principle is not like nature and soul, omnipresent. Again, it is
mutable ; it is subject to the changes which the world undergoes :
combined with the thirteen instruments, and incorporated in
the subtile frame, it undergoes worldly vicissitudes, and hence
is mutable. It is multitudinous ; it is intellect, egotism, the
five rudiments, and eleven organs ; and the five gross elements
are supported by the five rudiments. It is mergent ; subject
to resolution ; for at the period of (general) dissolution, the
five gross elements merge into the five rudiments ; they, with
the eleven organs, into egotism ; egotism into intellect ; and
intellect merges into nature. Conjunct ; conjoined, made up
of parts, as sound, touch, taste, form, and smell. Governed ;
not self-dependent; for intellect is dependent on nature,
egotism on intellect, the rudiments and organs on egotism,
and the gross elements on the rudiments. In this way the
governed or subject discrete principle is explained: we now
explain the undiscrete.
The undiscrete one is the reverse. An undiscrete principle is
the contrary in respect to the properties attributed to the
discrete : that, is causable ; but there is nothing prior to nature
whence follows its nou-production, and therefore it is without
( 55 )
cause. A discrete principle is inconstant ; an undiscrete is
eternal, as it is not produced. The primary elements are not
produced from any where ; that is, nature. A discrete principle
is unpervading ; nature is pervading, going every where. A
discrete principle is mutable ; nature immutable, from the same
omnipresence. Discrete principles are multitudinous ; nature is
single, from its causality: "Nature is the one cause of the three
worlds ;" thence nature is single. Discrete principles are depen
dent ; the undiscrete one is independent, from its not being an
effect : there is nothing beyond nature of which it can be the
effect. A discrete principle is mergent ; the undiscrete immer-
;gent (indissoluble), being eternal : intellect and the rest, at the
period of general dissolution, merge respectively into one
another ; not so nature ; and that therefore is immergent
(indissoluble). A discrete principle is conjunct (or compound,
made up of parts) ; nature is uncompounded, for sound, touch,
flavour, form, and odour, are not in (crude) nature. Discrete
principles are governed ; the undiscrete is independent, it
presides over itself. These are the properties in which discrete
and undiscrete principles are dissimilar: those in which they are
similar are next described.
COMMENT.
It was stated in the eighth stanza, that intellect and the
other effects of nature were in some respects similar, and in
others dissimilar, to their cause : the properties in which the
dissimilarity consists are here enumerated.
The generic term used for the effects or products of primae
val nature (vyakta*) means, in its etymological and commonly
received senses, that which is evident or manifest, or that
which is individual or specific ; from vi distributive particle,
and anja, ' to make clear or distinct'. The purport is there
fore sufficiently well expressed by the equivalent Mr. Colo*
( 56 )
broke has selected, 'discrete,' detached from its cause, and
having a separate and distinct existence. Nature (or primary
matter) is the reverse of this, or avyakta* 'undiscrete,
unseparated, indistinct.' If natura were substituted for tellus
these lines of Lucretius would illustrate the application of the
terms in question :
Multa modis multis multarum semina rerum
Quod permixta gerit tellus discretaque tradit.
Discrete or separated effect or principle (meaning by
principle a tatwa, or category, according to the Sankhya classi
fication of the elements of existent things) is described by its
properties, and they are the same which arc specified iii the
original Sutra. 1. Hetuinat'f, ' having cause, or origin;'
hetu implying ' material ^ efficient, and occasional cause ;'
2. Anitya J,- ' temporary ;' for whatever has cause has begin
ning, and whatever has a beginning must have an end. At
the same time this is tov be understood of them in their actual
or present form or condition : * Of their own nature (or as
one with their cause) they are eternal, but they are perish
able by their separate condition's' ||.' So in the Sutras
6 destruction ' is explained * resolution into cause§ ' 3. Un-
pervading IF :' ' Every one of the effects of nature is not
observable in every thing, they are dispersed as different
modifications**.' Tydpli is the essential and inherent presence
of one thing in another, as of heat in fire, oil in sesamum,
&c. 4. SdJcriya^-f, 'mutable/ or 'having action:' perhaps
' movable ' or ' migratory ' would perfectly express the senses
for the phrase is explained to signify that the effects of nature
migrate from one substance to another ;' Intellect and the rest
leave one body in which they were combined, arid enter into
§ 5ff5T: qWTOTW. f
«« H^?ft«rrfJi T sqmrrft i ft
( 57 )
the composition of another : this is their transition : the transi
tion of the gross elements earth and the rest, composing body,
is well known *.' 5. ' Multitudinous ;' many, aneka f being
repeated in various objects and persons, as ' the faculties in
different individuals, and the elements in different forms $.'
6. Supported by, referable to, asrita §; as an effect may be
considered to be upheld by its cause, or an individual referable
to a species ; as trees form a wood. 7. ' Mergent,' linga ||;
that which merges into, or is lost or resolved into, its primary
elements, as subsequently explained. Intellect and the rest
are the lingas, signs, marks, or characteristic circumstances
of nature : and when they lose their individuality, or discrete
existence, they may be said to have been absorbed by, or to
have fused or merged into, their original source. Although
therefore, the application of linga as an attributive in this sense
is technical, the import is not so widely different from that of
the substantive as might at first be imagined. VACHASPATI,
explaining the term, has, ' Linga, the characteristic of pra-
dhdna, for these principles, buddhi and the rest, are its charac
teristics, as will be hereafter explained IT:' and the author
of Sankhya Chandrika has, ' Linga is that which charac
terizes, or causes to be known ** ;' it is the anumdpaka^,
* the basis of the inference:' ' For this effect (of nature)
is the parent of inference that an undiscrete cause
exists Jf.' (See also Com. on V. 5. p. 24.) According to
these interpretations, ' predicative' or * characteristic' would
perhaps be a preferable equivalent ; but * mergent' or
'dissoluble §§' is conformable to the Sankhya Bhdshya.
^: srfa?[: i
§ anfeRT i
IF TOT 5T«rnrw ^^r %rr
*^ feaf feiWft IfT^frT I ft
8
( 58 )
'The commentator on the S. Pravachana explains it by both
terms ' inferential' or ' resolvable :' Effect is termed linga
either from its being the ground of inference of cause, or from
its progress to resolution *.' 8. ' Combined, conjunct,' s&va-
yavat ; explained by VACHASPATI, ' mixing/ misrana$, or
'junction/ samyoga§, as the elements combine with one
another. It might be said, then, that nature is a compound
as its products combine with it ; but this is not so, for their
union with nature is not mere 'mixture or conjunction, but
identification from the sameness of the cause and effect ;||
a notion which distinguishes the pradhana of the Sankhyas
from the first principles of those Grecian philosophers, who,
if their doctrines have been rightly represented, taught that
substances existed either as distinct particles of an aggregate,
or component parts of a mixture, in their original form. In
the Sankhya they separate or reunite as one and the same,
10. c Governed H:' the effects of nature depend upon its exis
tence, and each in its turn produces its peculiar effect or
product, in furtherance of the influence of nature, or in con
sequence of its existence, without which they would cease to
be, and their effects would be null; as, 'In the effect of
egotism, which intellect has to produce, the fulfilment of
nature is regarded; otherwise intellect, being ineffective, would
not be able to produce egotism.**'
The properties of nature, or the undiscrete principle, are
the reverse of these ; it has no cause; it has no end; it is omni
present; it is immutable ; it is single; it is self-sustained ; it is
the subject, not the predicate; it is entire, or one whole; it is
supreme.
IF
( 59 )
Although the especial object of the text here is the dis
similarity between the effects of nature and their material cause
yet the term avyakta applies equally to purusha, or ' soul,'
also an invisible or undiscrete principle; and accordingly soul
differs from discrete principles in the same circumstances as
nature. In the properties, therefore, of non-causability,
constancy, omnipresence, immutability, singleness, self-support,
substantiveness. entireness, and supremacy, soul and nature
correspond. They differ, however, in other respects, and
particularly in those in which nature and its effects assimilate,
as enumerated in the succeeding stanza.
XI.
A DISCRETE principle, as well as the chief (or un
discrete) one, has the three qualities : it is indiscrimi-
native, objective, common, irrational, prolific. Soul is
in these respects, as in those, the reverse.
5«JTT
< 60 )
fr*"f I
^r
^fanfft
( 61 )
for*
: i ^q^w snrnr
: i
BHASHYA.
t/ie iArce qualities : it is that of which goodness, foul
ness, and darkness, are the three properties. A discrete prin
ciple is indiscriminative ; discrimination does not belong
to it : that is, it cannot distinguish which is a discrete prin
ciple and which are properties, or that this is an ox, that is
a horse : such as the properties are, such is the principle ; such
as is the principle such are the properties ; and the like.
Objective; a discrete principle is to be enjoyed (made use of),
from its being an object to all men. Common ; from being
the common possession of all, like a harlot. Irrational ; it
does not comprehend pain, pleasure, or dulness. Prolific ;
thus, egotism is the progeny of intellect ; the five rudiments
and eleven organs of egotism ; and the five gross elements of
the five rudiments. These properties, to prolific inclusive,
are specified as those of a discrete principle ; and it is in them
that the chief (or undiscrete) one is similar: " Such as is a
discrete principle, such is the chief (or undiscrete) one/?
Therefore as a discrete principle has three qualities, so has,
( 62 )
the undiscrete, or that of which intellect and the rest, having
the three qualities, are the effects : so in this world effect is
of the like quality with cause, as black cloth is fabricated with
black threads. A discrete principle is ^discriminative- ; so i&
the chief one, it cannot discern that qualities are distinct from
nature, that qualities are one thing, and that nature is an
other ; therefore the chief one is indiscriminative. A discrete
principle is objective ; so is the chief one, from its being the
object of all men. A discrete principle is common ;. so is the
chief one, being common to all things. A discrete principle
is irrational ; so is the chief one, as it is not conscious of pain
or pleasure, or dulness. Whence is this inferred ? From the
irrationality of its effects ; from an irrational lump of clay
proceeds an irrational water-pot. Thus has (nature) the chief
one been explained. Soul is in these respects, as in those, the
reverse : this is now explained.
Reverse of both the discrete and undiscrete principles. Soul
is the reverse of both, thus : Discrete and undiscrete have (the
three) qualities ; soul is devoid of qualities : they are indis
criminative ; soul has discrimination : they are objects, (of sense
or fruition) ; soul is not an object (of sense or fruition) : they
are common ; soul i.s specific : they are irrational ; soul is ra
tional ; for inasmuch as it comprehends, or perfectly knows,
pleasure, pain, and dulness it is rational : they are prolific ;
soul is unprolific ; nothing is produced from soul. On these
grounds soul is said to be the reverse of both the discrete and
undiscrete principles.
It is also said, as in those, referring to the preceding verse ;
for as the chief (or undiscrete) principle is there said to be
without cause, &c. such is the soul. It is there stated that a
discrete principle is causable, inconstant, and the like ; and
that the undiscrete one is the reverse ; that is, it has no cause,
&c., so soul is without cause, being no production. A discrete
principle is inconstant; the undiscrete one is constant; so is soul;
and it is immutable also, from its omnipresence. A discrete
principle is multitudinous ; the undiscrete is single ; so is soul.
( 63 )
A discrete principle is supported ; the undiscrete is unsup
ported ; so is soul. A discrete principle is mergent ; the un-
diserete immergent (indissoluble) ; so is soul ; it is not in any
way decomposed. A discrete principle is conjunct ; the un
discrete one uncorabined ; so is s©ul ; for there are no (com
ponent) parts, such as sound, &o., in soul. Finally, discrete
principles are governed ; the undiscrete one is independent *,
so is soul, governing (or presiding over) itself. In this way
the common properties of soul and nature were described in
the preceding stanza ; whilst those in which they differ, as
possession of the three qualities, and the like, are specified in
this verse. Next follows more particular mention of these
three qualities, with which both discrete principles and the
undiscrete one are endowed.
COMMENT.
In this verse the properties common to crude nature and to
its products are specified, continuing the reference to the eighth
verse, in which it was asserted, that in some respects the effects
of nature itself were analogous. This being effected, the text
proceeds to state that soul has not the properties which are
common to nature and its products, but possesses those which
are peculiar to the former ; agreeing therefore in some respects
with crude nature, but dissimilar in every respect to its effects
or products.
The three qualities,* or satwa^, ' goodness/ rajasl, ' foulness,'
and tamas\\, ' darkness', which are familiar to all the systems of
of Hindu speculation, are more particularly described in the
nextaverse ; soul, has them not. Pradhana? 'the chief one,' crude
nature, and its products, have not discrimination, iiveka§, tha
faculty of discerning the real and essential differences of things,
of < distinguishing between matter and spirit, of knowing self.
the exercise of which is the source of final liberation (from'
-existence)T. By the term ' objective**' is intended that which
if
**
( 64 )
may be used or enjoyed, such as the faculties of the mind
and the organs of sense; or such as may be perceived by
observation, vijndna* : such nature, or pradhdna, may
also be considered as the origin of all things inferable by rea
son. Soul, on the contrary, is the observer or enjoyer, as after
wards explained. Achetana'f ' irrational;' that which does not
think or feel unconscious, non-sentient; as in the Meghaduta;
'Those afflicted by desire seek relief both, from rational and irra
tional objects,!'' explained either ' living and lifeless§' or
* knowing and ignorant)!' chetana^ being defined knowledge
of right and wrong, or ' of what ought, and what ought not, to
be done **.'
The general position, that the properties of soul are the
reverse of those of the products of nature, requires, however,
some modification in one instance. A discrete principle is
said to be multitudinous, many, awe/caff; consequently soul
should be single, eka JJ; and it is so, according to the 8m
JBhdshya§§. On the other hand, the S. Tatwa Kaumudi
makes soul agree with discrete principles, in being multitudi
nous : The properties of non-causability, constancy, and the
rest, are common to soul and nature ; multitudinousness is a
property common to (soul and) an undiscrete principle||||.' The
8. Chandrika confirms the interpretation, ' The phrase tathd,
cha implies that (soul) is analogous to the undiscrete principle
in non-causability and the rest, and analogous to discrete
principles in manifold enumeration1^.' This is, in fact, the
Sankhya doctrine, as subsequently laid down by the text, ver.
18, and is conformable to the Sutra of KAPILA ; * Multitude
* ftflR I
11
»
** f^mp&^rr i ft
: t
( 65 )
of souls is proved by variety of condition* :' that is, ' the
virtuous are born again in heaven, the wicked are regenerated
in hell ; the fool wanders in error, the wise man is set freet/
Either, therefore, GAURAPADA has made a mistake, or by his
4ka is to be understood, not that soul in general is one only,
but that it is single, or several, in its different migrations ;
or, as Mr. Colebrooke renders it (R. A. S. Trans, vol. I. p. 31),
' individual/ So in the Sutras it is said, ' that there may be
various unions of one soul, according to difference of receptacle,
as the etherial element may be confined in a variety of ves-
selsj.' This singleness of soul applies therefore to that par
ticular soul which is subjected to its own varied course of
birth, death, bondage, and liberation ; for, as the commentator
observes, ' one soul is born, not another (in a regenerated
body)||.' The singleness of soul therefore, as asserted by
GAURAPADA, is no doubt to be understood in this sense.
: sRjRrafRrftwil:
XII.
THE qualities respectively consist in pleasure, pain,
and dulness ; are adapted to manifestation, activity,
and restraint ; mutually domineer ; rest on each other;
produce each other ; consort together ; and are reci
procally present.
# 5F
. W
( 66 )
i I rT5T
fwil ^T^mc
: I iff T^?T
?pir ffw
|fRt f s
( 67 )
BEASHYA.
The qualities goodness, foulness, and darkness, are severally
the same as what is agreeable, what is disagreeable, and what
is indifferent : thus goodness is all that is pleasure, priti
meaning ' pleasure ;' being one with (or consisting of) that
(pleasure) : foulness is one with, or consists of, disagreeableness
(apriti) : darkness consists of, or is the same with, dulness ;
vishdda meaning moha, ' dulness, stupidity.* Next, are adapt
ed to 'manifestation, &c. ; a-rtha signifying ' competency' or
' fitness.' Groodness, then, is for the sake of manifestation ; it
is fit for, or adapted to it : foulness is for activity ; darkness
for restraint : that is, the qualities are connected with, or
possessed of, manifestation, action, and inertia. They mu
tually domineer : they are mutually paramount, sustaining,
productive, cooperative, and coexistent. Thus, they are said
to domineer mutually ; that is, they severally prevail or pre
dominate over each other, or they are displayed by the pro
perties of pleasure, pain, or dulness. When goodness is
dominant, it overpowers foulness and darkness by its own pro
perties, and is exhibited or identified with light and joy.
When foulness predominates, it overpowers goodness and dark
ness, and exists in pain and action. When darkness triumphs*
it suppresses goodness and foulness, and is supreme as one
with insensibility and inaction. So they rest on each other :
the qualities combine with one another, like binary atoms.
They produce each other, as the lump of clay generates the
earthen jar. Tliey consort together, as males and females
cohabit: as it is said, "Goodness is the consort of foulness*
foulness of goodness ; darkness is called the consort of both "
( 68 )
that is, they are respectively associates. They are recipro
cally present : they abide or exist reciprocally, according to the
text, " qualities abide in qualities" (that is, the same qualities
may be regarded as different, according to their different
effects) : thus, a beautiful and amiable woman, who is a source
of delight to every one else, is the cause of misery to the other
wives of her husband, and of bewilderment (insensibility) to
the dissolute : and in this manner she is the cause of the
influence of all three qualities. Thus also, a king, assiduous
in protecting his people, and curbing the profligate, is the
cause of happiness to the good, of misery and mortification to
the bad : here foulness (activity) produces the effects of good
ness and darkness. So darkness, by its investing nature, pro
duces the effects of goodness and foulness, as clouds, over
shadowing the heavens, cause delight upon earth, animate by
their rain the active labours of the husbandman, and over
whelm absent lovers with despair. In this manner the three
qualities are reciprocally present (or perform the functions of
one another).
COMMENT-
The three qualities are here described, by their effects and
relations; by the production of pleasure, pain, and indifference;
and by the manner in which they are detached or combined in
their operations and influence.
The terms priti and apriti are here used as synonymes of
sukha, l pleasure,' and dukha, ' pain ;' vishdda as a synonyme
of moha, ' bewilderment, stupefaction, dulness, or insensibility.'
The composition of dtma with these terms, prity&tmaka,
implies ' essential or inseparable presence,' like that of life or
soul in the living body. &n exact equivalent for such a
compound can scarcely perhaps be supplied, but the sense
maybe conveyed by such expressions as 'consists of, com
prehends, is one or identical with/ and the like. A'tma is
here used also to shew that the properties have positive
( 69 )
existence ; that is, pleasure is not the mere absence of pain ;
pain is not the mere absence of pleasure ; as, ' Negatives could
not be essential ingredients in any thing : pleasure, pain, and
insensibility are therefore entities ; the work dtma implying
being, existence, existent nature, or property*.'
The absolute and relative influence of the several qualities
is sufficiently illustrated by GAUKAPA'DA ; but VA'CHASPATI
understands the text as in some respects differently construct
ed. Instead of considering the last term, vrittaya^, as a dis
tinct condition, anyonyavrittaya]., expounded in the 8. Bhdshya,
parasparam varttante\\, they are reciprocally present, he inter-^
prets vritti by kriyd, ' act, operation, function,' and compounds
it with each of the foregoing terms§. In all other respects
his explanation of the terms coincides with that of the elder
commentator. The passage quoted by GAUBAPA'DA is cited by
VA'CHASPATI, with some difference, from the Vedas : * As it is
said in the dgctma, all universally present are the associates
of each other : goodness is the partner of foulness, foulness of
goodness ; both are the companions of darkness, and darkness
is said to be the associate of both. Their original connexion,
or disjunction, is never observedHV The Chandrikd concurs
with the 8. Tatwa Kaumudi in the explanation of vritti**.
This commentary likewise offers some additional interpretation
of the terms priti, &c. Thus prtti is said to comprise ' recti-
ftq^r^fr
##
( 70 )
tude, gentleness, modesty, faith, patience, clemency, wisdom :'
apriti, besides c misery,' implies * hatred, violence, envy, abuse,
wickedness ;' and vishdda is not only ' insensibility/ but ' tardi
ness, fear, infidelity, dishonesty, avarice; and ignorance. When
ever either of these is observed, it is referable to the corres
ponding quality*.'
In speaking of qualities, however, the term guna is not to be
regarded as an insubstantial accidental attribute, but as a
substance discernible by soul through the medium of the facul
ties. It is, in fact, nature, or prakriti, in one of its three
constituent parts or conditions, unduly prominent ; nature en
tire, or unmodified, being nothing more than the three qualities
in equipoise, according to the Sutra, Prakriti is the equal
state of goodness, foulness, and darknesst, on which the com
mentator remarks, Satwa and the rest are "things," not specific
properties, from their being subject to combination or disjunc
tion, and from their having the properties of lightness, heavi
ness, and strength} ;' and again ' From the construction of in
tellect and the rest endowed with the three properties, like
cords wherewith to bind the victim the soul||.' So in the S.
Sara, i Goodness and the rest are not the faculties of that
(prakriti), being of the same nature§' — ' Such expressions as
" qualities of nature" are to be understood (in the same sense)
as (the term) " the trees of a f orest"HV that is, the forest is
*
m :
surfer,
( 71 )
nothing different from the trees of which it is the aggregate,
although particular trees or clumps may sometimes be indivi
dualized. In like manner nature is not different from the
qualities, but is the aggregate of them. ' Ingredients or con
stituents of nature,' therefore, would be preferable term per
haps to ' quality ;' but ' quality' is the more ordinary accepta
tion of the word guna, and it may therefore be used, re
membering only the distinction made by the Sankhyas of its
materiality, as a constituent part of nature itself; the qualities
being, in fact, only the conditions of things, and therefore not
separable from the things themselves. It may be thought
possible that there is some connection between the qunas
which are the constituents, of prakriti, and the qualities, pas
sions, or affections of primary matter of the older philosophers,
alluded to by Aristotle ; from the changes produced by which
on one unaltered substance all things originated : Trjg (J.GV ovo-ias
v7ro/uL€vov(rr]$, TOt$ Se TraOeon /u.eTa/3a\\ovarr]$, TOVTO <TTOiyeiov Kal
Tavrrjv TCOV OVTCOV TY\V ap\/jv <pa<Tiv elvai. Metaph. I. 3.
Another analogy may be conjectured in the identification of
the two, gunas, satwa and rajas, with prtti, ' affection,' and
apriti, ' aversion,' as they thus correspond with the <pi\la and
vetKo?, the ' love' and ' strife' of Empedocles as the principles
of creation ; respectively the source of what is good or evil.
The sense in which the several terms for the three gunas
is employed is sufficiently clear from the .explanation given of
them in the text ; and the meaning of the equivalents which
Mr. Colebrooke has assigned them must be understood ac
cording to the same interpretation. Prof. Lassen renders them
essentia, impetus, and caligo ; which, similarly understood,
are equally unobjectionable : but as the name of a £ quality t
sativa, is not perhaps well rendered by ' essence,' or even by
' existence,' which is its literal purport, ' goodness,' denoting
exemption from all imperfection, seems to be preferable.
Impetus is rather the effect of rajas, than the quality ; and
the term ' foulness,' derived from its etymology from ranf
( 72 )
' to colour or stain/ will better comprehend its characteristic
results. The quality bears a striking analogy to the perturbatio
of the Stoics, and might be rendered by that word, or by
* passion/ in its generic acceptation. ' Darkness/ or caligo,
expresses both the literal and technical signification of tamas.
em: sim«fir f r: M ^ I
XIII.
GOODNESS is considered to be alleviating and en
lightening : foulness, urgent and versatile : darkness,
heavy and enveloping. Like a lamp, they cooperate
for a purpose (by union of contraries).
f FH
fT f f%
( 73 )
BHASHYA.
Goodness is alleviating, &c. — When goodness predominates,
the frame is light, the intellect is luminous, and the senses are
acute. Foulness is urgent and versatile. — What urges, urgent,
exciting: as a bull, upon seeing another bull, exhibits vehement
excitement; that is the effect of foulness. Foulness is also seen to
be versatile ; that is, a person under its influence is capricious.
Darkness is heavy and enveloping. — Where darkness prevails,
the members of the body are heavy, the senses obtuse, or inade
quate to the performance of their functions. But here it may
be said, If these qualities are contraries to one another, what
effect can they produce by their several purposes, and how
therefore can it be said, they co-operate, like a lamp, for ct
(common purpose). Like a lamp, their operation is for a
(common) purpose : as a lamp, which is composed of the op-
posites, a wick, oil, and flame, illuminates objects, so the
qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, although contrary
to one another, effect a (common) purpose.
This question involves another. It was said (in ver. 11)
that a discrete principle, as well as the chief one, has the three
qualities, and is indiscriminative, objective, and the like.
Admitting this to be true of the chief one (or nature), how is
it ascertained that intellect and the rest have also the three
qualities, and are indiscriminative, and the like ? This is next
explained.
COMMENT.
The description of the three qualities is continued in this
Verse.
Goodness is alleviating ; lagliu, ' light ;' it is matter, elastic
and elevating, generating upward and lateral motion, as in the
ascent of flame, and the currents of the air. It is the cause of
active and perfect functionality also in the instruments of vita"
10
( 74 )
iity* ; enlightening, prakdsakam, < making manifest/ the
objects of the senses. The term ish'tam, meaning ordinarily
' wished, desired/ imports in the text merely drishtam, ' seen,
regarded, considered' — * by the Sankhya teachers-)-.' Foulness
is urgent and versatile. — The qualities of goodness and dark
ness are both inert and inoperative, even with regard to their
own peculiar consequences ; and it is only by the restless
activity and stimulating agency of the quality of foulness that
they are roused to action ; upash'tambhakam } being here ex
plained to signify ' stimulating, impelling/ udyotakam, preda-
kam\\, contrary to its usual sense of ' opposing, hindering.'
It might be supposed to imply some relation to the primitive
shtabhi§, ' stop, hinder, oppose, be stupid ;' inasmuch as the
idea appears to be that of action consequent upon obstruction,
or inertia, ' reaction.' Thus, as illustrated in the 8. Bhdshya,
a bull displays excitement on beholding, or being opposed by,
another. The S. Tatwa Kaumudi has, ' The qualities good
ness, and darkness, on account of their own inertia, are in
operative, in regard to the exercise of their own effects, until
excited by foulness. Having been roused from inactivity, they
are made to put forth vigour and energy ; and therefore foul
ness is said to be uigentK.' The Chandrikd is to the same
effect : ' The meaning is this : From the production of combi
nation and activity by foulness, the definition of that quality is
excitement and versatility**.' It is not necessary, however,
to take into consideration the sense of the primitive sh'tabhi,
for upasKtambhaka is not derived from that root, but from
stambhu^, a Sautra root ; which therefore, although the
meanings of sh'tabhi are usually also assigned to it, may take
the import required by the text, of ' urging' or * exciting.'
* jwrn rrqr t Hirers : i }
i I! ssfara? srs* i § sfa i
**
: » tt
( 75 )
The quality of darkness is ' heavy/ guru, causing sluggish
ness of body and dulness of mind. It is also varynaka, ' sur
rounding, enveloping/ so as to obstruct light, retard
motion, &c.
But these qualities, although contraries, co-operate for a
common purpose ; as the cotton, the oil, and the flame, al
though mutually destructive, combine in a lamp to give light.
The common object of the qualities is the fulfilment of the
purpose of soul, as is subsequently explained.
XIV.
INDISCRIMINATIVENESS and the rest xof the properties
of a discrete principle) are proved by the influence of
the three qualities, and the absence thereof in the
reverse. The undiscrete principle, moreover, (as well
as the influence of the three qualities,) is demonstrat
ed by effect possessing the properties of its cause
(and by the absence of contrariety),
^nrfir
( 76 )
BHASHYA.
That which is the property of indiscriminativeness and the
rest is proved from the influence of the three qualities in
mahat and the other discrete principles : but this is not proved
in the ur discrete ; therefore it is said, by the absence the reverse
of it : the reverse of it ; the absence ; the non-existence of the
reverse of that: thence the undiscrete principle is established; as,
where there are threads, there is cloth ; the threads are not one
thing, and the cloth another. Why so 1 From the absence of
the reverse (they are not contraries to each other). In this
manner the discrete and undiscrete principles are established.
The latter is remote, the former is near : but he who perceives
discrete principles, perceives the undiscrete one also, as there is
no contrariety between them. Hence also the undiscrete one
is proved by effect possessing the properties of cause in this
world : such as is the nature of the cause, such is that of the
effect; thus from black threads black cloth is made. In the
same mariner, as the characteristics of intellect and the rest
are their being indiscriminative, objective, common, irrational,
prolific, such as they are, such the undiscrete is proved essenti
ally to be. From the influence of the three qualities, indis,
criminativeness and the rest are proved to be in discrete princi
ples ; and from there being no difference between them (and
( 77 )
the undiscrete), and from essential identity of the properties
of cause and effect, the nndiscrete principle also is demon
strated.
But it is replied, this cannot be true ; for in this world that
which is not apprehended is not ; but the undiscrete one is,
although not applicable.
COMMENT.
It was stated in ver. 8, that mahat and the other effects of
prakriti were in some respects like, and in others unlike, to
their original. The circumstances in which they were dis
similar were specified in ver. 10, and those in which they
agreed in ver. 11. In the latter stanza, the first of the con
current properties that was named was that of their possessing
the three qualities ; and in verses 12 and 13 it was explained
what was meant by the three qualities. In the present stanza
it is asserted, that as the effects of prakriti have the three
qualities, they must have, as a necessary consequence, the other
properties, want of discrimination and the rest, enumerated in
ver. 11 ; and that as they have them, their origin, or prakriti,
must have them also, as there is no essential difference bet
ween the properties of cause and effect.
The influence of goodness, foulness, and darkness, or the
varied affections and conditions of all substances, is the obvious
cause of perplexity, or want of discrimination, &c.; being, in
fact, the same state or condition. Traigunya is the influence
or any consequence of the three gunas. The next expression
is variously interpreted.
Mr. Colebrooke renders tad viparyaya abhdvdt*, i and from
the absence thereof in the reverse ;' that is, the absence of want
of discrimination, &c. in that subject which is the reverse of the
( 78 )
material products of nature, as, for instance, soul, is a negative
proof of their existence in the former. The properties of
contraries are contrary. Soul and matter are contraries, and
consequently their properties are mutually the reverse of each
other : but one property of soul is freedom from the three
qalities, whilst that of matter, or any material product of pra
kriti, is their possession ; consequently the former must be cap
able, of discrimination. The same may be said of the other
properties of mahat arid the rest. Thus YACBESPATI observes :
' It (the assertion) is first plainly affirmatively expressed in the
natural order : it is then put negatively, or in the inverted
°rder ; from the absence thereof in the reverse ; from; the ab
sence of the three qualities in soul, as the reverse of the pro
ducts of prakriti, in regard to want of discrimination and the
like*/ The S. Chandrika has- a similar explanation : ' The
reverse of that want of discrimination j where that is that is the
reverse (of mahat, &c.), or soul: for in soul there are not the
three qualities ; or, where there is not want of discrimination
there are not three qualities, as in sourf :' intimating, therefore,
that tad, ' thereof,' may refer either to the three qualities
traigunya, or to want of discrimination, &c.
There is, however, another sense attached to the expression T
and the reverse is understood not to signify souly or any thing
contrary to mahat and the rest, but to imply contrariety or in
compatibility in the properties of their origin, or prakriti: that
is, iiidiscriminativeness and the rest are the properties of mahat
&c. not only from their possessing the three qualities, but be
cause there is nothing contrary to indiscriminativeness, &c. in
prakriti. This proposition is indicated by VACHESPATI, who,
after explaining the passage as above, adds, ' Or it may be
understood as taking for its two subjects vy&kta and avyakta
( 79 )
((discrete and undiscrete matter), and by the inverted proposi
tion (or negatively) asserting that there is no reason (to the
contrary) arising from one being exempt from the three quali
ties*.' The same is more explicitly stated by GAURAJPADA.
The absence of indiscriminativeness, he observes, as deduced
from the influence of the three qualities, relates in the first in
stance to vyakta, 'discrete matter/ mot to avyakta, or 'indiscrete:'
but the same must apply to the latter also, because there is no
.property belonging to it which is incompatible with, or the re
verse, of, the properties of the vyakta, or * discrete matter,'
mahat, &c,; as in the case ©f the cloth sund the threads of which
it is woven, there is no incompatibility between them.
The first portion of the stanza having shewn, then, either
simply that discrete matter is possessed of indiscriminativeness,
^&c. or that both it and indiscrete matter are equally devoid of
discrimination, proceeds to draw the conclusion that such an
indiscrete cause must exist, endowed with properties similar to
those of its indiscrete effects, because there is no difference of
.property between cause and effect; agreeably to the Sutra,
' The three qualities, insensibility and the -rest, belong to both
^prakriti and its .products)!:' and VACHESPATI observes, ' Effect
is seen to be the same in its properties with cause, As the
.properties of the threads, &c. are identical with those of cloth
and the like, so the attributes of pleasure, pain, and insensibi
lity, evidenced in the effects, which are distinguished as mahat
•and the rest, are .proofs that similar conditions must belong to
their cause : the existence of $radh&na or avy&kta^ as a, cause,
of which pleasure, pain, and insensibility -are the conditions, is
consequently established!/
#
t
.
( 80 )
XV.
SINCK specific objects are finite ; since there is homo-
geneousness ; since effects exist through energy ; since
there is a parting (or issue) of effects from cause, and
a reunion of the universe, —
f 5
JT*R
W:
( 81 )
BHASHYA.
The undiscrete principle is cause : this is the completion of
the construction of the sentence. Since specific objects are
finite : as in the world, wherever the agent is, his limits are
observed : thus, a potter, makes certain jars with certain por
tions of clay ; so with intellect: intellect and the other charac
teristics (of nature) as finite, as specific effects o'f it. Intellect
is one, egotism is one, the subtile rudiments are five, the organs
eleven, the gross elements five : from the limitation of these
species nature is their cause, which produces finite discrete
principles. If nature were not the cause, then discrete princi
ples would have no limit: from the measure (or limit) of specific
objects, therefore, nature exists, whence discrete principles are
produced. Since there is homogeneoiisness : as in the world ^
that which is notorious is observed ; for having seen a religious
student engaged in sacred study, it follows that his parents
were assuredly of the Brahmanical tribe : so having observed
that mahat and the other characteristics have the three quali
ties, we conclude what their cause must be ; and in this way
11
( 82 )
from homogeneousness the chief one exists. Since effects exist
through energy : in life, that which is effective in any thing is
active in the same : a potter is able to make a jar, therefore he
makes a jar, not a piece of cloth. Since there is a parting of
effect from cause : the chief one is cause ; that which makes is
cause, that which is made is effect : the separation of cause and
effect : thus ; a jar is competent to hold curds, honey, water,
milk ; not so is its cause, .or the lump of clay ; but the lump of
clay produces the jar, the jar does not produce the lump of clay.
So having observed intellect and the other effects, it is inferred
that cause must have been separated, of which these discrete
principles are detached portions. Again, since there is a
reunion of the universe (vaiswarupa). Viswa here means
' the world ;' rupa, ' individualization' (or specific form) : the
abstract condition of the form of the world is the uni verse: from
its reunion, nature exists (as cause) ; whence there is no mu
tual separation of the five gross elements, earth &c., composing
the three worlds ; or, the three worlds are comprised in the
gross elements. The five gross elements are earth, water, fire,
air, ether ; which at the season of general dissolution return in
the order of creation to a state of non -separation, or into the
modified five subtile rudiments : they and the eleven organs
reunite in egotism ; egotism resolves into intellect ; and intellect
into nature. Thus the three worlds, at the period of general
dissolution, reunite in nature; and from such reunion of the dis
crete and undiscrete principles, like that of curds and milk, it
follows that the undiscrete principle is cause.
COMMENT-
. The sentence is incomplete, the government being in the
first member of the following verse ; kdranam asti-avyaktam,
There is (a general) cause (which is undiscrete).' Hitherto
the subjects discussed haye been the existence of effects, and
their correspondence or disagreement with their cause. It if
now she>rn that cause exists imperceptible, or undiscrete.
( 83 )
From specific effects being finite : from the certain or definite
measure of the varieties of discrete principles, as one intellect,
one egotism, five rudiments, and the like. If there were no
certain and defined cause, the effects would be indefinite and
unlimited : the water-jar, however, must be limited by the
earth of which it consists, and which, as a distinct body, is no
longer extant. ' Homogeneousness/ samanwaya, is defined
* the common nar ure of different things*,' as the property of
generating pain, pleasure, and dulness, which is possessed by
intellect and the rest. Effects exist through energy : ' through
the energy, ability, or power of cause they become activef:*
A parting, or issue, of effect from cause, and final reunion of
the separated effect. Vaiswartipa is merely a synonyme of
kdrya, { effect ;' that which is of various, or every, sort of form»
or nature. The evolution of effect from unseparated cause is
illustrated by comparing nature to a tortoise, the limbs of
which are at one time protruded, and at another retracted
within the shell : ' As when the limbs which are in the body of
the tortoise protrude, then they are distinguished, or (it is said)
this is the body, those are the limbs : so when they are with-
drawn into it they are undistinguished (from the body)!'. $•
Tatwa Kaumudi. In like manner the water-jar or the diadem
exist in the lump o-f clay or of gold, but are distinguished from
it only when individually manifested ; they become mere clay or
gold again on losing their detached condition : thus earth and
the rest exist in the subtile rudiments ; those and the organs of
sense and action in egotism; egotism in intellect; and intellect in
nature: when manifested or put forth they are separated or dis
tinguished from their several sources, but at the period of univer
sal dissolution lose their distinct form, and become progressively
( 84 )
ene with their common original : the existence of which there
fore, as their undiscrete cause, is proved both by their appear
ance or separation., and disappearance or reunion.
XVJ.
THERE is a general cause, which is undiscrete. It
operates by means of the three qualities, and by mix
ture, by modification, as water; for different objects
are diversified by influence of the several qualities re
spectively.
qz
BHASHYA.
That which is known as the undiscrete principle is the
cause ; whence intellect and the other effects proceed. It
operates by means of the three qualities. — That in which are
the three qualities, goodness, foulness, and darkness, is the
(aggregate of the) three qualities. What then is that ? The
equipoised condition of goodness, foulness, and darkness, is the
chief one (nature). Also, from mixture. — In like manner as
the Ganges unites into one river the three streams that descend
upon the head of Rtidra, so the (aggregate of the) three
qualities, the undiscrete, produces a single discrete principle .
or, as many threads combined from one piece of cloth, so the
undiscrete generates intellect and the rest from the inter
weaving of the three qualities : and thus from the influence of
the three qualities and their aggregation the discrete world
proceeds. But if discrete principles proceed from one un
discrete, then one form should be common to all. This objec
tion is invalid ; for it is by modification, like water, from
a variety in the receptacles of the several qualities, that the
three worlds, derived from one undiscrete principle, assume
different conditions of being. The gods are united with plea
sure, mankind with pain, animals with dulness ; so that a
( 86 )
discrete principle, emanating from one nature, becomes modi
fied, like water, according to the diversified receptacles of the
q ualities. Prati prati implies ' several order :' gund srayat
' a receptacle of the qualities,' by the difference of that recep
tacle (according to that several receptacle) in which it is
lodged. Discrete principles are varied from modification ; as the
simple element water, when fallen from the atmosphere, ia
diversely modified as various fluids, according to its various
combinations, so from one pradhdna proceed the three worlds,
which are no longer of one (uniform) character. In the
divinities the quality of goodness predominates, foulness and
darkness are inert ; therefore they are supremely happy. In
men the quality of foulness abounds, and goodness and dark
ness are inert ; therefore they are supremely miserable, la
animals goodness and foulness are inactive^ and darkness pre
vails ; and therefore they are supremely insensible.
In these two stanzas the existence of nature (pradhdna) has
been determined : in the next place, that of soul is to be
•stablished.
COMMENT
In this verse, besides the conclusion drawn from the argu
ments in the preceding stanza, it is here explained how nature,
which is one, produces diversified effects. This is said to be
through the influence of the three qualities, the combination,
or several predominance of which in various objects is attended
with a modification and diversity of that which is essentially
one and the same.
' Modified condition/ according to VA'CHESPATI, ' is the cha
racter of the three qualities, which are never for a moment
stationary*,' except when creation is not : and from this
constant vicissitude ensues combination in different proper-
< 87 )
tions, or the predominance of one or other in different objects
for they are always combined, or mixed, in different propor
tions. This is the mixture, the blending, or contention of the
qualities which the text intends. Hence proceeds the modi
fication of the original matter ; as rain water, falling upon
different trees, is modified as the juice of their different fruits.
' As simple water shed by the clouds, coming into contact with
yarious situations, is modified as sweet, sour, bitter, pungent,
or astringent, in the character of the juice of the cocoa-nut,
palm, bel karanja, and wood-apple.*' S. Tatwa Kaumudi.
So, according to Cud worth, the Italic philosophers maintained
that the forms and qualities of bodies were only different
modifications of primary matter. " The same numerical
matter," he observes, " differently modified, causing different
phantasms in us, which are therefore vulgarly supposed to be
forms and qualities in the things, as when the same water is
successively changed and transformed into vapour, snow, hail,
and ice." Intellect. System, III. 426.
It may be doubted if the latter portion of the verse should not
be preferably rendered, By ' modification, like water, according
to the receptacle, or subject, of the qualities-f*.' Such is evi
dently the sense in which the S. Bhdshya understands it, and
such appears to be that of the above illustration ; the simple
water being modified, as sweet, sour, &c., according to the tree
by which it is absorbed, and the fruit of which it constitutes
the juice. So certain objects are fitted for certain qualities ; as
the gods for goodness, men for foulness, animals for darkness ;
and nature is modified in them accordingly ; that quality pre
dominating which is conformable to the receptacle : the ques
tion here being, not the origin of things, but of their different
properties, VACHESPATI, however, seems to make the diversity
( 88 )
of objects depend upon the qualities, not the difference of
qualities upon the subject ; explaining the pharse prati gund-
sraya vishfahdt, ( The difference which is produced by the
recipience of each several quality ; thence, &c.*' The Chan-
drikd, has the same explanation, adding, ' Diversity is from
diversity (different ratio) of qualitiesf.' There is no incom
patibility, indeed, in the two views of the meaning of the text,
as the variety of things depends upon the difference or dispro
portion of the three primary qualities, whether those qualities
modify, or be modified by. the subject to which they belong :
in either case the variety is not a different thing, it is only a
modification of the same thing, pradhdna.
ii 3 « u
>
XVII.
SINCE the assemblage of sensible objects is for
another's use ; since the converse of that which has
the three qualities, with other properties (before men
tioned,) must exist ; since there must be superinten
dence ; since there must be one to enjoy ; since there
is a tendency to abstraction j therefore, soul is.
?r
Jfff
^rrat
frpraftftfrftro w$ '
i
BHASHYA,
As 'it is,11 said, " Liberation is obtained by discriminative
knowledge of discrete and undiscrete principles ;" and whereas
the undiscrete has been shewn to be distinct from the discrete
by five arguments (ver. 9), so soul being, like the undiscrate
( 90 )
principle, subtile (not cognizable by the senses), its existence
is now established by inference. Soul is. — Why ? Because the
assemblage of objects is for another's use. — The assemblage of
intellect and the rest is fpr the use of soul : this is inferred
from the irrationality (of nature and its effectf), like a bed.
In like manner as a bed, which is an assembk.gc of bedding,
props, cprds, cotton, coverlid, and pillows, is for another's use,
pot for its own ; and its several component parts render no
mutual service ; thence it is concluded that there is a man who
Bleeps upon the bed, and fpr whose use it was made : so this
body, which is an assemblage of the five elements, is for an-
pther's use ; or, there is soul, for whpse enjoyment this enjoy-
$ble body, consisting pf an aggregate of intellect and the rest*
has fyemi produced.
Again, soul is, because the reverse, of thai which has the
three qualities Jias been declared : as it was stated in a former
yerse (11), ' A discrete principle has the three qualities- is
indiscriminatiye, objective, &c.;" an 4 it is added, " Soul L in
these respects the reverse."
Again, soul is, because there must be superintendence. — A
It charioteer guides a chariot drawn by horses able to curvet,
to prance, to gallop, so the soul guides the body : as it is said
jn the Shasjithi Tantra, " Nature, directed by soul, proceeds.'
Soul is, because there irnust be an enjoyer. — In like manner
as tliere must be some one to partake pf food flavoured with
sweet, spur, salt, pungent, bitter, and astringent flavours, so
as there is no capability pf fruition, in intellect and the other
products pf nature, there must be soul, by which this body is
to be enjoyed.
Again, soul is, because there is a tendency to abstraction. — •
Kaivalya is tjie abstract noun? derived from kevala, ' sole
pnly' — i'or, on account pf, tiiat (abstraction) ; the practice of it :
from the exercise of (or tendency to) abstraction (for the sake
pf its own separation or detachment) it is inferred that soul is.
[That is, Every one, whether wise or unwise, equally desires im-
perishable release from succession of worldly existence.
( 91 )
It is next to be determined whether this soul be but one
superintendent over all bodies, like the string that supports sdl
the gems of a necklace ; or whether there be many souls pr^~
siding severally over individual bodies.
COMMENT-
Arguments for the existence of soul as a distinct principle
are here adduced.
The existence of soul is established by inference : a bed im
plies a sleeper ; nature, made up of its effect s, is for the pro
duction of pain, pleasure, and insensibility, of whidh soul alone
is conscious*. But admitting that the assemblage is for the
benefit of another, why should that other be soul ? because soul
is not a similar aggregate ; it is not made up of qualities and
the like, but is the reverse of nature in these respects, as was
explained in verse 11 : or, as the commentator on the Sutra*
Sankata par&rthatwat^, observes, because the property of
pain or pleasure, which is identical with body, must be dif
ferent from that which enjoys the cine, or suffers tlie other;
Because there must be an enjoyer.—ThQ existence of an en-
joyer implies the existence of both pleasure and pain ; election
between which cannot be made by intellect and the rest, which
are inseparable from them, and it must be the act of something
else, which is soul. ' Intellect and the rest are the things to be
used (bhogya) or perceived (drisya), and consequently imply
one who perceives^:.' S. Tatwa Kaumudi.
The term kaivalya, rendered ' abstraction,' signifies ' detach
ment from the world ;' or,as itis explained, 'absolute suppression
of the three kinds of pain, as a property of sacred writ, holy
sages, and inspired teachers or prophets. It must therefore be
something different from intellect and the rest, which are th@
( 92 )
same thing as pain, and cannot effect a separation from their*
own essence*/ S. Tatwa Kaumudi. So VIJNANA BHIKSHU
explains kaivalya, ' absolute extirpation of paint.'
The arguments in the text for the existence of soul are so
many original aphorisms ofKAPiLA; as, 1. 'Soul is distinct
from body, &c.J:' 2. ' From an aggregate being for another's
iise||:' 3. ' From (the properties of) soul being the converse of
the three qualities, &c.§:' 4. ' From superintendence's. 'From
the tendency to abstraction**.' The commentator notices a
different reading of the last Sutra, ' From nature not being
competent to abstraction :' but this he considers erroneous**-)-.
The fifth book of the 8. Pravachana contains other Sutras
affirmative of the separate existence of souL
11
ra^ rn<"?re^i in c n
XVIII.
SINCE birth, death, aiid the instruments of life are
allotted severally ; since occupations are not at once
universal ; and since qualities affect variously ; multi
tude of souls is demonstrated.
^ i t |-.^R^r%^:i J
§ r^wrr^^qwcT
i tt ^?%^z?[§ uft: i
( 93 )
ftr-
f f%
BHASHYA,
ii/e and death, and the instilments (of life). — Fwm the
several allotment of these : this is the meaning of the text.
Thus, if there was but on6 soul) then when one was bonij all
would be born ; when one died, all would die ; if there was any
defect in the vital instruments of one, such as deafness, blind
ness, dumbness, mutilation, or lameness, then all would be
blind, deaf, dumfy maimed, and halt : but this is not the case ;
and therefore, from the several apportionment of death; birth,
and instruments of life, multiplicity of soul is demonstrated.
Since occupations are not at once universal. — Yugapat
means, ' at one time.' Not at once ; or, at one time. Occupa*
tion : as engaging in acts of virtue and the like are not observ
ed to occur at one moment ; but some are busy with virtuous j
others with vicious, actions ; some cultivate indifference to the
world, and some acquire true wisdom : therefore) from the non-
Contemporaneousness of occupation, multitude bfsoulsis conclud
ed. Also, since qualities affect variously. — From the contrary
fcature of the qualities multitude of souls is proved ; as, in birth
in general, one endowed with the quality of good-ness is happy;
another with that of foulness is wretched ; and a third having
that of darkness is apathetic : hence, therefore, multitude of
souls is proved.
Soul is hot agent : this is next declared.
dOMMENT-
The multitudinous existence of soul, or the individual in-
borporatibn of soul in different bodies, is here maintained.
Birth is defined to be the association of soul with body ; death
its detachment : soul being always existent, and not in itself,
Subject to birth or death ; as in the S. Pravachana Bhdshya*-
also the S. Tatwa Kaumudi ; ' Life is the combination of
soul with the pains incident to body, &c.; not any modification
of soul. Death is the abandonment of those bodies, &c. ; not
the destruction of soulf/ The ins tr urn eats of life are the
brgans of perception and action, with egotism and intellect.
8 Allotment/ niyama, properly ' rule, regulation/ is explained
by vyavasthd, which may import ' distribution ;' as, ' The
distribution is in regard to different souls in several bodies^:'
so also the Sutra of KAPILA ; * From the distribution of life
&c. folltiws the multitudinousness of soul.il' The term is
especially understood, however, of the distribution which is
laid down by religious and legal authorities, ' a prescribed
distribution or allotment/ as the commentator o'n the Sutra
observes, after stating, ' The virtuous man is "happy in heaven*
?r 3
( 95 )
.&c, (see p. 48), • Souls are many, as otherwise there would not
.be the occurrence of such division, or appointment of conditions,
as is laid down in the Ye'da and the law.'* If soul were one,
all the accidents, vicissitudes and interests of existence would,
simultaneously affect all individuals.
But though manifold, as individualized, this individual soul
is one and unchanged, through all its migrations into various
forms, until its final liberation. It is the disguise which is
changed, not that which wears it, as has been before explain
ed (p. 48).
The multiplied existence of soul ig in especial contradiction
to the doctrine of the Ve'dantis, of the universality of one sup
reme soul of the world, from which all human souls are derived.
as in such texts as this ; ' One only existent soul is distributed
in all beings ; it is beheld collectively or dispersedly, like the
reflection of the moon in still or troubled water. Soul, eternal
omnipresent, undisturbed, pure, one, is multiplied by the power
of delusion, not of its own nature f.' This is undoubtedly the
doctrine of the Vedas, and the Sankhya teachers, who profess
to receive those worfcs as authority, are obliged to interpret
the texts unfavourable to their dogmas in a peculiar manner.
Thus the Sutra of KAPILA asserts, ' There is no contradiction
(to the doctrine of many souls) in the unity of the Vedas, from
its reference to the comprehensiveness of genus J:' that is, Soul,
considered as genus, is but one ; its nature and properties are
common to all souls, individualized and manifold in connection
with individual aggregates of the products of nature. ' G«nus
here means community, unity of nature ; such is the purport of
the unity of the Ve'das ; not indivisibility, from the absence of
*
^ ff
any motive (for its continuing undivided.) This is the meaning of
the Sutra*. ' The subject is discussed at considerable length
by VIJNANA BHIKSHU ; but, notwithstanding his arguments, it
is clear that the Sankhya doctrine is contradictory to that o
the Vedas.
f
1
The doctrines of those Grecian philosophers, who maintained
the immateriality and eternity of soul, conformed to that of the
Ve'das. As far as we are able to learn of the doctrines of
Pythagoras, he taught that human souls were portions of one
supreme soul. Plato held the souls of men to be emanations
from God, through the soul of the world. Souls and bodies
were both portions of the TO Jy, the '• one existent,' of the
Stoics ; and even Aristotle appears to, have conceived the>
human soul to, be an intellectual energy, derived from an,
eternal intelligence. Cudworth, asserts that none of the ancient
philosophers maintained the Sa,nkhya notion of the eternity
of individual souls. " It doth not follow/' he remarks, "because
they held sou Is to be ingenerable, that therefore ^hey supposed
souls to have existed from eternity of themselves unmade-
This was never asserted by theist or atheist. The philosophic
theists, who maintained ceternitatem Q,niniorw&i, did, notwith
standing, assert their essentia.1 dependence upon the Deity,
like that of the lights upon the sun, as if they were a kind of
eternal effulgenoy, emanation, or eradiation, from an eternal
Sun." Intell. Syst. III. 429.
II
ii
( 97 )
XIX.
And from that contrast (before set forth) it follows,
that soul is witness, solitary, bystander, spectator,
and passive.
BH/SHYA.
Vom ito contrast : the contrast of the possession of
the three qualities. Contrast : reverse. Soul is void of quali
ties, is discriminative, enjoyer, &c. The contrast is that pre
sented by these attributes of soul ; and thence, the qualities
of goodness, foulness, and darkness being agents (active), it
follows that soul is (passive) witness. This sentence is syn..
13 *
( 98 )
tactically connected with the preceding, regarding the multi-
tudinousness of soul. The qualities, as agents, act ; a witness
neither acts nor desists, from action. Again, abstraction (de
tachment) is an attribute (of soul) ; the property of being sole
is detachment or abstraction, difference or distinctness (from
all others) ; that is, it is distinct, or separate, from the three
qualities. Next, being a bystander (is an attribute of soul) :
the condition of a middle man (or looker-on, or neutral). Soul
is a bystander, like a wandering mendicant : as a vagrant
ascetic is lonely and unconcerned, whilst the villagers are
busily engaged in agriculture, so soul does not act where the
qualities are present. Hence also proceed the properties of
being a spectator and passive. From being a bystander, soul is
a spectator, and is not a performer of those acts (which it
contemplates). The three qualities, goodness, foulness, and
darkness, engage in acts in the relation of agent and act ; not
soul : and in this manner the existence of soul is demonstrated.
But if soul is a non-agent, how does it exercise volition ? as
I will practise virtue, I will not commit crime : here soul must
be the agent ; for if soul is not the agent (then these purposes
cannot be entertained). This is a dilemma: to explain which
it is said —
' COMMENT-
In the preceding verse it was stated that soul was many ; in
this, its other attributes are enumerated.
The conjunction cha, in the term tasmdt-cha, connects the
sentence with the preceding, or with baJtutwam, ' inultitudi-
nousness.' The contrast alluded to is that intimated in ver. 14,
and is this : Soul has not the three qualities, it is discrimina
tive, it is perceptive, it is specific, it is rational, it is unprolific ;
being the reverse, in these respects, of nature and its effects.
Not being an object of sense, but percipient of such objects, it
observes and testifies to the existence of nature and its pro-
( 99 )
ducts, like au evidence in a lawsuit being plaintiff and defen
dant. ' That which is irrational cannot observe, and that to
which an object is apparent is a witness*.' Solitariness is ' ex
emption from the three kinds of painf ;' or, in fact, total ab
straction from the world : this is the necessary consequence
of being devoid of the three qualities, which are essentially the
same with pleasure, pain, and dulness ; and from them, there
fore, soul is equally free. From the same cause, absence of
qualities and insusceptibility of agreeable or disagreeable emo
tions, proceeds the next property of soul, that of being a
bystander ; madkyastJia, * neutral, indifferent, unconcerned ;'
vtddslna, ( neither rejoicing in pleasure, nor sorrowing in pain.
Qualities, and particularly foulness, are indispensable to acti
vity ; and being without them, soul is consequently inert : the
same is considered to be also the necessary result of its being
* discriminative and uuprolific, or unproductive;.' VUNA'NA
BHIKSHU restricts the term sdkski, ' witness,' to the sense of
* beholder,' distinguishing it from the other term, to which
such a translation is more applicable, dmshtri, as importing
one who has the object near to, or before, his eyes ; the latter*
implies seeing in general : hence he says, ' Soul witnesses or
contemplates Iniddlu (intellect), and sees the other principles)),'
f
: II ^ « II
r^: %^??T i J N^K^r
^rr^ft 2^tr^Wr 3
( ioo )
XX.
THEREFORE, by reason of union with it, insensible
body seems sensible : and though the qualities be ac
tive, the stranger (soul) appears as the agent.
3-
f^rnit
: f%
BHASHYA.
Here soul is said to "be possessed of sensation ; and in connec
tion with it, intellect and the other predicates of nature assum
ing the appearance of sense seem sentient : as in life, a jar
•with cold water appears to be cold, with warm water seems to
be warm ; so intellect and the rest, from union with it, with
soul, seem sensible. But the qualities perform the active
application, (of sense), not the soul : for although in common
it is said, soul is the doer, the goer, yet soul is not the agent.
How so ? Though the qualities be active, (soul) the stranger
appears as the agent. There being activity of the qualities,
( 101 )
which is indifferent, or inactive, appears as if it was the
agent ; which it is not. Here is an illustration : as a man who
is not a thief, being taken np along with thieves, is suspected
to be a thief also ; so soul, being connected with three active
qualities, is supposed, though inert, to be active also.
In this manner the distinction of the perceptible, impercep
tible, and thinking principles (ver. 2. p» 13) has been explained ;
from the discrimination of which liberation is obtained. It is
next expounded why the union of the two (chief) principles,
nature and soul, takes place*
COMMENT.
It is here taught that the sentient faculty resides in soul,
mid not, as it appears to do, in the products of nature ; and
that activity resides in the qualities, not, as it appears to do,
in soul.
The term chetand, from chUt ' to reflect/ means in general
c reason, intelligence ;' but it is here applied to the possession
or exercise of every faculty proper to a sentient and thinking
being. It is the attribute of soul only, as will be more dis
tinctly made clear when the functions of the senses, of con
sciousness, and intellect are explained, and they are shewn to be
merely the vehicles or instruments through which ideas and
notions are conveyed. They seem, however, to act indepen
dently, but this is merely from their union with, or, more
correctly, proximity to, soul ; samyoga being explained by the
commentators to mean here merely sannidhdna, ' approxima
tion. In like manner, soul, which is contemplative, not active^
mover, though itself unmoved, appears to be active through a
similar contiguity. ' I am sentient ; wishing to do, I do : here
a common origin or subject of action and reflection is appre-
( 102 )
liendecl*.' 8. Tcdwa RaumufU. But this is an error, as the
site or subject of action and reflection is distiuctf. The term
linga in the first line is explained to denote makat and the
subtile products of pradlidna. UOA^ina^ ' indifferent,' is said
also to mean ' inert J.'
But it appears that there are passages in the Vedas and in
the law-books which attribute agency to soul, and knowledge
to buddki\\: and to meet this is supposed to be the purpose of the
aphorism, ' Agency from affection, intelligence from propin
quity^' that is, c The apparent agency of soul is from the
affection (or operation) of buddhi ; the apparent intelligence
of buddhi (understanding) is from the proximity of soul ;
neither is actual. Their mutual transfer of properties is like
that of fire arid iron in a heated bar, or of the sun and water,
in the reflected rays of the former from the latterHV & Prav.
8. In like manner the & Chdnd riled exemplifies the doctrine
by reference to buddhi, the organ of the understanding ; and
furnishes also an example of the sense in which cketand,
* intelligence,' is to be understood : ' Thence the effect (of
pradhdna), the category buddM?, which is unintelligent, is as
it were intelligent, (seems to be that which says) I know, be
comes as it were endowed with knowledge** :' that is, it is not
the understanding, but soul, that knows. This, however, ap
plies equally to all the other products of nature, as far as to
the subtile rudiments, whether individually considered, or
^rcrtfrfa ^ m%rRi?fr:
IF
fef
( 103 )
as composing subtile body*. They are all non-sentient, or
irrational and inert. Their activity depends on combination
with the qualities; their sentient power on proximity to soul :
and the conjoint presence of these two properties leads to the
erroneous belief that soul is agent, as well as sentient.
XXI.
For the soul's contemplation of nature, and for its
abstraction, the union of both takes place, as of the
halt and blind. By that union a creation is framed.
^fr
# few
( 104 )
: i ^f nff
BHASHYA.
The union of soul with nature is for its contemplation (of na
ture); that is, soul contemplates nature (in the state of) intellect
and the other effects to the gross elements inclusive. For that
object is the union of nature with soul ; and the same union,
which is also for the abstraction (of the latter), is like the
association of the halt and blind. As, a lame man and a
blind man, deserted by their fellow-travellers, who in making
their way with difficulty through a forest had been dispersed
by robbers, happening to encounter each other, and entering
into conversation so as to inspire mutual confidence, agreed to
divide between them the duties of walking and of seeing ;
accordingly the lame man was mounted on the blind man's
shoulders, and was thus carried on his journey, whilst the
blind man was enabled to pursue his route by the directions of
his companion. In the same manner the faculty of seeing is in
soul, not that of moving ; it is like the lame man : the faculty
of moving, but not of seeing, is in nature ; which resembles,
therefore, the blind man. Further, as a separation takes place
between the lame man and the blind man, when their mutual
object is accomplished, and they have reached their journey's
end, so nature, having effected the liberation of soul, ceases to
act ; and soul, having contemplated nature, obtains abstracted
ness ; and consequently, their respective purposes being effected,
the connexion between them is dissolved.
Again, By that, by that union, a creation is framed. — As the
birth of a child proceeds from the union of male and female, so
the production of creation results from the connection of na
ture and soul.
( 105 )
The text next describes the particulars of all the products
of nature.
COMMENT.
The object of the union of soul and nature, or the final libe
ration of the former by its knowledge of the latter, is here
explained.
1 Contemplation,' darsana, is considered to comprise ' frui
tion/ bkoga. As nature is devoid of sensibility and reflection,
it can neither enjoy nor observe ; and its existence would be
therefore without an object, unless there were some other one
capable both of observation and fruition*. This other one is
soul. But, again, as pain is inseparable from nature, so enjoy
ed soul desires, after a season, to be loosed from the combina
tion ; and this detachment, or the liberation of purified soul,
necessarily requires some one froni which to be liberated : that
some one is nature : consequently, for the fulfilment of their
respective ends— the fruition of nature, and liberation of soul —
their mutual cooperation and combination are essential. ' Ab
straction/ kaivalya, is explained by YACHESPATI, ' The cause
of the attribution of separation to purified soul, which cannot
be without previous union with nature f.' But these results
cannot be attained without the evolution of the products of
nature, and consequently they assume their several develop
ments, or, in other words, a creation is framed ; as it is only
in the state of discrete principles that nature is to be contem
plated by soul, and it is only by the exact appreciation of the
same, and of their source, that soul can detach itself from na
ture. For both purposes, therefore, the world must exist, as
developed from its material cause.
There are passages in the Vedas, however, attributing crea
tion to soul ; as, ' That was from it— From this soul was ether
STOR
t fl
14
( 106 )
joroduced.*' To this ib is replied, that all that is herein in
tended is the attribution of the act of the inferior, or nature,
to the superior soul : ' As in the world it is said that a king
triumphs or is defeated, - when it is not he, but his army, that
suffers a defeat or achieves a victoryf.' 8. Prav. Sdra.
XXIL
FROM nature issues the great one ; thence egotism :
and from this the sixteenfold set : from five among
the sixteen proceed five elements.
rrftr
( 107 )
BHASHYA.
Nature (pratriti) is also termed ' the chief one' (pradhdna\
' the supreme' (brahmi/Q,\ 'the undistinguished' (avyaktam), 'the.
multi-comprehending' (bakudhdndka) and mdyd. Such are.
its synonymes. From that which is devoid of characteristic at
tributes, or from (crude) nature, the great one (mahat) is pro
duced : this is also termed ' intellect' (buddfii) ; it is also called
dmri, or 'demoniac;' mat-it or 'understanding;' 'notoriety'
(khydti), ' knowledge' (jndna), ' wisdom' (pr&jna). From
thence proceeds egotism, also called ' the origin of the ele
ments/ &o. (bhutddi), ' the luminous, (taijasa), 6- the modified'
(vaikrita), ' conscience' (abhijndna). From this the sixteen
fold set. — From this, from egotism, the class of sixteen is de
rived. This consists of the five subtile elements, or the arche
types of sound, touch, form, flavour, and odour : the synonymes,
of tan-mdtra are all words denoting ' subtile' (sukshma) : also
( 108 )
the eleven organs, the ear, the skin, the eye. the tongue, the
nose, which are the five organs of perception ; the voice, the
hand, the foot, and the organs of excretion and generation,
which are the five organs of action ; and, besides these, mind,
making the eleventh, and being an organ of both action and
sensation. These constitute the class of sixteen produced from
egotism. From five among the sixteen. — From the five subtile
elements proceed the five gross elements : as it is said, " From
the archetype sound, ether is produced ; from touch, air ; from
form, light (or fire) ; from flavour, water ; from odour, earth :
and thus from these five rudiments the five gross elements
proceed." As also it is said, " From discriminative knowledge
of perceptible and imperceptible principles and the thinking
soul (see ver. 2) liberation is obtained." Now therefore intel
lect and the rest, to the gross elements inclusive, forming
twenty-three categories, have been specified (in the text) ; the
undiscrete principle has been described (see ver. 15,16); and
soul has been explained (ver. 18, 19) ; and these constitute the
tiventy-five tatwas (physical and metaphysical categories of the
Sa"nkhya system of philosophy). He who knows the universe
to be composed of these principles — called tatwas, from the
abstract of 'tad, ' that,' implying the abstract existence of those
principles — as it is said, " He who knows the twenty-five
principles, whatever order of life he may have entered, and
whether he wear braided hair, a top-knot only, or be shaven*
he is liberated : of this there is no doubt." (See p. 1.) The
twenty-five categories are, nature, soul, intellect, egotism, the
five subtile (or rudimental) elements, the eleven organs of
sensation and of action, and the five gross elements.
It is stated in this stanza, from nature issues the great one.
What is meant by that great one is next defined.
COMMENT.
The categories of the Sankhya system have been before
alluded to (ver. 3. p. 16), in explanation of their mutual re
lations, and of the properties which they have in common, or
( 109 >
by which they are discriminated from one another; but we
have them here enumerated in the order of their production,
as prefatory to a detailed description of them and of their func
tions contained in the following stanzas.
The generic term for the twenty-five principles, tattwa,
or as usually and with equal correctness written tatwa, is ex
plained by GAURAPADA to mean ' the abstract existence/
astitiva*, ov<rla, essentla of tat+t THAT ; that thing, which is
the object of philosophical investigation, or which has a real
existence, and must be known. The more common etymology,
tat, ' that/ and twam, ' thou' belongs to the Ve'danta system ;
as in the Mahdvdkya, tat-twam asi, l that (supreme soul) thou
art/ implies the identity of universal and individualized spirit.
We have in the scholia of GAURAPADA, on this stanza some
synonymes of nature and the two first principles, the analysis
of which elucidates the ideas entertained of them by the San-
khyas. The succeeding stanzas will afford an opportunity of
adverting to the terms used for intellect and egotism, and we
may here confine the enquiry to the synonymes of nature,
or matter.
PraJcriti, as has been previously, mentioned (p. 17), inti
mates, that which precedes, or is prior to, making ; that which
is not made from any thing else. It is also used relatively, to
signify that which is the source from which a product is deriv
ed ; so that mahat is the prakriti of ahankdra, &c. (see p. 18).
Here, however, our business is with the primary source of all
material products, and the term indicates merely that which
preceded (pro) production (kriti) ; what that may have been
is left wholly undefined or unimplied by the particular term.
The same maybe said of it agreeably to another etymology
given in the Sdnkhya Sara, where pra is interpreted by prak-
rishta, ' principal, chief, best/ analogously to its other denomi
nation, pradhdna, 'the chief/ Pradhdna is derived from
pra, * principal/ and dhd, to ' hold :' ' that in which all genera-
( no )
ted effect is comprehended*.' The next synonyme, avyakta
Hhe unseparated, the undistinguished, the unperceived/ has
teen also previously noticed (p 41). as derived from anja, ' to,
make clear/ with vi, separative preposition, and the negative a
prefixed : the term is of as frequent occurrence as either of the
preceding, and is constantly used as a synonyme of prakriti
in the Puranas and in Manu. Brahme, which is to be carefully
distinguished frp,m ftrqhmd, the personified creative power, is
ordinarily applied either to the Ve'das or supreme spirit, and is
an uncommon synonyme of prakriti', hut as derived from
vriha, ( to increase/ it implies the first principle of which the
expansion becomes all perceptible objects. Bahudhdnaka is
derived, like pradhdna from dfyd, ' to hold ;' dhdnaka, ( the
holder' or ' cornprehender' of bahu, ' much/ of all things. Md-
yd, \0( ita ordinary sense of ' illusion/ is applied to prakriti,
not by the Saukhyas, for they maintain the reality of existing
things, but by the Vedantis arid Pauranikas, who regard crea
tion as a delusion or as a sport of the creator : it is derived
from the root md, ' to measure/ and may here perhaps imply
either ' comprehension/ like pradhdna, or ' extension.' There
is no explanation of the term by any of the Scholiasts,
VIJNANA BHIKSHU quotes the Vedas to shew that it is synony
mous with prakriti-^. In the Sdnkhha we have other syno-
nymeS; as, sakti, ' power, §vvcyjLi$; aja, 'the unborn, the un-
produced ;' tamos, darkness ;' and avidyd, ' ignorance^/
Now what is tp. be considered as the sense of these words ?
By what equivalent is prakriti to be best i^en^ered ? Professor
Lassen. translates it procreatrix, but this seems to convey too
much the idea of personality, and therefore, although very
well agreeing with the original term as, used by the Pauraniks,
where prakriti is commonly personified, yet it can scarcely be
t
( 111 )
considered as indicative of that which not only produces, bufc
is the thing produced, being at once the origin and substance
'of all things. Mr. Colebrooke has rendered the term some
times by ' nature/ and sometimes by * matter:' the former ex
presses both the parent and the progeny, and agrees in being
also the constant subjects of prosopopeia. It is therefore, pre
ferable to perhaps any synonyme that the English language
can offer. At the same time the correct equivalent is ' matter,
materia, quasi matter, ' the substance and source of material
things ;' not, however, crude, visible, or divisible matter, but
that first principle of the Pythagoreans and Platonists, and of
Aristotle, which having neither parts, nor form, nor seiise, nor
quantity, nor any of the properties of body, was yet the one
universal-, .incorporeal, invisible substance from which all bodies
were derived. Ato 8r] r^y TOV yeyoi/oro? opctTov /ecu TTCLVTW?
'aio-Ot]TOV /ULtjTepa KOI VTroSoxw /m^re yr\v /^re aepa /x>/re 7rvp
jjirjrG vS(*)p Aeyco/xei/, /xrjre oera e/c TOVTCOV juujTe e£ &v TOUTO.
yeyovev. aXX' avoparov e?Sd<? ri KCU a/jLop(f>ov Trav$\e<s. Timoeus.
See also the Physics, p. III. c. 6. That w£ are to understand
this of the prakriti of the S&nkhyas is evident from the mean
ing of its several appellations. It is also said by YIJNANA
BHIKSHU, that ' the world is merely modification of form, of
which prakriti is the materiality*.' ' It is not individual or
formal, but universal materialf .' S. Pr. fehasJiya. Its invi
sibility is, as we have seen (ver. 8. p. 29), attributed, not to its
non-existence, but to itg subtilty (saukshmya). Prakriti is
also defined € the equilibrium of the three qualities^ ;' and here
it differs from the subject matter of Aristotle in having quali
ties. These qualities however, whilst prakriti is yet unevolved,
neutralize each other, and are scarcely qualities as regards
primary nature, because their loss of equilibrium, or their ac
tivity, is concurrent with the discontinuance of prakriti as
Separate from its products. So far, however, prakriti may
t
i
be considered as different from the brute matter of the
ancient physiologists, that it produces products of its own
energy or power for a special cause, and is therefore
friore akin to the " plastic nature that acts, evexa TOV,
for the sake of something." In the Sankhya system, how-
erer, such nature is not distinct from matter itself, whilst
it appears to be a different principle in the writings of the
Greek philosophers, although not always very intelligibly
'described ; for, as Cudworth observes of Aristotle, " he nowhere
declares of this nature of his, whether it be corporeal or in
corporeal-, substantial or accidental." To conclude, we are to
understand of the pmkriti of the Sankhyas, primary, subtile,
universal substanc'e; Undergoing modification through its own
energy, and for a special motive, by which it is manifest as
individual and formal substance, varied according to the pre
dominance of qualities, which are equipoised a'nd inert in the
parent, and unequal and active in the progeny.
XXIII.
ASCERTAINMENT is intellect. Virtue, knowledge, dis
passion, and power are its faculties, partaking of good
ness. Those partaking of darkness are the reverse.
I
( 113 )
i $TR JWRff^nifj- TRRTW
I PR
15
i
i
( H4 )
\
i
BHA'SHYA.
The definition of intellect is ascertainment. Ascertaining
(discerning, determining) is ascertainment : as in the seed the
future germinating shoot is contained, so is determination (in
intellect). This is a jar, this is cloth : that intellect which
will so determine is so denned. This intellect has eight
members, according to the twofold affection of goodness and
darkness. The first kind, or intellect, partaking of goodness,
is of fou* kinds, virtue, knowledge? di&pa&sion, 'power. Virtue,
comprises humanity, benevolence, and acts of restraint (yrnna)<
and of obligation (niyama). The former are said in the Pdtan-
jala to be, restraint of cruelty, of falsehood, of dishonesty, of
incontinence, and of avarice : the latter are the obligations of
purification, contentment, religious austerity, sacred study, and
worship of God. Knowledge has for its synonyrnes,. manifesta
tion, certainty, light. It is of two kinds, external and internal,
The former is (knowledge of) the Yedas and their six subordi
nate branches, recitation, ritual, grammar, glossary, prosodyr
and astronomy ; also (of) the pwrdnas, and of logic, theology,
and law. Internal knowledge is that of nature and soul, or
(the discrimination that) this is nature, the equipoised condi
tion of goodness-, foulness, and darkness : that is soulr perfect;
devoid of qualities, pervading, and sentient. By external
knowledge worldly distinction or admiration is acquired ;: by
internal knowledge, liberation. Dispassion is also of two
kinds, external and internal. The former is the indifference of
one who contemns sensible objects from observing their defects,
or the trouble of acquiring and preserving them ; the incon
venience of attachment to them ; their liability to decay ; and
the injustice they cause. The latter is the indifference of one
( 115 )
who Is desirous of liberation, and looks upon nature as if it
was a piece of witchcraft or a dream. Power, is the abstract
property of a superior (or divine) being : it is eightfold, (the
capacity of) minuteness, magnitude, heaviness, lightness, reach,
gratification of will, dominion, subjugation, and irresistible
purpose. Atomic existence is meant by ' minuteness;' so that
u person becoming atomically subtile or minute may traverse
the world : ' magnitude' is said of one who may make himself
a giant :" lightness5 is having limbs like the fibres of the lotus
stalk, or like cotton, so as to be able to stand upon the tops of
the filaments of a flower : ' reach' is attainment of a desired
object by going to the place where it is situated, wherever that
may be: 'gratification of will' is obtaining or effecting what
ever is desired : r dominion' is governing the three worlds, as a
king: 'subjugation' is having all things subject :' irresistible
purpose' is compelling the site, rest, and motion of all things,
from Brahma to a block, agreeably to the will of the person
endowed with this faculty. These are the four properties of
intellect which soul obtains when the qualities of foulness and
darkness -are overcome by that of goodness.
But those partaking of darkness are tJie reverse. — When
Intellect is influenced by the quality of da-rkness, then its four
properties are the reverse of the above ; they are, vice, igno
rance, passion, and weakness. In this manner intellect having
-eight members, as it is affected by goodness or foulness, is
produced from the imdiscrete principle having the three
-qualities.
Intellect feas thus been explained. Egotism is next des
cribed.
COMMENT-
The first product of nature, or intellect, is here described by
its properties.
( 116 )
Intellect (buddhi) is adhyavasdya*. It is not easy to offer
a satisfactory equivalent for this word, nor to understand pre
cisely what is meant by it. In the Amara Kosha it occurs as
a synonyrne of utsdlia"^, ' effort, strenuous and continued effort*
perseverance ;' according to RA'MA'SRAMA, ' possessing gieat
power}/ He derives it from so antakarmmani\\, ' finishing,
making end of/- with adhi§, ' over/ and aralT, ' off ;' that is, en
tirely or absolutely ending or effecting ; as in the Hitopadesa :
' The precepts of knowledge confer not the least benefit on one
who is afraid of exertion : of what use is a lamp to a blind man,
though it be within his reach**/ In the Mitdkshara, utsdha
is explained, * Effort (or perseverance) in the performance of
acts accomplishing the objects of manft/ In the Bhatti
Kavyct, we have the word used in the sense of ' wish, purpose*
determination :' ' The bird said to the monkeys; You have not
studied the law, if at such a season you wish (or resolve)
to die^J/
In a preceding passage (ver. 5) the phrase prati vishaya
adhyavasdya\\\\j ' ascertainment of several objects, was given as
the definition of drish'ta, ' perception ;' and the explanation of
the Scholiast, buddhivyapdra jndnam§§, ' knowledge, which
is the exercise of the intellectual faculty/ was cited (p. 23).
The same commentator, YACHESPATI, here defines it, ' the
specific function of intellect, not differing from intellect, itself;'
or, to quote the passage at length, 'Ascertainment is intellect,
from the identity of the act and the agent, as will be explained.
: i ft
f i 3T^>i r
r^^^rfr^rs^^^r^: i
srrvawfM ^ft: i 15
§§ 5
( H7 )
Every one who engages in any matter first observes, or crni*
siders ; he next reflects, it is I who am concerned in this ; arid
then determines, this is to be done by me ; thence he pro
ceeds to act : this is familiar to every one. Thence this as-
certainment that such act is to be done is the determination
of intellect, which is as it were endowed with reason, from the
proximity of the sentient principle. This is the specific func
tion of intellect, not differing from intellect itself; and the defi
nition of intellect is ascertainment, as that comprehends both
its generic and specific distinctions*.'
The explanation of the $. Chandrikd is to the same effect :
Adkyavasdya is a sort of modified condition of intellect, as
flame is of a lamp ; it is certainty in this form, such an act is
to be done by me.f
The explanations, however, would rather seem to intimate
intention, or volition, or, at least, the determination to act after
reflection ; but the determination or conclusion that such an
act should be done, does not necessarily signify that it shall be
done : it is only the conclusion or ascertainment of its fitness.
This function of the intellect, also, is not indispensably con
nected with the notion of will ; as in the example given by
GAURAPADA ; where, in the simple conclusion after considera
tion, "this object is ajar; that, is a piece of cloth/' no wish,
or will, is indicated; no act follows. It is clear also that he
considers adhyavasdya merely as the functions of intellect, in
i srtf s
exercise : they are in intellect, and part of it, as the germ is
in the seed, until brought into activity. Intellect is only an
instrument ; that which, having received the ideas or images
conveyed through the organs of sense, and the mind, constructs
them into a conclusive idea, which it presents to soul. Its
function in exercise, therefore, is ascertainment or certainty, as
described in the >Sf. Pravackana Bhashya, which explains
adJiyavasdya, ' the synonyme, as well as buddhi, of great prin
ciple (mahat), and its specific function denominated ascer
tainment *.'
The other synonymes of this principle are, buddhi, derived
from biidh, * to know/ ' knowing, intellect.' Mahat, 'great, the
great principle ;' * The first and most important of the products
of nature, and presiding over and pervading the wholet/ Asuri^:
this is a very unusual and questionable denomination. It
occurs only in the S. JShashya, and may be an error, perhaps
for semushi, one of the synonymes of buddhi in the Amara
koska. It cannot be connected with asura, ( a demon/ as if the
faculty were incompetent to convey divine knowledge ; for one
of its properties, in connexion with the quality of goodness, is
jnydna, ' true knowledge/ There is no good reason why it
should be derived from ASURI, the pupil of KAPILA, unless
allusion is made to some personification of intellect, as the
bride of the sage. No explanation of the word is given in the
Bhashya, and I must confess my inability to suggest one en
titled to any confidence. Matl means ' understanding :' man-
ydte anaya, that by which any thing is understood. Khy&ti
properly signifies ( fame but here means ' notoriety, notion,
familiar knowledge ;' as in the Smriti, ' The great one it is,
whence the familiar notions of the universe are always pro-
i t
J ^rrjfr i
( 119 )
duced*/ Jnyana is usually the term for * true or divine
knowledge ;' knowledge of matter and spirit leading to libera
tion ; but it is here employed in its generic purport, ' that by
which things are known.' The same may be said of prajna,
which is also commonly used in the sense of ' true wisdom/
but here implies merely, ' that by which knowledge is obtain
ed,' prajndyate anayti, as RAMASRAMA expounds it. Several
of these terms, in their technical, as well as literal application ,
bear an analogy to the vovs of Aristotle, and the ^>poi>ri<Ti<s of
Plato. M. Cousin considers the category to be ' une sorts
d'ame du monde.' It is, however, the instrument most proxi
mate to soul, by which the latter perceives, wills, and acts.
Intellect is of two kinds, or has two sets of properties, as it
is influenced or affected by the opposite qualities, goodness and
darkness. The former are, 'virtue,' dhcrnta] 'knowledge1,
jnyana ; ' dispassion/ wiragya , and ' power/ ai&waryya. The
latter are their negatives, ' vice,' ad/tcrmu ; ' ignorance,' ajuyana',
'passion/ avniragya\ and * weakness/ anuwjvaryya. These
again comprehend specific varieties.
Dherma, ' virtue/ according to the S. Bhasliya, comprehends
morality and religion. The S. Tutwa KoMinudi explains it,
' The cause of happiness arid liberationf.' As the source of
prosperity and happiness in life, it is the discharge of religious
and moral obligations! ; as the means of liberation, it is the
observance of the eightfold yoya, or eight modes of contempla
tive devotion[j. Jnyana, or ' knowledge,' is defined by the
same Scholiast to bey ' distinct notion of the difference between
the three qualities and soul§.' ' Dispassion/ vaimqya, is the-
extinction of rdqa, ' colour,'' or passion, which like dyes of vari
ous hues tinctures the soul^l.' ' Power,' a'ixwaryya, is the posses-
( 120 )
fclon of superhuman faculties, It is always termed eightfold,
even in the S. Bhdshya, although nine varieties are there
named : one of them, however, ' heaviness/ garimtni) finds no
place among the definitions given there, any more than in
other authorities. It may be supposed to be included under
the faculty of magnitude.
The four first faculties, minuteness/ animd ; ' lightness/
laghimd ; ' reach/ prdpti ; and * magnitude,' mahiwd; explain
ed and illustrated every where in the same way. According
to VACHESPATI. the person endowed with the first can make his
•way into a solid rock; with the second, he may ascend to the
solar sphere upon a sunbeam; or, as Moore has it, " may dance
on a beam of the sun :" with the third, he can touch the moon
•with the tip of finger : and with the fourth, he may expand
himself so as to occupy all space. The latter four faculties are
less distinctly defined, and are sometimes confounded : the
shades of difference are indeed so slight, that they may all be
resolved into one, * absolute power over matter.7 ' Gratifica
tion of will/ prakamya, is generally defined by ichchha-ntibhi-
ghata*, unobstr notion of wish ;' or. as explained by HEMACHAN-
DRA, in his commentary on his own Lexicon, ' The wishes of a
person possessing this faculty are unimpeded by the properties
of material nature, such as form and the like ; so that he can
swim, dive, or float in earth as readily as in waterf/ This is
sometimes adduced in illustration of the meaning of the next
faculty, but less accurately. That, is termed vasitd, which
VACHESPATI defines, ; absolute subjugation of the elements and
elementary beingsj/ The Chandrikd makes it ' independance
on matter||/ which is much the same as prakdmya ; and A
similar confusion occurs in RAMASRAMA's commentary on
AMARA, for he illustrates it by ' swimming or diving on dry
land§/ ' Subjugation of nature' is the usually accepted import
( 121 )
as HEMACHANDRA. * Thus as (with this faculty) any one deter
mines the elements shall be, so they remain*." The next
faculty is ' dominion,' foitd, According to VACHESPATI, it is
' disposition at will of the production, arrangement, and ex
penditure of the elements and elementary beingarj".' NARA-
YANA explains it, ' directing or impelling them at will}.' RAMAS-
RAMA interprets it prabkutva, ' dominion, sovereignty ; under
which inanimate things obey command)].' The last faculty is
termed yatrakdmdvasdyitd. In RAMASRAMA'S commentary he
reads the word kdmdvasdyitd§ ; and the only variety he notices
is that of the sibilant, which is sometimes, he observes, the
dental, instead of the palatal letter^". According to the latter
reading it is derived from si* * ' to sleep ;' to the former,
from sof-f^ ' to destroy :' in either, with ava prefixed,
meaning, as RAMASRAMA explains it, 'he who tranquillizes
or destroys (that is, accomplishes) his desires}}.' The
reading of GAURAPADA is, however, yatrakarndvasdyitd,
as one compound ; and the common definition of the
term is ' true (infalliable) purposej|||,' wherever exercised :
' Whatever the person having this faculty intends or proposes
must be complied with by that which is the subject of his pur
pose ; the elements themselves must conform to his designs§§.
The Cliandrikd has, ' Whatever the will proposes, that it
obtainslfllV HE'MACHANDRA, in his text, gives the word as in
the BhAshya, yatrakdmdvasdyitwom ; and explains it, 'he
who accomplishes his desires, to whatever they may be direct
ed*** :' and he illustrates it by saying that •' an arhat, or
tfr i ft
i
16
( 122 )
Bav.ddha saint, can, by virtue of this faculty, convert poison
into ambrosia, and administer it as means of vitality*/
rv rv C«s
*I*T: II
II * 8 (I
XXIV.
CONSCIOUSNESS is egotism. Thence proceeds a two
fold creation. The elevenfold set is one : the five
elemental rudiments are the other.
BHASHYA.
The elevenfold set: the eleven organs. The five elemental
rudiments : elementary matter of five kinds, or the rudiments,
sound, touch, form, flavour, and odour. What sort of creation
proceeds from that which is thus defined is next explained.
COMMENT-
The third category is here specified, and described as the
source of the senses and their respective objects.
The term here given as the synonyme and definition of
( 123 )
'egotism,' ahankdra'f, is abhimdn&Zr translated 'conscious
ness/ The ordinary sense of both words is pride, and the-
technical import is ' the pride or conceit of individuality •/
' self-sufficiency ;' the notion that 'I do, I feel, I think, I am/
as explained by VACHESPATI : c I alone preside and have power
over all that is perceived and known, and all these objects of
sense are for my use. There is no other supreme1 except I ; I
AM. This pride, from its exclusive (selfish) application, is
egotism!!/ The principle, therefore, is something more in
Hindu metaphysics than mere consciousness, or conscience.
It might be better expressed, perhaps, by 'Te nM>i,' as it adds
to the simple conception of individuality the notion of self-
property, the concentration of all objects anJ raterests and
feelings in the individual,
The other synonymes of this category express rather modifi
cations of it, as the next stanza intimates. Taijasa, ' the active'
or ( the ardent/ from tejas*, ' light, splendour, ardour,' refers to
its animating or exciting influence on human actions, in con
nection with the quality of foulness-: Bh&tddvf9 ' primitive
element/ and vaikrita]., t the modified,' as explained in the
Bhdshya o-n the next verse, regard its being, in connection
with darkness and goodness,, the principle from which the
organs and objects of sense proceed: for it roust not be for
gotten, that this category of egotism or consciousness has a
physical, not a metaphysical, character, according to the
Sankhya philosophy, being the organ or instrument by which
the impression of individuality is conveyed to so-ui. It is in
this capacity that it may be considered the primary element,
the parent of the rudiments of the elements, or the objects of
sense, and of the organs by which they are perceived. It is,
( 124 )
in fact, the same with both these, as it is only by the applica
tion of our own senses to the objects of sense that we can
become conscious of individual existence.
XXV.
FROM consciousness, affected by goodness, proceeds
the good elevenfold set : from it, as a dark origin of
being, come elementary particles : both issue from
that principle affected by foulness.
*TIT
IT
( 125 )
BHASHYA.
When goodness predominates in egotism over darkness and
foulness, that egotism is of the pure kind ; the name of which,
according to ancient teachers, was vaikrita, ' the modified/
From this modified egotism the class of eleven organs is pro
duced. The good set: perfect organs ; adequate to their func
tions : the set is thence called good. Again -from it as a dark
origin of beings, &v. — When darkness predominates in egotism
over goodness and foulness, that egotism is called dark, or, as
it was named by the old masters, * primitive element/ bhiitddi.
From it come elementary particles ; the fivefold set. The
first element of the elements is darkness ; therefore it is usually
called the dark : from that primitive element the fivefold nidi-
mental set proceed. Both issue from that principle affected
by foulness : that is, the egotism in which foulness predomi
nates over goodness and darkness takes the denomination
taijasa, ' the active ;' and from that both proceed ; both the
eleven organs and five rudiments. For the pure egotism, which
is vaikrita, ' the modified,' becoming so modified, produces the
eleven organs : but to do this it takes active egotism for its
assistant ; for pure (sdtwika) egotism is inert, and is only able
to produce the organs when combined with the active. In
like manner the dark egotism, or that which is called ' primi
tive element/ is inert, and becomes active only in union with
the active, when it produces the five rudiments. Therefore it
( 126 )
as said, both the organs of sense and their objects issue from
the modification of egotism affected by foulness. The good
elevenfold set proceeds from modified egotism, or that which
is affected by the quality of goodness. They are next
particularized.
COMMENT.
The products of egotism are here described as proceeding
from three modifications of that principle, varied by the in
fluence of the three qualities.
The terms used to designate the ' pure/ &r sdfwika principle;
the ' dark,' or tdmasa ; and the ' foul,' or vdjasa ; ' variety of
egotism,' or vaikrita, bJtutddi, and taijasti ; have been explain
ed. According to our text, as understood by the Scholiasts,
the eleven organs of sense issue from pure or modified egotism,
and the five rudiments from elemental egotism ; both being
influenced by ardent or active egotism.' The commentator
on the S. Pravachavia has a rather different explanation, in
terpreting e'kadasaka, ' eleventh/ not ' elevenfold :' according to*
him, this eleventh, which is mind, proceeds from the first kind
of egotism ; the other ten from the second kind ; and the ele
ments from the third. " Sutra :. The pure eleventh (organ)'
proceeds from modified egotism. Comments Eleventh, is
mind, which in the class of sixteen organs and rudiments is
of the quality of goodness ; there-fore it is born from egotism,,
affected by goodness, called vaikvita*. This is the sense. Hence
it follows, that from egotism, affected by foulness, proceed the
other ten organs of sense ; and from egotism, affected by
darkness, proceed the rudiments*/* This interpretation
he defends by the authority of the law-books and Puranas ;
( 127 )
and he gives a similar turn, although rather indistinctly
expressed, to the text of the Karika. In the stanzas subse
quent to this, to ver. 37, the organs of sense are fully
described, and in ver. 38 the text returns to the ele
ments. It is not necessary, therefore, to enter upon any
explanation of them in this place. There is a remarkable ex
pression in the Bhdshya, which presents a notion familiar to
all ancient cosmogonies. GAURAPADA says, ' the first of the
elements was darkness*.' It is the first of the ' elements/ not
the first of ' things ;' for it was preceded hy unevolved nature
and intellect, and it is itself a modified form of individuality.
It therefore harmonizes perfectly well with the prevailing ideas
in the ancient world, of the state of things anterior to ele
mentary or visible creation, when " chaos was, and night,"
and when
Nullus adhuc mundo prwbetxit lumina' Titan,
Nee nova crescendo reparabat cornua Phoebe.
In the influence of the quality of foulness, or passion, for the
word rajas has both senses, may be suspected an affinity to
the doctrine of an active principle, the moving mind, the eros,
that set inert matter into motion, and produced created things.
II
XXVI.
INTELLECTUAL organs are, the eyes, the ears, the nose,
the tongue, and the skin : those of action are, the
voice, hands, feet, the excretory organ, and that of
generation.
( 128 )
BHA'SHYA.
Beckoning from the eye to the organ of touch, the organs
are called * intellectual.' Touched by it, the organ of touch,
which is the skin : thence the term for the skin which is used
(in the text), * that which touches,' sparsanaka. Intellectual
organs are five, as they ascertain or know (severally) five ob
jects, or sound, touch, form, flavour, and smell. Those of ac
tion, &c. — They perform acts, whence they are called ' organs
of action :' thus, the voice articulates ; the hands variously
manipulate ; the feet effect motion ; the excretory organ, excre
tion ; and the sexual organ, generation. Thus are enumerated
ten organs, five of intellect and five of action. The character
and nature of the eleventh, or mind, is next described.
COMMENT-
The five instruments or means of perception and five of ac
tion, products of egotism, are enumerated in this stanza.
The term ' organs' is correctly applicable to the material
instruments by which perception is exercised ; but it is not to
be understood of the gross corporeal bodies, the visible eye,
ear, hand, &e., which are parts of gross body. The werd * sen*
( 129 )
Be's' would therefore be a less equivocal term, only that it does
not so distinctly convey the idea of an instrument which, though
subtile, is substantial. The original word, indriya, is defined
to mean whatever relates or belongs to i/nd/rfy said to be a
synonyme of soul, the senses being indicative, being marks or
signs, of the presence of soul*: accordingly each is donomina-
ted a linga (see p. 24), 'a characteristic feature or indication.'f
.11
II ^ II
^^
XXVII,
(!N this set is") mind, which is both (an organ of
sensation and of action). It ponders, and it is an or
gan as being cognate with the rest. They are numer
ous by specific modification of qualities, and so are
external diversities*
c
*
t
17
( 130 )
^rro ^arr^w^r I
i
BHASHYA.
Here, as one of the class of organs, mind is said to be both.
Among the organs of sensation it is one of sensation, and
among those of action it is an organ of action also. As it
performs the function of the organs of sensation and of those
of action it belongs to .both. It ponders (or purposes) ; whence
the term sankalpaka. It is also an organ as being cognate
with the rest ; for such is the meaning of the word sadhermya.
The organs of sensation and action being (cognate or) produced,
along with mind, from egotism affected by goodness, have this
(property, of origin) in common with mind ; and from this com
mon property mind is an organ likewise.
Thus eleven organs are produced from egotism affected by
goodness. What, then, is the function (vritti) of mind ? Re
flection (sankalpa) is its function. Sound and the rest are the
functions of the organs of sensation. Speech and the rest are
the functions of the organs of action. Now are these various
organs, apprehending various objects, so created by Iswara ?
or are they self-generated ? since nature, intellect, and egotism,
are devoid of sense ; and soul is devoid of action. Thence
according to the Sankhya doctrine, a certain spontaneity is the
cause (of the variety of the senses). Therefore it is addded.
They are numerous by specific modification of qualities,
and so are external diversities : that is, the several objects
of these eleven organs, or sound, touch, form, flavour, and
odour, which are the objects of five ; speech, manipulation,
motion, excretion, and generation, the objects of other five ;
and reflexion, the object of mind; these all proceed from
specific modification of qualities. From the variety (or special
difference) of such modifications of the qualities the multifari-
ousness of the organs proceeds, as well as the diversity of
external objects : consequently this variety is not the work of
Iswara, nor of egotism, nor of intellect, nor of nature, nor of
soul ; but from modification of the qualities, produced by
spontaneity. It does not proceed designedly (it is not the re
sult of a will to act), because the qualities are non-sentient
(unconscious or irrational). How then does it take place ?
This, as will be afterwards explained, is in like manner as the
secretion of milk is for the growth of the calf, so the proceed
ings of nature take place for the liberation of soul, without
( 132 )
soul's being cognizant of them ; so the unconscious qualities
become modified by the existence of the eleven organs, and
their varieties are thence derived. Hence the eye is placed
in its elevated orbit for the purpose of looking up to heaven ;
and in like manner the nose, the ear, the tongue are comrnodi-
ously situated for the apprehension of their respective objects :
the organs of action are also distributed conveniently for the
discharge of their several duties of their own nature, through
the modification of the qualities, not as their objects ; as it is
elsewhere said, " Qualities abide in qualities ; that which is
the function of the qualities is their object." External diversi
ties, therefore, are to be regarded as made by the qualities :
this is the meaning of the text. Of which nature is the
cause.
The several functions of the organs are next specified,
COMMENT.
After defining mind as an instrument both of sensation and
of action, this verse explains how it is that there are various
organs and objects of sense ; and it is said to depend in both
cases upon specific modifications of the qualities of nature.
Mind is an instrument both of sensation and of action. Its
function is sankatya, a word that more commonly means ' re
solve, purpose, expectation ; as in the Hitopadesa, ' the crow,'
Laghupatanaka, says, ' All has been heard by me ; and this is
my resolve, that we must be friends*.' And MENU: 'Desire
is the root of expectation ; sacrifice is its productf:' or, as
KULLUKA BHATTA explains it, ' Sankalpa is understanding to
this effect, that by a certain ceremony a desired consequence
is effected}.' In both passages the notion of * conclusion from
m\
I *J!ir:
( 133 )
foregone premises' is conveyed, and that seems to be its mean
ing here. Thus VACHASPATI explains it: 'The mind carefully
considers a substance perceived by an organ of sense, (and
determines) this is simple, that is not so ; or discriminates them
by their condition of predicate and predicable*.' Again, it is
said, " First, knowledge or perception ia simple (inconsiderate),
like the knowledge of a child, a dumb man, or the like : it is
produced by the mere thing ; but when, after this, the thing,
as distinguished by its properties, by its genus, and the like,
is recognised by the understanding, and intellect is in accor
dance with perception, that period (or interval) of determina
tion is the operation of the mind." Here, then, sankalpa is the
process of reflection, the consideration of the object of simple
perception, so as to form a definite idea, which mind transmits,
through individuality and intellect, to soul. In this way mind
is an organ both of perception and action ; perceiving the ob
jects presented by the senses, and forming them into a positive
idea. It is further identified with both classes of organs by
originating from the same source, egotism affected by goodness ;
and consequently it consists of the same materialf.
The second portion of the stanza conveys a doctrine that is
not very intelligible. The variety of the senses and of the ob
jects of the senses is said to arise spontaneously in them, from
specific modification of the three qualities. VACHASPATI under
stands the allusion to external objects to be merely illustrative ;
that is, the internal organs are diversified by modification of
the qualities, in the same manner that external objects are
varied by the same modification^:' and the translation follows
this explanation. In the Bhashya a different reading in the
original occurred, which would require the passage to be ren
dered, ' and from variety of external objects)!:' thus ascribing
( 134 )
the diversity of the organs, not only to modification of the
qualities, but to the diversity of external objects, which require
suitable, and therefore various organs for their apprehension.
The reading is, however, clearly incompatible with his argu
ment, although GAURAPADA is somewhat obscure ; but the
variety is noticed and admitted by the author of the Chandrika*.
The S. Pravachana Bhashya considers the multifariousness
spoken of in the Sutra, which conveys apparently a similar
doctrine to that of the Karika, as restricted to mind : ' Multi
fariousness is1 from modification of qualities, as the variety of
human condition (is from various association) : that is, as the
very same individual assumes different characters, according
to the influence of his associations ; becoming a lover with a
mistress, a sage with sages, a different person with others ; so
mind, from its connection with the eye or any other organ,
becomes identified with it, and consequently is diversified
according to the function of sight and the rest of the organs
with which it is severally associated^.' The association of mind
with the organs is intimated by the Ve'das, as in the text, ' My
mind was elsewhere, I did not hear.J' The very illustration
used by Locke : " A man whose mind is intently employed in
the contemplation of some objects, takes no notice of im
pressions made by sounding bodies upon the organ of hearing :
therefore it is evident that perception is only when the mind
receives the impression," says the English philosopher ; and the
Hindu infers, that ' the mind must cooperate with the organs
of sense, even for perception, as they would otherwise be in
capable of performing their f unctions. ||
* s s : i t JTUT-
nr%
grrf
J ^
( 135 )
The materiality of mind, considered as distinct from con
sciousness, intelligence, and soul, and as neither more nor less
than an internal sense, a sensorium, is much less absurd than
the same character of it when considered as part of, or identical
with, soul, as was the doctrine of the Epicureans, whose des
cription of mind, as an organ merely, agrees well enough with
the Hindu notion :
Primum ; animum clico mentem quam ssepe dicamus
Esse hominis partem nihilo minus ac mantis ac pes
Atque oculei, partes aiiimantes totius exstant. LUCRETIUS, III. 94,
\\'\c\\
XXVIII.
THE function of five, in respect to colour and the
rest, is observation only. Speech, handling, treading,
excretion, and generation are the functions of five
(other organs).
f%:
I
( 136 )
BHA'SHYA,
The term 6 only' (matra) is to be understood in the sense
of speciality, or the exclusion of what is not specified ; as in the
sentence, " Alms only are received ;" that is, nothing else is
received. Thus the eyes are observant of colour (form), not
of flavour and the rest ; and so of the other senses. And
in this way the function of the eye is colour (vision) ; of
the tongue, taste ; of the nose, smell ; of the' ear, sound (hear
ing) ; of the skin, touch : these are the functions of the Intellec
tual organs. Speech and the rest (are the functions) of the
five organs of action ; or, speech is the function of the voice
(larynx, <&c.) ; handling of the hands ; treading, of the feet ;
dejection of excrement separated from food, of the rectum ; and
generation of offspring, of the sexual organs : ' function or ob
ject' being required for each term by the grammatical eronstruc-
tion of the sentence.
The functions of intellect, egotism, and mind are next
described.
COMMENT.
The text particularizes the functions of the organs of sense
severally.
The general term for the office of the sense is dlochan-a* ,
literally ' seeing, beholding, perceiving, observing.' According
to ancient authorities it is said to comprise both the first un-
deliberative, and the second deliberative knowledge ; or, in
short, what is understood by ' perception-*-.' The commentator
on the 8. Pravachana, who gives this explanation, observes,
however, that some consider deliberative perception to be the
property of the mind only, whilst simple or tftadetiberative per-
t
swr nwtf i qrrnir ^wrrnrrT i <rere r-
( 13? )
fception is that of the external senses ; and this appears to be
the doctrine of the Sankhyas : the senses receive simple im
pressions from without of their own nature ; whether those im
pressions are perceived, depends upon the cooperation of the
internal sense, or mind. The term for ' function' is vritti, ex
plained by vyapara, ' active exercise or application ;' also by
samarthydm, ' ability, adequacy ;' and phala, ' fruit, result.'
GAURAPADA has vishayd, ' object ; and it may be said, that the
function and object of a sense is the same thing, sight being
both the function and the object of the eye. There is some
difficulty in translating some of the terms satisfactorily, al
though there is none in understanding what is meant by them,
Thus rtipa, ' form,' or, as rendered in the text, ' colour,' is the
object and office of the eye ; it is therefore equivalent both to
visible substance and sight. So of sabda, ' sound ;' it is both
hearing and that which is heard. Spersa, ' touch,' is the faculty
and the substance to which contact may be applied. In rasa>
'* taste,' and gandha, ' smell,5 we have the double equivalents,
as both words in English, as well as in Sanscrit, express both
the sense and the sensible property. In English, ' voice' is
a function ; but here, at least, vach* is also the instrument of
speech. In the other organs of action the function is more
readily rendered ; but the difficulty in any case is only that of
language, and the sense is sufficiently explicit.
n
II
is
( 138 )
XXIX.
OF the three (internal instruments) the functions
are their respective characteristics : these are peculiar
to each. The common function of the three instru
ments is breath and the rest of the five vital airs.
I
m-
ffTTFTT f f%: flfr JTr^
i
( 139 )
f
BHA'SHYA.
The natural properties, which are the several characteristics,
are the respective characteristics (as previously defined). As
certainment is intellect (ver. 23) : that also is the function of
intellect. Consciousness is egotism (ver. 24) : consciousness
is both its characteristic and its function. Mind ponders
(ver. 27) : such is its definition ; and reflection, therefore, is the
function of mind. Of these three, intellect, egotism, and mind,
their respective characteristics are their specific functions.
The functions of the intellectual organs, as before explained, are
also specific (the same is the case with the organs of action).
But now their common function is described. The common
function of the instruments. — The function of the instruments
in common is breath and the rest of the jive vital airs ; the airs
called prana, apana, samana, udana, and vyana. These are
the five airs which are the common function of all the organs
of sense. The air, for instance, called prana is that which is
perceptible in the mouth and nostrils, and its circulation is the
common function of the thirteen kinds (of instruments) : that
is, where there is breath, the organs acquire (are connected
with) soul (they become living). Breath, like a bird in a cage,
gives motion (vitality) to the whole. It is called prana
* breath' or ' life,' from ' breathing.' From carrying downwards
(apanaya/na)) the air apana is so named ; the circulation of
which, also, is the common function of the organs. Samana is
so named from conducting equally (samanayana) the food, &c«
(through the frame). It is situated in the central part of the
body, and its circulation is the common function of the in
struments. The air udana is denominated from ascending,
or from drawing or guiding best (un-nayana). It is percep
tible in the space between the navel and the head, and the
circulation that it has is the common function of the organs.
( 140 )
Lastly, the air by which internal division and diffusion through
the whole body is effected is called vyana, from its pervading
(vyapti) the body like the etherial element. The circulation
of that, also, is the common function of the assemblage of the
organs. In this manner these vital airs, as the common func
tion of the instruments, are explained ; that is, the common
function of the thirteen kinds (of organs).
COMMENT.
Besides the peculiar functions of the three internal instru
ments, mind, egotism, and intellect, which as the same with
their definitions have already been specified, they have a com
mon office in the evolution or circulation of the internal aerial
humours which constitute vitality.
The translation limits this community of function to the
three internal instruments only, or to intellect, egotism, and
mind ; and such is the interpretation of VACHASPATI MISRA ;
' The five airs, or life, is the function of the three (internal)
instruments, from being present where they are, and absent
where they are not*." So the 8. Pravachana Bh explains the
Sutra Sdmdnya karana vrittit ; which is also the phrase of
the Kdrikd, ' the function of the three internal instruments^.
GAURAPADA, however, understands, vitality to be the common
function of all the organs, external and internal ; or thirteen
instruments, ten of the former, and three of the latter kind.
The expression of. the text also is general, and applicable either
to all the organs, or to any of them, as variously understood.
The two meanings are not irreconcilable, although, strictly
speaking, the sense followed in the translation is most correct ;
for although vitality is the common function of all the senses,
yet it is essentially so of the internal senses only ; it might
J a^
( 141 )
continue with the privation of any or all of the external senses,
but could not, as VACHESPATI states, subsist without the inter
nal organs, as it depends upon their existence for its own. So
also the 8. Pravachana Bhdshya calls the vital airs not only
the 'functions,' but ' modifications, of the internal instruments)].'
These vital airs are not to be confounded with vdyu, or
' elemental air,7 for the Vedas are authority for their different
origin : * From him is born vital air, mind, and all the senses,
heaven, wind, light, water, and the all-sustaining earth§.' ' The
attribution of aerial operation to modification of the internal
instruments arises from their being susceptible of a sort of
motion similar to that of air and from their being governed by
the same deitylf.' The vital airs are, in fact, the vital func
tions of breathing, circulation, and digestion. That these
functions, resulting from organization, should be supposed to
partake of the nature of aerial humours, originates very possibly
from some misapprehension of the phenomena of breathing,
flatulence, and arterial pulsation. The term used by GAUIIA-
PADA to designate their action occurs syandana, * moving,
circulation,' in the copy ; but spandana, ' throbbing, pulsation/
were perhaps a preferable reading. The offices assigned to
them are evidently connected with notions either of circulation
or a pulse. Thus Prdna is breath, expiration and inspiration.
Apdna is flatulence, crepitus. Samdna is eructation, supposed
to be essential to digestion. Uddna is the pulsation of the
arteries in the head, the neck, and temples ; and Vydna is the
pulsation of the rest of the superficial arteries, and occasional
puffiness of external parts, indicating air in the skin. The
situations assigned to the five airs by the 8. Tatwa Kaumudi
are much less consistent and intelligible. Thus Prdna is there
said to be the function of the tip of the nostrils, head, navel,
( 142 )
and great toes ; Apfaia, of the back of the neck, the back, the
feet, and the organs of excretion and generation ; Samdna, of
the heart, the navel, and the joints ; Uddna, of the head,
throat, palate, forehead, and root of the nose ; and Vydna, of
the skin. With exception of the last, it is not easy to under
stand how such absurd situations should have been selected.
The S. Bhdshya may be taken as the expression of the
earlier notions.
ftfegT II
: II 9 • li
^
XXX.
OP all four the functions are instantaneous, as well
as gradual, in regard to sensible objects. The func
tion of the three (.interior) is, in respect of an unseen
one, preceded by that of the fourth.
11 «r-
f i
( 143 )
f g
f r
BHASHYA.
O/ a^ four the functions are instantaneous. — The four are3
Intellect, egotism, and mind, in connection with any one of the
organs of sense. Of these four the function is instantaneous
in regard to perception, or in the ascertainment of perceptible
•objects. Intellect, egotism, mind, and the eye see form at once,
in one instant, (coming instantly to the conclusion) that is a
post. The same three, with the tongue, at once appreciate
flavour ; with the nose, odour : and so with the ear and skin.
Again ; their functions are also gradual in regard to sensible
objects. — Of that aggregate of four the function is also (oc
casionally) gradual (progressive). Thus, a person going along
a road sees an object at 'a distance, and is in doubt whether it
be a post or a man : he then observes some characteristic
marks upon it, or a bird perched there ; and doubt being thus
dissipated by the reflection of the mind, the understanding
discriminates that it is a post ; and thence egotism inter
poses, for the sake of certainty, as, verily (or, I am certain)
it is a post. In this way the functions of intellect, egotism,
mind, and eye are (successively) discharged. And as in the
case of a visible object, so it is as to sound and the rest of the
objects of perception.
But in respect of an unseen one, the functions of the three
are preceded by that of the fourth.— Unseen implies time past,
( 144 )
or future : for instance, in respect to ' form,' the function of thd
eye has preceded that of intellect, egotism, and mind, as has
that of the skin in respect to touch ; of the nose in regard to
smell ; of the ear iti relation to sound ; and of the tongue in
respect to taste. The functions of intellect, egotism^ and mind
are preceded in order by those of tho senses in regard to time
future or past whilst in regard to time present they may be
either instantaneous or gradual. Further —
COMMENT.
The consentaneous or successive operation of the three in
ternal and any one ot the external organs in the formation of
ideas is here described.
The cooperation of the three internal organs and any organ
of sense may be instantaneous (yuga-pat). like a flash of lightn
ing, or as at the sight of a tiger, when the recognition of him,
knowledge of his ferocity, conclusion of personal peril, and
determination to try to escape are the business of one and the
same moment : or their operation may be gradual or succes
sive (kramasas), allowing leisure, for instance, for the eye to
see, for the mind to consider, for egotism to apply, and for
intellect to conclude. GTAURAPADA rather disarranges the order
of succession, and places the function of egotism last, assigning
to it the office of belief or conviction. VACHESPATI'S illu
stration is more regular : ' Thus, the ear hears the twang
of a bowstring ; mind reflects that this must be for the flight
of an arrow ; egotism says, It is aimed at me ; and intellect
determines, I must run away*.' Whenever the object is un
seen, adristita, not present, whether it be past or be to come,
there must have been a prior perception of it ; that is, as the
text is explained by the commentators, there must have been
a prior perception of it by an organ of sense. The expression
( 145 )
of the text, tat purviJcd vritti, ' their prior function,9 might be
thought to refer to a prior notion gained by the conjoint opera
tion of the internal and external organs at some former period*
This, however, would be recollection, the seat of which, as
well as of judgment or inference, is in buddhi, or ' intellect,'
alone ; as in the Pdtanjala Sutra, ' Proof, refutation, delibera
tion, sleep, memory; these are said to be the functions of
intellect*.' The prior operation, therefore, is merely percep
tion or observation by the external sense, alockanam (see ver.
28), conveying simple ideas to the mind. Taking, then, this
prior simple idea acquired through an external organ, any fur
ther consideration of it is the gradual operation of the three
internal instruments. Where the object is present, conviction
may be either momentary or successive : the Sankhyas main
taining the possibility of consentaneous operation of the organs
of sense and mind, egotism and intellect, in opposition to the
doctrine of the Vaiseshikas, that the formation of ideas is in
all cases a graduated process : Where the object is absent, the
idea must be formed by the internal organs so far in successive
order that they must be consequent upon a former impression
received by an external sense ; but as concerns themselves,
their action may be either simultaneous or successive^. The
illustration which occurs in the Bhdskya and other commen
taries, of the course of reasoning by which the nature of a
distant object is determined, is something like that with which
in the Philebus, the formation of opinion is elucidated.
RT%<TCF% q^qnf fTf prf |T% II
\\
m i
i t 3?^:
19
( 146 )
XXXI.
THE instruments perform their respective functions,
incited by mutual invitation. The soul's purpose is
the motive : an instrument is wrought by none.
i ff% m~
BHASHYA.
Swam is repeated, implying ' several order :' that is, intellect,
egotism, mind, perform their respective functions, the incite
ment to which is mutual invitation. Akuta implies ' respect
and alertness.' They do this for the accomplishment of the
purpose of soul. Egotism and the rest effecting it through
intellect : that is, intellect, knowing the wishes of egotism and
the rest, proceeds to its own peculiar function. If it be asked,
why it does so 1 the answer is, the purpose of the soul is the.
'motive. Soul's purpose is to be fulfilled : for this object the
activity of the qualities occurs, and thence these instruments
make manifest the object of the soul. How is it that (being
devoid of intelligence) they act ? They act of their own accord.
An instrument can be wrought by none. — The purpose of soul
alone causes them to act : this is the meaning of the sentence :
( 147 )
an instrument is not made — not roused — to act by any human
superior.
It is next specified how many (instruments) intellect and
the rest are,
COMMENT-
The circumstances that induce the internal and external
organs to perform their respective functions are said to be
mutual incitement, and spontaneous disposition to effect tha
objects of soul.
The organs of sense are said to act by mutual invitation or
incitement. Their cooperation in the discharge of their respec
tive functions is compared to that of different soldiers in an
army, all engaged in a common assault, but of whom one
agrees to take a spear, another a mace, another a bow. It is
objected, that the organs being declared non-sentient, incapable
of intelligence, cannot be supposed to feel, much less to know,
any mutual design or wish, dkuta* or abhiprdya'f ; and the
terms are explained to signify the insensible influence which
the activity of one exerts upon that of another, if there be no
impediment in the way ; a sort of sympathetic or consentane
ous action. * Akrtta here means incitement to activity ; that
is, at the time when one organ is in action, the activity of
another, if no obstruction hinder itj.' * With this view the
several instruments are directed by a presiding power, which
may be termed the adaptation of the mutual fitness of their
natures) (.' The motive for this sympathetic action is the pur
pose of soul, fruition or liberation ; which purpose they of their
own accord, but unconsciously, operate to fulfil, in the same
way as the unconscious breast spontaneously secretes milk for
r ?r%-
rorcsRSRwr ^ <w ^raflt *n*$s^rcqrft i
famr
( 148 )
the nourishment of the infant ; according to the Sutra, ' As the
cow for the calf:' that is, as the milk of the cow of its own
accord exudes for the use of the calf, and awaits not the effort
of another, so the organs of their own accord perform their
office for the sake of their master, soul*. S. Pravachana Eh.
They must act of their own nature ; it is not in the power of
any one to compel them to act. GAURAPADA'S expression is,
' Not by any sovereign manf :' perhaps some particle, such as
V&, may have been omitted in the copy, making the sense,
' Neither by a deity nor a mortal ;' or the phrase may imply,
that they are not compelled to action even by soul, as a divi
nity ; but fulfil soul's purposes through an innate property,
undirected by any external agent,
n
M ^ II
XXXII.
INSTRUMENT is of thirteen sorts. It compasses, main
tains and manifests : what is to be done by it is ten
fold, to be compassed, to be maintained, to be
manifested.
^tr. ^tfft ^frt
'. \ t
( 149 )
BHASHYA.
Instrument. — Intellect and the rest are three ; the intellec
tual organs are five ; the organs of action are five : all together
thirteen. What this performs is next declared : it compasses,
maintains, and manifests ; that is, the organs of action com
pass and maintain ; those of perception manifest. How many
kinds of action there are is next specified. Its action, that
which is to be done by it, is tenfold ; of ten kinds, as hearing,
touch, &c. by the instruments of perception ; speech and the
rest by those of action : and thus by the former, manifestation,
and by the latter, comprehension and support, are effected.
COMMENT.
The sense of the term karana, ' instrument' or ' organ/ is
here explained, as a generic denomination for the external and
internal organs.
The instruments or organs are thirteen ; that is, three inter
nal, intellect, egotism, and mind ; and ten external, or the
organs of sensation and action. Their respective functions as
organs have been explained : their effects as instruments are
classed under three heads, ' compassing/ dharana*; ' maintain
ing/ dhdrana'f ; and ' manifesting/ prakdsana].. The first
which means, literally, ' taking, seizing/ and rendered in the
text ' compassing/ signifies ' the application of an organ to the
( 150 )
cbject to which it is adapted*/ and is the especial function of
the organs or instruments of action. * Maintaining/ dhdrana*
Supporting, upholding/ is, according to the S. Bhdshya, also the
office of the instruments of action ; but the authors of the S.
Tatwa Kaumudi and S. Chandrikd assign it to the three
internal instruments, intellect, egotism, and mind, as being es
pecially the supporters of vitality. ' Buddhi, ahankdra, and
mind uphold, through their function being designated as the
production of the vital airs, &c.f The elder commentator
could not, of course, admit this doctrine ; for we have seen (ver.
29) that, according to him, all the senses or instruments contri
bute to support the vital principle. All the Scholiasts agree in
attributing ' manifestation, enlightening/ prakdsana, to the
intellectual organs. The objects to be effected by the instru
ments are tenfold, reducible to the same three classes : speech,
manipulation, walking, excretion, and generation are to be
compassed, to be effected, dhdrya%, by the actual application
of the several organs : sound, taste, touch, smell, form to be
manifested, to be made sensible, prakdsya : and all of them,
together with the vital airs, constituting in fact animal life, are
to be dhdryya\\t upheld or maintained.
II ^ II
XXXIII.
INTERNAL instruments are three ; external ten, to
make known objects to those three. The external
organs minister at time present : the internal do so at
any time.
t
J afrift: i H
( 151 )
<
f^lf f
frtf
BHA'SHYA.
..'
Internal instruments. — Intellect, egotism, and mind are
three, from the difference between intellect and the others,
External ten. — The five organs of perception and five of action
are the ten external instruments, and they are to make known
objects for the fruition of intellect, egotism, and mind. Time
present : that is, the ear hears a present sound, not one that is
past, nor one that is to come : the eye sees present form, not
that which is past, nor that which is future : the skin touches
present substance : the tongue tastes present flavour : the nose
( 152 )
smells present odours, nor past nor future. It is the same with
the organs of action : the voice articulates actual, not past nor"
future words : the hand takes hold of a present water-pot, not
one that has been or is to be : the feet traverse a present, not
a past nor a future walk : and the organs of excretion and
generation perform present, not past nor future offices Exter
nal organs, therefore, minister at time present. The internal
ones do so for any time. — Intellect, egdfism, and mind regard
objects of any period : thus intellect forms an idea, not only
of a present water-jar, but of one that has been or will be
made : so egotism exercises consciousness of an object past,
present, or future : and mind considers the past and future, as
well as the present. Internal instrument is, therefore, for
all times.
It is next explained which of these instruments apprehends
specific, and which unspecific objects.
COMMENT-
The difference between the functions of the external and
internal organs, as concerns time, is here explained : the action
of the former being confined to time present ; that of the latter
comprehending also the past and the future.
Internal instrument is so denominated from operating within
the body* ; the external from being applied to exterior objects
making them known to the internal organization. The term
vishaya, i object/ is also explained by bJiogya, ' that which is
to be enjoyed;' and vydpara, 'exercise;' and vishaydkhya^
' that which declares or makes objects known.' It is also
defined as ' that which occasions the exercise of the functions
of the three internal instruments"!*.' External sensation is
necessarily confined to present objects, but mind, conscious
ness, and intellect apprehend from present objects those which
( 153 )
have past, or are to come ; as past rain from the swelling
of a river ; and future rain, in the absence of any other
prognostic, from the destruction of the eggs of the ants*.
This last phrase • alludes probably to the well known destruc
tion of various species of the ant tribe, which in the East
takes place immediately before the setting in of the rainy
season : they then take wing, and fly abroad in vast multi
tudes, of which few survive ; according to the Hindustani
proverb, ^f& j* y ^5* ^T ^^ & ^ \£* *¥$ When the
ants are about to die, their wings come forth.' The expres
sion " ants' eggs," pipttikanda, is, however, rather question
able. It occurs in both copies of the S. Tatwa Kaumudi.
\\
xxxiv.
AMONG these organs the five intellectual concern
objects specific and unspecific. Speech concerns sound.
The rest regard all five objects.
sfsftra i
20
( 154 )
BHASHYA.
The intellectual organs concern specific objects : they ap
prehend objects which have specific properties. The intellec
tual organs of men distinguish sound, touch, form, taste, smell,
along with objects of indifference, pleasure and pain. The
organs of the gods apprehend objects which have no specific
distinctions. So, amongst the five organs of action, speech
concerns sound. Speech, whether of gods or of men, articu
lates words, recites verses, and the like ; and this instrument
is the same in both orders of beings. The rest — all except
speech ; the hand, the foot, and the organs of excretion and
generation — regard all Jive objects : that is, sound and the
other four objects of perception belong to all the other organs ;
for there may be sound, touch, form, taste, and smell in the
hands ; the foot treads upon the earth, of which sound and the
rest may be characteristics ; the excretory organ separates
that in which the five objects abide; and the generating
organs produce the secretion which is equally characterised
by the five organs of sense.
COMMENT.
Another distinction is made in the functions of the external
instruments, as they regard objects with or without specific
characteristics.
Objects arc distinguished as having specific characters or
effects, savise'sha* , and as devoid of them, nirviseslia^ and the
( 155 )
instruments are discriminated according to their capability of
conveying notions of either the organs of sense in mortals
can apprehend only those objects which have specific charac
ters ; either sensible, as colour, form, taste, &c. ; or moral, as
pleasant, painful, or indifferent. The faculties of the gods and
of sages can apprehend objects without such characteristic
properties, and which exercise no moral effect, producing
neither pleasure, pain, nor indifference. The S. Tatwa Kau-
mudi identifies ' specific' with ' gross corporeal' objects*, and
' unspecific' with 'subtile and redimental' objects! ; the latter
of which are cognizable alone by the organs of holy men and
deitiesj. This distinction applies to all the external organs,
except the voice, which in men, saints, and gods can articulate
sensible, specific, or corporeal words alone ; for it is the organ
of the voice that is the origin of speech. Speech cannot, like
sound, taste, &c., originate with any thing gross or subtilo
exterior to the speaker ; it must proceed from him, through the
agency of a gross material instrument, and must therefore be
gross or sensible itself. Gross corporeal mechanism cannot bo
the source of a subtile product, and therefore with every order
of beings speech must be specific. e The rest,' seskdni refer
ring to the organ of speech, implies the other organs of action,
all of which may regard the five objects of perception ; that is,
they may comprehend them all ; as ' from the combination (or
capability) of sound, touch, colour, smell, taste, in objects like
a water-jar and others, which may be compassed or taken hold
of by the hand, &c,||' S. Tatwa Kaumudi.
f RII ?T*?TFf II 3 H II
<2\
r4^f<m ^ \
wmw%ww\
( 156 )
XXXV.
SINCE intellect, with the (other two) internal instru
ments, adverts to every object, therefore those threo
instruments are warders and the rest are gates.
BHASHYA.
With the internal ; that is, intellect, with egotism and mind.
Adverts to ; takes, apprehends ; that is, apprehends sound and
the rest at all three seasons. Therefore these three are ward
ers, and the rest are gates. — The rest ; the other instruments ;
instruments being understood. Further. —
COMMENT-
A metaphor is employed to illustrate the functions of the
external and internal instruments.
The internal instruments are compared to warders, door
keepers, or to persons having charge of a door or gate ; not
opening and closing it merely, but as taking note of all that
enter : the external senses being the doors or gateways by
which the objects of perception gain admission.
( 157 )
XXXVI.
THESE characteristically differing from each other,
and variously affected by qualities, present to the
intellect the soul's whole purpose, enlightening it as
a lamp.
: i
f-
f r^nt
BHASHYA,
These, which are called instruments : they variously affected
by qualities. How affected? Like a lamp] exhibiting objects
like a lamp. Characteristically differing ; dissimilar, having
different objects ; that is the sense. Objects of the qualities
is intended. Variously affected by qualities; produced or
proceeding from qualities. Soul's whole purpose. — The in
struments of perception and action, egotism and mind, having
illustrated the object of soul (as attainable) through each res
pectively, present it to the intellect, place it in the intellect ;
and consequently soul obtains pleasure and the rest ; that is,
every object seated in intellect. Further —
COMMENT-
The process by which ideas are conveyed to soul is her*
described,
( 158 )
Intellect (buddhi or mahat) is the instrument or organ
which is the medium between the other instruments or organs
and soul ; that is, all ideas derived from sensation, reflection,
or consciousness must be deposited in the chief or great in
strument, intellect or understanding, before they can be made
known to soul, for whose use and advantage alone they have
been assembled. They are variously affected by tlie quali
ties. They convey impressions or ideas, with the properties
or effects of pleasure, pain, and indifference, accordingly as
they are influenced by the qualities of goodness, foulness,
and darkness. In fact these organs are identified with
the qualities by all the commentators. GAURAPADA says.
f they proceed or are born from them*:' and in the S.
Tatwa Kaumudi and 8. Chandrikd they are called also
' products or modifications and varieties of the qualities ;' thus
the former has, c The external organs, mind, and egotism are
affections of qualities ; they are changes of condition of the
qualities goodness, foulness, and darknessf :' the latter, ' These
affections of the qualities are kinds (or varieties) of themj'
It might have been preferable, therefore, to have rendered
the expression yunavise'sha, ' modifications or affections of the
qualities.'
The progressive communication of impression to soul is thus
illustrated by VACHESPATI : ' As the head men of a village collect
the taxes from the villagers, and pay them to the governor of the
district ; as the local governor pays the amount to the minister .
and the minister receives it for the use of the king ; so mind,
having received ideas from the external organs, transfers them
to egotism ; and egotism delivers them to intellect, which is
the general superintendent, and takes charge of them for the
use of the sovereign, soul. The same idea is more concisely
expressed in the $. Pravacliana Bit. '• Sutra : In the com-
: T<J[Rt
( 159 )
hion employment of the organs the chiefship belongs to buddhi
as in the world. Comment : As the function of the organs
is in common, through subservience to the purposes of soul^
so the most important is that of intelligence ; like the office
of the prime minister amongst the chiefs of villages and the
rest, who arc all alike engaged in the service of the king*/
The cooperation of opposites for a common purpose has been
once before (p. 54) compared to the light of a lamp, derived
from the combination of oil, cotton, and flame,
.* «\__* fv
N3
^ rv ^.
Sfo II
XXXVII.
SINCE it is intellect which accomplishes soul's frui*
tion of all which is to be enjoyed, it is that, again,
which discriminates the subtile difference between tho
chief principle fpradhanaj and soul,
?rfTfcf
srr^Nf
( 160 )
5
?RL
BHASHYA,
All: whatever comes within the reach of the organs, and in
all three (past, present, and future) periods. Fruition ; several
or respective enjoyment, through the instrumentality of the
organs of perception and action, whether in gods, men, or
animals. The internal instrument intellect accomplishes,
completes or effects : consequently it is that, again, which
discriminates, makes a distinction between the objects of na
ture and soul, (or establishes) their difference or severally*
Subtle ; not to be apprehended by those who have not practised
religious austerities, (or such distinctions) as, this is nature,
the equipoised condition of the three qualities, goodness, foul-
nesSj and darkness ; this is intellect ; this is egotism ; these are
the five subtile rudiments ; these the eleven organs ; these the
five gross elements ; and this, which is different from them all,
is soul. He whose intellect explains all this obtains liberation.
It was said above (ver. 34) that "objects are specific and
Unspecific :3> which these are respectively is next described,
COMMENT-
The function of discriminating between. soul and nature is
here also assigned to intellect.
The immediate contiguity and communication of intellect
With soul, as that of a prime minister and a sovereign, enables
it to appreciate the latter ; whilst its being the medium of
conveyance to external objects familiarizes it with them also ;
&nd thus it is enabled to distinguish between both : cr as ex
plained in the Ohandrikd, this discrimination is the neces
sary consequence of its relative function ; for as it conveys
ideas of pleasure or pain to soul, and is in this way the cause
( 161 )
of its fruition, it is subservient to another, to something
different nature from its own ; and the knowledge of this is
discrimination between nature and soul. ' All, sound and the
rest, with which the preposition pratl (implying several ty) is
to be connected. The fruition is that of soul. As intellect
accomplishes this, consequently although it be as it were a
chief principle, yet it is for another's use, not its own ; and as
hence arises the purpose of liberation, this sense is accordingly
intended to be expressed in the phrase, It Is that ayain ivhich
discriminates, &c.*'
XXXVIII.
THE elementary particles are unspecific : from these
five proceed the five elements, which are termed speci
fic ; for they are soothing, terrific, or stupifying.
*
21
( 1G2 )
^iTft
rawn *rcr
^rr
BHA'SHYA.
The five subtile elements, which are produced from egotism,
or the rudiments sound, touch (substance), form flavour, and
odour, are said to be unspecific ; they are the objects (of per
ception) to the gods, characterised by pleasure, producing
neither pain nor stupefaction. From these five proceed the five
elements, called earth, water, fire, air, and ether. These are
said to be specific. From the rudiment smell, earth proceeds ;
from the rudiment flavour, water ; from form (colour), fire ;
from touch (substance), air; and from the rudiment sound ;
proceeds ether. These gross elements are termed specific.
They are the objects of the senses of men, and are soothing,
causing pleasure ; terrific, causing pain ; and stupifying,
causing insensibility ; as the ethereal element may give delight
to one person coming forth at once from within a house, so the
same may be the source of pain to one affected by cold, or heat,
or wind, or rain ; and if he be going along a road leading
through a forest, in which he loses his way, it may then, from
the perplexity of space, occasion stupefaction : so the air (or
wind) is agreeable to a person oppressed by heat, disagreeablo
to one feeling cold ; and when tempestuous and loaded with
clouds of sand and dust it is stupifying. The same may be
said of fire and the rest, There are other specific varieties.
( 163 )
COMMENT.
It was intimated in vcr. 34, that objects were both specific
and imspecific ; and it is here explained, that by the former is
meant the various property which the same element possesses
at different times, and under different circumstances, in regard
to mortals ; and by the latter, the uniform and unvaried opera
tion of the subtile rudiments in respect to the gods.
The precise nature of the rudimental elements is not very
intelligible, according to their usual identification with what
we are accustomed to consider as qualities, not substances, or
sound, tangibility, form or colour, flavour., and odour ; mbda,
sparsa, rupa, rasa, and yandha. It seems, however, that we
should regard the rudimental elements as the imperceptible
subjects of these qualities, from which the grosser and visible
elements, ether, air, light, water, and earth, originate. So
VUNANA BHIKSHU calls them ' subtile substances, the elements
which are the holders (sustainers or subjects) of the species of
sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell ; but in Avhich, as a genus,
the three species of pleasurable, painful, and indifferent do not
occur : they arc not varieties of the gross elements, but in each
respectively the elementary property exclusively resides
whence they are said to be rudiments. In those elements
that elementary property resides alone (without being diversi
fied, as agreeable, &c,) ; and as there is nc distinction between a
property and its subject, that which is a rudimental substance is
called a rudiment, tan indtra ; the existence of which as a cause
is inferred from that of the gross element as an effect*.' Tan
mdtra is a compound of tad, ' that,' and rtidtra, ' alone ;' im
plying, that in which its own peculiar property resides, without
( 164 )
ciny change or variety : so VACHESPATI explains the text,
c Sound and the rest ; the subtile rudiments ; for the proper*
ties of agreeable, &c. do not belong to them, they have no
quality which is fit for (mortal) fruition. This is the meaning
of the word matra*.1 — c These rudiments, though not appre
ciable by human sense, are said to be sensible to sages and
to gods, producing to them pleasure only, from the pre
dominance with them of the quality of goodness, and con
sequently of happinessf.'
The notion of something more subtile than the elements
was not unknown to early Grecian philosophy, and Empedocles
taught that they were compounded of some more minute
matter, or of elements of the elements, crroiyeia o-roixeiovt
Plutarch and Stobseus, according to Cudworth, understand by
these rudiments of the elements primary atoms ; but it may
be doubted if they are to be so understood, for, according to
Aristotle, Empedocles held that there were four elements, out
of which all bodies were composed, and which were not
mutually transmutable. In fact the doctrine of Empedocles,
which was that of the school of Pythagoras, offers another
analogy to the Indian, in the assertion, not of four, but of five
elements, according to Plutarch, or the author De placitis phi-
losopliorum, 1. II. c. 6, or ether, fire, earth, water, and air. In
tellect. Syst. I. 97. That Empedocles was not of the atomic
school is evident from Lucretius, who specifies him as one of
those who greatly misunderstood the principles of things :
Principles tanien in rerum fecere minus
Et graviter niagnci magno cecidere ibi casu. I, 741--2.
It may be suspected that something like the Hindu notion
that the senses, or their faculties, and the gross elements, par-
? fit
take of a common nature, is expressed in the celebrated,
though otherwise not very intelligible verses of the same
philosopher :
Fa/0 IJLGV yap yjuav o7ru>7ra/UL€i>, vSan
A.i6epi 8' aiOcpa Slav, arup irvpl irup u
By the earthy element we perceive earth ; by the watery,
water ; the air of heaven by the aerial element ; and devour-
ing fire by the element of fire.'
As opposed to the simple unvaried rudiments, the derivative
gross elements, which are sensible to men and animals, are
susceptible of three qualities ; they may have specific or varied
effects, may be diversified as species ; they are said, accord
ingly, to be soothing or agreeable*, terrific or disagreeablefi
and stupifying, bewildering^ ; that is, they may be either of
these, according to the different circumstances in which the
influence of one or other of the three qualities predominates.
When goodness prevails, whether it be in themselves or in the
object affected, they are sdnta, ' tranquil or pleasant ;' when
foulness they are yhora, ( frightful, disagreeable ;' and when
darkness prevails, they are ' perplexing/ murha : as VACHES-
PATI ; ' In the gross elements, ether and the rest, some, through
the predominance of goodness, are soothing, pleasant, agree
able, light ; some, through the prevalence of foulness, are terri
fic, painful, restless ; whilst others, through the influence of
darkness, are stupifying, depressing, heavy ||.'
t sfar. i
( 160 )
XXXIX.
SUBTILE (bodies), and such as spring from father and
mother, together with the great elements, are three
sorts of specific objects. Among these, the subtile
bodies are lasting ; such as issue from father and
mother are perishable.
ftgft
g*»r% Trcrfajs
!j«ffa
%
sr
( 167 )
BHASHYA.
Subtile : the rudimental elements, that, when aggregated,
form the rudimental or subtile body, characterised by intellect
(mahat) and the rest, and which always exists, and undergoes
successive states of being (transmigration) : those are subtile
(bodies). SucJi aft spring from father and mother are the
cementers or means of the aggregation of gross bodies, or by
the effect of the mixture of blood and seminal secretion in
sexual cohabitation, at fit seasons they form the envelopment
of the subtile body in the womb ; that subtile body then is
nourished, through the umbilical cord, by the nutriment derived
from tea food and drink received by the mother ; and the (en
tire) body, thus commenced with the triple ingredient of the
subtile rudiments, the cognate investure, and the gross ele
ments, becomes furnished with back, belly, legs, neck, head,
and the rest ; is enveloped in its sixfold membranes ; is provided
with blood, flesh, tendons, semen, marrow, and bones ; and is
composed of the five gross elements ; ether being supplied for
its cavities (or extension), air for its growth, fire for its nutri
ment, water for its aggregation, and earth for its stability :
and thus being equipped with all its (component) parts, it
comes forth from the maternal womb. In this way there are
three kinds (of bodies) : which of these is constant, and which
temporary, is next described. The subtile bodies, are lasting* —
Subtile ; rudimental elements : these are lasting^ constant ; by
them body is commenced, and migrates, according to the im
perative influence of acts, through the forms of beasts, deer,
birds, reptiles, or immovable substances ; or, in consequence of
virtue, proceeds through the heaven of Indra, and other celes
tial abodes. So the subtile body migrates until knowledge is
attained ; when that is attained, the sage, abandoning all bodyt
acquires liberation ; these sorts of bodies, or subtile, therefore,
are called lasting. Such as issue from father and mother
are pevwhafole. — Having left that subtile body, the frame that
proceeds from mother and father ceases, eveu here, at the time
( 1G8 )
that th« breath departs ; the body born of parents ceases at the
time of death, and merges into earth and the other gross
elemente,
What subtile body is, and how it migrates, is next described.
COMMENT.
Objects were distinguished in the preceding verse according
as they were with or without specific or diversified effects :
they are here classified according to their forms, their origin,
and duration.
A question of some difficulty, however, arises here, as to the
objects of the classification. Are they bodies in general ? or
are they gross bodies only ? In the preceding stanza it was
stated, that the subtile elements, the tan mat-ras, were un-
specific; whilst their effects, the gross elements, were 'specific/
vise'sha, It is now stated, that there are three kinds of vise'vkas,
' sorts, species, specific differences ;' but it is not explicitly de
fined of what these are varieties. Mr. Colebrook, following the
principal commentators, renders it * sorts of objects ;' that is,
of bodies in general. Professor Lassen, carrying on the sense
of vl-sesha, l specific,' from the preceding stanza, considers the
variety here spoken of to concern only gross or perceptible
elementary bodies : " Distincta, elementa quae distincta dicun-
tur (ver. 38). Distinctorum triplex est divisio in subtilia, a
parentibus progenita, crassa" (ver. 39). He admits that the
commentators are against this interpretation, but concludes
rather that they are in error, than that ISWARA KRISHNA
should have employed the word viseska in a double sense.
The interpretation of Prof. Lassen is highly creditable to
his critical acumen and judgment, and is possibly correct al
though it is scarcely compatible with the notions of subtility
and durability which the text ascribes to this branch of the
triad. His view is not, as he supposes, wholly unsupported
by the commentators ; for VIJXANA BHIKSHU similarly ex
plains the stanza, as will presently bu noticed, The passage
is one of some importance, as it regards apparently the history
of the Saakhya doctrines respecting the nature of that subtile
body which is the imm3diate vehicle of soul, as we shall have
occasion to notice more particularly, when we come to verse 40.
If the meaning of the text be as Prof. Lasseri renders it, it
furnishes reason to suppose that the author of the Karikoi had
introduced an innovation upon the original doctrine, as will be
subsequently indicated.
According to GAURAPA'DA and NA'KA'YANA, the sorts or
species intimated in this verse are different from those des
cribed in the preceding ; the former calls them, as above,
' other varieties* ;' and the latter has, referring to ver. 38, ' So
many are the specific varieties ; but these are not all, there
are othersf .' VA'CHESPATI'S expression, ' A further species of
speciesj, might be thought to refer to the gross elements ; but,
from the explanation that follows, it is evident he does not
intend to limit the specific differences to gross elementary
bodies. Agreeably to the explanation, then, in which these
writers concur, bodies in general are threefold, subtile, gene
rated, and elementary ; and consistently with this view they
consider ' subtile,' trilkshma, as equivalent to tan-mdtra, 6 rudi-
mental :' thus GAUKAPA'DA has, ' Subtile is the aggregated
rudimental elements, forming a rudimento-elemcntal subtile
bodyll :' so also VA'CHESPATI ; ' Subtile means subtile bodies ;
subtile body is one specific object§ :' and the Ghandrikd ;
« Subtile are what are called rudimental bodieslF.' Consequently
they also conceive the subtile objects spoken of in this verse to
be something entirely different from the gross elementary
r-ixc'xkas, or ' species/ of the preceding verse ; not merely sub
species or varieties of the same : and it must be admitted that
t
i t- r^mRra^r-crt fatreurf i
rfa^ f 5*mii i § g$nr: tf^sr:
fatto; i "
( 170 )
there is some inconsistency in the Kdrikd's speaking of subtile
bodies being a species of gross bodies ; of the 'imperceptible
being a variety of the perceptible. According to VIJNA'NA
BHIKSHU, however, the text merely intends by ' subtile,
stikshma, a modification of gross elementary body ; a corporeal
frame, which is subtile only relatively, or which is more refined
than the second kind of body specified in the text, that which
is begotten : ' The nature of that body which is the support of
rudimental body is explained in the Kdrikd, " subtile, gene
rated," &c. : here is meant, body aggregated of the five ele
ments, the (product or) effect of the rudimental elements*
which is subtile relatively to generated body*.' The same
notion is again intimated by expressions which will be subse
quently cited ; and there remains no doubt that this commen
tator understands by the sukskma of the text, ' a subtile
variety of gross elementary body,' dist'mctorum dist'mctio.
The other commentators understand by it, ' rudimental bodies/
element a indixtincta. Either interpretation is therefore al
lowable : the latter agrees best with the construction, of the
original.
In the second variety of bodies of course specific or sensible
bodies only are intended ; bodies generated or begotten are
made of the gross elements, agreeably to the Sutra, ' Body
consists of the five elements t :' they are, however, in some
degree distinguished here from the elements ; holding, accord
ing to GAURAPA'DA, a middle place between them, and rudi
mental bodies serving to combine them ; u$xtckdyalca causing
ujxichaijd, ' proximate aggregation ;' the parts of the embryo
being derived in the first instance from the parents, and their
development being the result of the accession of the elements,
for purposes which he describes. There is some incongruity,
however, in this explanation, as it makes a distinction where
there is no essential difference ; organized matter being, in fact,
;
i ^
t ifaftftwit 31 : i
( 171 )
the same with elementary matter. The other commentators,
therefore, give a different explanation of the term ' great ele
ments/ restricting it to inorganic matter. Thus VA'CHESPATI
observes, 'Subtile body is one variety of objects ; generated
bodies are a second ; and the great elements a third : water-
jars and the like (inorganic bodies) are comprised in the class
of the great elements*.' So also the Ckandrikd,: 'Subtile
bodies are those called rudimental ; generated, are gross bodies ;
and the great elements are mountains, trees, and the like^.3
In this threefold division of bodies, as explained by the
Scholiasts on the Kdrikd, we have, in fact, but two distinc
tions, subtile and gross ; the latter being subdivided into
organic and inorganic. The twofold distinction is that which
is especially recognised in the Sutras : thus in the S. Prava-
chana Bhdshya, the Sutra, ' Thence (the origin) of bodyj,' is
explained, ' from the twenty-three tativas (or categories) two
kinds of bodies, subtile and gross, proceed! | :' and again, ' Gross
body is for the most part generated (some bodies being inor
ganic), the other (subtile body) is not§,'
The chief object of the stanza is, however, to assert the
different duration of these three kinds of bodies ; subtile are
permanent : and here we have an argument in favour of the
translation adopted ; for no form of gross body could be con
sidered as lasting : as composed of the elements, in however
delicate a form, it must resolve into them at the time of
death ; whilst the subtile bodies, consisting of the subtile ele
ments, endure either till liberation^, or until the great
Pralaya.**
Dissolvi quo qutuque supremo tempore possint.
r fttrc
( 172 )
XL.
(SouTiLE body), primaeval, unconfined, material, com
posed of intellect, with other subtile principles, mi
grates, else unenjoying ; invested with dispositions,
mergent.
«ffT«f
BHASHYA.
Primaeval ; whilst yet the universe is uncreated : in the first
creation of nature, at that season subtile body is produced.
Unconfined ; uncombined either in the state of animals, men,
or gods ; and from its subtilty wholly unrestrained, or passing
into rocks and the like without obstruction ; it migrates ; it
goes. Permanent: until knowledge is attained it migrates.
Composed of intellect, with other subtile principles ; having
makat and the rest : that is, intellect in the first place, with
egotism and mind, to the h' ve subtile rudiments, to the subtile
principles, to the rudimental elements. It migrates; it tra
verses the three worlds, as an ant the body of Siva. Unenjoy-
ing ; without enjoyment : that subtile body becoming capable
of enjoyment only in consequence of acquiring the property of
action, through its aggregation by external generated body.
Invested with dispositions. — Dispositions, as virtue and the
rest ; which we shall hereafter explain (see ver. 43). Invested
with ; coloured or affected by. Subtile body is that which, at
the period of universal v dissolution, possessed of makat f in
telligence, and the other subtile principles, merges into the
chief one (or nature), and, exempted from further revolution,
remains extant there until creation is renewed, being bound
111 the bondage of the stolidity of nature, and thereby incom
petent to the acts of migrating and the like. At the season of
re-creation it again revolves, and is hence called linya, ' charac
teristic' or ' mergent,' or sukshma, ' subtile/
From what cause the thirteen instruments (intellect, egotism,
and the eleven organs) revolve, as has been said, is next
explained,
COMMENT.
The condition of subtile body, in regard to commencement,
duration, and term, is here described.
The commentators are agreed that the subtile body here
spoken of is the linya, or the linya sarira, l rudiment/ or
' rudimental body ;' ordinarily, though perhaps not quite accu
rately, confounded : the liny a consisting, as intimated in the
last phrase of the Bh&skya, of thirteen component parts, in
tellect, egotism, and the organs of sense and action ; whilst
the llnga sarira adds to these a bodily frame, made up of the
five rudimental elements. In this form, however, they always
coexist, and i,t is not necessary to consider them as distinct :
thus the Sutra of KAPILA states, c one llnga of seventeen* ;'
that is, according to the Scholiast, c in the beginning, at crea
tion : there is but one rudimental body at the period of creation,
consisting of an aggregate of the eleven organs, five rudimental
elements, and intellect^.' This was at first embodied in the
person of HIHANYAGARBHA, or BRAHMA', and afterwards 'multi
plied individually, according to variety of actions^' In this
enumeration egotism is omitted, being included, according to
the commentator, in intellect. ' Unconfined,' asakta, means
unobstructed, capable of passing into any bodies. The next
epithet, nlyata, translated ' material/ is explained by GrAUKA-
PADA as above, by nltya, ' permanent, lasting ;' and VACHES-
PATI attaches to it the same signification. ' It endures till the
period of universal dissolution |j; and the 8. Pr. Bhdvhya ob
serves, also, that it ceases, or is destroyed, only at the same
season§ : a property, of which it may be observed by the way,
that it furnishes another reason for identifying the silkshmat
or * subtile body,' of the foregoing stanza with the linga, or
' rudimental body,' of this verse. The Chandrika explains
niyata differently, ' distinct in different persons^.' The com
position of subtile body is explicitly described by YACHESPATI :
1 Subtile body is an assemblage of intellect, egotism, the eleven
fetf i t irat H'rr
( 175 }
senses, and the five elements*.' He ascribes, however, to this
a specific or ' diversified existence, from its endowment with
senses, which arc the sources of pleasure, pain, or indifference!.'
The commentators agree that subtile body is subject to enjoy
ment or suffering only through its connection with generated
body ; understanding apparently thereby, not its abstract
capability of either, but the actual condition in which it par
takes of them ; for it is repeatedly declared that the seat of
enjoyment and suffering is buddhi, or 'intellect;' through the
presence of which as an ingredient in subtile body, it is im
mediately added, the latter is invested with ' dispositions,'
bhdvas ; that is, with the properties of intellect enumerated in
ver. 23, virtue, vice, knowledge, ignorance, &c. The term
bhdva was rendered by Mr. Colebrooke in that place by ' senti
ments/ but in another (ver. 43) he expressed the same ' dis
positions,' which, as far as relates to the mental bhdvas, ap
pears to be a preferable equivalent. Of the consequences of
these dispositions, reward in heaven, or punishment in hell,
dead, decomposed animal body is no longer susceptible : ' In a
dead body there can be no sense of pleasure or pain ; this all
admit:J:.' In order, however, to be placed in circumstances
leading to such enjoyment or suffering, generated body is
necessary ; and therefore subtile body migrates, sansarat-i,
goes from one body to another continually : hence the world
is called sansdra, i migration' or ' revolution.' ' Through the
influence of intellect the whole of subtile body is affected by
dispositions or conditions, in the same manner as a garment
is perfumed from contact with a fragrant cliampa flower||.' S.
Tdtu'a Kaiirnudi. Subtile body is called linga from its con-
( 176 )
sisting of those principles which are so termed, either from their
indicating or characterising that nature from which thy proceed,
or from their being ultimately resolvable into it. Thus the
Chandr'ikd, has, ' Linya, from designating, apprising*:' GAURA-
PADA, as above, ' It merges into nature at the season of dissolu
tion :' and VAOHESPATI, ' Linya is so termed because it suffers
resolution (lay a), or from its characteristic indication of the
source from which it proceeds*)".' See also remarks on ver,
10 p. 43.
c
3% f^ri Wf msm f^i«r4 fejpr^ 11 « m
XLI.
As a painting stands not without a ground, nor a
shadow without a stake, &c. so neither does subtile
person subsist supportless, without specific (or un-
specific) particles.
^ Iff^r
i1 fair Mt ^ fair
'Tr^H fair
I ^^
fan
' i t
; t
( 177 ),
BHASHYA.
As a picture without the support of a wall or the like does
not stand ; as the shadow does not stand without the stake
(the gnomon of a dial) ; that is, without them does not exist.
The term et cetera comprises (other illustrations) ; as, wator
cannot be without coldness, nor coldness without water ; fire
without heat ; air without touch ; ether without extension ;
earth without smell ; so by this illustration it is intimated that
it, the rudiment (linga), does not subsist without unspecific or
rudiinental particles. Here also specific elements are implied,
or body composed of the five gross elements ; for without a
body, having specific particles, where can the place of the linya,
be ; which, when it abandons one corporeal frame, takes refuge
in another. Supportless ; devoid of support. Subtile (person) ;
Instrument of thirteen kinds : this is the meaning of the text.
For what purpose (these subtile elements are embodied) ii
next described.
COMMENT.
Iii the preceding verse it was stated that subtile person
migrated, or as soon as deprived of one body it took refuge in
another. It is now explained why this must be ; and that it
proceeds from the necessity of something to give to subtile
principles asylum and support.
The text accordingly states,' that the 'rudiment' the linya,
cannot exist without such support; but with regard to the sup
port itself there is some difference of opinion, the passage being
variously read and interpreted.
GAURAPADA. reads the expression, rnvV.x7,,<r<V r] lt(i, ' without
unspecific particles ;' by which lie states that lie means the
' rudimental particles,' the tail ncdtra*. He adds, that specific
23
( 178 )
particles, gross elementary bodies, are also necessary ; using the
terms avwesha and vis&ka as th ey were before employed (ver.
38), to represent severally the rudiinental and gross elements.
VACHESPATI and NABAYAXA read the phrase viseshair vind,
1 without specific particles / but they use the term ' specific'
apparently in its general acceptation of ' species,' without re
ference to its technical employment in vcr. 38 ; for they con
fine its purpose to that of ' subtile bodies.' ' Without specific
particle* ; without subtile bodies : that is the meaning*.' S.
Tatwa Kanmudi. ' Without specific particles ; without very
subtile bodies : the rudiment (linga), being unsupported, does
not remain ; but being supported by subtile bodies it existst/
S. CJiandrikd. So far therefore, although the reading be
different, the interpretation appears to be the same. The
linya, or ' rudiment' — for it is to be observed, that it is this
which is spoken of by both text and comment, and not the
linger, sarira, ' rudimental body' — cannot subsist without a
bodily frame. Whence that frame is derived, GAUBAPADA
makes sufficiently clear. The linya, or ' rudiment,' consists of
but thirteen principles — the unclothed faculties and senses :
the rudimental body, by which they are aggregated and de
fended, is a tan rndtrika body, composed of the rudimental
elements (p. 123). This again, for worldly existence, is enve
loped in a bodily frame of gross elementary composition.
It may, however, be suspected that the authors of the 8.
Tatwa Kaainudi and the Chandrika have not attended to
the distinction, and that they intend by their ' specific or
subtile bodies' only one of the ' species,' or viseshas, which
may be intimated in ver. 38 ; a modification of the gross ele
ments enclosing, not the naked ' rudiment/ the linga, but the
* rudimental body/ the linya sarira. Such, at any rate, is
the interpretation of VIJXAXA BHIKSHU, who commenting on
fa^r
( 179 )
this stanza of the Kdrikd, explains ' specific particles, those
which are called subtile amongst gross ; a species or variety
of gross elements :' and he says, that ' the definition of subtile
body which is given in the preceding stanza, " composed of
intellect with other subtile elements" (p. 128), as compared
with the expression of the present verse, proves that there is a
distinction made between subtile body and the specific variety
of the gross elements, which is also called subtile*.'
The question then is not one merely of a difference of inter
pretation, but it is a difference of doctrine. According to
GAURAPADA'S explanation, which appears to be the original
theory, living bodies consist of two parts, one of a subtile, and
one of a gross nature ; the latter perishes or decomposes at
death ; the former may live on through the existence of the
world : the latter gives cover to the former, which is the imme
diate vehicle of soul, and accompanies it constantly, through
successive perishable bodies, until soul's liberation, or until a
period of universal dissolution restore its component parts to
their primitive and common parent. To this body the term of
linga sarira, ' rudimental body,' is properly applied ; it is also
called dtivdhika, that which is swifter than the wind in pass
ing from body to body ; and, as Mr. Colebrooke observes, " il
seems to be a compromise between an immaterial soul and the
difficulty which a gross understanding finds in grasping the
comprehension of individual existence, unattached to matter."
Tr. R. As. Soc. I. 32.
But some of the expounders of the Sankhya doctrines have
not thought even the rudimental body sufficiently material for
the purpose of independent existence, when separated from
gross body ; and a third corporeal frame has been devised for
its support, to which the present verse of the Kdrikd and the
**j3*r?TRt
( 180 )
other passages which seem to allude to a subtile form of speci
fic or gross elementary matter relate, according to VuxANi.
BHIKSHU : ' Having abandoned gross body, a support is neces
sary for the passage of rudimental body to other regions, and
another species of body is established*.' This is more particu
larly explained in the same writer's commentary on a some
what obscure Sutra immediately preceding : " In the body,
which is the receptacle of the receptacle of that (rudimental
body) ; for the denomination of body is applied to one as it is
to the other." That is, the receptacle or support of that rudi
ment, which will be described as composed of the five elements,
is supported or contained in body constituted of the six organic
ingredients (bones, blood, &c.) ; to which the name body is
applied, from the same being applicable to the sense of the
word adhis/i hdna (delta, " body," being understood apparently
in either case " containing" or " comprehending"). The cor
poreity of the vehicle or receptacle (adhlshthdna) arises from
its relation to the (aggregate) ling a ; the corporeity of gross
body, from its being the receptacle of vehicular body. This is
the meaning of the text. We have therefore three (kinds of)
body established*!*.' Quoting a passage which appears opposed to
this, and to intimate, as GAURAPADA has done, a twofold dis
tinction only of bodies, the same writer observes, ' What is said
in writings, upon the authority of the Ve'das, that there are
but two (kinds of) bodies, arises from their identifying the
rudimental and vehicular bodies as one, as they are mutually
ft I t c^faSRmq- ^1 asrerTfgJf: II cTST
( 181 )
permanent and subtile*.' This is no doubt correct ; but it is
very unlikely that the elder writers admitted any form of the
gross elements to be equally permanent and subtile as the ru
diments from which they proceeded. In the institutes of Hanu,
for instance, although the doctrine there laid down is of a dif
ferent tenor from that of tho Sankhya system, we have but
two kinds of bodies, a subtle and substantial one, described;
'After deatli another body, composed of the five rudimental
elements, is immediately produced, for wicked men, that may
suffer the tortures of the infernal regions-)-.' Md-nii, XII 16.
We have here, then, a body composed of the five rudimental
elements. In the Bhagavad Glta it is intimated that soul
retains the senses and mind in the intervals of migration : ' At
the time that spirit obtains a body, and when, it abandons one,
it migrates, taking with it those senses, as the wind wafts
along with it the perfume of the flowers^.'
If VACHESPATI be correct in his interpretation of the word
punusha, the Vdda makes one kind of subtile body of the size
of the thumb : " YAMA drew forth violently the subtile body,
as big as the thumb." — The specification of the size merely de
notes minuteness ; extraction of soul would be absurd ; and
therefore by puruslca must be meant " a subtile body," that
which reposes in gross body||.' This, agreeably to the older
doctrine, would be rudimental body ; according to later refine
ment, vehicular. It is the latter which, as Mr. Colebrooke
mentions (Tr. R, As. Soc. I. 33) in PATANJALI'S Yoc/a sastra,
t
i ;' srfrt ^ witfii
( 182 )
is conceived to extend, like the flame of a lamp over its \vick,
to a small distance above the skull ; and which, according to
M. Cousin, is " la fameuse pensee intracranienne. dont on a cru
faire re'cemment une decouverte merveilleuse." Hist, de la
Philosophic, I. 195.
The notion of some corporeal, however subtile envelopment
of soul — the ei'&oAoy, umlmi, manes, simulacrum, spirit, or
ghost — giving to invisible and intangible soul some visible and
tangible materiality, " such," as Grood (Translation of Lucreti
us) observes, " as will at least enable the soul to assume some
degree of material configuration, and to be capable of corporeal
feelings, however spiritualized and refined, even after its sepa
ration from the body" — has prevailed in all times and in all
ages. Nor was the doctrine confined to the people or the
poets : such of the philosophers as maintained the immateria
lity of soul, attaching to it, until its final purification, some
portion of corporeal substance, or some substantial, though
subtile investure, or o'x>;/xa, or vehicle. Thus Cudworth (vol.
III. 517) states, that 'the ancient assertors of the soul's im
mortality did not suppose human souls, after death, to be quite
stripped stark naked from all body, but that the generality of
souls had then a certain spirituous, vaporous, or airy body
accompanying them ; as also they conceived this spirituous
body to hang about the soul alse here in this life, before death,
as its interior indument or vestment, which also then sticks to
it when that other gross earthly part of the body is by death
put off as an outer garment." It also appears, that " besides
the terrestrial body, and this spirituous body, the ancients
held that there is a third kind, of a higher rank, peculiarly
belonging to such souls, after death, as are purged and
cleansed from corporeal affections, called by them crwjma
avyoeiSe?, or a luciform body." The authorities quoted by Cud-
worth for these opinions are new Platonists, or Christian
writers of the fourth and fifth centuries ; and it seems not
unlikely that they borrowed some of their notions from
the doctrines of Christianity, They profess, however, to
( 183 )
repeat the tenets of Pythagoras and Plato ; and Cudworth
asserts, that the distinction of two interior vehicles or
tu nicies of the soul, besides that outer vestment of the
terrestrial body, is not a mere figment of the latter Platonists,
but a tradition derived down from antiquity. Mosheim, in his
translation of Cudworth, has entered, in a note, very fully
into an inquiry as to the origin of the opinion of a subtile
body investing soul, and concludes, " Yetus ha?c opinio aut si
mavis superstitio, ab ipsis fere Gr.Tcorum haroicis temporibus
ducta :" and Brucker, in reference to his observations on this
subject, remarks, " Hoc vero magna doctrina et ingenio de-
monstravit Mosheimius hac de vehiculo opinionem non demum
in juniorum Platonicornm cerebro cnatam essc sed fuisse
dogma cairn? antiquitatis." Hi*t. Pldlos. I. 714. Although,
therefore, less clearly expressed than by the Hindu writers,
the early Greek philosophers entertained similar notions of
the nature of the subtile body, which was inseparable from soul
until the period of its final exemption from transmigration.
n
n s * n
XLII.
FOR the sake of .soul's wish, that subtile person
exhibits (before it), like a dramatic actor ; through
relation of means and consequence, with the aid of
nature's influence.
( 184 )
f^i
BIIASHYA.
The purpose of soul is to be fulfilled, therefore nature
proceeds to action. This (purpose) is twofold, apprehension of
sound and the other objects of sense, and apprehension of the
difference between qualities and soul. Apprehension of sound
and the other objects of sense is enjoyment of sensual grati
fication, as fragrance and the like in the spheres of Brahma
and the rest : apprehension of the difference between the qua
lities and soul is liberation. Therefore it is said, For the sake
of soul's wish subtile person is active. Th.ru a-yU relation of
iHeu'n* nn<l co'iiw<it!encex. — Mi'an* (or antecedents) are virtue
and the like : conwqtH'nces are their results, such as their
ascending to heaven and so forth, as we shall hereafter explain.
By then' relation; their connection. I}'//// //»: <(id of ncbtW&v
i rttlt'CiiC'' ;. of the influence of the chief one, nature. As a king
in his own kingdom does what he wishes of his own authority,
so by the application of the supreme authority of nature,
through the relation of means (or causes) and consequences,
subtile body exhibits : that is, nature commands subtile body
to assume different conditions, by taking different (gross)
bodies. Subtile body is that which is aggregated of subtile
atomic rudimental elements, and is possessed of thirteen in
struments (or faculties and senses). It assumes various con
ditions, by its birth, amongst gods, animals and men. How
does (it exhibit) ? Like an actor, who when he enters upon
the scene is a god, and when he makes his exit is again a
mortal : or again, a buffoon. So the subtile body, through the
relation of causes and consequences, having entered the womb,
may become an elephant, a woman, or a man.
It was said (ver. 40), " Subtile body migrates, invested with
dispositions." What those dispositions are is now described.
COMMENT-
The circumstances on which transmigration depends are
here said to be the purpose of soul, enforced by the authority
of nature.
Soul's purpose is either fruition or liberation ; and to accom
plish one or other of these, subtile body passes through various
conditions, assuming different exterior forms, as an actor puts
on different dresses to personate one while Rama, another
while Yudhishthira, or again, Vatsa*. The purpose of soul is
enforced by the power, authority, or influence of nature*.
Vibhutwa, as illustrated by GAURAPADA, means ' kingly or
supreme authority.' VACHESPATI understands it as ' univer
sality' rather, as in the text of the Pur ana : ' This wonderful
vicissitude is from the universality of naturej ;' that is, from
its invariable presence and consequent influence. But besides
these motives, the purpose of soul and influence of nature,
which may be regarded as the remote and proximate causes of
ff ^
J t^cqr<r q*rwj qftwft^ro Jtf
( 186 )
transmigration in general, it is still necessary to have what
may be regarded as a special, or exciting, or efficient cause J
the reason of the particular migration ; the cause wherefore, in
particular instances, subtile body should ascend from the
exterior frame of a man to that of a god, or wherefore it should
descend from the exterior frame of a man to that of a brute.
This depends, then, upon the relation of certain occasional or
instrumental means or causes, wi/mMas*, with their incidental
consequences or effects, the naimitlikas't', as virtue and vice,
which lead severally to reward and punishment after death ;
that is, to regeneration in an exalted or degraded condition.
Thus the Chandrikd explains the terms : ' Nimitta is virtue
and the rest ; naimittika is the effect, having the nimitta for
its cause, as gross bodies, &c. By the relation or connection
of these two, subtile body, assuming the form of gods or
other beings, performs its part}/ Professor Lassen has been
needlessly perplexed by this verse, and has strangely rendered
it as follows : " Corpusculum hocce propter genii causam
effectum, ludionis instar se habet ad has modo ad illas originari-
as et derivatas conditiones pronum, post conjunctionem pro-
creatricis cum potestate sua."
XLIII.
ESSENTIAL dispositions are innate. Incidental, as
virtue and the rest, are considered appurtenant to the
J
( 187 )
instrument. The uterine germ (flesh and blood) and
the rest belong to the effect (that is, to the body).
Wffi'
*nrr ?TR tNfa^Wfa i
f ^rftft^f
* i
rlr-
f fa?
BHA'SHYA,
Dispositions (Ikdvas, ' conditions') of being are considered
to be threefold, innate, essential, and incidental. The first, or
innate, are those four which in the first creation were cognate
( 188 )
with the divine sage KAPILA, or virtue, knowledge, dispassion,
and power. The essential are declared ; these were four sons
of BRAHMA', SANAKA, SANANDANA, SAN A' TAN A, and SANJLT-
KUMA'EA ; and these four dispositions were produced with them,
who were invested with bodies of sixteen years of age (or
perpetually juvenile bodies), inconsequence of the relation of
causes and effects (or in consequence of merit in a former
existence) : therefore these dispositions are called essential.
Incidental are those derived through the corporeal form of a
holy teacher ; from which (in the first instance) knowledge is
incidentally obtained by such as we are ; from knowledge
comes dispassion; from dispassion, virtue; and from virtue,
power. The form of a teacher is an incidental product (of
nature), and therefore these dispositions are termed incidental:
" Invested by which, subtile body migrates" (ver. 40). These
four dispositions are of the quality of goodness ; those of dark
ness are their contraries : as above, " Virtue, &c. are its faculties
partaking of goodness ; those partaking of darkness are the
reverse" (ver. 23). Consequently there are eight dispositions,
or virtue, knowledge, dispassion, power, vice, ignorance, passion,
weakness. Where do they abide ? They are considered ap-
purtenant to the instrument. Intellect is an instrument, and
to that they are appurtenant ; as in ver. 23, " Ascertainment is
intellect ; virtue, knowledge," &c. Effect; body. The uterine
germ and the rest belong to it ; those which are born of the
mother, the germ and the rest, or the bubble, the flesh, the
muscle, and the rest, which are (generated), for the develop
ment of the infant, in the union of the blood and the seminal
fluid. Thus the conditions of infancy, youth, and old age are
produced ; the instrumental causes of which are food and beve
rage ; and therefore they are said to be attributes of the effect
(or of the body), having, as the instrumental cause, the fruition
of the sensual pleasures of eating and the like.
It was said (ver. 42). " Through the relation of means and
consequences :" this is next explained,
( 189 )
COMMENT-
We have here an explanation of what is to be understood by
the term dispositions, used in a former passage (ver. 40).
The translation of bh&va* adopted by Mr. Colebrooke in this
place is ' disposition :' in the passage referred to he had em
ployed, as above remarked, ' sentiment;' but it was there
changed, in order to preserve consistency. Neither word per
haps exactly expresses the purport of the original, nor is it
easy to find one that will precisely correspond. In some res-
pects c condition,' mode, or state of being, conditio, as rendered
by Professor Lassen, is preferable, as better comprehending the
different circumstances to which bhdva is applied ; although,
as he has occasion subsequently to remark, it does not very
well express all the senses in which bkdva occur. These cir
cumstances or conditions, according to the obvious meaning of
the text, are of two kinds, or intellectual and corporeal. The
first comprise virtue, knowledge, dispassion, power, and their
contraries ; the second, the different periods of life, or embryo,
infancy, youth, and senility. They are also to be regarded as
respectively cause and effect ; virtue, &c. being the efficient
cause, or nimitta ; bodily condition the naimittika, or conse
quence ; as VA'CHESPATI explains the object of the stanza,
' which,' according to him, ' distinguishes incidental cause and
consequence, the latter being the incidental conditions of bodyf .'
But besides the division of conditions or dispositions into
the two classes of intellectual and corporeal, they are also
characterised according to their origin, as sdnsiddhika, prd-
krita, and vaikrita, rendered in the text ' innate, essential, and
incidental.' Prof. Lassen translates them conditiones absolute?,
pendentes ab origins, pertin&ntes ad evoluta principia*
Both the two first are innate, and some further distinction is
necessary. c Superhuman' or ' transcendental' would perhaps
t T*m f*rm^ ^ fw i ^tour mr%^r: \
( 190 )
best explain the first, as they are, according to the commenta
tor, peculiar, to saints and sages. According to GAURAPADA,
they occur only in one instance as the cognate conditions of
the divine KAPILA, the author of the Sankhya system. The
second class, which may be rendered ' natural/ agreeably to
his view, which is a little mystical, originated with the four
holy and chaste sons of BRAHMA. The third class, those which
are incidental or constructive, vaikrita, belong to mortals, as
they are produced in them by instruction. VACHESPATI re
cognises but two distinctions, identifying, as in the translation,
the innate (sdnsiddhika) with the essential (prdkrita) dis
positions, they being both sw&bhdvika, inseparable, inherent,'
not the production of tuition, and opposing to it the construc
tive or incidental (vaikritika)*. A similar account of their
origin as in the Bhdshya is given, but under these two heads
only : * Thus in the beginning of creation the first sage, the
venerable and great Muni KAPILA, appeared, spontaneously
endowed with virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power. The
incidental and unspontaneous dispositions were produced by
the cultivation of the means (of producing them), as (the les
sons of) -PKACHETASA and other great Rishis^J These dis
positions or conditions are dependent upon the instrument,
that is upon buddhi, or ' intellect,' of which they are faculties,
as was explained in verse 23. The states or conditions of life
depend upon the body, and are the immediate effects of gene
ration and nutriment, the more remote effects of virtue,
vice, &c.
( 191 )
: II 88 II
XLIV.
BY virtue is ascent to a region above ; by vice, des
cent to a region below : by knowledge is deliverance ;
by the reverse, bondage.
BHA'SHYA,
— Having made virtue the efficient cause,
it leads upwards. By upwards eight degrees are intended,
or the regions of Brahma", Prajapati, Soma, Indra, the Gan-
dharbas, the Yakshas, the Rakshasas, and Pisdchas \ the subtile
body goes thither. Or if vice be the efficient cause, it mi
grates into an animal, a deer, a bird, a reptile, a vegetable, or
a mineral. Again ; by knowledge, deliverance : knowledge of
the twenty-five principles ; by that efficient cause, deliverance,
the subtile body ceases, and (soul is) called ' supreme spirit1
( 192 )
(pammdtmd). By the reverse, bondage: ignorance is the
efficient cause, and that (effect) bondage is natural (prdkrita),
incidental (vaikdrika), or personal (ddkshina)^ as will be ex
plained : " He who is bound by natural, incidental, or personal
bondage is not loosed by any other (means than knowledge)."
Next, other efficient causes are declared,
II
: us MI
XLV.
BY dispassion is absorption into nature ; by foul
passion, migration : by power, unimpediment ; by the
reverse, the contrary.
T ftf ?^ I ^7 Rfll*.
( 193 )
BHASHYA.
If any one has dispassion without knowledge of principles
then from such dispassion unpreceded by knowledge occurs
absorption into nature, or when the individual dies he is re
solved into the eight primary elements, or nature, intellect,
egotism, and the five rudiments ; but there is no liberation, and
therefore he migrates anew. So also by fowl passion ; as I
sacrifice, I give gifts, in order to obtain in this world divine or
human enjoyment ; from such foul passion proceeds worldly
migration. By power, unimpediment. — Where eightfold
power, as minuteness, &c. is the efficient cause, the non-ob
struction is the effect. Such power is unimpeded in the sphere
of Brahma, or in any other. By the reverse, the contrary. —
The contrary of unimpediment is obstruction, which proceeds
from want of power, every where obstructed.
Thus sixteen efficient causes and effects have been enume
rated : what they comprehend (or amount to) is next described.
COMMENT-
In these two verses the efficient causes of the various con
ditions of subtile body and their effects, or its conditions,
are detailed.
These causes and effects are collectively sixteen, eight of
each : the former are positive and negative, as diversified by
the qualities of goodness and foulness (ver. 23); and the effects
respectively correspond. They are accordingly.
Cause. Effect.
1. Virtue. 2. Elevation in the scale of being.
3. Vice. 4. Degradation in the scale of being.
5. Knowledge. 6. Liberation from existence.
7. Ignorance. 8. Bondage or transmigration.
9. Dispassion. 10. Dissolution of the subtile bodily form,
11. Passion. 12. Migration.
13. Power. 14. Unimpediment.
15. Feebleness. 16. Obstruction.
25
( 194 )
By ' virtue/ dherma, both religious and moral merit are in
tended. Ascent, going upward, is elevation to a more exalted
station in another birth ; the term stkdna implying both place
and degree. According to GAURAPADA, this ascent is eightfold,
and the subtile frame may after death assume a new body
amongst the various classes of spirits, Pisachas, Kakshasas,
Yakshas, and Gandherbas ; or may attain a place in the heaven,
of Indra ; of Soma, or the moon ; of the Prajapatis, or progeni
tors of mankind ; or even in the region of Brahmd. It is a
curious, though perhaps an accidental coincidence, that the
Syrians and Egyptians enumerated also, according to Plato
(Epinomis), eight orders of heavenly beings : their places, how
ever, seem to be the planets exclusively. The author of the S.
T. Kaumudi understands by ascent, or elevation, ascent to
the six superterrestrial regions. Dyu, or Bhuvar loJca, the at
mosphere ; Siver loka, the heaven of Indra; Mahar loka, Jana-
loka, and Tapololca, worlds of sages and saints ; and Satya
loka, of Brahma. By degradation he understands descent to
the subterrene regions, Pdtdla, Rasdtahi, &c. These notions
are, however, not incompatible, as rewards and punishments in
heaven and hell are put temporary, and subtile body must even
afterwards assume terrestrial form, and undergo a series of
migrations before escape from the bondage of existence can be
finally accomplished.
Bondage is said by the commentators to be of three kinds,
intending thereby three different errors or misconceptions of
the character of soul and nature ; the prevalence of which pre
cludes all hope of final emancipation. ' These errors or bonds
are, 1. Prdkritika ; the error or bondage of the materialists,
who assert soul in nature (or matter) : 2. Vaikritika; the
error of another class of materialists, who confound soul with
any of the products of nature, as the elements, the senses,
egotism or intellect : and, 3. Ddkshina ; the error or bondage
of those who, ignorant of the real character of soul, and blind
ed bythe hop e of advantage, engage in moral and religioui
( 195 )
observances :' as VA'CHESPATI*. These errors confine the soul
to its subtile material frame for various protracted periods ; as,
for instance, in the case of those who identify soul with sense,
for ten manwantaraa, or above three thousand millions of
years (3,084,480,000).
By dispasslon occurs 'absorption into nature/ prakritl
lay erf ; or, as the Kaumudi and Chandrikd express it, ' reso
lution into the chief one and the restj.' GAURAPA'DA makes
the meaning of the phrase sufficiently clear : according to him
it signifies the resolution of even the subtile body into its
constituent elements : but this is not in this case equivalent
to liberation ; it is only the term of one series of migrations,
soul being immediately reinvested with another person, and
commencing a new career of migratory existence until know
ledge is attained.
: 11
^I^r
XLVI.
II S
THIS is an intellectual creation, termed obstruction,
disability, acquiescence, and perfectness. By disparity of
influence of qualities the sorts of it are fifty.
r *F^: i t^rfi;^
f i%
: i
( 196 )
-IT
ir-
gfgt i ^f m^r^r ^r^r i ^r-
f fe
BHASHYA.
This aggregate of sixteen causes and effects is called an in»
telledual creation. Pratyaya means buddhi, ' intellect is as
certainment," &c. (ver. 23). This intellectual creation is of
four kinds, obstruction, disability, acquiescence, and perfect-
ness. In this classification, doubt (obstruction) is ignorance ;
as when any one beholding a post (at a distance) is in doubt
whether it is a post or a man. Disability is when, even though
the object be distinctly seen, the doubt cannot be dissipated.
The third kind is called acquiescence ; as when a person de
clines to doubt or determine whether the object be a post or
not ; saying, What have I to do with this. The fourth kind
is perfectness ; as when the delighted observer notices a creeper
twining round the object, or a bird perched upon it, and is
certain that it is a post. By disparity of influence o
( 197 )
ties. — By the unequal (or varied) influence of the qualities of
goodness, foulness, and darkness, acting on this fourfold intel
lectual creation, there are fifty modifications of it : and these
kinds in which severally goodness, foulness, or darkness pre
vails, and the other two are subordinate, are next parti
cularized.
COMMENT-
In this and the five following stanzas the modifications of
the causes and consequences, or the conditions of existence pro
duced by the intellectual faculties, as influenced by the three
qualities, are detailed and classified.
By ' intellectual creation,' pratyaya serga*, is to be under
stood the various accidents of human life occasioned by the
operations of the intellect, or the exercise of its faculties, virtue,
knowledge, dispassion, power, and their contraries. Pratyaya
properly means ' trust,' but is here considered to be synonymous
with buddhi. It may be understood as implying ' notion ;'
and pratyaya serga is the creation or existence of which we
have a notion or belief, in contradistinction to bodily or organic
existence, of which we have an idea or sensible perception ;
the bhuta sergcff, or ' elemental creation.'
Existence then, dependent on the faculties of the intellect
and their consequences, is further distinguished as of four
kinds : 1. ' Obstruction/ viparyaya, is explained by VACHES-
PATI * ignorance' (ajndna), by GAURAPADA ' doubt' (sansaya) :
2. ' Disability,' asakti, is imperfection of the instruments or
senses : 3. Tiisliti is ' acquiescence' or ' indifference :' and, 4.
S-iddhi is * complete or perfect knowledge.' 'In the three
first are comprised the seven intellectual faculties, virtue and
the rest (see p. 88), all except knowledge, which is comprehen
ded in perfectnessj.' S. Tatwa Kaumuctt. This is the col-
I J
SHRT vRf^rt ursflRF^cwfa; ftrafi1 ^
( 198 )
lective or generic division. Each genus is again divided so as
to form fifty species, according as they are affected by the
three qualities, or the predominance of one, and the depression
of another*. The species are enumerated in the succeeding verse.
XL VII.
THERE are five distinctions of obstruction ; and,
from defect of instruments, twenty-eight of disability :
acquiescence is ninefold ; perfectness eightfold.
*frfT
STRFR i
BHA'SHYA.
Five distinctions of obstruction ; namely, obscurity, illusion
extreme illusion, gloom, and utter darkness : these will pre
sently be explained. There are twenty-eight kinds of disabi
lity from defec tof instruments ; which also we shall describe.
Acquiescence is ninefold, being the kinds of knowledge par-
( 199 )
taking of the quality of foulness in an ascetic. Perfectncss is
eightfold, which in holy men consists also of the kinds of
knowledge partaking of the quality of goodness. These wiU
all be explained in order ; and first of obstruction.
COMMENT.
We have here the fifty varieties of intellectual creation, or
conditions dependent upon the faculties of intellect, simply
enumerated under each head respectively.
The text in each case is limited to the enumeration of the
number of the varieties, leaving their designations and des
criptions to be supplied by the scholia : accordingly we have in
the JBhdshf/a the five distinctions of obstructions specified.
They are referred to in the text, in the succeeding stanza, for
the purpose of enumerating their subdivisions, and it is un
necessary therefore to enter upon the detail here.
•v fv
?T*?T
XL VIII.
THE distinctions of obscurity are eightfold, as also
those of illusion ; extreme illusion is eighteenfold, and
so is utter darkness.
( 200 )
i <T*IT <jrf^g»FNpJ sgr* srffor
f%3
BHASHYA.
Obscurity is eightfold; final dissolution being so distin
guished through ignorance ; as when a person thinks that soul
merges into the eight forms of prakriti, or the five rudiments,
egotism, intellect, and nature, and thence concludes, I am
liberated : this is eightfold obscurity. The same is the num
ber of kinds of illusion ; in consequence of which, Indra and
the gods, being attached to the possession of the eight kinds
of super-human power, such as minuteness and the rest, do
not obtain liberation, but upon the loss of their power migrate
again : this is called eightfold illusion. Extreme illusion is of
ten kinds, accordingly as the five objects of sense, sound, touch,
form, taste, and smell, are sources of happiness to the gods or
to men. In these ten objects (or the five objects of sense
twice told) consists extreme illusion, Gloom is eighteen/old. —
The faculties of superhuman power are eight sources, and the
objects of sense, human or divine, are ten, making eighteen ;
and the feeling that makes men rejoice in the enjoyment of
$ese eighteen, and given for the want of them, is gloom
( 201 )
Utter darkness has in like manner eighteen varieties, origin a =
ting with the eightfold superhuman power and the ten objects
of perception ; but it applies to the profound grief felt by one
who dies amidst the abundance of sensual delights in the
season of enjoyment, or who falls from the command of super
human faculties ; that is utter darkness. In this manner the
five varieties of obstruction, obscurity and the rest, are sever*
ally subdivided, making sixty-two varieties.
COMMENT.
The five kinds of obstruction, ignorance> or uncertainty, al
luded to in the preceding stanza, are here specified, and their
subdivisions enumerated.
* Obstruction/ viparyaya*, means, properly, whatever ob
structs the soul's object of final liberation : it is consequently
any cause of bondage, of confinement to worldly existence, or
of perpetual migration, and is therefore one of the four ele
ments of the creation of the world ; as, if spirit was not so
confined, created forms would never have existed. So the
Sutra of KAPILA has, ' Bondage is from obstruction;-)-' but libe
ration depends on knowledge : bondage therefore arises from
ignorance, and ignorance or error is obstruction. GAURAPADA
accordingly uses sansaya^, ' doubt' or ' error/ as the synonyme
of viparyaya ; and the specification of its sub-species confirms
this sense of the term, as they are all hinderances to rural
emancipation, occasioned by ignorance of the difference be
tween soul and nature, or by an erroneous estimate of the
sources of happiness, placing it in sensual pleasure or super
human might.
The five varieties of obstruction or error are, ' obscurity/
tamas ; illusion/ moha ; extreme illusion/ mahdmoha ; ' gloom/
tdmisra ; ' utter darkness/ andhatdmisra. The distinctions
t ^
26
< 202 )
•are more subtle than precise, but their general purport is
sufficiently obvious ; they all imply ignorance of self, and
thirst of pleasure and power. Another enumeration, that of
the Yoga, or Pdtanjala school, as repeated by VIJNANA
BHIKSHU, calls the five species, ' ignorance' (avidyd), ' egoism"
(asmitd), ' love' (r&ga), ' hate' (dwesha), and ' idle terror,
(abhinive'sa), as fear of death and the like*. They are called
also in the same system, ' the five afflictions^.' These are
identified with the species named in the text. Obscurity is
that ignorance which believes soul to be sealed in primary
nature, or one of its first seven products ; and is therefore
eightfold. Illusion is that egoism that exults in the appro
priation of the eight superhuman faculties ; and is con
sequently eightfold also. Extreme illusion, or love, is ad
diction to sensual objects, as they are grateful respectively
to gods and men: therefore this class of impediments to
liberation is tenfold. Gloom, or hate, is of eighteen kinds ;
ten as affecting the ten objects of sense, or the five divine
and five human, as before distinguished, and termed by
GAUKAPADA drishta,]. l seen,' perceived by men ; and anusra-
vikd\\, ' heard traditionally,' by men, of the gods : and eight
connected with the possession of the eight superhuman facul
ties. The mental conditions here intended are those of fierce*
ness and impatience, with which sensual enjoyments are pur
sued, or superhuman powers are exercised. Utter darkness, or
terror, is the fear of death in men ; and in gods, the dread of
expulsion from heaven by the Asuras : in either case the loss of
pleasure and power is the thing lamented ; and as their sources
are eighteen, so many are the subdivisions of this condition.
These distinctions are said to be the work of former teachers ;
as in the S. Pravachana Bhdshya : ' The subdivisions are as
( 203 )
formerly described : that is, the subdivisions of obstruction,
which is said to be of five species, are such as were fully de
tailed by former teachers, but are in the Sutra but briefly
alluded to, for fear of prolixity*/
r*_ P . _»v ^ «
I %\ II
XLIX.
DEPRAVITY of the eleven organs, together with in
juries of the intellect, are pronounced to be disability,
The injuries of intellect are seventeen, by inversion
of acquiescence and perfectness.
( 204 )
BHASHYA.
From defect of instruments there are twenty-eight kinds of
disability ; this has been declared (ver. 47) : these are, depra
vity of the eleven organs, or deafness, blindness, paralysis, loss
of taste, loss of smell, dumbness, mutilation, lameness, con
stipation, impotence, and insanity. Together with injuries of
the intellect : as, together with these, there are twenty-eight
kinds of disability, there are seventeen kinds of injuries of the
intellect. By inversion of acquiescence and perfectness : that
is, there are nine kinds of acquiesence, and eight of perfect-
ness ; and with the circumstances that are the reverse of these
(seventeen), the eleven above specified, compose the twenty-
eight varieties of disability. The kinds of injury of the in
tellect which are the reverse of (the sorts of) acquiescence and
perfectness will be understood from the detail of their varieties.
The nine kinds of acquiescence are next explained.
COMMENT-
The various kinds of the second class of conditions or dis
ability are here enumerated.
' Disability,' asakti, or incapability of the intellect to dis
charge its peculiar functions*, is the necessary result of imper
fection of the senses, or of any of the organs of perception and
of action. But besides these, which are sufficiently obvious,
such as blindness, deafness, and any other organic defect, there
are seventeen affections of the intellect itself equally injurious
to its efficiency. These are described as the contraries of the
conditions which constitute the classes acquiescence and per
fectness. Under the former head are enumerated, dissatisfac
tion as to notions of nature, means, time, and luck, and addic
tion to enjoyment of the five objects of sense, or the pleasures
of sight, hearing, touching, &c. The contraries of perfectness
( 205 )
are, want of knowledge, whether derivable from reflection,
from tuition, or from study, endurance of the three kinds of
pain, privation of friendly intercourse, and absence of purity or
of liberality.
m: n ^ * n
L.
NINE sorts of acquiescence are propounded ; four
internal, relating to nature, to means, to time, and to
luck ; five external, relative, to abstinence from (en
joyment of) objects.
( 20G )
i <T*TT
?ra ^frfrr:
fa* i
BHASHYA.
Five internal sorts of acquiescence. — Those which are in the
individual are internal. They are said to relate to nature, to'
means, to time, and to luck. The first is, when a person under
stands what nature is, its being with or without qualities, and
thence knows a principle (of existence) to be a product of
nature ; but knows this only, and is satisfied : he does not
obtain liberation : this is acquiescence in regard to nature.
The second is, when a person, ignorant of the principles (of
existence), depends upon external means, such as the triple
staff, the water-pot, and other implements (used by ascetics) :
liberation is not for him : this is acquiescence in regard to means.
Acquiescence in regard to time is when a person satisfies him
self that liberation must occur in time, and that it is unne
cessary to study first principles : such a one does not obtain
liberation. And in the same way acquiescence as relates to
luck is when a person is content to think that by good luck
liberation will be attained. These are four kinds of acquie
scence. Five external, relative to abstinence from (enjoyment
of objects). — The external sorts of acquiescence are five ; from
'( 207 )
•abstinence from enjoyment of (five) objects of sense ; that I»
when a person abstains from gratification through sound,
touch, form, flavour, and smell ; such abstinence proceeding
from observation of (the evils of) acquiring, preserving, waste,
attachment (to sensual pleasures), and injuriousness. Acquir
ing is pain (or trouble), for the sake of increase, by the pastur
age of cattle, trade, acceptance of gifts, and servitude. There
is pain in the preservation of what has been acquired ; and if
they be enjoyed, they are wasted ; and waste, again, is vexa
tion. When attachment to sensual pleasures prevails, the
organs have no repose : that is the fault of such attachment
Without detriment to created things there is no enjoyment
(of sensible objects) ; and this is the defect of injuriousness.
From observing then the evil consequences of acquiring and
the rest, abstinence from enjoyment of the five objects of
sense is practised ; and these are the five sorts of external
acquiescence. From the variety of these internal and external
kinds proceed the nine sorts of acquiescence. Their names
are differently enumerated in other works, or ambhaSj salilam,
ogha, vrishti, sutamas, pdram, sunetram, ndrikam, and
anuttamdmbhasikam : and from the reverse of these kinds of
acquiescence, constituting the varieties of disability, injuries
of the intellect arise, named (according to the last mentioned
nomenclature) anambhas, asalilam, and so on. From the
contrariety of these, therefore, are inferred the injuries of
the intellect.
Perfectness is next described.
COMMENT.
The different kinds of acquiescence, apathy, or indifference,
are specified in this verse.
The kinds of acquiescence, content, or complacency, tushti,
are of two descriptions ; internal or spiritual, ddhydtmiJca, and
external or sensible, bahya. GAUKAPADA explains the former,
( 208 )
* being in self or spirit*/ VACHESPATI defines them, ' Those
kinds of acquiescence are called internal which proceed from
discrimination of self, as different from naturef.' According
to VIJNANA BHIKSHU> they are those principles or sentiments
which preside over collected or composed soulj. Of the dif
ferent species, the first, or that which relates to nature, ac
knowledges it as the radical principle of all things, but expects
that as every thing is but a modification of nature so nature
will effect all that is necessary, even liberation, for example,
and the individual / remains passive and completed. Another
person, as the means of liberation, adopts a religious or
mendicant order, or at least bears the emblems, as the staff,
the water-pot, and the like : the term vividikd used in the
Bhdshya is of doubtful import, and is perhaps an error.
Others suppose that liberation must come in time, or at
least by a long continued course of meditation. Others
imagine it may come by good luck ; and contenting themselves
with these notions or practices, omit the only means of being
freed from existence, discriminative meditation. The five
external kinds of acquiescence are self-denial, or abstinence
from the five objects of sensual gratification ; not from any
philosophic appreciation of them, but from dread of the trouble
and anxiety which attends the means of procuring and enjoy
ing worldly pleasures ; such as acquiring wealth, preserving it,
spending it, incessant excitement and injury or cruelty to
others. Besides the terms ordinarily significant of those divi
sions of acquiescence, the Scholiasts specify other words, the
usual sense of which is quite different, and which may there
fore be regarded as the slang or mystical nomenclature of the
i t
: i J
y
( 209 )
followers of the Yoga,. There is some difference in the precise
expressions, but they are of a similar purport in general. The
first four, the synonymes of the internal modes of acquiescence .
are alike in all the authorities ; or ambhas*, ' water ;' salila^,
also ' water ;' ogha+, ' quantity ;' and vrishtill,' ' rain.' GAURA-
PADA then has for the five exterior modes, sutamas§, ' great
darkness ;' pdra^, ' shore ;' sune'tra**, ( a beautiful eye ;' nd-
rika-ff, ( feminine ;' and anuttamdmbhisika+l, ' unsurpassed
water/ VAGHESPATI makes them, p&ram, supdram\\\\, ' good
shore ;' apdram§§, ' shoreless ;' amuttamambhas^ , ' unsur
passed water ;' and uttamdmbhas*** , * excellent water.' The
Chandrikdj has the same, except in the third place, where the
term is pdrdpdrflftt, ' both shores ;' with which the 8. Prav.
Bh. agrees. No explanation of the words is any where given,
nor is any reason assigned for their adoption.
: \\ H i n
LI.
REASONING, hearing, study, prevention of pain of
three sorts, intercourse of friends, and purity (or gift)
are perfections (or means thereof). The fore-mention
ed three are curbs of perfectness.
i a*r. i
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ttf
27'
( 210 )
t f%
2-
wr
faf^t i
qri%
-
rr
mqqr
it:
f% ^rp
'
( 211 )
BHA'SHYA,
Reasoning ; as when a person always reasons. What here is
truth ? What is the future ? What is final felicity ? How may
I attain the object (of my existence) ? and from reflecting in
this manner, the knowledge is acquired that soul is different
from nature ; that intellect, egotism, the rudiments, the senses,
the elements, are several and distinct. In this manner know
ledge of the (twenty-five) principles is attained, by which
liberation is accomplished. This is the first kind of perfect-
ness, called reasoning. Next, from knowledge acquired by
hearing proceeds knowledge of nature, intellect, egotism, the
rudiments, the senses, and the elements ; whence liberation
ensues : this is pcrfectness by hearing. When from study, or
the perusal of the Yedas and other (sacred) writings, know
ledge of the twenty-five principles is acquired ; that is the
third kind of pcrfectness. Prevention of the three kinds of
pain. — When, for the purpose of preventing the three kinds
of pain, internal, external, and saperhuman, a holy teacher has
been attended, and liberation is derived from his counsel ; then
this constitutes the fourth kind of perfectness. This is three-
fold, with reference to the three different sorts of pain, and
makes, with the three preceding, six varieties of perfectness.
Next, 'intercourse of friend*>\u& when a friend, having acquired
knowledge, obtains liberation : this the seventh kind of perfect-
ness, Gift ; as when a person assists holy men, by donations
( 212 )
of a dwelling, of herbs, of a staff, a wallet, food, or clothing ;
and (in requital) receives from them knowledge, and thus ob
tains liberation : this is the eighth sort of perfectness. In
other books these eight kinds of perfectness are termed /dram,
sutdram, tdrat&ram, pramodam, pramoditam, pramodamd-
nam, ramyakam, and sadfrpramuditam. From contrariety
to these, the injuries of intellect which occur, or causes of dis
ability, are termed atdram, astitardm, &c. ; thus completing
the twenty-eight kinds of disability, as in the text (ver. 49),
" Depravity of the eleven organs, together with injuries of the
intellect," &c. Thus the contraries of the sorts of acquiescence
being nine, and the contraries of the kinds of perfectness being
eight, they form seventeen injuries of intellect ; and these, with
the eleven defects of the organs, constitute twenty-eight kinds
of disability, as previously stated.
In this way the various kinds of obstruction, disability,
acquiescence, and perfectness, have been affirmatively and
negatively described. Again, the forementioned three are
curbs of perfectness. — Forementioned; that is, obstruction,
disability, and acquiescence; they are curbs of perfectness
threefold curbs from their severalty. As an elephant is kept
in check when restrained by a goad (or curb), so, impeded by
obstruction, disability, and acquiescence, the world suffers
ignorance : therefore abandoning them, perfectness alone is to
be pursued ; for by a person having perfectness knowledge is
attained, and thence liberation.
It was stated (ver. 40) that " subtile body migrates, invested
with dispositions :" those dispositions were previously said to
be virtue and the rest, eight in number, modifications (or
faculties) of intellect ; which again have been described as
modified by obstruction, disability, acquiescence, and perfect-
ness. These (together) constitute intellectual creation, also
called dispositional (or conditional) : but subtile body is called
a rudimental (or personal) creation, extending throughout the
fourteen sorts of created things. (See v. 53.) It then becomes
a question, whether soul's purpose is accomplished by one kind
of creation, or by both ? This is next explained.
( 213 )
COMMENT.
Tho different kinds of perfectness are here specified.
By ' perfectness,' siddhi*, is here to be understood the means
of perfecting or fulfilling the purpose of soul, or the conditions
essential to its attainment ; the circumstances productive of
knowledge ; the necessary consequence of which is exemption
from future transmigration. ' f Reasoning, hearing, study,
intercourse of friends, and gift, are secondary kinds of perfect-
ness, as subsidiary to the prevention of the three kinds of pain,
which constitutes a triple principal class : they are respectively
distinguished as objects, and the means of effecting those
objects/ S. Taiva Kaumudi. Reasoning, according to
VACHESPATI, is ' investigation of scriptural authority by dia
lectics which are not contrary to the scriptures :' and investi
gation is defined, : refutation of dubious doctrine, and esta
blishment of positive conclusions^.' ' Hearing is oral instruc
tion, or rather the knowledge thence derived, or knowledge
derived either from hearing another person read, or from ex
pounding a work||.' 8. Pr. Bh. Intercourse of friends^ is
explained in the S. Tatwa Kaumudi to signify ' dissatisfac
tion with solitary inquiry, and discussion with a teacher, a
pupil, or a fellow-studentHV VIJNANA BHIKSHU defines it
' acquirement of knowledge from a benevolent visitor, who,
comes to give instruction**.' VACHESPATI and NARAYANA
agree in rendering ddna-ff — which GAURAPADA explains by
a J aTr^mWi^^mryTirmfr^^ i
i § gf^rfir. i ^ g
! *•-
: i tf- ^R i
( 214 )
1 gift, liberality/ particularly to religious characters-by \suddhi*,
' purity ;' meaning the purity of discriminative knowledge ;
deriving it from the root <iaipt, ' to purify ;' and not from
rfdj, ' to give/ The former cites the authority of PATANJALI
for this sense of one kind of perfectness : ' Undisturbedness of
discriminative knowledge, that is, purity ; which is not attain
ed except through long repeated and uninterrupted practice of
veneration, That is also comprehended in discrimination by
the term ddna\\. He also observes that others interpret
it 'gift, by which a sage, being propitiated, imparts know
ledge^' The S. Prav. Bh. gives this interpretation only!!".
The term for ' curb,' ankusa**, is the goad or iron hook used to
guide an elephant : it is here explained by nivdrana, 6 hinder
ing ;' and ' as obstruction, disability, and acquiescence hinder
perfectness, they are to be shunnedff /
L1I.
WITHOUT dispositions there would be no subtile per
son : without person there would be no pause of dispo
sitions : wherefore a twofold creation is presented, one
termed personal, the other intellectual.
J
( '215 )
BHASHYA.
Without dispositions, without intellectual creations, there
ivoiM be no subtile person, no rudimental creation ; from the
non-assumption of repeated successive bodily forms, without
the necessary influence of anterior conditions (or dispositions).
Withowitt person, without rudimental creation, there would be
no pause of dispositions ; from the indispensability of virtue
or vice for the attainment of either subtile or gross body, and
from the non-priority of either creation, they being mutually
initiative, like the seed and the germ. There is no fault in
this, for (the relation) is that of species, it does not imply the
mutual relation of individuals. Thence proceeds a twofold
creation, one termed conditional (or intellectual), the other
rudimental (or personal), Further —
COMMENT.
It is here explained that a double condition of existence, a
twofold creation, necessarily prevails ; one proceeding from the
intellectual faculties, the other from the rudimental elements ;
each being indispensable to the other.
It was stated (ver. 40) that subtile body migrates, invested
with dispositions : and it was then explained (ver 43, et seq.)
what those dispositions or conditions were, viz. the conditions
of the intellect (described in ver. 23), or virtue, vice, know
ledge, ignorance, passion, dispassion, power, and debility.
These were said ^(v. 46) to constitute an intellectual creation;
( -216 )
or a series of conditions originating in affections of buddhi, or
the intellectual principle. But the effects of these dispositions,
the consequences of virtue or vice and the rest, can only be
manifested in a bodily state, and therefore require necessarily
a creation of a different character, personal or rudimental
creation, such as subtile body, investing the imperceptible
products of nature ; intellect and its faculties included. Nor
is such a creation indispensable for the existence or exercise of
the intellectual conditions or sentiments alone, but it is equally
necessary for their occasional cessation : thus virtue, vice, and
the rest necessarily imply and occasion bodily condition :
bodily condition is productive of acts of vice and virtue ; vice
and virtue, again, occasion bodily condition ; and so on : like
the seed and the tree, each mutually generative of the other :
the tree bears the seed ; from the seed springs the tree, again
to put forth seed ; and so on for ever ; neither being initiative,
neither being final. But one result of bodily condition is
knowledge ; knowledge is liberation, when soul is disengaged ;
subtile body then resolves into its rudiments, and the dis
positions or conditions of the intellect terminate. In this way
there are two creations, the bhdvdkhya*, that termed ' con
ditional ' or ' intellectual ;' and the lingdkhya'f, that called
' rudimental' or ' personal.' Both these seem to be considered
by the text, as well as by GAUHAPA'DA and VA'CHESPATI, as
varieties of one species of the Pratyaya sarga, or ' intellectual
creation/ The commentator on the $. Pravachana so far
agrees with them, but he seems to restrict the two kinds
more closely to a creation of intellect, regarding the linga
as buddhi itself, and the blidva as its conditions or dis
positions. Thus, commenting on this verse of the Kdrikdt
he observes, ' J3hAva signifies the modes of the apprehen
sion (or the faculties) of intelligence, as the properties
knowledge, virtue, and the rest. Linya is the great
( 217 )
principle, or intelligence*.' He calls them both samashti
sarga, ' a collective or generic creation.' By the other com
mentators, however, the lingct is also called the tanmdtra, or
' rudimental creationf:' and it further seems to imply ' gross
body ;' for fruition, which is one of soul's objects, cannot be
accomplished without both bodies ; without the receptacle that
enjoys, and the objects to be enjoyed^.' The author of the
Chandrikd has accordingly adopted a totally different version
of this passage, understanding by bhdvdkhya, not any reference
to intellectual creation, but the creation of sensible objects,
the object to be enjoyed ; lingdkhya, or * personal creation/
being the enjoy er : ' Without the bh&vas, or present objects of
sense, the lingo,, or aggregate of imperceptible principles,
intelligence and the rest, could not be means of fruition ;
whilst without intelligence and the rest there could be no
pause, no cessation, of the means of enjoying sensible objects.
This is the purport of text||.' And he defines linga to be * that
which is only indicated, which is actually not visible, as intel
lect and the rest ;' and bhdva, * that object which is perceived
or apprehended by the senses, the class of sensible objects§.'
The succession of the two kinds of creation, as mutually
cause and effect, is said by VACHESPATI to be eternal, and with
out a beginning, as even in the commencement of a kalpa bo
dily existence results from the conditions of similar existence
in a former
foif RI^ST f^ftfir i f fe-
i J
t || *rrt: sR
fe^r
f&r n^r^imT^^: i
28
( 218 >
3T5 fNjsq 1^ I^FT 4^*1 ¥RI% II
LIII.
THE divine kinds of eight sorts ; the grovelling is
fivefold ; mankind is single in its class. This, briefly,
is the world of living beings.
era1
BHASHYA.
Divine, of eight sorts ; Brahma, Prajapatya, Saumya, Aindra,
Gandherba, Yaksha, Rakshasha, and Paisacha. Animals, deer,
birds, reptiles, and immovable substances are the five grovel-
ling kinds. MwnJcind is single. In this way there are four
teen sorts of creatures, there being three classes in the three
worlds. Which is supreme in each is next explained.
COMMENT. 1
The intellectual or rudimental creation hitherto described
has been that of creation generally ; we now have an account
of specific or individual creation, composed of fourteen classes
of beings.
The fourteen classes of beings are, first, eight superhuman,
or Brahma, that of BHAHMA and other supreme gods ; 2. PrA*
japatya, that of progenitors, the Menus, the Rishis, or divine
sages; 3. tiawnya, lunar or planetary; 4. Aindra, that of
INDRA and divinities of the second order ; 5. Gdndhcrba, that
of the demigods attendant on IXDRA, and of similar beings ;
( 219 )
6. ltdkskasa, that of demons, foes of the gods ; 7. Ydkxhay that
of the attendants of KUVERA ; 8. Paisacha, that of mischiev
ous and cruel fiends. These are divine or superhuman beings.
The ninth class is that of man, which contains but one species.
We have then five classes of inferior beings ; or, counting from
the preceding, 10. Animals, or domestic animals, pdsu; 11,
Wild animals, as deer and the like, tnriga ; 12. Birds; 12.
Keptiles, or creeping things, including fish sarisripa ; and 14.
Sthdvara, fixed things, such as vegetables and minerals.
These constitute the vyashti serya*, specific or individual
creation ; or, as denominated in the text, the bhautika sarga,
the creation of bliutas, ' beings ;' or elemental creation ; the
forms of things requiring the combination of the gross elements.
II 18 II
LIV,
ABOVE, there is prevalence of goodness : below, the
ereation is full of darkness : in the midst, is the pre
dominance of foulness, from BRAHMA to a stock.
i
( 220 )
BHASHYA.
Above: in the eight divine regions. Prevalence of goodness:
the extensiveness or predominance of the quality of goodness.
Above is goodness predominant, but there are foulness and
darkness also. Below, the creation is full of darkness. — In
animals and insensible things the whole creation is pervaded
by darkness in excess, but there are goodness and foulness.
In the midst, in man, foulness predominates, although good
ness and darkness exist ; and hence men for the most part
suffer pain. Such is the world, from BRAHMA to a stock ; from
BRAHMA to immovable ^ things. Thus non-elemental creation,
rudimental creation, conditional and elemental creation, in
beings of divine, mortal, brutal, and (immoveable) origin, are
the sixteen sorts of creation effected by nature.
COMMENT
The various qualities dominating in the different orders of
beings are specified in this stanza.
The coexistence of the several qualities, with the predomi
nance of one or other of them, in different beings, has been
previously explained (p. 54), as well as the different orders or
states of existent beings ; constituting, according to GAURA-
PADA, sixteen forms or kinds of creation : that is, apparently,
each of the four classes of beings proceeds from four modifica
tions of nature ; or, from the invisible principles, from the
subtile rudiments, from the conditions or dispositions of in
tellect, and from the gross elements.
IIXHII
( 221 )
LV.
THERE does sentient soul experience pain, arising
from decay and death, until it be released from its
person : wherefore pain is of the essence (of bodily
existence).
BHASHYA.
: in the bodies of gods, men, and animals. Pain pro
duced lay decay, and produced by death. Sentient soul: soul
having sensibility. Experiences : soul experiences ; not nature,
nor intellect, nor egotism, nor the rudiments, senses, nor gross
elements. How long does it suffer pain ? this (tke text) dis
cusses. Until it be released from its person. As long as it
is in subtile body, composed of intellect and the rest, it is
discrete (or individualized); and as long as migratory body does
( 222 )
not rest, so long, in brief, soul suffers pain, arising from decay
and death, in the three worlds. Until it be released from its
person : until the discontinuance of subtile person. In the
cessation of subtile body consists liberation ; and when libera
tion is obtained, there is no more pain. By what means, then,
can liberation be effected ? Whenever knowledge of the twenty-
five principles, the characteristic of which is knowledge of the
distinctness of soul and body, is attained ; or whenever a
person knows that this is nature, this intellect, this egotism
these are the five rudiments, these the eleven senses, these
the five elements, and this is soul, separate and dissimilar
from them all ; then from such knowledge proceeds cessation
of subtile person, and thence liberation.
The object of the activity (or development of nature) is
next explained.
COMMENT-
The presence of soul in these creations, and for what period,
is here specified.
Having defined the different objects which form the twenty-
five categories or tatwas of the Sankhya philosophy, the text
now comes to the main object of that and of all Hindu systems,
the final dissolution of the connection between soul and body.
The rest of the Kdrika is devoted to the illustration of this
topic. In this verse it is said that soul experiences pain in
the different stages of existence, until its corporeal frame is
discontinued ; for soul itself is not susceptible of pain, or of
decay, or death : the site of these things is nature, but nature
is unconscious,* insensible ; and the consciousness that pain
exists is restricted to soul, though soul is not the actual seat of
pain ; its experience of pain depends upon its connexion with
rudimental person, of the material constituents of which, decay,
death, and pain are concomitants. c Pain and the rest are
from nature, they are properties of intelligence. How do they
become connected with sense ? Soul (purusha) is that which
reposes (s'cte) in body (puri) : subtile body is immediately con-
( 223 )
nected with it, and becomes thereby connected with sense*.4
S. Tatwa Kaumudi. When soul is released from body, its
susceptibility of pain ceases : pain is therefore of the essencet
of its own nature ; that is, it is the inseparable concomitant of
bodily creation, according to PATANJALI, as quoted in the
S. Chandrikd : ' All is pain to the wise, through the conflict
of opposite qualities, and by the sufferings arising from
afflicting vicissitudes^;' that is, from dread of death and the
reiteration of birth ; to which even the conditions of spirits,
sages, and gods are subject. Thus the Sutra of KAriLA : t The
pain of death, decay, and the rest^is universal!! ;' as explained in
the S. Prav. Bhdshya : ' The pain of death, decay, and the rest
is the common portion of all beings, whether above or below,
from BRAHMA to immovable things§.' So also another Sutra :
1 It is to be shunned, from the connection of successive birth
by the thread of regeneration^:' that is, according to the com
mentator, ' since regeneration is unavoidable, even after ascent
to the regions above ; and in consequence of the succession of
births, that regeneration must be in an inferior condition ; even
the world above is to be shunned**.7 GAURAPA'DA and VA'CHES-
PATI take no notice of the expression, ' Pain is of the essence.'
The S. Chandrikd explains it, ' Creation is essentially of 'the
nature of painff.' RAMA KRISHNA calls it, ' Former acts ;'| the
acts of a former life.JJ
tfer JJK fen Sia 3^; i fetf ^ cRawFsfnTr %5RtePr c
: i t wff^r i
u
**
tt ^?T^q ^ Ti^^q: I
( 224 )
: mil
LVI.
THIS evolution, of nature, from intellect to the spe
cial elements, is performed for the deliverance of each
soul respectively ; done for another's sake as for itself.
BHASHYA.
This (or c thus, this/ ifyesha} implies conclusivcncss and
limitation (that is in this way all that has been hitherto des
cribed). Evolution of nature : in the instrumentality or act of
( 225 )
nature. Whatever evolution of nature, from intellect to the
special elements : that is, (the evolution) of intellect from na
ture ; of egotism from intellect ; of the rudiments and senses
from egotism ; and of the gross elements from the subtile.
Is performed for the deliverance of each soul respectively. —
This evolution is effected for the liberation of each individual
soul which has assumed body, whether brute, human, or divine.
How (is it effected) ? It is done for another's sake as for self:
as, for instance, a person neglecting his own objects transacts
those of a friend, so does nature ; soul makes no return to
nature. As for self; not for self: for the sake, in fact, of
another is the apprehension of sound and the other objects of
sense, or knowledge of the difference between soul and quali
ties ; for souls are to be provided (by nature), in the three
worlds, with objects of sense, and at last with liberation : such
is the agency of nature ; as it is said, " Nature is like a utensil,
having fulfilled soul's object it ceases."
It is here objected, Nature is irrational, Soul is rational ;
then how can nature, like a rational thing, understand that by^
me, soul is to be provided in the three worlds with the objects
of sense, and at last with liberation ? This is true ; but action"
and cessation of action are both observedfin irrational things ;
whence it is said —
COMMENT.
The object of nature's activity is here said to be the final
liberation of individual soul.
Nature is properly inert, and its activity, its ._" motion" or
evolution, takes place only for the purpose of soul, not for any
object of its own. The term is drambha ' commencement,',
successive origin or beginning,' as detailed in former passages :
that is, of intellect from crude nature; of egotism from in
tellect ; and so on. This is the spontaneous act of nature : '*
it is not influenced by any external intelligent principle, such
as the Supreme Being or a subordinate agent ; as BKAHMA, ife
29
( 226 )
is without (external) cause*.' ' But it is objected, Nature being
eternal, her works should be so too ; and forms once evolved
should therefore endure for ever. To this it is replied, The
work is done for a special purpose, the liberation of individual
aoul ; and that when this is accomplished, nature ceases with
regard to that individual, as a man boiling rice for a meal
desists when it is dressedf/ 8. Tatwa Kaumudi. According
to GAURAPADA, and to the text of the following stanza, nature
so acts spontaneously ; but the incompetency of nature, an
irrational principle, to institute a course of action for a definite
purpose, and the unfitness of rational soul to regulate the
acts of an agent whose character it imperfectly apprehends,
constitute a principal argument with the theistical Sankhyas
for the necessity of a Providence, to whom the ends of exist
ence are known, and by whom nature is guided, as stated by
VACHESPATI : ' But whether this (evolution) be for its own
purpose or that of another, it is a rational principle that acts.
Nature cannot act without rationality, and therefore there
must be a reason which directs nature. Embodied souls, though
rational, cannot direct nature, as they are ignorant of its
character ; therefore there is an omniscient Being, the director
of nature, tfhich is Iswara, or God?.' This is not inconsistent
with the previous doctrine, that creation is the evolution of
nature: it is so, but under the guidance of a ruling Power.
The atheistical Sankhyas, on the other hand, contend that
there is no occasion for a guiding Providence, but that the
activity of nature, for the purpose of accomplishing soul's
object, is an intuitive necessity, as illustrated in the ensuing
passage.
qf% SUfrRfa'Tfi:^ ft^ffcT ^ SKW Wtffafa SffTTF R-
J ^f
OT^ftcT
f^i IW
( 227 )
n
LVL
As it is a function of milk, an unintelligent (sub
stance), to nourish the calf, so it is the office of the
chief (principle) to liberate the soul.
BH^SHYA.
AS grass and water taken by the cow become eliminated into
) and nourish the calf ; and as (the secretion ceases) when
the calf is grown ; so nature (acts spontaneously) for the libera
tion of soul, This is the agency of an unintelligent thing.
COMMENT.
The intuitive or spontaneous evolution of nature, for soul's
purpose, is here illustrated.
As the breast secretes milk for a purpose of which it is un-
coEscious, and unconsciously stops when that purpose, the
nutriment of the young animal, is effected ; so nature, though
irrational, constructs bodily forms for the fruition and libera
tion of soul ; and when the latter is accomplished ceases to
evolve. The illustration is from KAPILA, as in the Sutra,
« From irrationality the activity of nature is like (the secretion
of) milk*.'
( 228 )
LVIII.
As people engage in acts to relieve desires, so does
the undiscrete (principle) to liberate the soul.
BHA'SHYA,
As mankind, being influenced bj desire, engage in acts of
various kinds for its gratification or fulfilment, and desist when
the object is accomplished, so the Chief one, active for the
purpose of liberating soul, desists, after having effected the
twofold purpose of soul ; one, cognizance of enjoyment of the
objects of sense ; the other, cognizance of the difference be
tween soul and qualities.
COMMENT-
' Another illustration is here give of the activity of nature.
According to VACHESPATI, this verse is an explanation of
the phrase (in ver. 56), ' For another's sake as for self*;' assign
ing, in fact, an object to nature, the accomplishment of its own
wish ; ftutaukya being rendered by ichchhd, ' wish :' and this
wish, which is, ' the liberation of soul, being gratified, nature
desistsf.'
( 229 )
: 11 H * H
LIX.
As a dancer, having exhibited herself to the specta
tor desists from the dance, so does nature desist-
having manifested herself to soul.
BHASHYA.
As a dancer (or actress), having exhibited her performances
on the stage in dramatic representations, rendered interesting
by the display of love and other passions, in situations drawn
from history or tradition, and accompanied by music and sing
ing, desists from acting when her part is finished, so nature,
having exhibited itself to soul, in the various characters of
intellect, egotism, the rudiments, senses, and elements desists.
What the cause of such cessation is, is next described.
COMMENT-
An illustration is here given of the discontinuance of nature's
activity. Manga, properly a stage or theatre, is said in the
S. Tatwa Kaumudi to imply also the audience*. A dancer is
equally an actress, narttalci, at least was so in ancient times,
The dancing girls of Hindustan are rather singers, than either
actresses or dancers.
* np&ftr
( 230 )
I! ^ • II
LX.
GENEROUS nature, endued with qualities, does by
manifold means accomplish without benefit (to her.
self) the wish of ungrateful soul, devoid as he is of
qualities.
?T<f
f^Tf TfT ^ f%
BHA'SHYA.
By manifold means. — Nature is the benefactress of soul, of
unrequiting soul. How ? By the characters of men, gods, and
animals ; by circumstances involving pain, pleasure, and in
sensibility ; by the properties of the objects of sense : in this
way having by various means exhibited herself to soul, and
shewn that ' I am one ; thou art another ;' having done this,
nature desists. Thus she accomplishes the wish of that (soul)
which is eternal, without benefit (to herself) : as a benevolent
man gives assistance to all, and seeks no return for himself
so nature pursues or effects the purpose of soul, without deri
ving from it any advantage.
It was said above (ver. 59), " Having manifested herself,
nature desists." It is next shewn what he does, having desisted.
( 231 )
COMMENT-
This verse may be considered as a further explanation of
the expression in ver. 56, " Nature labours for the benefit of
soul as if for self, but not for any advantage."
* Generous, benevolent*:' ' Not expecting a return ; for it is
not true generosity to do good to another with the expectation
of requitalf.' S. Chandrikd. ' Soul being devoid of qualities
(ver. 19), is consequently devoid of action, and can therefore
do nothing by way of return^.' Nature ' accomplishes, goes to',
charati or dcharati, or ' effect,' kurute. The last word of the
verse is differently read.
II
iu i n
LXI.
NOTHING, in my opinion, is more gentle than nature;
once aware of having been seen, she does not again
expose herself to the gaze of soul.
t i
( 232 )
??
: farrftfr
BHA'SHYA,
There is nothing in the world more soft (gentle, timid) than
nature, in my opinion : for which reason (nature's) opinion
consults another's advantage. Wherefore nature says to her
self, " I have been beheld by that soul," and does not again
present herself to the view of that soul ; that is, she disappears
from the presence of soul. That indicates what the text means
by gentle.
It (the next ?) declares Iswara (God) to be the cause of the
world : thus ; " Let this ignorant, brute, godless (soul), for its
own pleasure or pain, go to heaven or hell, sent (thither) by
Iswara" Others say, spontaneity is cause: 4'By what (or
( 233 )
whom) the swan is created white, the peacock of many
colours ;" that is, they arc so naturally (or spontaneously).
Here, therefore, the Sankhya teachers have said, how can be
ings endowed with qualities proceed from Iswava, who is de
void of qualities ? or how from soul, equally devoid of qualities ?
Therereforc (the causality) of nature is rendered probable.
Thus ; from, white threads white cloth is fabricated ; from black
threads black cloth : and in the same manner, from nature,
endowed with the three qualities, the three worlds, endowed
with the three qualities also, arc produced. This is determined,
Iswara is without qualities : the origin of the three worlds en
dowed with qualities, from him, would therefore be an incon
sistency. By this (same reason) soul also cannot be cause.
According to some, time is cause : a Time is the five elements ;
time destroys the world ; time watches, when all things sleep ;
time is not to be surpassed." There are but three categories,
the discrete principle, the undiscrete principle, and soul ; arid
by one of them time must be comprehended. Time, then, is a
discrete principle; for nature, from its universal creative
power, is the cause of them; spontaneity merges into it
(nature) : and time, therefore, is not cause ; neither is spon
taneity. Nature alone, therefore, is cause ; and there is no
cause of nature. She does not again expose herself to the
(jaze of so td. Therefore it is my opinion that there is no
cause more gentle, more enjoyable, than nature, such as Isiva-iu
and the rest.
It is said familiarly in the stanzas of the text, " Soul is
liberated ; soul migrates :" on this it is observed —
COMMENT-
Nature being once properly understood by soul ceases to act,
Nature being once fully seen — that is, known or understood
—by soul : disappears, goes no more into its sight ; it ceases
to be, with respect to that individual soul. Why is this ?
Because it is the most soft, the most gentle or timid S-uku-
mdratara, of all things. The term ktwidra, properly imply-
30
ing ' soft' or ' young,* is explained by the Scholiasts to signify
c bashful, modest, unable to bear the gaze of soul*.' VACHES-
PATI, Sukumdratam saki-jja^, NAKAYANA and RAMA
KRISHNA. In the S. Bhdshya it is rendered by subhogycdara^,
< more fit to be enjoyed ;' but this refers less to the meta
phorical illustration, than to the doctrine, of the text, and
might be rendered, ' more plastic ;' there being nothing so
suitable as nature (matter) for the cause or origin of sensible
objects. The S. Tatwa Kaumudi amplifies and explains the
illustration : ' Nature is like a woman of virtue and family :
such a one, of retired habits and modest looks, may be, by
some inadvertence, surprised in disabille by a strange man, but
she takes good care that another shall not behold her off her
guard. Nature being once fully seen by discrimination, has
too much matronly decorum to allow herself to be looked at a
second time||.' The S. Chandrikd has a similar exposition§,
The S. PravadiUMU Bh. cites this verse in explanation of the
Sutra. •' Upon the detection of her faults, there is no further
approach of nature (to soul) ; like a woman of family'IY that is,
' When nature finds that soul has discovered it is to her that
the distress, &c. of migration are owing, she is put to shame
by the detection, and ventures no more near soul ; as a woman
of family keeps aloof from a husband by whom she knows her
faults to have been found out. And this is considered as an
additional reason for the discontinuance of the activity of
nature**.' This is my opinion^ refers to what has preceded,
t
ft
wmr
If
I ft ?fift
( 235 )
there is nothing more yentle, as is shown by the termfti;
also by the Bhdahya of GAURAPADA. It is clear, therefore,
that the expression refers to the author ; such is his opinion 5
that is, he does not here dogmatise, and say that nature is
actually more timid or soft than any thing else — for the phrase
is merely a figure of speech, a metaphorical illustration — but
that it seems so to him ; the words having the force of ' me-
thinks, it seems :' c Nature, it seems to me, or methinks, is
the most soft, timid, retiring, of all things, and cannot
bear to be started at rudely : once seen, therefore, as she
Is, she takes care, like a truly modest matron, to be seen
no more.' Such is the obvious purport of the text, which
is merely a further illustration of the idea conveyed in
ver. 59. GAURAPADA has gone out of his way rather to
discuss the character of a first cause; giving to sukumd-
ratara a peculiar import, that of ' enjoyable, preceptible ;'
which nature eminently is, and is therefore, according to him,
the most appropriate source of all perceptible objects, or, in
other words, of creation.
II ^ II
LXII.
VERILY not any soul is bound, nor is. released, nor
migrates ; but nature alone, in relation to various
beings, is bound, is released, and migrates.
( 236 )
BHASHYA.
Therefore, from that cause, soul is not bound, nor indeed is
loosed, nor migrates ; for, because, nature, in relation to vari
ous beings — in relation (or connection) with celestial, human,
or brute forms, in the character of intellect, egotism, the rudi
ments, senses, and gross elements — is bound, is liberated, or
migrates. For soul is of its own nature loosed, and goes every
where, and how therefore should it migrate ? migration being
for the purpose of obtaining something not previously ob
tained. The phrases, therefore, Soul is bound, Soul is loose
or migrates, originate in ignorance of the nature of migration.
From knowledge, the end of soul and existence, the real nature
of soul is attained. The being manifest, soul is single, pure,
free, fixed in its own nature. Consequently if there is no
bondage there can be no liberation of soul. It is therefore
said (see next verse), "Nature binds and liberates herself;"
for where subtile body, composed of the rudiments, and having
a triple cause, exists, such body is bound with triple bounds ;
as it is said, " He who is bound by the bonds of nature," of
nature's products or of works, c: cannot by any other be loosed"
( 237 )
(see Comment, ver. 45), Such a subtile body is affected by
virtue, vice, &c.
Nature is bound, is loosed, and migrates, How is next
described.
COMMENT.
The subjection of nature, not of soul, to the accidents of
bondage, liberation, and migration is asserted in this verse.
The doctrine here laid down seems at variance with what
has preceded, and with the usual purport of the notions that
attach the accidents of bondage and liberation to soul. Appa
rently, however, the difference is one of words only.
Soul is incapable of action, consequently is not liable to
change. It cannot be bound, as the consequence of acts which
it does not perform ; and as it is never in bondage, it cannot
be set free. The application of these terms to soul, therefore,
is to be understood in a relative not in a positive sense ; and
their positive signification is properly restricted to nature. It
is nature that is bound, nature that is liberated, nature that
undergoes change or migration. When nature attaches her
self to soul, when she separates from it, the converse is equally
true, soul is attached to, or is separated from, nature ; and is
consequently said to be bound, to be set free, to undergo
change. But soul is passive in all these things ; it is nature
that is active, that binds, loosens, or changes form. GAURA-
PABAS explanation of these subtleties is not very clear, but
such appears to be his understanding of the text. So also
VACHESPATI : ' Soul is without qualities and exempt from
vicissitude. How then can it be liberated ? To soul, not liable
to change, there could apply none of the circumstances termed
bondage, arising from acts, sufferings, or consciousness : nor
could worldly change or migration, another name for which is
death, affect soul, incapable of action*.' The same coinmenta-
( 238 )
tor adds, ' These circumstances, which are in truth the acts
and conditions of nature, are ascribed to and affect soul as the
superior, in the same manner that victory and defeat are
attributed and relate to a king, although actually occurring to
his generals ; for they are his servants, and the gain or loss is
his, not theirs**' So NARAYANA explains the text : ' Binding
is the confinement of nature, in the various forms of intellect ,
&c, ; and bondage and liberation are attributed to soul only
through the contiguity of intellect, to which they belong, and
not to soulf.' It is from ignorance only that bondage and
liberation are ascribed to soul ; as by the Sutraf, as explained
by the Scholiast, ' Binding and liberation, or endurance of,
and exemption from pain, are not (conditions) of soul in
reality or absolutely, but (are considered as such) from
ignorance ; for the binding and liberation mentioned are
(conditions) of naturej].' So also the Sutra§, ' From actual pain
suffered by nature proceed binding and liberation, and from
its attachments ; that is, from its being affected by virtue and
the rest, which are the causes of pain ; like an animal ; that is,
as an animal may be bound or loosed, when entangled in a
ropeHV The distinction, after all, is little more than nominal,
except as it is the necessary consequence of the inactivity
attributed to the soul.
srercRr
?r*?wncfaicT ^ %^ =r 5 a^rccfrfa vim i J
i
( 239 )
am
LXIII.
BY seven modes nature binds herself by herself . by
one, she releases (herself), for the soul's wish.
BKA'SHYA.
^?/ seven modes. — These seveu have been specified, as virtue
dispassion, power, vice, ignorance, passion, and weakness.
These are the seven modes (or condtions) of nature by which
she binds herself, of herself. And that same nature, having
ascertained that soul's object is to be accomplished, liberates
heself by one mode, or by knowledge.
How is that knowledge produced 1
COMMENT-
Nature is bound by seven modes, and liberated by one,
Nature binds herself by acts of whatever kind, especially by
the faculties of intellect, enumerated above (ver. 23). She
binds herself of her own accord. She frees herself by one
mode, by the acquisition of philosophical knowledge* ' Nature
( 240 )
binds herself (in her own work), like a silkworm in its cocoon*.'
Siltra. Atman is here uniformly explained by viva, i own
self.'
I!
LXIV.
So. through study of principles, the conclusive,
incontrovertible, one only knowledge is attained, that
neither I AM, nor is auht mine, nor do I exist.
BHA'SHYA.
>S'o, by the order explained, the study of the twenty-five
principles, knowledge of soul, or the discriminative know-
' ledge, this is nature, this is soul, these are the rudiments,
( 241 )
censes and elements/ is acquired. Neither I wn : I am not.
JNot mine : not my body ; that, I am one < (thing), body is an
other Nor do I exist : that is, exempt irom egotism. This
is conclusive, incontrovertible.: free from doubt, Viparyayot,
means ' doubt,' with the negative prefixed, ' absence of doubt ;
and visuddha, ( pure;' pure through absence of doubt. Single. —
There is no other (true knowledge). In this way the cause
of liberation is produced, is manifested (individually). Know
ledge means knowledge of the twenty-five principles, or of soul.
Knowledge being attained, what does soul ?
COMMENT.
The knowledge that is essential to liberation is here de
scribed.
It is acquired through study of the twenty-five principles,
tatwdbhdsya ; familiarity with them; frequent recurrence to
them.: it is finite or conclusive, aparisesha ; it leaves nothing
to be learned.: it is perfect, as being without doubt, avipar-
yayavisudha: and single, the one the thing needful, kevala.
What sort of knowledge is this.? or what is the result it
teaches ? The absence of individuality ; the notion of the
abstract existence of soul. .Neither I am, nor is aught mine>
nor do I exist : that is, there is no activity, nor property, nor
individual agency. / am not precludes action only*. Indeed
As, the root, together with bhu and kri, are said to signify
action in general"}*. Ndsmi therefore signifies, not 'I am not,'
but ' I do not.' The $. Tatwa Kaumudt then proceeds :
•* Thus all acts whatever, whether external or internal, ascer
tainment, consciousness, reflection, perception, and all others*
.are denied as acts of soul : consequently, there being no active
functions in soul, it follows that neither do I (as, an individual
agent) exist, .Afiam here denotes "agent;" as, I know, I
31
( 242 )
sacrifice, I give, I enjoy- — or so on, implying uniformly the
notion of an agent — nor is aught mine : an agent implies
mastership ; if there be no agent there can be no abstract
mastership (or possession)*.' The same authority gives also a
different reading of the first expression n&smi, explaining it
nd asmi, ' I am male ;' or purusha, ' unproductive of progeny/
of acts-f. The 8. Prav. Bh., commenting on this verse of the
Karikd, has, ' Neither I am, denies the agency of soul ; nor
(is aught mine), denies its attachment (to any objects) ; nor do
I exist, denies its appropriation (of faculties)}.5 The Sutra
is to the same effect : ' From relinquishment (consequent
on) study of principles ; this is not, this is not|| :' that is, of
all the objects proceeding from prakriti, not one is soul. The
phraseology is ascribed to the Vedas, and a similar passage is
thence cited : ' Hence comes the conclusion, it is not, it is not
(soul), it is not (soul is not), from it : such is not so ; it is
different, it is supreme, it is that very thing (that it is). It
is riot, it is not, (means) soul. Such is (the phrase), It is not§,,
&c. And the Chandrikd explains the terms similarly : ' / am
not means I am not agent ; there I am distinct from the
principle of intelligence. Not mine is pain : exemption from
being the seat of pain and the rest is thence determined.
Nor do I exist : by this, difference from egotism is ex-
prcssedHV RAMA KRISHNA repeats the words of the Chan-
sm ^ sr 1 5R?ff
: i t
i rrer ^ f KT: i
f %
SJTH
( 243 )
By these expressions therefore, however quaint
or questionable, we are not to understand negation of soul.
This would be a direct contradiction to its specification as one
of the categories of the system, one of the twenty-five essential
and existent principles. It is merely intended as a negation
of the soul's having any active participation, individual
interest or property, in human pains, possessions, or feel
ings. / am, I do, I suffer, mean that material nature, or
some of her products, (substantially,) is, does, or suffers ; and
not soul, which is unalterable and indifferent, susceptible of
neither pleasure nor pain, and only reflecting them, as it were
or seemingly sharing them, from the proximity of nature, by
whom they are really experienced*: for soul, according to the
Vedas, is absolutely existent, eternal, wise, true, free, unaffec
ted by passion, universalf. This verse, therefore, does not
amount, as M. Cousin has supposed, to " le nihillisrne absolu,
dernier fruit du scepticisme."
IK til
LXV.
POSSESSED of this (self-knowledge), soul contem
plates at leisure and at ease nature, (thereby) de
barred from prolific change, and consequently preclu
ded from those seven forms.
SXET
( 244 )
fa
BHASHYA.
By that pure (absolute), single knowledge soul beholds na
ture, like a spectator, at leisure and composed ; as a spectator
seated at a play beholds an actress. Composed ; who stays (or
is involved) in self ; or staying or abiding In one's own place.
How is Prakriti ; debarred from prolific change ? Not pro
ducing intellect, egotisrm, and the other effects. Consequently
precluded from those seven forms : desisting from the seven
forms or modes by which she binds herself, or virtue, vice, and
the rest, and which are no longer required for the use of soul,,
both whose objects (fruition and liberation) are effected.
COMMENT. ' "
Soul, possessed of the knowledge described in the preceding
stanza, or divested of all individuality, becomes indifferent to,
and independent of, nature, which therefore ceases to act.
Soul contemplates nature, like a spectator, preJcshaka, one
who beholds a dancer or actress ; at leisure, avastkita, or with
out action, niskriya ; and at ease sustha. This is also read
swastha, * calm, collected in self* ;' or nirdkula, ' unagitated/
( 245 )
Nature consequently has nothing more to do. The objects of
soul, fruition and liberation, having been effected by know
ledge, the other faculties of intellect are needless.
LXVI.
HE desists, because he has seen her ; she does so,
because she has been seen. In their (mere) union
there is no motive for creation.
Or? xn ^r ^ ^ ft: V
T:
( 246 )
BHA'SHYA.
One present at a play, as a spectator, (ceases to behold :) so
one, single, pure soul desists. One (nature), knowing I have
been seen by him, stops, ceases. Nature is the one, chief
cause of the three worlds ; there is no second. Although form
have terminated, yet from specific difference there is, even in
the cessation of (the cooperation of) nature and soul, union,
as a generic characteristic. For, if there be not union, whence
is creation ? There being union of these two ; that is, of nature
and soul ; there being union from their universal diffusion
yet there is no further occasion for the world; from the ob
ject of creation being terminated. The necessity for nature is
twofold ; apprehension of the difference between qualities and
soul : when both these have been effected there is no further
use for creation ; that is, of further creation (of future regene
ration) ; as in the case of a settlement of accounts between
debtor and creditor, consequent on accepting what is given,
when such a union is effected there is no further connection
of object : so there is no further occasion for nature and soul.
If upon soul's acquiring knowledge liberation takes place,
why does not my liberation (immediately) occur ? To this it
is observed. —
COMMENT. ; j
The final separation of soul from nature is here . indicated,
as no further purpose is answered by their continued union.
The first part of its stanza repeats the illustrations given in
preceding verses (61 and 65) : " Nature, having been fully
seen or understood, ceases to act. — Soul, having seen or under
stood, ceases to consider ;' becomes regardless, upekshaka.
Consequently there can be no future reunion, no future
creation. For mere union of soul and nature is not the
cause of the development of the latter, constituting worldly
existence : the motive is, the fulfilment of the objects of soul.
The activity of nature is the consequence of her subserviency
( 247 )
to soul's purposes ; and when they are accomplished, all motive
for action, all inducement to repeat worldly creation, ceases.
' The two objects of soul, fruition and discrimination, are the
excitements to the activity of nature ; if they do not exist,
they do not stimulate nature. In the text the term motive
implies that by which nature is excited in creation (to evolve
the world) : which cannot be in the nonentity of the objects of
soul*.' VACHESPATI. So also NARAYANA : ' In the (mere)
union of these two there is no motive for the production of the
worldf.' With the accomplishment, therefore, of the objects
of soul, individual existence must cease for ever.
LXVII.
I
BY attainment of perfect knowledge, virtue and the
rest become causeless, yet soul remains a while invest
ed with body, as the potter's wheel continues whirl
ing from the effect of the impulse previously given
to it.
ITR
jwff
i
( 248 )
f R
SHASHYA.
Though perfect knowledge, that is, know-ledge >of the twenty-
ifive principles, be attained, yet, from the effect of previous
impulse, the sage continues in a bodily condition. How ?
Like the whirling of a wheel ; as a potter, having set his
wheel whirling, puts on it a lump of clay, fabricates a vessel,
•and takes it off, and the wheel continuing to turn round.
It does so from tJie effect of .previous impulse. — From the
-attainment of perfect knowledge, virtue and the -rest have no
influence upon one who is possessed of such knowledge. These
seven kinds of bonds are consumed by perfect knowledge : as
seeds that have been scorched by fire are net able to germi
nate, so virtue and the rest are not able to fetter soul. These
-then, virtue and the rest, not being (in the case of the 2/°5^>
the causes (of continued bodily existence), body continues
from the effects of previous impulse. Why is there not from
-knowledge destruction of present virtue and vice ? Although
they may be present, yet they perish the next moment)
•and knowledge destroys all future acts, as well as those which
•a man does in his present body by following instituted ubsei-
( 249 )
vances. With the cessation of the impulse the body perishes,
and then liberation occurs.
What liberation, is next specified.
COMMENT.
A reason is assigned why pure soul is not at once set free
from body.
This stanza may be considered partly as an illustration of
the preceding, explaining the continued union of soul and
body even after knowledge is attained. It is also a kind of
apology for the human forms of KAPJLA and other teachers of
the Sankhya doctrines, who, although in possession of perfect
knowledge, lived and died as men. The sage, or Yogi, is no
longer susceptible of the accidents of virtue, vice, passion, dis-
passion, and the rest, which are the proximate causes of bodily
existence ; and his continuance in the bodily form arises from
the effects of virtue, &c. lasting after the cause has ceased ;
like the whirl of a wheel after the impulse that set it going
has been withdrawn. ' As, when the potter's work is done, the
wheel, in consequence of the impulse or momentum given to
it, continues revolving, but stops when the period under such
influence has expired ; so virtue cmd vice, incident to body ini
tiative and mature, constitute impulse*.* The effects of former
acts of virtue and vice, then, cease when the impulse derived
from them is worn out ; and the possession of knowledge pre»
vents all future acts. GAURAPADA apparently suggests a
difficulty with respect to acts done in the present body ; such
as the observance of the ' Yoga, or performance of prescribed
rites. These acts may be performed by a sage possessing per
fect knowledge, and should therefore produce certain conse
quences. They lead, however, to no results ; for as far as they
fireft ^IWT«
32
( 250 )
are themselves concerned, they are but of brief duration, perish
ing as soon as performed ; and with regard to any future effects
they are anticipated, prevented, or destroyed, by the possession
of knowledge. Such seems to be the purport of the passage,
but it is not very perspicuous.
urn ~~-^
LXVIII.
WHEN separation of the informed soul from its cor
poreal frame at length takes place, and nature in re
spect of it cease, then is absolute and final deliverance
accomplished.
mn
BHASHYA.
When bodily separation is accomplished, by destruction of
the effects of virtue, vice, and the rest. In respect of it,
having accomplished its object, nature ceases : then absolute,
certain — final, unimpeded — deliverance, liberation, consequent
upon the condition of singleness. Soul obtains singleness
(separation), which is both absolute and final
( 251 )
COMMENT.
This verse refers to the first stanza, and announces the
accomplishment of what was there stated to be the object of
inquiry, absolute and final liberation.
When the consequences of acts cesfee, and body, both gross
and subtile, dissolves, nature, in respect to individual soul,
no longer exists ; and soul is one, single, free kevala, or ob
tains the condition called kaivalyam. This according to VA-
CHESPATI and NARAYANA, means ' exemption from the three
kinds of pain*.' GAURAPA'DA gives no definition of the term,
except that it is the abstract of hernia^. What the condition
of pure separated soul may be in its liberated state, the San-
khya philosophy does not seem to hold it necessary to inquire.
LXIX.
THIS abstruse knowledge, adapted to the liberation
of soul, wherein the origin, duration, and termination
of beings are considered, has been thoroughly ex
pounded by the mighty saint.
( 252 )
^ftraf^rr
BHASHYA.
Soul's object is liberation : for that (purpose) this abstruse,
secret, knowledge (has been expounded) by the mighty saint,
by the divine sage KAPILA. Wherein, in which knowledge,
the origin, duration, and termination, the manifestation,
continuance, and disappearance, of beings, of the products (or
developments) of nature, are considered, are discussed. From
which investigation perfect knowledge, which is the same as
knowledge of the twenty-five principles, is produced.
This is the Bkdshya of GAURAPADA on the Sankhya
doctrines, propounded, for the sake ol liberation from migra
tion, by the Muni KAPILA ; in which there are these seventy
stanzas.
COMMENT.
This verse specifies by whom the doctrines of the text were
originally taught.
The commentary of GAUBAPA'DA closes here in the only
copy of the MSS. procurable; and consequently omits all
notice of ISWARA KRISHNA, to whom a subsequent stanza of
the text attributes the Kdrikd. In the Bhdshya it is said
that the work commented on is the Sankhya declared by
KAPILA ; but that the Kdrikd is not the work of KAPILA, the
other Scholiasts agree. It is also different from the Sutras
of that teacher, as given in the Sdnkhya Pravachana, al
though it follows their purport, and sometimes uses the same
or similar expressions. GAUBAPA'DA may therefore probably
only mean to intimate that its substance is conformable to
( 253 )
the doctrines of the Sutras, not that it is the work of the
Muni. These doctrines, he adds, are contained in seventy
stanzas ; of which, however, our copy has but sixty-nine. The
verses of the Kdrikd, as usually met with, are seventy-two ;
but there also reference occurs to seventy verses, as compri
sing apparently the doctrinal and traditional part of the text,
derived from older authorities. Either GAURAPA'DA thought
it unnecessary to explain the concluding three verses of the
Kdrikd, or there is some omission in the copy, or they do not
belong to the work. The concluding verse is evidently in
accurate, the metre of the third line of the stanza being
defective.
The KAPILA to whom the Sankhya philosophy is attributed
is variously described by different authorities. In a verse
quoted by GAURAPA'DA, in his comment upon the first stanza
of the text, he is enumerated amongst the sons of BRAHMA.
VIJNA'NA BHIKSHU asserts him to have been an incarnation of
VISHNU*. He refers also to the opinion of a Vedanta writer,
that KAPILA was an incarnation of AGNI, or ' fire/ upon the
authority of the Smritif ; but denies their identity. There
does not appear to be any good authority for the notion.
Kapila is a synonyme of fire, as it is of a brown, dusky, or
tawny colour ; and this may have given rise to the idea of
AGNI and the sage being the same. The identification with
VISHNU rests on better grounds. The popular belief of the
Vaishnavas is, that there have been twenty-four Avatdrds
of VISHNU, and KAPILA is one of them. The earliest
authority for this specification is no doubt the Rdmdyana,
in which VASUDEYA or VISHNU is said by BRAHMA to assume
the form of KAPILA, to protect the earth against the violence
of the sons of SAGARA, searching for the lost steed intend-
t arm:
( 254 )
ed for their father's aswamedha. ' * BRAHMA having heard
the words of the gods, who were bewildered with the
dread of destruction, replied to them, and said, VASUDEVA
is the Lord, he is M&dhaw, of whom the whole earth is the
cherished bride ; he, assuming the form of KAPILA, sustains
continually the world.' So also the Mdkabktirata : ' Then
spoke incensed, KAPILA, the best of sages ; that VASUDEVA,
indeed, whom the holy Munis called KAPiLAf.' According to
the Bhdgavat, he was the fifth incarnation of VISHNU : ' The
fifth Avatdra was named KAPILA, the chief of saints, who
revealed to Asuiu the Sinkhya explanation of first principles
which has been impaired by time^:.' Book I. s. 12. The latter
half of the third book describes him also as an Avatar of
VASUDEVA, but as the son of DEVAHUTI, the daughter of
SAYAMBHUVA Menu, married to the Prajapati KERDDAMA,
far
irr:
( 255 )
LXX.
THIS great purifying (doctrine) the sage compas
sionately imparted to A sum, ASURI taught it to PAN-
CHASIKHA, by whom it was extensively propagated.
COMMENT-
Purifyiny ; that which purifies from the defects which are
the cause of pain ',pdwna or pavitra. Great, chief, principal
agryam, mvM.yam. This verse anticipates an objection that
may be made to the authority of the text ; as it may be said,
Although the words of KAPILA must command attention, of
what weight are the lessons of an uninspired teacher ? The
answer is, that they are the same which were originally taught
by KAPILA himself to his pupil ASURI. According to the
passage cited by GAURAPA'DA, in his notes on the first stanza
(p. 1), ASURI is also a son of BRAHMA. He is mentioned else
where as the pupil of KAPILA, and preceptor of PANCHASIKHA,
but there are no details of his history. Of PANCHASIKH there
is some account in the Makabhdrat, on occasion of his visiting
JANAKA, king of MithiLd, and imparting to him the Sankhya
philosophy. He is there also said to be named likewise
KAPILA* ; which the commentator explains to mean that he
was like KAPILA, being the disciple of his disciplef, as the
text proceeds to call him ; ' He, the long-lived, whom they
term the first disciple of ASURI+.' He is also called KAPILEYA
from his being, it is said, the son of a Brahmani named KA
PILA. ' ASURI went to the sphere in which that which is
Brahmc, the mystic-named, and multiform, and eternal, is be
held. His disciple was PANCHASIKHA, nourished with human
milk : for there was a certain Brahman matron, named KAPILA,
( 25G )
of whom he became the son, and at whose bosom he was fed ;
thence he obtained the denomination of KAPILEYA. and divine
imperishable knowledge*.'
LXXI.
RECEIVED by tradition of pupils, it has been com
pendiously written in Arya metre by the piously dis
posed ISWARA KRISHNA, having thoroughly investiga
ted demonstrated truth.
COMMENT-
' Succession or tradition of pupils,' sishyaparampard : each
pupil becoming teacher in his turn, as is the case with the
Pandits to the present day, It rarely, if ever, happens that
any branch of Sanscrit literature is acquired by independent
study : every science is studied under some teacher of emi
nence, who can, not unfrequently, trace his traditionary in
struction upwards for several generations. The interval be-
fw.
( 257 )
t\vcen PANOHASIKUA and ISWARA KRISHNA is not particularized,
but was probably considerable, as no allusion to the author
of the Kdrikd occurs in the older writings. If his commen
tator GAURAPADA be, as is not unlikely, the preceptor of
SANKARA ACHARYA, ISWARA KRISHNA must date anterior to
the eighth century,
II
LXXIt
THE subjects which are treated in seventy couplets
are those of the whole science, comprising sixty topics
exclusive of illustrative tales, and omitting contro
versial questions
COMMENT.
We have here in the text reference to seventy stanzas, as
comprising the doctrinal part of the Sankhya. In fact, how
ever, there are but sixty-nine, unless the verse containing the
notice of KAPILA be included in the enumeration ; and in that
case it might be asked, why should not the next stanza at
least, making mention of the reputed author, be also com
prehended, when there would be seventy-one verses. The
Scholiasts offer no explanation of this difficulty.
The sixty topics alluded to in the text are, according to the
Raja Vdrtlika, as cited by VACHESPATI, 1. the existence of
soul ; 2. the existence of nature ; 3, the singleness, 4. the
objectiveness, and 5. the subservience of nature ; and 6. the
multifariousness, 7, the distinctness, and 8, the inertness, of
33
< 258 )
soul ; 9. the duration of subtile, and 10. that of gross body.
These are the ten radical categories. To them are to be
added, the five kinds of obstruction, nine of acquiescence,
twenty-eight of disability, and eight of perfectness ; making
altogether sixty. Another enumeration specifies the sixty
categories or objects : 1. soul ; 2. nature ; 3. intellect ; 4. ego
tism ; 5 — 7. the three qualities ; 8. the class of the five rudi
ments ; 9. that of the eleven senses or organs ; 10. that of the
five element. These are the ten radical paddrtkas, or cate
gories. The remaining fifty are the same as those previously
enumerated. In consequence of comprehending all these
topics, the Kdrikd is a system, a sdstra ; not a partial tract or
treatise, or prakarana* ; although it omits the illustrative
anecdotes and controversial arguments. The KdriJcd must
consequently refer to the collection of KAPILA'S aphorisms
called Sdnkhya Pravachana. This work is divided into six
chapters, are adhydyas ; in the three first of which are con
tained all the dogmas of the system furnishing the materials
of the Kdrikd ; the fourth chapter is made up of short tales
or anecdotes, dkhydylkds, illustrative of the Sankhya tenets ;
and the fifth is appropriated to the refutation, rpavav&&a, of
the doctrines of different schools. Exclusive of these two sub
jects, ISWARA KRISHNA professes, therefore, to give the sub
stance of the S. Pravachana, or of the Sutras of KAPILA
assembled in that collection.
The Akhydyikds are in general very brief and uninteresting.
The Sutras, in fact, supply only a subject for a story, which
the Scholiasts may expand much after their own fan
cies. Thus the Sutra, ' From instruction in truth, like the
king's sonf.' On which ViJNANA BHIKSHU narrates, that
* there was a king's son, who, being expelled in infancy from
his native city, was brought up by a forester, and growing up
( 259 )
to maturity in that state imagined himself, to belong to th e
barbarous race with which he lived. One of his father's minis
ters having discovered him, revealed to him what he was, and
the misconception of his character was removed, and he
knew himself to be a prince. So soul, from the circumstances
in which it is placed, mistakes its own character, until the
truth is revealed to it by some holy teacher, and then it knows
itself to be Brahme*.'
The controversial portion of the original Sutras is as brief as
the narrative, and, from the nature of the subject, much more
obscure. The argument is suggested, rather than advanced,
and it remains for the Scholiast to amplify and explain it. A
specimen of the mode in which this is effected will best ex
emplify the darkness and difficulty of this part of our subject.
Some modern followers of the Ve'danta assert that liberation is
the attainment of (pure) felicity. To this it is replied : * Ma
nifestation of felicity is not liberation, from its not being a
property^.' Thus explained by the Scholiast : ' The condition
of happiness, or that of attainment (or manifestation), is not a
property of soul. The nature (of soul) is eternal, and is
neither an object to be attained, nor the means of attainment.
Therefore the attainment of happiness cannot be liberation.
This is the meaning (of the Sutra^).' ' Attainment of happi
ness in the region of BRAHMA and the rest is a secondary (or
inferior) sort of liberation ; as to maintain the contrary would
be in opposition to the text of the Ve'da, which says that a
( 260 )
I
wise man abandons both joy and sorrow.*' c Further ; if attain
ment be a faculty of soul, what sort of faculty is it ? Is it
constant or temporary. In the first case, there may be, even
in the state of accomplishment, still the existence of the object
of soul : in the last, inasmuch as there is perishableness of all
that is engendered (or, that which has a beginning must have
an end), then eternal liberation is subject to termination :
therefore the attainment (or manifestation) of felicity is not
chief or real liberation : and the assertion that it is so, is a
false conclusion of the modern Vedantis : this is undeniable.!'
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